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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 34087

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM,

Defendant-Respondent.

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2009 Opinion No. 22

Filed: April 2, 2009

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. John P. Luster, District Judge; Hon. Penny E. 

Friedlander, Magistrate.

Appellate decision of district court, reversing magistrate’s denial of defendant’s 

motion to suppress evidence, reversed, and case remanded.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Rebekah A. Cudé, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Rebekah A. Cudé argued.

Frederick G. Loats, Coeur d’Alene, for respondent. 

______________________________________________

LANSING, Chief Judge

The State appeals from the district court’s appellate decision that reversed the magistrate 

court’s denial of defendant Peggy Jean Finnicum’s motion to suppress evidence acquired after 

police entered her home without a warrant. We reverse the district court.

I.

BACKGROUND

In the early evening of September 25, 2005, deputies J.R. McFarland and Theodore 

Vrevich were dispatched, in separate vehicles, to respond to a reported domestic dispute 

involving Finnicum and her son. Deputy McFarland arrived first, but by the time he got there 

Finnicum had driven away. Finnicum’s son told Deputy McFarland that he believed Finnicum 

was highly intoxicated. While Deputy McFarland was talking with her son, Finnicum 

approached in her vehicle. Deputy McFarland flagged her down and ordered her to park the 

vehicle in a safe location and to exit the vehicle. In the course of this conversation, McFarland 

noticed that Finnicum smelled of alcohol and had slurred speech and glassy, bloodshot eyes. He 
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informed her that he was there to investigate a domestic dispute between her and her son and told 

her that she appeared to be intoxicated and driving under the influence. He directed her to stay 

near her vehicle while he conversed with her son.

Deputy Vrevich later arrived on the scene to assist McFarland. Vrevich testified that he 

saw Finnicum walk away from her vehicle and toward her residence, whereupon he followed 

her. Finnicum entered the residence before Vrevich reached her, however, so he followed her 

inside. Deputy McFarland entered also. While speaking with the deputies inside the house, 

Finnicum admitted that she had been drinking and driving. The deputies took her outside to 

conduct field sobriety tests, during which she exhibited signs of intoxication. Deputy McFarland 

then placed her under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). She was later 

given breath tests, returning breath alcohol content readings of .26 and .25, more than three times 

the legal limit for drivers. Idaho Code § 18-8004. Finnicum was cited for misdemeanor driving 

with excessive alcohol concentration, I.C. §§ 18-8004, 18-8004C. 

Finnicum filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained following the deputies’ entry 

into her home on the ground that the entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The magistrate 

concluded that the officers had effectuated an investigative detention of Finnicum based on 

reasonable suspicion of DUI while she was outside of the residence, and that it was permissible 

for them to follow her when she fled into the house in order to escape that detention. The 

magistrate therefore denied her motion. Finnicum then entered a guilty plea conditioned on her 

right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. 

On the intermediate appeal, the district court disagreed with the magistrate’s 

determination that officers may pursue a suspect into a home in order to complete an 

investigative detention that was initiated in a public location. The court then went on to analyze 

the deputies’ entry as one to make an arrest. The district court concluded that the deputies had 

probable cause to arrest Finnicum before she went into the house, but that their entry was 

impermissible because the State had not shown exigent circumstances that justified pursuing 

Finnicum into the home without a warrant. The district court therefore reversed the magistrate’s

order denying the suppression motion and vacated the judgment of conviction. The State now 

appeals from the district court’s decision.
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II.

ANALYSIS

When reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, we 

directly review the decision of the district court. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 

P.3d 758, 760 (2008). We examine the magistrate record, however, to determine whether there 

is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the 

magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 

184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008). On review of a decision to grant or deny a motion to 

suppress evidence, we will defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly 

erroneous, but we exercise free review over the application of constitutional standards to those 

facts. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 400, 958 P.2d 22, 26 (Ct. App. 1998). 

The magistrate court analyzed the deputies’ entry of Finnicum’s home as one involving 

an investigative detention of Finnicum based on reasonable suspicion, whereas the district court 

analyzed the circumstances as an arrest based upon probable cause. While we agree with the 

district court that the deputies’ actions should be viewed as accomplishing an arrest supported by 

probable cause, we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that the entry offended the 

Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects people against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. When a warrantless search or seizure occurs, the 

government bears the burden of proving facts necessary to establish an exception to the warrant 

requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 

871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007). Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment must be excluded from evidence in a criminal prosecution of the person whose 

rights were violated. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 920, 

155 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2007).

The Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry 

into a suspect’s home for a routine, non-exigent arrest, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-

88 (1980); Jenkins, 143 Idaho at 920, 155 P.3d at 1159; State v. Christiansen, 119 Idaho 841,

843, 810 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Ct. App. 1990), but it does not forbid warrantless arrests of 

individuals in a public place based upon probable cause. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 

423-24 (1976); Jenkins, 143 Idaho at 921, 155 P.3d at 1160; Christiansen, 119 Idaho at 843, 810 

P.2d at 1129. In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976), the United States Supreme 
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Court held that a suspect may not defeat an arrest that was initiated in a public place by escaping 

to a private place, such as a home. See also Jenkins, 143 Idaho at 922, 155 P.3d at 1161; State v. 

Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 621, 768 P.2d 1351, 1354 (Ct. App. 1989). Thus, arrests based on 

probable cause, if commenced in a public place, may be completed in a private residence if that 

is where the suspect flees.

Probable cause for an arrest requires that police possess information that would lead a 

person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a 

crime has been committed by the arrestee. State v. Kysar, 116 Idaho 992, 993, 783 P.2d 859, 

860 (1989); State v. Zentner, 134 Idaho 508, 510, 5 P.3d 488, 490 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether 

there is probable cause to arrest an individual depends upon the totality of the circumstances and 

the assessment of probabilities in the particular factual context. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 

366, 370-71 (2003). The facts making up a probable cause determination are viewed from an 

objective standpoint. State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136-37, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (1996). 

In this case, Deputy McFarland clearly had probable cause to arrest Finnicum for DUI 

before she retreated into the house. Finnicum’s son had informed him that Finnicum had been 

drinking all day, was highly intoxicated, and had recently driven away. About half an hour later, 

Deputy McFarland saw Finnicum driving on the adjacent public road and flagged her down. He 

then made observations that tended to confirm the report that she was intoxicated--she smelled 

strongly of alcohol, slurred her speech, had glassy and bloodshot eyes, and seemed confused. 

When Deputy Vrevich arrived, he noticed that Finnicum seemed unable to walk in a straight line. 

Collectively, this information amply provided probable cause for Finnicum’s arrest for DUI, and 

McFarland was authorized by state law to make a misdemeanor arrest without a warrant because 

the offense was committed in his presence. See I.C. § 19-603(1). Deputy McFarland not only 

possessed probable cause before he entered the residence, but he had already taken steps toward 

an arrest, notifying Finnicum that he suspected her of DUI and ordering her to stay by her 

vehicle while he finished interviewing her son. Although Finnicum initially complied, she 

ultimately disregarded this order and went into her residence.

Given these circumstances, Deputies McFarland and Vrevich acted lawfully when they 

followed Finnicum into the house because they were completing a justified arrest that had been 

set in motion in a public place. This conclusion is dictated by the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Santana. There, police possessing probable cause to arrest Santana for a drug offense

went to her house, where she was standing in the doorway. As the officers approached, they 
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shouted, “Police!” and displayed their identification, whereupon Santana retreated into the 

vestibule of her home. The officers followed her through the open door and caught her in the 

vestibule. Addressing the question of “whether her act of retreating into her house could thwart 

an otherwise proper arrest,” the Supreme Court held that it could not. The Court concluded that

“a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place . . . by the 

expedient of escaping to a private place.” Santana, 427 U.S. at 43. 

Here, Deputy McFarland had progressed further toward effectuating an arrest--by 

ordering Finnicum to stay by her vehicle--than had the officers in Santana who had merely 

yelled “Police!” and showed their identification. Finnicum’s arrest was set in motion in a public

place, and she may not gain refuge through her subsequent refusal to obey a lawful police order. 

Therefore, the deputies’ entry of Finnicum’s home to complete the arrest did not violate the 

Fourth Amendment.1

Finnicum has presented no argument countering the above analysis that there existed 

probable cause for her arrest and that the arrest was set in motion before she fled to her house. 

Rather, Finnicum’s argument that the deputies’ intrusion was unconstitutional is predicated upon 

the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 103 P.3d 430 (2004). 

There, the Court concluded that an investigative detention could not be effectuated by a 

warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a residence or place of business without probable cause 

and exigent circumstances. Id. at 824, 103 P.3d at 437. Maland is inapposite, however, because 

it involved only an investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion, not probable cause for 

an arrest, and because the detention was initiated by the entry into a residence, not by any act 

taken outside the residence.

The deputies’ entry into Finnicum’s home did not violate her constitutional rights. The 

magistrate court thus appropriately denied Finnicum’s suppression motion, and the district 

court’s order overturning the magistrate court was erroneous. We therefore vacate the district 

court’s appellate order and remand for further proceedings.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.

 

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The State also proposes hot pursuit and exigent circumstances as alternate justifications 

for the warrantless entry into Finnicum’s home. Since we find the police conduct lawful without 

considering those proposed bases, we do not address them.