NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

20-P-231

A.L.

vs.

C.D.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, C.D., appeals from the order denying his

motion to modify a G. L. c. 209A abuse prevention order entered 

against him and from the order denying his motion for 

reconsideration.1 We affirm.

Background. On January 21, 2009, the plaintiff filed an 

application for an abuse protection order under c. 209A. A oneday temporary order was entered, and after a series of 

extensions, on January 29, 2010, the order was made permanent. 

The order required the defendant to stay away from, and not to 

contact, the plaintiff and the parties' minor child. In 2013, 

the defendant successfully moved to modify the order to 

terminate the provisions requiring him to stay away from the 

1 The plaintiff did not file a brief.
2

child. In 2017, the defendant's motion to vacate the remaining 

portion of the order was denied. The defendant appealed, and a 

panel of this court affirmed the order. See A.L. v. C.D., 94 

Mass. App. Ct. 1103 (2018).

On August 26, 2019, the defendant moved to modify the abuse 

prevention order to make it "mutual." On August 28, 2019, a

judge denied the motion on the ground that the defendant had 

failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the order 

was no longer necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse.

The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration on September 

20, 2019, emphasizing that the application of c. 209A in this 

case violated his equal protection rights, and that a mutual 

order was necessary to protect him from harm. The judge denied

the motion in an order entered on September 24, 2019, stating, 

"There is no basis for a mutual order." The defendant appeals. 

Discussion. The defendant claims that the judge abused her 

discretion and violated his right to equal protection of the 

laws when she denied his motion to make the existing order 

mutual. We review a judge's decision denying a c. 209A order or 

denying a motion to vacate c. 209A order for abuse of 

discretion. See MacDonald v. Caruso, 467 Mass. 382, 391 (2014); 

S.V. v. R.V., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 813 (2019).

To be entitled to a mutual order, the defendant was 

required to establish his own entitlement to relief under 
3

c. 209A. "[A]pplications for retaliatory abuse prevention 

orders should only be allowed if the predicate conditions are 

shown and not as a prophylactic agent to prevent putative 

violations." Uttaro v. Uttaro, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 871, 875

(2002). Therefore, the defendant was required to establish that 

he was "suffering from abuse." Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 

734, 736 (2005), quoting G. L. c. 209A, § 3. In support of his 

motion, the defendant stated that he was "harmed" because the 

existing order prevented him from obtaining parole. This is not 

the type of harm contemplated by c. 209A. See Iamele, supra at

736-737 ("abuse" under c. 209A involves physical harm,

involuntary sexual relations, or placing another in fear of

imminent serious physical harm); Uttaro, supra at 873 (obtaining 

abuse prevention order "requires proof of some act that places 

the complainant in reasonable apprehension that force may be 

used"; fear of arrest due to plaintiff's selective enforcement 

of abuse prevention order insufficient). As the defendant made 

no showing of abuse, the judge did not abuse her discretion by 

declining to make the order mutual. 

As to the defendant's equal protection claim, we discern no 

error. His motion for a mutual order was evaluated under the 

same definition of "abuse" that was applied to the plaintiff's 

application. To the extent the defendant argues that the judges

issuing or extending the original c. 209A order did not properly 
4

apply the standard, or erroneously issued the order "simply 

because it seem[ed] to be a good idea," Smith v. Joyce, 421 

Mass. 520, 523 n.1 (1995), his time to challenge the original 

order has long passed. See MacDonald, 467 Mass. at 387-388; 

Iamele, 444 Mass. at 742. To modify or terminate the order, the 

defendant was required to "show by clear and convincing evidence 

that, as a result of a significant change in circumstances, it 

is no longer equitable for the order to continue because the 

protected party no longer has a reasonable fear of imminent 

serious physical harm" (emphasis added). Cordelia C. v. Steven

S., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 635, 639 (2019), quoting MacDonald, supra

at 382-383. The defendant made no such showing. See MacDonald, 

supra at 393 (defendant's affidavit stating he had "moved on 

with his life" insufficient to demonstrate he had "'moved on'

from his history of domestic abuse and retaliation"). The 

possibility that the existing order hurt his chances of 

obtaining parole was not a relevant consideration. 

Conclusion. The order docketed August 28, 2019, denying 

the motion to modify, is affirmed. The order docketed September 
5

24, 2019, denying the motion for reconsideration, is affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Massing, 

Ditkoff & Singh, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: August 3, 2023.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.