IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

DAVID C., KIM C.,

Appellants,

v.

ALEXIS S., A.C.,

Appellees.

No. CV-15-0302-PR

Filed August 2, 2016

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

The Honorable Annielaurie Van Wie, Judge Pro Tem

No. JA47249

AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One

238 Ariz. 174, 358 P.3d 595 (App. 2015)

VACATED

COUNSEL:

Robert D. Rosanelli (argued), Phoenix, Attorney for David C. and Kim C.

David W. Bell (argued), Higley, Attorney for Alexis S.

JUSTICE BRUTINEL authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF

JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, JUSTICE TIMMER,

and JUSTICE BOLICK joined.

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Petitioners David C. and Kim C., the proposed adoptive 

parents, seek to reinstate their adoption of A.C., arguing that the failure of 

Alexis S. (“Father”) to timely register as a putative father under A.R.S. § 8-

106.01(E) precludes his paternity case and his right to contest the adoption. 

Because Father timely filed and served a paternity action in compliance 

with A.R.S. § 8-106(J), we hold that he preserved his right to establish 
DAVID C. V. ALEXIS S.

Opinion of the Court

2

paternity despite his failure to strictly comply with the putative father 

registration requirement.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 A.C. was conceived in January 2013. The parents separated

two months later and Mother refused further contact with Father. Aware 

of Mother’s pregnancy and wanting to be involved in his child’s life, Father 

unsuccessfully attempted to reestablish contact. Even though she knew the 

identity of the father—and of his interest in parenting—at the time of A.C.’s

birth, Mother signed an affidavit of paternity falsely stating that A.C.’s 

father was unknown. She also signed a consent to adoption in favor of 

Petitioners, and A.C. was released into their care.

¶3 In accordance with A.R.S. § 8-106.01(H), thirty days after 

A.C.’s birth Petitioners searched Arizona’s putative fathers registry and

found no notice of claim of paternity associated with A.C. They filed a 

petition to adopt A.C. and, beginning on November 25, 2013, published a 

“John Doe” notice of the pending adoption.

¶4 Coincidently, on that same day Father filed a paternity action,

having learned of the child’s birth and gender. He served Mother two days 

later, but she never informed Petitioners of the paternity case. Unaware of 

the pending paternity action, the juvenile court granted A.C.’s adoption by 

Petitioners.

¶5 Father learned of the adoption in February 2014 and

immediately amended his paternity petition to include previously 

unknown information about A.C. (name, place of birth, etc.). Petitioners 

moved to dismiss the paternity case, and Father moved to set aside the 

adoption. Paternity testing established Father as A.C.’s biological father. 

Despite Father having never filed a notice of claim of paternity with the 

putative fathers registry as required by A.R.S. § 8-106.01, the juvenile court 

set aside the adoption, concluding that Father had timely filed and served 

his paternity action. The court found that he was entitled to notice of the 

adoption proceedings under A.R.S. § 8-111(5) and that the lack of notice 

violated his right to due process of law.

¶6 The court of appeals affirmed. David C. v. Alexis S., 238 Ariz. 

174, 179 ¶ 22, 358 P.3d 595, 600 (App. 2015). It reasoned that Father filed 
DAVID C. V. ALEXIS S.

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3

and served a paternity action on Mother within two days of the initial John 

Doe publication and then diligently pursued that case. Id. Accordingly, 

Father “retained the right to assert his parental rights under § 8-106(G)”

even though he failed to register as required by § 8-106.01(A)-(B). Id. The 

court of appeals distinguished Marco C. v. Sean C., 218 Ariz. 216, 221 ¶ 18, 

181 P.3d 1137, 1142 (App. 2008), in which a different panel of the court held 

that failure to register with the putative fathers registry within thirty days

of the child’s birth rendered a biological father’s consent to his child’s 

adoption unnecessary. David C., 238 Ariz. at 178 ¶¶ 20-21, 358 P.3d at 599. 

And the court disagreed with Marco C. “insofar as it holds that filing with 

the putative fathers registry is a necessary precondition in all cases in which 

a father asserts his parental rights.” Id. at 178 ¶ 21, 358 P.3d at 599.

¶7 We granted review to consider the interaction between A.R.S. 

§§ 8-106(G) and 8-106.01(E) and to resolve the conflict in the court of 

appeals’ opinions. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) 

of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

II. DISCUSSION

¶8 We review an adoption order for an abuse of discretion, Leslie 

C. v. Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Court, 193 Ariz. 134, 135, 971 P.2d 181, 182 (App. 

1997), and issues of law, including statutory interpretation, de novo, BMO 

Harris Bank, N.A. v. Wildwood Creek Ranch, LLC, 236 Ariz. 363, 365 ¶ 7, 340 

P.3d 1071, 1073 (2015).

¶9 When a statute is unambiguous, “we apply its terms without 

resorting to other tools of statutory interpretation, unless doing so leads to 

impossible or absurd results.” Fleming v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 237 

Ariz. 414, 417 ¶ 12, 352 P.3d 446, 449 (2015) (quoting Orca Commc'ns 

Unlimited, LLC v. Noder, 236 Ariz. 180, 182 ¶ 9, 337 P.3d 545, 547 (2014)). 

Statutes that are in pari materia—those of the same subject or general 

purpose—should be read together and harmonized when possible. State v. 

Jones, 235 Ariz. 501, 502 ¶ 6, 334 P.3d 191, 192 (2014) (“When two statutes 

conflict, we adopt a construction that reconciles them whenever possible, 

giving force and meaning to each.”).

¶10 Adoption proceedings are governed by Title 8. Paternity 

actions, however, are governed by Title 25. The father has the right to bring 

a paternity action, A.R.S. § 25-803, and the paternity action may be 
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Opinion of the Court

4

instituted during the pregnancy or after the child is born, but the time for 

filing is limited by A.R.S. § 8-106(J). A.R.S. § 25-804. Under Title 8, the 

biological father of the child to be adopted is entitled to notice of the filing 

of the adoption petition. See generally A.R.S. § 8-106. This notice gives the 

father the opportunity to file an action to establish his paternity and protect 

his right to parent the child. A biological father who initiates a paternity 

action is also entitled to notice of the hearing on the petition to adopt. A.R.S. 

§ 8-106(A)(5).

¶11 The entry of a decree of adoption, after a properly noticed 

hearing, terminates the biological father’s parental rights. A.R.S. § 8-117(B). 

But the juvenile court may not grant an adoption unless the child’s father

consents, if his paternity has been established under Title 25. A.R.S. § 8-

106(A)(2)(c). Father did not consent to A.C.’s adoption and has established 

in his paternity action that he is A.C.’s biological father.

¶12 The question in this case is whether a father who timely files, 

serves, and successfully pursues a paternity action under Title 25, but who 

fails to register as a putative father under A.R.S. § 8-106.01, is entitled to 

notice of the adoption hearing or instead waives such notice and his right 

to contest the adoption. The answer to the question depends on the 

interplay between A.R.S. §§ 8-106(G) and 8-106.01(E).

¶13 A.R.S. §§ 8-106(G) and 8-106.01 differentiate between persons 

who are entitled to notice of the filing of the adoption proceeding and 

persons who are entitled to notice of the adoption hearing. Legal fathers 

and fathers who have timely filed a paternity action are entitled to notice of 

the adoption hearing. A.R.S. § 8-111. A legal father is one who was married 

to the mother between the time of conception and birth, has adopted the 

child, or has legally established paternity. See A.R.S. § 8-106(A)(2). A legal 

father is not only entitled to notice of the adoption hearing; he must 

affirmatively consent to the adoption. A.R.S. § 8-106(A). Although Father 

later established in his paternity action that he is A.C.’s biological father and 

that he did not consent to her adoption, he was not the legal father when 

the adoption petition was filed.

¶14 There are also two categories of fathers who are entitled to 

notice of the filing of adoption proceedings. A.R.S. § 8-106(G) requires 

notice to potential fathers. A potential father is a man, identified by the 

mother in an affidavit, who is or could be the father of the child, but whose 
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Opinion of the Court

5

paternity has not been established. A.R.S. § 8-106(F). Section 8-106 

provides:

G. Notice [of a pending adoption petition] shall be served on each 

potential father as provided for the service of process in civil actions. 

The notice shall be substantially in the form prescribed in subsection 

I of this section and shall inform the potential father of all of the 

following:

. . .

7. That the potential father’s failure to file a paternity action pursuant 

to title 25, chapter 6, article 1, and to serve the mother and proceed 

to judgment in the paternity action as prescribed by this section, bars 

the potential father from bringing or maintaining any action to assert 

any interest in the child.

¶15 Under § 8-106(F) and (G), Father was a potential father, albeit 

unidentified by the Mother. Section 8-106(G) requires that notice of the 

adoption petition be given to any potential father to provide him an 

opportunity to establish paternity. The form of notice required by A.R.S. 

§ 8-106(I) recognizes that potential fathers are to be identified by the 

mother. When, as here, the mother lies about the father’s identity, the 

statutory scheme breaks down, but the mother’s deceit does not deprive a 

potential father of his status as such or of the right to notice.

¶16 A party seeking to adopt a child must serve notice on all 

potential fathers. A potential father is advised by such notice that he must 

file a paternity action if he wants to contest the adoption. A.R.S. § 8-106(G), 

(I). But because Mother failed to inform either the court or Petitioners of 

Father’s existence, Petitioners could not serve notice on him except by 

publication.

¶17 Finally, A.R.S. § 8-106.01 provides for notice to a putative father

who registers as such. A putative father is a man who is or claims to be the 

father of the child and whose paternity has not been established. See A.R.S. 

§ 8-106.01(A). Under the putative fathers registry provisions of A.R.S. § 8-

106.01(A) and (B), “[a] person who is seeking paternity, who wants to 

receive notice of adoption proceedings and who is the father or claims to be 

the father of a child,” within thirty days after the child’s birth, “shall file 
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Opinion of the Court

6

notice of a claim of paternity” with the Department of Health Services’

(“DHS”) registrar of vital statistics.

¶18 Prospective adoptive parents are required to provide the 

court with a certificate from DHS stating that there was no record of a filing 

pertaining to the child being adopted. A.R.S. § 8-106.01(H). When a notice 

of claim of paternity is found, notice of adoption proceedings and the 

father’s rights and responsibilities must be served on the putative father 

and the father must file a paternity action if he wants to protect his rights, 

as required under A.R.S. § 8-106(G). Father did not register with the 

putative fathers registry.

¶19 Both potential and putative fathers waive their rights by 

inaction. Further, both A.R.S. §§ 25-806(C) and 8-106.01(B) provide 

relatively short time frames for the potential father to act to protect his 

rights, recognizing that children require permanent, stable homes. S.B. 

1287, 54th Leg., 2002 Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2002) (Fact Sheet). Under § 8-106(J):

A potential father who fails to file a paternity action and who does 

not serve the mother within thirty days after completion of service 

on the potential father as prescribed in subsection G of this section 

waives his right to be notified of any judicial hearing regarding the 

child’s adoption . . . and his consent to the adoption . . . is not 

required.

¶20 There is also a waiver provision in § 8-106.01(E) which states:

E. A putative father who does not file a notice of a claim of paternity 

as required under this section waives his right to be notified of any 

judicial hearing regarding the child’s adoption and his consent to the 

adoption is not required, unless he proves, by clear and convincing 

evidence, both of the following:

1. It was not possible for him to file a notice of a claim of paternity 

within the period of time specified in subsection B of this section.

2. He filed a notice of a claim of paternity within thirty days after it 

became possible for him to file.

Adopting the court of appeals’ logic in Marco C., Petitioners argue that

under that subsection Father waived any right to notice of the adoption 

hearing because he failed to comply with the registry requirements of § 8-
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Opinion of the Court

7

106.01(A)-(B), and consequently, he was not entitled to contest the adoption 

petition.

¶21 The timely filing of a paternity action entitles a putative or 

potential father to notice of the hearing on the adoption petition. A.R.S. § 8-

111. Failure to file a paternity action under A.R.S. § 25-806 results in the 

father waiving his right to notice of the adoption hearing. A.R.S. § 8-106(J). 

Such waiver also results even if the father timely files a § 8-106.01 claim of 

paternity but then fails to file a paternity action after receiving notice of the 

adoption proceeding under A.R.S. § 8-106.01(G). But neither § 8-106 nor 

§ 8-106.01 bars a father from bringing a paternity action as long as he does 

so within thirty days after receiving notice of the adoption proceeding. The 

statutes only provide that failure to comply waives the potential father’s 

right to notice of hearings, and his consent to the adoption is not required, 

allowing the adoption to proceed. A.R.S. § 8-106(J).

¶22 We agree with the court of appeals that the registry 

requirement in A.R.S. § 8-106.01 supplements but does not supplant the 

provisions of the adoption statute, A.R.S. § 8-106. The two statutes provide

different ways of recognizing fathers’ parental rights and relieving 

prospective adoptive parents from the obligation of obtaining a father’s 

consent to the adoption. Section 8-106(G) provides notice when the mother 

identifies potential fathers, and § 8-106.01 is intended to provide notice 

when the putative father identifies himself. A potential father is entitled to 

notice under § 8-106(G) whether or not he registers with the putative fathers 

registry. A putative father must timely register to receive notice of the 

adoption proceedings or he waives notice and his consent is not required 

to finalize the adoption. In either case, a father is entitled to bring an action 

to establish paternity if he does so within thirty days of the A.R.S. § 8-106(G) 

notice. This reading harmonizes A.R.S. §§ 8-106 and 8-106.01.

¶23 As noted above, however, Title 8 imposes substantial time 

limitations on a biological father’s ability to assert his paternity. If the 

mother was truthful and a potential father was provided notice and then 

complied with A.R.S. § 8-106(G), he would be entitled to contest the 

adoption even if he failed to register. When a potential father was not 

personally served with notice because of the mother’s wrongdoing but 

nonetheless complied with A.R.S. § 8-106(G), but not A.R.S. § 8-106.01, 

requiring registration serves no purpose other than to reward mother’s 

conduct by precluding the potential father from contesting the adoption. 
DAVID C. V. ALEXIS S.

Opinion of the Court

8

The plain language of § 8-106.01 waives a non-filing father’s right to notice 

of the adoption and bars a paternity action by a father who fails to file a 

paternity action within thirty days of the § 8-106(G) notice. If the legislature 

had also intended to make registration under § 8-106.01 a threshold 

prerequisite for establishing paternity it would have expressly said so.

¶24 As previously noted, Mother falsely stated that the father was 

unknown. But Mother’s deceitful act does not change Father’s status. Thus,

Father is both a potential father—entitled to notice—and a putative father. 

Petitioners served Father by publication of a John Doe notice pursuant to 

§ 8-106(G). By coincidence, Father complied with the statutory 

requirements set forth in that notice by timely filing his paternity action and

serving Mother. Therefore, he did not lose his rights to notice of the 

adoption hearing orto decline his consent to the adoption. A.R.S. § 8-106(J).

Because Father ultimately established paternity, per § 8-106(A)(2)(c), the 

juvenile court correctly set aside the adoption order.

¶25 To the extent Marco C. suggests that failing to timely register 

with the putative fathers registry automatically bars a potential father from 

pursuing a paternity action and establishing paternity, or obviates the need 

for his consent to adoption, 218 Ariz. at 221 ¶ 18, 181 P.3d at 1142, we 

disagree. But we agree with the result in Marco C. because the biological 

father in that case also failed to timely serve the paternity action on the 

mother, as required by A.R.S. § 8-106(G)(3).

III. CONCLUSION

¶26 A father who timely files a paternity action within thirty days 

of service by publication of the A.R.S. § 8-106(G) notice and timely serves 

that action on the mother is not precluded from establishing paternity and 

does not waive his right to contest the child’s adoption, merely because he 

did not file a claim of paternity under the putative fathers registry statute,

A.R.S. § 8-106.01. We vacate the court of appeals’ opinion and affirm the 

juvenile court’s decision granting Father’s motion to set aside the adoption.