UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

JENIFER ADRIANA LOPEZ-RAMIREZ, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 20-1281 

(D.C. No. 1:19-CR-00285-RM-1) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before McHUGH, MORITZ, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

This matter is before the court on the government’s motion to enforce the 

appeal waiver in Jenifer Adriana Lopez-Ramirez’s plea agreement. We grant the 

government’s motion and dismiss the appeal. 

Lopez-Ramirez pled guilty to two counts of bank robbery, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and two counts of possession of a firearm during and in relation 

to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The district court 

sentenced her to five years’ concurrent imprisonment on the two bank-robbery counts 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 10, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

and seven years’ consecutive imprisonment on each of the two § 924(c) counts for a 

total of nineteen years. 

Lopez-Ramirez seeks to challenge the district court’s acceptance of her plea 

agreement and her sentence through this appeal. But she agreed to a broad waiver of 

appellate rights in the following portion of her plea agreement: 

“[T]he defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to appeal 

any matter in connection with this prosecution, conviction, or sentence 

unless it meets one of the following criteria: (1) the sentence exceeds 

the maximum penalty provided in the statute of conviction; (2) the 

sentence on the bank robbery counts exceeds the advisory guideline 

range that applies to a total offense level of 28; or (3) the government 

appeals the sentence imposed. 

Mot. to Enforce Appeal Waiver Attach. 1 at 2. The government has moved to 

enforce the appeal waiver in the plea agreement under United States v. Hahn, 

359 F.3d 1315, 1328 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). 

Under Hahn, we consider “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the 

scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would 

result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1325. The government asserts that all of the 

Hahn conditions have been satisfied: (1) Lopez-Ramirez’s appeal is within the scope 

of the appeal waiver because her sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum, her 

sentence on the bank-robbery counts did not exceed the advisory guideline range 

applicable to an offense level of 28, and the government did not appeal; (2) she 

knowingly and voluntarily waived her appellate rights; and (3) enforcing the waiver 

would not result in a miscarriage of justice. 
3 

Lopez-Ramirez’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a response citing 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), that said he could identify no 

non-frivolous argument to oppose the government’s motion. We gave 

Lopez-Ramirez the opportunity to respond to her counsel’s submission. See id. She 

did so, noting her belief that her plea agreement preserved her right to appeal based 

on ineffective assistance of counsel. And she outlined the basis for her ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, which relates to her trial counsel’s conduct in connection 

with the sentencing hearing and not to her trial counsel’s conduct in negotiating the 

plea agreement.1

Lopez-Ramirez misconstrues the appeal waiver in her plea agreement. She did 

not preserve a right to pursue a direct appeal based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel. But her plea agreement stated that her appeal waiver “does not prevent 

[Lopez-Ramirez] from seeking relief otherwise available in a collateral attack” on the 

grounds that she “was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.” Mot. Attach. 

1 at 3. This was proper. “Ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought 

in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal. Such claims brought on direct appeal 

are presumptively dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed.” United States v. 

Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). To the extent 

Lopez-Ramirez seeks to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, she should 

do so in a collateral proceeding. 

1

 “[I]neffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of [an 

appeal] waiver” can be grounds for refusing to enforce the appeal waiver. Hahn, 

359 F.3d at 1327 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
4 

Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that the Hahn

conditions are satisfied in this case. We therefore grant the government’s motion and 

dismiss the appeal. We do so, however, without prejudice to Lopez-Ramirez’s right 

to pursue post-conviction relief on the grounds permitted in her plea agreement. 

We grant Gregory Stevens’s motion to withdraw as counsel. 

Entered for the Court 

Per Curiam