ASJ Fall 2010 

1

AIRMAN SCHOLAR 

A JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY THOUGHT 

Volume XV Fall 2010 

Man’s Flight Through Life Is Sustained By The Power Of His Knowledge

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ASJ Fall 2010 

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From the Editors: 

An Exchange of Ideas 

The Fall 2010 edition of the Airman 

Scholar Journal has a new look which we, the 

editors, hope will draw increased attention to the 

publication, and the ideas contained therein. 

The goal of ASJ has been, and continues to be, 

to provide a forum for fresh new ideas about 

―military thought.‖ The Department of Military 

& Strategic Studies at the United States Air 

Force Academy, which sponsors the journal, is 

dedicated to the study of the context, theory, and 

application of military power, and to the 

education of future officers in those areas. 

This issue includes some of the ideas of 

members of the department‘s faculty regarding 

military thought, and educating cadets to 

generate their own thoughts. The bulk of the 

issue contains a cross section of recent cadet 

research. Besides the insights into the topics 

researched, the articles also offer insights into 

the issues deemed relevant and important by our 

future officers, as well as their approach to these 

issues. 

 WE SOLICIT YOUR FEEDBACK 

AND INPUTS. Past issues of ASJ have asked 

for reader comments, but we feel the time is 

right to redouble our efforts to use the journal to 

create a forum for ideas in this evolving area of 

study. We would like to make the journal a 

place for the true exchange of ideas between 

those interested in military thought. Please 

consider sharing your ideas with the community 

in one of the following ways: 

1. Submit an article. While publishing in the 

Airman Scholar Journal does not offer the same 

academic credit as publishing in a peer reviewed 

journal, its less formal status does offer the 

advantage of exchanging ideas with scholars 

with similar interests at a more exploratory 

level. Perhaps you are conducting research for a 

book or a peer reviewed submission and would 

like to expose a portion of that research to the 

community for feedback. The ASJ provides a 

unique opportunity to do so with fewer of the 

constraints of a peer reviewed journal. 

2. Write a letter to the editor. We would like to 

begin publishing readers‘ thoughts and reactions 

to the ideas presented in the articles. Many of 

the ideas presented, especially by cadets, are in 

the early stages of formulation, are new and 

creative, and/or are far off the beaten path. If 

you see potential or pitfalls, the authors and 

other readers would be interested in hearing a 

different perspective. Constructive inputs from 

members of the academic and operational 

community would be very useful as we continue 

to develop ideas together. 

3. Submit a book review. Every year hundreds 

of books are published. Not only is their value 

as literature of varying worth, but there is the 

further question of how useful they are to 

students of military thought. This is your 

opportunity to share your insights not only about 

books that are closely related to military 

thought, but also about books written in other 

areas, such as leadership and management, 

history, economics, etc. that have application to 

military power and its context, theory, and 

application. 

Any feedback, comments, inquires or 

submissions may be e-mailed to: 

daniel.gillespie1@usafa.edu or 

eric.moody@usafa.edu or feel free to call us at 

(719) 333-3550 or DSN 333-3550. 

or ―snail-mailed‖ to: 

DFMI 

Attn: AIRMAN SCHOLAR 

2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 2A2 

USAF Academy, CO 80840-6264 

 We hope you enjoy this issue of the 

Airman Scholar and look forward to hearing 

from you soon! 

 The Editors: 

 Lt Col Dan Gillespie 

 Lt Col Eric M. Moody 
ASJ Fall 2010 

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AIRMAN SCHOLAR 

Published by the 

Department of Military & Strategic Studies 

at the 

United States Air Force Academy 

Volume XV, Fall 2010

Dean of Faculty 

Brig Gen Dana H. Born 

Professor and Head, 

Department of Military & Strategic Studies 

Col Thomas A. Drohan

 

The Department‘s mission statement reflects our 

systematic approach to the study of military 

power...its context, theory and application, or 

―military and strategic studies.‖ The department is 

organized as follows: The executive staff provides 

departmental guidance and resources for cadet and 

faculty development. The academic divisions 

(strategic studies, comparative military strategies, 

operational concepts, and research and learning) 

develop and deliver courses and supporting 

programs. Each course and program combines 

intellectual rigor with operational relevance to 

achieve our goal of developing professional Air 

Force officers of character. 

The opinions expressed in Airman Scholar do not 

represent any official policies of the Dean of Faculty, 

US Air Force Academy, US Air Force, or US 

government. They are presented with the sole 

purpose of stimulating and generating 

discourse/debate on current military issues, as well 

as, domestic and international affairs. 

Airman Scholar is published bi-annually. When 

submitting potential contributions, we ask that you 

please adhere to the following guidelines: 

1. Full-length articles should be approximately 

6,000 words in length, although all 

submissions will be considered. Book 

reviews should be of books published in the 

last 3 years and should be approximately 

500-700 words in length. Priority will be 

given to books of relevance to the field of 

Military & Strategic Studies, although other 

related topics will be considered. 

2. Articles should be in the current MS-WORD 

format, Times New Roman, 12-pt font. 

3. Articles, as well as, book reviews will be 

edited, as necessary, to conform to Airman 

Scholar‘s format; proofs will not be sent to 

authors prior to publication. 

4. Articles are encouraged from all 

knowledgeable members of the academic 

and military communities. Publication of 

outstanding papers by USAFA cadets and 

other service academies is a particular goal 

of Airman Scholar. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Cadet Section: 

How Can The Department Of Defense Promote Its 

Own Energy Independence?.................................. 4

C1C M. Tyler Haugseth 

Nuclear Consequence Management: How the US 

Should Respond to a Nuclear Attack by a NonState Actor............................................. 16

C1C Joel Holley 

An Army of Lawrences............................... 24

C1C William C. ―Chip‖ Kirk III 

Terrorism and Technology.......................... 34

C1C Andrew Smith / C1C Aaron Widener 

Faculty Section: 

New Forms of Warfare: What’s Changing, 

What’s Not, and How Might Military Education 

Adapt?.................................................................... 49

 

Col Thomas A. Drohan 

“Ancient Alexandria, Alexander, and History: 

The Relevance of Thought in the Contemporary 

Strategic Environment”............................ 54

Lt Col Steve Pomeroy 
ASJ Fall 2010 

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How Can The Department Of Defense 

Promote Its Own Energy Independence? 

By Cadet 1st Class M. Tyler Haugseth 

Green. Everywhere companies are 

advertising green investment, green 

consumption, recycling, and conservation. 

Recently, [at] the Air Force Academy, I 

received a memorandum on the ―Falcon 

Green Initiative‖ intent on decreasing 

energy use by the base through conservation 

while implementing new energy projects 

such as the construction of a solar farm to 

supply electricity to the power grid. The 

initiative sought grass root efforts to reduce 

consumption such as turning computers off 

at night, unplugging ―vampire‖ power 

devices and installing motion detectors to 

turn off lights in empty rooms. For many, 

green is a fad. To those who are serious 

about a ―green revolution,‖ different 

motivations for adopting green principles 

include maximizing profit, lowering 

operating costs, conserving resources, or 

reducing pollution. For the military, every 

one of these reasons is significant. Reducing 

waste is one consideration, but reducing the 

need for a hydrocarbon fuel, especially oil, 

is not just environmentally friendly, but life 

saving. Petro-dollars may mean the 

difference between war and peace. Climate 

change is a destabilizing force. While 

private industry can still pay the premium 

for consuming imported oil and rely on 

liquid hydrocarbon fuel, energy 

consumption in the military is a deadly 

endeavor. As Admiral Nathman said, our 

reliance on imported oil ―weakens 

international leverage, jeopardizes foreign 

policy, exacts a huge price tag in money and 

lives, entangles the U.S. with hostile 

regimes, and undermines economic 

stability.‖ The solution to this problem lies 

in the Renewable Energy Triangle 

developed by the Navy including: energy 

security, economics, and environmental 

sustainability (Tindal). 

Energy Consumption 

 The United States is the single 

largest user of energy in the world. It 

contains five percent of the population, yet 

accounts for 26 percent of world energy 

consumption (Lengyel 7). Within the U.S., 

the Department of Defense is the single 

greatest consumer of energy on the order of 

$13.2 billion in 2006 (0.8% of U.S. energy 

consumption) (DoD facilities). Below are 

two graphs from the DoD facilities 

presentation which show the allocation of 

energy by application and commodity. 

 However, these statistics are only for 

one year, 2006. Anyone who drives 

regularly knows that the price of gasoline, 

and consequently oil, is quite volatile. The 

graph below (McGhee) demonstrates how 

even a decrease in fuel consumption of 16 

percent by the Air Force from 2003 to 2008 

still led to a nearly 250 percent increase in 

energy costs over the same period. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

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 The lesson from this trend indicates 

that simply reducing consumption through 

efficiency or decreased operations is not 

enough to offset the costs of using 

petroleum-based fuels. Since the U.S. cannot 

control the oil supply except, perhaps, by 

military force, it is subject to the variability 

of the petroleum market. The enormity of 

this problem lies in the graph below from 

Lengyel. 

 In 2006, the DoD consumed 4.6 

billion gallons of fuel, ―or an average of 

12.6 million gallons of fuel per day‖

(Lengyul 10). The problem is most evident 

in the 57.9 percent of consumption by cost 

in jet fuel. For the foreseeable future, the 

only fuel that will be used by aircraft in the 

DoD will be hydrocarbon based. Currently, 

nearly all of that is supplied by oil. The 

Quadrennial Defense Review published in 

February of this year states that ―by 2016, 

the Air Force will be postured to cost 

competitively acquire 50 percent of its 

domestic aviation fuel via an alternative fuel 

blend that is greener than conventional 

petroleum fuel.‖ According to McGhee, by 

mid-2011, all USAF aircraft will be certified 

to use an approved alternative blend 

consisting of petroleum-based fuels 

combined with hydrocarbons extracted from 

non-food seed oils in the short term and 

halophytic (algae-based) and cellulosic fuels 

in the long term. Though the prospect for 

wide-spread use of non-hydrocarbon-based 

fuels in USAF aircraft by the middle of the 

century is dim, the ability to acquire fuel 

from domestic sources like algae and 

cellulose make their supply more reliable. 

 Consider a scenario that could 

cripple U.S. war fighting capability right 

now. An Israeli strike is conducted against 

Iranian nuclear facilities in late 2010. Iran 

decides that it wants to cripple all U.S. 

operations and the American economy for 

their support of Israel. In 2011 it launches a 

major offensive. It mines the Strait of 

Hormuz, effectively blocking all tanker 

access. It destroys major oil production 

facilities and tanker docks in Saudi Arabia 

and other Persian Gulf states using its longrange ballistic missiles. It backs a domestic 

Nigerian terror group and provides them 

weapons which were successful in 

paralyzing oil exports from the Niger river 

delta. It garners an agreement with Hugo 

Chavez of Venezuela who immediately 

suspends all tanker transports of oil out of 

his country in exchange for financial support 

from Iran. Iran also launches its Shahab 

ballistic missiles at Russian pipelines in the 

region. Within one week it has cut 30% of 

the world‘s oil supply off from the U.S. and 

Europe. U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan 

must rely only on their fuel reserves stored 

prior to the attack and can only obtain 

limited fuel supplies airlifted from the U.S. 

The price of oil skyrockets and effectively 

cripples the world economy. While the 

retaliatory blow against Iran is devastating, 

they have achieved their goal of crippling 

further U.S. military action in the Middle 

East while the president must concentrate on 

damage control at home by opening the 

strategic reserve. Facing major political 

pressure, he removes forces from the Middle 

East in order to conserve fuel for domestic 

use. Not only will the U.S. enter the greatest 

economic depression in nearly a century, but 

its ability to project power abroad is 

effectively neutralized. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

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Anyone capable of disrupting oil 

supplies will be able to paralyze American 

military forces unless they are able to obtain 

energy supplies domestically or utilize 

energy supplies which will not compete with 

the rest of the U.S. economy. 

Cost of Defending the Oil Order 

 No good business relies on the 

honesty of men and women to provide for 

their interests. Likewise, the United States 

does not rely on the good will of leaders in 

the Middle East, Africa, Asia, or our 

neighbors to the north and south in Canada 

or Mexico to provide a reliable flow of 

energy supplies. With the rise of Chinese 

energy consumption, the prospects of a 

rising India, and the expected oil production 

peak in site, access to oil is not a right 

guaranteed to the United States. Access to 

affordable energy propelled the United 

States to its current superpower status. From 

wood in the new world, to coal, and now oil, 

readily available energy supplies propelled 

the enormous growth of American industry. 

Continued access to affordable energy is a 

necessity, not an option, to maintain the 

current standard of living in America. As 

such, the people of the United States expect 

the Federal government to protect their 

access to energy in order to continue to 

prosper. Thus, through the DoD, the 

government has deployed assets directly and 

indirectly in order to protect the flow of oil. 

While all the data are difficult to compile, 

some estimates of the direct costs are 

available. Indirect costs will not be 

accounted, but the sources of these costs will 

be mentioned. 

 In the late 1970‘s, President Carter 

stated that the ―protection of the Persian 

Gulf [is] a formal element of U.S. defense 

strategy‖ (O‘Hanlon 59). Though protecting 

oil supplies was vital to the government, it 

was not until the 1970s with the oil 

embargos and the increasing reliance of the 

U.S. on imported oil that it became an 

official position of the Federal government. 

As such, the primary focus of this effort is 

the Middle East with its share of the oil 

horde. According to O‘Hanlon, ―quasipermanent facilities‖ in the Middle East to 

include Central Command headquarters, 

various bases in the region, and thousands of 

military personnel account for $5-10 billion 

a year, or 1-2% of the defense budget. 

However, much of the manpower and forces 

used in defense of the region are not 

permanent forces and are deployed in 

regular intervals or constitute deployed 

readiness in the form of carrier battle groups 

and other naval forces. Again, O‘Hanlon 

places an estimate of annual costs not 

including those of the current operations 

(OIF and OEF) at about $50 billion a year. 

Without the $100 billion dollars a year 

currently allocated to the Iraq war, and 

considering an annual import of 1 billion 

barrels of oil from the Middle East per year 

to the U.S., that amounts to a $50 per barrel 

subsidy to protect oil resources from the 

Middle East or around 50 cents per gallon of 

gasoline ―assuming half of the oil goes 

towards gasoline.‖ This is in line with other 

estimates quoted by the author (O‘Hanlon 

60). 

 An illuminating statistical method 

cited by O‘Hanlon was developed by 

Kaufmann. The Kaufmann analysis 

attempted to break down the defense budget 

by regional costs in 1992. While the analysis 

has not been performed since 1992, 

O‘Hanlon roughly uses it to estimate current 

costs. The Kaufmann method found that 

approximately 20% of the defense budget 

was dedicated to the defense of the Persian 

Gulf. Using that percentage today, the costs 

approach $100 billion a year (70). Though 

O‘Hanlon only uses Kaufmann‘s estimate of 

Persian Gulf costs, I would consider two 
ASJ Fall 2010 

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other numbers in the Kaufmann analysis 

important. Though surely the costs 

associated with regions like Southeast Asia, 

the Mediterranean, Africa, and the 

Caribbean would include those to secure oil 

supplied from places like Indonesia, Russia, 

Nigeria, and Venezuela. However, the 

quotes of 7% and 5%, respectively, for the 

Atlantic and Pacific sea lane defense must 

be included in the estimate (68). These 

include the protection of all shipping, but a 

sizable portion of these ratios account for 

the protection of oil tankers considering that 

―two-thirds of the world‘s oil trade (crude 

and refined) is moved by tankers and 25 

percent of international natural gas trade is 

in the form of liquid natural gas‖ (Shaffer 

95). Even assuming a low estimate of 1% 

from each ratio for sea lane defense, this 

would mean an additional $10 billion a year 

is necessary to secure oil shipments via the 

sea lanes. 

 O‘Hanlon‘s bottom line using 

Kaufmann and his own estimates indicates 

the potential to save up to $50 billion a year 

(+/- $25 billion a year) in the budget if the 

Persian Gulf was ―removed from the list of 

overseas commitments‖ (70). If sea lane 

defense was also removed from the list of 

commitments, I would estimate another $5-7 

billion could be saved per year. These 

numbers do not take into consideration the 

costs associated with peacekeeping in 

Africa, operations involving Southeast 

Asian production, Northern European 

output, or Canadian supplies. Surely forces 

in places like Europe or funds allocated to 

Northern Command/NORAD have some 

impact upon oil supplies. When direct 

estimates are tallied, a range between $25 

billion and $83 billion is found for the 

defense of oil supplies. For the sake of 

argument, let‘s see how far this money could 

be used to produce renewable electricity in 

the U.S. 

 If an AP1000 nuclear reactor built by 

Westinghouse is capable of producing 1,117 

MW and operates continuously 24/7 to 

produce electricity, it can produce 9,784,920 

MWh of electricity a year. The United States 

uses 4.11 billion MWh of electricity a year. 

Of that, 70.7 percent is generated by nonrenewable sources (coal, natural gas, oil). A 

recent subsidy to build two AP1000 reactors 

in the U.S. guaranteed by President Obama 

was $8 billion dollars. With this rough data, 

it would require about 420 AP1000 reactors 

to replace all current non-renewable 

electrical generation with AP1000 nuclear 

reactors. At $4 billion apiece, this would 

require $1,680 billion to achieve. If we use 

the above range of $25 billion to $83 billion 

saved a year, this would require between 20 

and 67 years to replace all current nonrenewable electrical generation in the U.S. 

This, of course, assumes no one else would 

build electrical plants, that no growth in 

electrical demand will occur, a decrease in 

electrical demand per capita could occur, 

nor does it account for fuel used in 

transportation which accounts for about 28 

percent of U.S. energy consumption. 

However, the prospect that the U.S. could 

eliminate all fossil fuel use in electrical 

generation in as little as 20 years using the 

money saved from protecting the oil supply 

from the Persian Gulf is astounding. 

 

 The DoD is not in a position to 

redesign the country‘s electrical grid nor 

decide if protecting Persian Gulf oil is a 

favorable policy. However, it can change its 

own policies and operations procedures to 

pursue the marching orders given by the 

civilian leadership while improving the 

military‘s overall security posture. The 

temporal hierarchy, I believe, that must be 

followed to achieve greater energy 

independence follows: improve efficiency to 

reduce oil demand, develop and utilize non-
ASJ Fall 2010 

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food crop biofuels grown domestically for 

hydrocarbon fuel, initiate procurement 

measures which emphasize fuel efficiency 

and utilize fuels which are environmentally 

friendly as well as sustainable, and begin 

procurement of energy resources for all 

bases which are self-contained and 

controlled by the base as well are carbon 

free (nuclear, solar, wind). ―Energy 

efficiency can serve as a force multiplier 

because it increases the range and endurance 

of forces in the field and can reduce the 

number of combat forces diverted to protect 

energy supply lines, which are vulnerable to 

both asymmetric and conventional attacks 

and disruptions‖ (QDR 87). 

Energy in Theater 

The United States has the strongest 

military in the history of mankind in relation 

to her neighbors. At the same time, it is the 

most energy intensive military in the world. 

In order to maintain its dominance and warfighting capabilities, it requires enormous 

amounts of energy to sustain operations. For 

example, ―an Army heavy division may use 

about 600,000 gallons per day...Energy is 

the key enabler of U.S. military combat 

power.‖ This requires reliable access to fuel 

and electricity. Forward operating bases 

require fuel convoys to deliver the energy 

necessary to continue operations and bases 

outside the warzone acquire electricity from 

the civilian power grid (Lengyul 7-11, 

Nathman). 

 

First, the cost of this fuel is 

prohibitive. According to Nathman, ―one 

gallon of diesel fuel from Kuwait at $1.30-

$1.40 costs $190 to ship to Afghanistan. 

Considering that over 87 million gallons of 

fuel were transported in Afghanistan in 

2007, this accounts to a huge sum (Iraq 

required over 502 million gallons of fuel in 

2007) (Casualties). Reducing use of fuel in 

Afghanistan by only 1% would save $1.6 

billion a year assuming $190 per gallon of 

fuel. 

Second, the human costs of fuel are 

undeniable. The Army performed a study on 

fuel and water use in theater related to 

convoys and casualties. They found that 

50% of convoys are dedicated to theater fuel 

transportation. In their study, they found that 

there were ―0.042 casualties for every fuelrelated resupply convoy‖ or one casualty per 

24 convoys. With 6,030 convoys in 2007 

alone (Casualties), that amounted to 251 

casualties. As of August 2008, both 

operations had 4,683 casualties combined, 

3,708 to hostile fire (Powers). Using the 

above estimate, that means that between 10-

20 percent of the casualties up till 2008 were 

from transporting fuel for combat 

operations. Considering that the American 

military will continue to become a more 

energy intense force, the human and 

monetary cost (blood and treasure) of using 

hydrocarbon fuels in war will only increase. 

To save lives and money, the DoD must find 

ways of reducing consumption of petroleum 

based fuels and increase local energy 

production for forward operating bases. 

These measures should decrease the need for 

fuel convoys thereby decreasing the 

enormous costs of shipping fuel in the 

theater and preventing casualties related to 

convoy operations. 

Political War 

Some of the top antagonists of the 

United States include Venezuela and Iran, 

coincidentally two of the largest oil 

producers in the world. Yet, our way of life, 

and subsequent reliance on oil to power that 

way of life, provide enormous sums of cash 

to unfriendly regimes. According to Admiral 

Nathman: 

 
ASJ Fall 2010 

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America‘s energy posture constitutes 

a serious and urgent threat to 

national security – militarily, 

diplomatically, and 

economically...U.S. dependence on 

imported oil is a direct threat to 

national security because it triggers 

instability all over the word and 

limits American foreign policy 

options. Oil revenues allow petrodictators to stifle freedom in their 

countries and the inequality of 

revenue distribution fuels 

insurgency. 

Furthermore, he says the ―national security 

planning processes have not been 

sufficiently responsive to the security 

impacts of our current energy posture.‖ As 

such, dependence on imported energy has 

severely limited foreign policy options both 

directly and indirectly. Below are two 

graphs illustrating oil revenue and oil 

reserves by country. 

 

The political implications of these 

graphs are undeniable. Many countries 

unfriendly to the U.S. like Venezuela, Iran, 

and Russia are earning huge sums of money. 

Counties which are officially allies, like 

Saudi Arabia, but who fund organizations 

which promote extremism abroad maintain 

enormous reserves which will continue to 

provide them with strong revenue as long as 

oil is the reigning order. However, supplier 

nations are not the only concern; conflict for 

that supply is becoming as important to 

American foreign policy. 

 In 2005, the Chinese oil company 

(nationally owned), CNOOC, bid to buy the 

California oil company Unocal was the 

largest Chinese acquisition offer in history 

(Klare). Congress called the bid an 

―outrage‖ and blocked the offer. Politically, 

China saw the block as an attempt by the 

U.S. to prevent it ―from acquiring energy on 

the open market‖ and that it would have to 

buy up resources abroad to secure its energy 

supplies (Garrison 143). 

 Currently, ―China‘s push for energy 

security raises concerns that its mercantilist 

 ̳go forth‘ policy potentially disrupts 

international oil markets and the current 

energy system,‖ though China‘s motives and 

power projection are limited by its economic 

reliance on the U.S., the E.U. and Japan. 

However, American pressure on China‘s 

energy quest resulted in the opposite effect 

intended. Americans are calling on China to 

reduce its energy consumption, yet 

America‘s energy consumption per capita is 

twice the next highest in Europe and 

enormous compared to China‘s. This 

pressure empowers Chinese hard liners who 

advocate increased military posture and 

confrontation with America (Garrison 143). 

As such, the United States must be 

conscious of conflicting interests with China 

and ―as energy becomes scarcer, the two 

countries will have to carefully manage the 

relationship to avoid crisis-driven policy 

responses‖ (Garrison 151). 

 Despite America‘s and China‘s 

conflict for energy, Garrison makes a strong 
ASJ Fall 2010 

10

point which should be considered in 

America‘s foreign policy posture. As the 

two greatest consumers of energy in the 

world, China and the U.S. constitute a 

powerful buying lobby. A trade partnership 

could provide power over supply through 

purchasing deals (144). However, this is 

difficult, regardless of the purchasing power 

of both nations due to the inelasticity of oil 

as a commodity and its necessity to 

economic growth. Therefore, the more likely 

outcome are the ―strategic partnerships‖ we 

are seeing today between consumers and 

producers where the consumer strikes a deal 

with the producer in exchange for such 

commodities as arms. This can be seen with 

the Chinese contracts with Iran for oil. This 

scenario is worse since China is likely to 

seek oil where the U.S. has restricted trade 

(Iran, Myanmar, Libya, etc.). This 

undermines U.S. policy tools with those 

countries and increases tensions with nations 

like China (Klare). In all cases, the best 

scenario is to lower each nation‘s energy 

footprint (Garrison 151). 

 With constrained production today, 

Africa will be the next energy frontier 

―Africa is the final frontier as far as the 

world‘s supplies of energy are concerned 

with global competition for both oil and 

natural gas‖ (Klare and Volman). According 

to Klare and Volman, the discovery of new 

fields is no longer sufficient to compensate 

for the declining production in larger, older 

fields. With the increased focus on African 

oil, the DoD will be called upon to defend 

the African energy stage. The Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for African 

Affairs, Michael Westphal, stated in 2002 

that ―15% of the United States‘ imported oil 

supply comes from sub-Saharan 

Africa....this is also the number which has 

the potential for increasing significantly in 

the next decade.‖ Furthermore, his boss, 

Kansteiner, also said later in 2002, ―African 

oil is of strategic national interest to us...it 

will increase and become more important as 

we go forward.‖ In fact, in 2002-2003, the 

U.S. provided $300 million in aid to Angola 

and Nigera, the two largest African 

exporters of oil to the U.S. The U.S. gave 

Nigeria seven surplus coast guard cutters to 

the Nigerian navy. In 2003, the supreme 

commander of NATO, General James Jones 

said his NATO naval forces would spend 

less time in the Mediterranean and up to 

50% of their time along the West African 

coast. Finally, in accord with the official 

statement in 2003 that ―a key mission for 

U.S. forces [in Africa] would be to ensure 

that Nigeria‘s oil fields, which in the future 

could account for as much as 25 percent of 

all U.S. oil imports, are secure,‖ the DoD is 

―beginning to establish a basing 

infrastructure in Africa, again following the 

trajectory first seen in the Persian Gulf and 

Caspian regions‖ (Klare and Volman). 

 This means we can expect U.S. 

operations to increase in the near future with 

the decreasing force requirement in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. As President Obama achieves 

his goal of handing over Iraq to the new 

government while removing troops through 

2011, the next focus after Afghanistan will 

likely involve African policies. The DoD 

has spent the last decade developing a ―lily 

pad‖ basing infrastructure in Africa. This 

approach places an airstrip with a small 

contingency force in country that provides 

for the smallest footprint in order to avoid 

aggravating local tensions while providing 

the means of massive build-up in the event 

forces are needed in the region. 

Furthermore, the strategy involves 

augmenting the lily pad bases with the U.S. 

naval armada to secure African oil supplies 

in the event of major conflict. This is 

consistent with General Jones‘ statement 

that NATO forces will increasingly patrol 

the western coast of Africa. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

11

 These three major points will 

coalesce into conflicting interests throughout 

the region. With Persian Gulf production 

peaking and Chinese consumption 

increasing, Africa will be a foreign policy 

priority for the U.S. and China. The preview 

of this conflict is already apparent in the 

Chinese stakes in Sudan despite the 

humanitarian crisis there between the 

northern and southern regions. The 

increasing interests in African oil will likely 

cause irritation with Persian Gulf allies who 

will see their position diminishing with the 

United States. In fact, this may have a 

compounding factor. With less focus on the 

Persian Gulf and proliferation issues in Iran, 

major states like Saudi Arabia may be 

tempted to go nuclear. Also, the smaller 

states like Bahrain or Qatar, majority Shia 

nations, rely on the U.S. umbrella. Without 

that assurance, they may align with Iran, 

exasperating the problem. The oil issue and 

the politics behind it are complex as oil 

affects regional stability, power, freedoms, 

and relationships more than perhaps any 

other resource. 

Climate Change and Future Operations 

Though many critics consider 

climate change a hoax, the official stance of 

the DoD, according to the 2010 Quadrennial 

Defense Review, is that climate change is 

real and that it ―could have significant 

geopolitical impact around the world‖ (85). 

Several factors contribute to the effects 

which climate change may incur. The 

prospect of rising sea levels impacts not 

only the nations whose elevation lies at sea 

level currently or whose economy relies on 

coastal commerce, but on military bases 

located on the coast, especially naval and 

coast guard bases. The 2008 National 

Intelligence Council ―judged that more than 

30 U.S. military institutions were already 

facing elevated levels of risk from rising sea 

levels.‖ Predications suggest that more 

extreme weather patterns and the changes in 

land usability (arable land, desertification, 

etc.) will lead to decreased stability, ―further 

weakening of fragile governments,‖ as well 

as increasing humanitarian needs (QDR 85). 

Since the U.S. military traditionally is a first 

responder to humanitarian crises like the 

Asian tsunami or the Haitian earthquake, 

more weather based (i.e. 

hurricane/cyclone/typhoon and flooding 

incidents) crises will demand a response 

which the United States will likely be called 

upon to provide. In nearly all cases, climate 

change represents a new challenge to DoD 

operations by increasing instability abroad 

and impacting the operations of bases most 

at risk to the consequences of climate 

change (QDR 85-87). 

 

 Therefore, climate change is a 

significant risk to the DoD and its global 

operations. In the QDR, the ―DoD will work 

to foster efforts to assess, adapt to, and 

mitigate the impacts of climate change‖

(86). Though the DoD cannot curb climate 

change, it should still invest in measures 

which will decrease its carbon footprint. In 

addition, it can help decrease the country‘s 

carbon footprint. ―The Environmental 

Security and Technology Certification 

Program [will use] military installations 

as...test [beds] to demonstrate and create a 

market for innovative energy efficiency and 

renewable energy technologies coming out 

of the private sector and DoD and 

Department of Energy laboratories.‖ This is 

already apparent today on many bases such 

as Nellis AFB, Elmendorf AFB, DavisMonthan AFB, and Fort Irwin. In fact, four 

USAF bases are already completely reliant 

on renewable energy systems including 

solar, wind, and fuel cells. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

12

 Other aspects of climate change will 

also alter military operations. Increasing 

polar ice melting will lead to longer ice-free 

seasons in traditionally closed areas in the 

northern trade routes. In fact, the melting of 

Arctic ice may result in the formation of 

new naval trade routes which will require 

monitoring. Thus, the military must secure 

and improve infrastructure of the region to 

support new commerce (QDR 86). This will 

require redeployment of assets from other 

regions to monitor polar transit. With the 

current emphasis on downsizing of an 

overstretched force, further responsibilities 

may overtax the military infrastructure. 

 Reactions from other nations may 

also lead to conflicts. With geo-engineering, 

proposed by many scientists to reverse 

climate change through global cooling, new 

political consequences emerge. Melting ice 

caps also means that the Russian tundra will 

melt. This tundra can provide new arable 

land and favorable living conditions for the 

Russian population. It also makes access to 

Siberian oil easier for both production and 

transportation. Arguably, climate change 

would boost the Russian economy. So, geoengineering with atmospheric sulfate, algal 

seeding and cloud seeding would represent a 

conflict of interest with anyone who stands 

to profit from climate change. This means 

that there exists the potential for armed 

conflict over climate change and geoengineering. Does anyone have the right to 

enact geo-engineering on their own to 

reverse the effects of climate change? 

Therefore, the best option, currently, is to 

use passive techniques to curb the current 

effects by reducing the DoD carbon 

footprint. 

 

Recommendations 

Several initiatives can begin to 

reduce reliance on petroleum and other nonrenewable for the military. Another fact to 

consider, if the military‘s choice of fuel or 

power generation competes with the civilian 

sector, even a reliable supply of domestic 

fuels will not outweigh the public demand 

for the fuels in the event of price spikes or 

global supply shortfalls. For example, even 

though the U.S. produces enough petroleum 

alone to fuel the military in its current war, 

the impact on the civilian economy would 

be devastating if the military used all the 

available fuel for the war. This is only an 

acceptable option in a war for survival, not a 

proxy war. Therefore, using energy sources 

which do not compete is ideal. Using 

sources that do not compete and are viable 

for civilian use would be favorable as a 

technology demonstrator to lower capital 

costs related to research. Solar, nuclear, and 

wind fall under these categories as they are 

local (solar/wind) or the United States has 

an extraordinary surplus of fuel (nuclear). 

One area of particular interest for 

military bases is a Small and Modular 

nuclear power Reactor (SMR). The example 

which will be used is the Hyperion Power 

Module (HPM) developed by Hyperion 

Power Generation. It is a device capable of 

producing 25 MW of electricity during 

operation (Hyperion). Dyess Air Force Base, 

one of four USAF bases to run on 100% 

renewable energy from electricity, uses 80 

million kWh of electricity a year (Denslow). 

If Dyess AFB used the Hyperion system to 

provide its electrical needs, the HPM would 

only need to operate at 36.5% capacity (if 

running 24/7) to produce this electricity. 

Nellis AFB, which recently installed 13 MW 

of solar panels on a 130 acre capped landfill 

uses 120 million kWh a year (Peters). A 

HPM would only need to run at 55% 

capacity to power the entire base, and the 

module only occupies 1.5x2.5 meters (as 

compared to 130 acres for only a quarter of 

necessary production using solar). Any 
ASJ Fall 2010 

13

bases requiring more electricity than one 

HPM can provide can still use the units 

when they are ―teamed‖ (Hyperion). 

 Nuclear energy is the pariah of 

energy sources, conjuring memories of 

Chernobyl and Three Mile Island for many 

people. However, the HPM is far different 

from a conventional reactor. The fuel is only 

20% enriched, incapable of fueling a nuclear 

weapon. The fuel is also self-regulating; it 

will cease fission if it becomes too hot due 

to the nature of uranium nitride. The module 

is buried in the ground and not disturbed for 

8-10 years at a time. Thus, it is naturally 

hardened due to the burial and does not need 

refueling for up to 10 years, limiting 

exposure. It produces a volume of waste 

equivalent to the size of a softball every 10 

years (Hyperion). Logistically it is a 

superior choice. It can be airlifted to any 

location for use and can begin operation 

quickly. At a forward operating base, it is 

not vulnerable to mortar fire or non-bunker 

busting bombs. It eliminates reliance on 

civilian grids and on diesel generators in 

theater. As a power source, it can eliminate 

thousands of tons of CO2 emissions a year 

and saves money when compared to current 

electrical production (Hyperion). 

 In the 2010 QDR, the army stated its 

goal to transform its 70,000 non-tactical 

vehicles (NTV) to hybrid and electric 

systems. Currently, they have 500 hybrids 

and 4,000 low-speed electrical vehicles. 

Conversion of these NTVs to electrical or 

(plug-in) hybrid systems would allow for 

on-site modular nuclear systems to provide 

the energy for facilities and vehicles while 

continuing to reduce non-renewable fuel 

consumption. This would also reduce 

demand for fuel that can be used for combat 

systems. 

 The current fleet of aircraft and main 

battle tanks rely on JP-8 fuel. Their use will 

continue for decades to come. Retrofitting 

these vehicles to utilize non-carbon fuels is 

cost-prohibitive at best, impossible at worst. 

However, synthetic JP-8 derived from coal 

and biofuels grown domestically would 

ensure a reliable supply of fuel in the event 

of a major war. Current trends to certify all 

combat vehicles on syn-fuels is a significant 

step in a process of full conversion to synfuels. While coal-based fuels would not 

decrease carbon emissions, biofuel based 

systems would be carbon neutral in practice. 

All combat vehicles running JP-8 fuel or 

diesel should be exclusively fueled with 

these syn-fuels as soon as practical in order 

to reduce reliance on imported oil. 

 

 These three measures combined with 

new procurement policies to encourage the 

use of non-carbon based fuels would curb 

the need for imported oil to power the 

military establishment. While greater 

measures should be taken across the 

American economy to reduce overall 

exposure to foreign influence relating to oil 

consumption, the DoD has the capability to 

accomplish these goals ―in house.‖

 

Conclusions 

 Green is more than a luxury for the 

military, it is a necessity. Ideally, the entire 

country should adopt green principles. Only 

a complete national shift in policy can 

attenuate the political consequences of oil 

consumption which currently limits U.S. 

foreign policy options with nations like Iran 

or Venezuela. Using carbon-based fuels also 

requires significant logistical coordination to 

transport fuel to forward bases. Minimizing 

this need through efficiency and alternate 

power generation systems, like nuclear or 

solar, lessens the human stake and monetary 

price while improving combat effectiveness. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

14

Furthermore, the DoD can become a rolemodel for environmental stewardship after 

decades of environmental destruction. 

Encouraging the decrease in greenhouse gas 

emissions may attenuate the coming tides of 

instability as a result of climate change. 

Therefore, the DoD should increase efforts 

to stem petroleum use for military 

operations or the U.S. stands at the 

continued mercy of those with the power to 

shut-off the oil spigot and at the mercy of 

mother nature. 

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Intelligence Agency. United States 

Central Intelligence Agency, 22 Apr. 

2010. Web. 03 May 2010. 

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ns/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html>. 

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Vehicles Energy Use, Strategies and 

Goals." Address. 6 Aug. 2008. 

GovEnergy 2008. Web. 17 Apr. 2010. 

<http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/pdf

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Understanding Energy." Electricity 

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Garrison, Jean A. China and the Energy 

Equation in Asia. Boulder: First Forum, 

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Hyperion Power. Hyperion Power Generation. 

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Karbuz, Sohbet. "US Military Energy 

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<http://www.energybulletin.net/node/29

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Klare, Michael, and Daniel Volman. "America, 

China and the Scramble for Africa's 

Oil." Review of African Political 

Economy 108 (2006): 297-309. JSTOR. 

Web. 19 Apr. 2010. 

Kunzig, Robert By. "Geoengineering: How to 

Cool Earth--At a Price: Scientific 

American." Science News, Articles and 

Information | Scientific American. Nov. 

2008. Web. 10 May 2010. 

<http://www.scientificamerican.com/arti

cle.cfm?id=geoengineering-how-tocool-earth>. 

Lengyel, Gregory J. "Department of Defense 

Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog 

New Tricks." 21st Century Defense 

Initiative (2007). The Brookings 

Institution. Web. 17 Apr. 2010. 

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es/rc/papers/2007/08defense_lengyel/len

gyel20070815.pdf>. 

McGhee, Michael. "U.S. Air Force Energy 

Program." Address. Energy, National 

Security and Defense Department 

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Building, District of Columbia. 10 Sept. 

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<http://www.eesi.org/energy-nationalsecurity-and-defense-departmentsolutions-10-sep-2009>. 

Nathman, John. "Powering America‘s Defense: 

Energy and the Risks to National 

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Solutions. 328A Russell Senate Office 

Building, District of Columbia. 10 Sept. 

2009. Environmental and Energy Study 
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Institute. Web. 17 Apr. 2010. 

<http://www.eesi.org/energy-nationalsecurity-and-defense-departmentsolutions-10-sep-2009>. 

O'Hanlon, Michael. "How Much Does the 

United States Spend Protecting Persian 

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District of Columbia: Brookings 

Institution, 2010. 59-72. 

Peters, Katherine M. "Air Force Pushes the 

Envelope on Renewable Energy 

(8/13/08) -- GovExec.com." 

Government Executive. 13 Aug. 2008. 

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<http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/080

8/081308kp21.htm>. 

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Statistics." United States Military 

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m/a/iraqdeath1000.htm>. 

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Offers Loan to Help Fund Two Nuclear 

Reactors." Washington Post. 17 Feb. 

2010. Web. 2 May 2010. 

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021601302.html>. 

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<http://www.eesi.org/energy-nationalsecurity-and-defense-departmentsolutions-10-sep-2009>. 

Westinghouse Nuclear. AP1000. Westinghouse 

Nuclear, 2010. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

16

Nuclear Consequence Management: 

How the US Should Respond to a Nuclear 

Attack by a Non-State Actor 

by Cadet First Class Joel Holley 

 In the Cold War, a large amount of 

American policy was directed at the 

prevention of a nuclear war. The fall of the 

Soviet Union seemed to make the threat of 

nuclear war disappear. However, nuclear 

weapons are still a significant threat to 

American security. While nuclear war is no 

longer a significant threat to the West, 

detonation of a nuclear device in an 

American or Western city is a very real 

possibility. In fact, President Obama said in 

remarks to reporters at a global summit 

meant to limit nuclear proliferation that 

terrorist organizations obtaining a nuclear 

weapon is ―the single biggest threat to U.S. 

security, both short-term, medium-term and 

long-term.‖ The prevention of a WMD 

attack on America is a very significant 

priority for policy makers. 

 Despite the significant amount of 

policy which should be devoted to the 

prevention of a nuclear attack, some amount 

of thought should be devoted to 

consequence management as well. The aim 

of this paper is to determine the proper 

course of action the United States of 

America should take in the event of a 

nuclear attack by a non state actor. The 

answer will be approached by looking at 

historical precedent and current research on 

the hypothesized effects of nuclear 

weaponry. The answer is difficult to predict 

and complex in its application, the US 

should have a response which is heavy on 

retaliation as well as reclamation of the 

affected area. 

There is no historical example of a 

non-state actor using nuclear material as a 

weapon. However, there are other historical 

examples of non-state entities using 

destructive and creative weaponry, as well 

as the notable example of the reconstruction 

of Japan after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 

bombings. The four historical examples that 

will be considered are the US nuclear attack 

on Japan, the sarin attack in Japan in 1995, 

the Oklahoma City bombing, and the 9/11 

terrorist attacks. Through these examples, 

the response of the victim state, in retaliation 

and rehabilitation, will be evaluated. 

1945: Hiroshima and Nagasaki 

 The situation in Japan in 1945 is a 

unique one. The two atomic bombs 

devastated the country to the point of 

unconditional surrender. There would be no 

retaliation. Instead, the Japanese government 

would work closely with US and allied 

powers to rebuild the government. The US 

would occupy Japan until 1952, and would 

occupy Okinawa until 1971. A strong 

alliance between America and Japan would 

be formed. Currently, there is a strong 

American military presence in the country, 

as well as a prosperous and fruitful 

economic relationship between the two 

countries. 

 The most notable aspects of the 

bombing for our study are the effects the 

bombs would have on the cities, and the 

lessons which should be learned from the 

clean-up. Despite the relative weakness of 

the bombs compared to today‘s nuclear 

weapons, a bomb detonated by a non-state 

actor could potentially be equivalent in size 

to the Hiroshima bomb. The first notable 

failure in the clean-up process was how 

slowly relief arrived. Evacuations of the city 

to relief camps and damage to rice fields 

caused acute food shortages. Housing 

shortages also caused crises in the region. 

Even into 1950, demand for housing 

exceeded availability by 90 times. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

17

While housing and food shortages 

were significant causes for immediate 

concern, they were not unlike other more 

conventional disasters, man-made or 

otherwise. When reconstruction of the cities 

took place, it did not take long for health 

officials to understand that the nuclear 

explosion was far from conventional. In 

1946, President Truman formed the Atomic 

Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC). The 

ABCC studied many of the effects the bomb 

had on the health of those affected. Major 

health issues included cancer, leukemia, 

shortened life-span, loss of vigor, growth 

and developmental disorders, sterility, 

genetic alteration, abnormal pigmentation, 

hair loss, and epidemiological changes. 

Radiation is a very unpredictable 

side effect of nuclear explosions. While the 

effects of radiation from the bombs in 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki peaked 3 to 4 

weeks after the explosions, their effects still 

linger. Radiation is not easy to clean, as 

evidenced by other nuclear incidents 

(Chernobyl is still ravaged by the effects of 

the radiation). The ABCC‘s findings 

demonstrated the effects of the radiation, but 

both governments underestimated the 

process of removing radioactive materials 

from the site. What the nuclear attacks on 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki taught us is that 

nuclear clean-up is a prolonged process, and 

caution should be exercised throughout. 

Caution, however, should not be used at the 

expense of the survivors, as the lack of 

immediate aid almost proved to be as 

harmful as the bomb itself. 

1995: Tokyo Sarin Attack 

In 1995, Japan suffered another 

attack from a weapon of mass destruction, 

only this time from a non-state actor. A cult 

group called Aum Shinrikyo punctured bags 

of sarin in the Tokyo subway system. The 

number of deaths caused by the attack was 

relatively small, only 12 died, but the city 

was fully terrorized. Sarin is an extremely 

potent nerve gas, and hundreds of thousands 

of Tokyo residents depend on the subway 

system for travel. 

The emergency response in Japan 

was mixed in terms of success. There were a 

lot of lessons which can be taken away from 

the incident. Japanese failures included 

problem recognition, contingency plans, and 

lack of bureaucratic communication. 

When the sarin was released, Japanese 

passengers reported bags which were 

leaking liquid on the trains. This was the 

initial report of the disaster. The initial 

response was to send subway workers which 

cleaned up the spill with newspapers and 

trash bags. These employees would later die 

of sarin exposure. It was not until hundreds 

of passengers reported violent respiratory 

problems that the emergency response 

services were called. The first emergency 

responders were local agencies, including 

firemen, policemen, and physicians. Here, 

the vital lesson learned was that unmarked, 

unattended luggage should not be handled 

lightly. The lack of awareness by the station 

personnel resulted in the needless deaths of 

employees and affected hundreds of 

passengers which could have been 

sufficiently warned. 

The next lesson was that the civilian 

sector of Japan had very little training on 

how to handle a WMD attack. Physicians 

arriving on the scene had almost no 

experience or knowledge about nerve 

agents. Firemen and policemen also had 

extremely limited experience in dealing with 

a chemical attack. Even if these immediate 

response workers had the experience 

necessary for dealing with a situation like 

this, the subway station management and the 

city had no plan set up for any terrorist 
ASJ Fall 2010 

18

attack. The entire city was basically 

operating on improvisation. 

There are many lessons which can be 

learned from this perspective. The first and 

foremost is that every city susceptible to a 

terrorist attack should have a plan to respond 

to potential terrorist attacks, and should 

educate their employees about the plan. 

Since the initial moments after the attack are 

often the most critical, movements of 

personnel should be done with maximum 

effectiveness at this point. Also, emergency 

personnel such as firemen and policemen 

should have some training to be able to 

recognize WMDs. The signatures and telling 

elements of WMDs should be able to be 

recalled by emergency personnel, or at least 

they should have quick access to literature 

about potential attacks. 

The last lesson discussed here is how 

bureaucratic institutions in Japan failed to 

work synergistically. The system in Tokyo 

was set up so that bureaucratic branches 

were at best isolated, and at worst 

competitive and confrontational. This 

proved to make effective clean-up, 

mitigation of effects, and future prevention 

slow to be effective. 

America has recently set up the 

Department of Homeland Security. This new 

and highly budgeted department represents a 

synthesis of emergency response units. The 

Department directs emergency resources and 

provides for a high level bureaucratic focus. 

In addition to this, local and state 

governments need to give their agencies a 

clear focus and make sure they understand 

the larger picture. 

1995: Oklahoma City Bombing 

Another large scale terrorist attack 

that can be looked at for guidance is the 

Oklahoma City Bombing. Despite this event 

being a domestic terrorist case, it provided 

America with many lessons about 

international terrorism. 

Timothy McVeigh was an American 

militia movement sympathizer who 

possessed a strong hatred for the federal 

government. He timed his attack on the 

Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building to occur 

on the 2nd anniversary of the Waco siege. 

Using high grade ammonium fertilizer-based 

explosives, McVeigh and his accomplice, 

Terry Nichols, orchestrated what would 

become the largest terrorist attack on 

American soil until the 9/11 attacks. 

The emergency response to the 

bombings represented an appropriate 

civil/military relationship. Despite DoD‘s 

vast resources and personnel, military forces 

are in no position to be the first responders 

in any situation. This must be left to local 

and state powers. As was the case in the 

1995 Japanese sarin attacks, the Oklahoma 

City hospitals were overwhelmed with 

patients immediately following the 

bombing. The DoD responded appropriately, 

by making their services available to 

regional governments as soon as possible. 

The state will have access to national guard 

and reserve units, but federal agencies must 

let disaster relief occur at tactical levels 

before intervening in investigation 

processes. 

An interesting foreign policy 

phenomenon occurred in the wake of 

Oklahoma City. President Clinton not only 

had to deal with a country in grief, but also 

with the reactions of foreign states. While it 

is difficult enough to determine the correct 

application of American military forces, 

Clinton was being offered military 

assistance from many countries, including 

Israel. In what was perhaps a wise move, 

Clinton declined foreign military help, 

which prevented the escalation of any 

perceived favoritism or implied blame. For 
ASJ Fall 2010 

19

instance, had Clinton accepted Israel‘s help, 

he would have sent an implied message to 

the Islamic world that the West views 

terrorism as an Islamic tactic, and polarizes 

the world between the West and Israel vs 

Islam. 

The Oklahoma City Bombing also 

opened the FBI‘s and CIA‘s eyes to 

preemptive intelligence gathering. Before 

McVeigh, the FBI viewed extremist and 

fringe groups as low-threat entities. While 

neo-Nazi, white supremacist, and anarchist 

groups produced much extreme, violent, and 

hateful talk, the FBI never really anticipated 

that any of them would follow through with 

their threats. Oklahoma City changed all of 

that. After the bombing, the FBI uncovered 

many credible plots to destroy public and 

federal buildings and resources. Many of 

these came from groups like the one to 

which McVeigh belonged. 

The American government learned 

the same lesson here as the Japanese 

government did in the sarin attacks: never 

underestimate non-state actors. Resources 

are becoming more and more available 

throughout the world, and a team of trained 

scientists is becoming as dangerous as an 

army. 

2001: September 11th Attacks 

The 9/11 attacks provide perhaps the 

best historical precedent we have for a 

catastrophic terrorist attack on America. The 

attack was perpetrated by a non-state actor, 

perhaps operating with assistance from one 

or many states, on American soil with the 

intent to inflict as much damage as possible 

on the general populace. How America 

responded would define a generation, 

revamp foreign policy, and change the face 

of war fighting for the American military. 

One thing which characterized the 

entire rebuilding process, and perhaps 

foreign policy process as well, was haste. 

When the planes hit the towers, emergency 

personnel were immediately on the scene. 

Many of the New Yorkers who perished in 

the towers were in fact firemen rushing to 

help. 

While the clean-up was done very 

well, one thing which became mired in 

controversy was the rebuilding of the tower. 

One World Trade Center, aka ―Freedom 

Tower,‖ is currently under construction. 

However, it was once regarded as a project 

of ―hubris and waste.‖ The 104 story glass 

tower, which rises to a symbolic 1,776 feet, 

was once thought to require heavy 

government subsidization if it was to be 

built, much less profitable. However, with 

time and patience, astronomical prices 

which once scared away private companies 

are becoming acceptable. 

These two situations demonstrate the 

difference between emergency relief and 

large scale reconstruction. America did well 

in this situation as far as emergency relief 

goes. However, large scale reconstruction is 

much more difficult. Considering how many 

delays and problems went into rebuilding 

two buildings, reconstructing a city would 

be a nightmare, should a nuclear attack 

occur. 

The political ramifications of the 

attack overwhelmed the world. The Bush 

Doctrine polarized and isolated the nation. 

The invasion of Iraq (which was not 

necessarily done in response to 9/11, but the 

thought was there at least in prevention of a 

second attack) did much to characterize The 

United States as a rogue nation. Detainee 

abuses at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib 

ruined America‘s image as a humanitarian 

protector of rights. 

Despite the negative images the 

attacks stirred up in America, the world saw 

the USA make a heavy and prolonged 
ASJ Fall 2010 

20

investment into the affairs of foreign 

nations, and not just in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Immigration tightened, and 

diplomatic visits to countries like Pakistan 

focused on handling domestic terrorism in 

their countries. 

The main military and political takeaways from the 9/11 attacks were to be wise 

and effective when employing the American 

military throughout the world, never 

underestimate the power of forging an 

international coalition, and approaching 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 

from economic, sociopolitical, and cultural 

perspectives as well as martial perspectives. 

The Hypothetical Case of Nuclear 

Detonation 

While we can rely on historical 

consequence management examples, a 

nuclear blast would be an extremely unique 

and challenging situation for America. 

Before we even begin to approach the 

problem, we must determine the most 

probable way in which a nuclear bomb 

could be detonated in the country, and what 

effects it would have. After that, we should 

consider how to go about reconstruction and 

relief efforts to the area. Finally, we should 

decide what the country should do in 

retribution, and how to prevent another 

nuclear strike from ever occurring. 

Nuclear material is very difficult to 

handle. The United States is lucky to be 

surrounded by two oceans. While the 

Atlantic and the Pacific cannot prevent all 

attacks on US soil (Pearl Harbor, 9/11), it 

does a lot to prevent the transport of fissile 

material to America (fusion bombs will be 

ignored, because the technology to create a 

fusion bomb, much less store, transport, and 

detonate one, is seemingly beyond the 

capacity of any non-state actor). In order to 

create a weapon-ready form of uranium, it 

would need to be enriched to a very high 

level, around 80-90%. Nuclear plants can 

use 30% uranium as fuel, and while 

meltdowns are dangerous, the kind of chain 

reaction needed to propagate an explosion is 

impossible at this level. 

Assuming the lack of technical 

expertise and difficulty of transporting the 

weapon vast distances, the size of the 

weapon would be reasonably small. The 

possibility of creating the weapon or stealing 

it on North America is very, very small, for 

despite recent accountability issues on 

nuclear material, there is no reason to 

believe a non-state actor could either build 

an enrichment facility on the continent or 

steal the weapon from our military, who still 

remains professional and vigilant. The group 

would have to have some creativity with 

delivery, whether it be boat, missile, or land 

based, but the easiest way would be to carry 

the bomb into the center of the city. 

Notwithstanding the many problems and 

obstacles a group would face to accomplish 

this, for the sake of argument we will 

assume the group achieved successful 

detonation of a small nuclear weapon in the 

center of a population dense area. 

Because of the nature of this type of 

bomb, many cities in America would 

survive, especially larger cities which would 

be likely targets. Casualties would be in the 

tens of thousands, but the focus would of 

course have to be on the survivors. 

Immediate evacuation would be required. 

Emergency personnel, who would have 

hopefully been trained that most radiation 

(alpha and beta particles) can be stopped 

with relatively small amounts of materials 

(i.e. thick clothing, paper, etc.), would have 

donned appropriate equipment to operate in 

a post-nuclear environment. Hospitals, 

especially ones located in rural areas, would 

need to understand that they will be at 

maximum capacity for extended amounts of 

time. All immediate emergency personnel 
ASJ Fall 2010 

21

would need to have access to nuclear related 

checklists and literature, as inexperience 

would be a handicap. 

After the blast, the bureaucracy 

would need to be sorted out. The state would 

need to be in charge of relief efforts, but 

give local governments‘ sufficient 

discretionary power. Although the state 

where the incident occurred would assume 

responsibility, aid should be aggressively 

sought after. Military resources, especially 

NORTHCOM and US Transportation 

Command would need to provide as many 

resources as possible to the relief effort. 

America benefits from having a 

coordinated system of bureaucracy under the 

Department of Homeland Security and 

FEMA. However, despite having 

coordinated structures, hesitation can remain 

a problem. During Hurricane Katrina, 

FEMA poorly prioritized relief efforts and 

became weighed down in providing them. In 

the aftermath of a nuclear attack, time would 

be one of the biggest factors for a successful 

recovery. 

The United States would greatly 

benefit from technology on nuclear waste 

disposal. The Superfund projects across 

America have been dealing with nuclear 

waste for many decades now, and the 

technology being used in the cleanups there 

could be applied to cleanups from a nuclear 

attack. In addition to the technology already 

developed, America would benefit from 

studies or simulations of Superfund-type 

clean up of nuclear waste in populated areas. 

In addition to DoD being utilized for 

relief efforts, the American military would 

need to prepare for the next and more 

delicate step, which is proper retaliation. As 

we saw in 9/11, non-state actors can trigger 

full scale military action against other 

countries. We should expect nothing less in 

the case of a nuclear attack. Nuclear material 

has specific isotopes and impurities, 

regardless of the technology used for 

enrichment. These chemicals serve as 

fingerprints, and would give us an accurate 

assessment of the source of the material. 

A terrorist group can gain access to 

nuclear material in one of three ways: it can 

be sold to them from another non-state actor, 

perhaps a former state-sponsored scientist or 

a criminal group. The terrorist group can 

also steal the weapon from a state stockpile. 

Finally, a state can provide the group with 

the means to conduct the attack. The most 

likely case is the last one. Accountability on 

nuclear materials is very high, even in postSoviet Russia. For a non-state actor to 

overcome security and the ensuing pursuit, 

and independently draft the scientific 

expertise to transport the weapon across the 

world and properly detonate it is immensely 

improbable. What is more probable is that a 

state who has obtained nuclear weapons and 

is hostile to the US would provide the nonstate actor to serve as a proxy-delivery 

system. 

Of course, a full investigation would 

have to take place as to who has 

responsibility, but the weapon would likely 

be the result of an orchestrated plot 

involving some state leadership, and the 

international community and America would 

predictably demand justice. The correct 

application of that justice would be the issue 

politicians would have to consider. 

Responding with nuclear weapons would be 

foolish, unless another state was so involved 

in the process that war was declared on 

America in the aftermath of the assault. The 

US should foster help from the international 

community to eliminate the group 

responsible and to bring the state leadership 

responsible to an international war crimes 

court. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

22

Bringing a state leader to a war 

crimes court is a very delicate matter, but is 

of supreme importance. If the state has a 

powerful military like China or Russia, the 

United States may have to overwhelm their 

military power in order to get full justice. 

However, it may be much more effective to 

enlist the support of that foreign military. It 

would be best for American and world 

interests to separate the country‘s 

government from its population and 

resources. In the case in which the country 

was a smaller, less developed country, 

enlisting an international coalition like 

NATO and other countries would be the best 

case scenario for ousting a resisting 

government. In any case, taking routes like 

assassination or all out conventional warfare 

would be detrimental, as it avoids proper 

justice and would make the US appear as a 

rogue nation, abusing the support of 

sympathetic countries. 

In the wake of 9/11, the US set out 

for another round of state building after 

decapitating the leadership of both Iraq and 

Afghanistan. The result in Iraq was 

widespread bloodshed which claimed 

thousands of lives, both civilian and 

military. It was an incredibly costly 

endeavor, both in terms of finances and 

lives, which took over 7 years to complete. 

The process of creating a new, stable 

government in Afghanistan, despite the 

benefit of having the contributions of an 

international coalition, will take even longer. 

The US would be wise to leave the state 

intact, but to do only what is necessary to 

bring war criminals to justice, and full 

justice at that. 

Should the state have been so 

involved in the process that the entire 

government would need to be completely 

dismantled, and should the US be in even 

greater danger if the state was not rebuilt 

properly, state-building, though a costly 

investment, would be a worthwhile one. 

So in the event of a nuclear strike, 

the United States would need to consider 

both reconstruction and retaliation. The 

main priority for reconstruction would need 

to be timely deliverance of aid as well as 

minimization of bureaucratic red tape which 

would hamper the process of rebuilding the 

damaged area. Retaliation would need to 

prioritize prevention of another nuclear 

attack as well as delivering war criminals 

responsible for the attack to justice in an 

international venue. 

The world has evolved both 

technologically and socio-politically since 

the first nuclear attacks in 1945. While 

America benefits from an increased ability 

to handle a nuclear attack, new asymmetric 

warfare perhaps makes America more 

vulnerable than ever before. America would 

do well to remain vigilant and prepared for 

such an event. 

Works Cited 

Bagley, Charles V. "Once Derided, Freedom 

Tower Is Now Desired - 

NYTimes.com." The New York Times - 

Breaking News, World News & 

Multimedia. 23 Apr. 2010. Web. 03 

May 2010. 

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/n

yregion/24zero.html?scp=1&sq=1%20

World%20Trade%20Center&st=cse>. 

Becker, S. M. "Meeting the Threat of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Terrorism: toward a 

Broader Conception of Consequence 

Management." Military Medicine

166.12 (2001): 13-16. Web. 2 May 

2010. 

Chen, Shih-Yew. "Optimizing Decisions for 

Long-term Restoration Following a 
ASJ Fall 2010 

23

Radiological Terrorism Incident." 

Homeland Security Affairs 6.1 (2010). 

Web. 2 May 2010. 

<http://www.hsaj.org/?article=6.1.4. 

Harper, Frederick, Stephen Musolino, and 

William Wente. "Realistic Radiological 

Dispersal Device Hazard Boundaries 

and Ramifications for Early 

Consequence Management Decisions." 

Health Physics 93.1 (2007): 1-16. Web. 

2 May 2010. 

<http://journals.lww.com/healthphysics/Abstract/2007/07000/Realistic_

Radiological_Dispersal_Device_Hazard.

1.aspx>. 

Michael, L., and D. Herbeck. ReganBooks. 

2001. Print. 

Pangi, Robyn. "Consequence Management in 

the 1995 Sarin Attacks on the Japanese 

Subway System." Studies in Conflict 

Terrorism 25.6 (2002): 421-48. Web. 2 

May 2010. 

Renshon, Stanley Allen. National Security in the 

Obama Administration: Reassessing the 

Bush Doctrine. Milton Park, Abingdon, 

Oxon: Routledge, 2010. Print. 

Russell, W. J. "Diagnostic and Therapeutic 

Radiation Exposure." Rev. of Thirty 

Years Study of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 

Atomic Bomb Survivors. Journal of 

Radiation Research 16 Sept. 1975: 42-

48. Print. 

Sanger, David E., and William J. Broad. 

"Leaders Gather for Nuclear Talks as 

New Threat Is Seen - NYTimes.com." 

The New York Times - Breaking News, 

World News & Multimedia. 11 Apr. 

2010. Web. 03 May 2010. 

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/w

orld/12nuke.html?scp=1&sq=nuclear%2

0talks&st=cse>. 

Seiple, Chris. "Consequence Management: 

Domestic Response to Weapons of Mass 

Destruction." Parameters (1997): 119-

34. Web. 2 May 2010. <https://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97aut

umn/seiple.htm>. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

24

An Army of Lawrences 

By Cadet 1st Class William C. ―Chip‖ Kirk III 

 Americans have been engaging with 

many different and unique cultures and 

civilizations since before the creation of the 

United States. As the world and its many 

nations have become more interconnected 

and dependent, the need for cultural 

awareness and understanding has become 

increasingly important. The Middle East and 

the greater US Central Command area of 

responsibility have become well known to 

Americans in the past decades with US 

military forces continually being deployed 

to different countries with cultures that most 

Americans only ―understand‖ through 

movies like The Mummy or Aladdin. The 

United States needs to improve its cultural 

understanding of the greater region to 

improve military operations on all levels and 

improve international relations between 

governments and the Arab world‘s people. 

The United States should focus on building 

lasting relationships in the region through 

soft power and protect vital national 

interests through our friends and with soft 

coercive power supported by the credible 

threat of hard power. Better understanding 

the culture and history of the Middle East 

will allow US officials to better understand 

our friends, those that we want to be our 

friends, our competitors, and our enemies. 

Irregular Conflict 

The two major US military 

operations in the US Central Command Area 

of Responsibility are Operations Iraqi 

[Freedom] and Enduring Freedom. US 

forces have begun to withdraw from Iraq, 

but the future of the nation and the 

consequences of US involvement are still 

not fully understood. Afghanistan is now the 

main focus of US military operations with 

President Barak Obama announcing the 

surge of some thirty thousand more troops in 

the coming months and a promise of 

commitment to stability in the region. Both 

campaigns can be predominantly 

categorized as irregular conflicts. These 

conflicts involve a focus on the relevant 

population rather than an enemy force. Both 

operations have seen the success of further 

engagement with the populations as would 

be expected in a counterinsurgency 

campaign. Cultural awareness and US 

mindset were critical to failures and 

successes of engagement with the 

population and their Iraqi/Afghan 

counterparts in both theaters of operations. 

Iraq went from a lightning war of 

success to a war that seemed unrecoverable 

to a situation that has allowed US forces to 

relatively stabilize the country and 

disengage the majority of combat forces. 

The US military and its allies won a great 

conventional victory over Saddam Hussein‘s 

military in a brief six week campaign which 

was characterized with massed firepower 

and lightning drives of heavy armor. 

 However ―by August 2004, more 

than 1,000 U.S. military personnel and more 

than 130 foreign journalists, UN workers, 

and contractors, in addition to hundreds of 

Iraqi civilians and police, had been killed by 

an array of different armed groups.‖1

 US 

war planners and intelligence personnel 

planned for or gave any warning that there 

was a significant chance of an insurgency or 

ethnic disputes/civil war in a post Saddam 

Iraq which was recognized as a priority by 

leadership. ―Had intelligence specialists 

been tasked...their starting point would have 

been to decode the foundations of Iraqi 

identity – its historical and cultural 

narratives...in the fight that followed the 

 

1

Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Andrea J. Drew, 

Insurgents Terrorists and Militias: The Warriors of 

Contemporary Combat, (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2006), 197. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

25

conventional war, history, Arab and tribal 

culture, and Islam mattered a great deal.‖

2

 Even deployments planned for 2007 

prepared for a strategy of isolating US 

forces from the population in a plan known 

as ―transition bridging strategy‖.

3

 The 

strategy called for moving away from 

population centers and into consolidated 

forward operating bases (FOBs).4 The 

problems of US closed mindedness and lack 

of cultural knowledge is visible with the 

story of a US convoy rolling through an 

Iraqi army checkpoint that was trying 

frantically to stop them to warn them of an 

ambush ahead. The US convoy commander 

―leaned out the window and said casually to 

the frantic Iraqi soldier  ̳Hey buddy, we 

don‘t stop for you people‘.‖5

 This strategy 

was changed to a population centric strategy 

as the ―surge‖ began to take shape in 2007. 

David Kilcullen briefed US 

commanders on new operating procedures. 

Five of his most important pieces of advice 

were: ―Secure the people where they sleep, 

never leave home without an Iraqi, Look 

beyond the IED: get the network that placed 

it,  ̳give the people justice and honor...we 

talk about democracy and human rights. 

Iraqis talk about justice and honor‘ and, get 

out and walk – that is  ̳patrol on foot‘.‖6

 The 

most evident of understanding culture in the 

example above is the idea of ―justice and 

honor‖ rather than focusing on American 

centric values of democracy and human 

rights. Another example of understanding 

 

2

 Ibid., 199-200. 

3

 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General 

Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in 

Iraq 2006-2008 (New York: The Penguin Press, 

2009), 338. 

4

 Ibid. 

5

 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: 

Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 136. 

6

 Ricks, 140-41.

culture and knowing the local language can 

have an effect on military operations in Iraq 

can be seen in a soldier‘s description of part 

of a patrol in Iraq. ―...about 40 people in the 

narrow confines of a single-lane street. 

About half were the local children who, 

realizing I spoke a little Arabic, came up and 

asked cheekily if I would buy them a soccer 

ball from the local shop...the shopkeeper 

and I exchanged a few words earlier, and he 

was friendly.‖7

 

One of the major causes for 

improved security in Iraq was the ―Sunni 

Awakening.‖ While US outreach to tribes 

had a role in the rebellion of tribes against 

al-Qaeda forces in Iraq, the critical factor for 

the Sunni tribes turning against al-Qaeda 

was due to al-Qaeda‘s lack of cultural 

awareness and closed mindedness. Kilcullen 

explains that, ―...the sheikhs became angry 

and clashed with the Qa‘ida because they 

were not giving any role to tribal custom, 

and were giving it all to religion...Then 

more and more leaders turned against the 

takfiriin, and now the tribes are fighting al 

Qa‘ida.‖8

 As relative security and stability 

have been able to, at least temporarily, take 

hold in Iraq, US forces have been able to 

withdraw from the cities and countryside. 

The US military force is drawing down to 

50,000 troops by August 2010 from the 

current 115,000 troop level.9

 As troops continue to leave Iraq they 

will continue to increase in Afghanistan. 

Afghanistan has been known as the 

―graveyard of empires‖ or ―the place where 

empires go to die.‖ The United States 

launched its initial strikes into Afghanistan 

 

7

 Kilcullen, 136.

8

 Kilcullen, 160.

9

 Adam Entous, ―Iraq‘s March Vote Won‘t 

Affect Troop Plan, US Says,‖ Reuters, December 9, 

2009, 

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B90FX200

91210 (accessed December 14, 2009). 
ASJ Fall 2010 

26

in late 2001 following the terrorist attacks 

on the United States on September 11, 2001. 

These first strikes were led by US Special 

Forces and government agencies such as the 

Central Intelligence Agency. The war was 

operated similar to a classical 

unconventional warfare campaign with 

small teams of Special Forces supporting 

and advising indigenous afghan forces. The 

initial contact and success with Northern 

Alliance Forces would not have been 

successful if cultural understanding and at 

least some basic language skill was not 

available to the Special Forces ODA teams. 

Due to lack of time to prepare for 

engagement with Afghan forces, many 

teams still experienced problems and 

limitations of translators.10 There is no doubt 

that the once bright success of the initial 

strike into Afghanistan has deteriorated due 

to the change of focus to the Iraq War. 

Insurgent groups and terrorists have been 

able to intimidate or gain the loyalty of 

tribes across Afghanistan as the US mission 

over the past years has been one of strategic 

defense until relative success could be 

reached in Iraq. 

Bonds of War 

Building relationships has been 

equally if not more important in Afghanistan 

than in Iraq in operationalizing 

counterinsurgency operations. Major Jim 

Gant shows the importance of this factor 

when he describes the relationship between 

his ODA team and the tribe/village they 

worked with. He says, ―...the tribe offered 

us outstanding intelligence that allowed us 

to target both insurgents and terrorists in the 

area. Their loyalty was with us. Not Afghan 

 

10 Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The 

Secret History of the Special Forces (New York: 

Public Affairs, 2004), 170-71. 

forces or US forces, but us.‖11 The 

relationships and trust his team built with 

the village over relatively a short period of 

time, would not have been possible without 

a solid foundation in cultural understanding 

and open-mindedness. The tribal leader, 

Malik Noorafzhal, said to Major Gant, ―Jim, 

the last time I saw a person with a face like 

yours (white) the Russians killed 86 men, 

women, and children of my village...They 

never took my village. We are ready to fight 

again if we have to. You have great warriors 

with you. We will fight together.‖

These relationships were built 

initially through cultural understanding and 

were persevered and developed with trust 

and mutual respect. The ODA team‘s 

relationship grew so strong that in one case 

the tribal elders of the village they were 

working with came to their firebase the 

morning after it was attacked simply to 

check up on the team and see if they could 

offer assistance. The future of Afghanistan 

depends on the United States‘ ability to 

work with Afghan tribes and earn mutual 

trust and respect with them. 

Human Dynamics 

Culture is much more important than 

to allow for the implementation of 

counterinsurgency operations in the US 

Central Command AOR. Kilcullen describes 

the ―regional dynamic‖ that conflicts are not 

isolated events, they can spill over into other 

countries and that any US strategy for a 

conflict must take into account the outside 

influences of the region rather than treating 

the conflict as if it ―were an island 

somewhere in the Indian Ocean.‖

12 Conflicts 

must be approached with the understanding 

 

11 Jim Gant, One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy 

for Success in Afghanistan (Los Angeles: Nine 

Sisters Imports, 2009), 15.

12 Kilcullen, 152. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

27

of it being looked at as Kilcullen describes 

as a ―puzzle piece in a complex regional 

system.‖13 A conflict anywhere in the world 

is but a single side act on an extensive stage 

of interrelated events. While culture is 

particularly important to the current 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, culture 

is also incredibly important on the strategic 

level of long term partnerships and 

international relations throughout the US 

Central Command AOR. 

 The Central Command AOR covers 

much more than just Arab cultures, however 

the Middle East which dominates many of 

the countries the US interacts with in 

USCENTCOM are of Arab backgrounds. 

Arabs, first described as Aribi, were early 

settlers and camel herders of the Fertile 

Crescent which was initially composed of 

the Syrian-Mesopotamia and Northern 

Arabia areas.14 The Arab world is now 

considered the region from the West Coast 

of Northern Africa across the Arabian 

Peninsula to the western borders of Iran.15 It 

is extremely important to understand 

cultures that are different from our own 

because it will be the easiest to fail in these 

settings than ones that might be similar. 

Arab culture is different in many ways from 

Western culture. Arab culture is based on 

different values than most would consider 

being core Western values. While there are 

many ways to describe the values of Arab 

culture most can be related to relationships, 

honor, and the importance of Islam. 

In relation to human emotions and 

the importance of the human dimension in 

the Middle East, ―Arabs look at life in a 

 

13 Ibid, 152.

14 Heinz Halm, The Arabs: A Short History, 

trans. Allison Brown and Thomas Lampert 

(Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), 4-5.

15 Margaret K. Nydell, Understanding 

Arabs: A Guide for Modern Times (Boston: 

Intercultural Press, 2006), xxii.

personalized way. They are concerned about 

people and feelings and place emphasis on 

human factors when they make decisions or 

analyze events.‖16 T.E. Lawrence [in 

describing] Arab culture [said that]―in Arab 

culture, people are more important than 

rules.‖17 In the Arab world, relationships and 

interpersonal communication is much more 

important than in the Western world. The 

human dynamic and people interacting 

means everything to Arab culture. Arabs 

believe friends should visit each other at a 

minimum every couple days. For example, 

an Arab called his British friend saying, ―I 

haven‘t seen you anywhere. Where have you 

been for the last three days?‖

18 In fact, the 

word that is often used to translate ―privacy‖

into Arabic is translated to ―loneliness.‖19

Nydell quotes a young Arab American as 

saying, ―In the United States...you can have 

more personal space, I guess it is about the 

best way to put it. You have privacy when 

you want privacy. And in Arab society they 

don‘t really understand the idea that you 

want to be alone. That means that you‘re 

mad, you‘re angry at something, or you‘re 

upset and you should have somebody with 

you.‖20

Relationships are crucial to any 

business in the Middle East with successful 

agreements arising due to good 

relationships, not the opposite with good 

relationships arising from continued 

successful business which might be found in 

Western society.21 ―A meaningful 

relationship in the Peninsula (Saudi 

Arabia/Middle East) takes time to establish. 

 

16 Nydell, 30. 

17 Ibid., 31. 

18 Ibid, 20. 

19 Ibid. 

20 Ibid, 21. 

21 James Peters, The Arab World Handbook: 

Arabian Peninsula & Iraq Edition (London: Stacey 

International, 2005), 20.
ASJ Fall 2010 

28

It may take months or even years.‖22 While 

a good reputation may allow relationships to 

develop faster, an Arab will still want to 

make his own judgments of any individual.23

Arabs work through relationships, not 

institutions. To compare, if a Westerner 

needed to register a vehicle with the 

government, they might ask which office 

they needed to go to in order to give the 

appropriate information to the official 

assigned to that office, an Arab on the other 

hand would ask the question of who they 

know that might know someone at the 

appropriate office.24 Relationships also shed 

light to the loyalty and dedication Arabs 

have to each other and the emotional 

connection they have through their vast 

interconnected friendships. While 

Westerners see more value in having 

objectivity, Arabs see importance in letting 

emotions influence decisions. While using a 

logical thought process may make sense to a 

Westerner, it is not as important to an Arab 

who cares more about emotions and 

subjectivity. While Arabs will look at things 

logically as can be seen with their cultures 

great achievements in algebra and science, 

they also reserve the right to view events 

subjectively to protect their honor or better 

suit their goals. 

Honor is incredibly important in 

Arab culture as well. In Arab culture, ―a 

person‘s dignity, honor, and reputation are 

of paramount importance, and no effort 

should be spared to protect them. Honor (or 

shame) is often viewed as collective, 

pertaining to the entire family or group.‖

25

 

The value of honor extends to a person‘s 

word, loyalty to the family, respect for 

 

22 Ibid., 21.

23 Peters, 21. 

24 Patrick Macdonald, How to be succeed in 

the Gulf: Living & Working in an Arab Culture (New 

York: BookSurge, 2006), 25. 

25 Ibid., 15. 

elders, and caring for people in need. These 

important issues of honor can also be 

described as ―honorable behavior, courtesy, 

and unfailing hospitality.‖

26 Family loyalties 

are stronger than those of friends and 

business.27 The need to maintain honor 

explains other Arab customs that may seem 

strange to Westerners. As family honor is so 

important to protect and women are believed 

to be able to cause more damage to the 

honor of a family, practices were established 

to ―protect‖ women from situations that may 

hurt the family‘s honor.28 Saving face is 

more important than accepting the reality of 

situations. Nydell explains this dynamic by 

describing that there is nothing to be gained 

by explaining the successes of Israel in 

farming or manufacturing compared to their 

Arab counterparts because an Arab would 

insist ―that the situation is not as you 

describe it and bringing up issues such as 

Israeli occupation of Arab lands or the moral 

deterioration of technological societies.‖29

The need for Arabs to take certain actions 

that may not make logical sense to someone 

in the West might be explained by the 

importance of honor and the many 

obligations to maintain it. 

Mindsets and Beliefs 

As identified by Dr. Brent Talbot on 

the first day of MSS 496 (Military Strategies 

of Western and Central Asia) course this 

year, ―you cannot talk about the Middle East 

without talking about Islam.‖30 Halm states 

―Islam is without a doubt a constituting 

element of the Arab world, at least in the 

early Islamic period, when the notions of 

 

26 Peters, 19.

27 Nydell, 71. 

28 Ibid., 43.

29 Ibid., 28.

30 Brent Talbot, ―MSS 496 Class,‖ (lecture, 

USAF Academy, CO, Fall 2009). 
ASJ Fall 2010 

29

Arab and Muslim largely coincided.‖31

Islam finds its beginning with the prophet 

Muhammad in 610 A.D. when he received a 

divine revelation.32 Islam, translated from 

Arabic means ―submission to the will of 

God.‖33 Religion is incredibly important to 

life in the Arab world. Nydell states that, 

―there is no place for an atheist or an 

agnostic...shock and amazement would be 

the reaction of most Arabs, along with the 

loss of respect for you.‖34 The Quran, 

Islam‘s holy book, give precise directions 

for all aspects of daily life. ―Whereas 

Christianity sets out general moral principles 

against which actions may be judged, and 

the law in Christian society may be amended 

as circumstances change, Islam and the 

Shari‘a are indissolubly linked, and any 

prescriptions in them may not be altered.‖35

Islam has five obligatory acts known as the 

Pillars of Islam; Shahaada (The Declaration 

of Faith), Salah (Prayer), Zakat 

(Almsgiving), Sawm (Fasting), and Hajj 

(The Pilgrimage to Makkah). It is important 

to recognize that many of the same lessons 

that can be found in the Old and New 

Testaments of the Bible are also found in the 

Quran.36 Islam is a unifying identity 

throughout the Arab world and across all 

Muslims of the world whether they are from 

the United States or Indonesia. Islam is an 

integral part of everyday life throughout the 

Muslim world and is the basis for many of 

the principle values and culture of the 

Middle East and the countries in the Central 

Command AOR. 

 The US Central Command AOR 

covers the Middle East and South and 

Central Asia. The region of Iran, 

 

31 Heinz Halm, The Arabs: A Short History, 

29.

32 Ibid 30. 

33 Peters, 28. 

34 Nydell, 81. 

35 Peters, 29.

36 Nydell, 87-9.

Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia are 

not Arab regions but some of the same 

traditional mindsets and Islamic beliefs 

apply there as well. US policy in this region 

of the world has been in the words of 

Samuel Huntington, a ―clash of 

civilizations.‖ Condoleezza Rice said in 

Cairo in 2005, ―For 60 years, my country, 

the United States, pursued stability at the 

expense of democracy in the Middle East – 

and we achieved neither. Now we are taking 

a different course. We are supporting the 

democratic aspirations of all people.‖37

While the United States should seek to share 

its great values with the rest of the world, 

the way that those values are shared is 

critical to the success of the goal of 

establishing liberty, democracy, and justice 

around the world. The United States must 

share its values in the Middle East through 

long term soft power engagement so that 

Western ideas and values can integrate with 

current traditions and cultures. An extended 

soft power engagement strategy is the most 

effective and sustainable method to further 

American vital national interests in the 

region. 

Soft Power, Hard Power, and Persistent 

Engagement 

The most important aspect of the 

United States‘ interacting with other nations 

should be diplomacy and persistent 

engagement. Soft power is the ability of a 

nation to attract and co-opt behavior by 

communication and relationships compared 

to hard power being able to threaten or 

induce behavior with threats, intimidation, 

payment, or rewards.38 Dean of the John F. 

 

37 The Economist, ―Waking From its Sleep: 

A Special Report on the Arab World,‖ The 

Economist, 25 July 2009, 5. 

38 Joseph S. Nye, ―Soft Power, Hard Power 

and Leadership,‖ Harvard, October 11, 2006, 

(http://www hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/1
ASJ Fall 2010 

30

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 

University, Joseph Nye Jr. described soft 

power by saying, ―power is the ability to 

influence others to get what you want. And 

you do that three ways. You can do it with 

threats or sticks. You can do it with 

payments or bribes. You can do it with 

attraction or co-option. And it's the third of 

those that's soft power.‖

39 He goes on to 

describe the three ways soft power is 

projected; framing policy (include/seriously 

take into account the interests of others), 

living out and forwarding your ideals as a 

society, and what popular culture presents 

around the world.40

The Middle East and US Central 

Command in general has been categorized in 

American culture as an area of continuous 

strife. The US has been involved with 

conflicts in the Middle East in some way 

since WWII, through the Arab-Israeli wars, 

Desert Storm, Northern Watch, Operation 

Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 

Freedom which were briefly described 

above. While the US has a history of armed 

conflict in US Central Command AOR, it 

should not be the sole focus of US policy in 

the region. The effective use of soft power is 

critical to the success of the United States on 

the world stage and especially in the Middle 

East due to the continuing mission there. 

Relationships and friendship are a serious 

part of Arab culture and the US should 

better apply this to its foreign policy in the 

Middle East to be more effective in 

protecting our vital national interests and 

defense of our nation. Joseph Nye states 

that: 

 

1 06 06 seminar Nye HP SP Leadership.pdf

(accessed December 14, 2009). 

39 Joseph S Nye, interview by Joseph 

Lelyveld, New York, NY, April 12, 2004, transcript, 

Federal News Service, Washington DC, USA, 

http://www.cfr.org/publication/6939/soft power html

(accessed December 14, 2009). 

40 Nye, interview by Joseph Lelyveld. 

Our military wrapped up about a 

quarter of al Qaeda in Pakistan—I 

mean, in Afghanistan. And the only 

way you can wrap up a transnational 

network which has cells in 50 or 60 

countries is by close civilian 

cooperation—intelligence sharing, 

police work across borders, tracing 

financial flows, and so forth. And 

that's the point, that you can't bomb 

Hamburg or Kuala Lumpur or 

Detroit. You've got to have close 

civilian cooperation. And the extent 

to which others cooperate with you 

depends in part on their own selfinterests. But it also depends on how 

attractive you are. I mean, the degree 

of cooperation depends on your soft 

power.41

The United States should not see 

military force as the key instrument of 

national power. While military power is able 

to do things which no other instrument of 

national power can accomplish, it also 

cannot achieve many things that can be done 

by others and in some cases, can have very 

negative effects on the country that is using 

it. Trust and mutual respect is critical to 

creating lasting friendships in the Middle 

East and the United States needs to create 

lasting friendships to better accomplish its 

objectives in the region and around the 

world. The best way for the United States to 

create this trust and respect is to in the 

words of Former President Theodore 

Roosevelt, ―talk softly but carry a big stick.‖ 

Words are hollow if they cannot be 

supported with actionable power; however, 

words are sustainable while continuous use 

of hard power is not. The current US policy 

of attempting to stop the development of 

Iranian nuclear weapons is a great example 

of the concepts presented in this paper. The 

 

41 Ibid.
ASJ Fall 2010 

31

US policy for the Iranian nuclear 

procurement process has been shadowed 

with two camps of thought, one focused on 

soft coercive power and one focused on the 

use of hard military power. While it may be 

argued otherwise, the US does not have a 

―good‖ military option to deal with Iran due 

to it already being engaged in two major 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

international and internal pressures, and the 

significant vulnerability of major support 

and command and control structures of US 

forces in the region. The Iranian nuclear 

issue is much more involved than just Iran 

and the United States. The situation can be 

viewed in many different lenses; Saudi 

Arabia and Iran, Russia, China and the 

United States, Israel and Iran, the United 

States and Iran, Arab aristocrats and Islamic 

fundamentalists, etc. The direct way to deal 

with a challenge is not always the best way 

and is sometimes not even possible. 

Former President George W. Bush, 

when asked about US foreign policy with 

Iran, said, ―We're relying upon others, 

because we've sanctioned ourselves out of 

influence with Iran . . . in other words, we 

don't have much leverage with the Iranians 

right now.‖42 However, the United States 

has been improving coordination of peaceful 

coercive measures against Iran by working 

with the governments of Russia and China 

which have previously made US led 

sanctions ineffective. Defense Secretary 

Gates stated recently that significant 

international sanctions would be used 

against Iran if it continues to maintain or 

expand its current nuclear program. He also 

said that military options remain available 

for the United States. He said that Iran‘s 

 

42 Susan E. Rice, ―We Need a Real Iran 

Policy,‖ Washington Post, December 30, 2004 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A35655-2004Dec29.html (accessed 

December 14, 2009). 

provocations have brought together the 

international community, including Russia 

and China, which are now much more 

willing to confront Iran about its nuclear 

program.43 Similar to every deal brokered 

between nations, the ability for the United 

States to gain more support from Russia and 

China also has a cost and may be used as an 

ongoing restraint in other areas of interest. It 

could be argued that Russia and China 

support Iran in an effort to counteract US 

involvement in the Middle East. The United 

States removing the ground-based missile 

defense sites in Poland was an attempt to 

work with Russia to put more pressure on 

Iran. This demonstrates the difficulties and 

the costs of the need for coordinated 

coercive measures. It also demonstrates the 

ways that many different nations and their 

interests influence an environment. 

What the United States does in one 

area of the world and with different 

countries may be done to have an effect on 

other areas of the world. Other nations may 

participate in activities in one part of the 

world to have an effect against the United 

States in a completely different part of the 

world. Soft coercive measures such as 

economic sanctions are only successful if 

they are coordinated and can be supported 

with hard coercive power but are more 

effective than hard power alone. Effective 

coordination on an international scale can 

only be successful through effective 

diplomacy; but as seen above, this is usually 

extremely difficult with the many competing 

interests of different groups. The ability of 

the United States to have more effective 

means to coerce states depends on its soft 

power, or ―attractiveness‖ as described by 

Joseph Nye. 

 

43 Associated Press, ―Gates Stands Firm on 

US Withdrawal,‖ Associated Press, December 12, 

2009 http://www.azstarnet.com/sn/news/321061.php

(accessed December 14, 2009). 
ASJ Fall 2010 

32

Major Michael Monson makes a case 

for American soft power to help solve the 

Iranian nuclear procurement problem in his 

paper titled ―American Soft Power: An 

Innovative Approach to Neutralizing Iran‘s 

Growing Security Threat.‖ In a country 

comparison of US trade engagement with 

six Middle Eastern countries and their 

populations‘ views of the United States, he 

finds that the more the US is involved with 

nations the more positive [those nations] feel 

toward the US.44 The views of some of the 

officers he worked with are described 

below. 

What do average people in Saudi 

Arabia, Jordan and Bahrain think 

about America? According to the 

Middle Eastern coalition of 

international military officers 

attending the Air Force‘s Air 

Command and Staff College at 

Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, 

their preconceived notions of the 

U.S. and Americans, as expected, 

were not very favorable. However, 

after living in Montgomery, 

Alabama and working with 

Americans nearly every day for eight 

months, they generally agreed that 

they have enjoyed their time in the 

U.S. and now have a much higher 

opinion of America. During a 

question and answer session with 

these mid-level officers, they said 

they have made many friends in the 

U.S., traveled all across the country, 

and even enjoyed the fine southern 

culture that Montgomery offers45

 

44 Michael G. Monson, American Soft 

Power: An Innovative Approach to Neutralizing 

Iran’s Growing Security Threat (Maxwell Air Force 

Base: Air Command and Staff College, 2005) 15. 

45 Ibid, 14. 

Conclusion 

People around the world admire and 

respect American values and the United 

States. The failure of the US to fight the 

information war in the War on Terrorism is 

often discussed. Evidence of the US not 

effectively combating terror organizations 

on this front is evident with Capt David 

Blair‘s claim that ―al-Qaeda‘s brand 

recognition rivals that of Coca-Cola.‖46 The 

broad spectrum of information operations 

will not be effective if it is considered a 

specific military operation or something that 

has central control and coordination. 

Information warfare is warfare of the masses 

and is won by sheer mass of people and 

dissemination sources, whether direct or 

indirect. It cannot be as effective, if effective 

at all, if it is controlled or restrained to a 

narrow element of engagement. Soft power 

is information operations and both are how 

to better secure US interests in the Middle 

East and around the world. 

 While broad strategic level US 

engagement in USCENTCOM involves a 

cultured immersion into the Middle East, 

cultural awareness is incredibly important 

for the US military and policy makers so 

that direct engagement can be more 

effective. As can be seen earlier in Major 

Monson‘s quote, direct interaction between 

the US military and foreign militaries 

improves the feelings about the United 

States and its interests. This is equally 

important to State Department officials and 

other civilian officials which will be 

responsible for engagement with foreign 

governments. Direct soft power engagement 

 

46 David Blair, ―Asking the Right 

Questions,‖ Air & Space Power Journal XXII, no. 4 

(Winter 2008): 

http://www.airpower.au.af mil/airchronicles/apj/apj0

8/win08/blair html (accessed December 14, 2009). 
ASJ Fall 2010 

33

involves increasing US military exchanges 

and training exercises with countries in the 

Middle East. 

Direct soft power engagement 

requires immersion into the Arab cultural 

experience which is built upon partnerships 

and friendships with countries and their 

leadership in the region. Increasing relations 

between US personnel, both military and 

civilian, and other nations also helps both 

sides understand how each other operates 

and helps the coordination and fluidity of 

operations in the future. Relationships built 

now will also increase the effectiveness of 

peaceful coercive power in the future. 

The more the US is able to 

accomplish with soft power the more 

sustainable its operations will become. This 

approach will also increase the flexibility 

and effectiveness of its hard power. US 

military power will not become 

continuously engaged in an unending 

counterinsurgency campaign around the 

world, but will be able to provide a capable 

coercive element to support US diplomacy 

and act as a quick reaction force to support 

friends around the world. 

 The future of US foreign policy and 

its effectiveness to achieve vital national 

interests far into the future depends on soft 

power. While soft power is in part a very 

broad-based interaction between cultures in 

the world, the US military and government 

have an important role in direct soft power 

engagement. Direct soft power engagement 

relies upon individuals who have cultural 

awareness and are open minded. US policy 

needs to take into account the culture and 

history of regions to better achieve its goals. 

Long-term soft power engagement is 

the only sustainable and effective way to 

secure the stability and leadership of the 

United States in the future. The United 

States must shape its foreign policy to 

working with and through the nations of the 

world, not against them. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

34

Terrorism and Technology 

by Cadet First Class Andrew Smith and Cadet First 

Class Aaron Widener

 Terrorism is one of the greatest 

threats to the national security of the United 

States. This problem exists not only for the 

US, but also for the entire world. Terror 

networks continue to evolve with dramatic 

rapidity, and persuasive ideologies make 

fighting those who use terrorism 

increasingly more difficult. Until the US 

was attacked on September 11th, terrorism 

was something that happened to other 

countries for other reasons, and was not 

considered a part of US National Security 

Strategy. With this attack, al Qaeda and 

other religious fundamentalists were 

catapulted into the spotlight and focused US 

attention on the problem. 

Preventing terrorist attacks is one of 

America‘s main goals, but this is only the 

surface of a more complex problem of 

preventing people from becoming terrorists 

and sharing plans of destruction. Also, 

members must constantly be converted, 

trained, and groomed for their missions. By 

researching terror networks and various 

other centralized organizations, including 

their use of modern internet and 

technological capabilities, it is possible to 

learn how they can be fought. The analysis 

of changing informational systems like the 

internet as well as different types of 

organizations will provide ways in which 

various decentralized groups have been 

combated in the past. With this information 

in mind, a methodology specific to the Air 

Force and the Department of Defense will 

be developed. 

The Internet 

The Madrid bombings are one 

example of an increase of homegrown 

terrorism, or those who grow up in 

westernized society but later radicalize. The 

comparison can be shown as the difference 

between terrorist attacks that were 

perpetrated prior to 2004 and those 

occurring after. Previous attacks were 

prepared and then executed using face to 

face meetings at ethnic restaurants or barber 

shops near radical Islamist mosques. After 

2004, attacks were inspired and planned 

using media on the internet such as the 

Global Islamic Media. Approximately 90% 

of people in Europe have internet access and 

as police have begun to monitor radical 

meeting places, computer-mediated 

communications allows more people to be 

involved with less direct threat to their 

person (Sageman 2008). 

 The internet is basically constructed 

of two major systems. The first is the 

Worldwide Web. This part contains 

websites that correspond to the non-digital 

world, such as books, newspaper, radio, and 

television. These are passive means of 

information transference where people 

merely absorb information about various 

topics. These can be articles which describe 

operational knowledge or may exhibit 

passive opinions on tenants of Salafism. 

People have learned how to build bombs and 

improvised explosive devices from websites. 

Trained bombers still are able to produce 

better and more reliable bombs but this 

requires training camps, travel, and a greater 

possibility of being compromised in the 

process. Sageman states however, that this 

is not the ―engine of radicalization.‖ 

Websites are merely useful for reinforcing 

already made-up minds and are the lesser of 

the two types of media on the internet 

(Sageman 2008). 

The more important system is the 

vast active communication that can take 

place between people via e-mail, listservs, 
ASJ Fall 2010 

35

forums, or chat rooms. This type of 

communication is comparable to the 

classical systems of letters, telegrams, and 

telephone. These types of communication 

mold human relationships and are more 

impactful on lives than the type of passive 

media previously mentioned. One of the 

interesting aspects of these forums is the 

way in which people interact due to the 

apparent anonymity that exists as merely a 

screen name online. People are more likely 

to self-disclose which makes them feel more 

intimate and feel like they know they core of 

the other person. This revolutionary change 

in communication is helping to shape the 

21st century and will shape the future of 

fundamentalist Islam and terrorist 

interactions. People‘s views can thus be 

changed and often times substantiated by 

this intensely biased and radical talk exuded 

from people online in chat rooms and 

forums (Sageman 2008). 

The difficulty in fighting terrorism 

becomes more pronounced, as analysis of 

websites and static material is relatively easy 

compared to the ever shifting, changing, and 

undulating mentality of those in chat rooms 

and on forums. The internet remains 

extremely fluid and if sites are blocked or 

highlighted by a government agency, then 

people will move to a new site, change their 

names, and begin a new identity. This is 

what makes terrorism in the 21st century so 

difficult to combat and predict. In addition, 

if a US agency attempts to use psychological 

operations to dispute mindsets, people will 

just discount it and move to another website 

or forum where people conform to their 

views. The US is facing a difficult 

challenge and that perhaps the best way to 

combat these issues is to increase the ability 

to wage cyber warfare (Sageman 2008). 

Homegrown Terrorism and Its Increased 

Decentralization 

The immediate mobilization of the 

US to invade Afghanistan and to disrupt the 

established Taliban government seemed to 

surprise the Central al Qaeda leadership. 

The central training camps in Afghanistan 

were effectively neutralized, and although a 

few members of the elite al Qaeda 

community do continue to survive, they are 

effectively cut off from command and 

control of the rest of their units. A few of 

the changes include the ―training camps,‖

moving into Waziristan which is in the 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas in 

Pakistan. Although the camps in most cases 

are smaller and consist of fewer students, the 

fact that they exist and are receiving recruits 

is the troubling part of the problem. In 

addition, evidence indicates that camps are 

receiving recruits from outside regions. 

These new recruits come from the west or 

other foreign nations, travel to the region for 

a training program which lasts about four 

weeks, and then return to their home areas. 

This is the puzzling scenario because despite 

the disruption of Central al Qaeda, people 

are still willing to come, learn, and return to 

their respective regions without any 

direction from above (Sageman 2008). 

 

It is highly unlikely that al Qaeda 

Central has any ability to communicate with 

these individual cells of terrorists or 

contribute monetary support or advice. 

Groups such as the Madrid bombers merely 

use the al Qaeda name and attempt to carry 

out the perceived goals of the Ummah or 

Islamic community in whatever way they 

see fit. This individualization has created 

problems within the existing terrorist sects, 

and often shows the disconnect between 

members and leadership. For instance in 

Algiers the terrorist bombings that are often 
ASJ Fall 2010 

36

against a civilian population are creating 

debate among the Algerian Terrorists. The 

debate may result in another split as the 

techniques of achieving goals and ends are 

questioned and challenged (Sageman 2008). 

 Sageman states that although at one 

point al Qaeda central seemed to be able to 

mobilize inside of Pakistan and muster some 

attacks against high political leaders, this 

capability has decreased. In addition, lack 

of discipline in the ranks causes foolish 

bombings and attacks against highly valued 

areas of Pakistan which causes these regions 

to turn against the cause. This reinforces the 

idea that central al Qaeda is not in control 

and is actually only observing actions that 

various groups of followers decide to do. 

Although this trend is still present in 

Pakistan, the ousted Taliban government has 

begun to use terminology and training 

camps in a similar manner to al Qaeda 

(Sageman 2008). 

 Some of the most stirring and 

troubling evidence comes from the new 

wave of terrorists entering the world scene. 

These ―homegrown terrorists‖ exist in their 

respective societies and become intrigued 

and intertwined with al Qaeda despite the 

fact that they never have direct contact with, 

or funding from, the central leadership. It is 

argued that the method of radicalization 

does not vary that much over time, but only 

the fact that these new groups do not have to 

communicate with a central agency in order 

to carry out missions is different. It is 

important to realize that the radicalization 

occurs due to events within the host nation, 

or the place where these people live, and is 

not the response to events elsewhere in the 

world. Sometimes these people have 

traveled from their homes to Afghanistan or 

Pakistan for training or to participate in 

fighting, but they were radical before they 

got there, not afterwards. This shows the 

prevalence of homegrown terrorists and how 

they exist without any contact with a central 

set of leadership (Sageman 2008). 

A Framework for an Integrated 

Approach to Terrorism 

 It is clear to see that terrorism is 

something that will not go away in the near 

future. Currently the US is doing a good job 

of improving relations on a personal level, 

educating children and soldiers, as well as 

adjusting mindsets in dealing with the 

Middle East. One issue yet to be addressed 

is how to combat the spread of terrorist 

ideals over the internet, or the increase in the 

―homegrown‖ terrorism that may come to 

dominate the rest of the 21st century. From 

all of these sources the importance of an 

integrated approach can be seen. The 

following list of five ideas provides a strong 

framework for achieving this: Take the 

glory out of terrorism, diminish the sense of 

moral outrage, counter the enemy‘s appeal, 

eliminate discrimination against Muslims, 

and fund scientific research on terrorism 

(Sageman 2008). These ideas are mainly to 

be applied in a broad sense to change 

ideologies rather than ways to find and 

remove terrorists which already exist. 

 Terrorists achieve glory by being in 

the top ten wanted by America and by the 

size of the price on their head or information 

leading to their capture. This gives young 

terrorists the impression that they are 

selfless heroes for those who are too weak or 

unable to fight. Military action in many 

ways gives young Muslims an idea to strive 

towards; the modern Robin Hood or other 

hero is fighting the outside more powerful 

aggressors. The best way to take the glory 

out of terrorism is to treat them as common 

criminals. Arrested terrorists will not be 

cheered as they are taken into prison in 

handcuffs, and the terrorist will fade into 
ASJ Fall 2010 

37

oblivion and no longer inspire young 

Muslims to fight (Sageman 2008). 

 

 Diminishing moral outrage and 

countering appeal are linked together and 

thus must be solved together. The invasion 

of Iraq galvanized the al Qaeda movement 

and allowed its members to make claims 

against the ―imperialist Americans‖ who 

were ―taking over Islamic countries‖. 

People understand that criminals must be 

brought to justice, and terrorists are 

criminals. The counter is that when 

Muslims are singled out as the perpetrators, 

or at least when it appears this way, they 

become angry. Our courses of action need 

to be focused specifically on the criminals. 

The appeal of terrorism arises from two 

major causes. One is that people admire the 

sacrifice Osama bin Laden has made in his 

fight for Islam. They may not agree with his 

policy or tactics, but strength in belief is 

something to be admired. The Islamic 

people need to see other Muslims‘ 

achievements and adopt other role models. 

Most Imams preach peace and anti-violence 

but this rarely makes the news, and those 

upstanding members of society are not 

represented. If an Imam preaches violence, 

he is immediately propelled into the 

spotlight by the media. This makes it 

difficult for many Muslims to know the truth 

as well as to find role models outside of 

famous terrorists. The US needs to do a 

better job of showing the positive role 

models and encourage those who speak 

peace to be seen and heard (Sageman 2008). 

 The final two changes that need to 

occur are within US borders. First, 

increased funding for research on terrorism 

will help provide a clearer picture of the 

field. Questions such as who are terrorists, 

how do they become terrorists, and what are 

their demographics are questions that have 

not been adequately answered. If the US is 

to win the hearts and minds, it must first 

know whose hearts and minds must be won 

as well as what methods may work. Part of 

the completed research has shown that 

discrimination needs to be decreased to 

defeat terrorism. Muslims in Western 

nations are discriminated against, become 

marginalized, and then look for a place to fit 

in. These places are often Mosques or chat 

rooms where angry young people can vent 

about the travesties against them. Most do 

not make the jump to full-fledged terrorist, 

but the few that complete the process are the 

ones that carry out acts. The integration of 

Muslim immigrants into society is another 

way to prevent terrorism, and this is done by 

stopping discrimination and promoting 

understanding (Sageman 2008). It is next 

important to understand how these 

organizations operate on the larger scale, 

which is greater than a single individual. 

Decentralized Organizations 

 Decentralized organizations are an 

interesting and highly impactful force in the 

21st century. What is a decentralized 

organization and how are they so impactful? 

By first being able to recognize a 

decentralized organization, it is possible to 

identify some that exist for comparison with 

al Qaeda. Brafman and Beckstrom provide 

two instructive examples in their book The 

Starfish and the Spider: The Animal 

Liberation Front (ALF), and the evolution of 

peer-to-peer file sharing (P2P) (Brafman and 

Beckstrom 2006). A ―spider‖ organization 

is a corporation or a group that is not 

decentralized. It has a brain or command 

structure. On the other hand, a ―starfish‖ is 

completely decentralized with no executive 

authority and distributed systems. A list of 

ten criteria can be used to identify the level 

to which an organization is decentralized: 

someone is in charge, there is a 

headquarters, removing leadership kills it, 
ASJ Fall 2010 

38

division of roles exists, destruction of a 

single unit harms the whole, knowledge and 

power are concentrated, there is rigidity, 

units are funded by the organization, there is 

a specific number of participants, and 

groups communicate through intermediaries. 

 Each of these categories is relatively 

self explanatory; however a comparison to 

the P2P networks of the internet is helpful. 

The difference between a corporation and a 

P2P network is first of all apparent in the 

fact that a CEO is in charge of a corporation 

directing efforts and setting the vision. The 

P2P network on the other hand lacks a 

structure or even someone who organizes 

the distribution of information. There is no 

physical headquarters to house employees 

and servers like a corporation has, but only a 

distribution of people that can communicate 

with one another. By removing a 

company‘s headquarters or CEO the 

organization will die. A P2P network does 

not require a physical location or leader, 

rather any number of individuals or places 

can influence its actions over time (Brafman 

and Beckstrom 2006). 

 A corporation has a clear division of 

roles, sales department, advertising, human 

resources, etc. In comparison, in a P2P 

network any individual can do any number 

of jobs. Uploading new songs, changing 

software, or creating a new interface are all 

up to individual people with no specific 

defined role. Due to this fact, if a marketing 

department is removed from a corporation, 

the corporation will fail. A P2P network has 

no divisions and even if you remove 95% of 

its users, the network will still survive and 

flourish. This is additionally linked to the 

concentration of power and knowledge. A 

corporation concentrates information and 

power in certain people and departments 

while the P2P network leaves power and 

information in the hands of a group of 

individuals connected via a network 

(Brafman and Beckstrom 2006). 

 A flexible organization is more 

likely to be decentralized, while a rigid 

organization will likely be centralized. In 

addition, it may be difficult to ascertain the 

number of participants or employees in a 

starfish system, while a corporation has a 

specific payroll and list of employees. A 

decentralized organization also relies on 

individuals to provide funding for use in 

implementing plans while a corporation 

provides a specific budget and expects a 

tangible result from the funding. Finally, a 

decentralized organization can share 

information across all members while a 

corporation funnels information up a chain 

of command and back down through 

members. All of these factors contribute to 

the starfish or spider like characteristics of 

an organization (Brafman and Beckstrom 

2006). 

Terrorist Organizations versus DoD 

 If we look at a comparison between 

the Department of Defense and the 

organization of al Qaeda or the Taliban, it is 

possible to categorize them using these 

criteria. The following diagram is an 

analysis of what each organization possesses 

and how centralized it is. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

39

Terrorist Organizations

There's someone 

in charge X

There's no one in 

charge

There are 

headquarters X

There are no 

headquarters

If you remove its 

head, it dies X

If you remove its 

head, it survives

There's a clear 

division of roles

X

There's an 

amorphous 

division of roles

Harmed if a single 

unit is destroyed

X

Unharmed if a 

single unit is 

destroyed

Concentrated 

knowledge and 

power

X

Distributed 

knowledge and 

power

Organization is 

rigid X

Organization is 

flexible

Units are funded 

by the 

organization

X Units are selffunding

You can count the 

participants

X You cannot count 

the participants

Groups 

communicate 

through 

intermediaries

X

Groups 

communicate 

directly

According to these criteria, terrorist 

organizations seem to be highly 

decentralized with all ten of the categories 

falling on the starfish side. This validates 

the idea that these organizations are hard to 

track, and extremely versatile at what they 

do. The amount of upper leadership can be 

debated as well as the actual number of 

members that may exist within the 

organization. However, this interpretation 

makes sense and shows the amount of 

decentralization. 

Department of Defense

There's someone 

in charge X

There's no one in 

charge

There are 

headquarters X

There are no 

headquarters

If you remove its 

head, it dies X

If you remove its 

head, it survives

There's a clear 

division of roles

X

There's an 

amorphous 

division of roles

Harmed if a single 

unit is destroyed

X

Unharmed if a 

single unit is 

destroyed

Concentrated 

knowledge and 

power

X

Distributed 

knowledge and 

power

Organization is 

rigid X

Organization is 

flexible

Units are funded 

by the 

organization

X Units are selffunding

You can count the 

participants

X You cannot count 

the participants

Groups 

communicate 

through 

intermediaries

X

Groups 

communicate 

directly

The Department of Defense appears 

to be in exactly the opposite category as 

various terrorist organizations. Again it is 

incredibly difficult to say one way or the 

other if individual units if removed will 

cause absolute collapse. Furthermore, the 

capabilities of each service as well as 

service members are definitely distributed. 

However, this diagram still illustrates the 

difference between the two organizations 

which will be engaged in hostilities. 

Combating Decentralized Organizations 

 How does one combat a 

decentralized organization? When attacked, 

a decentralized organization tends to 

become even more open and decentralized. 

This can be observed from the fact that 

although al Qaeda leadership no longer 

gives orders, attacks continue to happen and 

plans continue to be made. This means that 
ASJ Fall 2010 

40

although direct attack may appear to be a 

good idea, three other strategies present 

themselves as being more useful: changing 

ideology of terrorist organizations, 

centralize the terrorist organization, or 

decentralize your organization (Brafman and 

Beckstrom 2006). 

 Changing ideology can be achieved 

through methods previously mentioned. By 

providing integration opportunities in the 

places where these people live as well as 

encouraging involvement in communities 

around the world, extreme ideologies die 

(Brafman and Beckstrom 2006). Relief 

operations in third world countries change 

individuals‘ perspectives about the US and 

what it stands for. In the same way that a 

decentralized organization is difficult to 

control and influence when spreading 

negative ideals, it is equally rapid in 

transferring the spread of positive ideas. 

Helping people help themselves not only 

gives them a purpose, but also allows for 

them to spend time working for a cause that 

is specific and relevant to their community 

rather than some far off war for Islam. 

 The second option is to centralize the 

enemy. In an example regarding the fight 

against the Apache in the late 19th century, 

the roving bands of Native Americans were 

able to cause increasing amounts of damage 

due to their migrant lifestyle and ability to 

act independently. These types of actions by 

the Apaches were considered normal all the 

way from the early 1600‘s when Spanish 

explorers found the area until around 1914. 

The way the Apaches were eventually 

defeated and removed from causing 

mayhem included a very simple solution. 

The US gave them cows and other grazing 

animals. It was now impossible to remain 

vagrants moving from place to place if they 

wished to maintain their material property. 

Due to the increased value of material 

goods, the tribes no longer moved and 

changed, thus they were able to be 

controlled (Brafman and Beckstrom 2006). 

This is an example of how changing the 

environment and changing the values of a 

people centralized them and created an 

opportunity for another centralized 

organization, the US Army, to defeat them. 

 The last option is to decentralize 

your organization as well. This is incredibly 

difficult for the US military to do; however, 

it seems with increasing technological 

capabilities this is an ever increasing 

possibility. The use of technology to align 

hundreds of people on the battlefield also 

allows individuals to have the information of 

a large group and act based on their piece of 

the puzzle in the context of the whole 

picture (Brafman and Beckstrom 2006). As 

smaller and better informed units deploy to 

Afghanistan and Iraq, individuals are able to 

function more as part of a starfish that is 

supplied via interaction with a spider. The 

blending of these two types of systems is 

very beneficial and one of the best ways that 

an effective stand can be made against the 

decentralized organization of al Qaeda. 

 These methods address more 

mentalities than it does of actual combat 

against people who are already terrorists. 

How can people who will commit violent 

acts in the future be identified and stopped? 

Levitt and Dubner‘s book, 

SuperFreakonomics, provides some ideas, 

mostly based on the concept of the 

decentralized system, and banks. A 

computer program was created to monitor 

for fraud and abuse of funds as massive 

amounts of money changed hands around 

the world. Money transfers and information 

about bank user demographics seems to be 

unrelated until it is acquired on a massive 

scale. This amount of financial information 

contained various facts about the 7/7 
ASJ Fall 2010 

41

London Train bombings, and caused 

researchers to ponder the implication of 

analyzing the financial information of the 

terrorists in order to find identifying factors 

(Levitt and Dubner 2009). 

 A correlation was found between a 

variety of factors and people who may be 

involved in radical Islamic circles. A few of 

these factors include the time of cash 

withdrawals from automatic teller machines, 

the locations where initial deposits came 

from, the lack of financial activity that 

matched the use of a normal daily life, and 

also whether the person had life insurance. 

Suicide bombers in most cases do not buy 

life insurance because if a person commits 

suicide, the life insurance company does not 

pay out. It is only rational, then, that a 

potential terrorist would not waste his 

money. These factors, in addition to a few 

others that were classified, helped to narrow 

the number of people in Britain who may be 

involved with terrorist organizations to an 

incredibly small number. From this number 

further evidence was gained and arrests were 

made (Levitt and Dubner 2009). It seems 

that the necessity of integrating technology 

of a variety of systems will help find people 

who do not conform to the norm and thus be 

potential terrorists or criminals. The 

integration of systems, or decentralization of 

various divisions and banks, allowed for 

these people to be identified and it is 

something that should be continued in the 

future. It is an example of a hybrid 

organization, going in some ways from 

centralized to decentralized, that is then able 

to effectively combat a completely 

decentralized organization. 

The Role of Technology 

The influence of technology on the 

fight against terrorism is clearly apparent. 

The internet has changed the way people 

communicate and plan, and this holds true 

for terrorists. The critical change that needs 

to occur is that of understanding. 

Relationships will be the foundation for 

future interactions in both the US and 

overseas, and people will make the 

difference. 

 

 But what specific strategies can the 

people of the United States, particularly the 

fighting forces of both the Air Force and the 

Department of Defense as a whole, use to 

combat that breed of insurgency known as 

homegrown terrorism? The apparent 

obstacles seem insurmountable; the size and 

scope of the Internet being amongst the 

greatest. 

 The Internet began to take form in 

1962, with a doctoral thesis that spelled out 

the type of data management that would 

later take on the name "packet switching" 

(National Academy of Engineering). The 

United States Department of Defense had an 

involvement in the Internet from this very 

early stage, with the Defense Advanced 

Research Project Agency (DARPA) 

expressing interest in a "galactic" network of 

computers in that same year (NAE). With 

the birth of ARPANet following these 

events, the Internet took on a definition that 

began to mirror the modern system of 

interconnected nodes that allow for rapid 

data transfer. 

 Today, the Internet has grown to a 

colossal size. While the size of the World 

Wide Web is difficult to measure exactly, 

the CEO of the largest Internet indexing 

corporation in the world, Google, has 

estimated that the Internet is comprised of 

roughly 5 million terabytes of data 

(McGuigan). Of this data, Google has 

indexed only about 200 terabytes, or .004 

percent (McGuigan). 

 
ASJ Fall 2010 

42

 Of greater importance with regards to 

the DOD's efforts to catch homegrown 

terrorists is the size of the Internet in terms 

of its user base. In 2008, there were over 1 

billion distinct Internet users, and 500 

million of them constitute "permanent 

residents" in the cyber realm, which means 

they use its resources at least once a week 

(McGuigan). Using this last element of 

measurement, it is possible to create a better 

picture of the exact problem that the DOD 

faces: finding a single person on the Internet 

is tantamount to tracking an anonymous, 

highly mobile criminal in a nation almost 

double the size of the United States (U.S. 

Census Bureau). Furthermore, the lack of 

physical traces within the virtual Internet 

world exacerbates this problem far beyond 

even that analogy. The elusive nature of the 

homegrown terrorist finds an incredible safe 

haven in the surrealistic mazes of clients and 

hosts that comprise today's Internet. 

 This fact does not serve to claim that 

the DOD and the Air Force are without hope 

in the effort to stop homegrown terrorists - it 

simply means that the first step is to level 

the playing field. Already in this article, the 

ideas of forcing enemy centralization and 

creating self-decentralization have 

showcased their prominence in the strategic 

realm. In order to both validate their 

respective values and provide plausible 

tactical applications that fulfill the strategic 

goal of each, it is necessary to examine these 

two approaches in further detail. 

Leveling the Playing Field 

 The goal of centralizing the enemy is, 

most specifically, to fashion from the 

starfish a more destructible spider. That is, if 

the DOD possesses the capability to fight a 

centralized enemy, it may be more effective 

to create change in a decentralized force 

rather than in its own organization. In the 

open fields of battle, this involves the use of 

diversions and attractive traps or ambushes - 

elements that gather the enemy for quick 

destruction. But what does this approach 

look like on the Internet? 

 One form of virtual centralization is 

very similar to the physical manifestation of 

such a task and involves creating facades 

that quite literally attract potential terrorists 

to the visitation of a particular Internet site. 

In Montana, a woman named Shannen 

Rossmiller has taken to posting videos of the 

beheadings of Westerners in order to draw 

potential terrorists into the limelight (Harden 

1). Her emails and forum postings create a 

simple rouse that attracts those who may be 

on the path to acts of terror. While her 

approach might not fool the most hardened 

radicals, it is likely to highlight the exact 

homegrown terrorists that create such a 

problem in today's world. The following 

article excerpt explains how her efforts have 

already had success. 

Posing as an al-Qaeda operative, 

she has helped federal agents set up 

stings that have netted two 

Americans -- a Washington state 

National Guardsman convicted in 

2004 of attempted espionage, and a 

Pennsylvania man who prosecutors 

say sought to blow up oil 

installations in the United States. 

Rossmiller was a key prosecution 

witness against the Guardsman, 

who is serving a life sentence, and 

said she has been told she will be 

called as a witness in the 

Pennsylvania case (Harden 1). 

 Another way of centralizing the enemy 

is to take advantage of natural hotspots or 

gathering areas that do not necessarily 

broadcast any tendency toward terrorist 

activity or thought. Certainly, online forums 

and chat pages that contain threads 

concerning terror-related topics or hate 
ASJ Fall 2010 

43

speech are obvious virtual locales for 

terrorism to take root. However, the 

seemingly more innocuous world of 

Massively-Multiplayer Online Role-Playing 

Games (MMORPGs) can also foster 

collective terrorist thought more in-line with 

the nature of homegrown terrorism. Two 

popular MMORPGs, World of Warcraft and 

Second Life, allow a user to assume the role 

of a virtual avatar and act out scenarios in a 

virtual world. Between these two particular 

games, Second Life is most unique in its 

realism, offering an online world that 

mirrors the real world 

(www.secondlife.com). The online world 

has over 19 million users 

(www.secondlife.com). A recent Gallup poll 

found that, amongst the Muslim population 

of the world, only seven percent amount to 

radical Muslims; this is approximately 1.52 

percent of the earth's entire population 

(Washington AFP). While there is still little 

demographic data within the world of 

Second Life, if even half of this percentage 

was reflected within the virtual world, that 

would amount to about 600,000 online 

radicals. This assumption may seem overly 

paranoid, but the following excerpt from an 

article on IslamOnline.net gives it some 

credence: 

On May 22, 2007, there was an 

attack on the Australian 

Broadcasting Corporation's (ABC) 

offices inside SL [Second Life]. It 

was the first virtual terrorism attack 

in-world. A group of people 

dropped a virtual nuclear bomb on 

ABC's island (virtual place inside 

SL), leveling it all except for a 

single communication tower. A 

group calling themselves the 

Second Life Liberation Army 

claimed responsibility for the 

attack. Until recently, those people 

were only regarded as "geeky 

teenagers" with too much time on 

their hands. 

But a report on the Sunday Times 

published on August 5, 2007, said 

that some experts blame this attack 

on real-life Islamist radicals. Now, 

all of a sudden, the attack that took 

place months ago has become 

important again. 

Terrorism experts are worried that 

"radical figures" may be pursuing 

terrorism training within the 

confines of SL. Experts expect that 

after the dismantling of training 

camps in Afghanistan, terrorists 

have gone online to train in virtual 

worlds. Some experts even think 

that the attack on ABC was a 

training or simulation for something 

the terrorists are preparing in real 

life (Yahia). 

 This particular article frames the idea 

as a bit of an overzealous conjecture, but the 

type of homegrown terrorism that the United 

States seeks to combat could find some ties 

to such a scenario. That is, much like forums 

and blogs that allow for anonymous hate 

speech and even treacherous anti-Western 

plotting, online video games could provide a 

relatively safe haven for those individuals 

who would like to express anti-Western 

ideals consequence-free (or, at the least, 

exercise an open curiosity related to terrorist 

activities). Therefore, it is worth the 

consideration to investigate the user base of 

these virtual worlds and their potential 

nature as breeding grounds of homegrown 

terrorism. 

Potential Air Force Contributions 

 Such investigation and, in the case of 

the previous example of subversive rouse, 

requires a group of dedicated individuals 

within the existing government defense 

infrastructure that could act as online 

deceivers to create centralization or as 

patrollers in naturally centralized virtual 

regions. The US Air Force has the long-
ASJ Fall 2010 

44

standing reputation of being the most 

technologically advanced branch of the 

national military force, and they may 

already have just such an infrastructure. 

Air Force "Cyber Command," or the 

24th Air Force, became fully active on 26 

January 2010, with the explicit mission of 

the defense and operation of the Air Force's 

network infrastructure (Cheek). The exact 

details of this mission are, for good reason, a 

bit veiled, but the potential for a cyber task 

force that fits the mold for the 

aforementioned tasks is clearly present in 

this new MAJCOM. A full force of "cyber 

warriors," capable of acting in the virtual 

world as forward-deployed troops do in the 

hills of Afghanistan, could seek out 

terrorists where they gather, or lure them out 

of their hiding spots. The immediate 

differences involve only the non-lethality of 

online actions against terrorism and the 

virtual goal of capture rather than 

instantaneous eradication. With these 

differences in mind, the Air Force could 

employ its own forces to do what Shannon 

Rossmiller is already doing, and, 

furthermore, search virtual, naturallyoccurring "hotspots" for would-be 

homegrown terrorists. 

Yet these are not the only two ways 

that the DOD, or the Air Force in particular, 

might centralize enemies of the state. So far, 

the proposed methods for such a task 

involve an almost literal gathering of antiWestern radicals. However, there is also the 

possibility of merely diminishing apparent 

separation through the creation of links or 

"backdoors" amongst suspect parties. In the 

real world, this pseudo-centralization takes 

the form of examining two parties who, 

perhaps, subscribe to the same newspaper or 

video delivery service, and then using that 

common ground to create an artificial tie 

between the two when no manifest tie exists. 

Notice that, in this scenario, there is no 

literal gathering of the parties or necessity 

for such a gathering - it is possible to 

"centralize" these individuals by utilizing 

information that bonds them to a common 

group, even one unrelated to terrorism per 

se. Online, this tactic would look more like 

polling user databases for email services and 

forum registries. Even if the questionable 

users are separately active, and especially if 

their particular interests make it difficult to 

draw them together even in the virtual 

world, the collective databases of user 

accounts and histories can provide useful 

and centralizing data. This means that an 

Islamic radical and an American cult 

member could be linked by a profile heading 

concerning the overthrow of the United 

States government, even if more specific 

details about their differing ideologies keep 

them from blogging in the same fashion, 

projecting overly similar messages, or ever 

visiting the same particular websites. An 

abundance of email and social networking 

websites offer users the option of creating 

public profiles, and the homegrown terrorist 

is likely to experiment with revealing his/her 

agenda at least in part through such a venue. 

The same Air Force "cyber warriors" that 

could work toward a literal (yet virtual) 

gathering of suspect individuals could 

employ this type of strategy to use email and 

profile databases to link together individuals 

all over the internet. It is just another way 

the DOD could begin to level the playing 

field. 

The Air Force is not without options 

when it comes to playing the decentralized 

game of the terrorists as well. However, it 

would require a bit of a different 

specialization for those who would act in 

this manner. Or, possibly, it would require a 

different set of personnel altogether. 

 The Department of Defense spent 

over $306 billion on defense contractors in 

2007, and that number grew to over $377 
ASJ Fall 2010 

45

billion in 2009 (govexec.com). These 

contractors provide myriad services and 

products, from fighter jets to bathroom 

construction. Based on this trend in defense 

spending, it would not be unreasonable for 

the government to consider private 

industries for the purpose of fighting online 

terrorism. In fact, it would make sense in 

light of the ―starfish‖ composition that 

makes up terrorism both online and abroad. 

This use of private contractors, perhaps in 

conjunction with the already burgeoning Air 

Force Cyber Command, reflects a form of 

decentralization for the DOD. It removes 

some of the bureaucratic ―red tape‖ so often 

associated with government involvement in 

any operation, and it redefines the chain of 

command into something less structured by 

spreading communication and control to 

different, less immediately centralized 

agencies. 

 The website 

http://www.google.com/governmentrequests

/ tabulates the number of government 

requests for user data, or data removal, made 

to the Internet search engine mogul, Google. 

The charts on this website showcase how 

involved certain world governments already 

are in private databases that reflect different 

Internet user populations. Furthermore, they 

showcase the efficiency with which an 

Internet corporation like Google can locate 

and provide accurate information on a given 

user for the purpose of legal prosecution or 

scrutinous investigation. The requests 

reflected on the website are often the result 

of government subpoenas at many levels. 

However, these data suggest that there is 

potential for using already-existing 

infrastructures for the purposes of locating 

suspect individuals the world over. And, as 

already highlighted, the use of private 

industry creates a multi-headed, multi-armed 

conglomerate organization capable of 

mirroring the decentralized nature of the 

homegrown terrorist movement. This beast 

can mine multiple sources of data 

throughout the globe to meet terrorism on its 

ground and work to eradicate it. 

 Another option for decentralization 

again focuses on the echelons within the Air 

Force‘s ―Cyber Warrior‖ ranks. Undercover 

Police Officers are a common force in the 

fight against domestic organized crime and 

the war on drugs 

(http://faculty.ncwc.edu/mstevens/205/205le

ct08a.htm). In the same way, the Air Force 

has an opportunity with the upcoming 

―Cyber Warrior‖ force to implement a 

program that puts its troops undercover in 

the midst of terrorists – in a virtual sense. 

The idea is the same: criminals are more 

open and honest about evil intentions and 

plans with those with whom they believe 

they have confidence. Much like the 

aforementioned centralizing actions of Mrs. 

Rossmiller, there is the hope that a façade 

can reveal those involved in terrorist 

activities. In the case of this scenario, the 

DOD and the Air Force would seek to 

decentralize their own forces by making 

them ―temporary terrorists‖ across the world 

in the hopes that their efforts would lead to 

the incrimination of otherwise anonymous 

insurgents in the online world. 

 Specifically, this would resemble a 

―black ops‖ group whose sole jurisdiction is 

the Internet. Perhaps a specific subclass of 

the Air Force‘s ―Cyber Warriors,‖ these 

undercover operatives could work from the 

seclusion of their own homes (with the 

benefits of utilizing private Internet Service 

Providers, some of which have already been 

discussed) for periods similar to current 

―real life‖ special operations deployment 

rotations. Putting these ―warriors‖ in these 

―deployment‖ scenarios for any meaningful 

period of time results in similar 

decentralizing effects to those of utilizing 

private corporations. That is, it removes the 

direct chain of command and cuts out some 
ASJ Fall 2010 

46

of the bureaucracy and control elements of 

direct government oversight. In order for 

this last point to remain true, it is critical that 

this new echelon of operatives function as a 

truly undercover force, maintaining limited 

involvement with their superiors as they 

gather data on suspect individuals, only 

passing immediately necessary information 

and otherwise waiting until their assignment 

ends before unveiling their entire collection 

of knowledge. 

 In the real world, there is always the 

concern that undercover officers could ―get 

made‖ (i.e. their identities would come to 

light) or, in an effort to retain credibility 

with their subjects of investigation, practice 

too many illegal activities. Both of these 

risks are highly mitigated in the online 

realm. ―Getting made‖ online does not 

consist of the same physical threats that it 

might in the real world, and it may prove 

easier to fabricate evidence of loyalty with 

regards to anti-Western ideals in a virtual 

world. Furthermore, it is not necessary that 

an online operative actually practice illegal 

activities against a people in a terroristic 

fashion in order to appear radical. Rather, 

that operative need only create an illusionary 

proof of such activities, perhaps crafting 

fake news articles or generating doctored 

photos, etc. While the opportunity for 

wrongdoing against the West still exists, 

these factors make it far less likely amongst 

the ranks of any Special Operations Cyber 

Warfare group. 

 The final way in which the United 

States Armed Forces could seek to root out 

homegrown terrorism, and perhaps the most 

complicated, is through changing ideologies. 

This is uncharted ground within the virtual 

world. It remains unclear what incentives a 

homegrown terrorist might find appealing in 

order to cease anti-Western activities. With 

some homegrown terrorists there is the hope 

that open conversation – even on a forum 

devoted to anti-Western ideals – might spur 

some level of tolerance that prevents full 

radicalization. Because of this truth, any 

method of destroying online insurgency 

should keep open the option of engaging 

with and seeking to moderate would-be 

terrorists. However, there are still problems 

associated with this approach. One major 

issue is the idea that online terrorists are 

already so difficult to track down; it would 

be a shame to cease investigation of an 

individual online based on the assumption 

that he/she has converted from terroristic 

activities, only to have him/her resurface 

later in another location that is more difficult 

to navigate, wasting more time and 

resources to seek out the same individual 

again through virtual means. Therefore, this 

approach should be implemented with 

caution. 

 It would be best for the DOD and the 

Air Force to focus on the methods of 

centralizing the enemy and decentralizing 

their own forces as the primary means of 

combating online homegrown terrorism. As 

General George S. Patton once remarked, 

―A good plan executed now is better than a 

perfect plan next week.‖ Therefore, although 

the approach that seeks to change the 

ideologies of online terrorists remains 

somewhat ambiguous in its composition, the 

Air Force and the DOD should seek to 

implement the aforementioned tactics as 

soon as possible. In this manner, the United 

States can make the most of its cyber-based 

forces and hope to manipulate and eradicate 

not only rational state forces that threaten 

communication infrastructure, but also 

radicalizing individuals the world over. 

 It is clear that homegrown terrorism 

presents somewhat of an undefined threat, 

and the Internet convolutes the already 

confusing situation. However, by examining 

the makeup of terrorist organizations the 

world over, it is possible to shed some light 
ASJ Fall 2010 

47

on their elusive nature. As decentralized 

groups of terrorists (especially those that 

utilize the growing and anonymizing 

Internet as a front for spreading their 

messages) act outside of the normal 

approaches of the centralized government 

entities that seek to combat them, by either 

decentralizing its own forces or centralizing 

the enemy, the United States government – 

through the DOD and the Air Force – can 

hope to even the playing field and slow the 

rate of development of homegrown 

terrorism. As opportunities present 

themselves within this strategy, it may 

become possible to also combat the factors 

that lead to anti-Western ideologies directly. 

What remains important at this juncture in 

history is that the DOD and the Air Force 

utilize their current cyber-based abilities to 

seek out and eliminate threats with the 

virtual world, in the hopes that every 

possible front for anti-Western terrorism 

becomes a treacherous path for anyone to 

tread. 

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Second Life? - IslamOnline.net - Health 

& Science." IslamOnline.net. Islam 

Online, 13 Aug. 2007. Web. 09 May 

2010. 

<http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Sat

ellite?c=Article_C&cid=118464983816

3&pagename=Zone-EnglishHealthScience/HSELayout>. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

49

New Forms of Warfare: 

 What’s Changing, What’s Not, and 

How Might Military Education Adapt? 

Colonel Thomas A. Drohan, USAFA, 

Colorado Springs, CO

An essay for the 14th International Seminar in 

Military Science’s discussion topic: 

―Form of Warfare in the Post-Cold War Era and 

its Influence on Military History Education‖ 

July 2009, Yokosuka, Japan

Success in today‘s security 

environment requires individuals and 

organizations to adapt to and anticipate 

changes in warfare. This is a widely 

acknowledged imperative, and easier said 

than done. But it‘s also only half the 

challenge that we face. Operators, planners, 

strategists and educators also make 

assumptions, deliberately or not, about what 

is not changing. This essay advocates 

viewing ―form of warfare‖ in terms of both 

its changing and unchanging aspects. 

Change can be interpreted in many 

dimensions such as temporal, spatial, 

cyclical, linear, relative, absolute, physical 

and psychological. Notwithstanding these 

differences, inquiring about warfare in terms 

of what’s changing and what’s not seems 

useful to military educators in at least two 

ways. First, such questioning impels us to 

take a fundamental first step to 

understanding forms of complex warfare. 

Second, the intellectual process is inherently 

practical, leading us to consider how to 

adapt to emerging forms of warfare. 

What’s Changing? 

The push of technological 

advancement and the pull of new 

requirements generate new military 

applications across ground, maritime, air, 

space and cyberspace domains. 

Communications and computer revolutions 

enable rapidly networked data systems and a 

COP (Common Operating Picture) for 

integrating command and control with other 

functions - C4ISR (Command, Control, 

Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 

Surveillance, Reconnaissance). From small 

arms to ballistic missiles, the use of new 

technologies tends to increase operational 

lethality, speed, range, and situational 

awareness. Remote sensors, stealth drones, 

automated defense, machine medics and 

nano-drones are but a few examples of what 

Peter Singer refers to as a ―robots‘ 

revolution‖47 where autonomous systems 

threaten to take humans ―out of the loop.‖

48

 

Besides increasing the cost of modern 

warfare, these systems deepen our 

dependence on them. They also create new 

vulnerabilities and invite ―peacetime‖ cyber 

attacks that challenge our definition of 

―wartime.‖ Some technology advocates see 

the operational processes of the information 

age as a shift from finding, fixing and 

tracking to targeting, engaging and 

assessing. 

 

Add to these technologies the 

phenomenon of globalization. Expanding 

economic ties and social connections raise 

the stakes that disruptive threats pose to 

societies. The commercialization of 

technology enables armed groups and cybersavvy individuals the prospect of making a 

worldwide impact. The Iranian state 

provides an example of increased 

conventional force capability and ballistic 

missile and nuclear technology, as well as 

 

47 Peter Singer, Presentation at USAF 

Academy, Colorado, 17 March 2009. See Peter 

Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and 

Conflict in the 21st Century (New York: The Penguin 

Press, 2009). 

48 John Boyd‘s OODA (Observe, Orient, 

Decide, Act) loop is pertinent here. See Grant T. 

Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and 

American Security (Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian 

Books, 2001). 
ASJ Fall 2010 

50

the empowerment of proxy groups (such as 

Hizbollah) to conduct asymmetric warfare. 

Next, add increased global and regional 

competition for scarce resources such as 

food and water and energy, and the longterm consequences of new forms of warfare 

become even more significant. 

What’s Not Changing? 

From the perspective of classic 

military theory, there are human, 

unchanging aspects of warfare that do not 

change. Sun Tzu stressed the importance of 

a full assessment especially knowing one‘s 

enemy, the need to shape the perception of 

the enemy while at the same time becoming 

unfathomable oneself, staying within one‘s 

means with respect to resources, and 

exhausting the will and ability of the enemy 

without fighting. If the Master were present 

today he would likely scrutinize the 

processes of information age technology to 

remind us of the importance of the human 

context, and the necessity to select wise 

targets for non-kinetic operations, not just 

kinetic operations. He would likely endorse 

such readings as David Killcullen‘s book, 

The Accidental Guerrilla,49 because it 

emphasizes the importance of a detailed 

assessment (including culture). According 

to the work of Carl von Clausewitz, the 

unchanging nature of war also focuses on 

the human context of war, such as the 

motives of violence itself, the need to deal 

with uncertainty even as data increases, and 

the timeless struggle of commanders to 

subordinate the goals of war to some sort of 

reasoned process—what we might refer to 

today in military doctrinal terms as the ends, 

ways and means of strategy. The main 

theme of Colin Gray‘s book, Modern 

Strategy, argues the merits of a 

 

49 David Killcullen, The Accidental 

Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big 

One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 

Clausewitzian distinction between the 

unchanging nature of warfare and the 

changing character of war.50

Complex Warfare 

Strategy that is related to military 

operations must consider this fundamental 

question about new forms of warfare – what 

is changing and what is not? Military 

scholarship and doctrine may be categorized 

in three ways; types, domains, and methods 

of warfare. The first category emphasizes 

the types of warfare, such as 

transformation,51 generational warfare,52 and 

small wars.53 Operational domains describe 

spatial or functional operations such as 

space and cyberspace,54

 and special 

 

50 This paper follows this tradition of Colin 

Gray‘s interpretation. Colin Gray, Modern Strategy 

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). See p. ix. 

51 Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation 

of War (New York: Free Press, 1991); Rupert Smith, 

The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern 

World (New York: Penguin, 2006). 

52 See Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and 

the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St Paul, MN: 

Zenith Press, 2004), and Max G. Max Manwaring, 

Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency (Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War 

College, 2005). 

53 See Max Manwaring, ed., Uncomfortable 

Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low-Intensity 

Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Max 

Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the 

Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 

2003),. 

54 See Ben Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate 

High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of 

Space (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003) and Peter Hays, 

James Smith, Alan Van Tassel, Guy Walsh, eds., 

Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and US 

National Security (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000) 

on the question of whether space technologies 

represent a ―revolution in military affairs‖ or an 

―enabler‖ of such a revolution. Gregory Rattray, 

Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge: MIT 

Press, 2001), p. 20: ―If one conceives of warfare 

only as events involving violence, then by definition 

non-violent military means will not be useful in war. 

In the broader context of understanding the utility of 
ASJ Fall 2010 

51

operations55 respectively. These arguments 

tend to advocate current and potential 

capabilities and outline their possible 

strategic roles. The final category, methods 

of warfare, distinguishes among how diverse 

actors employ their forces, such as 

unconventional, asymmetrical, irregular, and 

hybrids thereof.56

 Military doctrine tends to 

be written at strategic (basic), operational 

(operations), and tactical (tactics, techniques 

and procedures) levels in a practical style 

that combines types, domains and methods 

of warfare. All of these approaches require 

us to distinguish constants from variables in 

complex situations. 

A synthesis of opposite tendencies in 

warfare defines what could simply be 

referred to as ―complex warfare.‖ This 

term contains the main tendencies of 

variation in warfare: multi-layered conflicts 

among state and/or non-state actors pursuing 

diverse objectives with traditional and new 

technologies. The multi-layered aspect 

 

force, however, the achievement of political 

objectives may not require the actual use of violent 

means. The use of non-violent digital attacks to 

achieve political objectives must be understood as a 

new form of warfare. Compared to other types of 

military force, digital warfare represents a type of 

microforce.‖ 

55 See William McRaven, Spec Ops: Case 

Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and 

Practice (Novato, California: The Presidio Press, 

1996-propounds ―the theory‖ of special operations, 

based on a quick and temporary measure of relative 

superiority that wanes as the operation proceeeds; 

David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States 

Special Operations Forces (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2007)-advocates an organizational 

separation of special operations into kinetic and nonkinetic commands. 

56 See Brynjar Lia, , Architect of Global 

Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus‘ab 

al-Suri (New York: Hurst & Columbia Univ. Press, 

2007; Bard O‘Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism 

(Washington, DC: Brassey‘s, 1990); Andrew Exum, 

Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment

(Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy, December 2006). 

describes an array of competitive and 

cooperative affiliations among many 

different groups throughout society. 

Diversity of objectives is also an important 

feature because the typically assumed basis 

for alliance, a common threat, is not 

necessarily valid in complex warfare. 

Differences in values and interests can be 

exchanged in a security bargain among 

transnational and local groups. For military 

strategists and operators, complex warfare 

requires an ability to seamlessly plan and 

synchronize operations involving military 

forces, police, media, militias, terrorists, 

ethnic groups, governments, international 

organizations, businesses, possibly more. 

 

How Might Military Education Adapt? 

Sometimes making changes in 

military education is not that easy to 

implement, perhaps partly because military 

members tend to be conservative and 

academics tend to disagree over what, how 

and why something may needs to be 

changed. At the same time, military 

educators tend to recognize the need for 

change particularly when during ongoing 

contingency operations. 

 

 There are many initiatives 

throughout the US Department of Defense 

(DoD) and military services that promote the 

need to adapt military education. Sponsors 

of such initiatives visit academies, 

contributing to dialogues about continuity 

and change across the curriculum. 

Examples of policy and practical changes 

whose impact we often consider include 

Office of Net Assessment efforts, the 

Language and Culture Roadmap, centers for 

Lessons Learned, directorates in Irregular 

Warfare, and centers for new technology as 

in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and reorganizations. An interesting and perhaps 

ironic issue with respect to reorganization 
ASJ Fall 2010 

52

given the origin of the US Air Force, is the 

USAF‘s placement of its cyberspace assets 

under Air Force Space Command, in 

contrast to the establishment of a joint 

cyberspace command unfettered by 

subordination to another domain. 

 

 The following examples of 

adjustments in education at the USAF 

Academy changes that I have observed 

firsthand. They reflect and support broader 

initiatives throughout the DoD in four key 

areas: collaboration and teamwork for 

enhanced joint, combined and interagency 

education; assessment of lessons learned; 

establishment of new activities focused on 

contemporary forms of warfare; and military 

deployments in support of Foreign Internal 

Defense (FID) in Operation Enduring 

Freedom. 

 

Joint education is one example 

where we have adjusted our curriculum to 

focus on a core competency and mindset in 

any form of warfare. The USAF Academy 

offers a full semester core course (one that 

all cadets must take) on Joint Operations, 

with cadets choosing between a technologyoriented course and a regionally-oriented 

course. Begun in the 1980s as a singularly 

joint operations course addressing Air Force, 

Army, Navy and Marine Corps doctrine and 

force capabilities, the course refocused on 

multi-national operations in the 1990s and 

began force employment exercises. We still 

struggle to provide joint doctrine in addition 

to service doctrine. However, the latter is 

becoming more collaborative itself aided by 

recent doctrine on stability operations (US 

Army), counterinsurgency (US Army and 

Marine Corps), and irregular warfare (US 

Air Force). Since 2001, we have brought an 

inter-agency perspective to this course. In a 

related effort last year, we adopted one of 

the USAF Academy‘s 21 institutional 

learning outcomes, that of ―Teamwork,‖ as a 

course goal. Most recently, the cadet choice 

of technology or regions allows a degree of 

specialization motivated by personal 

interest. As you might expect, what do we 

take out? and how do we integrate more 

material in the course? are recurring 

questions. 

The second example addresses our 

concern, how do we assess what cadets 

learn, rather than assess only what 

instructors teach? The GOAL (Guiding 

Outcomes Assessed Learning) is a basic tool 

instructors use to assess classroom learning 

after each lesson. Three areas are 

considered: what your students...needed to 

learn (extracted from the lesson objectives); 

what your student did learn and how you 

determined that they learned; any instructor 

ideas for improvements; and the instructor‘s 

rating of the lesson (a letter grade that 

judges how well the students learned that 

lesson). Each lesson has learning 

objectives, and the process takes about five 

minutes of reflection after each class. 

Example number three is a new 

course on Asymmetric Warfare, the first 

time we have given cadets the responsibility 

of developing a proposed course. By 

selecting the right cadets, we are seeing a 

syllabus that is more compelling to more 

cadets which should enhance learning. Our 

desire to try this experiment arose from a 

semiannual department faculty development 

seminar that raised the following question: 

how many times have you assigned an 
ASJ Fall 2010 

53

important reading and then taught what you 

thought was your best lesson plan, only to 

notice that most cadets are not that 

interested? 

 

Finally, we are involved in 

developing the content of Academy 

education in Kabul, a Foreign Internal 

Defense (FID) mission in Afghanistan. 

According to our doctrine on joint 

operations, FID programs encompass the 

diplomatic, economic, informational, and 

military support provided to another nation 

to assist its fight against subversion, 

lawlessness, and insurgency. In the past, 

military FID has mainly involved special 

operations forces in operational assistance 

and collaborative planning. Today, in order 

to anticipate, preclude and counter the array 

of threats, FID is also being conducted by 

general purpose forces. So, in coordination 

with faculty from the US Military Academy 

at West Point, USAF Academy faculty serve 

as curriculum mentors and partners at the 

National Military Academy of Afghanistan 

(NMAA). 

This mission is under the Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, 

which replaced Combined Forces Command 

to transition security capability and 

responsibility from coalition forces to 

Afghan forces. The four-year curriculum at 

NMAA is tailored to local needs for 

complex warfare, including: military 

leadership under civilian authority and a 

national constitution; domestic defense 

rather than external force projection; an 

Army Air Corps rather than an independent 

Air Force. The broad curriculum is 

ambitious, but necessary due to the 

Taliban‘s intellectual devastation of the 

Afghan educational system. 

Concluding Thoughts 

The rigor and relevance of military 

education are critical components of 

professional success. Developing the 

judgment to succeed in contemporary and 

emerging forms of warfare is arguably the 

sine qua non of an Academy education. 

Facing variants of complex warfare, military 

educators also deal with a fundamental 

question of strategy as we develop, teach, 

and assess our curriculum -- what is 

changing and what is not? This approach 

recognizes the value of a Clausewitzian 

view of ―complex warfare‖ as a holistic 

phenomenon of essential (an enduring 

nature) and per accidens (changing 

character) elements. There are other valid 

ways to consider the question of ―form of 

warfare and its impact on military history 

education.‖ At this gathering of military 

educational institutions throughout Asia and 

the Pacific (the International Seminar in 

Military Science), we have a unique 

opportunity to gain a better understanding of 

various perspectives on this important topic. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

54

“Ancient Alexandria, Alexander, and 

History: 

The Relevance of Thought in the 

Contemporary Strategic Environment” 

By Lt Col Steve Pomeroy, USAFA 

Speaking Comments for the 

27th Annual Colorado All-Service Academy 

Ball 

28 December 2009 

 Good evening distinguished guests, 

honored alumni, cadets, families, organizers, 

Broadmoor staff, and all who join this 

evening‘s festivities. I am indeed humbled 

to speak in your presence. Tonight I shall 

attempt to pass a legacy of human thought, a 

legacy of thousands of years of which you 

and your profession bear full membership. 

Our tale begins tonight not in the mountains 

of contemporary Colorado, Afghanistan, or 

the flats of Iraq, but in the ancient city of 

Alexandria, Egypt. 

 In the third century before the 

Common Era, Alexandria was one of the 

great hubs of the Western World; indeed, it 

helped make the Western World. 

Alexandria was a magnificent seaport in 

which arriving ships were searched, not for 

contraband but for books. The books were 

borrowed, copied laboriously by hand, and 

returned to their owners. The copies 

numbered in the half millions, and were 

emplaced within the city‘s great library and 

made available to the city‘s residents, which 

was the first place in which Westerners 

collected systematically the knowledge of 

the world. Therein lived a man named 

Eratosthenes, who one of his envious rivals 

described as ―Beta‖ because, he said, 

Eratosthenes was second best in everything. 

As the late astronomer Carl Sagan 

eloquently described, Eratosthenes was 

clearly ―Alpha,‖ an historian, astronomer, 

geographer, philosopher, and more. The 

titles emergent from his hand ranged from 

Astronomy to On Freedom From Pain. He 

directed one of the wonders of the ancient 

world, a true research center, the Library of 

Alexandria, wherein one day he read that on 

the longest day of the year at the southern 

city of Syene, at noon, vertical sticks or 

temple columns cast no shadow. The Sun 

was directly overhead. 

 Eratosthenes asked why on June 

twenty-first, at the same moment, sticks in 

Syene cast no shadow and sticks in 

Alexandria, far to the north, did. The only 

possible answer, he saw, was that the 

surface of the Earth is curved. Not only 

that: the greater the curvature, the greater 

the difference in the shadow lengths. The 

Sun is so far away that its rays are parallel 

when they reach the Earth. Sticks placed at 

different angles to the Sun‘s rays cast 

shadows of different lengths. For the 

observed difference in the shadow lengths, 

the distance between Alexandria and Syene 

had to be about seven degrees along the 

surface of the Earth; that is, if you imagine 

the sticks extending down to the center of 

the Earth, they would there intersect at an 

angle of seven degrees. Now, seven degrees 

is something like one-fiftieth of three 

hundred and sixty degrees, the full 

circumference of the Earth. Eratosthenes 

knew the distance between Alexandra and 

Syene was approximately 800 kilometers, 

because he hired a man to pace it out. Eight 

hundred kilometers times fifty is 40,000 

kilometers: so that must be the 

circumference of the Earth. 

 This is the right answer. His only 

tools were sticks, eyes, feet, and brains, plus 

a taste for experiment. With them, he 

deduced the circumference of the Earth with 

an error of only a few percent, a remarkable 

achievement for two-thousand, two hundred 

years ago. In many ways, his ruminations 
ASJ Fall 2010 

55

not only shaped the world, they made the 

world. How so? 

 In its glory, Alexandria was a 

remarkable place. Founded by Alexander 

the Great and constructed by his former 

bodyguard, Alexander and his kingly 

descendants encouraged respect for other 

cultures and the open-minded pursuit of 

knowledge. He encouraged his generals and 

soldiers to marry Persian and Indian women. 

He respected the gods of other nations. He 

collected exotic life-forms from around the 

planet as well as the knowledge of various 

academic and physical disciplines. He 

sought to understand the world as it was, not 

as he wished it to be. His tutor was 

Aristotle. A thoroughly military officer, 

Alexander saw no discontinuity between 

service and synthetic or analytical and 

critical thought. To him, knowledge of the 

world, a broadly humanistic education, was 

as natural as wielding his sword. During the 

Hellenistic Age, Eratosthene‘s idea was 

tested and commonly accepted. Following 

the fall of classical civilization, you may 

remember, Western Europe did not accept 

such an idea until the sixteenth-century of 

our Common Era, and even then, the idea 

was viciously opposed on many grounds, as 

some still do today. What then does this tale 

demonstrate? It shows, I contend, that 

despite certain strands of our popular 

conventional wisdom, militaries have often 

been---and forgive the use of the following 

word---progressive organizations. But, such 

a state of affairs is neither birthright nor a 

given. 

 The argument here is that education, 

reflection, and the synthesis of knowledge 

about our world, peoples, and universe is 

fully compatible with military service. To 

understand one‘s strategic environment, one 

must reflect upon and understand its people, 

anthropology, history, music, art, 

communications, technology, science, 

philosophy, religion, politics, and 

interactions of regions through the ages. 

This expertise is not something that can be 

conjured instantly. It will not necessarily 

agree with our preconceptions. As a scholar 

and historian of technology, I must here 

reveal a bias. There exist common themes 

throughout world history that an astute 

observer may draw upon for intuition. 

Notice that I said intuition, for 

understanding humanity is not a predictive 

science, despite what some would say. It is 

an art as complementary as Clausewitz is to 

Sun Tzu. The crux of the aforementioned 

disciplines depends upon translating human 

thought into action. History is therefore not 

worth learning as some would say, ―to avoid 

repeating the mistakes of the past.‖ The past 

does not blindly repeat in the fashion of 

recorded tape. Human agency prohibits 

such a predictive instrument. It is difficult 

enough to predict what you will eat for 

breakfast on Thursday, let alone estimate the 

actions of battlefield opponents 

Of what use then is the record of 

human thought? History is the interpretation 

of the record of human thought and activity. 

This is why it changes. The people who 

write it change. Those who mockingly ask, 

―what‘s new in history?‖ simply do not 

understand the discipline. Robin George 

Collingwood, an historian and philosopher 

of his discipline, considered history an 

engaged reenactment of earlier thought 

expressed such that the interpretation could 

be openly debated and thus bringing 

scientific rigor to the enterprise. Those of 

you familiar with war will recognize the 

applicability of his method: 

First, the thought must be 

expressed: either in what we 

call language, or in one of the 

many other forms of 

expressive activity. 
ASJ Fall 2010 

56

Secondly, the historian must 

be able to think over again 

for herself or himself the 

thought whose expression he 

is trying to interpret.... The 

important point here is that 

the historian of a thought 

must think for himself or 

herself that very same 

thought, not another like it. 

And so he reached his third 

proposition: Historical 

knowledge is the reenactment of a past thought 

encapsulated in a context of 

present thoughts which, by 

contradicting it, confine it to 

a plane different from theirs 

Although there may be similarities 

between ages and events within the course 

of human events, the essential acts 

comprising history and all of human activity 

making it so appealing to us result from 

conscious and unconscious human thought. 

In an endeavor as complicated as the 

application of military power, it is therefore 

the understanding of human thought that is 

critical. By knowing your own thoughts, 

you learn the thoughts of others, and by 

learning to perceive the world through the 

eyes of others, you learn better your 

thoughts. Sometimes you will not like the 

revelations, but no matter the implications 

for objectives, strategies, and actions, you 

must possess the integrity of thought and 

character to face willingly the conclusions 

you deduce and induce. 

 These are not easy tasks. Your 

forthcoming challenges upon 

commissioning are such the demands of 

deployment, daily operations, and technical 

training to develop tactical and later 

operational and strategic proficiency are 

simply all consuming. But to be great as an 

Alexander, and even Alexander made 

mistakes, you cannot afford neglecting the 

reflective time to understand your universe, 

world, and place therein. One can become 

very good as an officer without 

contemplating such things or developing a 

philosophy of service, but you cannot 

become great. Doing so requires finding a 

passion to light the fires of your mind, not 

filling it as if it were a vessel. To make your 

service to the nation significant, you must 

continue to develop your minds and 

passions, for it is these things permitting one 

to make a difference for the better. Our 

short journey tonight has taken us from 

ancient Alexandria to interpreting the 

Cosmos of human thought. Why? I assert 

to you that the strength of a free people 

comes from their education. For it is 

through education they learn to ask 

courageous questions and to answer them 

with depth. As productive members of our 

Republic, it is up to you to ask questions of 

courage and answer them with sufficient 

depth. 

 From these serious thoughts, now let 

us turn our attention to the camaraderie and 

fellowship promised for this evening. With 

best wishes for your service, health, peace, 

prosperity, and happiness, I bid you 

goodnight and good service.