United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security,

International Affairs and Criminal Justice, Committee on

Government Reform and Oversight, House of

Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

1:00 p.m., EDT

Thursday,

April 23, 1998

COMBATING TERRORISM

Observations on

Crosscutting Issues

Statement of Richard Davis, Director, National Security

Analysis, National Security and International Affairs

Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our work and observations on

federal efforts to combat terrorism. As you know, we have been studying

the crosscutting aspects of the terrorism area for nearly 2 years at the

requests of Congressman Ike Skelton and Senator John Glenn, in addition

to this Subcommittee. This horizontal approach to our work—looking at

terrorism matters across several agencies—offers a very different

perspective on the issues to the Congress than if we looked at individual

agencies and their programs separately. We will first briefly talk about the

foreign-origin and domestic terrorism threat in the United States as we

understand it from intelligence analyses and the origins and principles of

the U.S. policy and strategy to combat terrorism. Then I would like to

share some of our observations about issues that warrant further

attention.

Summary Conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of

choice for terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to use chemical and

biological weapons than conventional explosives, although the likelihood

that they may use chemical and biological materials may increase over the

next decade, according to intelligence agencies. More than a decade ago,

the Vice President’s Task Force on Terrorism highlighted the need for

improved, centralized interagency coordination. Our work suggests that

the government should continue to strive for improved interagency

coordination today. The need for effective interagency coordination—both

at the federal level and among the federal, state, and local levels—is

paramount. The challenges of efficient and effective management and

focus for program investments are growing as the terrorism issue draws

more attention from the Congress and as there are more players and more

programs and activities to integrate and coordinate. The United States is

spending billions of dollars annually to combat terrorism without

assurance that federal funds are focused on the right programs or in the

right amounts. As we have emphasized in two reports, a critical piece of

the equation in decisions about establishing and expanding programs to

combat terrorism is an analytically sound threat and risk assessment using

valid inputs from the intelligence community and other agencies. Threat

and risk assessments could help the government make decisions about

how to target investments in combating terrorism and set priorities on the

basis of risk; identify unnecessary program duplication, overlap, and gaps;

and correctly size individual agencies’ levels of effort. Finally, there are

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164 Combating Terrorism
different sets of views and an apparent lack of consensus on the threat of

terrorism—particularly weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism.

The Foreign and

Domestic Terrorism

Threat in the United

States

We are all aware that certain key large-scale terrorist incidents at home

and abroad since 1993 have dramatically raised the public profile of U.S.

vulnerability to terrorist attack. The bombings of the World Trade Center

in 1993 and of the federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in 1995,

along with terrorists’ use of a nerve agent in the Tokyo subway in 1995,

have elevated concerns about terrorism in the United States—particularly

terrorists’ use of chemical and biological weapons. Previously, the focus of

U.S. policy and legislation had been more on international terrorism

abroad and airline hijacking.

The U.S. intelligence community, which includes the Central Intelligence

Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI), and others, has issued classified National Intelligence Estimates and

an update on the foreign-origin terrorist threat to the United States. In

addition, the FBI gathers intelligence and assesses the threat posed by U.S.

or domestic sources of terrorism.

What is important to take away from these intelligence assessments is the

very critical distinction made between what is conceivable or possible and

what is likely in terms of the threat of terrorist attack. According to

intelligence agencies, conventional explosives and firearms continue to be

the weapons of choice for terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to use

chemical and biological weapons than conventional explosives, although

the likelihood that terrorists may use chemical and biological materials

may increase over the next decade. Chemical and biological agents are

less likely to be used than conventional explosives, at least partly because

they are more difficult to weaponize and the results are unpredictable.

According to the FBI, the threat of terrorists’ use of chemical and biological

weapons is low, but some groups and individuals of concern are beginning

to show interest in such weapons. Agency officials also have noted that

terrorists’ use of nuclear weapons is the least likely scenario, although the

consequences could be disastrous.

The FBI will soon issue its report on domestic terrorist incidents and

preventions for 1996. According to the FBI, in 1996, there were 3 terrorist

incidents in the United States, as compared with 1 in 1995; zero in 1994; 12

in 1993; and 4 in 1992. The three incidents that occurred in 1996 involved

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164 Combating Terrorism
pipe bombs, including the pipe bomb that exploded at the Atlanta

Olympics.

Origins and Principles

of U.S. Policy and

Strategy to Combat

Terrorism

U.S. policy and strategy have evolved since the 1970s, along with the

nature and perception of the terrorist threat. The basic principles of the

policy continue, though, from the 1970s to today: make no concessions to

terrorists, pressure state sponsors of terrorism, and apply the rule of law

to terrorists as criminals. U.S. policy on terrorism first became formalized

in 1986 with the Reagan administration’s issuance of National Security

Decision Directive 207. This policy resulted from the findings of the 1985

Vice President’s Task Force on Terrorism, which highlighted the need for

improved, centralized interagency coordination of the significant federal

assets to respond to terrorist incidents. The directive reaffirmed lead

agency responsibilities, with the State Department responsible for

international terrorism policy, procedures, and programs, and the FBI,

through the Department of Justice, responsible for dealing with domestic

terrorist acts.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39—issued in June 1995 following

the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City—builds on the

previous directive and contains three key elements of national strategy for

combating terrorism: (1) reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks and

prevent and deter terrorist acts before they occur; (2) respond to terrorist

acts that do occur—crisis management—and apprehend and punish

terrorists; and (3) manage the consequences of terrorist acts, including

restoring capabilities to protect public health and safety and essential

government services and providing emergency relief. This directive also

further elaborates on agencies’ roles and responsibilities and some

specific measures to be taken regarding each element of the strategy.

Now a new PDD on combating terrorism is being drafted that could further

refine and advance the policy. This draft directive, which is classified,

reflects a recognition of the need for centralized interagency leadership in

combating terrorism. Among other things, the draft policy tries to resolve

jurisdictional issues between agencies and places new emphasis on

managing the consequences of a terrorist incident and on the roles and

responsibilities of the various agencies involved.

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164 Combating Terrorism
Observations on

Crosscutting

Terrorism Issues

Based on the reports and work we have performed to date, we would like

to make three observations. First, in certain critical areas, just as the Vice

President’s Task Force on Terrorism noted in 1985, improvements are

needed in interagency coordination and program focus. Since that

time—and even since PDD-39 was issued in June 1995—the number of

players involved in combating terrorism has increased substantially. In our

September 1997 report,1

 we noted that more than 40 federal agencies,

bureaus, and offices were involved in combating terrorism. To illustrate

the expansion of players since PDD-39, for example, Department of

Agriculture representatives now attend counterterrorism crisis response

exercise planning functions. Also, to implement the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

Domestic Preparedness Program,2

 the U.S. Army’s Director of Military

Support has created a new office for the new mission to train U.S. cities’

emergency response personnel to deal with terrorist incidents using

chemical and biological WMD and plans to create another office to integrate

another new player—the National Guard and Reserve—into the terrorism

consequence management area. The National Guard and Reserve initially

plan to establish 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID), teams

throughout the country. The U.S. Marine Corps has established the

Chemical Biological Incident Response Force. Further, the Department of

Energy has redesigned its long-standing Nuclear Emergency Search Team

into various Joint Technical Operations Teams and other teams. At least

one Department of Energy laboratory is offering consequence

management services for chemical and biological as well as nuclear

incidents. And the Public Health Service is in the process of establishing

25 Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams throughout the country in addition

to 3 deployable “national asset” National Medical Response Teams and

existing Disaster Medical Assistance Teams. There are many more

examples of new players in the terrorism arena.

Effectively coordinating all these various agencies’, teams’, and offices’

requirements, programs, activities, and funding requests is clearly

important. We are currently examining interagency coordination issues as

part of our work for this Subcommittee and Congressman Skelton in

counterterrorism operations, exercises, and special events and in the

1

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy

(GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

2

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, contained in the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (title XIV of P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23, 1996), established the

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program. The Department of Defense is the lead federal

agency for implementing the program, and is to work in cooperation with the FBI, the Department of

Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the

Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164 Combating Terrorism
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program. In doing our

work, we have observed some indications of potential overlap in federal

capabilities to deal with WMD, and we plan to further assess this issue for

you and Congressman Skelton.

In a second, related observation, more money is being spent to combat

terrorism without any assurance of whether it is focused on the right

programs or in the right amounts. Our December 1997 report3

 showed that

seven key federal agencies spent more than an estimated $6.5 billion in

fiscal year 1997 on federal efforts to combat terrorism, excluding classified

programs and activities. Some key agencies’ spending on terrorism-related

programs has increased dramatically. For example, between fiscal

year 1995 and 1997, FBI terrorism-related funding and staff-level

authorizations tripled, and Federal Aviation Administration spending to

combat terrorism tripled.

We also reported that key interagency management functions were not

clearly required or performed. For example, neither the National Security

Council nor the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was required to

regularly collect, aggregate, and review funding and spending data relative

to combating terrorism on a crosscutting, governmentwide basis. Further,

neither agency had established funding priorities for terrorism-related

programs within or across agencies’ individual budgets or ensured that

individual agencies’ stated requirements had been validated against threat

and risk criteria before budget requests were submitted to the Congress.

Because governmentwide priorities have not been established and funding

requirements have not necessarily been validated based on an analytically

sound assessment of the threat and risk of terrorist attack, there is no

basis to have a reasonable assurance that funds are being spent on the

right programs in the right amounts and that unnecessary program and

funding duplication, overlap, misallocation, fragmentation, and gaps have

not occurred.4

In part, as a result of our work, the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85, Nov. 18, 1997) requires OMB to establish a

reporting system for executive agencies on the budgeting and expenditure

3

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and

Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

4

For further discussion of threat and risk assessment approaches and models, see Combating

Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments

(GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164 Combating Terrorism
of funds for programs and activities to combat terrorism. OMB is also to

collect the information and the President is to report the results to the

Congress annually, including information on the programs and activities,

priorities, and duplication of efforts in implementing the programs. OMB

recently issued its first report to the Congress on enacted and requested

terrorism-related funding for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, respectively. OMB

reported that more than 17 agencies’ classified and unclassified programs

were authorized $6.5 billion for fiscal year 1998, and $6.7 billion was

requested for fiscal year 1999. OMB’s figures are lower than ours were for

fiscal year 1997, but different definitions and interpretations of how to

attribute terrorism-related spending in broader accounts could cause a

difference of billions of dollars. What is important about the OMB effort is

that it is a first step in the right direction toward improved management

and coordination of this growing program area. But this crosscutting, or

functional, view of U.S. investments in combating terrorism, by itself, does

not tell the Congress or the executive branch whether or not the federal

government is spending the right amounts in the right areas.

Many challenges are ahead as we continue to see the need for

(1) governmentwide priorities to be set; (2) agencies’ programs, activities,

and requirements to be analyzed in relation to those priorities; and

(3) resources to be allocated based on the established priorities and

assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist attack. As an example of my

last point, if an agency spends $20 million without a risk assessment on a

security system for terrorism purposes at a federal building, and the risk of

an attack is extremely low, the agency may have misspent the $20 million,

which could have been allocated to higher risk items.

Additionally, we see opportunities in the future to apply Government

Performance and Results Act of 1993 principles to the crosscutting

programs and activities intended to combat terrorism. The act requires

each executive branch agency to define its mission and desired outcomes,

measure performance, and use performance information to ensure that

programs meet intended goals. The act’s emphasis on results implies that

federal programs contributing to the same or similar outcomes should be

closely coordinated to ensure that goals are consistent and program

efforts are mutually reinforcing.

In response to a separate requirement from the fiscal year 1998

Appropriations conference report (House Report 105-405), the Department

of Justice is drafting a 5-year interdepartmental counterterrorism and

technology crime plan. The plan, due to be completed by December 31,

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164 Combating Terrorism
1998, is to identify critical technologies for targeted research and

development efforts and outline strategies for a number of

terrorism-related issues. In developing the plan, Justice is to consult with

the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the FBI; the Central

Intelligence Agency; and academic, private sector, and state and local law

enforcement experts. While Justice’s efforts to develop an interagency

counterterrorism and technology crime plan are commendable, this plan

does not appear to have been integrated into the agencywide Government

Performance and Results Act planning system. Justice’s 1999 annual

performance plan contains a section on reducing espionage and terrorism,

and it does not mention the 5-year plan or how it plans to coordinate its

counterterrorism activities with other agencies and assess inputs, outputs,

and outcomes. Justice has recognized that it needs to continue to focus on

developing and improving crosscutting goals and indicators.

Our third observation is that there are different sets of views and an

apparent lack of consensus on the threat of terrorism—particularly WMD

terrorism. In our opinion, some fundamental questions should be

answered before the federal government builds and expands programs,

plans, and strategies to deal with the threat of WMD terrorism: How easy or

difficult is it for terrorists (rather than state actors) to successfully use

chemical or biological WMDs in an attack causing mass casualties? And if it

is easy to produce and disperse chemical and biological agents, why have

there been no WMD terrorist attacks before or since the Tokyo subway

incident? What chemical and biological agents does the government really

need to be concerned about? We have not yet seen a thorough assessment

or analysis of these questions. It seems to us that, without such an

assessment or analysis and consensus in the policy-making community, it

would be very difficult—maybe impossible—to properly shape programs

and focus resources.

Statements in testimony before the Congress and in the open press by

intelligence and scientific community officials on the issue of making and

delivering a terrorist WMD sometimes contrast sharply. On the one hand,

some statements suggest that developing a WMD can be relatively easy. For

example, in 1996, the Central Intelligence Agency Director testified that

chemical and biological weapons can be produced with relative ease in

simple laboratories, and in 1997, the Central Intelligence Agency Director

said that “delivery and dispersal techniques also are effective and

relatively easy to develop.” One article by former senior intelligence and

defense officials noted that chemical and biological agents can be

produced by graduate students or laboratory technicians and that general

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164 Combating Terrorism
recipes are readily available on the internet. On the other hand, some

statements suggest that there are considerable difficulties associated with

successfully developing and delivering a WMD. For example, the Deputy

Commander of the Army’s Medical Research and Materiel Command

testified in 1998 about the difficulties of using WMDs, noting that “an

effective, mass-casualty producing attack on our citizens would require

either a fairly large, very technically competent, well-funded terrorist

program or state sponsorship.” Moreover, in 1996, the Director of the

Defense Intelligence Agency testified that the agency had no conclusive

information that any of the terrorist organizations it monitors were

developing chemical, biological, or radiological weapons and that there

was no conclusive information that any state sponsor had the intention to

provide these weapons to terrorists. In 1997, the Central Intelligence

Agency Director testified that while advanced and exotic weapons are

increasingly available, their employment is likely to remain minimal, as

terrorist groups concentrate on peripheral technologies such as

sophisticated conventional weapons.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. we would be happy

to answer any questions at this time.

(701141) Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164 Combating Terrorism
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