December 18, 2007 

MEMORANDUM TO: Luis A. Reyes 

 Executive Director for Operations 

FROM: Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary /RA/ 

SUBJECT: STAFF REQUIREMENTS - SECY-07-0148 – INDEPENDENT 

SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION SECURITY 

REQUIREMENTS FOR RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE 

The Commission has addressed the staff’s recommendations for each of the six issues raised in 

the subject paper as follows: 

Issue 1: 

 The Commission has approved the staff’s recommendation to apply the radiological 

 dose criterion to all independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) and to have the 

 licensee perform the assessments and demonstrate the ISFSI is in compliance with the 

 dose limit. 

Issue 2: 

The Commission has approved the staff’s recommendation to keep the dose limit for 

radiological sabotage consistent with the dose limit for ISFSI Design Basis Accidents 

(DBAs) (i.e., a 0.05-Sv (5-rem) dose limit at the controlled area boundary. The 

Commission has disapproved the staff’s recommendation to meet a 0.01-Sv (1-rem) 

dose limit for both safety and security events at the site area boundary. 

In developing the proposed rule, the staff should engage stakeholders on appropriate 

approaches to address potential licensing, emergency preparedness, and security plan 

impacts stemming from this rulemaking. 

For purposes of preparing this rulemaking, the staff should continue to use the 5 rem 

dose limit currently specified in 10 CFR 73.51 (a)(3). The staff should also ensure 

consistency in emergency planning requirements for ISFSIs, independent of the type of 

10 CFR Part 72 license. 
Issue 3: 

The Commission has approved the staff’s recommendation to develop new, riskinformed, performance-based security requirements applicable to all ISFSI licensees to 

enhance existing security requirements and to develop ISFSI-specific regulatory 

guidance supporting the new regulations. 

The staff should ensure that the proposed regulation and guidance documents make it 

clear that these requirements do not impose a new Design Basis Threat (DBT). 

Issue 4: 

The Commission has approved the staff’s recommendation to develop ISFSI regulatory 

guidance that would be bounded by the adversary characteristics regulatory guidance 

supporting the Design basis Threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage associated with 

power reactors. 

As it prepares this proposed rule, the staff should assess additional threat and 

vulnerability information in order to develop a technical basis to support inclusion of this 

approach or, if indicated by the staff’s assessment, an appropriate alternate approach in 

the proposed rule. 

Because of the complexity of the issues associated with this proposed rulemaking, the 

staff should develop draft regulatory guidance and other draft licensing guidance for 

deployment during the proposed rule stage to ensure all parties understand the 

objective, implementation and scope of the proposed rule. 

Issue 5: 

The Commission has approved the staff’s recommendation to apply the proposed ISFSI 

security rulemaking to all existing and future ISFSI licenses. 

Issue 6: 

The Commission has approved the staff’s recommendation to publicly release this SECY 

paper including redacted portions of Enclosures 1 through 5. In addition, this SRM and 

the Commission Voting Record will also be released to the public upon issuance of the 

SRM. 

The staff should consider the degree to which public release of certain information could 

impede or inhibit its ability to candidly communicate with the Commission and to perform 

a thorough and objective review of the issues relevant to this rulemaking. 

The staff should share to the maximum extent possible, classified and unclassified 

security related information with stakeholders that would be affected by this rulemaking 

with appropriate controls and safeguards in place. 

The staff should aggressively encourage public comments during the development of the proposed 

rule so that all relevant issues are identified and unintended consequences resolved if they exist. 
The staff should conduct a formal workshop with stakeholders to work through the nuances of 

normalizing the security regulations for both general and specific ISFSI licensees. 

The staff should monitor other rulemaking activities, including the geologic repository operations 

area (GROA) security and material control and accounting requirements, the security 

rulemakings for reactors, and the staff’s enhancement for reactor emergency preparedness to 

ensure regulatory harmonization for similar activities. 

cc: Chairman Klein 

 Commissioner Jaczko 

 Commissioner Lyons 

 OGC 

 CFO 

 OCA 

 OPA 

 Office Directors, Regions, ACRS, ACNW, ASLBP (via E-Mail) 

 PDR