Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 24 / Thursday, February 5, 2004 / Notices 5591

accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 and 

50.92. 

For further details with respect to this 

action, see the application for 

amendment dated November 13, 2003, 

which is available for public inspection 

at the Commission’s PDR, located at 

One White Flint North, Public File Area 

O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first 

floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly 

available records will be accessible 

electronically from the Agencywide 

Documents Access and Management 

System’s (ADAMS) Public Electronic 

Reading Room on the Internet at the 

NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/

reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who 

do not have access to ADAMS or who 

encounter problems in accessing the 

documents located in ADAMS, should 

contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by 

telephone at 1–800–397–4209, 301–

415–4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day 

of January 2004.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Nageswaran Kalyanam, 

Project Manager, Section 1, Project 

Directorate IV, Division of Licensing Project 

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 04–2485 Filed 2–4–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 50–275 and 50–323] 

Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit Nos. 

1 and 2; Exemption 

1.0 Background 

The Pacific Gas and Electric Company 

(the licensee) is the holder of Facility 

Operating License Nos. DPR–80 and 

DPR–82, which authorize operation of 

the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (facility 

or DCPP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, 

respectively. The licenses provide, 

among other things, that the facility is 

subject to all rules, regulations, and 

orders of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC, the Commission) 

now or hereafter in effect. 

The facility consists of two 

pressurized water reactors located in 

San Luis Obispo County, California. 

2.0 Request/Action 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR), part 50, 

§ 50.68(b)(1) sets forth the following 

requirement that must be met, in lieu of 

a monitoring system capable of 

detecting criticality events.

Plant procedures shall prohibit the 

handling and storage at any one time of more 

fuel assemblies than have been determined to 

be safely subcritical under the most adverse 

moderation conditions feasible by unborated 

water.

The licensee is unable to satisfy the 

above requirement for handling of the 

10 CFR part 72 licensed contents of the 

Holtec HI–STORM 100 Cask System. 

Section 50.12(a) allows licensees to 

apply for an exemption from the 

requirements of 10 CFR part 50 if the 

regulation is not necessary to achieve 

the underlying purpose of the rule and 

other conditions are met. The licensee 

stated in the application that 

compliance with 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) is 

not necessary for handling the 10 CFR 

Part 72 licensed contents of the cask 

system to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. 

3.0 Discussion 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the 

Commission may, upon application by 

any interested person or upon its own 

initiative, grant exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) 

the exemptions are authorized by law, 

will not present an undue risk to public 

health or safety, and are consistent with 

the common defense and security; and 

(2) when special circumstances are 

present. Therefore, in determining the 

acceptability of the licensee’s exemption 

request, the staff has performed the 

following regulatory, technical, and 

legal evaluations to satisfy the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.12 for 

granting the exemption. 

3.1 Regulatory Evaluation 

The DCPP Technical Specifications 

(TS) currently permit the licensee to 

store spent fuel assemblies in highdensity storage racks in each spent fuel 

pool (SFP). In accordance with the 

provisions of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(4), the 

licensee takes credit for soluble boron 

for criticality control and ensures that 

the effective multiplication factor (keff) 

of the SFP does not exceed 0.95, if 

flooded with borated water. 10 CFR 

50.68(b)(4) also requires that if credit is 

taken for soluble boron, the keff must 

remain below 1.0 (subcritical), if 

flooded with unborated water. However, 

the licensee is unable to satisfy the 

requirement to maintain the keff below 

1.0 (subcritical) with unborated water, 

which is also the requirement of 10 CFR 

50.68(b)(1). Therefore, the licensee’s 

request for exemption from 10 CFR 

50.68(b)(1) proposes to permit the 

licensee to perform spent fuel loading, 

unloading, and handling operations 

related to dry cask storage, without 

being subcritical under the most adverse 

moderation conditions feasible by 

unborated water. 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations, part 50, Appendix A, 

‘‘General Design Criteria (GDC) for 

Nuclear Power Plants,’’ provides a list of 

the minimum design requirements for 

nuclear power plants. According to GDC 

62, ‘‘Prevention of criticality in fuel 

storage and handling,’’ the licensee 

must limit the potential for criticality in 

the fuel handling and storage system by 

physical systems or processes. 

Section 50.68 of 10 CFR part 50, 

‘‘Criticality accident requirements,’’

provides the NRC requirements for 

maintaining subcritical conditions in 

SFPs. Section 50.68 provides criticality 

control requirements which, if satisfied, 

ensure that an inadvertent criticality in 

the SFP is an extremely unlikely event. 

These requirements ensure that the 

licensee has appropriately conservative 

criticality margins during handling and 

storage of spent fuel. Section 50.68(b)(1) 

states, ‘‘Plant procedures shall prohibit 

the handling and storage at any one time 

of more fuel assemblies than have been 

determined to be safely subcritical 

under the most adverse moderation 

conditions feasible by unborated water.’’

Specifically, 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) ensures 

that the licensee will maintain the pool 

in a subcritical condition during 

handling and storage operations without 

crediting the soluble boron in the SFP 

water. 

The licensee has submitted a license 

application to construct and operate an 

Independent Spent Fuel Storage 

Installation (ISFSI) at DCPP. The ISFSI 

would permit the licensee to store spent 

fuel assemblies in large concrete dry 

storage casks. In order to transfer the 

spent fuel assemblies from the SFP to 

the dry storage casks, the licensee must 

first transfer the assemblies to a MultiPurpose Canister (MPC) in the cask pit 

area of the SFP. The licensee performed 

criticality analyses of the MPC fully 

loaded with fuel having the highest 

permissible reactivity, and determined 

that a soluble boron credit was 

necessary to ensure that the MPC would 

remain subcritical in the SFP. Since the 

licensee is unable to satisfy the 

requirement of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) to 

ensure subcritical conditions during 

handling and storage of spent fuel 

assemblies in the pool with unborated 

water, the licensee identified the need 

for an exemption from the 10 CFR 

50.68(b)(1) requirement to support MPC 

loading, unloading, and handling 

operations, without being subcritical 

under the most adverse moderation 

conditions feasible by unborated water. 

The staff evaluated the possibility of 

an inadvertent criticality of the spent 

5592 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 24 / Thursday, February 5, 2004 / Notices 

nuclear fuel at DCPP during MPC 

loading, unloading, and handling. The 

staff has established a set of acceptance 

criteria that, if met, satisfy the 

underlying intent of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1). 

In lieu of complying with 10 CFR 

50.68(b)(1), the staff determined that an 

inadvertent criticality accident is 

unlikely to occur if the licensee meets 

the following five criteria: 

The cask criticality analyses are based 

on the following conservative 

assumptions: 

a. All fuel assemblies in the cask are 

unirradiated and at the highest 

permissible enrichment, 

b. Only 75 percent of the Boron-10 in 

the Boral panel inserts is credited, 

c. No credit is taken for fuel-related 

burnable absorbers, and 

d. The cask is assumed to be flooded 

with moderator at the temperature and 

density corresponding to optimum 

moderation. 

2. The licensee’s ISFSI TSs require the 

soluble boron concentration to be equal 

to or greater than the level assumed in 

the criticality analysis and surveillance 

requirements necessitate the periodic 

verification of the concentration both 

prior to and during loading and 

unloading operations. 

3. Radiation monitors, as required by 

GDC 63, ‘‘Monitoring Fuel and Waste 

Storage,’’ are provided in fuel storage 

and handling areas to detect excessive 

radiation levels and to initiate 

appropriate safety actions.

4. The quantity of other forms of 

special nuclear material, such as 

sources, detectors, etc., to be stored in 

the cask will not increase the effective 

multiplication factor above the limit 

calculated in the criticality analysis. 

5. Sufficient time exists for plant 

personnel to identify and terminate a 

boron dilution event prior to achieving 

a critical boron concentration in the 

MPC. To demonstrate that it can safely 

identify and terminate a boron dilution 

event, the licensee must provide the 

following: 

a. A plant-specific criticality analysis 

to identify the critical boron 

concentration in the cask based on the 

highest reactivity loading pattern. 

b. A plant-specific boron dilution 

analysis to identify all potential dilution 

pathways, their flowrates, and the time 

necessary to reach a critical boron 

concentration. 

c. A description of all alarms and 

indications available to promptly alert 

operators of a boron dilution event. 

d. A description of plant controls that 

will be implemented to minimize the 

potential for a boron dilution event. 

e. A summary of operator training and 

procedures that will be used to ensure 

that operators can quickly identify and 

terminate a boron dilution event. 

3.2 Technical Evaluation 

In determining the acceptability of the 

licensee’s exemption request, the staff 

reviewed three aspects of the licensee’s 

analyses: (1) Criticality analyses 

submitted to support the ISFSI license 

application, (2) boron dilution analysis, 

and (3) legal basis for approving the 

exemption. For each of the aspects, the 

staff evaluated whether the licensee’s 

analyses and methodologies provide 

reasonable assurance that adequate 

safety margins are developed and can be 

maintained in the DCPP SFP during 

loading of spent fuel into canisters for 

dry cask storage. 

3.2.1 Criticality Analyses 

For evaluation of the acceptability of 

the licensee’s exemption request, the 

staff reviewed the criticality analyses 

provided by the licensee in support of 

its ISFSI license application. Chapter 6, 

‘‘Criticality Evaluation,’’ of the HI–

STORM Final Safety Analysis Report 

(HI–STORM FSAR) contains detailed 

information regarding the methodology, 

assumptions, and controls used in the 

criticality analysis for the MPCs to be 

used at DCPP. The staff reviewed the 

information contained in Chapter 6 as 

well as information provided by the 

licensee in its exemption request to 

determine if Criterion 1 through 4 of 

Section 3.1 were satisfied. 

First, the staff reviewed the 

methodology and assumptions used by 

the licensee in its criticality analysis to 

determine if Criterion 1 was satisfied. 

The licensee provided a detailed list of 

the assumptions used in the criticality 

analysis in Chapter 6 of the HI–STORM 

FSAR. The licensee stated that it took 

no credit in the criticality analyses for 

burnup or fuel-related burnable 

absorbers. The licensee also stated that 

all assemblies were analyzed at the 

highest permissible enrichment. 

Additionally, the licensee stated that all 

criticality analyses for a flooded MPC 

were performed at temperatures and 

densities of water corresponding to 

optimum moderation conditions. 

Finally, the licensee stated that it only 

credited 75 percent of the Boron-10 

content for the fixed neutron absorber, 

Boral, in the MPC. Based on its review 

of the criticality analyses contained in 

Chapter 6 of the HI–STORM FSAR, the 

staff finds that the licensee has satisfied 

Criterion 1. 

Second, the staff reviewed the 

proposed Diablo Canyon ISFSI TS. The 

licensee’s criticality analyses credit 

soluble boron for reactivity control 

during MPC loading, unloading, and 

handling operations. Since the boron 

concentration is a key safety component 

necessary for ensuring subcritical 

conditions in the pool, the licensee 

must have conservative TS capable of 

ensuring that sufficient soluble boron is 

present to perform its safety function. 

The most limiting loading configuration 

of an MPC requires 2600 parts-permillion (ppm) of soluble boron to ensure 

the keff is maintained below 0.95, the 

regulatory limit relied upon by the staff 

for demonstrating compliance with the 

requirements of 10 CFR 72.124(a). 

Proposed TS 3.2.1, ‘‘Dissolved Boron 

Concentration,’’ requires the soluble 

boron concentration in the MPC cavity 

be greater than or equal to the 

concentrations assumed in the 

criticality analyses under a variety of 

MPC loading configurations. In all 

cases, the boron concentration required 

by the proposed ISFSI TS ensures that 

the keff will be below 0.95 for the 

analyzed loading configuration. 

Additionally, the licensee’s proposed 

ISFSI TS contains surveillance 

requirements which ensure it will verify 

that the boron concentration is above 

the required level both prior to and 

during MPC loading, unloading, and 

handling operations. Based on its 

review of the proposed Diablo Canyon 

ISFSI TSs, the staff finds that the 

licensee has satisfied Criterion 2. 

Third, the staff reviewed the DCPP 

Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 

Update and the information provided by 

the licensee in its exemption request to 

ensure that it complies with GDC 63. 

GDC 63 requires that licensees have 

radiation monitors in fuel storage and 

associated handling areas to detect 

conditions that may result in a loss of 

residual heat removal capability and 

excessive radiation levels and initiate 

appropriate safety actions. As a 

condition of receiving and maintaining 

an operating license, the licensee must 

comply with GDC 63. The staff reviewed 

the DCPP FSAR Update and exemption 

request to determine whether it had 

provided sufficient information to 

demonstrate continued compliance with 

GDC 63. Based on its review of both 

documents, the staff finds that the 

licensee complies with GDC 63 and has 

satisfied Criterion 3. 

Finally, as part of the criticality 

analysis review, the staff evaluated the 

storage of non-fuel related material in an 

MPC. The staff evaluated the potential 

to increase the reactivity of an MPC by 

loading it with materials other than 

spent nuclear fuel and fuel debris. 

Section 2.0, ‘‘Approved Contents,’’ of 

the proposed Diablo Canyon ISFSI TS 

limits the cask contents to spent nuclear 

fuel, fuel debris, and non-fuel hardware. 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 24 / Thursday, February 5, 2004 / Notices 5593

The Diablo Canyon ISFSI FSAR Tables 

10.2–1 through 10.2–4 provide 

limitations on the materials that can be 

stored in the various MPC designs 

intended to be used at the Diablo 

Canyon ISFSI. The staff determined that 

the loading limitations described in 

Tables 10.2–1 through 10.2–4 will 

ensure that non-fuel hardware loaded in 

the MPCs will not result in a reactivity 

increase. Based on its review of the 

loading restrictions for non-fuel 

hardware, the staff finds that the 

licensee has satisfied Criterion 4.

3.2.2 Boron Dilution Analysis 

Since the licensee’s ISFSI application 

relies on soluble boron to maintain 

subcritical conditions within the MPCs 

during loading, unloading and handling 

operations, the staff reviewed the 

licensee’s boron dilution analysis to 

determine whether appropriate controls, 

alarms, and procedures were available 

to identify and terminate a boron 

dilution accident prior to reaching a 

critical boron concentration. 

At the staff’s request, the licensee 

provided additional information 

describing the boron dilution analysis it 

performed. First, the licensee performed 

a criticality analysis to determine the 

DCPP critical boron concentration, 1720 

ppm, during MPC loading, unloading, 

and handling operations. Therefore, the 

DCPP SPF boron concentration would 

have to decrease from the ISFSI TS limit 

of 2600 ppm to the critical boron 

concentration 1720 ppm before SPF 

criticality is possible. This analysis 

assumed that a fully loaded MPC–32 

canister containing fresh fuel of the 

maximum permissible enrichment is 

uniformly diluted to the critical boron 

concentration. The licensee based the 

remainder of its boron dilution analysis 

and its preventive and mitigative 

actions on preventing the MPC from 

reaching this concentration. 

The licensee referenced a detailed 

analysis of the boron dilution event 

previously performed for DCPP and 

submitted to the NRC. In this analysis, 

the licensee determined all of the 

potential dilution pathways for adding 

makeup water to the DCPP SFP. The 

pathway with the maximum flowrate is 

from the demineralized water system to 

the SFP via valve 803, which can 

provide a maximum flowrate of 494 

gallons per minute (gpm). Based on this 

maximum flowrate, the licensee 

calculated a time line for the boron 

dilution event, and determined that, 

starting from the SFP low level alarm 

setpoint, it would take 39 minutes to 

reach the SFP high level alarm. It would 

take an additional 10 minutes before the 

SFP began to overflow. Finally, 

approximately five hours after the SFP 

high level alarm setpoint was reached, 

the critical boron concentration would 

be achieved. 

To demonstrate that it has ample time 

and opportunity to identify and 

terminate a boron dilution event, the 

licensee described the alarms, 

procedures, and administrative controls 

it has in place. The licensee described 

the alarms available to operators to 

identify a boron dilution event. The SFP 

high level and low level alarms are 

annunciated in the control room and the 

operator response is described in a 

response procedure. Additionally, 

operators are trained to terminate any 

boron dilution source within one-half 

hour of receiving the high level alarm. 

In addition to the high level alarm, the 

operators would receive indication of a 

boron dilution event from the liquid 

waste systems alarms caused by the 

overflowing pool water ending up in the 

fuel handling building floor drains. As 

part of its pool monitoring program, 

operations personnel perform rounds in 

the SFP area once every shift where they 

check the level of the pool and the 

conditions around the pool. Also, while 

cask loading operations are in progress, 

numerous plant personnel would be 

working next to the SFP where they 

could easily identify any level changes. 

The licensee stated that during any 

delays where the SFP is not 

continuously monitored, exceeding 

those for normal shift changes and 

breaks, either trained personnel will be 

assigned to monitor the SFP or the 

frequency of operator rounds will be 

increased. 

The licensee stated that it will 

implement additional temporary 

administrative controls while the MPC 

is in the SFP to minimize the possibility 

of a boron dilution event. The licensee 

stated that except for the primary water 

station near the SFP, which is used for 

the decontamination process and 

rinsing dry cask storage equipment as it 

is removed from the SFP, at least one 

valve in each potential flow path of 

unborated water to the SFP will be 

closed and tagged out. As an additional 

precaution, the licensee will double 

isolate the flow path with the highest 

potential flowrate of 494 gpm. The 

licensee will close and tag out two 

valves in this flow path to minimize the 

potential that it can cause a boron 

dilution event. 

Finally, to ensure that operators are 

capable of identifying and terminating a 

boron dilution event during MPC 

loading, unloading, and handling 

operations, the licensee will incorporate 

the changes made to the operating 

procedures relating to the SFP boron 

dilution flow paths into the DCPP 

operator training program. The licensee 

stated that the training will emphasize 

the importance of avoiding any 

inadvertent additions of unborated 

water to the SFP, responses to be taken 

to alarms that may be indicative of a 

potential boron dilution event during 

cask loading and fuel movement in the 

SFP, and identification of the potential 

for a boron dilution event during 

decontamination rinsing activities. 

Based on the staff’s review of the 

licensee’s exemption request, the 

additional information it provided, and 

its boron dilution analysis, the staff 

finds the licensee has provided 

sufficient information to demonstrate 

that it satisfies Criterion 5. 

3.3 Legal Basis for the Exemption

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, ‘‘Specific 

Exemption,’’ the staff reviewed the 

licensee’s exemption request to 

determine if the legal basis for granting 

an exemption had been satisfied, and 

concluded that the licensee has satisfied 

the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12. With 

regards to the six special circumstances 

listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), the staff 

finds that the licensee’s exemption 

request satisfies 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 

‘‘Application of the regulation in the 

particular circumstances would not 

serve the underlying purpose of the rule 

or is not necessary to achieve the 

underlying purpose of the rule.’’

Specifically, the staff concludes that 

since the licensee has satisfied the five 

criteria in Section 3.1 of this exemption, 

the application of the rule is not 

necessary to achieve its underlying 

purpose in this case. 

3.4 Staff Conclusion

Based upon the review of the 

licensee’s exemption request to credit 

soluble boron during MPC loading, 

unloading, and handling in the DCPP 

SFP, the staff concludes that pursuant to 

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) the licensee’s 

exemption request is acceptable. 

However, the staff limits its approval to 

the loading, unloading, and handling of 

the components of the HI–STORM 100 

dual-purpose dry cask storage system at 

DCPP. 

4.0 Conclusion 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. Also, special 

circumstances are present. Therefore, 

the Commission hereby grants Pacific 

Gas and Electric Company an exemption 

5594 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 24 / Thursday, February 5, 2004 / Notices 

from the requirements of 10 CFR 

50.68(b)(1) for the loading, unloading, 

and handling of the components of the 

HI–STORM 100 dual-purpose dry cask 

storage system at DCPP. Any changes to 

the cask system design features affecting 

criticality or its supporting criticality 

analyses will invalidate this exemption. 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the 

Commission has determined that the 

granting of this exemption will not have 

a significant effect on the quality of the 

human environment (69 FR 2012). 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day 

of January 2004.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Ledyard B. Marsh, 

Director, Division of Licensing Project 

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 04–2486 Filed 2–4–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. IC–26340; File No. 812–12999] 

MetLife Investors Insurance Company, 

et al.; Notice of Application 

January 29, 2004.

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange 

Commission (‘‘Commission’’).

ACTION: Notice of application for an 

order pursuant to Section 26(c) of the 

Investment Company Act of 1940 (the 

‘‘Act’’) approving certain substitutions 

of securities and an order of exemption 

pursuant to Section 17(b) of the Act. 

Applicants: MetLife Investors 

Insurance Company (‘‘MetLife 

Investors’’), MetLife Investors Variable 

Annuity Account One (‘‘VA Account 

One’’), MetLife Investors Variable Life 

Account One (‘‘VL Account One’’), First 

MetLife Investors Insurance Company 

(‘‘First MetLife Investors’’), First MetLife 

Investors Variable Annuity Account 

One (‘‘First VA Account One’’), MetLife 

Investors Insurance Company of 

California (‘‘MetLife Investors of 

California’’), MetLife Investors Variable 

Annuity Account Five (‘‘VA Account 

Five’’), MetLife Investors Variable Life 

Account Five (‘‘VL Account Five’’), 

MetLife Investors USA Insurance 

Company (‘‘MetLife Investors USA’’), 

MetLife Investors USA Separate 

Account A (‘‘Separate Account A’’), 

General American Life Insurance 

Company (‘‘General American’’), 

General American Separate Account 

Eleven (‘‘Separate Account Eleven’’), 

New England Life Insurance Company 

(‘‘New England’’), New England 

Variable Life Separate Account (‘‘NEVL 

Separate Account’’), Metropolitan Life 

Insurance Company (‘‘MetLife’’) 

(together with MetLife Investors, First 

MetLife Investors, MetLife Investors of 

California, MetLife Investors USA, 

General American and New England, 

the ‘‘Insurance Companies’’), 

Metropolitan Life Separate Account UL 

(‘‘Separate Account UL’’), Metropolitan 

Life Separate Account E (‘‘Separate 

Account E’’), Security Equity Separate 

Account Thirteen (‘‘Separate Account 

Thirteen’’) (together with VA Account 

One, VL Account One, First VA 

Account One, VA Account Five, VL 

Account Five, Separate Account A, 

Separate Account Eleven, NEVL 

Separate Account, Separate Account 

UL, and Separate Account E, the 

‘‘Separate Accounts’’), Met Investors 

Series Trust (‘‘MIST’’) and Metropolitan 

Series Fund, Inc. (‘‘Met Series Fund’’) 

(MIST and Met Series Fund are the 

‘‘Investment Companies’’). The 

Insurance Companies and the Separate 

Accounts are the ‘‘Substitution 

Applicants.’’ The Insurance Companies, 

the Separate Accounts and the 

Investment Companies are the ‘‘Section 

17 Applicants.’’

Filing Date: The application was filed 

on August 5, 2003, and amended on 

January 22, 2004. 

Summary of Application: The 

Substitution Applicants request an 

order pursuant to Section 26(c) of the 

Act to permit certain unit investment 

trusts to substitute shares of certain 

portfolios of MIST and Met Series Fund 

(collectively, the ‘‘Replacement Funds’’) 

for shares of certain portfolios of the 

AIM Variable Insurance Funds (‘‘AIM 

Fund’’), the Alger American Fund 

(‘‘Alger Fund’’), the AllianceBernstein 

Variable Products Series Fund, Inc. 

(‘‘AllianceBernstein Fund’’), the 

American Century Variable Portfolios, 

Inc. (‘‘American Century Fund’’), 

Dreyfus Variable Investment Fund 

(‘‘Dreyfus Fund’’), Federated Insurance 

Series (‘‘Federated Fund’’), Variable 

Insurance Products Fund (‘‘Variable 

Fund’’), Franklin Templeton Variable 

Insurance Products Trust (‘‘Franklin 

Templeton Fund’’), Goldman Sachs 

Variable Insurance Trust (‘‘Goldman 

Sachs Fund’’), INVESCO Variable 

Investment Funds, Inc. (‘‘INVESCO 

Fund’’), MFS Variable Insurance Trust 

(‘‘MFS Fund’’), Liberty Variable 

Investment Trust (‘‘Liberty Fund’’), 

Oppenheimer Variable Account Funds 

(‘‘Oppenheimer Funds’’), Putnam 

Variable Trust (‘‘Putnam Funds’’), 

Scudder Variable Series I (‘‘Scudder I 

Fund’’), Scudder Variable Series II 

(‘‘Scudder II Fund’’), and Van Kampen 

Life Investment Trust (‘‘Van Kampen 

Fund’’) (collectively, the ‘‘Existing 

Funds’’) currently held by those unit 

investment trusts. The shares are held 

by the unit investment trusts to fund 

certain group and individual variable 

annuity contracts and variable life 

insurance policies (collectively, the 

‘‘Contracts’’) issued by the Insurance 

Companies. The Section 17 Applicants 

request an order of the Commission 

pursuant to Section 17(b) of the Act 

exempting them from Section 17(a) of 

the Act to the extent necessary to permit 

the Investment Companies to carry out 

certain substitutions by the in-kind 

purchases and sales of shares of the 

Replacement Fund. 

Hearing or Notification of Hearing: An 

order granting the amended and restated 

application will be issued unless the 

Commission orders a hearing. Interested 

persons may request a hearing by 

writing to the Secretary of the 

Commission and serving Applicants 

with a copy of the request personally or 

by mail. Hearing requests should be 

received by the Commission by 5:30 

p.m. on February 23, 2004, and should 

be accompanied by proof of service on 

Applicants, in the form of an affidavit 

or, for lawyers, a certificate of service. 

Hearing requests should state the nature 

of the writer’s interest, the reason for the 

request and the issues contested. 

Persons may request notification of a 

hearing by writing to the Secretary of 

the Commission.

ADDRESSES: Secretary, Securities and 

Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, 

NW., Washington, DC 20549–0609. 

Applicants, Richard C. Pearson, Esq., 

MetLife Investors Insurance Company, 

22 Corporate Plaza Drive, Newport 

Beach, California 92660. Copy to Robert 

N. Hickey, Esq., Sullivan & Worcester 

LLP, 1666 K Street, NW., Washington, 

DC 20006.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thu 

Ta, Senior Counsel, or Lorna J. 

MacLeod, Branch Chief, at 202–942–

0670, Office of Insurance Products, 

Division of Investment Management.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

following is a summary of the 

application. The complete application 

may be obtained for a fee from the 

Public Reference Branch of the 

Commission, 450 Fifth Street, NW., 

Washington, DC 20549 (tel. (202) 942–

8090). 

Applicants’ Representations 

1. MetLife Investors is a stock life 

insurance company organized in 1981 

under the laws of Missouri. MetLife 

Investors is an indirect wholly owned 

subsidiary of MetLife. MetLife Investors