[Cite as State v. Sidey , 2019-Ohio-5169.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-19-32

v. COREY R. SIDEY, O P I N I O N

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Lima Municipal Court Trial Court No. 19TRC01507 Judgment Affirmed Date of Decision: December 16, 2019

APPEARANCES: 

### John C. Huffman for Appellant 

### Lisa R. Bradley for AppelleeCase No. 1-19-32

-2- ZIMMERMAN, P.J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Corey R. Sidey (“Sidey”), appeals the Apri l 10, 2019 judgment entry of the Lima Municipal Court denying his mot ion to suppress evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. {¶2} This case stems from a February 19, 2019 traffic stop of the ve hicle operated by Sidey after Sergeant Alec Cooper (“Sgt. Cooper”) of the Delphos Police Department received radio contact from another officer that Sid ey’s vehicle had no front license plate. As a result of the traffic stop, Sidey wa s cited for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs-OVI (“OVI”) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), (d) a first-degree misdemeanor and for displa y of license plates, registrations, marks, placards, and stickers in violation of R. C. 4503.21(A)(1), a minor misdemeanor. (Doc. No. 1). {¶3} On February 20, 2019, Sidey appeared for arraignment and entere d pleas of not guilty. (Doc. No. 4). {¶4} On March 26, 2019, Sidey filed a motion to suppress evidence ar guing that Sgt. Cooper did not have a reasonable, articulable suspici on to stop Sidey based on the observations of another officer and that his testimony a lone was insufficient to establish reasonable articulable suspicion. 1 (Doc. No. 12). After a hearing on

1 The State did not file a respon se to Sidey’s motion to suppres s evidence.Case No. 1-19-32

-3- April 10, 2019, the trial court denied Sidey’s motion to suppre ss evidence. (Doc. No. 14). {¶5} On April 29, 2019, Sidey withdrew his pleas of not guilty and e ntered a no-contest plea, under a negotiated-plea agreement, to OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d). (Doc. No. 18). In exchange for his change o f plea, the State agreed to dismiss the other charges. (Doc. No. 17, 18, 19). T he trial court accepted Sidey’s no-contest plea, found him guilty, and dismissed the ot her charges. (Doc. Nos. 17, 18, 19). {¶6} Sidey filed his notice of appeal on May 29, 2019. (Doc. No. 20 ). He raises one assignment of error for our review. Assignment of Error

The Trial Court Erred When It Overruled Defendant’s Motion To Suppress By Determining That Based Upon The Evidence Adduced At The Hearing, There Was Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Defendant And That The Testimony Of The Officer Initiating The Stop, Alone, Was Sufficient To Establish Reasonable Suspicion For The Stop. {¶7} In his sole assignment of error, Sidey argues that the trial co urt erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. In particular, he arg ues that the trial court erred by concluding that Sgt. Cooper had reasonable, articulabl e suspicion to believe that Sidey had committed a display of license plates, registrat ions, marks, placards, and stickers vehicle violation. We disagree.Case No. 1-19-32

-4- Standard of Review {¶8} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed q uestions

of law and fact. State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8, citing

State v. Mills , 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, deference is given to the trial court’s fin dings of fact so long as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8. With respect to the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo and we must decide whether the facts satisfy the applicable leg al standard. State v.

McNamara , 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist.1997), superseded by state regulation on other grounds , State v. Schmehl , 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-05-33, 2006- Ohio-1143, ¶ 22. Analysis {¶9} The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit warrantless searches and seizures, and an y evidence that is obtained during an unlawful search or seizure will be excluded as “fruits” of an

unconstitutional search Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 649, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961). The State bears the burden of establishing that a warrantless s earch and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement and tha t it meets FourthCase No. 1-19-32

-5- Amendment standards of reasonableness at a suppression hearing. City of Xenia v.

Wallace , 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), at paragraph two of the syllabus; State v.

Kessler , 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978). See City of Maumee v. Weisner , 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999). An investigatory stop is one exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Steinbrunner , 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-11-27, 2012-Ohio-2358, ¶ 13, citing State v. Keck , 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5- 03-27, 2004-Ohio-1396, ¶ 11, State v. Bobo , 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 179 (1988), and Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 439-440, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984). When the constitutionally-challenged-investigatory stop involves a vehicle, an officer must, at a minimum have either: (1) a rea sonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that cr iminal behavior has occurred, is occurring, or is imminent; or (2) a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable fac ts, that the vehicle should be stopped in the interests of public safety

. State v. Burwell , 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-09-06, 2010-Ohio-1087, ¶ 10, citing State

v. Moore , 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-07-60, 2008-Ohio-2407, ¶ 10, State v. Andrews , 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-07-30, 2008-Ohio-625, ¶ 8, State v. Chatton , 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 61 (1984), State v. Purtee , 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-04-10, 2006-Ohio-6337, ¶ 9,

and State v. Norman , 136 Ohio App.3d 46, 53-54 (3d Dist.1999). {¶10} “An officer’s ‘reasonable suspicion’ is determined based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 11, citing Moore at ¶ 11, citing Andrews at ¶ 8, citing State v. Terry , 130 Ohio App.3d 253, 257 (3d Dist.1998), citing State v.Case No. 1-19-32

-6- Andrews , 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87 (1991). The question whether a traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment involves an objective assessment of an off icer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at th e time he or she initiates the traffic stop. Dayton v. Erickson , 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 6 (1996), citing United States v. Ferguson , 8 F.3d 385, 388 (6th Cir.1993). The officer must be able to point to “‘Specific and articulable facts’ that will justify an investigatory stop by way of reasonable suspicion include: (1) location; (2) the offi cer's experience, training or knowledge; (3) the suspect's conduct or appearance; and (4) the surrounding circumstances.” Purtee at ¶ 9; State v. Gaylord , 9th Dist. Summit No. 22406, 2005-Ohio-2138, ¶ 9; Bobo , 37 Ohio St.3d at 178-79; State v. Davison , 9th Dist. Summit No. 21825, 2004-Ohio-3251, ¶ 6. {¶11} The officer can rely on his or her personal observations or inf ormation transmitted through dispatch or a flyer of a traffic violation or criminal activity.

Weisner , 87 Ohio St.3d at 297, citing United States v. Hensley , 469 U.S. 221, 231, 105 S.Ct. 675, 681 (1985). State v. Bailey , 3d. Dist. Logan No. 8-07-02, 2008-Ohio2254, ¶ 17. State v. Devanna , 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-04-12, 2004-Ohio-5096, ¶ 13. When an officer relies on information from other officers, the State must show that the officer (who provided that information) had a valid re asonable suspicion of a traffic violation or criminal activity. See State v. Wortham , 145 Ohio App.3d 126, 130 (2d Dist.2001), citing Hensley at 221 and Maumee at 297.Case No. 1-19-32

-7- {¶12} Here, in addition to a charge of OVI, Sidey was cited for a dis play of license plates, registrations, marks, placards, and stickers vi olation. Sgt. Cooper testified that he had observed Sidey operating his vehicle abov e the posted-speed limit; although, he was unable to “clock” Sidey’s speed at the time or pace his vehicle because his patrol vehicle was at a “dead stop.” (Apr. 10, 2019 Tr. at 5-7, 10, 11). Consequently, Sgt. Cooper radioed his partner—Officer Chris Hamacher (“Officer Hamacher”)—to determine if he was able to “clock” Sid ey’s speed. ( Id. at 9). Officer Hamacher advised Sgt. Cooper that Sidey had “no front license plate on the vehicle.” ( Id. at 6-7, 9, 11). Thus, based upon Officer Hamacher’s information, Sgt. Cooper initiated the traffic stop and request ed Sidey’s license, proof of insurance, and vehicle registration. 2 ( Id. at 7-8). {¶13} Sidey argues that because Sgt. Cooper did not personally observ e or visually verify the absence of a license plate affixed to the f ront bumper of Sidey’s vehicle, Officer Hamacher’s testimony was required at the suppr ession hearing. We disagree. Contrary to Sidey’s contention, an officer may rely upon information collectively known to the law enforcement officers involved in the search or investigation. See State v. Cook , 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 521 (1992). “An officer need not have knowledge of all the facts necessary to justify an inv estigatory stop, as long

2 Officer Hamacher arrived at Sidey’s traffic stop in the midst of Sgt. Cooper and Sidey’s conversation. ( Id. at 15). While speaking with Sidey (about the license plate) w ith Officer Hamacher to his left, Sgt. Cooper “detected the odor of alcohol.” ( Id. at 8). Sidey admitted to consuming alcohol at the bar while a cting as a designated driver for the passenger of the vehicle. ( Id. at 8-9).Case No. 1-19-32

-8- as the law enforcement body as a whole possesses such facts and the detaining officer reasonably relies on those who possess the facts.” Cook , 65 Ohio St.3d at 521, citing State v. Henderson , 51 Ohio St.3d 54 (1990), Whiteley v. Warden , 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031 (1971), Hensley , 469 U.S. at 221. See Bailey , 2008-Ohio2254, at ¶ 17, citing Cook , 65 Ohio St.3d at 521 (concluding that “just as in the case of a radio dispatch that justifies an investigatory stop, it is the collective knowledge of the law-enforcement officers that allows the arresting offic er to rely upon those facts to effect an arrest”). The relevant inquiry is whether t he law-enforcement community as a whole has complied with the Fourth Amendment; th e entire system is required to possess facts justifying the stop or arrest, eve n though the arresting

officer does not have those facts. Henderson , 51 Ohio St.3d at 57, quoting 1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, Section 3.3(e) (1984). R.C. 4503.21 provides in its pertinent part: (A)(1) No person who is the owner or operator of a motor vehicl e shall fail to display in plain view on the front and rear of the motor vehicle a license plate that bears the distinctive number and registrat ion mark assigned to the motor vehicle by the director of public safety, including any county identification sticker and any validation sticker issued under sections 4503.19 and 4503.191 of the Revised Code * * * (Italics added.) Here, Sidey argues that his license plate dis played in the front windshield complied with the requirement of the statute, we dis agree. As Sgt. Cooper approached Sidey’s vehicle, he was careful to stay behin d the “B pillar”Case No. 1-19-32

-9- because the vehicle had been modified (i.e., “jacked up and rai sed”). (Apr. 10, 2019 Tr. at 13). As such, Sgt. Cooper could not see the license pla te “tucked in between the dash and the windshield” until Sidey pointed it out. ( Id. at 13-14). See State v.

Anderson , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-127, 2018-Ohio-2455, ¶ 17, (conclu ding that because the officer could not see the license plate “propped up in the front windshield” until he approached the vehicle, the license plate was not “in plain view” within the meaning of R.C. 4503.21(A)(1)). Under the fac ts before us, Sidey’s license plate was not displayed “in plain view,” and no t in compliance with the statutory scheme. Thus, Sgt. Cooper’s corroboration of Off icer Hamacher’s

observations eradicated the need for Officer Hamacher’s testimo ny at the motion hearing. {¶14} Based on the foregoing and under the totality of the circumstan ces, we conclude that Sgt. Cooper possessed a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” which was supported by “specific and articulable facts” that justifie d this investigatory stop for a display of license plates, registrations, marks, placards , and stickers violation. The trial court’s findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. The trial court did not err by overruling Sidey’s motion to suppress evid ence. {¶15} Accordingly, Sidey’s assignment of error is overruled.Case No. 1-19-32

-10- {¶16} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in th e particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Judgment Affirmed PRESTON and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur. jlr