United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and

Economic Development, Committee on Transportation

and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

9:00 a.m. EDT

Thursday

June 4, 1998

GENERAL SERVICES

ADMINISTRATION

Many Building Security

Upgrades Made But

Problems Have Hindered

Program

Implementation

Statement of Bernard L. Ungar

Director, Government Business Operations Issues

General Government Division

GAO/T-GGD-98-141

Summary 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

In response to the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Murrah Federal Building

in Oklahoma City, the President directed the Department of Justice (DOJ)

to assess the vulnerability of federal office buildings, particularly to acts of

terrorism and other forms of violence. A DOJ-directed interagency working

group issued a report in June 1995 recommending specific minimum

security standards for federal buildings and criteria, guidance, and

timetables for evaluating the security needs of federal buildings and

estimating the cost of needed upgrades. The President directed executive

departments and agencies to upgrade the security of their facilities to the

extent feasible based on the DOJ report’s recommendations, and he gave

the General Services Administration (GSA) this responsibility for the

buildings it controls.

In July 1995, GSA initiated a multimillion-dollar security enhancement

program for its 8,300 buildings. Using the criteria, guidance, and timetables

recommended in the DOJ report, GSA has made progress in assessing risks,

setting priorities, and completing thousands of upgrades in its buildings,

particularly the high-risk ones. GSA’s computer-based upgrade tracking

system showed that about 7,000 upgrades were completed between

October 1, 1995, and March 31, 1998, and based on data from GSA’s

accounting system, we estimated that GSA obligated roughly $353 million

from the Federal Buildings Fund (FBF) for these upgrades. However,

because of erroneous and incomplete data in these systems, we were

unable to reliably determine the exact status or costs of the program.

Mistakes made by rushing to meet the DOJ report’s recommended

timetables so it could improve security in federal buildings before the first

anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing, staff reductions due to

downsizing, uncertain funding sources, and unreliable data in GSA’s

upgrade tracking and accounting systems hindered GSA’s implementation

of the program. GSA didn’t meet either the DOJ recommended times for

completing building security evaluations and upgrade cost estimates or its

own internal goals for completing security upgrades. Funding

uncertainties continue because GSA and the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) have not yet completely agreed on how best to fund all the

future costs of the building security program. Finally, GSA does not have

valid data needed to assess the costs versus the benefits of upgrades and

the extent to which completed upgrades have contributed to increased

security or reduced vulnerability to the greatest threats to federal office

buildings. Therefore, we are recommending that GSA correct the data in its

upgrade tracking and accounting systems; ensure that all GSA buildings are

evaluated for security needs; work with OMB to ensure sufficient funding is

Page 1 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Summary 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

available for the building security program; and develop outcome-oriented

program goals, measures, and evaluations so that it can better manage the

program and work toward mitigating security threats in its buildings.

Page 2 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Statement 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the General Services

Administration’s (GSA) progress in upgrading the security of federal

buildings under its operation. As you know, following the April 19, 1995,

bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the President

directed the Department of Justice (DOJ) to assess the vulnerability of

federal office buildings, particularly to acts of terrorism and other forms of

violence. Under the direction of DOJ, an interagency working group

comprising security professionals from nine federal departments and

agencies issued, in June 1995, a report recommending specific minimum

security standards for federal buildings.1

 Subsequently, the President

directed executive departments and agencies to upgrade the security of

their facilities to the extent feasible based on the DOJ report’s

recommendations. The President gave GSA this responsibility for the

buildings it controls, and in July 1995, GSA initiated a multimillion-dollar

security enhancement program for its 8,300 buildings.2

You requested that we evaluate the GSA building security upgrade program.

Specifically, you asked that we determine (1) what criteria GSA used to

assess security risks and prioritize security upgrades for its buildings,

(2) the implementation and operational status of GSA’s security upgrade

program and the costs GSA has incurred by both funding source and type of

security upgrade (such as x-ray machines and security guards), and

(3) whether any problems have hindered GSA’s implementation of the

security upgrade program.

In summary, we found that GSA used the DOJ report’s criteria to assess risks

and prioritize security upgrades in its buildings. Despite the formidable

challenges posed by this program, GSA has made progress implementing

upgrades in federal buildings throughout the country, particularly in its

higher risk buildings. GSA’s data systems indicate that about 7,000 upgrades

were completed and we estimate that roughly $353 million were obligated

from the FBF for the upgrade program nationally between October 1, 1995,

and March 31, 1998. However, mistakes made by rushing to meet the

1

Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, (hereinafter referred to as the DOJ report) issued

June 28, 1995, by a DOJ-directed working group comprising security professionals from GSA, DOJ,

Marshals Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, Social Security Administration, the

Departments of Defense and State, and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

2

According to the DOJ report, there are 26 federal agencies that are authorized to purchase, own, or

lease space, buildings, or other parcels of land. The three largest of these are GSA, the Department of

Defense, and the Department of State. According to GSA’s fiscal year 1997 annual report, the 8,300

buildings it managed contained about 257 million square feet of office space and constituted about

39 percent of the government’s total office space.

Page 3 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Statement 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

timetables in the DOJ report because of GSA’s sense of urgency to upgrade

security in its buildings, reduced staffing due to downsizing, data

reliability problems, and uncertain funding sources have hindered GSA’s

upgrade program implementation. Because of data reliability problems,

neither GSA nor we can specify the exact status or cost of the building

security upgrade program, and because GSA has not established program

outcome measures, neither GSA nor we know the extent to which

completed upgrades have resulted in greater security or reduced

vulnerability for federal office buildings. Thus, GSA is not in a good position

to manage its program to mitigate security threats.

Before presenting specific information on our findings, I would like to

provide some information on our scope and methodology. In responding

to your request, we interviewed key GSA officials in Washington, D.C.; and

in GSA Regional Offices in Atlanta, GA; Ft. Worth, TX; Denver, CO; and the

National Capital Region of Washington, D.C.; and obtained and reviewed

the DOJ report as well as documents from GSA relating to the planning,

implementation, and operation of the security upgrade program. We held

discussions and obtained data from representatives of the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB), the GSA Office of Inspector General (OIG),

and several federal agencies that have organizational units in GSA-owned

and -leased buildings. We did not evaluate the appropriateness of the DOJ

building security standards or the effectiveness of either GSA’s building

security program or security programs administered by other agencies. We

did our work from July 1997 to May 1998 in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. We have included more details

about our scope and methodology and additional details about our

findings in appendixes I through IV.

Criteria Used by GSA GSA used the criteria and guidance recommended in the DOJ report to

assess the types of security upgrades needed and to prioritize its buildings

for receiving upgrades. The DOJ report established minimum security

standards in categories such as perimeter and interior security, and

provided guidance for estimating upgrade costs. Different standards were

to be applied to each building based on its evaluated risk level. Risk levels

were to be assigned to buildings using criteria such as tenant population

and volume of public contact, with level I the lowest risk level and level V

the highest. The report also recommended that GSA establish a building

security committee (BSC) in each GSA-controlled building to identify the

minimum security requirements needed in each specific building. The

committees were to consist of representatives from all agencies occupying

Page 4 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Statement 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

a given building and were to be assisted by a GSA regional physical security

specialist in identifying and estimating the costs of needed security

upgrades. GSA assigned initial risk level designations to its buildings based

on information available at the time, pending more definitive

determinations by the BSCs. Generally, GSA prioritized its buildings for

receiving security upgrades based on risk level, with the higher risk

buildings receiving security assessments and needed upgrades first. (For

further details, see app. II.)

Operational and

Implementation

Status

Although GSA has completed many building security assessments, upgrade

cost estimates, and upgrades, we weren’t able to reliably determine the

total numbers of upgrades completed nationally because GSA’s upgrade

tracking system contained incomplete and erroneous data. According to

GSA, tracking system data were unreliable because its regional staff did not

always appropriately or accurately record upgrade transactions in the

tracking system.

The Federal Protective Service (FPS)—the physical security and law

enforcement arm of GSA’s Public Buildings Service—developed a

computerized database system to track the status of all building security

committee-requested upgrades. The system, which became fully

operational in early 1996, was designed to track by region, and by building,

upgrades requested, approved, and completed, as well as upgrade cost

estimates.

The tracking system was also intended to serve in part as a forerunner to a

larger government-wide database of security upgrades in all federal

buildings, as required by Executive Order 12977, dated October 19, 1995.

The order created the Interagency Security Committee, which was to be

chaired by GSA’s administrator or his designee, comprising representatives

from 17 federal agencies and specific individuals. The Committee was

established to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security in

buildings and facilities occupied by federal employees.

As of March 31, 1998, the tracking system showed that about 7,800

upgrades had been approved and about 7,000, or 90 percent, had been

completed. Our review of the records of 53 buildings and our visits to 43

buildings in GSA regions 4, 7, 8, and 11, as well as visits by GSA’s OIG audit

staff to 121 buildings in GSA regions 1, 4, 7, and 11, showed that GSA had

completed security upgrades in many of its buildings across the United

States. Examples of the types of upgrades that we observed on our visits

Page 5 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Statement 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

to GSA buildings around the country included (1) concrete bollards

constructed around building perimeters, (2) security cameras installed and

in use both inside and outside of buildings, and (3) metal detectors and

x-ray machines installed at building entrances and operated by GSA or

contract security personnel.

However, based on our work and that of the OIG, we do not believe that a

reliable determination of the building security upgrade program’s status

can be made because of errors in the upgrade tracking system. GSA’s

upgrade tracking system contained errors related to the number of

upgrades approved and the number completed in 24, or 45 percent, of the

buildings we reviewed and in 65, or 54 percent, of the buildings reviewed

by the OIG. For example, (1) some upgrades that were shown as approved

and completed in the tracking system in fact were not completed, and the

requests for the upgrades had been cancelled; and (2) some approved

upgrades shown in the system as completed weren’t complete, and in fact

the related security equipment was boxed and stored. According to GSA,

these errors occurred because GSA personnel didn’t always appropriately

or accurately record the status of the upgrades in the tracking system.

In addition to these errors related to upgrades approved, completed, and

cancelled in the tracking system, we have concerns about whether all GSA

buildings have been evaluated for security needs. We found that, as of

October 1997, the nationwide upgrade tracking system contained little or

no evidence that building security evaluations had been done for 754 GSA

buildings, 14 of which were level-IV buildings. We judgmentally selected a

sample of 26 of the 754 buildings and attempted to determine whether a

security evaluation had been done by contacting a representative from

each building’s security committee during December 1997 and

January 1998.3

 Representatives from 22 of the 26 buildings responded. Of

the 22, representatives of 5 buildings told us that a building evaluation

wasn’t done, 6 said they weren’t sure whether one was done, and 7

representatives said that the evaluations were done, but the remaining 4

representatives said that evaluations weren’t applicable for their buildings

because (1) the lease for the federal agency tenants in the building had

been terminated, (2) the building was leased and used only for storage

purposes, (3) the building was a maintenance garage with access limited to

agency personnel, and (4) the building was no longer in use.

3

Our sample was selected to obtain a cross section of GSA regions and building risk levels, and

included buildings in 9 of 11 GSA regions and security risk levels I through IV.

Page 6 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Statement 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

For the 11 building representatives that said a building evaluation was not

done or that they weren’t sure, we asked whether they believed that their

buildings’ current levels of security met the DOJ minimum standards.

Representatives of four buildings said “yes”; five said they didn’t know;

and two said that the standards weren’t applicable to their specific

buildings because the agencies were moving out of the buildings. Four of

the five that said they didn’t know also said that they weren’t aware of the

DOJ minimum security standards.

Similarly, we found no evidence in GSA’s building files that security

evaluations had been done for a number of buildings that had no requests

for security upgrades in the tracking system. During the latter part of 1997,

we judgmentally selected 50 buildings in two GSA regions that showed no

requests for security upgrades in the tracking system, and we found no

evaluations on file for 12, or 24 percent, of the buildings. GSA had initially

classified 3 of these 12 buildings as level IVs, 8 as level IIIs, and 1 as level

II. Ten of the 12 buildings were in one GSA region.

FPS officials told us that they weren’t sure whether evaluations had been

done for all GSA buildings. They said that although they had attempted to

obtain evaluations for all buildings, not all BSCs had provided evaluations.

Upgrade Obligations

Data Unreliable and

Not Available by Type

In addition to being unable to reliably determine the program’s operational

and implementation status, we also couldn’t reliably determine the actual

costs or obligations incurred by GSA for security upgrades because GSA’s

accounting system, like its tracking system, contained significant errors.

Further, we couldn’t determine the actual costs incurred by type of

security upgrade because GSA said that its accounting system was not

designed to account for costs by upgrade type. Nevertheless, based on the

existing accounting system data, we estimate that from October 1, 1995,

through March 31, 1998, GSA obligated roughly $353 million for the building

security upgrade program nationally. The source of those funds was the

FBF. As you know, the Fund consists primarily of rent that GSA charges

federal agencies for space and is administered by GSA. It is the primary

means of financing the capital and operating costs associated with

GSA-controlled federal space.

According to GSA, and we agree, the accuracy of these obligations data was

unreliable because of errors GSA personnel had made when they recorded

obligations for upgrade transactions in the accounting system. For

example, late in fiscal year 1997, FPS attempted to identify regions with

Page 7 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Statement 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

unneeded upgrade funding allowances that could be shifted to regions in

need of funds to complete upgrades. In FPS’ analysis, it identified over

$5 million in obligations shown in the accounting system for upgrades in

109 buildings in 10 GSA regions for which there were no corresponding

approved upgrades shown in the tracking system. FPS found that

(1) $0.9 million of the obligations related to other GSA programs rather than

the building security upgrade program; (2) $0.6 million in obligations

related to upgrades that in fact had been completed but were shown in the

tracking system as cancelled and voided by GSA; (3) $1.2 million in

obligations related to upgrades completed in other buildings; and

(4) $1.6 million were valid obligations, but the corresponding upgrades

had inadvertently not been entered into the tracking system. FPS was

uncertain about the remaining discrepancies. FPS found similar problems

relating to upgrades recorded in the tracking system for which there were

no corresponding obligations recorded in the accounting system. Because

of these errors or discrepancies in the obligations data, FPS was unable to

complete its efforts to reallocate funds among regions for over 2 months.

We discuss these discrepancies in more detail in appendix III.

Problems Hindering

Program

Implementation

In addition to the unreliable nature of the data in the upgrade tracking and

accounting systems, several other problems have hindered and slowed

GSA’s implementation of the security upgrade program. These included

(1) funding source uncertainties; (2) mistakes made to meet deadlines by a

downsized staff, as well as a sense of urgency to rapidly complete as many

security upgrades as possible; and (3) unreliable upgrade cost estimates.

As a result of these problems, GSA was not able to meet several program

implementation goals. In addition, GSA lacks information about the benefits

of upgrades relative to their costs; has not established specific program

effectiveness goals, outcomes, or measures; and doesn’t know whether

and to what extent federal office buildings’ vulnerability to acts of

terrorism and other forms of violence has been reduced.

Funding uncertainties: Uncertainties about the source of funds for the

security upgrade program have confronted GSA from the beginning. With

no specific building security upgrade funding initially identified in fiscal

year 1996 budget plans, GSA had to use FBF funds that were intended for

other purposes. In addition, because of funding concerns in early fiscal

year 1996, GSA placed on hold proposed costly upgrades, such as the

purchase of parking areas adjacent to GSA buildings. Further, even though

the June 1995 DOJ report recommended that GSA consider increasing the

rent of federal agencies to pay for the increased costs of upgraded

Page 8 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Statement 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

security, uncertainty continues to exist regarding the source of funds for

the building security program. While GSA has projected about $260 million

in obligations for fiscal year 1998 and budgeted about $251 million in

obligations for fiscal year 1999 on building security, GSA and OMB have not

yet reached complete agreement on how best to fund all the future costs

of the program. Once GSA and OMB agree on how to fund increased security

costs, the increased funding would be contingent on congressional

approval in the appropriations process.

Timetables, staff, and urgency issues: According to GSA officials, GSA

wanted to add as much security as possible in federal buildings before the

first anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing—April 19, 1996. The

officials said that this sense of urgency, coupled with the program

implementation timetables in the DOJ report and limited availability of staff

due to downsizing, led to security upgrade decisions being made with the

information available, recognizing that planning and implementation

adjustments would likely be necessary. They acknowledged that, as a

result, some initial efforts suffered and some mistakes were made. GSA and

agency staffs at GSA-controlled buildings had about 3.5 months after

issuance of the DOJ report to do security assessments and develop upgrade

cost estimates for several hundred level-IV buildings, and they had about 7

months to do the same for several thousand lower level buildings.

According to FPS staff and a member of the DOJ report task force from the

U.S. Marshals Service, there was little time available to develop the desired

level of implementing guidance and training for FPS staff and the thousands

of BSCs. Further, they said that the ratio of GSA-operated buildings to FPS

physical security specialists added to the difficulties. For example, in one

GSA region, we were told that the region had responsibility for about 1,000

buildings but had only 15 FPS physical security specialists available to

assist BSCs with the building risk assessments. Nationwide, a total of about

200 FPS physical security specialists were responsible for assisting in the

assessment of over 8,000 GSA-operated buildings.

According to GSA, the speed with which these assessments and cost

estimates had to be done caused errors that contributed to the need to

reevaluate, change, cancel, and void a number of decisions on security

upgrades. For example, some hurriedly approved upgrades had to be

cancelled and voided or modified because of the effects that the planned

upgrades would have had on the flow of people and vehicular traffic in and

around the buildings or because of concerns raised by local governments

or by others due to the historic nature of some of the buildings. As a result,

Page 9 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Statement 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

GSA had to devise alternative security measures, which sometimes required

additional funds.

Unreliable cost estimates: A number of the initial cost estimates for

upgrades recorded in the tracking system proved unreliable. In an effort to

determine how much money was available to complete approved upgrades

and reallocate funds among its regions, GSA analyzed upgrade cost

estimates versus the actual obligations required to complete the upgrades

in many of its buildings, and it found that many of the initial cost estimates

were unreliable. For example, the estimated costs in the tracking system

of completed upgrades for a group of 98 buildings in 11 GSA regions were

about $10.4 million, while the actual obligations to complete the upgrades

recorded in the accounting system were about $29 million—that is,

obligations to complete the upgrades were over $18 million more than the

estimated costs of completing the upgrades. According to GSA, the initial

cost estimates were made using the general guidance contained in the DOJ

report. Although more accurate cost estimates were made as the upgrade

implementation progressed, the upgrade tracking system was not designed

to readily capture the revised cost estimates. Without more accurate cost

estimates, GSA decisionmakers were not in the best position to judge the

cost/benefit of various upgrade options or to reliably estimate funds

needed to complete approved upgrades.

The unreliable cost estimates combined with the unreliability of the status

and cost data in the upgrade tracking and accounting systems, the funding

source uncertainties, the reduced level of staff, and the mistakes made due

to program deadlines, as well as the sense of urgency by GSA to complete

upgrades as quickly as possible hindered the implementation of the

upgrade program. Thus, GSA was unable to fully meet program timetables

established in the DOJ report and several upgrade implementation goals it

had established internally. Further, because additional security upgrade

requests were received in the last half of fiscal year 1997, and additional

funds were needed to complete previously approved upgrades, GSA

estimated in October 1997 that it would need about $7.8 million in

additional funds in fiscal year 1998 to complete the upgrades approved as

of September 26, 1997.

The DOJ report called for GSA to complete security assessments and

upgrade cost estimates by October 15, 1995, for its high-risk (level-IV)

buildings, and by February 1, 1996, for the remaining lower risk buildings

(levels I through III). Level-V buildings were generally not included in GSA’s

building security upgrade program because the DOJ report recommended

Page 10 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Statement 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

that agencies (usually those involved in national security issues) in these

buildings secure the buildings according to their own requirements.

Although the DOJ report did not specify goals for GSA’s completion of the

security upgrades, GSA established and subsequently revised internal goals

for completing upgrades in all its buildings several times in 1996 and 1997.

GSA has indicated that it had met the goals established by the DOJ report for

evaluating the security needs and estimating the costs of upgrades for all

level-IV buildings: In November 1995, GSA told the Senate Subcommittee on

Transportation and Infrastructure that, in accordance with the DOJ report’s

recommendation and the President’s directive, it had established 429

level-IV building security committees, and it had received over 2,500

upgrade requests from these committees. Also, later that same month, GSA

told OMB that $222.6 million would be needed in fiscal years 1996 and 1997

to pay for the upgrades in these 429 buildings.

However, we believe that GSA did not fully meet either goal specified in the

DOJ report because (1) security evaluations were not made for some

level-IV buildings until after November 1995 and (2) in October 1997, much

later than the DOJ report’s target dates of October 15, 1995, and February 1,

1996, we found indications that not all of GSA’s buildings, including some

level-IV buildings, had been evaluated for security needs. In addition, GSA

reported to us that, by March 1996, the number of level-IV buildings had

increased to over 700. GSA stated that the increase was partly caused by

DOJ’s request that GSA reclassify certain buildings containing court-related

tenants from lower levels to level IV, and partly by additional level-IV BSCs’

decisions to conduct building evaluations and provide GSA with upgrade

requests after November 1995.

Concerning GSA’s internal goals, GSA initially established a goal to have all

security upgrades completed for level-IV buildings by September 30, 1996.

When it didn’t meet the September 30, 1996, goal, GSA established a new

goal to have upgrades completed in all buildings, including level IVs, by

September 30, 1997. This goal was not met either, and now GSA’s goal is

September 30, 1998, for completing all upgrades approved as of September

26, 1997. GSA’s tracking system indicated that GSA had completed about

85 percent of the approved upgrades for all buildings as of October 3, 1997,

and reached the 90-percent mark by March 31, 1998.

Information lacking on program goals, measures, and results: GSA did not

have information to evaluate whether the benefits of the upgrades justified

their costs, to determine the effectiveness of the security upgrades

Page 11 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Statement 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

completed, or to know whether upgrades reported as completed were

actually complete and operating as planned. GSA needs this information to

justify expenditures for security upgrades and to make changes in its

security program if and when appropriate. For example, Social Security

Administration (SSA) officials expressed concern to GSA about certain

security upgrades that GSA initially placed in some SSA-occupied buildings.

SSA was concerned about both the need for and the costs of purchasing

and operating the upgrade equipment. After negotiations, GSA removed

some upgrades from some SSA locations.

Further, security-related evaluations, which GSA security staff were doing

prior to the Oklahoma City bombing, were curtailed because these staff

were needed to help implement the upgrade program, and at the time of

our review, these evaluations hadn’t been resumed. In addition, GSA also

hadn’t fully implemented a key recommendation, from an internal “lessons

learned” study done after the Oklahoma City bombing incident, to evaluate

its current risk assessment methodology to ensure that a wider range of

risks are addressed, with an increased emphasis on acts of mass violence.

The principal conclusion of the October 1995 study was that GSA’s security

and law enforcement processes currently in place did not adequately

address the threat environment.

In a related issue, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993

(the Results Act) requires every major federal agency to establish its

mission, its goals and how they will be achieved, how its performance

toward meeting its goals will be measured, and how performance

measures will be used to make improvements. In accordance with the

Results Act, GSA established its strategic plan, dated September 30, 1997,

covering years 1998 through 2002. GSA’s building security program is

specifically addressed in the 1997 plan and in its annual performance plan

for fiscal year 1999. However, GSA did not identify in its strategic plan

security program evaluations it plans to do, and the 1999 annual

performance plan did not state its goals and indicators for the security

program in terms of outcomes or desired results as is called for by OMB in

Circular A-11. Finally, although GSA’s data systems for tracking program

status and funding had incorrect data, which hampered implementation,

GSA has just recently initiated efforts to ensure security program

measurement data would be valid in connection with the security-related

performance goal included in its 1999 annual performance plan prepared

under the Results Act.

Page 12 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Statement 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

Without more specific information on security program goals and results,

GSA does not know the extent to which the upgrades have improved

security or reduced federal office building vulnerability to acts of

terrorism or other forms of violence. (For further details, see app. IV.)

Recommendations We recommend that the GSA Administrator direct the PBS Commissioner

to

• correct the data in GSA’s upgrade tracking and accounting systems and

institute procedures to accurately record approved and completed

upgrades in the upgrade tracking system and accurately record obligations

incurred for security upgrades in the accounting system;

• review all GSA buildings to ensure that security evaluations have been

completed;

• complete agreements with OMB on the most appropriate means of

providing sufficient funding for the security of GSA-operated buildings at

the minimum standard levels recommended by the DOJ report;

• develop outcome-oriented goals and measures for its security program,

identify security program evaluations to be done and implement them as

appropriate, and identify the means by which FPS will verify and validate

measurement data related to security program goals in GSA’s annual

performance plan for 2000; and

• complete the internally recommended review of GSA’s current security risk

assessment methodology, and once the appropriate risk assessment

methodology is determined, resume GSA’s program of periodic building

security inspections by GSA physical security specialists.

Agency Comments On May 27, 1998, we met with GSA’s Public Buildings Service Deputy

Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner, Office of the Federal

Protective Service, and members of their staff to obtain their comments on

the information discussed in a draft of our testimony. These GSA officials

generally agreed with the information in the testimony and with our

recommendations. The Deputy Commissioner stated though that he did

not completely agree with our characterization that funding uncertainties

hindered GSA’s implementation of the building security upgrade program

because GSA was able to fund virtually all of the upgrades requested by the

building security committees. He pointed out that all required funding to

accomplish security enhancements has been provided to the GSA regions.

However, we believe that our characterization is appropriate because, as

we have described, GSA faced uncertainties throughout much of the

Page 13 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Statement 

General Services Administration: Many

Building Security Upgrades Made but

Problems Have Hindered Program

Implementation

program about the source of funds to pay for the capital and operating

costs of the upgrades. For example, GSA initially had to use funds to pay

for upgrades that had been intended for other purposes. Further, as we

have pointed out, early in the program GSA placed on hold proposed costly

upgrades, such as the purchase of parking areas adjacent to GSA buildings,

because of funding concerns. Thus, while some security upgrades were

put on hold due to lack of funds, our major concern is the uncertain

funding sources that have confronted the program from its inception.

In addition, the GSA officials stated that they have directed GSA regions to

resume the periodic building inspection and risk assessment program

placed on hold after the Oklahoma City bombing. They said that the

inspections are to resume shortly, and inspections for all level-IV buildings

are to be completed by the end of fiscal year 1998. Also, the GSA officials

said that they have begun to correct the data in the upgrade tracking

system and will consider developing outcome-oriented goals for the

security program that will be described in GSA’s Year 2000 annual

performance plan. In addition, the GSA officials said that they have made

substantial progress in discussions with OMB on adjusting agency rental

charges to cover the cost of security, and they expect to reach agreement

with OMB in time for the Year 2000 budget cycle.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to

answer any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.

Page 14 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Page 15 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix I 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objective of our work was to evaluate the GSA building security

upgrade program. Specifically, we were to determine (1) what criteria GSA

used to assess security risks and prioritize security upgrades for its

buildings, (2) the implementation and operational status of GSA’s security

upgrade program and the costs GSA has incurred by both funding source

and type of security upgrade, and (3) whether any problems have hindered

GSA’s implementation of the security upgrade program.

To meet our first objective of determining the criteria GSA used to assess

building security risks and prioritize its security upgrade implementation,

we held discussions with GSA personnel; reviewed relevant

correspondence, guidance, and other documentation on program

implementation; reviewed building risk assessment files; and obtained and

reviewed copies of GSA’s security upgrade tracking system database as of

June 27, August 29, October 3, and December 30, 1997. We also had

discussions with a member of the DOJ report task force at the U.S.

Marshals Service, as well with security personnel at the Social Security

Administration and Department of Health and Human Services, to obtain

more insight into how the minimum standards were developed and how

they were being implemented by GSA.

To meet our objective of determining the security upgrade program’s

implementation and operational status and costs, we reviewed the security

upgrade tracking system database; compiled data on security upgrades

requested, approved, completed, and voided; and compared our results

with those compiled by GSA. We judgmentally selected and reviewed GSA

building files for 53 buildings in 4 regions and visited 43 of these buildings

to determine whether the upgrades were operational. We selected these

files to provide a cross section of different risk level buildings with either

high or low dollar upgrade cost estimates. We chose not to include level-I

buildings in this sample because most upgrades were going into buildings

at the higher risk levels. During our review, the GSA OIG’s Office of Audits

also began a review of the GSA security upgrade program. We maintained

contact with the OIG audit staff and coordinated our work. The GSA OIG

audit staff shared with us three alert reports issued to and discussed with

GSA management in October 1997, December 1997, and February 1998,

concerning problems with erroneous upgrade completion data in the

upgrade tracking system and instances of inefficient and ineffective use of

security equipment in one or more of the four GSA regions reviewed. We

referred to their findings in our report.

Page 16 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix I 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Further, we obtained and reviewed GSA budget information and actual

obligations data from accounting reports generated from the NEAR system4

and from data compiled for us by GSA headquarters for fiscal year 1996

through the second quarter of fiscal year 1998. We also reviewed upgrade

cost estimates contained in GSA’s security upgrade tracking system as well

as documentation on GSA headquarters’ efforts during late August to

October 1997 to correlate upgrade cost estimates recorded in the security

upgrade tracking system with upgrade obligations data recorded in the

accounting system for the purpose of reallocating unneeded upgrade funds

among GSA regions.

To determine any problems that may have hindered GSA’s implementation

of the security upgrade program, we had discussions with GSA

headquarters and regional staff in four regions; reviewed GSA

correspondence and building files; performed analyses of the security

upgrade tracking system databases; and made contacts with 22 of 26

selected building security committees that, according to GSA records, had

not requested security upgrades. We also reviewed the results of GSA

headquarters’ analyses made during late August to October 1997 of the

security upgrade tracking system and accounting system that identified

data errors and unreliable upgrade cost estimates. Further, we held

discussions with responsible GSA and OMB staff to understand the concerns

and ongoing debate related to the future funding of the GSA building

security program at the enhanced levels.

Finally, we discussed with FPS staff what procedures were in place for

monitoring security operations and what efforts had been made to

evaluate the security upgrade program, including actions taken on

recommendations in an October 1995 internal FPS “lesson learned” report

concerning its experiences following the Oklahoma City bombing incident.

We also reviewed GSA’s 1997 strategic plan and 1999 annual performance

plan required under the Results Act to determine the goals, performance

measures, and outcomes that GSA had established for the building security

program.

We did our work primarily at GSA headquarters in Washington, D.C., and

four GSA regional offices in Atlanta, GA—GSA Region 4; Denver, CO—GSA

Region 8; Fort Worth, TX—GSA Region 7; and Washington, D.C.—GSA

Region 11 (National Capital Region), between July 1997 and May 1998, in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

4

The National Electronic Accounting and Reporting (NEAR) System is GSA’s agencywide accounting

system. We used obligation data primarily from the monthly FR70P-PBS Fund and Program Status

Report to compile obligation data for the security upgrade program.

Page 17 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix I 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Because the various samples we used in our work were judgmentally

selected, the results of the samples cannot be projected to the universes

from which they were taken. We also did not evaluate the DOJ security

standards or the effectiveness of GSA’s building security upgrade program

or any other agency’s building security program.

Page 18 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix II 

Information on DOJ Report-Recommended

Criteria for Federal Building Security

GSA Used Criteria in

DOJ Report for Its

Building Security

Upgrade Program

In July 1995, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) began its process for

identifying and prioritizing building security upgrade needs and cost

estimates using the criteria, guidance, and timetable recommended by the

DOJ report, which was issued on June 28, 1995. The DOJ report established

52 minimum security standards in 4 separate categories, which were to be

considered for buildings under GSA’s operation based on their assessed

risk level. GSA assigned initial risk level designations to its buildings based

on information it had on file. Building security committee (BSC) and FPS

staff were to subsequently assign the buildings a risk level, using the DOJ

report’s more definitive criteria, and evaluate them to determine needed

security upgrades and the estimated costs for the upgrades.

Building Risk Levels Using DOJ report criteria, BSC and FPS staff were to place buildings under

GSA’s operation into risk levels. The DOJ criteria included tenant

population, volume of public contact, size, and agency sensitivity, with

level V the highest risk level and level I the lowest, as follows:

Level V: A building that contains mission functions critical to national

security, such as the Pentagon or CIA Headquarters. A Level-V building

should be similar to a Level-IV building in terms of number of employees

and square footage. It should have at least the security features of a

Level-IV building. The missions of Level-V buildings require that tenant

agencies secure the site according to their own requirements.

Level IV: A building that has 451 or more federal employees; high volume

of public contact; more than 150,000 square feet of space; and tenant

agencies that may include high-risk law enforcement and intelligence

agencies, courts, and judicial offices, and highly sensitive government

records.

Level III: A building with 151 to 450 federal employees; moderate/high

volume of public contact; 80,000 to 150,000 square feet of space; and

tenant agencies that may include law enforcement agencies, court/related

agencies and functions, and government records and archives. (According

to GSA, at the request of the Judiciary, GSA changed the designation of a

number of buildings housing agencies with court and court-related

functions from Level III to Level IV.)

Level II: A building that has 11 to 150 federal employees; moderate volume

of public contact; 2,500 to 80,000 square feet of space; and federal

activities that are routine in nature, similar to commercial activities. Level

Page 19 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix II 

Information on DOJ Report-Recommended

Criteria for Federal Building Security

I: A building that has 10 or fewer federal employees; low volume of public

contact or contact with only a small segment of the population; and 2,500

or less square feet of space, such as a small “store front” type of operation.

Facility Evaluations BSCs were also to prepare facility evaluations based on the DOJ minimum

standards. The facility evaluations, containing requested security

upgrades, justifications, and estimated costs for each upgrade were to be

submitted to the applicable FPS regional offices for review and approval.

Security upgrades costing more than $100,000 to acquire or having an

annual operating cost greater than $150,000 required final approval at FPS

headquarters.

FPS regional staff focused their evaluation efforts on level-IV buildings first,

followed by levels III through I, consistent with the timetable

recommended by the DOJ report and endorsed by the President.5

 Funding

of upgrades generally followed this same progression, with FPS focusing

first on level-IV buildings and then levels III through I. Each FPS region

established its own building security upgrade implementation schedule

based on coordination with other involved PBS components and the

individual requirements of the various types of security upgrades. For

example, some upgrades required design and engineering work before

actual installation could proceed, and some required coordination and

approvals from local governments and historical building societies before

work could proceed.

In early 1996, FPS completed a computerized database system to track, by

regional office and by building, all BSC-requested security upgrades. This

tracking system was to include the date each upgrade was approved or

disapproved; the estimated cost of acquiring, installing, and operating the

upgrade; and its scheduled and actual completion status. Each FPS region

was to have a database of its buildings and was responsible for

maintaining its database. FPS headquarters staff periodically uploaded and

entered data into each region’s database to show headquarters’ approval

actions on requested upgrades, where required. FPS headquarters staff also

consolidated the regional databases for its own use in tracking the

nationwide security upgrade program.

52The DOJ report noted that level-V facilities required tenant agencies to secure their facilities

according to their own requirements, and that the degree to which those requirements dictate security

features in excess of those for a level IV facility should be set by the individual agencies. For this

reason, except for two approved level-V upgrades requiring capital and/or operating funding, risk level

IV was the highest level included in GSA’s security upgrade program.

Page 20 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix II 

Information on DOJ Report-Recommended

Criteria for Federal Building Security

Application of DOJ

Standards to Security Risk

Levels

The DOJ report established 52 minimum security standards in the

categories of perimeter security, entry security, interior security, and

security planning to be considered for a building based on its assessed risk

level. Tables II.1 through II.4 show how the DOJ report’s minimum security

standards are to be applied to each building on the basis of its assessed

risk level. For example, control of facility parking is recommended as a

minimum standard for buildings in security level III through V and

recommended as desirable for buildings in security levels I and II.

Table II.1: Recommended Minimum

Security Standards—Perimeter

Security

Level of security

Perimeter Security I II III IV V

Parking

Control of facility parking • • •

Control of adjacent parking o o

Avoid leases in which parking cannot be

controlled

Leases should provide security control for

adjacent parking o o

Post signs and arrange for towing

unauthorized vehicles o o • • •

ID system and procedures for authorized

parking (placard, decal, card key, etc.) • • •

Adequate lighting for parking areas • • •

Closed circuit television (CCTV) monitoring

CCTV surveillance cameras with time

lapse video recording o o • •

Post signs advising of 24 hour video

surveillance o o • •

Lighting

Lighting with emergency power backup • • • • •

Physical barriers

Extend physical perimeter with concrete

and/or steel barriers N/A N/A o o

Parking barriers N/A N/A o o

Legend:

Minimum standard = • Standard based on facility evaluation = o

Desirable = Not applicable = N/A

Source: Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, Department of Justice, June 28, 1995.

Page 21 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix II 

Information on DOJ Report-Recommended

Criteria for Federal Building Security

Table II.2: Recommended Minimum

Security Standards—Entry Security Level of security

Entry Security I II III IV V

Receiving/Shipping

Review receiving/shipping procedures

(current) • • • • •

Implement receiving/shipping procedures

(modified) o • • •

Access control

Evaluate facility for security guard

requirements o • • •

Security guard patrol o o o

Intrusion detection system with central

monitoring capability o • • •

Upgrade to current life safety standards

(fire detection, fire suppression systems,

etc.) • • • • •

Entrances/Exits

X-ray and magnetometer at public

entrances N/A o o •

Require x-ray screening of all

mail/packages N/A o • •

Peepholes o o N/A N/A N/A

Intercom o o N/A N/A N/A

Entry control with CCTV and door strikes o N/A N/A N/A

High security locks • • • • •

Legend:

Minimum standard = • Standard based on facility evaluation = o

Desirable = Not applicable = N/A

Source: Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, Department of Justice, June 28, 1995.

Page 22 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix II 

Information on DOJ Report-Recommended

Criteria for Federal Building Security

Table II.3: Recommended Minimum

Security Standards—Interior Security Level of security

Interior Security I II III IV V

Employee/Visitor identification

Agency photo ID for all personnel

displayed at all times N/A o • •

Visitor control/screening system • • • •

Visitor identification accountability system N/A o • •

Establish ID issuing authority o o o • •

Utilities

Prevent unauthorized access to utility

areas o o • • •

Provide emergency power to critical

systems (alarm systems, radio

communications, computer facilities, etc.) • • • • •

Occupant emergency plans

Examine occupant emergency plans

(OEP) and contingency procedures

based on threats • • • • •

OEPs in place, updated annually,

periodic testing exercise • • • • •

Assign & train OEP officials (assignment

based on largest tenant in facility) • • • • •

Annual tenant training • • • • •

Daycare centers

Evaluate whether to locate daycare

facilities in buildings with high threat

activities N/A • • • •

Compare feasibility of locating daycare in

facilities outside locations N/A • • • •

Legend:

Minimum standard = • Standard based on facility evaluation = o

Desirable = Not applicable = N/A

Source: Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, Department of Justice, June 28, 1995.

Page 23 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix II 

Information on DOJ Report-Recommended

Criteria for Federal Building Security

Table II.4: Recommended Minimum

Security Standards—Security Planning Level of security

Security Planning I II III IV V

Intelligence Sharing

Establish law enforcement

agency/security liaisons • • • • •

Review/establish procedure for

intelligence receipt and dissemination • • • • •

Establish uniform security/threat

nomenclature • • • • •

Training

Conduct annual security awareness

training • • • • •

Establish standardized unarmed guard

qualifications/training requirements • • • • •

Establish standardized armed guard

qualifications/training requirements • • • • •

Tenant assignment

Co-locate agencies with similar security

needs

Do not co-locate high/low risk agencies

Administrative procedures

Establish flexible work schedule in high

threat/high risk areas to minimize

employee vulnerability to criminal activity o o

Arrange for employee parking in/near

building after normal workhours o o o o o

Conduct background security checks

and/or establish security control

procedures for service contract personnel • • • • •

Construction/Renovation

Install mylar film on all exterior windows

(shatter protection) o • •

Review current projects for blast

standards • • • • •

Review/establish uniform standards for

construction • • • • •

Review/establish new design standards

for blast resistance o o • • •

Establish street setback for new

construction o • •

Legend:

Minimum standard = • Standard based on facility evaluation = o

Desirable = Not applicable = N/A

Source: Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, Department of Justice, June 28, 1995.

Page 24 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix III 

Status and Costs of Upgrades Uncertain

GSA’s upgrade tracking system showed that as of March 31, 1998, about

7,000 building security upgrades had been completed, and we estimate

that roughly $353 million were obligated for upgrades between October 1,

1995, and March 31, 1998. The source of funds expended on the upgrade

program was the FBF. However, actual cost information by upgrade type

was not readily available, and the data on the implementation status and

actual costs of GSA’s security upgrade program are unreliable. We could

not reliably determine the completion and operational status of security

upgrades in GSA’s buildings because upgrade status data were not

accurately recorded in the tracking system. Further, the accuracy and

reliability of the obligations data are questionable because of errors made

by GSA personnel when recording upgrade obligations transactions into the

accounting system.

Security Upgrade Tracking

System Not Accurate

GSA’s upgrade tracking system showed that as of March 31, 1998, about

7,800 upgrades were approved and about 7,000 upgrades were completed

in federal buildings across the United States. However, the data shown by

the tracking system were not reliable because the tracking system

contained numerous errors. According to GSA, these errors occurred

because its regional personnel did not always appropriately or accurately

record upgrade transactions into the tracking system.

Our review of security upgrade program records of 53 buildings and our

visits to 43 of these buildings in 4 regions, as well as visits by the GSA OIG’s

audit staff to 121 buildings in 4 GSA regions, showed that GSA has

implemented numerous upgrades in buildings throughout the country.6

However, through these visits, errors were identified in the tracking

system related to the number of upgrades approved and completed in 24,

or 45 percent, of the buildings we reviewed and in 65, or 54 percent, of the

buildings reviewed by the OIG. Our comparison of tracking system data for

the 53 GSA buildings with information from FPS building files and our

observations at the buildings showed errors affecting completion rates

(for 24 buildings) and other information (for 6 buildings) in the tracking

system for 30 of these buildings, or about 57 percent, and ranged from

46 percent of the buildings reviewed in region 8 to 70 percent in region 11.

For 24 of these 30 buildings, we found (1) upgrades in 20 buildings that

were not operational but that were reported as completed in the tracking

63Our work related to these buildings was done during the period August through December 1997 in

GSA regions 4, 7, 8, and 11. The GSA OIG staff’s work related to these buildings was reported on in

October and December 1997 and in February 1998 in GSA regions 1, 4, 7, and 11. We and the OIG audit

staff reviewed 4 of the same buildings—2 in Region 7 and 2 in Region 11.

Page 25 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix III 

Status and Costs of Upgrades Uncertain

system and (2) for four buildings, completed upgrades were not shown in

the tracking system. In addition, in nine of the 20 buildings, we found

security upgrades that were initially approved and then subsequently

cancelled, but were still shown as approved upgrades in the tracking

system.

Further, for six of the buildings, we found other discrepancies between the

buildings’ records and the upgrade tracking system. For example, some

buildings’ risk level designations, security upgrade cost estimates, and

types of upgrades approved were inaccurately recorded in the tracking

system.

Additionally, in one region, we found that the completion status of the

region’s security upgrade program was overstated and erroneously

reported to FPS headquarters because regional FPS staff were

inappropriately accounting for some upgrades. According to regional FPS

staff, the term “pending” may have been used to categorize upgrades that

had been approved and not completed because (1) the upgrades were for

new buildings being constructed or (2) the contracts for purchasing the

upgrade equipment had not been signed or GSA funds obligated. Further,

the regional staff thought headquarters had instructed that new upgrades

approved after March 31, 1997, would not be funded in fiscal year 1997 and

should be put in a pending status for funding in fiscal year 1998. According

to FPS headquarters staff, the “pending” category was intended only for

upgrades not yet approved. FPS headquarters officials became aware of

this issue late in fiscal year 1997 while attempting to reallocate among

regions funds needed to complete approved upgrades. FPS then instructed

the regions to ensure that all approved upgrades were categorized as

“approved” in the tracking system because all “pending” upgrades as of

September 26, 1997, would be considered for funding at a later time.

Because of the confusion over the intent of the term pending for

categorizing upgrades, this region reported in August 1997 an upgrade

completion rate of 99.6 percent for level-IV buildings. However, once these

pending upgrades were changed to approved, the region’s completion rate

decreased to 77 percent in October 1997. For the same reason, the region’s

upgrade completion rate for levels-I through -III buildings also dropped

from about 65 percent to about 56 percent over this same period. GSA’s

completion goal for all level-IV building upgrades was 100 percent by the

end of fiscal year 1997.

Page 26 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix III 

Status and Costs of Upgrades Uncertain

GSA’s OIG issued three separate audit “alert” reports with significant

findings related to the building security upgrade program.7

 The OIG audit

staff’s visits to 121 buildings in GSA regions 1, 4, 7, and 11 showed that 65

buildings, about 54 percent, had upgrades reported as completed in the

tracking system that were not completed. In fact, the OIG staff found

instances where security upgrade equipment reported as completed was

actually stored (sometimes in its original packaging), missing, or not

operational. For example, in region 11, upgrades for 32 buildings involving

equipment, such as x-ray scanners and magnetometers used to screen

people and packages, were shown in the tracking system as completed but

were actually missing, not operational, or in storage.

In addition, the OIG staff found problems, similar to those we found,

related to security upgrades in 33 of the 69 buildings they visited in regions

1, 4, and 7. They found that upgrades shown in the tracking system as

completed had not been installed because of changes in building security

needs, use of alternative security measures, or building lessors’ opposition

to the installation of the planned security upgrades.

Finally, in a separate report, the OIG stated that security equipment costing

about $2 million, such as X-ray devices, magnetometers, and cameras

purchased for the upgrade program, were found stored in two storage

rooms in region 11. Much of the equipment was in its original packaging.

The OIG reported that at that time, the GSA region had no immediate plans

for using the equipment.

In addition to these errors related to upgrades approved, completed, and

cancelled in the tracking system, we have concerns about whether all GSA

buildings have been evaluated for security needs. We found that as of

October 1997, the nationwide upgrade tracking system contained little or

no evidence that building security evaluations had been done for 754 GSA

buildings, 14 of which were level-IV buildings. We judgmentally selected a

sample of 26 of the 754 buildings to determine whether a security

evaluation had been done by attempting to contact a representative from

each building’s security committee during December 1997 and

January 1998.8

 Representatives from 22 of the 26 buildings responded. Of

the 22, representatives of 5 told us that a building evaluation wasn’t done,

74These reports were issued to the Assistant Commissioner, FPS. They were reports

A70659/P/2/R98001, dated Oct. 1, 1997; A80613/P/2/R98006, dated Dec. 11, 1997; and

A80615/P/2/R98012, dated Feb. 11, 1998.

85Our sample was selected to obtain a cross section of GSA regions and building risk levels, and

included buildings in 9 of 11 GSA regions and security risk levels I - IV.

Page 27 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix III 

Status and Costs of Upgrades Uncertain

6 said they weren’t sure whether one was done, 7 representatives said that

the evaluations were done, but the remaining 4 representatives said that

evaluations weren’t applicable for their buildings because (1) the lease for

the federal agency tenants in the building had been terminated, (2) the

building was leased and used only for storage purposes, (3) the building

was a maintenance garage with access limited to agency personnel, or

(4) the building was no longer in use.

For the 11 building representatives that said a building evaluation was not

done or that they were not sure, we asked whether they believed that their

building’s current level of security met the DOJ minimum standards.

Representatives of four buildings said “yes”; five said they didn’t know;

and two said that the standards weren’t applicable to their specific

buildings because the agencies were moving out of the buildings. Four of

the five that said they didn’t know also said that they weren’t aware of the

DOJ minimum security standards.

Similarly, we found no evidence in GSA’s building files that security

evaluations had been done for a number of buildings that had no requests

for security upgrades in the tracking system. During the latter part of 1997,

we judgmentally selected 50 buildings in 2 GSA regions that showed no

requests for security upgrades in the tracking system, and we found no

evaluation on file for 12, or 24 percent, of the buildings. Of these 12

buildings, 1 was a level II, 8 were level IIIs, and 3 were level IVs. Ten of the

12 buildings were in one GSA region.

FPS regional officials told us that they were not sure that evaluations had

been done for all GSA buildings. They said that although they had

attempted to obtain evaluations on all buildings, not all building security

committees had provided evaluations.

Table III.1 provides upgrade completion status information we compiled

from the tracking system as of different points in time during program

implementation. The note at the end of the table provides upgrade status

information as of March 31, 1998, which was provided to us by FPS in late

April 1998.

Page 28 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix III 

Status and Costs of Upgrades Uncertain

Page 29 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix III 

Status and Costs of Upgrades Uncertain

Table III.1: Number of Buildings With

Approved Upgrades; Number of

Upgrades Approved, Completed, and

Voided; and Estimated Costs by

Security Level as of Mar. 25, 1996,

Aug. 29, 1997, Oct. 3, 1997, and

Dec. 30, 1997

Security

risk level As of date

Number of buildings

with approved

upgrades

Number of upgrades

approved

IV 3/25/96 632 3.752

8/29/97 681 3,790

10/3/97 699 4,013

12/30/97 683 3,836

III 3/25/96 358 1,097

8/29/97 359 973

10/3/97 368 1,030

12/30/97 357 984

II 3/25/96 1,348 2,977

8/29/97 1,104 2,268

10/3/97 1,120 2,327

12/30/97 1,115 2,310

I 3/25/96 451 751

8/29/97 370 583

10/3/97 379 642

12/30/97 409 755

Totals 3/25/96 2,789 8,577

8/29/97 2,514 7,614

10/3/97 2,566 8,012

12/30/97 2,564 7,885

Page 30 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix III 

Status and Costs of Upgrades Uncertain

Number of upgrades

completed

Percent of

approved

upgrades

completed

No. voided

upgrades

previously

approved

Estimated capital

costs

Estimated annual

operating costs

*Total

estimated costs

N/A N/A N/A $86,464,000 $86,712,000 $173,176,000

3,315 87.5% 1,360 99,103,450 68,711,348 167,814,798

3,503 87.3 1,432 111,601,661 76,765,746 188,367,407

3,402 88.7 1,459 102,073,684 67,647,011 169,720,695

N/A N/A N/A 15,842,000 12,793,000 28,635,000

727 74.7 473 12,933,733 12,527,197 25,460,930

828 80.4 511 14,473,940 13,092,721 27,566,661

798 81.1 526 13,310,690 11,622,264 24,932,954

N/A N/A N/A 22,791,000 14,117,000 36,908,000

1,698 74.9 1,294 12,581,987 10,712,357 23,294,344

1,944 83.5 1,337 13,946,715 10,786,679 24,733,394

2,015 87.2 1,355 14,136,904 11,426,275 25,563,179

N/A N/A N/A 6,927,000 5,458,000 12,385,000

454 77.9 246 3,019,216 1,793,648 4,812,864

510 79.4 259 4,432,516 2,149,894 6,582,410

626 82.9 312 12,667,600 11,285,743 23,953,343

N/A N/A N/A $132,024,000 $119,080,000 $251,104,000

6,194 81.4% 3,373 127,638,386 93,744,550 221,382,936

6,785 84.7 3,539 144,454,832 102,795,039 247,249,871

6,841 86.8 3,652 142,188,879 101,981,293 244,170,172

Note: GSA/FPS headquarters provided us a completion status update as of March 31, 1998—For

all levels, 6,997, or 90.1 percent of 7,764 approved upgrades, were reported as completed. For

level-IV buildings, 3,416, or 88.8 percent, of 3,848 approved upgrades were reported as

completed. For levels-I through -III buildings, 3,581, or 91.4 percent were reported as completed.

GSA/FPS did not provide us with information on the number of buildings with approved upgrades.

Totals may not add up due to rounding.

Source: Compiled by GAO from GSA/FPS security upgrade tracking system.

Actual Costs of Upgrades

Not Readily Available by

Type and Obligations Data

Not Reliable

Based on data obtained from GSA’s accounting system, we estimated that

from October 1, 1995, through March 31, 1998, obligations of roughly

$353 million were incurred for the building security upgrade program, and

all of these funds were obtained from the FBF. However, we could not

readily obtain actual cost information by upgrade type because, according

to GSA, its accounting system was not designed to provide obligations

incurred by upgrade type. In addition, the obligations data shown by the

Page 31 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix III 

Status and Costs of Upgrades Uncertain

accounting system were not reliable because GSA personnel did not always

appropriately and accurately record the obligations incurred for upgrades

in the accounting system.

Although actual cost information by upgrade type was not readily

available, to provide an indication of the costs incurred by GSA by upgrade

type, we compiled from the upgrade tracking system data showing the

estimated costs of upgrades by upgrade category. These estimated costs

data are shown in table III.2. However, as we discuss in detail in appendix

IV, many of the estimated costs of upgrades differed significantly from the

actual obligations incurred by GSA to complete the upgrades.

Table III.2: Summary of Estimated Costs of Approved Security Upgrades Types by Category as of December 30, 1997

Security category—upgrade type

Number of

upgrades

Estimated

capital costs

Estimated

operating costs

Perimeter Security—includes closed circuit televisions, physical barriers,

security lighting, fences, gates, etc. 2,648 $74,346,347

$31,106,567

Entry Security—includes access control systems, X-rays/

magnetometers, security guards, intrusion detection systems, security

locks, etc. 3,166 51,347,945 68,514,569

Interior Security—includes employee/visitor ID, emergency power

backup, etc. 1,025 12,409,656 761,464

Other security planning—intelligence sharing, training, tenant

assignment, construction/ renovation, etc. 1,046 4,084,932 1,598,692

Total 7,885 $142,188,880 $101,981,292

Source: Compiled by GAO from GSA/FPS’s security upgrade tracking system as of December 30,

1997.

In August 1997, FPS headquarters staff attempted to identify regions having

unneeded upgrade funding allowances that could be shifted to other

regions needing funds to complete approved upgrades. They were unable

to complete this effort until October 1997 because of the numerous

discrepancies they found between the upgrade obligations in GSA’s

accounting system and the approved and completed upgrade data in the

tracking system. Although not all of the discrepancies could be explained,

FPS regional staff’s research provided some insight.

In one FPS headquarters analysis, obligations totaling $5.1 million for

upgrades in 109 buildings in 10 GSA regions were found in the accounting

system, but no corresponding approved upgrades were found in the

tracking system. These obligations ranged from $16 to $662,912. Regional

Page 32 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix III 

Status and Costs of Upgrades Uncertain

staff were able to determine the cause for most of this $5.1 million

discrepancy between the accounting and tracking systems—$1.2 million

had been recorded in error to other buildings; $1.6 million were valid

obligations but the corresponding upgrades had inadvertently not been

entered into the tracking system; about $0.6 million were valid, but

corresponding upgrades had been cancelled and voided in the tracking

system;9

 $0.9 million had been erroneously entered into the accounting

system—the obligations were not related to the building security upgrade

program.

In a second FPS headquarters analysis, the tracking system showed

completed upgrades for 386 buildings in 10 regions with estimated costs of

about $9.7 million, for which there were no corresponding obligations

recorded in the accounting system. Regional staff were able to explain

some of these discrepancies: (1) about $2 million of the $9.7 million in

estimated upgrade costs were borne by either the tenant agencies or the

building lessors, not by GSA; (2) about $0.2 million in obligations were

recorded in error in the accounting system to other FBF programs instead

of the security upgrade program; and (3) about $0.2 million related to

upgrades erroneously recorded in the tracking system as completed when,

in fact, they had been voided.

Table III.3 compares contract security guard and security system capital

budgets and obligations obtained from GSA’s accounting system for fiscal

years 1996 through March 31, 1998, with similar obligations for fiscal year

1994, prior to the Oklahoma City bombing. As shown by the table, GSA’s

contract guard costs have risen significantly from $23 million in 1994 to

almost $63 million through only the first 6 months of fiscal year 1998.

96According to the regions, although the approved upgrades were voided after it was determined that

the upgrades were not needed for the buildings originally intended, the upgraded security equipment

purchased through these obligations would be used in other buildings.

Page 33 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix III 

Status and Costs of Upgrades Uncertain

Table III.3: Comparison of Fiscal Years 1996 Through March 31, 1998, Building Security Upgrade Program Budget

Allowances and Obligations With Fiscal Year 1994 Pre-Upgrade Program Obligations

Budget activity 61, Building

operations

Budget activity

54, Basic

repairs and

alterations

FBF totals

FBF

Fiscal year budget

allowances/obligations

Contract

security

guards (K-2x)

Security

systems (K-36)

Security

upgrade

program (K-36

capital costs)

K-2x, K-36,

Budget

activity 61

K-36, Budget

activity 54

Budget

activities 61

and 54

($000) ($000) ($000) ($000) ($000) ($000)

Fiscal year 1994 (pre-upgrade program)

Actual obligations $22,951 $3,724 $0 $26,675 $0 $26,675

Fiscal year 1996

Budget allowances to

regions $26,434 $5,364 $77,758 $31,798 $77,758 $109,556

Actual FBF obligations 59,463 778 57,719 60,241 57,719 $117,960

Fiscal year 1997

Budget allowances to

regions 115,973 8,459 63,438 124,432 63,438 $187,869

Actual obligations 102,903 1,325 53,279 104,228 53,279 $157,507

Fiscal year 1998 (as of March 31, 1998)

Budget allowances to

regions 124,941 5,267 0 130,208 0 $130,208

Actual obligations 62,970 991 13,450 63,961 13,450 $77,411

Total—fiscal years 1996-1998 (as of March 31, 1998)

Budget allowances to

regions $267,348 $19,090 $141,196 $286,438 $141,196 $427,634

Actual obligations $225,336 $3,094 $124,447 $228,430 $124,447 $352,877

(Table notes on next page)

Page 34 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Appendix III 

Status and Costs of Upgrades Uncertain

Note 1: GSA’s accounting system provides for coding FBF obligations by budget activities, such

as basic repairs and alterations (BA-54) and building operations (BA-61), which have been the

primary budget activities funding the building security upgrade program. Within the FBF budget

activities, the system also provides for coding obligations by functions, such as the K-series

function codes that were established for the FPS law enforcement and security programs. The

primary K-codes applicable to the upgrade program have been the K-1x series—uniformed

operations (police officers), K-2x series—contract guard services, and K-36—security

systems/equipment. GSA established new, specific K-codes to enable identifying and tracking

(1) police and contract guard services for the upgrade program (operations costs) as

distinguished from the level of contract guard services for normal security prior to the Oklahoma

City bombing and from the level of police and contract guard services for moderate security

provided since the bombing and (2) the capital costs of upgraded security systems equipment

and other capital security measures, such as building perimeter barriers and parking lot fencing

and gates. However, GSA did not establish the new K-codes for the upgrade program until

March 1996, nearly 6 months into fiscal year 1996 activities. PBS Controller staff advised us that

upgrade costs such as for police and contract guard services were not always correctly coded as

upgrade program costs and that costs charged to normal security operations prior to the new

K-codes may not have been corrected. Thus, for this table, we are showing the regional budget

allowances GSA provided and the obligations reported in the accounting system for all BA-61

contract guard services, K-2x series, and security systems upgrades, K-36, and for BA-54, the

K-36 capital upgrade obligations recorded. However, GSA did not issue specific BA-61 regional

budget allowances for K-36, so the budget amounts GSA gave us are for all BA-61, K-3x series

function codes. FPS has managed its police officer operations as a separate program from the

building security upgrade program, and thus we have not included the K-1x series in the above

table. From fiscal year 1996 through March of fiscal year 1998, about $65.592 million had been

obligated in the K-1x series for federal protective police officers. Totals may not add up due to

rounding.

Note 2: Not shown in this table are FBF funds appropriated in fiscal year 1997 for security

upgrade capital costs under GSA’s new construction program (BA-51) of about $27.3 million and

major repairs and alterations (BA-55) of $2.7 million. Of the $27.3 million from BA-51, GSA

provided budget allowances to its regions of about $6.7 million and in fiscal year 1997 through

April 30 of fiscal year 1998 had obligated only about $53,000. None of the $2.7 million from BA-55

had been provided as regional budget allowances or had been obligated. Also as of April 30,

1998, GSA added about $2.9 million in fiscal year 1998 FBF BA-54 funds to the regional budget

allowance totals and actual obligations in fiscal year 1998 for security upgrades had increased by

$1.698 million to $15.148 million. We did not obtain actual BA-61 obligations for security

operations as of April 30, 1998.

Source: GSA Public Buildings Service Comptroller’s Office staff.

Page 35 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

A number of problems hindered GSA’s implementation of the security

upgrade program. First, GSA officials told us that they believed it was

incumbent on GSA to implement as soon as possible security upgrades in as

many buildings as possible after the Oklahoma City bombing incident.

However, they said they were faced with both limited time and staff to

help plan and implement the program, so mistakes were made. Second,

GSA faced program funding source uncertainties throughout the upgrade

program. Third, many of the initial decisions made about the need for

upgrades had to be reevaluated, changed, or cancelled. Finally, many of

the initial cost estimates for completing the upgrades proved to be

unrealistic. Because of these problems, program implementation was

slowed; GSA was unable to meet program goals; and it now estimates that

additional funds will be needed in fiscal year 1998 to complete upgrades

approved through September 26, 1997. In addition, GSA had not established

specific program effectiveness goals, outcomes, or measures, nor had it

specified in its performance plan how it intended to verify performance

data. Thus, GSA does not know whether or to what extent federal office

buildings’ vulnerability to acts of terrorism and other forms of violence has

been reduced.

GSA’s Urgency to

Implement the

Program

FPS regional and headquarters staff told us that the time frames imposed

on them for completing building assessments and cost estimates for

security upgrades by the DOJ report created a difficult environment for GSA.

Thousands of building security committees had to be organized and

assisted in determining security upgrade needs fairly quickly. As a result,

the quality of these initial efforts may have suffered. Further, with the first

anniversary of the Oklahoma bombing rapidly approaching, GSA wanted to

place as much added security as was possible into its buildings by the

April 19, 1996, anniversary date because of concerns about further

bombings or other acts of violence that might occur.

At the time of the Oklahoma City bombing incident in April 1995, GSA was

in the process of streamlining its operations and downsizing its

headquarters and regional staff, including those of FPS—GSA’s arm

responsible for managing its nationwide physical security and law

enforcement programs.10 GSA reduced its full-time equivalent employees

from about 20,200 in fiscal year 1993 to about 14,400 at the end of fiscal

year 1997. FPS was responsible for coordinating and implementing GSA’s

10Organizationally, FPS is under GSA’s Public Buildings Service (PBS), which is responsible for

acquiring, managing, and maintaining GSA facilities and employs staff at GSA headquarters and 11

regional offices. According to GSA’s fiscal year 1997 annual report, GSA’s facilities included space in

about 1,900 owned and 6,400 leased facilities.

Page 36 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

building security upgrade program, and as of July 31, 1995, FPS employed

972 regional staff, including a force of 376 uniformed Federal Protective

Police Officers, 199 physical security specialists, 66 criminal investigators,

331 other staff, and a number of contract security guards. In March 1996,

PBS documents showed that it planned to hire 150 more police officers as

the result of a study that showed that PBS needed 508 additional regional

staff—347 police officers, 26 physical security specialists, 26 criminal

investigators, and 109 other staff—to support the enhanced security levels

stemming from its implementation of the security upgrades recommended

by the DOJ report.

From the beginning of the upgrade program, according to FPS staff and a

member of the DOJ report task force from the U.S. Marshals Service, there

was little time available to develop the desired level of implementation

guidance and training for FPS staff and the thousands of BSCs. Further, FPS

staff said that the ratio of GSA-operated buildings to FPS physical security

specialists added to the difficulties. For example, in one GSA region, we

were told that the region had responsibility for about 1,000 buildings but

had only 15 FPS physical security specialists available to assist BSCs with

the building risk assessments. Nationwide, a total of about 200 FPS physical

security specialists were responsible for assisting in the assessment of

over 8,000 GSA-operated buildings.

An FPS official told us that in this challenging environment—deadlines,

staff reductions, and significant levels of effort required by many

players—it was not surprising that program implementation mistakes

occurred. However, the FPS official believed that GSA has taken great

strides in significantly improving the level of security in its buildings.

Program Funding

Uncertainties

According to GSA officials, uncertainties over where funds could be

obtained to purchase and operate security upgrades have hindered

program implementation. In addition, concerns about the availability of

funds for the program contributed to FPS’s decisions to delay approval of

some types of more costly upgrades requested by BSCs and to place those

requests into a “pending” status. Some of these pending requests were

subsequently cancelled and voided or removed from the building security

upgrade program by FPS because of funding uncertainties. Further, GSA and

OMB have not yet reached agreement on how best to fund all the costs of

the security program in the future.

Page 37 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

Initial Program Funding

Shifted From Other

Programs

By February 1996, GSA had received requests for security upgrades from

thousands of BSCs. Although GSA had established the implementation of the

building security upgrade program as one of its top priorities, GSA faced

the challenge of identifying and obtaining funds for acquiring and

operating the security upgrades during a period when overall federal

budget constraints and uncertainties existed. No funds were included in

GSA’s fiscal year 1996 budget for maintaining security at the enhanced

levels that began immediately after the bombing in Oklahoma City, or for

funding the security upgrades requested by the BSCs. Further, GSA was

experiencing a shortfall in the Federal Buildings Fund (FBF) because of an

overestimation of rental revenue from federal agencies due to several

reasons.11

According to GSA officials, delays in congressional approval of many

federal agencies’ fiscal year 1996 appropriations were occurring and

adding to the uncertainties of how the upgrades were to be funded.

Without knowing the available funding that could be expected from the

FBF and/or customer federal agencies, GSA officials said that it had to

proceed with what information was available in making program

decisions, setting program priorities, and working to complete upgrades,

while recognizing that planning and implementation adjustments would be

necessary.

On February 29, 1996, the GSA Administrator asked tenant agencies to help

fund the security upgrade program. He stated that within its own funding

constraints, GSA had been paying for certain security enhancements,

primarily additional contract guard services, for the past 9 months. He

asked the tenant agencies to reimburse GSA about $84 million for these

cost in fiscal year 1996. He further stated that he would commit GSA to

provide $79.5 million from the FBF to pay for the acquisition costs of

security upgrades in fiscal year 1996.

According to GSA staff, shortly thereafter, GSA received indications that

many tenant agencies would be unable to pay their share of the security

upgrade costs in fiscal year 1996. At about this same time, GSA requested

11In 1975 the Federal Buildings Fund (FBF), which consists of rent that GSA charges federal agencies

for space, replaced appropriations to GSA as the primary means of financing the operating and capital

costs associated with federal space owned or managed by GSA, including costs related to security.

PBS administers the FBF, but Congress exercises control over it through the annual appropriations

process that sets annual limits on how much of the fund can be expended for various activities. In

addition, Congress may appropriate additional amounts for the FBF. FBF annual rent revenues have

grown from about $2.5 billion in fiscal year 1987 to about $4.8 billion in fiscal year 1997. See General

Services Administration: Overestimation of Federal Buildings Fund Rental Revenue Projections

(GAO/T-GGD-98-69, Mar. 5, 1998).

Page 38 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

congressional authority to reprogram $119.8 million in fiscal year 1996 FBF

funds from other planned building activities and to use these funds for the

security program: (1) $40 million from GSA’s installation acquisitions

payment activity and (2) $79.8 million from the building repairs and

alterations program consisting of $13.5 million from the Internal Revenue

Service Center modernization project, Holtsville (Brookhaven), New York;

$49.3 million from the chlorofluorocarbons replacement program;

$12.6 million from the energy reduction program; and $4.4 million from the

basic building repairs and alterations program. In April 1996, GSA received

congressional approval from the cognizant House and Senate

Appropriations Subcommittees to reprogram the $119.8 million in funds

previously made available for other FBF programs.

According to GSA, in its fiscal year 1997 appropriation, Congress directed

GSA to spend about $240 million from the FBF for the building security

upgrade program—$175 million for the operations costs of security

upgrades and $65 million for the capital costs of security upgrades.

However, because of GSA’s overestimation of FBF revenues, GSA made

available only about $130 million of the $175 million from the buildings

operations program for security operations. Thus, in fiscal year 1997, a

total of about $195 million was made available from the FBF for the

security program.

According to GSA, for fiscal year 1998, Congress appropriated about

$130 million for the operations costs of security upgrades but GSA did not

request nor receive from Congress any additional capital funds for the

building security upgrade program. However, because additional security

upgrade requests were received from BSCs in the last half of fiscal year

1997, and because additional funds were needed to complete previously

approved upgrades, GSA determined in October 1997 that it could need an

additional $7.8 million in fiscal year 1998 to complete upgrades approved

as of September 26, 1997. GSA planned to obtain these additional capital

funds through a reprogramming of funds from other fiscal year 1998 FBF

accounts.

Some Upgrades Delayed

Due to Lack of Funding

Also, because of funding uncertainties, in early 1996 FPS placed into a

“pending” status upgrade requests involving relatively expensive items,

such as the purchase of parking areas adjacent to GSA buildings and fire

suppression and fire detection systems. The DOJ report had included these

security measures in its recommended standards for some buildings. Later

in 1996, FPS advised its regions that upgrade requests for these items were

Page 39 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

to be voided. FPS decided that security measures, such as fire suppression

and fire detection systems, would be considered separate and apart from

the building security upgrade program.

Funding Source for Future

Security Program Costs

Uncertain

As recommended by the DOJ report, GSA has been working with OMB to

increase future FBF revenues to more closely approximate its expenditures

for the GSA security program at its upgraded level. However, GSA and OMB

have not yet reached complete agreement on how and when to increase

the rent that GSA charges tenant federal agencies so that rental revenues

will be sufficient to pay for the costs of GSA’s building security program.

Rent that GSA charges federal agencies for space and services it furnishes

is set by the GSA Administrator, who is authorized by law to charge

agencies for furnished services, space, quarters, maintenance, repair, or

other facilities. The law states that the rates and charges shall approximate

commercial charges for comparable space and services. The law does not

require that GSA’s rental charges be based on its actual costs of providing

the space and services, which include security. Thus, GSA’s rental charges

are based primarily on GSA’s periodic market price appraisals for

comparable space, not on GSA’s actual costs to provide the space.

GSA’s practice when determining the amount of rent to charge federal

agencies has been to include a charge for security. This fee consists of two

components: (1) the basic service charge of 6 cents per square foot that,

coupled with other funds from the FBF, is used for control center

operations, criminal investigations, protective services activities, and

administration of FPS programs; and (2) a building-specific fee that is used

along with other funds from the FBF to pay for commercial equivalent

items, such as contract security guard services, and security alarm

systems’ installation and maintenance. According to GSA, because GSA’s

expenditures for security have historically exceeded the amount charged

to agencies for security, the FBF has absorbed the excess expenditures.

According to GSA, its obligations for security have increased significantly

following the Oklahoma City bombing incident, and its security charges

billed to tenant agencies have not kept pace. Before the incident, GSA’s

records show that it obligated about $96 million for security in fiscal year

1994. Following the incident, GSA’s records show that it obligated

$257 million for security in fiscal year 1997—an increase of nearly 168

percent in 3 years. According to GSA, from fiscal years 1994 through 1997,

GSA’s obligations for the building security program have exceeded security

Page 40 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

charges billed to tenant agencies by about $540 million. GSA has projected

about $260 million in obligations for fiscal year 1998 and has budgeted

about $251 million for fiscal year 1999 for building security. GSA projects

that its obligations for security will exceed security related revenue by

about $228 million in fiscal year 1998 and by about $112 million in fiscal

year 1999.

The DOJ report recommended that GSA consider increasing rents to cover

the added costs of upgrading security. GSA is required to obtain OMB

approval for the rent it charges federal agencies. GSA and OMB officials said

they were not in a position to increase rents in fiscal years 1996 and 1997

to help pay for increased costs of security because agencies need to know

their rent costs at least 2 years in advance to provide sufficient time for

annual budget development and approval. GSA requested an increase in

rents for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 as part of a comprehensive effort to

redesign its system for determining rent charges and fees for services such

as security.

As a pilot project, OMB approved part of the requested rent increase—an

increase in building-specific fees to recover the cost associated with

security operations for new lease agreements made in 1998, and for all

leases beginning in fiscal year 1999. OMB also allowed GSA to increase its

basic service charge for security from 6 cents to 16 cents per square foot

for new lease agreements made in 1998 and 1999.

According to GSA and OMB officials, OMB did not allow GSA to increase the

basic service charges for existing leases for fiscal years 1998 and 1999

because a comprehensive rent reform proposal was under development by

GSA. These officials expect to complete this action by the end of fiscal year

1998. Also, they are continuing to discuss how agencies’ rent charges will

reflect GSA’s costs for security in fiscal year 2000 and beyond.

Decisions about funding GSA’s security program are complex and involve

tradeoffs among competing needs and funding sources. These decisions

are important for both federal agencies and the FBF. There are a number of

options for addressing the security funding issue. These include allowing

the FBF to continue to fund the excess security costs, decreasing

expenditures for security, or increasing revenues by either raising security

charges or obtaining additional direct appropriations to cover the

shortfall. The option or options selected could affect the government’s

investment in the existing inventory of federal buildings as well as GSA’s

ability to meet the government’s future space needs.

Page 41 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

Initial Upgrade

Decisions

Reevaluated,

Modified, or Voided

Another problem affecting the implementation of the security upgrade

program was the need to reevaluate the initial decisions about building

security upgrade needs. According to GSA officials, many of these decisions

were changed, or even cancelled and voided, for a number of reasons.

Because of these changes, it was more difficult for GSA to order priorities,

allocate funds, and set realistic completion schedules and goals; delays

and inefficiencies in the program resulted. Also, these changes created

challenges for GSA in maintaining the reliability of the tracking system, and

in some cases, the system was not updated to reflect the changes.

Security upgrade decisions often had to be reevaluated, changed, or

voided because of several building-unique issues that surfaced after GSA’s

initial efforts to identify building security upgrade needs. For example,

many GSA-owned and -operated buildings are considered “historic.” For

some of these buildings, issues raised by historical societies about the

effects of installing certain security upgrades had to be addressed by GSA.

In one region we visited, GSA had to find an alternative method for

mounting surveillance cameras for monitoring a building’s outside

perimeter because of concerns raised by the historical society about the

adverse effects of mounting the cameras on the building. GSA decided to

attached the cameras to poles near the building instead of to the building

itself. This alternative method for utilizing the cameras to upgrade security

required additional design work, time, and cost for GSA.

There were other instances in which building owners and/or

nongovernment tenants in GSA-leased buildings expressed concerns or

objections to approved security upgrades, such as the use of

magnetometers to screen people entering the building. Some approved

and some completed upgrades subsequently had to be cancelled. During

our building site visits, both we and the GSA OIG staff found examples of

approved, and sometimes completed, upgrades that were voided because

of subsequent reevaluations.

Another example involves the Social Security Administration (SSA). During

1996 and 1997, SSA officials expressed concerns to GSA that it did not need

certain security upgrades that GSA was placing in some SSA-occupied

buildings. SSA believed that some of the upgrades, mainly metal detectors

and security guards, were not necessary, particularly at some SSA

store-front locations that deal with the public. In addition, SSA expressed

concern about how these security measures would be funded. SSA believed

that some security upgrades were requested and implemented without

sound criteria. GSA stated that the upgrades were approved only after being

Page 42 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

requested by each building’s BSC. SSA, however, said that the BSCs

sometimes requested upgrades without sound security knowledge and the

presence and oversight of a GSA physical security specialist. After

negotiating with SSA, GSA removed upgrades from some SSA locations and

agreed to assess the need for upgrades at other locations.

In still other instances, security upgrades requested and/or approved

required extensive discussion, coordination, and/or approvals from local

municipalities prior to completion. Examples of security upgrades

involving these situations included perimeter barriers, such as planters

and concrete bollards, that were to be placed on sidewalks or curbs

owned by cities or other municipalities, or where city-owned parking

meters along the streets around the GSA-operated building were to be

eliminated.

Changes to approved security upgrades were also necessitated when one

or more federal agency tenants moved out of or into a building, thus

changing the security needs of the building. Also, as GSA acquired new

space in buildings not previously assessed, the related security needs had

to be assessed and addressed. Further, FPS staff also told us that some BSCs

that initially did not request security upgrades later reconsidered and

requested upgrades for their buildings. We noted in the upgrade tracking

system a number of requests for upgrades initiated between April 1 and

December 30, 1997. During this period, over 800 new approved requests

for upgrades, totaling about $20 million in estimated capital costs and

$11 million in estimated annual operating costs, were recorded in the

upgrade tracking system.

The extent to which these upgrade program changes have occurred is

reflected by the changes in the number of buildings with approved

upgrades, the number of approved upgrades, the number of completed

upgrades, and the number of cancelled upgrades as reflected by the

upgrade tracking system. According to the tracking system, the number of

buildings and the number of approved security upgrades decreased

between March 25, 1996, and December 30, 1997—from 2,789 total

buildings with 8,577 approved upgrades to 2,564 buildings with 7,885

approved upgrades. Also, the number of completed upgrades and the

number of voided upgrades reported increased from 6,194 to 6,841, and

from 3,373 to 3,652, respectively, between August 29, 1997, and

December 30, 1997.

Page 43 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

Upgrade Cost

Estimates Not

Reliable

FPS’s security upgrade tracking system did not provide upgrade program

managers with reliable cost estimates for completing and operating

security upgrades because initial cost estimates shown in the system often

did not reflect building-specific installation requirements or other factors

affecting cost. Although GSA regional staff developed more accurate cost

estimates as upgrades were completed, the upgrade tracking system was

not designed to readily add revised cost estimates to the individual

upgrade records. As a result, upgrade cost estimates in the tracking system

varied significantly with the actual obligations recorded in the accounting

system, thus lessening the tracking system’s effectiveness as a

management tool for GSA and BSC program decisionmakers. Without readily

available and more accurate cost estimates, BSC and GSA decisionmakers

were not in a good position to judge the cost/benefit of various upgrade

options nor to determine reliable estimates of funds needed to implement

and operate the security upgrades.

According to GSA, the DOJ report contained general cost estimating

guidelines for certain recommended security upgrades for BSC’s and FPS

security specialists’ use when estimating the costs of needed building

security upgrades. FPS recorded the BSC upgrade requests and associated

cost estimates in the upgrade tracking system. GSA regional staff developed

more accurate cost estimates after the requests were approved, often after

further engineering and design work and consideration of building-specific

conditions. Although regional GSA building and contracting staff could

have been aware of the revised estimates, FPS did not provide a means for

readily including the more accurate cost estimates in the upgrade tracking

system. FPS regional staff told us that updated estimates could have been

shown in the tracking system by voiding the existing upgrade record and

then creating a new upgrade record with the revised cost estimate, but this

alternative was not often employed.

In August 1997, FPS headquarters staff identified in the tracking system 98

buildings for which the estimated cost of the upgrades varied significantly

from the actual obligations incurred. They found that the estimated capital

costs of these upgrades totaled about $10.4 million compared to

$29 million in obligations recorded in the accounting system for these

upgrades—a difference of $18.6 million, or 179 percent.

From information we obtained from FPS headquarters, we found that for

most of the buildings (57 of 98 with differences of $9.7 million), the

estimated costs were lower than the actual obligations incurred for

completing the upgrades because the estimates made by the BSC were too

Page 44 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

low. For example, for seven of these buildings, FPS regional explanations

to headquarters indicated that additional costs of $2.3 million were

obligated to complete the upgrades because of unexpected problems: for

six historic buildings additional costs had to be incurred, including three

buildings where closed circuit television cameras had to be mounted on

poles rather than attached to the buildings ($1.1 million in additional

costs); and for one building, while installing barriers around the building,

old fuel oil tanks were discovered and had to be removed ($1.2 million in

additional costs).

Our further analysis of FPS data obtained from the tracking system and

accounting system in September 1997 showed that the estimated costs of

upgrades approved for 551 buildings in 11 GSA regions varied significantly,

both up and down, from the actual costs obligated to complete the

upgrades. For 348 buildings, the cost estimate of the upgrades totaled

$18.2 million more than the actual costs obligated; for 202 buildings, the

estimated costs were $14.3 million less that the actual costs obligated; and

for 1 building, the estimated costs equaled the actual costs obligated.

Program

Implementation Goals

Not Met

The DOJ report called for GSA to complete security assessments and

upgrade cost estimates by October 15, 1995, for its high-risk (level-IV)

buildings, and by February 1, 1996, for the remaining lower risk buildings

(level I - III). Although the DOJ report didn’t specify goals for GSA’s

completion of the security upgrades, GSA established and subsequently

revised goals for completing upgrades in level IV and lower level buildings

several times over the last 2 years. However, GSA did not fully meet the

goals for completing security assessments called for in the DOJ report, nor

did it meet goals it established for the completion of the security upgrades.

In November 1995, GSA indicated that it had met the goals established by

the DOJ report for evaluating the security needs and estimating the costs of

upgrades for all level IV buildings. GSA told the Senate Subcommittee on

Transportation and Infrastructure that, in accordance with the DOJ report’s

recommendation and the President’s directive, it had established 429

level-IV building security committees and had received over 2,500 upgrade

requests from these committees. Also, later that same month, GSA told OMB

that $222.6 million would be needed in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to pay

for the upgrades in these 429 buildings. However, we believe that GSA did

not fully meet either goal specified in the DOJ report because (1) security

evaluations and requests for upgrades were not made for some level-IV

buildings until after November 1995, and (2) in October 1997, much later

Page 45 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

than the target dates of October 15, 1995, and February 1, 1996, we found

indications that not all of GSA’s buildings, including some level-IV

buildings, had been evaluated for upgrade needs after November 1995.

GSA reported to us that by March 1996 the number of level-IV buildings had

increased to over 700. GSA stated that the increase was partly because DOJ

requested GSA to reclassify certain buildings containing court-related

tenants from lower levels to level IV, and partly because additional level-IV

building security committees conducted building evaluations and provided

GSA with upgrade requests after November 1995.

Concerning GSA’s internal goals, GSA initially established a goal to have all

security upgrades completed for level-IV buildings by September 30, 1996,

but GSA didn’t meet this goal. Subsequently, GSA established a new goal to

have upgrades completed in all buildings by September 30, 1997; this goal

was not met either, and now GSA’s goal is September 30, 1998, for

completing all upgrades approved as of September 26, 1997. GSA’s tracking

system indicated that GSA had completed about 85 percent of the approved

upgrades for all building levels by October 3, 1997, and reached the

90-percent mark by March 31, 1998.

Program

Effectiveness Goals

and Measures

GSA has not established several key program evaluation mechanisms for its

building security program that could assist it in determining how effective

its security program has been in reducing or mitigating building security

risks or in shaping new security program initiatives. These features are

(1) specific goals, outcomes, and performance indicators for the security

program, such as reducing the number of thefts or unauthorized entries;

(2) establishing and implementing systematic security program

evaluations that would provide feedback on how well the security

program is achieving its objectives and contributing to GSA’s strategic

goals; and (3) ensuring that a reliable performance data information

system is place.

GSA has established goals and measures for its security program both apart

from and in connection with the Government Performance and Results

Act of 1993 (the Results Act). However, these goals and measures are

output or activity oriented. They do not address the outcomes, or results,

expected to be achieved by the security upgrade program as envisioned by

the Results Act and encouraged by OMB.

Page 46 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

As required by the Results Act, GSA prepared a strategic plan dated

September 30, 1997, for fiscal years 1998 through 2002, and also prepared

an annual performance plan for fiscal year 1999. GSA’s building security

program is specifically addressed in both the strategic plan and the annual

performance plan. In its strategic plan, under “Goal #4: Anticipate Future

Workforce Needs,” GSA identified the objective: “Ensure that all Federal

buildings in the GSA inventory meet the highest Federal standards in terms

of accessibility, energy consumption, security, systems, technology and

maintenance.” In its description of this objective, GSA’s strategic plan

states that

“In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, GSA has bolstered all of its security systems.

To ensure that we have the highest levels of security in place, we are implementing all the

security measures recommended in the Justice Department’s Vulnerability Assessment of

Federal Facilities.”

In its first annual performance plan under the Results Act for fiscal year

1999, dated March 5, 1998, GSA identified the following two performance

goals: (1) implement all security measures recommended in the

Department of Justice’s Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, and

(2) provide for the safety of workers and visitors in GSA space. Further, GSA

identified as performance indicators the percentage of security

countermeasures completed in levels I-III and level-IV buildings. This

indicator serves as a measure of the program’s output, but no indicators

were identified that would enable measurement of program outcomes,

particularly relating to GSA’s second performance goal for the security

program. Indicators based on such security incidents as the number of

building break-ins, reductions in the number of thefts, and the number of

weapons and other prohibited items detected on persons and in packages

are some examples that might be considered in setting performance

outcome goals and indicators.

Under the Results Act, GSA is required to include in its strategic plan a

schedule of evaluations to be done during the period covered by its plan.

GSA did not include such a schedule or otherwise identify evaluations to be

done in its strategic plan. We believe that scheduling and carrying out

continuous security program evaluations would provide GSA managers

with data to assess the effectiveness of the security program, and would

facilitate GSA strategic planning and goal setting under the Results Act for

its security program. In addition, at the time of the Oklahoma federal

building bombing in April 1995, GSA’s building security inspection and risk

assessment program required regional physical security specialists to

Page 47 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

periodically inspect security at GSA-operated buildings, complete building

risk assessments based on established criteria, and recommend security

improvements. According to an FPS official, this inspection program was

curtailed after July 1995 so that the regional physical security specialists

could focus on assisting the BSCs in determining building security needs

based on the DOJ report’s recommended minimum security standards.

After the Oklahoma bombing incident, an October 1995 internal “lessons

learned” report made 30 recommendations for improving aspects of GSA’s

building security operations, including a recommendation that GSA conduct

a comprehensive review of its current risk assessment methodology to

ensure that a wider range of risks were addressed with increased

emphasis on acts of mass violence. Specifically, the recommendation was

that GSA’s current risk assessment methodology, which addressed the

safety of federal workers from theft and assault, be revised to one that

addresses acts of terrorism and other violence. The principal conclusion of

the report was that GSA’s security and law enforcement processes

currently in place did not adequately address the threat environment.

In a November 25, 1997, progress report that FPS sent to the PBS

Commissioner, FPS reported that actions on 20 of the 30 “lessons learned”

recommendations had been completed. However, action had not yet been

completed to review and modify its risk assessment methodology.

Although the November 1997 progress report stated that FPS planned to

complete actions on this recommendation by the 4th quarter of fiscal year

1998, we believe that this is a very significant recommendation that should

be completed as soon as possible. The recommendations completed by FPS

related to security program aspects such as contingency planning for

emergencies and disasters involving criminal activities and acts of mass

violence, as well as intelligence sharing between agencies with

security-related missions. Completion of revisions recommended in its

building risk assessment methodology and the resumption of FPS’s periodic

building inspection and risk assessment program would provide updated

evaluations on a building-by-building basis of how well security measures

have operated and whether they continue to be appropriate for future

threats that may arise. Further, these evaluations could form the basis for

overall evaluations of the building security program and provide data for

GSA’s annual performance measurement and evaluations under the Results

Act.

Page 48 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
>appendix IV 

Problems Hindered Upgrade Program

Implementation

Data Verification and

Validity

The Results Act requires GSA to describe in its annual performance plans

the means to be used to verify and validate the performance measures it

intends to use to determine whether it met its performance goals. GSA’s

1999 annual performance plan contains a general description of how it

intends to verify performance data, including audits of its financial records

and systems and high-level quarterly meetings to review financial and

programmatic results. However, GSA’s description does not identify

specific controls to be used to verify and validate performance data on an

ongoing basis. Such controls could include periodic data reliability tests,

computer edit controls, and supervisory reviews of data. The significant

problems we and GSA’s OIG have identified with GSA’s data on its progress

in, and costs associated with, implementing the security upgrade program,

suggest that a more detailed discussion of the specific means GSA intends

to use to verify and validate security program data in GSA’s Year 2000

performance plan would be helpful.

The accuracy of the data in GSA’s tracking system is particularly important

because Executive Order 12977, dated October 19, 1995, requires GSA to

coordinate efforts to establish a governmentwide database of security

measures in place at all federal facilities. Further, an accurate reflection of

the status of the security upgrade program and its cost will provide GSA,

OMB, and Congress with important information needed for determining

how much money has been spent on the program and how best to fund the

costs of upgrades still needed.

(240255) Page 49 GAO/T-GGD-98-141
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100