ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 

 ANNUAL REPORT

 Calendar Year 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Enforcement 

Washington, DC 20555
OE Annual Report
OE Annual Report

Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................................... iii 

Calendar Year 2008 Summary ................................................................................................. v 

Introduction and Overview .......................................................................................1 

 Mission and Authority ................................................................................................. 1 

The Office of Enforcement........................................................................................... 2 

I. Escalated Enforcement Actions................................................................................... 3 

A. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties ..................................................... 3 

B. Civil Penalty Actions ......................................................................................... 4 

C. Orders ............................................................................................................... 5 

D. Enforcement Actions Supported by the Office of Investigation .................... 6 

E. Escalated Enforcement Trends ........................................................................ 6 

F. Demand for Information .................................................................................... 7 

II. Actions against Individuals and Non-Licensees......................................................... 7 

III. Cases Involving Discrimination ................................................................................... 8 

IV. Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOEDs) .............................................................. 8 

V. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate Enforcement 

Sanctions....... ............................................................................................................... 8 

VI. Withdrawn Actions........................................................................................................ 9

VII. Significant Enforcement Actions ................................................................................ 9 

VIII. Hearing Activities ........................................................................................................ 11 

IX. Enforcement Policy Changes and Enforcement Guidance Memoranda ................. 12 

X. Ongoing Activities ..................................................................................................... 13 

A. Safety Culture .................................................................................................. 13 

B. Alternative Dispute Resolution ....................................................................... 13 

C. Knowledge Management ................................................................................. 14 

D. OIG Audit of the NRC’s Enforcement Program ............................................. 15 

XI. Regional Accomplishments ..................................................................................... 16 
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- TABLES - 

Table 1. Civil Penalty Information ........................................................... 5 

Table 2. Escalated Action Trends ........................................................... 7 

Table 3. CY 2008 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Regions 

and Program Office ................................................................. 17 

Table 4. CY 2008 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type of 

 Licensee, Non-Licensee, or Individual ................................... 18 

- FIGURES - 

Figure 1. How NRC Regulates .................................................................. 1 

Figure 2. Escalated Enforcement by Type ............................................... 3 

Figure 3. CY 2008 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Regions 

and Program Office ................................................................... 7 

- APPENDICES - 

A. Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties ........... A1 

B. Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties ................................................ B1 

C. Summary of Orders ......................................................................................... C1

D. Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions against Individuals ............... D1 

E. Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions against Non-Licensees 

(Vendors, Contractors, and Certificate Holders) .......................................... E1 

 F. Summary of Notices of Enforcement Discretion .......................................... F1 
OE Annual Report

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Abstract 

This report provides the Commission with an overview of Enforcement Program activities for 

calendar year 2008. These activities include escalated enforcement actions, proposed changes 

to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Enforcement Policy, new initiatives, and revised 

staff guidance. 

Please note that security-related escalated enforcement actions involving, for example, notices 

of violation, civil penalties, and orders, not available to the public are included for statistical 

purposes but not described in this report. 

In calendar year 2008, the Office of Enforcement (OE) continued to focus on appropriate and 

consistent enforcement of NRC regulations. 

→ The agency issued 157 escalated enforcement actions, including the following: 

▪ 94 escalated notices of violation without civil penalties 

▪ 28 proposed civil penalties totaling $1,185,900 

▪ 35 orders modifying, suspending, or revoking a license, including prohibiting 

involvement in NRC-licensed activities 

→ The agency issued one demand for information. 

→ OE continued initiatives regarding licensee safety culture in a number of areas, including 

operating reactors, fuel facilities, and new reactor construction. 

→ The agency continued the successful use of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 

program in 12 enforcement cases. 

→ OE issued Revision 6 of the Enforcement Manual. 

OE Annual Report

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OE Annual Report

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Introduction and Overview 

Mission and Authority 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) regulates 

the civilian uses of nuclear 

materials in the United States to 

protect public health and safety, 

the environment, and the 

common defense and security. 

The agency accomplishes this 

mission through: licensing of 

nuclear facilities and the 

possession, use, and disposal of 

nuclear materials; the 

development and 

implementation of requirements 

governing licensed activities; 

and inspection and enforcement 

activities to ensure compliance 

with these requirements. 

The NRC conducts various 

types of inspections and 

investigations designed to 

 Figure 1: How NRC Regulates 

ensure that NRC-licensed activities and associated activities are conducted in strict compliance 

with the Commission’s regulations, the terms of the licenses, and other requirements. 

The sources of the NRC’s enforcement authority are the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended, (AEA), the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and the Energy Policy 

Act of 2005. These statutes provide the NRC with broad authority. The Energy Policy Act of 

2005 expanded the definition of byproduct material, placing additional byproduct material under 

NRC’s jurisdiction, including both naturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive 

materials (NARM). The agency implements its enforcement authority through Title 10, Part 2, 

“Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings and Issuance of Orders,” Subpart B, 

“Procedures for Imposing Requirements by Order, or for Modification, Suspension, or 

Revocation of a License, or for Imposing Civil Penalties,” of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR Part 2). The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 provides the statutory 

framework for the Federal Government to use alternative dispute resolution. 

The NRC Enforcement Policy sets out the general principles governing the NRC=s Enforcement 

Program and provides a process for implementing the agency=s enforcement authority in 

response to violations of NRC requirements. This statement of policy is predicated on the 

NRC=s belief that compliance with NRC requirements is essential to ensuring safety, maintaining 

security, and protecting the environment. The Enforcement Policy applies to all NRC licensees, 
OE Annual Report

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to various categories of non-licensees, and to individual employees of licensed and 

non-licensed firms involved in NRC-regulated activities. 

The NRC enforces compliance as necessary. Enforcement actions serve as a deterrent, 

emphasize the importance of compliance with regulatory requirements, and encourage prompt 

identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations. In addition, because 

violations occur in a variety of activities and have varying levels of significance, the NRC 

Enforcement Policy contains graduated sanctions. 

Most violations are identified through inspections and investigations. Enforcement authority 

includes the use of notices of violation, civil penalties, demands for information, and orders to 

modify, suspend, or revoke a license. The NRC staff may exercise discretion in determining the 

severity levels of violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions to be taken. 

The Office of Enforcement 

The Office of Enforcement (OE) develops policies and programs for enforcement of NRC 

requirements. In addition, OE exercises oversight of NRC enforcement, providing programmatic 

and implementation direction to regional and headquarters offices conducting or involved in 

enforcement activities, and ensures that regional and program office enforcement programs are 

consistently implemented. 

The Director of OE reports directly to the Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste, 

Research, State, Tribal, and Compliance Programs (DEDMRT), and is responsible for ensuring 

the DEDMRT is kept apprised of certain escalated actions. The DEDMRT is consulted on any 

case involving novel issues, substantial legal, programmatic, or policy issues raised during the 

enforcement review process, or where the Director believes it is warranted. OE works in 

partnership with NRC headquarters and regional offices to enforce the agency’s requirements. 

The NRC’s enforcement Web site includes a variety of information such as the Enforcement 

Policy, the Enforcement Manual, and current temporary enforcement guidance contained in 

enforcement guidance memoranda. This Web site also contains information about significant 

enforcement actions issued to reactor and materials licensees, non-licensees (vendors, 

contractors, and certificate holders), and individuals. Consistent with NRC practices and 

policies, most security-related actions and activities are not included on the NRC’s public Web 

site. However, OE does include in its enforcement documents collection security orders that 

impose compensatory security requirements on various licensees. The enforcement Web site is 

located at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement.html. 

In addition to enforcement activities, OE has oversight responsibilities for the Allegations 

Program, Employee Protection/Discrimination, the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 

Program (both early-ADR and post-investigation ADR), external (licensee) safety culture, 

internal (NRC) safety culture, Differing Views (which includes the differing professional opinion 

program, and the non-concurrence process), and Freedom of Information Act requests to 

ensure that alleger identity is not released. Additional information about the responsibilities of 

OE is available at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organization/oefuncdesc.html on the NRC’s 

public Web site. 
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I. Escalated Enforcement Actions

 Escalated enforcement actions include the following: 

▪ notices of violations (NOVs) including Severity Level I, II, or III violations 

▪ NOVs associated with Red, Yellow, or White significance determination process 

(SDP) findings (for operating reactor facilities) 

▪ civil penalty actions 

▪ orders 

Figure 2 shows the 

types of escalated 

enforcement actions 

issued in calendar 

year (CY) 2008. The 

tables at the end of 

this report break this 

information down 

further by identifying 

the region or program 

office that initiated 

the action, as well as 

the licensees, nonlicensees, and 

individuals who were 

involved. 

 Figure 2: Escalated Enforcement by Type 

 A. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties

During CY 2008, the NRC issued 94 escalated NOVs without civil penalties. Of these 

violations, 18 were associated with White SDP findings under the Reactor Oversight 

Process (ROP). No violations were associated with Yellow or Red SDP findings. Four 

NOVs associated with Green SDP findings were issued to licensees. NOVs associated 

with Green SDP findings are not considered escalated enforcement actions. 

Appendix A to this report summarizes each of these NOVs without civil penalties issued 

to licensees, as well as the NOVs associated with SDP findings. Security related issues 

involving NOVs without civil penalties are not addressed in Appendix A of this report; 

however, the number of NOVs associated with security related issues is included in the 

data discussed in this report. 

The increase from CY 2007 of NOVs without civil penalties is attributed, in part, to a 

decrease in the use of discretion for licensees who had not implemented specific 

security requirements in accordance with NRC orders issued in 2005. Enforcement 

Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 2006-003, “Guidance for Dispositioning Enforcement 

Issues Associated With Orders Imposing Increased Controls for Licensees Authorized to 

Civil Penalties 

 18%

Orders 

 22% 

Escalated NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

 60% 
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Possess Radioactive Material in Quantities of Concern,” allows the staff, under certain 

circumstances, to use discretion and not issue an NOV for violations of the order 

identified during the first inspection following issuance of the order. In 2008, the agency 

identified violations of the security requirements of the order in repeat inspections of 

certain licensees and issued appropriate enforcement. 

 B. Civil Penalty Actions

During CY 2008, the agency processed 28 cases involving proposed civil penalties. 

Nine of these cases involved willfulness. Willfulness is defined as either deliberate 

misconduct or careless disregard. 

Information regarding willful violations is identified because such violations are of 

particular concern to the Commission. The NRC’s regulatory program is based on 

licensees and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and 

communicating with candor; therefore, a violation involving willfulness may be 

considered more egregious than the underlying violation taken alone would have been, 

and the severity level may be increased. 

Table 1 provides information comparing civil penalty assessments for the current 

calendar year as well as for the previous four years. When reviewing the information in 

this table, it is important to note that an enforcement action may include more than one 

civil penalty or more than one violation. In addition, a civil penalty may be proposed in 

one year and paid or imposed in another year. Finally, the amount of a proposed civil 

penalty may be reduced, for example, as a result of exercising discretion as part of a 

settlement agreement developed during alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 

The value of civil penalties issued to reactor licensees in CY 2008 increased sharply 

from those issued in CY 2007 mainly because of the $650,000 civil penalty issued to 

Entergy Nuclear for a continuing violation of an NRC confirmatory order which required 

the licensee to install backup power for the Indian Point Alert and Notification System, 

and the $208,000 civil penalty issued to Florida Power & Light for security plan violations 

at the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station. 

The number of civil penalties issued in CY 2008 increased from those issued in CY 2007 

because of the increase in civil penalties issued to materials user licensees (mainly 

radiographers and hospitals). This increase is partly because of the reduced use of 

discretion to not issue NOVs to licensees who failed to implement specific security 

requirements in accordance with NRC orders issued in 2005 per EGM 2006-003 as 

described in section A. 

Appendix B includes a brief description of each of the civil penalty actions for 2008. 

Security related issues involving NOVs with civil penalties are not addressed in 

Appendix B of this report; however, the number of NOVs associated with security related 

issues is included in the data discussed in this report. 
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Table 1 – Civil Penalty Information 

1 This amount reflects a $5,450,000 civil penalty that was issued on April 21, 2005, to FirstEnergy Nuclear 

Operating Company for multiple violations, some willful, that occurred at its Davis-Besse Nuclear Power 

Plant.

2

 The NRC issues an “order imposing civil monetary penalty” when a licensee refuses to pay a 

proposed civil penalty, unless a basis exists for withdrawal of the proposed penalty. 

 

 C. Orders

During CY 2008, the NRC issued 35 orders to licensees and to individuals. These 

included 12 confirmatory orders that were issued to confirm commitments associated 

with ADR settlement agreements, nine orders issued to individuals restricting their 

involvement in NRC licensed-activities, and 14 orders which either implemented 

additional security measures or modified licenses conditions. 

Six of the nine orders issued to individuals resulted from successful ADR mediation 

sessions. The results of these orders included: one individual being prohibited 

indefinitely from involvement in NRC-licensed activities associated with 10 CFR Part 21 

Type B shipping activities; two individuals being prohibited from involvement in 

NRC-licensed activities for 5 years; two individuals being prohibited from involvement in 

NRC-licensed activities for 3 years; three individuals being prohibited from involvement 

in NRC-licensed activities for 1 year or less; and one individual being required to 

implement certain actions prior to seeking employment having involvement in 

NRC-licensed activities. 

 

CY 2008 CY 2007 CY 2006 CY 2005 CY 2004 

Number of 

Proposed Civil 

Penalties 28 18 15 24 26 

Number of 

Imposed Civil 

Penalties 0 1 0 3 3 

Number of Civil 

Penalties Paid 29 17 16 22 22 

Amount of 

Proposed Civil 

Penalties $1,185,900 $383,200 $332,350 $6,099,9501 $498,700 

Amount of 

Imposed Civil 

Penalties2 $0 $3,250 $0 $112,100 $31,200 

Amount of Civil 

Penalties Paid $1,039,850 $446,500 $375,500 $5,891,900 $526,900 
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As seen in Table 2, the number of orders issued in CY 2008 increased, in part, because 

of confirmatory orders issued to nonlicensed security personnel and the contractor 

company who supplied workers at the Florida Power & Light’s Turkey Point nuclear 

facility. 

 

Appendix C includes a brief description of the enforcement orders issued in CY 2008. 

The appendix also includes a brief description of a demand for information (DFI) issued 

in CY 2008. (See Section F below). 

 D. Enforcement Actions Supported by the Office of Investigations

 In CY 2008, an Office of Investigations (OI) Report supported 38 percent or 59 out of the 

157 escalated actions: 

 16 of the 28 escalated NOV cases with civil penalties (57 percent) 

 24 of the 94 escalated NOVs without civil penalties (26 percent) 

 19 of the 35 enforcement orders (54 percent) 

The 59 cases with an OI investigation represent a 93 percent increase from 2007. This 

increase is, in part, a result of the completion of enforcement activities associated with 

high-profile cases involving multiple individuals and licensees such as Turkey Point 

Nuclear Generating Station, Alaska Industrial X-Ray, and Baxter Healthcare of Puerto 

Rico. 

 E. Escalated Enforcement Trends 

During CY 2008, the agency issued 157 escalated enforcement actions. This number is 

significantly greater than the average number of 114 escalated enforcement actions 

issued for the last 5 years and the number of escalated enforcement actions issued in 

CY 2007. Table 2 provides information regarding the total number of escalated 

enforcement actions from fiscal year (FY) 2004 to CY 2008. Figure 3 provides this 

information in graphical form. 

As previously noted, this increase in escalated enforcement actions is attributed, in part, 

to a decrease in the use of discretion for licensees who failed to implement specific 

security requirements in accordance with NRC orders issued in 2005. In 2008, repeat 

inspections identified violations of the security requirements of the order by certain 

licensees. In addition, several cases involved multiple individual actions. 
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Table 2 – Escalated Action Trends 

CY 2008 CY 2007 CY 2006 CY 2005 FY 2004 Average 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o CPs) 94 77 57 70 58 71 

Civil Penalties 28 18 15 24 26 22 

Orders 35 22 15 17 7 19 

Orders 

Imposing CPs 0 1 0 3 3 1 

Total 157 118 87 114 94 114 

7

17 15

22

35

3 3 1

94

77

57

70

58

28

18

15

24 26

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Escalated NOVs

(w/out Civil

Penalty)

Civil Penalties

Orders

Orders Imposing

Civil Penalties

 

Figure 3: Escalated Action Trends (FY 2004 – CY 2008)
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F. Demand for Information 

When the NRC concludes that additional information is necessary, the agency may 

issue to a licensee or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, a DFI 

(see 10 CFR 2.204). A DFI requires the licensee or other person to provide more 

information or a context for its action(s) so that the NRC is able to determine whether an 

order or other action is warranted. During CY 2008, the NRC issued one DFI to 

Mattingly Testing Services, Inc., for information that the NRC needed to evaluate and 

determine the appropriateness of Mattingly’s licensed material program at temporary job 

sites. Appendix C includes a brief description of this DFI (Enforcement Action 

(EA)-07-303). 

II. Actions Against Individuals and Non-licensee Organizations

During CY 2008, the agency issued 17 escalated actions to licensed and unlicensed 

individuals. This number is included in the total number of escalated enforcement 

actions (NOVs and orders) that the agency issued in CY 2008. Appendix C provides 

summaries of the orders that were issued to individuals, including those orders 

prohibiting or limiting their participation in NRC-licensed activities. Appendix D 

summarizes the NOVs issued to individuals in CY 2008. 

The increase in escalated actions issued to individuals is attributed to several cases 

which involved multiple individuals engaged in wrongdoing including Turkey Point 

(5 actions) and Alaska Industrial X-Ray (4 actions). 

The agency issued two escalated enforcement actions to non-licensees in CY 2008. 

Appendix E provides a summary of these actions, which involved a single contractor. 

III. Cases Involving Discrimination 

During CY 2008, one case involving allegations of discrimination was resolved using 

post-investigation ADR. On July 8, 2008, a confirmatory order (effective immediately) 

was issued to confirm commitments made as result of an ADR session, held on June 5, 

2008, between Chevron Environmental Management Company (CEMC) and the NRC 

(EA-08-054). See Appendix C for additional details. 

IV. Notices of Enforcement Discretion 

Occasionally, circumstances may arise where a power reactor licensee’s compliance 

with a technical specification or other license condition would involve an unnecessary 

plant transient or performance testing, inspection, or other system realignment that is 

inappropriate for the specific plant conditions. In these circumstances, the NRC staff 

may choose not to enforce the applicable requirement(s). The staff exercises this 

enforcement discretion, designated as a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED), only if 

it is clearly satisfied that the action is consistent with protecting the public health and 

safety. The staff may also issue NOEDs in cases involving severe weather or other 

natural phenomena, when it determines that exercising this discretion will not 

compromise safety. NOEDs require justification from a licensee or certificate holder that 
OE Annual Report

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documents the safety basis for the request and provides whatever other information the 

staff deems necessary to issue an NOED. The NRC issued four NOEDs during 

CY 2008. Appendix F to this report includes a brief description of these NOEDs . 

V. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate 

Enforcement Sanctions 

After considering the general tenets of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy and the safety 

significance of a violation and its surrounding circumstances, the staff may exercise 

judgment and discretion in determining the severity levels of violations and the 

appropriate enforcement sanctions to be taken. In exercising discretion, the NRC may 

either escalate or mitigate the enforcement sanctions to ensure that the resulting 

enforcement action considers all the relevant circumstances of the particular case and is 

in the public interest. 

OE exercises enforcement discretion for various reasons. For example, in CY 2008, the 

staff applied enforcement discretion to several materials cases where licensees had not 

implemented specific security requirements regarding increased controls (ICs) of certain 

radioactive material in their possession in accordance with NRC orders issued in 

CY 2005. A total of 30 IC cases were the subject of escalated enforcement in CY 2008. 

The staff exercised enforcement discretion in 12 of these cases, based on the criteria in 

EGM 2006-003, and issued close-out letters in lieu of NOVs. This is a decrease from 

the 31 cases which involved the exercise of enforcement discretion in CY 2007. 

In CY 2008, the NRC exercised enforcement discretion in 20 additional cases not related 

to the IC order and EGM 2006-003. These cases involved use of Section VII.B.6 of the 

Enforcement Policy to address a violation of NRC requirements. In each case, the staff 

determined that the facts supported issuance of a close-out letter to the licensee in lieu 

of an NOV. 

VI. Withdrawn Actions 

Licensees can challenge enforcement actions for several reasons; for example, a 

licensee might dispute the requirements, the facts of the case, the agency’s application 

of the Enforcement Policy, or the significance of the violation. Licensees may provide 

clarifying information that was not available at the time of the inspection, and this may 

affect the finding of a noncompliance. During CY 2008, the agency did not withdraw any 

escalated enforcement action. 

In addition, OE has established a metric for quality of enforcement actions based on the 

number of disputed and withdrawn nonescalated enforcement actions. The goal is less 

than 30 withdrawn nonescalated enforcement actions in a calendar year. This metric 

does not include violations that are withdrawn on the basis of supplemental information 

that was not available to an inspector before the assessment of an enforcement 

sanction. During CY 2008, the agency issued approximately 1160 nonescalated 

enforcement actions to reactor, materials, and fuel facility licensees. Of these actions, 

12 nonescalated enforcement actions were disputed. In CY 2008, the NRC withdrew all 

or part of only three of these disputed actions. 
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VII. Significant Enforcement Actions 

During CY 2008, the agency was involved with several significant enforcement actions 

that required coordination among internal and external stakeholders beyond the typical 

enforcement case. 

Florida Power & Light (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station) 

Two cases came to resolution in early CY 2008, which resulted in the NRC issuing a 

total of nine enforcement actions involving a single licensee during a 4-month period 

beginning in January of 2008, and extending through April 2008. These agency actions 

were very complex and included: two enforcement actions (a severity level II problem 

and a severity level III violation) with civil penalties totaling $338,000 against the 

licensee (Florida Power & Light, Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station); two 

confirmatory orders issued to the licensee’s security contractor (Wackenhut); 

two confirmatory orders to individuals who were previously employed by the licensee’s 

security contractor; and three orders prohibiting involvement in licensed activities to 

individuals previously employed by the licensee’s security contractor. Two of the orders 

prohibiting involvement in licensed activities were for 5 years, and one was for 3 years. 

In one case, the individual was also convicted in Federal court for providing false 

statements to a Federal investigator. Extensive coordination between OE, OI, the Office 

of the General Counsel (OGC), and the U.S. Department of Justice was needed to 

complete these enforcement actions. 

Source Production & Equipment Co., Inc. (SPEC) and Joseph S. Shepherd 

On July 15, 2003, December 4, 2003, and May 20, 2004, SPEC made shipments of 

licensed radioactive material to Mexico using a shipping container that did not comply 

with the requirements of the NRC certificate of compliance. The licensee contracted 

Joseph S. Shepherd to perform certain required quality assurance inspections of the 

container and complete the shipments in a safe and compliant manner. An OI 

investigation revealed that Mr. Shepherd did not conduct the required inspections and 

made modifications to the container without prior NRC authorization. The statute of 

limitations (SOL) for issuing an enforcement action expired on July 15, 2008. The U.S. 

Department of Justice was pursuing legal action against Mr. Shepherd, which delayed 

issuance of the final enforcement action by the staff. Authorization to request a waiver 

of the SOL expiration date from SPEC and Mr. Shepherd was obtained from the 

Commission on April 4, 2008. On July 11, 2008, OE reached an agreement with 

Mr. Shepherd to extend the SOL expiration date an additional three months. The NRC 

issued an NOV for a Severity Level II problem and a proposed civil penalty of $9600 to 

SPEC on July 14, 2008, for its involvement in the shipping violations. The agency 

issued an order to Mr. Shepherd on September 8, 2008, confirming commitments 

reached as part of conjoined negotiations with the U.S. Department of Justice. Mr. 

Shepherd pled guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to a 

one count indictment (18 USC 371) regarding conspiracy and was sentenced on 

March 27, 2009. 
OE Annual Report

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Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. 

During CY 2007, an OI investigation determined that Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. (AIX) 

radiographers, including its Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and assistants, violated NRC 

licensing requirements performing industrial radiographic operations at a job site. Based 

upon evidence developed during the OI investigation, on October 19, 2007, NRC issued 

an immediately effective order to AIX suspending licensed activities. In addition, on 

August 20, 2008, the NRC issued AIX an NOV for a Severity Level II problem; a 

proposed imposition of a civil penalty in the amount of $20,800; and an order modifying 

its license (effective immediately) for deliberate violations. The agency also issued 

immediately effective orders to the licensee’s former Radiation Safety Officer prohibiting 

his involvement in NRC-licensed activities for 3 years; and a licensee radiographer 

prohibiting his involvement in NRC-licensed activities for 1 year. In addition, the NRC 

issued NOVs to 2 radiographers for Severity Level III violations because they 

deliberately violated the two-person rule. Extensive coordination was needed between 

OE, OI, Region IV, and OGC to complete these enforcement actions. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Units 2 & 3) 

On January 24, 2008, the NRC issued an NOV and a proposed imposition of a civil 

penalty in the amount of $650,000 to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Indian Point 

Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3, for a continuing severity level III violation of 

NRC requirements. A prior civil penalty in the amount of $130,000 was issued to the 

licensee on April 23, 2007, when it initially failed to implement requirements of NRC’s 

January 31, 2006, confirmatory order which implemented Section 651(b) of the Energy 

Policy Act of 2005. The order, in part, required installation of a backup power capability 

for the Indian Point Alert and Notification System. The January 2008 enforcement action 

and civil penalty was issued because of the licensee’s failure to implement timely, 

effective corrective actions after the initial enforcement action and civil penalty, and the 

resulting continuing violation of the NRC order. Extensive coordination between OE, 

OGC, the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR), the Office of 

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), Region I, and the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency was needed to complete this action. In addition, extensive coordination and 

discussion was involved with external government agencies, including interested 

Congressional delegations, the State of New York, and the four local counties because 

the order required installation of equipment that would be used by those organizations if 

an emergency at the Indian Point plant was declared. 

VIII. Hearing Activities 

During CY 2008, two hearings were pending before the Atomic Safety and Licensing 

Board (ASLB) relating to enforcement actions against two former employees at the 

Davis Besse Nuclear Power Plant. 

In the first case, the NRC issued an order on April 21, 2005, against Mr. Andrew 

Siemaszko, a former system engineer at Davis-Besse, for deliberately providing 

inaccurate and incomplete information to the NRC. The order prohibited him from 

involvement in NRC-licensed activities for 5 years from the effective date of the order. 

On April 22, 2005, Mr. Siemaszko requested a hearing before the ASLB. On 
OE Annual Report

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December 31, 2006, the ASLB placed the NRC proceeding on hold because of the 

concurrent proceeding brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against Mr. Siemaszko 

in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, arising out of 

the same set of facts and circumstances. In August 2008, a Federal jury found 

Mr. Siemaszko guilty on three of five counts. Mr. Siemaszko was later sentenced,

among other things, to 3 years of probation. Since then, the ASLB has scheduled a 

status teleconference with the parties to determine the course Mr. Siemaszko wishes to 

pursue in light of the outcome of his criminal trial. 

In the second case, the NRC issued an order on January 4, 2006, against 

Mr. David Geisen, a former Manager of Design Engineering at Davis-Besse, for 

deliberately providing inaccurate and incomplete information to the NRC. The order 

prohibited him from involvement in NRC-licensed activities for 5 years. On 

February 23, 2006, Mr. Geisen requested a hearing before the ASLB. On 

February 1, 2007, the Commission placed the NRC proceeding on hold because of the 

concurrent proceeding brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against Mr. Geisen in 

the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, arising out of the 

same set of facts and circumstances. In October 2007, a jury found Mr. Geisen guilty on 

three of five counts. Mr. Geisen was sentenced, among other things, to 3 years of 

probation during which he is barred from employment in the nuclear power industry. 

Starting on December 8, 2008, a 5-day evidentiary hearing was held before the ASLB at 

the NRC Headquarters. The ASLB’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are 

forthcoming.

IX. Enforcement Policy Changes and Enforcement Guidance Memoranda 

The NRC Enforcement Policy is a living document and is revised to reflect experience 

and stakeholder input. On January 25, 2007, the NRC published a notice in the Federal 

Register (72 FR 3429) announcing that the agency was undertaking a major revision of 

its Enforcement Policy, including a revision to the supplements. Notices published in the 

Federal Register on September 15, 2008, (73 FR 53286) and October 16, 2008, 

(73 FR 61442) announced that a draft of the proposed major revision to the Enforcement 

Policy was available and that the NRC was soliciting written comments from interested 

parties. The public comment period ended on November 14, 2008. OE is in the process 

of addressing the comments received from members of the public and anticipates 

issuing the revised Enforcement Policy in 2009. 

In September 2008, OE issued a notice in the Federal Register (73 FRN 52705) which 

changed the Interim Enforcement Policy regarding the use of enforcement discretion for 

certain fire protection issues. This change grants licensees who are making the 

transition to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 the opportunity to apply 

for an additional period of enforcement discretion. This offer of an additional period of 

enforcement discretion applies only to licensees who have made substantial progress in 

their transition effort. If granted by the NRC, the additional enforcement discretion would 

end 6 months after the date of the safety evaluation approving the second pilot plant 

license amendment request review. 
OE Annual Report

13 

On December 22, 2008, OE completed the sixth significant revision of the NRC 

Enforcement Manual. This revision updated the manual by revising existing guidance 

and information where applicable and adding new guidance on various activities 

including, for example, the post-investigation ADR process. OE revised pertinent 

sections throughout the manual to reflect the creation of the Office of New Reactors 

(NRO) and the Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management 

Programs (FSME). The Enforcement Manual is located on the OE Web site at: 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/guidance.html. 

OE issues EGMs to provide guidance in the interpretation of specific provisions of the 

Enforcement Policy. A link to the full text of all publicly available EGMs can be found in 

Appendix A of the NRC Enforcement Manual. The office issued one EGM in CY 2008, 

which is summarized below: 

May 28, 2008, Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 08-002 – 

Documentation of Security-Related Sensitive Unclassified 

Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI) in Enforcement Documents 

The purpose of this EGM is to provide guidance with respect to the 

documentation of security-related information (below the safeguards and 

classified levels) in enforcement documents. This EGM is not publicly 

available. 

X. Ongoing Activities 

A. Safety Culture 

 

In CY 2008, OE continued to be the lead office for the agency safety culture policy 

development. In response to Commission direction in Staff Requirements Memorandum 

(SRM)-GBJ-08-001, OE initiated an agencywide effort to develop a Safety Culture Policy 

Statement(s) for licensees. OE will provide this policy statement and transmittal paper to 

the Commission in the second quarter of CY 2009. 

OE continues to chair the agency’s Safety Culture Working Group (SCWG), and 

provides assistance and guidance to other offices in safety culture developmental 

activities. OE also participates as the vice-chair of the Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation’s Safety Culture Focus Team (SCFT). The purpose of the SCFT is to 

promote the implementation of the ROP safety culture changes effectively and 

consistently across the regions. The Agency Allegation Advisor, located in OE, chairs 

the SCFT’s subgroup, the Safety-Conscious Work Environment Findings Review Group, 

whose purpose is to ensure regulatory consistency by reviewing and handling all 

potential inspection findings in the safety-conscious work environment cross-cutting area 

of the ROP. Additional information on these activities appears in the “Allegation 

Program, 2008 Annual Trends Report.” 

In an effort to continue the Commission’s broad review of issues related to safety 

culture, OE assists other NRC offices in their safety culture initiatives. This assistance 

includes efforts in the fuel facility, new reactor construction, and security areas. 
OE Annual Report

14 

B. Alternative Dispute Resolution 

ADR can be offered at three points in the enforcement process for discrimination and 

other wrongdoing cases: (1) before a predecisional enforcement conference; (2) when 

an NOV is issued; or (3) when cases result in the issuance of an order imposing a civil 

penalty. 

Despite limited overall resource savings in the enforcement portion of the ADR program, 

the staff continues to believe that the opportunity to communicate openly with other 

parties in mediation, with the assistance of a trained mediator, helps reach effective 

agreements that meet NRC’s interests and best serve the public interest. Corrective 

actions are broader or more comprehensive than typically achieved through the 

traditional enforcement process. For example, as part of the settlement agreement for 

case EA-07-232 between Southern California Edison Company (SCE) and the NRC, 

SCE agreed to conduct a safety culture assessment and develop or enhance various 

company programs in areas such as ethics, their disciplinary process, contract 

programs, and oversight. Improvements in these areas would not likely have resulted 

from the traditional enforcement process. 

During CY 2008, OE issued 12 confirmatory orders documenting settlement agreements 

(8 in reactor-related cases, and 4 in materials-related cases). Of the 12 cases, all but 

one was negotiated before a predecisional enforcement conference was held. The one 

exception was negotiated after issuance of the NOV and proposed civil penalty. 

On December 22, 2008, OE revised the Enforcement Manual to include, in part, ADR 

program guidance. A revision to the Enforcement Policy, which is expected to be 

completed in CY 2009, will fully integrate the post-investigation ADR program. 

C. Knowledge Management 

In CY 2008, the OE engaged in several knowledge management activities. Similar to 

the agency as a whole, OE hired a number of new staff and saw more experienced 

enforcement specialists retire from the NRC. Some of the ongoing knowledge 

management activities to maintain an adequate knowledge base included conducting 

counterpart meetings, supporting training, and completing reviews and self 

assessments. 

Enforcement Counterpart Meetings 

In July 2008, regional and headquarters enforcement staff held a counterpart meeting in 

the Region I office to discuss ways to improve the enforcement process and 

communications among staff. The meeting resulted in a number of ideas that are 

improving the handling of casework, especially those associated with OI investigation 

reports. 

In October 2008, regional and OE enforcement staff held a three day counterpart 

meeting which included participation by staff from OGC, OI, NRR, the Office of New 

Reactors, the Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management 

Programs, and the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. The result of the 
OE Annual Report

15 

counterpart meeting was improved communications between office staff members and 

efficiencies in handling case work that involves multiple offices. 

Training 

OE supported several Nuclear Safety Professional Development Program members on 

rotational assignments to the office. The knowledge gained by those staff members will 

provide a better understanding of the enforcement program in the field. 

Headquarters and regional enforcement staff provided outreach training to internal 

stakeholders on the allegation, enforcement, and ADR processes during counterpart 

meetings. External outreach training on the allegation and enforcement processes was 

also provided during regional utility group meetings. Training provided as a part of the 

internal and external stakeholder outreach efforts has increased the staff’s 

understanding of the key interests of important stakeholders. 

Reviews and Self Assessments 

In January 2008, OE completed an audit of Enforcement Actions resulting from 

inspections of the NRC’s IC Orders issued to materials user licensees. The purpose of 

the audit was to identify any inconsistencies in the enforcement of the IC Order between 

regions. 

The review concluded that, initially, the use of enforcement discretion to not cite a 

licensee because of its “good faith effort” to comply with the requirements of the order 

was inconsistently applied by regional staff. As a result of the audit, OE provided 

guidance which resulted in improved consistency between regions on applying 

enforcement discretion for good faith. In addition, the audit identified an inconsistency in 

the way multiple violations of the order were being characterized. OE provided guidance 

to the staff that multiple violations of the IC Order should be cited as a single Severity 

Level III problem. 

In July 2008, OE completed an audit, using ADAMS, to determine the accessibility of 

Enforcement Action Worksheets (EAWs) associated with cases that were closed in 

2008. The purpose of the audit was to determine (1) if EAWs could be retrieved from 

ADAMS, and (2) if EAWs could be located by Enforcement Action (EA) number. 

The review concluded that the staff needed additional training and guidance to ensure 

that all EAWs are properly entered into ADAMS. OE conducted training and a follow-up 

audit completed in December 2008 showed an improvement in the accessibility of EAWs 

in ADAMS and that EAWs were properly formatted in ADAMS. 

D. OIG Audit of the NRC’s Enforcement Program 

On September 26, 2008, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) completed an audit of 

the NRC’s enforcement program. The purpose of the audit was to determine if the 

NRC’s enforcement program is comprehensive and consistently implemented, and if 

enforcement decisions are based on complete and reliable information. The OIG 

reviewed relevant management controls, enforcement-related documentation and 
OE Annual Report

16 

guidance, and Federal statutes. Interviews were conducted with NRC staff, industry 

representatives, and intervener groups. Two findings were identified, dealing primarily 

with the NRC’s application of the enforcement program as it pertains to non-escalated 

enforcement actions (e.g., those actions associated with Green or Severity Level IV 

violations). First, OIG identified that the enforcement program lacked clear and 

comprehensive guidance to ensure consistent program implementation. Second, OIG 

identified that the NRC does not collect complete and reliable data associated with nonescalated enforcement actions. 

To address the two findings, the OIG provided three recommendations: (1) develop 

comprehensive guidance to more clearly establish expectations for inspectors and 

managers to disposition violations and the relevant participants needed for enforcement 

decision-making, (2) define data collection requirements for non-escalated enforcement 

actions, and (3) develop and implement a quality assurance process to ensure the 

collected data is complete and accurate. In an October 27, 2008, response to the OIG, 

the staff agreed with the findings of the audit and initiated actions to implement the 

associated recommendations. Meetings were held in late 2008 between staff from the 

Offices of Enforcement, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards, and Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs 

to discuss resolution of the OIG audit findings. The staff plans to complete all corrective 

actions by October 31, 2009. 

XI. Regional Accomplishments 

During CY 2008, the regions conducted both routine and focused self assessments of 

the enforcement area to ensure effective performance and to identify opportunities for 

continuous improvement. The self-assessments encompassed both the reactor and 

materials arenas; considered performance associated with development and issuance of 

both nonescalated and escalated enforcement actions; and included activities that 

required a high degree of coordination with other NRC stakeholders, such as OI. 

These assessments included the following reviews: 

 reactor and materials program nonescalated enforcement actions 

 reactor program Criterion XVI violations 

 licensed operator enforcement actions involving fitness-for-duty issues 

 Overall, the self-assessments showed that the regions were effectively implementing the 

Enforcement Program. However, the reviews did identify opportunities for improvement 

associated with some of the administrative tools used to facilitate the enforcement 

process and with draft and final enforcement products associated with wrongdoing 

cases. The regions developed recommended corrective actions for each of the items 

and shared the results of the self assessments with OE. 
OE Annual Report

17 

Table 3: CY 2008 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by 

Region and Program Office

Program 

Office 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

Civil 

Penalties Orders 

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil Penalty 

TOTAL 

Region I 30 11 2 0 43 

Region II 12 5 10 0 27 

Region III 31 6 0 0 37 

Region IV 20 5 6 0 31 

NRR 1 0 1* 0 2 

NMSS 0 1 9* 0 10 

FSME 0 0 6* 0 6 

OE 0 0 1 0 1 

TOTAL 94 28 35 0 157 

* includes orders modifying licenses, primarily security related.
OE Annual Report

18 

Table 4: CY 2008 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type of 

Licensee, Non-licensee, or Individual

Type of Licensee 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

Civil 

Penalty Orders 

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil 

Penalty 

TOTAL 

Operating Reactor 23 3 3 0 29 

Gauge User 21 7 0 0 28 

Hospital 18 6 0 0 24 

Radiographer 10 2 3 0 15 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Materials) 7 0 3 0 10 

Fuel Facility 5 3 1 0 9 

Irradiator 4 2 1 0 7 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Reactor) 0 0 6 0 6 

Materials Distributor 0 2 4 0 6 

Non-licensee 0 0 2 0 2 

Academic 2 0 0 0 2 

Research Reactor 1 0 1 0 2 

Licensed Individual 

(Reactor) 1 0 0 0 1 

UF Conversion Facility 0 0 1 0 1 

Mill 0 0 0 0 0 

Pharmacy 0 0 0 0 0 

Physician 0 0 0 0 0 

Radiographer 

Fabricator 0 0 0 0 0 

Waste Disposal 0 0 0 0 0 

Well Logger 0 0 0 0 0 

Other 2 3 10 0 15 

TOTAL 94 28 35 0 157 
OE Annual Report

A1 

Appendix A: Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation 

Without Civil Penalties*

Notices Issued To Reactor Licensees

Constellation Energy EA-08-075 

Ginna Nuclear Plant 

On April 7, 2008, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued for a Severity Level (SL) III violation, 

due to changes the licensee made to its NRC approved emergency plan; specifically they made 

changes to the emergency action levels (EALs), between 1996 and 2001, without first obtaining 

Commission approval. This decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan. The violation 

cited the licensee for not following 10 CFR 50.54(q), which requires, in part, that a licensee 

authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect 

emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in 

Appendix E of this part. 

Dominion Energy Kewaunee Inc. EA-08-223 

Kewaunee Power Station 

On October 29, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White 

Significance Determination Finding. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify that Kewaunee’s 

emergency plan emergency action levels specifying instrument threshold values were beyond 

the limits of the effluent radiation monitors’ capabilities to accurately measure and indicate. As a 

result, action directed by the State and local emergency response plans, which rely on 

information provided by the licensee, could have potentially delayed minimum initial offsite 

response measures. 

Duke Power Company, LLC EA-08-220 

McGuire Nuclear Station 

On October 27, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White 

Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 

XVI. The violation involved the failure to take adequate corrective action related to the service 

water strainer backwash system. Specifically, a plant modification implemented to address a 

macro-fouling concern associated with the service water strainers (1) utilized non-safety-related 

instrument air to support backwash operations, and (2) did not account for the impact on timely 

operator response following a safety injection signal or loss of instrument air. As a result, there 

was a lack of reasonable assurance that the service water system would have been capable of 

performing its safety-related function during a time of high fouling potential. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
OE Annual Report

A2 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-08-046 

Byron Station 

On April 1, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for violations associated with a White 

Significance Determination Finding. The NOV involved violations of 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions,” and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 

III, “Design Control.” Specifically, the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions after 

the identification of extensive corrosion on essential service water riser pipes and failed to 

verify the adequacy of the methodology and design inputs in calculations that supported the 

decision to accept three degraded essential service water riser pipes for continued service. 

Luminant Generation Company, LLC EA-08-028 

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station 

On February 29, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a 

White Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of the Unit 1 Technical 

Specification (TS) 3.8.1, “AC Sources - Operating,” which requires that while the plant is in 

Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4, two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E 

power distribution subsystem(s) shall be operable. From November 1, 2007, through 

November 21, 2007, while the plant was in Mode 1, one of the two DGs capable of 

supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) was inoperable, and action 

was not taken to either restore the DG to an operable status within 72 hours or be in Mode 3 

within 6 hours and Mode 5 within 36 hours. Specifically, DG 1-02 was made inoperable as a 

result of painting activities due to paint having been deposited and remaining on at least one 

fuel rack in a location that prevented motion required to support the operation of the DG. 

This condition caused DG 1-02 to fail to start during a surveillance test on November 21, 

2007. 

Nebraska Public Power District EA-07-204 

Cooper Nuclear Station 

On June 13, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White 

Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, 

Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.” Specifically, between 1997 and June 

2007, the licensee failed to ensure that two emergency operating procedures which were 

used to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition in the event of certain postulated fire 

scenarios would work as written. Additionally, the licensee failed to properly verify and 

validate procedure steps to ensure that they would work to accomplish the necessary 

actions. 

Nebraska Public Power District EA-08-124 

Cooper Nuclear Station 

On August 1, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White 

Significance Determination Finding to Nebraska Public Power District involving a violation of 

Technical Specifications which requires that written procedures be established, 

implemented, and maintained. Specifically, an inadequate work order instruction and 

maintenance procedure resulted in a loose electrical connection on an emergency diesel 

generator and the subsequent failure of the diesel generator. 
OE Annual Report

A3 

Reed College EA-08-339 

Portland , OR 

On December 19, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. 

Specifically, the facility was operated at a power level in excess of the licensed full power 

limit of 250 kW for approximately 70 minutes, which is in violation of their Technical 

Specifications. This event was caused by a disagreement between the indicated and 

calculated power due to the installation of a new fuel element into the core. 

Southern California Edison Company EA-08-296 

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 

On December 19, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a 

White Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 

B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.” Specifically, maintenance and work 

control personnel failed to develop appropriate instructions or procedures, and failed to 

include quantitative or qualitative steps to ensure the maintenance activities on safetyrelated battery. This failure resulted in a safety-related battery being inoperable between 

March 2004 and March 25, 2008. 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. EA-08-192 

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Station 

On September 4, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a 

White Significance Determination Finding to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, as a 

result of a failure to implement the TS procedural requirements during an overhaul of the 1B 

emergency diesel generator at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. The violation cited the 

licensee for failure to install a new exhaust header system correctly, as required by vendor 

documents, causing the 1B emergency diesel generators to be declared inoperable when 

the exhaust header failed during a surveillance test. 

Notices Issued To Material Licensees

Alaska Rim Engineering, Inc. EA-08-139, EA-08-140 

Palmer, AK 

On September 17, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion were 

issued for a Severity Level III problem. The violations involved possession and use of a 

portable gauge containing radioactive material without an NRC license, and failure to 

provide complete and accurate information in its license application dated March 6, 2007. 

Specifically, from May 17, 2003, until March 6, 2007, Alaska Rim Engineering, Inc., 

possessed and used a portable gauging device without an NRC license and on March 6, 

2007, Alaska Rim Engineering, Inc., submitted an application for an NRC license stating that 

it was planning to purchase and will be licensing one portable moisture density gauge. This 

is inaccurate because it had purchased and used the gauge in May 2003, without an NRC 

license. 
OE Annual Report

A4 

AREVA NP, Inc. EA-08-122 

Lynchburg, VA 

On June 13, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The 

violation involved the failure to properly prepare a package containing fuel service 

equipment such that dose rates on the surface of the package would not exceed 10 CFR 

71.5(a) and 49 CFR 173.441(a) limits. Specifically, on February 3, 2008, AREVA shipped 

surface contaminated equipment as an open conveyance on a flatbed trailer. On February 

4, 2008, the shipment arrived at a nuclear power facility with measured contact radiation 

levels between 800-2000 millirem/hour in a localized area on the bottom of the container. 

The localized area was not easily accessible and no measurable radiation exposures to 

workers or members of the public occurred as a result of this event. 

Ball Memorial Hospital EA-08-026 

Muncie, IN 

On May 12, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. 

Specifically, on April 30, 2007, two nuclear medicine technologists administered greater than 

30-microcuries of I-131 sodium iodide to two patients, without a dated and signed written 

directive. 

Bon Secours Virginia Health Source EA-08-234 

Midlothian, VA 

On October 10, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for three Severity Level III violations. 

The first violation involved a failure to meet 10 CFR 35.41(b)(2) requirements. Specifically, 

the licensee did not develop and implement written procedures to provide high confidence 

that each medical administration is in accordance with the written directive, in that the 

procedures did not address response to high dose rate device error messages. The second 

violation involved a failure to ensure an authorized user (AU) was physically present during 

initiation of a patient treatment. Also, during continuation of the patient treatment, neither 

the AU, nor a physician under the supervision of an AU, was physically present. 

Bridgeport Hospital EA-08-269 

Bridgeport, CT 

On November 6, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation that 

involved the failure to develop, implement, and maintain written procedures to provide high 

confidence that each medical administration will be done in accordance with the written 

directive, for administrations requiring a written directive. Specifically, changes in 

procedures for inputting geometric information into the treatment planning system were not 

performed in accordance with the current version of the vendor’s operator manual. An 

incorrect magnification factor was used in treatment dose calculations and the licensee’s 

calculation double-checks did not include validation of geometric accuracy. As a result, the 

patients were administered doses that ranged from 45 percent to 62 percent less than the 

prescribed dose set forth in the written directive. 
OE Annual Report

A5 

BWX Technologies, Inc. EA-08-171 

Lynchburg, VA 

On August 8, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued. for a Severity Level III problem 

involving three violations of their license. Specifically, the licensee did not (1) inspect 

Raschig ring-filled vacuum (RRVCs) cleaners on multiple occasions between January 28, 

2008, and March 5, 2008 to ensure adequate levels of Raschig rings were present to 

prevent inadvertent criticality, (2) establish, prior to March 5, 2008, double contingency for 

operation of RRVCs to ensure that a criticality accident could not occur with only one 

change in process conditions, and (3) fill, prior to March 5, 2008, multiple RRVCs with wellsettled Raschig rings in accordance with ANSI/ANS-8.5-1996 such that further settling was 

not likely during use. In this case, no actual consequences resulted because an inadvertent 

criticality accident did not occur. 

Crane Army Ammunition Activity – Department of the Army EA-08-222 

Crane, IN 

On October 30, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem 

involving (1) the failure to control radioactive material not in storage as required by 10 CFR 

20.1802, and (2) the failure to properly describe the material on shipping papers and 

properly mark and label the packages in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 71.5 

and 49 CFR 171.2. Specifically, on May 22 and 29, the licensee shipped depleted uranium 

in three cardboard boxes to a facility in Virginia as part of their site operation to demilitarize 

munitions. The boxes were not controlled when not in storage and were not properly 

marked nor labeled. In addition, the material was not properly described as hazardous on 

the shipping papers that accompanied the shipment. 

CTI and Associates, Inc. EA-07-300 

Brighton, MI 

On January 15, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation 

involving the failure by the authorized gauge operator to control and maintain constant 

surveillance of a portable nuclear gauge. Specifically, the gauge, which contained 

NRC-licensed radioactive material, was damaged when it was run over by a bulldozer after 

the authorized gauge operator had left it unattended while he was preparing for another test 

at a temporary job site. 

Hudson Energy Services (System One Holdings, LLC) EA-08-032 

Pittsburgh, PA 

On June 13, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued to Hudson Energy Services. This action 

is based on a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 20.1802 involving the licensee’s failure 

to maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that was in an unrestricted area and 

was not in storage. Specifically, for a period of about five minutes, licensee personnel failed 

to maintain constant surveillance and monitoring of licensed material at a temporary use 

location. 
OE Annual Report

A6 

Karmanos Cancer Center EA-07-316 

Detroit, MI 

On April 10, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The 

violation involved the failure to develop, implement and maintain written directive procedures 

to provide high confidence that each administration was in accordance with the written 

directive. Specifically, the licensee’s written procedures for the implementation of treatment 

plans with its stereotactic radiosurgery unit did not require a check of the treatment plan 

parameters and magnetic resonance image orientation prior to administration of the 

treatment. As a result, the licensee administered a single gamma knife treatment to an 

unintended portion of the patient’s brain. 

Northrop Grumman Corporation EA-08-159 

Rolling Meadows, IL 

On August 15, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. This 

action was based on a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 150.20(b)(1) which requires, in 

part, that any person engaging in activities in areas of exclusive Federal jurisdiction within 

Agreement States shall, at least three days before engaging in each such activity, file four 

copies of NRC Form-241, "Report of Proposed Activities in Non Agreement States," with the 

Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office. However, on May 1, 2008, 

Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, a licensee of the State of Illinois, used radioactive 

material that would otherwise require an NRC license, at the Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, 

an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction within an Agreement State, without filing a Form-241 

with the NRC. 

Oncology Institute of Greater Lafayette EA-07-313 

Lafayette, IN 

On March 31, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem. The 

violations involved (1) the failure to instruct an Authorized Medical Physicist, a supervised 

individual, in the licensee’s written directive procedures with respect to the use of byproduct 

material and (2) the failure to develop, implement and maintain written directive procedures 

to provide high confidence that each administration was in accordance with the written 

directive. Specifically, the licensee did not verify before treatment that the treatment plan 

was properly input into the high dose rate remote afterloader unit and did not verify, after 

treatment, that the step size, a treatment parameter used for the treatments, was in 

agreement with the treatment plan. A medical event occurred during the licensee’s 

administration of three treatment fractions to a patient. As a result, portions of the treatment 

site received a total dose that differed from the prescribed dose by more than 20 percent. 

Reid Hospital and Healthcare Services EA-08-136, EA-08-137 

Richmond, IN 

On July 11, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for two Severity Level III violations. The 

first violation is of 10 CFR 35.41, requiring procedures to provide high confidence that the 

treatment is delivered as planned and directed, and second violation is of 35.3045(c), 

requiring notification to NRC of a medical event no later than the next business day. 

Specifically, the licensee’s procedures for prostate radioactive seed implants did not require 

verifying the position of the patient’s prostate before placing the seeds into the prostate and 
OE Annual Report

A7 

resulted in incorrect placement of the seeds to deliver a radiation dose to the prostate more 

than 20 percent below the prescribed dose and a dose to the perineum that was more than 

50 percent above the minimal dose expected. Further, the licensee did not notify the NRC 

until two days after this event. 

Saint Louis University EA-07-317 

Saint Louis, MO 

On March 31, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation 

involving the failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is 

in controlled or unrestricted area. Specifically, the licensee did not secure from 

unauthorized removal or limit access to materials containing regulated amount of iodine-125 

located in the Medical School building and regulated amount of hydrogen-3 located in the 

Pediatric Research Institute, both of which were controlled areas. 

Wang Engineering, Inc. EA-08-066 

Lombard, IL 

On April 18, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation which 

involved the failure to file NRC Form 241- Report of Proposed Activities in Non-Agreement 

States, at least three days prior to engaging in licensed activities within NRC jurisdiction. 

Specifically, on numerous occasions during 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007, Wang Engineering, 

Inc., a licensee of the State of Illinois, used portable moisture/density gauges containing 

licensed material at Department of Veteran Affairs construction sites; areas of exclusive 

federal jurisdiction in an Agreement State, without filing a Form-241 with the NRC. 

Western X-Ray Corporation EA-07-277, EA-07-278 

Oxnard, CA 

On February 15, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for two Severity Level III violations. 

The first violation involved a failure to certify an individual who acted as the radiographer of 

record while performing industrial radiography. The second violation involved a failure to 

wear an operating alarm ratemeter by an individual who acted as the radiographer’s 

assistant during radiographic operations. Specifically, on April 23, 2007, the individual 

acting as the radiographer of record was not certified as a radiographer and the individual 

acting as the assistant radiographer of record was not wearing an operating ratemeter at all 

times during radiographic operations, while performing industrial radiography on an offshore 

platform in federal waters. 

Westinghouse Electric Company EA-08-057 

Columbia, SC 

On May 1, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The 

violation involved the failure to assure safe and compliant activities involving nuclear 

material. Specifically, on November 17, 2006, a safety significant control interlock was 

willfully bypassed by an operator who disabled an alarm acknowledgement pushbutton 

associated with Conversion Line 5 while hydrogen gas was flowing to the calciner in the 

licensee’s wet conversion process. This activity is prohibited by licensee procedures and 

NRC license conditions. 
OE Annual Report

A8 

Westinghouse Electric Company EA-08-165 

Columbia, SC 

On August 6, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem 

involving three violations associated with the loss, on February 4, 2008, of sixteen sample 

vials of uranium hexafluoride. Specifically, the violations involved (1) the failure to properly 

document and control the transfer of sixteen sample vials of uranium hexafluoride from 

shipping and receiving to the chemistry laboratory as required by procedures, (2) the failure 

to secure from unauthorized removal the sixteen vials when they were stored in a controlled 

area and the failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of the sample vials when 

they were not in storage, and (3) the failure of an individual to annotate that he had read and 

acknowledged the procedure governing the disposal of empty shipping containers prior to 

performing that work assignment. In this case, there are no indications of any radiation or 

chemical exposures as a result of the licensee’s loss of control of the sixteen uranium 

hexafluoride sample vials. 
OE Annual Report

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Appendix B: Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties* 

Civil Penalties Issued To Reactor Licensees

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-08-006 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station 

On January 24, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $650,000 for a continuing Severity Level III violation of the NRC’s January 31, 

2006, Confirmatory Order to implement Section 651(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 

The Order required Entergy to install backup power for the Indian Point Alert and Notification 

System (ANS) by January 31, 2007. The NRC subsequently extended, at the licensee’s 

request, the implementation date to April 15, 2007. On April 23, 2007, the staff issued a 

Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $130,000 when 

Entergy failed to meet the April 15, 2007, implementation date. On July 30, 2007, the NRC 

issued an Order to supplement the requirements of the January 31, 2006, Confirmatory 

Order, based on Entergy's proposed corrective actions for noncompliance with the 

Confirmatory Order. On August 30, 2007, the staff issued a subsequent Notice of Violation 

for Entergy’s failure to place the new ANS in service by August 24, 2007, as required by the 

July 30, 2007 Order. 

Florida Power and Light Company EA-07-110, EA-07-113, EA-07-116, EA-07-119 

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 & 4 

On January 22, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $208,000 was issued for a Severity Level II problem consisting of (1) the 

licensees failure to ensure, on or about April of 2004, that each of its armed responders was 

equipped with a contingency weapon in accordance with an NRC Order issued on February 

25, 2002, Section B.4(f); (2) the licensees failure to ensure, on or about August 2005, that 

each of its armed responders was equipped with a contingency weapon in accordance with 

the licensee Physical Security Plan; (3) a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, incomplete and 

inaccurate information; and (4) the failure of the licensee to make a one hour report to the 

NRC as required in 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, I(a)(3). 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
OE Annual Report

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Florida Power and Light Company EA-07-138 

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 & 4 

On April 9, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $130,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving inattentive 

security officers. An investigation conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations 

determined that there were multiple willful examples of security officer inattentiveness 

and complicity or facilitation by other security personnel to support inattentive behavior 

between 2004 and 2006. A base civil penalty of $65,000 is normally considered for a 

SL III violation. However, in this case the staff concluded that discretion to increase the 

amount of the civil penalty to two times the base was warranted because (1) the licensee 

did not self identify these issues, (2) the licensee’s corrective actions were neither 

prompt nor comprehensive, and (3) the licensee had been subject to escalated 

enforcement action within the past two years. 

Civil Penalties Issued To Material Licensees

Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. EA-07-325, EA-08-196 

Anchorage, AK 

On August 20, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in 

the amount of $20,800 was issued for a willful Severity Level II problem involving 

(1) performing radiography at a location other than a permanent radiographic installation 

without the presence of two qualified individuals, in violation of 10 CFR 34.41(a), and 

(2) failing to provide the NRC with information that was complete and accurate in all 

material respects, in violation of 10 CFR 30.9(a). The NRC also issued an immediately 

effective Order Modifying License to require additional actions by the licensee to provide 

reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will be protected. 

American Radiolabeled Chemicals, Inc. EA-08-126 

St. Louis, MO 

On July 22, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $6500 was issued for a Severity Level III problem. The violation involved 

multiple examples of failure to adhere to license commitments and regulations. 

Specifically, between January 22 and March 14, 2008, the licensee failed to: (1) secure 

from unauthorized removal or limit access to licensed material in an aggregate quantity 

greater than 1000 times Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 20 limits; (2) comply with license 

commitments related to management oversight of the radiation protection program, 

including a failure to conduct monthly meetings of the Radiation Safety Committee and a 

failure to implement timely and adequate corrective actions for issues identified during 

annual program reviews; (3) comply with license commitments related to radiological 

surveys; and (4) perform and document required investigations of contamination found in 

controlled and unrestricted areas. 
OE Annual Report

B3 

BWX Technologies, Inc. EA-07-240 

Lynchburg, VA 

On January 24, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in 

the amount of $32,500 was issued for a Severity Level III violation of Safety Condition 

S-1 of NRC License SNM-42 and Section 5.1.1 (f), “Protection Against Criticality,” of the 

License Application involving the failure of the licensee to analyze a specific transfer 

process to ensure the configuration of special nuclear material (SNM) during transfer 

could not result in a criticality accident. Specifically, on July 26, 2007, a Raschig ring 

vacuum cleaner spilled its contents containing a solution of SNM during transfer on a 

fork lift into a plastic bag being used for contamination control, which created an 

unanalyzed condition. In this case, no criticality event occurred because of the low 

amount and concentration of SNM present. 

BWX Technologies, Inc. EA-08-204 

Lynchburg, VA 

On October 20, 2008, a Notice of Violation (NOV) and Proposed Imposition of Civil 

Penalty in the amount of $32,500 was issued to BWX Technologies, Inc. This action is 

based on a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 70.61 involving the failure of the 

licensee to provide adequate engineered and administrative controls to limit or prevent 

an acute chemical exposure from a hazardous chemical produced from licensed 

material. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly label a storage tank containing liquid 

hydrogen fluoride (HF), and failed to ensure that a Process Operator was adequately 

trained. As a result, on April 28, 2008, a Process Operator received an ocular exposure 

to liquid HF while trying to neutralize a spill that could have led to irreversible or other 

serious, long-lasting health effects. In this case, no permanent vision loss was sustained 

by the operator. However, under different circumstances, such as a delayed response 

from the emergency team, the exposure could have resulted in a more severe 

consequence to the operator. 

Dickinson County Memorial Hospital EA-08-048 

Iron Mountain, MI 

On May 7, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the 

failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that was stored 

in a controlled area. Specifically, on January 25, 2008, the doors to a room which 

contained licensed material being packaged for shipment were left unsecured and 

unattended, resulting in licensed radioactive material being accessible to unauthorized 

individuals via an adjacent, unrestricted hallway. 

Digirad Imaging Solutions, Inc. EA-07-223, EA-07-225 

Bemus Point, NY 

On April 3, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty was 

issued for two Severity Level III violations resulting in two $3,250 civil penalties (a total of 

$6,500). In violation of 10 CFR 30.9, the licensee provide the NRC information that was 

not complete and accurate in a material respects when it submitted statements from a 
OE Annual Report

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physician ( preceptor) for the purposes of attesting that an applicant physician met the 

training and experience criteria to be named as an authorized user on an NRC license. 

However, the applicant physician had not worked with or under the supervision of the 

preceptor and the preceptor did not meet the NRC requirements for a preceptor to be an 

authorized user physician on a license. Further, in violation of 10 CFR 201801, the 

licensee did not secure from unauthorized removal, limit access to, or maintain control 

and surveillance of licensed material at several facilities and over a period of several 

years (2001- 2006). 

Global Nuclear Fuel – Americas, L.L.C. EA-08-187, EA-08-123 

Wilmington, NC 

On August 13, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in 

the amount of $16,250 was issued for a Severity Level III violation for circumstances 

surrounding an incorrect emergency action level declaration. The incorrect emergency 

action level declaration stemmed from an event that occurred on January 29-30, 2008, 

also categorized as SL III (EA-08-123), involving introduction of moisture into the Dry 

Conversion Process Line-2 cooling hopper containing uranium dioxide powder. 

Hevly Technical Services, Inc. (HTS) EA-08-129, EA-08-130 

Wanetchee, WA 

On May 16, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $3,000 was issued for a deliberate Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 

150.20(b)(3) involving the transfer of a portable moisture density gauge containing 

radioactive material to a company in the State of Alaska that was not licensed to 

possess or use the gauge. Specifically, on May 17, 2003, HTS, a General Licensee 

under 10 CFR 150.20, transferred a portable gauging device containing radioactive 

material to Alaska Rim Engineering, a company that HTS knew was not specifically 

licensed by the NRC to receive the material. In addition, a second Severity Level III 

violation was issued for failure to file NRC Form 241- Report of Proposed Activities in 

Non-Agreement States, at least three days prior to engaging in licensed activities within 

NRC jurisdiction. Specifically on May 17, 2003, HTS, who held specific licenses from the 

Agreement Sates of Washington and Oregon, used a portable device containing 

radioactive material in Palmer, Alaska, during training without filing a Form -241 with the 

NRC. 

IBS of America Corporation EA-08-031 

Chesapeake, VA 

On June 6, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.34(c). 

Specifically, the licensee possessed byproduct material at a location not authorized by 

their license. 
OE Annual Report

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McCallum Testing Laboratories, Inc. EA-08-004, EA-08-086 

Chesapeake, VA 

On May 28, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III problem. The violations involved 

(1) the failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of material that is in an 

unrestricted area and not in storage and (2) the failure to block and brace packages 

containing radioactive material to prevent change in position during transport. 

Specifically, a portable gauge fell from the back of a pickup truck, after it was placed in 

the back of the truck without using a transport case or attaching the gauge in any way to 

the truck. After falling, the gauge was subsequently damaged, and was lost for 

approximately an hour. 

Quality Inspection Services, Inc. EA-08-158 

Buffalo, NY 

On September 15, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty 

in the amount of $6,500 was issued for a Severity Level III violation. This action is 

based on a willful violation of 10 CFR 34.71, involving the failure to maintain utilization 

logs of radiographic activities. Specifically, between November 15, 2006 and March 2, 

2007, the licensee’s site radiation safety officer performed radiographic operations at the 

Connecticut site, without maintaining utilization logs. In addition, three related Severity 

Level III violations were also issued for failures to: (1) provide complete and accurate 

information by licensee’s site radiation safety office and assistance radiographer, 

regarding the use of the proposed permanent fixed installation in the Manchester facility; 

(2) obtain NRC approval prior to conduct of radiographic operations at the Manchester 

permanent radiographic installation; and (3) be accompanied by at least one other 

qualified radiographer when the licensee’s corporate radiation safety officer performed 

radiographic operations in the proposed permanent radiographic installation. 

Source Production and Equipment Co., Inc. (SPEC) EA-08-039 

St. Rose, LA 

On July 14, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $9600 was issued to Source Production and Equipment Co., Inc. (SPEC) for 

a deliberate Severity Level II problem of 10 CFR 71.3. Two violations were identified 

involving the transport of NRC licensed material without a license because SPEC did not 

comply with NRC Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 5979 requirements. Specifically, 

on July 15, 2003, December 4, 2003, and May 20, 2004, SPEC shipped licensed 

material to Mexico and 1) the end caps of the package were physically and 

dimensionally different from those approved in the CoC, and 2) the package was not 

inspected prior to the shipments as required by the CoC. There are no known actual 

health and safety consequences associated with the shipments. 

Washington University of St. Louis EA-08-180 

St. Louis. MO 

On September 4, 2008, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in 

the amount of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III problem. This action was based 

on violations of 10 CFR 20.1802 and 10 CFR 35.404(a) which were combined into a 
OE Annual Report

B6 

SL III problem. Specifically, the licensee transferred an applicator, containing two iodine125 seeds from the operating room to the decontamination room. The loaded cartridge 

was opened during the cleaning process and the seeds were washed down the drain 

into the sanitary sewer. The licensee had failed to make a survey to locate and account 

for the two iodine-125 sources that were not implanted.
OE Annual Report

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Appendix C: Summary of Orders* 

Orders Issued To Licensees

Accurate NDE and Inspection, LLC EA-06-281; EA-07-289

Broussard, LA 

On February 20, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to 

confirm commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 

settlement agreement. The licensee requested ADR following the NRC’s March 20, 

2007, Notice of Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty of $13,000 for a willful violation 

involving the failure to secure from unauthorized removal or access licensed material 

that was stored in an unrestricted area; failure to wear required personnel dosimetry 

during radiographic operations; and failure to provide complete and accurate information 

on documents provided to an NRC inspector. As part of the agreement, Accurate NDE 

agreed to additional management review and oversight programs that will include 

implementation of amended procedures for offshore radiographic operations, 

implementation of a training program, and increased audits of the program. Accurate 

NDE will also submit an article in the company newsletter regarding this case and the 

consequences of wrongdoing. In exchange for Accurate NDE’s extensive corrective 

actions, the NRC agreed to reduce the civil penalty originally proposed to $500. 

Baxter Healthcare of Puerto Rico EA-07-132 

Albonito, PR 

On February 26, 2008, a Confirmatory Order modifying the license and confirming 

commitments reached as part of an ADR mediation settlement agreement was issued 

along with a Severity Level III Notice of Violation and Civil Penalty in the amount of 

$15,000. This enforcement action was based on violations resulting from deliberate acts 

of certain Baxter employees. Specifically, violations included failure to perform 

preventative maintenance checks of safety systems, failure to conduct safety 

performance reviews and written tests for two irradiator operators; and failure to maintain 

complete and accurate records of inspection and maintenance checks and operator 

performance. The NRC and the licensee agreed to disagree regarding the failure to 

conduct safety performance reviews and written tests for the two irradiator operators and 

the associated record requirements. Further, Baxter has taken multiple corrective 

actions agreed to in the ADR session, including development of specific procedures, 

training, and processes for which the Order will modify the license to require 

implementation. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included.
OE Annual Report

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Chevron Environmental Management Company (Molycorp) EA-08-054 

Washington, PA 

On July 8, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to confirm 

commitments made as result of an ADR session, held on June 5, 2008, between 

Chevron Environmental Management Company (CEMC) and the NRC. The parties 

agreed to engage in ADR following NRC’s February 29, 2008, letter to CEMC wherein 

an apparent violation of 10 CFR 40.7, “Employee Protection” was identified. As set forth 

in the order, CEMC agreed to complete a number of actions at its Washington, PA 

decommissioning site, including, but not limited to: training supervisory employees 

regarding employees’ rights to raise concerns; communicating CEMC’s policy and 

management expectations regarding employees’ right to raise concerns; and distributing 

a questionnaire to assess employees’ willingness to raise nuclear safety concerns. The 

NRC agreed to not pursue further enforcement action relating to this matter. 

Florida Power and Light Company EA-07-321 

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 

On June 13, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Florida 

Power and Light Company (FPL) to formalize commitments made as a result of a 

successful ADR mediation session. The commitments were made by FPL as part of a 

settlement agreement between FPL and the NRC regarding a licensee supervisor who 

deliberately submitted a materially incomplete condition report to the licensee and 

deliberately violated a licensee procedure when he failed to contact the site security 

manager to evaluate the trustworthiness and reliability of two valve technicians who 

falsified a work order. The agreement resolves an apparent violation involving FPL’s 

failure to adhere to FPL Nuclear Division Policy, which was identified during an NRC 

Office of Investigations (OI) investigation. In consideration of these commitments, the 

NRC agreed to exercise enforcement discretion and forego issuance of a Notice of 

Violation or take other enforcement action against FPL in this matter. 

Florida Power and Light Company EA-08-172 

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 

On October 20, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to 

Florida Power and Light Company to formalize commitments made as a result of a 

successful ADR mediation session. The commitments were made by FPL as part of a 

settlement agreement between FPL and the NRC regarding a security operations 

supervisor who failed to follow site security procedures at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. 

Specifically, the security operations supervisor willfully permitted the entry of a container 

into the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant without conducting the required search of its contents.
OE Annual Report

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Global X-Ray & Testing EA-08-008, EA-08-009, EA-080010, EA-08-011, EA-08-013 

Houma, LA 

On May 23, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to 

Global X-ray & Testing (Global) to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR 

settlement agreement. NRC identified four violations during inspection and investigation 

involving: (1) a willful failure to provide the NRC with complete and accurate information; 

(2) the failure to prevent workers from resuming work after their pocket dosimeters were 

found to be off-scale; (3) the failure to ensure that a radiographer was providing personal 

supervision of the radiographer's assistant through direct observation of the assistant’s 

performance of radiographic operations; and (4) allowing an individual who was not 

wearing a personal dosimeter to conduct radiographic operations. In response to these 

violations, the licensee requested ADR. As part of the agreement, the licensee agreed to 

additional management review that will include developing procedures for additional 

oversight of offshore radiographic operations, obtaining an agreement with lay-barge 

operators that will address radiographic operations, incidents, and oversight; field audits 

of lay-barge radiographic operations by licensee management, making arrangements for 

NRC inspection of radiographic activities on U.S. owned lay-barges, implementation of 

training on potential consequences for violation of NRC regulations, and delivering a 

personal letter to each employee regarding the consequences of wrongdoing. Global 

also agreed to obtain an NRC license with special license conditions for radiographic 

operations in offshore waters. In exchange for Global’s extensive corrective actions and 

most notably in consideration of costs associated with obtaining an NRC license, the 

NRC agreed to eliminate the civil monetary penalty. 

Southern California Edison Company EA-07-232 

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 

On January 11, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to 

Southern California Edison Company (SCE) to formalize commitments made as a result 

of a successful ADR mediation session. The commitments were made by SCE as part of 

a settlement agreement between SCE and the NRC concerning the falsification, by a 

contract fire protection specialist at SONGS, of firewatch certification sheets on 

numerous occasions from April 2001 to December 2006. As part of the settlement 

agreement, SCE agreed to, in general terms, performing a common cause evaluation of 

known recent events, conducting a safety culture assessment, conducting training and 

communications, and developing or enhancing various programs in areas such as 

ethics, disciplinary process, contract programs, and oversight. In recognition of these 

actions, and those corrective actions already completed, NRC refrained from further 

enforcement action related to this particular case, and may exercise enforcement 

discretion for the next six months on willful cases that meet the conditions of Section 

VII.B.4 of the Enforcement Policy, “Violations Identified Due to Previous Enforcement 

Action.” NRC will evaluate the implementation of SCE’s commitments during future 

inspections. 
OE Annual Report

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Orders Issued To Individuals

Oscar Aguilar IA-07-029 

On January 22, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order prohibiting an individual, a 

contract security officer with the Wackenhut Corporation, from involvement in all NRClicensed activities for a period of 5 years from the date the Order was issued. The Order 

was issued based on activities that occurred on or about April of 2004. Specifically, Mr. 

Aguilar deliberately removed firing pins from two contingency response weapons, 

rendering the weapons non-functional. As a result, Mr. Aguilar caused Florida power and 

Light (FPL) to be in violation of NRC Order for Interim Compensatory Measures, dated 

February 25, 2002, Section B.4(f). Mr. Aguilar’s actions in this regard constituted a 

violation of 10 CFR 50.5. 

Juan Blanco IA-07-025 

On February 11, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order prohibiting an individual from 

involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of 3 years was issued. The Order 

was issued based upon the individual providing the NRC information that he knew was 

inaccurate or incomplete. Specifically, Mr. Blanco stated during an NRC Office of 

Investigations (OI) interview in April 2005 that he had no knowledge of an incident 

involving the removal of two firing pins from contingency response weapons at the 

Florida Power and Light, Turkey Point facility. However, in a February 2006 interview 

with OI, Mr. Blanco admitted that he was shown the firing pins after the pins were 

removed from the weapon by the security officer who removed the pins. Mr. Blanco also 

failed to report the broken firing pins as required. 

Jon Brumer IA-07-027 

On January 22, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order prohibiting an individual, a 

contract security Lieutenant with the Wackenhut Corporation, from involvement in all 

NRC-licensed activities for a period of 5 years from the date the Order was issued. The 

Order was issued based on activities that occurred on or about August of 2005. 

Specifically, Mr. Brumer deliberately removed and broke a firing pin from a contingency 

response weapon, rendering the weapon non-functional. As a result, Mr. Brumer caused 

FPL to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 73. Mr. Brumer’s actions in this regard were in 

violation of 10 CFR 50.5 “Deliberate Misconduct.” Additionally, on or about February 19, 

2006, Mr. Brumer provided a transcribed statement to an OI agent regarding his 

involvement in the breaking of a firing pin that was later determined to be incomplete and 

inaccurate. Mr. Brumer’s actions in this regard were also in violation of 10 CFR 50.5. 

Luis Fernandez IA-07-026 

On January 22, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Mr. 

Luis Fernandez, a former security Project Manager for the Wackenhut Corporation, as a 

result of a settlement agreement entered into following the conclusion of Alternative 

Dispute Resolution, requested by the individual. This Confirmatory Order relates to a 

series of actions taken by Mr. Fernandez that resulted in the deliberate documentation of 

damage to a contingency response weapon in a licensee Condition Report, which was 

incomplete and inaccurate. The Condition Report, which is required to be maintained by 
OE Annual Report

C5 

the licensee, was provided to the NRC staff during an ongoing inspection and 

investigation. As a result, the actions of Mr. Fernandez placed the licensee in violation of 

10 CFR 50.9. During the mediation session, Mr. Fernandez agreed, among other things, 

to: (1) he has no intention of working or seeking employment in any activities or at any 

facility subject to NRC regulations, and that he will not seek employment requiring his 

participation in NRC-regulated activities before June 30, 2008, (2) should he seek 

employment with an entity involved in NRC-regulated activities and requiring unescorted 

access authorization prior to June 30, 2010, he will provide the NRC with a letter 

discussing the steps he has taken to assure his understanding of the importance of 

completeness and accuracy of information at facilities subject to NRC regulation, 

(3) make himself available to participate in training to discuss lessons learned from this 

matter and the importance of completeness and accuracy of condition reports and other 

internal documents, (4) should he seek employment with any NRC-regulated entity prior 

to June 30, 2010, to provide to the NRC a letter discussing the steps he has taken to 

assure his understanding of NRC requirements in effect at the time, is sufficient to 

address all Agency concerns regarding his involvement in the matter discussed in the 

NRC’s letter of May 30, 2007. In consideration of the above, the NRC agreed to forego 

issuance of a Notice of Violation or take other enforcement action against Mr. Fernandez 

in this matter. 

Mr. Anthony R. Fortuna IA-07-069 

On July 3, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued as part of a 

settlement agreement confirming commitments reached during an ADR mediation 

session. The ADR session involved discussions of Mr. Fortuna’s failure to provide 

required information on an application for unescorted access to the Hatch Nuclear Plant. 

Specifically, on February 6, 2006, Mr. Fortuna failed to disclose on a Personal History 

Questionnaire (PHQ) that he previously tested positive on an employer’s drug test. As a 

result, Mr. Fortuna gained unescorted access to the protected area of the Hatch Nuclear 

Plant. The failure to disclose the prior positive drug test was material because it 

precluded the licensee from taking the information from this disclosure into consideration 

when determining his trustworthiness and reliability prior to granting unescorted access 

to the plant as required by 10 CFR 73.56(b). Mr. Fortuna engaged in deliberate 

misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 50.5 when he did not disclose his prior positive drug 

test result on the PHQ. 

William Johns IA-07-028 

On January 22, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Mr. 

William Johns, a former security manager for Florida Power and Light, as a result of a 

settlement agreement entered into following the conclusion of an ADR mediation 

session, requested by the individual. This Confirmatory Order relates to Mr. Johns’ 

deliberate failure to make a one-hour report to the Commission of an event involving the 

interruption of normal operation of a licensed nuclear power reactor through the 

unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls, including 

the security system. In this case, the tampering event involved the breaking of a firing 

pin for a contingency response weapon, a component of the security system. The NRC 

reached a preliminary conclusion that Mr. Johns’ failure to make a report was in violation 

of 10 CFR 50.5, in that Mr. Johns’ actions caused Florida Power & Light to not report this 

event to the NRC as required by 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix G.I.(a)(3). During the 
OE Annual Report

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mediation session, Mr. Johns agreed, among other things, to: (1) not seek employment 

requiring his participation in NRC-regulated activities before July 15, 2008, (2) that prior 

to seeking future employment in NRC-regulated activities, Mr. Johns will submit to the 

NRC a letter explaining the steps he has taken to assure he understands the NRC’s 

security reporting requirements in effect at the time, (3) that prior to seeking future 

employment in NRC-regulated activities, Mr. Johns will submit to the NRC a letter 

explaining the steps he has taken to assure he understands the NRC’s security reporting 

requirements in effect at the time. In consideration of the above, the NRC agreed to 

forego issuance of a Notice of Violation or other enforcement action to Mr. Johns in this 

matter. 

Patrick A. Kelly IA-08-008 

On August 20, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order was issued to an individual 

prohibiting him from involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of 1 year from 

the date the Order was issued. The Order was issued based on his engagement in 

deliberate misconduct which caused his employer, Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. to be in 

violation of 10 CFR 34.41(a) and for providing the NRC with information that he knew 

was inaccurate or incomplete. Specifically, the individual deliberately violated 10 CFR 

34.41(a) by performing radiography with only one radiographer present at a temporary 

jobsite, on multiple occasions over about a 3-year period. In addition, when first 

interviewed by the NRC’s Office of Investigations, he deliberately provided information 

that he knew was incomplete or inaccurate. 

Joseph S. Shepherd IA-08-014 

On September 8, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to 

Mr. Joseph S. Shepherd, a contractor for Source Production and Equipment Company 

(SPEC), confirming commitments reached as part of conjoined negotiations with the 

Department of Justice (DOJ). As a result of the plea negotiations with DOJ, 

Mr. Shepherd agreed to not contest the Order. The Order was issued based on 

Mr. Shepherd’s failure to comply with certain NRC Certificate of Compliance (CoC) 

requirements regarding a shipping package and his engagement in deliberate 

misconduct which caused SPEC to be in violation of 10 CFR 71.3. Specifically, SPEC, 

an NRC licensee pursuant to 10 CFR Part 110, shipped licensed radioactive material to 

Mexico on July 15, 2003, December 4, 2003, and May 20, 2004 while (1) the end caps 

were physically and dimensionally different from those approved in the CoC, and (2) the 

package was not inspected prior to shipment as required by the CoC. Mr. Shepherd 

agreed that he authorized modifications to the transportation package without prior NRC 

approval and that he concealed these package non-conformances from SPEC at the 

time of the shipments. Mr. Shepherd also agreed that he did not perform inspections of 

the shipping package as required by the CoC prior to the shipments to Mexico, but 

provided SPEC documentation which indicated that he performed the required 

inspections. As a result, SPEC, which relied on Mr. Shepherd’s representations that the 

shipping package complied with all regulatory requirements, shipped NRC licensed 

material without a license in violation of 10 CFR 71.3. The Order and DOJ agreement 

will prohibit Mr. Shepherd from participating in 10 CFR Part 71 licensed activities 

indefinitely. He also will (1) be subject to additional unannounced inspections for 5 years 

from the date of the Order, (2) notify and make available copies of the Order to 
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customers, (3) attend additional regulatory safety training, and (4) prepare a 

presentation for an industry conference describing the circumstances of his violations. 

Kenneth J. Vandiver IA-08-006 

On August 20, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order was issued to the former radiation 

safety officer for Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc, prohibiting him from involvement in 

NRC-licensed activities for a period of 3 years from the date the Order was issued. The 

Order was issued based on his engagement in deliberate misconduct on numerous 

occasions over several years, and providing the NRC with information that he knew was 

inaccurate or incomplete. Specifically, as RSO he was responsible for ensuring that 

radiation safety activities were being performed in accordance with approved procedures 

and regulatory requirements in the daily operation of the licensee’s program. In this 

case, not only did the individual deliberately violate 10 CFR 34.41(a), he was also aware 

that other AIX radiographers were deliberately violating this requirement and took no 

actions to stop it. When questioned by the NRC, he knowingly provided incomplete and 

inaccurate information about the violations. 

Demand For Information

Mattingly Testing Services, Inc. EA-07-303 

Molt, MT 

On January 23, 2008, a Demand for Information (DFI) was issued to Mattingly Testing 

Services, Inc. (Mattingly Testing) in response to the information obtained during 

November 7, 2007, inspection and investigation of Mattingly Testing’s licensed activities. 

While the inspection and investigation activities continue, the DFI required Mattingly 

Testing to provide information in order for the NRC to evaluate and determine the 

appropriateness of Mattingly Testing’s licensed material program at temporary job sites. 

The DFI also required Mattingly Testing to provide information in order for the NRC to 

evaluate the depth and completeness of Mattingly Testing’s work environment and its 

determination that it maintains an environment where employees can raise safety 

concerns without fear of retaliation. Specifically, the DFI required Mattingly Testing to 

provide additional details relative to the establishment, implementation and maintenance 

of a program designed to provide and support such a work environment. 
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Appendix D: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions 

Against Individuals* 

Orders

Nine Orders were issued to individuals during 2008 and are discussed in Appendix C. 

Notices of Violation 

William M Johnson IA-08-022 

On May 23, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation 

involving a deliberate failure to provide the NRC with complete and accurate information, 

as required by 10 CFR 30.10(a)(2). Specifically, in a report submitted to the NRC on 

May 18, 2006, the individual, as the radiation safety officer (RSO) for Global X-Ray and 

Testing Corporation, described an event that took place during radiographic operations 

on board a lay-barge on April 20, 2006, but failed to include complete information 

regarding the radiation exposure to the radiographer involved in the event. He also failed 

to disclose the fact that the radiographer reported that his pocket dosimeter had gone 

off-scale and he did not reconcile or explain the discrepancy between the reported dose 

and the off-scale dosimeter reading. 

Sean J. Kelly IA-08-009 

On August 20, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation 

involving deliberate misconduct on the part of the individual which caused his employer, 

Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. to be in violation of 10 CFR 34.41(a). Specifically, the 

individual deliberately performed radiography, on multiple occasions, without being 

accompanied by at least one other qualified radiographer or an individual who had at a 

minimum met the requirements of § 34.43(c). 

Charles A. Leet IA-08-025 

On September 17, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation 

involving a deliberate submission of materially inaccurate information to the NRC and 

deliberately caused his employer, Alaska Rim Engineering, Inc., to be in violation of 

NRC regulations. Specifically, Mr. Leet, on behalf of Alaska Rim, purchased, received, 

possessed, and used a portable gauge device without an NRC license. In addition, on 

May 6, 2007, Mr. Leet submitted a license application to the NRC stating that Alaska 

Rim was planning to purchase the portable gauge when, in fact, Alaska Rim had already 

purchased the gauge in May 2003 and used it without an NRC license. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
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Scot A. Menzies IA-08-010 

On September 10, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation 

involving a deliberate failure to use a minimum of two independent physical controls that 

formed tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal, when the 

portable gauges were not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. 

Specifically, Mr. Menzies did not use tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from 

unauthorized removal while in storage. 

Donald M. Miller IA-08-007 

On August 20, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation 

involving deliberate misconduct on the part of the individual which caused his employer, 

Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. to be in violation of 10 CFR 34.41(a). Specifically, the 

individual deliberately performed radiography, on multiple occasions, without being 

accompanied by at least one other qualified radiographer or an individual who had at a 

minimum met the requirements of § 34.43(c). 

Alex Ortiz IA-07-041 

On February 26, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation 

involving deliberate misconduct on the part of an individual which caused his employer, 

Baxter Healthcare of Puerto Rico to be in violation of NRC regulations. Specifically, the 

individual deliberately failed to perform required weekly, monthly, and quarterly 

maintenance checks of safety systems, and deliberately created inaccurate records of 

the aforementioned maintenance checks to reflect that these activities had been 

completed when, in fact, they were not completed as required by the associated 

regulation. 

Efrain Santiago IA-07-040 

On February 26, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation 

involving deliberate misconduct on the part of an individual which caused his employer, 

Baxter Healthcare of Puerto Rico to be in violation of NRC regulations. Specifically, the 

individual deliberately failed to perform required preventative maintenance checks of 

safety systems, failed to conduct the annual performance (safety) tests for two irradiator 

operators, and created inaccurate records of the aforementioned maintenance checks 

and irradiator operator performance tests to reflect that these activities had been 

completed when, in fact, they were not completed as required by the associated 

regulation. 

Stanley Swans IA-07-070 

On June 6, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation 

involving deliberate misconduct on the part of an individual which caused his employer, 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, to be in violation of NRC regulations. 

Specifically, Mr. Swans deliberately failed to disclose information that obscured his 

trustworthiness and subsequently contributed to the failure of the licensee to evaluate 

his trustworthiness and reliability prior to granting him access to the facility. 
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Appendix E: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions 

Against Non-Licensees 

(Vendors, Contractors and Certificate Holders)* 

Confirmatory Order

Wackenhut Nuclear Services EA-07-111, EA-07-114, EA-07-117 

On January 22, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to 

Wackenhut Nuclear Services, Inc., (WNS) to confirm commitments made as a result of 

an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) settlement agreement concerning three 

violations involving WNS employees who were providing security-related services at 

Florida Power and Light Company’s Turkey Point Nuclear Plant in 2004 and 2005. 

Specifically, the violations involved deliberately removing or breaking firing pins on 

multiple contingency response weapons rendering them non-functional, and providing 

incomplete or inaccurate information. The Order requires WNS to (1) revise its hiring 

and recruitment policy; (2) develop a site enhancement plan for the Turkey Point facility; 

(3) develop an enhanced leadership program; (4) benchmark, audits and selfassessments, (5) develop performance indicators for the Turkey Point facility; (6) provide 

focused one-on-one training between supervisors and subordinates and (7) continue 

communications with the NRC detailing progress on the above six items. In 

consideration of the commitments in the Order, the NRC agreed to forgo issuance of a 

Notice of Violation, or take any other enforcement action in this matter. 

Wackenhut Nuclear Services EA-07-256 

On April 9, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Wackenhut 

Nuclear Services (WNS) resulting from a successful Alternative Dispute Resolution 

(ADR) session involving security officer inattentiveness at Florida Power and Light 

Company’s Turkey Point Nuclear Plant in 2004 and 2005. As part of the ADR settlement 

agreement, WNS agreed to the development and continuation of several initiatives to 

ensure security officer attentiveness at all facilities supported by WNS. WNS also 

agreed to a continuation of periodic communications with the NRC to discuss the status 

and effectiveness of these initiatives. In consideration of the commitments in the Order, 

the NRC agreed to forgo issuance of a Notice of Violation, or take any other 

enforcement action in this matter. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
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Appendix F: Summary of Notices of Enforcement Discretion 

NOED 08-4-01, issued February 20, 2008, to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation 

(Wolf Creek Generating Station), provided enforcement discretion that allowed the 

licensee to extend the 4-hour completion time for Technical Specification 3.8.1, Action 

B.2, by 15 hours to restore the Train A centrifugal pump and room cooler to an operable 

statue. 

NOED 08-3-01, issued April 10, 2008, to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Palisades 

Nuclear Plant), provided enforcement discretion that allowed the licensee to extend the 

length of allowed outage time in Technical Specification 3.8.1, “AC Sources - Operating,” 

an additional 24 hours to support completion of corrective maintenance activities on the 

safeguards transformer without having to shut down. 

NOED 08-3-002, issued August 21, 2008, to Exelon Generation Company LLC (Dresden 

Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), provided enforcement discretion that allowed the 

licensee to extend the length of allowed outage time in Technical Specification 3.4.4, 

“RCS Operational Leakage,” and Technical Specification 3.4.5, “RCS Leakage Detection 

Instrumentation,” an additional 7 days to reconfigure the drywell floor drain sump 

monitoring system, such that the drywell equipment drain sump monitoring system could 

be used to quantify unidentified drywell leakage without having to shut down. 

NOED 08-2-001, issued October 2, 2008, to Tennessee Valley Authority (Sequoyah 

Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), provided enforcement discretion that allowed the licensee 

to extend the time required by Technical Specification 3.0.5.1 to be in at least hot 

standby in 6 hours by an additional 36 hours to restore Train B of the control room air 

conditioning system to an operable status.