ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT

 Calendar Year 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Enforcement 

Washington, DC 20555

ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

-iCONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................................1 

OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM ACTIVITIES ..............................................................3 

Allegation of Inattentive Security Officers at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station............3 

Safety Conscious Work Environment..................................................................................4 

Posting of New Allegation Statistics ....................................................................................6 

TRENDS IN ALLEGATIONS ...........................................................................................................7 

National Trends ...................................................................................................................7 

Reactor Licensee Trends ........................................................................................8 

Materials Licensee Trends ....................................................................................10 

Source Trends .......................................................................................................11 

Allegation Trends for Selected Reactor Sites ...................................................................13 

Indian Point Units 2 and 3 .....................................................................................13 

Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3..................................................................................15 

Callaway.................................................................................................................17 

Salem/Hope Creek ................................................................................................18 

Harris .....................................................................................................................21 

Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 ..................................................................................22 

Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 ........................................................................................23 

San Onofre Units 2 and 3......................................................................................24 

Browns Ferry 1.......................................................................................................25 

Fermi......................................................................................................................26 

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 ..........................................................................................27 

Byron Units 1 and 2 ...............................................................................................29 

Grand Gulf .............................................................................................................30 

Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Units 1 and 2.........................................................31 

Allegation Trends for Selected Materials Licensees.........................................................32 

Allegation Trends for Selected Vendors............................................................................33 

CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................34 

APPENDIX ..................................................................................................................................A-1 

Figures

1 Allegations Received by CY ............................................................................................... 1 

2 Reactor Issues Nationwide 2007........................................................................................ 8 

3 Materials Licensee Types Nationwide 2007..................................................................... 10 

4 Allegations by Source Category 2007 .............................................................................. 12 

5 Indian Point Allegations .................................................................................................... 13 

6 Palo Verde Allegations ..................................................................................................... 15 

7 Callaway Allegations......................................................................................................... 17 

8 Salem/Hope Creek Allegations ........................................................................................ 18 

9 Harris Allegations.............................................................................................................. 21 

10 Susquehanna Allegations................................................................................................. 22 
2006 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

ii

11 Sequoyah Allegations....................................................................................................... 23 

12 San Onofre Allegations..................................................................................................... 24 

13 Browns Ferry Allegations.................................................................................................. 25 

14 Fermi Allegations .............................................................................................................. 26 

15 St. Lucie Allegations ......................................................................................................... 27 

16 Byron Allegations.............................................................................................................. 29 

17 Grand Gulf Allegations ..................................................................................................... 30 

18 ANO Allegations ............................................................................................................... 31 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

1

0

200

400

600

800

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

FIGURE 1 - ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED BY CY

Reactor Materials Agreement State

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Management Directive 8.8, AManagement of 

Allegations,@ dated February 4, 1999, requires the Agency Allegation Advisor to prepare an 

annual report for the Executive Director for Operations that analyzes allegation trends. This 

annual report fulfills that commitment by providing national, regional, and site-specific trend 

analyses. 

In addition, several staff activities in calendar year (CY) 2007 involving the Allegation Program 

and related policies warrant mention in this report. The agency conducted internal lessonslearned reviews regarding the handling of allegations in CY 2007 of inattentive security officers 

at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. These reviews resulted in proposed enhancements 

to the allegation process. In addition, the staff solicited the support of the Safety Conscious 

Work Environment (SCWE) Finding Review Group (FRG) for the first time in CY 2007. The 

NRC developed the SCWE FRG as part of its safety culture initiative to help the staff ensure that 

potential findings with Safety Conscious Work Environment crosscutting aspects are handled 

consistently through the most appropriate process (i.e., through either the Reactor Oversight 

Process or the Allegation Program). In addition, the allegation staff continues to implement the 

agency-sponsored alternative dispute resolution process (Early ADR) for discrimination 

allegations. Twenty percent of the discrimination cases offered Early ADR reached settlement in 

CY 2007, a slight decline from the 27% that settled in CY 2006. Lastly, allegation statistics for a 

number of new reactor and material facility sites were added to those already publicly available 

on the agency’s Web site. 

 

 

With regard to allegation trends, Figure 1 indicates that, from calendar years 2003 through 2007, 

the total number of allegations the NRC received has remained fairly steady with a slight decline 

in the materials and Agreement State areas. Each allegation can include multiple concerns, 

however, and the trend in the total number of concerns increased for reactor facilities in CY 

2007, even as the number of allegations decreased. The largest percentage of concerns 

continues to be related to security. 
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

2

For some reactor licensees, the NRC received allegations in numbers that warranted additional 

analysis. In preparing this report, the staff reviewed a 5-year history of allegations for reactor 

and materials licensees and vendors to identify adverse trends. The analysis focused on 

allegations that originated from onsite sources to help inform the NRC=s review of the Safety 

Conscious Work Environment.1

 The staff selected 14 reactor sites for a more indepth review: 

Indian Point Units 2 and 3; Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3; Callaway; Salem/Hope Creek; Harris; 

Susquehanna Units 1 and 2; Sequoyah Units 1 and 2; San Onofre Units 2 and 3; Browns Ferry 

Unit 1; St. Lucie Units 1 and 2; Fermi; Byron Units 1 and 2; Grand Gulf; and Arkansas Nuclear 

One Units 1 and 2. The report discusses allegation trends at each of these sites. In summary, 

the trends either did not suggest a weakening Safety Conscious Work Environment or the 

licensee is taking steps to address an adverse trend and the NRC is monitoring those activities. 

No materials licensees or vendors were the subject of allegations at a level that warranted 

additional analysis. 

 

1 The total number of allegations received concerning reactor licensees from all sources, as well as other 

information concerning the Allegation Program, appears on the NRC=s public Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/statistics.html. 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

3

OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

In calendar year (CY) 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) undertook certain 

significant activities that affected the Allegation Program and related policies and that warrant 

discussion in this report. The agency conducted internal lessons-learned reviews regarding the 

handling of allegations in CY 2007 of inattentive security officers at the Peach Bottom Atomic 

Power Station. These reviews have resulted in recommended enhancements to the allegation 

process. In addition, the staff solicited the support of the Safety Conscious Work Environment 

(SCWE) Finding Review Group (FRG) for the first time in CY 2007. The NRC developed the 

SCWE FRG as part of its safety culture initiative to help the staff ensure that potential findings 

with Safety Conscious Work Environment crosscutting aspects are handled through the most 

appropriate process (i.e., through either the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) or the Allegation 

Program). In addition, the allegation staff continues to implement the agency-sponsored 

alternative dispute resolution (Early ADR) process for discrimination allegations. Twenty percent 

of the discrimination cases offered Early ADR reached settlement in CY 2007. Lastly, allegation 

statistics were added for a number of new reactor and material facility sites to those already 

publicly available on the agency’s web site. These areas are discussed in more detail below. 

Allegation of Inattentive Security Officers at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station

In March 2007, the NRC received an allegation from a former contract security manager that 

security officers at Peach Bottom were sleeping on duty as a result of fatigue caused by 

excessive overtime. The alleger requested that the NRC not contact him about the concerns. 

The NRC staff, respecting this request, did not contact the alleger further to inquire about other 

potential locations or to discuss other aspects of the concerns and the agency’s proposed 

handling of them. 

It is the agency’s policy to request a written evaluation of allegation concerns from the licensee 

as often as is appropriate and when the alleger has no objection. When conditions do not inhibit 

the NRC from requesting such information from the licensee, this is considered an effective 

approach to allegation evaluation because the licensee has the primary responsibility for 

ensuring the safe operation of the facility and can promptly address issues through ready access 

to site personnel, equipment, and documentation related to the concerns. Historically, the 

agency has made such requests for approximately 40 percent of the allegations received. 

Employing the agency’s policy, the staff notified the licensee of the Peach Bottom allegation and 

requested an evaluation of the specific concerns raised and a written response to the NRC, 

including documentation of any corrective actions taken in response to the evaluation. The 

licensee concluded that the concerns were unsubstantiated. The NRC reviewed the licensee’s 

response and gathered some additional information but was also unable to substantiate the 

alleger’s specific concerns. 

Notwithstanding that assessment, in September 2007, the NRC received video evidence from a 

reporter that showed a number of inattentive security officers at Peach Bottom. The agency 

promptly conducted an investigation, and both the licensee and the agency are continuing to 

respond to this event. Since the September 2007 video evidence demonstrated that the March 

2007 allegation was, in part, valid, the agency has subsequently conducted several internal 

reviews in an effort to determine a better response to the March 2007 allegation and the 

clarifications and/or modifications that could be made to the NRC allegation process to provide 

the staff with better opportunities to discover such inappropriate activity earlier. The NRC is 
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

4

developing new or enhanced guidance for the staff responsible for handling allegations in a 

number of program areas, including allegation terminology; communicating with allegers; the 

process for requesting from a licensee information related to an allegation; informing the NRC 

inspectors of allegation activity, as appropriate; expectations for review and documentation of 

allegation closure information involving a licensee response to a request for information; and, 

handling alleger feedback after the allegation is closed. In addition to the staff’s internal reviews, 

the Office of the Inspector General is conducting an investigation into this matter that may yield 

further enhancements for consideration. Finally, the staff plans to engage external stakeholders 

regarding aspects of the process enhancements. The NRC will document the outcome of these 

efforts in Commission and Allegation Program policy and guidance documents. 

Safety Conscious Work Environment

The 1996 NRC Policy Statement, AFreedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise 

Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation,@ outlines the agency=s expectations that licensees 

and other employers subject to NRC authority will establish and maintain a SCWE. The NRC 

defines a SCWE as an environment in which (1) employees are encouraged to raise safety 

concerns to their employers or the NRC without fear of retaliation, (2) concerns are promptly 

reviewed, given the proper priority, and appropriately resolved, and (3) timely feedback is 

provided. 

In CY 2005, the staff enhanced the ROP to more fully address safety culture, including the 

SCWE. One aspect of the change pertained to the staff’s documentation of findings related to 

the three crosscutting areas (SCWE, problem identification and resolution (PI&R), and human 

performance). To help the staff ensure that it handles potential findings with SCWE crosscutting 

aspects through the most appropriate process (i.e., either through the ROP or the Agency 

Allegation Program), the agency formed the SCWE FRG. The purpose of the SCWE FRG 

review is to ensure regulatory consistency by reviewing and dispositioning any potential ROP 

findings in the SCWE crosscutting area. The multioffice management review group, chaired by 

the Agency Allegation Advisor, evaluates potential findings and SCWE crosscutting aspects 

before the finding is documented in an inspection report. In addition, the NRC encourages its 

regions to hold discussions with the SCWE FRG when SCWE-related issues arise during the 

conduct of their inspections. In CY 2007, the NRC convened the SCWE FRG for the first time 

when the staff identified a greater-than-green inspection finding with a SCWE-related 

crosscutting aspect. The SCWE FRG agreed with the regional staff’s proposed handling of the 

issue. 

In addition to identifying findings with a SCWE crosscutting aspect, the staff can gather insights 

into the SCWE at a particular site in several ways, such as reviewing the number and nature of 

allegations concerning that site. Furthermore, during the baseline PI&R inspection, the staff 

documents its observations concerning a site=s SCWE based on interviews with licensee 

employees and reviews of pertinent documents. Should the staff discern that a work 

environment may be Achilled,@ (i.e., potentially not conducive to raising safety concerns 

internally), the NRC management can request, in writing, information concerning the licensee’s 

SCWE. Such correspondence is called a chilling effect letter. The agency also initiates chilling 

effect letters after a finding of discrimination related to raising safety concerns by the U.S. 

Department of Labor under Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, 

or by the NRC under the following employee protection regulations: 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

5

• Title 10 CFR Part 19, ANotices, Instructions and Reports to Workers: Inspection and 

Investigations,@ of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 19) 

• 10 CFR Part 30, ARules of General Applicability to Domestic Licensing of Byproduct Material@

• 10 CFR Part 40, ADomestic Licensing of Source Material@

• 10 CFR Part 50, ADomestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities@

• 10 CFR Part 60, ADisposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic Repositories@

• 10 CFR Part 61, ALicensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste@

• 10 CFR Part 63, ADisposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic Repository at 

Yucca Mountain, Nevada@

• 10 CFR Part 70, ADomestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material@

• 10 CFR Part 72, ALicensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste@

• 10 CFR Part 76, ACertification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants@

• 10 CFR Part 150, AExemptions and Continued Regulatory Authority in Agreement States and 

in Offshore Waters under Section 274@

In CY 2007, the agency issued two chilling effect letters, one to a materials licensee and one to 

a research reactor both based on indications of a potentially chilled work environment. The NRC 

staff will continue to monitor the SCWE of both sites through normal inspection activities and 

allegation review. 

In October 2004, the staff implemented the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program which 

included the opportunity for using ADR early in the allegation process for cases of alleged 

discrimination before the NRC conducts an investigation of the allegation. This allows additional 

opportunities for the parties to resolve their differences outside of the normal regulatory 

framework. Early-ADR involves the use of a neutral third party to facilitate discussion and the 

timely settlement of the discrimination concern. It is believed that voluntary dispute resolution by 

the parties using the communication opportunities afforded in the Early-ADR process can stem 

the inherent damage such disputes have on the SCWE more quickly than an investigation. At 

any time, either party can exit the ADR process and, if the alleger still wants to pursue the 

discrimination matter, the option of an NRC investigation remains. If a settlement is reached, 

however, the staff will not pursue an investigation or subsequent enforcement of discrimination 

findings. The NRC may also consider settlements resulting from licensee-initiated mediation as 

equivalent to settlements reached under the Early-ADR program. 

In CY 2007, the NRC made 45 Early-ADR offers, of which 15 (33 percent) resulted in 

agreements to mediate. Nine of the 15 (60 percent) mediated discrimination concerns resulted 

in the parties reaching a mutually agreeable settlement, a slight decline from the 75% of 

mediated concerns that settled in CY 2006. 
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

6

Posting of New Allegation Statistics 

Allegation statistics are posted on the agency’s public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory/allegations/statistics.html. Five years of data are available and updated monthly 

in the following categories: 

• allegations from all sources 

• allegations from onsite sources2

• discrimination allegations received 

• allegations open 

• allegations substantiated 

• allegations substantiated with violations/enforcement 

Statistics for all operating power reactors, permanently shut-down power reactors, and large fuel 

cycle facilities are included. In CY 2007, the NRC added allegation statistics for Category I fuel 

cycle facilities to the facilities tables after the Commission directed the staff to release previously 

withheld information about these facilities. The agency also recently added new fuel cycle 

facility and reactor license applicants to its public Web site. 

 

2 Onsite sources include current or former licensee employees, current or former contractor employees, or 

anonymous allegers 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

7

TRENDS IN ALLEGATIONS

The NRC monitors allegations to discern trends or marked increases that might prompt the 

agency to question the licensee as to the causes of such changes or trends. In preparing this 

report, the staff reviewed a 5-year history of allegations received for reactor and materials 

licensees and vendors. The staff focused on those allegations that have the potential to provide 

insights into the SCWE at a given facility. Such allegations include those submitted by current or 

former licensee or contractor employees or by anonymous sources that indicate an 

unwillingness to raise safety concerns internally. The staff performs an analysis of recent 

allegation activity twice a year in support of the ROP midcycle and end-of-cycle assessments. In 

addition, the staff may perform an analysis for a particular site or licensee whenever allegations 

or inspection findings indicate that such an analysis is warranted. 

The staff also conducts reviews to identify national trends for reactor and materials allegations 

received, shifts in users of the Allegation Program, and the effect of Allegation Program 

implementation on the workload in the regions and program offices. The following section 

discusses these trends. 

National Trends

National trends are of interest because they provide general information to the staff concerning 

the effect of external factors, plant events, and industry efforts to improve the SCWE at NRClicensed facilities. In addition, they can be useful in developing budget and planning 

assumptions to support future agency and Allegation Program needs. Figure 1 shows that the 

5-year national trend in the number of allegations has remained relatively steady with a slight 

decline in the materials area. 

The number of allegations processed by the NRC involving Agreement State matters is declining 

to a minimal level as additional States achieve Agreement State status. The reason for this is 

that most individuals who contact the NRC with concerns about Agreement State licensees 

indicate a willingness to contact and be contacted directly by Agreement State personnel about 

the evaluation of their concern(s), once the Agreement State program is explained to them. 

Such matters are forwarded to the Agreement State and are not processed by the NRC as 

allegations. Generally, the NRC only uses the Allegation Program to track the evaluation of 

concerns about Agreement State licensees when the concerned individual does not want his or 

her identity provided to the Agreement State. 

0

200

400

600

800

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

FIGURE 1 - ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED BY CY

Reactor Materials Agreement State
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

8

Because each allegation can include multiple concerns, the number of concerns received can 

provide more specific information on the staff effort needed for an appropriate response. The 

trend in the total number of concerns has paralleled the trend in total allegations over the last 

several years. For example, the number of concerns about operating power reactor facilities 

increased in the CY 2003 to CY 2005 timeframe, as did the number of allegations in all regions 

except Region III, while all regions experienced a decrease in the number of reactor concerns 

received in CY 2006. In CY 2007, however, although the total number of allegations decreased, 

the number of concerns actually increased for reactor facilities in almost every region and 

program office. 

The volume of reactor concerns received in Region I increased by 20 percent between CY 2006 

and CY 2007 because a limited number of allegations contained a relatively high volume of 

concerns, including those related to a publicly released video of inattentive security officers at 

the Peach Bottom site. Similarly, the volume of concerns per allegation increased on average by 

almost 30 percent for Region III reactor sites; again, this increase is attributable to a limited 

number of allegations involving notably higher numbers of concerns. Regarding materials 

concerns in CY 2007, the NRC received a significant increase at one non-operating fuel facility, 

as well as less dramatic increases at a number of other facilities. 

Reactor Licensee Trends

To provide further insight into areas in which the NRC is allocating resources on reactor-related 

allegation followup, Figure 2 below depicts the 12 functional areas that represent approximately 

80 percent of the issues received nationwide in CY 2007.3

 

3 The agency received few concerns in the areas not depicted in Figure 2, which represent the remaining 20 

percent of the issues received. These areas include Access Authorization; Chemistry; Civil/Structural; 

Construction; Electrical; Emergency Preparedness; Employee Concerns Programs; Environmental; 

Falsification; Fatigue/Overtime; Fire Protection; Heating, Venting, and Air Conditioning; Industrial Safety; 

Inservice Testing; Instrumentation and Control; Licensing; Mechanical; Other; Quality Assurance; 

Radwaste; Safeguards; and Transportation. 

FIGURE 2 - REACTOR ISSUES NATIONWIDE 2007

Fitness for Duty

6%

Security

19%

Health Physics

13%

Corrective Action

7%

Training/Quals

8%

Discrimination

9% Chilling Effect

8%

Wrongdoing

8%

Maintenance

5%

Safety Culture

6%

Engineering

4%

Operations

7%

Security Health Physics Training/Qualifications

Discrimination Operations Chilling Effect

Wrongdoing Maintenance Corrective Action

Fitness for Duty Safety Culture Engineering
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

9

As indicated in the Figure 2, security issues comprised the largest percentage of alleged 

concerns received in CY 2007. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, securityrelated concerns have continued to represent the greatest percentage of allegation concerns 

received in each subsequent calendar year. Increases noted in CY 2003 and CY 2004 were 

attributable to issues related to the effectiveness with which reactor licensees implemented 

changes to the facility and the physical security plan based upon NRC security orders issued 

and implemented in that time frame. In CY 2005 the number of security-related concerns 

sharply increased in association with a national broadcast in October 2005 regarding security at 

research and test reactors. Lacking similar events in CY 2006 or CY 2007, the numbers of 

security concerns decreased. 

Assertions related to a chilling effect or a chilled work environment in which individuals fear 

retaliation or are discouraged from raising safety concerns have trended downward over the last 

5 years. While positive industry accomplishments in the SCWE area are believed to have 

contributed to the general decrease in the number of these concerns since CY 2003, the 

sustained percentage of chilling effect concerns (7 to 8 percent of all reactor concerns received 

in each of the last 3 years) may reflect increasing awareness of SCWE concepts by the nuclear 

workforce resulting from an increased industry focus in this area, media interest in the increased 

NRC attention to this area at some sites, and guidance made publicly available by the NRC (i.e., 

Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-018, AGuidance for Establishing and Maintaining a Safety 

Conscious Work Environment,@ issued in August 2005). It may also reflect the fact that, in CY 

2005, the NRC modified the database that tracks allegations and allegation concerns to allow 

concerns to be attributed to the concept of Asafety culture.@ As such, a concern regarding a 

component of safety culture broader than a chilling effect (such as a concern about a licensee 

taking a production-over-safety approach) is now placed in a separate category. Concerns may 

now be applied to safety culture that in the past might have been applied to chilling effect in the 

absence of a more descriptive category. In fact, the percentage of concerns attributed to safety 

culture has increased from approximately 4 percent of reactor concerns received in CY 2005 

and CY 2006, to approximately 6 percent in CY 2007. Another reason for the rise in safety 

culture concerns in CY 2007 may be an increased industry and worker awareness of safety 

culture in reaction to the mid-2006 change to the ROP incorporating safety culture components 

into the ROP cross-cutting areas of human performance, PI&R, and SCWE. 

For both CY 2006 and CY 2007, the same 12 functional areas (as depicted in Figure 2) 

represented approximately 80 percent of the reactor concerns received nationwide. However, 

overall, the number of concerns received in CY 2007 increased 9 percent compared to CY 2006. 

Specifically, the percentage and number of health physics issues increased substantially, 

primarily as a result of one instance involving the receipt of multiple health physics concerns at a 

Region I facility. Region I also experienced a notable increase in concerns in the operations 

area in CY 2007 with a concentration of concerns related to a specific issue at a Region I plant. 

Other regional offices noted more moderate increases in allegation concerns in the operations 

area. Concerns related to the training and qualifications of plant personnel increased 

substantially in Region IV in CY 2007 with concerns in this area involving nine different Region 

IV facilities. The percentage of discrimination concerns raised in the reactor area during the CY 

2003 to CY 2007 review period has remained consistent at approximately 9 percent per year. 

More than 60 percent of the discrimination concerns raised in the reactor area in CY 2007 came 

from workers in the functional areas of maintenance, security, operations, health physics, and 

engineering. 
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

10

Materials Licensee Trends

Because of the many different types of materials licensees and because the activities performed 

by these licensees are not as homogeneous as those performed by reactor licensees, a 

comparison of the types of issues received does not produce meaningful results. For insights 

into the areas in which the NRC focused its attention regarding materials-related allegations, 

Figure 3 depicts the eight types of materials licensees from which the NRC received 

approximately 80 percent of allegation concerns nationwide.4

 

4 The agency received few concerns about the materials licensee types not depicted in Figure 3, which 

represent the remaining 20 percent of issues received. These licensee types include Exempt Distribution, 

General Licensee, Nuclear Pharmacies, Other, Research and Development, Test/Research Reactor, 

Tritium Light Sources, Transportation, and Waste Disposal. 

Since CY 2003, the number of allegations related to fuel cycle facilities has remained a 

substantive percentage (25-35 percent) of the total number of allegations received by the NRC 

in the materials area. While a notable increase in the receipt of concerns related to fuel cycle 

facilities occurred in CY 2005, the NRC received lower numbers of concerns in CY 2006 and CY 

2007, similar to the number of concerns received in CY 2004. The increase from CY 2004 to CY 

FIGURE 3 - MATERIALS LICENSEE TYPES NATIONWIDE 2007

Fuel Cycle Facility

29%

Medical

24%

Radiography

16%

Nuclear Gauges

10%

Uranium Recovery

5%

Decommissioning 

Reactor

4%

Irradiators

4%

Decommissioning 

Materials

8%

Fuel Cycle Facility Medical Radiography

Nuclear Gauges Decommissioning Materials Uranium Recovery

Decommissioning Reactor Irradiators
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

11

2005 was largely attributable to a number of issues received about one fuel facility following a 

specific event, a change in management expectations regarding procedural adherence, and a 

planned workforce reduction in the fall of CY 2005. Allegation concerns received regarding 

decommissioning reactors have steadily decreased since CY 2003. The numbers of concerns 

regarding decommissioning reactors has diminished as facility activities and staffing decrease 

over time. For example, the sharp decrease in the number of decommissioning reactor 

allegations in Region I from CY 2004 to CY 2005 coincided with the cessation of 

decommissioning activities at two sites. 

The number of allegation concerns received regarding decommissioning materials facilities was 

significantly larger in CY 2006 and CY 2007 than in CY 2004 and CY 2005. The increase is 

attributed primarily to activities at four facilities, two in Region I and two in Region IV. The 

numbers of allegation concerns regarding radiographers, nuclear pharmacies, and research and 

development has fluctuated during the CY 2003 to CY 2007 timeframe, with most increases 

caused by events at specific facilities. 

Source Trends

Figure 4 provides a breakdown of 99 percent of the sources for reactors and materials 

allegations received in CY 2007.5

 The data indicate that the distribution of source categories 

remained consistent between CY 2003 and CY 2007. That is, the primary sources of allegations 

continue to be employees of licensees (or former employees) and contractors (or former 

contractors). It follows that the percentage of reactors and materials allegations from other 

sources has also remained largely unchanged over the review period. The only notable change 

in the data resulted from the role of the news media as a more prominent source of allegations 

in CY 2005. The October 2005 national broadcast about security at research and test reactors, 

discussed previously, was the primary cause of the increase in allegations. 

In considering those allegation sources previously mentioned as having the potential to provide 

insights into the SCWE at a given facility (i.e., allegations submitted by current or former 

licensee or contractor employees or by anonymous sources), it is notable that the percentage of 

allegations from these sources since CY 2004 has remained consistently in the range of 74 to 

77 percent. In CY 2003, the percentage of allegations originating from these sources was 

slightly higher at 81 percent. 

 

5 The NRC received few concerns from the 1 percent of sources not depicted in Figure 4. These sources 

include State Agencies and the News Media. 
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

12

In comparing the sources of materials allegations to those of reactor allegations over the past 

few years, the largest source for both is consistently licensee (or former licensee) employees. It 

is worth noting, however, that while contractor employees are the second most frequent source 

of reactor allegations, private citizens are the second most frequent source of materials-related 

allegations. This is understandable since materials licensees employ fewer contract personnel 

and their activities involve more direct interaction with the public. 

Two of the source categories deserve some explanation. The source category ANRC@

designates an NRC staff member who suspects that a regulatory requirement has been violated 

deliberately or as a result of careless disregard, prompting the initiation of an investigation by the 

NRC Office of Investigations. The source category ALicensee@ denotes that a licensee 

representative, acting in his/her official capacity, has reported a potential wrongdoing matter to 

the NRC. The agency staff assigns an allegation process tracking number to such items to 

allow it to track the progress of a review of the potential wrongdoing issue. 

FIGURE 4 - ALLEGATIONS BY SOURCE CATEGORY 2007

NRC

10%

Federal Agency

1% Special Interest 

Group

1%

Licensee

6%

Private Citizen

8%

Anonymous

18%

Contractor 

Employee

18%

Licensee 

Employee

38%

Licensee Employee Contractor Employee Anonymous

Private Citizen NRC Licensee

Special Interest Group Federal Agency
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

13

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

5

10

15

20

FIGURE 5 - INDIAN POINT ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received

Allegation Trends for Selected Reactor Sites

Trending the number and nature of allegations concerning individual reactor sites is one method 

the NRC staff uses to monitor the SCWE at reactor sites. The appendix to this report provides 

statistics on allegations concerning all operating reactor sites. The NRC received the listed 

allegations during the 5-year period between January 2003 and December 2007 and included 

only allegations received from onsite sources (i.e., those that may be indicative of the health of 

the SCWE). Onsite sources include current or former licensee employees, current or former 

contractor employees, or anonymous allegers. For the purpose of this analysis, the NRC 

assumes anonymous allegations are submitted by on-site personnel. 

In determining which reactor sites should receive a more indepth review, the staff applied one of 

the following two criteria: 

(1) The number of onsite allegations received exceeds 2 times the median value for the 

reactor industry but does not exceed 3 times the median, and there is a 50-percent 

increase in the number of allegations over the previous year. 

(2) The number of onsite allegations exceeds 3 times the median value. 

For CY 2007, the median number of onsite allegations per reactor site was three. The 14 

reactor sites that met one of these criteria are Indian Point Units 2 and 3 (19); Palo Verde Units 

1, 2, and 3 (18); Callaway (17); Salem/Hope Creek (16); Harris (14); Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 

(13); Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 (13); San Onofre Units 2 and 3 (12); Browns Ferry Unit 1 (11); St. 

Lucie Units 1 and 2 (11); Fermi (10); Byron Units 1 and 2 (9); Grand Gulf (8), and Arkansas 

Nuclear One (ANO) Units 1 and 2 (8). The first 11 sites listed exceeded 3 times the industry 

median, while the last 3 sites exceeded 2 times the median and experienced more than a 50 

percent increase in the number of allegations concerning the site over the previous year. A 

detailed discussion of each of the sites follows. 

Indian Point Units 2 and 3

The NRC’s receipt of allegations concerning the Indian Point site trended upward in CY 2007; 

however, the agency received most 

of the allegations in the first two 

quarters of the calendar year (Figure 

5). Many of the allegations indicated 

concerns with the environment for 

raising issues internally, with 

approximately half of them being 

sent anonymously. The licensee’s 

Employee Concerns Program (ECP) 

also saw an increase in the number 

of concerns raised in CY 2007 from 

the previous year. 

One alleger who raised an allegation 

of discrimination in CY 2007, withdrew it. In the previous 4 years (CY 2003 through CY 2006), 

the NRC received 13 discrimination allegations. Of these, an alleger withdrew 1; the NRC 

investigated 10 that were not substantiated, and 2 were not investigated because the allegers 
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

14

did not articulate a prima facie showing of potential discrimination. For clarification, for the NRC 

to consider a matter of potential discrimination pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.7, “Employee 

Protection,” an alleger must present a certain pattern of facts, called a prima facie showing. 

Specifically, the allegation must initially establish that an employee has engaged in a protected 

activity, that an adverse personnel action was taken against the employee, that management 

knew that the employee had engaged in the protected activity, and that the protected activity 

was, in part, a reason for the adverse personnel action. 

In the fall of CY 2006, the NRC conducted a P&IR inspection (Inspection Report Nos. 

05000247/2006006 and 05000286/2006006) which included an assessment of the licensee’s 

SCWE. Based on interviews with site personnel, as well as earlier licensee self-assessments, 

the PI&R inspection team found that some workers expressed reluctance to raise issues under 

certain circumstances because of the perception that there would be negative consequences 

from management for doing so. The inspection team also found that Entergy had made only 

limited progress in evaluating and responding to earlier SCWE concerns and to the results of the 

licensee’s safety culture assessment, specifically the declining trends related to the SCWE. As 

a result, in a letter dated December 21, 2006, that transmitted the results of the NRC PI&R 

inspection, the agency requested that the licensee provide a plan for evaluating and responding 

to the potential chilling effect on site. In January 2007, Entergy responded to the NRC’s letter 

with a plan of action intended to (1) improve communications, (2) identify and prevent retaliation, 

chilling effects, and the perception of retaliation, (3) enhance the Corrective Action Program 

(CAP), (4) enhance the ECP, and (5) improve the broader work environment at Indian Point. 

On February 26, 2007, the NRC responded that Entergy’s proposed actions appeared to be 

reasonable and emphasized the importance of monitoring progress to assess their 

effectiveness. In June 2007, reviews conducted under the PI&R inspection sample found that 

the licensee had made adequate progress with regard to addressing the SCWE issues. In 

addition, the licensee was conducting effectiveness reviews at the time of this report. 

Entergy executed a realignment of its fleet operations in CY 2007, completing that initiative in 

December 2007. Although the number of allegations and the percentage of those that were 

submitted anonymously are relatively high compared to other reactor sites, it is recognized that 

the licensee's realignment initiative likely affected the work environment throughout the calendar 

year. Trends in the licensee's ECP suggest an increased willingness to raise concerns internally 

and to use that organization. The licensee credits its initiatives in response to the chilling effect 

letter, including improved communications, ECP visibility, and the newly instituted Executive 

Review Board and Executive Protocol Group (designed to identify and prevent retaliation, chilling 

effects, and challenges to the safety culture) for the increase in the number of concerns raised 

internally. Although a number of discrimination concerns were raised in the last 5 years, the 

number is declining and none investigated have been substantiated. 

The NRC will maintain its oversight of the SCWE through baseline inspection activities, with a 

particular focus on the licensee's SCWE metrics and effectiveness reviews. 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

15

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

10

20

30

FIGURE 6 - PALO VERDE ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received

Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3

The number of allegations from onsite sources at Palo Verde remained relatively high in CY 

2007, with a small increase over the 

number received in CY 2006 (Figure 

6). A very small percentage of the 

allegation concerns raised involved 

issues related to the willingness of 

employees to raise concerns. Of 

the 18 allegations received in CY 

2007, more than half (10) were 

submitted in the fourth quarter of the 

year. Almost half of the allegations 

(8) involved the maintenance area, 

with the others spread across 

several other functional areas. The 

licensee’s ECP, which also received 

an increase in concerns received compared to 2006, saw similar trends in concerns received in 

the maintenance area and in the concentration of concerns received during the year. Several 

factors likely contributed to these trends. First, the licensee conducted an outage at Palo Verde 

Unit 3 during the last quarter of CY 2007 that included steam generator replacement and 

involved a large influx of contract workers on site. In addition, the NRC increased its inspection 

activities pursuant to Inspection Procedure (IP) 95003, “Inspection for Repetitive Degraded 

Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs, or One Red Input,” 

during the fall (Inspection Report Nos. 05000528/2007012, 05000529/2007012, and 

05000530/2007012). In addition, the site implemented a number of organizational changes 

throughout the year to address problems and improve performance. Because of these factors 

and the similarity in trends to the ECP data, the number and nature of allegations regarding Palo 

Verde do not appear to indicate a broader SCWE problem. 

To monitor the status of the SCWE at Palo Verde, Arizona Public Service plans to administer 

independent surveys and assessments of the safety culture and SCWE periodically. The results 

of the last independent survey and assessment, which was conducted in 2007, did not indicate 

any SCWE concerns. However, responses to the 2007 survey items in general were more 

negative than responses to the previous survey conducted in 2005. The licensee plans to 

conduct another safety culture survey and assessment in the fall of 2008. 

The NRC PI&R inspection conducted in early CY 2007 (Inspection Report Nos. 

05000528/2007007, 05000529/2007007, and 05000530/2007007) found that a SCWE exists at 

Palo Verde and that many of the individuals interviewed believed that recent changes to the 

CAP were improving the process. However, they expressed some concerns regarding the 

timeliness of corrective actions and the effectiveness of the resolution of lower priority issues. 

The inspection team identified similar results when the NRC reviewed Palo Verde’s independent 

safety culture evaluation and conducted an independent assessment of the safety culture. The 

IP 95003 inspection team determined that the environment for raising concerns at Palo Verde 

was healthy. None of the licensee employees interviewed indicated they were hesitant to raise 

nuclear safety issues. The large majority of interviewees perceived that their managers were 

receptive to concerns and willing to address them. However, they reported frustrations 

regarding ineffectiveness in resolving longstanding issues. Overall, the inspection team 

identified weaknesses in organizational characteristics and attitudes associated with 10 of the 
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

16

NRC's 13 safety culture components, which are detailed in Section 06.07 of Inspection Manual 

Chapter 0305, "Operating Reactor Assessment Program.” However, it found the two SCWErelated components (the environment for raising concerns; and preventing, detecting, and 

mitigating perceptions of retaliation) to be adequate. 

The IP 95003 inspection team did note some differences between contractors and licensee 

employees in their willingness to raise concerns. Consistent with these perceptions, the ECP 

had received several concerns involving contractor personnel in the month before the inspection 

team arrived on site. In response to these concerns, the licensee reinforced expectations for 

maintaining a SCWE in all contract organizations and took actions to include SCWE obligations 

in contract terms. In addition, senior management took steps to integrate contractor supervisors 

and managers into meetings to better communicate SCWE expectations. 

The NRC’s annual assessment of facility performance continues to place Palo Verde Units 1 

and 2 in the Degraded Cornerstone column and Palo Verde Unit 3 in the Multiple/Repetitive 

Degraded Cornerstone column of the ROP Action Matrix. In addition, the 2007 assessment 

continued to find substantive crosscutting issues in the areas of human performance and PI&R. 

The NRC had performed periodic inspections to evaluate progress in addressing the 

crosscutting issues and found that even though some corrective actions addressed 

weaknesses, the actions were not completely effective. The licensee has proposed actions to 

address the substantive crosscutting issues, and the NRC will evaluate the effectiveness of 

improvement efforts through inspection. 

The NRC received three allegations of discrimination in CY 2007. It is currently investigating 

one and closed two that were resolved between the concerned individual and the licensee 

through external (non-NRC-related) mediation. The NRC received 10 allegations of 

discrimination regarding Palo Verde from CY 2003 through CY 2006. Of these, it investigated 

eight but none were substantiated. It did not investigate one because the individual did not wish 

to participate in an investigation, and the parties settled one via Early ADR. 

The number and nature of allegations received regarding Palo Verde and the similarity of trends 

seen by the licensee’s ECP, combined with the results from the 2007 NRC P&IR inspection, the 

IP 95003 inspection team assessment of SCWE, and the licensee’s CY 2007 independent 

safety culture evaluation, give no indication of a broader SCWE problem at the site. However, 

the NRC’s independent safety culture assessment from the IP 95003 inspection identified 

several challenges that could negatively affect the safety culture, including the SCWE, if they 

and/or other challenges related to identified substantive crosscutting issues are not improved. 

The licensee has committed to implementing a number of actions to address the causes of the 

identified performance problems, the existence of the continuing substantive crosscutting issues, 

and the issues identified by the CY 2007 safety culture assessment. The NRC will determine 

the effectiveness of the licensee’s improvement efforts through periodic inspections and 

regulatory performance meetings. 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

17

Callaway

The number of allegations received by the NRC from onsite sources concerning Callaway 

substantially increased from 3 allegations in CY 2006 to 17 in CY 2007, with a significant 

majority coming from licensee and former license employees (Figure 7). Unlike a similar 

increase in allegations 

received from CY 2004 to CY 

2005 that involved a large 

influx of allegations related to 

security, the increase in 2007 

involved functional areas 

throughout the Callaway 

facility, with concentrations in 

the operations and 

maintenance functional areas. 

Discrimination allegations also 

increased substantially from 

two in CY 2006 to seven in CY 

2007. 

The number of concerns involving nuclear safety received by the Callaway ECP over the past 

several years has been consistent, with many issues stemming from company efforts to increase 

employee accountability for the identification and resolution of safety issues, and from issues 

related to the effectiveness of the CAP, along with an earlier concentration of concerns in the 

security area. Approximately 30 to 40 percent of the issues received by the ECP are not related 

to nuclear safety (e.g., human resource issues). 

In response to the significant increase in allegations submitted to the NRC in CY 2007, 

AmerenUE assembled an independent team to conduct an assessment of the SCWE at 

Callaway, the results of which were issued on February 1, 2008. As part of the independent 

assessment, the team interviewed 80 individuals from various departments and working levels 

within the organization. The team concluded that some of the factors that may have contributed 

to the increased number of allegations were continuing issues, including the strength of the 

CAP, the adjustment of workers to a new accountability initiative applied in recent years, and the 

separation of approximately 50 employees from the site in CY 2007. The assessment 

concluded that the SCWE at Callaway was generally healthy. As part of its evaluation, the 

independent team also reviewed the factors related to the discrimination concerns initiated in CY 

2007 and concluded that the discrimination concerns were not indicative of a chilled 

environment for raising concerns. These results notwithstanding, the independent assessment 

highlighted some organizational weaknesses that, if unaddressed, could have a detrimental 

effect on the safety culture and the SCWE at Callaway (e.g., effectiveness in addressing change 

management issues, lack of a structured process for dealing with differing professional 

opinions). The assessment team made a number of related recommendations that are currently 

under evaluation at Callaway. 

In addition, AmerenUE conducts annual internal SCWE surveys and biennial third-party 

independent surveys of safety culture, the most recent of which was conducted in March 2007. 

The results of the more recent surveys have been generally positive, with continuing problems 

being identified in the areas of CAP effectiveness and employee adjustment to new 

accountability expectations. 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

5

10

15

20

FIGURE 7 - CALLAWAY ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

18

In part because of the number of allegations received in CY 2007, the NRC conducted an 

augmented number of SCWE-related interviews during the most recent PI&R inspection at 

Callaway (Inspection Report No. 05000483/2008006) in February-March 2008. From the 

interviews and the PI&R inspection team’s review of the results of Callaway’s recent SCWE 

assessments, the PI&R team determined that Callaway employees generally expressed a 

willingness to raise nuclear safety concerns and to use the CAP. Although not all of the 

individuals interviewed by the PI&R team were comfortable using all of the methods available to 

them for reporting concerns, all were comfortable using at least one method. The PI&R team 

concluded that the licensee is maintaining a SCWE at the facility and that a chilled work 

environment does not exist. However, similar to comments made by the independent team 

chartered by AmerenUE to evaluate the increased numbers of allegations received in 2007, the 

PI&R team noted some organizational issues not specifically within the NRC’s regulatory 

jurisdiction that, if not addressed by AmerenUE, could potentially affect the SCWE at the plant. 

Of the seven discrimination concerns submitted in CY 2007, the NRC investigated one that was 

not substantiated, while two remain under NRC investigation. For the remaining CY 2007 

discrimination concerns, the NRC did not investigate one because the alleger requested that it 

not conduct an investigation, while two others did not present a prima facie showing of potential 

discrimination. The parties settled one via Early ADR. For the two discrimination concerns 

submitted in CY 2006, the NRC investigated one that was not substantiated, and the parties 

settled the other one via Early ADR. In CY 2005, the NRC investigated one discrimination 

concern that was not substantiated and the parties settled three via Early ADR. In CY 2004, the 

NRC received no discrimination concerns and in CY 2003, it investigated one discrimination 

concern that was not substantiated. 

Based on the NRC’s recent PI&R inspection findings and the results of the licensee’s recent 

safety culture surveys and SCWE assessments, there does not appear to be a broad SCWE 

issue at the plant. However, the NRC staff will continue to monitor the SCWE at Callaway by 

way of the baseline inspection program and allegation trending. Attention should be paid to the 

effectiveness of the licensee’s ongoing efforts to improve identified weaknesses in the CAP and 

to address organizational issues that could affect the SCWE. 

Salem/Hope Creek

The number of allegations received concerning Salem/Hope Creek in CY 2007 (16) represented 

a slight increase from the number received in 2006 (14) (Figure 8). However, these numbers 

are significantly lower than the 

number received in CY 2005 (23) 

and reflect improvements made in 

the SCWE area in response to 

significant SCWE findings 

identified during the CY 2003 – CY 

2004 timeframe. Before CY 2006, 

the number of allegations received 

concerning Salem/Hope Creek had 

steadily increased from CY 2003 

through CY 2005, as the SCWE 

issues emerged and as licensee 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

10

20

30

FIGURE 8 - SALEM/HOPE CREEK ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

19

efforts to resolve them progressed. 

The allegations from Salem/Hope Creek onsite sources in CY 2007 were spread throughout the 

first three quarters, with a large increase in the last quarter of the year. Most of the allegations 

received in the last quarter of CY 2007 involved Hope Creek operations and were related to a 

specific issue. A very small percentage of the allegation concerns raised involved issues related 

to the willingness of employees to raise concerns. Overall, the majority of the allegations 

received involved the security and operations functional areas. The licensee indicated that the 

ECP saw a slight decrease in concerns received in CY 2007 compared to CY 2006. The ECP 

saw a similar trend in the portion of concerns received regarding Hope Creek operations. 

However, the ECP did not receive as many concerns in the security area as the NRC. An NRC 

PI&R inspection conducted at Hope Creek in September 2007 evaluated the actions taken by 

the licensee in response to concerns received by the ECP regarding Hope Creek operations and 

found that the licensee had adequately addressed them. 

The NRC received four allegations of discrimination regarding Salem/Hope Creek in CY 2007, 

compared to five received in CY 2006. The NRC did not investigate one of the discrimination 

concerns received in CY 2007 because it did not show prima facie evidence of potential 

discrimination, and the agency did not investigate another one because the concerned individual 

did not wish to participate in the investigation. Another concern involved a third-hand complaint 

of suspected retaliation. The NRC does not pursue third-party complaints because it lacks 

specific information about the alleged act and does not have permission from the individual 

named to reveal his or her identity to the licensee. The parties used Early ADR to settle the 

other discrimination concern raised in CY 2007. From CY 2003 through CY 2006, the NRC 

received 16 allegations of discrimination regarding Salem/Hope Creek. It closed eight of these 

because a prima facie showing of potential discrimination was not articulated. It did not 

investigate four because the individuals did not wish to participate in the investigation. The NRC 

investigated three that were not substantiated, and the parties settled one via Early ADR. 

The Hope Creek PI&R inspection in September 2007 (Inspection Report No. 

05000354/2007006) did not identify any significant observations related to SCWE. During the 

interviews, plant staff expressed a willingness to use the CAP to identify plant issues and 

deficiencies and to raise safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed a sample of ECP files and 

found that some of the concerns were from the Hope Creek operations department regarding 

personnel administrative practices, but that the issues had been adequately addressed to 

minimize their effect on the work environment. Similarly, the Salem PI&R inspection in March 

2007 (Inspection Report Nos. 05000272/2007006, 05000311/2007006, and 05000354/2007007) 

did not identify any observations of significance related to the SCWE. The inspectors 

determined that the plant staff expressed a willingness to raise safety concerns and were aware 

of the ECP. Licensee employees interviewed by the PI&R inspection team were familiar with the 

CAP and other means of raising safety issues. 

As background, a summary of past SCWE issues regarding Salem/Hope Creek and associated 

NRC actions follows. In mid-2004, the NRC informed Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (PSEG) 

of the final results of a special NRC SCWE review. While no serious safety violations were 

found, the NRC identified numerous indications of weaknesses in corrective actions and 

management efforts to establish a SCWE. PSEG self-assessments during this timeframe 

revealed similar findings. The 2004 ROP midcycle assessment for Salem/Hope Creek prompted 

the NRC to issue a Deviation from the ROP Action Matrix to provide enhanced oversight for the 

SCWE area. While PSEG put forth significant effort in 2004-2005 to address the SCWE 
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

20

findings, numerous senior management changes and the implementation of initiatives to 

address long-standing performance problems in 2005 presented new challenges to SCWE 

improvement. These changes contributed to continuing negative worker perceptions regarding 

the advisability of raising issues or challenging decisions. As a result, the 2005 ROP mid-cycle 

assessment for Salem/Hope Creek identified a substantive crosscutting issue in the SCWE area 

based on the results of the NRC’s ongoing review. The NRC renewed the ROP Deviation 

Memorandum to allow for continued close monitoring of PSEG efforts to address issues 

associated with the SCWE. In September 2005, the staff completed a SCWE inspection at the 

site which concluded that progress had been made in addressing SCWE issues but identified 

areas requiring additional action and focused attention. The results of a PI&R inspection 

conducted in late 2005 (Inspection Report Nos. 05000354/2005007, 05000272/2005012, and 

05000311/2005012) revealed progress in the SCWE area. However, the agency retained the 

SCWE substantive crosscutting issue at the 2005 ROP end-of-cycle assessment because of 

remaining SCWE followup activity. 

The results of a third-party site safety culture survey administered by PSEG in early CY 2006 

indicated improvement in nearly all cultural metrics when compared to the results of a similar 

survey conducted in CY 2005. Also in that timeframe, PSEG commissioned an independent 

peer assessment of the SCWE at Salem/Hope Creek, which concluded that substantial and 

sustainable progress had been made in the work environment at both facilities. In June 2006, 

the NRC completed a followup SCWE team inspection that also concluded that the progress 

realized in the SCWE area at Salem/Hope Creek was substantial and that processes were in 

place for sustaining these improvements (Inspection Report Nos. 05000354/2006011, 

05000272/2006012, and 05000311/2006012). As a result, the NRC closed the SCWE 

substantive crosscutting issue at the 2006 ROP mid-cycle assessment. The NRC had 

previously closed a substantive crosscutting issue in PI&R in early 2006 after actions taken by 

PSEG to improve the resolution of concerns proved effective. The licensee plans to conduct 

another third-party safety culture survey in the second half of CY 2008. 

The NRC’s most recent annual assessment of facility performance placed Salem Unit 1 within 

the Degraded Cornerstone column and Salem Unit 2 within the Licensee Response column of 

the NRC Action Matrix. In addition, for Salem Unit 2, the NRC concluded that the site did not 

meet the criteria for clearing a substantive crosscutting issue in human performance related to 

procedural compliance that was identified in the mid-cycle assessment, so it remains open. The 

NRC placed Hope Creek within the Licensee Response column of the its Action Matrix. 

The number and nature of allegations received regarding Salem/Hope Creek indicate that the 

progress made in improvements to the SCWE area at Salem/Hope Creek in CY 2006 was 

generally sustained in CY 2007. The NRC will continue to monitor the SCWE at Salem/Hope 

Creek by means of the baseline inspection program and allegation trending, with attention given 

to concerns related to the functional areas of operations and security. 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

21

Harris

The NRC receipt of allegations concerning the Harris plant remained high in CY 2007 and most 

were received anonymously (Figure 9). As in the previous two years, the majority were in the 

area of security. To ensure 

that the agency avoids the 

unnecessary release of 

information that would reveal 

any potential security-related 

vulnerabilities, the NRC staff 

is not at liberty to discuss 

specific information 

concerning actions taken by 

the agency or the licensee in 

the security area. 

The licensee indicated that it 

also continued to note a trend 

in the security area and, as with the allegations received at the NRC, a number of the concerns 

brought to the ECP were from anonymous individuals. In June 2007, the licensee added free 

standing computer kiosks in the security area to facilitate the anonymous reporting of concerns 

via the CAP. The security organization experienced turnover during the calendar year. 

In August 2007, the NRC conducted a PI&R inspection (Inspection Report No. 

05000400/2007006), reviewed the Security Organization Excellence Plan, and interviewed 

approximately 25 officers. The inspection team concluded that the licensee’s plan which 

emphasized the importance of a SCWE appeared effective and the officers interviewed 

expressed comfort raising concerns internally. 

The number of discrimination concerns raised in the last 5 years is low. The agency received 

two discrimination allegations in CY 2007, one of which it did not investigate because it did not 

involve a prima facie case and one that is still open. In CY 2006, it investigated a discrimination 

concern but the concern was not substantiated. 

Although the number of allegations received is relatively high compared to other reactor sites it 

is recognized that the personnel turnover in the security organization likely affected the work 

environment throughout the calendar year. The number of allegations that the NRC received 

anonymously was also high; however, the licensee’s ECP also received a high percentage of 

concerns anonymously. Trends in the licensee's ECP and use of the new concern kiosks 

suggest a willingness to raise concerns internally using those avenues. The NRC will maintain 

its oversight of the SCWE through baseline inspection activities. 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

5

10

15

FIGURE 9 - HARRIS ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

22

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

5

10

15

20

FIGURE 10 - SUSQUEHANNA ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received

Susquehanna Units 1 and 2

The number of allegations received by the NRC from onsite sources regarding Susquehanna 

decreased in CY 2007 from CY 2006, demonstrating a continuing downward trend since CY 

2005 (Figure 10). The majority of the 

allegations received in 2007 involved 

the areas of maintenance and worker 

training and qualifications. The 

number of discrimination concerns 

received by the NRC during the CY 

2005 - CY 2007 timeframe has also 

decreased (six in 2005, three in 2006, 

and two in 2007). During the same 

time period, the overall number of 

concerns filed with the Susquehanna 

ECP has steadily increased, as have 

concerns of discrimination. 

In the past few years, Susquehanna 

has taken a number of actions in an effort to improve the SCWE at the site, including revising 

the company policy, improving communications regarding management’s commitment to SCWE, 

improving visibility of the ECP and improving SCWE-related supervisor training. The licensee 

has conducted SCWE surveys at Susquehanna periodically since 1997, most recently in the fall 

of 2006. The NRC documented its review of the results of the 2006 survey in Inspection Report 

Nos. 05000387/2006005 and 05000388/2006005. The survey showed a slightly improving trend 

in the overall SCWE and ECP ratings, and results also revealed a significant improvement in the 

workforce’s perception of the ECP compared to prior assessments. An increase in the volume 

of concerns being raised to the ECP (which has continued through 2007) indicates that the 

workforce considers the ECP to be a viable avenue for raising concerns. Finally, the 2006 

survey results showed a notable improvement in employee willingness to raise issues as a result 

of the responsiveness of the CAP and management’s reaction to workers who raise issues. The 

survey confirmed work environment concerns in the maintenance organization, where the 

negative response rate to questions regarding the SCWE was higher than the site norm. The 

licensee completed corrective actions in the maintenance area in the latter half of 2007 (e.g., 

selected department SCWE survey, focus groups), as well as in other organizations noted in the 

2006 survey results as needing management attention (e.g., radiation protection). Another 

sitewide SCWE survey is conditionally planned for late 2008 to early 2009. Also in the latter half 

of 2007, the licensee completed SCWE training for its supervisory employees. 

The NRC conducted its most recent PI&R inspection at Susquehanna in January-February 2008 

(Inspection Report Nos. 05000387/2008006 and 05000388/2008006) and included a review of 

the SCWE at the facility. The PI&R inspection team interviewed licensee employees from each 

functional organization during the inspection. The team also interviewed the ECP representative 

and reviewed a sample of ECP files. The employees interviewed expressed a willingness to 

raise issues and document them in the CAP as well as a belief that the work environment was 

free from retaliation. The PI&R team noted that the evaluations conducted by the ECP were 

thorough and responsive to the issues raised. 

While the volume of discrimination allegations received over the CY 2003 – CY 2007 review 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

23

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

5

10

15

FIGURE 11 - SEQUOYAH ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received

period concerning Susquehanna has been relatively high (16), the number of discrimination 

concerns received by the NRC per year has steadily decreased since CY 2005. The NRC 

received two discrimination concerns in CY 2007; it is investigating one and the alleger withdrew 

the other. Of the three discrimination allegations filed in CY 2006, the alleger withdrew one, the 

NRC investigated one that was not substantiated, and one did not meet the requirements for 

initiation of an investigation. In the previous 3 years (CY 2003 through CY 2005), 11 allegations 

of discrimination were raised. Three of these allegations were closed because a prima facie 

showing of potential discrimination was not articulated and, although the NRC investigated the 

remaining eight, none were substantiated. 

A review of the number and nature of allegations received by the NRC, along with the trends of 

concerns received by the Susquehanna ECP and the consistent widespread use of the CAP 

suggests an increasing worker willingness to raise concerns internally at Susquehanna rather 

than engaging the NRC. The NRC will maintain oversight of the SCWE at Susquehanna 

through normal inspection activities. 

Sequoyah Units 1 and 2

The volume of allegations received concerning the Sequoyah site indicates an increasing trend 

in the last 3 years in both technical and discrimination allegations (Figure 11). Allegations 

increased throughout CY 2007. A 

clear trend is observed in 

concerns involving the security 

organization. In the summer of 

2007, the NRC interviewed a 

number of licensee employees 

about the SCWE (PI&R 

Inspection Report Nos. 

05000327/2007008 and 

05000328/2007008) and 

concluded that workers felt free to 

raise safety concerns and did not 

hesitate to bring issues to the 

attention of their management. 

Trends in the licensee’s ECP suggest an increased willingness to raise concerns internally and 

through that organization, but discipline trends do not mirror those seen in the Allegation 

Program. However, anonymous corrective action reports concerning the security organization 

experienced a significant increase. In mid-2007, the licensee interviewed personnel about the 

work environment in security and other organizations that earlier had been identified as having 

lower ratings in the SCWE. The results were generally positive; nonetheless, the licensee 

concluded that further review in the security organization was warranted. The licensee 

conducted a focused review of the work environment in the security organization in the fourth 

quarter of 2007. The licensee indicated that the security contractor has taken some actions to 

address findings from that report and other actions are expected. 

The NRC received four allegations of discrimination in CY 2007, all of which are still open. Four 

discrimination allegations were raised in CY 2005; three were investigated, but the NRC was 

unable to substantiate them, while one was withdrawn at the request of the alleger. The NRC 

received no other claims of discrimination during the review period (CY 2003 through CY 2007). 
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

24

The NRC will maintain its oversight of the SCWE through normal inspection activities. Its 

oversight efforts will include a particular focus on the effectiveness of actions the licensee and its 

contractor are taking to improve the SCWE in the security organization. 

San Onofre Units 2 and 3

The number of allegations received from onsite sources at San Onofre decreased from CY 2006 

to CY 2007 (Figure 12). The 12 allegations received in CY 2007 involved several different 

functional areas, with the 

majority related to maintenance, 

engineering, or health physics, 

and the allegation receipt rate 

was not concentrated in any 

particular part of the year. A 

very small percentage of the 

allegation concerns raised 

involved issues related to the 

willingness of employees to raise 

concerns. The number of 

concerns received by the ECP in 

CY 2007 was similar to the 

number received in CY 2006, 

with no notable trends regarding 

a willingness to raise issues. 

The ECP was aware of issues in engineering and conducted some followup activities to explore 

the reasoning behind the increased number of concerns in this area. It was also aware of work 

environment conditions (both positive and negative) in several other departments. San Onofre 

has been providing a variety of SCWE related training to both the workforce and supervisors. 

The NRC received six allegations of discrimination regarding San Onofre in CY 2007, which is 

twice the number received in CY 2006. Of these, the NRC investigated one that was not 

substantiated, and another is still under investigation. The NRC did not investigate one 

discrimination concern because it was provided by a third-party source, and in another instance, 

a discrimination concern was not investigated because the alleger did not wish to participate in 

an NRC investigation. The remaining two concerns involve offers to mediate via Early ADR and 

the mediation activities are in progress. The discrimination allegations received in CY 2007 

were all from either the maintenance or engineering departments. The NRC received 13 

allegations of discrimination regarding San Onofre between CY 2003 and CY 2006. It 

investigated 11 that were not substantiated. It did not investigate the other two because one 

individual did not respond to an NRC request for information, and one would not provide his or 

her identity. 

The NRC conducted its last PI&R inspection August through September 2006 (Inspection 

Report Nos. 05000361/2006013 and 05000362/2006013) and found that a healthy SCWE exists 

at San Onofre. Site personnel interviewed during the inspection demonstrated a willingness to 

raise safety concerns and an awareness of the means available for raising concerns. A few 

individuals voiced concerns to the PI&R team about a decrease in confidence that the CAP will 

adequately address low-level problems, but none of the individuals indicated that this would 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

5

10

15

FIGURE 12 - SAN ONOFRE ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

25

inhibit them from raising concerns in the future. The NRC also reviewed the results of the 

licensee’s 2005 third-party independent survey of safety culture at San Onofre and the 

licensee’s efforts in response. The results were similar to those of a previous survey conducted 

in 2003, and they were very positive with regard to the health of the SCWE at San Onofre. The 

NRC staff found the licensee’s action plan for identified areas for improvement to be 

appropriately focused, including extensive efforts to train managers at all levels on numerous 

elements of safety culture. The licensee conducted another third-party safety culture survey in 

the first quarter of CY 2008. 

In general, the number and nature of allegations regarding San Onofre do not appear to indicate 

a SCWE problem at the facility at this time. However, the NRC’s annual assessment of facility 

performance identified substantive crosscutting issues in human performance regarding the 

failure to provide adequate procedures or work instructions and, in the PI&R area, failure to 

evaluate problems thoroughly so that the resolutions address the causes and extent of 

conditions, thus placing San Onofre in the Licensee Response column of the NRC’s Action 

Matrix. Continuing problems in these crosscutting areas could have a deleterious effect on the 

safety culture, including the SCWE, if not corrected. Allegations of discrimination also increased 

significantly in CY 2007. In addition to monitoring the licensee’s activities in response to the 

identified substantive crosscutting issues, the NRC will continue to monitor the work environment 

through normal inspection activities, including reviewing the licensee’s response to the latest 

safety culture survey, observing any additional trends in allegations and concerns for the 

maintenance department, and monitoring the number of discrimination allegations received. 

Browns Ferry Unit 1

After peaking in CY 2005, the declining trend in the number of allegations the NRC received 

concerning the Browns Ferry Unit 1 site continued in CY 2007 (Figure 13). No clear issue or 

discipline trends are evident. The NRC conducted a PI&R inspection in August 2007 (Inspection 

Report Nos. 

05000259/2007008, 

05000260/2007008 and 

05000296/2007008) that 

included a review of the 

SCWE. The staff 

observed that licensee 

management routinely 

emphasized the need for 

all employees to identify 

and report problems and 

that employees were not 

hesitant to do so. 

Discussions with the licensee revealed trends towards a significant drop in usage of the ECP. 

At midyear the licensee conducted SCWE interviews in organizations that were identified the 

previous year as needing management attention. The purpose of the interviews was to assess 

the effectiveness of actions taken to improve the work environment. The licensee indicated that 

improvements were noted in those targeted organizations, while ratings worsened in other 

areas. 

The number of discrimination allegations also declined in CY 2007 to two after the NRC received 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

5

10

15

20

FIGURE 13 - BROWNS FERRY ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

26

five the previous year. The alleger withdrew one before an investigation could be initiated and 

the parties settled the other using the Early ADR process. Of the three received in CY 2006, the 

allegers withdrew two and one did not make a prima facie showing. Of the five allegations of 

discrimination received in CY 2005, the NRC investigated and substantiated one and continues 

to investigate one. The staff investigated two others but was unable to substantiate them, and 

the alleger withdrew one. The NRC acknowledged that the contractor involved identified the 

issue and took prompt corrective actions to address the specific issue and the SCWE within its 

organization with little Government intervention. In view of the immediate investigation and 

prompt corrective action, the NRC exercised enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 

VII.B.5 of the Enforcement Policy and did not issue a Notice of Violation in this matter. The 

agency will consider any future violation of 10 CFR 50.7 for full application of the Enforcement 

Policy. In the previous 2 years, the agency received five discrimination allegations. Of the four 

received in CY 2004, the NRC investigated two that could not be substantiated and closed one 

after repeated unsuccessful attempts to contact the alleger for an interview, while an alleger 

withdrew one. The one allegation received in CY 2003 was investigated, but not substantiated. 

The nature of allegations received in CY 2007 does not indicate a concern with the SCWE at the 

Browns Ferry Unit 1 site. The NRC will continue to monitor the site’s work environment through 

normal inspection activities. 

Fermi

The number of allegations received from onsite sources at Fermi in CY 2007 represented a 

substantial increase compared to the low numbers of allegations received in the previous 4 

years (Figure 14). It is notable that 7 of the 10 allegations received from onsite sources in CY 

2007 involved security, and that the NRC received 9 of the 10 allegations in the last 2 months of 

CY 2007. It is also notable that the 

NRC received seven allegations within 

2 weeks of an Unusual Event at Fermi 

on November 11, 2007, involving 

unexplained holes in a steam pipe, at 

first thought to be potential sabotage, 

but later determined to be the result of 

a maintenance error. In addition to the 

Unusual Event, other significant plant 

activities at Fermi during CY 2007 

included a refueling outage from late 

September 2007 to mid-November 

2007, and union contract negotiations 

that began after midyear (the union 

contract was ratified at the end of 

2007). 

The most recent NRC PI&R inspection at Fermi (Inspection Report No. 05000341/2007007) 

completed in September 2007 concluded that Fermi has established an acceptable SCWE. The 

PI&R team received minimal negative feedback about the work environment for raising safety 

issues on site, and also noted that few issues were submitted to the CAP or to the 

Ombudsman/ECP with stated or implied problems related to plant safety culture or the SCWE. 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

5

10

FIGURE 14 - FERMI ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

27

Similar to the pattern of allegations received by the NRC, the Fermi Ombudsman/ECP received 

few concerns in CY 2007 until after the third quarter of the year (although the Ombudsman/ECP 

did not receive a concentration of issues in the security area as did the NRC). Notwithstanding, 

Fermi has acknowledged the volume of allegations received by the NRC late in CY 2007, 

particularly in the security area (as evidenced in requests for information issued to Fermi 

regarding allegation concerns received by the NRC), and it is considering a SCWE assessment 

in CY 2008 with a possible focus in the areas of security and radiation protection. 

In August 2006, the licensee conducted a third-party safety culture assessment. The 

assessment concluded that Fermi staff had a healthy respect for nuclear safety and were not 

compromised by production priorities. The safety culture assessment did identify some items 

that could detract from a strong safety culture, and the licensee has taken actions in response, 

including providing safety culture training for managers and line personnel, providing training to 

the entire site in 2006 on a “Learning Map” in safety culture, and forming of a multidisciplinary 

team to examine the site work control process. The licensee will conduct another safety culture 

assessment at Fermi in 2008. 

An analysis of the trends and nature of allegations does not suggest a SCWE concern at Fermi. 

There has only been one allegation of discrimination related to Fermi in the last 5 years (CY 

2003 - not substantiated). Notwithstanding, recent NRC allegation activity in the Security area 

should be monitored for possible negative effects on the SCWE. It is apparent that recent 

security-related allegation activity relates to the licensee’s handling of the Unusual Event on 

November 11, 2007. The NRC should maintain its oversight of the SCWE at Fermi through 

normal inspection activities, with attention to the security area and the monitoring of any 

additional efforts by the licensee in 2008 to assess the degree to which the security department 

maintains a SCWE. 

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2

The number of allegations received in CY 2007 from onsite sources at St. Lucie (10) represents 

a decrease in allegations 

received in prior years and an 

overall downward trend over the 

past 5 years (Figure 15). The 

disciplines involved in the 

allegations received from onsite 

sources at St. Lucie were spread 

among multiple workgroups, with 

small concentrations of issues in 

the maintenance/Instrumentation 

and control and security areas. 

The NRC received only one 

anonymous onsite allegation in 

CY 2007. The trend in internal 

concerns received by the St. 

Lucie ECP was similar to allegations received by the NRC and the St. Lucie ECP also received 

only one anonymous concern in CY 2007. 

Only 3 of the 10 allegations from onsite sources were received during the period of a major 

refueling outage at St. Lucie Unit 2 (September 30, 2007, to January 4, 2008) which included 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

5

10

15

20

25

FIGURE 15 - ST. LUCIE ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

28

steam generator and reactor vessel head replacement. The number of discrimination allegations 

received in CY 2007 (1) and 2006 (1) represent a substantial decrease from the number 

received in the 3 previous years. In the same timeframe, the St. Lucie ECP received a similar 

reduced rate of concerns. An analysis of these trends indicates that efforts taken by the 

licensee to mitigate past SCWE issues at St Lucie (in the 2003 timeframe) have been relatively 

successful. 

For background, in response to an NRC-identified concern with the SCWE at St. Lucie in CY 

2003, the licensee took actions to measure and improve the onsite work environment, including 

restructuring the organization, monitoring the SCWE annually using survey tools, providing 

SCWE training, enhancing the CAP, and initiating a Leadership Development Academy. The 

licensee noted evidence of an improving SCWE in CY 2004, and in 2004, an NRC PI&R 

inspection (Inspection Report Nos. 05000335/2004007 and 05000389/2004007) did not identify 

any reluctance on the part of plant staff to report safety concerns. In CY 2005, the NRC 

reviewed the effectiveness of the ECP and CAP in dealing with SCWE issues (Inspection Report 

Nos. 05000335/2005003 and 05000389/2005003) with generally positive results. In addition to 

interviewing site personnel about the environment for raising safety issues during the PI&R 

inspection in August 2006 (Inspection Report Nos. 05000335/2006008 and 05000389/2006008), 

the NRC inspection team reviewed a large sample of ECP files to assess the effectiveness of 

the ECP in capturing and resolving concerns that involved conditions adverse to quality and the 

responsiveness and quality of feedback provided to concerned individuals. In general, the 

inspection team found that the SCWE at St. Lucie was healthy and that employees felt free to 

raise issues to their management without fear of retaliation. The team found the ECP to be 

generally effective in investigating and facilitating the resolution of employee concerns. 

However, during the 2006 P&IR inspection, some individuals indicated a problem with the 

timeliness of ECP feedback and suggested that this might cause some to be reluctant to use the 

ECP in the future. The licensee acknowledged the negative perceptions about the ECP, as 

evidenced by both recent internal SCWE survey results and the results of the NRC 2006 PI&R 

inspection. In response, the licensee took actions to address these perceptions, including the 

standardization of the organizational makeup and function of the ECP within the Florida Power & 

Light reactor fleet, better communications about ECP program functions and policies, and the 

initiation of “cultural meetings” with employees to discuss topics related to the SCWE and safety 

culture. The licensee added training modules to their Web-based training in 2007 to discuss the 

standardization of the ECP across the licensee’s organization, and also to provide site staff with 

feedback on past issues related to the St. Lucie ECP. In 2007, the licensee took actions to 

make the ECP more responsive to concerned individuals and to improve the quality of its 

investigations. 

The licensee conducted the most recent survey of the SCWE at St. Lucie in January 2007. The 

licensee performs its own SCWE surveys, with questions derived from industry guidance. The 

results of the January 2007 survey for St. Lucie were generally good, and were discussed during 

quarterly meetings with site employees. The SCWE survey results did identify a weakness at St. 

Lucie related to employee confidence in the CAP to handle issues and prompt an appropriate 

level of review, likely in reference to numerous condition reports that are placed in a “trend” 

status. The licensee is currently pursuing the implementation of another CAP computer tracking 

program within its Nuclear Division. It was also noted that considerably more St. Lucie 

employees responded to the 2007 SCWE survey (860) than to the last SCWE survey in 2005 

(540). The licensee is considering conducting another SCWE survey late in 2008. 

One allegation of discrimination was received in CY 2007 and remains under investigation. One 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

29

allegation of discrimination was raised in CY 2006, but was not investigated because the 

concerned individual did not wish to participate in an investigation. In CY 2005, the NRC 

received four allegations of discrimination. Three were investigated and not substantiated, and 

the other alleger did not wish to participate in an investigation. For the three allegations of 

discrimination raised in CY 2004, the concerned individuals in two of the cases indicated that 

they did not wish to pursue the matter via NRC investigation. The other case was investigated, 

but not substantiated. In CY 2003, four discrimination allegations were raised. All were 

investigated, but none were substantiated. 

In general, the nature and number of the allegations received regarding St. Lucie in CY 2007 

and similar trends in concerns being raised internally do not indicate a problem with the SCWE. 

The NRC will maintain its oversight of the SCWE at St. Lucie through normal inspection 

activities, with a focus on the SCWE in the maintenance/instrumentation and control and 

security organizations, as well as on overall employee perceptions of the functionality of the CAP 

and any changes or improvements to it. 

Byron Units 1 and 2

The number of allegations received by the NRC from onsite sources regarding the Byron facility 

has fluctuated upward and downward each year since CY 2003 (Figure 16). While the NRC 

received no allegations of 

discrimination at Byron in CY 2007, 

it received nine other allegations 

representing a substantial increase 

from the previous year. However, 

a review of the individual allegation 

concerns identified no trend or 

pattern in the related disciplines 

that would indicate a significant 

weakness in the SCWE. The 

Byron ECP also saw a notable 

increase in concerns in CY 2007, 

receiving twice as many as in 

2006. Several discrimination 

concerns were raised to the ECP in 

CY 2007, but none involved NRC protected activity. The ECP also received more anonymous 

concerns in CY 2007 than in previous years. On a continuing basis, the ECP interviews the site 

staff in an effort to identify any trends or emerging issues related to the work environment for 

raising concerns at Byron. Additionally, Exelon is currently conducting a company-wide safety 

culture assessment and is planning company-wide training related to the SCWE. 

The most recent NRC PI&R inspection at Byron conducted in July-August 2007 (Inspection 

Report Nos. 05000454/2007006 and 05000455/2007006) did not identify any findings of 

significance relating to the SCWE. The PI&R inspection team interviewed several members of 

the site staff and reviewed the ECP interface activities with site personnel in its effort to identify 

any issues related to the willingness of workers to raise safety issues and also to promote the 

use of the ECP. The PI&R team concluded that issues are freely communicated to supervisors 

at Byron and that the CAP and the ECP are readily used. 

In addition to the fact that the NRC received no discrimination allegations in CY 2007, it received 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

5

10

15

FIGURE 16 - BYRON ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

30

only seven allegations of discrimination in the 4 previous years (CY 2003 – CY 2006). Of these 

seven discrimination concerns, two were investigated by NRC and not substantiated, one was 

not investigated because the alleger did not want the NRC to release his/her identity, one was 

settled via Early ADR, and three were not pursued by NRC because the alleger did not articulate 

a prima facie showing of potential discrimination. 

In general, the nature and number of the CY 2007 allegations regarding Byron along with the 

findings of the most recent NRC PI&R inspection, conducted in late 2007, do not indicate a 

problem with the SCWE. Accordingly, the NRC will continue to monitor the SCWE at Byron 

through normal inspection activities. 

Grand Gulf

The number of allegations regarding Grand Gulf has gradually increased over the past 5 years 

(Figure 17). However, the NRC 

received all of the CY 2007 

Grand Gulf allegations from 

onsite sources during the first 

half of 2007. Half of the 

allegations involved the 

security area. 

The most recent NRC PI&R 

inspection (Inspection Report 

No. 05000416/2007008) 

completed in November 2007 

found that site personnel felt 

free to raise safety concerns to 

supervisors and to enter issues 

into the CAP. Individuals were also familiar with alternate paths for raising safety concerns (e.g., 

the ECP, the NRC) and indicated that they would not be hesitant to use one of those paths when 

appropriate. This was indicative of improvements made since the previous PI&R inspection in 

2005, which identified a few workers who perceived a lack of ECP independence from 

management. In response to this 2005 PI&R observation, the ECP took actions to increase its 

visibility around the site and to conduct a self-assessment in 2006. The 2007 PI&R inspection 

also noted that while workers felt that management was receptive to the reporting of problems, a 

few individuals indicated a lack of confidence that concerns of lesser significance would be 

addressed in a timely manner. 

In CY 2007, the number of items fielded by the Grand Gulf ECP was substantially higher than 

those received in CY 2006, primarily as a result of human resources issues arising from a 

company realignment that was implemented in the second half of 2007. Management changes 

at the site in CY 2007 and an effort by Wackenhut to monitor standards and expectations also 

affected the rate at which the ECP received issues. However, it should be noted that very few of 

the items received by the ECP regarding these notable activities in CY 2007 rose to the level of 

a nuclear safety concern requiring evaluation and analysis. In addition, the Grand Gulf ECP 

receives very few anonymous issues (1-2 per year) and minimal SCWE-type issues (e.g., 

discrimination claims, chilled work environment issues, concerns regarding the effectiveness 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

2

4

6

8

FIGURE 17 - GRAND GULF ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

31

of the CAP). This is an additional indication that the site staff has confidence in the use of the 

ECP. 

The results of a third-party site safety culture assessment in early 2006 indicated a good overall 

safety culture and SCWE at Grand Gulf and noted a few issues in the communications area. 

The findings of the safety culture assessment echoed some of the observations made by the 

2006 NRC PI&R inspection team. The 2007 PI&R inspection team noted that the licensee had 

taken actions to address these issues by way of the action plan established following the safety 

culture assessment. 

The NRC received only three discrimination concerns regarding Grand Gulf in the past 5 years 

and no discrimination concerns in CY 2006 or CY 2007. In CY 2005, the agency received two 

discrimination allegations and both individuals subsequently withdrew their claims. The NRC 

investigated one discrimination concern in CY 2004 but it was not substantiated. 

An analysis of the trends and nature of the allegations does not suggest a SCWE problem at 

Grand Gulf. Similarly, trends in the licensee’s ECP suggest a good work environment and a 

willingness to raise concerns. There are minimal issues at Grand Gulf related to safety culture, 

chilled work environment, or discrimination. The NRC will maintain its oversight of the SCWE 

through normal inspection activities, being mindful of concerns in the security area. 

Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 and 2

The number of allegations received by the NRC regarding ANO Units 1 and 2 in CY 2007 (8) 

represents a notable increase compared to the number of allegations received in the previous 4 

years (Figure 18), with 

six of the eight 

allegations in the 

security area. The 

NRC received six of 

the eight allegations 

(including five security 

allegations) in the first 

half of CY 2007, which 

encompassed the 

period of the twentieth 

ANO Unit 1 refueling 

outage in April-May 

2007. 

The most recent NRC PI&R inspection (Inspection Report No. 05000313/2007007) conducted 

from January 22 -March 8, 2007 concluded that although the team identified no SCWE 

concerns, complaints noted in the results of a sitewide nuclear safety culture assessment in 

March 2006 and a Wackenhut security safety culture survey in August 2006 identified general 

cultural factors that, if not addressed, might affect the SCWE (e.g., occasional emphasis on 

production over safety; staffing/budget necessary to accomplish tasks and maintain plant 

reliability). The PI&R team noted that the licensee had created an action plan to address the 

weaknesses described in the March 2006 safety culture assessment, and that corrective actions 

have been implemented. In the security area, the PI&R team noted that the licensee had 

communicated its views to security officers regarding a specific personnel action that many 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

2

4

6

8

FIGURE 18 - ANO ALLEGATIONS

Substantiated Closed Received
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

32

officers had perceived as retaliatory and that was the reason Entergy senior management asked 

Wackenhut to perform the security safety culture survey. 

In CY 2007, the number of concerns fielded by the ANO Unit 1 and 2 ECP was similar to 

numbers received in CY 2006 and CY 2005. Site activities affecting ECP issue receipt in CY 

2007 were a company “realignment” initiated in early 2007 that eventually resulted in 

approximately 100 site employees either accepting early retirement or being asked to seek 

employment elsewhere either within or outside the company, and the ANO Unit 1 refueling 

outage in April-May 2007. The ECP saw an increase in concerns reported in February 2007 

after the company realignment was announced in January 2007, and in May 2007 (at the end of 

the refueling outage). The ECP continued to receive issues in the security area and is 

anticipating that additional issues may be received subsequent to a significant change in senior 

security management at ANO at the end of CY 2007. 

Entergy emphasized SCWE concepts to the site workforce at all-hands meetings and leadership 

meetings in CY 2007. In addition, the licensee developed computer-based training modules for 

all employees on various SCWE-related topics (e.g., SCWE basics, the ECP). Entergy asked 

Wackenhut to perform its security culture survey again in 2007, and the results were somewhat 

better than those of the 2006 survey. Given the recent changes in senior security management 

Entergy is considering asking Wackenhut to continue to survey the security department 

periodically to monitor the work environment as the new security management transitions to the 

site. 

Only 3 discrimination concerns were raised to the NRC regarding ANO Units 1 and 2 in the last 

5 years. The most recent two concerns of discrimination, one each in CY 2007 and CY 2006, 

involved third party discrimination claims. In CY 2005, an alleger submitted a discrimination 

concern but later withdrew it. No discrimination concerns were submitted to NRC in CY 2004 or 

CY 2003. 

In summary, ANO has recognized SCWE issues in the security department and is continuing 

efforts to improve in that area. Recent changes in upper level management in security could 

challenge that improvement if the transition is not handled well. An analysis of the trends and 

nature of allegations received regarding ANO Units 1 and 2 does not suggest an overall concern 

with the SCWE, but attention should be paid to the security area. The NRC will maintain its 

oversight of the SCWE through normal inspection activities. Review efforts will include a 

particular focus on the effectiveness of actions the licensee is taking to improve the SCWE in 

the security organization. 

Allegation Trends for Selected Materials Licensees

The NRC Web site posts allegation statistics for certain fuel cycle facilities (see the appendix to 

this report). Because of the small number of allegations concerning other smaller materials 

licensees and because of the potential for a licensee or contractor to identify an alleger, tables of 

statistics on allegations concerning materials licensees other than fuel cycle facilities have not 

been provided publicly or included in this report. None of the materials licensees, fuel cycle 

facilities or otherwise, received a sufficient number of allegations to discern a trend or pattern or 

to provide insights into the SCWE. Therefore, this report does not include more in-depth 

reviews of specific materials licensees. 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

33

Allegation Trends for Selected Vendors 

Because none of the vendors received a sufficient number of allegations to discern a trend or 

pattern or to provide insights into the work environment, this report does not include more 

indepth reviews of specific vendors. The report also does not provide statistics by contractor or 

vendor because publishing the number of allegations could identify an alleger. 
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

34

CONCLUSIONS

From calendar years 2003 through 2007, the number of allegations received by the NRC has 

remained fairly steady, in the range of approximately 600 allegations per year, with a declining 

trend from CY 2004 through CY 2007. Reductions in allegations received from some reactor 

facilities that had previously experienced significant allegation activity explain the more recent 

declining trend. From a national and regional perspective, the trend in the total number of 

concerns has paralleled the trend of total allegations received in the 2003 to 2006 timeframe, 

with the number of concerns received at operating power reactor facilities decreasing slightly in 

all regions in 2006. In 2007, however, although the number of allegations decreased, the 

number of concerns actually increased for reactor facilities in almost every region and program 

office. Security-related concerns continue to be the largest percentage of concerns received. 

The analyses of allegations have provided insights into the SCWE at several facilities. The staff 

has taken action to engage licensees concerning their work environment when warranted and 

will continue to monitor these sites with interest. 

The agency’s Early ADR process resulted in nine cases in which discrimination allegations were 

successfully settled between the parties before the start of an NRC investigation. The staff 

believes that voluntary dispute resolution by the parties using the communication opportunities 

afforded in Early-ADR can stem the inherent damage such disputes have on the SCWE more 

quickly than an investigation. 

Finally, the NRC is currently considering a number of proposed enhancements to the allegation 

process based on internal review of the lessons learned in 2007 in handling allegations of 

inattentive security officers at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. In addition to the staff’s 

internal reviews, the Office of the Inspector General is conducting an investigation into this 

matter that may yield further enhancements for consideration. In addition, the staff plans to 

engage external stakeholders regarding certain aspects of these process enhancements. The 

outcome of these efforts will be documented in Commission and Allegation Program policy and 

guidance documents. 
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

A-1

APPENDIX 

ALLEGATION STATISTICS 

OPERATING REACTORS AND FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES 
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

A-2

OPERATING REACTOR ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED FROM ONSITE SOURCES 

Site 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE 1 & 2 4 6 4 4 8

BEAVER VALLEY 1 & 2 1 9 7 3 1

BRAIDWOOD 1 & 2 1 3 4 6 5

BROWNS FERRY 1 5 18 20 16 11

BROWNS FERRY 2 & 3 6 5 1 

BRUNSWICK 1 & 2 3 2 3 1 3

BYRON 1 & 2 11 6 12 3 9

CALLAWAY 3 1 11 3 17

CALVERT CLIFFS 1 & 2 4 5 1 2 1

CATAWBA 1 & 2 2 2 2

CLINTON 2 4 1 3 1

COLUMBIA PLANT 4 6 7 3 3

COMANCHE PEAK 1 & 2 1 2 9 3 4

COOK 1 & 2 9 12 7 7 3

COOPER 8 10 1 3 2

CRYSTAL RIVER 3 4 2 5 4

DAVIS-BESSE 18 12 9 4

DIABLO CANYON 1 & 2 2 2 2 2 2

DRESDEN 2 & 3 3 3 9 7 

DUANE ARNOLD 2 8 1 1 1

FARLEY 1 & 2 3 1 4 4 6

FERMI 2 2 2 3 10

FITZPATRICK 7 3 3 1

FORT CALHOUN 3 2 2 6 

GINNA 2 2 2 2

GRAND GULF 6 7 4 8

HARRIS 1 9 14 14

HATCH 1 & 2 2 1 3 1 6

INDIAN POINT 2 & 3 20 19 9 15 19

KEWAUNEE 4 3 3 4 1

LASALLE 1 & 2 2 2 1 5

LIMERICK 1 & 2 4 4 8 4 1

McGUIRE 1 & 2 2 2 2 

MILLSTONE 2 & 3 6 1 10 9 5

MONTICELLO 1 2 2 1

NINE MILE POINT 1 & 2 2 4 4 5 6

NORTH ANNA 1 & 2 1 4 2 1 3

OCONEE 1, 2, & 3 3 11 3 2 2

OYSTER CREEK 18 8 14 4 2

PALISADES 7 10 3 6 5

PALO VERDE 1, 2, & 3 19 8 22 16 18

PEACH BOTTOM 2 & 3 2 1 5 6 8
ALLEGATION PROGRAM 2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT 

A-3

Site 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 

PERRY 5 12 4 1 1

PILGRIM 5 14 9 6 7

POINT BEACH 1 & 2 9 11 13 2 1

PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 & 2 2 4 5 6 6

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 1 1 2 1 4

RIVER BEND 4 3 2 3 2

ROBINSON 1 1 

SALEM/HOPE CREEK 6 18 23 14 16

SAN ONOFRE 2 & 3 11 13 10 15 12

SEABROOK 3 3 9 4 4

SEQUOYAH 1 & 2 7 4 10 11 13

SOUTH TEXAS 1 & 2 2 6 4 8 6

ST LUCIE 1 & 2 24 4 16 15 11

SUMMER 4 3 3 

SURRY 1 & 2 2 1 2 1

SUSQUEHANNA 1 & 2 3 13 20 19 13

THREE MILE ISLAND 1 6 4 1 1

TURKEY POINT 3 & 4 3 9 10 18 4

VERMONT YANKEE 3 1 4 3

VOGTLE 1 & 2 1 1 5 5 7

WATERFORD 1 2 2 2

WATTS BAR 2 4 2 6 3

WOLF CREEK 3 1 1
2007 ANNUAL TRENDS REPORT ALLEGATION PROGRAM 

A-4

FUEL CYCLE FACILITY ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED FROM ONSITE SOURCES 

Site 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 

BWX TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 3 3 1

FRAMATONE-LYNCHBURG 1 

FRAMATONE-RICHLAND 1 1 1 

GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL 1 2 1

HONEYWELL 2 7 1

NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES, INC. 10 10 6 1 3

PADUCAH 22 10 7 3 6

PORTSMOUTH 2 7 2 6 2

WESTINGHOUSE 1 8 2 2