Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

July 2001 HAZARDOUS WASTE

EPA’s National and

Regional Ombudsmen

Do Not Have

Sufficient

Independence

GAO-01-813
Page i GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Key Aspects of EPA’s National Hazardous Waste Ombudsman Are

Not Consistent With Relevant Professional Standards 6

EPA’s Regional Ombudsmen Serve on a Part-Time Basis and Play a

Lesser Role Than the National Ombudsman 16

Conclusions 21

Recommendations for Executive Action 22

Agency Comments 23

Scope and Methodology 24

Appendix I Investigations Initiated by EPA’s National

Ombudsman Between October 1992 and

December 2000 26

Appendix II Distribution of National Ombudsman Investigations

by EPA Region 28

Appendix III Comments From the Environmental Protection

Agency, Including Comments From the National

Ombudsman 29

Tables

Table 1: Line Management Positions for Regional Superfund

Ombudsmen 17

Figures

Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Time Spent on Regional

Ombudsman Activities in Calendar Years 1999 and 2000 18

Contents
Page ii GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Abbreviations

ABA American Bar Association

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

GAO General Accounting Office

OSWER Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
Page 1 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

July 27, 2001

The Honorable Paul E. Gillmor

Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment

 and Hazardous Materials

Committee on Energy and Commerce

House of Representatives

The Honorable Michael Bilirakis

House of Representatives

Through the impartial and independent investigation of citizens’

complaints, federal ombudsmen provide the public an informal and

accessible avenue of redress. In particular, ombudsmen help federal

agencies be more responsive to persons who believe that their concerns

have not been dealt with fully or fairly through normal problem-solving

channels. At the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 1984

amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act first

established a national hazardous waste ombudsman, who operated under

the aegis of the act.1

 Over time, EPA expanded the ombudsman’s

jurisdiction to include Superfund2

 and other hazardous waste programs

managed by the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. EPA’s

national hazardous waste ombudsman is charged with responding to

citizens’ concerns, assisting industry in complying with environmental

regulations, and handling complaints arising from the relevant programs.

The ombudsman’s activities range from providing information to

investigating the merits of complaints.

Recognizing that the national hazardous waste ombudsman provides a

valuable service to the public, EPA retained the ombudsman function as a

matter of policy after its legislative authorization expired in 1988. As of

March 1996, EPA had installed ombudsmen in each of its 10 regional

offices as part of a larger effort to adopt administrative reforms in the

Superfund program. While the national ombudsman’s jurisdiction covers

 1

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act governs the management of solid and

hazardous waste.

2

The Superfund program was established under the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 to clean up highly contaminated

hazardous waste sites.

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

any hazardous waste program, the regional ombudsmen are more likely to

focus on Superfund issues.

In recent years, the national ombudsman has played an increasingly

prominent role through his investigations of citizen complaints referred by

Members of Congress. As the number and significance of the

ombudsman’s investigations have increased, so have questions about the

adequacy of available resources and whether there are other potential

impediments to fulfillment of the ombudsman’s responsibilities. Both the

House and the Senate are currently considering legislation that would

formally reauthorize an office of the ombudsman within EPA and increase

the ombudsman’s independence and investigative authority.

Concerned about whether there are institutional barriers to the fulfillment

of the EPA national hazardous waste ombudsman’s responsibilities, you

asked us to (1) compare the national ombudsman’s operations with

professional standards for independence and other factors and

(2) determine the relative roles and responsibilities of EPA’s national and

regional ombudsmen. To address our first objective, we compared the

national ombudsman’s operations with relevant standards of practice,

including those published or drafted by the American Bar Association

(ABA), The Ombudsman Association, and the U. S. Ombudsman

Association. Because legal and practical constraints preclude EPA from

implementing some aspects of the existing standards, we also looked at

other federal agencies whose ombudsmen deal with inquiries from the

public. We chose four agencies whose ombudsmen had sufficient

longevity and workload to allow for a meaningful comparison: the Agency

for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Internal Revenue

Service. Regarding the relative roles and responsibilities of EPA’s national

and regional ombudsmen, we developed a data collection instrument to

collect information from the ombudsmen in EPA’s 10 regional offices and

compared what we learned with information obtained from the national

ombudsman.

Key aspects of EPA’s national hazardous waste ombudsman differ from

professional standards for ombudsmen who deal with inquiries from the

public. For example, an effective ombudsman must have both actual and

apparent independence from any person who may be the subject of a

complaint or inquiry. However, EPA’s national ombudsman is located

within the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER), the

organizational unit whose decisions the ombudsman is responsible for

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

investigating, and his budget and staff resources are controlled by unit

managers within OSWER. The adequacy of the ombudsman’s resources

under this arrangement is also in question, but more information is needed

to determine the appropriate level. In addition, this arrangement

undermines another fundamental requirement of an effective ombudsman:

impartiality. That is to say, the ombudsman must be free from initial bias

and conflicts of interest. The operation of EPA’s ombudsman differs from

professional standards in other important areas as well. In terms of

accountability, for example, EPA’s ombudsman does not prepare an

annual report to keep the public informed of his activities. Ombudsmen at

other federal agencies come closer to meeting professional standards. For

example, at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Internal

Revenue Service, the ombudsman’s office has its own budget and reports

directly to the head of the agency. Officials from EPA’s OSWER have

drafted new guidance to improve the effectiveness of the ombudsman’s

operations and have proposed an organizational change that offers greater

control to the ombudsman over his budget and staffing. However, these

measures do not fully address concerns about the ombudsman’s

independence.

Compared with EPA’s national hazardous waste ombudsman, the regional

ombudsmen are less independent and play a reduced role, primarily

responding to informational inquiries on a part-time basis. Most of the

ombudsmen in EPA’s 10 regional offices hold positions within the regional

organization that appear to compromise their independence. The regional

ombudsmen split their time between performing duties related to the

ombudsman function and duties related to the implementation of the

hazardous waste programs that they are responsible for investigating.

Communication between the national and regional ombudsmen is limited,

despite operating guidelines that call for close coordination. The national

ombudsman refers informational inquiries to the regional ombudsmen but

rarely requests their assistance in investigations.

This report contains recommendations to the Administrator, EPA,

concerning actions needed to strengthen the independence, impartiality,

and accountability of the national hazardous waste ombudsman and to

address impairments to the independence of the regional ombudsmen. In

commenting on a draft of this report, EPA officials, including the Acting

Assistant Administrator of OSWER and the national ombudsman, generally

agreed with our conclusions and recommendations.
Page 4 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

The term “ombudsman” originated in Sweden and has generally come to

mean an impartial official who receives complaints and questions, collects

relevant information through an investigation or inquiry, and works

toward the resolution of the particular issues brought to his attention.

Ombudsmen may make recommendations for the resolution of an

individual complaint or improvements related to more systemic problems.

Depending on their jurisdiction, ombudsmen may protect those who work

within an organization or those who are affected by the organization’s

actions. An ombudsman who handles concerns and inquiries from the

public, such as EPA’s national hazardous waste ombudsman, is often

referred to as an “external” ombudsman. In contrast, internal or

“workplace” ombudsmen provide an alternative to more formal processes

to deal with conflicts and other issues that arise in the workplace.3

While there are no federal requirements or standards specific to the

operation of ombudsman offices, the Administrative Conference of the

United States recommended in 1990 that the President and the Congress

support federal agency initiatives to create and fund an external

ombudsman in agencies with significant interaction with the public.4

 In

addition, several professional organizations have published or drafted

relevant standards of practice for ombudsmen. Among these organizations

are the Ombudsman Committee of the ABA, The Ombudsman Association,

and the U.S. Ombudsman Association. In July 2000, ABA’s Ombudsman

Committee released a draft of its recommended Standards for the

Establishment and Operation of Ombudsman Offices, which are intended

to expand on a 1969 ABA resolution that identified essential

characteristics of ombudsmen.5 An article published by the U.S.

Ombudsman Association, “Essential Characteristics of a Classical

 3

See Human Capital: The Role of Ombudsmen in the Dispute Resolution (GAO-01-466,

Apr. 13, 2001) for information on the role of the ombudsman in resolving workplace issues.

4

The Administrative Conference of the United States was an independent advisory agency

in the executive branch that issued recommendations and statements on the improvement

of the federal administrative process. The agency was terminated by the Treasury, Postal

Service, and General Government Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1996.

5

The recommended standards have since been modified as a result of internal review

comments; ABA’s House of Delegates will consider them for final approval in August 2001.

To help draft the recommended standards, ABA’s Sections of Administrative Law and

Regulatory Practice and Dispute Resolution appointed a steering committee, which

included representatives from several ombudsman associations: The Coalition of Federal

Ombudsmen, The Ombudsmen Association, the U.S. Ombudsman Association, and the

University and College Ombuds Association.

Background
Page 5 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Ombudsman,” elaborates on these factors and explains why they are

necessary.6

 Similarly, The Ombudsman Association has published a

generic position description for ombudsmen, including critical skills and

characteristics, and the U.S. Ombudsman Association has drafted a model

ombudsman act appropriate for state governments.

Both the recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United

States and the standards of practice adopted by ombudsman associations

incorporate the core principles of independence, impartiality, and

confidentiality. The ABA’s recommended standards define these

characteristics as follows:

• Independence—An ombudsman must be and appear to be free from

interference in the legitimate performance of duties and independent from

control, limitation, or penalty by an officer of the appointing entity or a

person who may be the subject of a complaint or inquiry.

• Impartiality—An ombudsman must conduct inquiries and investigations

in an impartial manner, free from initial bias and conflicts of interest.

• Confidentiality—An ombudsman must not disclose and must not be

required to disclose any information provided in confidence, except to

address an imminent risk of serious harm. Records pertaining to a

complaint, inquiry, or investigation must be confidential and not subject to

disclosure outside the ombudsman’s office.

In addition to the core principles, some associations also stress the need

for accountability and a credible review process. Accountability is

generally defined in terms of the publication of periodic reports that

summarize the ombudsman’s findings and activities. Having a credible

review process generally entails having the authority and the means, such

as access to agency officials and records, to conduct an effective

investigation.

The role of EPA’s national ombudsman has evolved since it was first

established in the 1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act.7

 In 1991, EPA expanded the ombudsman’s jurisdiction to

 6

Gottehrer, Dean M. and Hostina, Michael, “Essential Characteristics of a Classical

Ombudsman” (U.S. Ombudsman Association, 1998),

http://www.usombudsman.org/References/Essential.pdf, (downloaded June 19, 2001).

7

The statutory authorization for the ombudsman’s office expired in 1988. EPA has

maintained the ombudsman function as a matter of policy since then.
Page 6 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

encompass all of the hazardous waste programs managed by OSWER, with

the most significant addition being the Superfund program. EPA appointed

Superfund ombudsmen in each of its 10 regional offices in 1996, when the

agency adopted a number of administrative reforms in the Superfund

program.8

The nature of the national ombudsman’s work has also changed; although

the emphasis was initially on responding to informational inquiries, he has

taken on more detailed investigations in recent years. In January 2001, the

ombudsman temporarily suspended his ongoing investigations over

disagreements with OSWER management about staffing in the

ombudsman’s office. However, we did not address the issue in this report

because investigation of internal personnel disputes was beyond the scope

of our work.

Important characteristics of EPA’s national hazardous waste ombudsman

differ from the professional standards of practice adopted by various

ombudsman associations. While EPA is not required to comply with such

standards—and, in some instances, faces legal or practical constraints to

doing so—the standards can serve as a guideline for implementing the

core principles of an effective ombudsman: independence, impartiality,

and confidentiality. Contrary to these standards, EPA’s national

ombudsman is not independent of the organizational unit whose decisions

he is responsible for investigating. Moreover, this lack of independence

raises questions about the ombudsman’s impartiality and hence his ability

to conduct a credible investigation. EPA’s national ombudsman also falls

short of existing standards in other areas, such as accountability. When we

examined the operations of ombudsmen at other federal agencies, we

found that these agencies have found ways to increase their ombudsmen’s

ability to adhere to professional standards of practice. EPA is considering

several changes to the operations of the national ombudsman, but these

changes do not address existing limitations on the ombudsman’s

independence and, in some instances, they impose additional constraints.

 8

According to the legislative history of the provision that established the ombudsman, the

House Committee on Energy and Commerce anticipated that “fulfilling this important

function will require staff resources at EPA headquarters in Washington and at each of the

regional offices.” However, OSWER and regional officials told us that the level of regional

ombudsman activity was very limited prior to 1996.

Key Aspects of EPA’s

National Hazardous

Waste Ombudsman

Are Not Consistent

With Relevant

Professional

Standards
Page 7 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Existing professional standards contain a variety of criteria by which an

ombudsman’s independence can be assessed, but in most instances, the

underlying theme is that an ombudsman should have both actual and

apparent independence from persons who may be the subject of a

complaint or inquiry. According to ABA guidelines, for example, a key

indicator of independence is whether anyone subject to the ombudsman’s

jurisdiction can (1) control or limit the ombudsman’s performance of

assigned duties, (2) eliminate the office, (3) remove the ombudsman for

other than cause, or (4) reduce the office’s budget or resources for

retaliatory purposes. Other factors identified in the ABA guidelines on

independence include a budget funded at a level sufficient to carry out the

ombudsman’s responsibilities; the ability to spend funds independent of

any approving authority; and the power to appoint, supervise, and remove

staff. The Ombudsman Association’s standards of practice define

independence as functioning independent of line management and

advocate that the ombudsman report to the highest authority in the

organization.

As currently constituted, some aspects of EPA’s national hazardous waste

ombudsman are not consistent with existing criteria for independence. In

terms of organizational structure, the national ombudsman is located

within OSWER, the organizational unit whose decisions the ombudsman is

responsible for investigating. In addition, the ombudsman reports to and

receives performance evaluations from one of OSWER’s managers. Thus,

OSWER management is in a position to control or limit the ombudsman’s

performance of assigned duties. OSWER managers told us that the

organizational structure was established as a matter of convenience and

simply reflects the fact that the ombudsman’s jurisdiction encompasses

the hazardous waste programs within the office’s purview. The officials

also said that at the time the structure was established, the ombudsman’s

workload consisted primarily of responding to informational inquiries

rather than conducting investigations.

Although OSWER managers acknowledge concerns about the appearance

of constraints on the ombudsman’s independence, they point out that most

decisions about specific hazardous waste sites or facilities are made at the

regional office level. The officials believe that OSWER’s top management

is sufficiently removed from site-specific decisions to mitigate such

concerns. According to the ombudsman, however, decisions on the most

significant or costly sites are the most likely to be elevated to OSWER’s

management level at EPA headquarters. He also believes that locating the

ombudsman’s office outside of OSWER would increase his independence

and lessen the likelihood that he would be reporting to someone who was

EPA’s Ombudsman Lacks

Organizational and

Functional Independence
Page 8 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

once responsible for making decisions on specific hazardous waste sites

or facilities.

On a functional basis, OSWER’s control over the ombudsman’s budget and

staff resources also affects the ombudsman’s independence. For example,

until recently, the ombudsman did not have a separate budget and was on

a “pay-as-you-go” system in which prior approval was required for every

expenditure. In November 2000, OSWER created a separate line item

within the OSWER budget for ombudsman-related expenditures.

According to OSWER managers, having a separate line item made sense in

light of the ombudsman’s increased workload. In addition, they decided

that it is better to give the ombudsman a budget up front and tell him that

he has to set priorities and work within the amount provided than to

approve funding on a case-by-case basis. They recognized that the latter

approach could create the impression that OSWER is hampering the

ombudsman’s independence any time a funding request is disapproved

because such a decision would limit his involvement in particular cases.

From the ombudsman’s perspective, knowing the amount of available

funding at the beginning of a fiscal year allows him to better prioritize and

manage his activities. However, without supervisory authority, he does not

have the same discretion as other OSWER managers over how the budget

resources are used.

OSWER exercises similar control over the ombudsman’s staff resources.

Since the ombudsman is a nonsupervisory position, he does not have

authority to hire, fire, or supervise staff.9

 OSWER managers approve all

staff detailed or assigned to the ombudsman function and prepare their

performance appraisals. Until recently, the ombudsman function was

carried out with only one full-time, permanent staff member—the

ombudsman himself. To aid the ombudsman as his workload has

increased, OSWER has supplied a variety of temporary help including, at

various times, a part-time assistant, an individual on a short-term detail,

technical consultants, and student interns and retired persons funded

through special grant programs. In April 2001, an individual who had been

assigned to work with the ombudsman under a 6-month detail was granted

permanent status in that position. In addition, according to OSWER

officials, a total of 3 full-time-equivalent staff-years have now been

 9

According to OSWER officials, the national ombudsman has always been a nonsupervisory

position. Initially, the national ombudsman operated as a separate entity within OSWER

under the title of “office of the ombudsman.” The office was abolished in 1991; this change

was made to more accurately reflect the size and staffing of the function.
Page 9 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

budgeted for the ombudsman function, and OSWER management secured

an exemption for the ombudsman function from an agency-wide hiring

freeze. However, because the ombudsman continues to be a

nonsupervisory position, OSWER managers still prepare the performance

appraisals for any of the staff assigned to the ombudsman.

Another issue relating to independence is the adequacy of the resources

available to the ombudsman. Some evidence suggests that the

ombudsman’s resources have not kept pace with his increased workload.

Information compiled by the ombudsman at our request shows a

significant increase in the number of investigations over the past 2 years.

On the basis of information extracted from his case files, the ombudsman

told us that he initiated 34 investigations since he took office in October

1992, more than half of which were initiated since 1999.10 OSWER

managers point out that the ombudsman was allocated a total of $900,000

for fiscal year 2001, a significant increase over the estimated $500,000

spent on ombudsman-related activities during the previous year.11

However, when the ombudsman was asked to provide an estimate of his

fiscal year 2001 resource needs, he requested a budget of $2 million and

seven full-time equivalent staff.

Without more information, it is difficult to determine whether the

ombudsman’s estimate was realistic or what the appropriate level of

resources should be. The ombudsman does not maintain sufficient

statistical records on his investigations and other activities to serve as a

basis for a reasonable estimate of resource needs. He also does not have

written procedures for selecting, prioritizing, and tracking inquiries and

cases. He told us that during his first few years as ombudsman, he had an

assistant who maintained case logs on inquiries received, and thus could

produce summary statistics on his workload. According to the

ombudsman, once his assistant retired, he no longer had sufficient staff

resources to maintain logs on inquiries received and their resolution,

summary information on the results of investigations, or records on the

status of ongoing cases, although he does maintain case files on his

investigations.

 10See appendix I for a list of the ombudsman’s investigations from October 1992 through

December 2000.

11Of the $900,000, about 45 percent was allocated to salaries and benefits, with the

remainder to be spent on administrative, travel, and technical-support expenses.
Page 10 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

While independence is perhaps the most essential characteristic of an

effective ombudsman, other aspects are also important. When we

compared these aspects of EPA’s national ombudsman with relevant

professional standards, we found several differences.

One significant difference concerns the ombudsman’s impartiality, which

is called into question by the impairments to the ombudsman’s

independence. According to the ABA’s recommended standards, “the

ombudsman’s structural independence is the foundation upon which the

ombudsman’s impartiality is built,” and independence from line

management is a key indicator of the ombudsman’s ability to be

impartial.12 However, in the case of EPA’s national ombudsman, line

management not only has direct supervisory authority over the

ombudsman but also controls his budget and staff resources.

Other criteria for evaluating an ombudsman’s impartiality relate to the

concept of fairness. For example, according to the article published by the

U.S. Ombudsman Association about the essential characteristics of an

ombudsman, an ombudsman should provide any agency or person being

criticized an opportunity to (1) know the nature of the criticism before it is

made public and (2) provide a written response that will be published in

whole or in summary in the ombudsman’s final report.13 However, we

found that EPA’s national ombudsman does not have a consistent policy

for preparing written reports on his investigations, consulting with agency

officials to obtain their comments before his findings are made public, or

including written agency comments when reports are published.

According to the national ombudsman, inconsistencies in the degree of

consultation with the agency are linked to differences in the extent of

OSWER management’s interest in reviewing his reports. However, he

acknowledged that these differences do not preclude him from soliciting

comments.

Another difference concerns confidentiality since legal constraints prevent

EPA’s national ombudsman from adhering to relevant professional

standards in this area. Under ABA’s recommended standards, an

ombudsman must not disclose and must not be required to disclose any

information provided in confidence, except to address an imminent risk of

 12American Bar Association, Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice,

Section of Dispute Resolution, Report to the House of Delegates, July 2000, p.10.

13Gottehrer and Hostina, “Essential Characteristics of a Classical Ombudsman.”

Other Aspects of EPA’s

Ombudsman Differ From

Relevant Standards
Page 11 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

serious harm. The standards say that records pertaining to a complaint,

inquiry, or investigation must be confidential and not subject to disclosure

outside the ombudsman’s office. However, as an EPA employee, the

national ombudsman is subject to the disclosure requirements of the

Freedom of Information Act. The act generally provides that any person

has a right of access to federal agency records, except to the extent that

such records are protected from disclosure by statutory exemption.14

Exempted information includes agency internal deliberative process or

attorney-client information.15 According to the ombudsman, the

confidentiality issue has not posed a significant problem thus far because

he has not been asked to disclose information provided by complainants.

However, he believes that his inability to offer confidentiality could be

troublesome in the future.

Accountability is another area in which EPA’s national ombudsman differs

from relevant standards of practice for ombudsmen. The ABA

recommends that an ombudsman issue and publish periodic reports

summarizing his findings and activities to ensure the office’s

accountability to the public. Similarly, recommendations by the

Administrative Conference of the United States regarding the

establishment of ombudsmen in federal agencies state that ombudsmen

should be required to submit periodic reports summarizing their activities,

recommendations, and the relevant agency’s responses. EPA’s national

ombudsman does not prepare such reports; he told us that EPA has never

required an annual report at the national level. The regional ombudsmen

are expected to submit annual reports on their activities, but the reports

are for internal use only. He also indicated that he does not have the

resources to maintain the records necessary to produce such a report.

Other federal agencies have provided their ombudsmen with more

independence than that available to EPA’s national ombudsman—both

structurally and functionally. At least four other federal agencies have an

ombudsman function somewhat similar to EPA’s: the Agency for Toxic

Substances and Disease Registry, the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Internal Revenue

Service. Of these agencies, three have an independent office of the

ombudsman that reports to the highest level in the agency. For example,

 14See 5 U.S.C. 552(a), (b).

15See 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5).

Other Federal Agencies

Have Taken Steps to

Enhance the Independence

of Their Ombudsmen
Page 12 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

the ombudsmen from the Food and Drug Administration and the Internal

Revenue Service each report to the Office of the Commissioner in their

respective agencies. The exception is the ombudsman at the Agency for

Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Although the agency does not

have a separate office of the ombudsman—a single individual fulfills its

ombudsman function—the ombudsman reports to the Assistant

Administrator of the agency. In contrast, EPA’s national ombudsman is

located in a program office (OSWER) and reports to the Office’s Deputy

Assistant Administrator.

OSWER officials pointed out that the ombudsmen in other federal

agencies generally have an agency-wide jurisdiction, while EPA’s

ombudsman is responsible only for inquiries and investigations relating to

the hazardous waste programs managed by OSWER. They believed that it

was logical to place the national ombudsman within OSWER because that

office would directly benefit from the ombudsman’s activities. However,

as noted earlier, the ombudsman believes that locating his function

outside of OSWER would offer him greater independence. In addition,

structural issues take on greater prominence when the unit to which the

ombudsman must report also controls his budget and staff resources.

The ombudsmen in three of the agencies we examined—the Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Food and Drug Administration, and

the Internal Revenue Service—also have more functional independence

than the EPA ombudsman has.16 For example, they have the authority to

hire, supervise, discipline, and terminate staff, consistent with the

authority granted to other offices within their agencies. These ombudsmen

are able to hire permanent full-time staff and do not have to rely on parttime or detailed employees. In addition, the ombudsmen in these three

agencies have control over their budget resources. For example, the

ombudsmen have authority to draft and submit budgets to cover their

anticipated workloads in the upcoming fiscal year. While they are subject

to the same budget constraints as other offices within the agencies, they

have the ability to prioritize their workloads and make decisions about

where their funds will be spent.

 16The exception is the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, where the

ombudsman does not have any staff and does not have a separate budget.
Page 13 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

In January 2001, OSWER proposed new guidance to explain the roles and

responsibilities of the national and regional ombudsmen.17 The primary

objective in issuing the guidance was to improve the effectiveness of the

ombudsman program by providing a clear and consistent set of operating

policies and expectations.18 On the subject of the ombudsman’s

independence, the guidance is relatively brief. It states: “The Ombudsman

will be free from actual or apparent interference in the legitimate

performance of his/her duties. The Ombudsman has the autonomy to look

into any issue or matter consistent with this guidance.” However, the

guidance leaves the current organizational structure in place and, in some

respects, imposes additional constraints on the ombudsman’s

independence.

Maintaining the existing structure raises questions about whether the

ombudsman will be subject to interference in the performance of his

duties. Many of the comments EPA received on its proposed guidance

expressed concerns about structural constraints on the ombudsman’s

independence. The general theme of the comments was that the

ombudsman must be located outside of the organization that is being

investigated to be truly independent. Some commenters suggested that the

ombudsman report to the EPA Administrator, and others believed that the

function should be entirely independent of the agency.

In addition to maintaining the status quo with regard to the organizational

structure, EPA’s proposed guidance places some new restrictions on the

ombudsman’s independence. Regarding case selection, for example, the

guidance states that the regional ombudsmen will generally handle matters

that fall within the territorial boundaries of their respective regions.

(See appendix II for a map showing the EPA regions and the distribution

of national ombudsman investigations.) For cases that concern a

“nationally significant” issue, the guidance states that regional ombudsmen

will consult with the national ombudsman regarding who is best suited to

take the lead, considering time, resources, location, and familiarity with

the subject and parties involved. If the national and regional ombudsmen

cannot reach agreement on a particular case, the guidance provides that

 17In May 2001, EPA suspended implementation of the proposed guidelines to consider all

formal and informal comments and await the results of our review.

18Although EPA consulted relevant professional standards in developing the guidance, the

draft document states that the guidance was tailored to meet the needs of OSWER and,

thus, may not be consistent with existing standards.

Proposed Organizational

and Operational Changes

Do Not Fully Address

Concerns About the

Ombudsman’s

Independence
Page 14 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

the Assistant Administrator or Deputy Assistant Administrator of OSWER

will resolve the dispute.

Giving the regional ombudsmen such a prominent role in case selection is

problematic considering their part-time involvement in the ombudsman

function and, more significantly, the nature of their other responsibilities.

EPA’s proposed guidance acknowledges that the national ombudsman is

best suited to handle matters that pose potential conflicts of interest for

the regional ombudsmen, but it does not recognize the inherent problems

created by their dual roles. (Concerns about impairments to the

independence of the regional ombudsmen are discussed in more detail

later in this report.)

Regarding another aspect of case selection, EPA’s proposed guidance

includes a general prohibition on investigating matters in litigation, on the

ground that such investigations could be construed as creating an

alternative forum for arguing the issues. The guidance cites the risks of

confusion, inefficiency, and potentially conflicting statements about the

agency’s position as reasons that the ombudsman should avoid

investigating matters in litigation. According to OSWER officials, their

primary concern with the ombudsman’s involvement is the potential for

undermining the legal process and building a separate record as a result of

his investigation. They acknowledged that most Superfund cases are in

litigation at some point, but they said that the matter being litigated

usually concerns who should pay for a cleanup, not how the cleanup

should be done. The officials believe that the latter issue is more likely to

be the subject of an ombudsman investigation.

EPA’s national ombudsman told us that he should have the authority to

select cases for investigation regardless of whether the matter is in

litigation. Most of the comments on EPA’s proposed guidance also stated

that the ombudsman should have the discretion to choose which cases to

investigate without interference from agency management. For example,

the Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen commented that although

coordination between top management and the ombudsman is a necessity

when matters are in litigation, requiring the concurrence of agency

management is “not a workable solution.” Comments from two entities

within the ABA agree that the involvement of agency management would
Page 15 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

be inconsistent with the ombudsman’s independence.19 However, they also

said that the national ombudsman should be able to accept jurisdiction

over an issue that is pending in a legal forum only if all parties to the

action explicitly consent.

In addition to drafting new guidance for the ombudsman program, EPA

officials, including those in OSWER, have been considering a variety of

organizational options for the ombudsman function. In March 2001,

OSWER developed, as one possible option, a proposal for creating a

separate office of the ombudsman within OSWER. They indicated that the

proposed organizational change stems from a recognition that the role and

workload of the national ombudsman have evolved and that some current

management practices are cumbersome and inefficient. Under the

reorganization, the incumbent ombudsman would serve as director of the

office and have more control over his budget and staff resources.

Specifically, the ombudsman would have the authority to hire, supervise,

and remove staff, consistent with other offices within OSWER. In addition,

the director would be responsible for drafting and submitting a budget to

cover the ombudsman’s activities. Although this proposal would enhance

the functional independence of the ombudsman, the office of the

ombudsman would still be located within OSWER. Final decisions about

the appropriate staffing levels and resource allocations would still be

under the purview of OSWER management. EPA has decided to table its

decision on the appropriate placement of the ombudsman function within

the agency until agency management has time to consider the results of

our report and comments from other stakeholders, including the

ombudsman.

 19The ABA’s Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice and Section of Dispute

Resolution submitted comments on EPA’s proposed guidance. These sections were

responsible for drafting ABA’s July 2000 recommended Standards for the Establishment

and Operation of Ombudsman’s Offices.
Page 16 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Within EPA’s 10 regional offices, the ombudsman function is perceived as

a collateral duty and is assigned to individuals whose primary role often

poses a potential conflict of interest. Most of the regional ombudsmen

devote less than 25 percent of their time to the ombudsman role. They

spend the majority of their time performing duties that could be the

subject of an ombudsman investigation. The regional ombudsmen

primarily respond to informational requests, including some referred by

the national ombudsman. While the national and regional ombudsmen

disagree on the extent to which they coordinate their activities, the

regional ombudsmen clearly have little involvement in substantive

matters, such as helping to select which cases will be investigated by the

national ombudsman or to conduct such investigations.

ABA’s recommended standards for ombudsmen call for independence in

structure, function, and appearance and, among other criteria, stipulate no

assignment of duties other than that of the ombudsman function. Similarly,

guidance developed by The Ombudsman Association states that an

ombudsman should serve “no additional role within an organization”

because holding another position would compromise the ombudsman’s

neutrality. However, by virtue of their dual roles, EPA’s regional

ombudsmen appear to have less independence than the national

ombudsman has. Moreover, they are more likely to encounter a potential

conflict of interest, since most decisions on hazardous waste sites and

facilities are made at the regional level.

The ombudsman function is generally seen as a collateral duty at the

regional level, and the manner in which the function is implemented is left

to the discretion of the agency’s regional administrators. As a result, the

nature of the primary role served by the regional ombudsmen varies from

region to region, although 7 of the 10 regional ombudsmen are located

within the regional unit that manages the Superfund program.

(See table 1.)

EPA’s Regional

Ombudsmen Serve on

a Part-Time Basis and

Play a Lesser Role

Than the National

Ombudsman

Other Duties Assigned to

the Regional Ombudsmen

Hamper Their

Independence
Page 17 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Table 1: Line Management Positions for Regional Superfund Ombudsmen

Region Line management position Program or office

I Environmental Scientist, Office of Site Remediation

& Restoration

Superfund

II Accelerated Cleanup/Stabilization Manager,

Emergency and Remedial Response Division

Superfund

III Acting Branch Chief, Enforcement and Federal

Facilities Branch

Superfund

IV Project Manager, Brownfields, Customer Service

Branch

Superfund

V Superfund Enforcement Coordinator, Superfund

Division

Superfund

VI Superfund Division Coordinator & Alternative

Dispute Specialist, Superfund Division

Superfund

VII Policy Coordinator, Superfund Division Superfund

VIII Manager, Public Affairs and Involvement Unit, Office

of Communication and Public Involvement

Regional

Administrator’s Office

IX Director, Strategic Planning and Emerging Issues,

Office of the Administrator

Office of Strategic

Planning and Emerging

Issues

X Associate Director, Office of Management Programs Office of Management

Programs

Source: GAO’s analysis of data provided by the regional ombudsmen.

The amount of time spent on ombudsman duties also varies widely from

region to region. During fiscal year 2000, for example, estimates of the

percentage of time devoted to ombudsman-related work ranged from

about 2 percent to 90 percent. Figure 1 summarizes the estimated time

spent on regional ombudsman duties during calendar years 1999 and

2000.20

 20The ombudsmen from EPA regions II and V provided their responses on a fiscal year

basis.
Page 18 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Time Spent on Regional Ombudsman Activities

in Calendar Years 1999 and 2000

a

The ombudsman in EPA’s Seattle regional office (region X) was only recently appointed and did not

have enough experience to provide an estimate. The individual who held the position previously no

longer works at EPA.

Source: GAO’s analysis of data provided by the regional ombudsmen.

When asked how they are able to ensure their independence in light of

their dual roles, 7 of the 10 regional ombudsmen either did not perceive

their multiple responsibilities as hampering their independence or cited

direct access to regional management as a way of dealing with potential

conflicts. However, we also asked about the extent to which their

supervisors have been involved or have the potential to be involved in

decisions or cases subject to investigation by the ombudsmen. Five of the

ombudsmen acknowledged that their immediate supervisors could have

significant involvement in matters subject to an ombudsman investigation.

While the remaining five ombudsmen did not agree, they also reported that

their immediate supervisors held positions in which the potential for

involvement appears high.
Page 19 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

OSWER officials recognize that the regional ombudsmen are more

constrained than the national ombudsman as a result of their dual

responsibilities. However, the officials believe that these individuals

provide a valuable service in responding to informational inquiries, a

function in which independence is less likely to be an issue. If the regional

ombudsmen are to be truly independent, EPA’s national ombudsman

believes that they should report to him and should not have other

responsibilities that pose a potential conflict. He attributed their relatively

light workload and part-time role to public perceptions that the regional

ombudsmen are not independent. OSWER officials agreed that such

perceptions might be at least partly responsible for the situation.

When we looked at how other federal agencies dealt with regional

ombudsmen, we found that two of the four agencies we examined—the

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Internal Revenue

Service—have ombudsmen in regional offices. The Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation currently has ombudsmen in each of its seven

service centers located across the country. Within the Internal Revenue

Service, the National Taxpayer Advocate is required to appoint local

taxpayer advocates, including at least one in each state. In both agencies,

the staff that perform the regional ombudsman function devote

100 percent of their time to that responsibility. The regional staffs are

considered part of the national ombudsman’s office and report directly to

the national ombudsman. In each case, the national ombudsman has

responsibility for the hiring, supervision, and removal of all staff within his

office, including regional staff, and the regional operations are included in

his office’s budget request.

Since the ombudsman function was first created within OSWER, EPA has

issued and proposed guidance that calls for coordination between the

national and regional ombudsmen. EPA’s Hazardous Waste Ombudsman

Handbook, which was published in 1987 and remains in effect, states that

close cooperation between the national and regional ombudsmen is

important. In February 1998, after some misunderstandings developed

between the national and regional ombudsmen regarding their respective

roles and responsibilities, OSWER’s Acting Assistant Administrator issued

a memo that attempted to clarify the situation. Most significantly, the

memo stated that the regional ombudsmen would take the lead on all

Superfund-related matters and would refer to the national ombudsman

only those cases that the regional ombudsmen believe are “nationally

significant”—and only with the concurrence of the Assistant Administrator

of OSWER. Although EPA officials generally agree that this policy was

National and Regional

Ombudsmen Disagree on

the Nature and Extent of

Their Coordination
Page 20 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

never implemented, the regional ombudsmen believed, until at least 1999,

that the policy was in effect and that the coordination called for in the

policy was supposed to be occurring.21 The new guidance recently

proposed by OSWER is, in part, another effort to delineate the roles and

responsibilities of the national and regional ombudsmen, particularly with

regard to the selection and referral of cases for investigation.

Notwithstanding the guidance, the extent to which the national and

regional ombudsmen actually coordinate is unclear and is the subject of

disagreement among the parties. According to the national ombudsman,

he notifies his regional counterparts of all inquiries he receives and refers

many of them to the regions for follow-up. However, he said that he rarely

receives any information on how the inquiries were resolved. According to

an OSWER official who helps coordinate monthly conference calls among

the regional ombudsmen, the reason for the lack of response is that almost

all of the referrals involve minor problems that are not worth any

additional reporting or time spent on paperwork. Other OSWER officials

suggested that these referrals are often passed on to other EPA or state

employees and are not handled directly by the ombudsmen.

The national ombudsman generally does not consult with the regional

ombudsmen on substantive matters, such as deciding which complaints

are significant enough to warrant investigations, or request their

assistance in conducting investigations. He told us that he notifies the

applicable regional ombudsman and regional management when he

initiates an investigation and asks for their views on the issues raised in

the complaints. In addition, he said that he occasionally requests

administrative and/or logistical assistance when visiting one of the regions

in the course of conducting an investigation. For example, the regional

ombudsmen may obtain copies of documents for the national ombudsman,

arrange meetings with regional staff, and help set up public hearings.

From the perspective of the regional ombudsmen, the extent of the

communication from and coordination by the national ombudsman is not

sufficient. According to the minutes of their monthly conference calls and

the information we collected, the regional ombudsmen have had limited

contact with the national ombudsman and generally are not consulted

 21According to the national ombudsman, the memo was verbally rescinded after he

objected to it on the basis that it compromised his independence. However, the minutes of

periodic conference calls among the regional ombudsmen indicate that they believed the

memo remained in effect.
Page 21 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

when investigations are initiated nor are they updated as the investigations

proceed. According to an OSWER official who helps coordinate the

conference calls, the regional ombudsmen complain that the national

ombudsman almost never calls them for any reason and sometimes does

not notify them when he is visiting the region.

Another area of disagreement is the extent to which the national

ombudsman has authority to oversee the activities of the regional

ombudsmen. The national ombudsman told us that he does not have

supervisory authority and thus, is not responsible for overseeing the

regional ombudsman program as envisioned in EPA’s 1987 handbook.22 He

said that under current operating procedures, the regional ombudsmen are

under no obligation to refer cases to him and have made no referrals in the

last 4 or 5 years. However, OSWER officials suggested that he could

provide more direct oversight. They pointed out that many senior-level

employees at headquarters have functional responsibility for various

activities performed by regional employees even if they do not supervise

the employees.

To some extent, an ombudsman’s effectiveness is within the ombudsman’s

control. For example, the ombudsman strengthens his credibility when all

parties perceive his investigations as fair and objective. Yet effectiveness

is also a function of an ombudsman’s actual and apparent independence,

and this is an area where the ombudsman’s home agency can make a big

difference. In the case of the national hazardous waste ombudsman, EPA

could help ensure that the ombudsman is perceived as independent by

locating the function outside the unit he is responsible for investigating

and by giving him control over his budget and staff resources. Although

the current organizational structure may have made sense originally, the

function has evolved, and the organization should reflect the shift in the

ombudsman’s workload from responding to informational inquiries to

investigating complaints.

Under the current framework, the national ombudsman must compete

with other offices within OSWER for scarce budget resources. With senior

OSWER officials making the budget allocations, this arrangement may

 22EPA’s Hazardous Waste Ombudsman Handbook indicates that the national ombudsman,

working with the Regional Administrators, is responsible for evaluating regional

ombudsman programs, recommending changes, and updating the guidance.

Conclusions
Page 22 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

create a perception that EPA is not allocating an adequate share of

OSWER’s resources to the ombudsman. Similarly, OSWER management’s

authority to hire and fire the ombudsman’s staff clearly poses an

institutional barrier to the ombudsman’s independence. A related issue

involves the nature of the staff allocated to the ombudsman. Reliance on

temporary assistance from interns and employees on short-term details

does not provide the necessary experience or continuity to support the

ombudsman. OSWER has taken a step in the right direction by allocating

3 full-time-equivalent staff-years to the ombudsman function, but to be

truly independent, the ombudsman should have direct control over the

staff.

For his part, if the national ombudsman is to be given responsibility for

managing his resources, he needs to maintain adequate records on his

operations to serve as the basis for a reasonable budget request. The

ombudsman must also establish the criteria and operating procedures

necessary for managing his workload within his budget constraints and

select and prioritize his workload so that he can work within those

constraints. Having a consistent policy for preparing written reports on

investigations and soliciting comments from affected parties would help

ensure that the ombudsman is perceived as fair and impartial. In addition,

the ombudsman should be accountable for his activities through a publicly

available annual report.

Regional ombudsmen may provide a valuable service to the public in

responding to informational inquiries, but their current lack of

independence should preclude their involvement in more significant

investigations. Despite their dual roles, in recent years, OSWER has

attempted to give the regional ombudsmen a greater say in selecting cases

for investigation and deciding which ones should be referred to the

national ombudsman. Instead, EPA should reexamine the position of

regional ombudsman and, if a regional presence is warranted, ensure that

whoever provides such a presence is truly independent.

To improve the effectiveness of EPA’s ombudsmen and secure the public

trust, we recommend that the Administrator, EPA, take steps to strengthen

the independence of the national hazardous waste ombudsman.

Specifically, EPA should (1) modify its organizational structure so that the

ombudsman is located outside of OSWER and (2) provide the ombudsman

with a separate budget and, subject to applicable Civil Service

requirements, the authority to hire, fire, and supervise his own staff. To

ensure that the ombudsman has adequate resources to fulfill his

Recommendations for

Executive Action
Page 23 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

responsibilities within the context of EPA’s overall mission, EPA should

require the ombudsman to (1) develop written criteria for selecting and

prioritizing cases for investigation and (2) maintain records on his

investigations and other activities sufficient to serve as the basis for a

reasonable estimate of resource needs. In the interests of fairness, EPA

should require the ombudsman to establish a consistent policy for

preparing written reports on his investigations, consulting with agency

officials and other affected parties to obtain their comments before his

findings are made public, and including written agency comments when

reports are published. To ensure that the ombudsman is accountable, EPA

should require the ombudsman to file an annual report summarizing his

activities and make it available to the public. Finally, we recommend that

EPA officials, including the national ombudsman, (1) assess the demand

for ombudsman services nationwide to determine where these resources

are needed and, (2) in those locations where regional ombudsmen are

warranted, ensure that their operations are consistent with the relevant

professional standards for independence.

EPA provided comments on a draft of this report. Specifically, we received

a letter from the Acting Assistant Administrator of OSWER, an enclosure

with additional technical comments from OSWER, and an enclosure from

the national ombudsman containing general and technical comments.

EPA’s comments and our responses are contained in appendix III.

Both OSWER and the national ombudsman generally agreed with our

conclusions and recommendations. According to OSWER, the agency

supports “a strong, independent, and appropriately funded Ombudsman

function and [is] committed to full and serious consideration of the [GAO]

audit recommendations.” OSWER plans to assess our recommendations

over the next few months, along with input from stakeholders, as the

agency determines the most appropriate organizational placement of the

ombudsman function. OSWER also noted that our recommendations

relating to increased accountability by the national ombudsman were

helpful.

Similarly, the national ombudsman indicated that he was taking steps to

implement several of our recommendations, including developing criteria

for selecting and prioritizing cases for investigation, maintaining records

to serve as a basis for a reasonable estimate of resource needs, developing

a consistent policy for preparing written reports on his investigations, and

publishing an annual report on his activities. He also indicated his intent to

assess the operations of the regional ombudsmen.

Agency Comments
Page 24 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

We incorporated technical comments from OSWER and the national

ombudsman as appropriate.

To determine how the national ombudsman’s operations compare with

relevant professional standards, we identified four organizations—the

Administrative Conference of the United States, the Ombudsman

Committee of the ABA, The Ombudsman Association and the U. S.

Ombudsman Association—that have published or drafted such standards.

Based on our review of the standards and on discussions with EPA’s

national ombudsman, OSWER officials, and representatives of

professional associations, we evaluated characteristics of EPA’s national

ombudsman using the standards as criteria. To learn more about the

development and application of ombudsman standards, we contacted

representatives from the Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen, the

Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution Working Group, The

Ombudsman Association, the University and College Ombuds Association,

and the U. S. Ombudsman Association, as well as the current and former

chairmen of the ABA’s Ombudsman Committee. Besides conducting

interviews with EPA’s national ombudsman and OSWER officials, we

reviewed various documents that they provided regarding the

implementation of the ombudsman function and proposed changes,

including the ombudsman handbook, the proposed new guidance, the

proposed change in OSWER’s organizational structure, and budget

documents. In addition, we reviewed information that the ombudsman

compiled at our request on the investigations that he initiated between

October 1992 and December 2000.

Recognizing that there are no federal requirements or standards specific to

the operation of ombudsman offices at federal agencies, we also looked at

how other federal agencies are implementing the ombudsman function.

We compiled a list of federal agencies with ombudsmen that handle

external inquiries or complaints. None of these ombudsmen was totally

comparable to his counterpart at EPA in terms of longevity, jurisdiction or

the nature of the investigations conducted.23 However, we selected four

ombudsmen with enough similarity in longevity and workload to provide a

reasonable basis for comparison. These ombudsmen were located in the

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, the Federal Deposit

 23For example, in some agencies, the ombudsman function was too new to be useful for our

comparison.

Scope and

Methodology
Page 25 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Insurance Corporation, the Food and Drug Administration, and the

Internal Revenue Service. We met with the ombudsman at these agencies

to obtain information on their operations and on the extent to which they

are consistent with relevant professional standards.

To obtain information on the relative roles and responsibilities of EPA’s

national and regional ombudsmen, we developed a data collection

instrument to question the regional ombudsmen on their functions in each

of EPA’s 10 regions for calendar years 1999 and 2000. Among other things,

we obtained information on their ombudsman-related activities, other

roles and responsibilities, and supervisors; the amount of time spent on

ombudsman duties; and the extent of interaction and coordination with

the national ombudsman. We discussed the operations of the regional

ombudsmen with OSWER officials and with the national ombudsman and

compared those operations with those of the national ombudsman and the

relevant professional standards for independence. We also reviewed

minutes of periodic conference calls held by the regional ombudsmen

during 1999 and 2000, as well as various documents that they provided on

their operations and activities.

We conducted our review from November 2000 through July 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents

of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days

from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Administrator,

EPA, and make copies available to others who request them. If you or your

staff have questions about this report, please call me on (202) 512-3841.

Key contributors to this assignment were Ellen Crocker, Richard Johnson,

Les Mahagan, Cynthia Norris, and Robert Sayers.

John B. Stephenson, Director

Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Investigations Initiated by EPA’s

National Ombudsman Between October 1992

and December 2000

Page 26 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Number Case name

State

location

Date inquiry

received

Status as of

06/30/01

Date

resolved

Report

issueda

1 Babcock-Wilcox Site Pennsylvania 10/30/92 Resolved 10/01/93 No

2 Old Southington Landfill Site Connecticut 03/15/93 Resolved 05/01/94 No

3 Brio Refining Site Texas 05/19/93 Resolved 04/01/94 Yes

4 Vertac Incinerator Arkansas 06/09/93 Resolved 08/18/94 Yes

5 Yaworski Landfill Site Connecticut 09/24/93 Resolved 04/01/94 No

6 Triumph Mine Tailings Piles Idaho 12/93 Resolved 02/15/95 No

7 Commencement Bay Site Washington 06/01/93 Resolved 09/01/94 No

8 DTC Environmental Services, Inc. Ohio 03/95 Resolved 02/01/96 No

9 North Casper Site Wyoming 03/13/95 Resolved 08/01/95 No

10 Agrico Chemical Site/Escambia/Environmental

Justice Site Florida 08/95 Resolved 02/17/97 No

11 Drake Chemical Company Pennsylvania 03/14/96 Resolved 04/16/98 Yes

12 Times-Beach Incinerator Missouri 04/30/96 Resolved 12/20/96 Yes

13 McFarland Contamination Site California 03/28/97 Ongoing

14 Public Service of New Hampshire Landfill Site New

Hampshire 08/17/98 Resolved 06/15/99 No

15 Rayonier Mill Washington 10/98 Ongoing

16 Rocky Mountain Arsenal Site Colorado 1998 Ongoing

17 Shattuck Chemical Site Colorado 02/02/99 Ongoing Yes

(Interim)

18 Alberton Train Derailment /Mix Chemical Spill Montana 03/08/99 Ongoing

19

Passyunk Homes (Philadelphia Public Housing)

& Defense Supply Center Philadelphia Site,

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania 03/10/99 Resolved 06/01/00 No

20 Augusta Sludge Contamination Site Georgia 04/07/99 Ongoing

21 Bunker Hill “In the Box” Site Idaho 09/09/99 Ongoing

22 Stauffer Chemical Co. Site Florida 10/12/99 Ongoing

23 Bloomington PCB Indiana 01/20/00 Ongoing

24 Quincy Hazardous Waste Site Washington 01/25/00 Ongoing

25 Waste Technologies Industries Hazardous

Waste Incinerator Site Ohio 01/31/00 Ongoing Yes(interim)

26 Marjol Battery Site Pennsylvania 04/13/00 Ongoing

27 Coeur d’Alene Basin Site Idaho 05/16/00 Ongoing

28 Precision National Plating Site Pennsylvania 07/10/00 Ongoing

29 Industrial Excess Landfill Site Ohio 01/25/99 Ongoing Yes

(interim)

30 Escambia Treating Co. & Agrico Chemical Co. Florida 07/20/00 Reopened

31 Pennsylvania Sludge Contamination Site Pennsylvania 08/08/00 Ongoing

32 Boyertown Contamination Site Pennsylvania 08/29/00 Ongoing

33 Hercules 009 Site Georgia 09/13/00 Ongoing

34 Solitron Devices/Honeywell Site Florida 10/02/00 Ongoing

Appendix I: Investigations Initiated by EPA’s

National Ombudsman Between October 1992

and December 2000
Appendix I: Investigations Initiated by EPA’s

National Ombudsman Between October 1992

and December 2000

Page 27 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

a

Many of the investigations resolved by the ombudsman did not result in the issuance of a report. He

told us that consensus among stakeholders may be reached prior to the issuance of a preliminary or

final report.

Source: GAO’s analysis of data provided by EPA’s national ombudsman.
Appendix II: Distribution of National

Ombudsman Investigations by EPA Region

Page 28 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Source: GAO’s analysis of data provided by EPA’s national ombudsman.

Appendix II: Distribution of National

Ombudsman Investigations by EPA Region
Appendix III: Comments From the

Environmental Protection Agency, Including

Comments From the National Ombudsman

Page 29 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Appendix III: Comments From the

Environmental Protection Agency, Including

Comments From the National Ombudsman

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this appendix.
Appendix III: Comments From the

Environmental Protection Agency, Including

Comments From the National Ombudsman

Page 30 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen
Appendix III: Comments From the

Environmental Protection Agency, Including

Comments From the National Ombudsman

Page 31 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen
Appendix III: Comments From the

Environmental Protection Agency, Including

Comments From the National Ombudsman

Page 32 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Now on line 2.
Appendix III: Comments From the

Environmental Protection Agency, Including

Comments From the National Ombudsman

Page 33 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

Now on line 8.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.
Appendix III: Comments From the

Environmental Protection Agency, Including

Comments From the National Ombudsman

Page 34 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

See comment 3.
Appendix III: Comments From the

Environmental Protection Agency, Including

Comments From the National Ombudsman

Page 35 GAO-01-813 EPA's National and Regional Ombudsmen

The following are GAO’s comments on the letter signed by EPA’s national

ombudsman dated July 11, 2001.

1. According to a February 1991 Decision Memorandum from EPA’s

Office of Administration and Resources Management, the Office of the

Ombudsman was abolished as part of a reorganization of the

Immediate Office of the Office of the Assistant Administrator of

OSWER.

2. Our report does not suggest that the ombudsman does not obtain

agency comments on his findings before they are made public. Rather,

we say that the ombudsman does not have a consistent policy for

soliciting agency comments and that his decision to seek them is

contingent on management’s interest in seeing the report prior to

publication and providing comments. We are recommending that the

ombudsman adopt a consistent policy to solicit agency comments

whenever reports are published; agency officials can choose to provide

comments at their discretion.

3. Our recommendation was that EPA officials, including the national

ombudsman, assess the demand for ombudsman services nationwide

to determine where these resources are needed.

GAO Comments

(360002)

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