JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General 

Supreme Court Building 

P. 0. Box 12548 

Aus:in. TX. 78711-2548 

51214752501 

Telex 9101874.1367 

Telecopier 51214750266 

714 Jackson. Suite 700 

Dallas. TX. 75202-4506 

2141742.8944 

4624 Alberta Ave.. Suite 160 

El Paso. TX. 79905.2793 

9151533.3464 

,001 Texas. suite 700 

Houston, TX. 77002-3111 

7131223-5866 

a06 Broadway, Suite 312 

Lubbock. TX. 794013479 

606f747-523a 

43G9 N. Tenth. Suite S 

McAllen, TX. 76501.1685 

51216624547 

200 Main Plaza, Suite 400 

San Antonio. TX. 78205-2797 

512/2254191 

A” Equal Opportunityl 

Affirmative Action Employer 

The Attorney General of Texas 

mgust 23, 1985 

Eonorable T. R. Bmdy, 

Nueces County Attomey 

Courthouse, Room 206 

Corpus Christi, Texas 

Jr. 

78401 

Opinion No. JM-345 

Re: Whether a county may impose 

au annual fee for parking of 

motor vehicles on Gulf Coast 

beaches 

Dear Mr. Bandy: 

You have provided us with the following information: 

The Nueces County commissioners court is considering .sdopting a motor vehicle traffic regulation to be effective upon gulf coast beaches 

located outside of corporate city limits. Such 

order wculd be adopted in the manner prescribed 

and pursuant to this county's authority to do so 

under 1:he Natural Resources Code. section 

61.122(a), V.T.C.S. See Attorney General Opinion 

H-1310 (1!)78). - 

The p,coposed regulation would require any motor 

vehicle parked on the beaches of Mustang and 

Padre Islands outside of corporate city limits, 

but wit1Li.n the boundaries of Nueces County, to 

display s validly issued county parking permit. 

Permits would be readily available for a $5.00 

annual frcs. Funds derived by the county from the 

fees collected would be utilized for beach 

cleaning, public restrooms and law enforcement 

purposes on the beaches. 

You ask whether "LL commissioners court has the power either directly 

or by implication to impose au annual parking fee for the parking of 

motor vehicles on gulf coast beaches pursuant to its authority to 

regulate traffic cm. these beaches." We answer your question in the 

negative. 

The threshold question is vhether a county is authorized to 

restrict and regulate parking on such beaches. If we answer this 

question in the af'firmative. we must then determine whether a county 

p. 1570 
Eonorable T. R. Bandy, Jr. - 'Page 2 (JM-345) 

may then impose an annual parking fee such as the one which you 

propose. Article IX, sectixr 1-A of the Texas Constitution provides 

the following in pertinent part: 

The Legislature may authorize the governing body 

of any county bordering on the Gulf of Mexico or 

the tidewater lislts thereof to regulate and 

restrict the speed, parking and travel of motor 

vehicles on beache. available to the public by 

virtue of public fight and the littering of such 

beaches. 

Nothing in thi.s amendment shall increase the 

rights of any rip;lrian or littoral landowner with 

regard to beaches available to the public by 

virtue of public right or submerged lands. 

Section 61.122(a) of the Natural Resources Code provides the 

following: 

The commissioners court of a county bordering on -- 

the Gulf of Mexico or its tidewater limits, by 

order, may regulate motor vehicle traffic on any 

beach within the Boundaries of the county and may 

prohibit the littc%ing of the beach and may define 

the term 'littering.' (Emphasis added). 

The constitutional prav:lsion pursuant to which section 61.122(a) 

was adopted permits the legislature to authorize the governing body of 

any county "to regulate and restrict the speed, parking and travel of 

motor vehicles on beaches available to the public." The statute 

authorizes the commissioners court to "regulate motor vehicle 

traffic. . . .u That the commissioners court has authority to 

regulate parking on beaches is shown by section 61.126 of the code, 

which provides as follows: 

P61.126. Traffic Regulations 

If the order includes a traffic regulation, the 

order shall prov:lde for signs that are designed 

and posted in compliance with the current 

provisions of the Texas Manual on Traffic Control 

Devices for Streets and Highways, stating the 

p. 1571 
.b - , - 

Ronorable T. R. Bandy, Jr. . . Page 3 (JM-345) 

applicable speed 'limit, parking requirement. or 

that vehicles are prohibited. (Emphasis added). 

However, the prohibition against motor vehicles on public beaches may 

not have the effect of prec'luding all public access to public beaches. 

We next turn to whether ssrction 61.122(a) of the Natural Resources 

Code authorizes a county lo impose an annual parking fee. For two 

reasons, we conclude that it does not. See 161.011. - 

Commissioners courts may exercise only those powers conferred by 

the constitution and statutes. Canales v. Laughlin, 214 S.W.2d 451 

(Tex. 1948). We have fount. no statute which purports to authorize 

counties to impose such a fee. Section 61.070 provides that 

[slubsection (4), [slection 61.069 of this code 

shall not be construed to prohibit the assessment 

of a reasonable :iee for off-beach parking or for 

the use of facil.j.ties provided for the use and 

convenience of the public. (Emphasis added). 

In the event that a city oc county seeks state funds to clean public 

beaches, subsection (4) of Election 61.069 provides that such application must provide "that c!n.trance to all public beaches under the 

jurisdiction of the govern:tng body of the city or county is free of 

charge. . . ." Section 61.069 clearly contemplates that, in this 

instance, certain specifietL counties may impose a reasonable parking 

fee for off-beach parking; no such authority is conferred with respect 

to on-beach parking. Secc:ion 61.069 is not express authority-to 

charge a fee; it is simply a statement that if a governmental body has 

authority to charge a fee it is not taken away by this section. We 

conclude that the legislature's express inclusion of authority to 

impose a reasonable fee for off-beach parking is tantamount to an 

express exclusion of such authority with respect to on-beach parking. 

Moreover. unless the imoosition of a fee is snecificallv orovided 

by law, none may lawfully lie charged. Nueces County v. C&;ington, 

162 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1942). See also McCalla v. Rockdale, 246 S.W. 

654 (Tex. 1922); McLennan Count v. Bo ess, 137 S.W. 346 (Tex. 1911). 

In Attorney General Opinion -*his H-990 1977 , office said that Harris 

County, lacking specific authority therefor, could not charge tolls on 

the operation of the Lynchburg Ferry. In this instance, the imposition by a county of a parking fee for off-beach parking is nowhere 

specifically provided by statute. Accordingly. we conclude that a 

county may not, pursuant ta section 61.122(a) of the Natural Resources 

Code, impose an annual parking fee for on-beach parking. 

p. 1572 
Honorable T. R. Bandy, Jr. - 'Page 4 (JM-345) 

,SUMMARY 

A county may rot impose, pursuant to Section 

61.122(a) of the Natural Resources Code, an annual 

parking fee for on-beach parking. 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

TOM GREEN 

First Assistant Attorney General 

DAVID R. RICRARDS 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

ROBERT GRAY 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Cdttee 

Prepared by Jim Moellinger 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTRE 

Rick Gilpin, Chairman 

Colin Carl 

Susan Garrison 

Tony Guillory 

Jim Hoellinger 

Nancy Sutton 

Sarah Woelk 

p. 1573