UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

31 January, 2000

1 of 4

Message From

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry H. Shelton

For 78 days, from March to June 1999, the United States and its NATO allies

engaged in a major military operation to bring an end to Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. At

a turning point in NATO’s long and successful history, Operation Allied Force was an

overwhelming success. We forced Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw his forces from

Kosovo, degraded his ability to wage military operations, and rescued over one million

refugees. We accomplished these goals through a cohesive alliance of democratic

nations whose military men and women conducted the most effective air operation in

history.

From the onset of the operation, the United States and its NATO allies had three

primary interests:

Ensuring the stability of Eastern Europe. Serb aggression in Kosovo directly

threatened peace throughout the Balkans and thereby the stability of all of southeastern

Europe. There was no natural boundary to this violence, which already had moved

through Slovenia and Croatia to Bosnia.

Thwarting ethnic cleansing. The Belgrade regime’s cruel repression in Kosovo,

driving thousands from their homes, created a humanitarian crisis of staggering

proportions. Milosevic’s campaign, which he dubbed “Operation Horseshoe”, would

have led to even more homelessness, starvation, and loss of life had his ruthlessness gone

unchecked.

Ensuring NATO’s credibility. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the

Republic of Serbia signed agreements in October 1998 that were to be verified by the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and monitored by NATO. In the

period leading up to March 1999, Serbian forces increasingly and flagrantly violated

these agreements. Had NATO not responded to Milosevic’s defiance and his campaign

of ethnic cleansing, its credibility would have been called into question.

The attached report, which is forwarded in response to Congressional

requirements, provides considerable detail on both the diplomatic background to the

Kosovo conflict and to the military and humanitarian relief operations that followed. The

United States military forces that took part in this challenging effort performed superbly.

The men and women of our armed forces excelled in undertaking a military operation

that delivered a decisive response to Serbian aggression and was characterized by

extraordinary professionalism, innovation, and bravery.
2 of 4

The Kosovo conflict confirmed one of NATO’s enduring strengths: the

independence of each of NATO’s member nations defines the institution. The fact that

these separate nations sometimes disagreed in the course of the campaign (on some of the

tactics, but never on the core aims) is proof of the fundamental democratic spirit that

animates NATO, and that spirit will keep the Alliance strong in facing any future

challenge to the peace, stability, and freedom of the North Atlantic region.

The campaign over Kosovo was not a traditional military conflict. There was no

direct clash of massed military forces in Operation Allied Force. Throughout the

conflict, Milosevic was unable to counter effectively NATO’s military operations

(although the continuous threat to allied pilots posed by large numbers of surface-to-air

missiles and anti-aircraft artillery was formidable). Therefore, he chose to fight chiefly

through indirect means: use of terror tactics against Kosovar civilians; attempts to

exploit the premium the alliance placed on minimizing civilian casualties and collateral

damage; creation of enormous refugee flows to trigger a humanitarian crisis; and the

conduct of disinformation and propaganda campaigns. Militarily, Milosevic’s forces

dispersed themselves among civilian populations and exploited the small signature of

dispersed light infantry and police forces. They hid many of their better military

weapons and kept their surface-to-air missile defenses largely intact through hit-and-runtactics. NATO’s military effort prevailed in spite of these strategems, incurring very few

losses in the process.

NATO’s success in Operation Allied Force was the result of nineteen nations

working together. While the United States provided the preponderance of the military

forces employed during the campaign, our NATO allies were crucial partners and

contributors throughout the operation. Our European allies aircraft that were committed

to the operation were roughly as large a part of their total inventory of aircraft as was the

case for the United States, and they flew a very substantial number of strike missions,

facing the same dangers as U.S. aircrews. In addition, European nations had substantial

ground forces deployed in Albania and Macedonia. European airbases were essential for

the effective prosecution of the air operation. European facilities providing

communications, intelligence, and logistics support similarly were necessary for the

campaign’s prosecution. Europeans provided the majority of the humanitarian relief

supplies, particularly in adjacent countries such as Albania and the Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia, which was critical in limiting the human cost to the many

Kosovo refugees. Finally, it is the Europeans who are shouldering the major share of the

peacekeeping effort.

The Department of Defense is continuing to study the operations over Kosovo and

to refine its future plans and programs in light of the lessons learned in this conflict.

Necessarily, analysis of some of the complex operations and reconciliation of multiple

sources of information takes time. A series of major internal reviews already has taken

place, however, with significant and positive results. The Department has identified the

need for specific enhancements in its precision strike, electronic warfare, and

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
3 of 4

Overall, the Department has funded more than $3.5 billion in enhancements to

address the lessons learned from the Kosovo operation. Of this amount, over $1.9 billion

was provided by the Congress in the FY 2000 supplemental. In addition, the Department

devoted considerable attention to the Kosovo lessons learned during the development of

the FY01-05 program, with the result that an additional $1.6 billion was added to the

program.

Precision Strike. Using the emergency supplemental funds provided by the

Congress, the Department’s current program incorporates $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2000

to procure additional precision munitions. This includes $431 million to convert 624

additional Tomahawk missiles to the latest land-attack configuration, $306 million to

procure approximately 11,000 additional Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits, and

$178 million to convert 322 additional air-launched cruise missiles to a conventional

configuration. Other investments include substantial additional numbers of expanded

response standoff land attack missiles (SLAM-ER), high-speed anti-radiation missiles

(HARM), Maverick air-to-surface missiles, laser-guided bombs, and general-purpose

bombs. In addition to the $1.2 billion provided by the FY00 supplemental, the

Department’s FY01-05 program includes an additional $234 million for various precision

strike investments, including a substantial investment ($158M) for targeting pods.

Electronic Warfare. A number of EA-6B upgrades were funded by $158 million

from the FY00 supplemental, along with the procurement of 7,600 additional ALE-50

towed decoys. The FY 01-05 budget and program invests an additional $389 million to

accelerate improvements to the EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft, to add another Navy

expeditionary squadron (the fifth) to support joint missions and ease the deployment

strain on that important element of the force, and for the initiation of a jointly-conducted

Analysis of Alternatives to determine what capabilities will be required to replace the

EA-6B beginning in about 2010 to 2015.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). The supplemental provided

$37 million to replace and enhance UAVs, $111 million for additional EP-3 aircraft and

enhancements, and $30 million for other ISR-related investments. These investments

reflect, among other lessons, the fact that the operations in Kosovo saw an unprecedented

use of unmanned aerial vehicles. Funding is being used to replace Predator UAV losses,

to repair Hunter UAVs and maintenance facilities, and to add a laser designator capability

to Predator. The FY01-05 budget and program invests an additional $918 million for: a

new JSTARS aircraft ($260 million), accelerated acquisition and early deployment of the

Global Hawk program ($390 million), and additional EP-3 and other ISR enhancements.

Finally, and separate from the above, the Department’s FY01-05 program adds

$1.5 billion to address the need for increased investments in the tasking, production,

exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) of intelligence assets. Although plans to make

these enhancements were well under way prior to the Kosovo conflict, these investments

address many of the shortcomings in ISR integration that were identified in the Kosovo

lessons learned review.
4 of 4

Additional details on the FY 2001 budget and the FY01-05 program are provided

in the FY01 budget submission.

In addition to lessons that are reflected in budget changes, numerous operational

and other lessons have been developed. The Department has instituted a course of action

to ensure the lessons of this operation are not lost. Specifically, the Joint Staff is

reassessing and updating doctrine, training, joint professional military education, war

planning and Joint Vision 2010 in light of what was learned from Operation Allied Force.

Additionally, the lessons from Kosovo will be integrated into the Joint Forces

Command's Joint experimentation process. Finally, the lessons from the operation will

be inducted into the Department's appropriate formal processes for tracking, remediation,

and dissemination of lessons learned.

Operation Allied Force proved that our military forces are unequaled in skill and

capability. Our challenge and our commitment are to ensure that we preserve the same

warfighting edge in the future. The President’s budget submission will describe in more

detail the forces and capabilities needed to accomplish this goal.

We can all take pride in our accomplishments in Operation Allied Force. They

were the direct result of the tremendous skill and dedication of our men and women in

uniform, the partnership that has been forged between the Administration and Congress,

the enduring strengths of our allied relationships, and the unflagging support of the

American people. An abiding “lesson learned “ from this operation is that sustaining all

of these is critical for the future security of the nation.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

i

OVERVIEW

MESSAGE FROM SECDEF AND CJCS

INTRODUCTION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MAIN BODY OF REPORT

SUMMARY OF MAJOR OBSERVATIONS

GLOSSARY

ANNEX - Chronology of Events
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ii

(This page is intentionally blank.)
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OVERVIEW .......................................................................................................................i

LIST OF FIGURES.............................................................................................................xi

INTRODUCTION (U)........................................................................................................xiii

Operational Perspective (U)..................................................................................xiii

Purpose of the Report (U) .....................................................................................xiv

Organization of the Report (U) ..............................................................................xv

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (U).......................................................................................... xvii

Lessons Learned (U) ...........................................................................................xviii

Men and Women in Service (U).........................................................................xviii

NATO Contributions (U)....................................................................................xviii

Improving Allied Military Capabilities (U)..........................................................xix

Target-Approval Process (U).................................................................................xx

Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (U) ...............................................xx

Relationship with Russia (U) .................................................................................xx

Effect on Our Capability To Fight Two Major Theater Wars (U)........................xxi

Ground Operation (U)...........................................................................................xxi

Absence of Combat Fatalities (U).........................................................................xxi

Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (U).................................xxii

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (U)............................................xxii

Preferred Munitions (U)......................................................................................xxiii

Air Defense Suppression (U) ..............................................................................xxiii
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

iv

Logistics and Deployment (U)............................................................................xxiv

I. GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS (U)..............................................................1

A. Prelude to Conflict (U).......................................................................................1

1. Background on the Conflict (U)...................................................................1

2. Interests at Stake (U)....................................................................................3

3. Reaffirming the Alliance (U) .......................................................................4

B. The Campaign Over Kosovo (U).......................................................................6

1. An Asymmetric Conflict (U)........................................................................6

2. U.S. and NATO Strategic Objectives (U)....................................................7

3. Phases of the Campaign (U).........................................................................7

4. Status of a Ground Forces Plan (U) .............................................................8

5. Conditions To End the Operation (U)..........................................................8

6. Role of Diplomacy (U).................................................................................9

7. Mandate and Legal Basis (U).....................................................................10

C. Why Did Milosevic Capitulate? (U) ................................................................10

D. Implications for U.S. Defense Strategy (U).....................................................12

II. ALLIANCE AND COALITION WARFARE (U).....................................................15

A. Interagency Planning (U).................................................................................15

B. NATO’s Political-Military Process (U) ...........................................................16

1. Command-and-Control Structure (U) ........................................................16

2. Operational Planning and Targeting Process (U).......................................21

C. Force Capabilities (U)......................................................................................24

1. U.S.-Allied Force Capabilities Imbalance and the Defense Capabilities

Initiative (U)...............................................................................................24

2. Alliance C4 Policy (U)...............................................................................26

3. Allied Joint Doctrine Issues (U).................................................................27

III. FORCE DEPLOYMENT (U)..................................................................................31

A. Basing and Refueling Considerations (U)........................................................31

1. Aircraft Basing (U).....................................................................................32

2. Aerial Refueling Support (U).....................................................................33

B. Deployment Planning (U) ................................................................................34

1. Deployment Data Planning Systems (U) ...................................................34

2. TPFDD-Generation Process Discipline (U)...............................................35

C. Deployment Execution (U) ..............................................................................36
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

v

1. Understanding Infrastructure Limitations (U)............................................37

2. In-Transit Visibility (U).............................................................................38

3. C-17 Performance (U)................................................................................39

4. Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Capability (U) ..........................................40

5. Use of Sealift (U) .......................................................................................41

D. Task Force Hawk Deployment (U)..................................................................42

1. Deployment Planning (U) ..........................................................................42

2. Deployment Execution (U) ........................................................................42

IV. FORCE DIRECTION (U).......................................................................................45

A. Combined Air Operations Center (U)..............................................................45

B. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (U).............................46

1. Overview (U)..............................................................................................46

2. C4 Infrastructure (U)..................................................................................47

3. NATO C4 Agreements (U)........................................................................47

4. Joint Network and Information Management (U)......................................48

5. Maintenance and Training in New Technologies (U)................................48

C. Information Interoperability (U) ......................................................................49

1. Interoperability Between U.S. and NATO Data Networks (U) .................49

2. Joint Tactical Data Connectivity and Control (U) .....................................49

3. Information Releasability (U) ....................................................................50

4. Needed Improvements (U).........................................................................51

V. INTELLIGENCE AND TARGETING SUPPORT (U) ............................................52

A. Intelligence Systems and Architectures (U).....................................................52

1. Collection Management Capability (U).....................................................52

2. Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) (U) ......53

3. Federated Target Development and Battle Damage Assessment (U).......53

4. Needed Improvements (U).........................................................................53

B. Command-and-Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Assets

(U) 53

1. ISR Asset Availability (U).........................................................................54

2. ISR Asset Employment (U)........................................................................54

3. Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (U)......................................................56

C. Target Production Process (U).........................................................................58

D. Precision Intelligence (U).................................................................................59

E. Effects of Weather, Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (U)...............60
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

vi

VI. FORCE PROTECTION (U) ...................................................................................64

A. Countering Yugoslavia’s Integrated Air Defense System (U).........................64

1. Yugoslavia’s Integrated Air Defense System (U)......................................65

2. NATO Air Defense Suppression Efforts (U).............................................66

3. Lessons Learned (U) ..................................................................................70

B. Personnel Recovery (U)...................................................................................71

1. Training of Combat Search-and-Rescue Task Forces (U).........................71

2. Legal Status of Isolated Personnel (U).......................................................72

3. Repatriation of Isolated Personnel (U).......................................................72

4. Lessons Learned (U) ..................................................................................72

C. Operations and Communications Security (U) ................................................73

1. U.S. and Allied Secure Voice Systems (U)................................................73

2. Allied Communications Security Equipment (U)......................................74

3. Security Procedures (U).............................................................................74

4. Lessons Learned (U) ..................................................................................74

D. Protecting Task Force Hawk (U).....................................................................75

1. Threats to the Task Force (U)....................................................................75

2. Lessons Learned (U) ..................................................................................76

VII. STRIKE OPERATIONS (U)...................................................................................78

A. Strike Effectiveness (U)...................................................................................80

1. Fixed Targets (U).......................................................................................82

2. Mobile Targets (U).....................................................................................84

B. Preferred Munitions (U)...................................................................................86

1. Precision Engagement (U).........................................................................87

2. Weapons-of-Choice (U).............................................................................91

3. Weapon Expenditures and Other Insights (U) ...........................................93

4. Observations (U)........................................................................................96

C. Other Important Aspects of Strike Operations (U) ..........................................96

1. Global Force Integration (U)......................................................................96

2. Effects of Weather on Attack Operations (U)............................................98

3. Information Operations Synchronization (U) ............................................98

VIII. LOGISTICS AND FORCE SUSTAINMENT (U).................................................100

A. Prepositioning Preferred Ammunition (U).....................................................100

B. Mobility Readiness Spares Packages (U).......................................................101
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

vii

C. Engineering Assets (U) ..................................................................................101

1. Lack of Forward-Deployed Engineering Assets (U)................................102

2. Air-Transportable Engineer Response Capability (U).............................102

3. Requirements for Expeditionary Operational and Support

Facilities (U).............................................................................................103

D. Humanitarian Assistance (U).........................................................................103

1. Simultaneous Combat and Humanitarian Operations (U)........................104

2. Coordination of Relief Efforts (U)...........................................................105

3. Assessment of Humanitarian Needs (U)..................................................105

4. Establishing Refugee Camps (U).............................................................106

IX. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING (U).....................................................................108

A. Personnel Shortfalls and the Individual Augmentation Process (U)..............109

1. Individual Augmentation Process (U)......................................................109

2. Impact on Active Units (U)......................................................................112

3. Role of Reserve Forces (U)......................................................................113

4. Role of Contractors (U)............................................................................113

5. Observations (U)......................................................................................114

B. Intelligence Personnel (U)..............................................................................114

1. Personnel Augmentation (U)....................................................................115

2. Role of Other Commands and Agencies (U) ...........................................115

3. Observations (U)......................................................................................116

C. Training (U)....................................................................................................116

1. Service Doctrine and Training (U)...........................................................117

2. Interoperability and Joint Training (U)....................................................117

D. Force Health Protection (U)...........................................................................118

1. Health Assessment Screening (U)............................................................118

2. Access to Healthcare (U)..........................................................................118

3. Deployed Health Services Support (U)....................................................119

X. IMPACT ON OTHER OPERATIONS (U)............................................................120

A. Allied Force Impact On Major Theater War Operation Plans (U).................120

B. Joint Staff and Joint Force Issues (U) ............................................................121

C. Global Force Integration (U)..........................................................................122

XI. SUMMARY OF MAJOR OBSERVATIONS (U)..................................................126

A. Alliance and Coalition Warfare (U)...............................................................126

1. Interagency Planning (U).........................................................................126
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

viii

2. Political-Military Process (U) ..................................................................127

3. NATO Capabilities (U)............................................................................127

B. Force Deployment (U)...................................................................................128

1. Deployment Checklist (U).......................................................................128

2. Aerial Refueling Forces (U).....................................................................128

3. Deployment Planning Tools and Procedures (U).....................................129

4. In-Transit Visibility (U)...........................................................................129

5. Role of Airlift (U)....................................................................................129

6. Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Capability (U) ........................................130

C. Force Direction (U)........................................................................................130

1. Air Operations Center (U)........................................................................130

2. Joint Tactical Data Connectivity and Control (U) ...................................130

3. Joint Operational Architecture (U)...........................................................131

D. Intelligence and Targeting Support (U).........................................................131

1. Intelligence Support (U)...........................................................................131

2. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems (U)..................132

3. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (U)................................................................132

4. Precision Intelligence (U).........................................................................132

5. Countering Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception Tactics (U)........132

E. Force Protection (U).......................................................................................132

1. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (U).................................................133

2. Personnel Recovery (U)...........................................................................133

3. Communications and Operations Security (U) ........................................133

4. Joint Deep Operations (U)........................................................................134

F. Target Attack (U)...........................................................................................135

1. Precision Engagement (U).......................................................................135

2. Preferred Munitions (U)...........................................................................135

3. Information Operations (U)......................................................................135

G. Logistics and Force Sustainment (U).............................................................136

1. Preferred Munitions (U)...........................................................................136

2. Engineer Assets (U).................................................................................136

3. Humanitarian Assistance (U)...................................................................136

H. Personnel and Training (U)............................................................................137

1. Personnel Augmentation (U)....................................................................137

2. Reserve Component (U)...........................................................................137

3. Intelligence Personnel (U)........................................................................137

4. Training (U)..............................................................................................138

I. Impact on other Operations (U).....................................................................138

1. Major Theater War Operation Plans (U)..................................................138
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ix

2. Joint Staff and Joint Force Issues (U) ......................................................138

3. Global Force Integration (U)....................................................................139

GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................140
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

x

(This page is intentionally blank.)
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xi

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Command Structure Prior to August 1998 (U).................................................18

Figure 2 Command Structure, August-December 1998 (U) ..........................................19

Figure 3 Command Structure, January-July 1999 (U) ...................................................20

Figure 4 Joint Vision 2010 NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative Parallels (U).............26

Figure 5 U.S. Aircraft Basing During Operation Allied Force (U)...................................32

Figure 6 C-17 Globemaster III (U) ..................................................................................40

Figure 7 U-2 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Platform (U) ..................54

Figure 8 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (U)............................................................57

Figure 9 Satellite Image of Typical Weather in Kosovo (U) ...........................................61

Figure 10 Serbian Artillery Decoy (U).............................................................................62

Figure 11 Serbian Surface-to-Air Missile Launcher Decoy (U)......................................63

Figure 12 EA-6B Prowler Tactical Electronic Warfare Aircraft (U) ................................67

Figure 13 Cumulative Sorties for Operation Allied Force (U).........................................68

Figure 14 Cumulative Strike and Air Defense Suppression Sorties (U) ........................69

Figure 15 Cumulative Air Defense Sorties Flown in Operation Allied Force (U)...........70

Figure 16. Non-U.S. Allied Aircraft Participating in Operation Allied Force.....................78

Figure 17 Strike Assessment Results for Operation Allied Force (U)............................86

Figure 18 Established Individual Augmentation Process (U) ......................................110

Figure 19 Personnel Augmentation Process ...............................................................111

Figure 20 Demand for Personnel Augmentees During Operation Allied Force (U) ....112

Figure 21 Global Force Integration Concept (U) ..........................................................123
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Characteristics of Weapons Used in Operation Allied Force...................89
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xiii

INTRODUCTION (U)

(U) This report presents the results of the Department of Defense review of the

conduct of Operation Allied Force and associated relief operations as required by

Congress. The first and most important lesson learned from Operation Allied Force is

that it was extraordinarily successful. Slobodan Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing of Kosovo

was reversed. Allied Force was the largest combat operation in NATO’s history and one

that achieved all of its military objectives. It forced Milosevic to withdraw his forces

from Kosovo, allowing nearly a million refugees to return home. Of equal note, Allied

Force was the most precise military operation ever conducted. No military operation of

such size has ever inflicted less damage on unintended targets. And all of this was

accomplished without a single combat fatality to NATO forces — an incredible and

unprecedented achievement for an operation of this scale. At the end of all our effort,

Milosevic and his police and military forces were out of Kosovo, a NATO-led

peacekeeping force had deployed there, and the refugees were able to return.

(U) Our success was due in large part to the outstanding performance of our men

and women in the air, in the field, and at sea; the high quality of their leadership, training

and education; and the unequaled quality of our equipment, material, and technology.

Nonetheless, it is important not only to study what went well, but what could have been

done better.

Operational Perspective (U)

(U) By their very nature, combat operations are incredibly demanding. In the

case of Operation Allied Force, these inherent difficulties were magnified by the complex

nature of the operation itself, a ruthless adversary, and less-than-ideal environmental

conditions. Combined operations are a difficult task in the best of circumstances; during

Allied Force U.S. military forces conducted combined air operations with 13 of our

NATO allies. U.S. forces were deployed to over two dozen bases in the European region,

while numerous locations in the United States, around the world, and in space provided

people or systems that contributed to the operation.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xiv

(U) Despite this complexity, we successfully integrated air, land, and sea

operations throughout the conflict. Some of our activities — notably, targeting, strike

operations, and humanitarian assistance — were conducted from locations around the

globe. Within the Kosovo area of operations, NATO carried out combat strikes over the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the province of Kosovo using aircraft from 14 of its

member states, including the United States. In addition, NATO forces provided defense

and logistics support for the alliance forces deployed in Italy, Albania, and the Former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; conducted support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

and carried out naval operations in the Adriatic Sea. The latter included, at one time,

aircraft carriers, submarines, and surface ships from four nations, all operating within the

same confined sea space.

(U) Throughout Operation Allied Force, NATO maintained effective and

efficient control over an intricately layered airspace in what was perhaps the most

complex and challenging environment in which U.S. combat aircraft have ever operated.

The scope of this complex air operation included thousands of combat sorties over hostile

territory laden with a formidable air defense network that continually engaged allied

pilots, military sorties in and out of theater, commercial and private flights, and

humanitarian relief flights.

(U) Adverse weather greatly complicated efforts to acquire and identify targets,

increased the risk to aircrews, and made it more difficult to restrict damage to only the

targets we intended to strike. The rugged mountainous terrain also confounded NATO’s

ability to find targets and posed hazards of its own. Despite these difficulties, NATO

conducted the most precise and lowest collateral damage air operation in history. We

were able to do so largely because of our commitment to developing precision munitions,

the platforms and systems to deliver them, and vigorously training forces under realistic

conditions.

Purpose of the Report (U)

(U) While the Department of Defense is proud of its success in Operation Allied

Force, we are also aware that we need to examine our performance with a critical eye and

learn from both what went well and what could have been done better. Over the last

several months, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Department has

undertaken a detailed examination of our performance in the operation. In response to a

mid-June request for assessments of our performance during Operation Allied Force,
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xv

hundreds of specific after-action assessments were provided by the Unified Commanders,

the Services, the Defense Agencies, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of

Defense. Based on these assessments and other information, we have identified key

lessons learned from this experience. We have also determined where the Department

needs to take immediate action to improve capabilities and where we can afford to wait

for existing plans to come to fruition. This report documents those lessons learned and

identifies the remedial actions that are necessary to improve U.S. capabilities even

further, or to correct our shortcomings. In addition, these lessons will be added to the

database maintained by the Joint Center for Lessons Learned so that they can be followed

up throughout the Department of Defense.

Organization of the Report (U)

(U) The main body of this report is divided into 10 chapters that describe the

conduct of Operation Allied Force, its associated humanitarian relief operations, and the

important lessons learned from those operations. This material is organized starting with

the events leading up to the conflict and then proceeds through the major activities

involved in planning and executing the operation, e.g., force deployment and basing,

force direction, intelligence and targeting support, force protection, target attack, and

force sustainment. For each of these activities, the principal lessons learned and the

major observations associated with those lessons have been identified. In addition, the

observations are summarized in a separate section at the end of the report. Following this

are annexes that provide additional detail regarding topics of particular interest.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xvi

(This page is intentionally blank.)
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xvii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (U)

(U) For 50 years, NATO has given caution to its foes and comfort to its friends.

As a watershed in NATO's long history, Operation Allied Force was an overwhelming

success. NATO accomplished its mission and achieved its strategic, operational, and

tactical goals in the face of an extremely complex set of challenges. It forced Milosevic

to withdraw from Kosovo, degraded his ability to wage military operations, and rescued

and allowed resettlement of nearly one million refugees. It put a peacekeeping force with

NATO at its core into place, and remains committed to a peaceful, multi-ethnic and

democratic Kosovo, enjoying substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia. NATO accomplished this by prosecuting the most precise and lowestcollateral-damage air operation ever conducted — with no U.S. or allied combat fatalities

in 78 days of around-the-clock operations and over 38,000 combat sorties against very

active Yugoslav integrated air defenses.

(U) Despite extensive efforts to resolve the crisis in Kosovo short of military

action, NATO was eventually left with no other recourse but to use military force. In

reaching that decision, NATO recognized that the use of military force could not

immediately stop Serbian attacks on Kosovar civilians. These attacks had been planned

in advance and were already in the process of being carried out when Operation Allied

Force began. At the outset of the air operation, NATO set specific strategic objectives

for its use of force in Kosovo. These objectives were to: (1) demonstrate the seriousness

of NATO’s opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in the Balkans, (2) deter Milosevic from

continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians and create conditions to reverse

his ethnic cleansing, and (3) damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the

future or spread the war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to wage

military operations. These objectives would be accomplished by attacking strategic

targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and fielded forces in Kosovo.

(U) In taking these actions, alliance forces demonstrated unrivaled military

prowess by executing the largest combat operation in NATO's history. A number of new

systems and capabilities were used for the first time in combat and performed in ways

that exceeded our expectations. We were also able to reassure and help neighboring
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xviii

countries come through the crisis intact, despite Milosevic's intent to destabilize the

region. In short, NATO demonstrated both the unwavering political cohesion and the

unmatched military capability that will be required to meet the security challenges of the

21st century.

Lessons Learned (U)

(U) In June 1999, the Secretary of Defense initiated actions to collect lessons

from Operation Allied Force. This report captures the most critical lessons and identifies

areas where more detailed assessments are needed to determine appropriate changes in

doctrine, training, organization, and technology. At the same time, it is essential that one

does not draw the wrong lessons from this unique conflict. The Department has studied

the Kosovo operation with an eye toward identifying concepts that have broad

applicability to many different situations. The most important of these lessons or related

observations are summarized in the paragraphs that follow; their implications are outlined

in more detail in the Summary of Major Observations that follows the main body of the

report.

Men and Women in Service (U)

(U) First and foremost, the success of Operation Allied Force was an

extraordinary demonstration of the competence, capability, determination, perseverance,

and patriotism of the men and women who serve in America’s armed forces. Success

was made possible by thousands of airmen, Marines, sailors, and soldiers in the active

forces as well as in the Guard and Reserve, whose courage and dedication allowed them

to overcome the countless challenges they faced throughout this operation. Their

accomplishments confirmed that quality people, combined with first-class technology and

equipment, is what gives America's armed forces the decisive edge. Our nation can be

extremely proud of our Service men and women and the spirit with which they carried

out their obligations, not only in waging the air operation but also in carrying out

humanitarian efforts during and after the conflict.

NATO Contributions (U)

(U) Another key to success was the cohesion demonstrated by our NATO allies.

All 19 NATO members contributed steadfastly to the effort, despite extraordinary

domestic pressures in a number of countries. It simply would not have been possible to
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xix

carry out even the U.S. part of this operation without the NATO members contributing

their airspace, their infrastructure, their military bases, and their airfields — often at the

cost of considerable disruption to civilian activities. This alone was a tremendous

achievement for the NATO alliance.

(U) Our NATO allies also provided significant military capabilities. Twelve

other NATO nations deployed military aircraft to the operation in roughly the same

proportion to their overall inventories as did the United States. They also contributed

ground forces to help stabilize the countries neighboring Kosovo and to conduct

humanitarian relief operations. The NATO command structure allowed the Supreme

Allied Commander to employ effectively those assets that the NATO members had

committed to the operation. NATO also demonstrated a capability to conduct sustained

and effective combined operations on a multinational basis.

Improving Allied Military Capabilities (U)

(U) Although experience in Operation Allied Force confirmed that the United

States and our allies have made significant accomplishments working together, it also

made clear that improvements are necessary. Our experience demonstrated the urgent

need to pursue the Defense Capabilities Initiative, which the Secretary of Defense and the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff introduced last year to address the shortcomings of

NATO. Among the most important of these are deficiencies in command-and-control

and information systems, secure communications, precision strike capability, air

operations support, and mobility systems. During Allied Force these shortcomings

combined to shift a disproportionate burden of responsibility for combat operations to the

United States and impeded our ability to operate more effectively with NATO allies. A

more detailed assessment of allied military capabilities is contained in the Report on

NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative that will be submitted in accordance with Section

1039 of the FY 2000 Defense Authorization Act.

(U) Unless addressed, these disparities will limit NATO’s ability to operate as an

effective alliance over the long term. Accordingly, the successful implementation of the

Defense Capabilities Initiative is a top priority. On an encouraging note, NATO is

already concentrating on what needs to be done to improve precision-strike capabilities

and strategic lift, and to deploy secure communications that are fully interoperable with

U.S. equipment.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xx

Target-Approval Process (U)

(U) During the course of the campaign, NATO developed mechanisms for

delegating target approval authority to military commanders. For selected categories of

targets — for example, targets in downtown Belgrade, in Montenegro, or targets likely to

involve high collateral damage — NATO reserved approval for higher political

authorities. NATO leaders used this mechanism to ensure that member nations were

fully cognizant of particularly sensitive military operations, and, thereby, to help sustain

the unity of the alliance.

Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (U)

(U) The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was entirely unintended.

It was the result of a failure in the process of identifying and validating proposed targets.

The headquarters of the Yugoslav Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement

(FDSP) was a legitimate military target, but the technique used to locate it was severely

flawed. None of the military or intelligence databases used to validate targets contained

the correct location of the Chinese Embassy. Nowhere in the target review process was a

mistake detected.

(U) Immediate corrective actions have been implemented and organizations

primarily responsible for these databases have been tasked to institutionalize long-term

corrective measures. Additionally, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National

Imagery and Mapping Agency have established rapid response procedures for critical

database updates for “No Strike” targets. The Intelligence Community and other

government agencies will explicitly report whenever foreign embassies move or are built.

Relationship with Russia (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force clearly tested Russian relations and, at least for a

brief period, complicated our ability to interact with Russian counterparts. In the end,

however, Russia worked with the alliance and provided considerable diplomatic

assistance in bringing the conflict to an end. Russian leaders eventually agreed with

NATO that all the Serb forces should leave Kosovo, that the refugees should return, and

that some form of international peacekeeping force should be deployed. Today, NATORussian collaboration is contributing directly to the success of the peacekeeping

operation in Kosovo as well as that in Bosnia.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xxi

Effect on Our Capability To Fight Two Major Theater Wars (U)

(U) Concerns have been raised about how Operation Allied Force affected the

Department’s ability to carry out the most stressing requirement associated with its

defense strategy ? to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Had

one such war broken out while the United States was involved in Kosovo, the

Department is confident that the challenge could have been met, albeit at a higher level of

risk than would have been the case if U.S. forces had not been conducting operations in

Kosovo. The Department was cognizant of these risks at the time and made various

adjustments in our posture and plans to address those risks. Consistent with U.S. defense

strategy, if we had faced the threat of two major theater wars, we would have withdrawn

our forces from other activities, including Operation Allied Force, but we are confident

that we would have ultimately prevailed.

Ground Operation (U)

(U) In the early stages of NATO’s operational planning for the Kosovo crisis,

NATO considered a wide range of contingency planning options, including use of both

air and ground forces, to achieve the alliance’s objectives. In the period leading up to the

initiation of the air operation, there was not a consensus in the United States or the

alliance to aggressively pursue planning for a ground force option in other than a

permissive environment. At that time, we were exhausting all diplomatic initiatives

while maintaining the credible threat of NATO air power. Following the failure to reach

a settlement with the Serbs at Rambouillet and Paris, U.S. and allied leaders decided that

execution of a phased air operation was the best option for achieving our goals.

Absence of Combat Fatalities (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force was conducted without a single allied combat fatality.

However, this outcome, as gratifying as it now is, is not what was expected when the

operation began. The likelihood of casualties in high-intensity combat operations is very

significant. Among the gravest decisions senior civilian and military leaders face is to

accomplish fully the military objectives set forth, while maintaining acceptable risk to

personnel. In this instance, a combination of skill, technology, training, and tactics

enabled U.S. and NATO forces to incur no combat fatalities, despite great risk to our

personnel, particularly withering fire from Serb air defenses. This achievement cannot be

expected in every future conflict.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xxii

Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (U)

(U) The command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems

provided for Operation Allied Force were unprecedented in terms of capacity and variety

of services. The available bandwidth was nearly double that used during the Gulf War,

an operation with far more forces committed. This achievement was made possible by

the communications infrastructure in Europe, both military and civilian, which are among

the most robust and flexible available to the United States in any theater of operations. In

addition, extraordinary efforts were made to bring additional C4 capabilities into the

theater, even though this impacted other U.S. military commitments worldwide.

(U) The widespread use of video teleconferencing and other advanced

technologies for command and control and collaborative planning presented numerous

limitations and challenges. In order to optimize the application of these systems and

accustom operational commanders to their effects, appropriate doctrine, tactics,

techniques, and procedures must be developed. In addition, these technologies should be

included regularly in future large-scale joint and combined training exercises.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (U)

(U) For the United States, Operation Allied Force provided a real-world test of

information superiority concepts outlined in Joint Vision 2010. Over the course of

Operation Allied Force, U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities

provided unprecedented levels of information to NATO warfighters. The supporting

intelligence architecture included a worldwide network of processing centers and highspeed data communications, all operating in direct support of combat operations in

Kosovo. Despite NATO’s success, it is evident that further integration of worldwide

collection of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems is needed to provide

warfighters with a more coherent picture of the battlespace and more accurate and timely

targeting support.

(U) Among the capabilities that require particular attention are unmanned aerial

vehicle (UAV) systems, which were used extensively in combat for the first time. UAVs

contributed greatly to NATO’s success by increasing the information available for strike

and other operations. In addition, better sensors along with improved processing and

dissemination capabilities are needed to provide a capability to counter any future

adversary.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xxiii

Preferred Munitions (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force involved what was undoubtedly the most precise air

and missile combat operation in history. In large part, this was made possible through the

successful development and deployment of weapons such as the Tomahawk Land Attack

Missile (TLAM) missile and the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), both of which

use Global Positioning System (GPS) information for guidance. The desire to avoid

collateral damage and the Balkan region’s frequently adverse weather resulted in the use

of large numbers of these preferred munitions. As a consequence, we now need to

accelerate replenishment of our preferred munition stockpiles — a process that has been

helped considerably by the appropriation of funds in the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense

Supplemental. In addition, the Department is looking at ways to expand the number of

platforms that employ precision munitions, given their effectiveness against fixed targets

during Operation Allied Force.

(U) The Department is also examining whether we have the right mix of

munitions and if they are stored where we are likely to need them the most. The success

of these munitions in Operation Allied Force strongly suggests that they will be

employed at very high rates in future conflicts. In addition, while it is clear that our

weapons systems were highly accurate and highly effective, it is apparent that we need to

improve our capability to conduct precision engagement, especially against mobile

targets that are easy to hide. Also, the potential vulnerability of these systems to

jamming is a critical issue that must continue to be addressed.

Air Defense Suppression (U)

(U) Key among the factors that made Operation Allied Force difficult for NATO

forces was the Serbian integrated air defense system. The command centers, radars, and

missile launchers that make up this system were very high priority targets from the

beginning of the war. Despite this, the Serbs used their system to launch a large number

of surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery at allied pilots. In fact, the average

aircrew participating in Operation Allied Force experienced a missile-launch rate three

times that encountered by the average Coalition aircrew during Desert Storm.

(U) Nonetheless, NATO was able to mitigate the threat. In over 38,000 sorties,

only two aircraft were lost to hostile fire — a testament to NATO’s skillful conduct of the

operation. To achieve this result, however, NATO had to devote considerable resources
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

xxiv

to suppressing the enemy's air defenses. Rather than expend sorties attempting to find

and attack the large numbers of man-portable missile and anti-aircraft artillery threats,

NATO commanders chose to operate most aircraft at altitudes beyond the effective reach

of these systems. Electronic warfare and air-defense suppression aircraft (such as the

EA-6B and the F-16CJ) supported nearly all strike aircraft on their missions. Our

experience in Operation Allied Force thus re-emphasized the importance of having a

comprehensive air-defense suppression strategy. Accordingly, the Department will

conduct a detailed and thorough study of joint air-defense suppression capabilities in the

Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives. In addition, it is clear that all

members of the alliance need to develop appropriate air defense suppression capabilities.

Logistics and Deployment (U)

(U) As is the case in every military operation, logistics proved critical in Allied

Force. Working with limited infrastructure and the competing demands of combat and

humanitarian operations, logisticians made the extremely difficult seem routine. This

was helped, in part, by the addition of the C-17 to the strategic airlift fleet. The C-17’s

high reliability and basing versatility clearly enhanced our ability to deploy forces to, and

within, the European theater. Although the overall deployment process was successful,

arrival of some forces was delayed owing to changes in operational plans and needed

adjustments to standard practices. These problems highlight the need for progress on

several initiatives aimed at making time-phased force deployment data more relevant and

more usable. Another factor in our success was an improved capability to track supplies

and equipment from the warehouse to the warfighter. While much has been done in this

area, there is still room for improvement.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1

I. GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS (U)

(U) As a result of the end of the Cold War, NATO has shifted its focus away

from deterring and if necessary responding to Soviet and Warsaw Pact aggression toward

crisis management operations beyond NATO members’ territory. These types of

operations cut across the spectrum of military conflict to include such activities as

humanitarian assistance and peace enforcement operations. This shift of focus is not

without challenges, particularly due to many NATO nations’ requirements for more

deployable forces in the context of constrained defense budgets.

(U) In addition, the rise of Slobodan Milosevic to power coincided with a pattern

of increased instability in the Balkan region. For the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans

as a whole, the decade of the 1990s was marked by the rise of nationalism and a series of

increasingly violent armed confrontations. Between 1992 and 1995, Milosevic instigated

wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. During this period, we witnessed increased

involvement in the area by many NATO nations and then eventually NATO itself, a

reflection of our concern that failure to take action could lead to widespread regional

instability. In the case of the Bosnian conflict, for example, NATO took several

important actions. NATO air strikes ultimately contributed to a general cease-fire in

Bosnia-Herzegovina and set the stage for the Dayton Peace Accords of November 1995.

NATO then sponsored a peacekeeping mission to Bosnia, in support of the Dayton

accords, which remains in place today.

A. Prelude to Conflict (U)

1. Background on the Conflict (U)

(U) The potential dangers of the situation in Kosovo had been recognized for

more than a decade. In concert with his rise to power in the late 1980s, Milosevic took

away Kosovo’s autonomy and implemented severely repressive policies that excluded

Kosovar Albanians from virtually all positions of responsibility, even though ethnic

Albanians made up 90 percent of Kosovo’s population. In December 1992, President

George Bush warned Milosevic that “the United States will respond in the event of Serb-
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

2

incited violence in Kosovo.” In 1998, Serbia’s discrimination turned into systematic

violence against the Kosovar Albanians, precipitating the crisis that compelled the

international community and NATO to act on the diplomatic and military fronts. In

October 1998, under pressure of impending NATO military action, Milosevic agreed to

sharply reduce his forces in Kosovo, refrain from repression, and begin negotiations

towards an autonomous regime for the province. The agreements allowed for the

deployment into Kosovo of unarmed international observers from the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission) and a NATO

air verification mission.

(U) Despite initial Serb compliance with the agreements, the violence in Kosovo

quickly resumed. Evidence of a deliberate decision by Milosevic to ethnically cleanse

Kosovar Albanians from Kosovo is now clear. Notably, the massacre of 45 ethnic

Albanians by Serb forces at Racak on 15 January 1999 served to once again galvanize the

international community, and led to a renewed emphasis for all sides to exercise restraint

and engage in a negotiating process. Contact Group Ministers, meeting in London on 29

January, called on both sides to end the cycle of violence and to commit themselves to a

process of negotiation leading to a political settlement. On 30 January, NATO issued a

statement by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) giving full support to the Contact Group

Strategy. The NAC further agreed to give NATO Secretary General Solana authority to

authorize air strikes against targets on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

(U) Following prolonged peace settlement talks at Rambouillet and thereafter in

Paris, the Kosovar Albanians signed a proposed agreement, in which all citizens of

Kosovo would enjoy, without discrimination, equal rights and freedoms. The agreement

outlined requirements for a cessation of hostilities and the redeployment, partial

withdrawal, and demilitarization of all forces in Kosovo. The agreement also set forth

guidelines for civil implementation of a settlement, including democratic selfgovernment, proposed civil structures, police and civil public security, elections, and

humanitarian assistance and economic reconstruction. Belgrade, however, refused to

agree. The negotiations ultimately failed because of Milosevic’s intransigence.

(U) Even while blocking international diplomatic efforts, Milosevic was

finalizing a barbaric plan for expelling or forcing the total submission of the Kosovar

Albanian community. On 19 March, the day the peace talks were officially suspended in

Paris, the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission — whose operations had been increasingly

obstructed by Belgrade authorities — withdrew from Kosovo. Just one day later, Serb
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3

forces launched a major offensive and began driving thousands of ethnic Albanians out of

their homes and villages, summarily executing some while displacing many others and

setting fire to many houses. Dubbed “Operation Horseshoe,” this ethnic-cleansing

campaign was comprehensively planned months in advance by Milosevic.

(U) With this as backdrop, on 21 March, the international community initiated

one last diplomatic effort. U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was dispatched to

Belgrade to deliver a final warning to Milosevic. On 22 March, in response to Belgrade’s

continued intransigence and repression, and in view of the evolution of the situation on

the ground in Kosovo, the North Atlantic Council authorized Secretary General Solana to

decide, subject to further consultations with the allies, on a broader range of air

operations, if necessary. Ambassador Holbrooke departed Belgrade on 23 March, having

received no concessions of any kind from Milosevic. Secretary General Solana

thereupon directed General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

(SACEUR), to initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 24

March, the United States and its NATO allies turned from a path of diplomacy backed by

the threat of force to a military campaign supported by diplomacy. This military

campaign was known as Operation Allied Force. (A more complete description and

chronology of events leading up to the start of Operation Allied Force is contained in

Annex A.)

2. Interests at Stake (U)

(U) The United States and its NATO allies had three strong interests at stake

during the Kosovo crisis.

(U) First, Serb aggression in Kosovo directly threatened peace throughout the

Balkans and the stability of southeastern Europe. There was no natural boundary to this

violence, which previously had moved from Slovenia to Croatia to Bosnia and then to

Kosovo. Continued fighting in Kosovo threatened to: (a) undermine the successful

Dayton peace process in Bosnia; (b) re-ignite chaos in Albania; (c) destabilize the Former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with its large Albanian minority; and (d) spill over into

other neighboring countries, including Bulgaria and Greece. Instability in this region had

the potential to exacerbate rivalries between Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies with

significant and often distinct interests in Southern Europe.

(U) Second, Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of

staggering proportions. Dubbed “Operation Horseshoe,” this ethnic cleansing campaign
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

4

was comprehensively planned months in advance by Milosevic as a brutal means to end

the crisis on his terms by expelling and killing ethnic Albanians, overtaxing bordering

nations’ infrastructures, and fracturing the NATO alliance. NATO and other members of

the international community responded to this crisis, preventing starvation and ensuring,

ultimately, that the Kosovars could return safely to their homes.

(U) Third, Milosevic’s conduct leading up to Operation Allied Force directly

challenged the credibility of NATO, an alliance that has formed the bedrock of

transatlantic security for 50 years. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic

of Serbia signed agreements in October 1998 that were to be verified by the Organization

for Security and Cooperation in Europe and monitored by NATO. In the period leading

up to March 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia increasingly and flagrantly

violated these agreements. Had NATO not eventually responded to these violations and

other acts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, its credibility, as well as the credibility

of the United States, would have been called into question.

(U) Balancing NATO’s response to the Kosovo conflict with the desire to

maintain a positive and cooperative relationship with Russia, which strongly opposed

NATO military actions against Yugoslavia, was essential. Given the importance of

maintaining a constructive relationship with Moscow, both the United States and NATO

had to consider carefully how actions in the Balkans would affect their long-term

relationship with Russia. Ultimately, we were able to work constructively with Russia.

Moscow’s diplomatic assistance helped bring the conflict to an end, and Russia

contributes forces to the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

3. Reaffirming the Alliance (U)

(U) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization proved to be flexible, effective, and

ultimately successful during a uniquely challenging time in its history. Despite domestic

pressures in many NATO nations, an enormous humanitarian crisis, and isolated

instances of target misidentification with incidental injury or collateral damage, the

nations of the alliance held firm and unified and saw the operation through to a successful

conclusion. In short, NATO accomplished its mission and achieved its goals: NATO

stopped the killing; forced Milosevic’s forces out of Kosovo; made it possible for the

refugees to return; put a peacekeeping force with NATO at its core into place; and

remains committed to a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo, enjoying

substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where all people can
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5

live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal

basis.

(U) It was no surprise that conducting a military campaign in the alliance was

challenging (discussed in more detail in Chapter II). Nevertheless, Operation Allied

Force could not have been conducted without the NATO alliance and without the

infrastructure, transit and basing access, host-nation force contributions, and most

importantly, political and diplomatic support provided by the allies and other members of

the coalition. These immense contributions from our allies and partners — particularly

those nations near the theater of conflict such as the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and others — were in large part a

dividend of sustained U.S. and NATO engagement with those nations over the last few

years. This engagement — including vigorous participation in Partnership for Peace

activities — helped to stabilize institutions in these nations so they were better able to

withstand the tremendous burden inflicted upon them by the humanitarian crisis and the

conduct of the operation itself. The whole alliance owes a particular debt of gratitude to

Italy, without whose commitment the operation would have been greatly jeopardized.

(U) Admittedly, gaining consensus among 19 democratic nations is not easy and

can only be achieved through discussion and compromise. However, the NATO alliance

is also our greatest strength. It is true that there were differences of opinion within the

alliance. This is to be expected in an alliance of democracies, and building consensus

generally leads to sounder decisions. If NATO as an institution had not responded to this

crisis, it would have meant that the world’s most powerful alliance was unwilling to act

when confronted with serious threats to common interests on its own doorstep.

(U) It is important to remember that the alliance had been addressing this crisis

— through diplomatic activities and military planning — for some time before the onset

of the military campaign itself. Because NATO had been engaged in trying to resolve

this conflict before the operation commenced, because it had conducted planning for the

operation itself, because of its member nations’ respect for differences of opinion and the

need for consensus, and simply because the alliance is the most effective means there is

for addressing European security problems — as it demonstrated through perseverance

and unwavering solidarity — it was both natural and inevitable that we would work

through NATO. Without the direct support of our NATO allies and key coalition

partners, the campaign would not have been possible. There are, of course, useful lessons

to be learned for NATO decision-making processes during crises and for alliance
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6

capabilities, which we will discuss, but this must not obscure the fact that NATO stood

up to the challenge facing it, and succeeded.

B. The Campaign Over Kosovo (U)

1. An Asymmetric Conflict (U)

(U) The campaign over Kosovo was not a traditional military conflict. There was

no direct clash of massed military ground forces in Operation Allied Force. Milosevic

was unable to challenge superior allied military capabilities directly. His fielded forces

were compelled to hide throughout most of the campaign, staying in caves and tunnels

and under the cover of forest, village, or weather. He was forced to husband his

antiaircraft missile defenses to sustain his challenge to our air campaign. Therefore, he

chose to fight chiefly through asymmetric means: terror tactics and repression directed

against Kosovar civilians; attempts to exploit the premium the alliance placed on

minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage; creation of enormous refugee flows

to create a humanitarian crisis, including in neighboring countries; and the conduct of

disinformation and propaganda campaigns.

(U) These tactics created several serious challenges for our forces, all of which

we were able to overcome thanks to excellent training, leadership, equipment and

motivation. Nevertheless, these challenges underscored the continued need to develop

new operational concepts and capabilities to anticipate and counter similar asymmetric

challenges in the future. Simply put, adversaries will use unconventional approaches to

circumvent or undermine U.S. and allied strengths and exploit vulnerabilities.

(U) Milosevic illustrated very clearly his propensity for pursuing asymmetric

approaches. He chose his tactics in the hope of exploiting the NATO nations’ legitimate

political concerns about target selection, collateral damage, and conducting military

operations against enemy forces that are intentionally intermingled with civilian refugees.

In the case of refugee flow, the time-scale was so rapid and the numbers so great that it

initially overwhelmed the neighboring countries, particularly the Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania. The humanitarian crisis created by

Milosevic appeared to be an attempt to end NATO’s operation by “cleansing” Kosovo of

ethnic Albanians, overtaxing bordering nations’ infrastructures, and fracturing alliance

cohesion. He failed, despite all these efforts, principally because NATO adapted to the
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7

changing circumstances. One general lesson learned is that similar attempts at

asymmetric challenges should be anticipated in future conflicts as well.

2. U.S. and NATO Strategic Objectives (U)

(U) At the outset of Operation Allied Force, NATO set specific strategic

objectives for its use of force in Kosovo. These objectives were consistently articulated

and refined by NATO’s North Atlantic Council as the crisis unfolded, and they later

served as the basis for its stated conditions to Milosevic for stopping the bombing. These

objectives were to:

• Demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in

the Balkans

• Deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians

and create conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing

• Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or spread

the war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to conduct military

operations.

(U) Although there were expectations on the part of some that this would be a

short operation, the United States made clear to its allies that Operation Allied Force

could well take weeks or months to succeed and that the operation should be initiated

only if all were willing to persevere until success was achieved. Once NATO

commenced offensive operations, it became essential for NATO to maintain political

consensus and cohesion in order to prevail. Maintaining alliance unity then became an

overarching strategic objective in the offensive phase of the crisis.

3. Phases of the Campaign (U)

(U) Military operations were originally planned to be prosecuted in five phases

under NATO’s operational plan, the development of which began in the summer of 1998.

Phase 0 was the deployment of air assets into the European theater. Phase 1 would

establish air superiority over Kosovo (creating a no-fly zone south of 44 degrees north

latitude) and degrade command and control and the integrated air-defense system over

the whole of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Phase 2 would attack military targets

in Kosovo and those Yugoslav forces south of 44 degrees north latitude, which were

providing reinforcement to Serbian forces in Kosovo. This was to allow targeting of

forces not only in Kosovo, but also in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia south of

Belgrade. Phase 3 would expand air operations against a wide range of high-value
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

8

military and security force targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Phase

4 would redeploy forces as required.

(U) A Limited Air Response, relying predominantly on cruise missiles to strike

selected targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was developed as a

stand-alone option. As originally planned, it was intended to be a short-notice, limited air

response, to a serious, but limited incident in Kosovo, with the aim of preventing a

further deterioration of the situation. The Limited Air Response was eventually

integrated into Phase 1 of the air campaign. Within a few days of the start of NATO’s

campaign, alliance aircraft were striking both strategic and tactical targets throughout

Serbia, as well as working to suppress and disrupt its integrated air defense system.

4. Status of a Ground Forces Plan (U)

(U) In the early stages of NATO’s operational planning for the Kosovo crisis,

NATO considered a wide range of contingency planning options, including use of both

air and ground forces, to achieve the alliance’s objectives. In the period leading up to the

initiation of the air campaign, there was not a consensus in the United States or the

alliance to aggressively pursue planning for a ground force option in other than a

permissive environment. At that time, we were exhausting all diplomatic initiatives

while maintaining the credible threat of NATO air power. Following the failure to reach

a settlement with the Serbs at Rambouillet and Paris, U.S. and allied leaders decided that

execution of a phased air campaign was the best option for achieving our goals.

5. Conditions To End the Operation (U)

(U) At the NATO Summit in Washington on April 23, 1999, alliance leaders

decided to further intensify the air campaign by expanding the target set to include

military-industrial infrastructure, media responsible for promulgating propaganda, and

other strategic targets, and by announcing the deployment of additional aircraft. The

alliance also clearly outlined its conditions to end the operation. As proclaimed in the

NATO Statement on Kosovo, President Milosevic had to:

• Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate end of violence

and repression in Kosovo

• Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police, and paramilitary forces

• Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

9

• Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons,

and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations

• Provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the establishment of a

political framework based on the Rambouillet accords.

The fact that NATO as a whole endorsed these principles in its Summit Statement

illustrated anew the cohesion of the alliance. Moreover, the fact that the Group of 8

(G-8) nations subsequently endorsed these conditions added strength to our position,

since this now meant that Russia supported these conditions.

6. Role of Diplomacy (U)

(U) During Operation Allied Force, U.S. diplomatic efforts had several

objectives. The first was to ensure that NATO remained united and firm in order to

prevail in the conflict. To this end, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of

Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and other U.S. officials spoke almost daily

with their alliance counterparts during the 78-day campaign. Alliance unity and resolve

not only remained firm, but strengthened over time.

(U) The second diplomatic objective was to prevent the conflict from widening

by helping the countries that were directly affected to cope with the humanitarian crisis.

To this end, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were in regular contact

with their counterparts from the region. The United States, its NATO allies, and, in fact,

many other countries and non-governmental organizations from around the world

contributed prodigious amounts of emergency assistance to help meet the needs of the

tides of refugees then pouring out of Kosovo into neighboring countries. (Of course, U.S.

and allied militaries also contributed to this effort, as discussed in detail in Chapter VIII.)

(U) The third diplomatic objective was to work constructively with Russia. After

a somewhat rocky start, the relationships between the United States and Russia, and

between the NATO alliance and Russia, over the issue of Kosovo were maintained

effectively over the course of Operation Allied Force. While there continued to be sharp

differences with Russia over the conflict itself and the kind of international presence that

would be required in Kosovo after the conflict ended, these differences did not preclude

agreement on the conditions that Belgrade would have to meet to bring an end to the air

campaign — or indeed on the roles for Russian army units in KFOR, the international

security force with NATO at its core.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

10

7. Mandate and Legal Basis (U)

(U) There were a number of factors that provided the legal basis for NATO’s

action in Kosovo. These include UN Security Council Resolution 1199, which

reaffirmed that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace

and security in the Balkan region, invoked the Security Council's authority under Chapter

VII of the Charter, and demanded that all parties cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo. FRY actions constituted a threat to regional security, particularly to the

security of Albania and Macedonia and potentially Greece and Turkey. The Former

Yugoslavia is a region that has historically been a tinderbox for conflict and in which

NATO has assumed special responsibilities during the last decade, with the repeated

approval of the Security Council. Also, FRY actions caused heavy outflows of refugees

into neighboring countries, endangering the political and economic stability of the region.

Finally, the very real threat of a humanitarian catastrophe was an important factor in

NATO's action. In Resolution 1199 the Security Council demanded that Serbian forces

take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the impending

humanitarian catastrophe, and accordingly directed the FRY to cease its actions. Instead,

the FRY placed hundreds of thousands of lives at risk (many in fact lost their lives) by

forcing Kosovar Albanians to flee into the countryside and neighboring states, where they

suffered from lack of food and shelter. In so doing, FRY military and police forces

committed serious and widespread violations of international law, and used excessive and

indiscriminate force.

C. Why Did Milosevic Capitulate? (U)

(U) Because many pressures were brought to bear, it can never be certain about

exactly what caused Milosevic to accept NATO’s conditions to stop the bombing and

instruct the Serbian military to sign the Military Technical Agreement with NATO

embodying those conditions. Clearly, the mounting damage that resulted from the

intensified air campaign against strategic, military-industrial, and national command-andcontrol targets, as well as the attacks against Milosevic’s fielded forces in Kosovo and

Serbia’s utter inability to cause any notable damage or casualties to NATO forces, had a

major impact on Milosevic’s decision. Air attacks on military forces in the field forced

Serbian forces to remain largely hidden from view, traveling only under limited

circumstances. Air attacks on selected infrastructure targets, such as bridges and electricpower systems, degraded the ability of the Yugoslav military to command and control its
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

11

forces or to resupply and reconstitute them. Together, these effects created pressure on

Milosevic to yield to NATO demands.

U) However, other extremely important factors were also at work in

precipitating Milosevic’s capitulation. First, the solidarity of the alliance was central in

compelling Belgrade to accept NATO’s conditions. Because Milosevic could not defeat

NATO militarily, his best hope lay in splitting the alliance politically. Thus, it was not

enough for NATO simply to concentrate on winning a military victory; at the heart of

allied strategy was building and sustaining the unity of the alliance. NATO maintained

and strengthened its resolve, especially after the NATO Summit in Washington, DC. It

became clear that Milosevic could not undermine NATO’s unity and purpose.

(U) Second, the alliance’s continuous efforts to engage Russia in diplomacy

proved critical to achieving the settlement. While Russia strongly opposed the NATO

campaign, it limited its practical support to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and was

prepared to work with the alliance diplomatically to end the conflict. The Russians

agreed that the refugees should return, that Serb forces should leave, and that some form

of international security force with NATO at its core needed to be deployed to Kosovo.

When Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and Russian Special Envoy Viktor

Chernomyrdin met with Milosevic in Belgrade and spoke with one voice, Milosevic

realized that he had become politically isolated and could expect no help from Russia.

(U) Third, the buildup of NATO ground combat power in the region (e.g., Task

Force Hawk in Albania, allied peace implementation forces in the FYROM, and visible

preparations for the deployment of additional forces), combined with the increasing

public discussion of the possibility of and planning for the use of ground forces,

undoubtly contributed to Milosevic’s calculations that NATO would prevail at all costs.

(U) Fourth, the persistent military efforts of the Kosovar Albanians in the face of

significant setbacks — particularly their resurgence in the latter weeks of the campaign

— demonstrated to Milosevic that he would not be able to eliminate this threat.

(U) Finally, NATO nations employed other economic and political means —

enforcing economic sanctions, tightening travel restrictions, freezing financial holdings

— that raised the level of anxiety and discontent within Belgrade’s power circles. In

addition, the indictment of Milosevic by the international war crimes tribunal certainly

helped persuade his most powerful supporters that the international political consensus

against Serbia’s actions would continue to strengthen rather than weaken.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

12

(U) In sum, all these factors — diplomatic and economic leverage combined with

superior military force — played important roles in the settlement of the crisis.

D. Implications for U.S. Defense Strategy (U)

(U) In considering the implications of Operation Allied Force for U.S. defense

strategy, two important questions arise: what would be the impact of Operation Allied

Force on our ability to execute a single major theater war (MTW), and did the

participation of U.S. forces jeopardize our ability to execute the most demanding

requirement of the defense strategy, namely the ability to fight and win two nearly

simultaneous major theater wars?

(U) If the threat of major theater war had developed in another theater duirng

Operation Allied Force, the United States would have taken all actions necessary to

prevail. Our first course of action would have been to take additional steps to enhance

our deterrent posture in the likely theater of conflict, as was the case during Allied Force.

Had deterrence failed, we would have deployed those forces that would be required to

halt the initial attack and then build our combat strength to conduct counteroffensive

operations.

(U) Without question, a situation in which the United States would have to

prosecute two major theater wars nearly simultaneously would be extraordinarily

demanding — well beyond that required for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

in 1990 and 1991. It would involve our complete commitment as a nation and would

entail all elements of our total force. The Department recognizes that, if confronted with

two major theater wars, we would need to withdraw U.S. forces from ongoing peacetime

activities and smaller-scale contingency operations — including, in this instance, from

Operation Allied Force — to prepare them for war. Consistent with our defense strategy,

U.S. forces could not have continued the intense campaign in Kosovo and, at the same

time, conducted two nearly simultaneous major theater wars.

(U) Ultimately, if the decision was made to disengage from Kosovo in order to

mount two major theater wars in defense of vital interests in other theaters, we would

have been able to do so, albeit at higher levels of risk than would have been the case if

U.S. forces had not been conducting operations in Kosovo. We were cognizant of these

risks at the time and made various adjustments in our posture and plans to address those

risks. Operation Allied Force heightened awareness to the fact that managing these risks

is a highly complicated endeavor that would benefit from a more structured and dynamic
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

13

set of tools for assessing our ability to conduct major wars when we respond to

contingencies.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

14

(This page is intentionally blank.)
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

15

II. ALLIANCE AND COALITION WARFARE (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force taught us much about how we function both as a

government and as a member of an alliance when engaged in a major military operation.

A. Interagency Planning (U)

(U) Before and during Operation Allied Force, the National Security Council

(NSC) oversaw a series of interagency planning efforts on Kosovo. These planning

efforts were directed by the National Security Council’s Deputies Committee and

monitored by an interagency Kosovo Executive Committee. The first political-military

plan on Kosovo, completed in the fall of 1998, focused on using the threat of NATO air

strikes to achieve a political-military settlement. After this threat of force convinced

Milosevic to garrison most Serb forces in October 1998, interagency planning efforts

focused on deploying the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s

(OSCE's) Kosovo Verification Mission, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and

responding to possible Serbian noncompliance.

(U) As it was executed, the interagency planning process helped to mobilize and

coordinate the activities of different agencies, identify issues for consideration by

National Security Council Deputies, provide planning support for international

organizations (e.g., OSCE and United Nations), and develop benchmarks for measuring

progress. This political-military planning played an important role in ensuring that the

United States achieved the objectives set forth by the NCA. At the same time, it is now

possible to identify an important area for improvement.

(U) Planning focused on air strikes and diplomacy as the primary tools to achieve

U.S. and NATO objectives. As it became clear that Milosevic intended to outlast the

alliance, more attention was paid to other ways of bringing pressure to bear, including

economic sanctions and information operations. While ultimately these instruments were

put to use with good effect, more advance planning might have made them more effective

at an earlier date. Our experience in Operation Allied Force has shown that Presidential

Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), Managing Complex Contingency Operations, had not

yet been fully institutionalized throughout the interagency. As a result of this experience,
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

16

the interagency has applied the lessons learned to further institutionalizing PDD-56. The

routine participation of senior officials in rehearsals, gaming, exercises, and simulations

would strengthen awareness of the broad range of available policy tools.

B. NATO’s Political-Military Process (U)

(U) Any discussion of the NATO and U.S. decision-making processes must begin

with the simple fact that the process worked, and NATO achieved its stated objectives.

NATO’s success was the direct result of 19 nations working together. While the United

States provided the preponderance of the military forces employed during the operation,

its NATO allies were crucial partners and contributors throughout. The notion that the

United States could have carried out this operation unilaterally is simply not true. NATO

allies provided personnel, planes, ships, submarines, logistics, infrastructure, over-flight

permission, and political and diplomatic support throughout the operation.

1. Command-and-Control Structure (U)

(U) This section describes the U.S. and NATO command structure during

Operation Allied Force, beginning with the evolution of the overall command-andcontrol structure from separate U.S. and NATO chains to an integrated NATO structure.

Chapter IV of the report describes the application of this command-and-control structure

to the process of directing combat operations.

(U) As the crisis evolved, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) granted Secretary

General Javier Solana the authority, subject to close consultation with the NAC, to

launch, suspend, or terminate air strikes and to determine their scope, scale, and

application essential for the timely and flexible political control of air operations.

(U) Within NATO’s military structure, the Secretary General depends on

NATO’s Military Committee to perform the crucial role of providing necessary strategic

military guidance to the military commanders as well as oversight of the conduct of

operations. Additionally, NATO’s Military Committee and International Military Staff

play essential roles in ensuring the timely flow of military advice to the North Atlantic

Council and Secretary General, as well as to the military commanders executing the

operation. In this way, the Secretary General receives the military advice needed to

execute his responsibilities and is assured of the proper oversight and coordination of

military activities under his direction.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

17

(U) Figure 1 shows the U.S. and NATO command structures prior to the creation

by the United States of Joint Task Force Flexible Anvil and Joint Task Force Sky Anvil

in August 1998. This was the typical peacetime arrangement, with independent U.S. and

NATO operational structures. The U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR),

operating under the National Command Authorities (NCA), had operational control

(OPCON) of his service components, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and U.S.

Naval Forces, Europe (USNAVEUR). (U.S. Army Forces, Europe was not engaged in

operations at the time and is not shown.) The Commander, USAFE (COMUSAFE)

exercised operational control of both 16th Air Force and the B-52s based in theater along

with their conventional air-launched cruise missiles (CALCMs). Commander Sixth Fleet

(COMSIXTHFLT), acting as Commander Allied Naval Forces (COMNAVFOR), had

operational control of naval assets in theater and directed strike planning and execution

for Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs). Commander Task Force 60 (CTF 60),

forward deployed and under the operational control of COMSIXTHFLT, was the

commander of all naval forces at sea in the Mediterranean. CTF 60, also acting as Battle

Force Sixth Fleet, had operational control of the Theodore Roosevelt Battle Group when

it arrived in theater on 4 April 1999.

(U) In the NATO command structure, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,

(SACEUR) reported to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and had operational control of

the NATO regional commanders, including the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces,

Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH). The Commander, Allied Command Europe (ACE)

Rapid Reaction Corps (COMARRC) was separated from the Commander in Chief, Allied

Forces, Southern Europe, and not engaged in operations in the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia. The Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, headquartered in

Naples, Italy, exercised operational control over Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe

(NAVSOUTH), Allied Strike Forces, Southern Europe (STRKFORSOUTH), and Allied

Air Forces, Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH). The Commander Allied Air Forces,

Southern Europe, was also the Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC),

and thus controlled the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) and all the air forces in

the NATO southern region. Under this arrangement, 16th Air Force and carrier wing

aircraft remained under operational control of the Commander, Allied Air Force Forces,

and the Commander, Sixth Fleet, respectively, but were under tactical control of the

CAOC during missions.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

18

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 1 Command Structure Prior to August 1998 (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Figure 2 shows the command-and-control structure during the period that

Joint Task Force Flexible Anvil and Joint Task Force Sky Anvil were activated, between

August and December 1998.

(U) Under the new arrangement, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in

Europe, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, were removed from

the chain of operational control, and the Commanders, 16th Air Force and Sixth Fleet

became joint task force commanders reporting directly to the U.S. Commander in Chief,

Europe. The principal role of Joint Task Force Flexible Anvil was to execute a limited

strike option using Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, and that of Joint Task Force Sky

Anvil was to execute a more extensive strike option if a limited strike did not achieve the

desired end state. Targets were apportioned by matching target type to optimal weapon

characteristics. The U.S. and NATO chains of command were still separated, and no

other changes were made to the command and control structure.

CINCEUR

COMSIXTHFLT

CTF-60

USAFE

16 AF/CC

AFFOR

CALCM TLAM

16 AF

AIRCRAFT

NCA

SACEUR

STRKFOR

SOUTH

AIRSOUTH/

CFACC

NAC

NATO AIR

NAV

SOUTH

CINCUSNAVEUR CINCSOUTH COMARRC

CVW

HQ

FIVEATAF/

CAOC

US OPCON

NATO

OPCON

TACON
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

19

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 2 Command Structure, August-December 1998 (U)

USCINCEUR

NCA

COMJTF FLEXIBLE

ANVIL /

COMSIXTHFLT

COMJTF

SKY ANVIL /

AFFOR/16 AF

SACEUR

STRKFOR

SOUTH

AIRSOUTH/

CFACC

NAC

NATO AIR

NAV

SOUTH

CINCSOUTH COMARRC

16 AF TLAM

AIRCRAFT

CVW

AIRCRAFT

CAOC

CALCM

US OPCON

NATO

OPCON

TACON

HQ

FIVEATAF

/CAOC

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Figure 3 shows the final command-and-control structure that was used during

the period January-July 1999. A new joint task force, Noble Anvil, subsumed Joint Task

Force Flexible Anvil and Joint Task Force Sky Anvil, and through an evolutionary

process, U.S. and NATO organizations and command-and-control structures became

linked.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

20

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 3 Command Structure, January-July 1999 (U)

(U) Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, commanded by Admiral Ellis, established an

intermediate command level between the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, on the one

hand, and the Commander, Sixth Fleet and Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe, on the

other. The United States also established a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)

and a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF). Lieutenant General Short, the

Commander, Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe, who was also the Combined Force Air

Component Commander, now became the U.S. Joint Force Air Component Commander

(JFACC) as well. Similarly, Vice Admiral Murphy, already the Commander, Sixth Fleet,

as well as Commander, Allied Strike Forces, Southern Europe, was also the U.S. Joint

Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). British Lieutenant General Jackson,

the Commander, Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, was subordinated to

ADM Ellis, Commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe.

(U) As previously discussed, NATO's political-military command structure

played an important role in the planning and execution of the operation. NATO’s

command structure worked well, but parallel U.S. and NATO command-and-control

structures complicated operational planning and unity of command. These structures are

(May 1999)

CINCSOUTH

COMAIRSOUTH/

CJFACC

NCA NAC

CJFLCC/

COMARRC

(LTG JACKSON)

COMNAVSOUTH

(ADM SPINOZZI)

JSOTF

JPOTF

USCINCEUR SACEUR

COMJTF NOBLE ANVIL

NAVFOR/

COMSIXTHLT

COM

STRKFOR SOUTH

(ADM ELLIS)

AFFOR/16 AF/

JFACC

TF HAWK

(LTG HENDRIX)

(LTG SHORT)

(VADM MURPHY)

(GEN CLARK)

US OPCON

NATO

OPCON

TACON

US NATO

NOTE: Does not include Joint Task Force Shining Hope UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

21

well defined, but had not been used previously to plan and conduct sustained combat

operations. Despite the overall success of NATO’s processes, we will work with our

allies to:

• Enhance NATO's contingency planning process for operations outside the

NATO area

• Develop an overarching command-and-control policy and agree on procedures

for the policy's implementation

• Enhance procedures and conduct exercises strengthening NATO's politicalmilitary interfaces.

2. Operational Planning and Targeting Process (U)

(U) Beginning in May 1998, internal NATO planning explored a wide range of

military options, including the use of both air and ground forces to achieve NATO

objectives. Target planning followed specific guidance provided by SACEUR and the

North Atlantic Council, and continued to evolve with the dynamics of the situation in

Kosovo.

a. Initial Planning (U)

(U) On September 24, 1998, NATO Defense Ministers, meeting at Villamoura,

Portugal, approved issuance of Activation Warnings for two different types of air

operations. The first, a five-phased air operation, envisioned an air attack beginning with

deployment of air assets and the suppression of enemy air defenses and moving through

phases to ultimately eliminate major elements of Yugoslavian military and security force

capability. The second option was known as the Limited Air Response and was designed

to be a short notice, limited air response to a serious, but limited incident in Kosovo, with

the aim of preventing a further deterioration of the situation. The Limited Air Response

was eventually integrated into Phase 1 of the air campaign. As early as May 1998, well

in advance of the activation warnings, planning staffs at all levels had initiated work to

identify the classes, types, and specific characteristics of targets that would need to be

attacked to meet the specific goals of these two alternatives.

b. New Options (U)

(U) As the situation in Kosovo evolved, the North Atlantic Council first issued

activation requests and then activation orders for both of these air options while backing

diplomatic means to resolve the situation. While NATO worked toward a decision on
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

22

issuing an activation order, the United States dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to

Belgrade on 5 October 1998 to press for full Federal Republic of Yugoslavia compliance

with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199. Following 7 days of talks,

Ambassador Holbrooke reported to NATO that Milosevic was prepared to accept a

2,000-man OSCE ground-verification presence and a NATO air surveillance mission to

monitor Yugoslav compliance with the resolution. On 25 October, General Clark and

NATO Military Committee Chairman General Naumann reached a comprehensive

agreement with the Serbian leaders for specific withdrawals of Yugoslav army and

interior forces from Kosovo. Yugoslav compliance with these requirements resulted in a

NAC decision to suspend execution of the Limited Air Response and Phased Air

Operations on 27 October 1998. However, the NAC did not cancel the activation orders;

both would remain in place but would require a positive NAC decision for execution.

The two options continued to operate as the basis for target development and update over

the next several months.

(U) Despite initial Serb compliance with the agreements, the fragile cease-fire in

Kosovo was punctuated by a number of significant incidents in late 1998 and early 1999.

The massacre of 45 ethnic Albanians by Serb forces at Racak served to once again

galvanize the international community, and led to a renewed emphasis for all sides to

exercise restraint and engage in a negotiating process that would lead to a political

settlement. Contact Group Ministers met in London on 29 January 1999 to consider the

critical situation in Kosovo. The Ministers called on both sides to end the cycle of

violence and to commit themselves to a process of negotiation leading to a political

settlement. In the proposed agreement, all citizens of Kosovo would enjoy, without

discrimination, equal rights and freedoms. The agreement outlined requirements for

cessation of hostilities and the redeployment, partial withdrawal, and demilitarization of

all forces in Kosovo, and set forth guidelines for civil implementation of a settlement,

including democratic self-government, proposed civil structures, police and civil public

security, elections, and humanitarian assistance and economic construction. To that end,

the Contact Group agreed to summon representatives from the Federal Yugoslav and

Serbian governments and representatives of the Kosovar Albanians to Rambouillet,

France, by 6 February to begin discussions with the direct involvement of the Contact

Group.

(U) On 30 January 1999, NATO issued a statement by the North Atlantic

Council, giving full support to the Contact Group strategy. The NAC further agreed to
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

23

give NATO Secretary General Solana authority to authorize air strikes against targets

within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At that point, however, the primary focus

remained on the pending peace settlement talks in Rambouillet. While neither side had

signed the agreement after more than 2 weeks of intensive international efforts, it was

recognized that enough progress was made to justify reconvening in Paris several weeks

later to continue working toward a political solution. Following the second round of

negotiations at the Kleber Center in Paris (15–19 March), the Kosovar Albanians signed

the proposed agreement. The Serbs, however, continued to obstruct negotiations by

reneging on previously agreed sections of the accords, walking out of sessions, and

failing to attend scheduled meetings.

(U) As the peace talks broke down, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe

directed that a new option separate from previous plans be developed. This option was

envisioned to be a 2-day strike, hitting targets throughout the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia in an attempt to convince Milosevic to withdraw his forces and cease

hostilities. This option was eventually translated into a list of specific targets. In

addition to this option, planners developed two responses to Yugoslav actions that might

follow strikes on these targets. The two options ultimately settled on were, first, a

potential response to Yugoslav forces’ acts of repression against the Kosovar Albanians,

and, second, a response to Yugoslav attacks against NATO forces or countries. The

limited 2-day strike with its two response options became the basis for new planning

activities. During this time, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff repeatedly cautioned allied leaders that the limited duration options would

not guarantee success, and that NATO should not initiate these strikes unless the alliance

was willing to escalate, if necessary, and persist until victory was secured.

(U) Within a few days of the start of NATO’s campaign, alliance aircraft were

striking targets throughout Serbia, as well as working to provide freedom of maneuver for

friendly air forces by suppressing and disrupting the Yugoslavs’ integrated air defense

system. At the NATO Summit in Washington on 23 April 1999, alliance leaders decided

to further intensify the air operation by expanding the target set to include militaryindustrial infrastructure, propaganda-related media, and other strategic targets, and

announcing the deployment of additional aircraft. This led to the development of

additional target classes.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

24

c. Target Coordination Process (U)

(U) The specific objectives promulgated by the CINC were well coordinated at

the political and military levels in NATO and followed the strategic guidance passed

from U.S. National Command Authorities and the NAC. NATO’s objectives were to:

• Enable unhindered NATO air operations

• Isolate Serb military and security forces in Kosovo

• Degrade combat capability of Serb military and security forces in Kosovo

• Compel Yugoslav leaders to withdraw their forces from Kosovo and cease

hostilities

• Reduce Yugoslav capability to conduct and sustain offensive operations.

(U) During the course of the campaign, NATO developed mechanisms for

delegating target approval authority to military commanders. For selected categories of

targets — for example, targets in downtown Belgrade, in Montenegro, or targets likely to

involve high collateral damage — NATO reserved approval for higher political

authorities. NATO leaders used this mechanism to ensure that member nations were

fully cognizant of particularly sensitive military operations, and, thereby, to help sustain

the unity of the alliance.

(U) Legal reviews of selected targets were conducted at successive echelons of

the chain of command. Targets nominated for approval by SACEUR received legal

reviews in the field. Targets nominated that met the criteria requiring NCA approval

received detailed legal scrutiny by the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff and by the DOD General Counsel. Legal reviews involved evaluation of certain

targets as valid military targets as governed by applicable principles of the laws and

customs of armed conflict.

C. Force Capabilities (U)

1. U.S.-Allied Force Capabilities Imbalance and the Defense Capabilities

Initiative (U)

(U) NATO partners contributed significantly to the military capabilities

employed in Operation Allied Force. Broadly speaking, other members of the alliance

contributed about the same share of their available aircraft for prosecuting the campaign

as did the United States. Alliance members also contributed ground forces that helped to
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

25

stabilize neighboring countries and to conduct humanitarian relief operations. And it

would not have been possible to conduct Operation Allied Force without the use of our

allies' military infrastructure, including military bases, airfields, and airspace.

(U) Notwithstanding the allied contributions, and overall success of the

campaign, Operation Allied Force highlighted a number of disparities between U.S.

capabilities and those of our allies, including precision strike, mobility, and command,

control, and communications capabilities. The gaps in capability were real, and they had

the effect of impeding our ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with our NATO

allies. For example, because few NATO allies could employ precision munitions in

sufficient numbers (or at all), the United States conducted the preponderance of the strike

sorties during the early stages of the conflict. Problems regarding communication

interoperability persisted throughout the campaign. Insufficient air mobility assets

among our allies slowed deployment of Kosovo Force ground forces — beyond those

already in the theater — once Milosevic agreed to NATO's terms to end the conflict.

Disparities in capabilities will seriously affect NATO’s ability to operate as an effective

alliance over the long term.

(U) If the alliance is to meet future military challenges effectively, it must

successfully implement the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The Defense

Capabilities Initiative seeks to enhance allied military capabilities in five key areas:

deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; effective engagement;

survivability of forces and infrastructure; and command, control, and information

systems. The United States will continue to promote the Defense Capabilities Initiative

and encourage experimentation by NATO's members with new and advanced warfighting

concepts. Successful implementation of the Defense Capabilities Initiative must remain

one of NATO's top priorities — a lesson strongly reinforced by the Kosovo experience.

(U) Within the alliance, efforts by the United States and its allies to implement

the Defense Capabilities Initiative can be facilitated by close coordination through

NATO’s established structure, namely the Military Committee and High Level Steering

Group. Review of alliance interoperability challenges highlighted by Kosovo operations

could prove fruitful in addressing improved integration of forces.

(U) Figure 4 illustrates the parallels between Joint Vision 2010 and Defense

Capabilities Initiative visions of the military capabilities required to address the future

security environment as seen by the United States and NATO.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 4 Joint Vision 2010

NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative Parallels (U)

NATO DCI Common Operational Vision JV 2010

Full Spectrum Dominance

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) The term Common Operational Vision shown in the figure is not used by

NATO; it is a U.S. construct to evaluate current NATO capabilities and efforts to meet

NATO’s 21st century challenges. NATO capabilities will have their own unique

characteristics, and they will not necessarily mirror those of the United States. However,

the more nearly parallel U.S. and NATO processes are for development of future

capabilities, the more likely it is that we will achieve the desired level of interoperability.

2. Alliance C4 Policy (U)

(U) The command, control, communications, and computer (C4) support to

Operation Allied Force was highly successful. Several important communications

capabilities saw their first significant combat application: use of Web-based technologies

for coordination and information sharing; video teleconferencing for command, control,

and coordination; and e-mail for coordination and tasking. As the United States and

NATO fielded these capabilities, some policy differences emerged that highlighted the

need for increased emphasis and coordination in the alliance. The Defense Capabilities

Initiative and NATO’s Strategic Concept provide mechanisms to assist in formalizing C4

policies. Intensive efforts in this vital area of alliance command, control,

communications, and computers will contribute to improved interoperability and

reduction in the imbalance in capabilities.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

27

(U) In particular, the United States must work with our NATO allies to develop

an overarching command-and-control policy and a detailed agreement on procedures for

the policy's implementation. Additional policy and agreements, or implementation and

enforcement of existing agreements, are essential in the following key areas as part of the

development of a comprehensive and overarching NATO C4 policy:

• Collaboration on allocation of limited bandwidth and communications assets to

alliance members

• Establishment of network integration training standards for Commander Joint

Task Force (CJTF) command, control, communications, and computers

• Management of the electromagnetic spectrum to optimize operations and to

avoid mutual interference in support of the Joint Task Force

• Implementation and enforcement of coalition agreements on network security

• Improvements in timely compliance with NATO Standardization Agreements

• Improvements in interoperability by focusing on overarching standards and

architectures rather than hardware

• Refinements in the policy and process of releasing information

• Acceleration of Host Nation Agreement processes affecting extensive networks

of command, control, communications, and computers for Commanders of Joint

Task Forces.

3. Allied Joint Doctrine Issues (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force provided a real-world laboratory for gaining insights

into the capabilities envisioned by Joint Vision 2010. Operation Allied Force confirmed

the need for the goal of Joint Vision 2010 to develop force capabilities that can handle

unexpected circumstances and threats across the full range of military operations. The

Allied Force experience demonstrated the need for forces that are able to adapt and

transition across diverse operations calling for combat, peace enforcement, peacekeeping,

and humanitarian assistance. This experience also provides a potential framework for

assessing the approach to projecting future requirements — by focusing on capabilities

and the effects they can deliver — across the spectrum of warfare.

a. Allied Joint Doctrine (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force confirmed the importance of Allied Joint Doctrine to

improving the interoperability of NATO forces. Consistent allied joint tactics,
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

28

techniques, and procedures will improve integration of NATO’s sea, air, and land forces

involved in activities across the range of military operations. Allied Joint Doctrine

should enable future NATO operations to be more effective and to achieve higher

operational tempo, and should increase the probability of mission success while reducing

the risk to forces.

(U) To enhance our ability to support development of Allied Joint Doctrine, the

Department is currently reviewing U.S. procedures for participating in the formulation of

Allied Joint Doctrine. We believe NATO also needs to streamline its procedures for

doctrine development and approval. Accordingly, the Department will engage NATO in

the Military Committee and High Level Steering Committee to facilitate these

improvements.

b. Use of Video Teleconferencing (U)

(U) NATO commanders used video teleconferencing for the first time as a major

instrument for exercising command and control. Daily commanders’ video

teleconferences were held to review progress of operations, coordinate future operations,

and promulgate intentions. These conferences spanned the chain of command from the

Supreme Allied Commander Europe to the Commander Joint Task Force and onward to

component commanders. In other words, these commanders’ video teleconferences

spanned the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command, thus greatly

compressing normal command-and-control processes. As a result, strategic and

operational commanders were able to directly influence tactical operations. Joint Vision

2010 anticipates these phenomena — from use of technologies such as video

teleconferencing — by observing “...higher echelons will use these technologies to

reduce the friction of war and to apply precise centralized control when and where

appropriate. Real time information will likely drive parallel, not sequential planning and

real time, not prearranged, decision-making. The optimal balance between centralized

and decentralized command and control will have to be carefully developed as systems

are brought into the inventories.”

(U) The ability of high-level commanders to influence tactical operations directly

had positive as well as challenging aspects. Among the positive developments was the

speed with which commanders and key staff officers could perform essential

coordination. One of the challenges remains timely documentation and promulgation of

the most essential substance of the proceedings, such as the commander’s intentions, to
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

29

those key personnel who did not attend the video teleconference. The Department is

continuing to review the Kosovo experience in search of improvements that can be made

in the use of video teleconferencing as a major tool for exercising command and control.

Where appropriate, revisions to doctrine will be incorporated. The compression of time

to exercise command and control made possible by video teleconferencing and other

technologies is already a topic for Joint experimentation.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

30

(This page is intentionally blank.)
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

31

III. FORCE DEPLOYMENT (U)

(U) The United States has dramatically decreased its overseas basing of military

forces since the end of the Cold War. Consequently, the success of U.S. military

operations around the world often hinges on the combat capability of rotationally

deployed forces already in theater and on our ability to rapidly deploy forces to distant

conflicts or hot spots. For very small operations, a deployment of forces from within the

theater might be adequate. However, larger contingencies such as Operation Allied Force

require strategic deployment of military units from the continental United States or from

other theaters to augment the forces on hand. In such situations, transportation planners

must rapidly develop movement schedules for the deployment of these forces. For

Operation Allied Force, planners drew upon forces deployed worldwide, including forces

based in the continental United States. Even with an extremely compressed planning

timeline for the operation and vast distances to move, the deployment of U.S. forces to

Operation Allied Force was, from an overall perspective, successful.

(U) Despite this overall success, however, the deployment of forces to Operation

Allied Force was not problem-free. Although the commitment and ingenuity of

transportation planners, as well as the dedication of the men and women responsible for

actually moving units and their critical equipment and supplies overcame these

difficulties, there is room for improvement.

(U) This chapter highlights some of these problems, and the lessons to be drawn

from them. Attention to these lessons will allow us to execute future deployments more

effectively and with less heroic efforts required on the part of transportation personnel.

A. Basing and Refueling Considerations (U)

(U) On 24 March 1999, 214 U.S. aircraft and 130 allied aircraft were poised at

bases in Europe ready to initiate combat operations against the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia. B-2 aircraft operating from the heartland of the United States augmented

these aircraft.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

32

(U) By June 1999, the total number of U.S. aircraft in Europe had grown to 731.

These aircraft were based at the locations shown in Figure 5. During that same period,

allied contributions more than doubled to over 300 aircraft. In addition, our NATO allies

provided virtually all the basing facilities, air traffic coordination, and supporting

elements to keep this air armada of over 1,000 aircraft functioning throughout the

conflict.

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 5 U.S. Aircraft Basing During Operation Allied Force (U)

AVIANO

GIOIA BANDIRMA

TRAPANI

CERVIA

LAKENHEATH

 FAIRFORD

INCIRLIK SOUDA BAY SIGONELLA

ISTRES

M-D-MARSAN

GEILENKIRCHEN

RHEIN-MAIN

BRIZE-NORTON

MILDENHALL

MORON

BUDAPEST

 BRINDISI

TASZAR

CVBG

 ARG

CONUS

TIRANA

RAMSTEIN

SPANGDAHLEM

UNCLASSIFIED

1. Aircraft Basing (U)

(U) Bedding down and employing such a massive force was challenging.

Despite Partnership for Peace, NATO, and other organizations, there were issues that,

although eventually solved, initially delayed or encumbered operations. Avoiding these

problems in future conflicts could be helped by the development of appropriate checklists

to ensure international agreements contain critical host nation support for military

operations plans and contingency operations. Some suggestions for such a checklist’s

contents include: designated points of entry and departure, customs, overflight
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

33

authorization, use of radio frequencies, air traffic control, blanket diplomatic clearances,

basing rights, facility access agreements, coalition contracting procedures, connectivity,

force protection, site surveys and update process, site explosive material handling plan,

and weapon storage. Implementation of such agreements would facilitate quick access

and assist in rapid deployment, as well as rapid employment and immediate sustainment.

Each of these areas has unique challenges and some mutually exclusive areas of concern.

Rapid employment and immediate sustainment necessitate more extensive efforts with

customs and diplomatic clearances than do rapid deployment concepts. Base

infrastructure support for rapid deployment is not as extensive as support requirements

needed for rapid employment and immediate sustainment.

2. Aerial Refueling Support (U)

(U) A challenging aspect of Operation Allied Force was providing aerial

refueling support for transport aircraft delivering forces to the theater and for combat

aircraft deploying to the theater and conducting strike operations. Aerial refueling

missions were particularly demanding because tankers operated, in many cases, from

bases on the periphery of the theater. There were not enough air bases in the area

immediately around Kosovo to support all the aircraft committed to Operation Allied

Force. Strike aircraft were placed on bases closest to Kosovo, and longer-range tankers

were based at locales farther away, often at distances that exceeded those expected for a

major theater of war operation. Because of the multiple locations and long distances,

planners had to overcome a host of coordination and support issues including providing

support for global attack sorties flown from the continental United States by B-2

bombers. Another key factor that increased tanker demand was the need to provide

refueling support for at least four combat air patrol stations that were filled continuously,

24 hours per day, from the beginning until the end of the war. Consequently crew ratios

for tankers participating in Operation Allied Force were higher than typically planned.

Many of the considerations mandating increased crews could be confronted in an

intensive air-refueling scenario in the future.

(U) Although U.S. forces succeeded in providing the tanker support needed to

sustain the air operation, the Department is reviewing the tanker forces and crew ratios to

determine whether existing and planned forces are sufficient to meet the two MTW

requirement or other future contingencies. The Department is also investigating our

ability to plan in theater, in real time, for the most effective use of our tanker fleet and is

reviewing options for improving this key planning capability.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

34

B. Deployment Planning (U)

(U) One of the linchpins of a successful military deployment is detailed planning.

In the case of force deployments, this planning takes the form of an accurate description

of what units need to be moved, their points of origin, their destinations, their size (e.g.,

weight, volume, and number of personnel), and when they are required to arrive. This

basic information comprises the backbone of the Time-Phased Force and Deployment

Data (TPFDD) that drives the allocation of transportation assets to the units that must be

moved. As the deployment data is developed, additional information is incorporated

(e.g., preferred mode of transportation) to ensure that scarce mobility assets are used in

the most efficient fashion.

(U) Given the great level of detail required to coordinate a large deployment, the

rapid generation of the deployment data to support a quick reaction operation such as

Allied Force is a monumental task. The quite substantial force and deployment data for

Operation Allied Force had to be developed in weeks. Further complicating deployment

planning is the fact that the TPFDD is a living document that must be continuously

modified in response to changes in the operational situation. As the Commander’s plans

change, so must the deployment data. This inherent aspect of deployment data

development was graphically illustrated in the Task Force Hawk deployment when

political and operational imperatives required a significant shift in basing from the

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Albania. A large portion of the deployment

data had to be rapidly reworked in response to this change. Of course, the ideal of a

stable, pre-planned TPFDD is never achievable. The deployment data and its planning

process must be flexible and responsive to the inevitable shifts in the commander’s

operational priorities.

(U) We have identified two major factors in Operation Allied Force that

contributed to avoidable delays in TPFDD development: inadequate planning systems

and poor planning discipline.

1. Deployment Data Planning Systems (U)

(U) Automated planning systems are essential for rapid and accurate TPFDD

development. Today, many different planning systems contribute to the deployment data.

These systems range from unit-level tools up to the often-mentioned Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System (JOPES), a high-level system that is the primary driver
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

35

for strategic deployments. This hierarchy of lower-level systems feeding data to

progressively higher-level systems culminates with the global TPFDD.

(U) Unfortunately, the limited interoperability of today’s systems creates friction

at all levels of the deployment planning process. Among the specific problems are

inconsistent data requirements and electronic data formats that cannot be easily shared

between systems. This lack of “user friendliness” slows data development and places an

unnecessary premium on the relatively few individuals with the experience to work

through an ad hoc end-to-end TPFDD generation process. Unfortunately, the pressure of

crisis action planning can significantly strain such an ad hoc system.

(U) To improve TPFDD generation, the Department is reviewing the suite of

tools used for TPFDD generation with the goal of providing a more seamless system for

planners at every level. Much has already been accomplished in this direction. For

example, the Transportation Coordinators' Automated Information for Movement System

(TC-AIMS II) now under development, will integrate the functionality of the Services’

existing movement planning systems into a single tool. Taking this integration another

step, the Department is considering integrating TC-AIMS II with the Joint Forces

Resource Generation II (JFRG II) system to further speed unit data into the deployment

data.

(U) A related shortcoming of deployment planning was the difficulty assessing

the impact of Allied Force deployments on major theater war plans. Many assets

deployed to Operation Allied Force are simultaneously tasked for the major theater wars.

Should a major theater war erupt, this engagement in another contingency would be

expected to delay deployment to the larger conflict. From the more general perspective

of deployment planning tools, the capability to track the status and location of major

theater war forces would be valuable. This would help planners avoid adverse impacts to

major theater war plans and allow them to identify any decrements to our senior

leadership.

2. TPFDD-Generation Process Discipline (U)

(U) Improving the automated planning systems is only part of the solution to

delays in the TPFDD-generation process. Deployment policies, process procedures, and

trained personnel are as integral to the JOPES as are the hardware and software described

above. Additional emphasis is required to ensure all participants follow the established

deployment data development procedures and policies in a disciplined manner. Failure to
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

36

follow proper procedures can result in conflicts and other delays as the system tries to

incorporate inadequate or incomplete movement requests into the deployment data.

(U) The problem with poor discipline in the execution of established planning

procedures was at least partially an outgrowth of the planning system shortcomings

described above. With multiple planning systems and their associated procedures in use

at any given time, there were few policies and procedures that could be consistently

followed across the spectrum of data development activities. Individuals encountering an

unfamiliar aspect of the process were forced to improvise solutions. Although this might

get a specific job done, other aspects of the deployment could be adversely impacted.

The integration of planning systems recommended above will go a long way toward

solving this problem by providing a more unified set of procedures and policies across

the full range of TPFDD-development activities. By ensuring all participants are able to

collaborate in a real-time environment, we can increase the efficiency of strategic lift

planning.

(U) Even with improved planning systems in place, a better understanding of the

TPFDD-development process is needed at all levels. For example, specific information is

required if deployment requests are to be included in the data in a timely manner.

Without the necessary data, requests cannot be processed, and the time consuming task of

asking for clarification will ensue. During Operation Allied Force, delays resulted from

errors as simple as failure to specify the desired delivery locations for deploying units. It

was like placing a catalog order without specifying a mailing address.

(U) Since individuals can only follow procedures if they know what the

procedures are, deployment-oriented continuation training should be provided from the

highest staff levels down to the lowest. As a proponent of the Joint Deployment process,

U.S. Joint Forces Command intends to pursue end-to-end solutions, including process,

training, and technology, in an effort to identify the best long-term solutions to this aspect

of the deployment process.

C. Deployment Execution (U)

(U) As discussed earlier, the deployment of forces to Operation Allied Force

from the continental United States and other theaters was a significant undertaking.

Because of the nature of the operation, the key aim of the deployment was on moving

fixed-wing air assets into the theater. As problems with the deployment data were

addressed and resolved, the people and equipment of the transportation system efficiently
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

37

executed its tasking. The operation was far from routine, however, and required tireless

efforts on the part of those responsible for the unit deployments. Indeed, in many

dimensions the air operation achieved major theater war magnitude, and hence required

similar levels of deployment activity.

(U) As was the case with TPFDD planning, the deployment execution system did

not work perfectly despite its overall success. First, a lack of understanding of the

infrastructure available in Southeast Europe contributed to inefficiencies in deployment.

In addition, although in-transit visibility — the ability to track the progress of units and

supplies while they are en route to their destinations — was generally improved over past

experiences, commanders had insufficient knowledge of the status and location of

deploying units and supplies. On the positive side, the Air Force’s new C-17A

Globemaster III inter-theater airlifter performed exceptionally well, and was critical to

the deployment’s success. The report elaborates on these and several other observations

in the sections that follow.

1. Understanding Infrastructure Limitations (U)

(U) In Operation Allied Force, the austere transportation infrastructure —

airports, seaports, roads, and railroads — in and around Albania limited deployment

options and increased deployment timelines. Poor infrastructure conditions slowed

aircraft turn-around times, limited throughput at the ports, and slowed onward movement

of forces and humanitarian supplies. Such problems can be mitigated to some extent by

an early assessment of infrastructure limitations. This enables a matching of

transportation infrastructure capability to operational requirements. As a result,

deployment packages can be optimized and required transportation support can be more

efficiently allocated.

(U) In preparation for deployment, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)

conducted extensive beddown planning by surveying, preparing, and publishing new

beddown assessments for 27 sites in 11 NATO and Eastern European countries. These

assessments were critical and allowed logistics planners from deploying units to reduce

the equipment necessary for deployed operations. This, in turn, decreased the

requirements for both intra-theater and inter-theater airlift. However, there were still

instances where deploying units brought more capability than required, which needlessly

increased airlift sorties. It is critical that deployment planners obtain all necessary

planning information on potential beddown locations as soon as possible. In addition,
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

38

assessment teams should be given better training and more useful tools to gather and

distribute information to effected units.

(U) In contrast, ground and sea infrastructure capabilities were not assessed until

later in the operation. As a result, planners lacked sufficient information to make

informed decisions about the desirability of employing additional assets such as Joint

Logistics Over-the-Shore or of relying more heavily on strategic sealift. Similarly,

planners could have deployed engineers or mobilized contractors to enhance the

transportation infrastructure as necessary. Decisions to deploy these forces need to be

made early in the operation to increase transportation throughput capacity. These issues

are discussed in detail later in this chapter and in Chapter VIII.

2. In-Transit Visibility (U)

(U) In-transit visibility refers to the ability to track the progress of an item or a

unit as it is processed through the transportation system. One can see in-transit visibility

at work in the commercial world whenever a person calls a commercial shipper to check

on the status of a package. While it’s nice to know that your catalog order left the

warehouse at midnight, such detailed in-transit visibility can be of much greater benefit to

a military commander. In fact, use of commercial parcel airlift services on a wide scale

provided commanders with partial in-transit visibility during Operation Allied Force.

Additionally, exploiting commercial services helped commanders reduce transit times

and husband scarce airlift resources. However, commercial systems do not possess all of

the attributes required of a military deployment tracking system. For example, they

cannot ensure unit integrity and do not typically track package contents.

(U) Depending on circumstances, a unit’s journey from home base to a deployed

base in theater can take days to weeks and involve several different modes of

transportation. Without in-transit visibility, a commander’s ability to adjust a unit’s

movement in response to changes in the operational situation is severely limited. For

example, an F-16 squadron originally destined for Aviano, Italy, might be better placed in

Bandirma, Turkey. While diverting the aircraft to their new destination might be

straightforward, the system needs to know which C-17s are carrying the squadron’s

support and maintenance equipment so they can be diverted as well. For Operation

Allied Force, this type of capability could have greatly enhanced overall operational

flexibility.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

39

(U) In-transit visibility also gives a commander a better idea of when forces will

arrive in theater. Especially important is accurate knowledge of when the unit will be

ready for employment. Some current tracking systems list a unit as in theater when the

first ship or transport aircraft arrives. In reality, it might be several more days before the

entire unit has arrived. By solving problems such as these, in-transit visibility gives a

commander a much clearer picture of the status of the deployment.

(U) Asset visibility continues to mature within the military transportation system.

However, there is still room for significant improvement. A major impediment to

achieving in-transit visibility is the inability to capture data accurately at the source.

Without this data, the best of systems would remain functionally useless. Even if the

necessary data were available, there is currently a lack of adequate feeder systems and the

associated communications support needed to collect and fuse the data into a coherent

picture on the Global Transportation Network (GTN). At a higher level, there remains a

lack of theater in-transit visibility doctrine and supporting policies. This necessitates ad

hoc planning in critical times, and results at best in fragmented theater in-transit

visibility.

(U) To help overcome these problems, the Department is continuing to place

emphasis on improving end-to-end asset visibility. The Unified Commanders will

continue to develop internal in-transit visibility plans that leverage the technical in-transit

visibility capabilities that are developed and deployed by the Services and other agencies.

As the in-transit visibility functional lead, the U.S. Transportation Command will

evaluate the need for additional joint doctrine and procedures to link strategic and theater

in-transit visibility into an integrated process. Furthermore, the current Joint Staff study

on Information Technology for Deployment, Force Tracking, and Sustainment will

consider technical solutions to the problem of multi-point collection of in-transit visibility

data.

3. C-17 Performance (U)

(U) One of the great success stories of Operation Allied Force was the

performance of the Air Force’s C-17A Globemaster III airlifter. The C-17 is the newest

member of the strategic airlift fleet. Current plans call for procurement of more than 120

C-17s for the Air Force Air Mobility Command. Some of the basic characteristics of the

C-17 are shown in Figure 6.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

40

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 6 C-17 Globemaster III (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) The performance of the C-17 in Operation Allied Force demonstrated the

great utility of the demanding requirements originally established for that aircraft. The

C-17 flew half of the strategic airlift missions required by the operation. Because of its

small-field capability, the C-17 made the concept of direct delivery (strategic movement

from port of embarkation to airfield closest to final destination) a reality. It was no

longer necessary to transfer cargo from an inter-theater airlifter to an intra-theater airlifter

for the final leg of deployment. In addition to being able to use small airfields, the C17’s average ground time was significantly less than the published planning factor times.

Rapid turnaround such as this is critical at airfields that can only accommodate small

numbers of aircraft on the ground, and is testimony to the design of the aircraft as well as

the efforts of aerial port personnel supporting the off-load operations.

4. Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Capability (U)

(U) The movement of heavy ground forces by sea would have been necessary if a

ground combat option had been used in Operation Allied Force. Unfortunately, sea port

facilities in Albania, one of the potential points of entry, are rudimentary at best. Because

of this, operations known as logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) would have been necessary

if ground forces had been deployed by sea.

(U) Logistics over-the-shore is the process of discharging cargo from vessels

offshore, transporting it to the shore or a pier, and marshalling it for movement inland.

These operations range in scope from bare beach operations to operations supplementing

Performance Characteristics

Average Payload: 45 tons Block Speed: 420 Knots

Minimum Runway (Landing): 3000 ft

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

41

fixed-port facilities. Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) operations occur when both

Army and Navy LOTS elements conduct operations together under a Joint Force

Commander. The scope of JLOTS operations extends from acceptance of ships for

offload through the arrival of equipment and cargo at inland staging areas.

(U) Executing JLOTS requires a great deal of large specialized equipment. The

Navy’s Cargo Offload and Discharge System or the Army’s Modular Causeway System

form the primary structures spanning the distance from the sealift ship to the shore.

Landing craft and warping tugs are also used to assemble causeways and move other

equipment. Prior to assembly, unloading the causeway systems requires heavy lift

capability such as Navy amphibious construction battalions or Army floating craft

companies. Additional systems may be needed to provide logistics support across a

broader range of major theater wars and smaller-scale contingencies.

5. Use of Sealift (U)

(U) The Department of Defense has standing plans for moving forces to major

theater wars. As we have seen, however, it did not have such plans for Operation Allied

Force. The rapidly evolving requirements of Allied Force strained our ability to quickly

develop plans for deploying our forces that utilized our lift assets efficiently. We relied

heavily on strategic airlift to deploy forces to the theater, while the sealift component of

the strategic mobility triad lay essentially idle. This was due to the understandable desire

of the commanders in the field to have needed equipment and personnel transported as

quickly as possible; air transport was not, however, mandatory in all cases. The impact

on operations was that it overburdened limited strategic airlift assets and was costly. The

proper use of all means of strategic lift, supported by earlier assessment of ground and

sea infrastructure, might result in faster force closure in future deployments.

(U) Since Desert Storm, the Department has spent over $6 billion to augment the

capability to move U.S. forces in a contingency. We have purchased 19 large, mediumspeed, roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs); 10 have been delivered. When delivery is

completed, these ships will add 5 million square feet to the total strategic sealift capacity.

Additionally, 14 roll-on/roll-off ships were added to the Ready Reserve Force, increasing

its capacity by an additional 2.2 million square feet. Additionally, the readiness level of

the Ready Reserve Force has been increased to ensure its reliability, readiness, and speed

when needed.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

42

(U) When possible, increased use of sealift assets should be considered in future

conflicts and contingencies. The improvements that the Department is making to its

automated capabilities for real-time transportation planning will enable better use of these

improved sealift assets to support the rapidly evolving needs of a contingency such as

Operation Allied Force.

D. Task Force Hawk Deployment (U)

(U) The primary lessons learned from the Task Force Hawk experience fall under

the areas of command relationships and training, and are discussed in other chapters.

This section briefly describes some of the deployment problems encountered by Task

Force Hawk.

1. Deployment Planning (U)

(U) Task Force Hawk was originally directed to deploy to Macedonia and to use

the existing facilities and local experience provided by U.S. Army units based at Camp

Able Sentry. The expectation that this infrastructure would be available drove the early

deployment planning. Unfortunately, based on availability of space, the Macedonian

government determined they could not allow helicopters to be based there and the

deployment had to be shifted to Albania, where the government had agreed to accept

them. The change in deployment site to Albania necessitated the deployment of

additional force protection assets and infrastructure support. Consequently, the material

required to deploy this force grew by a factor of three.

(U) Exacerbating the dramatic increase in the lift requirement was the fact that

Task Force Hawk was in competition with the humanitarian Joint Task Force Shining

Hope for scarce airbase resources in Tirana, Albania. The airport remained a bottleneck

despite heroic efforts by Air Force Red Horse Engineers to expand its capacity.

2. Deployment Execution (U)

(U) Given the changes in the scope and specifics of Task Force Hawk’s

deployment, a different means of moving the task force might have been chosen. It is a

misimpression that the Task Force Hawk deployment merely involved 24 Apache

helicopters. In fact, Task Force Hawk was an Army Aviation Brigade Combat Team.

This unit included a corps aviation brigade headquarters, a corps artillery brigade

headquarters with a Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battalion, an attack
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

43

helicopter regiment (Apache), a ground maneuver brigade combat team, a corps support

group, a signal battalion, a headquarters troop battalion, a military police detachment, a

psychological operations detachment, and a special operations command-and-control

element. Had time permitted, it might have been advantageous to ferry Task Force Hawk

from Italy to Albania by ship. Indeed, much of the logistics support was moved by ship.

(U) One aspect of the Task Force Hawk deployment was a particular success. To

accommodate the demands of the Task Force Hawk deployment, the U.S. Transportation

Command, for the first time, gave a theater tactical control of a significant number of

strategic airlift aircraft for a specific deployment. Tactically, the C-17s were controlled

out of U.S. Air Force’s Air Mobility Operations Control Center (AMOCC) in Ramstein,

Germany. The command-and-control relationship between the AMOCC and Air

Mobility Command’s Tanker Airlift Control Center was smooth, and operations in

support of Operation Allied Force and humanitarian assistance were not adversely

impacted. Given this success, the Department plans to examine the structure and

concepts of operation employed at the AMOCC to determine if they are applicable to

other theaters. As Operation Allied Force demonstrates, temporarily assigning strategic

airlift aircraft to theater control may be of great utility to commanders faced with sudden,

large intra-theater airlift requirements. Theater CINCs should consider creating

appropriate organizations and updating operational plans to facilitate similar

arrangements.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

44

(This page is intentionally blank.)
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

45

IV. FORCE DIRECTION (U)

(U) In Chapter II, we discussed the evolution of the overall command-and-control

structure from separate chains of command and control to an integrated NATO structure.

This chapter describes how that structure was used to direct the NATO forces deployed in

the operation. The specific organization of the Combined Air Operations Center, which

directed most of the combat operations, is described first. Next, the command, control,

communications, and computer systems that supported the operation are assessed, with a

focus on some of the challenges that were encountered. Lastly, some problems of

information interoperability, primarily between U.S. and NATO forces, are discussed.

 A. Combined Air Operations Center (U)

(U) The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) was the nerve center that

connected pilots and airborne controllers and directed air operations. It had been in place

at 5th Allied Tactical Air Force in Vicenza, Italy, since the Bosnia operations, and grew

from a hodgepodge of unique systems to an integrated operation. For Operation Allied

Force, its staff swelled from 400 personnel to more than 1,300. Because the number of

aircraft available in theater was large relative to the number of approved targets, the

CAOC was able to schedule assets some time in advance. However, the target approval

process often resulted in targets being assigned on the same day that they were to be

attacked, thereby compressing the mission planning time available to aircrews. A variety

of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sources were downlinked into the

CAOC where operators analyzed information, integrated the target lists, and provided

strike approval. Airborne elements of the theater air control system (AETACS) such as

the airborne battlefield command-and-control center (ABCCC), airborne warning and

control system (AWACS), and the joint surveillance and targeting radar system

(JSTARS) provided inputs and enabled strike aircraft to flex from pre-planned targets to

time critical targets (TCTs). This entire process reinforced the dictum that centralized

control and decentralized execution of air and space forces are critical to force

effectiveness. A more detailed discussion of operational-level targeting procedures

employed at the CAOC is provided in Chapter V.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

46

(U) The Army units assigned to Task Force Hawk were organized and equipped

to form part of a larger land force under the assumption that certain additional commandand-control and support elements would be present as part of this larger force. After

Task Force Hawk arrived, a Deep Operations Coordination Cell and an Air Coordination

Element were added. This finally provided elements that had been missing in developing

the ground intelligence preparation of the battlefield and nominating targets to the air

tasking order. An important lesson was learned from this experience: extraordinary

methods are needed to focus collection and analysis efforts on enemy ground forces in

operations where ground forces are not integrated from the beginning, and a ground

commander is not present.

(U) Future conflicts will continue to require appropriate command-and-control

centers to effectively execute and manage the joint force commander’s strategy and

execution plans. To be most effective, such centers cannot be set up from scratch. The

development of established expeditionary air operations centers with supporting

resources and manpower will allow the military to create CAOCs that can be tailored to

the crisis at hand and deployed quickly. This faster deployment will help shrink the

strategic decision loop while the greater cohesion and training of an expeditionary CAOC

will enable it to tighten the operational decision loop. Such units will be able to develop

and standardize tactics, techniques and procedures and be more effective as a highly

value-added weapon system.

B. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (U)

1. Overview (U)

(U) The command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems

provided for Operation Allied Force were unprecedented in terms of capacity and variety

of services. For U.S. elements in fixed locations, wideband interconnection was the rule,

provided by a combination of military and commercial systems. The available bandwidth

was nearly double that used during the Gulf War, an operation with far more forces

committed. One reason this was possible is that the communications infrastructure in

Europe, both military and civilian, is among the most robust and flexible available to the

United States in any theater of operations. Additional C4 capabilities were brought into

the theater, even though this impacted other U.S. military commitments worldwide.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

47

(U) The widespread use of video teleconferencing and other advanced

technologies for command and control and collaborative planning presented numerous

limitations and challenges. Video teleconferencing allowed for horizontal and vertical

sharing of information and enhanced situational awareness, permitting senior leaders

throughout the command chain an unprecedented visibility into, and the real-time ability

to exert influence over, many aspects of Operation Allied Force. It was very apparent

that there is still a need for written documentation and dissemination of decisions,

however. As already expressed in Joint Vision 2010: “Accelerated operational tempo

and greater integration requirements will likely create a more stressful, faster moving

decision environment. Real-time information will likely drive parallel, not sequential,

planning and real-time, not prearranged, decision making.” In order to optimize their

application and accustom operational commanders to their effect on operations, such

systems should be included regularly in future large-scale joint and combined training

exercises. Likewise, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures must be developed to

adapt the optimum combinations of technologies to corresponding warfighting scenarios.

(U) Despite the unprecedented communications bandwidth and services provided

during Operation Allied Force, a number of shortfalls soon became apparent. These are

discussed in the following subsections.

2. C4 Infrastructure (U)

(U) Although the existing communications infrastructure was relatively robust, it

had to be quickly expanded to meet U.S. and NATO needs. This was accomplished

through the addition of Standardized Tactical Entry Points (military satellite gateways),

by the reprioritization of military satellite communications, by leasing commercial

satellite and fiber-optic systems, and by reapportioning the Joint Broadcast System and

Bosnia Command-and-Control Augmentation Assets.

3. NATO C4 Agreements (U)

(U) Although successful in some areas, NATO C4 capability was limited by the

lack of C4 agreements and the need for more stringent enforcement and implementation

of existing agreements. Problem areas included (1) sharing of bandwidth and C4 assets,

(2) C4 network integration training standards at the combined and joint task force level,

(3) spectrum management within combined and joint task forces,

(4) network security, (5) lack of timely compliance with NATO standardization
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

48

agreements (STANAGs), and (6) releasability of information. In addition, the C4 host

nation agreement process needs to be expedited, and the focus of the agreements should

be on standards and architectures rather than specific hardware.

4. Joint Network and Information Management (U)

(U) Expanding information demands at all levels highlighted two challenges: (1)

proper management of joint networks that distribute information, and (2) proper

dissemination of information (i.e., getting the right information to the right place at the

right time). Increasing information requirements led to network congestion and

information overload. There were no real-time automated joint network monitoring or

management tools at the joint task force level, resulting in little visibility and inefficient

use of critical C4 assets. Collocated systems did not use communications channels

efficiently.

(U) Management tools to dynamically allocate bandwidth on demand would have

allowed much better functioning of joint networks. The lack of joint network and

information management tools also severely handicapped intelligence research and

analysis reporting. Numerous graphically intense briefing presentations, reports, imagery

products, and e-mail threatened to overload systems throughout the theater. People had

difficulty identifying and locating real-time sensitive data. The overwhelming amount of

information also caused severe problems with network file servers, slowing the

acquisition of needed information.

(U) A joint network management system is clearly needed. The Joint Defense

Information Infrastructure Control System-Deployed has been approved as an interim

network management solution and should be deployed with the joint task force. Current

initiatives to develop automated tools, processes, and procedures for information

dissemination management should be vigorously pursued. Joint network and information

management tools will promote greater access to information, lessen the time for data

retrieval, and reduce information fatigue. These tools need to be used during exercises to

test systems and train personnel.

5. Maintenance and Training in New Technologies (U)

(U) Several noticeable shortfalls in training on modern C4 equipment were also

evident during Operation Allied Force. In the case of the handheld PRC-112B survival

radio, which both the Air Force and Navy have purchased limited numbers for their
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

49

aircrews, problems arose because most of the Air Force radios were in storage in Europe

and not routinely used by aircrews.

(U) Training deficiencies in the use of new technologies also contributed to

security vulnerabilities. Operation Allied Force was the first major combat operation to

use Web technology on a grand scale. Unfortunately, some important network details

were not adequately protected. In addition, not all computer hardware and software

security features had been enabled.

C. Information Interoperability (U)

(U) Information interoperability was sometimes a major problem. This was true

during both U.S. joint operations and combined NATO operations. Interoperability

concerns were noted in how information is disseminated (the supporting C4

infrastructure) and how to disseminate it securely (releasability of various levels of

classification). Dissemination networking and procedures were ad hoc, and it was never

possible to present a common operational picture to joint and allied commanders.

1. Interoperability Between U.S. and NATO Data Networks (U)

(U) Interoperability between U.S. and NATO data networks was complicated

because a single, integrated data network to support dissemination of coalition

information was never established. Existing data networks were not adequate to support

the flow of tactical, operational, and theater-level data among key nodes of the NATO

information grid. The problem was further compounded by a lack of interoperability

between U.S. and NATO databases and by the use of different security classifications to

protect information.

2. Joint Tactical Data Connectivity and Control (U)

(U) The inability to pass high fidelity digital data was a shortfall in every phase

of Operation Allied Force. Successful strikes against time-sensitive targets require a

rapid exchange of precision target data and continuous precision updates from sensor-toshooter until the target is destroyed. However, during Operation Allied Force strike

reaction times were often slow, and diminished our ability to engage time-sensitive

targets throughout the conflict. Data sometimes could not be transmitted to the required

location at all. A joint data network was established within the theater, but it was

composed of disparate tactical digital systems with multiple transmission systems and
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

50

message formats. Information had to be passed through “stovepipe” systems with liaison

personnel fulfilling the functions that should be done through automated interfaces. This

ad hoc system increased the operations tempo, workload, and potential for error at the

joint task force headquarters.

(U) A joint, secure, tactical data link capability such as Link 16 is needed across

all strike platforms to allow real-time data exchange and precision target processing

between sensor and shooter, and to establish a robust common tactical picture. The

Single Integrated Air Picture is planned to represent the air track portion of the common

tactical picture and should improve battle management if it evolves successfully. The

Joint Requirements Oversight Council has supported the designation of a lead

organization to be responsible for Single Integrated Air Picture systems engineering,

focusing on the joint data network/Link-16 component. Per the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council’s request, U.S. Joint Forces Command will recommend the lead

organization by January 2000.

(U) Because of the ad-hoc framework, the first organization in theater was left to

set up the joint data network and to solve the most immediate problems. Given the

complexity of the operation, the lack of joint and multinational doctrine, and the number

of different tactical networks, no one was able to successfully integrate all these systems

and maintain an overarching tactical network. As Operation Allied Force became more

complicated, it was obvious that a Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO) element was

needed. The JICO is the only activity that is trained to integrate tactical data systems at a

joint level, but CINCs are not authorized this organization within their headquarters.

Consequently, the JICO school at U.S. Army Forces Command dispatched its joint

training team to support the operation. The JICO school has now been reestablished at

Joint Forces Command, but it will need to be strongly supported with automated tools

and the right people. The joint requirements process, working through the Joint

Requirements Board (JRB), will be used to formally establish authorized Joint Interface

Control Officer positions on each CINC’s staff.

3. Information Releasability (U)

(U) In addition to dissemination problems on the data networks discussed above,

U.S. sensitivity to releasing certain types of information greatly inhibited combined

planning and operations in some areas. Battle damage assessment products generated by

the Joint Task Force Noble Anvil J2 were classified at a level that limited their use by
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

51

allied forces. The same kinds of concerns precluded any integration of deception

planning between U.S. and NATO information operations planners. Much of the U.S.

information in question should be classified at the SECRET collateral level releasable to

the coalition operation so that it can be effectively used by both U.S. and coalition

warfighters. To the extent possible, imagery and signals intelligence data should

classified “SECRET/NOFORN Releasable to NATO,” and sources and methods should

be protected "by exception," rather than the other way around.

4. Needed Improvements (U)

(U) To address interoperability deficiencies in the near term, combatant CINCs

need joint and coalition warfare concepts of operations that identify interoperability

shortfalls and define contingency plans. For the long term, the Department is pursuing an

end-to-end joint operational architecture as directed in Defense Planning Guidance 98-3

in order to provide a roadmap for U.S. acquisition strategies. This joint operational

architecture will also aid our allies and coalition partners in their acquisitions,

organization, and training to ensure compatibility with U.S. forces. Accordingly, the

Department will develop a joint operational architecture with appropriate functional lines

to facilitate and interface with the analogous structure in NATO and other coalition

partners. We will clearly articulate system requirements for information systems

interoperability and network architectures. Once these requirements are laid out, and

materiel solutions identified, we can proceed with decisions on funding our efforts.

Additionally we need to implement, where operationally viable, commercially accepted

standards and specifications in ways that enhance interoperability between our NATO

and coalition partners. By employing a common, high-level system engineering

approach to solve interoperability challenges and ensuring that the end result supports the

established Joint Operational Architecture, we believe we will accomplish a high degree

of interoperability as part of Joint Vision 2010.

(U) In summary, we see that interoperability will be the cornerstone for future

alliance participation. With the pace of U.S. modernization, it becomes imperative to

ease the modernization burden on our allies to the maximum extent possible. The United

States must carefully review its policy regarding licensing requirements for our allies and

ensure, where appropriate, these requirements are eliminated and do not unnecessarily

allied modernization.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

52

V. INTELLIGENCE AND TARGETING SUPPORT (U)

(U) Intelligence and targeting support played critical roles during Operation

Allied Force. These assets provided intelligence regarding the disposition of Serbian

military forces and the locations of defense infrastructure, and performed surveillance

and reconnaissance over the battlefield. An extensive array of intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance (ISR) resources were deployed to the European theater or otherwise

tasked to support the NATO forces. These systems were effectively integrated into all

aspects of the operation. The principal accomplishments and lessons learned regarding

their employment in Kosovo are reported in this chapter.

A. Intelligence Systems and Architectures (U)

(U) The intelligence systems architecture available worldwide to support

Operation Allied Force was both extensive and robust. Several specific aspects of the

intelligence architecture warrant discussion both in terms of unique accomplishments and

needed improvements.

1. Collection Management Capability (U)

(U) In general, a well-managed, multi-source intelligence collection system is

necessary to support all military operations. In Operation Allied Force, two specific

operational requirements made effective and robust collection management a high

priority: (1) the need to create a comprehensive picture of the battlespace, and (2) the

need to simultaneously detect and track elusive mobile targets. Because this system did

not provide all of the support desired, the Department is reviewing the need for

improvements in our capabilities, employment, and collection-management processes to

ensure that we can handle future contingencies. In particular, we are focusing on

achieving time-sensitive operational objectives using an integrated multi-mode collection

systems-of-systems approach.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

53

2. Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) (U)

(U) JWICS was an essential force multiplier and was invaluable in the success of

the federated intelligence process. In particular, the video teleconferencing capability of

JWICS provided reliable, secure video communications with excellent clarity.

3. Federated Target Development and Battle Damage Assessment (U)

(U) A federated intelligence process was instituted to facilitate burden-sharing

among intelligence processing centers worldwide. This approach reduced deployment

costs while maximizing the use of existing finite resources. The federation process was

highly successful and depended on information sharing and agreements among

participants. It would not have been possible, however, without applied technology,

innovation, and pre-planning of exercises. Also, while technology and innovation were

the primary contributors to success, the shifting of resources impacted the planning and

support for other theaters.

4. Needed Improvements (U)

(U) For the most part, intelligence systems and architecture shortfalls that

surfaced in Operation Allied Force had been recognized prior to the crisis and remedies

had been programmed. However, the Department needs to further develop and refine

tactics, techniques, and procedures for federated intelligence efforts and to reassess and

size long-haul communications needs accordingly. Planning for intelligence

communications needs must include deployable systems and technicians. Additionally,

the Department needs a clear policy and implementation plan to explain when and how

coalition partners can be connected to U.S. networks and, when and how data can be

shared with those partners.

B. Command-and-Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance Assets (U)

(U) A wide variety of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

systems installed on both manned and unmanned airborne platforms were critical to

Operation Allied Force. Because ISR assets typically are few in number but

operationally in great demand, they are referred to as “low density/high demand”

(LD/HD) assets as mandated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Global Military Force Policy
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

54

(GMFP). Lessons learned and issues associated with the deployment and employment of

ISR assets are discussed below.

1. ISR Asset Availability (U)

(U) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets such as the U-2, Iron

Clad, RC-135 Rivet Joint, and special-mission aircraft were in extremely high demand

during the Kosovo operations. The U-2 (pictured in Figure 7) is a single-pilot, multi-role

collection platform that can take photographic or radar images, as well as monitor enemy

communications and locate the sources of electronic signals. The RC-135 can also

monitor enemy communications and signals. Maritime patrol aircraft also provided a

number of important capabilities to support commanders’ ISR needs.

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 7 U-2 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Platform (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) These platforms are especially critical since they also support multiple

intelligence collection activities in other areas around the world. The limited availability

of these critical ISR assets will require careful force management in the future.

2. ISR Asset Employment (U)

(U) A number of innovative ISR system employment concepts and tactics were

successfully developed and implemented during Operation Allied Force. These concepts,

the most important of which are discussed below, should be viewed as lessons learned for
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

55

future operations. (The use of unmanned aerial vehicles is addressed separately in

section 3 below.)

a. JSTARS (U)

(U) The Joint Surveillance and Targeting Attack Radar System (JSTARS) is an

airborne command-and-control system designed to detect, track — and to some degree,

classify — moving targets. During Operation Allied Force, new concepts were

developed for employing JSTARS in a variety of ISR missions and for fusing the data

that it provides with that collected by other ISR platforms. Concepts of operations for

using JSTARS will continue to evolve.

b. “Reachback” to CONUS (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force saw the first extensive use of sensor platforms

deploying forward while their data reduction and analysis components remained at the

home base. This “reachback” technique was also used as part of the federated

intelligence process to perform timely battle damage assessment as discussed earlier, thus

reducing the number of scarce imagery analysts required in theater.

c. Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (U)

(U) The Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (ATARS) was

employed aboard USMC F/A-18D aircraft in the latter stages of Operation Allied Force.

Although operational evaluation of ATARS is still ongoing, the system was cleared for

use in theater. In several weeks of strike operations, ATARS produced numerous digital,

multi-spectral images using primarily synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and mediumaltitude electro-optical (MAEO) imagery to augment the imagery and information

available to commanders from other ISR systems. These images were used for targeting,

battle damage assessments, and tactical reconnaissance while maintaining the aircraft’s

complete weapons capability.

d. Needed Improvements (U)

(U) The overall quality and level of intelligence support provided during

Operation Allied Force was far superior to that provided during the Gulf War. Because

the Serbs frequently dispersed their air defenses and fielded forces from one location to

another, it was difficult for NATO to find, fix, and destroy them.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

56

1) Dynamic Targeting (U)

(U) The Department needs to meet the difficult challenge of rapidly targeting

enemy forces and systems that can move and hide frequently. In addition, the

Department also need to place emphasis on rapidly collecting and disseminating no-strike

target information to avoid collateral damage.

2) Foliage and Weather Penetrating Sensors (U)

(U) Detecting and tracking mobile targets on the ground in poor weather can be

extremely difficult. Further, we should expect that future adversaries will use

concealment and deception to hide their forces. Thus, the Department needs to develop

and acquire sensors for use in all weather and in foliage-covered terrain.

3) Geolocation Accuracy and Timeliness (U)

(U) The Department needs to improve our ISR sensors and streamline the

targeting process to be able to employ precision munitions against fixed and mobile

targets and to re-target those weapons dynamically.

4) Numbers of ISR Assets (U)

(U) Based upon the shortfalls in targeting capability evident during Operation

Allied Force, and the stresses placed on U.S. ISR assets, initiatives are underway to

optimize coordination between theater and national assets.

3. Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (U)

(U) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) operated as remote-controlled ISR

platforms. These systems were used at unprecedented levels during

Operation Allied Force and played an important role in our overall success.

UAVs enabled commanders to see the situation on the ground without

putting aircrews at risk and provided continuous coverage of important areas.

Three tactical UAV systems were employed  the Air Force Predator (see

Figure 8), the Army Hunter, and the Navy Pioneer. As discussed below,

specific UAV missions included general surveillance and reconnaissance,

real-time targeting, and cueing of other ISR systems.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

57

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 8 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

a. UAV Employment Concepts (U)

(U) During Operation Allied Force, unmanned aerial vehicles were used

extensively for surveillance and reconnaissance in much the same way they had been

used earlier in Bosnia. In addition to using UAVs in these traditional roles, we developed

innovative employment tactics whereby UAVs helped locate and target Serbian military

forces in Kosovo. By providing target-location data back to the Combined Air

Operations Center, the UAVs helped cueing fighter attacks against Serbian forces in the

field. When employed in this way, UAVs were being used as a component of the

forward-air-control system.

(U) UAVs were also used to perform near-real-time battle damage assessment to

allow timely re-strike and to cross-cue other ISR assets. The Navy used UAVs

extensively to conduct surveillance of surface ships and coastal areas, where they

successfully identified Yugoslav naval vessels, surveyed potential landing areas for the

U.S. Marines, and targeted coastal defense radar sites. Despite problems, the successful

application of UAVs in Kosovo clearly demonstrates their potential to become a highly

flexible and effective ISR asset on the future battlefield.

b. Needed Improvements (U)

(U) Although UAVs were used effectively during Operation Allied Force, a

number of technical improvements are still needed to attain the full promise of these

systems. In addition, the Department needs to improve the tactics, techniques, and
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

58

procedures that guide UAV employment to better integrate their operations into overall

campaign plans.

C. Target Production Process (U)

(U) The target coordination and approval process for Operation Allied Force was

discussed in some detail in Chapter II in the context of the NATO political-military

command structure. We now focus on the target production process at the operational

level and discuss targeting procedures within the Combined Air Operations Center and

the targeting support provided by C2ISR assets.

(U) The capabilities available at the CAOC enabled C2ISR assets to successfully

tighten timelines that had been problematic in the past. Real-time threat information

provided by airborne signals-intelligence sensors were relayed to appropriate theater

command-and-control assets, and, in some cases, even directly to strike aircraft entering

airspace over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. U-2 imagery was exploited using the

reachback capabilities described earlier. Navy F-14 aircraft equipped with the Tactical

Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) were also used effectively to identify targets

during the conflict. Navy maritime patrol aircraft also made significant contributions to

the ISR collection effort. The processing times achieved with these assets were well

within the required timelines for the air tasking order, and in several cases allowed the

CAOC to reassign aircraft to new targets rapidly (called “flex targeting”).

(U) Space assets also provided important capabilities. Improved weather

forecasting capabilities, enabled by space-based sensors, made the application of

aerospace power more effective throughout Operation Allied Force.

(U) In addition, increased capability was provided both by enhancements to the

CAOC itself, as well as by the application of specific reachback and distributed

operations capabilities. These capabilities provided a major increase in capability and

should be refined and standardized to ensure effective reachback in future conflicts. As

much as possible, these capabilities should attempt to ensure 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-aweek operations.

(U) In normal joint task force operations, a representative of the land component

commander (usually the commander of the battlefield coordination element) sits on the

Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). As such, he acts as the land component

commander’s advocate for targets to be executed within the joint or combined air tasking
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

59

order. During Operation Allied Force, no land component commander was designated,

and the Battlefield Coordination Element trained and synchronized with the CAOC early

in the conflict, but not with Task Force Hawk. Once the Battlefield Coordination

Element and Deep Operations Coordination Cell were deployed with Task Force Hawk,

coordination of Task Force Hawk into the larger operation improved greatly.

D. Precision Intelligence (U)

(U) Precision engagement consists of the following sequence of events: (1)

accurate target location and identification; (2) responsive command and control of strike

forces; (3) achievement of desired engagement effects on the target; (4) assessment of the

level of success of the engagement; and (5) reengagement of the target with precision

when desired. In order to achieve precision engagement, precision intelligence is

required. During Operation Allied Force, our precision-intelligence capability played a

significant role in the employment of precision munitions to systematically degrade

important Serbian military targets.

(U) A number of systems currently in research and development would have been

useful had they been available. In fact, if nothing else, Operation Allied Force

emphasized that the Department needs to continue on the modernization path it has

pursued with the help of Congress since Desert Storm. We need to field those systems

that improve precision and timeliness with which we detect, identify, track, and assess

potential targets, regardless of constraints imposed by adverse weather, nighttime,

concealment and deception techniques, or rapid movement. Ongoing programs such as,

Future Imagery Architecture, Global Hawk, Predator radar, and synergistic sensor

pairing, offer an improved sensor mix. Likewise, those areas that contribute to precision

intelligence, dynamic collection management, common battlespace awareness, and

interoperable intelligence systems and architectures when fielded will all contribute to

more effectiveness in conflicts such as this one.

(U) In addition, improved policies, procedures, and tools are needed to further

enhance the quality and responsiveness of precision intelligence support for military

operations. Areas that warrant particular emphasis based on experiences in Operation

Allied Force are as follows:

• Preparation for crises and the transition-to-crisis by the Intelligence community

• Development of collection strategies that deconflict national policy and theater

operational requirements when necessary
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

60

• Development of a mix of improved sensors with day and night, adverse weather

capability to identify and track mobile targets with required timeliness and geolocation accuracy in the presence of sophisticated camouflage, concealment, and

deception techniques

• Inclusion of UAV sensor data and cockpit video into the tasking, processing,

exploitation, and dissemination processes

• Consideration of operational targeting needs when developing ISR system

requirements

• Development of streamlined ways to exchange intelligence information

exchange (to include Web-based collaborative tools) between the intelligence

communities and supported forces of the United States and its coalition partners

• Continued development of capabilities to disseminate sensor data directly to intheater tactical forces.

E. Effects of Weather, Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (U)

1. Effects of Weather on ISR (U)

(U) Air operations during Allied Force were hampered by bad weather a

significant portion of the time  a circumstance that greatly aided the Serbs. Adverse

weather affected target acquisition and identification, increased risk to aircrews, and

complicated collateral damage concerns. Cloud cover was greater than 50 percent more

than 70 percent of the time. Weather conditions allowed unimpeded air strikes on only

24 of 78 days. Weather not only affected the target area, but also the airfields and tanker

patterns. The satellite picture shown in Figure 9 illustrates the extensive cloud cover that

was often present in much of the theater. The key weather-related observation from

Operation Allied Force is that we need all-weather search capabilities for target detection

and tracking.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

61

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 9 Satellite Image of Typical Weather in Kosovo (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

2. Effects of Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (U)

(U) Serbian forces in Kosovo employed camouflage, concealment, and deception

tactics extensively. While reliance on camouflage and concealment protected much of

the Serbian force, it also precluded conventional maneuver operations and limited their

fighting effectiveness. Air defenses also moved and hid a significant amount of time — a

tactic that increased their survivability, but greatly reduced their ability to hit NATO

aircraft.

(U) Throughout Operation Allied Force, the Serbian forces conducted an

extensive strategic, tactical, and operational-level denial and deception campaign against

NATO forces. The objectives of this campaign were to degrade the effectiveness of

NATO air strikes, ensure survival of Serb forces, discredit the NATO bombing

campaign, retain key foreign support by hiding and discrediting evidence of atrocities,

and exert pressure on NATO determination and resolve. However, the Serbs were

largely unsuccessful in preventing the destruction of their fixed-wing aircraft; key fixed

installations such as bridges, television and radio stations, petroleum and oil facilities;

and some underground command and control bunkers. However, as NATO forces
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

62

increasingly learned how to deal with Serbian deception tactics, the impact on allied

operations became much more limited.

(U) The Serbs employed a wide variety of tactics to deceive NATO forces. For

example, most barracks were emptied prior to hostilities and troops and equipment were

dispersed and hidden throughout the countryside. The Serbs also used natural cover such

as woods, tunnels and caves, civilian homes and barns, and schools, factories,

monasteries, and other large buildings to hide their personnel and weapons. Most

movement of Serbian combat forces occurred during the night, or under the cover of bad

weather. In addition, the Serbs used small convoys and decoys and dispersed their forces

among civilian traffic. The Serbs used camouflage extensively to hide both tactical

targets, such as military vehicles, and fixed facilities, such as bridges. In addition, the

Serbs used decoys, like those shown in Figures 10 and 11, to create a variety of false

targets.

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 10 Serbian Artillery Decoy (U)

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

63

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 11 Serbian Surface-to-Air Missile Launcher Decoy (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

b. Needed Improvements (U)

(U) Overall, NATO’s recognition of the broad scale of Serbian denial and

deception activities somewhat limited their success. However, because future adversaries

are likely to study Serbian denial and deception tactics and could present more advanced

threats to future operations, the Department is working on a variety of techniques to

further improve our capability to counter an adversary’s use of camouflage, concealment,

and deception.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

64

VI. FORCE PROTECTION (U)

(U) From a force protection perspective, Operation Allied Force was the most

successful major military action in modern history. Despite a determined enemy, NATO

defense forces quickly fought and won control of the air, ensuring that its forces enjoyed

complete safety and freedom to maneuver outside the borders of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia. The Serbs were unable to mount any successful air-to-ground or air-to-sea

strikes, and recorded no incidences of space denial or space attack against allied space

assets. More importantly, the allies completed the operation without the loss of a single

aircrew even though the Serbs launched hundreds of surface-to-air missiles against

NATO aircraft. Throughout the conflict, NATO enjoyed freedom from attack and

freedom to attack.

(U) Suppression of enemy air defenses was more problematic due to enemy

tactics, the complex terrain, and current technological limitations of our systems. The

Serbs put major elements of their integrated air defenses into hiding, making it harder for

NATO aircraft to attack them as well as making it more difficult for the Serb defenders to

employ them. By applying suppression of enemy air defense assets to protect strike

operations, Serb air defenses were rendered almost ineffective. However, the

requirement to package suppression assets with strike platforms complicated attack

operations. Finally, in some cases, poor operations security procedures and the lack of

interoperable communications systems compromised on-going missions.

A. Countering Yugoslavia’s Integrated Air Defense System (U)

(U) While the threat posed by Serbia's offensive air capability was eliminated in

the first few days of the conflict, reducing Serbian defensive capabilities did not proceed

as quickly. Even before the campaign began, the Serbs began dispersing major elements

of their integrated air defense system and then adeptly employed them throughout the

conflict. While NATO plans called for the systematic degradation and destruction of

these integrated air defenses, this proved problematic due to the tactics the Serbs adopted.

The Serbs chose to conserve their air defenses, while attempting to down NATO aircraft

as targets of opportunity. Full effectiveness of an air defense suppression operation in
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

65

future conflicts will depend on how the enemy chooses to employ its systems as well as

on the capability of allied forces to attack across all aspects of the enemy’s integrated air

defense system.

1. Yugoslavia’s Integrated Air Defense System (U)

(U) One way to measure the severity of the Yugoslav air defense system that

NATO encountered during Operation Allied Force is to compare it with the Iraqi air

defenses that the Allied Coalition confronted during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. During

Allied Force, NATO aircraft flew approximately one-third the number of combat sorties

(21,000) that were flown by coalition aircraft during Operation Desert Storm (69,000).

However, the number of radar-guided surface-to-air missiles launched by the Serbs

during Allied Force was almost the same as the number launched by the Iraqis during

Desert Storm. As a consequence, the average aircrew participating in Operation Allied

Force experienced a missile-launch rate three times that encountered by the average

coalition aircrew during Desert Storm. Despite the larger number of radar-guided

surface-to-air missiles fired at NATO aircraft flying over Serbia and Kosovo, the

Yugoslavs achieved a much lower success rate than did the Iraqis. Based on the ratio of

combat losses to sorties, NATO aircrews participating in Operation Allied Force were six

times less likely to be shot down than were coalition aircrews engaged in Operation

Desert Storm. Overall, although Yugoslavia’s integrated air defense system was very

active against NATO aircraft during Operation Allied Force, NATO employment tactics

rendered that system largely ineffective.

(U) NATO forces rapidly achieved air supremacy in the theater by destroying

Serb interceptor aircraft in the air and on the ground and by destroying or damaging their

airbases. Rather than expend sorties prosecuting the large quantities of anti-aircraft

artillery and man-portable missile threats, NATO commanders chose to operate their

aircraft at altitudes above the effective reach of these systems. However, reducing the

Serb defensive radar-guided surface-to-air missile systems that are effective against

aircraft flying at higher altitudes proved more difficult than anticipated as a result of the

tactics employed by the Serbs. By conserving their systems and attempting to down

NATO aircraft as targets of opportunity, they gave up many of the advantages of a

connected and continuously operating system in order to achieve tactical surprise in a few

instances.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

66

(U) Within Kosovo, individual longer-range systems emerged to fire at our

aircraft in an unpredictable fashion. Shorter-range Serbian antiaircraft artillery and manportable air defense systems were plentiful, complicating NATO’s efforts to defeat them.

Rather than shift the weight of effort aimed against these systems, NATO commanders

chose to operate at altitudes beyond which most Serbian anti-aircraft systems could be

employed effectively. The tradeoff of flying at higher altitudes to mitigate risk made

weather conditions such as cloud layers and visibility more of a factor in daily execution.

Additional factors complicating these critical tasks were collateral damage considerations

and the absence of any land-component forward air controllers to assist in locating enemy

forces. Engagement altitudes for both airborne forward air controllers and striking assets

were lowered as Operation Allied Force progressed. However, mobile anti-aircraft guns

and man-portable missiles posed a viable threat throughout the conflict.

2. NATO Air Defense Suppression Efforts (U)

(U) Several support assets were used to protect NATO strike aircraft during

Operation Allied Force. These included air superiority aircraft supported by airborne

warning and control (AWACS) to protect NATO strike aircraft from attacks by Serbian

interceptors. These aircraft orbits also defended against air attacks by Serbian aircraft

into neighboring countries friendly to the alliance effort. In addition, EA-6B and

EC-130H electronic warfare aircraft and F-16CJ air-defense-suppression aircraft were

used to protect NATO aircraft from attack by Serbian air defenses. Throughout the

campaign, air defense and suppression aircraft flew thousands of sorties to ensure the

safety of the strike assets.

(U) EA-6B aircraft were absolutely important to the air operation. The EA-6B is

the only U.S. electronic-attack aircraft able to use electronic jamming to suppress enemy

air defenses (see Figure 12). Consequently, EA-6Bs are in high demand and are one of

the Low Density/High Demand assets established in the Global Military Force Policy. At

the same time that EA-6Bs were assigned to support Operation Allied Force, other EA6Bs were providing support for Operations Southern Watch and Northern Watch over

Iraq. To aid in the recovery of these important assets, an EA-6B reconstitution plan has

been adopted in accordance with Global Military Force Policy. Our intent is to maximize

EA-6B utility and effectiveness while returning these units to personnel and operating

tempo guidelines.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

67

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 12 EA-6B Prowler Tactical Electronic Warfare Aircraft (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) While the initial plans developed by NATO for the suppression of enemy air

defense had to evolve in response to Serbian actions, the results emphasize the

importance holding the key nodes of the enemy’s air defense system at risk and

effectively employing those assets that are available. NATO used a combination of

active support jamming and launch of High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs)

from a variety of aircraft to provide air-defense-suppression support for strike aircraft. In

addition, NATO aggressively employed a variety of precision-guided munitions and

bombs to destroy elements of the Yugoslav air defense system.

(U) Even though NATO forces had difficulty targeting the Serb defensive

systems, the Serbs had minimal success downing NATO aircraft. Indeed, the allied air

operation was sustained and, in fact, expanded greatly despite the presence of the

remaining Serbian air-defense systems. NATO succeeded because we maintained

pressure on their defenses, forcing the Serbs to keep their systems hidden under most

circumstances and to use defensive tactics that limited their systems' effectiveness. We

increased the tempo of operations in our air-defense suppression forces to provide the

maximum protection to our forces. NATO also adapted its concepts of operation to

sustain an increasing pace of strike operations without compromising our concern for

minimizing casualties and collateral damage.

(U) Throughout the conflict, NATO provided effective air protection for over

38,000 sorties, almost a third of which were strike and air defense suppression sorties
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

68

operating directly in Yugoslav airspace. Figure 13 provides a cumulative total of these

sorties by day.

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 13 Cumulative Sorties for Operation Allied Force (U) Force

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

45000

3/24/993/31/99

4/7/99

4/14/994/21/994/28/99

5/5/99

5/12/995/19/995/26/99

6/2/996/9/99

Date

Sorties

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) The number of sorties flown per day varied from just over 200 day at the

beginning of Operation Allied Force to over 1,000 per day by the end of the conflict. The

focus of this effort was the destruction of Yugoslav military capabilities. The cumulative

totals of strike and air defense suppression missions are shown in Figure 14.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

69

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 14 Cumulative Strike and Air Defense Suppression Sorties (U)

Flown in Operation Allied Force (U)

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

3/24/993/31/99

4/7/99

4/14/994/21/994/28/99

5/5/99

5/12/995/19/995/26/99

6/2/996/9/99

Date

Sorties

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Over the course of the conflict, air superiority fighters provided almost

continuous combat air patrols, ensuring no Serbian interceptor aircraft could respond to

allied attacks or take offensive action against allied bases or personnel. U.S. pilots shot

down 5 of the 6 Serbian fighters that were destroyed in air combat operations; strike

missions accounted for roughly 100 Serbian aircraft that were destroyed on the ground.

As indicated in Figure 15, the total number of combat air patrol and other air defense

sorties approached 3,600 by the end of the war. The lack of an airborne threat to NATO

forces provided a significant advantage to allied freedom of operation throughout the

conflict.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

70

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 15 Cumulative Air Defense Sorties

Flown in Operation Allied Force (U)

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3/24/993/31/99

4/7/99

4/14/994/21/994/28/99

5/5/99

5/12/995/19/995/26/99

6/2/996/9/99

Date

Sorties

UNCLASSIFIED

3. Lessons Learned (U)

(U) While NATO prevailed in delivering a punishing air offensive with virtually

no loss to its forces, we must acknowledge some concerns for the future. Although

among the most capable that the United States has faced in combat, the Yugoslav air

defense systems do not represent the state of the art. Much more capable systems are

currently available for sale in the international arms market. In the years ahead, the

United States can expect to face adversaries armed with these state-of-the-art systems,

and the Department of Defense needs to prepare for that possibility now.

(U) In particular, the Department needs to provide continuous, real-time,

precision location of passive and active enemy systems to better enable U.S. forces to

focus their efforts and achieve effective suppression and destruction of enemy weapon

systems, allowing greater access over the target area for extended periods of time.

Successful development of real-time sensor-to-shooter technology along with further

enhancement of our offensive and defensive night vision systems would also improve

effectiveness.

(U) Operation Allied Force also served to re-emphasize the importance of a

comprehensive air-defense suppression capability that is able to locate key defensive
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

71

systems in real time and make use of limited assets in order to destroy them. While the

combination of anti-radiation missiles and electronic attack did an effective job in

suppressing enemy defenses in this case, our experience in Operation Allied Force

indicated that how the enemy employs its air-defense systems will become increasingly

important in the future. The effectiveness of U.S. air defense suppression efforts in

future conflicts will depend on our ability to prosecute an unhindered, full-spectrum

attack against an enemy’s integrated air defense system.

(U) As a result of Operation Allied Force, the Department will conduct a

comprehensive study of joint capabilities to suppress enemy air defenses specifically to

identify trade-offs in de facto versus destructive suppression. This study will examine

improvements in destructive air defense suppression capabilities that will permit

precision location of enemy systems even in a limited emissions environment as well as

to identify systems and procedures allowing for time responsive attack against mobile or

relocatable systems. Without such enhancements in capability and improvements in

technology, the only other option is to increase that portion of the force structure capable

of electronic combat operations to ensure continuous protection of all strike assets in

future conflicts.

B. Personnel Recovery (U)

(U) The nature of the intense air operation over Serbia and Kosovo, coupled with

the threat to NATO aircraft posed by Yugoslavia’s integrated air defense system,

necessitated a comprehensive personnel recovery plan. The Combined Search and

Rescue Center (CSRC) located in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at

Vicenza, Italy, was well manned with experienced recovery planners. More importantly,

the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) made Combat Search and Rescue

(CSAR) operations his number one priority in the event of a downed NATO aircraft and

insisted on full integration of search-and-rescue planning into all air operations and

throughout the CAOC staff.

1. Training of Combat Search-and-Rescue Task Forces (U)

(U) The Combined Search and Rescue Center built its recovery plan around a

traditional CSAR Task Force employment architecture, and integrated national- and

theater-intelligence collection assets to support a rapid response. CSAR Task Forces are

composed of numerous components that must train as a totally integrated team to be
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

72

effective. Training shortcomings were evident during Operation Allied Force, where the

lack of procedural familiarity among task force members created significant coordination

problems during the two operations conducted to recover downed U.S. pilots.

Fortunately, the professionalism, high level of training of the individual components, and

superior equipment of the CSAR Task Force overcame, in these two instances, the

challenges of not having trained together as an entire entity.

2. Legal Status of Isolated Personnel (U)

(U) The legal status of isolated personnel should be determined through close

consultation with legal counsel. Before the onset of hostilities, the National Command

Authorities, in coordination with the Joint Staff, the OSD General Counsel, and other

authorities as appropriate (e.g., NATO, the United Nations), must establish the legal

status of U.S. personnel participating in operations, and convey that decision to the

combatant commander. The Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) within the

office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [USD(P)] is well suited to provide

expeditious, coordinated policy options such as recommendations on legal status of

isolated personnel to the Secretary of Defense.

3. Repatriation of Isolated Personnel (U)

(U) On 31 March 1999, Serbian forces captured three American soldiers. When

it was reported that President Milosevic might release the three captured Americans

repatriation preparations intensified. Doctrinally, the combatant commanders are

responsible for the returnees’ initial processing in theater, but overall, repatriation is a

Service responsibility.

4. Lessons Learned (U)

(U) While the rescue operations of our two pilots were ultimately successful,

both incurred significant challenges. Personnel recovery operations are among the most

complex and dangerous missions that our forces undertake. Accordingly, the combatant

commands must include personnel recovery training in joint exercises as often as

possible, and this training must include the full range of recovery operations. During

combat search-and-rescue exercises, the combatant commands should regularly

incorporate all the normal components of combat search-and-rescue task forces

(CSARTF), especially the command-and-control elements, so that they can learn to work

together before called upon to do so under combat conditions. This training should not
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

73

be limited to bilateral training just prior to, or during, a contingency operation, but should

be end-to-end, including all CSARTF assets in all major joint and combined training

exercises.

(U) In this regard, the Department must clarify the importance of personnel

recovery in modern warfare, especially in operations other than war. Judging its priority

in relation to the myriad other competing training interests will enable commanders of

both conventional and special operations forces to determine the extent to which

personnel recovery training consumes limited training time and resources. The

Department must also improve access by the combatant commands to current

conventional Combat Air Force elements during contingency operations and during

training. Migrating assets from the reserve component to the active forces, or

streamlining and expediting the process used to recall reserve component forces to active

duty when CINC requirements dictate would improve the access.

(U) Finally, the combatant commands should designate in contingency plans a

primary combat search-and-rescue force for each component and joint task force.

Identifying those forces in advance will enable them to train together and make

unnecessary the use of ad hoc organizations for this important mission.

(U) Repatriation of recovered personnel is a complicated process that involves

numerous agencies. It must be an integral part of all contingency planning prior to and

during operations. It is imperative that the well being and legal rights of the individual

returnee be the overriding factors when planning and executing repatriation operations.

C. Operations and Communications Security (U)

(U) During Operation Allied Force, shortcomings were evident in both operations

security (OPSEC) and communications security (COMSEC); and there is some evidence

that these were exploited by the Serbs. Poor operations and communications security

procedures reduced the effectiveness of NATO air strikes and increased the risk to

NATO forces.

1. U.S. and Allied Secure Voice Systems (U)

(U) Some of the operations security concerns were caused by disparities in the

communications security equipment available to U.S. forces and their NATO allies. The

major differences were in the numbers and types of secure telephones at the various
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

74

headquarters and secure radios aboard aircraft. To avoid such problems in the future, the

Department needs to develop a strategy to ensure future secure voice interoperability with

our allies and coalition partners that uses or is interoperable with our new secure

telephone technology called Secure Terminal Equipment (STE). For now, the regional

commanders and the Services will review their distribution and allocation plans for

existing secure telephones to ensure that they are available to communicate with allies

and coalition partners.

2. Allied Communications Security Equipment (U)

(U) Some allied aircraft were not equipped with either the cryptograph devices or

keying material needed to conduct secure communications with other elements of the

force. As a result, airborne command-and-control aircraft and other allied aircraft had to

pass information in the clear, severely compromising operations security. This situation

can only be corrected by ensuring all allied forces have the kinds of technologies,

equipment, communications, planning, and training that will make them fully secure and

interoperable.

3. Security Procedures (U)

(U) In addition to the shortage of compatible, secure communications, NATO

vulnerabilities were also linked to the use of predictable operating patterns and poor

understanding of operations security. The Serbs capitalized on these shortcomings, in

conjunction with a variety of other techniques, to help ensure the survival of deployed

Serb forces.

(U) Other security problems were caused by multiple security levels, which at

times acted as a barrier in disseminating operational intelligence to warfighters. A review

commissioned immediately after the conflict found that "the electronic flow of NATO

data through US systems precluded effective US exploitation of ... NATO databases."

To resolve this problem, the review recommended that intelligence and other information

be classified at the lowest reasonable level to enable its being used most effectively by

warfighters and coalition partners.

4. Lessons Learned (U)

(U) In future operations, NATO must vary the operating patterns that it employs

so as to degrade the accuracy with which any future adversary can predict routes and
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

75

timing associated with an air operation. Security procedure awareness training at all

levels and locations, particularly at sites with augmentees, is essential.

(U) Computer-network details useful to hackers must be made more restricted.

System administrators must train effectively and enable available security features in

hardware and software.

(U) NATO will continue to be among the highest-value targets for intelligence

organizations of our potential adversaries. There should be no misunderstanding that our

effort to achieve and maintain information superiority will also invite resourceful enemy

attacks on our information systems.

D. Protecting Task Force Hawk (U)

(U) The decision to employ or not to employ the combat firepower of Task Force

Hawk required constant evaluation by senior leadership and was heavily influenced by

several factors, especially the ability to provide credible force protection to employing

elements of the force.

1. Threats to the Task Force (U)

(U) The threat to Task Force Hawk’s helicopters from Serbian anti-aircraft

artillery and shoulder-fired air defense weapons posed significant risks. Task Force

Hawk’s capability to detect and track ground targets in Kosovo was constrained — both

by the enemy’s employment of defensive tactics (Serbian ground forces were widely

dispersed, well camouflaged, and employed decoys) and by the lack of friendly ground

forces into Kosovo. Although Task Force Hawk achieved some visibility over the

battlespace in Kosovo from overflights by manned and unmanned reconnaissance

systems, the Task Force’s lack of ground forces and low-altitude forward air control

capability increased the level of difficulty they would have experienced had they been

required to locate and track mobile, well concealed Serbian ground forces in hostile

territory.

(U) Current attack helicopter training primarily involves division and corps level

operations. In some scenarios, a land component commander uses his attack aviation

assets to shape the battle and provide fire support to the advancing friendly ground

forces. In these situations, the land commander is able to employ organic surface-to-
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

76

surface missiles to suppress enemy air defenses as the attack helicopters reach deep into

enemy territory.

(U) The attack helicopters and other land component assets were integrated with

tactical aircraft assets through the air tasking order. Coordinating rotary-wing aircraft

operations into the Air Tasking Order proved problematic because this is not a traditional

mission defined in Army doctrine nor is it exercised on a regular basis in joint training.

As a result, the Services had to work through numerous complexities associated with the

evolution of new missions and employment concepts in the middle of a major conflict.

Integrating Army helicopters, radars, artillery, and other assets through the Air Tasking

Order requires significant refinement. In short, the tactics, techniques, or procedures

required for this mission had not yet been developed when Operation Allied Force took

place.

(U) Supporting Task Force Hawk with combat search-and-rescue assets also

posed integration challenges. Differences in doctrine, training, and employment concepts

led to difficulties that were often only resolved after several mission rehearsals.

2. Lessons Learned (U)

(U) While the Apaches engaged in rigorous mission rehearsals in preparation for

combat, the conflict terminated without their being commited to combat operations. As

Operation Allied Force progressed and the effectiveness of the ongoing campaign

became evident, it was decided not to add Task Force Hawk’s firepower to the ongoing

air operation. Task Force Hawk’s Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), deployed

with Task Force Hawk to engage deep targets and suppress enemy air defenses, were

never used due to collateral damage concerns. Ultimately, while Task Force Hawk

represented a threat to Milosevic’s ground forces and was likely a factor in his decision to

capitulate, attack elements of Task Force Hawk were not used.

(U) Additional training and integration issues arose as Task Force Hawk was

incorporated into support of the operations. In the future, the concept of Joint Deep

Operations in which Army tactical missiles and attack helicopters are employed as part of

a supporting operation must be reinforced in joint training. Integration of Army tactical

missile employment into Joint and Combined operations also requires more emphasis on

the development and practice of standard tactics, techniques, and procedures.

(U) Finally, some improvements are needed if armed helicopters are to be

employed effectively in future conflicts that involve constraints similar to those in effect
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

77

during Operation Allied Force. Technological innovations, such as using unmanned aerial

vehicles or other airborne platforms to spot and designate targets for attack helicopters,

along with attendant equipment upgrades, would be of particular value.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

78

VII. STRIKE OPERATIONS (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force was a comprehensive coalition effort. Although the

United States contributed the majority of the assets, 14 of the 19 nations contributed

forces to the operation. In total, our NATO allies provided 327 manned and unmanned

aircraft and flew over 15,000 sorties (about 39 percent of the total.). Figure 16 shows the

breakout of non-U.S. allied aircraft participating in the conflict. The allies also provided

the host nation support for basing and overflight access that was critical for all aircraft

participating in Operation Allied Force.

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 16. Non-U.S. Aircraft Participating in Operation Allied Force (U)

Belgium

Canada

Denmark

France

Germany

Hungary

Italy

NATO

Netherlands

Norway

Portugal

Spain

Turkey

United Kingdom

14

18

8

84

33 58

39

22

21

7

10

6

3

4

Includes manned and unmanned aircraft UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

79

(U) Operationa lly, Allied Force was a military success. NATO generated 78

days of continuous, around-the-clock operations, flew 38,000 sorties with only 2 aircraft

failing to return to base, and suffered no combat fatalities. Strike operations achieved

effective targeting and weapon effects with relatively low collateral damage.

(U) There are two notable aspects of the strike operations. First, there was a

heavy use of standoff and Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided munitions to attack

targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. .Second, the operation was

marked by the introduction of new weapons and systems, including B-2s equipped with

Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), and new applications for the Standoff Land

Attack Missiles (SLAM). Despite the heavy use of preferred munitions and newer

technology weapon systems, legacy weapon systems played a significant role in

successful strike operations.

(U) Although strike operations were predominately conducted by land-based

aircraft, Navy carrier-based aircraft, Marine shore-based and sea-based strike aircraft, and

cruise-missile equipped ships and submarines played a significant role. Airlift and

refueling forces fulfilled their critical roles superbly. The tanker fleet overcame extended

sortie duration and high usage rates to provide timely support of deploying and

employing units and strike packages throughout the conflict.

(U) Adverse weather and rugged undeveloped terrain characterized the operating

environment of Allied Force. This environment had a corresponding impact on the

conduct of operations, including target selection and the pairings of weapons and delivery

systems. In addition, the environment challenged the capabilities of collection systems in

theater and at a national level.

(U) The majority of direct attack weapons employed during Operation Allied

Force were laser-guided bombs. In addition, long-range, stand-off munitions such as the

Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and the Conventional Air Launched Cruise

Missile (CALCM) were employed extensively, especially during the initial stages of the

operation and in periods of adverse weather. Strike packages received consistent support

from air defense suppression platforms, including Navy and Marine Corps EA-6B radar

jammers, HARM-equipped F/A-18s, and Air Force F-16C/J air-defense suppression

aircraft. Onboard self-protection systems proved their value and once again

demonstrated that suppressing hostile air defenses requires a comprehensive multiplatform, multi-system effort.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

80

(U) Battle damage assessment and the evaluation of the effectiveness of allied

attacks against the various targets in Serbia proper and Kosovo remained at the forefront

of NATO and U.S. efforts and concerns. The ongoing assessments and analysis clearly

show that while there were instances where collateral damage occurred, it was minimized

by use of precise and accurate weapons. In addition, while wartime battle damage

assessment did not always provide complete information, wartime assessments of

damage to fixed targets in Kosovo were generally accurate. Allied strikes against fixed

targets including bridges, airfields, tunnels, bunkers, petroleum and fuel facilities, and

other above ground structures were highly successful and inflicted very limited collateral

damage. However, Serbia’s mobile Army and Interior forces presented a targeting and

damage assessment challenge.

A. Strike Effectiveness (U)

(U) Air attack operations were designed to accomplish specific objectives. In

turn, targets were selected with the goal of attaining these objectives in a phased

operation, consistent with NATO’s policies for conducting the operation (see Chapter I).

NATO adapted its military operations and target sets as the operation proceeded, based

upon an improved understanding of what the best approach should be. Thus, the classes

and locations of targets changed as the campaign proceeded. An appraisal of the

effectiveness of attack operations needs to be made in the context of evolving campaign

goals as well as in terms of the performance of the specific weapon types used.

(U) NATO’s air attacks clearly had an impact on military operations in the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Air attacks on military forces in the field forced Serbian

forces to remain largely hidden from view, traveling only under limited circumstances.

Air attacks on selected infrastructure targets, such as bridges and electric power systems,

degraded the ability of the Yugoslav military to command and control its forces and to

resupply and reconstitute them. Together, these effects created pressure on Milosevic to

yield to NATO demands.

(U) Analyses of the results of NATO attacks were conducted as the campaign

proceeded, based on the fullest available information. The Mission Analysis Tracking

and Tabulation System (MATTS) was used to construct a primary target database as

Operation Allied Force unfolded. The MATTS database began with the mission

designations provided by the air tasking order; these designations were then correlated to

mission reports filed by returning aircrews. The mission report data were loaded into the
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

81

database to reflect weapons released and the Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI) for

each weapon. Analysts used imagery and other sources to review the desired impact

points to assess the damage done by each strike sortie. Time sequencing between strike

sorties and reconnaissance of an impact point were critical. Typically, individual

installations have multiple desired impact points — for example, a factory installation

may have several buildings that must be struck individually, or an airfield may have

multiple aircraft shelters, storage locations, and other targets within the complex. If

reconnaissance resources could not be scheduled to review a particular installation until 2

or 3 days after air strikes had occurred, it was extremely difficult to determine properly

the weapons and aircraft responsible for specific damage. In such cases, NATO was

unable to confirm damage associated with a particular aircraft and weapons mix and

therefore characterized the damage in the MATTS database as unconfirmed. After the

conflict ended, NATO sent a team into Kosovo to assess the effects of air attacks. This

assessment examined both fixed and mobile targets. The U.S. European Command has

already made public an initial presentation of findings from this review. The results from

the wartime analyses and the postwar assessment provide the basis for this study of

lessons learned.

(U) Further study is now underway within the Department to integrate the

findings of all available data and to develop insights from this information on a variety of

important topics. How good was our understanding of attack effectiveness as combat

proceeded? What surveillance and reconnaissance systems proved most accurate and

timely in delivering information critical to these assessments? What lessons can we draw

from postwar examination of targets and target areas to modify or improve our battle

damage assessment process? How should the inevitable uncertainty in the information be

handled? For example, targets were often attacked by multiple systems, making an

assessment of any single system’s effectiveness against those targets nearly impossible.

Further, judging the degree of impairment inflicted on a damaged, but not destroyed,

target probably will always remain a source of uncertainty. New technologies, such as

video imagery from munitions in the terminal attack phase or intrusive sensors at

important pre-selected sites, will improve our capability to assess weapon performance.

On the other hand, munitions such as JDAM that do not incorporate a real-time imagery

loop and will be used in much greater numbers in the future will complicate the damageassessment process. Consequently, a substantial degree of uncertainty will continue to

exist in any future war.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

82

1. Fixed Targets (U)

(U) Following the end of Operation Allied Force, NATO released an initial

assessment of their attack effectiveness against a number of targets. These targets

destroyed or significantly damaged include:

• Eleven railroad bridges

• Thirty-four highway bridges

• Twenty-nine percent of all Serbian ammunition storage

• Fifty-seven percent of petroleum reserves

• All Yugoslav oil refineries

• Fourteen command posts

• Over one hundred aircraft

• Ten military airfields.

(U) After the bombing campaign had ended, an assessment team visited a

representative sample of such fixed targets as tunnels, bridges, bunkers, petroleum

facilities, and above ground facilities. At each site the team evaluated and recorded target

characteristics, physical and functional target damage, weapon impact locations and

effectiveness, and evidence of collateral damage. Based on these observations, the team

assessed strike effectiveness against fixed targets:

a. Tunnels (U)

(U) The assessment team examined damage to four tunnels in Kosovo that had

been attacked by NATO aircraft: an underground aircraft storage and servicing facility, a

military staging area, and two railroad tunnels. The team found that, in general, air

attacks were very successful in closing tunnel adits (entrances). In addition, because of

softer-than-estimated geological conditions, damage to tunnels was sometimes more

significant than expected.

b. Bunkers (U)

(U) For the most part, the bunkers encountered in Kosovo were constructed with

reinforced concrete walls and ceilings. All had blast doors and some of the bunkers were

hardened against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attacks, with independent

manually operated electrical generators as well as an air filtration system. At every

bunker site visited, the team found that NATO attacks were successful.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

83

c. Bridges (U)

(U) NATO targeted bridges to hinder or stop enemy movement of troops and

logistics along the major lines of communications. The air strikes effectively destroyed

the targeted bridges and battle damage assessment of such strikes was reasonably

accurate.

d. Above-Ground Structures (U)

(U) Yugoslav Ministry of Interior Forces and Regular Army units had extensive

garrisons and headquarters structures in nearly every major city in Kosovo. NATO

airstrikes reduced a majority of these facilities to rubble. Once NATO airstrikes forced

them from their traditional sites, the Interior Forces and Yugoslav Army fled to, and

staged out of, several ad hoc garrisons, often at established industrial sites. Overall,

NATO’s effort against the majority of above-ground, garrison structures and depots that

were targeted and attacked was a complete success. NATO strikes severely damaged

these structures with minimal collateral damage. No evidence of reconstitution was

found.

(U) As part of its look at above-ground structures, the team examined nine

command, control, and communications facilities in Kosovo. These were part of the Serb

communications network needed for command and control of Yugoslav Army and

Interior Forces military system. In general, these targets fell into two categories: military

specific targets (e.g., radio relay sites and air defense control and reporting posts) and

dual-use facilities such as telephone systems and television and radio broadcast facilities.

The military specific targets all had reinforced concrete bunkers to protect the mission

critical equipment. The Serbs had removed electronic equipment from the sites and

emptied the bunkers prior to the assessment team’s arrival. The team could not

determine when the Serbs removed the equipment. However, because they discovered

little or no equipment in the destroyed above-ground support buildings, the team

surmised the sites were not operational at the time of the attacks. It appeared that the

inspected dual-use facilities (civilian and military) were operational at the time of attack

causing the destruction of most of the equipment along with the destruction of the

buildings.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

84

e. Collateral Damage (U)

(U) Throughout the air operation against the Serbs, NATO made every effort to

minimize collateral damage. Of the 38 sites visited after the war, only one had sustained

any significant collateral damage from NATO weapons falling on areas other than their

intended target. At the other 37 sites, collateral damage was limited to broken windows,

blown off roof tiles, and detached ceiling tiles.

2. Mobile Targets (U)

(U) To assess the number of mobile targets struck during operations in the

Kosovo, a team conducted a comprehensive day-by-day, mission-report-by-mission

report reconstruction of the operation to determine the actual number of mobile targets

struck with high confidence. This assessment covered all 78 days of Operation Allied

Force, focused exclusively on mobile targets, and covered only strikes in the area of

Kosovo and the Presevo Valley. The assessment team was comprised of 67 personnel

from all Services and intelligence agencies, and included air and air defense analysts,

ground analysts, Balkans analysts, imagery analysts, signal intelligence analysts,

collection managers, targeteers, battle damage assessment analysts, and systems

operators. The team gathered data and other pertinent information related to the

following essential elements of information:

• Indications of destruction or damage of tanks, armored personnel carriers,

artillery, mortars, and military vehicles

• Indications of the use of camouflage, concealment, and deception campaign by

the Yugoslav military

• Indications that some NATO strikes missed specific targets (tanks, armored

personnel carriers, artillery, mortars, and military vehicles)

• Indications of evidence that Yugoslav military forces cleaned the battlefield

• Indications that the Kosovo Liberation Army destroyed or damaged tanks,

armored personnel carriers, artillery, mortars, and military vehicles

• Indications that some NATO missions struck the same targets on multiple

occasions.

(U) Assessments of these indications were made using cockpit video from actual

strikes, image intelligence, measurements and signatures intelligence, signals

intelligence, human intelligence, interviews with forward air controllers and on-scene

witnesses, and through on-site observations by the team. Figure 17 shows the results of
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

85

the assessment. The assessment provides no data on what proportion of total mobile

targets were hit or the level of damage inflicted on the targets that were struck. Instead,

the number of target hits were collected. Thus, the first segment of each bar represents

the final number of strikes that were determined to have achieved successful hits against

mobile targets as confirmed by the assessment team. The last segment on each bar

represents those mission reports that provided sufficient evidence of a hit based on the

methodology to support a successful strike assessment. Thus, the targets in this category

represent possible hits that cannot be confirmed. The team also determined that a small

number of targets had been hit and reported by more than one strike mission (49 probable

across all target classes and shown in the second segment) and that a more limited

number of decoy targets had been attacked (25 across all target classes and shown in the

third segment).

(U) As is apparent from the figure, roughly 60 percent of the target-hit claims

made during Operation Allied Force could be confirmed by the assessment team.

However, the on-site visits did not occur until more than a month after the conflict had

ended, allowing time for the Serbs to remove damaged vehicles from the battlefield.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

86

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 17 Strike Assessment Results for Operation Allied Force (U)

B. Preferred Munitions (U)

(U) The latest generation of air-delivered munitions was employed in substantial

numbers for the first time during Operation Allied Force. Throughout the conflict,

weapons fired at fixed sites hit intended targets producing the intended results, with

limited collateral damage to civilians. In particular, the success achieved in delivering

the new Joint Direct Attack Munition from altitudes above cloud cover demonstrated the

wisdom of decisions made following the 1991 Gulf War. During that conflict, coalition

forces had little choice but to allow the enemy a sanctuary from attack when target areas

were obscured by adverse weather. In Kosovo, NATO forces operated under conditions

in which there was at least 50 percent cloud cover more than 70 percent of the time, and

yet were able to continue the operation.

(U) As expected, attacks on mobile targets proved more problematic than attacks

against fixed targets. The Serbs hid many of their mobile ground force systems, making

them difficult to locate and attack. NATO’s desire to limit collateral damage also

constrained us in some circumstances from attacking possible ground force targets. On

the other hand, by forcing the Yugoslavs to hide their ground maneuver forces and not

 389

 339

 153

 93

Arty/Mortars

APCs

Vehicles

Total = 181

Total = 317

Total = 857

STRIKES

MULTIPLESTRIKES

DECOY STRIKES

UNCONFIRMED

UNCLASSIFIED

Tanks

Military Total = 800

Vehicles
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

87

operate them as units in the open, we limited their combat effectiveness, therefore

achieving the desired effect.

(U) In some cases, only small inventories of the latest U.S. preferred munitions

were available for operations. Several of these systems, such as JDAM and the Joint

Standoff Weapon (JSOW), are in the early phases of production with plans for increasing

these inventories over the next several years as a result of programs already funded by the

Congress. Our success in using these systems in Kosovo validates these production

plans. In addition to weapons used and proven during Operation Allied Force, other

weapons under development will be available for employment later, including improved

versions of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile and the new Joint Air-to-Surface

Standoff Missile (JASSM). The Department has reviewed munition production and

development programs carefully in constructing our annual defense program to ensure

that munitions acquisition proceeds at an appropriate pace and scope in light of

experience in Kosovo. DoD has also requested, and Congress has approved, use of $1.4

billion in FY 1999 supplemental funds to replenish stocks of the preferred munitions

expended during Operation Allied Force.

1. Precision Engagement (U)

(U) During Operation Allied Force, NATO forces conducted over 23,300 strike

missions against an array of targets. These strikes were directed at roughly 7,600 target

aimpoints associated with a variety of fixed targets as well as at just over 3,400 flex

targets. The weapons employed against these targets represent a full spectrum of

capability, from unguided 500-pound bombs to sophisticated long-range cruise missiles.

As shown in Table 1, the significant discriminators among these weapons are their

standoff range and guidance. Standoff allows the platform and aircrew to remain outside

the threat area, thereby minimizing aircraft attrition. There are three categories of

guidance: unguided, man-in-the-loop guidance, and Global Positioning System (GPS)

guidance. Unguided weapons require the aircrew to deliver the weapon on a ballistic

trajectory to the target. For man-in-the-loop guidance, there are several options, all

involving specific aircrew input during the employment of the weapon. Crewmembers

may identify the target via a seeker, steer the weapon during flight, point a laser at the

target, or alter the aimpoint just prior to impact in order to maximize the weapon’s effect

on its target. Typically, man-in the loop systems require line of sight from the sensor to

the target, and are degraded by adverse weather conditions. Global Positioning System
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

88

guidance uses satellite input to track to specific target coordinates, which makes the

weapon capable of all-weather employment.

(U) Precision engagement was a cornerstone of Operation Allied Force. Over the

57 days of actual airstrikes, emphasis was placed on munitions that increased the

probability of kill against a given target or that significantly improved survivability of

weapon platforms or crew. For comparison, during Operation Desert Storm only 10

percent of U.S. strike aircraft were capable of delivering these types of weapons; this

increased to 90 percent for Operation Allied Force. The remainder of this section focuses

on those preferred weapons.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

89

UNCLASSIFIED

Table 1 Characteristics of Weapons Used in Operation Allied Force (U)

Range Guidance Weapon Name/

Nomenclature

Specific

Characteristics

Long GPS

(near-precision)

Tomahawk (TLAM) Ship and sub-launched

Unitary and submunition warheads

Powered

Long GPS

(near-precision)

CALCM ( AGM-86C) Air-launched from B-52

Unitary warhead

Powered

Standoff

(>15 miles)

INS/GPS

(near-precision)

SLAM (AGM-84E) Air-launched from P-3

Powered

INS and GPS midcourse guidance

Standoff

(>15 miles)

Man-in-the loop

Terminal

(precise)

AGM-130 Air-launched from F-15E

Unitary warhead

Powered

INS and GPS midcourse guidance

Standoff

(>15 miles)

GPS

(near-precision)

JSOW (AGM-154) Air-launched from F/A-18

CEB submunition dispenser

Unpowered

Standoff

(>15 miles)

Man-in-the loop

Terminal

(precise)

HAVE NAP

(AGM-142)

Air-launched from B-52

Blast fragmentation or

penetrator warhead

Powered

Inertial midcourse guidance

Direct Attack GPS

(near-precision)

JDAM (GBU –31) Air-launched from B-2

Low cost ($18K) tail kit,

Blast fragmentation or

Penetrator warhead

Direct Attack GPS

(near-precision)

GBU-37 Air-launched from B-2

Very hard-target

penetrator with GPS tail kit

Direct Attack Man-in-the loop

(precise)

Maverick (AGM-65) Shaped charge or unitary warhead

Direct Attack Man-in-the loop

Laser Guided

Bombs

(precise)

GBU-10

GBU-12

GBU-16

GBU-24

GBU-27

GBU-28

Blast fragmentation

Blast fragmentation

Blast fragmentation

Blast fragmentation

Penetrator

Very hard-target penetrator

Direct Attack Unguided,

ballistic

MK-82

MK-83

MK-84

BLU-109

CBU-87

Rockeye (CBU-99)

Blast fragmentation

Blast fragmentation

Blast fragmentation

Penetrator

Combined Effects Bomblet submunition

dispenser

Submunition dispenser

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

90

(U) Our experience in Operation Allied Force also demonstrated the importance

of Combined Effects Munitions (CEM). These munitions are soda-can-sized bomblet

submunitions, designated BLU-97 or cluster bombs, that are dispensed in large numbers

(approximately 150-200 bomblets per weapon) to attack “soft” area targets. These

submunitions are dispensed by several different weapon airframes — the TLAM-D from

long range, the JSOW from medium-standoff range, and the CBU-87 tactical munitions

dispenser for direct attack. CEM is an effective weapon against such targets as air

defense radars, armor, artillery, and personnel. However, because the bomblets are

dispensed over a relatively large area and a small percentage of them typically fail to

detonate, there is an unexploded-ordnance hazard associated with this weapon. These

submunitions are not mines, are acceptable under the laws of armed conflict, and are not

timed to go off as anti-personnel devices. However, if the submunitions are disturbed or

disassembled, they may explode, thus, the need for early and aggressive unexplodedordnance clearing efforts. Combined effects munitions remain an appropriate and

militarily effective weapon when properly targeted and employed. However, the risk of

collateral damage, as with any weapon, must be considered when employing these

weapons.

(U) The requirement to maintain a mix of weapon capabilities and platforms was

highlighted by Operation Allied Force. In the final stages of the campaign when the

weather had improved and the air defense system had been degraded, the availability of a

complete mix of weapons maximized the flexibility of strike options against the

remaining priority targets. Because pilots could now employ direct attack weapons at

less risk, less costly legacy weapons were, in many cases, as effective (and sometimes

more) as more costly preferred weapons against such targets as fielded forces, large

military storage complexes, and airfields.

(U) Although we cannot predict every scenario that will require the employment

of military force in the future, our flexibility and adaptability in providing precision

engagement in Kosovo was certainly noteworthy. A balanced application of direct

attack, standoff, and GPS-guided munitions will be the backbone of future air operations.

Among the important tactical challenges encountered during Operation Allied Force were

countering mobile surface-to-air missiles, employing all-weather precision and standoff

weapons, and real-time targeting. To ensure that U.S. forces are adept at handling such

challenges in any future campaign, they must be incorporated not only in individual unit

training, but also more importantly, in joint training.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

91

2. Weapons-of-Choice (U)

(U) Cruise missiles were used extensively in the first few days of Operation

Allied Force and during periods of adverse weather. These weapons were selected to

match NATO’s campaign strategy. In particular, the desire to limit the exposure of

manned aircraft in the threat area, as well as the need to minimize collateral damage,

made cruise missile employment a logical choice.

(U) As the conflict continued, a larger cross-section of the weapons inventory

was employed, including standoff, GPS-guided, laser-guided, and unguided bombs.

GPS-guided systems were critical to the success of the campaign given the weather and

the requirement for minimal collateral damage.

(U) Sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles (TLAM and CALCM),

JDAM, and JSOW provided the capability to penetrate enemy air defenses and attack a

wide spectrum of targets throughout the battlespace. Attacking day or night in any

weather, GPS-guided weapons placed all target sets at risk, denying the enemy

sanctuaries created by weather or the use of heavily concentrated defenses. In the

paragraphs that follow, we characterize these weapons and describe their employment

during the campaign.

a. JDAM (U)

(U) The Joint Direct Attack Munition is designated GBU-31, a 2,000-pound class

munition guided by an $18,000 tail kit. (The GBU-37, which is similar to JDAM,

includes a 5,000-lb class warhead and is also guided by a GPS tail kit.) During Operation

Allied Force, the JDAM, which is still in low-rate production was employed at nearly the

same rate that it is being manufactured. The B-2 was the only operational aircraft used to

deliver JDAMs; the combination of its all-weather precision capability and the B-2’s

ability to penetrate lethal defenses put high-value fixed targets at risk. Several additional

aircraft are pending JDAM operational status in conformance with the JDAM acquisition

plan.

(U) To deliver JDAMs, the B-2s had to fly from Whiteman Air Force Base,

Missouri, requiring multiple air-refueling hook-ups per mission. Using rotary launchers

in their internal weapons bays, each B-2 was able to carry and deliver up to 16 JDAMs.

A selectable fuse on each JDAM was set before the munition was loaded, and allowed for

a variety of time delays — before or after impact — for the weapon’s explosion..
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

92

b. Tomahawk (U)

(U) The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) is a conventionally armed,

long range, land attack cruise missile that can be launched from surface ships or

submarines. All TLAMs expended during Operation Allied Force were the Block III

configuration. Tomahawk missiles utilize a solid propellant rocket motor to accelerate

the missile through the initial boost phase of flight until the turbofan engine takes over

for the cruise and terminal phases.

(U) Two versions of TLAM were used in this operation. The TLAM-C has a

conventional unitary warhead, while the TLAM-D carries conventional submunitions.

TLAMs were continuously present in the theater, and could be used to execute timely

attack. This gave the joint force commander the ability to utilize the principles of

surprise, initiative, and massed firepower on key enemy targets. Six ships and three

submarines from two U.S. Navy battle groups and one UK submarine launched 218

missiles in preplanned and quick-reaction strikes. Target types ranged from traditional

headquarter buildings and other infrastructure targets to relocatable targets such as

aircraft and surface-to-air missile launchers. Tomahawk was often a weapon of choice

for targets with the potential for high collateral damage, and was used to attack numerous

targets in Belgrade.

c. CALCM (U)

(U) The Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM), designated

AGM–86C, is a guided, air-to-ground missile armed with a conventional blast

fragmentation warhead. The missile has been designed specifically to provide accurate

attacks against long range, strategic “soft” targets. During Operation Allied Force,

CALCMs were delivered by B-52s operating from forward bases in England.

d. JSOW (U)

(U) The Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), designated AGM-154, is a 1,000-pound

class air-to-ground weapon. It is unpowered, but has a kinematically efficient airframe

that provides standoff outside point defenses. The “A” variant, which is the only

configuration currently operational, dispenses combined effects bomblets against area

soft targets such as air defense radars, armor, artillery, and personnel. During Operation

Allied Force, JSOWs were employed from Navy F/A-18 aircraft.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

93

e. AGM-130 (U)

(U) The AGM-130 is an air-to-ground, rocket-motor-powered missile with a

television (TV) or infrared (IR)-guidance system. The AGM-130 was designed for stand

off outside point defense attack missions using the remote control capability provided by

a data link system. Under control of a crewmember, the missile flies toward the preselected target through midcourse, transition, and terminal phases. Through the data-link

system, the crewmember can acquire the target or target area, issue steering commands as

necessary, and lockon or manually track the target to impact. The AGM-130 also

contains an inertial navigation system that can be updated with location data obtained

from the Global Positioning System to point the seeker and navigate to the target without

operator input if required. However, with a crewmember monitoring the video display,

man-in–the-loop control can be provided at any time. During Operation Allied Force,

AGM-130s were employed from Air Force F-15E aircraft.

f. SLAM (U)

(U) Another success story from Operation Allied Force was the development of

techniques for employing Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM) from Navy aircraft.

SLAM provided the Joint Task Force and the Joint Force Air Component Commander

with new flexibility to strike mobile targets on short notice.

g. HAVE NAP (U)

(U) The AGM-142 HAVE NAP is a self-powered munition with inertial

midcourse guidance and an 800-pound fragmentation or penetrator warhead that is

launched from the B-52. Only two HAVE NAP munitions were launched during

Operation Allied Force.

3. Weapon Expenditures and Other Insights (U)

a. Weapon Expenditures (U)

(U) Because of the character of Allied Force operations, heavy reliance on

preferred munitions throughout the conflict resulted in a high expenditure rate. These

rates reduced weapon stockpiles, especially for cruise missiles — the inventories of

which had already been reduced by Operation Desert Fox, which was executed just

months before Operation Allied Force began — and JDAM, a weapon that is still in lowrate production.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

94

b. Acquisition-Related Actions (U)

(U) There were several acquisition-related actions taken during and shortly after

Operation Allied Force to improve our military readiness.

1) Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Request for Weapons.

(U) Before Operation Allied Force began, there was concern about our cruise

missile inventory due to the high expenditure rate during Operation Desert Fox. The

TLAM and CALCM cruise missile replenishment was considered necessary since

developmental missiles, slated to supplement and eventually replacement these fielded

cruise missiles, were several years from production. After Operation Allied Force began

and cruise missile use continued at a steady pace, it became even more apparent that

replenishment was essential. Other precision guided weapons were also used more than

anticipated and usage of several weapons that are in the early phases of production (most

notably JDAM) caused inventory shortages.

(U) The decision to include funding for weapons in the Emergency Supplemental

Appropriations Request was made early in Operation Allied Force. Some specific

weapon systems were requested by name for Congressional consideration. Since weapon

use for the remainder of the operation could not be forecast adequately, the Department

also requested a contingency fund to provide flexibility in funding weapons that might be

depleted.

(U) Congress approved the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Request,

and the funds were distributed to replenish the weapons that had been most significantly

impacted by the military operations.

2) Accelerating Weapon Deliveries

(U) As a near-term solution during the operation, the Department investigated the

possibility of accelerating weapons with active production lines. JDAM was one of the

programs that could be accelerated, and the Department worked with the contractor to

speed delivery. In addition to early deliveries of the JDAMs already ordered, a follow-on

contract was expeditiously awarded to acquire the next production lot.

(U) As part of normal business practices to reduce excess capacity and reduce

production costs, some prime contractors were already consolidating and physically

relocating weapon system production lines. These geographical moves had been planned

well in advance, but proved untimely nonetheless.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

95

3) Industrial Resource Allocations.

(U) While exploring the possibilities of accelerating production and the execution

of the emergency supplemental appropriations, concerns arose regarding competition for

common components. Since some weapons have common components or suppliers, it

was expected that the acceleration could pose allocation problems with the supplier’s

existing contractual commitments. A task force was established to help guide

reallocation of industrial resources where necessary by prioritizing weapon systems. In

these cases, the Department asked the Department of Commerce to intervene and provide

legal direction to the suppliers, ensuring priority to key DoD programs. The task force

relied on the Joint Requirement Oversight Council as the decision authority to establish

priorities among weapon systems competing for common components. While only a few

Commerce directives were ultimately issued, the task force proved beneficial and would

have been even more valuable had the conflict continued for a longer period of time.

b. Fuse Settings (U)

(U) Preliminary and follow-up ground battle damage assessments show that fuse

setting can be a critical factor in the amount of damage inflicted. Effective real-time

targeting may require that aircraft have the capability to change weapon fuse settings

while airborne. This would allow the aircrew to maximize target destruction while

adjusting for specific collateral damage restrictions.

c. Attacking Time Sensitive Targets (U)

(U) A long-standing military requirement, again validated during Operation Allied

Force, is the need to provide rapid targeting and re-targeting of aircraft and

preferred munitions against known and emerging targets. A rapid targeting

system that included reachback, distributed operations, and real-time

collection, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets was successful

in shortening timelines from sensor to shooter. Real-time threat information

detected by various systems was relayed to the Combined Air Operations

Center, passed directly to strike assets, and exploited at national intelligence

centers.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

96

4. Observations (U)

(U) The lessons learned in the area of precision engagement lead to the following

observations:

• Continue Service initiatives to replenish inventories of preferred munitions.

Continue to assess development of weapons that fill gaps and shortfalls in

current capabilities and their subsequent certification on launch platforms.

• Assess methods to determine wartime planning factors affecting expenditure

rates.

• Assess future weapon inventories to achieve the right balance of capabilities for

future requirements.

• Continue to assess technologies that will ensure flexibility and enable allweather precision strikes, including on-board and off-board accurate targeting

capability against fixed and mobile targets, that can be executed within minutes

of target assignment.

• Incorporate real-time targeting training in individual unit training; perform joint

training exercises and practice the use of national, theater, and tactical collection

assets in support of reduced timeline employment tactics.

• Continue to pursue technologies that will process, exploit, and disseminate

target information in a timely manner to support precision engagement; review

Intelligence Community procedures and capability to enhance the level of detail

and quality of intelligence to support theater-wide GPS-targeting requirements,

especially in real-time or near-real time.

C. Other Important Aspects of Strike Operations (U)

1. Global Force Integration (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force exercised our military as a global force; forces were

not only deployed from locations around the globe to support the theater, but forces were

also employed from the continental United States and other distant bases to provide

support in order to accomplish assigned tasks via reachback. Attack planning for cruise

missiles, B-2 missions originating in the United States, and space operations highlight the

widely dispersed nature and global capabilities of the U.S. military. Multiple federated

agencies throughout Europe and the continental United States provided direct support to

the Joint Force Commander in the execution of the operation. The full spectrum of

maritime operations, to include sustained forward presence, extensive participation in the
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

97

air operation, air and sea support operations, protection of the allied western flank, and

putting Marines ashore, was significant to the success of the campaign.

(U) As noted previously, the ability to perform all-weather precision strike was

limited during Operation Allied Force. However, the B-2 bomber combined with the

Joint Direct Attack Munition became an effective counter to these limitations. Over the

course of Operation Allied Force, 45 B-2 sorties delivered 656 JDAMs on critical targets

in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

(U) Extensive tanker support was needed to refuel B-2s flying global attack

sorties. As indicated previously, each plane had to be refueled multiple times during its

sortie. While such capability is essential for rapid employment in any scenario, forward

basing would substantially reduce tanker requirements, reduce sortie length (simplifying

everything from mission preparation to crew fatigue), and allow these assets to be utilized

at a greater rate. Forward basing remains the optimum employment scheme for all our

long-range platforms. Accordingly, the Air Force is examing ways to enhance its

forward bomber-base infrastructure enhancement.

(U) Another global force initiative was the employment of the B-1B bomber from

bases in the United Kingdom. The B-1B’s Block-D modification performed flawlessly

during Operation Allied Force.

(U) Cruise missile employment also benefited from global capabilities, with

mission planning being done in the United States and then forwarded to launch platforms

in theater. In fact, Allied Force saw the successful realization of TLAM as a tactical

weapon. New capabilities were also implement for air-delivered cruise missiles. The

Department is now investigating ways to expand these capabilities further.

(U) The complexities associated with an emerging global force that will employ

with distributed operations and federated systems support via reachback must be captured

in our training scenarios. As we learned in Operation Allied Force, even with a theater

focus, using the global force is the best way to achieve the desired result. Given the

probability that the United States will continue to be involved in small scale

contingencies, with precision requirements and high knowledge demands that may again

exceed the capacity of in-place theater forces, the Department needs to plan now to

utilize the advantages offered by our global force capabilities. Because the United States

might face a myriad of unpredictable scenarios, the Department needs to develop new

levels of adaptability and flexibility in the interoperability and integration of this force.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

98

This suggests that we develop a global focus in our organization and training. We must

continue to improve doctrine and training, and to organize and equip our forces to meet

the demands of global engagement. Key to the success of future operations will be the

concept of a joint operational architecture that clearly defines the relationships between

elements of the global force in a contingency or major theater war. Given an appropriate

joint operational architecture, the Department can then develop the technical architectures

to support warfighter needs, prioritize our resources and training requirements against the

spectrum of global threats, and describe the organizations necessary to support our

National Military Strategy. The Joint Staff is in the process of evolving such a joint

operational architecture based on the tenants of Joint Vision 2010.

2. Effects of Weather on Attack Operations (U)

(U) Throughout the campaign, air operations and strike execution were impacted

by the requirement for favorable weather in up to four geographically dispersed locations.

These were (1) the target area, (2) the base from which the strike aircraft were operating,

(3) the base used by any aircraft supporting the strike, and (4) the orbit location for the

refueling tankers. This requirement complicated strike execution by allowing brief,

localized periods of inclement weather to adversely affect overall operations. For

example, on several occasions, morning fog at Aviano prevented strike-support aircraft

from launching, which then caused missions to be cancelled even though strike aircraft

from other bases were already airborne. On other occasions, thunderstorms or reduced

visibility in the tanker pattern caused strike waves to be cancelled. Numerous other

examples exist, making it clear why the capability to forecast weather conditions, which

was greatly enhanced by space and weather forecasting tools in this conflict, is so

valuable. Even if aircraft were able to get airborne, refueled, and matched up with

supporting defensive and control aircraft, there was still no guarantee that the weather in

the strike area would cooperate. As mentioned earlier, conditions in Kosovo were such

that there was at least 50 percent cloud cover more than 70 percent of the time,

hampering our ability to employ laser-guided munitions and putting a premium on other

preferred weapons.

3. Information Operations Synchronization (U)

(U) Successfully conducting operations to disrupt or confuse an enemy’s ability

to collect, process, and disseminate information is increasingly important in this

information age of warfare. The importance of such capabilities was recognized fully
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

99

during Operation Allied Force, but the conduct of integrated information operations was

hampered by the lack of advance planning and necessary strategic guidance to define key

objectives. The Department will address this problem by developing the needed plans

and testing them in exercises.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

100

VIII. LOGISTICS AND FORCE SUSTAINMENT (U)

(U) No matter the size of the operation, critical supplies (“beans and bullets”)

must be delivered to our fighting forces when and where needed. The importance of

tracking the movement of these items was discussed earlier in the in-transit visibility

section of this report. The need to move daily supplies also highlights the requirement

for a sustainment-planning tool to enable better allocation of theater transportation

resources. The magnitude of the forces deployed to Operation Allied Force and the

limited availability of logistics infrastructure presented particular challenges to the

logistics units and personnel tasked with sustainment operations. In this chapter we

discuss the major sustainment issues that can provide valuable lessons for the next

conflict.

A. Prepositioning Preferred Ammunition (U)

(U) As was discussed in Chapter VII, accurate guided munitions are preferred for

operations like Allied Force because they are more effective from altitudes beyond the

reach of many ground-based air defense systems and because they can kill their targets

with fewer sorties and minimal collateral damage. These preferred munitions, however,

only exist in limited numbers. They are typically more expensive than unguided or

“dumb” iron bombs, and require greater care in storage. Given the preference for guided

munitions coupled with their relative scarcity, a review of the policies surrounding their

allocation is warranted.

(U) Currently, the allocation of limited preferred munitions stocks is oriented to

support the strategy outlined in the Defense Planning Guidance. Most important is the

distribution of prepositioned munitions that a theater commander can rapidly draw upon.

Prepositioned munitions are stored on the ground or on ships located near the supported

theater. However, because munitions stockpiles must be divided among several overseas

theaters, theater inventories of preferred munitions tend to lag requirements. In the event

of a contingency like Operation Allied Force, these inventories can become strained very

quickly. During Allied Force, rapid resupply from the United States was required early

in the operation.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

101

(U) Airlift of preferred munitions from the United States adds a significant

burden to an airlift fleet already tasked with deploying units. In light of the high demand

for preferred munitions, the Department plans to reexamine the allocation of preferred

munitions to the different theaters. This assessment will try to reconcile the demands of

smaller-scale contingencies with the operational plans for major theater wars in an effort

to minimize the overall risk to our military posture as a whole. In a similar vein, the

Department will examine the mix of preferred to non-preferred munitions in

prepositioned stocks.

B. Mobility Readiness Spares Packages (U)

(U) Present day U.S. Air Force Mobility Readiness Spares Package (MRSP)

levels reflect the projected demands for a scenario involving two nearly simultaneous

major theater wars and rely heavily on the availability of deployed aircraft that can be

cannibalized for spare parts to offset MRSP shortfalls. Cannibalization is the primary

source of many parts not carried in present fighter MRSPs. When these MRSPs are used

to support a partial squadron deployment (split-based operations), stay behind (home

station) aircraft must be cannibalized to fill spares shortfalls of the deployed element,

since there are not enough aircraft deployed to meet spares (cannibalization)

requirements. The lower than planned aircraft loss rates and higher aircraft availability

rates experienced in OAF exacerbated this problem by increasing the demand for spares

while further limiting the availability of cannibalization aircraft.

(U) Our experience in Operation Allied Force provided indication that current

Air Force Mobility Readiness Spares Packages may be insufficient to achieve aircraft

availability targets under the Air Force’s Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept. For

AEF commitments, the Air Force may not deploy entire squadrons, creating split-based

operating conditions not unlike those experienced during Allied Force.

C. Engineering Assets (U)

(U) The relatively limited infrastructure available in Albania made engineering

assets essential to Operation Allied Force. For example, Air Force Red Horse engineers

made critical improvements to the airfield at Tirana, Albania, while both Air Force and

Army engineers made major improvements to the Albanian highway system to enable

movement of equipment and supplies. Engineering units can employ large pieces of

equipment (e.g., bulldozers) and great quantities of construction materials. As a result,
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

102

these units are not easy to move. Their equipment and materials are not efficiently

transportable by air, and use of sealift is slow. Accordingly, the following lessons

learned are deemed important.

1. Lack of Forward-Deployed Engineering Assets (U)

(U) Had ground forces been deployed into Kosovo, the requirements for

engineering support would have been substantial. Engineers would have had to make

necessary improvements to airfields, seaports, and the road and rail network so that the

transportation network could adequately support the movement of refugees as well as the

ground-combat forces involved in offensive operations. These demands may have

exceeded the capability of in-theater engineering assets. Moving engineering units form

the United States to fulfill this requirement would have adversely affected the CINC's

concept of operations owing to the strategic lift required to move these engineering units.

The large volume of airlift required for equipment-heavy engineer units makes airlift

impractical and uneconomical. Sealift, on the other hand, is very slow; its use would

have delayed the arrival of engineer assets in theater, thereby postponing the completion

of needed improvements in the region’s transportation network and slowing the

movement of forces into Kosovo. After the Military Technical Agreement was signed,

EUCOM was able to substantially reduce its requirement for CONUS-based engineers.

However, even these smaller forces had to deploy by sealift so as not to impact higher

priority elements of the Kosovo Force which were being moved by airlift.

(U) To identify possible remedies for this problem, a working group of CINC and

Service engineers is conducting a detailed investigation of options for establishing

different mixes of forward-deployed engineer assets. Among other issues, this group is

assessing worldwide requirements for forward-deployed, strategically located

engineering assets to ensure that theater commanders have sufficient engineering support

for rapid response contingencies in their theaters.

2. Air-Transportable Engineer Response Capability (U)

(U) The shortage of an initial level of engineer response capability that is air

transportable may lead to ineffective engineering support in some circumstances. Even

though most engineer units are deployable by air or sea, they are so heavy that there is

insufficient engineer capability that can be quickly brought to a crisis situation given the

competing demands for strategic lift assets. In support of the initial phase of contingency
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

103

operations in Kosovo, Air Force Red Horse teams and a Navy Seabee Air Detachment

(both are air deployable and much lighter than other engineering units) provided

engineering capability in Albania. These units made road and airfield repairs to help

support the overwhelming flood of refugees leaving Kosovo. Both of these units are air

deployable and light compared with other engineering units, yet they provide a

substantial level of engineer capability.

(U) The aforementioned working group of CINC and Service engineers is also

assessing the capabilities of Service engineer units so that appropriate engineering

capabilities can be provided quickly in time of crisis. In particular, we plan to examine

the requirements for air-deployable engineering assets to determine if it is possible to

tailor engineer units that can be more expediently deployed by air.

3. Requirements for Expeditionary Operational and Support Facilities (U)

(U) Depending on the type and size of unit being deployed into an expeditionary

theater, temporary facilities may be required for base camps, electrical power, water

supply, vehicle and equipment maintenance and storage, administrative space, and

command-and-control centers. Engineers are responsible for preparing suitable sites for

all of these facilities as well as providing important force-protection support. In many

cases, units have very specific requirements that impose unique demands onengineering

units. As a result, engineers are called upon to accommodate the storage of ammunition

and petroleum products, as well as improve ports, airfields, road networks, railroads,

waterways, and pipelines. The current automated planning system used by engineers to

sort through the myriad of issues attendant to a major deployment is designated the Joint

Engineer Planning and Execution System (JEPES). It became evident during Operation

Allied Force that this tool cannot adequately support facility requirements planning for

deploying forces in a fast-moving crisis situation. Moreover, no other automated system

is available that enables engineer planners to rapidly identify facility requirements and to

effectively assess and execute required engineer support in acquiring the needed facilities

for deploying forces. Consequently, JEPES will have to be modernized or replaced.

D. Humanitarian Assistance (U)

(U) Operation Sustain Hope prevented mass starvation and homelessness among

the estimated 850,000 Kosovars who fled to Albania and Macedonia after Serbian forces

stepped up their "ethnic cleansing" campaign in Kosovo. More than 500 airlift sorties
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

104

were flown to deliver nearly 3,100 tons of bulk food, humanitarian daily rations, tents

and other shelters, bedding, medical supplies, and a variety of support equipment and

vehicles. In all, the United States contributed approximately 18 percent of the

humanitarian assistance end-items provided by the international community. Roughly 10

percent of the 90,000 Kosovo refugees who were evacuated from Macedonia to third

countries were accepted into the United States. At the same time, the U.S. Air Force

Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) contractor constructed three refugee camps in

Albania under the supervision of Prime Beef teams and with support from Air Force Red

Horse engineers. Each of the camps could support up to 20,000 refugees. This

humanitarian assistance was successful in saving tens of thousands of lives, and in

preventing Serbian terror from undermining the NATO campaign.

(U) Although Operation Sustain Hope did not support military operations

directly, we have placed it in this chapter because it was a sustainment operation

conducted largely by military forces. The lessons learned from Operation Sustain Hope

are valuable should our military be called upon for similar missions in the future.

1. Simultaneous Combat and Humanitarian Operations (U)

(U) A unique set of circumstances shaped Operation Sustain Hope from the very

beginning. Of particular importance was the need to conduct combat operations at the

same time as humanitarian operations. This introduced conflicts and complexities not

present in purely humanitarian scenarios such as Support Hope (Somalia,1994) or Strong

Support (Hurricane Mitch, 1998). This was felt most acutely in Albania, where combat

and humanitarian operations were collocated at Rinas Airport. The airport, austere by

Western standards, was the main base of operations for both Operation Sustain Hope and

Task Force Hawk. The demands of these two activities resulted in an inevitable

competition for landing spaces, ground transportation, and other support assets. In

addition, assets not associated with the airport itself were in demand by both operations.

These included heavy lift aircraft, special communications and intelligence assets, and

even military linguists.

(U) In some cases, the competition for resources led to a perception on the part of

non-governmental relief organizations that insufficient attention was given to the

humanitarian operation. In this case, however, the two very different Task Forces

(Shining Hope and Hawk) worked through their conflicting priorities and effectively

accomplished their missions.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

105

2. Coordination of Relief Efforts (U)

(U) Coordination of humanitarian operations was generally good among NATO

allies (and Partnership for Peace members). However, coordination between U.S.

Government agencies was somewhat rough at the beginning of the operation. As a result

of this initially shaky coordination, things that could have improved the humanitarian

operation were sometimes overlooked. For example, DoD humanitarian assessments and

those carried out by the U.S. Agency for International Development (often with

representatives from the Department of State) should be combined or at least more

closely coordinated. Coordinated assessments are particularly important because they

provide input to many critical logistics issues such as road conditions and existence of

suitable housing for refugees. Effective assessments are critical because of their impact

on the allocation of humanitarian relief supplies.

(U) As the operation progressed, coordination improved. In Albania, the

establishment of an Emergency Management Group helped effectively harness the

resources of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and donor

countries, while preserving overall host nation sovereignty. A NATO cell was

established at the Emergency Management Group to coordinate military resources

effectively. For its part, the DoD established a Civil Military Operations Center at Rinas

Airport in Albania. This Center worked effectively with the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees and with non-governmental organizations. To foster such

superb humanitarian assistance relationships and logistics interactions for future

operations, we are examining use of activities such as liaison officer exchanges or

conducting humanitarian assistance exercises.

3. Assessment of Humanitarian Needs (U)

(U) The effective assessment of humanitarian needs is a critical element of any

relief effort. By evaluating road conditions and establishing the existence of suitable

housing for refugees, such assessments help determine the priority of engineering

projects and the need to build refugee camps. During the Kosovo operation, the CINC

designated the JTF commander, who in turn designated the deployed Marine Air Ground

Task Force (MAGTF) to act as a Humanitarian Assessment Team and provide an

assessment of the humanitarian conditions in Albania and Macedonia. As a result, the

team had little familiarity with embassy personnel, the CINC staff, or the Disaster

Assistance Response Team (DART) that had been provided by the interagency process.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

106

Moreover, the U.S. ambassador in Albania did not have a good understanding of the

assessment team’s role. The consequent lack of coordination and cooperation resulted in

the departure of the assessment team before it had completed its mission. A humanitarian

assessment team provided by the CINC staff, rather than a deployed unit, would have had

better ties with embassy staffs and would have been more familiar with theater

conditions. To avoid such problems in the future, in-theater personnel who are familiar

with the area and the embassy staffs in neighboring nations should be used to conduct

humanitarian assessments. These assessment teams should also develop effective liaison

with other inter-agency humanitarian efforts such as Disaster Assistance Response

Teams.

4. Establishing Refugee Camps (U)

(U) A lack of standard procedures for establishing refugee camps either within or

outside the continental United States caused some confusion and prevented full unity of

effort among the various U.S. Government agencies involved. The interagency

participants did not anticipate an executive policy directing development of refugee

camps and processing centers in the United States. After discussion of several;

alternatives, it was determined that refugees would be brought to the United States, and

the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would act as the overall lead

agent for support within the continental United States. Overseas, because the presence of

thousands of refugees fleeing Kosovo could have hindered ongoing NATO military

operations and presented a target for cross-border operations by Serb forces, the U.S.

concept for easing the refugee crisis was to have the Department of Defense undertake

refugee relief efforts, including the establishment of refugee camps in the region.

(U) The interagency employed ad hoc solutions when executive policy dictated a

need for refugee camps and processing centers to accommodate up to 20,000 refugees for

resettlement within the continental United States. To meet this objective, the U.S.

Government needed to establish a processing center to receive, temporarily house, and

process Kosovars for temporary refuge and possible resettlement. The National Security

Council looked to the Department of Defense for recommendations on locations, and it

looked to the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration for

the procedures to establish this entity. As indicated above, the U.S. Department of Health

and Human Services was the overall lead agency for this effort. HHS funded and

administered the processing center; the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice

provided support services and personnel; and the Department of Defense provided the
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

107

facility, although Health and Human Services funded upgrades and contracting services.

Pursuant to relevant legal authorities, DoD’s incremental support costs were funded by

HHS. Within the Department of Defense, the Director of Military Support (DOMS) was

selected to act as lead agent, utilizing Fort Dix, New Jersey, as the location for the center.

(U) The Director of Military Support had extensive experience dealing with

relevant interagency groups, but this operation was more complex than the loan of

equipment or the temporary assignment of personnel. Providing support for the Kosovar

refugees involved detailed coordination in the areas of immigration law, refugee policy,

ethnic and cultural sensitivity, and, above all, public diplomacy. Some policy decisions

regarding the Fort Dix center were made at the highest level of the executive branch,

while housing and care of the refugees was left to the military in conjunction with Health

and Human Services. The total number of refugees intended to be housed and processed

at the Fort Dix center was never truly established. The original plan was to use that

facility for only a minor share of the 20,000 refugees that the United States had agreed to

accommodate. However, the population target for the Fort Dix center changed over time,

and forced planners to react accordingly.

(U) In the event that refugee camps within the continental United States are

required in the future, the U.S. Government should establish appropriate standard

operating procedures to guide their development. These procedures should be

constructed so as to preclude interagency ad hoc decisions as the situation develops. The

Department of Defense should work with the Department of Health and Human Services

and the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration and the

National Security Council to accomplish this task.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

108

IX. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING (U)

(U) The overall levels of readiness and training of U.S. forces deployed during

Operation Allied Force, both active and reserve components, were superb. The ability to

plan, conduct, and sustain complex integrated operations of this kind demonstrated both a

very high level of professional skill and the availability of material resources that were

adequate for the task at hand. Losses due to accidents were few; indeed, they were even

below levels typically anticipated in peacetime operations. The capability of U.S. forces

to achieve this degree of success is reassuring, but must be tempered by an understanding

of the indirect costs in terms of reduced readiness in U.S.-based forces and the postconflict "reconstitution" expenses necessary to restore the deployed forces to a

satisfactory steady-state operational tempo. Further, as discussed elsewhere, certain key

force elements were deployed to this conflict as a very high proportion of their total

inventory. Recognizing the challenges presented by the Kosovo operation, the

Department is reviewing its planning for both peacetime and wartime readiness.

(U) Previous sections of this report have discussed how our troops quickly solved

the problems associated with the limited transportation infrastructure in Albania; how our

engineers and other support personnel quickly constructed refugee facilities and

distributed supplies, thereby providing critically needed shelter and preventing starvation;

and how our pilots and their commanders quickly developed and implemented tactics and

techniques to successfully attack Milosevic's elusive forces in Kosovo. These and their

many other accomplishments make it clear that our people made Operation Allied Force

a success. They were well trained, disciplined, and creative. Their ability to overcome

the many challenges they faced through initiative and innovation is unrivaled among the

world's military forces.

(U) The paramount lesson learned from Operation Allied Force is that the well

being of our people must remain our first priority. Other important lessons arising from

the unique challenges of mobilizing people in support of this operation are discussed

below.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

109

A. Personnel Shortfalls and the Individual Augmentation Process (U)

(U) At the onset of Operation Allied Force, the number of military personnel

required by U.S. European Command and Joint Task Forces Noble Anvil and Shining

Hope exceeded the numbers of trained personnel on hand. This shortfall was further

complicated because augmentation personnel were not immediately available from other

sources. In many cases, the various joint and combined staffs operating in the theater

were competing for personnel with the same skills. Further, the inability of the supported

command to specify the type and qualification requirements of augmentees slowed down

the process and sometimes placed the wrong person in a needed position. Operation

Allied Force provided a crucial test for the process of accomplishing Individual

Augmentation.

1. Individual Augmentation Process (U)

(U) The Individual Augmentation process is designed to assign individuals, rather

than entire military units, on a temporary duty (TDY) or temporary additional duty

(TAD) basis. The procedures to be used to accomplish these assignments are described

in detail in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1301.01A: Policy

and Procedures To Assign Individuals To Meet Combatant Command Mission Related

Temporary Duty Assignments and illustrated schematically in Figure 18. Because each

potential source of augmentation personnel will need to query its subordinate commands

before responding, the process is not designed for rapid response.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

110

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 18 Established Individual Augmentation Process (U)

EUCOM

USAFE

NAVEUR

USAREUR

MARFOREUR

SOCEUR

INDIVIDUAL

ASSIGNED

MISSION ASSIGNED

VIA DEPLOYMENT ORDER

SERVICE

ASSETS

SERVICE

HEADQUARTERS

INDIVIDUAL

ASSIGNED

INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNED

DOD

AGENCY CINCs SERVICES

TASKING

ORDER

YES

NO

NO YES

CJCS

SECDEF

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Due to the need for rapid action during the initial surge, the European

Command did not follow the established procedures in requesting the

augmentation personnel needed for the CINC’s headquarters staff. The Joint

Staff then contacted the appropriate Service personnel chiefs and defense

agencies to expedite augmentation. This process was not error free, however,

and at times resulted in delays and created dual taskings to the Services. The

policies and procedures identified in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Instruction 1301.01A were followed after this initial surge. (The personnel

augmentation process actually used during the early phase of Operation

Allied Force is illustrated in Figure 19.)
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

111

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 19 Personnel Augmentation Process

Actually Employed During Operation Allied Force (U)

SERVICE

ASSETS

SERVICE

HEADQUARTERS

INDIVIDUAL

ASSIGNED

INDIVIDUAL

ASSIGNED

DOD

AGENCY CINCs

CJCS

USAFE

NAVEUR

USAREUR

MARFOREUR

SOCEUR

INDIVIDUAL

ASSIGNED

YES

YES

IF NOT

W/IN SVC’S

BYPASSED

REQUEST

IF NOT

W/IN SVC’S

EUCOM

UNCLASSIFIED

*NOTE:AFTER COORDINATION

WITH EUCOM SERVICE

COMPONENTS. CJCSI1301.01A

WAS FOLLOWED AFTER THE

INITIAL REQUIREMENTS

SURGE.

(U) To achieve the manning levels required to support operations in Kosovo,

nearly 1,000 individual augmentees were requested. Of these, the European Command

accounted for 439 (45 percent), Joint Task Force Noble Anvil for 326 (34 percent), and

Joint Task Force Shining Hope for 202 (21 percent). As shown in Figure 20, the affected

commands identified the need for nearly all of these personnel at the outset of Operation

Allied Force. This surge in demand, coupled with the need for immediate reporting dates

in theater and often stringent personnel qualifications [e.g., the need for Top

Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) security clearances, or specific

foreign language skills], severely stressed CINC and Service force personnel providers.

(U) Although the CINCs and Services made every effort to provide the

augmentation personnel sought for Operation Allied Force, not every request could be

satisfied. Of particular concern were the 193 vacant personnel billets that had been

determined to require an augmentee on an “immediate” basis. Personnel to be moved
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

112

into immediate-fill positions were to be identified in only 3 days, a time period that

proved too short in many instances. Despite these problems, the personnel process

ultimately achieved a fill rate of roughly 82 percent by the end of the campaign (again,

see Figure 20.)

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 20 Demand for Personnel Augmentees During Operation

Allied Force (U)

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

TIME 17-Apr 22-Apr 30-Apr 6-May 11-May 18-May 25-May 1-Jun 8-Jun 15-Jun 25-Jun

Filled

Required

Required

Filled

Percent

Filled

R

E

Q

U

I

R

E

M

E

N

T

S

815

276

34%

838

373

45%

888

475

53%

925

587

63%

935

603

64%

946

667

71%

949

700

74%

950

711

75%

950

757

80%

947

776

82%

948

769

81%

UNCLASSIFIED

2. Impact on Active Units (U)

(U) As has been seen, the need to flesh out key staff positions in the units

assigned to Operation Allied Force imposed a sudden and unanticipated requirement for

roughly 1,000 additional personnel (a number comparable in size to a Reinforced

Battalion). Moreover, the required skill areas for many of these personnel fell in such

critical areas as intelligence, imagery analysis, and communications. (The difficulties

incurred in meeting these needs are discussed in more detail in Section B below.)

Because the numbers of such personnel are already limited, many of these positions had

to be filled by drawing personnel from other active units. Use of this so-called “rip to

fill” mode meant that the active unit providing the augmentee was left without its

required complement of skilled personnel.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

113

3. Role of Reserve Forces (U)

(U) The Reserve component provides a well-established and ready source of

personnel augmentation for staff functions through the Individual Mobilization

Augmentee (IMA) program. The utility of this program is evident in that roughly 5,600

Reserve component personnel were mobilized. Of these, nearly 4,000 served in the

European theater, accounting for 40 percent of KC-135 tanker aircraft crews and 25

percent of the A-10 attack aircraft crews in theater, and roughly 10 percent of the total

number of U.S. military personnel deployed there. While most of the Reserve personnel

were committed following the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up, thousands of

Reservists and National Guardsmen voluntarily supported Operation Allied Force.

Fifteen of the 19 Air National Guard tanker units that supported Allied Force, for

example, had volunteered and deployed aircraft and personnel before the Call-up was

announced.

4. Role of Contractors (U)

(U) Contractor support was used or considered for use for a wide array of

Operation Allied Force activities. In general, the practice of using civilian contractors

worked well, although some difficulties were encountered. Examples of contractor

support to Operation Allied Force include:

• Operational support for the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications

System’s Mobile Integrated Communications System (JMICS) and other C4ISR

activities

• Linguists, especially Serbo-Croatian and Albanian linguists, for intelligence,

special operations, and translation functions

• Transportation of fuel from barges on the Adriatic to locations inland

• Transportation support such as civilian airlift and sealift

• Construction of three refugee camps for displaced Kosovars.

(U) In situations where contractor support is the norm (e.g., some maintenance),

the practice was effective. However, in many instances, contractor support was a last

resort when organic capabilities were unexpectedly proven to be inadequate. In those

cases, the process of hiring contractor support and as well as integrating the contractors

into the operation presented some problems. In general, the Department needs to better

anticipate instances where contractor support might be required, and have plans in place

for rapid implementation. These plans should include mechanisms for quickly
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

114

establishing the contractual relationship as well as a thorough definition of what is

expected of the contractor and what support the contractor can expect from the military

(e.g., force protection).

5. Observations (U)

(U) The primary lessons learned from this experience are that (1) the demand for

augmentation personnel should be anticipated in future crises and (2) a process designed

to accommodate requests for small numbers of augmentees is not suited to providing

large numbers of high demand, uniquely qualified personnel in a fast-moving, large-scale

contingency. Accordingly, the Department will undertake the following actions:

• In the near term, the CINCs will develop and disseminate to the Services

detailed personnel augmentation plans to support Joint Task Force contingency

operations. These plans should identify the personnel billets that will need to be

filled during a crisis as well as the component or Service that should be tasked to

provide those personnel

• Over the long term, the Joint Staff and Services will examine ways to improve

the process used to provide personnel augmentation during times of crisis.

Needed actions include identifying the specific responsibilities to be assigned to

the CINCs, the Joint Staff, and the Services; setting realistic reporting dates; and

establishing a timely reclama process to resolve the inevitable conflicts that will

arise when crisis needs are at odds with other Service or agency priorities.

(U) The Department recognizes that major contingencies require ready access to

personnel assigned to the Reserve Component. Because a significant fraction of the

military’s total pool of uniquely skilled personnel resides in the Reserves, it is imperative

that Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up be considered early-on, and that a mechanism

to identify, fund, and obtain volunteers in the 2-3 weeks leading up to the contingency be

developed. These actions would preclude undue stress on other Active Component units,

especially those in other theaters.

B. Intelligence Personnel (U)

(U) As indicated above, among the many personnel augmentees called upon

during Operation Allied Force were those skilled in such areas as intelligence and

imagery analysis, targeting, and Serbo-Croatian linguists. Such skilled people represent

the common denominator that ensured the operation’s successful outcome across the full

range of intelligence support missions. Although intelligence personnel were stressed for
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

115

an extended period, they rose to the occasion with enthusiasm, creativity, and flexibility.

Important lessons learned regarding the utilization of this important resource are

identified here, along with recommended actions to ensure its availability in future crisis

situations.

1. Personnel Augmentation (U)

(U) While certain critical skills were in short supply — most notably experienced

targeteers, Albanian and Serbian linguists, and multi-discipline collection managers —

the collective resources of the Intelligence Community were effectively leveraged and

applied to the mission. The Services, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the

National Security Agency (NSA) shifted substantial numbers of resources from other

missions to provide dedicated, sustained, and broad support to the crisis in Kosovo.

(U) Augmentation from outside the European Theater was essential because the

European Command is not staffed to provide intelligence support to a sustained largescale contingency. Augmentation was drawn from other Commands, the Services,

National Agencies, and the Reserve Forces. The support provided by reserve and

contractor personnel proved invaluable, although the skill mix among available

augmentees was not always a perfect match with Theater needs. These shortfalls

highlight some minor deficiencies in resource allocation and training. As discussed

earlier, drawing personnel from active commands caused some degradation in the

mission capability and readiness of the donor organizations. Such an approach would

invariably cause problems were it used to support an extended operation or if a crisis

emerged in a donor command’s area of responsibility. Further investment in key skill

areas is essential.

2. Role of Other Commands and Agencies (U)

(U) Use of other commands and agencies to provide support to the European

Command was a clear success. This includes actions taken by supporting units based in

the United States (reach back), actions accomplished entirely by units assigned to other

theaters (federation), and actions accomplished by such units working together with

European Command units (collaboration). However, it remains to be seen whether

institutionalizing the successes realized by federation, collaboration, and reach back will
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

116

ultimately reduce the need for physical augmentation in the theater where the crisis or

conflict is occurring. What is apparent is that these approaches clearly offer promise.

3. Observations (U)

(U) Augmentation planning is a necessary component of crisis intelligence

operations. Given this fact, the Intelligence Community needs to develop a rapid reaction

capability that enables the various intelligence agencies to better anticipate requirements,

prepare their workforces, and streamline procedures for individual or organizational

augmentation. Moreover, the Department can hedge against possible future need for

specific low density/high demand skills by better anticipating requirements and building

them into the Reserve Forces. Investments must be geared toward developing a rapid

reaction capability, comprised of both active and reserve personnel.

(U) Linguist shortfalls are the subject of several ongoing studies. Currently, the

Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) is developing a strategy, policies, plans, and

resource programs to meet the Department’s language requirements. The shortfall in

linguists is also being reviewed by the Joint Staff, with help from Service language

program offices. In a complementary initiative, the National Security Agency has

convened a task force to look at all aspects of the linguist issue to ensure that the United

States is better prepared to deal efficiently with the full range of potential crisis scenarios.

Among the topics of major interest are the development of an overall linguist

requirements strategy and the use of contracted services.

(U) The Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs) are one example of a new

capability that allows Reserve component members of the Intelligence Community to

surge and focus resources without deploying to the mission location. Virtual

augmentation through online collaboration, federated burdensharing, and reach back have

already proved their potential. The Department needs to accelerate similar developments

to improve accessibility to the entire pool of intelligence professionals.

C. Training (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force provided invaluable insights into the readiness of our

military forces; their capability to execute a small-scale contingency within a coalition

structure; and the likely impact of the operations, given current structure and resources,

on the Department’s ability to execute the National Military Strategy. Not surprisingly,

nearly every issue addressed within this report has direct or indirect training readiness
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

117

implications. One of the most significant readiness lessons learned, and one which has

been repeatedly revealed in the analyses conducted post-Operation Allied Force, is the

criticality of and need for Service, joint, and coalition interoperability training.

1. Service Doctrine and Training (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force presented a unique operational and strategic

environment for our forces. In some cases, however, Service doctrine and training had

not fully prepared us for the missions and conditions that were encountered. As

discussed earlier in this report, Apache pilots assigned to Task Force Hawk were not fully

prepared, upon their arrival in theater, to fly the full spectrum of combat missions

required to support the Joint Force Air Component Commander, and in the existing

conditions of poor weather, mountainous terrain, and unmapped flight obstacles to be

found in the region. Though professional, motivated, and highly skilled, these pilots

required extensive training with night vision goggles. Similarly, Navy pilots had not

been fully trained for the mission of providing close-air-support type missions (i.e.,

locating targets, while minimizing collateral damage) under the unique operational

conditions of Allied Force.

2. Interoperability and Joint Training (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force also validated the need for joint, integrated training

among the Services to enhance their ability to execute both joint and coalition air

operations such as those encountered in Kosovo. Working as a joint team, the

capabilities of each Service’s aircraft and supporting systems can complement each other

to enhance both force survivability and combat effectiveness, and permit the full

exploitation of capabilities in contingencies, as well as in major theater wars. The

importance of integrated training was also evident in the need for interoperability

between the deep-strike assets assigned to Task Force Hawk (Apache attack helicopters

and multiple-launch rocket systems) and other deep-strike assets such as fixed-wing

aircraft and their command-and-control network. Operation Allied Force underscores the

criticality of joint doctrine, interoperability training, and supporting Service doctrine,

tactics, techniques, and procedures. Greater emphasis must be placed on interoperability

training among our own forces, with those of our allies, other nations, and partners; as

well as on interagency training within our Government.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

118

D. Force Health Protection (U)

(U) Force Health Protection (FHP) efforts played a pivotal role in the success of

Operation Allied Force. The United States was simultaneously committed to a

contingency operation and a large-scale humanitarian relief operation, with medical

personnel heavily engaged in both. What may not be readily apparent is the evolving

doctrine of Force Health Protection, which is increasing the role of medical surveillance

and preventive medicine in the conduct of contingency operations. Military medical care

has evolved steadily from reliance solely upon the treatment of casualties to a more

balanced approach that adds the principles of casualty prevention and a healthy and fit

force. These principles have become a force multiplier to DoD's success in providing

health support for its personnel. Three aspects of health protection merit further

attention.

1. Health Assessment Screening (U)

(U) Pre-deployment and post-deployment health assessment screening

compliance was inconsistently implemented. Some units deploying to the Kosovo area

of responsibility did not complete medical assessments as directed in the USEUCOM

Deployment Order (DEPORD) and as required by DoD Directive 6490/2; DoD

Instruction 6490.3; Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) Memorandum Policy

for Pre and Post Deployment Health Assessments (dated 6 October 1998); and Joint Staff

Memorandum (JCS MCM 251-98, dated 4 December 1998) Deployment Health

Surveillance. Pre-deployment surveys provide extremely valuable medical information

about the health of deploying forces and enable medical personnel to identify disease

trends far earlier than if no surveys were taken. Post-deployment surveys provide crucial

retrospective information to identify Service members who may be at risk of developing

illnesses months or years after returning to their home stations. Commanders assigned to

theater CINCs, Joint Task Forces, and the Services must ensure that medical screenings

are completed.

2. Access to Healthcare (U)

(U) Deployment of military health care teams in support of Operation Allied

Force resulted in reduced accessibility to healthcare benefits for military personnel and

dependents who remained at the home bases of deployed units. TRICARE contracts did

not fully fill all the gaps caused by deploying providers. As a result, beneficiaries had
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

119

difficulties getting all of the health care benefits that TRICARE is supposed to provide.

Deployment of healthcare resources in support of contingency operations creates

unprogrammed and expensive TRICARE requirements that can place an extreme

hardship on medical treatment facilities and beneficiaries. Consequently, the Services

must plan for rapid augmentation or backfill of military healthcare personnel to these

facilities as soon as feasible. In addition, a TRICARE contract contingency plan that

provides for additional contract support is needed.

3. Deployed Health Services Support (U)

 (U) Operation Allied Force underscored the disconnect between the current

structure of Service medical units that are based on a two-major-theater-war strategy and

the reality of medical mission requirements in multiple, smaller-scale contingencies.

Many of the Service medical units currently in use are sized for a major theater war and

are cumbersome when used for smaller-scale contingency deployments. Moreover, these

units are not well suited for rapid deployment. Army and Navy hospital assets, for

example, are large and heavy, and thus require use of substantial lift assets when they

must be deployed. Their lack of modularity simply does not permit rapid operational

support in smaller-scale contingencies. The Air Force’s Expeditionary Medical Support

(EMEDS) and Air Force Theater Hospital (AFTH) are modularized, able to rapidly

deploy to provide forward stabilization, and provide tailored force packages to meet the

requirements of theater commanders across the full spectrum of military and

humanitarian operations.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

120

X. IMPACT ON OTHER OPERATIONS (U)

(U) Given the size of the military force that was deployed to carry out Operation

Allied Force, the potential for adverse impacts on other U.S. commitments around the

world seems clear. The causes and implications of the most important impacts that were

observed are explored here.

A. Allied Force Impact On Major Theater War Operation Plans (U)

(U) As noted previously, if the threat of major theater war had developed in

another theater during Operation Allied Force, the United States would have taken all

actions necessary to prevail. In order to provide the full array of combat capabilities

necessary to meet our MTW objectives, we would have likely reduced the tempo of U.S.

operations over Kosovo to make certain specialized air assets ? particularly RC-135

aircraft and aerial refueling platforms ? available for higher priority missions. The

Department has always recognized that, if confronted with two major theater wars, we

would need to withdraw U.S. forces from ongoing peacetime activities and smaller-scale

contingency operations as quickly as possible ? including, in this instance, from

Operation Allied Force ? to prepare them for war. Consistent with our defense strategy,

U.S. forces could not have continued the intense campaign in Kosovo and, at the same

time, conducted two major theater wars.

(U) Accordingly, the Department continuously assessed the impact of these

operations on our ability to defend effectively in other theaters. As discussed previously,

the Department initiated a number of actions to mitigate the risk in other theaters by

enhancing our deterrent posture in those theaters. Ultimately, should we have faced the

challenge of withdrawing U.S. forces to mount two major wars in defense of our vital

interests elsewhere, we are confident that we would have been able to do so, albeit at

higher levels of risk. We were cognizant of these risks at the time and made various

adjustments in our posture and plans to address them. At the same time, we recognize

that managing these risks is a highly complicated endeavor that would benefit from a

more structured and dynamic set of tools for assessing our ability to conduct major wars

when we respond to contingencies.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

121

(U) As previously discussed, Operation Allied Force represented an MTW’s level

of effort for some key air assets, particularly the so-called Low Density/High Demand

(LD/HD) assets, as well as selected tactical aircraft, airlift aircraft, and refueling tankers.

The high demand for these aircraft was met by deploying aircraft from the forces

assigned to the Commanders in Chief of theaters outside Europe. To mitigate the risk to

the affected commands, equivalent type aircraft stationed in the continental United States

were placed on alert and issued orders to be prepared to deploy on short notice

(U) Risk analysis is important in judging force readiness where commitments are

made to support important and necessary operations but do not involve our vital interests.

Some smaller-scale contingencies may be in this category. Probable future commitments

make it important to enhance the Department’s process for providing timely assessment

of the impact of smaller-scale contingencies on the ability to execute the overall defense

strategy. The complexities of assessing risk and taking operational measures to reduce

risk during Operation Allied Force provided insights as to refinements in our process that

can be made. For example, some improvements can be gained by ensuring that theater

CINCs and the Services fully utilize the deployment-order coordination process for risk

analysis. When coordinating deployment orders, CINCs can assess the impact of orders

to deploy forces from their command to other theaters (i.e., to “swing” forces from one

theater to another) on their ability to execute the defense strategy and, when possible,

identify measures that can reduce risk. Another possible improvement is the Readiness

Assessment System (RAS) currently in development by the Defense Information Systems

Agency (DISA). This system holds promise to provide a user-friendly, Web-based tool

that allows users to view time-phased force and deployment data that supports an

operational plan. The Readiness Assessment System can assist theater CINCs, the Joint

Staff, and the Services in performing risk analysis. The Department will continuously

strive to refine our process for timely assessment of risk.

B. Joint Staff and Joint Force Issues (U)

(U) In April 1999, NATO took advantage of its 50th Anniversary Summit in

Washington, DC to discuss the Balkan crisis and to issue a new strategic concept. This

concept reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to collective defense, but also stated that “to

enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area,” NATO will “stand ready,

case by case and by consensus...to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to

engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.” In this
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

122

context, Operation Allied Force was a textbook example of the type of challenge that

NATO envisioned as it developed this new strategic concept.

(U) The new strategic concept reflects the realistic view that the U.S. role in

future NATO operations is likely to fall somewhere between full-scale combat operations

in defense of the alliance and peace support activities. To conduct such operations,

which fall outside the normally planned Article-V mutual-defense requirements of the

North Atlantic Treaty, existing U.S. military capabilities in Europe will need appropriate

augmentation. The vehicle used for providing forces is the Joint Strategic Capabilities

Plan (JSCP), which apportions military forces to the various regional commanders for

planning purposes. Future editions of this plan will need to consider and apportion

appropriate forces for the Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command to use to

support planning for these NATO crisis management and crisis-response operations. To

enhance the deliberate planning available to support the most likely NATO scenarios, the

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan will be reviewed for adequacy and updated as required.

C. Global Force Integration (U)

(U) Our ability to reach-back and use capabilities in the continental United States

to perform functions formerly accomplished only in the theater of military operations is

one of the highlights of Operation Allied Force. Such capability improves

responsiveness to urgent requirements in a conflict and reduces the amount of equipment

and the number of personnel that must be transported to the theater. In short, the

capability to integrate our force globally yields significant improvements in our ability to

respond to crises, particularly during their initial stages. Figure 21 depicts the concept of

global force integration.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

123

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 21 Global Force Integration Concept (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Extensive growth in communications capacity enabled an unprecedented

degree of reliance on U.S.-based forces to provide direct support for in-theater tasks.

Targets in Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were developed through the

concerted effort of numerous agencies in the United States cooperating closely with

commands in Europe. Planning and integration of cruise missile attacks by bombers

operating from the continental United States and the United Kingdom and by ships and

submarines operating in the Mediterranean were closely coordinated by commanders and

planners who were widely separated geographically. Bomb damage assessments of

strikes made against targets in theater were conducted by agencies and commands located

in the United States in close support with efforts by commands in the European theater.

This system of using geographically dispersed activities to perform and integrate bomb

damage assessment (BDA) became known as federated BDA. Expert personnel located

in the United States and Europe performed detailed planning of information operations.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

124

Kosovo operations continued a trend of increasing global integration of U.S. forces and

commands to support operations in a distant theater.

(U) The European Theater’s unprecedented reliance on organizations and

personnel in the United States and elsewhere was enabled by advances in information

technology. High-capacity communications made possible the exchange of large

amounts of data such as high-resolution imagery and secure video teleconferencing. In

addition, extensive growth and availability in defense data and communications networks

enabled unprecedented coordination by staff members in European commands and

supporting commands outside Europe by secure e-mail. Secure high-capacity networks

using Web-based technology permitted personnel engaged in theater to access up-to-date

information posted for their use on military Web sites around the world.

(U) Space support was instrumental to our success. Satellite communications

provided a significant portion of the communications capacity and were a major enabler

of the global integration of our forces. Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites

provided highly accurate navigation necessary for synchronization of complex

operations, conduct of precision strikes, and input to GPS-guided weapons. Increased

use of recently available GPS-guided weapons signals even greater reliance on satellite

navigation. Weather satellites provided detailed and timely information necessary to

exploit locally favorable environmental conditions for strikes. Reliance on space

continues to grow in our military operations. Space operations during Allied Force

illustrate our dependence on widely dispersed global capabilities that were effectively

integrated.

(U) Integration of global forces during Kosovo operations provides insight to the

design of future exercises and training required for increasing our proficiency in the

complex actions necessary for integrating a global force. While our focus is on theater

operations, the Department must exercise the global capabilities required in support of

theater operations. Additionally, the Department must recognize the need to deploy

forces in a myriad of unpredictable scenarios requiring new levels of adaptability and

flexibility in global interoperability and integration.

(U) As discussed in detail in Chapter IV, our experience in integrating worldwide

capabilities during Operation Allied Force highlights the importance of the joint

operational architecture concept. This architecture would define the relationships

between forces and commands involved in complex operations. A joint operational

architecture would also serve as the basis for developing technical architectures to
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

125

support warfighters’ needs, and for prioritizing resources and training requirements.

These technical architectures would be defined for the spectrum of global threats and

would identify any organizational changes required to support the National Military

Strategy.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

126

XI. SUMMARY OF MAJOR OBSERVATIONS (U)

A. Alliance and Coalition Warfare (U)

(U) Although Operation Allied Force was successful, our experience revealed the

need for improvements both in the way we function as a government and in the way that

NATO functions as an alliance.

1. Interagency Planning (U)

(U) Expand Scope of Policy Actions Considered during Planning. The

interagency planning process could be improved by expanding the scope of policy tools

considered. As it was executed, the interagency planning process (1) helped to mobilize

and coordinate the activities of different agencies, (2) identify issues for consideration by

National Security Council Deputies, (3) provide planning support for international

organizations (e.g., OSCE and United Nations), and (4) develop benchmarks for

measuring progress. This political-military planning played an important role in ensuring

that the United States achieved the objectives set forth by the President. At the same

time, it is now possible to identify an important area for improvement. Planning focused

on air strikes and diplomacy as the primary tools to achieve U.S. and NATO objectives.

As it became clear that Milosevic intended to outlast the alliance, more attention was paid

to other ways of bringing pressure to bear, including economic sanctions. While

ultimately these instruments were put to use with good effect, more advance planning

might have made them more effective at an earlier date. In addition, our experience in

Operation Allied Force has shown that Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56),

Managing Complex Contingency Operations, had not yet been fully institutionalized

throughout the interagency planning process. To remedy this shortcoming, the U.S.

Government agencies involved in interagency planning have applied the lessons learned

to further institutionalize PDD-56. The routine participation of senior officials in

rehearsals, gaming, exercises, and simulations will further strengthen awareness of the

broad range of available policy tools.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

127

2. Political-Military Process (U)

(U) Improve NATO Political-Military Process. As previously discussed,

NATO's political-military command structure played an important role in the planning

and execution of the operation. NATO’s command structure worked well, but parallel

U.S. and NATO command and control structures complicated operational planning and

unity of command. These structures are well defined, but had not been used previously

to plan and conduct sustained combat operations. Despite the overall success of NATO’s

processes, the Department will work with our allies to:

• Enhance NATO's contingency planning process for operations outside the

NATO area

• Develop an overarching command-and-control policy and agree on procedures

for the policy's implementation

• Enhance procedures and conduct exercises strengthening NATO's politicalmilitary interfaces.

3. NATO Capabilities (U)

(U) Encourage NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative. If NATO is to meet

future military challenges effectively, it must successfully implement the Defense

Capabilities Initiative. Accordingly, the United States will continue to promote the

Defense Capabilities Initiative and encourage experimentation by NATO's members with

new and advanced warfighting concepts.

(U) Develop Alliance C4 Policy. The United States must work with our NATO

allies to develop an overarching command-and-control policy and an agreement on

procedures for the policy's implementation. To accomplish this, we will develop

additional policy and agreements, or ensure more effective implementation and

enforcement of existing agreements, in the following key areas:

• Collaboration on allocation of limited bandwidth and communications assets to

alliance members

• Establishment of network integration training standards for Joint Task Force

command, control, communications, and computers

• Management of the electromagnetic spectrum to optimize operations and to

avoid mutual interference in support of Joint Task Forces

• Implementation and enforcement of coalition agreements on network security

• Improvements in timely compliance with NATO Standardization Agreements
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

128

• Improvements in interoperability by focusing on overarching standards and

architectures rather than hardware

• Refinements in the policy and process of releasing information

• Acceleration of Host Nation Agreement processes affecting extensive networks

of command, control, communications, and computers for Commanders of Joint

Task Forces.

(U) Accelerate Development of Allied Joint Doctrine. Because the development

of Allied Joint Doctrine has been slower than desired, the Department is currently

reviewing U.S. procedures for participating in the development process. We believe

NATO also needs to streamline its procedures for doctrine development and approval.

Accordingly, the Department will engage NATO’s Military Committee and High Level

Steering Committee to facilitate these improvements.

B. Force Deployment (U)

(U) The deployment of U.S. forces to Operation Allied Force was, from an

overall perspective, highly successful, especially given the compressed planning timeline

and the great distances that forces were moved.

1. Deployment Checklist (U)

(U) Develop Deployment Checklist. To build on this success in future conflicts,

the Department is developing an appropriate checklist for use by U.S. negotiators to

ensure our international agreements contain critical host nation support for military

operations plans and contingency operations. Items that will be considered for inclusion

in these checklists are: designated points of entry and departure, customs, overflight

authorization, use of radio frequencies, air traffic control, blanket diplomatic clearances,

basing rights, facility access agreements, coalition contracting procedures, connectivity,

force protection, site surveys and update process, site explosive material handling plan,

and weapon storage. Implementation of such international agreements will facilitate

quicker access and assist in realizing the Joint Vision 2010 goals of rapid deployment, as

well as rapid employment and immediate sustainment.

2. Aerial Refueling Forces (U)

(U) Review Aerial Refueling Capabilities. The Department is reviewing its

aerial refueling forces and crew levels to determine whether they are sufficient to meet
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

129

future needs in major theater wars or other contingencies. The Department is also

reviewing options for improving our capability to plan in theater, in real time, for the

most effective use of our aerial refueling fleet.

3. Deployment Planning Tools and Procedures (U)

(U) Improve Deployment Planning Capabilities. The Department is reviewing

the suite of tools used to generate time-phased force and deployment data with the goal of

providing a more seamless system for planners at every level. However, improving the

automated planning systems is only part of the solution to eliminating delays in the

process used to generate Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) for an

operation, especially one that is unplanned. To ensure that existing deployment-planning

tools are used effectively, the Department will also provide more deployment-oriented

continuation training from the highest staff levels down to the lowest. The Department

also continues to pursue long-term, end-to-end solutions for this aspect of deployment

planning.

4. In-Transit Visibility (U)

(U) Improve In-Transit Visibility. The Department will continue to develop

internal in-transit visibility plans that leverage the technical in-transit visibility

capabilities that are being developed and deployed by the Services and other agencies.

The Department is also evaluating the need for additional joint doctrine and procedures to

link strategic and theater in-transit visibility into an integrated process so as to provide

commanders with a much clearer picture of the status of deploying units, equipment, and

supplies.

5. Role of Airlift (U)

(U) Continue To Support C-17 Program. The Department will provide

continued strong support for the C-17 program. The performance of the Air Force’s

C-17A airlifters was one of the great success stories of Operation Allied Force. The

planes flew half of the strategic airlift missions required during the operation. Their

capability to land on small airfields and to accommodate rapid offloading of cargo were

particularly important.

(U) Examine Utility of Placing Strategic Airlift under Theater Control. The

Department is also examining the structure and concepts of operation employed at the Air
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

130

Mobility Operations Control Center to determine if they are applicable to other theaters.

To accommodate the deployment demands associated with Task Force Hawk, the U.S.

Transportation Command, for the first time, gave a theater tactical control of a significant

number of strategic airlift aircraft for a specific deployment. An established mechanism

for temporarily placing strategic airlift aircraft under theater control may be of great help

in major theater wars if commanders are faced with sudden, large intratheater lift

requirements.

6. Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Capability (U)

(U) Review Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Capabilities. The Department will

review its requirements for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) systems and similar

logistics enablers. Although our JLOTS capability was not needed in Operation Allied

Force, the Department must ensure that we have adequate capability to provide logistics

support across a broad range of major theater wars and smaller scale contingencies.

C. Force Direction (U)

(U) Command, control, and communications systems and facilities provide

essential force direction capability. While the command, control, and communications

capabilities available during Operation Allied Force enabled effective application of U.S.

and NATO forces, some shortcomings were apparent. These are discussed below.

1. Air Operations Center (U)

(U) Develop Expeditionary Air Operations Centers. Operation Allied Force

highlighted the need for the Department to develop expeditionary air operations centers

and equip them with supporting resources and manpower to enable U.S. forces to create

combined air operations centers that can be tailored to the crisis at hand and deployed

quickly. Future conflicts will continue to require appropriate command-and-control

centers to effectively execute and manage the joint force commander’s strategy and

execution plans. If such centers are to be effective, they cannot be set up from scratch.

2. Joint Tactical Data Connectivity and Control (U)

(U) Establish Joint Interface Control Officers on CINC Staffs. The Department

is staffing a joint requirement for the Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO) organization

to fill authorized positions on CINC headquarters staffs. The JICO is the only activity
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

131

that is trained to integrate tactical data systems at a joint level. At present, however,

theater CINCs are currently not authorized to include elements of this organization within

their headquarters. Consequently, during Allied Force, the JICO school at U.S. Army

Forces Command dispatched its cadre of trainers to Europe to support the operation. The

JICO school has now been reestablished at Joint Forces Command, where it will need

strong support, including the development of automated tools and the right people.

(U) Provide Secure Joint Tactical Data Link. The Department must develop a

joint, secure, tactical data-link capability across all strike platforms to allow real-time

data exchange and precision-target processing between sensors and shooters, and to

establish a robust common-tactical picture.

3. Joint Operational Architecture (U)

(U) Develop Joint Operational Architecture. To address interoperability

deficiencies in the near term, the Department needs to develop a concept of operations for

joint and coalition warfare that identifies interoperability shortfalls and defines

contingency plans. For the long term, the Department must consider construction of an

end-to-end joint operational architecture that provides a roadmap for U.S. and NATO

acquisition strategies.

D. Intelligence and Targeting Support (U)

(U) The overall quality and level of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR) support provided during Operation Allied Force was far superior to that provided

during the Gulf War. Moreover, many of the intelligence system and architecture

shortfalls that surfaced during Allied Force had been recognized prior to the crisis and

remedies had been programmed. Others, however, became evident for the first time.

1. Intelligence Support (U)

(U) Improve Federated Intelligence Capability. The Department will continue

to develop and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures to guide our federated

intelligence efforts. The Department will also reassess the communications systems

needed to support our increased reliance on federation, taking into account the needs for

deployable systems and technicians. In addition, the Department must develop a clear

policy and implementation plan to explain when and how coalition partners can be

connected to U.S. networks and when and how data can be shared with those partners.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

132

2. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems (U)

(U) Enhance the Employment of ISR Assets. The Department will identify

innovative and affordable ways to enhance the employment of low-density/high-demand

ISR assets. In particular, the Department will identify ways to adjust the deployments of

ISR platforms dynamically so as to provide adequate support for emergent theater-level

requirements while maintaining required levels of surveillance and intelligence

awareness in other areas of the world.

(U) Improve ISR Sensors and Communications Capability. The Department

must also develop better sensors and communications to improve our capability to target

an adversary’s mobile-fielded forces. We also need to emphasize rapid collection and

dissemination of no-strike target information to avoid collateral damage.

3. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (U)

(U) Improve Capability To Use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. To enhance U.S.

capability to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the Department is investigating

specific technical and training improvements. In addition, the Department will improve

the tactics, techniques, and procedures that guide UAV operations so as to better integrate

these systems in overall campaign plans.

4. Precision Intelligence (U)

(U) Improve Precision Intelligence Capability. To improve U.S. capability to

provide precision intelligence, the Department will focus on specific technical

enhancements.

5. Countering Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception Tactics (U)

(U) Improve Capability To Counter an Adversary’s Use of Camouflage,

Concealment, and Deception. The Department must devise better means to counter the

use of camouflage, concealment, and deception tactics by potential adversaries. Greater

emphasis needs to be placed on the development of advanced sensors and improved

training.

E. Force Protection (U)

(U) From a force protection perspective, Operation Allied Force was among the

most successful major military actions in modern history. Despite a determined enemy,
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

133

NATO defense forces quickly fought and won control of the air, ensuring that its forces

enjoyed complete safety and freedom to maneuver outside the borders of the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia.

1. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (U)

(U) Prepare for State-of-the-Art Air Defense Threats. While NATO prevailed

in delivering an overwhelming air offensive with virtually no loss to its forces, we must

acknowledge some concerns for the future. Although the Yugoslav air defense systems

were among the most capable that U.S. forces have ever faced in combat, those defenses

do not represent the state of the art. Much more capable air defense systems are currently

available for sale in the international arms market. The Department needs to prepare for

the possibility that, in the years ahead, the United States may face an adversary armed

with state-of-the-art air defense systems.

(U) Enhance Capability To Locate and Attack Air Defense Threats. The

Department is investigating ways to improve our capability to attack hostile radar and

missile systems.

(U) Develop a Comprehensive Air Defense Suppression Capability. Our

experiences in Operation Allied Force re-emphasized the importance of having a

comprehensive air defense suppression capability. Accordingly, the Department is

conducting a detailed and thorough study of our joint air-defense suppression capabilities.

2. Personnel Recovery (U)

(U) Designate and Train Combat Search and Rescue Forces. Because

personnel recovery operations are among the most complex and dangerous missions

undertaken by our forces, the combatant commands must include appropriate personnel

recovery training in joint exercises. Moreover, this training must include the full

spectrum of recovery operations. In addition, the combatant commands should designate

in contingency and operation plans a primary combat search-and-rescue force for each

component and joint task force and should then ensure that these forces train

appropriately.

3. Communications and Operations Security (U)

(U) Provide Secure Telephone Capability. Over the near term, regional

commanders and the Services will review their distribution and allocation plans for
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

134

secure telephones to ensure that sufficient numbers are available to enable U.S. forces to

communicate with allies and coalition partners. Over the long term, the Department has

developed a strategy for achieving secure interoperability with our allies and coalition

partners that relies on the new Secure Terminal Equipment.

(U) Facilitate Distribution of Intelligence Products to Warfighters and Allies.

The Department will explore ways to permit intelligence and other information to be

classified at the lowest possible classification level in order to ensure its availability to

warfighters and coalition partners, while still protecting intelligence sources and methods.

(U) Maintain Operational Security. To further enhance operational security, the

Department will ensure that all personnel (especially augmentees) receive appropriate

training in security procedure awareness.

(U) Protect Computer Networks. To ensure that DoD computers are protected

from deliberate attack, the Department will appropriately restrict access to sensitive

information that could be useful to either a wartime adversary or computer hackers. We

will also ensure that system administrators emphasize computer security during training

and that they implement all available hardware and software security features.

(U) Counter Hostile Intelligence Collection Efforts. Because the United States

and NATO are among the highest-value targets of many foreign intelligence

organizations, U.S. counterintelligence agencies must provide adequate capability to

detect, identify, deter, and neutralize hostile intelligence collection efforts.

4. Joint Deep Operations (U)

(U) Develop Joint Concepts for Employing Army Attack Helicopters and

Tactical Missiles. The Department will develop Joint Deep Operations concepts to guide

the employment of Army attack helicopters and tactical missiles in support of overall

operations. The concepts will include procedures for including Army assets on the Air

Tasking Order, when appropriate. In addition, the Department will continue to evolve

standard tactics, techniques, and procedures for integrating Army Tactical Missiles into

Joint and Combined operations. We will then reinforce these concepts and procedures

through appropriate joint training exercises. Finally, the Department will explore

technological innovations (e.g., using unmanned aerial vehicles or other airborne

platforms to find and designate targets for attack helicopters) and attendant equipment

upgrades that will improve our ability to integrate air operations.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

135

F. Target Attack (U)

(U) Operation Allied Force was notable for its heavy reliance on standoff and

precision-guided munitions to attack targets and by the successful introduction of new

strike platforms and weapons. In the main, however, the campaign was primarily and

successfully prosecuted by systems and platforms that have long been in the inventory.

1. Precision Engagement (U)

(U) Enhance Precision Engagement Capability. To improve U.S. capability to

conduct precision engagement, the Department will continue to assess technologies that

will ensure flexibility and enable all-weather precision strikes. In addition, the

Department will continue to pursue technologies that will process, exploit, and

disseminate target information in a timely manner to support precision engagement.

2. Preferred Munitions (U)

(U) Enhance Capability To Use Preferred Munitions. The latest generation of

air-delivered munitions was employed in substantial numbers for the first time during

Operation Allied Force. Throughout the conflict these weapons were highly successful in

hitting their intended targets and in producing the intended results, while limiting

collateral damage to civilians. To further enhance U.S. capability to use these weapons

effectively, the Department will:

• Continue Service initiatives to replenish inventories of preferred munitions.

• Continue to assess development of weapons that fill gaps and shortfalls in

current capabilities and pursue their subsequent certification on launch platforms.

• Assess methods to determine wartime planning factors affecting expenditure

rates.

• Assess future weapon inventories to achieve the proper balance of capabilities

for future requirements.

3. Information Operations (U)

(U) Improve Information Operations Planning. The Department will ensure

that information operations planning is initiated early and synchronized with other

operational plans.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

136

G. Logistics and Force Sustainment (U)

(U) The magnitude of the forces employed to Operation Allied Force and the

limited availability of logistics infrastructure presented particular challenges to the

logistics units and personnel tasked with sustainment operations. The implications of the

most important of those challenges are summarized below.

1. Preferred Munitions (U)

(U) Reexamine Allocation of Preferred Munitions. In light of the high demand

for preferred munitions during Operation Allied Force, the Department will reexamine

the allocation of preferred munitions to the different theaters. This assessment will

reconcile the demands of smaller-scale contingencies with other operational plans so as to

minimize the risk to our overall military posture.

(U) Reexamine Prepositioned Munitions Mix. In a similar vein, the Department

will reexamine the mix of preferred and non-preferred munitions in its prepositioned

munition stockpiles.

2. Engineer Assets (U)

(U) Provide Timely Engineering Capability. To ensure that theater CINCs have

sufficient engineer support for rapid response contingencies in their theaters, the

Department will investigate options for establishing different mixes of forward-deployed

engineer assets. The Department will also examine its requirement for air-deployable

engineer assets.

3. Humanitarian Assistance (U)

(U) Ensure Adequate Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance Operations.

To ensure that future humanitarian assistance operations are conducted as effectively and

efficiently as possible, the Department will explore such activities as exchanging liaison

officers and conducting humanitarian assistance training exercises. When conducting

humanitarian assessments at the outset of a crisis, the Department will closely coordinate,

or perhaps even combine, its activities with those of other U.S. Government agencies

involved.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

137

H. Personnel and Training (U)

(U) Our people made Operation Allied Force a success. They were well trained,

disciplined, and creative. The paramount lesson learned from this operation is that the

well being of our people must remain our first priority. Other important aspects of

mobilizing people in support of the operation are summarized here.

1. Personnel Augmentation (U)

(U) Develop Personnel Augmentation Plans. In the near term, the theater

CINCs will develop and disseminate to the Services detailed personnel augmentation

plans to support Joint Task Force contingency operations. We expect these plans to

identify the personnel billets that will need to be filled during a crisis as well as the

component or Service that should be tasked to provide those personnel.

(U) Improve Personnel Augmentation Process. Over the long term, the Joint

Staff and Services will work to improve the process used to provide personnel

augmentation during times of crisis. Actions include identifying the specific

responsibilities to be assigned to the theater CINCs, the Joint Staff, and the Services;

setting realistic reporting dates; and establishing a timely reclama process to resolve the

inevitable conflicts that will arise when crisis needs are at odds with other Service or

agency priorities.

2. Reserve Component (U)

(U) Ensure Access to Reserve Component Personnel. Because a significant

fraction of the military’s total pool of uniquely skilled personnel resides in the Reserves,

a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up should be considered early on in future

contingencies to preclude undue stress on other Active Component units, especially those

in other theaters.

3. Intelligence Personnel (U)

(U) Develop Rapid Reaction Intelligence Support Capability. The Intelligence

Community will develop a rapid-reaction capability that enables the various intelligence

agencies to better anticipate requirements, prepare their work forces, and streamline

procedures for individual or organizational augmentation.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

138

4. Training (U)

(U) Emphasize Joint Interoperability Training. The Department will place

greater emphasis on interoperability training among our own forces, with those of our

allies, other nations and partners, as well as on interagency training within our

Government. When the Services work as a joint team, each Service’s capabilities and

systems can complement those of the other Services to enhance both force survivability

and combat effectiveness, and permit the full exploitation of their operational

capabilities.

I. Impact on other Operations (U)

(U) Given the size of the military force deployed for Operation Allied Force, the

potential for adverse impacts on other U.S. commitments around the world seems clear.

The implications of the most important of these are summarized here.

1. Major Theater War Operation Plans (U)

(U) Ensure Use of Deployment Order Coordination Process. The Department

will ensure that our theater commanders in chief and the Services fully utilize the

deployment-order coordination process when conducting risk analysis. Over the long

term, the Readiness Assessment System should assist the CINCs, Joint Staff, and

Services in performing risk analysis. We expect this system to provide a user-friendly,

Web-based tool that allows users to view time-phased force and deployment data that

supports operational plans.

(U) Improve Conflict Assessment Tools. In addition, the Department will pursue

a more structured and dynamic set of tools to assess our ability to conduct major wars

while at the same time responding to contingencies. The desired tools should also enable

the Department to gauge the risks that contingency operations pose to our ability to

execute the overall defense strategy.

2. Joint Staff and Joint Force Issues (U)

(U) Apportion Forces To Support NATO’s New Strategic Concept. The

Department will ensure that future editions of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)

consider and apportion appropriate forces to the U.S. European Command for use in

supporting NATO crisis management and crisis-response operations.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

139

(U) Add a Dynamic Assessment Capability to the Joint Monthly Readiness

Review. The Department will expand the Joint Monthly Readiness Review to enable

rapid, internal, and dynamic assessment of force-deployment options and to capture their

impacts on competing requirements.

3. Global Force Integration (U)

(U) Emphasize Global Focus when Organizing and Training Forces. The

Department will continue to develop a global focus in U.S. military organization and

training. Accordingly, we will improve both doctrine and training as well as our

capability to organize and equip our forces to meet the demands of global engagement.

When designing future exercises and training, the Department will include the global

capabilities that are required to support theater operations. While our forces must

necessarily focus on their respective theaters, we need to increase their proficiency in the

complex actions necessary for integrating a global force. Additionally, we will

encourage new levels of adaptability and flexibility in global interoperability and

integration so that our forces are better prepared for unpredictable scenarios.

(U) Include Global Engagement in Emerging Joint Operational Architecture.

The Department also intends to incorporate global engagement tenets in our emerging

Joint Operational Architecture. Our experience in integrating worldwide capabilities

highlights the importance of a Joint Operational Architecture that defines the

relationships between the forces and commands involved in complex operations. This

architecture will also serve as the basis for developing technical architectures to support

warfighters’ needs and prioritize resources and training requirements. Eventually, we

expect to develop similar architectures for the spectrum of global threats as well as to

identify and describe the organizational changes necessary to support the National

Military Strategy.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

140

GLOSSARY

A/C Aircraft

AAA Antiaircraft Artillery

AAR After-Action Report

ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center

ACC Airspace Control Center

ACE Allied Command Europe

ACOM United States Atlantic Command

ACS Auxiliary Crane Ship

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

ADA Air Defense Artillery

ADM Admiral

ADVON Advanced Echelon

AEF Air Expeditionary Force

AETACS Airborne Elements of the Theater Air Control System

AEW Airborne Early Warning

AF Air Force

AF/CC Air Force Commander

AFCAP Armed Forces Contract Augmentation Program

AFFOR Air Forces Force

AFTH Air Force Theater Hospital

AGM Air-to-Ground Missile

AH Attack Helicopter

AIRSOUTH Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe

AIS Air Intelligence Squadron

AIT Advanced Interceptor Technology

AJD Allied Joint Doctrine

AMC U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command

AMOCC Air Mobility Operations Control Center

AOR Area of Responsibility

APOD Aerial Port of Debarkation
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

141

APOE Aerial Port of Embarkation

APS Afloat Prepositioned Ship

ARG Amphibious Ready Group

Arty Artillery

ASIT Adaptable Surface Interface Terminal

ASOC Air Support Operations Center

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

ATARS Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System

ATM Air Target Material

ATO Air Tasking Order

AVN Aviation

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

B/H Bosnia and Herzegovina

BC2A Bosnia Command-and-Control Augmentation

BCD Battlefield Coordination Detachment

BCE Battlefield Coordination Element

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

C2 Command and Control

C2ISR Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance

C3 Command, Control, and Communications

C4 Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

CALCM Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile

CAOC Combined Air Operations Center

CAP Combat Air Patrol

CAS Close Air Support

CBU Cluster Bomb Unit

CCD Cover, Concealment, and Deception

CD Collateral Damage

CDE Concept Development and Experimentation
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

142

CENTCOM United States Central Command

CFACC Combined Forces Air Component Commander

CFLCC Combined Forces Land Component Commander

CG Guided Missile Cruiser

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CINC Commander in Chief

CINCSOUTH Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe

CINCUSAFE Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe

CINCUSNAVEUR Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Europe

CJCS Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CJTF Commander Joint Task Force

CMSA Cruise Missile Support Activity

CNA Computer Network Attack

COMARRC Commander, Allied Command Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps

COMJTF Commander, Joint Task Force

COMNAVFOR Commander, Allied Naval Forces

COMNAVSOUTH Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe

COMSEC Communications Security

COMSIXTHFLT Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet

COMSTRKFORSOUTH Commander, Allied Strike Force, Southern Europe

CONOPLAN Concept of Operation Plan

CONOPS Concept of Operations

CONUS Continental United States

COP Common Operating Picture

COV Common Operational Vision

CRC Control and Reporting Center

CS Constant Source

CSAR Combat Search and Rescue

CSE Combat Support Equipment

CSRC Combined Search and Rescue Center

CTF Combined Task Force

CVBG Carrier Battle Group

CVN Nuclear Aircraft Carrier

CVW Carrier Air Wing
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

143

DART Disaster Assistance Response Team

DC Disk Controller

DCI Defense Capabilities Initiative

DCINC Deputy Commander in Chief

DCSPERS Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

DDG Guided Missile Destroyer

DEPORD Deployment Order

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DII Defense Information Infrastructure

DIRMOBFOR Director of Mobility Forces

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DISN Defense Information Systems Network

DMPI Desired Mean Point of Impact

DOCC Deep Operations Coordination Cell

DoD Department of Defense

DOMS Director of Military Support

DOS Department of State

DOTMLP Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, and

Personnel

DPG Defense Planning Guidance

DRSN Defense Red Switch Network

DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System

DSMAC Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation

DSN Defense Switched Network

DSO Direct Support Objective

DSP Defense Support Program

ECCM Electronic Counter-Counter Measures

EMCON Emissions Control

EMEDS Expeditionary Medical Support

EO Electro-Optical

ESDI European Self-Defense Initiative

EU European Union

EUCOM U.S. European Command

EW Electronic Warfare

EXCOM Executive Committee
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

144

EXORD Execution Order

FAAD Forward Area Air Defense

FAC Forward Air Controller

FAC(A) Forward Air Controller (Airborne)

FAST Forward Area Support Team

FFG Guided Missile Frigate

FHP Force Health Protection

Flex Flexibly Retargeted Aircraft Sorties

FLIR Forward Looking Infrared

FLT Fleet

FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command

FR France

FROG Russian-built Surface-to-Surface Missile

FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

G-8 Group of 8

GATS GPS-aided Targeting System

GBS Global Broadcast System

GBU Guided Bomb Unit

GCCS Global Command and Control System

GCI Ground Control Intercept

GE Germany

GEN General

GFI Global Force Integration

GIG Global Information Grid

GMFP Global Military Force Policy

GP General Purpose

GPS Global Positioning System

GSORTS Global Command and Control System Status of Resources and

Training System

GTN Global Transportation Network

HA Humanitarian Assistance

HARM High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

145

HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

HLPS Heavy Lift Preposition Ship

HLSG High Level Steering Group

HQ Headquarters

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IA Interagency; Individual Augmentation

IADS Integrated Air Defense System

IAW In Accordance With

IC Intelligence Community

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia

IDP Internally Displaced Persons

IEF Initial Entry Force

IFOR Implementation Force

IMA Individual Mobilization Augmentee

Indus Industrial Facilities

INFOSEC Information Security

IO Information Operations

IP Internet Protocol

IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

IR Infrared

ISO In Support Of

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

IT Italy

ITV In-transit Visibility

IWG Interagency Working Group

J2T Joint Staff Targeting Section

JAC Joint Analysis Center

JASSM Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile

JBS Joint Broadcast System

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

JDIICS-D Joint Defense Information Infrastructure Control System -

Deployed

JDN Joint Digital Network
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

146

JEPES Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System

JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander

JFC United States Joint Forces Command

JFGR II Joint Forces Resource Generator

JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander

JICO Joint Interface Control Officer

JIPTL Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List

JIVA Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture

JLOTS Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore

JMRR Joint Monthly Readiness Review

JOA Joint Operational Architecture

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

JRB Joint Resources Board

JRIC Joint Reserve Intelligence Center

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JS Joint Staff

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSEAD Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense

JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force

JSOW Joint Standoff Weapon

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board

JTF Joint Task Force

JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System

JTTP Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

JV2010 Joint Vision 2010

JWCA Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment

JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

KFOR Kosovo Force

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

LCC Launch Control Center

LD/HD Low Density/High Demand

Ldr Leadership Targets
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

147

LGB Laser-Guided Bomb

LHD General Purpose Amphibious Assault Ship

LMSR Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ship

LOAC Laws of Armed Conflict

LOC Line of Communication

LOG Logistics

LOTS Logistics-Over-The-Shore

LPD Amphibious Transport Dock

LSD Landing Ship Dock

LTG Lieutenant General

LT INF Light Infantry

MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force

MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense System

MAOC Modular Air Operations Center

MARFOREUR United States Marine Forces, Europe

MASINT Measurements and Signatures Intelligence

MAST Multi-Agency Support Team

MATTS Mission Analysis Tracking and Tabulation System

MBPS Megabytes per Second

MC Military Community

MC&G Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy

MCE Modular Control Equipment

METL Mission-Essential Task List

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MILREP Military Representative

MILSATCOM Military Satellite Communication

MLRS Multiple-Launch Rocket System

MLS Multilevel Security

MOE Measures of Effectiveness

MOG Maximum on Ground

MPC Military Personnel Center

MRC Major Regional Contingency

MSRP Mobility Readiness Spares Package

MSTS Multi-Source Tactical System

MTW Major Theater War
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

148

MUP Yugoslav Interior Forces (i.e., Special Police)

NAC North Atlantic Council

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVEUR United States Naval Forces, Europe

NAVSOUTH Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe

NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

NCA National Command Authorities

NCC National Coordinating Center

NFZ No-Fly Zone

NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency

NIPRNET Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network

NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council

NSS National Security Strategy

OAF Operation Allied Force

OOTW Operations Other Than War

OPCON Operational Control

OPLAN Operations Plan

Ops Operations

OPSEC Operations Security

OPTEMPO Operating Tempo

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PACOM Pacific Command

PAO Phased Air Operation

PC Personal Computer

PCG Peacekeeping Core Group

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PE Peacetime Establishment

PERSTEMPO Personnel Tempo

PGM Precision Guided Munition

PK Peacekeeping

POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

149

POL-MIL Political-Military

POM Program Objective Memorandum

POTUS President of the United States

POW Prisoner of War

PRC Presidential Reserve Call-up

PRRC Personnel Recovery Response Cell

PSYOPS Psychological Operations

PTDO Prepare to Deploy Orders

PTT Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph

QL Quick Look

RADREL Radio Relay

RAS Readiness Assessment System

RC Reserve Component

Recce Reconnaissance

RO Response Option

ROE Rules of Engagement

RSOI Reconnaissance, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

RTS Rapid Targeting System

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar

SATCOM Satellite Communication

SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defense

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SFOR Stabilization Force

SHF Super-High Frequency

SIAP Single Integrated Air Picture

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

SLAM Standoff Land Attack Missile

SNFL Standing Naval Force, Atlantic

SNFM Standing Naval Force, Mediterranean

SOCEUR United States Special Operations Command, Europe
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

150

SOCOM Special Operations Command

SOUTHCOM United States Southern Command

SPACECOM Space Command

SSC Smaller-Scale Contingency

SSN Nuclear Attack Submarine

STANAG Standardization Agreement

STE Secure Terminal Equipment

STEP Standardized Tactical Entry Point

STRATCOM United States Strategic Command

STRKFORSOUTH Allied Strike Forces, Southern Europe

STU Secure Telephone Unit

SVC Service

SVTC Secure Video Teleconferencing

SYG Secretary General (United Nations)

TACAIR Tactical Air

TACON Tactical Control

TAD Temporary Active Duty

TADIL Tactical Digital Information Link

TAOM Tactical Air Operations Module

TARPS Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System

TBD To Be Determined

TC-AIMS II Transportation Commanders’ Automated Information for

Movement System

TCT Time Critical Target

TDY Temporary Duty

TERCOM Terrain Contour Mapping

TF Task Force

THAAD Theater High-Altitude Area Defense

TLAM Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile

TPED Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination

TPFDD Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data

TRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command

TS/SCI Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

TV Television
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

151

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UHF Ultra-high Frequency

UK United Kingdom

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USA United States Army

USACOM United States Atlantic Command

USAF United States Air Force

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe

USAREUR United States Army, Europe

USCG United States Coast Guard

USCINCEUR United States Commander in Chief, Europe

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense Policy

USG United States Government

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USIA United States Information Agency

USIGS United States Imagery and Geospatial Information Service

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

VIP Very Important Person

VJ Yugoslav Army

VTC Video Teleconferencing

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

wx Weather
UNCLASSIFIED

A-1

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX - CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL

INVOLVEMENT IN KOSOVO (U)

1998 (U)

March (U)

(U) The situation in Kosovo began to deteriorate sharply in early March 1998

when Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) security forces launched a series of strikes

to crackdown on the growing Kosovar insurgent movement known as the Kosovo

Liberation Army (KLA). During the crackdown FRY Interior Ministry security units

(MUP Special Police) used excessive force, destroying homes and villages and

terrorizing the civilian population.

31 March. (U) The United Nations adopted Security Council Resolution 1160,

condemning the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces against civilians in

Kosovo, and also established an embargo of arms and material against the FRY.

May (U)

May. (U) Ambassador Holbrooke arranged the first meeting between FRY

President Milosevic and Dr. Rugova, the leader of the shadow government in Kosovo.

Milosevic and Rugova met once in May to lay the groundwork for peace talks. Although

Milosevic did appoint a negotiating team that participated in preliminary talks in Pristina,

the dialogue process quickly broke down following a deliberate Serb offensive in Decani

where several dozen Kosovar Albanians were killed. Also in May, NATO Foreign

Ministers approved a series of steps aimed at deterring conflict spillover and promoting

regional stability. These included PfP exercises in Albania and the FYROM, a NATO

ship visit to Albania, and NATO preparations to assist NGOs in response to major

refugee flows out of Kosovo.
UNCLASSIFIED

A-2

UNCLASSIFIED

June (U)

12 June. (U) In London, the Contact Group (CG) issued a statement calling for: (1)

a cease-fire; (2) effective international monitoring in Kosovo; (3) access for UNHCR and

NGOs along with refugee return; and (4) serious dialogue between Belgrade and the

Kosovo Albanians with international mediation.

16 June. (U) President Milosevic, in talks with Russian President Yeltsin, agreed to

grant access to diplomatic observers – the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission

(KDOM). In late June, Ambassador Holbrooke continued his diplomatic efforts, meeting

again with Milosevic in Belgrade and with KLA commanders in the Kosovo village of

Junik.

July (U)

(U) The KDOM was established, and quickly became an invaluable tool for the

international community in assessing events on the ground.

September (U)

2 September. (U): During a Clinton-Yeltsin summit meeting, Secretary of State

Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov issued a joint statement on Kosovo calling

on Belgrade to end the offensive and for the Kosovar Albanians to engage with Belgrade

in negotiations.

5-7 September. (U): John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,

Human Rights, and Labor, and former Senator Bob Dole visited Kosovo to see firsthand

the conditions there. They continued on to Belgrade, delivering a stern warning to

Milosevic about his treatment of prisoners and refugees in Kosovo.

23 September. (U): The United Nations Security Council (with China abstaining)

passed Resolution 1199 which called for, among other things, a cease fire, the withdrawal

of all FRY security forces, access for NGOs and humanitarian organizations, and the

return home of refugees and the internally displaced.

24 September. (U): NATO Defense Ministers, meeting at Villamoura, Portugal,

approved issuance of Activation Warnings (ACTWARN) for two different types of air

operations, known as the Phased Air Campaign and the Limited Air Response.
UNCLASSIFIED

A-3

UNCLASSIFIED

28 September. (U): Milosevic declared victory over the Kosovo insurgency and

announced the end of the FRY offensive. However, intelligence reporting indicated

continued fighting in several areas and no significant changes to FRY security force

deployments.

October (U)

1 October. (U) The NAC issued an Activation Request (ACTREQ) for both air

options.

5 October. (U) UN Secretary General Koffi Annan released a highly critical UNSC

report on FRY compliance with the provisions of UNSCR 1199. In the wake of this

report, the US pushed NATO to issue Activation Orders (ACTORD) for both air options.

5 October. (U) While NATO worked toward an ACTORD decision, the US

dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to Belgrade to press for FRY full compliance with

UNSCR 1199. Holbrooke spent the next seven days in talks with both Milosevic and the

Kosovar Albanians.

12 October. (U) Ambassador Holbrooke reported to NATO that Milosevic was

prepared to accept a 2,000 man OSCE ground verification presence and a NATO air

surveillance mission to monitor FRY compliance with UNSCR 1199.

13 October. (U) A unilateral statement issued by Serb President Milutinovic

included a number of key principles that could form the framework of a peace settlement,

including substantial autonomy, elections, and a local Kosovar police force. The

statement included proposed dates for: (1) the achievement of an agreement which will

comprise the basic elements of a political solution in Kosovo – 2 November; and (2)

general agreements on the rules and procedures of elections – 9 November (in reality,

neither date was achieved). In order to demonstrate NATO resolve and hedge against

Milosevic backsliding, the NAC proceeded with its ACTORD decisions. However, it

instructed SACEUR not to execute the Limited Air Option for 96 hours and authorized

the execution of only the deployment phase of the Phased Air Campaign. NATO then

communicated to Milosevic that it expected him to use the 96 hour “pause” to

demonstrate concretely his commitment to complying with UNSCR 1199. As part of this

commitment, Milosevic subsequently signed a Terms of Reference for a ground

verification force with NATO Secretary General Solana. Additionally, FRY Army Chief

Perisic and SACEUR signed a separate agreement allowing NATO aerial surveillance

missions over Kosovo.
UNCLASSIFIED

A-4

UNCLASSIFIED

16 October. (U): Prior to the expiration of the first 96-hour window, the NAC

judged that enough progress had been made to justify an extension of the “pause” on the

Limited Air Option until 27 October.

16 October. (U): A signed agreement between OSCE CIO Geremek and Yugoslav

Foreign Minister Jovanovic paved the way for the creation of the OSCE Kosovo

Verification Mission, or KVM.

23 October. (U): The NAC directed General Clark and NATO Military Committee

Chairman General Naumann to travel to Belgrade to impress upon Milosevic the

seriousness of the 27 October deadline.

24 October. (U): The OSCE Mission was endorsed by the UN Security Council

(UNSCR 1203)

25 October. (U): The OSCE KVM was established under OSCE Permanent Council

decision No. 263. The primary mission of the KVM was to ensure FRY compliance with

UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199.

25 October. (U) Clark and Naumann reached a comprehensive agreement for

specific VJ and MUP withdrawals with the FRY leadership.

27 October. (U) FRY compliance with these requirements resulted in a NAC

decision to suspend execution of the Limited Air Option and Phased Air Operation.

However, the NAC did not cancel the ACTORDs. Both would remain in place but would

require a positive NAC decision for execution.

December (U)

23 December. (U) The Yugoslav Army (VJ) and internal special police (MUP)

undertook military action near Podujevo, in northern Kosovo, along the main road linking

the provincial capital Pristina to Belgrade. The U.S. condemned this action.
UNCLASSIFIED

A-5

UNCLASSIFIED

1999 (U)

January. (U):

(U) In early January, three Serb police were killed as a result of KLA ambush

attacks on police patrols in the vicinity of Stimlje, prompting a significant build-up of

Serb security forces in the area.

15 January. (U) The KVM reported a serious deterioration of the situation in the

area. KVM patrols witnessed VJ tanks and armored vehicles firing directly into houses

near Malopoljce and Petrova, and noted houses burning in Racak. KVM units were

initially denied direct access to these areas (late in the afternoon on 15 January, a KVM

patrol did get to the village of Racak – they noted one dead Albanian civilian and five

injured civilians, and received unconfirmed reports of other deaths).

16 January. (U) Returning to Racak, the KVM confirmed that Serb security forces

had killed 45 Albanian civilians. The initial facts as verified by KVM included evidence

of arbitrary detentions, extra-judicial killings, and the mutilation of unarmed civilians by

the security forces of the FRY. FRY authorities took exception to direct comments made

by KVM HOM Ambassador Walker, and declared him “persona non-grata” (PNG),

ordering him to leave the country within 48 hours (an additional 24 hours was

subsequently added to this order). In the face of intense international criticism for this

action, Milosevic froze the PNG status of Ambassador Walker (allowing him to remain in

Kosovo/Serbia), but did not lift it entirely.

28 January. (U) NATO Secretary General Solana issued a statement indicating that

NATO fully supported the early conclusion of a political settlement under the mediation

of the Contact Group. The settlement would provide an enhanced status for Kosovo,

preserve the territorial integrity of the FRY, and protect the rights of all ethnic groups.

The statement called for FRY authorities to immediately bring the Yugoslav Army and

the Special Police force levels, posture and actions into strict compliance with their

commitments to NATO on 25 October 1998 and end the excessive and disproportionate

use of force in accordance with these commitments.

29 January. (U) Contact Group Ministers met in London to consider the critical

situation in Kosovo. The Ministers called on both sides to end the cycle of violence and

to commit themselves to a process of negotiation leading to a political settlement. To that

end, the Contact Group agreed to summon representatives from the Federal Yugoslav and
UNCLASSIFIED

A-6

UNCLASSIFIED

Serbian Governments, and representatives of the Kosovo Albanians to Rambouillet,

France, by 6 February, to begin discussions with the direct involvement of the Contact

Group.

30 January. (U) NATO issued a Statement by the North Atlantic Council (NAC),

giving full support to the Contact Group strategy. The NAC further agreed to give

NATO Secretary General Solana authority to authorize air strikes against targets on FRY

territory. At that point, the primary focus remained on the peace settlement talks in

Rambouillet. Even as negotiations in Rambouillet were ongoing, intelligence reports

clearly showed a significant buildup of FRY forces in Kosovo.

February (U)

6 February. (U) Talks at Rambouillet began.

23 February. (U) Contact Group Ministers met in Rambouillet at the end of more

than two weeks of intensive international efforts to reach a signed Interim Political

Agreement (IPA). While neither side had signed the agreement, it was recognized that a

political framework was now in place, and the groundwork had been laid for finalizing

the implementation Chapters of the Agreement, including the modalities of the invited

civilian and military presence in Kosovo. It was essential that the agreement on the

interim accord be completed and signed as a whole, thus, the parties committed

themselves to attend a conference, covering all aspects of implementation, in France on

15 March.

March (U)

8 March. (U) Former Senator Dole, unable to get a visa from FRY to travel to

Kosovo, went to Macedonia instead to meet with the Kosovar Albanian delegation in an

effort to persuade them to sign the agreement.

10 March. (U): Ambassador Holbrooke, at the request of Secretary Albright, met

with FRY leadership in Belgrade. His trip supported the on-going negotiating efforts of

the U.S. envoy for Kosovo, Ambassador Chris Hill, and his Contact Group colleagues

Ambassadors Boris Mayorsky and Wolfgang Petritsch. Ambassador Holbrooke

conveyed to the authorities in Belgrade the necessity for full compliance with all of their

commitments to the international community, and for maximum restraint in the period

leading up to the March 15 conference in France.
UNCLASSIFIED

A-7

UNCLASSIFIED

19 March. (U) Following the second round of negotiations at the Kleber Center in

Paris, 15 – 19 March, the Kosovar Albanians signed the proposed agreement.

Negotiations were suspended, and the Belgrade delegation left Paris without signing the

agreement, denouncing the western ultimatum as a violation of international law and the

UN charter. At the same time, almost one-third of the FRY's total armed forces had

massed in and around Kosovo, in preparation for an obvious offensive.

19 March. (U) The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission withdrew from Kosovo

20 March. (U) Serb forces launched a major offensive, driving thousands of ethnic

Albanians out of their homes and villages, summarily executing some while displacing

many others, and setting fire to many houses.

21 March. (U) Ambassador Holbrooke was dispatched to Belgrade to deliver a

"final warning" to Milosevic.

22 March. (U): In response to Belgrade's continued intransigence and repression,

and in view of the evolution of the situation on the ground in Kosovo, the NAC

authorized Secretary General Solana to decide, subject to further consultations, on a

broader range of air operations if necessary.

23 March. (U) Ambassador Holbrooke departed Belgrade, having received no

concessions of any kind from Milosevic. Subsequently, Secretary General Solana

directed General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to

initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

24 March. (U) Operation ALLIED FORCE commenced.

25 March. (U) The Yugoslav government broke off diplomatic relations with the

United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

30 March. (U) Russian Prime Minister Primakov, Foreign Minister Ivanov, and

Defense Minister Sergeyev held talks with President Milosevic in Belgrade.

April (U)

1 April. (U) Serbian forces capture three U.S. soldiers in the Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia.

3 April. (U) NATO missiles struck central Belgrade for the first time and destroyed

the Yugoslav and Serbian interior ministries.
UNCLASSIFIED

A-8

UNCLASSIFIED

6 April. (U) The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared a unilateral cease-fire to

commence at 1200 EDT and last until 1800 EDT 11 April. Belgrade claimed that all

FRY army and police actions in Kosovo would end and that the government was ready to

negotiate with Rugova. NATO rejected the offer, with French President Chirac calling

the proposed cease-fire indefensible without a political agreement and security package.

6-10 April. (U) The NAC approved the Concept of Operations and the Operations

Plan for Allied Harbor, the NATO humanitarian effort in Albania.

10 April. (U) In discussion with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE), Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov said that a NATO-led Kosovo

implementation force was "unrealistic" and called for greater UN involvement.

14 April. (U) Germany unveiled a plan for a 24-hour halt to the airstrikes to give

the FRY a chance to start pulling out of Kosovo. Russian President Yeltsin named

former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin as FRY peace envoy.

16 April. (U) The NAC approved the Activation Order for Operation Allied Harbor.

20 April. (U) U.S. Representative James Saxton met with FRY Foreign Minister

Jovanovic in Belgrade.

21 April. (U) It was reported that all EU countries agreed to back a proposed plan to

stop oil product deliveries by or through member states to the FRY. NATO missiles in

Belgrade hit the headquarters of Milosevic's Serbian Socialist Party and his private

residence, both believed to have capability for command and control of VJ/MUP forces.

22 April. (U) At the NATO Summit, Alliance nations reaffirmed the conditions that

would bring an end to the air campaign. They also announced an intensification of the air

campaign.

23 April. (U) NATO attacked the Serbian state television building in central

Belgrade a facility used for propaganda purposes. The FRY agreed to accept an

international military presence in Kosovo after Chernomyrdin-Milosevic talks in

Belgrade.

30 April. (U) The Reverend Jesse Jackson arrived in Belgrade and met with the

U.S. servicemen that had been held captive by Serb forces for the past month. Russian

envoy Chernomyrdin reported "progress" after 6 hours of talks with Milosevic in

Belgrade.
UNCLASSIFIED

A-9

UNCLASSIFIED

May (U)

1 May. (U) President Clinton extended U.S. sanctions to ban oil sales and freeze

Belgrade's assets in the U.S.. Following an agreement with NATO and FRY authorities

on modalities, the ICRC announced plans to return to Kosovo. Reverend Jackson

secured the release of the captured servicemen following a 3-hour meeting with

Milosevic.

6 May. (U) At the Group of Eight meeting in Bonn, the West and Russia announced

agreement over the basic strategy to resolve the conflict.

7 May. (U) NATO planes accidentally hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing

3 and wounding 20.

8 May. (U) The UNSC convened in an emergency session to debate the bombing of

the Chinese Embassy. China implicitly accused the U.S. and NATO of a deliberate

attack while the Alliance apologized for a "terrible mistake." Thousands demonstrated in

front of U.S. diplomatic posts in China. Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov canceled his

trip to London in the wake of the attack.

9 May. (U) President Clinton wrote to Chinese President Jiang Zemin to offer

regrets for the bombing, while Chinese demonstrations continued.

10 May. (U) Chinese demonstrations continued for a third day. China suspended

contacts with the U.S. regarding arms control and human rights. Serbs announced a

partial withdrawal from Kosovo. The FRY accused NATO of genocide and demanded

that the World Court order an immediate end to NATO air strikes.

11 May. (U) Russian envoy Chernomyrdin met with President Jiang Zemin in

Beijing and labeled the Chinese embassy bombing an act of aggression. China hinted

that it might hold up Western attempts to achieve a peace deal at the UN unless the

bombing stops. NATO disputed FRY claims of a troop withdrawal from Kosovo,

countering that FRY military and police had actually stepped up their actions against the

KLA.

16 May. (U) Italian Prime Minister D'Alema proposed a NATO cease-fire on

condition that Russia and China support a UNSC resolution imposing the G-8 terms on

Milosevic.
UNCLASSIFIED

A-10

UNCLASSIFIED

17 May. (U) The EU announced that Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari would serve

as the EU's new senior Kosovo envoy. The Greeks called for a temporary cease-fire "to

give diplomacy a chance."

23 May. (U) NATO began a bombing campaign of the Yugoslav electricity grid,

creating a major disruption of power, creating a major disruption of power affecting

many military related activities and water supplies.

27 May. (U) Milosevic and four other Serbian leaders were indicted by the UN War

Crimes Tribunal (ICTY) for crimes against humanity.

June (U)

1 June. (U) The FRY told Germany that it had accepted Group of Eight principles

for peace and demanded an end to NATO bombing.

3 June. (U) The FRY accepted terms brought to Belgrade by EU envoy Ahtisaari

and Russian envoy Chernomyrdin.

6 June. (U) NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana announced it would be difficult

to help rebuild Yugoslavia while Milosevic remained in power.

7 June. (U) NATO and Yugoslav commanders failed to agree to terms of pullout

from Kosovo and suspended talks. NATO intensified the bombing campaign. G 8

Foreign Ministers in Bonn attempted to finalize a draft UN resolution. The FRY insisted

that a UN Security Council resolution must be in place before any foreign troops could

enter Kosovo.

8 June. (U) The West and Russia reached a landmark agreement on a draft UN

resolution at G8 talks in Cologne. NATO called on Milosevic to resume military talks on

troop withdrawal at once. Talks between senior NATO and FRY officers on a Serb

pullout from Kosovo resumed in Macedonia and continued into the night.

9 June. (U) Military talks continued with senior NATO and FRY officers. Late in

the day, a Military Technical Agreement was signed between the two parties.

10 June. (U): After receiving definite evidence that Serb forces were withdrawing

from northern Kosovo, Secretary General Solana called for a suspension of NATO

airstrikes. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 on Kosovo. In Cologne,

G8 ministers drafted a plan to anchor the Balkans to Western Europe and rebuild Kosovo.

13 June. (U) UNHCR relief missions began.
UNCLASSIFIED

A-11

UNCLASSIFIED

20 June. (U) In accordance with the 9 June Military Technical Agreement, Serb

forces completely withdrew from Kosovo, leading NATO Secretary General Solana to

officially end NATO's bombing campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
UNCLASSIFIED

A-12

UNCLASSIFIED

(This page is intentionally blank.)