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16-P-223 Appeals Court

WILL QUARTERMAN vs. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD & another.1

No. 16-P-223.

Hampden. November 9, 2016. - March 29, 2017.

Present: Kafker, C.J., Kinder, & Lemire, JJ.

Alcoholic Liquors, License, Local licensing authority. AntiDiscrimination Law, Race, Damages, Attorney's fees. 

Practice, Civil, Judgment notwithstanding verdict, Motion 

to amend, Instructions to jury. Judgment, Amendment. 

Damages, Loss of profits, Attorney's fees.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 

August 14, 2008. 

The case was tried before Daniel A. Ford, J., an award of 

attorney's fees was ordered by him, and motions for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict and to alter or amend the judgment 

were heard by him.

Leonard H. Kesten for the plaintiff.

Edward M. Pikula, City Solicitor, for the defendants.

KINDER, J. On April 13, 2006, the board of license 

commissioners (board) of the city of Springfield (city) denied 

 

1 Peter Sygnator, individually and as chairman of the board 

of license commissioners.
2

plaintiff Will Quarterman's application for a liquor license. 

Quarterman, an African American, brought this action against 

board chairman Peter Sygnator and the city, claiming that denial 

of the application was discriminatory and in retaliation for 

Quarterman's earlier filing of a complaint with the 

Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). 

Ultimately, a Superior Court jury rejected the claim of racial 

discrimination, but found that the city, through the actions of 

former Mayor Charles Ryan, had retaliated against Quarterman in 

violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4(4).

2 The jury awarded damages of 

$250,000 in lost profits and $100,000 for emotional distress. 

The city challenged the verdict in posttrial motions for 

judgment nothwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.), to 

alter or amend the judgment, and for a new trial. Principally,

the city argued that the evidence of retaliation and damages was 

insufficient. In a comprehensive written decision, the trial 

judge denied the motions as to liability for retaliation, but 

allowed them, in part, as to damages. The judge concluded that 

there was evidentiary support for the award of $100,000 for 

emotional distress. However, he found that the evidence of lost 

profits was "lacking in substance." He also reasoned that 

 

2 The jury found that neither Sygnator nor Mayor Ryan 

discriminated against Quarterman, and that Sygnator did not 

retaliate against him. Mayor Ryan is not a named defendant in 

this action.
3

Quarterman had failed to establish standing to claim lost 

profits because the profits were not direct and personal to him. 

Accordingly, the judge reduced the damages from $350,000 to 

$100,000. Quarterman challenges that ruling on appeal. 

On cross-appeal, the city argues that (1) the motions for 

judgment n.o.v. and to alter or amend the judgment should have 

been allowed in their entirety; (2) the judge erred in refusing 

to instruct the jury regarding the mayor's right to freedom of 

speech; (3) the judge abused his discretion in denying a motion 

in limine to admit findings in a related Federal case; and (4) 

the judge abused his discretion in awarding attorney's fees.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order denying

the motion for judgment n.o.v. as to liability for retaliation, 

and affirm the order to alter or amend the judgment by

eliminating damages for lost profits. We also conclude that the 

jury were properly instructed, and that the judge did not abuse 

his discretion with respect to the motion in limine and the 

award of attorney's fees.3

Background. We summarize the facts in the light most 

favorable to Quarterman, reserving some details for our 

discussion. See Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard 

 

3 In light of our ruling affirming the allowance of the 

motion to alter or amend the judgment, we need not address the 

motion for new trial, which was allowed only on the condition 

that the motion to amend or alter judgment was reversed. See 

Mass.R.Civ.P. 50(c), as amended, 428 Mass. 1402 (1998).
4

College, 432 Mass. 107, 110 (2000). Quarterman had been in the 

bar business in the city for several years. In September, 2002,

he opened a nightclub, Logan's Lounge, after obtaining a liquor 

license from the board. The business operated without incident 

until April, 2004, when a brawl and shooting occurred there 

during an afterhours party. Although Quarterman was not present 

at the time, police reports suggested that he was. Immediately 

following the shooting, Quarterman voluntarily closed Logan's 

Lounge. Shortly thereafter, the business was evicted from the 

property and closed permanently. 

In August, 2004, Quarterman and a new business partner, 

Paul Ramesh, applied to the board to transfer the liquor license 

to a new club called Halo that they planned to open in the 

entertainment district of the city. Despite Quarterman's 

repeated requests for a hearing on the application, one was not 

convened until March, 2005. In the intervening months, Sygnator 

raised multiple concerns about the interior design of the club,

which Quarterman addressed. There was also a concern about the 

proposed venue, which had previously been occupied by a

nightclub called Asylum. Asylum had posed problems for the city 

because of large crowds, excessive noise, vandalism, illegal 

drug use, and violence.

On March 2, 2005, Quarterman filed the first of two

complaints with the MCAD. He alleged that the city, the mayor,
5

and Sygnator discriminated against him on the basis of race by 

failing to schedule a vote on his application to transfer the

liquor license. Meanwhile, the board held a hearing and voted 

three to two to deny the application. The city, through its 

attorney, suggested to Quarterman and Ramesh that they address 

the concerns raised by the board and apply for a new license. 

In January, 2006, Quarterman and Ramesh applied for a new 

liquor license in the name of their new corporation, Exile 

Entertainment, Inc. The hearing on the application was delayed 

from March 9, 2006, to April 13, 2006, at the mayor's request so 

that he could attend. At the hearing, the mayor, who had never 

previously appeared before the board, argued against the 

application. He also recruited other witnesses to speak in 

opposition to the application, including the police commissioner 

and a representative of American International College. In 

support of his opposition, the mayor cited the shooting at 

Logan's Lounge, suggesting that Quarterman had been present when 

it had occurred. The board voted three to one to deny the 

application. At least one commissioner changed his vote based 

on the mayor's opposition. 

By contrast, immediately following the vote denying Exile a 

liquor license, the board voted to approve a liquor license for 

another nightclub in the entertainment district, the Alumni 

Club. The mayor spoke in favor of that application. 
6

After issuance of the board's final written decision 

denying his application, Quarterman filed a second complaint 

with the MCAD. He again alleged that the city and Sygnator 

discriminated against him on the basis of race and engaged in 

retaliation. Following a finding of probable cause by the MCAD,

Quarterman removed the complaint to Superior Court by filing

this action. 

Discussion. Although the judge's memorandum of decision 

did not distinguish between the relief sought by the city in its 

motion for judgment n.o.v. and its motion to alter or amend the 

judgment, the motions addressed different issues. The city 

clarified the relief sought by each motion in its joint 

memorandum in support of all posttrial motions: "The [c]ity has 

moved, pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 

50(b), [as amended, 428 Mass. 1402 (1998),] for judgment in its 

favor notwithstanding the verdict as to liability for 

retaliation; moved, pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Civil 

Procedure Rule 59(e), [365 Mass. 827 (1974),] to alter or amend 

the judgment by deducting the amount of damages awarded for lost 

profits; and moved, pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Civil 

Procedure Rule 59(a), [365 Mass. 827 (1974),] for a new trial on 

the issue of liability for retaliation attributed to Mayor 

Ryan." Thus, the city sought to address liability with its 

motion for judgment n.o.v. and motion for new trial, and damages 
7

with its motion to alter or amend the judgment. While the 

judge's decision and some of the pleadings conflate these

issues, we address liability and damages separately as the city 

framed them at the outset.

1. Motion for judgment n.o.v. regarding liability for 

retaliation. Relief is appropriate under a motion for judgment 

n.o.v. "[o]nly when no rational view of the evidence warrants a 

finding [for the nonmoving party] . . . ." Mullins v. Pine 

Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 56 (1983), quoting from Zezuski v. 

Jenny Mfg. Co., 363 Mass. 324, 327 (1973). See J.W. Smith & 

H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice § 50.13, at 150 (2007). Accordingly, 

in analyzing this motion we draw every reasonable inference in 

favor of Quarterman "without weighing the credibility of the 

witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence

. . . ." Bavuso v. Caterpillar Industrial, Inc., 408 Mass. 694, 

695 n.1 (1990), quoting from McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 Mass. 43, 

45 (1989).

General Laws c. 151B, § 4(4), as inserted by St. 1946, 

c. 368, § 4(4), makes it unlawful "[f]or any person . . . to

. . . discriminate against any person because he has opposed any 

practices forbidden under this chapter or because he has filed a 

complaint . . . ." "Retaliation is a separate and independent 

cause of action" from a claim of discrimination under G. L. 

c. 151B, Abramian, 432 Mass. at 121, but the basic framework of 
8

the claim remains the same. First, "the plaintiff bears the 

initial burden of establishing a prima facie case"; second, "the 

burden shifts to the [defendant] to articulate a legitimate 

reason for its actions"; and third, "the burden shifts back to 

the [plaintiff] to show that the [defendant's] asserted reason 

was not the true reason, but rather a pretext." Handrahan v. 

Red Roof Inns, Inc., 43 Mass. App. Ct. 13, 14-15 (1997). To 

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Quarterman must

prove that he "reasonably and in good faith believed that the 

[city] was engaged in wrongful discrimination, that [he] acted 

reasonably in response to [his] belief, and that the [city's] 

desire to retaliate against [him] was a determinative factor in 

its decision" to deny him a liquor license. Tate v. Department

of Mental Health, 419 Mass. 356, 364 (1995). See Abramian, 

supra. 

The city does not dispute that Quarterman believed the city 

discriminated against him or that he acted reasonably in 

response to that belief. Rather, the city argues that there was 

insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that denial of 

the liquor license was caused by the city through the actions of 

the mayor. Further, the city contends that Quarterman failed to 

adequately rebut evidence that the license was denied for a 

legitimate, nonretaliatory reason. Drawing all reasonable 

inferences in favor of Quarterman, we agree with the judge's 
9

assessment that the evidence was sufficient to prove that it was 

more likely than not that Quarterman "suffered harm as a result 

of Mayor Ryan's action." 

The jury could have found that the 2006 liquor license 

application addressed the concerns the board had expressed at 

the 2005 hearing. The capacity of the club had been decreased 

from 700 to 400, security had been increased, parking was added, 

and Quarterman's role in the business had been reduced. 

Considering evidence of these modifications in the light most 

favorable to Quarterman, the jury could reasonably have 

concluded that, but for the mayor's opposition, the application 

would have been approved. 

There was also evidence from which the jury could have 

inferred retaliatory animus. After Quarterman filed the MCAD 

complaint naming the mayor as a defendant, the mayor took an 

unusual interest in Quarterman's liquor license application. He 

had never before appeared to testify against an applicant, he

requested and was granted a postponement of the hearing to 

ensure his attendance, and he recruited other witnesses to 

testify against the application. He spoke forcefully against 

the application at the hearing, persuading at least one board 

member to vote against it. 

According to the city, Quarterman's application was denied 

for legitimate nonretaliatory reasons -- the board's concerns 
10

about the location and size of the establishment, prior problems 

with Asylum at the same location, and Quarterman's troubled 

history at Logan's Lounge. But, as set forth above, there was 

evidence that those issues had been previously raised and, in 

large part, addressed by Quarterman, such that the jury could 

have reasonably concluded the stated reasons were a pretext. 

Reasonable minds might disagree whether the mayor's intent 

in opposing the liquor license was to retaliate against 

Quarterman, or to protect the city and its residents. But, in 

analyzing a motion for judgment n.o.v., we do not weigh the 

evidence. Simply put, when considered in a light most favorable 

to Quarterman, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to 

conclude that by filing an MCAD complaint Quarterman engaged in 

legally protected conduct, that he suffered an adverse action in 

the denial of the liquor license, and that there was a causal 

connection between the two. See Ritchie v. Department of State 

Police, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 664 (2004). Accordingly, there 

was no error in the denial of the motion for judgment n.o.v. as 

to liability for retaliation.

2. Motion to alter or amend the judgment as to damages. 

The judge allowed the city's motion to alter or amend the 

judgment in part, by reducing the damages from $350,000 to 

$100,000. In doing so, he concluded that the evidence supported 
11

an award of $100,000 for emotional distress damages, but not an 

award of $250,000 for lost profits damages. We agree.

Under Mass.R.Civ.P. 59(e), a motion to alter or amend "'is 

designed for . . . situations' where the judgment is incorrect 

because it lacks both legal and factual justification." Shawmut 

Community Bank, N.A. v. Zagami, 419 Mass. 220, 223 (1994), 

quoting from Page v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 383 Mass. 250, 

252 (1981). In such circumstances, "the judge [is] not 'called 

upon to find different facts from the evidence, but merely to

correct the judgment by striking out that portion which [is] 

erroneous because it lack[s] both legal and factual

justification.'" Page v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, 

quoting from Mumma v. Reading Co., 247 F. Supp. 252, 260 (E.D. 

Pa. 1965) (affirming reduction of jury's award of $10,000 as 

nominal damages to $1 on a contract claim in the "absence of a 

showing of pecuniary loss"). See Spring v. Geriatric Authy. of 

Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 290-291 (1985) (affirming reduction of 

jury award from $50,000 to nominal damages of $1 on a breach of 

contract claim where "no actual damages were proved at trial").

We review the order allowing the motion to alter or amend 

for an abuse of discretion. See Gannett v. Shulman, 74 Mass. 

App. Ct. 606, 615 (2009). A judge abuses his discretion only 

when he makes "a clear error of judgment in weighing" the 

relevant factors "such that the decision falls outside the range 
12

of reasonable alternatives." See Hoegen v. Hoegen, 89 Mass. 

App. Ct. 6, 9 (2016), quoting from L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 

Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

We first address whether lost profits are a proper element 

of damages for a claim of retaliation. "In the context of . . .

G. L. c. 151B, compensatory damages are those damages which 

'make[] the aggrieved party whole,' . . . including those which 

are the 'natural and probable consequences' of the illegal 

conduct." Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 402 Mass. 385, 388 

(1988), quoting from Bournewood Hosp., Inc. v. Massachusetts 

Commn. Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 303, 315-316 (1976). 

Typically, compensatory damages in such an action can be awarded 

for emotional distress, see Stonehill College v. Massachusetts

Commn. Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549, 570-577 (2004); 

back pay, see DeRoche v. Massachusetts Commn. Against 

Discrimination, 447 Mass. 1, 15-16 (2006); front pay, see Haddad

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (No. 1), 455 Mass. 91, 102-106 (2009);

and lost pension benefits, see Ventresco v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 55 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 209-211 (2002). Compensatory 

damages also can be awarded based on other damages incurred as a 

"direct consequence" of the action. Massachusetts Commn.

Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, 357 Mass. 112, 115 (1970). 

Lost profits are the usual measure of damages in cases 

involving business torts, see Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. 
13

Crampton, 377 Mass. 159, 169 (1979), and are typically awarded 

to businesses and corporations injured by another's conduct. 

See, e.g., Eldim, Inc. v. Mullen, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 125, 129-130

(1999). 

Although claims for lost profits are not common in cases 

alleging discrimination and retaliation under G. L. c. 151B, we 

are aware of no authority prohibiting such claims as a potential 

remedy and we see no reason to preclude them as a matter of law. 

The provisions of c. 151B are to be "construed liberally for the

accomplishment of its purposes." G. L. c. 151B, § 9, as amended 

by St. 2002, c. 223, § 2. The clear legislative purpose of 

c. 151B is "to afford victims of discrimination the legal remedy 

of compensatory damages." Conway, supra at 387. Bearing in 

mind these principles, we conclude that the natural and probable 

consequence of retaliation under c. 151B can, if supported by 

the evidence, include lost profits.

4 

Having concluded that lost profits damages are recoverable 

under c. 151B, we turn to the evidence supporting Quarterman's 

claim of lost profits. Quarterman was the only witness to 

testify about lost profits. Despite the fact that Halo never 

 

4 Other jurisdictions have held that lost profits damages 

are available in analogous circumstances. See Thompson v. Hales 

Corners, 340 N.W.2d 704, 716 (Wis. 1983) (affirming jury award 

of lost profits for civil rights violation); Johnson v. Alaska 

State Dept. of Fish & Game, 836 P.2d 896, 910-913 (Alaska 1991) 

(lost profit damages available as remedy for discriminatory 

restrictions on salmon fishing).
14

opened, he estimated that the business would have earned a 

profit of $700,000 to $800,000 in the first year of operation. 

He based this opinion on his prior experience as a bar owner, 

his knowledge of the profits from other clubs owned by Ramesh, 

and the success of a sports bar in the entertainment district.5 

There was no evidence regarding startup costs, retained earnings 

for improvements, or the distribution of corporate profits to 

the shareholders. Quarterman's opinions were not supported by 

documentary evidence. No shareholder agreement, employment 

agreement, business records, or tax returns were offered. While 

Quarterman was "not required to prove [his] lost profits with 

mathematical precision," lost profit damages must be proved "to 

a reasonable degree of certainty." Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. 

Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 439 Mass. 387, 413 (2003) (quotations 

omitted). Here, the judge found that "Quarterman's testimony 

about the alleged loss of profits was lacking in substance." 

Based on our review of the record, this determination was within 

the range of reasonable alternatives and, therefore, not an 

abuse of discretion. 

 

5 According to Quarterman, Logan's Lounge made a $4,000 to

$7,000 profit each Friday night, and a little less on Saturday. 

He testified that Sam's Sports Bar, which had a smaller capacity 

and served food, earned a profit of approximately $20,000 per 

week. He also testified that Ramesh's bar, the Zone, earned a 

profit of approximately $20,000 per week. 
15

In considering the posttrial motions, the judge also 

concluded that, based on the evidence at trial, Quarterman

lacked standing to claim lost profits. As a general rule, a 

shareholder does not have standing to sue to redress an injury 

to the corporation in which he holds an interest. See Pagan v. 

Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 28 (1st Cir. 2005). Here, it is 

undisputed that Quarterman applied for the liquor license in the 

name of Exile Entertainment, Inc., the closely held corporation 

in which he had a thirty percent ownership interest.6 Had Halo 

opened, it was Exile that would have operated the business and 

benefitted from any profits. According to the city, Quarterman

lacked standing because his claim to lost profits was merely

derivative of Exile's corporate claim. Quarterman argued that 

he had standing because the damages he suffered were direct,

personal, and supported by adequate proof. See id. at 29

(shareholders did not have standing because they failed to

allege "a particularized, nonderivative injury"). In addressing 

this issue, the judge reasoned that:

"If Quarterman and Ramesh, as directors of the corporation, 

had testified that they would have voted to declare a 

dividend and that Exile would have distributed all its 

profits to the shareholders, the jury would have been free 

to assess that testimony and, if they believed it, would 

have been warranted in concluding that Quarterman had 

indeed suffered a loss of 'profits,' in the form of a lost 

dividend."

 

6 Ramesh owned the other seventy percent.
16

Because there was no such evidence, the judge ruled that 

Quarterman had failed to prove the direct and personal injury 

necessary to establish standing to claim lost profit damages. 

Based on the record before us, we cannot say that this was an 

abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm so much of the 

order allowing the motion to alter or amend the judgment as

eliminated the lost profits damages.

7

3. Jury instruction. The city argues that the judge erred 

in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the mayor's freedom 

of political speech. "We review objections to jury instructions 

to determine if there was any error, and, if so, whether the 

error affected the substantial rights of the objecting party." 

Dos Santos v. Coleta, 465 Mass. 148, 153-154 (2013), quoting 

from Hopkins v. Medeiros, 48 Mass. App. Ct.600, 611 (2000). 

The city requested the following instruction:

"As the Chief Executive Officer of the [c]ity, a [m]ayor is 

entitled to express the views of his administration and to 

state what political judgments seemed appropriate so long 

as they were not defamatory. 'The interest in remedying 

discrimination is weighty, but not so weighty as to justify 

a restriction on core political speech.' Bain v. 

Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 766 (1997)."

In declining to give the instruction as requested, the judge 

stated, "I just don't think it's necessary. I think everyone 

 

7 The judge concluded that there was no impediment to the 

jury's award of $100,000 in emotional distress damages because 

those damages were direct and personal to Quarterman. But for 

the city's argument on liability, it does not challenge that 

conclusion.
17

agrees that the mayor is entitled to express his views and state 

what his judgments are. I don't think that's in dispute. The 

issue is, in doing so did he discriminate?" We agree.

The language of the proposed instruction would have, by 

implication, suggested to the jury that the right to speak 

freely is superior to the right to be free from discrimination 

and retaliation. That is not the law. "In outlawing 

retaliation . . . the Massachusetts Legislature prohibited a 

type of conduct that can, and often does, include speech." 

Dixon v. International Bhd. of Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 83 

(1st Cir. 2007). Here, the jury were accurately instructed that 

the city, through its representatives, was entitled to make its 

own policy, business, and governmental judgments. But, it could 

not lawfully deny Quarterman a liquor license simply because he 

filed a complaint with the MCAD. Those instructions were 

sufficient. There was no error in the denial of the city's 

proposed instruction.8 

4. Motion in limine. In 2007, Quarterman filed an action 

against the city in Federal Court alleging discrimination in 

 

8 The city's reliance on certain language in Bain, supra at

766, is misplaced. There the Supreme Judicial Court held that a 

mayor had a right to express to the local newspaper that claims 

of discrimination and retaliation against him were meritless, 

and that such statements were not retaliatory. Here the mayor 

was not merely defending himself against accusations in the 

newspaper, but urging the board, an agency of the government 

that he headed, to take action that would adversely affect 

Quarterman. 
18

connection with the denial of his 2005 liquor license 

application. Following a bench trial in 2010, judgment entered 

for the defendants. Prior to trial in the instant case, the 

city filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit any evidence 

of retaliation, arguing that the issue had already been 

litigated in the Federal case. The city appeals the denial of 

that motion.

We need not dwell on this argument because another panel of 

this court has already done so. The motion in limine was 

previously allowed by a different Superior Court judge who then 

dismissed the case sua sponte. The dismissal was reversed by a 

panel of this court in a memorandum and order pursuant to rule 

1:28, and remanded for further proceedings. See Quarterman v.

Springfield, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 1103 (2012). In short, the panel 

held that the doctrine of issue preclusion did not apply because 

the issues in the Federal and State cases were not the same. 

"[T]he issue in the Federal Court litigation was whether the 

city displayed racial animus against Quarterman in denying his 

2005 liquor license transfer request; the issue raised in the 

Superior Court litigation is whether the city had racial animus 

and retaliated against Quarterman a year later, in 2006 . . . ."
19

Ibid. The city has given us no reason to revisit our resolution 

of that issue.9

5. Attorney's fees. Following a nonevidentiary hearing 

and consideration of multiple affidavits regarding attorney's 

fees, the judge, in a thorough memorandum and order, awarded 

Quarterman $169,002.41 in attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 

G. L. c. 151B, § 9. Based on the arguments advanced in its

posttrial motions, the city requested a reduction in that award. 

The judge denied the motion, concluding that, even though he had 

eliminated lost profits damages, "[t]he time spent on proving 

the alleged loss of profits cannot be separated from the time 

spent on proving other aspects of the case, as those hours were 

inextricably intertwined." On appeal, the city argues that the 

reduction in damages should result in a decrease in the 

attorney's fees. We disagree.

"The amount of a reasonable attorney's fee . . . is largely 

discretionary with the judge, who is in the best position to 

determine how much time was reasonably spent on a case, and the 

fair value of the attorney's services." Fontaine v. Ebtec 

 

9 To the extent that this section of the city's brief claims 

error in the failure to admit the MCAD findings at trial, the 

fleeting reference to the issue provides an insufficient basis 

for us to reasonably consider the claim. See Howe v. Tarvezian, 

73 Mass. App. Ct. 10, 12 (2008) ("Contentions lacking legal 

authority or reasoned explanation fall short of [appellate] 

argument"); Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass 921 

(1975).
20

Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 324 (1993). In general, when only some 

claims are successful, "no fee should be awarded for services 

[employed pursuing an] unsuccessful claim, unless the court 

finds that the unsuccessful claims are sufficiently 

interconnected with the claims on which [t]he plaintiff 

prevails." Killeen v. Westban Hotel Venture, LP, 69 Mass. App. 

Ct. 784, 792-793 (2007) (quotations and citations omitted). 

Here, the judge concluded that the time expended on the claim of 

lost profits damages was "inextricably intertwined" with the 

other claims. We discern no abuse of discretion in that order. 

Conclusion. We affirm the order denying the motion for 

judgment n.o.v. as to liability for retaliation, and affirm the 

order allowing the motion to alter or amend the judgment by 

eliminating the award of $250,000 for lost profits. The 

judgment awarding $100,000 in emotional distress damages is 

affirmed. We also affirm the award of attorney's fees.

So ordered.