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Airman Scholar Journal. Volume 18. Fall 2012

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
Airman Scholar Journal

Volume 18 Fall 2012

Published by the Department of 

MILITARY & STRATEGIC STUDIES (DFMI)

United States Air Force Academy

Dean of Faculty 

Brig. Gen. Dana Born

Department Head 

Lt. Col. Steven Pomeroy

Editor 

Dr. Brent J. Talbot

The opinions in Airman Scholar Journal do not represent any official policies of the Dean of Faculty, 

US Air Force Academy, US Air Force or US Government. They are presented to stimulate discussion on 

current military issues and domestic and international affairs.
I

Table of Contents

Featured Article

1 Core Relevance at the USAF Academy

Thomas Drohan

Topical Focus: Educating the Airman Scholar

9 Active Learning and the Rising Generation of 

Air Force Officers

Joshua Huckabee

15 Hands on Keyboard: Considerations for a 

Cyber Weapons School

Gordan Lang

Topical Focus: Post Cold War Applications of Air 

& Space Power

22 Siezing the Ultimate High Ground: 

Weaponizing Space

Joseph Shields

29 An Airplane for All Seasons

Brandon Shoenfeld

35 Personnel Recovery: CV-22 Expansion Pack

Vincent T. Jovene, III

Book Review

42 War Made New, by Max Boot

reviewed by Edward Boylan

From The Editor

Our feature article introduces our first of 

two topical foci: Educating our future and 

current officer force. Colonel Thomas Drohan, 

Department of Military & Strategic Studies 

(on sabbatical this semester), assesses the core 

education at the Air Force Academy and debates 

the merits of a more flexible set of choices in 

the core cirriculum. This issue also includes 

our best cadet-authored capstone theses for 

the Military & Strategic Studies major and 

highlights their research accopmplishments. 

Cadet Joshua Huckabee argues for improved 

simulation scenarios in the Cadet Battle Lab, 

DFMI’s premier networked classroom. Cadet 

Gordan Lang follows with his proposal for a 

joint military Cyber School to train the rising 

generation of Cyber warriors. From there, this 

issue focuses on post-Cold War applications 

of Air & Space Power. Cadet Joseph Shields 

argues the merits of weaponizing space. Of 

particular note is Cadet Brandon Shoenfeld’s 

argument that the Air Force should buy the 

A-29 Super Tuscano as it’s next light attack 

aircraft, instead of the US-built AT-6 Texan II, 

also extensively used as an Air Force trainer. 

As this issue went to press, the Air Force 

announced plans to purchase the Tuscano’s 

for use in Afghanistan; thus, Brandon’s logic 

has proven sound. Cadet Vincent Jovene also 

makes an airframe argument in favor of a 

mixed purchase of CV-22 Ospreys as Rescue/

Recovery aircraft, rather than sole reliance on 

the less agile HH-60 Pave Hawks. Finally, our 

book review by Cadet Edward Boylan looks at 

Max Boot’s work, War Made New, a text used 

in our core senior course.

ASJs mission is to feature topical and 

regionally-focused articles of interest to 

the military academic community. Both 

military and civilian academic faculty and 

staff are encouraged to submit articles for 

publication and nominate outstanding cadet 

papers. We also encourage reviews of militaryrelevant topics (see samples on page 41). Send 

all submissions in word format (with Chicagostyle endnotes) to ASJeditor@usafa.edu
II
Core Relevance at the USAF Academy 1

Over the past decade, a reshaping of the core curriculum 

has been underway at the 

United States Air Force Academy 

(USAFA). First, robust academic 

majors and increased opportunities for cadet research are raising 

the academic expectations of core 

courses. At the same time, most 

cadets enter the Academy from a 

public education system in relative international decline. Second, 

USAF mission demands are pulling 

on the core, traditionally the broad 

foundation of a liberal education, 

to supply “total force competencies”1

 of immediate relevance to 

the profession. Enduring academic 

debates over educational depth 

and breadth are now sharpened by 

strident if not contradictory calls 

to develop more strategic thinking 

as well as deeper competence in 

science, technology, engineering 

and math. Third, learning-focused 

pedagogy and assessment have 

nudged core courses into deliberate development of 19 institutional 

learning outcomes (Academy Outcomes). 

The Academy Outcomes appeal 

to social scientists and education administrators throughout 

the American Association of Colleges and Universities (AAC&U), 

and well resonate with effectsbased and inspection-requirement 

frameworks that permeate Air 

Force operations. The Outcomes 

consist of six knowledge-type outcomes (heritage and application of 

air, space and cyberspace power; 

national security and full spectrum 

of joint and coalition warfare; 

civic, cultural and international 

environments; ethics and the foundation of character; principles of 

science and the scientific method; 

and principles of engineering 

and the application of technology), eight skill outcomes (quantitative and information literacy, 

oral and written communication, 

critical thinking, decision making, 

stamina, courage, discipline, 

teamwork) and five responsibility 

outcomes (ethical reasoning and 

action, respect for human dignity, 

service to the nation, lifelong development and contributions, intercultural competence and involvement). These Outcomes, drawn 

from a bureaucratically-vetted 

blend of official USAF documents 

and an AAC&U public advocacy 

initiative in 2006,2

 are meant not 

only to meet mandated commissioning education standards but 

also to define the desirable characteristics of “leaders of character.”3

Core Thoughts

As if the core were malleable 

clay rather than sacred stone, 

software rather than hardware, 

reformists would sculpt a new 

form consisting of greater academic diversity and more individual choice. A USAF missionoriented architecture could be 

more flexible and defined not 

simply in terms of mandatory 

common courses (“core”), but also 

in terms of common choices (an 

“outer core” superimposed on an 

“inner core” [formerly “core”]), 

providing “ multiple purposeful 

pathways” to the Outcomes. Advocates expect structured flexibility 

to better prepare cadets for the 

complex adaptive disciplines and 

dynamic demands of Air Force 

specialties. Such educational alignment at a military academy, all of 

which have signature large-core 

curricula two to three times those 

found at colleges or universities, 

As if the core were malleable clay rather than sacred stone, 

software rather than hardware, reformists would sculpt a 

new form consisting of greater academic diversity and more 

individual choice.

Colonel Thomas Drohan is Professor 

and Department Head of Military & 

Strategic Studies. This article was presented to the Inter-University Seminar 

on Armed Forces & Society, October 

2011.

Core Relevance at the USAF Academy 

The Professional Need for a Comprehensive Liberal Education 

Thomas Drohan
2 Core Relevance at the USAF Academy 

poses significant challenges to 

swollen schedules and an academic 

divisionally distributed core. The 

current core comprises 96 of the 

141 semester hours of a cadet’s 

education, a proportion that has 

stayed fairly constant over the past 

30 years (USAFA was established 

in 1954). 

Figure 1

When viewed from the perspective of post-World War II 

reforms that transformed US 

military academies into icons of 

liberal education still stuffed with 

valuable programs that distinguish them as four-year officer 

commissioning programs (military, athletics, ethics), a more 

professionalized curriculum with 

academic choice constrained by 

Outcomes seems anachronistic. The prospect of a narrower 

core with fewer common courses 

generates considerable debate at 

USAFA, where the core is more 

prescribed than at West Point or 

Annapolis. Some say introducing core choices is needed to offer 

cadets more motivational and 

effective learning; others warn 

such a change eliminates an obvious 

difference of an academy education 

and risks expensive irrelevance. 

Since its inception, the core curriculum has attempted to clarify 

the distinctiveness of a military 

academy education — one that is 

professionally relevant and intellectually rigorous. As is the case with 

its armed services counterparts, 

USAFA complements other USAF 

commissioning sources’ strengths, 

recognizing that Air Force Reserve 

Officer Training Corps (AFROTC) 

and Air Force Officer Accession 

Training School (AFOATS) can 

provide a more tailored and timely 

supply of officers. There are differences among service academy 

core curricula, including degree of 

individual choice, but all feature 

an exceptionally broad liberal education to prepare cadets for the 

unpredictable variety of challenges 

they will face as officers. 

So strong was this founding 

assumption that when USAFA 

became the first US military 

academy to introduce academic 

majors (first as divisional additives 

from the core, then as departmental disciplinary offerings), they 

were justified as enhancements of 

the core. That is, academic majors 

were not established primarily to 

produce specialists, but rather to 

bring more academic rigor and 

breadth into the core experience. 

This early core contained what 

was referred to as the “professional 

nucleus,” an inner core regarded 

as educationally important for any 

Air Force officer, to which each 

academic department contributed, 

and for which all departments 

were professionally responsible. 

Given the collective commitment 

to maintaining this commons, it 

was often remarked that the true 

major at the Academy was the 

core. This is not often heard today 

among serving faculty. 

CURRENT USAFA CORE CURRICULUM 

(Number of 3 semester hour courses)4

BASIC SCIENCES 

Biology-2, Chemistry-2, Computer Science-1, Mathematics-3, Physics-2

ENGINEERING

Aeronautics-1, Astronautics-1, Elec & Comp Engr-1, Engr (Systems)-1, Engr Mechanics-1 

SOCIAL SCIENCES

Behavioral Sci-2, Economics-1, Law-1, Management-1, Political Sci-1, Soc Sci-1

HUMANITIES

English-3, Foreign Language-2, History-2, Military & Strategic Studies-2, Philosophy-1

INTERDISCIPLINARY

First Year Experience-1/3, Science and Technology Energy/Systems Option-1
Core Relevance at the USAF Academy 3

As the Air Force has expanded 

its missions beyond airpower to 

encompass air, space and cyberspace, the need for both a broader 

perspective and more specialized and integrated capabilities 

challenges service identity. Similarly for USAFA, the USAF’s 

only commissioning program 

that must meet undergraduate 

accreditation requirements, this 

strategic complexity became a core 

issue. At a time when USAFA was 

called to improve its professional 

relevance and effectiveness, learning-focused assessment emerged 

as a way ahead toward accountable, professional relevance and 

effective academic rigor.5

 This path 

would lead to new concepts for the 

core and its professional nucleus. 

Enter Learning-Focused 

Assessment

USAFA’s newfound emphasis 

on learning, rather than teaching 

per se, is related to the dual role of 

the core. Professional stakeholders 

wanted to know that Academy 

graduates internalized key qualities. In 2006, curriculum guidance 

flowed from the Superintendent to 

the Dean. Under the assumption 

that professional requirements 

needed to be balanced with those 

of a broad university education, 

a curriculum task force designed 

a system that would integrate the 

Academy’s mission across academic, military, athletic and ethics 

programs.6

In an effort to improve Academy 

effectiveness, the Dean’s Faculty 

Council meetings prepped and 

tasked departments to align core 

course goals with Outcomes, and 

to lead Nineteen cross-mission 

Outcomes Teams. 

Professional shaping encountered limitations as faculty balanced educational priorities within 

the realities of an always full schedule of calls. Some Outcomes such 

as critical thinking and communication are handily blended into 

coherent lesson plans, while others 

such as intercultural competence 

and teamwork are more dependent on the compatibility of lesson 

objectives. Even critical thinking 

often needs to be tailored to an 

introductory learning level, such 

as acquiring basic computational 

skills before analyzing an engineering problem, or understanding the 

categorical imperative before discussing Kantian ethics in combat. 

Such disciplinary basics are not 

obvious at a strategic assessment 

level of diagrams or an operational 

level of course titles. 

As learning-focused assessment 

Outcome Teams met and shared 

their course experiences, it became 

apparent that discipline-specific 

details of assessment and learning effectiveness were adequately 

appreciated only by those at the tactical level of teaching. This strategic-level blind spot was reinforced 

by the absence of such interdisciplinary majors common at other 

colleges and universities as neuroscience, anthropology, biophysics, 

public policy, human biology and 

the philosophy of science. Such 

content is being taught in USAFA 

departments, but one would have 

to be in the disciplinary arena 

to know that. In contrast to the 

absence of these inter-disciplinary 

departments, USAFA does have 

profession-prompted majors in 

disciplinary specializations and 

multi-disciplines: Space Operations, Meteorology, Operations 

Research, Foreign Area Studies, 

Systems Engineering, and Military & Strategic Studies majors. In 

this environment, the expectations 

levied on the Outcomes Teams 

increased from assessing existing 

course content to reforming course 

content in order to expand the 

learning of a particular Outcome. 

This increased tension between 

two basic needs competing for 

time: institutional-level assessment rubrics and broad, deep disciplinary expertise. 

The Air Force Academy’s 

macro-alignment campaign continued, which led to the rollout of 

the Curriculum Outcomes Assessment Plan, or COAP (see Figure 3 

next page). 

The COAP materialized from 

agendas organized to muster 

support for threading Outcomes 

through the curriculum, using the 

Outcomes Teams as tools. More a 

strategy than a plan, the scheme 

sought to establish an appreciation of the value of Outcomes, by 

laying bare the intentionality of the 

core curriculum. It is reasonable 

to assume that COAP advocates 

hoped to promote faculty-wide 

networks of learning throughout 

the multi- and cross-disciplinary 

core. But top-down and bottomup perspectives mashed more 

than meshed. On the one hand, 

the COAP provided a visual representation of desired pre- and 

co-requisites to develop Outcomes 

Figure 2
4 Core Relevance at the USAF Academy 

in a linear, sequential manner. On 

the other hand, restricting linkages 

and knowledge aggregates to predetermined courses proscribed 

what was deemed to be professionally relevant and undercut educational creativity and richness. 

The common Outcome-oriented, learning-focused assessment frameworks (Outcomes, 

Outcome Teams and the COAP) 

implied that there were alternatives to the traditionally disciplines-driven professional nucleus 

and common core cultivated by 

academic departments. This fundamental difference in how the 

Academy could improve (or prove) 

its performance became obvious 

as Outcome-oriented integration 

coincided with discipline-based 

insertion of content into the core. 

On Alignment 

Assessments of selected Outcomes in courses where actual 

learning is not so restrained are 

slender strands of illustrative integration. If the faculty is to weave 

a meaningful fabric, then what 

is needed is a working concept 

of alignment that recognizes 

and advances the origins of Outcomes. Ideally, the understanding 

of Outcomes themselves should 

derive from a liberal education 

comprised of multiple disciplines, 

which spawn inter-disciplines 

and new disciplines. The intellectual power of disciplines and 

the interdisciplinary connections 

they foment then enables adaptation and anticipation of changes 

in the professional environment. 

My assumption is that education 

creates knowledge and any associated outcomes (intended or not) 

and processes from which Outcomes are derived. 

From this perspective, curriculum alignment may be understood 

in at least two ways. It may be 

interpreted as a supervisory tool to 

restrict content to that which supports desired Outcomes, or targets. 

This may be for the purpose of 

forging a sense of common identity, or to meet stakeholders’ 

requirements. An example of this 

approach is the use of Outcome 

Teams to promote the Outcomes, 

which has led to a resisted expectation that curriculum content will 

change accordingly. 

Alignment could also be seen 

as drawing from a broad core that 

supports the Outcomes without 

being limited to them. This 

approach would view Outcomes 

as partial inputs, not independent 

seeds, of future Outcomes. 

From this point of view, aligning a liberal education to Outcomes is problematic, especially 

if taken to extremes. The first 

example above could orchestrate 

a top-down “wire brushing” of the 

curriculum to ensure that all Outcomes are developed and assessed. 

This could be referred to as a “only 

teach outcomes” philosophy of the 

Efficiency School (similar to a wellfocused training approach) with 

its omniscient “ergo propter hoc” 

fallacy. The second example could 

devolve in the opposite direction 

toward ad hoc selection of content 

to assess any particular Outcome. 

This might be the Random School’s 

credo, “teach anything and everything and something surely will 

support Outcomes,” which ignores 

the need for the Academy to actually teach certain professional 

content, such as those specified 

for USAF Commissioning Education Programs. We could expect 

the Efficiency School to suffer 

from structured conformity and 

Random School to be riddled with 

unanticipated gaps and overlap. 

Figure 3 The COAP7
Core Relevance at the USAF Academy 5

Consider the work of Colonel 

John Boyd, an approach to learning that depends upon aggressive inquiry and the discovery of 

knowledge. Boyd’s fighter pilot 

sequence of Observe - Orient - 

Decide - Act, or “OODA loop,” 

is a practical process of creative 

learning with broad situational 

awareness and constant feedback. 

In a context of air-to-air combat 

(which Boyd experienced during 

the Korean War), the OODA 

Loop fits nicely into the Efficiency 

School (random flying would tend 

toward undesirable outcomes). 

However, as Boyd applied his 

combat tactics to strategic questions, he developed general arguments in presentations such as 

Discourse on Winning and Losing, 

Destruction and Creation, and Patterns of Conflict. Boyd’s incisive 

inquisitiveness crossed disciplinary boundaries as he synthesized 

perspectives from organizational 

learning, cybernetics, autopoietic 

models and chaos theory. External knowledge was permitted; 

the OODA Loop is not a closed 

circuit. By seeking out various 

forms of knowledge, Boyd was 

able to improve historical fighter 

tactics to create an energy maneuverability theory still evolving 

today well beyond air-to-air 

combat applications. 

Similarly, a field of study’s 

content and process knowledge, 

irrespective of any Outcomes, is 

critical to educational development. Now let’s compare Boyd’s 

construct with USAFA’s Learning 

Development Model (LDM), currently a widely-used process.8

The LDM schematic is strikingly similar to Boyd’s OODA 

Loop except for one important 

respect (see Figure 4 above right). 

Both models aim to represent a 

process more complex than targeting and re-targeting desired 

outcomes, and rely on knowledge 

outside their self-constructed 

systems. Each presumes to adapt to 

internal changes and admit external stimuli. The major difference 

is that Boyd’s assessment methods 

step occurs after feedback (in the 

Orientation phase), not before it 

as in the Learning Development 

Model (LDM). In theory, Boyd’s 

OODA Loop allows for broader 

situational awareness and more 

forms of external stimuli, rather 

than feedback-free assessment. 

Similarly, professional intelligence 

analysis prescribes a requirementsfocused process that continues 

to analyze information before 

knowing how the information will 

be collected. That is, analysts are 

not supposed to filter out potentially significant data with desired 

collection Outcomes, because such 

alignment could cripple the understanding of complex operational 

environments.9

 Whether fighter 

pilot or intelligence analyst, competitive learning requires models 

that promote creative, innovative 

and highly interactive processes of 

discovery. 

Two further examples support 

the idea that educational alignment 

should further the unrestrained 

growth of academic knowledge: 

bounded rationality and uncertainty. In Rubenstein’s concept 

of bounded rationality, humans 

intend to pursue goals rationally 

and adapt to achieve them, but 

based on our limited information, 

time, and abilities to understand 

the environment, we “satisfice.” 

Therefore, we need to seek knowledge outside the fundamental 

elements and relationships that 

constitute our modeled systems 

(including Outcomes) and assess 

our learning after broad feedback 

(not before it). Let’s assume that we 

need to out-compete clever, smart, 

cunning and highly motivated 

adversaries. This implies that the 

broad knowledge base comprising 

our source of current Outcomes 

needs to be acknowledged, valued 

and protected, because knowledge 

is the culture from which future 

Outcomes grow. 

Content knowledge is important, even when not deemed to be 

professionally relevant to current 

Outcomes. An interpretation of 

Heisenberg’s Uncertainty PrinFigure 4 USAFA Learning Development Model (LMD)
6 Core Relevance at the USAF Academy 

ciple makes a similar point. Take 

a potential target as an example. 

The smaller the aperture of a single 

optical sensor on a target, the 

less likely we are to know about 

its movement, and the more we 

know about a target’s location the 

less we know about its mobility. 

In the case of human intelligence, 

attributing intent and accounting 

for random behavior is even more 

difficult. Ideally we’d like multiple 

sensors and sources, but we are 

constrained by various resources 

so there will always be an element 

of uncertainty in our knowledge no matter how sophisticated 

the technology. If we accept this 

principle, then we need to allow 

uncertainty in our outcomes so 

that any Outcome does not exclusively determine what we judge as 

relevant to teach and research. 

Conclusions

The development of knowledge, 

skills and responsibilities is vital 

for an accredited institution of 

higher learning whose social value 

to the nation is to be at once a professional and academic program 

that commissions military officers. The profession of arms is a 

most competitive enterprise with 

critical consequences, so USAFA 

must strive to be value-added with 

respect to the alternatives in the 

American educational system. The 

USAFA core experience should 

be more than mission elements 

independently pursuing military 

training and academic education 

respectively. Learning tends to 

operate along a spectrum whose 

endpoints are training on one end 

and education on the other, with 

variable methods and purposes.10

So the Academy’s Athletic Director, 

Dean of the Faculty, and Commandant of Cadets lead proportionally different mixtures of training 

and education knowledge, skills 

and responsibilities. Knowledge 

in particular is exploding far too 

quickly for any specific Outcome 

to competently direct. Therefore, 

Outcomes at the institutional level 

are needed, but they need to be as 

general as the mission permits in 

order to empower liberal education as the main engine of professional Outcomes. 

If Academy educators are to 

actively create knowledge rather 

than passively observe or translate 

it, then we need to be unrestrained 

by pre-determined Outcomes. 

Outcomes cannot be updated often 

or precisely enough compared to 

what is going on in dynamic fields 

of study, research, courses and 

lessons. The reification of knowledge Outcomes and resultant analytical categorization of sub-tiers to 

be assessed, does not equate to all 

relevant knowledge. Such a calculus would be particularly deadly to 

innovation and creativity, because 

unlike skills and responsibility 

Outcomes, knowledge Outcomes 

are a priori limits to knowledge. 

At the same time, USAFA 

needs to actively lead, not simply 

be accountable to, commissioning education requirements. Professional relevance is the sine 

qua non of an Academy education, which is not to downplay 

the need for intellectual rigor. To 

the contrary, given the globally 

competitive nature of the military 

profession, an Academy’s professionally relevant academics need 

to be first-rate. USAFA faculty 

participation in the USAF Commissioning Education Program is 

a vital aspect of core relevance as 

this collaboratively determines the 

outcomes that should be integrated 

into every USAF commissioning curriculum. Strong embracement of this program by USAFA 

academic departments helps 

ensure professional requirements 

are relevant and rigorous, and met. 

Faculty do teach material that 

does not align particularly well 

with any of the Outcomes, but 

teach it anyway using judgment 

in addition to organizational templates. The Department of History, 

for instance, has steadfastly taught 

counterinsurgency as part of its 

History of Unconventional Warfare 

course since the 1960’s through the 

post-Vietnam period of doctrinal 

stagnation (only rejuvenated since 

9/11). Similarly, the Department 

of Military & Strategic Studies 

taught interagency and irregular 

operations years before service 

and joint doctrines changed and 

before USAFA’s knowledge-type 

Outcome, “the full spectrum of 

joint and coalition warfare.” 

By venturing outside established boundaries of professional 

education, yet ensuring we meet 

such requirements, we encourage 

cadets and ourselves to develop 

and defend innovative arguments. 

Multiple disciplinary approaches 

to knowledge can provide any 

number of pathways to Outcomes, 

but they also lead to places only 

discovered along the way. A curricIf Academy educators are to actively create knowledge rather 

than passively observe or translate it, then we need to be 

unrestrained by pre-determined Outcomes. 
Core Relevance at the USAF Academy 7

ulum bounded by Outcomes may 

be adequate for a vocational school 

charged with developing currently 

needed skills. But an education for 

world-class military officers needs 

to be balanced to participate in the 

creation of the Outcomes. 

A research and teaching enterprise should nurture the freedom 

of the mind to encourage department-level adjustments of its 

curriculum to support Outcomes, 

rather than to align by enforcing the curriculum to fit Outcomes. Faculty members may 

not intend to trim a course or 

lesson to Outcomes only, but it 

tends to happen in a structured 

approach. Moreover, Outcomes 

can drive research priorities in 

the competition for funding. 

If faculty think that liberal education is a process that creates 

knowledge for knowledge’s sake, 

then the departments charged 

with exercising professional and 

academic judgment about relevant 

content is where liberal education 

must be deliberately nourished. 

Liberal education is not just theoretically robust; it is also quite 

practical development of human 

capacity to lead (students and 

faculty alike). 

Disciplinary approaches to 

knowledge creation provide different perspectives and creative 

methods of learning, tempered by 

the humility that no single discipline always has the best answer 

to knowledge creation. Interdisciplinary approaches draw from 

the richness of disciplines, which 

is how a well-developed core of 

disciplines provides a creative 

intellectual foundation. We need 

robust discipline-based knowledge 

to have well-informed, quality 

debates over breadth and depth, 

majors enhancing the core and 

the core building majors, professional and academic balancing, 

and so forth, in the first place. A 

broad core foundation can support 

what will surely be a continuing complexity of Outcomes (air, 

space, cyber, what’s next?) without 

being utterly defined by them. We 

need to approach Outcomes from 

disciplinary and derivative interdisciplinary perspectives which 

embrace teaching and assessing 

content that includes what we may 

sometimes judge as professionally 

irrelevant but academically rigorous for educational learning. 

Fundamental assumptions 

about the origins and creation of 

knowledge matter. By preserving a broad, multiple discipline 

approach to achieving professionally relevant Outcomes, we can 

better ensure that such Outcomes 

will continue to be derived from 

fundamental questions rather than 

final answers.

1 An Air Force Learning Committee, part of the HQ USAF Force Development Directorate, was established in 

2007 and regularly updates the USAF 

Total Force Competency List. This 

effort was predated by a series of USAF 

committees and conferences in which 

USAFA faculty have been involved 

since the mid-90’s. A short list includes 

the Learning and Education Council, 

the Commissioning Training and Education Committee, and the Developing 

Aerospace Leaders initiative, whose 

“Mastery of Aerospace Power” competencies and components matrix developed into today’s competency list.

2 Eight “strategic documents” were 

used to develop the Academy Outcomes 

in 2006: AFDD-1, Leadership & AF 

Development; American Association 

of Colleges & Universities LEAP Outcomes; AFI 36-2014, AF Pre-Commissioning Education; AFMD-12, USAFA; 

USAF Total Force Competency List; 

AFPD 36-35, USAFA; AFI 36-3502, 

Performance Measurement Program for 

USAFA; and the USAFA Mission and 

Vision statements. 

3 USAFA Mission Statement: To 

educate, train and inspire men and 

women to become leaders of character, 

motivated to lead the United States Air 

Force in service to our nation; USAFA 

Vision Statement: to be the Air Force’s 

premier institution for developing 

leaders of character.

4 United States Air Force Academy 

Curriculum Handbook 2011-12, 

Office of the Associate Dean for Aca-
8 Core Relevance at the USAF Academy 

demic Affairs, 74, http://www.usafa.

edu/df/dfr/curriculum/handbook.

cfm?catname=dfr2, 

5 The first two recommendations of 

the Larson Report, a National Defense 

Authorization Act-directed Secretary of 

the Air Force task, were as follows: R1.T 

his study highly recommends that the 

Superintendent, in coordination with 

senior Air Force leadership, establish a 

common mission statement for the Air 

Force Academy that reflects the needs 

of the Air Force. R2. One of the most 

important things to be done at the Air 

Force Academy is to improve the integration of the three mission elements. 

Adm (ret) Charles R. Larson, Study and 

Report Related to Permanent Professors 

at the Air Force Academy, April 2004, 

55.

6 The increase in accountability to 

standards across all mission elements at 

the Academy (military, academic, athletic, ethics) is illustrated by the addition of an institutional-level Physical 

Education Review Committee in the 

early 2000’s. The PRC, like its predecessors the Academic Review Committee 

and the Military Review Committee, 

judges cases of cadets failing to meet 

mission element standards, oversees 

rehabilitation, and recommends retention/disenrollment. The Cadet Honor 

system is a different process as it has 

been proudly owned and run by cadets. 

However, it is bureaucratically conceivable that assessment-oriented research 

on character and ethics could lead to the 

implementation of screening metrics for 

college and university applicants

7 United States Air Force Academy 

Curriculum Handbook 2011-12, 

Office of the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, 75, http://www.usafa.

edu/df/dfr/curriculum/handbook.

cfm?catname=dfr2, 

8 “Guide to Learning-Focused Practice: Rubrics for Self-Assessment and 

Curriculum Development,” May 2006, 

Directorate of Education, Dean of the 

Faculty, USAF Academy. This working 

paper is one example of learningfocused ideas that contributed to what 

became referred to as the Learning 

Development Model. Beginning in 2000, 

officer development under the Commandant started to be formalized with 

Commandant Learning Outcomes and 

related to the Dean’s Educational Outcomes. In 2004, new learning constructs 

and models were incorporated into the 

newly established Officer Development 

System. At the strategic level were the 

Academy Outcomes, at the operationallevel the PITO (Personal, Interpersonal, 

Team, Organizational) Flight Plan, 

and at the tactical-level the Leadership 

Growth Model. 

9 Analysts“should not quit the 

decomposition process because they 

do not know how the resultant observables might be collected against.” Wayne 

Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, 

Intelligence Analysis: How to Think 

in Complex Environments (Oxford: 

Praeger Security International, 2010), 

91.

10 Education: (a) developing intellectual capabilities based on broad 

principles or guidelines (b) to understand or explain (c) relatively ill-defined 

situations and problems. Training: (a) 

engaging in disciplined practice according to specific principles or guidelines 

(b) to reach decisions or perform tasks 

(c) in more recognizable situations and 

problems. Quoted from Tom Drohan 

and Doug Murray, Responding to the 

“Developing Aerospace Leaders” Initiative, Aerospace Power Journal (Summer 

2001), 13-22. 
ACTIVE LEARNING AND THE RISING GENERATION OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS 9

Technology has had a transforming impact on military 

education. Michael Macedonia, 

the Chief Scientist and Technical 

Director of the US Army Simulation, Training and Instrumental 

Command (STRICOM), states 

that “Modeling and Simulation 

are considered essential to military transformation-the retooling of armed forces for the new 

realities of the 21st century. These 

tools present a powerful way for 

military leadership to visualize the 

future and assess needs.”1

 Using 

new technologies is essential to 

increasing the depth of education in many learning environments. One such environment 

that employs “state-of-the-art” 

education technologies is the 

US Air Force Academy’s Department of Military & Strategic 

Studies (DFMI or MSS) and its 

Cadet Battle Lab (CBL). Properly 

employed, the CBL has the potential to encourage the development 

and implementation of new and 

innovative learning strategies. 

This essay will explore new 

alternatives for simulation in 

the CBL by drawing on research 

about new and innovative technologies that can be employed 

to foster a more engaging learning experience for cadets. To that 

end, this paper will seek to answer 

the question: how can one best 

implement new technologies for 

use in the CBL? 

Learning laboratories generally need to be able to accommodate innovative change in order 

to promote the most effective 

learning strategies. One problem 

that arises is how to approach 

the implementation of rapidly 

evolving state-of-the-art technologies. According to Michael 

Macedonia, “Traditional universities face major competition from 

non-traditional organizations such 

as the the University of Phoenix 

and the US Army’s eArmyU that 

employ disruptive technologies 

and techniques such as distributive learning.”2

 The implementation of these new technologies 

by the University of Phoenix and 

the US Army’s eArmyU exemplify an innovative approach to 

learning that has been extremely 

successful. Michael notes that 

“eArmyU is an online army college 

where technical training can 

be accomplished. It also serves 

as a means to higher military 

learning.”3

A related issue that arises is 

how to choose a state-of-theart technology that makes the 

best use of a given learning 

environment. In the case of the 

MSS CBL, once selected, that 

state-of-the-art technology needs 

to be appropriately integrated 

into CBL-based activities in a 

way that promotes innovative 

learning-focused and engaging 

simulation exercises. By drawing 

on proven ideas, a simulation tailored to time-constrained DFMI 

faculty and cadets can be crafted 

that will result in a stimulating 

learning environment. The simulation proposed here is the CadetEngaged Strategic Simulation 

(CESS). CESS is offered as a modelfocused approach that could be 

ACTIVE LEARNING AND THE RISING 

GENERATION OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS 

AN INCORPORATION OF NEW SIMULATION TECHNOLOGIES AND SIMULATIONS FOR 

THE CADET BATTLE LAB

JOSH UA HUCKABEE

Modeling and Simulation are considered essential to military 

transformation—the retooling of armed forces for the new 

realities of the 21st century. These tools present a powerful 

way for military leadership to visualize the future and assess 

needs. 

Cadet JOSHUA HUCKABEE is a Military & Strategic Studies major in the 

Class of 2012.
10 ACTIVE LEARNING AND THE RISING GENERATION OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS 

considered for implementation in 

MSS core courses. Furthermore, 

it could also serve a dual-use 

as the basis for an iterative capstone project for MSS majors. For 

example, cadets majoring in MSS 

could choose between completing 

a traditional paper or undertaking a CBL-related capstone project 

involving further refinement of 

the proposed CESS simulation. 

Implementing new state-of-theart learning environments in educational institutions is extremely 

beneficial and has the potential 

to provide a more effective way 

of learning. Moreover, 

facilities such as the CBL 

are capable of accommodating a multitude of 

potential state-of-theart education technologies. Accordingly, a key 

issue involves identifying 

which learning simulations 

will provide the desired 

outcome in the demanding, time-constrained environment of the Air Force 

Academy. Bassem Alhabi, 

a professor of technology at 

Florida Atlantic University, 

acknowledges this issue 

when he notes, “Despite 

ceaseless investments in emerging 

technologies by U. S. institutions 

of higher education, few questions 

have been raised as to whether 

these technologies are truly essential to support instructional and 

overall educational goals.”4

 While 

it is beneficial to have the capability to host a multitude of innovative learning-focused simulations, 

employing the wrong one can 

hinder progress to improve innovative learning. Not only may the 

innovative technology fail as a 

learning tool, but resources will be 

wasted as well. Thus, it is important 

to draw on technologies employed 

successfully in other institutions and tailor them to Academy 

needs. In part, these include the 

time-constrained environment, in 

which both cadets and instructors 

must function. Simplicity of operation thus becomes vital, although it 

must be recognized that the more 

simple a simulation is, the less 

fidelity it will possess. Accordingly, there is a tradeoff between 

simplicity and fidelity that needs to 

be reorganized and balanced carefully. The guiding philosophy of the 

CESS seeks to strike that balance. 

When dealing with state-of-theart education technology, usually 

very little experience exists about 

how to use and support that technology most effectively. Put simply, 

there is always a high chance of 

failure when dealing with innovative ideas. With a system that is too 

complex, a lack of relevant technical expertise may result simply in 

an expensive failure. It is important 

to keep the system simple, a principle that has informed the concept 

being proposed here. In this paper, 

various simulations will be analyzed in order to make the case 

for the CESS and why it should be 

adopted to augment current simulation technology employed in the 

CBL.

Employing state-of-the-art technology in the Cadet Battle Lab 

(CBL) for innovative learningfocused simulations can best be 

accomplished in three sequential steps: (1) an analysis of stateof-the-art simulation technology 

and trends must be conducted 

in regards to the Academy’s academic mission; (2) The state-ofthe-art technology must satisfy the 

learning-focused philosophy 

that justifies the existence 

of the Cadet Battle Lab as a 

tool for facilitating learning 

within the time limitations 

of the cadet schedule; (3) 

The state-of-the-art technology must be capable of functioning with the expertise 

that is available in DFMI. In 

regards to the first step, there 

are many potential technologies that pertain to education simulations and engagement. One such medium is 

adding visual media to simulations and engage learners. In regards to the second 

step, “virtual worlds” (i.e., artificial environments) are domains 

that can be created to simulate any 

learning objective. The use of associated technology can promote 

the desired learning outcome of 

Military and Strategic Studies by 

increasing the strategic mindset of 

cadets in a way that engages them 

and inspires their participation. 

This could be accomplished by 

simulations that can be manipulated easily, such as a decision simulation where students must act 

quickly in reaction to a simulated 
ACTIVE LEARNING AND THE RISING GENERATION OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS 11

nuclear attack. In regards to the 

third and final step, virtual worlds 

are user friendly. This means that 

special technical expertise is not 

required to employ this system for 

instructional purposes. A virtual 

world is a viable solution to the 

argument presented in the thesis. 

For example, cadets could have 

the ability to participate in simulations anywhere in the world; that 

is, students could access terminals 

via their smart phones or computers and participate in a virtual 

class. This is important because 

students could continue learning 

outside the classroom, not merely 

when a traditionally rigid schedule 

dictates they must. That, in turn, 

could promote a greater motivation for learning. Before making 

the case for the proposed CESS, 

some background on the use of 

technology in military education 

may be useful. 

It is important to understand 

the future of state-of-the-art technology in order to determine 

which technologies can best be 

implemented to support a positive, 

proactive learning environment 

for the CBL. Adam Grissom of 

the RAND Corporation provides 

great insight about the application of state-of-the-art technology in his monograph about the 

future of military innovation. He 

states, “Innovation and stagnation 

have been important themes since 

the earliest writings on warfare.”5 

Innovation is key in the case of 

simulation technology, and stagnation of our current simulation 

methodology must be avoided. 

Grissom makes a further 

noteworthy comment when he 

observes that staying ahead in 

all technical aspects of warfare, 

to include the learning environment, serves as a significant security measure. In his conceptual 

framework, Grissom describes 

state-of-the-art technology as the 

highest process of learning in a 

field that contributes to a scientific revolution. In The Structure 

of Scientific Revolutions, another 

author, Thomas Kuhn, writes that 

the accumulation of anomalies 

within a field of research creates, 

over time, pressure for change in 

the field’s prevailing assumptions 

and conceptual frameworks.6

 This 

means that state-of-the-art technology is defined as a reform that 

is at its highest stage of development and with time creates a revolutionary outcome. In essence, the 

key to a revolutionary outcome is 

creativity. For example, in World 

War II the Germans created the 

blitzkrieg by forming new linkages of two existing ideologies in 

different ways. German tanks were 

used in an innovative fashion. 

These tanks were used essentially 

as cavalry instead of being devoted 

exclusively to infantry support. 

This was made possible by using 

radios. Ultimately, linking tanks, 

cavalry tactics and radios creatively was fundamental to the 

blitzkrieg’s success. It takes a high 

level of creativity to accomplish 

feats such as the blitzkrieg. Similarly the CESS can serve as a creative device for engaging cadets 

and promoting “outside the box” 

thinking by allowing them to see 

the effects of the decisions they 

have made. This can best be fostered by allowing cadets discussion 

time and enabling them to see the 

results of their decisions by more 

fully exploiting the CBL’s projection capabilities. Also, as a capstone, cadets must improve upon 

the framework that is the CESS 

forcing elaborate research and 

critical thinking. A more detailed 

explanation will be provided in the 

following pages. 

As we shall see, the CESS is built 

upon a historical foundation of 

successes in previous simulations. 

The history of implementation of 

state-of-the-art technology in military environments gives a baseline 

of what has been successful and 

unsuccessful. That, in turn, can be 

of assistance in determining the 

appropriate new technology for 

the CBL. Chris Dede, a professor of 

learning technologies at Harvard’s 

Graduate School of Education, 

provides great insight about how 

learning technologies have been 

employed to promote learning. 

Historically, knowledge was transmitted by word of mouth and by 

lecturing. Since the dawn of computers, computational tools have 

been employed to create a much 

more active and “well-rounded” 

learning environment. Simply put, 

as technology has advanced so has 

the level of detail and realism of 

simulations. Dede notes, “To date, 

uses of information technology to 

enhance constructivist learning 

environments have centered on 

creating computational tools and 

virtual representations that students can manipulate.”7

 State-ofthe-art education technology can 

be expected to advance the overall 

effectiveness of learning as well. In 

that regard, Dede goes on to state, 

“As learners interpret experience 

Staying ahead in all technical aspects of warfare, to include the 

learning environment, serves as a significant security measure.
12 ACTIVE LEARNING AND THE RISING GENERATION OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS 

to refine their mental modes, computational tools that complement 

human memory and intelligence 

are made available.”8

 Thus, the use 

of state-of-the-art technologies 

can be expected to accelerate the 

effectiveness of the learning environment, providing another set 

of future technologies to further 

advance learning. It’s a continuous cycle that needs monitoring 

to keep promoting the use of new 

types of learning material in order 

to avoid becoming complacent 

with the technology that is already 

in use. 

The process represented by the 

blitzkrieg and the history of educational technology both represent 

innovative approaches. If creating 

new linkages in military technology 

promoted the success of blitzkriegstyle warfare, then creating new 

linkages in education technology 

should also foster success. Linking 

multi-media, visual aesthetics and 

mass communication technology 

will appeal to cadets and promote 

simplicity for instructors. As noted 

above, this is a fundamental intent 

of the CESS. Among the US armed 

forces, the Army has realized that 

creating linkages appealing to the 

younger technocratic generation 

can create a successful training, 

engaging and recruiting simulation. “The Army Game,” as it is 

called, is in the form of a game for 

platforms such as X-box that promotes certain goals for the Army, 

chief among them recruitment 

of high school and college-age 

youth. It has been a huge success. 

The Army understood the power 

of engaging simulations and used 

linkages of different simulations to 

create the successful recruiting tool 

that they have today. Among its 

strengths is the fact that the Army 

Game appeals to the user rather 

than the teacher. The point here is 

that a successful simulation must 

be appealing to the students, to 

include Air Force Academy cadets. 

Future technologies need to be 

examined to determine how they 

can best be implemented into 

the CBL. Another author, John 

Gibbons, states, “The military has 

been a leader in the development 

and use of instructional delivery 

systems having used high technology for many years. Its great 

need for technical skill training, 

together with the critical nature of 

its national security mission and its 

nonprofit orientation, has led to a 

training technology revolution and 

a good market for state-of-the-art 

technology in military education 

and training.”9

 The military is far 

ahead in learning technology and 

needs to stay ahead by implementing concept state-of-the-art technologies to create the next step in 

innovative learning. The foregoing 

discussion points out the importance of simulations in the military. 

The question for now becomes this: 

how can we make the most of the 

CBL as a resource for simulationbased instructing and learning at 

the Air Force Academy?

The Cadet Battle Lab

The CBL can support a myriad 

of learning activities and includes 

two sound proof battle simulation labs, state-of-the-art computers for advanced simulation and a 

three projector system mimicking 

actual Air Control Centers used 

in the operational Air Force. The 

CBL is an Academy laboratory run 

by the Department of Military & 

Strategic Studies to teach, test, and 

evaluate Air Force Academy cadets 

as they learn to formulate military strategy. It has its own virtual 

world that can house a variety of 

imaginable situations. According to the DOD Joint Warfighting 

Center (JWFC) and the Training 

Development Group (TDG), (both 

leaders in virtual world simulations), virtual worlds are “an innovative blend of social networking 

and gaming technologies.  Users 

are able to create personas known 

as avatars that can interact with 

each other in computer-generated 

three-dimensional environments, 

which in some cases are accessible 24 hours a day, seven days 

a week.”10 The CBL can be completely shut off from the rest of the 

world and virtual simulations can 

be conducted in an unrestricted 

way without creating problems for 

outside systems. It has the ability to 

be closed or open to the network at 

USAFA per instructor desires. For 

example, a virus can be released 

in the CBL to simulate a foreign 

cyber-attack. In the closed CBL 

environment the instructor can use 

emails embedded with a virus in 

order to train personnel in Operation Security (OPSEC). Overall, 

Students of today live in a completely different world than 

their predecessors. Understanding touch screen, gaming and 

other visual mediums is second nature to cadets and younger 

officers. The point here is that visual stimulation should be 

stressed in order to foster an already high level of affinity for 

visual learning.
ACTIVE LEARNING AND THE RISING GENERATION OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS 13

the capabilities inherent to the CBL 

provide faculty and cadets with a 

highly potent visual learning tool. 

That’s because junior officers and 

cadets alike are media-oriented 

and technologically-adept. Therefore, increased reliance on mediabased learning can be expected to 

engage cadets and serve as a more 

effective training tool. 

Visual Media in the CBL

Visual learning has had a profound effect on students since the 

early days of television. In World 

War II, the First Motion Picture 

Unit (FMPU) was created in order 

to test whether soldiers could 

be trained by means of visual 

media. Such a training technique 

ultimately proved to be a huge 

success. In the words of one historian, “Approximately a year and a 

half before the War, Warner Bros. 

Studios was contacted by the Army 

Public Relations in Washington 

with an official request that a series 

of short subjects be made, released 

in theaters throughout the country, 

for the purpose of orienting the 

public with the various branches 

of the military.”11 Since the days 

of World War II, students have 

become accustomed to be stimulated by visual cues. Practically all 

training now relies on visual techniques. This includes job training. To cite just one example, on 

their first day at McDonalds, new 

employees are required to sit in 

front of a television and receive 

visual training. Students of today 

live in a completely different world 

than their predecessors. Understanding touch screen, gaming and 

other visual mediums is second 

nature to cadets and younger officers. The point here is that visual 

stimulation should be stressed 

in order to foster an already high 

level of affinity for visual learning. 

Accordingly, one application for 

the CBL would be to visually depict 

decisions and the repercussions of 

those decisions. If augmented by 

appropriate historical film footage, 

the visual classroom environment 

of the CBL increases the prospect 

of cadets remembering what they 

had been taught beyond the classroom.

The Cadet Engaged Strategic 

Simulation (CESS)

As envisioned here, the CESS 

will begin by introducing the scenario to its participants. The simulation will feature fictional countries and situations. The reason for 

fictional countries is that national 

countries and scenarios are less 

likely to become obsolete. The simulation could start with a fictional 

antagonist country, Blueland, 

releasing an address threatening 

the democratic nation of Redland. 

The government of Blueland might 

be assessed to desirr a hegemonic 

status upon the color continent. 

Having set the stage, Red vs. Blue 

cadet teams will then be organized. 

United States, Redland, Blueland, 

and NATO, or other appropriate 

regional teams could be assembled. At the beginning of the simulation a presentation utilizing 

real life media and visual technology would capture the interest of 

CESS participants. One approach 

would be to use actual historical 

footage of an appropriate conflict 

and related news articles adapted 

as necessary for the simulation. 

Coupled with pronouncements 

from various key government 

leaders from the United States, 

allied partners, Redland and 

Blueland, this approach could be 

expected to promote active cadet 

participation. The benefit of using 

fictional countries is that you can 

feature material pertaining to 

real world leaders whose names 

have been changed. The fictional 

aspect of the CESS also allows it 

to be much more adaptable. To 

incorporate a useful dimension of 

simulated fog and friction of this 

simulation, simulated personalities and personal agendas could be 

assigned to the various cadet participants.

There could also be a news 

agency consisting of several cadets 

where reporting might intentionally be biased toward either the governments of Blueland or Redland. 

Information biased toward one 

side or the other demonstrates that 

public media can be biased and 

encourages cadets to sift through 

the biased news reports for real 

facts. Media plays a major role in 

information operations as well as 

public affairs. Thus, it becomes 

important for cadets to understand 

the role of media and how propaganda can be employed in potential and actual conflicts. The media 

influence should promote additional discourse among decisionmakers on both sides and can be 

expected to increase the complexity of the crises situation. Furthermore, communication between 

cadet participants implemented 

by the CESS utilizes new technologies. To facilitate media transmissions, CESS could employ Text/

Twitter technology as well. This 

would allow instructors to text all 

participants in regard to upcoming situations, which gives them 

time to think of alternative strategies. The larger point is that Text/

Twitter technology would enable 

instructors and cadets to engage in 

CESS-related activities outside of 

normal class time and outside the 
14 ACTIVE LEARNING AND THE RISING GENERATION OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS 

confines of the CBL. 

CESS exercises could be organized into phases drawn out over 

several lessons when sufficiently 

complex. Phases might include: 

“Analysis and Psychological Operations Phase,” using psychological operations to win the hearts 

and minds of US friends and foes. 

To that end, media influence and 

propaganda could be utilized by 

both teams. A “Diplomacy Phase” 

could be aimed at influencing diplomatic relations between Redland 

and Blueland, or multiple players. 

Options in this phase range from 

treaties, embargoes or sanctions 

that can be placed by the primary 

actors, or others, such as US or 

NATO teams. Once an option has 

been selected, the cadets will see 

the results and effects of their decisions by means of visual media. A 

third phase option would be the 

“Action Phase”. This could begin on 

the second or subsequent lessons 

and focus on the kinetic side of 

operations. The choices here would 

range between kinetic or nonkinetic military or other instruments of power. For example, if the 

cadets argued for diplomacy, the 

end result could be a stand-down 

of military forces and they might 

see newscasts of the Redland leader 

shaking hands with the Blueland 

leader. In this phase, each option 

could result in additional options, 

ultimately creating a tree branch 

of possibilities. Although it may 

sound complicated, the instructor 

would select the desired/negotiated option and the scenario could 

alter toward a new set of variables. As the simulation unfolds, 

cadets discuss and make a decision 

based on the options provided in 

“Action Phase”. A final “Conclusion Phase” would conclude the 

simulation based on the previous 

inputs and discussions, where participants present their findings and 

their takeaways in an After Action 

Report (AAR) format. 

As explained above, the CESS 

will be guided by the instructor 

and make increased use of the 

CBL’s visual capabilities. It is arguable that realism is proportional to 

participation. Actually seeing the 

results of the decisions the participants make in real time will foster 

a greater degree of active participation and enhance the retention 

of course objectives even after the 

class has been concluded. 

In conclusion, the Cadet Battle 

Lab is a first-rate facility for conducting war-games and simulations. It can accommodate various 

kinds of simulations and, thanks 

to its inherent adaptability, simulations can be offered that involve 

increasing or decreasing levels 

of complexity. The sophisticated 

multi-media capabilities of the 

CBL constitute a particularly 

impressive engagement opportunity for cadets from a visually-oriented generation. 

1 Michael Macedonia, Games, 

Simulation, and the Military Education Dilemma (Washington, DC: EDUCAUSE Publications, 2002), 159. One 

example of state-of-the-art education 

technologies is Twitter, which provides 

a simple information highway that uses 

messaging to inform and teach anyone 

with a cell phone.

2 Ibid., 157.

3 Ibid., 156. 

4 Bassem al Halabi et al., “Technology and education: between chaos and 

order,” First Monday (peer-reviewed 

journal on the internet 1999), 1, 

http://131.193.153.231/www/issues/

issue4_3/hamza/index.html.

5 Adam Grissom, The Future of Military Innovation Studies (Washington, 

DC: RAND Corp, 2006), 2.

6 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of 

Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1962), 1

7 Chris Dede, The Evolution of 

Constructivist Learning Environments: 

Immersion in Distributed Virtual Worlds

(Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 

1996), 165.

8 Ibid., 166.

9 John Gibbens, ed., Information 

Technology and its Impact on American 

Education (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1982), 246. 

10 Joint Warfighting Center Training Development Group, Analysis Division, “Virtual Worlds,” paper presented 

at NORTHCOM Simulation Conference, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September, 2008).

11 George Siegal ed., “Hollywood’s 

Army,” The California State Museum 

collection (2010), 1.
HANDS ON KEYBOARD 15

The United States Air Force has recently taken great strides 

in establishing an effective cyber 

warfare component. Nevertheless, 

there remains a significant amount 

of work to fully integrate the cyber 

mission into the institutional Air 

Force. That effort includes the 

need for a well-developed Cyber 

Weapons School (CWS) to provide 

graduate level training and serve as 

the Air Force’s cyber training flagship organization. The question 

this paper attempts to answer is 

how this proposed Air Force Cyber 

Weapons School should be structured in order to develop highly 

effective network warfare specialists.

Networks and cyberspace are 

crucial in nearly every current Air 

Force mission and can be expected 

to have an increasing role to play in 

the future. For example, Remotely 

Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) in current 

conflicts are assuming combat 

roles; the link connecting the plane 

to its pilot halfway across the world 

is entirely within the cyberspace 

domain. As the Air Force increases 

its RPV inventories and expands 

their roles, peoples’ lives and the 

success of the mission could hinge 

on the security of the link between 

RPV and pilot. Other operations, 

such as intelligence gathering, 

information security, defense of 

energy grids, and surface to air 

missile targeting are all highly integrated into cyberspace networks.1

There is currently a cyber training squadron attached to the Air 

Force Weapons School at Nellis 

Air Force Base, but given the 

major focus and culture at Nellis, 

cyber operators likely are not 

primary focus of attention, and 

their mission calls goes beyond 

the traditional battlespace.2

 While 

the Weapons School at Nellis is 

focused on, “achieving battlespace 

dominance” in a typical kinetic 

warfare sense, there are many 

functions of network warfare that 

operate independently of physical battles.3

 This traditional focus 

of the Weapons School at Nellis 

could marginalize uniquely cyber 

missions at the expense of assisting 

kinetic operations.

This essay provides an alternative possibility to remedy this 

issue. It is concerned with developing a basic blueprint, or outline, for 

how this new, or rejuvinated CWS 

should be developed. Various academic issues will be addressed, 

such as the content and length of 

the curriculum and how best to 

achieve the overall objectives of 

this education. This study is not 

intended to provide a detailed, 

lesson-by-lesson syllabus for the 

school. 

This paper will offer a number 

of contentions. First, the proposed 

Cyber Weapons School does not 

have to be built completely from 

scratch. Three current weapons 

schools will be evaluated in an 

effort to find a ready-made baseline 

on which to model the new CWS: 

the Air Force Weapons School, the 

Navy’s Top Gun, and the Army 

Ranger School. Each of their basic 

frameworks will be drawn upon; 

in particular, curriculum content, 

teaching techniques, as well as 

standards for evaluating and managing students. Second, the major 

unique dimension of cyber operations will be considered; i.e., the 

fact that almost every new attack 

involves methods even an experienced operator has not yet seen. 

It will be argued that the solution 

to this problem requires that the 

CWS must promote independent, 

quick, and intelligent decisionmaking by its students. In order to 

achieve these important outcomes, 

a general outline of the CWS 

HANDS ON KEYBOARD

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A CYBER WEAPONS SCHOOL

GORDON LAN G

Cadet GORDON LANG is a Military & 

Strategic Studies major in the Class of 

2012. 
16 HANDS ON KEYBOARD

program will be offered. What is 

envisioned is a three month-long 

course that addresses all three 

subsets of cyber operations in an 

environment that is stressful and 

mirrors what operations against 

an intelligent and capable enemy 

might actually look like.

Similarities of the CWS to 

Current Weapons Schools

Weapons schools are nothing 

new to the United States military 

so there is no need to start from 

scratch when designing a Cyber 

Weapons School. The Air Force’s 

Weapons School, the Navy’s Top 

Gun, and the Army’s Ranger School 

all have practices which, when 

properly employed, can create a 

ready-made, strong foundation 

on which to build a CWS. Its focus 

would be providing the experience 

and tools needed by cyber operators to become the leading experts 

in their home squadrons once they 

return. Because the CWS would 

not have the opportunity to train 

the entire career field due to operational and monetary concerns, as 

well as the pre-requisite experience required for admission, graduates would be expected to share 

their newfound knowledge. The 

Air Force Weapons School tells its 

students to, “’make others like you,’ 

spreading the wealth of experience, leadership skills and knowledge.”4

 The Navy and the Army also 

promote this concept of “training 

the trainer,” an idea that can be leveraged in the cyber community to 

great effect. Cyber operations are 

one of the fastest changing fields 

in the military and new ideas and 

methods are constantly required to 

remain competitive. By leveraging 

CWS graduates as prime-instructors within their own squadrons, 

more people can be exposed to the 

various ideas and practices that 

will make the graduates the best 

in their field. This approach would 

encourage open-mindedness and 

promote a system of a bottom-up 

meritocracy of ideas in which the 

best become the most used rather 

than a having single school’s syllabus dominating the field for better 

or worse.

Another dimension of the 

CWS modeled after its more 

kinetic counterparts would be its 

focus on practical applications of 

theory. While an undergraduate 

course may be more concerned 

with how to best use the weapons 

and materials given to the operator, a weapons school should be 

more concerned with how those 

weapons actually work. This is 

exemplified by how the Navy went 

about creating Top Gun: the initial 

instructors “wanted to teach the 

Top Gun crews how the [Sparrow] 

missile worked and therefore ‘how 

they could successfully deploy it.’”5

In the classroom-based theory 

section of the CWS curriculum, 

emphasis should be placed on 

understanding how the various 

network warfare techniques and 

tools work. Using this fundamental understanding of how their 

tools operate, network warfare 

specialists would be well equipped 

to devise their own methods of 

operation and adapt quickly to a 

changing environment. Coupled 

with the expectation that graduates 

will help train, either formally or 

informally, members of their operational squadrons, it would also 

discourage a culture of expecting 

the weapons to work “like magic” 

within the cyber operations community. 

The theory and engineering behind cyber operations are 

important to understand, but in 

order to fight best in cyberspace 

specialists must comprehend the 

connection between theory and 

actual operations. While the academic side should be modeled 

after the Air Force and Naval 

Weapons schools, the practical 

side should be based on the Army’s 

Ranger school. This is because Top 

Gun was designed around, “training hops [that] were designed... 

to test the crew’s ability to do all 

these [dog-fighting maneuvers] 

in a quick and efficient manner,”6

while the Ranger School is more 

with concerned creating a long 

term, continuous training environment.7

 Like an infantryman, a 

cyber operator conceivably could 

be engaged in continuous combat 

for extended periods. Ranger 

School simulates this by creating 

an overarching war game-type 

mission within which the students 

must function. The Air Force CWS 

should take a similar approach. By 

linking all the exercises together, a 

fictional cyber war can be created, 

allowing the instructors to create 

the most realistic “worst case” scenario for a cyber conflict. CWS 

graduates must experience and be 

Like an infantryman, a cyber operator conceivably could be 

engaged in continuous combat for extended periods. Ranger 

School simulates this by creating an overarching war gametype mission within which the students must function. The Air 

Force Cyber Weapons School should take a similar approach. 
HANDS ON KEYBOARD 17

able to handle the accompanying 

stress in a manner similar to that of 

successful Ranger School students, 

something that the Air Force and 

Naval Weapons schools do not 

place emphasis on. 

Officers do not dominate 

network warfare. The enlisted 

force also has an important part to 

play in operating systems. To best 

educate selected members of this 

force the CWS cannot be officerexclusive as both aviation weapons 

schools are, and instead must 

accept enlisted students as well. 

This may pose problems for an Air 

Force-run Weapons School, which 

so far have not been 

expected to train enlisted 

personnel. To best deal 

with the challenge, the 

Army’s methods of training their enlisted force in 

advanced courses should 

be used as a framework. 

For example, there is “no 

rank in Ranger School;” 

rather, everyone is given 

opportunities in leadership positions and are 

evaluated based on a 

common rubric for all 

students.8

 This principle 

should also be extended to 

instructors, who must be selected 

for their outstanding proficiency 

and teaching capacity rather than 

the rank they happen to hold.

Established weapons schools 

also have an air of being reserved 

for the elite. The high dropout rates 

of Ranger School are well established at around 50 percent per 

class, including recycled students.9

Graduates of the Weapons School 

at Nellis Air Force Base have a 

special patch they wear and are 

categorized as “patch wearers.” To 

be successful, the CWS must also 

have an elite culture and reputation. Its graduates should be viewed 

as a brotherhood of the best cyber 

operators in the world. In large 

part this can be achieved through 

the standard methods currently 

in use at the established weapons 

schools. More specifically, the 

CWS must offer a comprehensive 

and very challenging course both, 

in theory and practical application. 

It should also have a strict selection process for potential students, 

as well as a system for evaluating 

CWS students and the authority 

to disenroll or recycle underperformers. CWS instructors should 

be military members, the very best 

operators in their community, and 

already have graduated from the 

Weapons School themselves.10

Graduates should be authorized an outward symbol of their 

achievement, most easily accomplished through the use of a patch 

they can wear on their operational uniform. Additionally, the 

instructors, and perhaps the students, should work to achieve a 

mythos of being legendary men 

and women, while realizing that 

many cyber-accomplishments will 

never be known outside the classified community. Ideally, attending 

the Cyber Weapons School would 

be more than career advancing; it 

would also be a rite of passage.11

Special Considerations

Cyberspace operations are 

unique in that they are far-andaway the fastest form of operations 

currently available. Richard Clark 

writes that, “Cyber war happens 

at the speed of light... the time 

between the launch of an attack 

and its effect is barely measurable, 

thus creating risks for crisis decision makers.”12 Other missions, 

bound by the requirement to employ large 

pieces of physical equipment and Newtonian 

physics, are inherently 

slower than their cyber 

counterparts. Accordingly, the nature of cyber 

conflict requires that its 

operators be exceptionally quick thinking, intelligent, and independent 

in order to succeed in 

such a unique environment. These are all qualities generally assumed to 

be necessary for combat 

officers, but in the cyber realm 

such qualities also must be possessed by enlisted members. A 

Cyber Weapons School should not 

only have both officer and enlisted 

students, but would also require a 

syllabus that is focused on developing fast, independent, and critically thinking warfighters. Students should not be provided set 

solutions or structured scenarios 

as is often the case with the established weapons schools at which, 

for example, a certain airframe 

can use the same maneuver on an 

enemy time and again and always 
18 HANDS ON KEYBOARD

claim victory because of the different limitations of each aircraft.13

In cyberspace, where every actor 

has the same capabilities and can 

execute any “maneuver” they wish, 

there cannot be prescribed solutions to specific problems. Instead, 

students must be taught to think 

quickly and creatively while operating effectively against unique 

threats.

Once a cyber operator has 

encountered a specific type of 

enemy action they should be able to 

effectively negate it through experience, as “exploits tend to depreciate rapidly after exposure; i.e., 

first time use.”14 This means that 

for an attack to be most effective 

it should be what is called a “zeroday” threat; that is, a program or 

exploit that has not yet been used. 

These threats, and their counters, 

can be thought of as analogous to 

the common cold. Consider: while 

a cold causes the same symptoms 

every time, ones’ body is still vulnerable to them even after decades 

of living because the virus changes 

how it is structured, and can then 

pass by the body’s defenses unnoticed and achieve its “mission.” 

Computer operations are generally intended to cause some sort 

of effect from an established list, 

but if an operator uses the exact 

same attack tactic repeatedly, it 

will be met with rapidly depreciating results, just as a biological virus that does not change its 

appearance would experience. As 

such, the school’s curriculum must 

be able to rapidly evolve to include 

current events, new threats and, 

most importantly, ensure that no 

two classes are provided the same 

scenarios. If a graduate was able 

to pass along a schedule of training events to a current student, the 

CWS would have lost its ability to 

train outside-the-box, independent, quick thinkers. 

A Snapshot of the proposed 

Cyber Weapons School

One basic question concerns 

the length of the course at the 

Cyber Weapons School. The US 

Army Ranger school takes two 

months to train its students.15 The 

Air Force Weapons School takes 

six.16 A dedicated CWS would be 

much more like Ranger school 

in this regard as unlike Air Force 

Weapons School students, CWS 

students would only be required to 

learn about cyber operations. Also, 

due to the quickly evolving nature 

of cyber operations, the school 

cannot be so long that its lessons 

become obsolete before graduation. The complicated math and 

engineering involved in advanced 

cyber activities is yet another 

factor, as it would take more than 

just a basic run-through to achieve 

the desired level of understanding. With these three factors considered, the CWS should ideally 

have a curriculum of roughly 

three months. While the initial 

cyber attack and defense course, 

known as Intermediate Network 

Warfare Training (INWT), is nine 

weeks, this is only long enough 

to prepare novice operators for 

their new job.17 For a critical indepth understanding of the cyber 

mission, extra time will have to 

be allocated. A three-month-long 

syllabus should be sufficient to 

achieve such a level of understanding. Three months would also be 

long enough to achieve the desired 

social effects of camaraderie and to 

stress the students while still being 

short enough to hopefully, avoid 

becoming obsolete.

Because graduates of the CWS 

would be the absolute best network 

warfare specialists in the Air Force, 

they have to be well versed in 

every aspect of their career field. 

In all, there are three core specialties of cyberspace operations that 

must be covered in this school: 

computer network attack, defense, 

and exploitation.18 Network attack 

involves actively hampering enemy 

computer operations, exploitation 

is the collection of information, 

and defense is securing friendly 

networks against the previous two 

operations.19

While these competencies could 

be divided up equally by allocating 

one month of training to each, that 

would not be the best way to structure the material. Continuously 

teaching new concepts and applications, and expecting the students to master and employ them 

all in practice, would make for a 

more challenging course, facilitate smoother transitions between 

subjects, and offer a more realistic 

experience. By covering the theories behind each type of operation 

as well as practicing their application, the students would not only 

become adept at their particular 

mission, but would also better 

understand the actions of their 

opponents and thus be more likely 

to mitigate them effectively. A deep 

understanding of all the cyber missions would also enable graduates 

to become operators and leaders 

in any network warfare squadron, 

enabling the spread and diffusion 

of knowledge while still retaining 

maximum mission effectiveness. 

In the INWT course students 

are taught a wide range of subjects intended to prepare them for 

their new job as network warfare 

specialists, including “policy, 
HANDS ON KEYBOARD 19

doctrine, employment, executing organizations and missions, 

operational functions, and law and 

ethics.”20 In comparison, the CWS 

would be one month longer and 

focus solely on how to best execute 

missions based on the assumption 

that students would already have 

an acceptable grasp of subjects 

such as cyber law and morality. 

Included in the CWS curriculum 

would be instruction on the theoretical and technical workings of 

cyber operations, much as current 

weapons schools teach how a particular missile functions so as to 

best employ or counter it. For 

CWS students, this would mean 

not just learning which operation 

to use when, but how each part of 

the weapon, or computer program, 

functions. By understanding their 

operational tools on an intimate 

level, the students would not be 

confined to using premade programs or standard missions. 

Instead, they would be able to tailor 

their actions to meet a specific 

challenge as well as more quickly 

conceive of ways to combine their 

mission’s tools for novel effects. 

The basics of which type of attack 

to use when and the knowledge of 

what to look for during a defensive 

or exploitation mission is taught 

at INWT and through job experience. The purpose of the theoretical instruction portion of the CWS 

would be to understand the inner 

workings of those capabilities, in 

which the operator would not have 

the time or the knowledge to learn 

independently.

The CWS program also would 

include practical exercises, which 

would constitute much of the 

curriculum. Students would be 

expected to leverage both their 

own experiences and classroom 

instruction to devise and execute 

network warfare operations in 

realistic scenarios. Overarching 

conflict scenarios, similar to Red 

Flag or the Ranger School’s Aragon 

Liberation Front setting, would 

provide a backdrop against which 

to frame the training in a realistic 

way. There should be at least two 

teams for each scenario, perhaps 

with additional factions being 

added to further complicate the 

situation in later simulations. The 

instructors, because of their significant experience and skill, should 

take an active part in opposing the 

students in their assigned missions, 

but this should not be the only 

method of identifying teams. Student-on-student missions would 

expose exercise participants to 

even more variations of attack and 

defense, as would having instructors act as team leaders from time 

to time. These various types of 

student-instructor team combinations would expose the students 

to a greater number of different 

personalities and operational preferences, thereby giving them as 

much experience as is possible.

War-gaming events should also 

be relatively ill defined. Students 

should only receive a mission or 

desired end state and then be told 

to achieve it. Greater learning takes 

place when a problem is imposed 

without a known solution, as the 

students will not know what will be 

directed at them by the opposing 

team. Only by using quick, intelligent thought and action will they 

win. This, in turn, will encourage 

the students not only to understand the material but to think for 

themselves. Similar scenarios are 

set up at Red Flag for cyber operators, where the red and blue teams 

battle each other through networks.21 However, the CWS would 

go a step further than Red Flag. 

Students should not be told when 

or under what circumstances the 

scenario ends. That, coupled with 

twenty-four hour operations and 

multiple shifts, would present as 

realistic an environment as possible. Rather than just a regular 

school day, forcing the students 

to operate effectively in situations 

where they have high stress and no 

fixed end date would help further 

facilitate the types of learning 

and experience that CWS seeks to 

promote.

If CWS students are to learn 

effective cyber operations, they 

will require instructors who can 

understand and teach the material. 

These instructors should be the 

best operators the network attack 

and defense communities have to 

offer. They should have significant 

say in what particular lessons the 

syllabus includes, as they would 

be the best qualified to know what 

is important and what is not with 

respect to cyber operations. They 

would be best equipped to identify who is not preforming up to 

standards or not putting forth the 

required effort in a way that standardized tests and objectives could 

not. Subsequently, CWS graduates, 

both officers and enlisted, would 

naturally become the primary 

pool for future instructors. Spending a tour as a teacher at the CWS 

would be very similar to a tour at 

other weapons schools in that such 

individuals would be identified as 

exceptional candidates for senior 

leadership positions and special 

duties.

Findings and Conclusions

There are many common features shared by weapons schools. 
20 HANDS ON KEYBOARD

All of the existing schools expect 

their graduates to return to their 

units and teach others what 

they have learned. In this way, a 

larger audience can be reached 

without unduly taxing readiness 

or the weapons school’s limited 

staff. Understanding the link 

between theoretical, classroombased instruction and its implementation in realistic scenarios 

is also a common feature of all 

weapons schools. A major difference, though, is that while the Air 

Force school trains only officers, 

the CWS must include significant 

numbers of enlisted troops. The 

Army’s Ranger School can provide 

direction on how to approach this 

problem as it holds that all rank is 

equal among Ranger candidates. 

As noted above, cyber conflict 

differs from the other missions 

that currently are examined in 

existing weapons schools. In the 

case of cyber operations, there are 

never set, unchanging methods of 

operations. While a fighter pilot 

can learn how to defeat a particular airframe or missile with a high 

likelihood of success every time 

afterwards, network warfare specialists should expect to routinely 

find themselves confronted with 

attack techniques they have never 

seen before. Addressing this, the 

CWS should not focus on teaching prescribed solutions or set 

answers, but should instead seek to 

develop an intelligent, quick, and 

independent operator who can 

rapidly comprehend and perform 

effectively in unique scenarios. 

The CWS’s curriculum should 

focus on both the theory and practice of each of the three primary 

subsets of network warfare operations: attack, defense, and exploitation. Rather than examining these 

missions separately, they should 

be studied in an integrated fashion 

that would provide both a tougher 

learning environment and more 

realistic scenarios. The classroom 

portion of the CWS would involve 

teaching the workings of the cyber 

environment as well as the tools 

used to complete missions that the 

operator may encounter. The main 

goal should be to give students 

the ability to create new capabilities based on their personal deep 

understanding. Most of the course 

should be spent in war gamingtype activities. Designed to be 

as realistic as possible, involving 

multiple teams, no checklists, an 

undisclosed end date, and twentyfour hour operations, these exercises should be designed to test the 

student’s capability to effectively 

fight in a contested battle space 

against a sophisticated enemy.

Instructors should be drawn 

from the very best specialists in 

the network warfare community 

as they will be the ones who will 

develop the syllabus and run this 

premier cyber training unit. Rank 

should not be a factor when selecting faculty, just as it should not be 

a factor when selecting students. 

Once enrolled, the students should 

expect to be treated equally, regardless of specialty or rank, in order to 

encourage the best possible learning environment. Constant adjustment of exercise scenarios would 

also be necessary to reach the 

desired outcomes. If a set pattern 

of operations can be identified and 

shared among generations of students, then the CWS will lose its 

ability to surprise, which is crucial 

to the desired training outcomes. 

Additionally, a dynamic curriculum will enable the proposed CWS 

to stay abreast of advancing technologies and new threats, providing students with the most relevant 

education possible.

A three-month course at the 

CWS would be sufficient to achieve 

all of these objectives. Students are 

only expected to learn about the 

various capabilities within cyber 

operations. Accordingly, the CWS 

does not need to last six months 

like the Air Force Weapons School, 

which requires its students to 

learn and understand every type 

of mission performed by the Air 

Force. Three months is also long 

enough to significantly stress the 

students, testing their abilities even 

in the worst of situations, while 

remaining short enough to minimize the possibility of instructional 

content becoming obsolete before 

the students graduate. Finally, the 

CWS should be promoted as the 

premier Air Force school for cyber 

warfare training. In addition to 

all the factors described above, an 

identification symbol, most likely 

a cyber weapons patch, should be 

awarded to graduates as is currently the case at Nellis, which is 

the cyber-equivalent of the fighter 

weapons school patch. The “patch 

wearers” of the flying world are 

considered the best airmen, and 

the proposed Cyber Weapons 

School mentioned herein intends 

the same end result, to train and 

educate the best cyber-warriors. 

1 Cyber warfare, or computer 

network warfare, describes the missions carried out in the cyber domain. 

It is the use of computer networks and 

cyber assets to conduct attack, defense, 

and exploitation missions against an 

enemy’s networks. The United States 

military describes it as the operation 

and use of the “global information 

grid;” the combined networks, software, 

services, and information connected to 

cyberspace. Joint Publication (JP), 1-02, 
HANDS ON KEYBOARD 21

Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 

2001 as amended through 31 July 2010, 

143, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new

pubs/jp1 02.pdf

2 The Air Force Weapons School is 

six months long, and includes students 

from every type of airframe as well as 

the intelligence, space, missile, services, 

and cyber communities; all of which 

are expected to learn each other’s missions and operations. The primary focus 

of the school is kinetic operations, and 

support for the kinetic mission.

3 J.R. Wilson, “DMN Q&A: Robert 

Garland, Commandant, USAF Weapons 

School,” Defense Media Network, 

http://www.defensemedianetwork.

com/stories/qa-with-col-robert-sharkgarland-commandant-usaf-weaponsschool/

4 Ibid.

5 Robert K. Wilcox, Scream of 

Eagles: The Creation of Top Gun – And 

the US Air Victory in Vietnam (New 

York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1990), 

145.

6 Ibid, 146.

7 “Ranger Training Brigade: US 

Army Ranger School,” Fort Benning, 

Georgia, http://www.benning.army.mil/

infantry/rtb/content/PDF/Ranger%20

School%20web11.pdf

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Military members, as opposed 

to civilians or intelligence community 

people, are uniquely focused on the 

degradation and destruction of enemy 

assets, and are thus best suited for 

control of network warfare operations, 

and by extension the weapons school 

dedicated to it. Martin C. Libicki’s book 

Cyberdetterence and Cyberwar, page 

156, provides a more detailed explanation of this position. 

11 Wilcox, 173.

12 Richard A. Clarke and Robert 

K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat 

to National Security and What to Do 

About It (New York: HarperCollins, 

2010), 31.

13 Thomas Lang, interview by 

author, February 28, 2012.

14 Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, (Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 157.

15 “Ranger Training Brigade...”

16 Wilson.

17 Scott McNabb, “Initial cyber 

INWT class graduates schoolhouse,” 

24th Air Force, http://www.24af.af.mil/

news/story.asp?id=123251064

18 Joint Publication (JP), 3-13, 

Information Operations, http://www.

dtic.mil/doctrine/new pubs/jp3 13.pdf 

34

19 Ibid.

20 Kinder Blacke, “Intermediate Network Warfare Training 

Up and Running,” 24th Air Force, 

http://www.24af.af.mil/news/story.

asp?id=123245134

21 Scott McNabb, “Red Flag Cyber 

Operations: Part II – Cyber Operators Stand Against Red Team ‘Aggressors,’” Air Force Space Command, 

http://www.afspc.af.mil/news/story.

asp?id=123246419
SEIZING THE ULTIMATE HIGH GROUND 22

Historically, humanity’s greatest advancements in technology have been fueled by conflict. As Everett Dolman, a widely 

published scholar who has written 

multiple works discussing the benefits of weaponizing space, points 

out in his book, Astropolitik, it was 

competition rather than cooperation that “propelled mankind into 

space.”1 During the Cold War, the 

United States and the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 

were pushed to explore space as an 

expression of intense, competitive 

nationalism. Although the USSR 

was the first nation to reach space, 

the US was able to recover from 

that initial setback and take the 

lead in space innovation, becoming the first to land a man on the 

moon. In other areas of development, particularly military technology, closing the gap may not 

be possible, particularly if those 

developments are used to deny 

access to certain aspects of the battlespace.

Since the end of the Cold War, 

innovations in space technology 

have become relatively stagnant. 

Although US reliance on space 

assets, both military and civilian, 

has become irreversible and the 

quantity and quality of the technology in use has increased, their 

capabilities and applications have 

not seen much variation.2

 It would 

seem that another conflict might 

be necessary to inspire further 

developments. Despite undeniable 

American dominance in current 

space capabilities, declarations by 

Chinese officials of intent to weaponize space, coupled with hesitance by American policy makers 

to make such a momentous decision, could potentially put the US 

at a disadvantage in the event of 

another arms race.3 While many 

insist that the weaponization of 

space is not likely to happen soon, 

the development of new military technologies has been a fact 

of human existence. Realistically 

speaking, there is little room for 

an increase in land-, air- and seabased capabilities. Even the development of robotic warfare serves 

only to enhance current capabilities by overcoming human frailties. This leaves the domains of 

space and cyberspace. Although 

cyber-attacks are becoming more 

common, kinetic modes of combat 

will always be necessary. This begs 

the question: when the time comes 

to take the ultimate high ground, 

how should the US go about weaponizing space?

Although space has been militarized for decades, there is no 

public knowledge of any spacebased weapon platform currently 

in existence. This is due, in part, 

to the general taboo placed on the 

pursuit of such capabilities by the 

global community and the generally stated belief that space should 

be reserved only for peaceful uses, 

to include homeland security.4

However, many countries, such as 

the US, and Russia, and China, are 

keeping open the option of weaponizing space. As stated above, 

China has already declared its 

intent to weaponize space and the 

only widely signed treaty banning 

weapons in space refers to nuclear 

weapons.5

 While the treaty was 

being negotiated in the early 

1960s, attempts to ban all weapons 

in space were stalled by the USSR.6

More recently in 2008, prior to 

China’s aforementioned statement 

of intent to place weapons in space, 

the New York Times reported that 

Russia and China presented a proposal to the United Nations (UN) 

attempting to revive a blanket ban 

on such weapons, a proposal which 

the US immediately rejected.7

Because the US itself refuses to 

abandon this line of research on 

space-based weapons, the subject 

must be explored. To begin analyzing how space could be exploited, 

one must first look at current capabilities.

SEIZING THE ULTIMATE HIGH GROUND

WEAPONIZING SPACE

JOS EPH SH IELDS

It was competition rather than 

cooperation that propelled 

mankind into space.

Cadet JOSEPH SHIELDS is a Military 

& Strategic Studies major in the Class of 

2012.

24 SEIZING THE ULTIMATE HIGH GROUND

target ICBMs in their terminal 

or re-entry stage. The PAC-3 is 

employed by the US Army to 

compliment THAAD.14

The biggest issues with the 

US’s current BMDS are time and 

gravity. Especially in the case of 

intermediate-range and ICBMs, 

these weapons are most vulnerable on their ascent when a large 

portion of their thrust is used 

to combat the effects of gravity. 

Once they begin their descent, ballistic missiles gain speed quickly as 

they close in on their target. Where 

this presents a problem is with 

long-range intercept methods. 

While the Aegis can be useful for 

shorter-range interceptions, the 

launch window against exo-atmospheric missiles is lamentably small 

before the more powerful ICBM 

will simply outrun the SM-3.

Long-range systems are limited 

by the same factors that make the 

ICBM vulnerable. There is a very 

limited window during which 

the GMD or THAAD must be 

launched in order to intercept the 

missile at the apex of its trajectory since both missiles must fight 

gravity on their way out of the 

atmosphere. If the first attempt to 

shoot down an incoming missile 

fails, then there will not be another 

opportunity to destroy the target 

before reentry into the atmosphere. 

After this point, the destruction of 

the target becomes not only more 

difficult but more risky. Gravity 

is now accelerating the missile 

while it slows the interceptors and 

destroying a ballistic missile in the 

atmosphere runs the risk of scattering whatever payload it might 

be carrying. This is especially hazardous in the case of biological and 

chemical weapons, where destruction of the target risks aerosolizing 

the payload wherever the wind 

takes it.

Although short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles provide 

less time to be shot down, the 

geo-strategic location of the US 

means that any attack must come 

from an ICBM. If America’s goal is 

to intercept these missiles before 

or during the exo-atmospheric 

stage, then preemptively placing a 

BMD network in orbit is the ideal 

solution. This way, the effort of 

fighting against gravity is already 

accomplished. When the ICBM 

is launched, the interceptors will 

already be waiting in orbit. 

This space-based interceptor 

concept carries with it the potential 

for integration into the air defense 

system currently employed by the 

military. Current US air defense 

capabilities involve numerous 

early warning radar, ground-based 

missile defenses, and air-to-air 

weapons platforms. Ground- and 

air-based radar systems provide 

tracking capabilities of any detectable aircraft and relay this information to waiting air combat 

aircraft or surface-to-air missile 

sites.15 This IAD system works to 

deny aerial access to enemy forces. 

However, such systems are not 

unique to the US and those controlled by unfriendly nations are 

the greatest limiting factor on US 

Air Force capabilities.

The “Vision” of the US Air 

Force is, “Global Vigilance, 

Reach, and Power.”16 As the 

space domain has typically fallen 

under Air Force jurisdiction, it 

seems only fitting that the future 

of space development grow in 

accordance with that vision. 

Currently, US aircraft have the 

collective ability to strike anywhere in the world in a matter 

of hours. Ballistic missiles reduce 

this time to thirty minutes or less. 

Quick and devastating strikes are 

the key to success for any air force 

and such tactics were used to great 

effect against industrial targets 

early in the history of air power, 

with new technology dramatically increasing their effectiveness. 

Formidable as these capabilities 

might be, such power projection is 

limited by the similar capabilities 

of America’s adversaries. For the 

power projection capability of the 

US Air Force to surmount these 

challenges and achieve its vision, 

new technology must be introduced.

Each of the aforementioned 

three missions—BMD, IAD, 

and power projection—can be 

achieved by space-based weapon 

systems. The RAND Corporation outlines, in one of their many 

publications on policy and strategy, entitled Space Weapons Earth 

Wars, four types of space-based 

weapons. These include directedenergy, kinetic-energy vs. missiles, 

kinetic-energy vs. surface targets, 

and conventional space-based 

weapons. Directed energy weapons 

include electronic jamming, laser 

cutting torches, and a variety of 

similar weapons. None of the 

directed energy weapons currently 

employed on a practical scale are 

Patriot or PAC 3 Launch
SEIZING THE ULTIMATE HIGH GROUND 25

powerful enough to accomplish 

the kinetic missions listed above 

and will not be referenced in this 

paper. The latter three depend on 

the transfer of potential energy to 

destroy the target. Kinetic weapons 

rely on velocity and mass to cause 

damage, while the conventional 

weapons that RAND refers to typically use stored chemical energy 

(i.e., explosives) to achieve their 

effect.17 Kinetic energy weapons 

have the advantage of being 

mechanically simpler, as well 

as cheaper, than conventional 

weapons with the disadvantage 

that they must be traveling at great 

speeds to achieve the same destructive capability. This works well with 

space-based systems because the 

high altitude means the projectile 

has a high potential energy, which 

translates directly to kinetic energy 

as the Earth’s gravity accelerates it 

towards a chosen target. The basic 

physics involved is set forth in the 

following equation:

Potential Energy = gravitational 

acceleration x projectile mass x 

altitude

As applied to BMD, when the 

weapon system is launched, it is 

imbued with kinetic energy by the 

boosters which transfers to potential energy as its altitude increases. 

After that, it is a relatively simple 

matter of converting the potential energy of the system back into 

kinetic energy using gravity and 

intercepting the ICBM’s course at 

the proper moment with a GPS 

guidance system. In essence, this 

system will work much like the 

“Hypervelocity Rod Bundles”18

mentioned in the 2003 “US Air 

Force Transformation Flight Plan,” 

a theoretical weapon system that, 

in many circles, has come to be 

known as the “Rods from God.”

There has been much discussion across the internet on physics 

websites and future weapons blogs 

about the concept of these “Rods 

from God,” kinetic energy weapons 

capable of delivering destruction 

on the scale of nuclear weapons due 

to their enormous mass. A recurring argument against this idea 

is noted on the Popular Science 

website: “Launching heavy... rods 

into space will require substantially cheaper rocket technology 

than we have today.”19

While this is a legitimate 

concern for the powerful weapon 

system mentioned by the Air 

Force, the force of a nuclear 

weapon is far greater than the 

kinetic energy required to destroy 

any legal targets in a conflict, conventional or non-conventional. 

Although the cost of a space-based 

weapon system would be great, it 

would not be so prohibitively high 

as to prevent its implementation 

due to the far smaller weight of any 

useable weapon.20

The greatest issue with this 

system is the problem of atmospheric reentry. The smallest and 

cheapest system would destroy 

ballistic missiles outside of the 

atmosphere where reentry would 

not be an issue. This limits the 

window of opportunity to the brief 

time when the target is above sixty 

kilometers.21

In order to engage below that 

altitude, larger projectiles with 

atmospheric reentry capabilities 

would need to be built, greatly 

increasing the cost of the system. A 

reentry vehicle is required for such 

weapons, kinetic or conventional, 

intended for use against ground 

or aerial targets. The limitations 

of such kinetic weapons include 

the fact that, in order to maintain velocity, their maneuverability and target window is severely 

limited. In addition, because they 

derive their power from the pull 

of gravity, reentry angles must be 

steep, giving the weapon system a 

very narrow scope of targets at any 

given time. Because of this, a useful 

system would require deployment 

of a larger number of satellites to 

be in position to strike targets anywhere around the globe in a reasonable amount of time. According to RAND’s study, six platforms 

in high orbit would only provide 

targeting opportunities every two 

to three hours.22

These problems are addressed by 

RAND’s fourth weapon type, conventional space-based weapons. 

Because these weapons rely on 

their explosive payload to do 

damage, they are less reliant on the 

pull of gravity and more maneuverable. This seems to suggest that, 

while kinetic weapons are limited 

to relatively slow-moving or stationary targets such as buildings or 

ships, these weapons could theoretically engage a wider range of 

targets, to include aircraft and missiles. This also results in a greater 

targeting window. The same 

number of space-based platforms 

requiring hours for kinetic systems 

to be in place could provide targeting opportunities within minutes 

using maneuverable weapons.23

With any given weapon and 

type of mission, there are a few 

Rods from God [are] kinetic 

energy weapons capable of 

delivering destruction on the 

scale of nuclear weapons due 

to their enormous mass.
26 SEIZING THE ULTIMATE HIGH GROUND

security concerns that must be 

addressed when determining 

how to deploy these capabilities. 

The first step in establishing an 

undoubtedly unpopular spacebased arsenal must 

be to ensure its 

security. Employment of spacebased weapons 

would undermine 

long-standing treaties and unwritten agreements 

not to pursue an 

arms race or place 

ballistic missile 

defenses in space. 

Aside from the 

political backlash, 

certain countries 

will likely view 

this as an attempt 

to destabilize the 

MAD doctrine that has thus far 

prevented nuclear war. Deterring 

the threat of a first strike attempt, 

then, should be the first step in 

establishing space superiority. This 

must be done quickly if it is to be 

effective because once the US plan 

becomes public knowledge; any 

military retaliation would have to 

engage before the system is in place 

to have a guaranteed effect.

The next concern is the demonstrated ability of other countries’ 

anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. 

Fortunately, such weapons operate 

on similar principles to ICBMs and 

must exit the atmosphere while 

operating against gravity. Once 

established, space BMD assets 

will be capable of destroying those 

threats before they have the chance 

to knock out a satellite. Non-BMD 

platforms, such as those designed 

for ground strike missions, must be 

within a certain proximity of such 

a system to ensure survivability.

The third concern is the development of future technology by 

competing nations. Even if the US 

manages to establish its weapons 

in space before opposing nations 

can counter with thier own developments, there is no doubt that 

the power gap created by such a 

capability will result in attempts 

to counter US space superiority. In 

other words, a space arms race is 

likely to ensue. In order to maintain the lead, the US must anticipate future adaptations to the new 

way of fighting. These potential 

adaptations could be combated 

through policy change, a shift in 

tactical focus, or any other means 

depending on the perceived threat, 

but the military must be flexible.

With these challenges in mind, 

it is imperative that the weaponization of space must start with 

an effective BMD satellite constellation. Decisions about this 

system cannot be influenced by 

anything other than effectiveness. The initial deployment of 

such a system is the crucial step 

when any weaknesses in the net 

will be found and exploited and, 

should it fail, another opportunity 

will be less likely to present itself. 

While building a system that uses 

RAND’s kinetic exo-atmospheric 

weapons to protect the US might 

seem desirable, it must be considered that a nuclear-capable nation 

with far less reliance on space 

assets than the US might detonate 

a nuclear device upon exiting the 

atmosphere, resulting in an electromagnetic shockwave that would 

knock out the new system along 

with every other satellite in the 

area. The kinetic destruction of a 

single Chinese satellite in 2007 in 

Low Earth Orbit (LEO) resulted 

in about 15,000 pieces of debris 

that are expected to threaten space 

assets for more than twenty years 

into the future.24 The collateral 

damage resulting from a nuclear 

explosion in LEO would be far 

worse. As such, the initial BMD 

system must be capable of destroying targets before they exit the 

atmosphere.
SEIZING THE ULTIMATE HIGH GROUND 27

In terms of the third concern 

listed above, there are many 

possible situations that may arise, 

not all of which will be covered. 

This paper will discuss briefly 

some of the opposing strategies 

that could prove problematic for 

the continued effectiveness of a 

space-based arsenal, although 

solutions to those problems are 

properly the subject for another 

paper. Assuming that the established BMD system is capable of 

defending itself from groundbased missiles, countries may look 

for other means to circumvent the 

defenses. Launching new “Trojan” 

satellites carrying ASAT weapons 

or self-destructive charges disguised as peaceful purpose satellites, or even redirecting existing 

satellites to collide with the weapon 

systems, are the biggest threats 

after the neutralization of ballistic 

missiles. The US will have to establish a policy regarding the launch 

of foreign satellites to prevent this, 

and/or establish countermeasures 

to prevent intentional collisions. 

Additionally, the potential to target 

surface capabilities may result, 

in the longer term, a shift in warfighting strategies from surface to 

sub-surface warfare. Once initial 

attempts to counter a US space 

arsenal are exhausted, one could 

expect that there will be a shift 

toward short- to medium-range 

submarine-based nuclear missiles 

by US competitors/enemies, resulting in unknown launch points and 

shorter flight times to complicate targeting by the space-based 

systems. Such counters might be 

viewed as an effort to correct the 

percieved disruption of the Cold 

War-era MAD doctrine.

There are many political concerns that are beyond the scope of 

this paper. However, given historical trends of realist politics along 

with technological and military 

dynamics, it is only a matter of 

time before weapons find their way 

into space, as Dolman advocates. 

The key for success in the future 

is to be the first nation to take that 

step. Although there will be inevitable political consequences, the 

US cannot allow itself to be placed 

at a major strategic disadvantage 

by its recent technological stagnation and an excessive concern with 

global opinion not shared by its 

rivals.25

Although political backlash will 

be unavoidable, the deployment 

of US space-based weapons must 

be executed completely, resolutely, 

and swiftly. Though national security may temporarily be at greater 

risk during the deployment phase, 

once space-based defenses are in 

place, they will provide security 

for the global commons, much like 

the US Navy has provided on the 

high seas for decades, ensuring 

the safe movement of sea-based 

commerce, benefitting all, not 

just the US. A space-based system 

must first be defensively focused 

to demonstrate a US concern for 

global security and others must be 

assured that there are no aggressive 

intentions; contol of global orbits 

will ensure that sattelite commerce 

is safe from other would-be aggressors. Others aggressively-intended 

systems would be prevented from 

reaching orbit. Once the system 

is in place, to include the establishment of an international body 

governing orbits and approving 

space-bound payloads, US national 

security policy and strategic focus 

will still need to accommodate the 

inevitable accompanying shifts in 

strategic warfare capabilities. In 

a world ruled by self-interest, the 

party that always plays nice will 

lose to the party that acts in its 

own self-interest. But in space, like 

the sea, US self-interest can serve 

mankind.

1 Everett Dolman, Astropolitik, 

(London: Frank Cass, 2002), 86.

2 Everett Dolman, US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space, http://

mercury.usafa.edu/dfmi/MSS485/

L e s s o n % 2 0 M a t e r i a l s / M S S % 2 0

485%20Lesson%2025/MSS%20

485%20Lesson%2025%20Everett%20

Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transformation%20and%20Weapons%20

in%20Space.pdf

3 Stephen Chen and Greg Torode, 

“03 Nov 2009 - - South China Morning 

Post - China ‘to put weapons in space,’” 

International Institute for Strategic 

Studies (03 November, 2009), http://

www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-thepress/press-coverage-2009/november-2009/china-to-put-weapons-inspace/?locale=en

4 “National Space Policy of the 

United States of America,” 28 June, 

2010, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/

awcgate/whitehouse/national_space_

policy_28june2010.pdf

5 Chen and Torode.

6 Department of State, “Treaty on 

Principles Governing the Activities 

of States in the Exploration and use of 

Outer Space, Including the Moon and 

Other Celestial Bodies,” http://www.

state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/

space1.html

7 Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.N. 

Weighs a Ban on Weapons in Space, but 

U.S, Still Objects,” New York Times (13 

February, 2008), http://www.nytimes.

com/2008/02/13/world/europe/13arms.

html

...given historical trends of 

realist politics along with 

technological and military 

dynamics, it is only a matter 

of time before weapons find 

their way into space.
28 SEIZING THE ULTIMATE HIGH GROUND

8 Lorinda A. Frederick, “Deterrence 

and Space-Based Missile Defense,” Air 

and Space Power Journal, 1 September, 

2009, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/

airchronicles/apj/apj09/fal09/frederick.

html

9 “The Ballistic Missile Defense 

System (BMDS),” Missile Defense 

Agency, 26 October, 2011, http://www.

mda.mil/system/system.html

10 Ibid.

11 “Worldwide Ballistic Missile 

Inventories,” Arms Control Association, 

January, 2012, http://www.armscontrol.

org/factsheets/missiles

12 Missile Defense Agency.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 “Air Defense of the United States,” 

The Nike Historical Society, http://nikemissile.org/air defense of the united

states.shtml

16 “Air Force Mission,” US Air Force, 

http://www.af.mil/main/welcome.asp 

17 Bob Preston, et al., Space Weapons 

Earth Wars, RAND Corporation, 2002, 

xvi, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/

rand/pubs/monograph reports/2011/

RAND MR1209.pdf

18 “US Air Force Transformation 

Flight Plan,” US Air Force, November, 

2003, 66, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/

awcgate/af/af trans flightplan nov03.

pdf

19 Eric Adams, “Rods from God,” 

Popular Science, 1 June, 2004, http://

www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2004-

06/rods-god

20 RAND, xviii.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., xviii-xix.

23 Ibid.

24 Shirley Kan, “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test,” CRS Report for Congress, 23 April, 2007, http://www.fas.

org/sgp/crs/row/RS22652.pdf

25 Dolman, Astropolitik, 157.

Gyre Falcon,

Alias - “The Bird”
AN AIRPLANE FOR ALL SEASONS 29

I

n October 1994, Air Force 

Special Operations Command 

(AFSOC) fielded the 6th Special 

Operations Squadron (6 SOS), the 

first-ever USAF squadron dedicated to the foreign internal defense 

(FID) and coalition support 

mission areas.1

 The creation of this 

specialized unit demonstrated the 

increased need for an advisory 

group capable of training and 

equipping foreign militaries 

to enable them to defend their 

countries through the use of 

airpower. Throughout much of 

airpower history, supporting 

and teaching foreign militaries 

the most effective tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) 

for employing their aircraft has 

been viewed as a mission with 

significant military and political 

implications.

The underlying problem with 

training foreign militaries is that 

in order to have experts on foreign 

aircraft, the United States also 

must own and operate these aircraft. Special operations consist of 

the ability to adapt and overcome 

in any area of warfare; however, 

the potential of the US Air Force 

“to adapt” has been impaired by 

a failure to develop a light attack 

aircraft (LAS) with significant 

FID capabilities. The absence of 

such an aircraft is impairing the 

FID mission. As recently stated 

by Maj Gen Richard Comer, “The 

Air Force stands at a fork in the 

road, deciding how much of its 

resources it should devote to the 

current war and its irregular nature 

[i.e., Afghanistan], and how much 

to the threats of a peer competitor 

challenging its dominance of air 

and space.”2

 The decision to select 

an aircraft to help train the Afghan 

Army Air Corps has been made, 

but because of subsequent controversy over the selection process, 

acquisition of a LAS aircraft has 

been delayed. This troubling situation then leads to the question: 

“In an era of increasing budget 

cuts, has the United States Air 

Force selected the most appropriate aircraft for the foreign internal 

defense and light attack mission?”

Background and Significance 

of the Problem

The Air Force has had a long 

standing engagement with the 

foreign internal defense mission. 

“With roots in special air warfare 

dating back to the Vietnam War 

and even as far back as the Second 

World War, the 6th SOS was created 

to advise, train, and assist foreign 

aviation forces in the application 

of airpower in internal defense 

and development.”3

 A principal 

challenge involves not so much 

the importance of foreign internal 

defense, but rather acquisition 

of the most appropriate aircraft to conduct that mission. 

Third world countries cannot 

operate the United States’ 

F-16s nor can they handle the 

maintenance and repairs of 

such an aircraft. On the other 

hand, the US Air Force seems 

institutionally predisposed to 

fast jets, American-made products, and sophisticated aircraft 

generally. “Since its inception...the 

6th SOS has been plagued by a host 

of difficulties in fulfilling the vision 

of its creators, the most salient of 

which stem from the question of 

whether the squadron should have 

aircraft appropriate to its third 

world mission.”4

 This problem has 

become increasingly urgent and 

involves decisions about which 

aircraft would be the most effective, and whether the FID mission 

even requires a light attack aircraft. 

However, the 6th SOS and the Air 

Force currently do not maintain 

AN AIRPLANE FOR ALL SEASONS

AN EVALUATION OF THE MOST APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT FOR THE LIGHT ATTACK 

MISSION

BRAN DON SCHO ENFELDT

Cadet BRANDON SCHOENFELDT is a 

Military & Strategic Studies major in the 

Class of 2012.

Embraer A-29 Super Tuscano
30 AN AIRPLANE FOR ALL SEASONS

the most appropriate aircraft for 

the FID mission in Afghanistan 

and other countries. Lt. Col Wray 

Johnson notes, “Aircraft remain 

critical to the original vision of 

what has become the 6th SOS....”5

This assertion remains true not 

only for the 6th SOS but for the 

Air Force as a whole during the 

current era of contingency operations and the longer-term threat of 

involvement in such operations in 

the future.6

Several definitions are crucial to 

understanding the capabilities of 

LAS/FID aircraft as well as comprehending the needs of the FID 

mission:

Foreign Internal Defense 

(FID)-- According to Joint Publication 3-05, foreign internal defense 

involves, “participation by civilian 

and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs 

taken by another government or 

other designated organization to 

free and protect its society from 

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”7

Short Take-off and Landing 

(STOL)-- Joint Publication 1-02 

defines Short Takeoff and Landing 

as, “the ability of an aircraft to 

clear a 50-foot (15 meters) obstacle 

within 1,500 feet (450 meters) of 

commencing takeoff or in landing, 

to stop within 1,500 feet (450 

meters) after passing over a 50-foot 

(15 meters) obstacle.”8

Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance visualization (ISR 

visualization)-- According to 

the Joint Publication 1-02, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance visualization consists 

of, “The capability to graphically 

display the current and future 

locations of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensors, 

their projected platform tracks, 

vulnerability to threat capabilities 

and meteorological and oceanographic phenomena, fields of 

regard, tasked collection targets, 

and products to provide a basis for 

dynamic re-tasking and time-sensitive decision making.”9

This study assumes that new 

special purpose aircraft are 

required for specific missions in 

FID. Those missions include drug 

interdiction, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, light attack, and most importantly flight training for the Afghan 

Army Air Corps. This study argues 

that successful accomplishment 

of the USAF Foreign Internal 

Defense mission in Afghanistan 

requires the Embraer A-29 because 

of its capabilities and demonstrated success in comparison to 

the less capable Hawker Beechcraft 

AT-6. Drawing on this analysis, the 

study will evaluate why the A-29 is 

needed for employment in current 

and near-term future FID operations. On the basis of anticipated 

operational requirements, data 

will be presented that clearly make 

evident the superiority of the A-29 

over the AT-6.

In December 2011, the US Air 

Force announced the completion 

of contract for the Light Support 

Aircraft (LAS). The contract was 

awarded to the Sierra Nevada Corporation and its Brazilian partner, 

Embraer, for production of twenty 

A-29 Super Tucano light turboprop training and attack aircraft. 

This aircraft is used throughout 

the world for counterinsurgency 

operations as well as for flight 

training. The Air Force’s plan was 

to use this aircraft in Afghanistan 

as a platform to train the nation’s 

army air corps. The competition for the contract was between 

the AT-6, produced by Hawker 

Beechcraft Corporation based in 

Wichita, Kansas, and the A-29 

Super Tucano. Hawker Beechcraft 

was disqualified from the competition causing resentment toward 

the only other contender for the 

bid. Subsequently, “Hawker Beechcraft Corporation...filed a lawsuit 

against the US government after 

the company’s AT-6 light attack 

turboprop...was ejected from 

the competition for submitting a 

‘technically unacceptable’ bid.”10 In 

late February 2012, the Air Force 

canceled the contract with Sierra 

Nevada Corporation pending 

investigation of the award decision. Air Force Secretary Michael 

Donley said in a statement, “While 

we pursue perfection, we sometimes fall short, and when we do 

we will take corrective action...

Since the acquisition is still in litigation, I can only say that the Air 

Force Senior Acquisition Executive, David Van Buren, is not satisfied with the quality of the documentation supporting the award 

decision.”11 Although the contract 

has been cancelled the question 

still remains: Is the A-29 the best 

This study argues that successful accomplishment of the 

USAF Foreign Internal Defense mission in Afghanistan 

requires the Embraer A-29 because of its capabilities and 

demonstrated success in comparison to the less capable 

Hawker Beechcraft AT-6. 
AN AIRPLANE FOR ALL SEASONS 31

choice for the Light Support Aircraft in the context of the foreign 

internal defense mission?

According to Buck Sexton of 

The Blaze,12 “In conflict zones 

around the world, the need for 

nimble, low-maintenance reconnaissance and light attack capability far outstrips the need for the 

most advanced 5th generation 

airframes. The US needs an aerial 

platform it can give to and train 

allies on as part of partner building 

efforts in Afghanistan and other 

conflict nations.”13 The Air Force 

must make a decision that will best 

support the vitally important FID 

mission. A light support aircraft 

has been sought after for the war 

in Afghanistan since 2006. Having 

an aircraft that is simple and effective in a counterinsurgency environment is key to success. 

Hawker Beechcraft agrees with 

that requirement but questions 

whether that should be a consideration in the decision. Jim 

Moore, an author for the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association magazine said, “[Hawker] 

agreed that the overall mission 

in Afghanistan merits careful 

consideration, but insisted the 

Air Force decision was not 

related to recent developments in 

the war-torn country. [Hawker] 

agreed that a “major reassessment” of Afghanistan strategy 

could make the contract moot, but 

the procurement process needs to 

be reformed.”14 Given the recent 

announcement of the US drawdown in Afghanistan, the need for 

an effective light air support aircraft is crucial and the best, most 

appropriate aircraft needs to be 

identified and acquired without 

undue delay. According to Defense 

Tech, 

The LAS mission requires a nondevelopmental solution that provides 

the versatility, engagement, and 

persistence that the war fighter needs in 

a counterinsurgency environment, at a 

significantly lower cost than fighter jets. 

That aircraft must offer intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

capabilities; deliver a wide variety of 

munitions configurations, including 

precision guided munitions; and 

operate in extremely rugged terrain and 

austere conditions.15

The mission is incredibly important not only for the successful conclusion of the war in Afghanistan, 

but also for future counterinsurgency operation and for the success 

of the continuing FID mission. As 

budget worries continue to grow, 

the contract for a LAS aircraft may 

be scraped completely. “There’s no 

way to put a happy face on this,” 

Chief of the Staff General Norton 

Schwartz said, noting that funding 

for up to twenty aircraft expires in 

2013. Schwartz said the aircraft is 

vital to Afghanistan’s military. “We 

will work with all dispatch.”16

An objective evaluation of the 

Super Tucano and AT-6 will help 

to resolve the choice the Air Force 

must make. The Super Tucano, 

or Super T, currently is the only 

combat-proven light attack aircraft in the world. This does not 

mean the AT-6 lacks the capabilities of a good light attack platform, 

but it is still a conceptual design 

that has not been tested in combat 

nor has it had the opportunity to 

prove its abilities in austere conditions. In contrast, the Super T has 

been widely used throughout Latin 

America for many counterinsurgency operations in which it has 

demonstrated the effectiveness of 

its simple design and its flexibility. 

According to an article in the Wall 

Street Journal, 

The A-29 Super Tucano was built 

specifically for counterinsurgency 

missions and is currently used by six 

air forces...It has proven extremely 

capable for LAS missions and is 

credited with helping the Colombian 

government defeat the FARC and 

other governments’ counter illegal 

activities. The more than 150 units 

now in operation around the world 

have logged over 130,000 flight hours, 

including more than 18,000 combat 

hours without any combat loss.17

This operational record 

points out the capabilities of the 

Super T, which possesses many 

other added advantages over an 

unproven aircraft. For example, 

the Super T is the only aircraft 

with the proven ability to carry 

and deliver precision guided 

munitions while operating in 

extremely rugged terrain. This 

record of accomplishment is 

worth noting because the ideal 

light attack aircraft must be able to 

provide many different operational 

capabilities at a relatively low cost. 

In terms of comparative dimensions, the Super T is a significantly 

larger aircraft than the AT-6 and 

sits higher off the ground in order 

to provide stability on unimproved runways. It combines a 

heavier platform with more rugged 

landing gear that is more suitable 

for the many unimproved runways 

in Afghanistan and elsewhere in 

the third world. The Super T’s 

larger landing gear and broader 

USAF T-6 Texan II Trainer
32 AN AIRPLANE FOR ALL SEASONS

stance produces a greater distance 

between the wheels making them 

more suitable for rough landings. These factors contribute to 

more stable handling, especially 

for newer pilots who tend to make 

harder landings. 

Another key difference between 

the two aircraft is their respective weapon systems and payload. 

The Super T has two internally 

mounted guns that do not take 

up any vital hard points allowing 

them to be used for other weapons. 

In contrast, “The AT-6 carries no 

weapons in its native configuration and therefore must give up a 

vital ‘hard point’ under each wing 

for a gun pod exacting a penalty in 

both payload and performance.”18

The Tuscano can also accommodate 133 fully qualified NATO ordnance and operational weapons 

load configurations. 

A significant additional mission 

for the LAS aircraft will be conducting ISR for sustained timeframes. The Super Tucano has a 

fully integrated EO/IR imaging 

system positioned under the nose 

for maximum effect, to include 

space and visibility. Sierra Nevada 

Corporation points out that, “Due 

to a lack of space and balance, the 

AT-6 places it’s thermal imaging 

system under the cockpit, which 

leads to degraded effectiveness 

whenever the plane drops a wing 

to turn.”19 In contrast, the Tuscano 

cockpit contains state of the art 

displays and is configured for ease 

of handling. 

The A-29 has been tested and 

proven. It is not a concept design 

that may or may not work. Time is 

running out to begin production of 

the aircraft and to ensure that US 

Air Force pilots are fully qualified 

to fly it under demanding operating conditions. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Super Tucano 

represents the best option for a 

timely decision and is reflected in 

a letter from Representative Allen 

B. West to the Secretary of the Air 

Force,

The safety of our men and women 

on the ground in Afghanistan and the 

security of our nation depend upon 

an Afghan military that is capable 

of defending against the Taliban and 

other extremist organizations. A light 

air support capability is essential to 

this objective.... The road to providing 

US commanders in Afghanistan with 

the light air support capability they 

urgently requested has been paved with 

numerous unnecessary delays. These 

delays are endangering our security, 

wasting taxpayer dollars, and prevent 

us from putting Americans to work 

building these aircraft. I hope that the 

Air Force has a plan for minimizing 

further delay and mitigating the adverse 

affects of this latest action.20

As for the AT-6, it is a great 

trainer aircraft and as has been used 

very effectively for that purpose for 

many years. The problem involves 

taking an aircraft purposely built 

for training and attempting to turn 

it into a combat-capable aircraft. 

Of course, the AT-6 does have 

a few unique advantages. Every 

US Air Force and Navy pilot in 

the grade of senior lieutenant or 

below has recent experience with 

the systems employed in the T-6 

trainer. Defense Analyst Daniel 

Goure states, “Another reason that 

the AT-6 makes sense is because it 

facilitates an easy and natural relationship with the US Air Force, 

given its experience with the T-6 

trainer and partner countries. US 

pilots and maintainers would not 

have to learn how to fly a different 

aircraft in order to train foreign 

air force personnel.”21 This experience would require less training 

for USAF instructors assigned to 

train pilots of other nations. Secondly, understanding of maintenance issues, parts, and familiarity with the aircraft already exist 

because the T-6 is an integral part 

of pilot training for both the Air 

Force and the Navy. Nonetheless, 

that does not mean it is ready for 

less sophisticated nations such as 

Afghanistan. When dealing with 

less technically competent countries and with different languages, 

the overall simplicity of an aircraft must play a vital role in the 

procurement decision. The availability of an aircraft that already 

is in use worldwide is important 

to note. Although the T-6 is currently fielded in Iraq, Iraq is the 

only country outside of the US to 

operate this aircraft. In comparison, 

The A-29 Super Tucano is the only 

aircraft in LAS competition that has a 

combat record. It has been in service 

for seven years and been flown in 

actual combat by five nations, with no 

combat losses. Embraer – as well as 

this specific aircraft, the A-29 Super 

Tucano – has a strong military track 

record. Embraer has supplied more 

than 1,300 aircraft to armed forces in 

31 nations. The A-29 Super Tucano is 

operational and combat-proven and 

flying with nations similar to those 

targeted for the LAS mission. More 

than 173 A-29 Super Ts are in use or 

on-order by armed forces around the 

The A-29 Super Tuscano is the only aircraft in LAS competition 

that has a combat record. It has been in service for seven 

years and been flown in actual combat by five nations, with no 

combat losses.
AN AIRPLANE FOR ALL SEASONS 33

world. It has more than 100,000 flight 

hours and 16,000 combat hours, with 

no combat losses, and it is certified for 

more than 130 weapon configurations. 

The Super Tucano also is the plane that 

was tested and requested by the US 

Navy for Imminent Fury.22

Currently the focus is on a 2011 

lawsuit filed by Hawker Beechcraft for being eliminated from the 

competition and the recent cancellation of the project while Hawker 

Beechcraft’s objections are evaluated. But the true focus should be 

on making sure whatever aircraft is 

selected represents the best choice 

to support the needs of the military. Secondary questions such as 

how many more jobs would be produced in America should not be 

an issue while the nation is still at 

war and requires the most capable 

LAS aircraft to help complete the 

mission. The focus for many is on 

the fact that the A-29 is a Brazilian aircraft. However, Embraer 

has teamed up with the US Sierra 

Nevada Corporation to compete 

for the LAS bid and ultimately will 

bring additional jobs and money 

to the US through subcontracts 

with American companies. Sierra 

Nevada Corporation states, “The 

A-29 Super Tucano will be built 

in Jacksonville, FL, by American 

workers with parts from American 

companies. Training on the aircraft 

will be provided in Clovis, NM. 

More than 60 US suppliers in 19 

states will supply parts or services 

for this contract. At least 1,200 US 

jobs will be supported through this 

contract.”23

The mission in Afghanistan 

includes a variety of coalition partners. The availability of an aircraft 

that is familiar to some partners 

increases the likelihood of effectively training the new Afghan 

pilots.24 As one experienced fighter 

pilot states, “The A-29 Super T has 

the same Hands-on-Throttle-andStick (HOTAS) and cockpit configuration as a modern fourth generation fighter aircraft. Yet, it is highly 

efficient to operate and easy to fly. 

It has unrivaled endurance, giving 

the war fighter the persistent ISR, 

kinetic, or training support.”25 The 

Super T is perfect for the low altitude missions expected of it. “Crew 

survivability is ensured through 

armor protection and state-ofthe-art provisions 

such as a Missile 

Approach Warning 

System and Radar 

Warning Receiver, 

alongside chaff and 

flares dispensers.”26

Giving further credence to its potential 

survivability is the 

Super T’s successful track record in 

its current training 

environment. “The Super Tucano’s 

airframe was designed for singleand twin-seater versions and can 

withstand +7G/-3.5G loads. The 

aircraft’s structure is corrosionprotected and the side-hinged 

canopy has a windshield capable 

of withstanding a bird strike at 270 

kts.”27

The terrain of Afghanistan is 

rugged and unforgiving at times 

for inexperienced pilots. Flying 

an aircraft that offers added safety 

and protection in this stern environment is an important consideration. The need for an aircraft to 

support the FID and light attack 

mission is a pressing one for commanders in Afghanistan. An objective evaluation clearly suggests the 

Super Tucano is the best choice for 

current and future LAS missions 

around the world. 

Although both aircraft, the 

Hawker Beechcraft AT-6 and 

Embraer A-29 Super Tucano, 

have their own unique strengths, 

the A-29 Super Tucano is the best 

choice for the situation we face in 

Afghanistan. Moreover, this aircraft will also provide a superb 

platform for future FID missions 

worldwide, especially those conducted in South America. The LAS 

contract requires a low cost solution for an aircraft that offers the 

engagement and persistence a war 

fighter needs in a counter insurgency environment. Clearly, the 

Super T best meets these needs. 

“The Super Tucano meets all the 

requirements of the LAS mission 

and then some. It provides the 

highly advanced avionics and 

communications that pilots need. 

It makes no compromises when it 

comes to crew survivability, aircraft 

controllability or combat effectiveness.”28 The Super Tucano is ready 

for employment in the harshest 

conditions and is the best choice to 

meet the Air Force’s needs. 

1 Wray Johnson, “Ends Versus 

Means: The 6th Special Operations 

Squadron and the Icarus Syndrome,” 

Air and Space Power Journal, http://

www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/

cc/WJohnson.html

Indonesian Air Force Tuscanos 
34 AN AIRPLANE FOR ALL SEASONS

2 Richard Comer, “An Irregular Challenge,” Armed Forces Journal, 

http://www.armedforcesjournal.

com/2008/02/3290589

3 Wray Johnson, “Whither Aviation 

Foreign Internal Defense,” Airpower 

Journal 11, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 66-85, 

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/

airchronicles/apj/apj97/spr97/johnson.

html

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Limitations: The limitations of 

this study pertain to the recent selection of the light attack aircraft for the 

FID mission and the needs for this aircraft. This study will not address the 

political dimensions of foreign aircraft 

versus American-made aircraft. Training and maintenance are critical to the 

FID mission, and the capabilities of 

the two aircraft being compared will 

address the issues at hand. This study 

will not address any other aircraft than 

the A-29 and the AT-6. These aircraft 

are the primary contenders for the FID 

and Light Attack Mission (LAM) and 

therefore will be the primary focus of 

this study.

7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for 

Joint Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05 (Washington, DC: 17 December 2003), GL-7. 

8 Ibid., 424.

9 Ibid., 233.

10 Dave Majumdar, “USAF Halts 

Work on Attack Planes for Afghans,” 

Defense News, January 9, 2012: 26.

11 Andrea Shalal-Esa, Air Force 

scraps deal with Embraer, Sierra 

Nevada, February 28, 2012, http://

www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/29/

u s - e m b r a e r- s n c - a i r c r a f t - i d U S -

TRE81R1W920120229

12 The Blaze is a magazine that 

focuses on topics ranging from culture 

to politics. The Authors have an interest in new dynamics that are important 

today. 

13 Buck Sexton, The Blaze, January 3, 

2012, http://www.theblaze.com/stories/

check-out-the-super-tucano-counterinsurgency-fighter-plane-in-action/

14 Jim Moore, Air Force halts controversial contract: Afghan light air 

support deal may be dead, analysts say, 

February 28, 2012. http://www.aopa.

org/aircraft/articles/2012/120228airforce-halts-controversial-contract.html

15 “Super Tucano Wins USAF’s 

Light Attack Contest,” December 

31, 2011, http://www.defensetech.

org/2011/12/31/embraer-wins-usafslight-attack-contest

16 Ibid. 

17 PR Newswire, “A-29 Super 

Tucano Wins Air Force Bid for Light Air 

Support Mission,” Wall Street Journal, 

February 2012: 1.

18 Sierra Nevada Corporation, Built 

for the Mission, 2009. http://www.builtforthemission.com/a-29-vs-at-6.php

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid. 

21 Daniel Goure, “AT-6 Meets The 

Need For An Affordable Light Attack 

Aircraft,” April 27, 2011, http://www.

lexingtoninstitute.org/at-6-meets-theneed-for-an-affordable-effective-lightattack-aircraft?a=1&c=1171

22 Sierra Nevada Corporation, Built 

for the Mission, 2009. http://www.builtforthemission.com/a-29-vs-at-6.php

23 Ibid. 

24 The A-29 Super Tuscano is flown 

in some African and Latin American 

countries, including US allies Brazil and 

Columbia.

25 Ibid.

26 Sexton. 

27 Ibid.

28 Sierra Nevada Corporation. 

Where the aquisition decisions are made
PERSONNEL RECOVERY 35

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

THE CV-22 OSPREY EXPANSION PACK

VINCENT T. JOVENE III

Time has a funny way of changing things. In the words of 

Italian Air Marshall Guilio Douhet, 

an aggressive advocate for airpower 

in the early twentieth century, 

“Victory smiles upon those who 

anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who 

wait to adapt themselves after the 

changes occur.”1

 What works well 

in today’s fights will not necessarily work well in tomorrow’s. Most 

of the armed conflicts of the twentieth century were fought conventionally, and the US dominated 

the battle-space. As a result, adversaries quickly realized that they 

could fight more effectively and 

cause significantly more damage 

to the US by conducting irregular 

warfare. Operations that were once 

relatively simple are now complex. 

These changes have greatly affected 

missions and operations of US 

combat search and rescue forces. 

Fighter pilots are in less danger of 

being shot down behind enemy 

lines; instead, terrorists are snatching any Americans they can and 

hiding them in insurgent safe 

houses. The US is currently, and will 

likely continue to be, engaged in 

multiple irregular conflicts around 

the world. The myriad of locations 

and types of engagements present 

several hurdles to Combat Search 

and Rescue (CSAR) forces’ capabilities. These diverse challenges 

prompt the question: does the US 

Air Force have the most effective aircraft inventory to perform 

personnel recovery missions? The 

short answer is that given the wide 

range of conflicts the US confronts, 

the Air Force does not have the 

most effective inventory and must 

acquire more versatile aircraft to 

most effectively perform personnel recovery.

Why an Inventory Upgrade?

Today’s Air Force relies almost 

solely on HH-60 Pave Hawks and 

HC-130 Kings for the bulk of personnel recovery missions. While 

HH-60s and HC-130s are valuable rescue assets, the HH-60 has, 

“acute performance limitations in 

areas such as speed, range, carrying capacity, and reliability that 

are evident in harsh environments 

such as Afghanistan and in Iraq.”2

These weaknesses are a serious 

disadvantage in many of today’s 

conflicts. The Air Force needs a 

more robust, versatile selection of 

faster aircraft that can operate over 

longer distances, at higher altitudes, and in tighter spaces.

Personnel recovery and CSAR 

are not the same thing and a distinction should be made between 

the two. Personnel recovery is 

defined as, “the sum of military, 

diplomatic, and civil efforts to 

prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated 

personnel.”3

 Isolated personnel 

are, “those US military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel who are separated...from 

their unit while participating in 

a US-sponsored military activity or mission and who are...in a 

situation where they must survive, 

evade, resist, or escape.”4 Personnel recovery essentially applies to 

the rescue of anyone that is separated from their unit. CSAR is a 

tactic of personnel recovery; it is 

an active location and recovery 

process used in high-threat situations to return isolated personnel 

to friendly control. Not every case 

of isolated personnel will require 

a CSAR mission or CSAR assets; 

oftentimes a single, small aircraft 

will suffice. 

The US military’s most valuable 

asset is its people. In today’s irregular conflicts, terrorists know that if 

they can capture Americans, they 

can exploit their prisoners in ways 

Cadet VINCENT T. JOVENE III is an 

Military & Strategic Studies major in 

the Class of 2012. 

The US is renowned for taking care of its own and refuses to allow 

the enemy any opportunity to take advantage of Americans. 

Therefore, personnel recovery is extremely important to the 

military’s top leaders. 
36 PERSONNEL RECOVERY

that can cause strategic damage 

to the US while furthering their 

own objectives. The US is renowned for taking care of its own and 

refuses to allow the enemy any 

opportunity to take advantage of 

Americans. Therefore, personnel 

recovery is extremely important 

to the military’s top leaders. As 

Joint Publication 3-50 states, “preserving the lives of those participating in a US-sponsored activity 

or mission is one of the highest 

priorities of the Department of 

Defense.”5

Among the Army, Air Force, 

Marine Corps, and Navy, the Air 

Force is the only military branch 

that has assets dedicated primarily 

to personnel recovery. The other 

service branches do train some of 

their units to perform rescue missions; for example, the Marines 

have Tactical Recovery of Aircraft 

and Personnel teams. However, 

when the US military mobilizes 

and deploys troops en masse, the 

Air Force holds the responsibility 

for providing a dedicated personnel-recovery force.

Major Chad Sterr, an Air Force 

combat rescue officer, declares that 

while rescue forces are appreciated 

at the tactical level for bringing 

everyone home, “airpower advocates often fail to understand [the 

rescue mission’s] inherent strategic 

value as part of the broader personnel recovery...function.” Sterr says 

that the Air Force has, “developed 

the rescue force into the service’s 

[personnel recovery] experts...

[and] can mitigate the operational 

and political costs created when an 

adversary exploits isolated personnel to generate propaganda, gain 

intelligence, or restrict their physical freedom of action or maneuver.”6

 Sterr further points out that 

“the increased presence of Americans abroad and the dynamics of 

irregular warfare require the US 

to develop an effective [personnel 

recovery] infrastructure.”7 Because 

of the negative implications surrounding isolated personnel, the 

Air Force needs the most effective 

aircraft platforms for personnel 

recovery for the widest range of 

situations.

THE OPTIONS

Osprey versus Pave Hawk

The uncertainty involved in 

irregular warfare contributes a significant amount of added confusion to the fog and friction of war. 

In the unpredictable combat environment frequently encountered 

today, speed is of vital importance. 

Denying the enemy an opportunity 

to exploit an isolated American, 

preserving the lives of wounded 

troops, and building rapport with 

civilians by aiding their injured are 

all missions where the capability 

to rapidly engage and disengage 

can mitigate that confusion. When 

things go wrong in the combat 

environment, rapid arrival of a 

rescue force can make the difference between success and failure. 

While the Air Force currently 

relies on the HH-60 Pave Hawk 

to perform the personnel recovery 

mission, it also has in its inventory the CV-22 Osprey, presently 

employed for special operations 

missions. If the Air Force expands 

its personnel recovery inventory 

to include the CV-22, it arguably could more effectively carry 

out personnel recovery missions. 

Major John Groves, an Air Force 

Special Operations pilot, says that 

the CV-22’s, “unique capabilities of 

the aircraft, particularly range and 

speed, qualify it for the [personnel 

recovery] role.”8

The Osprey is a hybrid between 

fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, enabling it to execute missions that would normally require 
PERSONNEL RECOVERY 37

both types of aircraft.9

 Its tilting 

propellers allow it to take-off and 

land vertically like a helicopter, but 

also to fly with the speed, range, 

and efficiency of a fixed-wing turboprop. This combination of characteristics gives the CV-22 the 

capabilities to travel at distances 

and speeds that a helicopter could 

not, and to land in locations that a 

fixed wing aircraft could not. The 

newer CV-22 has advanced avionics systems and terrain following 

radar for bad weather conditions, 

both of which aid the situational 

awareness of the crew.10

The CV-22 is similar in size to 

the workhorse HH-60. This hybrid 

aircraft possesses a wingspan of 84 

feet and 57 feet long, with a propeller blade diameter of 38 feet for 

each propeller. In comparison, the 

HH-60 has a rotor diameter of 53 

feet, and length of 64 feet. However, 

beyond the dimensional similarities, the CV-22 and HH-60 have 

little in common. Maximum vertical take-off weights for the CV-22 

and HH-60 are 52,870 pounds 

and 22,000 pounds, respectively. 

If the CV-22 does a rolling takeoff, it can carry 60,500 pounds. 

Both aircraft’s flight crews consist 

of two pilots and two crew chiefs. 

The CV-22 can carry twenty-four 

troops in seats or thirty-two on the 

floor while the HH-60 carries only 

twelve troops. The CV-22 cruises at 

241 knots, 82 knots faster than the 

HH-60, and has a ceiling of 25,000 

feet, 11,000 feet above the HH-60’s 

ceiling. While both aircraft have 

refueling capabilities, the CV-22’s 

unrefueled range is nearly twice 

that of the HH-60’s approximately 

500 nautical miles.11

Besides the capability to fly at a 

high ceiling, the CV-22 can climb 

rapidly out of range of dangerous 

rockets and automatic weapons 

that pose the greatest threat to 

helicopters. Also, Special Operations Command has stated that 

when the propellers are rotated 

forward, the CV-22 is 75 percent 

quieter than rotary-wing aircraft, 

an attribute useful for either clandestine or recovery missions.12 The 

CV-22 is certainly a formidable 

aircraft. It can race in and out of 

battle going twice the distance, at 

almost twice the speed, carrying 

double the payload, as the HH-60.

Despite its strengths, the CV-22 

is not without its shortcomings. 

A project in the works since the 

late 1980s, the CV-22 has been 

harshly scrutinized following 

deadly crashes caused by the tiltrotor technology and doubts have 

been expressed about its ability to 

perform key helicopter maneuvers. 

Groves states, “in the event of a dual 

engine failure, the [aircraft] settles 

much faster than a normal helicopter, making autorotational descent 

and landing extremely difficult.”13

The CV-22 also lacks the kind of 

armament normally seen on comparable aircraft: it only has one tailmounted machine gun instead of 

two door-mounted machine guns. 

This lack of armament, combined 

with a poor ability to autorotate, 

makes leaders hesitant to take the 

aircraft into combat zones.14

Although the Air Force has 

gained invaluable experience 

with the CV-22 while conducting 

special operations missions in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, the hybrid aircraft is still less battle-proven than 

the older HH-60. A high-price tag 

is attached to the CV-22—at $89 

million, it is much more expensive 

than the $40 million HH-60.15 The 

Air Force also has a much smaller 

fleet of only 17 CV-22s, which are 

used solely by Air Force Special 

Operations Command, compared 

to nearly 100 HH-60s. Regardless, 

the CV-22 has exceptional capabilities that can bridge gaps left by the 

HH-60s, and the Air Force could at 

least augment its personnel recovery forces with this capable hybrid 

aircraft.

Operating Incognito

The ever-changing battle-spaces 

encountered today demonstrate 

that American troops will deploy 

to myriad environments. Altitude, 

terrain, population, and other 

factors contribute to how effective an aircraft is for a particular 

mission. Operations in high mountains, such as those in Afghanistan, 

can unnecessarily hinder a mission 

if the aircraft is nearing its ceiling. 

A helicopter, while the best choice 

for recovery where there is no 

room for a fixed-wing aircraft to 

land, struggles at high altitudes. 

Thick forests, hills, and other 

natural obstacles restrict the length 

of runways making it difficult for 

refueling aircraft to have access to 

deployment locations. In remote 

locations, unless aerial refuel capabilities are at hand, helicopters 

cannot travel the necessary distances to execute missions. Indigenous populations may be loyal to 

Americans or they may side with 

the enemy; in the latter situation, 

a loud, overly-conspicuous aircraft 

draws unwanted attention to the 

...the CV-22 is 75 percent quieter than rotary-wing aircraft... 

It can race in and out of battle going twice the distance, at 

almost twice the speed, carrying double the payload.
38 PERSONNEL RECOVERY

already high-stress recovery. These 

factors further demonstrate the 

need for a wider selection of aircraft that are able to mitigate the 

fog and friction of combat.

The CV-22 helps to mitigate 

these functions. It has an operating ceiling comparable to that 

of a fixed-wing aircraft, so it can 

fly at the hazardous altitudes in 

mountainous terrains. The longer 

range of the CV-22, to an extent, 

solves the refueling problem, and 

its quieter engines draw less attention. However, the CV-22 is still 

very obviously a military aircraft, 

which, depending on the mission, 

will not always constitute the most 

preferable platform. Fortunately, 

there is a solution to the problem of 

unwanted visibility: light-weight, 

fixed-wing aircraft.

Currently, the only fixed-wing 

platform dedicated to personnel 

recovery is the HC-130 King. The 

Air Force has thirty-six such aircraft divided between active duty, 

reserves, and air guard. This variant 

of the C-130 provides support and 

refueling capabilities for personnel recovery forces. The HC-130 

is much larger than the CV-22 and 

the HH-60, measuring 98 feet long 

with a wingspan of 132 feet, and 

carries a payload of 34,000 pounds. 

This fixed-wing aircraft has a much 

longer reach than the rotary-wing 

platforms—4,000 miles with a 

ceiling of 33,000 feet at a speed 

of 251 knots.16 A 6000-foot long 

runway is the minimum distance 

needed for take-off, and although 

the HC-130 can land on a strip 

3000 feet long, that point is moot 

if it cannot take-off again.17 During 

landings, every C-130’s engines go 

in reverse and make a good deal 

of noise, which draws unwanted 

attention to the aircraft. This attention could increase the risk of a 

rescue mission. The HC-130’s size 

and noise levels do not make it the 

most desirable aircraft when discretion is the better part of valor.18

Captain Kyle Porter, an Air 

Force combat systems specialist, 

argues a personnel recovery squadron that includes light-weight, 

fixed-wing aircraft among its assets 

can more effectively accomplish a 

wider range of missions.19 Porter 

offers the following example: if a 

remotely piloted aircraft with a 

sensitive payload goes down in 

Africa, it is most effective to send 

a recovery team on a light-weight, 

inconspicuous aircraft. Locals are 

accustomed to seeing small aircraft 

carrying hunters, doctors, and 

explorers, so that a lightweight aircraft landing on a dirt road is likely 

to go unnoticed.20

Adding to their appeal, lightweight aircraft also require significantly less distance for take-offs 

and landings. The smallest aircraft 

proposed by Captain Porter, the 

A-1C, needs only one pilot, 500 

feet for take-off and 200 feet for 

landing. The largest light-weight 

aircraft, the DHC-6 Twin Otter, 

can also be flown by only one pilot 

and requires just 1200 feet for takeoffs and landings. Light-weight aircraft can also be employed on misCV-22 Osprey
PERSONNEL RECOVERY 39

sions that normally fall under the 

HC-130s responsibility: “overland 

and water search; light airdrop or 

resupply; communication relay, 

spotting or marking isolated 

persons; low visibility insertion or 

extraction; nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; on-scene commander; and 

humanitarian relief.”21

The major disadvantage of 

using a lightweight aircraft is its 

significantly reduced payload. An 

A-1C carries only 925 pounds; 

the DHC-6 carries 3,250 pounds. 

The lighter, smaller aircraft can go 

more places and draw less attention at the cost of carrying smaller 

payloads. Still, these light-weight 

aircraft have impressive ranges for 

their diminutive sizes. The A-1C 

can fly 800 miles with a ceiling 

of 20,000 feet going 113 knots.22

Depending on whether an auxiliary fuel tank is onboard and the 

size of the payload, the DHC-6 

has a range of 644-903 miles with 

a ceiling of 25,000 feet, also going 

113 knots.23

Because of their small size, 

these lightweight aircraft carry 

two other major advantages: low 

price tags and lower operating 

costs. The Air Force is being forced 

to do more with less. When possible, it makes more sense to use 

a smaller and cheaper aircraft to 

perform a rescue conserving valuable resources. Most light-weight, 

fixed-wing aircraft cost no more 

than $500,000.24 Porter points out 

that fuel costs for an HC-130 can 

reach $4,800 an hour.25 A Twin 

Otter costs significantly less at 

$300 an hour.26

The Alternatives

Given the Air Force’s need for 

a more effective personnel recovery inventory and the capabilities 

of the CV-22 and the lightweight, 

fixed wing aircraft, there are two 

different alternatives the Air Force 

can pursue. The first, more costly, 

alternative offers the widest selection of assets: 

Purchase CV-22s specifically dedicated 

to personnel recovery and invest in 

various lightweight aircraft. If the Air 

Force possesses a diverse inventory 

of aircraft dedicated to personnel 

recovery, it can more likely conduct 

virtually any rescue scenario in any 

location. As Captain Porter says, 

“having an option to tailor aircraft types 

and deployment footprints to match the 

operating environment can enhance 

mission effectiveness, decreasing risk 

from threats and realizing monetary 

and logistical savings.27

A blended deployment package 

including HH-60s, CV-22s, 

HC-130s, and lightweight, fixedwing aircraft would provide the 

most comprehensive coverage for 

a wide range of potential personnel recovery missions. Given the 

unique capabilities of these various 

platforms, vital rescue missions in 

different conditions could be conducted with a greater sense of confidence and higher probability of 

success. The fuel-hauling HC-130 

could transport supplies to 

forward locations from which the 

lightweight, fixed-wing platforms 

could operate. For low-visibility, 

low-impact rescues, the lightweight, fixed-wing assets make 

the most sense, thereby permitting 

rotary-wing aircraft to remain on 

alert for more hazardous, complicated missions. Essentially, the 

unique strengths of one asset in the 

blended deployment package serve 

to offset the weaknesses in its sister 

platforms. This maximized combination of dedicated personnel 

recovery assets is a highly efficient 

solution for enhancing and modernizing the Air Force’s personnel 

recovery aircraft inventory.

The second alternative the Air 

Force could pursue is to simply 

purchase a variety of lightweight, 

fixed-wing platforms to augment 

the current inventory of HH-60s 

and HC-130s. 

Although the CV-22 offers very 

attractive qualities for personnel 

recovery missions, the time-proven 

HH-60 can accomplish most of the 

missions the CV-22 would undertake. The Air Force already compensates for the HH-60’s shorter 

range with aerial refueling services 

provided by HC-130s. The HH-60 

is a safer, considering its ability to 

autorotate, though it is also aging 

in comparision to the CV-22. 

Lightweight, fixed wing aircraft can 

ease the load on HH-60s by carrying out inconspicuous rescues in 

low-threat environments. If it purchases only lightweight aircraft, 

the Air Force can obtain a greater 

number of assets to cover different areas and augment current 

personnel recovery forces than if 

the same amount of money was 

spent to purchase both CV-22s 

and light-weight platforms. Buying 

only lightweight, fixed-wing aircraft gives the Air Force the largest 

number of rescue assets for personnel recovery, though operatA blended deployment package including HH-60s, CV-22s, HC130s, and lightweight, fixed-wing aircraft would provide the 

most comprehensive coverage for a wide range of potential 

personnel recovery missions.
40 PERSONNEL RECOVERY

ing range remains an obstacle for 

reaching forces deep in enemy territory.

Of the two possible alternatives, 

the author suggests the Air Force 

select the first. How the Air Force 

acquires the new CV-22s and lightweight, fixed-wing aircraft is also 

important. The Air Force should 

purchase the CV-22s and the 

lightweight aircraft in equal proportions every year so as to have 

a well-rounded and balanced personnel recovery force. Focusing on 

only one or the other would unnecessarily create gaps in capability. 

While augmenting current assets 

solely with lightweight platforms 

would be the cheaper option, the 

CV-22’s range and STOL capabilities are invaluable and should be 

applied to personnel recovery. 

Because of the amount of time 

it will take to create a full-strength 

personnel recovery inventory in 

the Air Force, special operations 

forces units that possess CV-22 

assets should, when possible, 

assist rescue forces. As a corollary, it would be mutually beneficial if personnel recovery forces 

assisted other organizations in 

their assigned missions. Otherwise idle personnel recovery aircraft assets could be used to move 

troops, deliver supplies, and aid 

indigenous populations. In peacetime, personnel recovery forces 

can maintain their skills by assisting victims of natural disasters and 

by conducting search and rescue 

missions for lost hikers or skiers. 

Maintaining individual and crew 

proficiency is just as important as 

strong rescue platforms. Accordingly, recovery forces should not 

idly sit by when opportunities are 

at hand to practice their skills.

Conclusion

Personnel recovery is a very high 

priority when the US military goes 

to war. People are precious, and the 

US seeks to mitigate the risks that 

its fighting men and women will 

be captured and exploited.28 Nevertheless, every military operation 

involves a certain degree of danger, 

and just because there are significant threats to personnel safety 

does not mean that the US will 

never deploy troops. Therefore, 

personnel recovery is an important 

mitigating factor to the dangers 

posed by combat. 

The American people rely on 

commanders to bring home their 

family members, friends, and 

loved ones, and the US does not 

passively allow terrorists to abuse 

captured Americans. The US Air 

Force thus requires the most effective possible personnel recovery 

force. Purchasing new personnel 

recovery aircraft will be expensive, 

but it is likely the US will continue 

to be engaged in conflicts around 

the world. When its most valuable 

assets are in danger, the US cannot 

afford to be without the most 

robust and versatile inventory possible. Although the current fleet 

of HH-60s and HC-130s are presently considered adequate for 

accomplishing personnel recovery 

missions, Air Force capabilities 

will be significantly enhanced by 

the acquisition of new aircraft that 

can more effectively perform these 

strategically significant tasks, particularly as the US finds itself in 

more remote regions like Afghanistan.

1 Guilio Douhet, The Command of 

the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 

5.

2 John Marshall Groves, “A Combat 

Search and Rescue (CSAR) Role for the 

CV-22: It’s Coming, Get Ready” (master’s thesis, Marine Corps Command 

and Staff College, 2008), 5.

3 Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Personnel Recovery, final coordination, 

Joint Publication (JP) 3-50 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 5 January 2007), I-1.

4 JP 3-50, Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery (Second Draft), (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, 11 May 2005), I-1.

5 JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, (final 

coordination copy), I-1.

6 Chad Sterr, “Strategic Rescue: Vectoring Airpower Advocates to Embrace 

the Real Value of Personnel Recovery,” 

Air & Space Power Journal 25, no. 3 (Fall 

2011): 26-27.

7 Ibid, 29-30.

8 Groves, A (CSAR) Role for the 

CV-22, 16.

9 US Air Force, “CV-22 Osprey,”

September 15, 2011, under “Factsheets,” 

http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3668

10 Groves, A (CSAR) Role for the 

CV-22, 17.

11 US Air Force, “HH-60G Pave 

Hawk,” October 20, 2011, under “Factsheets,” http://www.af.mil/information/

factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=107

12 Otto Kreisher, “Finally, the 

Osprey,” AirForce-Magazine.com, February 2009, under “Magazine Archive,” 

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/

M a g a z i n e A r c h i v e / P a g e s / 2 0 0 9 /

February%202009/0209Osprey.aspx

13 Groves, A (CSAR) Role for the 

CV-22, 17.

14 Ibid, 18.

15 US Air Force, “CV-22 Osprey,”

September 15, 2011, under “Factsheets,” 

http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3668

16 US Air Force, “HC-130P/N King,” 

January 1, 2010, under “Factsheets,” 

http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=106

17 Kyle J. Porter, “Air Force FixedWing Rescue: A Multifaceted Approach 
PERSONNEL RECOVERY 41

for Full-Spectrum Personnel Recovery,” 

Air & Space Power Journal 25, no. 3 (Fall 

2011): 42.

18 Ibid, 42.

19 Ibid, 44.

20 Ibid, 37.

21 Ibid, 44.

22 Aviat Aircraft, “Husky A-1C,” 

Aviat Aircraft Inc, http://www.aviataircraft.com/hspecs html

23 US Department of Commerce, 

“DeHavilland Twin Otter (DHC-6),” 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, http://www.aoc.noaa.

gov/aircraft otter htm

24 Porter, “Air Force Fixed-Wing 

Rescue,” 43. 

25 Ibid, 39.

26 Dornier Seaplane Company, 

“Direct Operating Costs,” Dornier Seaplane Company, http://www.dornierseaplane.com/content/direct-operatingcosts

27 Porter, “Air Force Fixed-Wing 

Rescue,” 39.

28 The US is fearful of experiencing another Mogadishu. The Black 

Hawk Down incident and capture of 

CWO Mike Durant scared the US out of 

Somalia in the early 1990s and the US 

has been apprehensive of committing 

ground forces to any volatile military 

operations since then.A Modern Cuban 

Missile Crisis?

Chief of Air Staff’s Reading List 2013 In honour of 

DFMI’s recently-departed RAF exchange officer, we are including the 

RAF Chief ’s reading list for the upcoming year--any title listed here 

would make a great book review in ASJ--the editor...

Airpower Studies

1. Colin Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect, Air University Press, 2012.

2. John Andreas Olsen, Global Air Power, Potomac Books, Inc., 2011.

Historical Analysis

3. Antony Beevor, The Second World War, W&N, 2012.

4. Dave Sloggett, The RAF’s Air War in Libya: New Conflicts in the Era of Austerity, Pen & Sword 

Books, Ltd.,, 2012.

Leadership and the Moral Component

5. Peter Gray, The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from Inception 

to 1945, Continuum, 2012.

6. Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham, Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People and Their 

Motives Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflicts, Military Studies Press, 2011.

7. Stephen Bungay, The Art of Action: How Leaders Close the Gaps Between Plans, Actions and Results, 

Nicholas Brealey Publ., 2010.

Future Operating Environment

8. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, The Changing Charachter of War, Oxford Univ. Press, 2011.

9. Donald Sull, The Upside of Turbulence: Seizing an Opportunity in an Uncertain World, Collins 

Business, 2009.

10. Joseph Nye, The Future of Power: And Use in the Twenty-First Century, Public Affairs, 2012
Book Review 42

Max Boot’s work, War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, 

and the Making of the Modern 

World is a cumulative composition 

of the development and history of 

warfare. The text begins with the 

gunpowder revolution, progresses 

through the industrial revolution 

and beyond to today’s information 

revolution, and concludes with 

how the past affects the present 

along with a peek into potential 

future military innovations and 

their impacts. Boot begins each 

of his chapters with an account of 

a particular battle in history. For 

example, his first chapter, “Sail and 

Shot: The Spanish Armada,” opens 

with the Spanish catching their first 

glimpse of the English coastline on 

29 July 1588.1

 His method of interweaving storytelling into factual 

accounts supports the compelling 

arguments, which builds upon the 

overall theme of the book in each 

of his chapters and makes for a captivating read throughout his text. 

War Made New is an all-encompassing overview of the development of military history, breaking 

the last five hundred years into the 

four revolutions mentioned above, 

using major historical benchmarks 

and more to look at the future, 

drawing the reader into the environment of the time before stating 

his case, and finally, by basing his 

claims upon historical facts available from the appropriate era.

According to the Council on 

Foreign Relations, Max Boot’s 

work “argues that the past five centuries of history have been marked 

not by gradual change in how we 

fight but instead by four revolutions in military technology—and 

that the nations who have successfully mastered these revolutions 

have gained the power to redraw 

the map of the world.”2

 Boot’s use 

of these breaks in the past five centuries serves to bring attention to 

four major technological revolutions that he argues serve as the 

organizing standard for military 

history. Boot’s breakup of the past 

makes an interesting read as he 

concludes historical battles were 

won or lost not only by having 

technology, but knowing how to 

properly harness it.

Boot’s practice of opening each 

chapter with a captivating intro 

draws the reader in as he outlines his main points. According to the article, “Review of War 

Made New,” Boot “provides the 

background and detailed descriptions of actual combat of several 

campaigns to demonstrate the 

effect of intelligent adoption of 

the new technologies produced in 

each of the four revolutions.”3

 By 

drawing the reader in, Boot is able 

to narrate freely while still engaging and maintaining interest. From 

the defeat of the Spanish Armada 

to the German Blitzkrieg of WWII, 

Boot uses numerous examples of 

one adversary being able to effectively adapt new technology or 

strategy to become victorious over 

equal, and sometimes superior, 

adversaries. Boot’s storytelling 

combined with factual accounts 

from various battles across history 

are accompanied by easy to understand concepts that almost always 

universally apply, even in different 

centuries of warfare.

From his book, The Iraq Wars 

and America’s Military Revolution, 

author Keith L. Shimko includes 

Boot’s sentiments about the US’s 

easy campaign against Saddam 

Hussein in Iraq during 2003. As 

Boot works through his chapters 

from the renaissance to modern 

military history, he uses the volley 

of available information to further 

substantiate his thoughts on the 

Book Review 

War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World, by Max Boot

Reviewed by Edward Boylan

Cadet Edward Boylan is a Humanities 

major in the class of 2011.

Max Boot’s work “argues that the past five centuries of history 

have been marked not by gradual change in how we fight but 

instead by four revolutions in military technology—and that 

the nations who have successfully mastered these revolutions 

have gained the power to redraw the map of the world.”
Book Review 43

need for militaries to not only adapt 

new technology, but also to employ 

it effectively. Shimko quotes Boot’s 

text directly to comment on the 

US’s rapid race to Baghdad in the 

Second Iraqi War,

The eminent military historian John 

Keegan... remarked that in taking 

Baghdad in less than three weeks 

“the Americans achieved a pace of 

advance unprecedented in history”...

Victor Davis Hanson agreed that “by 

any fair standard of even the most 

dazzling charges in military history, the 

Germans in the Ardennes in the spring 

of 1940, or Patton’s romp in July of 

1944, the . . . race to Baghdad [was] 

unprecedented in its speed and daring 

and in the lightness of its casualties.” 

Max Boot was the more succinct: “No 

army had ever travelled faster with 

fewer casualties.”4

Unfortunately, some argue that 

Boot’s use of facts and figures sometimes takes shortcuts. According 

to one author writing in a “Review 

of War Made New,” the “eminent 

historian William McNeill, criticized the book because he felt it 

omitted important events and 

failed to analyze crucial nonmilitary aspects of the events it 

did treat.”5

 Though pointing out 

flaws in Boot’s work, these can be 

countered by his opening chapter 

statement: “I will not attempt to 

challenge...a number of prominent recent works that have sought 

to explain the [entire] course of 

human development.... Rather 

than attempting to supplant them, 

this book will supplement them 

by highlighting the importance of 

certain vital military developments 

in the making of the modern 

world.”6

 What Boot is saying here 

is that he does not mean to blot 

out longer, more detailed works on 

the subject, but to add to them. So 

despite the criticism, I believe that 

Boot successfully defends himself 

by stating he is not looking to write 

an all-encompassing cumulative 

history of the events surrounding 

all the examples in his depictions 

of famous battles. By stating this 

limitation up front, Boot achieves 

his end goal. He does so by demonstrating that throughout history, 

nations that have evolved and correctly realized the uses and limits 

of their military technology have 

achieved victory over their adversaries.

In conclusion, War Made New 

is an easy to read survey of key 

advancements in military history. 

Boot’s maintains the reader’s interest breaking the last five hundred 

years of history into four sections, divided by major historical 

benchmarks, allowing the reader 

to clearly understand the background of the battles he is describing. In addition to his framing, 

he also paints a clear picture for 

the reader by narrating individual 

battles, describing them from the 

perspective of someone actually 

there, before explaining the specific actions of the battle. In this 

way he achieves a novel-esque 

style of writing. This technique 

only gets more intriguing as his 

book progresses towards the recent 

military actions of the wars in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. Max Boot’s 

work serves as a basic overview 

of military history for the last five 

hundred years, and does so with 

clear validity. Boot makes persuasive arguments about how technology may have won the battle, but 

only the consistent adaptation and 

trial and error method of learning boundaries of technology win 

in the end. War Made New is an 

excellent read for anyone looking 

to see how the US military got 

where it is today and even catch a 

glimpse of where it may be headed 

in the future.

1 Max Boot, War Made New: 

Weapons, Warriors, and the Making 

of the Modern World. New York, NY: 

Gotham, 2007.

2 War Made New, Review. Council 

on Foreign Relations. Web. 13 Apr. 

2011, http://www.cfr.org/informationwarfare/war-made-new/p10313.

3 “Review of War Made New: 

Weapons, Warriors, and the Making 

of the Modern World, by Max Boot.” 

Rhapsody in Books. Wordpress.com, 

4 Apr. 2011, http://rhapsodyinbooks.

wordpress.com/2011/04/11/review-of-

%E2%80%9Cwar-made-new-weaponswarriors-and-the-making-of-the-modern-world%E2%80%9D-by-max-boot/

4 Keith L. Shimko, The Iraq Wars 

and America’s Military Revolution. New 

York, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010.

5 “Review of War Made New...”

6 Boot, 10.

Man’s flight through life is sustained by 

the power of his knowledge.