Docket N os. 103620 , 103639 c ons.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

In re LEONA W., a Minor, Appellant (The People o f the St ate of

Illinois, Appellant, v. Oscar H., Appellee ).

Opinion filed April 3, 2008.

JUSTICE KARMEIER

deliver ed the jud gment of the cour t, with opinion. Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurr ed in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

This app eal arises from a judgment of the circ uit court of Cook County that fo und Oscar H. to be unfit and terminated his parental rightsto Leon a W. (L .W.), his bi ologica l daugh ter. The appella te court reversed and remanded with directions. In r e L. W. , 362 Ill. App. 3d 1106 (2005). We denied leave to appeal, but in the exercise of our supervisory

authority, we dire cted the appellate court to vacat e its judgment and reconsider the cause in light of our decisi on in In re Arthur H ., 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004). In re L .W.
, 218 Ill. 2d 540 (2006) (supervisory

order) . Followi

ng rema nd, th e appellate court reached the same conclusion i t h ad initially and once a gain reversed and remanded to the cir cuit cour t. 367 Ill. App. 3d 844. TheState and the office of the Cook County public guardian, r epresenting

the inter ests of L.W., then petitioned

our court for

leave to appeal. 210 I ll. 2d R. 315

. We allowed those petitions and consolidated them. For the

reasons that follow, we re verse the appellate court’s judgment and remand t he cause to that co urt for f urther proceed

ings.-2- L.W., the biological daughter of Osca r H., was born

in October of 1996 to Sandr

a W. , a dr

ug addic t. At t

he time of h er bi

rth, L .W. tested positive for intrau

terine cocaine exposure and sy philis. She was subseque ntly found to be

suffer ing from mental d eficits, a seizure disorder and asthma. Within weeks of her birth, L.W. was take n into protective custody by the Depa

rtment of

Children and Family Servic es (DCFS). Alth ough this was originally intend ed to be a temporary

measure, L.W

. has never lived with either of her biological parents. She is now 11 years old.
Inearly November 1996, less than three weeks after L .W.’s birth, DCFS filed a petition under section 2–13 of the Juv enile Court Act of 1987 ( 705 IL CS 405/2–13 (West 1996)) asking that the child be made a ward of the court. That request was pr edicated on D CF S’s allegation that L.W. was neglecte d within the meaning of se ction 2–3(1)(b) of

the Juvenile Court Act (705 IL CS 405/2–3( 1)(b) ( West 1996)) because her environment was injurious to her welfare. More sp ec if ic al ly, the petition alleged that the whereabouts of L .W.’s mother were currently

unkn own, that

the mothe

r had adm

itted to cocaine use thre e weeks

before L.W. w as born, a

nd that the

moth e r had failed to utilize support services which had been offere d to her. As an additional basis for requesting that L.W. be made a ward of the court, the petition also a lleg ed that th e child wa s abused w ithin the meaning of section 2–3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 IL CS 405/2–3(2 )(ii) (West 1996) ). The ground s for t hat al lega tion were t hat the mo t her or other person responsible for the child’s we lfare presented a sub stantial risk of physical injury to her because (1) the mother had a doc umented history of inadequa te supervision of the child ’s siblings

and (2) one of thos e sibling s had bee n sexually molested and sustained a fractured arm due to phy sical abuse. When DCFS initia

lly f iled it s p etition for adjudication of wardship, the identity of L .W .’s fat her was unknown. Oscar H. subseque ntly cam e forward and admitted paternity . In January of 1997, t he cir cuit court entered an order memorializing Osca r H.’s admission. By

separate order the court appointed the public de fender
to repres ent him. The petition for adju dication of ward ship was then amended to name Oscar H. as L .W.’s biological father.-3- A hearing on the petition for adjudication of wa rdship was convened Febr uary 25, 1997. I

n connection with that hearing, the parties stipu

late d tha t Sand ra W. and Oscar H. are L .W’s biological parents ; that

L.W. w as born on Oct. 21, 1996; that at the time of L.W.’s birth, Oscar H. was “non custodia l”; and th at if cal led as a witness, Judith Kilpatri ck, asocial worker wit h Cook Count

y Hospital, would testify that Sandra W. had admitte d using cocaine three weeks prior to L.W.’s birth and wished to give up the child. The parties further stipulated that Pam Rowlands, a cas ew orker with Cathol ic Charit ies, would testify that at the time L .W. was born, Sandra W. had eight ot

h er children, a ll of whom w ere in DCFS

cu st od y, and that Sa

ndra W. ha

d not complete d any drug rehabil itation se

rvices. The circuit c ourt rev

iewed the parties’ stipulations, which were read into the re cord at t

he February

25, 1997, hearing. At the conclusionof that hearing, the circuit cou rt enter ed an order which found, based on

the stipulated facts, that

L.W. was abused within the meaningof the Juvenile CourtAct because she was at substantial risk of ph ysical injury

as set forth in section 2–3(2)(ii) of the Ac t (70 5 IL CS 405/2–3(2 )(ii) (We st 1996)) . The matt er was the n set for a disp osit ional hearin g. By consent of all the parties and with approval of the court, the normal 30-day dea

dline for the dispositional hearing was waived. See 705 IL CS 405/2–21( 3) (West 19 96). The dis po sitional hearing was ult imately conducted on April 29, 1997. At the conclusion of that hearin g, the cour

t entere d a disposi

tional ord er in ac cordanc e with section2–23 of the Juvenile Cou rt Act (7 05 IL

CS 405/2–23 (

West 1996)). That orde

r made L .W. a war

d of the c ourt; fou

nd both pa

rents “unable for

some reason other than financial circumstance s alone to care f or, prote ct, train

or discipline the minor”; held that reasona ble efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the minor from the h

ome, but t hat appr

opriate service s aimed a

t family preservation

and family unifica

tion had bee n un success ful; determi ned

that it was in the best interests of L.W. to remove he r fromher parents’ custody and care; and placed L .W. in the custody of the DCFS Gua

rdianshi p Administrator with the right to place the minor. See 705 IL CS 405/2–27 (West 1996).-4- As authorized by section 2–23(2)of the Juve nile Court Act (705 IL CS 405/2–23(2) (West 1996)), the co urt a lso entered an order of protection

pursuant to se ction 2 –25 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2–25 (W est 1996)). The o rder prohibited any unsupervised contact between L.W

. and Sandra W., butallowed Oscar H. to have unsupervised day visits with the child

subject to various conditions. Finally, the cour t scheduled a prog ress report and permanency hearing for June 9, 1997.
Numerous proceeding s ensued. On May 13, 1997, Oscar H. moved to vacate the prior placement order s and to have custody of L.W. be given

to him. This was styled “emerg ency motion to return home” and was submitted on Oscar H .’s beha lf by the public defender. A hearing

on that motion was held June 9, 1997, the same date set for

the permanency

hearing and progre ss report. The result of that hearing was entry

of an agreed order

which set as a permanency goal L.W.’s “return home,” meaning her return to Oscar H.’ s home. Shortly thereafter, on June 19, 1997, a second agreed permane ncy order was entered. The new permanency orde r set as a goal L .W.’s return home to Oscar H. within 12 months. Both Sand ra W. and Oscar H. were pres ent in cou rt when this was done and both were repres ented by

counsel. Sect ion 2– 28 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 IL CS 405/2–28(2) (West 1996)) provides that permanency hearings are to be

conducted every 12 months f

ollowin g t he initial permanency hearing, more freque ntly if necessary , until the permanency plan and goal have been achieved. In accorda

nce with that requirement, four additional permanency

hearings were conducted by the circui t court between 1998 and 2001. Throughout these proceeding s, the goal remained returning L.W. to Oscar H

. Another pe rm an en cy h ea ri ng wa s h el d i n F eb ru ar y of 2 002. Following that hearing, a hearing officer recommended a

n ew goa l: substitute care pending a determination by t he court as to whether the biological parents’ parental rights should be terminated a nd a guardian appointed with authority to consent to L.W.’s adoption. Oscar H., through his attorney , object e d to this recommendation, arguing that the other childre n he had f athere d with

Sandra W. reside with him, he had proven his ability to car e for those children and for L.W., and it wou

ld be in L .W.’s best in terests for her to come live-5- with him as well. In Os car H.’s view, the appropriate per manency goal sho uld have b een ret

urn of L .W. to him with

in 5 months. The circuit c ourt rej ected Oscar H.’s arg uments and entered a permanency

order setting as a goal the plac ement of L.W

. with a private guardian. The intended gua rdian was a nonrelative foster parent with whom L.W. had

been living since shortly

after her birth. The reasons stated in the o rder f or selecting this goal and rejecting previous goals were that L .W., who was thenfive, had lived with the foster parent n ea rl y her entire life; L.W.’s mother was not wor king toward reunification; L.W.’s father, Osc ar H., had not made

reasona ble progress toward reunification; and the foster p arent wo uld allow continue d contact with L.W .’ s b io lo gi ca l f

am il y. The planned date for achievement of the goa l was the following October.
Inthe mo nths which follo wed, t he pub lic gua rdian sough t and

w as grante d approv al to allow L.W. to move out of

state with he r foster parent. At the end of the y ear, the courtentered a new permanency

order setting as a goal substitute car e pend ing a determination

as to whethe rthe biolog ical par ents’ pa rental r ights should be terminated. The reasons given for this goal were that

L.W., thensix, had lived in“a non-relation, specialized home” since 1996; she had special needs; and her parents had “ p arti cipated in services but*** not made substantial progress toward re unific ation.” The deadline for achieving this goal wa s March of 2003. When March 2003 arrived, the State filed a petition under section 2–29 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 IL CS 405/2–29 (West 1996))

se eking appointme

nt of a g uardian with autho

rization to

consent t o L.W.’s adoption unde r th e Adoption Act (750 IL CS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)). The petition alleged that in Fe brua ry of 19 97, L .W. was found by the court to have

been abused, and that both of L.W.’s parents were unfit because they

had failed to maintain a r easonab le degreeo f inter est, concern or responsibility for the child’s welfare (see 750 I LCS 50/1(D)(

b) (West 19 96)) and

had not ma

de reas onable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from them or made reasonable progress toward r eturn of the child to the

m (see 75 0 ILCS 50/1(D) (m) (West 1996)). The petition further alleged that L.W.’s mother wa s also unfit for the additional

reasons that she had failed to protect L.W. fro m conditions in the child’s environmen t inj urious to h er welf are (se e 750 I

LCS-6- 50/1 (D)(g) (West 1996)) and that she was an habitual drunk or a drug addict (see 750 IL CS 50/1(D)(k) (W est 1996)). Finally, the petition asserted that i t would be in the child’s best interests if a guardian were appointed with the right to consent to her adoption.
A hearing on the State’s petition was convened on Aug ust 15, 2003. At the outset of that hearing, the public guar dian filed a

motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding Oscar H.’s custody

and parentingof the other

children he had fathered with Sandra W., L.W.’s moth er. Oscar H. opposed the motion, asserting that such evidence was rele

vant to the issue

of his par ental fit ness in this case. The court then d ecided to con tinu e the h earing for four day s, until August 19, 2003. In anticipation of the new hearing, the State advised the court tha

t i t was drop

ping its c laims that

the mothe

r was unf it under subsections (g) and (k) of section 1(D) of t he Adoption Act (750 IL CS 50/1(D)(g), (D)(k) (West 1996)). When the he aring r esume d on Au gust 1 9, th e court gr ant ed the public guard

ian’s in limine motion , hold ing that it would exclude evidence regarding

Oscar H.’s fitness a s a pare nt with re spect to h

is other children. The court then proceeded to hear evidence on whether Oscar H. and Sandra W. were unfit under subsections (b) or (m) o f section1(D) of t

he Adopti on Act (750 I

LCS 50/ 1(D)(b) , (D)(m) (West 1996)), a

nd, if unf it , whether

it was in the best interests of L.W

. that a g

uardia n be appointed with the power to consent to her adoption.
To support its claim of unfitness, the S tat e calle d as a witness Mary Henderson, a case supervi sor fo r Catholic Charities who had been working on L.W.’s ca se s ince 1997 . Henderson revie wed in detail the hist ory of the c ase, the details of L.W.’s condition, education, and developmental progress; the parents ’ circu

mstance s; their relationship with L.W.; the steps they had taken to correct the conditions which were the basis for removal of the child from them ; and the progress they

had made toward the return o f the chi ld to them. Based on Henderson’s testimony a nd the document

a ry evidenc e in the record, the court found that there was clear and convincing evidence
to s upport th e alleg ation tha t Oscar H . and Sand

ra W. wer

e unfit under subsection (m) of

section1(D) of t

he Adopti on Act (7 50 IL

CS 50/1(D)( m) (West 1996)) because they had failed to make re asonable efforts to correct the conditions that werethe basis for the removal of-7- L.W

. from them and had n ot made reasonable progre ss toward her
return to them. After making t his finding , the cour

t immediate ly proceed

ed to consideration

of the child’s best interests. On that question the court heard testimony from the woman who had be en serving as L .W.’s foster mother. The foster mother described L .W.’s condi ti on; the conditions in the fos ter hom e; L.W.’s relationship with the foster mother’s adopted s o n; L .W.’s involvement with the neighborhood, school and commu

nity ; and the f

oster mother’s de sire to ult imat ely adop t L. W. The court also heard testimony fr

om Gina Barrios, a social worker fromCatholic Charities currently a ssigne d t o L. W.’s case. Barrios testified about her familiarity w

ith L.W.’s case and detail ed L.W.’s
current livin g co nd it io ns an d r el at io ns hi p w it h h er fo st er fa mi ly. Barrios reported that a neighbor boy was alleged to h ave to uched L.W

. inappropriately

, an incid ent reported to a

uthoritie s by L.W.’s fost er mother. Barrios also spoke of L .W.’s medical and developmental needs and ho w th ey wer e being addressed by

the foster mother. Barri os thou ght the f oster mother should

be permi

tted to adop t L. W. Based upon the foregoi ng ev idence and after hearing closing argume nts, the circ

uit court c oncluded

that it wa s in L. W.’s b es t interest s to terminate the parental rights of both Oscar H. a nd Sandra W. and to appoint a guardian with the right to con sent to L .W.’s adoption. The court entered its termination order on Augu st

20, 2003. In that order, t

he court grante d both par

ents the r ight to a ppeal. Terminationof pare

ntal rig hts is immediate ly a

ppealab le under

Rule 307(a)(6) (188 I ll. 2d R. 307(a)(6)), and Sandra W. and Oscar H. each filed separa te notice s o f appeal within the time and in the manner required by

that rule. Sandra W.’s appe al was ult

imately found tobe without

merit, and the appellate court

affirmed the circuit court’s judgment terminating her parental rights. That decision has not been chall enged . This appeal concerns only

the challenge to the circ uit court’s judgment asserted by O scar H. As grounds for his ap peal , Oscar H. raised two issues in the appella te court: (1) whether the trial court erre d when it granted the-8- motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding hi s cus tody of the four other children he had fathered with Sandra W.; and (2) whether the trial cou

rt’s find ing of pa rental u nfitness was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidence in light of the fact that Oscar H . was fou

nd fit
t o care f or the other four children, some of whom suffer f rom the

same or similar

medical p

roblemsas L .W. The public guard ian cros sappealed, arguing

that the circuit court had erred in rejecting his claim that Sandra W. and Oscar H. were unfit for the additional reason that they had failed to maintain a reasonable deg ree of interest, concern or responsi bility for the child’s welfare within the meaning of s ection 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 I LCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 1996)). The appellate court

reversed and remanded. It he ld that the circuit

c ourt’s judgment terminating Oscar H.’s par ental rights co uld no t stand because compliance with section 2 –21 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 IL CS 405/2–21 (West 1996) ) was a precondition to a terminationhearing and, in its view , the cir cuit court’s February

25, 1 997, determination that L.W. was abused did not meet the requirements of that statute. L. W. , 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1115-16. Whether the circ uit court’s decision comported with section 2–21

was not questioned by

any of the pa

rties to the case. It was ra ised by the appella

te court sua sponte . In the appellat e court ’s view, the circuit court’s determination failed to comply with section 2–21 for
two reasons. First, while Sandra W.’s culpability for the circumstances leading to the court’s finding of abuse we re appa rent, the circuit court

had failed to identify

any fac ts which would support

a determination tha

t Oscar H ., himself

, was in a ny way responsi ble for those cir

cumstanc es. Second, the ap pellate c ourt thoug

ht th e writtenorder entered by

the circuit court was technically defi cient because it did not c o mport with

section 2 –21’s re quireme

nt that a court’s determination of abuse “sha ll be stated in writing with the factual basis supporting that determination” (705 I LCS 405/2–21(1) (West 1996)). L. W. , 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1115-16. After reachi ng this c onclu sio n, the app ellate c ourt wen t on to address whether evidenceof Oscar H.’s success in gaining custody of four of L.W.’s siblings should have been admitted. After rejecting an argument by the public g

uardian that considerations of

waiver should bar consideration of the issue, the appellate co ur t opined “that evidence that Oscar H. has been f ound fit and given custody

of four1 The court’s opinion alluded to a constitutional challeng e Oscar H. had raised, but i t pro vide d no d eta ils regar ding that chal len ge. It merely stated thatif the issue should arise in the trial court on rem and, the tria l court should consider it in light of our opinion in In re D.W

. , 214 I ll. 2d 289 (2005). See L.W. , 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1120.

-9- of L.W.’ s siblin gs is material and relevant and is one factor that should be considered

by a court making a determination on the issue of Oscar H.’s parenta

l fitness a nd ability to parent and care for L .W., the child who is the subject o f these proceedings.” L. W. , 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1120. Accordingly , the appellate court held that should the

State elect to begin these proceedings a new in the circuit court, the circuit
court should not bar O scar H . from presenting this evidence. The court did not reach any

of the other issues in the case. 1
The State petitioned our court for leave to appeal. It c ontended that the appellate court’s decision conflicted with this court’s opinion in In re Arthur

H. , 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004), because it was premised on the erroneous view that salient inquiry at the adjudicatory

hearing was whether parents wer e at fault. According to the State, the critical inquiry under Arthur H. is simply whether the child has been abused

orneglected, not who is responsible. The State next argue d t hat th e appella te court’s decision conflicted with this court’s opinion in In re Madison H.
, 215 Ill. 2d 364 (2005), and various appellate court op inions because it failed to consider whether transc ribed oral findi ngs or other

sources in the re cord we

re suff icient to allow th e reviewing court to o verlook t

he trial c ourt’s f

ailure to make the writtenfindings required by section 2–21(1) of

the Juvenile Court Act (705 IL CS 405/2–21( 1) (West 19 96)). Th e State also contended that the appellate court’s decision misinterpreted section 2– 21(2) of the Juv enile Court Act (705 IL CS 405/2–21(2) (West 1996)) by concludingth at wi th ou t t he wr it te n f in di ng s r eq ui re d b y secti on 2–21(1), a heari ng on term ination of parental rights cannot occur. Fi na ll y, the State asserted that by addressing the propriet

y of th e motion in limine and

considering what evidence would be a

dmissible
at a possible f

uture he aring, the appe llate court exceeded the proper boundaries of judicial revi ew an d issued an improper advisory opinion.2 The transcript of the February 25, 1997, hearing was not included in the origin al record on appe al. Unt il the ap pellate court sua spo nte made the findingof abuse or neg lect an issue on appeal, the parties did not know and could not have foreseen

that the transcript would be relev ant to a review o f the judgment term

inating Oscar H. ’s pa rental r ights. After t

he appe llate court’sruling mad

e the tran script re levan

t, the rec ord was

supplemente d to include it.

-10- A petition f

or leave to appea

l was also

filed by the public guardian. As had the

State, the

publi c guardian asserted that the appella te co urt was wrong to overturn the judgment terminating Oscar H.’s par ental rig hts b ased on the failure of the circuit court’s February 1997 determination

to specif y w hat actsof Oscar H. caused the child to be abused. It ag reed with the State’s con

ten tion that the appellate court’s ruling

conflicted

with this court’s decision in In re Arthur H. , 212 I ll. 2d 441 ( 2004), bu t it also challenged

the appe llate court’s decision on the additional ground s that the t ime for appealing the initial determination of abuse or neglect had passed an d the appella te court lacked

jurisdiction to revisit that determination. Even if the cour t’s deter mination w ere subj ect to re examination, the pub lic guardian contended, any

deficiencies in the written findings entered by the court were not necessarily fatal. The public guardian arg ued that under this court’s decision in In re Madison H

. , 215 Ill. 2d 364 (2005), deficiencies in the court’s written order co uld be overcome by transcribed

oral findings or other sources in the record, a nd that when the appella

te court ruled as it did here, it did so without reviewing the transcript of the F ebruary 1997 hearing on the petition for adjudicationo f ward ship. 2 Because the appellate court did not have the full basis for

the circuit court’s adjudicatory ruling before it, the public guardian asserted, that court did not know and could not have knownwhether there was, in fa ct, a suff icient ba sis for the

circuit court’s ruling n

otwithst a ndin g the ab sence o f the w ritt en fin dings required by

statute. The public guardian n ext took issue with the appellate court’s judgment onthe gro

unds that i

tappeared to have been predic ated on the mist ake n belief that L.W. had actually been physica

lly abused prior to the February

1997 he ar in g, wh en sh e h ad no t b ee n. Fi na ll y, the public g

uardia n asserted that the appellate court’s resolution of the-11- motion in limine quest ion conflicted with its prior holding in In re M.C.
, 201 Ill. App. 3d 792, 798 (1990), that a paren t’s ability to care for another child is not

relevant to the question

of wheth er he is f

it to care f or the ch ild prese ntly before the cour t. This court denied both the State’s petition for leave to appealand the petition for leave to appeal filed by the p u blic guardian. At the

same time, howe

ver, we ente red sup ervisory orde rs directing the appella te to vac ate its judgment and to reconsider the cause in lig ht

o f our opinion in In re Arthur H. , 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004). I n accordancewith our supervisory orde rs, entered at the end

of March 2006, the ap pellate court filed orders vacating its judg ment and indicating that it would reconsider the case. The State and the public guardian were granted leave

t o fil e supplemental br

iefs, an d a reply brief was filed by

Oscar H. Several months later, in September of 2006, the ap pe llate court filed a new opinion in the case. The new version wa s large ly unchanged

from the prior version. The opinion revised the court’s discussion of the re quireme nts of section 2–21 of

the Juvenile Court Act (705 I LCS 405 /2–21 (Wes t1996)) to include a reference to our opinion in In re Arthur H. , 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004), but the o ve rall analy sis remaine d unchan

ged. The court c oncluded th a t the circ

uit court’s determination of abuse or n eglect was not supported by the requisite written findings and did not provide Oscar H. with notice of the reasons supporting the determination of abuse or neglec t. Beca use the finding

of abuse or neglect was deficient, the cour topined that the
matter should not have proceeded to a hearing on the pet itio n for termi nationof parental rights. The court theref ore reversed an d remanded to the circuit court

for fur ther pro ceeding s. 367 Ill. App. 3d

a t 8 54-55. In so doing, the cour t held, as it had originally , that evidence that Oscar H . had been found fit and given custody of L.W.’s sibl ings was material and relevant and should not have been excluded. Correspondingly , the court continue d to adhere to the position that the evidence could be considered by the circ uit court i n assessing Oscar H .’s fitne ss to parent L.W. should the State ele ct to proceed with ter mina tion proc eeding s followin g rema nd. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 858-59. There being no s ig nificant change in the appellate cour t’s judgme nt, the public guardian once ag ain petitioned our court for3 There is anot her r ule pert ain ing t o adj udic ati ons o f war dshi p. Su preme Court Rule 662(a) provi des that “[a]n a ppeal m ay be taken

to the A ppellate Court from an adjudication o f wardship i n the event that an o rder of disposition

has no t been e

ntered w it h in 90 days of the adjudication of wardsh ip.” 13 4 Ill . 2d R. 662(a) . In this ca se, however, there was no such delay. The dispositional orde r was entered within 90 days of the adjudication of wardship. The ruling s were, in f a ct, ent ered si multane ously.

-12- leave to appea

l based on t he arguments it asserted in its original petition for leave to appea l. The Stat

e did likewi se. We gr

anted bot h petitions and consolidated them for briefing, argument and decision. Befor e turning to the mer

its of thes e consolidated

appeals, there is one prel iminary

matte r we must address. Oscar H. contends that because our court

denied the prior petitions for leave to appeal filed by the State and the public guardian, principles of res judicata should bar those entities from raising any of the same arguments now that the
mat ter is before us again. This argume nt is without merit. For

re s judicata to apply

, there m ust have b een a fi

nal judg ment on the

merits of the case. D enials of

petitions f

or leave to appeal are not decisions

onth e merits. People v

. Ortiz , 196 Ill. 2d 236, 257 (2001). They
cannot be interpreted as reflecting approval or disapprova l of a lower court’s action. They sig

nify only that four members of the court, for

reasons satisfac

tory to them, have not voted to grant leave to appeal. See People v. Vance , 76 I ll . 2d 171 , 183 (1979). The merits of the argume nts asserted

by the State and public g uardian are therefore properl y be fore us.
We turn then to the question of whether the appe llate court erred in setting aside the circuit court’s judgment terminating Oscar H.’ s parental rights to L.W. based on what it perc eivedas defects in the circuit court’s order of February

25, 1997, finding L.W. to be abused. The answer

to this question is yes. Theappellate court did so err. Had Oscar H. wished to challenge thevalidity of the February

1997 order, he had two opportunities to do so. First, he could have filed a petition for leave to appeal from that order pursuan t to Supreme

Court Rule 306(a)(5) (155 Ill. 2d R. 306 (a) (5)), governing appe als from interlocutory

orders affecting the

care and custody of une

mancipated

m inors, if

the appe al of such orders is not othe

rwise spe cifical ly provided for else where in these ru les. 3 Second, he could ha veRule 66 2(a) is t herefore inappli cable

.
-13- challenged

the finding of abuse by

taking an appeal from the April 29, 1997, order a

djudging L.W. a ward of the cour t, finding both pare nts “unable for some reason other than financial circ umstances alone to

care for, protect, train or discipline the minor,” and determining that it was in L .W.’s best

interest s to remov e her fr om her pa

rents’ custody and care and placing her in DCFS custody. Dispositional orde rs of this kind

are re garde d as fina

l and appe alable a s of rig ht. See In re Fait

h B.
, 216 Ill. 2d 1, 3 (2005). Appealing a dispositional order is the prope r vehicl e for challenging a f inding of abuse or neglec t. See In re Arth ur H. , 212 Ill. 2d 441 (2004) (where a permissive interlocutory a ppeal has not been sought or allowed). Appeals from final judgments entered i n pro ceedings under the JuvenileCourt Act, other than delinquent minor proceedings, are governed by t he rules applica ble to civil cases. 134 Ill. 2d R. 660(b). The rule per

taining to appeals

from fina l judgme nts is Supre

me Court Rule 301 ( 155 I ll. 2d R. 301). Where an appeal is appropriate under Rule 301, notice of appealmust be filed within 30 after entry of the final judgment from which the ap pe al is be in g t ak en or 30 da ys after entry of the order

disposing of any posttrial motions which may have been filed. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). No su ch notice of appeal was filed here. Any

error pertaining to the d ispos itional order has therefore been forfeited. See In re R.A.B. , 146 Ill. App. 3d 993, 996 (1986). More than

that, the appellate court

had no juris dicti on to go back and reconsider whether it wa s proper when made. See In re Janira T ., 368 Ill. App. 3d 883, 891 (2006).
Inchallenging

this conclusion, Oscar H. contends that it would be anomalous to bar parties from seeking review of dispositional orders after time for a

ppeal ha s passed g

iven that we have

held th a t dispositional orders may normally be modified

at any time up to final closing and discharge o f the pro ceeding s if the co urt finds t

hat it would be in the best in

terests o f the chi ld to make the modification. See In re Aust

in W. , 214 Ill. 2d 31, 43-44 (2005); 705 IL CS 405/2–23 ( West 1996 ). What Oscar H. fails to appreciate is that asking a n appella te court to re view an order of

the circ uit court on appea

l is fundame ntally different from asking

the circuit court

itself to a lter its4 A chan ge in circum stances

is not a statutory precondition to a

court’s exercise of its a

uthority to mo dify a

dispos itional order (

In re Austin W

., 214 Ill. 2d at 45), but Oscar H. has not cited and we have not found any authori ty which would p ermit any p arty to challenge a dispos itional order after the time for an appeal has passed on grounds which could have been raised on direct review

but were not.

-14- ownjudgment, and the two avenues of reco urse are subj ect to en

tirely different sets of rules and standards. M odifications , for exam ple, must be ca rr ie d o ut in a w ay n o t inconsistent with section 2–28 of the JuvenileCourt Act

(705 I LCS 405 /2–28 (Wes t 1996). 70 5 ILCS 405/2–23(2) (West 1996). That statute does notcontrol review by the appella te court. We note, moreover, that, unlike a ppeals, modifications do not normally challeng e the validity of the orig inal order. Rather, they

are typica

lly directed

to consider

ations tha t arise after the original dispositional order was entered. In re Austin W ., 214 Ill. 2d at 45. 4
Even if there had been some basis for the appellate court to reach back a nd address the validity of the circuit court’s prior order, it s dec ision t o reverse the circuit court’s judgment ter minating Oscar H.’s parenta

l rights c ould not sta

nd. I t is true that the written order of February 25, 1997, f

indin g L.W. t o be abused did not include a
statement of the fa c tual basis supporting that determination, as required b y sec tion 2–21( 1) of the Juvenile Cou

rt Act (7 05 IL

CS 405/2–21(1) (West 1996)). As noted e arlier i nthis opinion, however,
t he trial judge’s ruling was predica ted on stipulated facts that wer e read into the record, and the court clearly speci fiedthe facts it was taking into acc ount i n making its decision. The stipulations and the
state ment s were, in turn, transcribed and included in the repor t of pro ceeding s. There w as nothing specula tive abou t the tria l ju dge’ s actions. What she did and

why she did it were clearly

spelled out. The lack of detail in the actual written order therefore worked no prejudic e on any

of the pa rties. I t was a pu

rely technic al defe ct. Th is situation is directly analog ous to the one present in In r e Madi son H. , 215 Ill. 2d 364 (2005), which concer ned a trial court’s failure to comply with a compara ble written-explanation requirement
set forth in section 2–27(1) of the Juvenile Cou

rt Act (7 05 IL

CS-15- 405/2–27(1) (West 199 6)). Noting that the purpose of the writing requirement

was to give the parties notice of the reasons forming the court’s decision and to preserve the reasoning for appell ate review,

we concluded that those purposes would be served jus t as well by explicit oral findings stated during the hea ri ng and then transcribed and made part of the record. In re Madison H. , 215 Ill. 2d at 374-75. Ac co rd in gl y, we concluded that wher e an oral pronounceme nt is explicit and sufficient to advise the par ties o f the co urt’s reason ing, the statutory

require ment of a written e xplanation

will be satisfied. In

re Madison H. , 215 I ll. 2d at 37 7. We belie ve that r ationale ap plies with equal force her

e. See a lso In re Z.Z ., 312 Ill. App. 3d 800, 803- 04 (2000 ). Th e appellate court therefore e rred when it reversed the circuit court’s termination judgment based on the circuit court’s prior order of February

25, 1997. Rather than

revisiting the prior order, the appella te court should, instead, have decided Oscar H.’s cha llenge to the termination judgment

on the merits. Having failed to do so on two prior occasions, it must do so now. The final question raised by the petitions for leave to appeal filed by the State and the pu

blic gua rdian, a nd the las t is sue we m ust resolve, is whethe

r the app ellate c ourt err

ed in holdi

ng that t he circ uit
court should not have g ranted t he motion in limine regarding Oscar H.’s custody of

L.W.’ s siblings. In considering this question, we begin by noting that the matter has different signifi can ce under our disposition than it did in the a p pellate c ourt. Be cause the appell ate court rev ersed the termi

nation jud

gment ba sed on the

defect s it perceive d i n the February 25, 1997, order, its discussion of the in limine motion d id no t alter th e outcome of the ca se. I

t merely provided guidance to the circui t court in the event t he State should initiate new termi

nation pr oceedin gs. The situation is now diffe rent. Because we have c oncluded that the terminationjudgment should not have been reversed base d on the February 25 , 199 7, order, the issue before us is not whether the guidance gi v en by the appe llate court was correct. I t is, instead, whether the circ uit court’s ruling on the in limine motion provides an alternative basis for

reversing that cour t’s judg ment. We ho ld that it does not. Genera lly speaking, ev ident iary

motions, su

ch as motions in limine
, are directed to the trial court’s discretion. A trial court’s ruling5 An offer of proof is, in fact, normally mandatory

in o rd er to pr eserve for review the questio

n of whether a m

otionin limine was properly g ranted. That require

ment may

be re laxed w

here it i s appar

ent that the tria l court

-16- onsuch motions wi ll not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Harvey
, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 392 (2004). The threshol d for finding an abuse of discretion is high. A t

rial cou rt will

notbe fo und to ha ve abused its discretion with respect to an evidentiary

ruling unless it can be said that no re asonable

man would take the view a

dopted by the cour t. See Cla yton v. County of Cook
, 346 Ill. App. 3d 367, 377 (2003). Moreover, even where an abuse of discretionhas occurred, it will not warrant reversal of the judgment

u nless the record indicates the existence of substantial prejudic e affe cting the outcome of the trial. Holston v. Sisters of the T hir d Order of S

t. Francis , 165 Ill. 2d 150, 170-71 (1995). Neither of these conditions was satisfied in this case. As we have discussed, the State sought to find Oscar H. unfit on

two grounds: that he fa iled to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsi bility for L.W.’s welfare ( see 750 IL CS 50/1( D) (b) (West 1996)) and that he had not made reasonable eff orts to correct the conditions that were the basis for L.W.’s removal or made

reasona ble progre ss toward her ret

urn t o him (see

750 I LCS 50/ 1(D)(m)

(West 1996)). Both of these grounds deal specific ally

with the steps Oscar H. has taken with respect to L.W. How he ha s handled his parent a l responsibilities with

respect to L.W.’s siblings is not germane to that question. We there fore ca nnot say that no reas onable pe

rson woul d have take n the circuit court’s view in allowing the motion in limine and excluding the evidence.
We note, moreo v er, that while the circuit court granted the motion in limine , it never

theless d id hear testi mony lat er in t he pro ceedin gs that custo dy of L.W.’s sibl ings had been returned to Oscar H. The fact that Oscar H. was ap parentl y f it to parent those children was therefore before the circuit court notwithstanding the court’s ruling on the motion in limine . Although Oscar H. may not have been allo wed to present the details of the care heprovided to those other children, the approp riatecourse when faced with such a ruling was to make an offer of proof. Snelson v. Kamm , 204 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2003). 5 No suchclear ly understood the nature a

nd character of the ev

idence sought to b e introd uced. Dillon v. Evanston H ospital , 199 I

ll. 2d 4 83, 49 5 (2002 ). Althou gh the app ellate c ourt bel ieved this to be such

a case (see 36 7 Ill

. App. 3d at 8 57), its

analy sis appear s to have been based on the assum ption thatthe excluded

evidence consisted only of the fitness d eterminations and awards of custody m

ade in the siblings’ cases. Base d upon our review of the record, it appears that the evidence Oscar H. sought to admit and which the in limine ruling excluded exten d ed to othe r details

about O scar H. ’s parentingabili ty, inc luding his success in meeting social service requirements.

-17- offer was made. We therefore ha ve no basis for ascertaining how, if
at all, tha t evidenc e may

have alt ered the outcome o f the ca se. As a result, we cannot say

that allowing the motion in limine resulted in any materia

l prejudice to Oscar H. Before concluding our d i scussion, there is one final matter we
must address. The public guardian, as attorney for

L.W., argues that instead of rema

nding thi s cau se to the appellate court for consideration

of the merit s of Oscar H.’s challenge to c ircuit court’s judgment ter m inating his pare ntal rig hts, this co

urt should

address that claim directly . We have d

eclined a similar request by t he public guardian in In re Mark W

., No. 104168 (Apr il 3, 2008), a case involving factual and proc edural c ircumsta nces com parable to those present in this case. After c are ful delibe ration, w e have d

ecided t o decline direct review here as well. Nevertheless, mindful of the timesensitive nature of child custody proceedings, we accompa ny our remand with the same d irec tive we issued in In re Mark W . The appella te court is to

file its jud

gment in this matter within

60 days of the issuance of this court’s mandate.
For the foregoing reasons, the judg ment of the ap pellate c ourt is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for re view, on the merits, of the circuit court’s judgment terminating Osca r H.’s pa rental rights. The appe llate cou

rt i s h ereby

directe d to file it s judgme nt in this matter within 60 days of the issuance of this court’s mandate.

Reversed and remanded with direc tions.