United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman and Ranking

Minority Member, Subcommittee on

Military Research and Development,

Committee on National Security, House

of Representatives

June 1998 NAVY MINE

WARFARE

Plans to Improve

Countermeasures

Capabilities Unclear

GAO/NSIAD-98-135

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-279054 

June 10, 1998

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman

The Honorable Owen Pickett,

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military

Research and Development

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

As requested, we reviewed the Navy’s mine countermeasures efforts. This

report discusses the Navy’s plans for improving mine countermeasures

(MCM) capabilities; provides information on the status of current research,

development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs; and evaluates the

process the Department of Defense (DOD) used to prepare the annual

certification required by Public Law 102-190.

Background Enemy sea mines were responsible for 14 of the 18 Navy ships destroyed

or damaged since 1950, and producing countries have developed and

proliferated mines that are even more difficult to detect and neutralize.

After the Gulf War, during which two Navy ships were severely damaged

by sea mines, the Navy began several actions to improve its mine warfare

capabilities.

The Navy’s current MCM capabilities are in a special purpose force that

consists of 12 mine-hunter, coastal (MHC) and 14 MCM ships, 1 command

and support ship, 24 mine-hunting and clearing helicopters, 17 explosive

ordnance disposal detachments, a very shallow water detachment, and a

marine mammal detachment. According to the Navy, the cost of operating

and maintaining this MCM force from fiscal year 1992 through 2003 will be

about $1.9 billion. Because the Navy’s MCM ships lack the speed and

endurance they would need to accompany carrier battle groups and

amphibious ready groups on overseas deployments, the Navy has changed

its strategy of maintaining only a special purpose force to also developing

mine countermeasure capabilities to be placed on board combat ships

within the fleet.

The Navy has consolidated operational control of all surface and airborne

mine warfare forces under the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, and

improved the readiness of these forces through exercises and training. The

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Navy also initiated research and development projects to address the

weaknesses in its MCM program, especially the lack of on-board MCM

capability throughout the fleet, and created a Program Executive Office

for mine warfare, which brought together disparate MCM programs and

their associated program management offices.

In a prior report,1

 we discussed weaknesses in the Navy’s ability to

conduct effective sea mine countermeasures. We reported that critical MCM

capabilities were unmet and reviewed the Navy’s efforts to address these

limitations. At that time, the Navy had not established clear priorities

among its mine warfare research and development programs to sustain the

development and procurement of the most needed systems. Consequently,

the Navy experienced delays in delivering new systems to provide

necessary capabilities. DOD concurred with our recommendation that a

long-range plan be developed to identify gaps and limitations in the Navy’s

MCM capabilities and establish priorities. DOD said the process was ongoing

and consisted of developing an overall concept of MCM operations and an

architecture within which needs and shortfalls in capabilities could be

evaluated and prioritized. DOD also said that critical programs would be

identified and funded within the constraints of its overall budget.

Congress previously expressed its concern that the Navy had failed to

sufficiently emphasize mine countermeasures in its research and

development program and noted the relatively limited funding allocation.

As a result, mine warfare programs were designated as special

congressional interest items. To support continuing emphasis on

developing the desired mine countermeasures, Congress added a

certification requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for

fiscal years 1992 and 1993. This required the Secretary of Defense to

certify that the Secretary of the Navy, in consultation with the Chief of

Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, had

submitted an updated MCM master plan and budgeted sufficient resources

for executing the updated plan. It also required the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to determine that the budgetary resources needed for MCM

activities and the updated master plan are sufficient. This certification

requirement will expire with the fiscal year 1999 budget submission unless

it is renewed.

1

Navy Mine Warfare: Budget Realignment Can Help Improve Countermine Capabilities

(GAO/NSIAD-96-104, Mar. 13, 1996).

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B-279054 

Results in Brief The Navy has not decided on the mix of on-board and special purpose

forces it wants to maintain in the future and committed the funding

needed for developing and sustaining those capabilities. This decision will

determine the types and quantities of systems to be developed and their

priority. It also affects the schedule and cost of those developments and

the design and cost of the platforms on which they will operate. A final

force structure decision will likely be determined by the level of resources

the Navy decides to dedicate to the MCM mission in the future—a decision

that depends on numerous issues outside the MCM arena such as

conflicting priorities among the various Navy warfare

communities—aircraft, surface ships, and submarines.

Since 1992, the Navy has spent about $1.2 billion in RDT&E funds to

improve its mine warfare capabilities. However, this investment has not

produced any systems that are ready to transition to production. Delaying

factors include funding instability, changing requirements, cost growth,

and unanticipated technical problems. A few systems, such as the

Airborne Mine Neutralization System and the Shallow-Water Assault

Breaching system, are scheduled for production decisions within the next

2 to 3 years. Other systems were not produced because the Navy never

funded their procurement. The Navy plans to spend an additional

$1.5 billion for RDT&E over the next 6 years.

Most officials we interviewed said the annual certification process has

served to increase the visibility of MCM requirements within DOD and the

Navy, with positive results and should continue to be required. However,

as currently conducted, the annual certification process does not address

the adequacy of overall resources for this mission, nor does it contain any

measures against which the Navy’s progress in enhancing its MCM

capabilities can be evaluated. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staffs’ review

for resource sufficiency, which is conducted because of the congressional

mandate, occurs after the Navy’s budget proposals for its MCM program

have been formalized. Therefore, the review does not affect specific Navy

MCM acquisition programs or overall MCM resource decisions.

Future Force

Structure Has Not

Been Decided

Although it has developed a strategy for overcoming deficiencies in its MCM

capabilities, the Navy has not decided on the composition and size of its

future on-board and special purpose MCM force. Navy officials have

acknowledged the need to maintain some special purpose MCM force, while

the Navy is moving toward an on-board MCM capability. The Navy currently

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B-279054 

has no on-board MCM capabilities and relies on a force of MCM capabilities

that are specifically dedicated to that mission.

The Navy has two assessments in progress to develop the information it

needs to decide on the mix of its future on-board and special purpose

forces. The objectives of these assessments are to determine (1) the

quantities and types of on-board MCM systems the Navy will need to

procure to meet fleet requirements in fiscal years 2005-2010; (2) the

optimal force mix to meet fleet requirements in the 21st century; and

(3) the numbers and types, if any, of special purpose MCM assets that will

still be needed in the fiscal year 2010-2015 time frame. Initial results are

expected to be available in October 1998, in time to influence the

development of the fiscal year 2001 Navy resource program, with a final

report in January 1999. Navy officials do not expect this phase of the

assessments to provide them all of the information that is needed to tailor

the future MCM force structure. They do expect, however, that it will give

them a good idea of how to plan procurement, training, and maintenance

for the on-board systems expected to be deployed in the fiscal year

2001-2005 time frame.

To address the lack of on-board capability, the Navy accelerated the

delivery of a Remote Minehunting System and established a contingency

shallow-water mine-hunting capability in one Navy Reserve helicopter

squadron using laser mine detection systems, and it is including

mine-hunting systems in upgrades to existing and in new construction

submarines. Maintaining the special purpose force is costly, and Navy

resource managers have been evaluating how to pay for the operations

and support costs of this force while pursuing costly development of

on-board capabilities. A final force structure decision will likely be driven

by the level of resources the Navy intends to dedicate to the MCM mission

in the future—a decision that depends on numerous issues outside the MCM

arena such as conflicting funding priorities among the various Navy

warfare communities (aircraft, surface ships, and submarines).

A decision on the future force structure is, however, still needed because

that decision will determine the types and quantities of systems to be

procured, set priorities among systems, and determine the level of

resources required for development, procurement, and sustainment. For

example, the Navy is currently debating whether to retire the current

mine-hunting helicopters, the MH-53, in favor of maintaining only H-60

series helicopters. This helicopter decision will directly affect the types

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B-279054 

and quantity of airborne MCM capabilities the Navy will be able to field in

the future.

Research and

Development

Investment Has Not

Yet Paid Dividends

Since 1992, the Navy has invested about $1.2 billion in RDT&E funds to

improve its mine warfare capabilities. The Navy plans to spend an

additional $1.5 billion for RDT&E over the next 6 years. It is currently

managing 28 separate MCM development programs and several advanced

technology and advanced concept technology demonstrations. (See app. I

for the status of selected programs.)

So far, according to a Navy official, this investment has not produced any

systems that are ready to transition to production. A few systems, such as

the Airborne Mine Neutralization System, the Shallow-Water Assault

Breaching system, Distributed Explosive Technology, and a Closed Loop

Degaussing system, are scheduled for a production decision over the next

2 to 3 years. Other systems, such as communications data links for the

MH-53 helicopters and the airborne laser mine-detection system (Magic

Lantern Deployment Contingency), were not produced because the Navy

never funded their procurement.

Delays experienced in a number of MCM development programs result from

the same kinds of problems that are found in other DOD acquisitions such

as funding instability, changing requirements, cost growth, and

unanticipated technical problems. For example, although the MCM funding

program is small, the Navy has reduced funding for its MCM research and

development programs after budget approval. (See app. II for two program

examples.) These problems in MCM acquisition programs show that the

design, development, and production of needed systems are complex and

that technical processes must operate within equally complex budget and

political processes. If programs are not well conceived, planned, managed,

funded, and supported, problems such as cost growth, schedule delays,

and performance shortfalls can easily occur.

Two examples of mine warfare programs that have been in the research

and development phase for many years without advancing to procurement

are the AQS-20, an airborne mine-hunting sonar, and the Airborne Mine

Neutralization System. The AQS-20 began in 1978 as an exploratory

development model and was scheduled for a limited rate initial production

decision in fiscal year 1999. The Navy terminated the program in 1997 in

favor of a follow-on sonar, the AQS-X, with added mine identification

capability and a tow requirement from a H-60 helicopter instead of a

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
B-279054 

MH-53 helicopter. During the intervening 19 years, the program was

plagued by cost growth, changing requirements, and a funding shortfall.

The development of the Airborne Mine Neutralization System began in

1975, but a production decision is not scheduled until fiscal year 2000. The

principal reason for the delay is that the program was canceled and

restarted two times because of funding instability.

Contributing to difficulties in transitioning programs into production are a

number of management and internal control weaknesses noted during the

annual Federal Manager’s Financial Integrity Act certification. Since 1992,

the Program Executive Office has attempted to improve internal controls

within five subordinate program offices by developing financial and

acquisition management information and reporting systems. At its request,

the Naval Audit Service is reviewing the state of internal controls within

one of the program offices and expects to issue a report in the fall of 1998.

Certification

Requirement Has Had

a Positive Impact

A majority of officials we interviewed said that the annual certification

requirement was useful because it served to increase the visibility of MCM

requirements within DOD and the Navy. Most said that some form of the

certification should continue to be required. However, as currently

prepared, the annual certification does not address the adequacy of overall

resources for this mission, nor does it provide for objective measures

against which progress can be evaluated. Moreover, the Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff’s involvement in the certification process occurs too late to

have a significant impact.

The annual certification does not address the adequacy of overall

resources for this mission because the Navy’s budget for MCM programs

addresses only the adequacy of funding for the budget year, not the out

years. Further, nothing in the certification process provides objective

measures against which progress can be evaluated. Such measures have

been developed within the MCM community. For example, the time

required by a tactical commander to clear a certain area of mines with and

without various capabilities could be used in making individual program

decisions. Likewise, there are mean times between repairs and average

supply delay times to gauge reliability and supportability for the MCM and

MHC ships.

In the past, the DOD staff has not been willing to challenge Navy decisions

regarding the content and adequacy of its MCM program. Instead, it focused

on analyzing the consistency of the program from year to year.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
B-279054 

Consequently, DOD has been able to certify annually that the budget

contains adequate resources for the program.

However, in November 1997, the Secretary of Defense expressed his

concern about the Navy’s financial commitment to mine warfare

programs. As a result, the Navy added about $110 million to MCM programs

over the future years defense planning period.

The inclusion of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the certification

process was intended to give the regional commanders in chief an

opportunity to influence the development of the MCM budget. We believe,

however, and DOD and Navy officials agree, that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs

of Staff’s determination has not added any significant value. Although the

Joint Staff has assessed joint MCM requirements and capabilities, its

conclusions have not been used as a basis for challenging the Navy’s MCM

programs or suggesting alternatives. Moreover, since the Joint Staff’s

review has occurred after, rather than before, the Navy’s budget proposals

for MCM programs have been formalized, it has had no impact on specific

Navy acquisition programs or overall resource decisions.

Conclusions To have an effective program, the Navy needs to decide on the size,

composition, and capabilities of its future MCM forces. This decision will

assist in prioritizing and disciplining its research, development, and

procurement efforts. As with other mission areas, the types and quantities

of systems to be procured and their platform integration will most likely

be driven by the level of resources the Navy allocates to the MCM mission

in the future. What is required is for the Navy leadership and the various

warfare communities to agree on the composition and structure (size) of

future MCM forces and commit the necessary resources to their

development and sustainment. Without such an agreement, budgetary

pressures may result in degradation of the special purpose forces before

the Navy has demonstrated and fielded effective, on-board capabilities

within the fleet.

The certification requirement has forced DOD and the Navy to pay

increased attention to the MCM mission, and most officials involved support

its continuation in some form. However, the certification has not provided

any assurance that the resources for the MCM mission are “sufficient”

because it has only addressed the adequacy of funding for the particular

budget year and because the DOD staff and the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff have not challenged Navy resource allocation or budget

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
B-279054 

decisions. If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s involvement in the

certification process is still considered important, it must occur in time to

influence Navy decisions on requirements and funding. Overall budgetary

pressures, the high operations and maintenance costs associated with the

special purpose MCM fleet, and the Navy’s expectation of potential

increased capabilities from on-board systems still early in development

may combine to result in budgetary shifts from current special purpose

forces before potential on-board capabilities are realized.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the Navy, determine

the mix of on-board and special purpose forces DOD plans to maintain in

the future and commit the funding deemed necessary for the development

and sustainment of these desired capabilities. We also recommend that the

Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to sustain the special

purpose MCM forces until the Navy has demonstrated and fielded effective,

on-board capabilities.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

The certification process has increased DOD’s and the Navy’s attention to

the MCM mission. Since the certification requirement is scheduled to expire

this year, Congress may wish to consider extending the annual

certification requirement until the Navy has determined the mix of

on-board and special purpose forces it will maintain in the future and has

fielded effective, on-board MCM capabilities. To strengthen the certification

process, Congress may wish to consider amending the requirement to

ensure that the participation by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, occurs

before the Navy’s fiscal year budget is submitted to the Office of the

Secretary of Defense.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report (see app. III), DOD concurred with

our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of

the Navy to sustain the special purpose MCM forces until the Navy has

demonstrated and fielded effective on-board capabilities. DOD partially

concurred with our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense

determine the mix of on-board and special purpose forces DOD plans to

maintain in the future and commit the necessary funding. DOD has directed

the Navy to ensure that both current and future mine warfare programs

are adequately funded. In an April 7, 1998, letter to the Secretary of the

Navy, the Secretary of Defense expressed his concern about the Navy’s

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
B-279054 

lack of commitment of the necessary resources to mine warfare and noted

that currently, requirements exceed resources allocated. He directed the

Navy to (1) protect the mine warfare program from any further funding

reductions until some on-board capabilities are available, (2) avoid using

the funds currently planned for the special purpose forces to fund the

development of on-board capabilities, and (3) develop a future years

funding plan that matches requirements with resources.

DOD, however, cited the Navy as having primary responsibility for MCM

forces, whereas our recommendation was directed to the Secretary of

Defense. We agree that the Navy does have primary responsibility, but the

Secretary of Defense has had a special role through the certification

process. As we conclude in the report, the certification requirement has

had a positive impact. Therefore, we have added a matter for

congressional consideration to the report that suggests that the

certification requirement be extended.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of

Defense direct that involvement by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

occur early enough to affect annual Navy budget submissions. DOD said the

Chairman is involved early enough to affect budget decisions. Our

recommendation, however, is based on our conclusion that the

certification process has not been effective in assuring the adequacy of

resources. This conclusion is based, in part, on the late involvement of the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. For example, we note that the Navy’s

fiscal year 1999 budget submission went to Congress in late January 1998,

yet the Secretary of Defense’s certification, which includes the Chairman’s

determination regarding the sufficiency of the Navy’s resources in fiscal

year 1999, was submitted in May 1998. Although the Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff, has input in the budget process, the certification

requirement provides an additional opportunity to have an effect in

assuring the sufficiency of resources. Since DOD only partially concurred

and to strengthen the certification process, we have deleted our

recommendation regarding the Chairman’s participation and added a

matter for congressional consideration that the annual certification

requirement be amended to ensure the participation by the Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Navy’s budget is submitted to the Office of

the Secretary of Defense. The intent of our matters for consideration is to

give additional attention to the sufficiency of budget resources the Navy

has devoted to MCM.

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B-279054 

DOD also provided some updated information in its comments and we have

incorporated it into our report as appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

To obtain information on the status of Navy plans, programs, and the

certification process, we interviewed and obtained documentation from

officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the

Defense Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval

Operations, the Naval Air and Sea Systems Commands, the Office of Naval

Intelligence, and the Office of Naval Research in the Washington, D.C.,

area, and the Navy Operational Test and Evaluation Force and the Surface

Warfare Development Group in Norfolk, Virginia. We also interviewed and

obtained information from officials engaged in MCM scientific and technical

research and development activities at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center

in Newport, Rhode Island; the Navy Coastal Systems Station in Panama

City, Florida; and the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins

University, in Laurel, Maryland.

To gain an understanding of existing capabilities and requirements, and an

operational perspective, we interviewed and obtained information from

the staff and operational units of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic

Command and the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet in Norfolk, Virginia;

and the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, in Corpus Christi, and

Ingleside, Texas.

We conducted our review between September 1997 and March 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman, Senate Committee

on Armed Services; the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Senate

Committee on Appropriations; the Chairman, Subcommittee on National

Security, House Committee on Appropriations; the Secretaries of Defense,

the Army, and the Navy; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Copies

will also be provided to other interested parties upon request.

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Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you have any questions about this

report. The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Katherine V. Schinasi

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Status of Selected

Mine

Countermeasures

Research and

Development

Programs

14

Programs Emphasized During Fiscal Years 1996-97 14

Programs Emphasized During Fiscal Years 1998-2003 15

Programs Emphasized Beyond Fiscal Year 2003 17

Appendix II 

Programmatic

Examples of Funding

Instability

20

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Secretary of Defense

23

Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to

This Report

26

Tables Table II.1: AQS-20 and Airborne Mine Neutralization System

Funding Profile, as of March 1996

20

Table II.2: AQS-20 and Airborne Mine Neutralization System

Funding Profile, as of February 1997

21

Table II.3: AQS-20 and Airborne Mine Neutralization System

Funding Profile, as of February 1998

22

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

MCM mine countermeasures

MHC mine-hunter, coastal

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix I 

Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures

Research and Development Programs

Programs Emphasized

During Fiscal Years

1996-97

Remote Minehunting

System

Program description: The Remote Minehunting System program develops

a new remotely operated mine-hunting system that is capable of detecting

and classifying mines. It is intended to provide the surface fleet with an

on-board means of finding and avoiding mined waters. The program has a

three-fold strategy to develop a new vehicle, upgrade it with

state-of-the-art mine-hunting sensors, and provide a supportable,

incremental operational contingency system to the fleet during the

development process.

Platform: Surface combatants.

Mine threat: Bottom & moored mines/deep to very shallow water.

Program start date: Fiscal year 1993.

Date of estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal

year 2002, milestone III on version 4 (proposed).

Current status: Milestone III on version 3 had been scheduled for fiscal

year 1999; however, due to cost and schedule problems, the program has

been restructured to drop version 3 and continue development of version 4.

Funding (fiscal years 1992-97): $44.1 million.

Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998-03): $103.7 million.

Magic Lantern Program description: The Magic Lantern is a helicopter mounted

laser/camera system that detects and classifies moored mines. The

objective of the Magic Lantern1

 Deployment Contingency system is to field

an advanced development model on one detachment of Naval Reserve

SH-2G helicopters to provide on-board mine reconnaissance capability for

surface and near surface water. In fiscal year 1996, Congress directed a

competitive evaluation field test of the Airborne Laser Mine Detection

System technologies. These technologies included Magic Lantern,

ATD-111, and the Advanced Airborne Hyperspectral Imaging System. This

field test took place in late 1997. The Navy expects to send the final report

to Congress by the end of April 1998.

Platform: SH-2G helicopters.

Mine threat: Floating and shallow-water moored mines.

1

Magic Lantern is the trade name of one of the manufacturers (Kaman) of the Airborne Laser Mine

Detection System technologies. Airborne Laser Mine Detection System is the Navy project title under

which these technologies have been pursued and funded.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix I 

Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures

Research and Development Programs

Program start date: Fiscal year 1992 (Start of the Airborne Laser Mine

Detection System program).

Date of estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal

year 1999.

Current status: Installation of contingency systems on H-60 helicopters.

Funding (fiscal years 1992-97): $73 million.

Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998-03): $29.3 million.

Programs Emphasized

During Fiscal Years

1998-2003

Near-Term Mine

Reconnaissance System

Program description: This system is intended to provide an unmanned

undersea vehicle mine reconnaissance capability in the form of a single

operational prototype, as a stop-gap, interim clandestine offboard system.

The system is to be launched and recovered from a SSN-688 class

submarine.

Platform: SSN-688 class submarines.

Mine threat: Bottom and moored mines in deep through very shallow

water.

Program start date: Fiscal year 1994.

Date of estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal

year 2003.

Current status: Initial operational capability is scheduled for fiscal

year 1998. The system is scheduled to participate in the Joint Countermine

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration II in June 1998.

Funding (fiscal years 1994-97): $42.3 million.

Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998-03): $29.6 million.

Radiant Clear Program description: Radiant Clear is a joint Navy-Marine Corps effort to

graphically depict the littoral environment and coastal defenses through

the application of advances in the processing of data collected by national

systems.

Platform: Not applicable.

Mine threat: Very shallow water to the beach.

Program start date: Fiscal year 1996.

Date of estimated completion of research & development phase: Open.

Current status: Demonstration, May 1998.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix I 

Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures

Research and Development Programs

Funding (fiscal years 1996-97): $2 million.

Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998-03): $6 million.

Shallow Water Assault

Breaching System

Program description: This system is an explosive line charge system that is

delivered from a rocket motor and deployed from a manned Landing Craft,

Air Cushion at a standoff range of 200 feet.

Platform: Manned Landing Craft, Air Cushion.

Mine threat: Very shallow water and surf zone, optimized for 3-10 feet

water depth.

Program start date: Fiscal year 1992.

Date of estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal

year 1999, milestone III.

Current status: Fiscal year 1998, developmental and operational testing.

Funding (fiscal years 1992-97): $35.3 million.

Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998-03): $10.9 million.

Distributed Explosive

Technology

Program description: The Distributed Explosive Technology program is a

distributed explosive net that is delivered by two rocket motors and

deployed from a manned Landing Craft, Air Cushion at a standoff range of

200 feet. It is designed to provide a wide swath of mine clearance in the

surf zone.

Platform: Manned Landing Craft, Air Cushion.

Mine threat: Surf zone, optimized for depths less than 3 feet to the beach.

Program start date: Fiscal year 1992.

Date of estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal

year 1999, milestone III.

Current status: Fiscal year 1998, developmental and operational testing.

Funding (fiscal years 1992-97): $47 million.

Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998-03): $19.5 million.

AQS-20 Program description: The AQS-20 was to be an airborne towed high speed

mine-hunting sonar. It was to work in conjunction with the Airborne Mine

Neutralization System. The AQS-20 was to provide the capability to search,

detect, localize, and classify mines.

Platform: MH-53 helicopters.

Mine threat: Bottom, close tethered, and volume mines in deep and

shallow water.

Program start date: 1978.

Date of estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix I 

Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures

Research and Development Programs

year 2001.

Current status: Transitioning to AQS-X, a follow-on advanced sonar with

the addition of mine identification capability and towed capability from

the H-60 helicopter. An advanced sonar fly-off is planned for fiscal year

1999.

Funding (fiscal years 1992-97): $73.1 million.

Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998-03): $76.3 million.

Programs Emphasized

Beyond Fiscal Year

2003

Advanced Lightweight

Influence Sweep System

Program description: This system is a magnetic and acoustic system and is

to rapidly sweep and clear influence mines by emulating the signatures of

amphibious assault craft. It is to be an on-board mine countermeasures

asset and capable of night operations.

Platform: Remotely controlled surface craft, but other platforms are being

explored.

Mine threat: Influence mines in shallow and very shallow water.

Program start date: Fiscal year 1993.

Date of estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal

year 2000, scheduled transition from Advanced Technology Demonstration

status to acquisition program.

Current status: To be a part of the Joint Countermine Advanced Concept

Technology Demonstration II in June 1998 (approximate 6 months

slippage from original schedule).

Funding (fiscal years 1992-97): $49.8 million.

Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998-03): $7 million.

Airborne Mine

Neutralization System

Program description: This system is an expendable, remotely operated,

explosive mine neutralization device that is towed by a helicopter. It is

intended to rapidly destroy mines and operate in day or night. Originally, it

was intended to operate in conjunction with the AQS-20 sonar. With the

termination of the AQS-20 and transition to AQS-X, the system will operate

with the AQS-14A sonar, which will be integrated with a laser line scan

system to provide interim mine identification capability.

Platform: MH-53 helicopters.

Mine threat: Bottom and moored mines in deep or shallow water.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix I 

Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures

Research and Development Programs

Program start date: Fiscal year 1975.

Date of estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal

year 2000, milestone III is scheduled.

Current status: Engineering, manufacturing, and development contract

award scheduled for second quarter, fiscal year 1998.

Funding (fiscal years 1992-97): $12.4 million.

Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998-00): $22.6 million.

Rapid Airborne Mine

Countermeasures System

Program description: This system is an advanced technology

demonstration program and is intended to employ laser targeting and

supercavitating projectiles to neutralize near surface moored contact

mines. Its objective is to provide fast reacting organic helicopter capability

to safely and rapidly clear mines.

Platform: Helicopter.

Mine threat: Near surface moored contact mines.

Program start date: Fiscal year 1998.

Date of estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal

year 2004.

Current status: Fiscal year 1998, demonstration of lethality against key

mine types.

Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998-04): $65 million.

Explosive Neutralization

Advanced Technology

Demonstration

Program description: The Explosive Neutralization Advanced Technology

Demonstration, as a group of four subsystems, is intended to demonstrate

the capability to neutralize anti-invasion mines in the surf zone and craft

landing zone. Two of the subsystems will consist of line charges and surf

zone array, which are to be launched from an air cushion vehicle and

propelled by new rocket motors for extended range and increased

stand-off. These two subsystems will also have a third subsystem, a fire

control system, for accurate placement of explosives. The fourth

subsystem, the beach zone array, will consist of a glider and an array

system. The glider, an unmanned, unpowered air vehicle, will be released

by an air deployment vehicle. The glider will approach the beach by means

of a global positioning system guidance and control system. To detonate

and clear mines, it will deploy the array of nylon webbing and shaped

charges over a predesignated target.

Platform: Unmanned air vehicle.

Mine threat: Anti-invasion mines in the surf and craft landing zones.

Program start date: Fiscal year 1993.

Date of estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix I 

Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures

Research and Development Programs

year 2005 for the line charges, surf zone array, and fire control system and

fiscal year 2009 for the beach zone array.

Current status: Demonstration of fieldable prototype of the beach zone

array scheduled for fiscal year 1998.

Funding (fiscal years 1993-97): $63.7 million.

Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998-03): $87.8 million.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Programmatic Examples of Funding

Instability

Two examples of mine warfare programs that have been in the research

and development phase for many years without advancing to procurement

are the AQS-20, a mine-hunting sonar, and the Airborne Mine

Neutralization System. The following tables illustrate the changes,

including the recent series of internal Department of Defense (DOD)

increases and decreases, to these programs’ funding. The changes

depicted in table II. 1 resulted in a delay in the AQS-20 schedule. The

production decision slipped 1 year, from second quarter fiscal year 1998 to

second quarter fiscal year 1999.

Table II.1: AQS-20 and Airborne Mine

Neutralization System Funding Profile,

as of March 1996 Fiscal year

(Dollars in thousands)

1995 1996 1997

As presented in the fiscal

year 1996 President’s

budget

$218

(actual)

$12,791

(estimated

appropriation)

$20,123 (estimate)

Reprogramming from

Airborne Laser Mine

Detection System

8,947

Congressional

undistributed reductions

–346

Revised inflation rates –55 –843

Reinitiate Airborne Mine

Neutralization System

10,400

AQS-20/MK 105

realignment

1,200

Realignment to Shallow

Water Mine

Countermeasures

program element

–10,431

Realignment to Remote

Minehunting System

–7,285

Total, as presented in

the fiscal year 1997

President’s budget

$9,165

(adjusted actual)

$12,390

(adjusted

appropriation)

$13,164

(revised estimate)

Source: Fiscal year 1997 Navy budget estimates for research development, test, and evaluation

(RDT&E).

The changes depicted in table II.2 resulted in delays in the schedules of

both the AQS-20 and the Airborne Mine Neutralization System. The

production decision for the AQS-20 slipped an additional 6 months, to the

fourth quarter fiscal year 1999. The production decision for the Airborne

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Programmatic Examples of Funding

Instability

Mine Neutralization System slipped 1 year, from third quarter fiscal year

1999 to third quarter fiscal year 2000 due to funding constraints.

Table II.2: AQS-20 and Airborne Mine Neutralization System Funding Profile, as of February 1997

Fiscal year

Dollars in thousands)

1996 1997 1998 1999

As presented in the fiscal year 1997

President’s budget

$12,355a

(actual)

$13,164

(revised estimate)

$13,069

(estimate)

$5,694

(estimate)

Estimated appropriation 19,164

Small Business Innovative Research

assessment

–194

General reductions –187 –46 –99

Navy Working Capital Fund adjustments –807 80 –58

Cost growth related to AQS-20 design

complexity, contractor requirements

4,500 10,200

Technical evaluation cost growth –1,100

Restructuring of Airborne Mine

Neutralization System

4,200

Total, as presented in the fiscal year

1998-99 President’s budget

$11,974

(adjusted actual)

$18,357

(adjusted

appropriation)

$16,503

(revised estimate)

$19,937

(revised estimate)

aThe $45 difference between the figure of $12,390 shown in table II.1 and the figure of $12,355 is

unexplained in the budget documents.

Source: Fiscal year 1998-99 Navy budget estimates for RDT&E.

The changes depicted in table II.3 reflect the addition of two new

initiatives, the Configuration Theory Tactical Decision Aid and the Shallow

Water Influence Minesweep System. Congress increased the fiscal 

year 1998 budget request by $2 million for the Shallow-Water Influence

Minesweep System program.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix II 

Programmatic Examples of Funding

Instability

Table II.3: AQS-20 and Airborne Mine

Neutralization System Funding Profile,

as of February 1998 Fiscal year

(Dollars in thousands)

1997 1998 1999

As presented in the fiscal

year 1998-99 President’s

budget

$18,357

(actual)

$16,503

(estimated

appropriation)

$19,937

(estimate)

Appropriations 18,503

Small Business Innovative

Research assessment

–366

Navy Working Capital Fund –22 –598 –83

Configuration Theory

Tactical Decision Aid

200

Total, as presented in

the fiscal year 1999

President’s budget

$17,969

(adjusted actual)

$17,905

(adjusted

appropriation)

$20,054

(estimate)

Source: Fiscal year 1999 Navy amended budget estimates for RDT&E.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix III 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix III 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

Now on p. 8.

Now on p. 8.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix III 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

Now on p. 9.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Richard J. Price, Assistant Director

Martha J. Dey, Senior Evaluator

John D. Heere, Senior Evaluator

Jack G. Perrigo, Jr., Senior Evaluator

Office of the General

Counsel

William T. Woods, Assistant General Counsel

Boston Field Office Ralph L. Tavares, Senior Evaluator

Norfolk Field Office Anton G. Blieberger, Evaluator-in-Charge

(707301) Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-135 Navy Mine Warfare
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