COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Petty, Malveau x and Senior Judge Annunziata Argued by teleconference

FARAH KHAKEE MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No . 2001-18-4 JUDGE MAR Y BENNETT MALVEAUX AUGUST 27, 2019 DAVID W. RODENBERGER

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY David Bernhard, Judge Farah Khakee, pro se . Camille A. Crandall (Hicks Crandall Juhl PC, on brief), for appellee.

Farah Khakee (“wife”) appeals an order of the Fairfax County C ircuit Court finding her in contempt for failing to pay cer tain sums to David W. Rodenbe rger (“husband”). Wife assigns fifteen errors to the circuit co urt, as discussed below. For t he reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the c ircuit court.
I. BACKGROUND On appeal, this Court views the evidence in the light most favo rable to husband, the party who prevailed below. O’Rourke v. Vuturo, 49 Va. App. 139, 145 (2006). So viewed, the evidenc e establishes that w ife and husband divor ced on July 30, 2013. The parties agreed that they w ould have joint legal custody and that wife would have primary physical custody of their two minor children. Their agreement was memorialized in a final custody and visitation order of the circuit court.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - The parties also entered into a s ettlement agreement. The agre ement provided that husband would pay wife “an award of spousal and child support f or one year from . . . July 1st [2013]” and that the award woul d be “nonmodifiable” and “withou t prejudice . . . to [husband] regarding child support.” Both part ies affirmed that the agree ment, which was read into the record, “resolv[ed] all issues in [the] case,” including equita ble distribution, child support, spousal support, and the grounds f or the divorce. The agreemen t was silent on attorney’s fees. The circuit court’s final order of divorce incorporated the set tlement agreement. It also provided that husband would maintai n health and dental insuranc e for the children and that certain expenses that were not c overed by husband’s insurance w ould be shared by the parties. In its final order, the circuit court noted its jurisdiction pursuant to Code § 20-107.3(K) “for the entry of such further Orders as may be necessary to effectuate or enforce the term s of this Order, the Custody Order and the parties’ Agreement.” Subsequently, husband filed a mo tion to modify custody, and wif e filed a motion for continued spousal support and modi fied child support. On May 1 8, 2015, the circuit court entered an order on these motions. The court transferred prima ry physical custody of both children to husband and awarded h im child support. It also est ablished a specific pro rata basis upon which the parties would reimb urse each other for the reaso nable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the child ren that were not covered by husban d’s insurance. Fur ther, the court awarded husband attorney’s fees t o be paid by wife within one y ear. The court reserved the issue of wife’s request for spousal support and dismissed her request at a subsequent hearing. On November 30, 2015, husband filed a pe tition for rule to show cause alleging that wife had violated the terms of the May 18, 2015 order by failing to pay her share of certain medical expenses. The circuit court entered an orde r on March 10, 2016 , which found wife in contempt- 3 - and ordered her to pay husband her share of unreimbursed medica l expenses and husband’s attorney’s fees. On June 28, 2016, this Court entered an order disposing of wife ’s appeal of several orders entered by the circuit court . See Khakee v. Rodenberger, No. 0 008-16-4 (June 28, 2016). We held that husband was entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in curred in connec tion with wife’s appeal of the orders and remande d for the circuit court “to seta reasonable award of attorney’s fees and costs incurred by [husba nd] in this appeal.” Id. at * 5. On December 6, 2017, wife filed another motion to modify spousa l and child support. Husband filed a motion to dismiss. Following a May 23, 2018 he aring, the circu it court granted husband’s motion to dismiss with prejudice and awarded him atto rney’s fees and costs. Wife appealed that order to this C ourt, and the matter remained on a ppeal during the proceedings at issue here. See Khakee v. R odenberger, No. 0990-18-4 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2019). Husband filed a petition for rule to show cause on May 16, 2018 . He requested that the circuit court find wife in contem pt for failure to comply with its May 18, 2015 and March 10, 2016 orders and requested that wife be ordered to pay child sup port arrears, her prorated portion of unreimbursed medical and dental expenses, and his existing a wards of attorney’s fees with interest. Husband further aske d that wife be ordered to pay th e attorney’s fees and costs he incurred in pursuing his s how cause petition. Also on May 16, 2018, husband filed a motion to establish the attorney’s fees a nd costs awarded by this Court o n June 28, 2016, and to establish a payment plan for those fees a nd the fees awarded by the circuit court on March 10, 2016. On October 19, 2018, wife filed moti ons for leave to file petit ions for spousal support and pendente lite spousal support and to modif y or suspend her child support obl igation. 1 At a

1 Prior to these filings, wif e filed, on September 4, 2018, a “N otice of Federal Younger Alert.” In that document, wife stated that she was “giving her formal federal Younger doctrine alert, as to any and all federal questions raised within these proceedings that may still lack proper- 4 - November 9, 2018 hearing on the motions, husband noted that wif e had appealed the denial of her previous motion with respe ct to support matters and that th e appeal was still pending before this Court. The circuit court denied wife’s motions, citing Gr eene v. Greene, 223 Va. 210 (1982), and explaining to wife that “you noted an appeal and . . . the noting of that appeal . . . transfers jurisdiction from the lower court to the appellate co urt.” On November 20, 2018, the circuit c ourt heard husband’s petitio n for rule to show cause and his motion to establish attorney’s fees and a payment plan. Husband detailed the amounts owed to him under the existing c ourt orders. He also provided an attorney’s fees affidavit for the expenses incurred in connection w ith the petition for rule to s how cause and motion to establish attorney’s fees. In addition, husband also noted that wife was a licensed New York attorney with assets, and in prior proceedings she had produced documents sho wing she held a retirement account worth over half a million dollars. Thus, husband argue d, “she does not have the ability to argue that she can not [ sic ] pay.” Wife, appearing as a self-repres ented party, atte mpted to intro duce documents relating to what she described as “the underl ying problem” of child and spo usal support. Husband objected on hearsay and relevance grounds. T he circuit court sustained husband’s objection, noting that such matters were “collateral” and “not something that I can de al with here.” The court made clear that “there’s two questi ons here. One is do you owe the money? And . . . they’ve

resolution in compliance with w ritten law.” In her twelfth ass ignment of error, wife argues that the circuit court erred “when it ignored the filed Notice of Yo unger Doctrine.” However, wife’s notice did not request any speci fic relief from the circuit cou rt and she did not argue at the November 20, 2018 contempt hearing tha t the notice required anyspecific action by the court. Regardless of whatever federal purposes wife’s notice may have served, she did not obtain any ruling on her notice. It is well es tablished that where an app ellant “requested no relief” and “failed to obtain a ruling from t he [circuit] court,” that appe llant “was denied nothing by the [circuit] court, and there is no r uling for us to review.” Fis her v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 447, 454 (1993). Because there is no ruling for us to review w ith respect to wife’s “Notice of Federal Younger Alert,” we do not a ddress wife’s twelfth assign ment of error.- 5 - introduced orders a nd they’ve had te stimony. Two, can you pay it?” The court acknowledged that wife might not prefer to liqui date some of her retirement holdings in order to satisfy any purge provisions but noted that that “doesn’t mean you don’t ha ve the ability to pay.” Wife testified on her own behalf. S he stated that she did some work for a law firm and also that she owned a timeshare . Wife questioned the court’s “ authority to do anything that’s not in [the] settlement agreement,” which she claimed provided for the parties to each pay their own attorney’s fees. Wife reiterate d that she believed the extant court orders were “very unfair” and “illegal” and that husband “fra udulently procured the initial c ontempt finding” against her. The circuit court found that husband was owed the amounts of ch ild support arrears, unreimbursed medical expenses, a nd attorney’s fees that he clai med and that wife had the funds to pay, and that it would be “up t o [wife] how she wants to [pa y] it.” The court told wife that she would be held in civil contempt a nd jailed if she did not pay b y January 11, 2019. It also reiterated that in enforcing its prior orders, its “discretion” was “restricted. . . . I can’t collaterally -- I can’t look behi nd the orders to what, if any, defects are there.” The circuit court entered a November 20, 2018 contempt order wh ich detailed the sums owed to husband. The order explicit ly excluded the attorney’s fees awarded in connection with wife’s motion to modify support, t he denial of which was on app eal with this Court. Wife was ordered to pay husband by Ja nuary 4, 2019, in order to purge he r contempt, but the order did not include the court’s directive from the bench that wife would be jailed if she failed to pay. Wife filed a motion for reconsid eration and for a suspending or der on December 11, 2018. On December 17, 2018, the circuit court denied the motio n in an order that stated that wife “filed her motion on the last day the Court would have had jurisdiction to change its order,- 6 - which thus did not reach the [court] in time to consider a susp ending order as no copy was left with Chambers . . . directing the m atter be given the [court’s] immediate attention.” Wife appealed the circuit court’ s contempt order to this Court.
II. ANALYSIS As an initial matter, we note that as the party alleging rever sible error by the circuit court, “[t]he burden is on [wife] . . . to s how that reversal is justi fied.” D’Agnese v. D’Agnese, 22 Va. App. 147, 153 (1996); see also T homas v. Thomas, 40 Va. App . 639, 644 (2003). Further, this Court will not “search the r ecord for error[s] in order to interpret [wife’s ] contention and correct deficiencies in a bri ef.” West v. West, 59 Va. App. 22 5, 235 (2011) (quoting Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56 (1992)). Nor is it this Court’ s “function to comb through the record . . . in order to ferret-out for ourselves the validity of [her] claims.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 666, 674 (2015) (quoting Fitzgerald v . Bass, 6 Va. App. 38, 56 n.7 (1988) ( en banc )). We also note that a self-repr esented litigant “is no less bound by the rules of procedure and substantive law th an a defendant represented by c ounsel.” Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 319 (1987) ( quoting Church v. Common wealth, 230 Va. 208, 213 (1985)); see also Francis v. Francis, 30 Va. App. 584, 591 (199 9) (noting that even self-represented litigants must comply with the rules of court)

. The Circuit Court’s Authority a nd Jurisdiction to Enter the Con tempt Order (Assignment of Error One) Wife argues that the circuit co urt erred in entering its contem pt order where it lacked “authority . . . under . . . Code § 20- 109(C) and the Settlemen t Agreement” between the parties. 2

2 Wife also argues that the circu it court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter its contempt order. We note that the jurisdiction of circuit court s over divorce and related matters has been established by the Gener al Assembly by statute. See, e.g., Westbrook v. Westbrook, 5 Va. App. 446, 455 (1988) (acknowledging c ourts’ statutory juris diction over di vorce); Fry v. Schwarting, 4 Va. App. 173, 178 (1987) (acknowledging courts’ s tatutory jurisdiction over child- 7 - She contends that Code § 20-109(C) limits the power of a circui t court to modify a settlement agreement and prohibits a court from imposing fees or condition s that are not part of the terms of the agreement. Wife further ar gues that the settlement agreeme nt’s terms “require [husband] to pay spousal and child support and . . . his own attorneys’ fees ” and “do[] not allow an award of attorneys’ fees to either party.” Consequently, she maint ains, the circuit court’s cont empt order “[i]mpermissibly [r]ewrites” the parties’ settlement agreement. Code § 20-109(C) provides, in pe rtinent part, that In suits for divorce . . . if a s tipulation or contract . . . i s filed before entry of a final decree, no decree or order directing the payme nt of support and maintenance for the spouse, suit money, or counsel fee or establishing or imposing a ny other condition or consideratio n, monetary or nonmonetary, shall be entered except in accordance with that stipulation or contract. “‘[S]ettlement agreements are contracts and are subject to the same rules of construction that apply to the interpretati ons of contracts generally.’ We review a court’s in terpretation of the parties’ agreement de novo ” and “‘are not bound by the [circu it] court’s conclusions as t o the construction of . . . disputed prov isions.’” Jones v. Gates, 6 8 Va. App. 100, 105 (2017) (citation omitted) (first quoting Southerland v. Est. of Southerland, 249 Va. 584, 588 (1995); then quoting Smith v. Smith, 3 Va. App. 510, 513 (1986)). Wife relies upon the language of Code § 20-109(C) to argue that the parties’ settlement agreement, which was stipulated p rior to entry of the final ord er of divorce, precluded the circuit court from entering any subseque nt orders relating to child sup port and attorney’s fees, including the November 20, 2018 contempt orde r. This argument is withoutmerit, for two reasons. First, we note that the 2013 set tlement agreement only provided for a one-year award of spousal and child support to wife , which was nonmodifiable duri ng its term but explicitly did not

support). Jurisdiction to hear a nd rule on such matters is wel l established in the Code. See, e.g., Code §§ 20-96, -107.2, and -107.3.- 8 - prejudice husband’s ability to l ater seek child support. Thus, following the expiration of the one-year term, wife was no longe r entitled to receive spousal s upport under the agreement and father was not precluded from pur suing child support. We also note that the circuit court possessed statutory authority t o subsequently modify the partie s’ child support arrangements. See Code § 20-108 (providing that a child support decree may, u pon motion of the court or petition of certain parties, subsequently be “revise[d] and alt er[ed]” and the court may “make a new decree . . . as the circumstances of the parents and the be nefit of the children may require”). The court did modify those arrangements by its May 18, 2015 ord er awarding father both primary physical custody and ch ild support, and that order beca me final when wife did not appeal within twenty-on e days. See Rule 1:1. Second, contrary to wife’s assert ion, the settlem ent agreement did not require husband to pay his own attorney’s fees, and t he agreement’s silence on suc h fees did not preclude the circuit court from making subsequent awards of attorney’s fees to husband. The parties stipulated that the settlement agreement “resolv[ ed] all issues in [the] case,” including equitable distribution, child support, spousal support, a nd the grounds for the divorce . Thus, the settlement agreement’s silence on attorney’s fees made clear that the is sue of such fe es was not before the circuit court and was not subject to the terms of the agreement. Since those fees were not covered by the agreement, husband was free to s eek—and the court was free to a ward—attorney’s fees for the costs of subsequent proceedi ngs. See Jones, 68 Va. App. at 105 (noting that where a settlement agreement does not contain a pr ovision governing fee disputes, an award of attorney’s fees and costs is a matter for the circuit court’s sound discretion). T he court awarded such fees by its March 10, 2016 order, and that order became final when twenty-o ne days passed without wife filing an appeal. See Rule 1:1.- 9 - For these reasons, we reject w ife’s argument and hold that the circuit court did not lack authority to enter its Novem ber 20, 2018 contempt order and tha t the order did not impermissibly rewrite the parties’ settlement agreement. The Pendency of a Prior Appeal (Assignment of Error Two) Wife argues that the circuit co urt erred when it entered its co ntempt order during the pendency of her prior appeal to this Court concerning support a nd attorney’s fees. She contends that during the November 9, 2018 he aring on wife’s motions withrespect to support, the circuit court “ruled that it has no s ubject matter jurisdiction over su pport and arrearages, since the filing of a Notice of Appeal, under Greene v. Greene, 223 Va. 210 (198 2).” Consequently, she argues, “[s]ince the trial C ourt lack[ed] jurisdiction over [her] suppo rt and arrearages, it lack[ed] jurisdiction over [ husband’s] support and fee claims, which are inextricably intertwined.” Greene and its progeny make clear that “[t]he orderly administr ation of justice demands that when an appellate court acq uires jurisdiction over the parties involved in litigation and the subject matter of their controversy , the jurisdiction of the [circui t] court from which the appeal was taken must cease.” Greene, 223 Va. at 212 (emphasis added) ; see also Reaves v. Tucker, 67 Va. App. 719, 727 (2017); McCoy v. McCoy, 55 Va. App. 524, 528 (2010). Jurisdiction transfers from the circuit to the appellate court when the appe al is filed and docketed in the clerk’s office of the appellate court. Holden v. Holden, 35 Va . App. 315, 326 (2001). Wife misconstrues the meaning and import of the circuit court’s ruling with respect to Greene. At the November 9, 2018 hearing, husband noted that wi fe had appealed the denial of her prior motion seeking modifi cation of support and that the a ppeal was still pending before this Court. Citing Greene, the circuit court denied wife’s motions and explained to her that noting her appeal had transferred juris diction to this Court. However , when wife filed and docketed her appeal, that appeal only deprived the circuit court of “the sub ject matter of the[] controversy”- 10 - pertinent to the denied motion— i.e., whether the court should m odify the parties’ support arrangements going forward. Gr eene, 223 Va. at 212. Wife’s ap peal did not, as she contends, deprive the circuit court of jurisdicti on over all matters rela ting to the parties’ then-existing support arrangements, and in partic ular did not deprive it of j urisdiction to issue orders enforcing the terms of those arrangements . Thus, contrary to wife’s asse rtion, the circuit court’s November 9, 2018 ruling did not constitute a fi nding that it lacked juri sdiction over arrearages or the support due from wife pending res olution of her appeal, and it does not require this Court to find that the court lacked jurisdi ction “over [husband’s] support an d fee claims.” Consequently, we hold that the circuit court di d not err when it entered its con tempt order during the pendency of wife’s appeal of the denial of her motion to modify support. The Application of Rule 1:1 (Assignment of Error Three) Wife argues that the circuit co urt erred when it entered its co ntempt order because that order “violates Rule 1:1.” Sp ecifically, she contends that the court’s final order of divorce was a final order under the terms of R ule 1:1(b), and thus the circui t court lacked jurisdiction to issue any further orders with respect to the parties’ divorce. Conse quently, she maintains, she cannot be found in contempt for failing t o obey the court’s subsequentorders that she pay certain sums to husband because those orders are “all unlawful under Rule 1: 1.” “[A]s a question of law, the int erpretation of one of the Rules of [the Supreme] Court is subject to de novo review.” Northern Va. Real Est., Inc. v. Ma rtins, 283 Va. 86, 102-03 (2012). Rule 1:1(a) provides, in pertin ent part, that “[a]ll final judg ments, orders, and decrees . . . shall remain under the control of the trial court and subject t o be modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer.” I n turn, Rule 1:1(b) defines the qualities that make a judgment , order, or decree final and thus subject to expiration of the court’s jurisdiction after twenty-one da ys, “[u]nless otherwise provide d by rule or statute.”- 11 - Here, in its final order of divor ce, the circuit court noted it s jurisdiction pursuant to Code § 20-107.3(K) to enter “such further Orders as may be necessaryto effectuate or enforce the terms of this Order, the Cust ody Order and the parties’ Agreeme nt.” Code § 20-107.3(K)(2) provides that circuit courts may “[p]unish as contempt of court any willful failure of a party to comply with the provisions of a ny order made by the court under this section.” Further, subsection F of the statute provide s that circuit courts may co nsider, “upon motion of either party . . . whether an order for s upport or maintenance of a sp ouse or children shall be entered or, if previously entered, whether s uch order shall be modified or vacated.” Code § 20-107.3(F). Thus, the circuit court posse ssed, as “provided by . . . statut e” in Code § 20-107.3, the jurisdiction to enforce its fina l order of divorce and to issue and enforce further orders with respect to the parties’ divorce . Rule 1:1(b); see also Kahn v. McNicholas, 67 Va. App. 215, 228 (2017) (acknowledging a trial co urt’s authority to enforce a fi nal decree of divorce through its contempt powers and the operation of Code § 20-107.3). Accordi ngly, and contrary to wife’s argument, Rule 1:1(b) did not im pose finality on the circuit co urt’s final order of divorce after twenty-one days. We thus hold tha t the circuit court did not e rr in entering further orders in this matter, including the contempt or der at issue in this appeal. 3 Creating a “Back Door” to Inva de a Retirement Account (Assignment of Error Four) Wife argues that the circuit erred by entering its contempt ord er because the order “creates a ‘back door’ to invade a retirement account where the re is no qualified domestic relations order.” She contends that the circuit court’s “findi ng that the retirement account

3 To the extent that wife, in he r third and fourth assignments o f error, also argues that the circuit court improperly utili zed its contempt power to “requir e” or “order” her to make an early withdrawal from her retirement account, we address that argumen t below.- 12 - without a [qualified domestic re lations order] . . . creates a ‘current and actual’ ‘ability to pay,’ is erroneous as a matter of law, arbitrary and capricious, and a c lear abuse of di scretion.” To the extent that wife’s assi gnment of error challenges the ci rcuit court’s finding that she has the ability to pay the amounts owed, we hold that wife has waived any such argument. Neither in closing argument at t he hearing, nor when the court ruled from the bench, nor on the court’s written contempt order did wife specifically object to the court’s finding that she has the ability to pay. “Rule 5A:18 requi res that object ions to a tria l court’s . . . ruling be made with specificity in order to preserve an issue for appeal. A trial court must be alert ed to the precise issue to which a party obj ects.” Fox v. Fox, 61 Va. App. 185, 201 (2012) (citation omitted); see also Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 515 ( 1991) (noting that a lit igant “may meet the mandates of Rule 5A:18 in many ways,” by mak ing clear the ground for an obj ection in closing argument, on the court’s written order, or in amotion to set aside the verd ict or a motion to reconsider). 4 The rule functions to “ensure tha t any perceived error by the trial court is ‘promptly brought to the attention of the trial court with sufficien t specificity that the alleged error ca n be dealt with and timely addressed and corrected w hen necessary.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 131 (1989)). Because wif e did not object to the trial court’s finding that she has the ability to pay, we will not consider her argument on this i ssue on appeal. Due Process and Equal Protection (Assignments of Error Se ven, Eight, and Nine) Wife argues that the circuit co urt erred in entering its contem pt order because the court “failed to provide due proce ss . . . [and] equal protection und er the Virginia and U.S.

4 Although wife filed a motion for r econsideration, for the reas ons discussed below the circuit court did not have an opportunity to rule on the merits of that motion and thus the arguments advanced in it were notpreserved. Further, wife has not advanced good cause or ends of justice arguments with respectto this assignment of error, and this Court will not consider such arguments sua sponte . See Mayer v. Corso-Mayer, 62 Va. App. 713, 717 n.1 (2014); Kolesnikoff v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 396, 403 (2009).- 13 - Constitution.” However, wife failed to preserve any due proces s or equal protection arguments in the circuit court. Wife first contends that the ci rcuit court deprived her of due process and equal protection under the law by finding her in con tempt where she “simply has an ‘inability to pay’” and is a

“ bone fide insolvent.” As noted above, the circuit court found that wife had the ability to pay the sums owed to husband and wife di d not object to that finding. Having thus waived any argument that she is insolvent and unable to pay, wife has consequently waived any argument that the circuit court’s contempt finding violated her constitutional ri ghts on that basis. See Rule 5A:18; Roberts v. Roberts, 41 Va. App. 513, 525 (2003) (noting that “[ t]he requirements of Rule 5A:18 apply equally to constitutional claims”). Wife further contends that the circuit court violated her right s to due process and equal protection by ordering her to pay cer tain sums that were “outsi de the scope of the Rule to Show Cause” or “not referenced i n the Rule to Show Cause.” 5 However, wife did not argue before the circuit court that any of the sum s at issue were not encompasse d by husband’s rule to show cause or were otherwise not properly be fore the court. Consequently, wife waived any argument that the sums complained of were beyon d the scope of the proceedings and that ordering her to pay them thus violated her equal pr otection and due process rights. See Rule 5A:18; Roberts, 41 Va. App. at 525. For the above reasons, we do not consider the issues raised in wife’s seventh, eighth, and ninth assignments of error. 6

5 The attorney’s fees awarded to husband by this Court on June 2 8, 2016, were not encompassed by husband’s petition f or rule to show cause but we re encompassed by his motion to establish attorney’s fees a nd a payment plan. Both matters were before the circuit court at the November 20, 2018 contempt hearing.

6 Wife raises additional due process arguments on brief which we also decline to consider. First, wife asserts th at “the trial court deprived [ her] of ‘due process’ when it- 14 - Finding of Ability to Pay and Requi ring Early Withdrawal from R etirement Fund (Assignment of Error Eleven) Wife argues that the circuit co urt erred in “ruling that there was an ability to pay without an analysis of income and expens es, and requiring an early with drawal . . . from a retirement
account.” As noted above, wife did not argue inability to pay in closing argument, did not object to the court’s finding that she could pay the sums at issue when t he court ruled from the bench, and did not note an objection to the f inding on the court’s written contempt order. Consequently, she waived any objection to the circui t court’s finding that she ha s the ability to pay the sums detailed in its contempt order. See Rule 5A:18. To the extent that wife argues the circuit court erred in “requ iring an early withdrawal” from her retirement fund, we find no evidence of such a require ment in the record. The circuit court determined that wife was able to pay the sums sought by h usband but did not specify how, exactly, she was to do so. Inst ead, in ordering wife to pay, i t instructed her that “it will be up to

circumvented Black Letter contract and lien law concerning what . . . [it] conceded were ‘monetary judgments’ as opposed t o ‘Domestic Support Obligation s.’” To the extent that wife’s argument on this matter is articul ated on brief, it is clear th at no such argument was presented to the circuit court and thus the a rgument is waived. See Rule 5A :18. Second, wife alleges that the contempt order was improper becau se the underlying orders which the court sought to enfor ce were “fraudulently procured, through extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, [and] without ‘due proce ss,’” and were thus “Void or Voi dable.” Thus, wife’s argument is an attempt to utilize a due pro cess argument in the service of a collateral attack upon preexisting court orders. See Matthews v. Matthews, 277 Va. 522, 527 (2009 ) (noting that “[a] collateral attack is an attempt to impeach a judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of annulling or reviewing that judgm ent”). Although wife attempte d at the hearing to collaterally attack the orders which husband s ought to enforce, the circuit court noted that it did not have the authority to relitigate prior court orders. On appeal, wife di d not assign error t o the circuit court for failing to consider her a ttack upon the underlying orders, and thus wife’s argument regarding the underlying orders with respe ct to due process is not proper ly before this Court. See Fox v. Fox, 61 Va. App. 185, 202 (2012) (noting tha t “Rule 5A:20(c) re quires us to hold that [an] issue is waived” when it is not incl uded in an appellant’s assignment s of error). Third, wife argues she was denied due process because the circu it court’s contempt order violates federal consumer prot ection laws. For the reasons not ed below, this issue, which was raised solely in wife’s motion f or reconsideration, was not pre served.- 15 - [her] how she wants to do it.” Consequently, we hold there was no error by the circuit court as alleged by wife. Cruel and Unusual Punishment i n Violation of the Eighth Amendme nt (Assignment of Error Thirteen) Wife argues that the circuit co urt erred in using its contempt power to threaten her with “incarceration for failure to pa y civil ‘monetary judgments[,]’ ” which “is illegal under the . . . 8th . . . Amendment[] as ‘cruel and unusual punishment.’” 7 Here, although the circuit court ruled from the bench that wife would be jailed if she did not purge her contempt by a certai n date, the court’s written c ontempt order contained no incarceration provision. “It is we ll established in this Commo nwealth that a circuit court speaks only through its written order s,” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006), and that “those orders are presumed to accurately reflect what transpire d” at trial, Rubino v. Rubino, 64 Va. App. 256, 265 (2002) (quoting McB ride v. Commonwealth, 24 V a. App. 30, 35 (1997)). “This presumption also applies where an order conflicts with a transcript of related proceedings.” Marttila v. Cty. of Lync hburg, 33 Va. App. 592, 598 (2000). Be cause we are guided by the circuit court’s written order, w hich did not threaten wife withincarceration if she failed to purge

7 Wife’s thirteenth assignment of error also alleges that the ci rcuit court’s conduct was “illegal under the 5th . . . and 14th Amendments as ‘cruel and unusual punishment’” and was “a deprivation of Constitutional ri ghts, privileges and immunities .” Wife made no argument to the circuit court with respect to a ny putative violation of her Fif th Amendment rights, and thus we hold that wife has waived any such argument before this Court. See Rule 5A:18. To the extent that wife raises arguments in this assignment of error which re late to the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Ame ndment, we note, as discussed above, that wife failed to preserve any equal protection arguments. With respect to wife’ s “privileges and immunities” contention, wife made no argument to the circuit court about an y specific constitutional privileges and immunities which w ere allegedly at issue. Conse quently, we hold that wife failed to preserve any argument with r espect to privileges and immunit ies on appeal. See id.- 16 - her contempt, we conclude there i s no basis for wife’s argument . Consequently, we hold the trial court did not err as alleged by wife. 8
Denial of Wife’s Motion for Reconsideration (Assignments of Error Five, Six, Ten, Fourteen, and Fifteen) Wife’s fifteenth assignment of e rror argues that the circuit co urt erred in denying her motion for reconsideration. She presents no specific argument on brief as to why the denial of her motion was error. “Motions . . . to reconsider a pr ior ruling involve matters who lly in the discretion of the trial court.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 104, 109 (20 13). Thus, “[w]e review a trial court’s denial of a moti on to reconsider for an abuse of discretion.” Winston v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 620 (2004). “Final judgments, orders and decr ees ‘shall remain under the co ntrol of the trial court and [may] be modified, vacated, or sus pended for twenty-one days af ter the date of entry and no longer.’” Wells v. Shenandoah Va lley Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 56 Va. App. 208, 213 (2010) (alteration in origin al) (quoting Rule 1:1). “[T]he running of the twenty-one day time period prescribed by Rule 1:1 may be int errupted only by the entry, wi thin . . . [that] period, of an order modifying, vacating, or suspending the final judgment order.” Coe v. Coe, 66 Va. App. 457, 468 (2016) (quoting Super Fresh F ood Mkts. of Va. v. Ruffin, 263 Va . 555, 560 (2002)). “Neither the filing of post-trial or pos t-judgment motions, nor the tria l court’s taking such motions under consideration, nor the pendency of such motions on the twenty-first day after final judgment, is

8 In connection with this assignmen t of error, wife also asserts that she is “immune from civil, criminal and administrat ive prosecution under [Code] § 6 3.2-151[2].” That statute provides, in pertinent part, that in matters concerning reports of child abuse and neglect and subsequent investigations and judi cial proceedings, certain per sons shall generally “be immune from any civil or criminal liabil ity in connection therewith.” Wife made no argument to the circuit court in conne ction with this asse rtion, and thus her argument is waived. See Rule 5A:18; Mabe v. Wythe Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 53 Va. App. 325, 329 ( 2009) (noting that this Court will not consider arguments on appe al which were not presented to the circuit court).- 17 - sufficient to toll or extend the running of the twenty-one day time period of Rule 1:1.” Ruffin, 263 Va. at 560 (emphasis added). Here, the circuit court entered its contempt order on November 20, 2018. Wife filed her motion for reconsideration and suspending order on December 11, 2018. On December 17, 2018, the court entered an order denying the motion and explain ing that wife had “filed her motion on the last day the Court would have had jurisdiction to change its order, which thus did not reach the [court] in time t o consider a suspending order as no copy was left with Chambers . . . directing the matter be given the [court’s] immediate att ention.” Thus, the court denied wife’s motion not by ruling on its merits, but rather because w ife had filed her motion on the last day that the court had jurisd iction to consid er it and did not direct the court’s immediate attention to the motion while it still re tained its jurisdiction. Neithe r wife’s filing of her motion on the twenty-first day after entry of the contempt order, nor the pen dency of her motion on that day, was sufficient to toll or exte nd the jurisdictional limit impos ed by Rule 1:1. See Ruffin, 263 Va. at 560. Consequently, we hold that the circuit court did not a buse its discretion in denying wife’s motion for reconsideration and f or a suspending order. Further, we note that wife’s mo tion failed to preserve several issues and arguments for appeal to this Court. On appeal , wife assigns several errors t o the circuit court based upon arguments or objections which she raised solely in her motion f or reconsideration. As noted above, the court did not rule on th e merits of wife’s motion fo r want of opportunity to do so. Because there was no ruling on the merits of the arguments and objections raised solely in the motion, those matters are not pres erved for appellate review. See Rule 5A:18; Brandon v. Cox, 284 Va. 251, 256 (2012) (holding that simply filing a motion to reconsider within the twenty-one-day period prescribe d by Rule 1:1 is insufficient to preserve an issue for appellate review because the court must “h a[ve] the opportunity to rule u pon the argument that [the- 18 - appellant later] presents on app eal”); Westlake Legal Group v. Flynn, 293 Va. 344, 352 (2017) (holding that assignments of erro r were not preserved for appea l where the arguments they contained were first made in amotion to reconsider, the record contained no indication that a hearing was requested or that the motion was heard or decided, and the circuit court entered no order suspending, modifying, or va cating its pre vious order). We conclude from our examination of the record that wife’s fifth, sixth, tenth, and fourteenth assignm ents of error raise arguments or objections presented t o the circuit court solely i n wife’s motion to reconsider. Consequently, the matters encompassed by those assignments of e rror are not properly before us, and we decline to consider them. 9
III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circui t court. Affirmed.

9 Those assignments of error resp ectively alleged that the trial court erred in entering the contempt order because: (1) the order “improperly circumvented the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and invaded ‘exempt’ property followi ng an Order of Discharge” from bankruptcy; (2) the order “improperly circumvented the U.S. Consumer Protection Laws, req uiring ‘substantial due process’ before debt collection p ractices” and “exceed[ed] thre sholds for collection” under such laws; (3) husband “failed to reschedule prior proceedings on of fsets continued because [he] was unprepared for trial on Ma y 10, 2016 and the judge failed to ap pear on May 10, 2016”; and (4) the circuit court “refuse d to correct clerical errors and a rithmetic reflecting [husband], not [wife] was owed unreimbur sed medical expenses.”