## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S

O F T E X A S

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. P D

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W I L K I E S C H E L L C O L Y E R

, J R

. , A p p e l l a n t

v

.

T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

O N S T A T E ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E S E C O N D C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

T A R R A N T C O U N T Y

C O C H R A N

, J

. , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e u n a n i m o u s C o u r t

.

O P I N I O N

A j u r y c o n v i c t e d a p p e l l a n t o f d r i v i n g w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d

. T h e t r i a l j u d g e d e n i e d h i s

m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l

, w h i c h a l l e g e d t h a t o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e s w e r e i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t t o b e a r

o n t h e j u r y f

o r e m a n

. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

, o v e r a d i s s e n t

, h e l d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e d i t s

d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g a p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l a l l e g i n g j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t

. B e c a u s e 1

Colyer v. State

, 395 S.W .3d 277, 283 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 20 1 3 ) (“ Be ca u se the 1

uncontrove rted evidence in this case established that the foreman in Ap p el l an t’s trial chang ed his

vote to g uilty and that his vote was contra ry to a fair expression of his opinion, we hold that the trial

court a bused its discretion by

deny ing A

ppellant’s motion for new trial.”).Coly er Pag e 2

a p p e l l a n t ’ s “ o u t s i d e i n f

l u e n c e ” a r g u m e n t m i s a p p l i e s o u r h o l d i n g i n M c Q u a r r i e v

. S t a t e

, w e 2

g r a n t e d t h e S t a t e ’ s p e t i t i o n f o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e v i e w

. P e r s o n a l p r e s s u r e s

— s u c h a s a f e a r o f 3

i n c l e m e n t w e a t h e r o r c o n c e r n a b o u t a c h i l d ’ s i l l n e s s

— a r e n o t “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e s ” u n d e r

T e x a s R u l e o f E v i d e n c e 6 0 6 ( b )

. A c c o r d i n g l y

, j u r o r t e s t i m o n y a b o u t t h e s e i s s u e s i s n o t

a d m i s s i b l e

. B e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o p r o v e t h a t t h e j u r y ’ s v e r d i c t w a s t a i n t e d b y j u r o r

m i s c o n d u c t

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e d i d n o t a b u s e h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g a p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n f o r n e w

t r i a l

. W e t h e r e f

o r e r e v e r s e t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

.

I

.

A t a b o u t 1 : 3 0 a

. m

. , a p p e l l a n t w a s d r i v i n g h o m e a l o n e a f t e r h a v i n g d i n n e r w i t h f

r i e n d s

.

P o l i c e f o u n d h i m s t o p p e d i n t h e m i d d l e o f a n i n t e r s e c t i o n

, p a s s e d o u t b e h i n d t h e w h e e l

. A t

t r i a l

, t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d a v i d e o o f a p p e l l a n t ’ s p e r f o r m a n c e o n t h e f

i e l d s o b r i e t y t e s t s a n d o f

h i s r e f u s a l t o s u b m i t t o a b r e a t h t e s t

, a s w e l l a s t e s t i m o n y f r o m t h e a r r e s t i n g o f

f i c e r

. T h e

d e f e n s e a r g u e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t w a s o v e r w o r k e d a n d s l e e p d e p r i v e d

, w h i c h c a u s e d h i m t o f a l l

a s l e e p a t t h e w h e e l w h i l e w a i t i n g f o r t h e l i g h t t o c h a n g e

.

T h e j u r y f

o u n d a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y o f D W I

. A f t e r t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d i t s v e r d i c t

, t h e j u d g e

380 S.W .3d 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 2

We gr anted the State’ s three g rounds for r eview: 3

(1) Should the Court of Appea ls presume that the sole witness at a motion for new tria l

is telling the truth—when the trial judge coul d h av e m ade its decision to deny the

motion based on its rea sonable disbelief of that witness?

(2) Does Rule 606(b) permit a juror’s testimony that outside information pressure d him

to quickly rea ch a verdic t despite the fac t that the information did not influence him

one wa y or the other ?

(3) Must the preva iling party in a motion for new trial object to inadmissable evidenc e?Coly er Pag e 3

a s k e d t h e j u r y f

o r e m a n

, M r

. A g u i l e r a

, i f t h e v e r d i c t w a s u n a n i m o u s

. M r

. A g u i l e r a

r e s p o n d e d

, “ Y e s

, y o u r H o n o r

. ” B a s e d o n t h e f o r e m a n ’ s b o d y l a n g u a g e w h i l e r e s p o n d i n g

,

a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l a s k e d f o r t h e j u r y t o b e p o l l e d

. M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s i n i t i a l s t a t e m e n t w h e n 4

p o l l e d w a s

, “ I t w a s a m a j o r i t y

— I t w a s

— Y e s

, Y o u r H o n o r

. ” W h e n a s k e d t o c l a r i f y

, h e s a i d

,

“ W e a l l t o o k a p o l l a n d w e v o t e d u n a n i m o u s l y

. ”

D u r i n g t h e p u n i s h m e n t p h a s e

, a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l n o t e d t h a t

t h e j u r o r s a i d t h a t i t w a s a m a j o r i t y a n d t h e n I a p p r o a c h e d t h e C o u r t a b o u t m y

c o n c e r n a b o u t t h a t w o r d i n g a n d h i s b o d y l a n g u a g e

, a n d I j u s t w a n t t o p u t o n

t h e r e c o r d w h a t I n o t i c e d w a s t h a t h e a p p e a r e d u p s e t

. H e a p p e a r e d f r u s t r a t e d

.

H e w a s

— H e r o l l e d h i s e y e s

. H e k i n d o f h u f f e d w h e n h e w a s a s k e d

.

Y o u t h e n a s k e d h i m a g a i n

, a n d h e r o l l e d h i s e y e s a n d

— a n d j u s t s o r t o f

v e r y a b r u p t l y s a i d

, [ “ ] h a h h

. [ ” ] I ’ d a l s o l i k e t o p o i n t o u t t h a t

— j u s t f o r t h e

r e c o r d

, w e w e r e b u s y

— t h a t w e g o t t h e n o t e a b o u t

— d i s p u t e a b o u t p o l i c e

t e s t i m o n y

, t h e n w e a s k e d t h e m t o c l a r i f y

. . . t h e c l a r i f

i c a t i o n c a m e b a c k t h a t

i t w a s a c t u a l l y t e s t i m o n y a b o u t t h e d e f e n s e w i t n e s s

. I n t h e p r o c e s s o f u s t r y i n g

t o p u l l t h a t t e s t i m o n y a n d g e t i t f o r t h e m

, t h e y c a m e b a c k w i t h t h e v e r d i c t

p r e t t y a b r u p t l y w i t h o u t t h e t e s t i m o n y t r a n s c r i p t b e i n g g i v e n

— t h e t r a n s c r i p t

b e i n g g i v e n t o t h e m

.

S o j u s t b a s e d o n h i s b o d y l a n g u a g e

, h i s n o n v e r b a l e x p r e s s i o n s

a n d

— a n d w h a t I w a t c h e d h i m s a y w h e n h e

— a f t e r h e s a i d i t w a s a m a

j o r i t y

,

w h i c h

, o b v i o u s l y

, l e g a l l y i t h a s t o b e u n a n i m o u s

, I w o u l d a s k t h e C o u r t t o

w i t h h o l d s e n t e n c i n g u n t i l a l a t e r d a t e

.

The full exchang e wa s as follows: 4

Def ense: Your Honor , we would like the jur y polled, please

. J udg e: All rig ht. Mr. Ag uilera, w as that y our ver dict?

Ag uilera: I t was a ma jority —I t was—Ye s, Your Honor

. J udg e: Okay . I have to a sk eac h of y ou individually

. . . . Def ense: (On-the -re cord bench confe renc e.) I ’m conce rned beca use Mr. Ag uilera just said that

was a majority and he he sitated. . . .

J udg e: Okay

. Mr. Ag uilera, y ou made the statement it was a majority verdic t. Was it

unanimous or—Would y ou explain to m e wha t y ou meant by

that?

Ag uilera: We all took a poll and we voted una nimously , Your Honor

.Coly er Pag e 4

T w o m o n t h s l a t e r

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e s e n t e n c e d a p p e l l a n t t o t w e n t y d a y s i n j a i l

, a $ 5 5 0

f i n e

, a n d a s i x

- m o n t h s u s p e n s i o n o f h i s d r i v e r ’ s l i c e n s e

. A p p e l l a n t f i l e d a m o t i o n f

o r n e w

t r i a l

, a l l e g i n g j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t

. A t t h e h e a r i n g o n t h e m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l

, a p p e l l a n t c a l l e d

M r

. A g u i l e r a a s h i s s o l e w i t n e s s

. F r o m t h e s t a r t

, t h e S t a t e o p p o s e d t h e m o t i o n

, a r g u i n g t h a t

t h e r e w a s n o l e g a l b a s i s f o r a h e a r i n g b e c a u s e “ [ a ] n y e v i d e n c e o u t s i d e o f t h e r e c o r d w h i c h

t h e D e f e n s e a t t h i s t i m e w i s h e s t o p r e s e n t t o t h e C o u r t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o h i b i t e d b y R u l e

6 0 6 ( b ) o f t h e T e x a s R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e

. ” T h e t r i a l j u d g e a l l o w e d t h e h e a r i n g t o p r o c e e d

, b u t

l i m i t e d t h e s c o p e o f t h e t e s t i m o n y t o t h e t w o R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) e x c e p t i o n s

. T h e S t a t e t h e n 5

o b j e c t e d t o t h e c o n t e n t o f M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s t e s t i m o n y n i n e s e p a r a t e t i m e s

.

M r

. A g u i l e r a t e s t i f

i e d t h a t h i s v e r d i c t w a s n o t a f a i r e x p r e s s i o n o f

h i s o p i n i o n d u e t o

a n a r r a y o f “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e s

, ” i n c l u d i n g t h e l a t e t i m e o f d a y

, t h e d i s t a n c e t o t h e p a r k i n g

l o t

, t h e a p p r o a c h i n g i n c l e m e n t w e a t h e r

, a n d t h e a m o u n t o f t i m e i t w a s t a k i n g t o r e s p o n d t o 6

t h e j u r y ’ s n o t e s

. M r

. A g u i l e r a w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y a f f e c t e d b y a c a l l h e r e c e i v e d d u r i n g

d e l i b e r a t i o n s f

r o m h i s d o c t o r i n f

o r m i n g h i m t h a t h i s d a u g h t e r h a d t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r M R S A

. 7

“[A] j uror may testify : (1) whether any outside influence was improper ly broug ht to bear 5

upon any juror; or (2) to rebut a claim that the juror was not qualified to s er v e. ” T E X

. R

. E V I D

. 606(b).

Mr. Ag uilera testified, “I t was extremel y wi ndy

, dark, clouds, people wer e—it

6

was—wor

ried about the tornado that had hit befor e, so it was panic. There wer e phone calls made

while we w ere waiting on paper work.”

Mr. Aguilera said that his doctor c alled bec ause “I have a s ever e case of chronic arthritis 7

due to an anthra x injection that was g iven to me befor e I went to Dese rt Storm, Kuwait. My

daug hter had an absce ss on her body which was cover ed—which I was cover ed in 90 perc ent of the

y e a r p r io r

. Sh e b e c a

me p o s it iv e f

o r MRSA.” Methicillin–Resist ant Staphy lococc us Aure us (MRSA)

is a serious staph infe ction cause d by an antibiotic-re sistant bacter ium.Coly er Pag e 5

H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h i s c a l l i n f

l u e n c e d h i m t o c h a n g e h i s v e r d i c t : “ [ H e ] h a d t o c o n c e d e t o t h e

o t h e r p e o p l e a n d g e t h o m e t o [ h i s ] d a u g h t e r i m m e d i a t e l y

. ” H e a g r e e d t h a t t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s

w e r e c u t s h o r t b e c a u s e a l l o f t h e j u r o r s w e r e a f f e c t e d b y “ o u t s i d e i n f

l u e n c e s

. ” 8

A f t e r M r

. A g u i l e r a t e s t i f

i e d

, t h e S t a t e r e a s s e r t e d t h a t “ [ n ] o t h i n g t h a t M r

. A g u i l e r a h a s

t e s t i f i e d t o c a n e v e n b e c o n s i d e r e d a n i m p r o p e r o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e

. . . . T h e v e r y p u r p o s e o f

6 0 6 ( b ) i s s o t h a t d e f

e n d a n t s d o n ’ t h a v e a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e l i t i g a t e t h e i r c a s e s

, t h a t t h e y d o n ’ t

h a v e a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o t a l k t o j u r o r s a n d h a v e t h e m c h a n g e t h e i r m i n d s

. ” T h e t r i a l j u d g e

d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n f

o r n e w t r i a l w i t h o u t c o m m e n t

.

T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s m a j o r i t y r e v e r s e d

, f

i n d i n g t h a t “ t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e d i t s

d i s c r e t i o n b y d e n y i n g A p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l

. ” F i r s t

, b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e d i d n o t

9

o b j e c t t o e a c h i n d i v i d u a l p i e c e o f t e s t i m o n y

, c r o s s

- e x a m i n e M r

. A g u i l e r a

, o r p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e

f r o m o t h e r j u r o r s t o c o n t r a d i c t h i s t e s t i m o n y

, t h e c o u r t c a l l e d M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s t e s t i m o n y

“ u n c o n t r o v e r t e d

. ” N e x t

, t h e c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t

, b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e d i d n o t d i s p u t e t h e 1 0

Def ense c ounsel asked Mr . Ag uilera the following question: 8

Do y ou fee l that there wer e outside influence s such that y ou’ve mentioned; the time

of day

, parking

, which require d a ride to the shuttle bus and their conce rn over when

that stopped, the wea ther, the calls from home reg arding their con ce rn and the

amount of time that it was taking to g et cer tain things that y ou reque sted via the juror

notes, do y ou fee l that those outside influence s combined cause d the delibera tions to

proceed q u icker or in a manner that—that was—that the delibera tions wer e

abbre viated and tha

t they wer e actually cut off so tha t y ’all could be dismiss ed and

ever y one could attend to g et their car s and avoid the wea ther and that sort of thing?

Mr. Ag uilera r esponded, “ Absolutely .”

Colyer , 395 S.W .3d at 283. 9

See id. at 282 (“A ll this testimony [by Mr. Ag uilera] went unchalleng ed by the State, and 1 0

there was no conflicting evidenc e for the trial court to resolve ag ainst it. Thus, Ag uilera’ s testimonyColy er Pag e 6

t e s t i m o n y

, t h e r e w a s n o n e e d t o d o a 6 0 6 ( b ) a n a l y s i s

. F i n a l l y

, b e c a u s e M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s 1 1

t e s t i m o n y u n e q u i v o c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e s ” c a u s e d h i m t o c h a n g e h i s v o t e

,

h e r e a c h e d h i s v e r d i c t i n a “ m a n n e r o t h e r t h a n a f a i r e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e j u r o r s ’ o p i n i o n

. ” 1 2

T h e r e f o r e

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e s h o u l d h a v e g r a n t e d a p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l

. 1 3

T h e d i s s e n t a r g u e d t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e d i d n o t a b u s e h i s d i s c r e t i o n b e c a u s e t h e

t e l e p h o n e c a l l a n d t h e w e a t h e r w e r e “ p e r s o n a l p r e s s u r e s

, ” n o t o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e s

. T h e r e f

o r e

,

M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s t e s t i m o n y w a s i n a d m i s s i b l e u n d e r R u l e 6 0 6 ( b )

. F u r t h e r m o r e

, t h e d i s s e n t 1 4

n o t e d t h a t t h e S t a t e o b

j e c t e d t o t h e e n t i r e h e a r i n g o n R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) g r o u n d s a n d r e p e a t e d t h i s

o b j e c t i o n t h r o u g h o u t

, t h u s

, t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s s h o u l d h a v e a p p l i e d R u l e 6 0 6 ( b )

. 1 5

I I

.

A

. S t a n d a r d o f R e v i e w

W e r e v i e w a t r i a l j u d g e ’ s d e n i a l o f a m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l u n d e r a n a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n

e s tablished without dispute that an outside influence cause d him to vote differ ently than he otherwise

would have.” ).

Id. (“A g uilera testified without object ion, with no cross-e x amination, and ag ainst no 1 1

controve rting evidenc e that outside influence s cause d him to chang e his verdic t to g uilty despite his

belief that the State had not proven its case bey ond a rea sonable doubt, in order to allow him to leave

the jury room immediately

. Contrary to the State’s position, we will not hold that rule 606(b) applies

to testimony

that comes in unopposed by objection.”)

.

Id. at 283. 1 2

Id. ; T E X

. R. A P P

. P. 21.3(c) (listing re asons def endant must be g rante d a new trial). 1 3

Colyer , 395 S.W .3d at 283 (Walker, J., dissenting). 1 4

Id. at 284 n.2. 1 5Coly er Pag e 7

s t a n d a r d

. “ W e d o n o t s u b s t i t u t e o u r j u d g m e n t f o r t h a t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ; r a t h e r

, w e d e c i d e 1 6

w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n w a s a r b i t r a r y o r u n r e a s o n a b l e

. ” A t r i a l j u d g e a b u s e s h i s 1 7

d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g a m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l w h e n n o r e a s o n a b l e v i e w o f t h e r e c o r d c o u l d

s u p p o r t h i s r u l i n g

. W e v i e w t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e t r i a l j u d g e ’ s 1 8

r u l i n g a n d p r e s u m e t h a t a l l r e a s o n a b l e f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s t h a t c o u l d h a v e b e e n m a d e a g a i n s t t h e

l o s i n g p a r t y w e r e m a d e a g a i n s t t h a t l o s i n g p a r t y

. 1 9

A t a m o t i o n f

o r n e w t r i a l h e a r i n g

, t h e j u d g e a l o n e d e t e r m i n e s t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e

w i t n e s s e s

. E v e n i f t h e t e s t i m o n y i s n o t c o n t r o v e r t e d o r s u b j e c t t o c r o s s

- e x a m i n a t i o n

, t h e 2 0

t r i a l j u d g e h a s d i s c r e t i o n t o d i s b e l i e v e t h a t t e s t i m o n y

. I n e x p l a i n i n g t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n 2 1

“ u n c o n t r a d i c t e d t e s t i m o n y ” s u c h a s M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s a n d “ u n d i s p u t e d f a c t s ” ( s u c h a s t h o s e

f a c t s b o t h p a r t i e s a g r e e t o o r t h a t a r e s u b j e c t t o j u d i c i a l n o t i c e )

, w e h a v e n o t e d t h a t “ a

Salazar v. State , 38 S.W .3d 141, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 1 6

Holden v. State , 201 S.W .3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 1 7

Id. at 763. 1 8

Quinn v. State

, 958 S.W .2d 395, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (uphold i n g trial judge ’s 1 9

denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct, noting that court of appea ls had failed to

g ive appr opriate de fer ence to trial judge ’s cr edibility deter minations).

Salazar , 38 S.W .3d at 148. 2 0

Masterson v. State , 155 S.W .3d 167, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“A ppellant contends, 2 1

howeve r, that the trial court had no discretion to disbelieve appellant’ s testimony about reque sting

counsel befor e the mag istrate beca use the State never controve rted that testimony

. But the trial court

has discretion to disbe lieve testimony even if it is not c ontroverte d.”); see also Ev ans v. State

, 202

S

. W

. 3 d 1 5 8

, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Hernande z v. State

, 161 S.W .3d 491, 501 (Tex. Cri m

. App. 2005).Coly er Pag e 8

d e f e n d a n t ’ s m o t h e r m a y t e s t i f y t h a t t h e d e f

e n d a n t w a s w i t h h e r i n O s h k o s h o n t h e n i g h t o f

t h e m u r d e r

. E v e n t h o u g h t h e S t a t e d o e s n o t c r o s s

- e x a m i n e t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s m o t h e r

, t h e j u r y

i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o b e l i e v e h e r u n c o n t r a d i c t e d t e s t i m o n y

. ” 2 2

B

. R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) o f t h e T e x a s R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e

E a r l y E n g l i s h c o m m o n l a w a l l o w e d a d v o c a t e s t o h a r a s s t h e j u r y a f t e r t r i a l t o e l i c i t

a d m i s s i o n s o f j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t i n s u p p o r t o f a m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l

. I n e s s e n c e

, a f t e r t h e 2 3

j u r y t r i a l

, t h e j u r y w a s t r i e d

. I n 1 7 8 5

, L o r d M a n s f i e l d e n d e d t h i s p r a c t i c e b y p r o h i b i t i n g

j u d g e s f r o m a d m i t t i n g t e s t i m o n y f r o m j u r o r s i m p e a c h i n g t h e i r v e r d i c t u n d e r t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t

“ n o o n e s h o u l d b e a l l o w e d t o a l l e g e h i s o w n t u r p i t u d e

. ” 2 4

T e x a s i n i t i a l l y f

o l l o w e d L o r d M a n s f

i e l d ’ s r u l e s t r i c t l y

, b u t t h e L e g i s l a t u r e a d o p t e d 2 5

a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h e c o m m o n l a w j u r o r

- i n c o m p e t e n c y r u l e i n 1 9 0 5 t h a t e v e n t u a l l y r e s u l t e d i n

“ a f a r w i d e r s c o p e o f i n q u i r y i n t o t h e j u r y ’ s d e l i b e r a t i o n t h a n a n y o t h e r s t a t e

. ” A s a r e s u l t

, 2 6

Evans , 202 S.W .3d at 163. 2 2

See 8 J O H N H. W I G M O R E

, E V I D E N C E I N T R I A L S A T C O M M O N L A W § 2352, at 696 2 3

(McNa ug hto n r e v

. 1 9 6 1 ) ( c ollecting case s showing that, under ear ly common law, the “unquestioned

prac tice” ha d been to r ece ive juror testimony of misconduct to invalidate the ve rdict).

Vaise v. Delaval

, 99 Eng

. Rep. 944 (K.B

. 1785) (re jecting juror aff

idavits tha t a decision 2 4

had bee n rea ched by

chanc e bec ause “ [t ]he Court cannot rec eive suc h an af fidavit from a

ny of the

jury men themselves” ).

See St. Louis S.W

. Ry. Co. v. Ricke tts

, 70 S.W

. 315, 317 (Tex. 1902) (stating that the Court 2 5

has “uniformly denied the competenc y ” of juror aff idavits or testimony

to attack the jury ’s verdic t

based on c laims of “irre g ularities and improprie ties of diffe rent kinds”)

.

See Golden Eagle Archery

, Inc. v. Jack

son

, 24 S.W .3d 362, 367–68 (Tex. 2000) (citation 2 6

omitted) (discussing the history of Rule 606(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence ); see generally David

E. Keltner

, Jury Misconduct in Texas: Trying the Trier of Fact

, 34 Sw. L .J

. 1131 (1981) (discussingColy er Pag e 9

j u r y v e r d i c t s w e r e f

r e q u e n t l y a t t a c k e d b y d i s g r u n t l e d j u r o r s a n d r e v e r s e d f o r “ t r i v i a l

m i s c o n d u c t

. ” T h e T e x a s S u p r e m e C o u r t t o o k a c t i o n i n 1 9 8 3 b y a d o p t i n g T e x a s R u l e o f

2 7

C i v i l E v i d e n c e 6 0 6 ( b )

, w h i c h

, e x c e p t f o r t w o n a r r o w e x c e p t i o n s

, p r o h i b i t s p o s t

- v e r d i c t 2 8

j u r o r t e s t i m o n y t o i m p e a c h a v e r d i c t

. T h u s

, a j u r o r i s n o t p e r m i t t e d t o t e s t i f y a b o u t a n y 2 9

e v e n t s o r s t a t e m e n t s o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g j u r y d e l i b e r a t i o n s

, a n y o f t h e j u r o r s ’ m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s

,

o r h o w a n i m p r o p e r o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e a c t u a l l y a f

f e c t e d t h e j u r o r s

. 3 0

the evolution and applica tion of the pre- 1983 Texas rule).

1 M C C O R M I C K & RA Y

, T E X A S L A W O F E V I D E N C E § 394, at 331-32 (2d e d. 1956). 2 7

The orig inal Civil Rule 606(b) is, f or all purposes rele vant to this case

, indisti ng uishable 2 8

from the c urre nt Rule 606(b), which a pplies in both civil and criminal trials. Rule 606(b) states:

Upon an inquiry into the validi ty of a verdic t or i ndictment, a juror may n o t testify

as to any matter or statement occur ring during the jury ’s delibera tions, or to the eff ect

of any thing on any juror’s mind or emotions or mental proce sses, as influencing any

juror’s assent to or dissent from the verdic t or indictment. Nor may a juror’s aff idavit

or any statement by a juror conc erning any matter about which the juror would be

p re cl u d ed from testify ing be admitted in evidenc e for any of these purposes.

Howeve r, a juror may testify: ( 1) whether any outside influence was imp r o p er l y

brought to bear upon any juror ; o r (2 ) to rebut a claim that the juror was not

qualified to ser

ve.

T E X

. R. E V I D

. 606(b) (empha sis added)

. Texas Rule 606(b) differ s from it s fe d er al counter part

beca use it does not i n cl u d e t he exception that allows a juror to testify “whe ther extraneous

prejudicia l information was improper ly broug ht to the jury ’s attention.” F E D

. R. E V I D . 606(b).

Golden Eagle , 24 S.W .3d. at 367–68

. 2 9

See Robinson Elec. Sup. Co. v. Cadill ac C a b l e Corp.

, 706 S.W .2d 130, 132 (Tex. 3 0

App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1986, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) (noting the chang e from prior law, which

permitted a juror to testify to matters, statements, and overt acts occur ring during delibera tions and

which insulated only the mental proce sses of jurors); see generally

, 3 C H R I S T O P H E R B. M U E L L E R &

L A I R D C. K I R K P A T R I C K

, F E D E R A L E V I D E N C E § 247 at 51 (2d ed. 1994) (Rule 606(b) “bar s any

testimony or statement by a juror (whe ther proved by aff idavit or in any other way ) offe red to prove

virtually any

thing about delibera tions—any matter occur ring or statement m ad e, o r the eff ect of

any thing on the mind or emotions of any juror, or the mental proce sses of the juror whose testimony

or statement is off

ere d.”).Coly er Pag e 10

T h e p u r p o s e o f R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) i s t o l i m i t “ t h e r o l e j u r o r s m a y p l a y i n a t t a c k i n g t h e

v a l i d i t y o f a v e r d i c t

. ” T h i s l i m i t a t i o n s e r v e s f o u r i m p o r t a n t p o l i c y i n t e r e s t s : I t e n c o u r a g e s 3 1

j u r o r s t o c a n d i d l y d i s c u s s t h e c a s e

, p r o t e c t s j u r o r s f r o m p o s t

- t r i a l h a r a s s m e n t

, p r o m o t e s 3 2 3 3

f i n a l i t y

, a n d p r e v e n t s t a m p e r i n g a n d f r a u d

. I n s u m

, R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) p r o t e c t s a g o o d s y s t e m 3 4 3 5

t h a t c a n n o t b e m a d e p e r f e c t

. A s J u d g e L e a r n e d H a n d c a u t i o n e d

, w i t h o u t R u l e 6 0 6 ( b )

, 3 6

j u d g e s w o u l d b e c o m e l i k e m y t h o l o g i c a l “ P e n e l o p e s

, f o r e v e r e n g a g e d i n u n r a v e l i n g t h e 3 7

w e b s t h e y w o v e

. ” T o t h i s d a y

, c o u r t s t r y t o m a i n t a i n t h e b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e g o a l o f “ a 3 8

t r i a l b y a j u r y f

r e e f r o m b i a s o r m i s c o n d u c t ” a n d t h e n e e d t o p r e v e n t l o s i n g p a r t i e s f r o m

1 S T E V E N G O O D E E T A L

., T E X A S P R A C T I C E S E R I E S : G U I D E T O T H E T E X A S R U L E S O F 3 1

E V I D E N C E , § 606.2, 672 (3d ed. 2002)

.

Golden Eagle , 24 S.W .3d. at 367. 3 2

Id. 3 3

Id. 3 4

See United States v. Eagle , 539 F.2d 1166, 1170 ( 8th Cir. 1976) (the purpose of t he rule 3 5

is to preve nt “fr aud by individual jurors who could rema in silent during delibera tions and later asser t

that they wer e influenc ed by

improper c onsiderations.”)

.

See Tanner v. United St a t es

, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987) (“The re is littl e doubt that 3 6

postverdict investiga tion into juror misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation of

verdic ts reac hed af

ter irr esponsible or improper juror beha

vior. I t is not at all clea

r, howe ver, tha t

the jury sy stem could survive such e ffor ts to perfe ct it.”).

As a ploy to delay rema

rriag e, Penelope, the wife of Ody sseus, prete nded to wea ve a linen 3 7

shroud. Sh e wa s al wa y s wea ving but the shroud was never finished beca use ever y night she

unrave led her

wea ving.

Jorgense n v. Y

ork Ic e Mac hinery Corp. , 160 F.2d 432, 435 ( 2d Cir. 1947). 3 8Coly er Pag e 11

t r y i n g t h e j u r y

. B u t

, a s a g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n

, R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) a n d c a s e s f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 3 9

S u p r e m e C o u r t a n d t h e T e x a s S u p r e m e C o u r t h a v e s t r u c k t h e b a l a n c e i n f a v o r o f t h e p r i v a c y

o f j u r o r d e l i b e r a t i o n s

. 4 0

T h e m o s t c o m m o n

, b u t d i s a l l o w e d

, m e a n s t o i m p e a c h t h e j u r y ’ s v e r d i c t i s t h e

“ d i s g r u n t l e d j u r o r

. ” A s c o m m e n t a t o r s h a v e n o t e d

, “ [ a ] j u r o r w h o r e l u c t a n t l y j o i n e d a v e r d i c t

i s l i k e l y t o b e s y m p a t h e t i c t o o v e r t u r e s b y t h e l o s e r

, a n d p e r s u a d a b l e t o t h e v i e w t h a t h i s o w n

c o n s e n t r e s t e d o n f

a l s e o r i m p e r m i s s i b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s [

. ] ” A l l o w i n g s u c h j u r o r s t o 4 1

i m p e a c h t h e i r f

o r m e r v e r d i c t s w o u l d g i v e t h e l o s i n g p a r t y m u c h t o g a i n a n d l i t t l e t o l o s e i n

h a r a s s i n g a l l o f t h e f

o r m e r j u r o r s i n a s e a r c h f o r a “ d i s g r u n t l e d ” o n e

. R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) f l a t l y

p r o h i b i t s “ d i s g r u n t l e d j u r o r ” e v i d e n c e e i t h e r b y a f f i d a v i t o r t e s t i m o n y

.

H o w e v e r

, R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) i s n o t a b l a n k e t r u l e p r o h i b i t i n g a l l j u r o r t e s t i m o n y

. T h e m o s t

i m p o r t a n t e x c e p t i o n t o t h e j u r o r

- i n c o m p e t e n c y r u l e i s t h a t o f “ a n o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e ” t h a t i s

“ i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t t o b e a r ” u p o n a j u r o r

. T h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s e x c e p t i o n i s t o a l l o w p r o o f

o f e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e s t h a t a r e l i k e l y t o a f f e c t t h e v e r d i c t

. A l t h o u g h n o t e x p l i c i t l y d e f i n e d 4 2

See Golden Eagle

, 24 S. W

. 3 d

. at 3 6 7 –68 (discussing the history of Rule 606(b) of the 3 9

Texas Rules of Evidence ).

See Tanner

, 4 8 3 U.S. at 120; Golden Eagle

, 24 S.W .3d. at 367; See also F E D

. R. E V I D

. 4 0

606(b) advisory committee’ s n o t e 1 972 (“the Rule offe rs an acc ommodation betwee n these

competing considera

tions.”).

3 M U E L L E R & K I R K P A T R I C K

, supra note 30, § 247, at 57. 4 1

See id

. § 250, at 77 (noting that “blatant eff orts by outsiders to interfe re with delibera tions” 4 2

are rar e; “[f]ar more c ommon are c ontacts with outsiders that seem ambig uous and ar e plainly not

part of a plot to determine outcome.” ).Coly er Pag e 12

i n R u l e 6 0 6 ( b )

, t h i s C o u r t e x p l a i n e d i n M c Q u a r r i e t h a t a n “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e ” i s “ s o m e t h i n g

o r i g i n a t i n g f

r o m a s o u r c e o u t s i d e o f t h e j u r y r o o m a n d o t h e r t h a n f r o m t h e j u r o r s

t h e m s e l v e s

. ” 4 3

T h e r e f o r e

, a R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) i n q u i r y i s l i m i t e d t o t h a t w h i c h o c c u r s b o t h o u t s i d e o f t h e

j u r y r o o m a n d o u t s i d e o f t h e j u r o r s ’ p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e a n d e x p e r i e n c e

. E x t e r n a l e v e n t s 4 4

o r i n f o r m a t i o n

, u n r e l a t e d t o t h e t r i a l

, w h i c h h a p p e n t o c a u s e j u r o r s t o f e e l p e r s o n a l p r e s s u r e

t o h a s t e n ( o r e n d ) d e l i b e r a t i o n s a r e n o t “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e s ” b e c a u s e t h o s e p r e s s u r e s a r e

c a u s e d b y a j u r o r ’ s p e r s o n a l a n d e m o t i o n a l r e a c t i o n t o i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e

t r i a l i s s u e s

. T h o s e k i n d s o f i n t e r n a l p e r s o n a l p r e s s u r e s a r e n o r m a l a n d m a y b e e x p e c t e d i n

4 5

a n y t r i a l

. F u r t h e r m o r e

, t h e y a r e n o t “ i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t t o b e a r ” u p o n t h e j u r o r i n a m a n n e r

d e s i g n e d o r l i k e l y t o i n f l u e n c e d e l i b e r a t i o n s

. F o r e x a m p l e

, h e a r i n g a r a d i o w e a t h e r r e p o r t 4 6

McQ uarrie v. State , 380 S.W .3d 145, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (emphasis adde d). 4 3

Id. (“The internet re sear ch occ urre d outside of the jury room and outside deliberations.

. 4 4

. [and the information ] o ri gi n ated from a source on the internet, a source other than the juror

themselves.”)

.

See 3 M U E L L E R & K I R K P A T R I C K

, supra note 30, § 250, at 80 (“ [M] any external contac ts 4 5

are viewed as harmless and do not require a new trial even if they occur when the jury is sequester ed

during delibera tions, and in most case s more than the contac t alone must be shown to secur e a new

trial.”).

See United States v. Branco

, 516 F.2d 816, 819 (2nd Cir. 1975) (“Where an unauthorized

4 6

private c ommunication, contact, or tampering with a juror during a trial does not r elate to a matter

pending befor e the jury

, there is no rig ht to a new trial absent a showing of prejudice b y t h e

defe ndant.”) ; Drone v. State

, 906 S.W .2d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, pet. ref ’d) (althoug h

juror had una

uthorized discussions wit h a potential witness during the trial, there was no showing

that the two discussed trial fac ts or issues, there fore defe ndant was not entitled to new trial based on

juror misconduct).Coly er Pag e 13

o f a n a p p r o a c h i n g s t o r m m a y i n f l u e n c e a j u r o r t o q u i c k e n h i s d e l i b e r a t i o n s

, b u t t h a t w e a t h e r

r e p o r t i s n o t ( 1 ) a n “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e ” o r ( 2 ) i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t t o b e a r u p o n t h e j u r o r

. T h e

j u r o r h i m s e l f d e c i d e d t o h a s t e n d e l i b e r a t i o n s

, b a s e d o n i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t h a d n o t h i n g t o d o

w i t h t h e t r i a l i t s e l f o r w i t h i t s l e g a l o r f a c t u a l i s s u e s

.

T y p i c a l s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h j u r o r t e s t i m o n y i s a l l o w e d a s a n “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e ” u n d e r

F e d e r a l R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) a r e t h r e a t s

, b r i b e s

, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h c o u r t p e r s o n n e l

, a n d a s s a u l t s

u p o n a j u r y m e m b e r

. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y

, “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e ” h a s b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d b y T e x a s 4 7

c o u r t s t o i n c l u d e f

a c t u a l o r l e g a l i n f

o r m a t i o n c o n v e y e d t o t h e j u r o r s b y a b a i l i f f o r s o m e o t h e r

u n a u t h o r i z e d p e r s o n w h o i n t e n d s t o a f f e c t t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s

. B u t t h e o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e 4 8

e x c e p t i o n d o e s n o t i n c l u d e i n f l u e n c e s s u c h a s c o e r c i o n b y a f e l l o w j u r o r o r t h e d i s c u s s i o n

4 9

o f a j u r o r ’ s o w n p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e

. E x c e p t f o r ( 1 ) a n “ o u t s i d e i n f

l u e n c e ” a s d e f

i n e d i n 5 0

M c Q u a r r i e t h a t i s ( 2 ) “ i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t t o b e a r ” u p o n a j u r o r

, R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) c o n t i n u e s t o

p r o h i b i t j u r o r t e s t i m o n y t o i m p e a c h a v e r d i c t

.

1 G O O D E

, supra note 31, § 606.4, at 683; 3 M U E L L E R & K I R K P A T R I C K

, supra note 30, § 4 7

250, at 77–79.

Soliz v. State

, 779 S.W .2d 929, 932 (Te x

. Ap p

. – C o rpus Christi 1989, no pet.) (“To 4 8

constitute ‘outside influence ,’ the source of the information must be one who is outside the jury

, i.e

., a non-juror , who introduce s the information to affect the jury's verdict. ”) ( emphasis adde d).

Mitchell v. S. Pac. Transp. Co.

, 955 S.W .2d 300, 322 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no 4 9

writ), overruled on other grounds by Golden Eagle Archery

, Inc., v. Jack

son

, 24 S.W .3d. 362 (Tex.

2000).

Id . at 322; Soliz , 779 S.W .2d at 932.

5 0Coly er Pag e 14

I I I

.

A

. C r e d i b i l i t y o f T e s t i m o n y

I n i t s f i r s t g r o u n d f

o r r e v i e w

, t h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s s h o u l d n o t h a v e

a c c e p t e d M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s p o s t

- t r i a l t e s t i m o n y a t f a c e v a l u e

, t h e r e b y s u b s t i t u t i n g i t s o w n

c r e d i b i l i t y d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r t h e t r i a l j u d g e ’ s

. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t n o e v i d e n c e 5 1

c o n t r a d i c t e d M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s t e s t i m o n y

, a n d t h e r e f o r e t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s d i d n o t h a v e t o

a c c e p t t h e t r i a l j u d g e ’ s d e c i s i o n t o d i s b e l i e v e t h e t e s t i m o n y

.

H o w e v e r

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e w a s e n t i t l e d t o d i s c r e d i t M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s p o s t

- t r i a l t e s t i m o n y

,

e v e n i f i t h a d b e e n w h o l l y u n c o n t r a d i c t e d

. I n f a c t

, M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s p o s t

- t r i a l t e s t i m o n y t h a t 5 2

h i s d e s i r e d v e r d i c t h a d b e e n “ n o t g u i l t y ” w a s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s t r i a l

- t i m e s t a t e m e n t t h a t

t h e g u i l t y v e r d i c t w a s “ u n a n i m o u s

. ” T h e p o l i c y o f u p h o l d i n g t h e f i n a l i t y o f v e r d i c t s w a s 5 3

s e r v e d i n t h i s c a s e b y p o l l i n g t h e j u r y

. A t t h a t t i m e

, M r

. A g u i l e r a s a i d t h a t h e a g r e e d w i t h

t h e g u i l t y v e r d i c t

. A f

t e r t h e j u r o r s w e r e e x c u s e d

, t h e t i m e f o r p o s t

- v e r d i c t d o u b t s h a d

Colyer

, 395 S.W .3d at 282 (“A guilera’ s testimony established without dispute that an 5 1

outside influence cause d him to vote differ ently than he otherwise would have.” ) (empha sis added)

.

Quinn v. State

, 958 S.W .2d 395, 401–02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (trial court is sole judge 5 2

of witnesses’ cre dibilit y at a motion-for-ne w-trial hear ing al l eging juror misconduct); see also

Masterson v. State

, 155 S.W .3d 167, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (trial j u d g e has discretion to

disbelieve testimony

even w hen it is uncontrover ted).

This chang e in position is simil ar to rec antation case s in which a wi t n es s wh o testified 5 3

under oath at trial to cer

tain fac ts later signs an aff idavit or g ives testimony contra dicting or rec anting

the original t rial t estimony

. A t rial j udg e is not require d to believe the r eca ntation testimony over

the orig inal testimony

. See Keeter v. State

, 74 S.W .3d 31, 37-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (trial judge

did not abuse his discretion in deny ing motion for new trial based on disbelief of complainant’s posttrial rec antation).Coly er Pag e 15

p a s s e d

. G i v e n M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s s h i f t i n g t e s t i m o n y

, a r e a s o n a b l e f a c t f i n d e r c o u l d h a v e 5 4

c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e j u r o r h a d b e e n s o m e w h a t r e l u c t a n t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e v e r d i c t

, b u t i t w a s n o t

u n t i l a f t e r w e e k s o f r e f

l e c t i o n t h a t h e d e c i d e d t h a t h e w a n t e d t o c h a n g e h i s v o t e

. T h i s i s

p r e c i s e l y t h e t y p e o f “ d i s g r u n t l e d j u r o r ” w h o s u f f e r s b u y e r ’ s r e m o r s e t h a t R u l e 6 0 6 ( b )

p r o h i b i t s f

r o m t e s t i f

y i n g t o i m p e a c h h i s o w n v e r d i c t

. A j u r o r ’ s v o t e

, w h e n p o l l e d i n o p e n 5 5

c o u r t

, i s a “ f

i n a l s a l e ” i t e m ; i t c a n n o t b e e x c h a n g e d b e c a u s e t h a t j u r o r l a t e r h a s b u y e r ’ s

r e m o r s e

. T h e r e f

o r e

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e w a s n o t r e q u i r e d t o c r e d i t M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s p o s t

- t r i a l

t e s t i m o n y a n d w o u l d n o t h a v e a b u s e d h i s d i s c r e t i o n b y d e n y i n g a p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n f o r n e w

t r i a l o n t h a t g r o u n d a l o n e

.

B

. O u t s i d e I n f

l u e n c e

E v e n i f t h e t r i a l j u d g e f u l l y c r e d i t e d M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s t e s t i m o n y

, h e h a d t o t h e n m a k e

a R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) a n a l y s i s t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e j u r o r ’ s p e r s o n a l d e s i r e t o g e t h o m e q u i c k l y w o u l d

See People v. Jacobson

, 440 N.Y.S.2d 458, 462 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (“ The policy 5 4

underly ing the finality of a verdic t is reinfor ced by the prac tice of polling the jury afte r the fore man

states t he verdict. When the verdict

. . . was returned, the j u ry was formally polled, and every one

decla red his or her assent. This proce dure provided ea ch juror the opportunity to speak up and/or

dissent. The time for post-ve rdict doubts had passe d.”) ( citation omitted).

The Senate Report acc ompany ing the 1974 Enac tment of Fe dera l Rule 606(b) observe d 5 5

that the Rule would preve nt “the hara ssment of former jurors by losing parties as well as the possible

exploi tation of disgr

untled or ot herw ise badly -motivated ex jurors.” Senate Report No. 93–1277,

1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, quoted in the advisory committee notes for the 1974 Enac tment of Fe dera l

Rule 606(b). See State v. W atts

, 907 A.2d 147, 152 (Me. 2006) (Rule 606(b) protec ts jurors in their

communication t o fe l l o w jurors made in the confide nce of the jury room and preve nts the

impeachme nt of jury verdic ts by jurors who later have a chang e of hear t; juror testified about his

“depr ession, insomnia, and the anxiety he felt following the outcome of the Presidential elec tion-an

elec tion that occur

red more than five months prior to the trial. This is the very kind of attempt by

a disg runtled juror to set a side a ve rdict that Rule 606(b) is de signe d to preve nt.”).Coly er Pag e 16

q u a l i f y a s a n “ o u t s i d e i n f

l u e n c e ” b e f

o r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t e s t i m o n y t o i m p e a c h t h e v e r d i c t

. 5 6

W e c o n c l u d e t h a t n e i t h e r t h e j u r o r ’ s r e c e i p t o f a d o c t o r ’ s c a l l c o n c e r n i n g h i s d a u g h t e r n o r h i s

p e r s o n a l d e s i r e t o g e t h o m e q u i c k l y q u a l i f i e d a s a n “ o u t s i d e i n f

l u e n c e

. ” T h u s

, u n d e r R u l e

6 0 6 ( b )

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e w a s n o t p e r m i t t e d

, m u c h l e s s r e q u i r e d

, t o c o n s i d e r M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s

t e s t i m o n y t o i m p e a c h h i s v e r d i c t

.

A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e s t o r m y w e a t h e r a n d a c a l l f r o m M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s d o c t o r a r e

“ o u t s i d e i n f

l u e n c e s ” b e c a u s e t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n c a m e f

r o m o u t s i d e t h e j u r y r o o m

. B u t

a p p e l l a n t ’ s u s e o f t h e M c Q u a r r i e d e f i n i t i o n o f “ o u t s i d e i n f

l u e n c e ” t a k e s t h e t e r m o u t s i d e o f

i t s p r o p e r c o n t e x t a n d s c o p e

. A n o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e m u s t c o m e f

r o m o u t s i d e t h e j u r y a n d i t s

d e l i b e r a t i o n s

, b u t n o t e v e r y t h i n g t h a t c o m e s f r o m o u t s i d e t h e j u r y r o o m q u a l i f i e s a s a n

o u t s i d e i n f

l u e n c e f o r p u r p o s e s o f t h e r u l e

. T h e “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e ” e x c e p t i o n i n R u l e 6 0 6 ( b )

d o e s n o t i n c l u d e i n f

l u e n c e s o r i n f

o r m a t i o n t h a t a r e u n r e l a t e d t o t h e t r i a l i s s u e s

. T e x a s 5 7

Contrary to the court of appea ls, we find that, beca use the State objected to a ll testimony 5 6

by Mr. Ag uilera a t the onset of the he aring , the evidenc e is not “uncontrove rted.”

See Tanner v. United States

, 483 U.S. 107, 122 (1987) (“[ D] ru gs o r alcohol voluntarily 5 7

inge sted by a juror seems no more an ‘outside influence ’ than a virus, poorly prepa red food, or a lack

of sleep” ); see also United States v. Falsia, 724 F.2d 1339, 1343 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Juror

testimony is admissible only conce rning fac ts bear ing on extrane ous influences on the delibera tion,

in the sense of overt acts of jury tampering. ”) (quoting United States v. Pimentel, 654 F.2d 538, 542

(9th Cir. 1981)); United States v. Oshatz

, 715 F. Supp. 74, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (juror testimony that

jurors hastene d delibera tions because “they either ha d vacations which were planned or had to ge t

back to w ork” did not meet the standard f or jury misconduct); United States v. Marques

, 600 F.2d

742, 747 (9th Cir. 1979) (“The sole alleg ed outside influence

, then, was the judge ’s decision to keep

the jury late a couple of nights. This was wi t h i n t he discretion of the trial judge and was entirely

proper .”); United States v. Kohne

, 358 F. Supp. 1046, 1051 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (“[I f the juror] ag ree d

to verdic ts beca

use he was conce rned about his err atic oil heate r, or his dog s and cat, or the conduct

or statements of othe r jurors, a nd was a nx ious to ge t home, such would be insufficient to impea ch

the ver dicts.”).Coly er Pag e 17

c a s e s h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t a l l o w i n g n o r m a l p e r s o n a l p r e s s u r e s t o q u a l i f y a s “ o u t s i d e 5 8

i n f l u e n c e s ” w o u l d j e o p a r d i z e t h e f i n a l i t y o f v i r t u a l l y e v e r y v e r d i c t

. U n d e r a p p e l l a n t ’ s 5 9

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

, a j u r o r w h o h a s s e c o n d t h o u g h t s a b o u t h i s v o t e c o u l d r e t r o a c t i v e l y c l a i m t h a t

a p e r s o n a l p r e s s u r e

, s u c h a s h i s j o b

, m a r r i a g e

, o r c h i l d r e n

, m a d e h i m a p p r e h e n s i v e a n d e a g e r

t o c o n c l u d e t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s

. R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) e x p l i c i t l y p r o h i b i t s p o s t

- v e r d i c t t e s t i m o n y a b o u t

a j u r o r ’ s m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s t o i m p e a c h t h e v e r d i c t

. M o s t j u r o r s f e e l s o m e t y p e o f n o r m a l 6 0

i n t e r n a l

, i n d i v i d u a l p r e s s u r e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e e n t i r e t r i a l

. F o r i n s t a n c e

, t h e f i r s t d a y o f t r i a l

,

M r

. A g u i l e r a i n f

o r m e d t h e c o u r t t h a t h e w a s a n x i o u s t o l e a v e o n t i m e s o t h a t h e c o u l d a t t e n d

Although only Texas civil case s have addre ssed this Rule 606(b) issue, application of that 5 8

rule should apply equally in both criminal and civil case s, as the lang uag e of the rule is the same for

both. See McQ uarrie v. State

, 380 S

. W

. 3 d 145, 167 n.31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Cochra n, J

., dissenting) (noting that courts in criminal case s should “look to civil case s for g uidance on what

constitutes an ‘outside influence ’”) (quoti n g In r e S.P.

, 9 S.W .3d 304, 308–09 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 1999, no pet.)).

See Editorial Caballero, S.A. de C.V. v. Playboy Enters., Inc.

, 359 S.W .3d 318, 325 (Tex. 5 9

App.—Corpus Christi 2012, pet. denied) (“Per sonal p re s sures felt by jurors to wra p up the

delibera tions do not constitute outside influence s.”) ; Perry v. Safeco Ins. Co.

, 821 S.W .2d 279, 281

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (holding that a juror “coe rc[ing] jury members

in to q u ic k ly r e a c h in g a v e r dict” beca use of his family ’ s v a c a

ti o n p la n s w a s n o t a

n “ o u ts id e in f

lu e n c e ” ) ;

Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. Kirkland

, 772 S.W .2d 226, 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1989,

writ denied) (“The re are alway s pressure s not only from employ ers but also fa mily

, rec rea

tion a nd

persona l pref

ere nces of

jurors. We do not consider these normal pressure s to be an outside influence

wi t h i n t h e meaning of the rules. Were they to be considere d an outside influence

, few verdic ts

would stand.”).

T E X

. R. E V I D

. 606(b) (“[A] juror may not testify

. . . to the eff ect of any thing on the juror’s 6 0

mind or emotions or mental proce sses, as i n fl u en ci n g any juror’s assent to or dissent from the

verdic t[ .]”); see United States v. Farme r , 717 F.3d 559, 564 ( 7th Cir. 2013) (“Rule 606(b) (1) ba rs

juror testimony on, and court considera tion of, the jury ’s internal delibera tions, including the jurors’

discussions and mental proce sses. The rule also prohibits the court from ‘re ceiv[ing] a juror’s

aff idavit or evide n ce o f a j u ror’ s statements on these matters.’ To prese rve the privac y and

independe nce of juries from well-intentioned eff orts to p er fe ct them, such evidenc e is simply not

admissible.”).Coly er Pag e 18

h i s d a u g h t e r ’ s g r a d u a t i o n

. A l t h o u g h h i s d a u g h t e r ’ s g r a d u a t i o n o c c u r r e d o u t s i d e t h e 6 1

c o u r t r o o m

, i t d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e a n “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e ” u n d e r R u l e 6 0 6 ( b )

.

S i m i l a r l y

, a r a d i o r e p o r t a b o u t a g a t h e r i n g s t o r m a n d a t e l e p h o n e c a l l f r o m a d o c t o r

,

t h o u g h c o m i n g f

r o m o u t s i d e t h e j u r y r o o m a n d f r o m a n o n

-

j u r y s o u r c e

, a r e n o t “ o u t s i d e

i n f l u e n c e s ” b e c a u s e t h e y a r e n o t r e l a t e d t o t h e t r i a l i n a n y m a n n e r

. F o r e x a m p l e

, i n

M c Q u a r r i e

, t h e “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e ” w a s a j u r o r ’ s o u t

- o f

- c o u r t i n t e r n e t r e s e a r c h c o n c e r n i n g

t h e e f f e c t s o f a “ d a t e r a p e ” d r u g t h a t w a s a t i s s u e i n t h e c r i m i n a l t r i a l

. I n t h i s c a s e

, n e i t h e r 6 2

s t o r m y w e a t h e r n o r a d o c t o r ’ s c a l l c o n c e r n i n g a m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n w e r e f a c t u a l o r l e g a l

i s s u e s r e l e v a n t t o a p p e l l a n t ’ s D W I t r i a l

. 6 3

The fir st day

of the trial Mr. A g uilera state d: 6 1

I definitely want to make sure we g et a g ood and complete hear ing with no rush. I t’s

just I was not anticipating being here past 5:15. I t’s my daug hter’s g radua tion, stuff

that’s going on, and I have to be there and it’s very impo rtant for us—for me to be

there by m i n i m u m o f 5:30.

. . . I f the court require s me to stay of course

. Wit h no

disrespec t I will stay

. I would just want to voice my opinion, and I think there ’s a

couple other

jurors her e that have issues this afternoon that we need to g et to.

McQ uarrie , 380 S.W .3d at 148. 6 2

But suppose that the doctor and Mr. Ag uilera star

ted talking about the DWI trial and the 6 3

defe ndant, and the doctor suddenly exclaimed, “Oh, I ’m trea ting Mr. Coly er for alcoholism! He’ s

just not prog ressing well.” Now the contents of that phone call would constitute an “outside

influence ” because it was in fo rm ation that came from outs ide t he jury room and from a non-juror

and conce rns a fac tual or leg al issue in the trial. Mr. Ag uilera would be permitted to testify to tha t

conver sation had it occur red. Howeve r, he would not be permit t ed to testify to how that

conver sation actua lly

influence d him or his verdict because Rule 606(b) bars any testimony about

the juror’s menta l proce sses. “Whether the jury relied on imprope r evide nce or instructions is not

a question to be asked jurors, but ‘ is de termined

. . . on the basis of the na ture of the matter and its

probable eff

ect on a hy

pothetical ave rag e jury .’” United States v. Iannie llo

, 866 F.2d 540, 544 (2d

Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). I f the “hy pothetical aver ag e jury ” would be led astray by the doctor’s

statement and its ver dict aff ecte d, then the def

endant would be entitled to a new tr ial. Id.Coly er Pag e 19

S e c o n d

, t h e o u t s i d e i n f

l u e n c e m u s t b e “ i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t t o b e a r ” w i t h a n i n t e n t t o

i n f l u e n c e t h e j u r o r

. F o r e x a m p l e

, i n M c Q u a r r i e

, t h e j u r o r w h o r e s e a r c h e d “ d a t e r a p e ” d r u g s 6 4

t o l d o t h e r j u r o r s a b o u t h e r f i n d i n g i n a n e f

f o r t t o a f f e c t t h e v e r d i c t

. H e r e

, o f c o u r s e

, t h e r e 6 5

i s n o s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e d o c t o r ’ s c a l l o r t h e w e a t h e r f o r e c a s t w a s i n t e n d e d t o i n f l u e n c e t h e

v e r d i c t

. T h e A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e ’ s n o t e s a n d l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y f o r F e d e r a l R u l e 6 0 6 ( b )

b o t h u s e a p u r p o s e f

u l t h r e a t m a d e b y s o m e o n e a g a i n s t t h e s a f e t y o f a m e m b e r o f

t h e j u r o r ’ s

f a m i l y a s a n e x a m p l e o f a n o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e

. I n c o n t r a s t

, t h e c o m m e n t a r y f r o m t h e 6 6

A m e r i c a n B a r A s s o c i a t i o n ’ s s t a n d a r d s f o r i m p e a c h m e n t o f t h e v e r d i c t s p e c i f y t h a t t e s t i m o n y

f r o m a j u r o r “ i n d u c e d t o a g r e e w i t h t h e v e r d i c t b e c a u s e h i s w i f e w a s i l l a n d h e w a s a n x i o u s

t o g e t h o m e ” w o u l d b e i n a d m i s s a b l e

. 6 7

T h e o u t s i d e p r e s s u r e s i n t h i s c a s e a r e n e u t r a l ; t h e y w e r e n o t i n t e n d e d t o p e r s u a d e a

j u r o r t o d e c i d e t h i s c a s e i n a n y p a r t i c u l a r m a n n e r e v e n i f t h e y m i g h t h a v e i n f l u e n c e d t h e j u r y

t o r e a c h a v e r d i c t m o r e q u i c k l y

. A n “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e ” i s p r o b l e m a t i c o n l y i f i t h a s t h e 6 8

T E X .R. E V I D . 606(b). 6 4

380 S.W .3d at 148. 6 5

F E D

. R. E V I D

. 606 advisory committee’s note 1974; H.R.Rep. No. 650, 93d Co n g.

, 2 d 6 6

Sess. 9 (1974), re printed in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.New s 7075, 7083.

T H E A M E R I C A N B A R A S S O C I A T I O N P R O J E C T O N M I N I M U M S T A N D A R D S F O R C R I M I N A L 6 7

J U S T I C E

, A P P R O V E D D R A F T 1968, T R I A L B Y J U R Y § 5.7(a) , at 171.

See Seaton v. State

, 385 S. W

. 3 d 85, 92 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. 6 8

ref ’d)( “Ne utral statements from the bailiff not direc ted to the jury ’s specific delibera tions or verdic t

do not constitute an outside influence ”); Rosell v. Cent. W

. Motor Stages, Inc.

, 89 S.W .3d 643, 661

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied) (“[T]he bailiff informing the jury of the court’s schedule was

not misconduct” bec ause it wa s neutral infor mation).Coly er Pag e 20

e f f e c t o f i m p r o p e r l y a f f e c t i n g a j u r o r ’ s v e r d i c t i n a p a r t i c u l a r m a n n e r

— f o r o r a g a i n s t a

p a r t i c u l a r p a r t y

. T h e r e f

o r e t h e r e w a s n o “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e ” i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t t o b e a r u p o n

M r

. A g u i l e r a w h e n h e r e c e i v e d a c a l l f r o m h i s d o c t o r d u r i n g d e l i b e r a t i o n s o r w h e n h e

l i s t e n e d t o t h e w e a t h e r r e p o r t

.

T h i r d

, e v e n i f M r

. A g u i l e r a h a d t e s t i f i e d t o a n i m p r o p e r “ o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e ” u n d e r

R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) h e w o u l d s t i l l b e p r o h i b i t e d f r o m t e s t i f

y i n g a b o u t t h e e f

f e c t o f t h a t i n f

o r m a t i o n

o n h i m

. C o u r t s u s e t h e o b j e c t i v e “ r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n ” t e s t t o d e c i d e w h a t e f f e c t t h e p a r t i c u l a r

“ o u t s i d e i n f

l u e n c e ” i n a c a s e w o u l d h a v e o n t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l a v e r a g e j u r o r

. W e d o n o t 6 9

a l l o w t e s t i m o n y a b o u t t h e e f f e c t h a d u p o n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r j u r o r

. T h e r e f o r e M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s 7 0

McQ uarrie v. S t a t e

, 380 S.W .3d 145, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (we underta ke an 6 9

“objec tive analy sis to deter mine whether there is a rea sonable possibili ty that [t he outside influence ]

had a prejudicia l eff

ect on the ‘hy

pothetical aver ag e juror.’” ); United States v. Boylan

, 898 F.2d 230,

259–60 (1st Cir. 1990) (inquiry about extraneous influence does not e x tend to its subjective eff ect

on minds of

jurors); United States v. Ianniello

, 866 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1989) (under Fe d. R. Evid.

606(b), the trial judge “should not allow inquiries into the mental impressions of the jurors. Whether

the j ury relied on improper evidence or i nstructions is not a question to be asked juro rs

. . . . I f t he

‘hy pothetical aver ag e jury ’ would have been coer ced or led astray by improper ex parte statements

of the judge or marshal, then a new trial will be nece ssary .”); United States v. Howard

, 506 F.2d 865,

8 6 9 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that a court lacking “eve n the insight of a psy chiatris t ” m u s t

independe ntly evalua te “the subjective eff ects of objective fac ts without benef it of couch- interview

introspections” and without testimony from the jurors on h o w, i f at all, the improper “outside

influence ” would have affe cted a hy pothetical j u ry ). S

ee generally, 3 M U E L L E R & K I R K P A T R I C K

,

supra note 3 0

, § 2 54 at 96–97 (“Juror aff idavits or testimony can show only overt acts and who

lear ned or knew or participa ted. Whether prejudice resulted from o u t s i d e influence s must be

resolved by

draw ing inf

ere nces[.]”).

See Mattox v. United States

, 146 U.S. 140, 148 (1892) (“‘ Public policy forbids that a matter 7 0

resting in the persona l consciousness of one jur o r should be rec eived to overthrow the verdic t,

beca use, being persona l it is not acc essible to othe r testimony ; it g ives to the secr et thoug ht of one

the power to disturb the expressed conclusions of t welve[.]’”) (quoting J ustice B rew er in Perry v

. Bailey , 12 Kan. 539, 545 ( 1874)).Coly er Pag e 21

t e s t i m o n y a b o u t t h e p e r s o n a l p r e s s u r e h e f e l t t o e n d d e l i b e r a t i o n s i s i n a d m i s s a b l e e v e n i f

e i t h e r t h e p h o n e c a l l o r t h e i n c l e m e n t w e a t h e r h a d q u a l i f i e d a s a n “ o u t s i d e i n f

l u e n c e

. ” I n t h i s

c a s e

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e w o u l d n o t h a v e a b u s e d h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e “ a v e r a g e

h y p o t h e t i c a l j u r o r ” w o u l d n o t b e i m p r o p e r l y i n f l u e n c e d t o r e t u r n a g u i l t y v e r d i c t i n s t e a d o f

a n o t

- g u i l t y v e r d i c t b e c a u s e o f r a d i o r e p o r t s o f i n c l e m e n t w e a t h e r o r a d o c t o r ’ s t e l e p h o n e c a l l

c o n c e r n i n g a c h i l d ’ s i l l n e s s

.

I n s u m

, b e c a u s e M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s t e s t i m o n y a b o u t t h e w e a t h e r a n d h i s c h i l d w a s

u n r e l a t e d t o a n y f

a c t u a l o r l e g a l i s s u e a t t r i a l

, t h o s e m a t t e r s d i d n o t q u a l i f y a s a n i m p r o p e r

o u t s i d e i n f

l u e n c e ; t h e r e f

o r e

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e c o r r e c t l y r e f u s e d t o c o n s i d e r M r

. A g u i l e r a ’ s

t e s t i m o n y o r a f

f i d a v i t b e c a u s e b o t h w e r e i n a d m i s s a b l e u n d e r R u l e 6 0 6 ( b )

. T h e e x p e r i e n c e d

t r i a l j u d g e d i d n o t a b u s e h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g a p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l b a s e d o n

j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t

. T h e r e f o r e

, w e r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a n d a f f i r m t h e

j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l j u d g e

.

D e l i v e r e d : A p r i l 3 0

, 2 0 1 4

P u b l i s h