[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 214 (Friday, November 5, 2004)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 64510-64513]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-24729]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2004-19541; Directorate Identifier 2004-NM-129-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) 
for all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 airplanes. This proposed AD would 
require an inspection of the pushrod assemblies for the left and right 
elevator control tabs to determine if the pushrod assemblies are made 
of aluminum or steel, replacing any assembly made of aluminum with an 
assembly made of steel or modifying existing steel assemblies, and 
other specified actions. This proposed AD would also require an 
inspection of the crank assemblies for the inboard and outboard geared 
tabs of the elevator to determine if the crank assemblies are made of 
aluminum or steel, replacing any assembly made of aluminum with an 
assembly made of steel, and other specified actions. This proposed AD 
is prompted by an accident involving a DC-8 airplane. The probable 
cause of the accident was a loss of pitch control resulting from the 
disconnection of the pushrod for the right elevator control tab. The 
pushrod dropped down and jammed in front of the control tab crank, 
causing a large deflection of the control tab. We are proposing this AD 
to minimize the possibility of a control tab offset. A control tab 
offset could cause elevator deflection, an elevator airplane-nose-up 
condition, and reduced controllability of the airplane. This proposed 
AD is also prompted by a report that the elevator on a McDonnell 
Douglas Model DC-8 airplane did not respond to command inputs from the 
flightcrew. We are also proposing this AD to minimize the possibility 
of crank

[[Page 64511]]

assembly failure when the assembly is exposed to abnormal load 
conditions. Failure of a crank assembly could result in a jammed 
elevator and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by December 20, 
2004.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on 
this proposed AD.
    <bullet> DOT Docket Web Site: Go to http://dms.dot.gov and follow 
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
    <bullet> Government-Wide Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
    <bullet> Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street SW., Nassif Building, room PL-401, 
Washington, DC 20590.
    <bullet> By Fax: (202) 493-2251.
    <bullet> Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the 
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. 
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood 
Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service 
Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024).
    You can examine the contents of this AD docket on the Internet at 
http://dms.dot.gov, or at the Docket Management Facility, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street SW., room PL-401, on 
the plaza level of the Nassif Building, Washington, DC. This docket 
number is FAA-2004-19541; the directorate identifier for this docket is 
2004-NM-129-AD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
    Technical Information: Maureen Moreland, Aerospace Engineer, 
Airframe Branch, ANM-120L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification 
Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; 
telephone (562) 627-5238; fax (562) 627-5210.
    Plain Language Information: Marcia Walters, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4f222e3d2c262e61382e233b2a3d3c0f292e2e61282039"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="214c40534248400f56404d55445352614740400f464e57">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Docket Management System (DMS)

    The FAA has implemented new procedures for maintaining AD dockets 
electronically. As of May 17, 2004, new AD actions are posted on DMS 
and assigned a docket number. We track each action and assign a 
corresponding directorate identifier. The DMS AD docket number is in 
the form ``Docket No. FAA-2004-99999.'' The Transport Airplane 
Directorate identifier is in the form ``Directorate Identifier 2004-NM-
999-AD.'' Each DMS AD docket also lists the directorate identifier 
(``Old Docket Number'') as a cross-reference for searching purposes.

Comments Invited

    We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or 
arguments regarding this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address 
listed under ADDRESSES. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2004-19541; 
Directorate Identifier 2004-NM-129-AD'' in the subject line of your 
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. We will 
consider all comments submitted by the closing date and may amend the 
proposed AD in light of those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will 
also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA 
personnel concerning this proposed AD. Using the search function of 
that Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our 
dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or 
signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, 
etc.). You can review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the 
Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you 
can visit http://dms.dot.gov.
    We are reviewing the writing style we currently use in regulatory 
documents. We are interested in your comments on whether the style of 
this document is clear, and your suggestions to improve the clarity of 
our communications that affect you. You can get more information about 
plain language at http://www.faa.gov/language and http://www.plainlanguage.gov.

Examining the Docket

    You can examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-
5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT 
street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 
available in the AD docket shortly after the DMS receives them.

Discussion

    On February 16, 2000, a McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8-71F was 
involved in an accident shortly after takeoff, while attempting to 
return to Sacramento Mather Airport, Rancho Cordova, California, for an 
emergency landing. The National Transportation Safety Board determined 
that the probable cause of the accident was a loss of pitch control 
resulting from the disconnection of the right elevator control tab. The 
disconnection was caused by the failure to properly secure and inspect 
the attachment bolt. The disconnected control tab pushrod dropped down 
and jammed in front of the control tab crank, resulting in a large 
deflection of the control tab. A control tab offset could cause 
elevator deflection, an elevator airplane-nose-up condition, and 
reduced controllability of the airplane.
    We have also received a report that the elevator on a McDonnell 
Douglas Model DC-8 airplane did not respond to command inputs from the 
flightcrew. The flightcrew had to perform a rejected take-off. 
Investigation revealed that, prior to departure, the left elevator was 
shifted to an abnormal position by engine blast from another airplane. 
A preliminary inspection of the affected airplane revealed a broken 
geared-tab mechanism on the inboard aluminum crank assembly. The 
inspection also revealed a broken drive mechanism on the outboard 
aluminum crank assembly. Broken crank assemblies, if not corrected, 
could result in a jammed elevator and consequent reduced 
controllability of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

    We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC8-27A281, dated 
June 2, 2004. The service bulletin describes procedures for visually 
inspecting the pushrod assemblies for the left and right elevator 
control tabs to determine whether the pushrod assemblies are made of 
aluminum or steel, or using a magnet to make this determination. The 
service bulletin also describes procedures for replacing any assembly 
made of aluminum with an assembly made of steel or modifying existing 
steel assemblies, and other specified actions. Depending on the 
inspection results, the airplanes are divided into two groups, 
Condition 1 and Condition 2. Condition 1 airplanes have aluminum 
pushrod assemblies installed, and Condition 2 airplanes have steel 
pushrod assemblies installed. Depending on whether the airplane is 
Condition 1 or Condition 2, the other specified actions include:

[[Page 64512]]

    <bullet> Installing new steel pushrod assemblies, or modifying 
existing steel pushrod assemblies by installing new aft end assemblies, 
as applicable.
    <bullet> Identifying modified pushrod assemblies.
    <bullet> Performing balance checks on the elevators.
    <bullet> Calculating the weight and balance of the airplane with 
the new steel assemblies installed to determine if the values for the 
elevator nose heavy over balance limits are within the specified 
limits.
    <bullet> Performing an elevator and tab inspection/check on the 
left and right sides of the airplane.
    We have also reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC8-27A280, 
dated June 2, 2004. The service bulletin describes procedures for a 
general visual inspection of the inboard and outboard geared tab crank 
assemblies on the left and right elevators to determine whether the 
crank assemblies are made of aluminum or steel, or using a magnet to 
make that determination. The service bulletin also describes procedures 
for replacing any assembly made of aluminum with an assembly made of 
steel, and other specified actions. The other specified actions include 
removing aluminum crank assemblies and installing steel crank 
assemblies. Depending on the inspection results, the airplanes are 
divided into three groups, Condition 1 airplanes, Condition 2 
airplanes, and Condition 3 airplanes. Condition 1 airplanes have steel 
crank assemblies installed. Condition 2 airplanes have aluminum crank 
assemblies installed and replacement of the assemblies with steel crank 
assemblies will exceed the ``nose heavy over balance'' limits. 
Condition 3 airplanes have aluminum crank assemblies installed and 
replacement of the assemblies with steel crank assemblies will not 
exceed the nose heavy over balance limits. Depending on whether the 
airplane is Condition 1, Condition 2, or Condition 3, the other 
specified actions include:
    <bullet> Calculating the weight and balance of the airplane to 
determine if the values are within the specified limits.
    <bullet> Performing a balance check of the affected elevator.
    <bullet> Performing an elevator and tab inspection/check on the 
left and right sides of the airplane.
    Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is 
intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD

    We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an 
unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes 
of this same type design. Therefore, we are proposing this AD, which 
would require an inspection to determine if the pushrod assemblies for 
the left and right elevator control tabs are made of aluminum or steel, 
replacing any assembly made of aluminum with an assembly made of steel, 
and other specified actions. This proposed AD would also require an 
inspection to determine if the crank assemblies for the inboard and 
outboard elevator geared tabs are made of aluminum or steel, replacing 
any assembly made of aluminum with an assembly made of steel, and other 
specified actions. The proposed AD would require you to use the service 
information described previously to perform these actions.

Clarification of Applicability

    The Summary section of the service bulletins states the effectivity 
as all DC-8 airplanes. However, the detailed effectivity in paragraph 
1.A.1 of the service bulletins does not include DC-8-11, -12, -21, -31, 
and -32 airplanes. Those models are listed on the type certificate data 
sheet for the DC-8. We have determined that the effectivity of the 
service bulletins did not list those model numbers because those 
airplanes are permanently removed from service. The applicability of 
this proposed AD will be all DC-8 airplanes.

Clarification of Inspection Terminology

    Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC8-27A280 specifies to do a general 
visual inspection to determine the part number of the inboard and 
outboard geared tab crank assemblies. Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 
DC8-27A281 specifies to do a visual inspection to determine the part 
number of the pushrod assemblies. Each service bulletin includes a 
table that lists the applicable part numbers and whether the part is 
made of aluminum or steel. Both service bulletins also note that if a 
part number is difficult to read, a magnet may be used to determine if 
the part is made of aluminum or steel. This proposed AD would require 
an inspection of the crank and pushrod assemblies to determine if a 
part is made of aluminum or steel, but would not require a general 
visual inspection or a visual inspection.

Costs of Compliance

    There are about 227 airplanes of the affected design in the 
worldwide fleet. The following table provides the estimated costs for 
U.S. operators to comply with this proposed AD.

                                                                     Estimated Costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                          Number of U.S.-
                 Action                     Work hours     Average labor               Parts                 Cost per       registered      Fleet cost
                                                           rate per hour                                     airplane        airplanes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspection, crank assemblies............               1             $65  None..........................             $65             170         $11,050
Inspection, pushrod assemblies..........               1              65  None..........................              65             170          11,050
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed 
regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this proposed AD. See the ADDRESSES section for a location 
to examine the regulatory evaluation.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator,

[[Page 64513]]

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new 
airworthiness directive (AD):

McDonnell Douglas: Docket No. FAA-2004-19541; Directorate Identifier 
2004-NM-129-AD.

Comments Due Date

    (a) The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) must receive 
comments on this AD action by December 20, 2004.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.
    Applicability: (c) This AD applies to all McDonnell Douglas 
Model DC-8 airplanes, certificated in any category.

Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD was prompted by an accident involving a DC-8 
airplane. The probable cause of the accident was a loss of pitch 
control resulting from the disconnection of the pushrod for the 
right elevator control tab. The pushrod dropped down and jammed in 
front of the control tab crank, causing a large deflection of the 
control tab. We are issuing this AD to minimize the possibility of a 
control tab offset. A control tab offset could cause elevator 
deflection, an elevator airplane-nose-up condition, and reduced 
controllability of the airplane. This AD was also prompted by a 
report that the elevator on a McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 airplane 
did not respond to command inputs from the flightcrew. We are also 
issuing this AD to minimize the possibility of a crank assembly 
failure when the assembly is exposed to abnormal load conditions. 
Failure of a crank assembly could result in a jammed elevator and 
consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
    Compliance: (e) You are responsible for having the actions 
required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, 
unless the actions have already been done.

Inspection of Pushrod Assemblies and Other Specified Actions

    (f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD: Do an 
inspection of the pushrod assemblies located in the left and right 
elevator control tabs to determine whether the assemblies are made 
of aluminum or steel. Replace any pushrod assembly made of aluminum 
with a new, improved pushrod assembly made of steel, or modify any 
existing steel pushrod assembly by replacing the aft end assembly 
with a new, improved aft end assembly, as applicable. Do the 
inspection, replacement or modification, and all other applicable 
specified actions by accomplishing all of the actions in the 
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC8-
27A281, dated June 2, 2004. The replacement or modification and 
other applicable specified actions must be done before further 
flight.

Inspection of Geared Tab Crank Assemblies and Other Specified Actions

    (g) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD: Do an 
inspection of the inboard and outboard geared tab crank assemblies, 
located in the left and right elevators, to determine whether the 
assemblies are made of aluminum or steel. Replace any crank assembly 
made of aluminum with a new, improved crank assembly made of steel. 
Do the inspection, replacement, and other applicable specified 
actions by accomplishing all of the actions in the Accomplishment 
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC8-27A280, dated June 
2, 2004. The replacement and other applicable specified actions must 
be done before further flight.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (h) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in 
accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 26, 2004.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 04-24729 Filed 11-4-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>