Report to the Ranking Minority

Member, Subcommittee on Readiness

and Management Support, Committee

on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

July 2001 MILITARY

READINESS

Management of Naval

Aviation Training

Munitions Can Be

Improved

GAO-01-840
Page i GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Letter 1

Results in Brief 1

Background 2

Units Do Not Have Enough of Key Types of Ordnance Needed to

Conduct Required Training and Exercises 6

Causes of Training Ordnance Shortages 10

Shortages Lower Aircrew Proficiency and Squadron Readiness 15

Conclusions 17

Recommendations for Executive Action 18

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 19

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 20

Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense 22

Appendix III Training Ordnance Received by Navy and Marine Corps

Tactical Aviation Units 25

Appendix IV Training Ordnance Requested by Navy and Marine Corps

Tactical Aviation Units 27

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment 29

Figures

Figure 1. F/A-18 Ordnance 5

Figure 2: Percent of Required Training Ordnance Received by Navy

Tactical Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001 7

Figure 3: Percent of Required Training Ordnance Received by

Marine Tactical Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to

2001 9

Contents
Page 1 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

July 27, 2001

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Over the past several years senior Navy officials have testified before

Congress about the effects of shortages in training resource on the

readiness of aviation units. At your request, we examined one of these

resources—-ordnance1

 for air-to-ground training—to assess the potential

for enhancing Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation2

 unit readiness by

improving training ordnance management. This report analyzes (1)

shortages in air-to-ground training ordnance required to meet training

readiness requirements, (2) factors that account for the shortages, and (3)

the effect of shortages on training and tactical aviation readiness. The

scope and methodology of our work are described in appendix I.

Navy and Marine tactical aviation units do not have enough of some key

types of ordnance to meet their stated training and exercise requirements.

Navy units are experiencing shortages in several types of advanced

training ordnance, including inert laser guided training rounds and guided

bombs. Marine units are experiencing extensive shortages of both

advanced training ordnance and common ordnance, such as live bombs.

Factors that contribute to the Navy and Marine Corps’ training ordnance

shortages include a poor process for determining annual ordnance needs,

the low funding priority the Navy has assigned to ordnance, and an

allocation process that does not put the ordnance where it is needed for

training. More specifically

• Many Navy and Marine ordnance requests submitted between fiscal

year 1998 and 2001—particularly requests for inert laser-guided training

 1

 The term ordnance, as used in this report, refers to the ammunition and expendable items

used by tactical aviation units in air-to-ground operations, such as live bombs, inert bombs,

cartridges, flares, and chaff (fibers spread by aircraft and used as decoys for enemy radar).

2

 Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation squadrons are those that fly the F/A-18 Hornet,

the F-14 Tomcat, or the AV-8 Harrier.

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548

Results in Brief
Page 2 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

rounds and guided bombs—-were well below training requirements.

This occurs because Navy ordnance managers are not provided

sufficient guidance to determine training ordnance requirements,

including ordnance for Navy exercises.

• Training ordnance shortages also result from the low funding priority

the Navy gives ordnance, which has resulted in Navy-wide inventory

shortages of live ordnance and inert training ordnance. For some types

of live ordnance, Navy stockpiles are currently at about 40 to 65

percent of the Navy’s requirement.

• The Navy’s training ordnance allocation process does not make the

most efficient and effective use of available training ordnance. For

example, Marine units normally maintain a higher year-round readiness

than comparable Navy units and, thus, have higher training ordnance

requirements. However, the Marine Corps is not allocated any

additional ordnance to reflect this higher requirement. Additionally, we

identified instances where the Atlantic Naval Air Forces received more

ordnance than they needed to meet their training needs while the

Pacific Naval Air Forces received less than they needed of the same

ordnance to meet their training needs. These disparate allocations

occur because fleet ordnance requests are not validated against

training requirements at the Department of Navy level.

Training ordnance shortages limit the amount of training and exercises

aircrews can carry out and reportedly affect their proficiency in certain

tasks. The shortages also extend the period of time where units are at

lower readiness levels and force them to make a last-minute “rush” to

achieve readiness just before deployment. This increases the risk that

units may not be sufficiently prepared if they suddenly are needed for an

unexpected deployment.

We are making recommendations to help improve the Navy’s process for

determining training requirements and its ordnance procurement and

allocation process. In written comments on a draft of this report, the

Department of Defense agreed with most of our recommendations, but

disagreed that the fleets need guidance and training for determining

training ordnance requirements. As discussed in our evaluation of the

Department’s comments on page 19, we continue to believe that our

recommendation has merit.

In 1997, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued Instruction 3000.4,

which sets forth policies, roles and responsibilities, time frames and Background
Page 3 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

procedures to guide the services as they develop their ordnance

requirements. This instruction is titled the Capabilities-Based Munitions

Requirements Process and is the responsibility of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The process is

designed to ensure that the military departments establish ordnance

requirements necessary to address the operational objectives of the

commanders in chief of the combat commands and include those

requirements in the planning, programming, and budgeting process. The

Navy process that implements the Capabilities-Based Munitions

Requirements Process is the Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirements

determination process. This process, which includes the Marine Corps’

aviation ordnance requirements, identifies the Navy’s war reserve

ordnance requirements and training, testing, and current operations

requirements. These two requirements, along with the Navy’s ordnance

maintenance requirement, constitute the Navy’s total munitions

requirement. The calculation of the total munitions requirement is not

constrained by anticipated funding limitations. This requirement is input

into the Navy’s planning, programming, and budgeting process as the

Navy’s procurement objective.

The training, testing, and current operations block of the Non-Nuclear

Ordnance Requirements process determines the ordnance requirements

for training. Each year, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations

for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments requests training,

testing, and current operations data from 14 major claimants. Input for

tactical aviation training principally comes from three of these claimants:

the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and the Naval Strike and Air

Warfare Center.3

 Marine Force Pacific and Marine Force Atlantic aviation

training requirements are included in the data submitted by their

respective fleets. Even though the Navy refers to this as its training,

testing, and current operations requirement, calculation procedures do not

incorporate a Navy or Marine requirement for current operations.

Training ordnance includes a variety of live and practice non-guided

general purpose bombs, live and practice precision-guided ordnance,

cartridges, missiles, and other training expendable items managed by the

Navy as ordnance, such as chaff and flares. The most common general-

 3

 The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Fallon, NV, provides advanced training for naval

aviators whose missions are to attack enemy targets ashore, suppress enemy air defenses,

or engage enemy aircraft in air-to-air combat. The Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics

Squadron provides comparable training to Marine aviators.
Page 4 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

purpose bombs are the MK-80 series weapons, which weigh between 500

and 2000 pounds. General-purpose bombs were the type of ordnance most

frequently employed in both the Gulf War in 1991 and Operation Allied

Force in 1999. Precision-guided ordnance includes laser-guided bombs, in

which the operator illuminates a target with a laser designator and then

the munition is guided to a spot of laser energy reflected from the target;

television-guided or infrared-guided systems, in which a data link in the

bomb’s tail section sends guidance updates to a control aircraft that

enables the weapons system operator to guide the bomb by remote control

to the target; and bombs that utilize the Global Positioning System for

guidance to its target. While less than 10 percent of the weapons used in

the Gulf War were precision ordnance, about one-third of the weapons

employed by U.S. forces in Operation Allied Force consisted of this type of

ordnance. Figure 1 shows the range of ordnance an F/A-18 aircrew must

be trained to use.
Page 5 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Figure 1. F/A-18 Ordnance

Source: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Ordnance Package.

http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navypalib/allhands/ah0197/fa18ord.html.
Page 6 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

In fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, Navy and Marine Corps tactical

aviation units did not receive sufficient quantities of some key types of

ordnance they needed to conduct required training. The types and

quantities of training ordnance required for aircrew training are defined in

service training and readiness instructions for each aircraft model. We

compared the minimum amount of ordnance that the training instructions

said units needed to reach their readiness goals with the ordnance the

units received in each of the 4 years and found that both services had

persistent shortages. The shortages were actually greater than our analysis

indicated because our analysis did not include the ordnance needed for

Navy and Marine exercises, which are part of their training.

Specifically, Navy tactical aviation units had the severest shortages in

advanced training ordnance such as laser-guided training rounds and

guided bombs. The Marine Corps also had shortages of the same items, as

well as the most common types of ordnance (live and inert bombs). Figure

2 shows that there was improvement in the allocation of five types of

training ordnance in the Navy in fiscal years 1998-2001. Throughout the

period, however, both the Atlantic and Pacific Naval Air Forces had

shortages of laser-guided training rounds and guided bombs. While

availability of the latter ordnance increased substantially during the

period, availability of the former increased to only about half of the

requirement. Guided bombs have been the preferred type of ordnance in

recent operations, such as Operation Allied Force, and laser-guided

training rounds are used to train for delivery of these weapons. Additional

data on other types of ordnance received by Navy and Marine Corps units

are in appendix III.

Units Do Not Have

Enough of Key Types

of Ordnance Needed

to Conduct Required

Training and

Exercises
Page 7 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Figure 2: Percent of Required Training Ordnance Received by Navy Tactical

Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001

Figure 2 only shows that the regional air forces received less ordnance

than required by the Navy’s training instruction. The actual shortages were

more severe because the Navy conducts training exercises that have

ordnance requirements that are not included in the instructions. Several of

these exercises are relatively large, such as training at the Naval Strike and

Air Warfare Center, and the Composite Training Unit Exercise. For

example, a training officer estimated that one carrier air wing needs 126

laser-guided training rounds for the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center

detachment and another 128 for the Composite Training Unit Exercise.

However, the Navy’s training instruction shows that one carrier air wing

needs only about 54 to 56 laser guided training rounds during the period it

0

50

100

150

200

Practice bombs

Inert bombs

Live bombs

Laser-guided training rounds

Guided bomb units

Fiscal year

1998 1999 2000 2001

Percent of requirement
Page 8 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

goes to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center and about 15 to 19 laserguided training rounds during the period it conducts its Composite

Training Unit Exercise.4

Figure 3 shows the percentage of required training ordnance received by

Marine tactical aviation units for the same 5 items. The data again show

improvement but also that Marine aircrews still were not receiving the

required amounts of two types of ordnance--live bombs remained at 14 to

20 percent of requirements, and laser-guided training rounds were at about

75 percent of requirement in fiscal year 2001.

 4

 The number varies based on the composition of a wing. Some wings have one F-14

squadron and three F-18 squadrons, and some have two F-14 squadrons and two F-18

squadrons.
Page 9 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Figure 3: Percent of Required Training Ordnance Received by Marine Tactical

Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001

Figure 3 shows the shortages we identified using the Marine Corps training

instructions. The actual shortages could be more severe, because like the

Navy, Marine Corps units also participate in exercises, known as

Combined Arms Exercises, requiring ordnance that is not included in the

training instructions. Unlike the Navy, the Marines have identified a

standard Combined Arms Exercise ordnance requirement. Units are aware

of the requirement and are instructed to incorporate this requirement into

their requests. The data in figure 3, however, show that the amounts

received do not support the training instruction requirements alone,

without considering these additional exercise requirements.

0

50

100

150

Practice bombs

Inert bombs

Live bombs

Laser-guided training rounds

Guided bomb units

Percent of requirement

Fiscal year

1998 1999 2000 2001
Page 10 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Our calculations do not include the training ordnance made available to

units or pilots through participation in certain training events or the

service weapons schools. Like the fleets, the weapons schools receive

training ordnance allocations. The ordnance used by units or pilots

attending the training events and weapons schools is in addition to the

ordnance available to units from fleet allocations. For example, the Naval

Strike and Air Warfare Center provides some ordnance to support units

during their training there. Therefore, it is possible that portions of the

shortages identified are offset by ordnance received from other claimants.

Factors contributing to shortages include (1) units do not ask for sufficient

amounts of ordnance to support their training and exercise needs; (2) the

Navy has given munitions a low funding priority, which has resulted in low

ordnance stockpile-levels of live munitions and shortages of inert training

munitions; and (3) the Navy has poorly allocated available ordnance.

We reviewed Navy and Marine aviation training ordnance requests

submitted in fiscal years 1998 through 2001 for 10 types of air-to-ground

training ordnance. We compared the amounts requested to that required

by the units as defined by their training instructions and found that

requests were frequently for less ordnance than needed to support the

training identified in the instruction. Our calculations did not include

exercise requirements, which would make the disparity even greater.

Overall, Naval Air Forces Atlantic requested less ordnance than required

to meet its training instruction requirements for 25 percent of its requests

during the period. Most notably, it requested less than 50 percent of its

required laser-guided training rounds and less than 15 percent of its flare

requirement in fiscal years 1998 to 2000. Data on Naval Air Forces Pacific

requests were not available for fiscal year 2000, but in the other 3 years its

requests were less than its training instruction requirements for about 40

percent of the items reviewed. Its requests for laser-guided rounds were

less than requirements in all 3 years and its request for guided bombs was

less than requirements in 2 of the 3 years.

Marine Force Atlantic training ordnance requests during the period

understated its training requirements for 78 percent of its requests, while

Marine Force Pacific requested less than its requirements for 69 percent of

its requests. Again, Marine Force Atlantic requested less than 50 percent of

its laser-guided training round requirement in 3 of the 4 years, and Marine

Force Pacific requested less than 50 percent of its requirements in all 4

years. For 4 of the 10 items reviewed, Marine Force Atlantic’s request

averaged less than 20 percent of the published requirement. One area

Causes of Training

Ordnance Shortages

Units Do Not Ask for

Required Ordnance
Page 11 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

where requests tended to exceed requirements was heavy inert bombs.

Marine officials told us that they requested these bombs to offset live

bomb requirements, because there are few ranges where live bombs can

be used. However, the Marine Force Atlantic’s request for live and inert

bombs combined was only between 34 and 43 percent of its total

requirement.

Units we visited did not ask for the ordnance they needed to support their

training for a variety of reasons. One explanation was that they did not

know how to use the training instruction to determine their annual needs

because the instruction does not provide sufficient guidance for

identifying needs. As a result, rather than using a standard methodology to

determine their annual training ordnance needs, units used a variety of

processes. For example, some units used historical expenditure or

allocation data, while other units based their requests on the training

instructions and planned exercises. There were also units that understood

the instructions but adjusted their requests based on anticipated aircraft

and pilot availability, and instances where officials said they were

instructed not to request certain ordnance because it would not be

available. Other units told us there were times where they did not request

ordnance because they believed it was either in short supply or because

they were not confident that they could expend it during the year. The

result was often the use of current and previous year’s expenditures—

which were usually well below requirements—as the basis for future

year’s requirements. For example, one carrier air wing requested 150 laserguided training rounds while the instruction shows a need for 639, and

5,750 practice bombs when the instruction shows a requirement for 11,300.

Another carrier air wing asked for 784 laser-guided training rounds when

the instruction shows a requirement for 509, and 7,026 practice bombs

when the instruction shows a requirement for 10,075.

The most significant shortcoming in the Navy’s training instruction is that

it does not include ordnance requirements for exercises and, as shown in

appendix IV, requests often did not include the additional amounts needed

to satisfy exercise requirements. Carrier air wings preparing for

deployment participate in a number of exercises that require relatively

large amounts of ordnance. With one exception,5

 the ordnance

requirements for these exercises are not identified in any instruction or

 5

 The Pacific Fleet’s Carrier Group One has issued an instruction for its Composite Training

Unit Exercise.
Page 12 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

guidance. As a result, units cannot plan for them. Instead, the exercise

sponsors identify shortly before the exercise the ordnance the carrier air

wings should bring. Officials in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

who are responsible for training ordnance agreed that all training

ordnance requirements should be identified in the instructions. They were

not aware that the fleets had imposed additional ordnance requirements

for any exercises.

When we discussed the process for calculating and reviewing ordnance

requests at the squadrons that we visited, Navy ordnance managers

expressed their frustration with the uncertainty of the exercise

requirements. They also said that they had received no training in the

computation of ordnance requirements. Ordnance managers at higher

command levels also said that they did not review the request data they

received from subordinate units for accuracy. They generally did not know

what the requirements were and thus had no basis for questioning requests

from subordinate units. They only totaled the requests they received and

passed them on to the next management level. Ordnance managers also

cited a lack of written guidance to help them through the process of

identifying training ordnance requirements. The only available guidance

(OPNAV Instruction 8010.12F/MCO 8010.12) provides an overview of the

Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirements process—the Navy’s input into

DOD’s Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements process—but the

instruction states only that naval commanders in chief are responsible for

ensuring training requirements are submitted. The guidance contains no

details on what this entails.

A Marine Corps headquarters official also told us they provided no

guidance for how requests were to be calculated but expected the training

and readiness instruction to be the basis for the requests. However,

variances between requests and training instruction requirements still

existed. A Marine Force Atlantic official, when asked to explain why

requests varied greatly from year to year, stated that he did not know, but

believed it may be due to the use of different methodologies from year to

year and among different units.

While our work shows that weaknesses exist in the guidance, we are not

advocating that ordnance requests be based solely on training instruction

requirements. We recognize that training is sometimes affected by the

availability of other resources including pilots, planes, parts, fuel,

adversarial aircraft, ranges, and targeting systems, which can lower a

unit’s ordnance requirement needs. The units we visited were generally

aware of the factors that impeded their training. Making these factors
Page 13 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

explicit when training ordnance requests are submitted allows officials at

higher levels to immediately recognize when a request is not “right” and to

see the impact of these factors on the level and quality of training possible.

Such an exception report could also serve to facilitate the development of

alternative training strategies that maximize readiness within these

resource constraints.

The Navy has one ordnance stockpile, which is used for both war reserve

and training purposes. Replenishment of the stockpile has been given low

funding priority, which has resulted in a depletion of the stockpile to the

point that it is below the Navy’s total requirement. In some cases Navy airto-ground ordnance stockpiles are currently at about 40 to 65 percent of

the Navy’s total ordnance requirement. This condition is expected to

continue. For example, documents provided by the Navy show that in

fiscal year 2003 the Navy will have a live practice ordnance requirement of

$267.2 million, but is procuring only $130.7 million of ordnance, a shortage

of $136.5 million. This will keep the stockpile below requirements and

force the Navy to either forego some training and accept lower training

readiness, develop alternative training strategies, or accept the readiness

risks attendant to using war reserve assets for training. According to

officials in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, releasing war

reserve ordnance for training is a subjective judgement that balances the

value of training against the risk of not having the ordnance available in

the event of war.

The Navy also has shortages of inert training ordnance. Inert training

ordnance includes the laser-guided training round, and inert bombs. These

items are not stockpiled and the Navy generally buys about a year’s worth

of inventory at a time. Navy data shows a total requirement of $72 million

for inert ordnance in fiscal year 2003. However, funding is projected at $41

million, $31 million short of the total inert ordnance requirement.

Additionally the Navy’s $72 million requirement is based on fleet requests,

many of which are understated. For example, in fiscal year 2001 the

Pacific Naval Air Forces asked for only 700 laser-guided training rounds or

approximately 28 percent of its actual requirement of 2,542.

Inventory shortages raise the question of whether accurate fleet ordnance

requests would have resulted in the Atlantic and Pacific Naval Air Forces

receiving sufficient quantities of ordnance to support their training. As

mentioned, stocks of some munitions are short and priority is given to war

reserve stocks, making it unlikely that training requirements for all

munitions would have been met, regardless of what the fleets requested.

However, planned ordnance procurements are based on the requirements

The Low Funding Priority

Given Ordnance

Contributes to Shortages
Page 14 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

received from the various claimants. When requirements are understated,

it becomes less likely that future stockpiles will meet future requirements.

The Navy’s understating of its training requirements during each of the 4

years in our review would indicate that this has contributed in part to the

stockpile shortages.

The Navy’s annual ordnance procurement budget request submitted to

Congress includes aggregated war reserve ordnance and training ordnance

requirements making it impossible for Congress to understand how

funding decisions affect training readiness. Identifying the amount of the

Navy’s and Marine Corps’ ordnance procurement request that is for war

reserve and the amount that is for training would make the impact on

training more readily apparent.

Misallocation of available resources also contributes to the problem.

Appendix III shows examples where the Naval Air Forces Atlantic

received ordnance in excess of the requirements identified while Naval Air

Forces Pacific received less than its requirement for the same type of

ordnance. For example, in fiscal year 2000 Naval Air Force Atlantic

received 137 percent of its inert bomb requirement while Naval Air Forces

Pacific received 91 percent. Even in situations where neither fleets’ full

requirements were met, there are examples of inequitably distributed

assets. For example, in fiscal year 2001 Naval Air Forces Atlantic received

85 percent of their guided bomb requirement while Naval Air Forces

Pacific received only 61 percent.

According to Navy officials responsible for making ordnance allocation

decisions, the decisions are based on the requests received from the

regional air forces. As mentioned, they do not analyze the requests but try

to satisfy as much of each claimant’s request as possible with the

inventory available for distribution. If a fleet asks for more than it needs, it

could result in that fleet receiving more than its share.

Furthermore, the way ordnance is allocated to Navy and Marine Corps

units shortchanges the Marine Corps, which expects its units to remain at

higher readiness levels and has higher ordnance requirements for live

ordnance than the Navy does. The Marine Corps’ requests are combined

with the Navy’s requests for the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, allowing no

visibility for Marine-specific requirements. When the fleet receives

ordnance, it is allocated between the Navy and the Marine Corps on the

basis of pilot population, not per pilot requirements. The amount of

training ordnance allocated to a Marine Corps F/A-18 pilot is, therefore,

the same as for a Navy pilot, even though certain Marine Corps

Allocation Problems Cause

Some Shortages
Page 15 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

requirements exceed Navy requirements. For example, the order shows

that a Marine Corps F/A-18 crew requires 80 live MK-80 series bombs per

year, while a Navy F/A-18 crew requires only 12 live MK-80 series bombs to

maintain the same readiness level. Marine requirements are higher

because in some cases its training instruction calls for more and Marine

units are expected to maintain a higher year-round readiness level than

Navy units. For the years examined, both Atlantic and Pacific Marine

Corps forces typically received less than 20 percent of their live bomb

requirement and 10 percent or less of their Maverick missile requirement.

Conversely, the Navy usually received much higher percentages of its

requirement than the Marine Corps received—sometimes in excess of

their calculated requirement—for the same types of munitions.

Both Navy and Marine Corps officials questioned the amounts of live

ordnance required by the Marine Corps’ training order. The officials stated

that there are mission differences between the Marine Corps and Navy

that may explain some of the difference, but they believe that these

differences are not significant enough to explain the entire difference. The

Marine Corps is in the process of updating its training and readiness

instruction.

Training ordnance shortages impact units in a several ways. Foremost,

they lower the training readiness of tactical aviation units, they extend the

periods where units experience low readiness levels, and they compress a

considerable amount of predeployment training into the weeks

immediately prior to deployment. As a result, should units have to prepare

rapidly for deployment, they may embark at lower readiness levels than

prescribed. Shortages also reduce the amount of practice aircrews receive

with weapons and affect pilot proficiency in attacking ground targets.

Both the Navy and Marine Corps have directly linked the accomplishment

of training tasks to reported training readiness through the DOD’s Global

Status of Readiness and Training System. In this system, training readiness

is reported in one of four categories, T-1 through T-4. A T-1 unit is trained

to undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized and

designed. A T-4 unit is at the lowest readiness level and needs additional

training to undertake its wartime mission.

Aircrews earn points through the completion of training tasks that allow

them to progress into higher training readiness categories. Without

ordnance, aircrews cannot fully complete many of their training tasks. For

Navy units, this reduces the number of training tasks that can be applied

toward training readiness. The Marine Corps is less stringent. For

Shortages Lower

Aircrew Proficiency

and Squadron

Readiness
Page 16 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

example, the Navy requires aircrews to have the required ordnance to earn

the points associated with a training task. Since about 64 percent of the

Navy’s F-14 training tasks and 58 percent of its F/A-18 training tasks

require ordnance, ordnance availability directly affects individual aircrew

readiness in Navy tactical aviation units. The Marine Corps permits

aircrews to conduct training events with less than the required ordnance.

According to Marine officials, Marine pilots can use less than the required

quantity of ordnance or substitute ordnance and still earn points. Thus,

ordnance shortages do not affect individual aviator readiness in Marine

units as significantly. Marine officials told us that they do not view a strict

by-the-book calculation of readiness as reflective of the true capabilities of

the squadron.

Ordnance shortages also extend the period in which units report low

readiness. Each training task has a currency period, which is the amount

of days after a training event is completed before the qualification expires.

Squadron and wing representatives told us when sufficient ordnance is not

available to support all training, units conserve their available ordnance so

they can achieve currency near their deployment date. For example, the

currency period for one of the Navy’s precision guided ordnance training

tasks is 90 days. Since the Navy does not have enough laser-guided

training rounds to support all required training, units generally only train

with the round in the months before deployment in order to be ready on

their deployment date rather than year round as envisioned by the training

instruction. Such practices can place aircrews in a degraded state of

readiness for much of the year as the currency periods for tasks expire

and are not renewed. It could be difficult for such units to respond quickly

and effectively to unexpected mission needs.

Several of the units we visited reported that the lack of training affects

pilot proficiency in attacking ground targets. Ordnance shortages also

reduce ground crew training, which impacts aircrew success. For

example, one squadron that had recently returned from Operation

Southern Watch in Iraq reported that during the deployment it dropped 18

precision weapons on targets in 1 day and all 18 failed to detonate. They

attributed the failures to ground crew inexperience in loading and wiring

the weapons. Because both the risk and cost of errors is great, squadron

and air wing officials told us they spend an inordinate amount of time

briefing ground ordnance and aircrews on the safe handling of live

ordnance prior to a training event or deployment where the use of live

ordnance is anticipated.
Page 17 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

A July 2000 report from the Navy Inspector General cited shortages of

training ordnance as a contributing factor to low initial air wing success in

the delivery of precision ordnance at major exercises and in contingency

operations. It found that 98 percent of combat operations since Desert

Storm have involved the employment of laser-guided bombs, but fewer

than 30 percent of Navy aviators had employed a live laser-guided bomb in

training or combat. The Navy Inspector General recommended that

training ordnance allocations be reassessed in order to ensure that all

aircrew are fully trained and qualified prior to deployment. We could find

no documented evidence of how severely units are impacted by the

shortages. However, clearly aircrews are not receiving all of the training

repetitions envisioned by the operators, education specialists, and training

system analysts who wrote the Navy and Marine Corps training

instructions.

The availability of Navy and Marine training ordnance depends on an

accurate requirements determination process, a procurement program that

supports identified needs, and an allocation process that puts the right

amount of ordnance where it is needed for training. The Navy program has

problems with all three of these elements. Neither the Navy nor Marine

Corps provides request data that reflects the training needs identified in its

training instruction. While both services have linked their ordnance

requirements to readiness in their training instructions, neither services’

request indicates that its instruction serves as the basis for identifying its

needs. Moreover, the Navy’s failure to fully identify its exercise

requirements, justify them in its training instruction, and develop a process

for including these requirements in its training ordnance requests, makes it

near impossible for ordnance officials to effectively plan ordnance needs.

We recognize that there are many other factors that impact each service’s

ability to fully execute its training plans. However, we believe each service

has the knowledge and ability to develop more accurate and justifiable

training ordnance requirements. Guidance that details how units should go

about this process would greatly aid units in developing their requests. A

well-justified training program linked to readiness would also aid in

developing and supporting a procurement program that meets its needs.

Better allocation of available ordnance to units also would improve

training readiness. We recognize that erroneous data from units

contributes to this problem. However, the practice of allocating ordnance

to the Marine Corps on a per-pilot basis rather than a training order

requirement basis creates additional readiness problems for the Marines. If

the Navy and Marine Corps believe that the ordnance requirements

identified in the Marine training order cannot be justified, they have the

responsibility to change the order.

Conclusions
Page 18 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Navy and Marine aviation training readiness depends on the completion of

training tasks identified in their respective training instructions. Between

41 and 64 percent of these training tasks require ordnance. Yet, despite

this direct link to training readiness, the Navy’s ordnance procurement

budget request, which combines both its war time requirements and its

training requirements, has been less than its training requirement alone.

This forces the Navy and Marine Corps to forego the training and accept

lower training readiness, to develop alternative training strategies, or to

accept the readiness risks attendant to using war reserve assets for

training. Further, unless the Navy separately identifies its training

ordnance needs in its budget request, the impact of funding decisions on

training readiness will not be apparent.

To improve the availability of training ordnance in tactical aviation units,

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Navy to take the following actions:

• Update the Navy and Marine Corps training and readiness instructions

so that they are comprehensive and identify the ordnance needed for

regularly scheduled pre-deployment exercises.

• Develop guidance for fleet use that provides a standardized

methodology for determining training ordnance requirements and train

the appropriate personnel in the use of that guidance to help ensure

that accurate and reliable data are submitted by units in the ordnance

requirements determination process.

• Require Marine and carrier air wings to include, along with their

training ordnance request, an exception report detailing the reason(s)

for requests that differ substantially from the ordnance requirements

identified in the training instructions.

• Allocate ordnance on the basis of the documented training

requirements identified in the Navy and Marine Corps training

instructions.

• Designate the Marine Forces-Atlantic and Marine Forces-Pacific as

major claimants in the ordnance requirements determination process

to increase the visibility of Marine requirements.

• Direct the Navy and Marine Corps to identify the amount of its

ordnance procurement request that is for the war reserve stockpile and

the amount that is for training. If the amount requested for training is

less than the training requirement, the services should explain how

training readiness will be maintained without the required training

ordnance.

Recommendations for

Executive Action
Page 19 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with most of

our recommendations. However, it did not agree that the fleets need

guidance and training to help ensure accurate and reliable data are

submitted in the ordnance requirement determination process. DOD stated

that additional guidance would be counterproductive because the Navy’s

current training and readiness instruction is already perhaps the best DOD

example of a well-defined event based training program and provides a

basis for establishing funding requirements. We disagree with DOD and

continue to believe that our recommendation has merit and would not be

counterproductive. As discussed in this report, carrier and Marine air wing

officials we met with largely did not know how to use the training and

readiness instruction to determine their ordnance requirements. The 4-

year pattern of understated ordnance requests submitted by the wings also

supports the need for some guidance and training in determining

requirements. Appendix II contains the full text of DOD’s comments. DOD

also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional

committees; the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; the

Honorable Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy; and the Honorable

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management and Budget.

Please contact me at (757) 552-8100 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

Neal P. Curtin, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 20 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

To assess shortages in Navy and Marine Corps air-to-ground training

ordnance required to meet training readiness requirements, we reviewed

the Navy and Marine Corps’ training, testing, and current operations

submissions, and ordnance allocations for the Naval Air Forces in the

Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific. We

reviewed this data for fiscal years 1998 through 2001. We compared the

Navy requests and allocations to a GAO-calculated squadron training and

readiness ordnance requirement based on Commander Naval Air Pacific

Instruction 3500.67E and Commander Naval Air Atlantic Instruction

3500.63E. We compared the Marines’ requests and allocations to a GAOcalculated squadron training and readiness requirement based on Marine

Order P3500.15. Officials within the Offices of the Navy Deputy Chief of

Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments,

and Headquarters Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Aviation,

Washington, D.C., validated the appropriateness of these models. We did

not question the validity of the ordnance requirements identified in either

instruction. Our Navy calculation is based on the minimum ordnance

required for squadrons to train to the readiness level appropriate to their

place in their inter-deployment training cycle. Our Marine calculation is

based on the annual requirements identified in its training order. We also

reviewed Department of Defense Instruction 3000.4, Capabilities-Based

Munitions Requirements Process, to ascertain roles and oversight

responsibilities and to identify required inputs to the process. We reviewed

the Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2000-2005 and the update

for fiscal years 2001-2005 to find out the instruction the Department

provided to guide the services as they determine their ordnance

requirements. We visited officials responsible for training and training

ordnance at the Naval Air Forces Atlantic and Pacific and Marine Force

Atlantic to discuss the guidance they provided. We obtained similar

information from Marine Force Pacific officials. Afterward, we visited a

sample of Navy carrier air wings and squadrons and Marine Corps air

wings and squadrons to obtain explanations of their training ordnance

determination processes.

To establish the reasons for ordnance shortages in units and their impacts

on units, we met with Department and service officials to obtain their

views on training ordnance problems. We met with senior officials and

performed work at the Office of the Navy Deputy Chief of Naval

Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments, and

Headquarters Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Aviation,

Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Air

Forces Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia; the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Honolulu, Hawaii;

Naval Air Forces Pacific, San Diego, California; Marine Force Atlantic,

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 21 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Ammunition Logistics Center, Mechanicsburg,

Pennsylvania; Carrier Air Wing 9, Lemoore Naval Air Station, California;

Strike Fighter Wing Pacific, Lemoore Naval Air Station, California; Carrier

Air Wing 8, Oceana Naval Air Station, Virginia; Marine Corps Training and

Education Command, Quantico Marine Corps Station, Virginia; 2d Marine

Air Wing, Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, North Carolina; Marine

Air Group 14, Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, North Carolina;

Marine Air Group 31, Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station, South Carolina;

and Navy and Marine fighter squadrons in both the Atlantic and Pacific

Fleets.

We performed our review from January through April 2001 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 22 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Appendix II: Comments From the

Department of Defense
Appendix II: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 23 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness
Appendix II: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 24 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness
Appendix III: Training Ordnance Received by

Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Aviation

Units

Page 25 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Percent of Required Training Ordnance Received by Navy Tactical Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001

Description Fleet FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 4-year average

MK-76/BDU-48 practice bombs Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 132 129 147 141 137

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 82 93 102 110 97

MK-80/BDU-45 inert bombs Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 89 208 137 116 138

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 93 141 91 100 106

MK-80 series live bombs Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 122 130 104 129 121

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 85 88 58 83 79

Cluster bombs Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 333 364 398 344 360

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 235 256 301 374 292

Laser-guided training rounds Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 25 44 66 45 45

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 31 36 44 56 42

Chaff Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 57 105 74 90 82

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 68 70 59 87 71

Flares Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 37 53 73 49 53

Naval Air Forces-Pacific No data 62 57 40 53

Guided bomb units Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 5 5 59 85 39

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 4 6 35 61 27

Infrared-guided Maverick missile Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 100 118 64 191 118

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 65 81 71 94 78

Laser-guided Maverick missile Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 86 64 64 145 90

Naval Air Forces-Pacific No data 50 59 88 66

Source: Navy F-14 and F/A-18 requirements were calculated based on a unit’s place in the interdeployment cycle using the per squadron requirements contained in COMNAVAIRPACINST

3500.67E and COMNAVAIRLANTINST 3500.63E.

Appendix III: Training Ordnance Received by

Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Aviation

Units
Appendix III: Training Ordnance Received by

Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Aviation

Units

Page 26 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Percent of Required Training Ordnance Received by Marine Corps Tactical Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001

Description Fleet FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 4-year average

MK-76/BDU-48 practice bombs Marine Forces-Atlantic 115 84 72 137 102

Marine Forces-Pacific 158 145 128 89 130

MK-80/BDU-45 inert bombs Marine Forces-Atlantic 51 101 54 127 83

Marine Forces-Pacific 74 109 74 79 84

MK-80 series live bombs Marine Forces-Atlantic 13 10 14 16 13

Marine Forces-Pacific 16 23 19 10 17

Cluster bombs Marine Forces-Atlantic

Marine Forces-Pacific

No requirement, but this ordnance is

requested and allocated annually.

Laser-guided training rounds Marine Forces-Atlantic 25 13 28 90 39

Marine Forces-Pacific 12 18 34 65 32

Chaff Marine Forces-Atlantic 11 11 11 No data 11

Marine Forces-Pacific 23 25 11 No data 20

Flares Marine Forces-Atlantic 13 9 17 No data 13

Marine Forces-Pacific 25 18 26 No data 23

Guided bomb units Marine Forces-Atlantic 26 6 47 121 50

Marine Forces-Pacific 16 6 51 75 37

Infrared-guided Maverick missile Marine Forces-Atlantic 6 10 19 15 13

Marine Forces-Pacific 9 9 7 9 9

Laser-guided Maverick missile Marine Forces-Atlantic 5 10 14 9 10

Marine Forces-Pacific 8 9 8 5 8

Source: Marine Corps AV-8B and F/A-18 requirements were calculated using the per crew

expendable ordnance requirements contained in the applicable T&R Volume II, MCO 3500.15. In

calculating the amounts required by units, we assumed that units are fully manned. Total

requirements were calculated by multiplying the squadron requirements times the appropriate number

of squadrons.
Appendix IV: Training Ordnance Requested by

Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Aviation

Units

Page 27 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Percent of Required Training Ordnance Requested by Navy Tactical Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001

Description Fleet FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01

MK-76/BDU-48 practice bombs Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 158 181 158 166

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 91 193 No data 84

MK-80/BDU-45 inert bombs Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 243 278 243 290

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 138 209 No data 158

MK-80 series live bombs Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 168 171 168 118

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 108 159 No data 89

Cluster bombs Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 142 157 142 551

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 663 435 No data 288

Laser-guided training rounds Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 38 47 38 112

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 77 65 No data 28

Chaff Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 94 102 94 171

Naval Air Forces-Pacific No data No data No data 72

Flares Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 13 14 13 126

Naval Air Forces-Pacific No data No data No data 64

Guided bomb units Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 98 109 98 111

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 70 238 No data 0

Infrared-guided Maverick missile Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 169 200 169 109

Naval Air Forces-Pacific 141 281 No data 138

Laser-guided Maverick missile Naval Air Forces-Atlantic 129 164 138 109

Naval Air Forces-Pacific No data 156 No data 150

Appendix IV: Training Ordnance Requested

by Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Aviation

Units
Appendix IV: Training Ordnance Requested by

Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Aviation

Units

Page 28 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Percent of Required Training Ordnance Requested by Marine Corps Tactical Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001

Description Fleet FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01

MK-76/BDU-48 practice bombs Marine Forces-Atlantic 140 138 90 106

Marine Forces-Pacific 335 136 131 131

MK-80/BDU-45 inert bombs Marine Forces-Atlantic 187 159 128 166

Marine Forces-Pacific 669 206 197 197

MK-80 series live bombs Marine Forces-Atlantic 23 21 20 21

Marine Forces-Pacific 34 58 56 56

Cluster bombs Marine Forces-Atlantic

Marine Forces-Pacific

No requirement, but this ordnance is

requested and allocated annually.

Laser-guided training rounds Marine Forces-Atlantic 29 33 68 24

Marine Forces-Pacific 22 39 39 39

Chaff Marine Forces-Atlantic 27 16 15 17

Marine Forces-Pacific 128 95 92 92

Flares Marine Forces-Atlantic 18 21 15 15

Marine Forces-Pacific 54 42 42 42

Guided bomb units Marine Forces-Atlantic 21 42 38 119

Marine Forces-Pacific 258 100 94 94

Infrared-guided Maverick missile Marine Forces-Atlantic 14 14 28 11

Marine Forces-Pacific 44 23 23 23

Laser-guided Maverick missile Marine Forces-Atlantic 11 21 16 11

Marine Forces-Pacific 28 9 9 9
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgment

Page 29 GAO-01-840 Military Readiness

Marvin Casterline, Assistant Director, (202) 512-9076

Anthony DeFrank, Senior Defense Analyst

Glenn D. Furbish, Senior Defense Analyst

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgment

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

(350030)

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