I PB 5-94-3 Approved far public release; distribution is unlimited. August 1994 
LEAR THE WAY 


By Major General Joe N. Ballard 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

versatile. Dynamic. Flexible. Diverse. These 

terms are often used to describe the soidiers, leaders and units that comprise the Corps 

of Engineers. They identify the qualities that our 

Army expects from us, and they are evident in 

all that we undertake and accomplish. As I look 

at the wide range of missions our Corps is 

performing, it is clear that these attributes are 

well deserved. 

Engineer soldiers have repeatedly risen to the 

challenges of a changing world and they stand 

ready to meet any challenges the future may 

bring. It is likely that future challenges will push 

us beyond our established doctrine and tactics, 

techniques and procedures VPs) into new 

mission areas. As engineer soldiers, your demonstrated ingenuity and versatility in accomplishing these rapidly evolving missions are 

astounding. 

I encourage you to share your experiences 

with new missions and new equipment with others in the engineer community. I challenge you 

to share your experiences and lessons learned 

throughout the entire Corps. ENGINEER magazine is an excellent forum to accomplish this 

dialogue. The Engineer School is your clearing 

house for observations, lessons learned and 

development of lTPs to meet our missions. We 

are here to serve you. 

The missions performed by engineers in the 

recent past have covered the full breadth of our 

doctrine: humanitarian assistance to victims of 

natural disasters, Civil Works' response to the 

great floods of 1993 and 1994, creating infrastructure in support of forces in Somalia, combat 

engineering in Southwest Asia, and host nation 

support throughout the world. In many cases, 

engineers created the TTPs in use today to 

meet specific needs in the past. Future nondoctrinal missions facing our Corps, which include the 

possibility of demining operations (see article, 

page 20),will expand our established doctrine 

and lTPs. These potential missions, combined 

with developmental and contingency operations 

equipment, wiil allow timely formulation of lTPs 

based on user input. Your voice is critical to successfully meet the TTP challenges of the future. 

My staff at the Engineer Center continues to 

explore advances in technology and their application to mission areas. Articles in this issue of 

ENGINEER by Dr. Robert Sickler and Captain 

Robert Berg discuss some applications being 

explored in the field of robotics technology and 

their impacts on TTPs. Your school is also 

aggressively integrating future engineer systems 

with all of the TRADOC Battle Labs through advanced warfighting experiments (AWEs). Of note 

are experiments in the countermine arena, which 

explore technologies aimed at improving the effectiveness of early entry forces to detect, avoid 

and clear mines and submunitions. 

The technologies and systems that prove effective in the AWEs will be pursued for either Army 

procurement or contingency operations procurement. Many of you will have an opportunity to 

use these developmental systems during training 

rotations at the National Training Center and 

Joint Readiness Training Center currently scheduled for FY 95. Here, too, your feedback concerning these new systems is critical for program 

success. 

I am excited about the future of the Engineer 

Corps and the challenges we wiil face. With your 

involvement, engineers wiil continue to "Clear 

the Way" for our Army. The missions that we 

face today are no more challenging and uncertain than those faced by our forefathers. I am 

confident that the engineer soldiers and leaders 

of today and tomorrow will continue to earn the 

motto "ESSAYONS"! 
Auaust 1994 Y' Headquarters, Deoartment of the Armv 	 Volume 23 PB 5-94-3 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 

COMMANDEREOMMANDANT 

Major General Joe N. Ballard 

MANAGING EDITOR 

Caherine Eubanks 

CONTRlBUTlNG EDITORS 

Shirley Bridges 

SPC Virginia Espree 

Lynne Sparks 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 

Jennifer C. Bolyard 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

GORDON R. SULLIVAN 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

MILTON H. HAMILTON 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army 

06977 


Cover photo: Remote controlled vehicle 

breaks hrough road obstade to allow MP 

foroes to rewe ambushed swut element 

during demmsfration ffw Under Seaetary 

of &e Am% TheHonwable Joe R. Reed% 

Photo by Jim Anderson. 

FEATURES 

2 Projecting Robotics Technology in Operations Other Than 

War 

by Dr. Robert A. Sickler 

10 Evaluating Robotics Systems 

by Captain Roberi Berg 

14 Demining Germany's Borders 

by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhold Hocke and Second Lieutenant 

Michael S. Humphreys 

20 The ANIPSS-12 Mine Detector: A Proven Performer 

by Phil Purdy 

22 Operating a Mine Detector: Proficiency Through Practice 

by Captain James E. Berhow, USMC 

29 	The Schiebel ANI9R Hand-Held Mine Detector: A 

Canadian's View 

Interview by Catherine Eubanks 

33 	Old Ironsides Sappers Expand Traditional Roles During 

BCTP 

by Colonel Edwin J Arnold and Lieutenant Colonel William 

J. Bayles 

40 Restructured Heavy Division Engineer Support: A Force 

Developer's Comments 

by Alan Schlie 

43 	 The "New" CSE Company 

by Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Porter 

49 	Pickett's Charge: The Final Day at Gettysburg 

by Captain William G. Garrison, Jr. 

DEPARTMENTS 

Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 


25 Lessons Learned 55 Engineer Solution 


32 Personal Viewpoint 56 Engineer Update 


48 Engineer Problem 57 Bridge the Gap 


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8.5 	 01 expertise for the purpose of enhancing their prolesslonsl development. Documenls 

August 1994 

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Engineer I 
Projecting Robotics Technology in 


Operations Other Than War 


Force Projection 


Through Robotics 


National interests and objectives have presented the 

United States military with the 

unique challenge of transitioning 

from an European focused mission to one of global force projection. Thanks to the technological 

might of the United States, our 

military has suroessfi~llymet part 

of this challenge by developing 

ways of engaging the enemy beyond his range of retaliation. A 

new and emerging capability for 

this projection of force through 

technology is the use of unmanned 

vehicles and military systems. 

Called "robotics" by the civilian 

community, this technology has 

the potential to change the nature of warfighting and the way 

in which soldiers conduct operations other than war (OOTW. 

The U.S. military is no longer 

focused on stopping a Soviet horde 

as it attempts to plow through 

Fulda Gap. Our new national military strategy calls for the U.S. 

military to project force as a 

1 	 meansof preventingar bringing to 

an end international situations 

that threaten the welfare of our 

i 	nation or the welfare of friendly 

nations that request aid. To meet 

today's requirements, we must 

carefully design a contingency 

force that can react to an international situation with sufficient 

force to accomplish the mission, 

yet not so great a force that it escalates resistance. 

: 

2 Engineer By Dr Robert A. S i ckler AU~US~ 1994 
?b project a limited force capable of removing or neutralizing a volatile international 

situation is not easy In such 

operations, there is a great 

risk to mission success: Too 

little force can result in too 

many soldiers dyingor even in 

military failure, but too much 

force can result in escalation 

to full-scale war. Even though 

it is risk, our nation cannot 

ignore an external situation 

that threatens the U.S. or our 

allies. What we can do, however, is develop technologies 

such as robotics, which will allow us to project force through 

machines-not human lives. 

.... 

. -. . 

L -'I ' 'Is 

l: . ,, . 

-

Such technology gives Us the University Compound in Somalia,Inside the "fort" it was relatively safe; outside it 

ability to limit the projection was all enemy country. 

of force without the negative 

impact of losing lives as a result of 

insufficient force. 

Recognizing the potential of robotiffi in force pojection, the U.S. 

Army Engineer School initiated a 

program to exploit this new and 

emerging technology 'Ib maximize 

the return on investment, the Engineer School has chosen to upgrade existing military systems 

through the horizontal insertion of 

roboticj technology. During this 

period of downsizing and constrained budgets, technology insertions are the preferred method 

for material acquisition. 

Engineer Vehicle 


Teleoperation 


Horizontal insertion of robotics technology is being developed through the Engineer 

School's Engineer Vehicle Teleoperation (EVT) program. The concept of EVT operations is to 

enhance the war-fighting capabilities of existing military systems. A major program requirement is that the inserted robotics 

technology must not interfere 

with manned operation of the vehicle. A second requirement is 

that, when operated in the 

, 

I 


, 

' 

unmanned mode, the robotics 

technology must allow a remote 

operator to perform vehicle functions compatible with manned 

operation. Program objectives are 

near-term contingency fielding of 

select EVT systems and eventual 

fielding of EVT systems to force 

package one units. 

Under the current EVTprogram, 

a limited number of systems that 

support contingency force operations will be fielded at Fort Leonard 

Wood in 1995. A training circular is 

beingwritten and a new equipment 

training (NET)team isbeingestablished to support the 1995 fielding 

effort. A select number of systems 

will go into contingency storage, 

and one or two systems will be 

fielded to the Engineer School's b 

botiffi-'kxhnology Insertion Activity 

(R-TIA)tosupportNETtraining(see 

inset, page 9). Should a situation 

arise where EVT capabilities are requid, the systems and aNET team 

will be ready for immediate fielding 

to the contingency force. Plans are 

underway to follow the initialcontingency capability with a larger interim fielding effort in 1997. Fullscale fielding of EVT block upgrades 

to force package one units is scheduld to begin about 1999. 

, 

I
I 


i

I 


1 

j 

! 


( 


A significant attribute of the 

EVT program is its ability to take 

a less-than-desirable existing 

system and make it deployable. 

For example, several vehiclemounted, mine-detection systems 

are capable of finding a limited 

number of mine types, but no one 

system can find all mine types. As 

a result, the Army has not fielded 

any vehicle-mounted, mine-detection system. Army rationale for 

not fielding is based on the fact 

that anyone operating a system 

that cannot find all mine types 

would almost certainly die. Thesolution to this dilemma is to mount 

the less-than-perfect technology 

on a vehicle equipped with EVT 

capability That way, a mine-detection mission can be carried out 

and, when the inevitable happens, 

only a vehicle is damaged; no life 

is lost. 

Unmanned operation of vehicles 

in highly hazardous situations has 

other attributes besides eliminating risk to the operator. One key 

enhancement is an increase in vehicle survivability Data gathered 

through the EVT program show 

that unmanned armored target 

vehicles used in munitions testing 

have taken numerous hits from 

Augwt 1994 Engineer 3 
pa *p,*r -% 

Evaluations at Fort 

Leonard Wood have 

proven that it 

doesn3t take long to VI ,., . ":; ' . , 

~ . construct an effec- 0 - tive route obstacle 

a 

E out of old vehicles. 

high explosive rounds and re- engagement" often are vague and in Somalia can be viewed as harmained functional. One piece of poorly suited for the ever chang- bingers of escalating global destathis data is a video tape that ing events of "nonwar." Under bilization, where antagonists will 

shows an armoredvehicle takinga those conditions, our military's capitalize on the warfighting wndirect hit from a copperhead mis- greatest advantage is the ability tribution and economics of landsile, and the vehicle keeps driving to project force without putting mine usage As Sun Tzu stated, "It 

down the road. The increase in soldiers in harm's way. If the is only one who is thoroughly acsurvivability, in conjunction with technology we project causes the quainted with the evils of war that 

the "willingness" of an unmanned I threat to cease hostilities, we can thoroughly understand the 

vehicle to take on any mission, sig- have achieved victory without profitable way ofcarryingit on."For 

nificantly increases the probability generating large body counts. the vast majority of those caught in 

of mission success. The best way to project force current conflicts, the land mine is a 

Robotics technology, when in- I without putting soldiers in major evil of war. 

serted in existing military sys- harm's way is to let a robot do it! In the Mogadishu MOUT (militems, offers an economic enhance- It is easy to say that OOTW pre- 1 tary operation in urban terrain) 

ment to the system's warfighting sent unique and difficult battle- i environment, mobility missions 

capability Nowhere is this more ! field challenges, but valid data are entailed both countering point 

evident than in meeting the de- required to justify a program to minefields and reducing barriers 

mandsofoperationsotherthanwar solve them. In 1993, the U. S, that often were reinforced with 1 Army Engineer School sent a mines. The Engineer Schoolk initial 

OOTW Challenges I countermine technology team to assessment verified the United Na0 

Somalia to obtain such data. In tions Logistics Support Command's 

ne of the most difficult essence, the team's mission was to request for M728 combat engineer 

situations for any military determine the contribution of vehicles (CEVs), wuntermine techorganization is to be in a hostile emerging technologies in solving 1 nologies and a reinforced mechaenvironment when there is no OOTW wuntermine force-projec- nized engineer platoon. Unfortudeclared war. In such situations, tion requirements. nately, a decision was made not to 

all terrain outside the limited ar- Somalia MOUT Experience. take the CEV into Somalia. 

eas of occupation becomes a risk i Somalia proved, once again, that Route Obstacle Threat. The 

to soldiers' lives. Additionally, the one of the greatest dangers facing Mogadishu MOUT mine and barantagonists are not well defined, U.S. soldiers in OOTW is the ever- ; rier threat was compounded by 

and the very fluid battlefield is increasing use of land mines by 1 the fact that U.S. forces did not 

defined only by events taking the threat. Both mines and unex- / have a full suite of weapon sysplace at the time we are on the ploded ordnance are major weap- tems at their disposal. In Somalia, 

field. When conflict exists on this ons inalmostallmilitaryarsenals, not only did our forces lack the 

kind of battlefield, "rules of I The Persian Gulf War and the war CEV, they also lacked support by 

4 Engineer August 1994 
The first generation Panther concept vehicle has proven the versatlllty of a multi-tunctlonal, unmanned armored platform. 

armor and field artillery Under 

those conditions, the enemy could 

ambush or attack our soldiers in 

relative freedom from armor or artillery reprisal-and they did. For 

example, simple barricades made 

with cars or junk and covered 

with antitank weapons stopped 

HMMWVs and 5-ton trucks. 

Because modern threat forces 

are often equipped with sophisticated antitank weapons, current 

vehicles such as the CEV have 

very limited application in MOUT 

route breaching. Where threat 

covering fires can he suppressed 

with armor and artillery, the CEV 

can effectively reduce barrier obstacles, fortifications and strong 

points. But in most OOTW we are 

constrained in the level of force we 

can project, making manned obstacle reduction extremely hazardous. If our forces in Mogadishu 

had been equipped with an unmanned, blade-mounted armored 

vehicle, they wuld have reduced 

the barriers easily. 

Panther Solution.The route obstacle situation that developed in 

Augut 1994 

Somalia motivated the Engineer 

School to initiate a program to develop an unmanned, route-obstacle breaching capability The program is designed to capture the 

route-obstacle breaching attributes of the CEV in an unmanned 

vehicle that will not be viewed by 

other nations as a tank. The objective is to have a vehicle that can ' 

reduce route obstacles, yet is not 

considered an escalation in U.S. 

military presence when introduced 

in an OOTWenvironment. One conceptual vehicle now under study is 

the sapper assault vehicle, code 

named Panther. 

The Panther conceptual vehicle 

is a product of the Engineer 

School's Robotics-Technology Insertion Activity (R-TIA) and the 

Joint Projects Office for Unmanned Ground VehiclesiSystems 

(DO). After the Panther was construtted, R-TIA, with the support 

of the Test and Evaluation Coordination Office (TECO) at Fort 

Leonard Wood, generated a concept of employment evaluation 

(COEE) to determine its employment potential. The purpose of a 

COEE is to establish the tactim, 

techniques, and procedures for a 

system's employment. It also establishes analytical data on system contributions to or degradation of mission performance, and 

the system's impact on doctrine 

(see article, page 10). 

Panther is especially designed 

for OOTW environments. Because 

it has neither a main gun nor a 

turret, Panther cannot he classified as a tank. Thus, employment 

of Panther should not escalate a 

conflict any more than employment of an armored bull dozer. 

Unlike a dozer, however, Panther 

can carry a full squad of engineers 

and employ numerous combat engineer systems. In addition, Panther can function as the command 

station for other robotics vehicles 

or be operated as an unmanned 

vehicle itself. 

Panther's ability to reduce route 

obstacles, such as the vehicle baniers in Somalia, was demonstrated 

at Fort Leonard Wood in June 

1994. The demonstration was 

Engineer 5 
C. 

- 'a: 

The Engineer School will soon be ready to meet the next contingency requirement for route obstacle breaching 

presented to the Under Secretary 

of the Army and was a complete 

success. In this demonstration, 

Panther was operated as an unmanned vehicle to conduct an "instride" duction of a route obstacle. 

Plans are underway to develop a 

second generation Panther prototype, which will have improved armor and a new (4th) generation remote-control system. Under this 

plan, the upgraded Panther will be 

fully operational and deployable for 

contingency operations by FY95. 

Somalia MSR Experience. 

Another concept initiative generated by the Engineer School's 

team in Somalia is a program 

aimed at providing unmanned 

host vehicles for vehicle-mounted, 

mine-detection equipment. In 

September 1993, theschool's countermine technology team accompanied the 362nd CSE company 

commander on a reconnaissance of 

Main Supply Route (MSR) Red, 

which was the main mute north 

from Mogadishu through Baidoba. 

The team's mission was to analyze 

6 Engineer 

potential countermine technology 

applications for MSR Red and determine the best methods of employment. The team mmmended 

converting less-than-perfect countermine capabilities into deployable 

countermine systems by mounting 

them on unmanned vehicles. 

MSR Red Threat. The countermine technology team's recommendation was based on their 

evaluation of the characteristics of 

MSRRed and threat miningmethods. MSR Red was approximately 

30 kilometers ofhighly degraded, 

semi-improved dirt road. Most of 

the road was compacted insitu materials and crushed coral, which 

years of traffic had further crushed 

into a considerable amount of 

fines. During wet weather the road 

probably would degrade considerably The 362 CSE Company's mission was to upgrade the road to 

semi-improved standards capable 

of supporting convoy speeds up to 

35 miles per hour. They were also 

tasked to keep the route open, 

although they lacked both the 

manpower and the technology to 

accomplish that mission. 

The terrain along most of MSR 

Red is flat, irrigated farmland. 

The road is straight except for two 

closely spaced 90-degree turns and 

a few long, sweeping curves. More 

than 55 irrigation culverts (ranging from 12- to 24-inch concrete) 

cross beneath the route and are 

found along the entire length of 

the MSR. The condition of the culverts ranges from poor and without headers to good and with 

3-foot headers. Often theelevation 

of the irrigation ditches is as 

high or higher than the elevation 

of the road surface; steep-sloped 

humps in the road allow traffic to st over the elevated culverts. The road profile varies 

from a raised mad bed to a depressed road bed. Vestation varies 

from sparse, low shrubs to moderately sized trees. 

Existing traffic along the MSR 

is primarily by foot or single-axle 

carts. Small- to medium-sized 

farm tractors are seen frequently, 

August 1994 
', 'I 

Mines and explosives . placed In culverts such 

as this one were a major ., , 

. threat on MSR Red. - --

..,r

. .. .., *. - r' 

and a few small- to mediurn-sized, 1 from the Mogadishu area and I H(li1ge;. ,Solutio?~.Based on the 

single-axle trucks move farm pro- make a concerted effort to shut MSR Red study, the Engineer 

duce on the MSR. down MSR Red, the 362 CSE Com- School initiated a concept program 

Intelligence was unable to pro- pany could not keep it open. This in late 1993 to combine several 

vide the Engineer School's team ' assumption was based on the fact technologies and generate a route 

with a well defined threat; how- that, without a vehicle-mounted, clearing capability. Code named 

ever, a threat profile was estab- mine-detection capability, the time Badger, this program relies on an 

lished by extrapolating data from and logisticsrequired toclear a mute EVT system to provide unmanned 

otherareas.Itwasdetennined that, the length of MSR Red with hand- operation capabilities for existing 

should the threat move its activity / held mine detedors was toogreat. military vehicles. In Somalia, the 

principle vehicles available 

were the High Mobility 

Multi-Wheeled Vehicle 

(HMMWV) and the 900-

1 I series, &ton truck. Because .a* 
 the same vehicles probably

will be used in future con-

. : .* tingency operations, the 

Badger program will employ a mine-detection capability mounted on a 

HMMWV and a proofingidetedion capability mounted on 

. a 5-ton truck. Under the cur-

,, .-I
 rent tademwo a route-clearing Thevehicles operational sequence as lead willteam. ofelements concept, operate operation the i

I 

for this route-clearing team 

is mine detection, marking, 

rt.: proofing, and neutralization. 

' ,, r f-9 r The unmanned HMMWV, 

- equipped with a vehicleCivilian traffic on the MSR can be used by the enemy to mask mining activities or halt mounted mine detector and 

convoy movement. marking system, leads the 

August 1994 Engineer 7 
Developed in Canada for contingency fielding to Somalia, Jingoss embodies the concept of unmanned, vehicle-mounted 

mine detection. 

way An unmanned &ton truck 

equipped with rollers follows the 

HMMWV and proofs that portion 

of road cleared by the HMMwV 

The third vehicle is the command 

and control vehicle. When a mine 

is found and marked by the 

HMMWV,it backs up and moves 

around the mine. The HMMWV 

does not stop but continues on. 

The 5-ton truck and command vehicle also avoid the marked mine 

and continue on. They are followed 

by combat engineers, who neutralize the marked mine. While this is 

taking place, the rest of the routeclearing team continues forward. 

Once a mine has been neutralized, the combat engineers move 

forward to join the rest of the 

team. 

In the initial phase of the 

Badger program, a study was 

made to determine the most viable 

candidate mine-detection systems 

for mounting on a HMMWV. Two 

systems were selected for evaluation. The mine-detection system 

with the longest lead time for 

fielding proved to have the highest 

potential for detecting a wide 

8 Engineer 

range of mine types. This system 

employs a commercial infrared 

camera, whose concept of operation 

was demonstrated in Somalia by 

the CECOM Research Development and Engineering Center 

(CERDEC), at Fort Belwir. Theseeond system is a vehicle-mounted, 

metallic mine detector being evaluated by the Program Manager 

Mines, Countermine, and Demolitions PMMCD), at Picatinny AmnaL In the current Badger concept, 

both systems will be mounted on an 

unmanned HMMWV. 

To help establish an employment concept for the unmanned 

HMMWV mine-detection portion 

of Badger, R-TIA conducted a 

COEE usingthe Canadian Army's 

robotics mine detector, Jingoss. 

The Jingoss system is a metal 

mine-detection array that is 

pulled by a small, unmanned vehicle. During the COEE, R-TIA 

evaluated the system's maneuverability and operational characteristics, while CERDEC evaluated its ability to detect mines. 

Evaluation results indicate a 

very high employment potential 

for an unmanned, vehicle-mounted, 

mine detection system. At Fort 

Leonard Wood, Jinguss has demonstrated its capability to detect metallicminesand mines with moderate metal content. The tactics, 

techniques, and procedures developed for Jinps by R-TIA can be 

applied to the Badger system. 

While it can detect only metallic 

mines, Jingoss has demonstrated 

that the operator can be removed 

from a route-clearing vehicle to 

make a less-than-perfect solution 

fieldable. 

The second element in the 

Badger team will be a simple yet 

robust countermine system for 

proofing routes. Plans are to employ a rubber-tired mine detection 

roller used to detect single-impulse 

mines. The PMMCD is working 

with the Engineer School and JPO 

to select the best roller configuration for the Badger program. 

Plans call for an unmanned 

5-ton truck mounted with South 

African style rollers to be tested at 

Fort Leonard Wood in the first 

quarter ofFY95. Once at R-TIA, the 

system will undergo an extensive 

August I994 
evaluation. Because roller technology is already mature, this portion of the Badger system will be 

ready for contingency fielding in 

1995. The initial fielding will be 

followed by the intermediate fielding of a fully developed Badger 

system in 1997. 

ESSAYONS 

0ur involvement in Sonlalia 

was the United States' 

first major attempt at limited 

force projection in an operation 

other than war where the conflict became a protracted affair. 

Somalia proved that, when warfighting capabilities are constrained by politics, time enhances the effectiveness of the 

threat's countermobility efforts. 

The message is clear: U.S. 

forces must be supported by the 

best mobility and countermine 

assets available in all future 

OOTW operations. 

Army engineers require a way 

to successfully breach route obstacles in contingency operations. 

They also require the capability to 

promptly detect and neutralize 

land mines on routes and areas 

adjacent to key terrain. Existing 

and emerging technology for obstacle breachingand mine detection 

and neutralization are not perfect, 

and the U.S, is unwilling to field 

partial solutions that unduly endanger soldiers. Tbtake soldier; out 

of harm's way, the Engineer School 

is working to put less-than-perfect 

solutions on unmanned vehicles. By 

removing the opemtor, these systems become viable and deployable 

assets that engineers can employ in 

countermineand mobility missions 

The Panther and Badger programs project force through technology-not human lives. Y 

DI:Robert Sickler is the mager of 

R-TIA, U.S Amy Engineer School. 

Dr Sickler has mom than 12 years' 

experience in robotics and a PhD dissertation on the automation of construction and mining equipment. 

Robotics-TechnologyInsertionActivity 

By Robert L.Hill 

IFort Leonard Wood's Robotics-Xxhnology Insertion Activity 

(RTW was mated at the U.S. Army Engineer School to 

support the development and fielding of robotics systems. The goal 

is to remove soldiers from hazardous situations and save lives. 

Robotics technology allows engineers to operate mine detection systerns, breaching vehicles, and other engineer equipment from an 

over-watch position. Putting this complex new technology into the 

hands of soldiers demands a fully integrated effort that covers the 

entire DTLOMS (dwtrine, training, leadership, organization, material, and soldiers) spectrum. 

The material developer responsible for producing robotics solutions to battlefield deficiencies is the Offtoe of the Secretary of Defense's Joint Project Office for Unmanned Gmund VehiclesISystems 

(JPO) at Redstone Arsenal. R-TIA, working with the Operational 

Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) andTRADOC Battle 

Labs, supports this effort by providing early soldier input and 

DTLOMS consideration throughout the developmental process. 

R-TWs involvement allowsJP0 to take a robotics system off the 

laboratory bench, put it in an engineer vehicle, and evaluate it in 

an employment scenario. By putting prototype systems in a real-life 

environment, R-TIA can ask questions and validate answers 

needed to support system fielding. Problems that contractors may 

overlook often become apparent in the dust, heat, cold or darkness 

of Fort Leonard Wood's UGV maneuver range. 

R-TIAincludes the following three sections: 

m Operations is responsible for providing field evaluations that assist in developing and validating the tactics, organizational structure, employment pl?ocedures, system design and training for each 

prototype system. Fielding involves more than simply placing 

a package on an engineer vehicle to create a remote controlled 

vehicle. Questions such as how a robotics vehicle is best employed and how operators will be trained must be answered 

and validated. Most of this effort is conducted at R-TIA's UGV 

maneuver range. 

Engineering provids limited technical support to integrate robotics into fielded engineer wstems. While JPO is the material 

developer, R-TIA engineers &n make adjustments or minor 

modifications, often eliminating the need to return a system to 

a contractor or lab, 

Support is responsible for administration, supply, equipment 

maintenance, and real property maintenance. 

The Engineer School is committed to working with JPO, 

TRADOC Battle Labs, and others to expedite the fielding of mbotics systems that meet engineer force requirements. With R-TWs 

support, the Army will soon field mbotics systems that remove 

soldiers from the hazards of the modern battlefield. 

Robert L. Hill is the Support Bmnch Chief, Robotics-lkchnology Insertion Activity, U.S.Amy Engineer School. 

Engineer 
Evaluating Robotics Sqstems 


By Captain Robert Berg 

The Engineer Schwl has established the concent of emwlwmint evaluation (CO~E)p&uk 

as a means of developing analytical 

data to support fielding of unmanned ground vehicles. The COEE 

prooess is designed to offset a lack of 

operational information such as tactics, techniques, procedures CITP), 

logistics, and safety requirements. 

In a COEE, the Rohotics-Technology 

Insertion Activity (R-TIA) at Fort 

Leonard Wood conducts a series of 

well orchestrated combat scenarios. 

For example, in April 1994, soldiers 

at Fort Leonard Wood breached a 

mute obstacle using an unmanned 

M60 chassis, called Panther. Data 

from the COEE exercise provided 

feedback to verify or modify TITS 

and recommend technological 

changes to robotics hardware. 

'bo other COEEs with applications 

to operations other than war 

(OOTW) were conducted at the RTIA facility in March and April 

1994. 'Ib ensure a logical format for 

data generation, evaluation plans 

for both COEEs were written by the 

Test Evaluation and Coordination 

Office at Fort Leonard Wood. The 

first COEE was for a remote controlled land mine (RCLM), called Hydra. The second COEE was for a remote controlled, vehicle mounted, 

mute mine detector developed for the 

Canadian Army, called Jzngoss. Both 

COEEs required soldier participation in extensive field exercises. 

The Hydra COEE 

s the U.S. Army's involvement 

in mntingency operations increases, the need for engineer units 

to perform nontraditional missions 

also increases. Peacekeeping and 

other noncombat missions place restrictions on line commanders. 'Ib 

safeguard civilians, the mmt mmmon restriction limits the use of 

weapons and land mines solely to 

self-defense purposes, even though 

it is often difficult to tell innocent 

civilians from those participating 

with opposing factions. 

While conventional land mines 

detonate on contact and do not distinguish between adversaries and 

innocent civilians, RCLM allow the 

commander to choose his target. The 

RCLM system Hydra, for example, 

allows the soldier or commander to 

identify a target thmugh theuse of 

an on-board, low-level light zoom 

camera. 

The Hydra is a six-man system 

consisting of six mines and a command console, which is easily transported to high risk areas of operations. The six mines can be armed 

10 Engineer August 1994 
with an explosively formed penetrator, chemical canister, antipersonnel 

claymore-style mine, or other type of 

munitions. Each mine is individually emplaced by a soldier and 

linked by fber-optic cable to a console that can monitor one or more 

"kill zones." The console has seven 

screens: one for each mine and one 

target screen, from which the operator controls detonation and movement. With this system, the operator has total control over who, what, 

and when the mines attack Hydra 

has an additional feature that allows a string of electrically detonated explosives andlor blasting 

caps to be connected to one or several auxiliary ports. The system's 

camera can pan, tilt and zoom on 

any object the operator chooses. 

Thus, the operator can use the camera to assess a situation and destroy 

the target by detonating only one 

auxiliary port or he can detonate all 

six ports and the entire mine. 

The COEE performed by R-TIA 

allowed engineers to evaluate Hydra's capabilities and study the tactics, techniques and procedures 

used to contml the system. During 

the evaluation, soldiers were depicted in both mounted and dis 

mounted operations in four scenarios: 

conducting an ambush, using Hydra 

as a protective minefield for an engineer combat service support unit, 

reinforcing a conventional minefield, and using the mine as a first 

generation intelligent minefield. 

Scenario 1involved a dismounted 

sapper squad, which carried the Hydra system to perform an ambush on 

opposing force (OPFOR) vehicles 

traveling along a secondary mad. Us 

ing two of Hydra's mines as security, 

the sappers prepared the other four 

mines for use against OPFOR vehicles entering the kill zone. The security camera was placed about 1kilometer away from the kill zone and 

pmvided video footage of oncoming 

vehicles. When the OPFOR vehicles 

approached, two soldiers conducted 

an ambush. One soldier monitored 

the target smn and fired a mine at 

the vehicle. The other soldier monitored the remaining six screens and 

directed which mine would be displayed next on the target screen. 

In this scenario, two soldiers 

equipped with the Hydra system 

sucoessfully performed an ambush. 

By employing robotics technology, 

the unit reduced the number of soldiers required to perform an ambush 

from an entire squad to two soldiers. 

Scenario 2 was a two-phased 

training exerclse in which nonengineer 

soldiers set up a hasty protective 

minefield for their unit. Soldiers assigned from a transportation company were trained by the Engineer 

School's sapper detachment for this 

exercise. Because the Hydra system 

is easy to operate, the soldiers 

quickly learned to use and maintain 

it. They used the auxiliary ports to 

control their MI8 mines and used 

the camera to observe several highspeed avenues of approach. By employing Hydra, the transportation 

unit reduced the number of observation posts from eight to two, while 

providing the same level of security 

In Scenario 3,an engineer squad 

from a corps mechanized battalion 

constructed a conventional minefield and used the Hydra system to 

overwatch and protect it. Hydra enabled the ground commander and 

engineer support element to protect 

the minefield and control any secondary charges such as demolition 

charges from the auxiliary ports. The 

Hydra's ability to individually fire 

each of the sixauxiliary ports enabled 

the engineers to be active participants on the combined arms team. 

In Scenario 4, the Hydra was 

used without any conventional 

dummy mines. Each of its ports controlled demolition charges andlor 

electrically detonated mines. The 

Hydra afforded the commander 

Photo opposite page: 

Two sappers focus one of 

Hydra's six mines while 

preparing to ambush the 

OPFOR. 


Photo left: A Canadian 

soldler controls the Argos 

and prepares to drive the 

vehicle into its trailer. 

August I994 Engineer I1 
Robotlca Description Subsystems Missions User 

System 

Hydra 	 Six remote- - Antitank mine - Hasly protective Squad-level (light and 

contolled land mines - Antipwsonnel mine minefield mechanized) units. - Panhilt camera 	 - Rdnforce conventional - Fibergptic link minefield 

-Six remote-demolition - Mine ambush 

auxiltary ports 	 - 1st generation intelligent 

mineheld 

Remol?conholled. Remote controlled,, - Route clearing Squad-level units. J~~~~~~ roule mlne detector 8-wheeledall-terrain - Rear area operations 

positive control over the demolition 

charges and each mine in the minefield, so that friendly units and civilians could safely pas thmugh the 

minefield without tripping a fuze. 

TheHydra COEEprovided d~cient 

data to continue system evaluation. 

Plans are underway to include I-Iydra 

in future joint exemises with TRADOC 

Battle Lab.There is also a demonstrated need to mntinue development 

of the Hydra operational amoept 

The Jingoss COEE 

I

n mpom to a significant mine 

theat, the Canadian Annfs Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) has developed a remote 

controlled mute mine detection system called Jingoss. The system has 

four major components: an eightwheeled amphibious, all-terrain vehicle called Argos, which is used as a 

remote platform; an annod pemnnel carrier (APC); a metallic minedetector head, called Vehicle Mounted 

Ordnance Dewtor WODI; and a 

tele-operational controlled system 

called Anmeus (seetable). 

The concept behind the Jingoss 

mine detection system is relatively 

simple. The Argos contains the receiver, vehicle control module, and actuators that wntrol the vehicle. Additionally, it has two payloads. The fust 

payload is a chain sweep, which is 

attached to the hnt of the Argos and 

sweeps the mad for tilt-rod and tripwire mines. The smnd isthe VMOD, 

which is pulled behind the Argos and 

detects metal objects. An APC follows from 100 to 150 meters behind 

the Argos, depending on the terrain, 

vehicle with RF ltnk to a 
 consol slation in an 
 armored personnel carrier 
 - ARGOS 

- VMOD 

- ANCAEUS 

- Lighl Am hibiovs 


Vehicle (~Av) 
 - Trdlei 

and carries a squad of sappers with 

hand-held mine detedors. 

The Argos operator controls vehicle movement and functions from an 

APC by means of a 68030 Motorola 

computer processor. The computer 

uses video feedback from the Argos 

and, thmugh a graphic user interface, superimposes a window environment control on the video screen. 

With this screen, the operator can 

monitor the Argos' status, see a 

graphic display, and hear an audio 

signal when targets are detected by 

WOD. It also has map displays and 

a global positioning system (GPS) 

to confirm the Argos' location. The 

operator uses a joy stick or a keyboard to control the Argos. Additional features such as multivehicle control, autonomous control, 

and external cameras may be added 

to Jingoss. 

Once in operation, the Argos travels from 3 to 5 kilometers per hour 

(kph). When the operator picks up a 

metal detection, the VMOD marks 

the location with marking fluid. The 

VMOD, which isfour meters wide and 

one meter long, contains two detector 

heads. Each head is independent so 

that the operator can determine on 

which side of the mad a detection is 

located. The marking fluid isplaced on 

only one side, either left or right, when 

a mine-sized object is detected. A fake 

detection, such as a culvert, wauld 

cause the VMOD to mark both sides. 

When a target is marked, the wntrol 

vehicle stops and the four-man team 

use hand-held mine detectors to isolate the target and determine if it is 

a mine. Then they mark the mine 

and either bypass it or blow it in 

place, depending on the mission. 

The Jingoss system can clear 

roads faster than a sapper squad 

can using hand-held mine detectors. 

A squad equipped with hand-held 

mine detectors can travel less than 

1kph, whereas the Jingoss can travel 

at speeds up to 5 kph. 

The most frequently asked question regarding to the Argos-VMOD 

setup is %hy does the Argos pull the 

detector head?" The logic behind 

this decision is based on the mechanics involved and the time allocated to constructing a bracket to 

mount the VMOD. The Canadians 

built the system from conception to 

final product in four months in order 

to respond to a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Aprimary factor in 

selecting Argos was the system's 

ground pressure applied per square 

inch (PSI). Each wheel applies less 

than 150 PSI, which enables the vehicle to pass over a pressure-fuzed 

antitank mine without detonating 

it. This capability is critical because antitank mines are frequently 

encountered in their peacekeeping 

missions. Argos has no protection, 

however, against antipersonnel 

mines. Therefore, it is an expendable item which can be replaced by 

another Argos or repaired on site. 

The Engineer School reviewed 

Jingoss' potential capabilities and 

invited the Canadian Army to display Jingoss during the 1994 Senior 

Engineer Leadership Training Conference. After the conference, R-TIA 

conducted a two-week COEE on Jingoss, with assistance from the Belvoir 

Reseaxh, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC) and the 

Joint Pmjects Office for Unmanned 

Gmund VehicledSystems (DO). 
A complete Jingoss system includes the Canadian Bison (LAV), with trailer, and the Argos, with a chain sweep and 

mlne detector. 

In the COEE, the Jingoss was employed in two scenarios: route mine 

detection and area mine detection. 

The evaluation concluded that the 

Jingoss performed well in route 

clearing missions but was not well 

suited for area clearing missions because it was difficult for the Argos 

operator to determine where he had 

orhad notbeen. Although thesystem 

has some limitations, the Argos successfully detected large metallic 

mines buried as deep as 3 feet. The 

Jingoss is user friendly and easy to 

operate. Aswith hand-heldminedetectors, however, Jingoss operators must practice to properly distinguish a mine from a false 

detection. 

The Canadian Army plans to deploy the Jingoss system to Bosnia 

in the fall of 1994. In Bosnia, Canadian engineers will have an opportunity to test Jingoss' mine-detection capabilities in a real-world 

environment. 

Future Applications 

Evaluations planned by RTIA 

for the near fiturn will support engineer operations on the 

battlefield. For example, R-TIA will 

evaluate robotics systems capable 

of supporting MOUT operations, 

1 


1 

I 

insert robotics technology in an I 

kg98 HMMWV for use in muteclearing operations, and evaluate 

concepts for employing unmanned 

breaching vehicles for use by a 

combined arms team. The R-TIA 

team will also evaluate the potential of the Mini-flail in clearing antipersonnel minefields, and evaluate an unmanned aerial vehicle for 

use by combat engineers in mute 

clearing missions. 

Because funding is insufficient to 

purchase robotics systems for the 

entire engineer force, the Engineer 

School has devised contingency kits 

and a new equipment training 

(NE'I3teamandsupportpackagefor 

units deploying to contingency operations. The kits are designed to ' 

enhance unit capabilities and ensure mission success. 

For example, assume that C Company, 123rd Engineer Battalion is 

deploying with the 1st Brigade, 28th 

Armored Division, to North Africa. 

The unit anticipates a need for an 

unmanned vehicle to detect mines 

along supply routes. In such a situation, the Engineer School will give 

the unit a remote-contml kit to insert in one of their vehicles. The 

NET team will train soldiers to operate the system and advise the 

commander of the best "text book" 

solution for employing the system, 

After two or three weeks of training, 

the unit signs for the system and the 

support package, and the NET team 

returns to the Engineer School. 

When the mission is completed, the 

unit returns the system to the Engineer School. 

The robotics systems evaluated 

and fielded by R-TIA will enhance 

the ability of engineer units to accomplish contingency missions 

without unnecessarily risking soldiers' lives. The target date for the 

first contingency kit developed by 

the JPO is second quarter, FY95. 

The kit includes a package for an 

M923, 5-ton cargo truck and is designed to perform route clearing 

missions. A set of rollers will supplement the remote-controlled system. Because the kit is the first of 

its kind, it will be upgraded frequently with the latest technological advances. By using the COEE 

process, the R-TIA is working to 

help field unmanned ground vehicles for use by combat engineers in 

contingency operations. Y 

captain B~~~is the opelations 

for R-TZA at the Engineer School. 

Previous assignments include opelations olyicer; V alps Staff Engineers, 

tank compmy XO, brigade HHC XO, 

and tank and support platoon leader 

in Gelmy. 

August 1994 Engineer 13 
By Lieutenant Colonel Reinhold Hocke 

and Second Lieutenant Michael S. Humphreys 

cold war tensions left nearly 

1,500 kilometers (km) of 

barriers along the inner-German 

border (IGB) separating East 

and West Germany and along 

the East German border of West 

Berlin. In addition to the extensive barrier system constructed 

between 1961 and 1985, the former German Democratic Republic (GDRj emplaced at least 1.3 

million antipersonnel (APj mines 

of various types and generations 

along the IGB. These obstacles 

were not designed to protect 

against western invasion but to 

prevent the defection of East 

German people to the west. 

After reunification in 1990, Germany launched a concerted effort 

to dismantle the barriers, demine the former border areas, 

and dissolve any remnants of its 

once torn countryside. 

Cold War Legacy 

1984, mounting interna- Tn 

tional pressure forced the 

GDR to begin clearing its Barrier areas along the former Inner German borders -- - 

14 Engineer August 1994 
- - 

Barrier system along the former Inner German border (IGB) 

@ wall @ 

@ Fence @ 

mineficlds. By then, a signal and 

harrier system, consisting of a series of sensor-equipped fences and 

runs where trained dogs could paAnti-vehicle ditch @ Lightlng system 

patrolway @ Dog run @) Minefield 

Speculation about the lingering : barrier system. The GDRnever in- 

: mine hazard led to an investigai tion of the questionable areas in 

: 1991. Analysis of the GDR's mine i 

: tended to open the border sectors, 

and their border troops could work 

: safely along the IGB after being 

: warned about the hazardous areas. 

j 

: 

i Barrier Removal 

: Che plans of unified Ger- 

: many to mend the gash 

: that separated East and West 

Germany and dissolve the border 

: areas back into the German 

: count~yside would not be accomplished easily. To eliminate the 

: remaining mine hazard, Germany's Minister of Defense de- 

: cided that minefields once 

i thought to be cleared by the 

: GDR's border troops would again 

: be searched. 

: Although the mine hazard 

: loomed like a ghost from a by-gone 

war, the most obvious presence 

: alongthe IGB was the barrier system that had been erected to keep 

Engineer 15 

trol the border, had reached a plans and sweeping records restate of efficiency that rendered : vealed significant discrepancies 

the mines unneccssnry (see fig- : between the number of mines laid 

ure). A year later the GDR reported that their border troops 

had cleared the minefields and 

neutralized all AP mines huricd 

along the IGB. 

Afterreunification, theFederal 

Armed Forces of Germany established the central deactivation 

staff of border troops, now headed 

by an army engineer officer. The 

staff reviewed existing documents 

fmm the GDR's mine-clearing operations and found some discrepancia. Additionally, engineer offlers 

oftheformerbordertroopsreported 

that the GDR's clearing operations 

had been inadequate because they 

had continuously operated under 

strict time constraints. 

August 1994 

i and the number detected or deto- 

: nated during their clearing opera- 

: tions. Records showed a total 

: shortage of 34,000 mines. Although many of those so-called 

: "deficient mines" may have been 

i detonated by outside influences 

: such as animals or frost, a danger 

: of intact mines lying in the border i sectors remained. 

: The commanders of the former 

i GDR border troop had accepted 

: the discrepancies because the 

East German government's oh-

: jective had been to convince the 

i outside world thnt the mines 

: had been removed, and inter- 

: nally to provide safe conditions 

: to construct a modern signal and 
An observation tower on the IGB is removed as part of the cleanup process. 

Concrete reinforced 


anti-vehlcl* dhches 


Unrelnlorced antl-vehicle 

Wire obstacles 

Table 1 

16 Engineer 

East German citizens locked behind 

the Iron Curtain. Before minesweeping equipment could be used 

to clear the suspected mine hazard, it was necessary for Germany 

to dismantle those barriers. Heavy 

earth-moving equipment was 

brought in to remove the obstructions, and that part of the operation was finally completed in 

January 1994. The number and 

types of barriers cleared in this 

effort are shown in Qble 1. 

While barriers were still being 

removed in some border areas, 

mine clearing operations began. 

Although the actual work is conducted by government contracted civilians, the German 

Army Corps of Engineers supervises the operation. 

It is Germany's intent to eliminate all hazards that might still 

exist in areas formerly laced with 

mines. Sectors where a comparison between mine-laying 

plans and clearing records 

show discrepancies are classified as "mine hazard areas" and 

marked with danger signs. The 

German government estimated 

the original length of the mine 

hazard areas to be 555 km. The 

types of mines emplaced along 

the IGB are shown in Table 2, 

page 17 

Restoring safety in terrain sectors formerly littered by mines 

means more than simply clearing 

known minefields. When a minefield is first eniplaced, fixed orientation points from which the minefield is measured are placed and 

recorded. When the GDR first reported their minefields were 

cleared in 1985, they removed the 

orientation points. Without those 

points, it would bealmost impossible for clearing teams to accurately 

locate the minefield perimeters. 

Therefore, the German government 

has entrusted mine clearing to governmont contractors, who employ 

former border tmps of the GDR. 

These civilians are most familiar 

with the areas where the GDR had 
planted mines and are best qualified to ensure all mines are detected. In addition to searching 

areas once saturated with GDR 

mines, the detection teams also 

search for mines that may have 

been washed to lower ground by 

heavy rains or mud slides. 

Clearing Methods 

cvhen clearing a suspect 

area, the mine detection 

team first conducts terrain reconnaissance to verify the results of document review. The 

inspection party, with the participation of civilian authorities 

if required or requested, then 

decides on the type and scope of 

the mine-detecting operation. 

For example, their efforts may 

include restrictions to conserve 

natural resources or protect tho 

environment. 

After the reconnaissance, the 

teams prepare the terrain for mine 

detection. Today this usually 

means cutting plants and trees, 

but before 1993 it also included 

the dismantling of barrier fences. 

Because the work is extremely 

hazardous, the teams must wear 

.-

Mlnes Emplaced Along Former IGB 

Type Origln rears Empaced 

POMS-2 USSR 1881 - 70 

~0~8-ZM USSR unknown 

PMDBM USSR 1962 - 79 

PMN USSR 1963 - 85 

Bulparls 

PMP-71 GOR 1971 - 05 

PPW2 GDR 1971 - 05 

Table 2 

: protective clothing and work from 

: ramps. These restrictions make 

: the job an arduous undertaking, 

: especially in summer. 

: Although the methods now used

: to clear mined areas are similar to 

: those used by the GDR in the 

1970s and 1980s, the procedures 

: are more successful because teams 

: are not required to work under 

: tight deadlines. The objective of 

: current mine-clearing operations 

: is to be thorough not fast. Based 

: on experience and severe person- : nel losses (130 soldiers injured 

: from 1962 through 1984), the for- 

: mer GDR border troops developed 

, , .,tYm...:... 

' I . : 

two major mine-clearing proce- 

: dures: tillage and probing. 

: Tillage 

: Tillage, a mechanical mine-

: detection method, is the technique 

: preferred by the clearingteams. It 

: consists of treating a suspect area 

: four times with a double-shared 

: plow and harrnw towed by a trac- 

: tor. Metal plates and steal mesh 

: on the tractor protect the driver. 

Plowingbringp the mines up to the 

: surface, where they can be seen. 

Usually the soil is plowed to a 

: depth of 30 centimeters (12 

: inches), but in unusually wet or 

A German civllian with 

an excavator tears 

down a fence along the 

IGB. The contractor ernploys machinery and 

construction equlpment 

formerly used by East 

German border troops. 

.. ' 

4 .'i'W-::,, 

r ..J 

AC. . , ',iT& ,. , \, 

f ,*, 

*: .- W..' .. 

m 

a +.* ib-+i :h, .. \. . y., '2 3: , * ', 

B :.. r=, 3.e. -c" 

. 

-:;, 

E , , ' . 

,$ ,.' 

August 1904 Engineer 17 

1 
~ 

marshy soil, the teams may plow 

as deep as 80 cm (32 inches). 

The GDR-emplaced minefields 

have a standard width of 180 meters and a standard depth of 23 

meters. To treat a minefield, a 

team plows 20 meters beyond each 

side in width and 5 meters beyond 

each side in depth. After the tractor begins to plow a lane, the team 

inspects the ground in two ways: 

first by observation fmm the tractor towing the plow, and then by 

minesweepers who follow on a 

working platform mounted on the 

front of a bulldozer (photo). 

If a mine is detected, explosive 

ordnance disposal (EOD) teams 

destroy it by demolition. Then the 

team begins the tillage operation 

over again and continues until no 

more mines are found in any of the 

four tillage treatments. 

Usual inspections by the teams 

do not always result in the discovery of whole mines. However, in all 

cases the mine detection teams will 

find parts of mines if the tillage is 

conducted on a minefield site and 

along the lines where the mines 

were laid. Visual inspedions a= 

18Engineer 

-:,. 

An inspection team 

looks for mines from 

a dozer equipped with 

a front-mounted platform. The protective 

clothina has been 

developed especially 

for personnel workIng in mlne detection P 

-; ,*. > 

#...- and mine-clearing *,, . .. . , ,.. .L' -.dr?- operations. 

: ersential to ensure that no sus- : when it encounters metal objects. 

: pected minefields are missed. When the signal is activated, a 

: Safety is an extremely impor- : team member uses a long, slender, 

i tant part of the mine-detection nonmetallic probe to confirm the 

: and disposal operation. It is espe- : source. The worker gently pushes 

i cially critical when teams clear ar- j the probe into the ground at an 

: eas using the tillage method. Till- : angle less than 45 degrees so that 

i age is feasible because the GDR it a 

: emplaced only antipersonnel : Pressure fuze. After the location 

I mines (no antitank mines) in the i a team member re-

: border areas. Efficiency standards : moves dirt around the object to 

: for the tillage method cannot be : determine if it is a mine. When a 

. mine is located, EOD teams either i specified, however, because the 

: remove it or destroy it in place. : number of treatments required to .
 i completely clear a sector of all . All mines do not have metal cas-
 e


: ings, but the Schiebel detector can : mines cannot be assessed. : locate the metal components 

: found in most low metallic mines. i Probing : Because teams must individually 

: Wherever the terrain or soil con- : inspect and clear each signal, the 

ditions make plowing impossible Or i probing method is a time-consum- 

: where metal case fragmentation : ing and labor-intensive procedure. 

: mines were emplaced, the teams i ~ h ~ the teams ~ ~ use f the till. ~ ~

: must use a probing method to : age method whenever possible. 

: clear minefields. Probing is a man- : 

ual method of detecting mines. It i ~ ~ ~support i ~ ~ : consists of searching the suspect : 


i area with an electronic mine de- : the end of a successful
 '_i91t 

: tector. The German teams use the : mine clearing operation in 

i Schiebel ANIPSS-12 detector, a sector, the contractor, in coop- 

: which is also employed by U.S. : eration with a representative of 

: Army engineers. It emits a signal the German Corps of Engineers, 

August 1994 
i 

~ 

turn the cleared site over to the 

German government. Other logistical efforts include medical 

support in accordance with the 

demolition regulations of the 

Bundeswehr (German Army) and 

equipment maintenance. For 

example, when teams handle 

munitions or live demolitions, a 

medical unit with emergency 

equipment must he available at 

the site. 

The maior factor limitinn - the 

speed of Germany's mine-clearing 

operations is the number of qualified teams available to do the 

work. At first, work teams were 

involved with both removing obstacles and clearing mines. Afte+ 

the border fortifications were dismantled, however, the German 

contractors involved in clearing 

theIGB consolidated and reorganizcd to focus primarily on mine 

detection. As a result of this reorganization, the number of minedetection teams increased from 

nine in 1993 to 14 in 1994. The 

number of workers on each team 

varies, based on the location of the 

site and the detection method 

used. The additional five teams 

brought the total number of workers involved in mine detection and 

clcaring to 270. 

The additional detection teams 

and reclassification of some areas 

from hazardous to nonhazardous 

mean that the process of detecting 

and clearing potential mine haz. 

ards will accelerate. Of the original 555 km of terrain classified as 

hazardous in 1991, approximately 

361 km were laced exclusively 

with PMD-6, wooden-box type 

mines. These mines were fully 

functional when firstburied in the 

1960% but during the 30 years 

they were in the ground the fuzes 

and wooden boxes deteriorated. 

Today, only weathered pieces of 

wood, lumps of explosives and 

heavily corroded fuzes and fuze 

components can be detected. Detailed investigation of excavated 

components revealed that these 

August I994 

within the last 3 years, however, 

and they have been reclassified 

"It is Germany's as hazardous, adding 29 km to 

the operational area. 

intent to eliminate As of 30 April 1994, the overall 

hazardous area was 202 km in all hazards that length. Of this area, about 130 km 

of minefields have been cleared. might still exist in The clearing -teams found a total of 

714 AP mines, which equates to laced about five mines per kilometer. Average clearing costs amounted to with mines." DM 150.000 uer kilometer. or 

about DM 30,b00 ($20,000) 'per 

. mine. Terrain sectors with a total 

: mines no longer present any dan- i length of 72 km remain to be de- 

: ger. In August 1992, the Minister : tected, with clearing operations 

i of Defense decided not to extend i expected to be complete by the end 

: efforts to detect the wooden-box, : of 1995. By then, the German 

pressure-blast mines. 1 Corps of Engineem and the Minis- 

: The decision to disregard the : try of Defense are confident that 

i wooden-box mines reduced Ger- i the mine hazard along the former 

: many's overall mine hazard area : IGB will be eliminated and the 

i to 194 km. This area contained : area will be safe for use by Ger- 

:

: both 

blast-type 

metallic 

mines, 

and 

of 

nonmetallic, 

which ap- : 

man citizens. Y

proxilnately 16,000 were not re- ~h~authors gratefully achnow. 

: coded by the GDR. : ledge the assistance of Colonel Ger- : The terrain reconnaissance per- i hard ~~~d&~kl~,~, A~.,,~~ 

: formed before the teams began : corps ~ ~who contrib. ~ mine-clearingo~erationshavedis- i uted tlLe photographsand data 

: closed that 21 km of terrain re- : ~~~~~~~k border.clenr. : portedly cleared by the GDR are i ing

: free of mines. These areas have . : been used extensively for agricul- : i tural purposes for more than 10 : Lieutenant Colonel ~ocke selves as 

: yearn and are no longer considered i German liaison officer to the U,S.

i hazardous. Elimination of these : Army Engineer and Centel; 

Foit Leonard Wood. He previously : areas reduced the total remaining :. seized as commmder of the German 

: mine-hazard areas to 173km. : 61st Engineer Bottolion, 6th Airnolad 

: : Infantiy Division, staff officer engii The Last Obstacle : nee? and senior. conidat engineer. of,- 

: : cei; Headquarters Allied Foices Cen11 sectors for which an : hnl Euivpe. LTC Hocke is a gmduate 

: evaluation of available : of the German General Staff Officers i A : Course at the Fedeial Aimed Foices : minefield records did not reveal : Command and Gene,.al taf,Callege, i the existence of discrepancies, or : in Hamburg, 


: which did not contain any other :
 : information suggesting the pres. i Semnd Lieutenant Humphiys :s cur-


: ence of mines, were initially de- : "nt'y anrozied in the Offi- cers Basic Cou?,se at Foit Leonard i clared as nonhazardous. The po- - Wood.He is e vetei-anof the Gulf Wol;

: litical branch of the Ministry of ; wheiv he enlisted in Colps of

: Defense agreed to assume re- : Enginee,.s, Lt, ~ , is g,.dIL. ~ i sponsibility for any residual risk : .te of the Aii50,~.School and holds 

: in these areas. Many mines have : a bachelor of science porn Emt Ten- : been detected in these sector:; : nessee State University, 

Engineer 19 
The US.Army Engineer Schwl continues to receive questions md comments concerning the capabilities and employment techniqves of the ANIPSS-12 Hand-Held Mine Detector, also called the AN1912 Mine Detector. The following 

articles describe the mine detector's capabilities, recommended haining techniques, and the operational experiences 

of organkations that have used the detector in demining operations. 

The ANIPSS-12 Mine Detector: 


A Proven Performer 


By Phil Purdy 

The ANPSS-12 Hand-Held Metallic Mine DeL tector has been in service with U.S. Army 

unlts since April 1992. Several articles have been 

published concerning the selection and fielding of 

the ANIPSS-12; this article focuses on its performance and soldier confidence. 

The ANPSS-12 replaces the Army's aging and obsolete ANPSS-I1 mine detector. Fielding of approximately 15,000 of the new detectors begdn in April 

1992 and will be completed in mid-1995. As of June 

1994, it has been fielded to most authorized Active 

Component units within the United States, Europe, 

Pacific, and Korea. Fielding to authorized Reserve 

Components units will be oompleted in mid-1995. 

The name "ANPSS-12" is the U.S. Army's designation for the Schiebel AN1912 detector, which is 

manuhctured in Austria. Before selecting the 

ANPSS-12, the Army competitively evaluated it 

against eight other leading manufactures'metallic 

mine detectors. Selection criteria included equipment 

performance, ease of use, and overall 'kt value." 

Performance 

The U.S. Army documented the ANPSS-12's 

L performance during technical and operational 

testing in 1991. These tests clearly demonstrated the 

equipment's excellent detection capability, ease of 

me, and reliability. Technical testing was conducted 

by the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Operational testing was conducted by the Army Test and Experimentation Command at Fort Hunter Ligget, Cali- --

fornia, and at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. SPC House operates the lzght-weight and user-friendly ANfPSSHow well does the ANPSS-12 perform in tacti- 12 mlne detector As the scarch head is swept over the ground, 

cal and real-life mine-clearing operations? While an audio signal Indicates the presence of a possible mine. 

20 Engineer 
Major components of the ANIPSS-12 mine detector set Include a search head, telescopic handle, control box, and 

headphones. The mlne detector uses standard Dcell batteries. 

it is a metallic mine detector, the ANPSS-12 has 

the sensitivity and capability to detect minute 

amounts of metal (one-fifth of a gram). Therefore, 

it can detect most low metallic (sometimes called 

"nonmetallic") mines because most of them have 

some metal in their fuze or detonation device. 

So far, use of the detectors by U.S. Army soldiers 

has been limited to routine training and units assigned to support Operation Restore Hope, in Somalia. Because the U.S. Army's experience with the 

detector is limited, the best assessment of its performance probably is through the experiences of 

other countries, humanitarian agencies, and commercial demining companies. 

The Schiebel AN1912 is used by several U.S. allies 

and friendly nations, including Canada, the United 

Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, and several nations in the Persian Gulf. Organizations such as the 

United Nations (UN)and International Red Cross use 

the Schiebel AN1912 in extensive demining operations 

around the world. The UN currently uses it for demining operations in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Somalia, and 

Mozambique. Based on their experience, UN personnel 

report that the AN1912 is reliable and performs well. 

Brigadier General P.M. Blagden, retired hom the 

United Kingdom and currently at the UN, reports favorably on the detector. He states that Royal Ordnance 

Plc, the commercial company that sucoessfully cleared 

the UK sector of Kuwait after the Gulf War, used the 

Schiebel AN1912 there in preference to other detectors, 

although at least three types were available. 

The Canadian Army has used the Schiebel AN1912 

since 1988. As a participant in several UN peacekeeping missions, the Canadian Army has acquired considerable experience with the detector. Canadian 

peacekeepers have used it in the former Yugoslavia 

since April 1992 and report that the AN1912 can 

detect the low metallic mines currently in use by 

the opposing forces. They have experienced few 

maintenance problems and consider the AN1912 to 

be one of the best metallic mine detectors on the 

market today. (See article, page 29.) 

Commercial Munitions Systems International 

(CMSI) successfully cleared more than 338,000 metallic and low metallic mines in the U.S. sector of 

Kuwait using the AN/PSS-12 mine detector. When 

selecting a detector for that operation, CMSI chose 

the ANPSS-12 based on such critical performance 

factors as reliability, capability, and low maintenance requirements. (See article, page 25). 

Soldier Confidence 

.S. soldiers can be confident that the newly 

fielded ANIPSS-12 will meet their minedetection requirements. Effective training, however, 

is critical to maximum performance of the detector 

and soldier confidence. While the equipment is 

easy to operate, proficient mine detection requires 

repeated practice against known threat targets. 

Only through practice will soldiers hone the skills 

they need to sucoessfully detect mines with low metal content. With proper training, the ANIPSS-12 is one 

of the most effective mine detedols in the world. 

Phil Purrly is a Countennine Pioject Management Engineer 

for the Pioject Manager for Mines, Countennines and Denwlition, Fort Belvoil: Mr. Pu~rly was irespnsible forpmuirement and fielding of the U.S. Anny's handheld metallic 

mine detector. He holds a bachelor's degi.ee in civil engineering from Virginia Tech. 
Operating a Mine Detector: 


Proficiency Through Practice 


By Captain James E. Berhow, USMC 

1nformation received at the U.S. Army Engineer 

School and published in the November 1993 issue of ENGINEER (page 5) indicates a lack of wnfidence in some engineer soldiers' ability to successfully locate buried antipersonnel or antitank mines 

using the ANIPSS-12 mine detector. I do not believe 

this to he a true representation of the U.S. Army as a 

whole. This article describes several measures wmbat engineers and their leaders can take to improve operator proficiency or skill-level with this 

equipment. First, let's clear up a few misunderstandings regarding the ANPSS-12 mine detector. 

Backmound -


The U.S. Armv selected the Schiebel ANPSSJL 12 mine detector as a nondevelopmental item 

ovi,r several other "finalists" more than two years 

ago. Without doubt, the Army purchased and placed 

the best available mine detector in its inventory. 

This was confirmed by a private agency, Commercial Munitions Systems International (CMSI), 

when their employees logged more than 25,000 

hours using the ANIPSS-12 in their successful 

demining operation in Kuwait. (See article, p. 25) 

Although CMSI could have selected any detector, 

they chose the Schiebel. The U.S. Marine Corps 

has also placed this mine detector into service in 

its engineer units. Additionally, many countries 

have purchased the Schiebel mine detector for their 

armies, including Austria, Canada, Germany, Sweden and Thailand. The bottom line is that the 

ANPSS-12 is a very good mine detector! 

The U.S. Army Engineer School trains more 

than 8,000 engineer soldiers, nonwmmissioned officers and officers annually in the area of combat 

engineering. Only a limited segment of each course 

syllabus, however, is devoted to mine warfare. For 

military occupational specialty (MOS) 12B10 soldiers, this equates to three days out of a five-week 

course, and only three hours of that are spent on 

the mine detector. During those three hours soldiers study equipment characteristics, operational 

set-up and use, and preventative maintenance. Resident training at the Engineer School, therefore, does 

not produce proficient mine detector operators. 

Operator proficiency is acquired by the individual soldier at his parent unit, and responsibility for 

that training rests with unit leaders. A skilled 

operator can detect virtually any known mine with 

the ANPSS-12 mine detector, hut it takes a lot of 

practice to reach that level of proficiency. There 

is no set rule of thumb that says a soldier must 

train for a certain number of hours to become a 

"journeyman" mine detector operator. Each soldier will require a different amount of time to 
become familiar with the equipment and learn how 

it interacts with his senses of sight, sound and 

touch. As an operator's proficiency increases, so 

does his confidence. 

Confidence is almost as important as skill. 

That's because a skittish or nervous soldier in the 

minefield can be as dangerous as an ignorant or 

untrained one. 

Training Tips 

KJnit training is the key to acquiring operational skill with the mine detector. To assist 

in developing unit training, the U.S. Army Engineer Center has developed the following tips for 

combat engineen and their leaders: 

The mine detector search head must remain parallel to the ground and at a consistent distance from 

the ground to operate correctly. Never drag the 

search head alongthe gmund becaw contact may 

cause pressure-activatedmines, sensitized cluster 

bomblets or submunitions to detonate. Dragging 

the detector along the ground also causes unnec 

essarv wear on the search head's ~lasticasing. 

The mine detector search head must move 

thmugh a constant l-meter radius arc (2-

meter frontage). The operator must develop a 

smooth, uniform sweep or he may miss mines 

as he moves forward. 

The sweep speed of the detector search head 

must remain constant. Operators who sweep 

too quickly may miss mines with a low metallic content. 

The rate of forward motion must remain constant. Operators have a tendency to vary their 

sweep speed and forward motion as they tire 

or get bored. Rate changes will result in the 

area being improperly swept. 

When using the mine detector, operators must 

ensure that obstacles such as rock outcropping, trees, and debris do not alter the sweep 

pattern. Obstacles will affect a sweep pattern 

and may cause mines in the sweep path to be 

missed. A common emr occurs when a low obstacle is encountered. Operators frequently raise 

the search head an inch or two to clear the obstacle and keep a constant sweep rate. Rais- ', 

Most operators have a tendency to raise the ing the search-head alters the sweep pattern 

search head at the end of a sweep arc and and may cause the operator to miss a mine. 

must concentrate to keep it level: Be aware w When physical discomfort exists, operators 

that any change in the position of the search have a tendency to focus their attention away 

head changes the way the mine detector reacts from the mine-clearing mission. Any time an 

to buried metal. operator is uncomfortable, he should stop and 

Training mlnes that duplicate the she. color. and 

August 1994 Engineer 23 

' . ... .. , 

y. ., 1 _, 

I? 

:a. 

,-.', : !.: 

I / 

),' . . 

'i 

. .. 1. 

appearance of threat mlnes 

can be requisitioned from 

local Training Support Centers (TSC). For detectton 

purposes, however, these 

molded or demllitarired 

mlnes may not accurately 

reflect the preclse metal 

content of the real mines. 
detection methods required for those 

specific mines. To train properly, 

Units deploying to a known region of the world can construct pens or boxes 

that replicate the soil composition in that area. Use of these pens facilitates 

countermine trainlna. 

take the time needed to readjust the equipment or relax his muscles. 

The following suggestions may also increase 

operator proficiency with the ANPSS-12 mine 

detector: 

To reduce boredom or complacency, rotate the 

detector operator in the sweep team every 30 

minutes. 

Before starting any mine-detection operation, 

ensure all equipment operators take a short 

detection-capability test. This test will ensure 

every soldier can operate the detector at minimum acceptable standards and does not have 

a sinus, nasal congestion, or other physical 

condition that may inhibit his ability to hear 

the electronic signal. 

m Units deploying to a known region of the world 

can find out what types of mines they can expect 

to encounter in theater. When training for such 

a deployment, unit trainers should "qualify" 

their soldiers in the probing techniques and 

- - ~ 

they should construct training pens 

or boxes that replicate the region's 

soil composition and rquisition the 

specific mines needed to practice 

with. The mine-clearing qualification should be similar to the engineer soldiers' annual update for the 

weapons range and NBC training. 

After a specific sensitivity hasbeell 

set on the detector, slide a metal object such as a 16-penny nail along 

the shaft toward the search head element, and mark the exact spot 

where the detector sounds off. Use 

the mark as a reference point when 

performing calibration checks to verify that the detector's sensitivity 

setting remains constant. To ensure 

accuracy, use the same nail in all 

calibration checks. 

A unit deploying for a mine-clearing 

mission may obtain specific information or request a mobile training 

team from the Engineer School to assist with their predeployment 

minelcountermine preparation. To request information or assistance from 

a mobile training team, write to: 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer 

School, ATTN: ATSE-T-CE-D, Fort 

Leonard Wood, MO 65473. Or, call 

(314) 563-4134, DSN 676-4134. 

Operator - ProficiencyThe process of mine-detector training and operator proficiency does not end at the Engineer 

School or at the unit. It is an ongoing, continuing 

process that must be continually maintained. The 

new ANIPSS-12 mine detector is an excellent tool. To 

use it effectively, the individual soldier must be committed to practicing this craft; at the same time, his 

leaders must ensure that sufficient training time is 

allocated for this purpose. Units that train effectively 

will benefit by enlisting themselves with confident 

operators who are sure of themselves and the 

WSS-12 mine detector in their hands. Y 

Captain Berhow, US. Marine Carps, is chief of the Mine 

WarfarvlField Engineering Bmh at the U.S. Anny Engineer School. He is a graduate of the Engineer Officer 

Advanced Course and the Marine Corps' Amphibious Warfare School. CAPT Berhow holds a bachelor's degree in 

ciuil engineering from Murray State University, Kentucky. 

24 Engineer August 1994 
The United Nations estimates that there are now 

more than 105 million uncleared land mines 

spread throughout 62 countries. This equates to approximately one land mine for every 50 people on our 

planet. These mines directly threaten civilian populations: Worldwide estimates for those killed and injured range from 10,000 to 100.000 people annually, 

most of them innocent women and children. U.S. military forces will probably encounter various types of 

land mines during any future combat operation or 

operation other than war, regardless of the location. 

ISSUE: Demining operations involve the removal 

or recovery of land mines in a non-hostile, permissive 

environment. While current U.S. Army doctrine does 

not support demining operations, such operations 

have been conducted or are ongoing in Cambodia, El 

Salvador, Nicaragua, and the former Yugoslavia. As 

engineers, our job is to breach and mark cleared 

lanes on a battlefield and move on. lmes change, 

however, and so do our missions. Because of operational necessity, some U.S. Army engineer units may 

be faced with the extremely difficult task of demining 

large areas in the future. 

This article focuses on lessons learned during 

demining operations conducted by Commercial Munitions Systems International (CMSI), a civilian contractor, in the U.S. sector of Kuwait. The techniques used 

by CMSI personnel enabled them to successfully 

August 1994 

clear more than 338,000 mines (approximately 40 

percent of them buried) and several hundred tons of 

unexploded ordnance (UXO). The lessons from this 

operation may help other engineers successfully 

perform demining missions in the future. 

WARNING 

The following information describes techniques 

that are NOT in accordance with Army doctrine. Before employing any of these techniques, field units 

must request approval from the U.S. Army Engineer 

School Commandant. The methods described were 

used by Gornmercial Munitions Systems lnternational 

personnel and achieved successful results in Kuwait. 

Some of them are unique to the Kuwaiti environment 

and may not be applicable in other environments. If 

your unit is tasked to conduct demining operations, 

immediately call the U.S. Army Engineer School at 

(314) 563-4007 for assistance. 

DISCUSSION: The U.S. Army Engineer School 

recently received a letter from Floyd D. Rockwell, 

who was employed by CMSI after the Persian Gulf 

War. His letter was an after action report that described their operation to clear all land mines and 

UXO in the U.S. sector of Kuwait. While working for 

CMSI, Mr. Rockwell sewed first as a consultant and 

Engineer 25 
later as the minefield zone manager, responsible for 

clearing the entire U.S. sector. 

The ANIPSS-12 Mine Detector 

uring their demining operation, CMSl personnel 

logged more than 38,000 hours using the 

ANIPSS-12 Mine Detector. While they found it to be 

a very effective and reliable piece of equipment, 

CMSl personnel modified some of the procedures 

described in the ANIPSS-12 Mine Detector User's 

Manual. Additionally, Mr. Rockwell developed some 

techniques that significantly enhanced the crews' ability to detect mines with minute (one-fifth of a gram) 

metal content. Such mines are sometimes called 

"nonmetallic" but really are "low metallic." 

The CMSl employees established an initial sensitivity setting and conducted field sensitivity checks in a 

sterile area that contained several of the type of low 

metallic mines they expected to clear that day. These 

mines were buried 6 inches beneath the surface. The 

crews checked their detectors and set the initial sensitivity level for tonal "beep" changes. While in the sterile area the teams also conducted field sensitivity 

checks by using a large mason trowel with the detector. Their method follows: 

b Paint one cable clip on the detector a bright 

color so it is easily identified. Place it between the 

two unpainted clips on the detector. 

Attach all the clips to the lower extension of the 

mine detector's handle. 

b Use the blade of the trowel to move the cable 

clip down the handle until the detector picks up the 

metal blade and begins to "growl." 

Run the blade of the trowel past the painted cable clip after every two sweeps with the detector to 

verify that the sensitivity has not changed. Adjust the 

sensitivity level setting as needed. 

Mr. Rockwell believes that the operator must perform field sensitivity checks at regular intervals (i.e., 

every several sweeps), although no guides for these 

checks are provided in the user's manual. 

The CMSl crews found the above method of sensitivity calibration to be very useful when they encountered a metai mine or large metal object. When they 

found one of those items, the crew turned down the 

detector's sensitivity so they could locate the center 

of mass. After a mine was located and neutralized, 

they reset the detector to its initial sensitivity level, 

performed another field sensitivity check, adjusted 

the detector, and resumed sweeping the area. 

Early in the Kuwaiti demining operation, the 

ANIPSS-12 became sensitive to heat. The detector 

began to lose sensitivity at 110° F ground 

temperature and continued to lose sensitivity as the 

temperature rose. The CMSl crews compensated for 

the loss by increasing the detector's sensitivity setting. To ensure maximum equipment reliability, they 

also rotated the detectors every 30 minutes after the 

ground temperature reached 110° F. The crews 

stopped working when the ground temperature 

reached 130' F because they could not continue to 

safely concentrate on the clearing operation. 

Soil type and conditions also affected the mine detector's sensitivity level. For example, wet sand would 

stick to the detector head and cause it to become 

less sensitive. CMSl personnel solved that problem 

by fabricating a cover for the detector head. The 

cover kept sand from sticking to the head and prevented any loss in sensitivity. The detector also 

"sounded off when it came in contact with soil 

burned by oil well fires, erroneously indicating that 

metal was beneath the surface. After the soil crust 

was broken, however, the detector returned to a normal reading. This condition was Kuwaiti-specific and 

could not be duplicated outside the country. 

The ANIPSS-12 mine detector can locate low metallic mines buried as deep as 6 inches beneath the 

surface. The user's manual states that operators 

should "maintain clearance of at least 2 inches above 

the surface." The clearing crews could not detect a 

low metallic mine that was actually buried 6 inches 

deep, if they maintained the 2-inch clearance. Therefore, CMSl operators skimmed the ground with the 

head of the detector, allowing the equipment to detect 

low metallic mines at the maximum depth possible. 

Initial concerns that personnel might accidently hit trip 

wires as the head skimmed the surface dissipated 

when the crews quickly learned that the detector located the trip wires before they were encountered. 

The CMSl crews found that rechargeable batteries 

were ineffective and should not be used in the 

ANIPSS-I2 mine detector. Rechargeable batteries 

reach a drop-off point as they lose power, and the 

low-battery light may fail to activate. As a result, the 

detector will quit without warning. Operators can 

avoid this problem by using only the batteries authorized by the manufacturer, such as the BA-30 or 

D-cell alkaline batteries. 

Demining Training 

0ne area Mr. Rockwell stressed was training 

and confidence building. Personnel had to feel 

confident in the equipment and procedures they were 

using in order to work effectively day in and day out. 

Because of their training program. CMSl had only 

two accidents and one death in 18 months, compared to 83 deaths not counting injuries from the 

other five coalition teams during the same period. He 
attributes their favorable safety record to strict procedures and confident personnel. 

If an accident occurred, an investigation began immediately to find the cause. Investigation results were 

disseminated quickly to all personnel to maintain confidence in equipment, training and safety procedures. 

Published results of the accidents involving CMSl personnel showed no actual equipment failures. Their 

accidents occurred when two employees violated the 

strict safety procedures. 

All CMSl personnel were certified only after completing a two-week training course, regardless of their 

previous experience. The course included detection 

techniques, disarm procedures, down-man drills, and 

first aid. After certification, all personnelwere 

required to attend monthly refresher courses. 

All CMSl personnel were trained using inert mines 

that had the exact metal content and configuration of 

those found in Kuwait. This training built confidence 

in the operators' ability to detect mines with the 

ANIPSS-I2 and confirmed that the equipment could 

detect low metallic mines. They trained and operated 

in three-man teams and rotated jobs at least every 30 

minutes. The teams consisted of: 

A minesweeper, who operated the detector and 

located and disarmed mines. 

A safety observer, who watched the minesweeper, looked for signs of fatigue, ensured 

strict adherence to procedures, maintained communication with personnel outside the minefield, 

made all safety decisions while in the minefield, 

and marked a clear lane to ensure rapid recovery in case an accident occurred. 

A man on break, who remained outside the 

minefield and had no designated duties except 

to rest and relax. 

Once established, the teams did not change members or alter their rotation sequence except when absolutely necessary. This procedure enabled the 

teams to establish strong working relationships and 

close bonds between members. If one team member 

was ill, the remaining two worked on a one-hour shift. 

They rotated jobs every 30 minutes and then took a 

30-minute break. 

-

Demining Operations 

o ensure safe demining operations, CMSl established the following procedures: 

Before starting operations, Mr. Rockwell personally conducted what he called "exploratory 

breaches." These breaches were conducted 

every 500 meters over the entire width of the 

minefield to verify mine distribution patterns. 

mine types, depth of buried mines, environmental hazards, and the percent of 'Yrag" (i.e. 

metal fragments, submunitions, unexploded 

shells, etc.). 

The CMSl teams used the "blow in place" 

method of mine removal only as a last resort. 

Their rationale was that blowing mines in place 

raised the percentage of fragments in a minefield and increased the difficulty of detecting any 

remaining mines. 

Mr. Rockwell experimented with the .SO caliber 

Barret Rifle using ball and tracer rounds because Rufus high-explosive rounds were not 

available. He found the rifle to be ineffective for 

clearing large areas. If a mine didn't detonate 

fully after being hit, it created a major disposal 

problem by increasing the frag content of the 

minefield. 

The CMSi teams "swept" every hole with the 

ANIPSS-12 detector after a mine was removed. 

This additional safety check would determine if 

mines were stacked on top of each other. 

These mines were called "suckers." Often as 

many as three mines were found stacked up 

with a layer of soil between them. 

Large, mason trowels made excellent tools for 

probing and excavating mines in Kuwait's sandy 

soil. The CMSl personnel used the trowels only 

after they had completed an exploratory breach 

and found no magnetically fuzed mines in the 

minefield. 

Mr. Rockweil elected to attach the mine detector's headphone directly to the handle, instead 

of on the minesweeper's head, and turned the 

volume to its maximum level. This procedure 

allowed both the safety observer and the minesweeper to hear the detector's "beep." For this 

procedure to be effective, the safety observer had to be close enough to hear and 

see everything. Thus, the safety observer remained a maximum of 12 paces behind the 

minesweeper. 

Finally, the CMSl personnel were trained to overlap sweep areas by half a detector head length. 

This practice ensured that the area was accurately covered and left little chance for error. 

Engineer School Recommendations 

Engineer units should continue to follow the countermine doctrine found in FM 20-32. If your unit 

is tasked for a demining mission, immediately call the 

Engineer School at (314) 563-4007 for assistance. 

Other recommendationsfollow: 
When training for a possible deployment, units 

should train mine detector operators with the 

actual types of mines found in theater. This will 

enable the operators to clearly hear the tone 

that represents the metallic content for the types 

of mines they expect to encounter. 

Periodically check the springs in the battery compartment of the ANIPSS-12. After extensive use, 

the springs lose tension and batteries may not 

maintain a good connection. To restore tension, 

pull up on the springs with a pair of needlenosed pliers. 

m Use only alkaline (not rechargeable) batteries in 

the ANIPSS-12 mine detector. When rechargeable batteries are used, the detector will not 

activate the low-battery light or indicate when 

the batteries are dead. 

Engineer units must carefully widen breach 

lanes created from mechanical breaches (mine 

plows) or blast-type breaches (MICLIC). Mine 

plows push mines and soil to the sides, creating 

berms. When vehicles pass through the lanes, 

vibrations cause the berms to deteriorate and 

mines are exposed. The exposed mines may 

slide back into the lane during movement. 

The United Nations is looking closely at banning 

the use of land mines under a Geneva-type convention. However, reality today is that land mines are 

weapons of choice for many nations. Export of land 

mines also provides needed hard currency to some 

countries. Because the mine threat still exists, U.S. 

Army Engineers must remain vigilant and trained. 

WARNING 

The previous article contains issues and techniques that are NOT in accordance with Army doctrine and should not be used by field units without the 

express approval of the Engineer School Commandant. The methods described were used successfully 

by Commercial Munitions Systems Internationalpersonnel in Kuwait Some of the methods are unique to 

the Kuwaiti environment and may not apply to other 

environments. If your unit is tasked to conduct demining operations, immediately call the Engineer School 

at (314) 563-4007for assistance. 

Captain Chirio is an evaluator with the Directorate of 

Evaluationand Standardization, at the Engineer School. 

Previous assignments include company commander, 10th 

Infantry Battalion, and assistant S3 with the 44th Divisional 

Engineer Battalion. He is a graduate of the Engineer Officer Advanced Course and the CombinedArms Services 

Staff School. 

Letter to the Editor 

Map Scales 

I commend you for putting out a publication that is truly 

beneficial to all Army engineers. It was with dismay, then, 

that I read and reacted to a small matter of possible misinformation in your February 1994 issue. In the article 'Zessans Learned: Midwest Flood of 1993" (page 28), the author, 

Mr. Vern Lomx stated that, 'Zarge-scale maps were used 

primarily in Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), while 

the small-scale maps were used by units and personnel on 

the gmund." I doubt seriously if this was the case. It must 

be remembeled that small-scalemaps are designed for use 

in EOCs (i.e., 1:250,000maps--they cover more area with 

less detail), while large-scale maps are designed for small 

unit and individual soldier use (i.e., 1:50,000maps-they cover less area with more detail. It is possible that Mr. 

Lomy made a common mistake of confusing the tenns 

"small-scale" and 'large-scale." 

I also reluctantly take exception to Mr. Lowrey's rewmmendation regarding the Maps topic on page 28. As task 

force engineer of lssk Force Hawkeye during Hurricane 

Hugo humanitarian assistance in the US Virgin Islands 

and in other associations with similar operations, I have 

observed that, due to the rapidity of deployment, units 

usually deploy with minimal map support. Additionally, 

the quality and amracy of the maps are often paor and 

are likely to be non-standard. In my current assignment 

at the Defense Mapping Agency, I remain amazed at the 

large portions of the world where either no or quite old 

map coverage exists. Therefore, the likelihood of a unit 

being deployed rapidly to an area of the world where minimal or no map coverage exist is quite gwd. Yet, despite 

this likelihood, Mr. Lowrey recommends that units "train 

with updated maps and products for potential disaster 

relief operations areas." 

It is my contention that units, at all levels, should conduct some part of their training using minimal non-standard map products. This action would ensure that units are 

exposed to situations that are more realistic than that 

perfect world which usually exists in my experiences with 

Army and Joint exemises. 

I send this letter to you as friendly criticism of a perceived small error and a difference of opinion regarding 

where training should focus. It is not to be construed as 

an overall negative criticism of your fine bulletin. Keep up 

your good work. Essayons! 

Major Stephen E. Lowe 

Defense Mapping Agency 

Bethesda. Maryland 

MK Lowrey replies: I appreciate Mejor Lowe's topographic insights. I should have stated The large-area 

maos were used onmurilv in Emermcv .. . Ooerations . Cenlax, while the smoll-urru maps were used by ,yrrnll.i 6n the 

around."Ho~efilly,hr; comments will clczlr up .:<.n/ilsrorr 

between map scale sire and muemge area. dystated in my 

recommendation, it is critical that units assess and t~ to 

acquire needed topographicproducts ofpotential disaster 

relief areas prior to training arui operations, to preclude 

possible delays in getting maps. 

28 Engineer August I994 
The Schiebel AN1912 Hand-Held Mine Detector: 


A Canadian's View 


Lieutanant Colonel Normand Levert, Branch 

of Military Engineers, Canadian Armed Forces, 

spoke to Catherine Eubanks about the Canadian Army's experience with the Schiebel 

kVl912 Mine Detector. The Schiebel AN1912 is 

the commercial designation for the ANIPSS-I2 

detector used by US.Army engineers. 

X am Lieutenant Colonel Normand Levert, and 

I'm now with the Directorate of Military Engineering and Requirements in the Canadian National Defence Headquarters, in Ottawa. I was involved with the procurement of the mine detector, 

first as the requirements officer and then as the 

project manager, because I was the life-cycle manager for combat engineer systems in Ottawa. 

In the late 1980s, we had a program to replace 

our hand-held mine detectors. Before making a solection, we first turned to our scientists and the scientific laboratories' defence research establishment, 

aj we call it, to perform scientific tests on several 

commercial and military mine detectors. The Schiebe1 AN1912 (we call it the AN19) came up as one of 

the very top ones along with the Farster METEX 

detector. The other detectors were not nearly as satisfactory as those two. We also performed several 

tests with our field troops (engineer platoons) to determine user confidence and satisfaction with how 

the mine detectors performed in field conditions, 

and how happy the soldiers were with the feel, 

size, weight, and performance of the detectors. 

A major concern in the selection process was 

whether or not a magnetic impulse along a 

pulse-induction coil would create a magnetic field 

which would trip a magnetic-influence fuze. We 

knew that the German Army was doing tests for 

that same problem since they had adopted the 

Swedish FFV mine. Through a data exchange we 

were able to obtain the German Army's test results, 

and they showed that the Schiebel AN19 was the 

only detector that consistently never triggered the 

magnetic-influence mine, at least not the FFV 

mine. So in terms of sensitivity, the W19 was, in 

fact, the best rated mine detector. It was also the 

one that had no likelihood of inducing detonation 

in the magnetic-influence mine. Our troops liked 

the AN19 very much, so we procured it for our 

armed forces. We made an immediate procurement 

for troops stationed in Europe and then filled in for 

the rest of our forces back in Canada. 

Shortly after receiving the mine detectors, we got 

our first operational exposure to its performance 

when we went into Kuwait with the United Nations 

(UN). U'e sent a battalion into Kuwait to establish a 

demilitarized zone between Kuwait and Iraq. Their 

mission was to clear a mad and then clear areas and 

construct observation posts all across the border hetween Iraq and Kuwait. The AN19 performed extremely well in this environment. It already had a 

good reputation for performing well in a hot climate: the Danes had used it in Beirut, and we 

were also getting good reports from civilian companies involved with demining operations. 

August 1994 Engineer 29 
One problem we experienced in Kuwait was that 

the insulation on the coils melted if soldiers rested 

the mine detector on the hot, burning sand. The 

trick to solving that problem was to put something 

like a bonnet around the search head coils to give 

enough insulation and distance. 

Another thing we found in Kuwait was that the 

search head's plastic mounting posts had been cut 

too far apart by the die maker. He tried to improve 

on the manufacturer's design but then some posts 

broke off. When we reported that problem to the 

Schiebel factory, their personnel identified the 

cause in less than three weeks, rectified it, and 

then replaced our search heads. They also immediately retrofitted their production lines so that all 

future search heads would be correct. Overall, our 

experience with the mine detector in Kuwait was 

excellent. 

Our next demining experience with the AN19 

was in Croatia and Bosnia. We deployed to Croatia 

with an engineer battalion in 1992, and we've had 

troops there since then. So Canadian engineers 

have experienced all seasons there. After several 

months, we received reports of performance degradation in wet weather. It turned out that some 

water was ingested where the wire enters the 

search head. Again, the Schiebel factory was able 

to correct the problem as soon as we had determined the cause. 

Canadian troops have a lot of confidence in the 

AN19 detector, and they have used it both in the 

hot desert and in the cold in Bosnia. We have consistently found 'plastic" mines, including the 

TMA3, which is a very low metallic contact mine, 

with the AN19 when they were shallow buried. 

Our worst experience with the mine detector 

was in Somalia. Canadian troops were in Somalia 

for about 8 months in 1992 and 1993, and we had 

several armored vehicles damaged by antitank 

mines. We were able to identify the type of mine 

that had hit the vehicles by the fragments left in 

the soil. Then we found more of thase mines and 

demonstrated to our satisfaction that we could find 

them with the AN19 detector. We had not found 

them before being hit because an operational decision had been made to take a chance and drive 

down the road inspecting for visual clues. One visual clue was that the armored carrier (LAV) lost 

a wheel when it ran over the mine! But our armored vehicles took the mine hits quite nicely: 

Although the vehicles were damaged, the crews 

were OK. 

Canadian soldiers have strong confidence in the 

AN19. To help them become confident, we have developed a three-step training process. When sappers first go through our Engineer School, they are 

given some hands-on training with the mine 

30 Engineer 

detector to make them familiar with the equipment. When they come back with their units in the 

normal cycle of unit training, the sappers get more 

hands-on time with the detector and practice using 

it. Then, when a unit is ear-marked to go to a UN 

mission, or any mission for that matter, the soldiers receive additional training. As part of the 

work-up for that unit, we provide intense training 

in first aid, field practice, and various skills such 

as weapons shooting. Of course, we also include 

hands-on training with the AN19 

In some cases, we have copies of the mines that 

are in theater. We may, for example, buy the Yugoslav's training mines from their laboratory and 

train with them. But training mines are not always 

exactly the same as the real ones. Therefore, as 

soon as we get in theater, we gather the mines 

found in theater and install them in known locations at various depths, and soldiers then practice 

with actual target mines. In this way, the troops 

become familiar with the type of auditory signal 

the target mines emit. So they know what an 

M15 mine sounds like, and what a bubble cap 

sounds like, and what a TMA3 mine sounds like. 

That is how soldiers learn to identify the target 

mines, although we prod every detection for 

insurance. 

We have found that a demining operation is 

stressful but, at the same time, it can eventually 

lead to boredom. Once soldiers are bored, they are 

not as keen and the operation becomes extremely 

dangerous. All of our field commanders have 

adopted a policy of rotating personnel involved 

with mine clearing or mine searching every 30 

minutes at the maximum and sometimes every 20 

minutes, depending on the climate. 

The demining teams consist of three people: a 

mine detector, a mine prodder (we use a nonmagnetic mine prodder), and a supervisor The supervisor follows slightly behind the other two so he can 

watch the safety of the operation. Again, let me 

stress that in operations other than war, where 

demining is the major task, the teams change 

about every 20 to 30 minutes so they remain fresh, 

alert and keen. 

Yesterday we discussed an interesting physiological problem for soldiers operating a mine detector. 

And that is to check the auditory accuracy (hearing) of soldiers using the equipment. The signal 

that the mine detector gives is a steady tone, and 

the strength of the tone depends on the amount of 

metal that is perceived by the detector. Thus, a low 

mass of metal produces a faint tone. The sensitivity of the detector can be adjusted, but if a soldier 

is looking for a mine that he knows has a large 

amount of metal, it is better to make the detector 

less sensitive to minimize the clutter. 
Q. Does making the detector less sensitive 

limit the kinds of mines the soldier can hear? 

In that case, he might not hear the signal for 

a low-metallic mine if the detector's sensitivity is set too low. 

A. That's right. So, if a soldier is seeking 

mines that contain only a very small amount of 

metal, such as the TMA3 found in Yugoslavia, the 

detector's sensitivity must be turned way up. Then 

the soldier hears a lot of signals because every 

time the detector picks up metal, it emits a signal. 

Q. Could a cold or sinus condition that 

might temporarily impair hearing affect a soldier's ability to hear the signal? 

A. It could have an effect if he can't hear well. 

Major Allan, the U.S.Army Engineer School's Canadian liaison officer, has suggested that a field commander should test each soldier's hearing when 

they arrive at a work site. Each detector comes 

with a piece of calibration metal of lrnown size and 

mass. If a soldier can't hear that piece of metal being detected, he should be assigned to duties other 

than the mine detector. Even listening to loud 

music can temporarily affect a soldier's hearing. 

Q. There are two earpieces with the headphone on the mine detector. Do Canadian soldiers use both earpieces or just one? 

A. One earpiece is a dummy It is only there to 

keep both ears at the same temperature when soldiers are out in cold weather. One earpiece is open 

to the outside so the soldier can hear battlefield 

and environmental noise. The other is hooked up to 

the detector. So, only one ear listens for the tone. If 

a soldier has a hearing impairment in one ear, this 

should be checked. 

Q. Must the headphone be on your head to 

hear the tone? Could you place the piece that 

normally goes on your ear somewhere else 

and still hear the tone? 

A. Well, it's a question of traditional design. 

The hand-held mine detector is also used during reconnaissance, when you want to avoid giving a position away Therefore, mine detectors have been 

made with an auditory signal as opposed to a light 

signal or something that must be read because a 

glow in the dark will give your position away. Today, with the proliferation of night vision devices, a 

soldier could give his position away quickly. You'd 

be surprised, when there is a night vision device, 

how the slightest amount of light turns on the 

battlefield as if it were a flare or illumination. Not 

only would the signal light up the soldier holding 

the mine detector, but everybody within a radius of 

about 10 meters probably would be illuminated. 

Q. The auditory signal, then, is the safest? 

A. Well, there is nothing to be picked up. The signal is very weak because it is directed into an ear. 

But on a very quiet night, if you are calibrating a 

mine detector too close to an enemy position and the 

earpiece is not on your ear, that little peep or sound 

wuld be picked up several yards away. When calibrating a detedor, soldiers usually use a large chunk of 

metal to make sure the detector is working. In that 

case, the whistle would be quite loud and the enemy 

could hear it 10, 15, or even 20 meters away. 

Q. Is hands-on time with the mine detector 

an important part of your training program? 

A. Yes, it's very important. Because it is a manmachine interface, soldiers must recognize the signal. They can visualize it in their minds, and that 

is important too. But, I personally would not want 

to go into a minefield unless I had three or four 

days of training time listening to the mine detector 

before I went. 

Q. Would you like to add anything to this 

conversation? 

A. I compared notes with the Belvoir Research 

Development and Engineering Center at Fort 

Belvoir in June 1990, shortly after we purchased 

the AN19, and Fort Belvoir agreed that it is, in all 

likelihood, the best mine detector in the world. 

Thank vou. I@ 
Personal Viewpoint 


Jointness-Essayons! 


By Colonel Lee Gibson 

oint Operations is the new the resulting downsizing of the roles and missions now, before 

cliche The term is used services, Congress directed the someone else's study tells us how 

whenever military operations are I DOD to conduct the RMS and to do it? 

discussed by almost anyone- look for efficiencies across service Engineers from each servjce 

military experts, diplomats or lines in the acquisition, doctrine, should seize the second RMS as a 

politicians. At the national politi- force structure, training, and op- i second strategic-level opportunity 

cal and military strategy levels it erations programs. They should continue the initiais decreed that military forces 1 The first RMS was conducted i tive established in response to the 

operate jointly through the om- 1 under the direction of the Chair- i first RMS:Establishjoint working 

mand and control of the unified / man, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). groups under their direction to inCommanders in Chief (CINCs). 1 During the conduct of that study, vest~gate ptential areas of benefit 

The U.S. Atlantic Command is be- the senior Joint Staff leadership 1 in engineer acquisition, doctrine, 

ing positioned now to ensure that discussed the feasibility of consoli- 1 force structure, training, and operathe training of all services in the dating all engineers across service t~onsprograms. Their focus should 

continental United States maxi- lines. One of the final recommen- be to Increase engineering interrnizes 'Sointness." All recent and dations forwarded by the Joint operability from a joint perspective. 

emerging military doctrine at , Staff to the CJCS was t,hat all con- i ' For example, why can't thejoint 

least speaks to this concept, and ; struction engineers (Army Com- services consolidate the research, 

FM 100-5 is no exception. The bat Heavy, Air Force Red Horse, development, and acquisition of 

question is, what are we, Army i and Navy Seabees) become Army engineer equipment-construcengineers, doing to help shape our i Combat I-Ieavy engineers. That tion as well as combat? Why can't 

'Qoint engineering" destiny? I offer recommendation was not, accepted i joint service engineers use the 

some recommendations. 1 by the CJCS and was not in the same construction standards and 

Army engineers need to seize RMS report to Congress. Instead, even the same construction manthis opportunity to shape our fu- 1 the RMS report to Congress em- I agement and component systems? 

ture while jointness is still in a , phasized the complementary roles Maybe the joint services should 

formative stage. We must work to- of each services' engineers. Some i

i delineate some responsibilities. 

gether at all levels-strategic (na- 1 consolidations and efficiencies i For example, perhaps only the 

tional), operational and tactical- were recommended, however, and Navy should be responsible for port 

to develop future policies for are currently beingexecuted. One construction-Army and Navy enacquisition, doctrine, force struc- ' example is the consolidation of en- ' gineers currently share that reture, training, and operations gineer training among the serv- sponsibility With Joint Staff apacross service lines. i ices'schoolhouses. Army, Air Force, 1

i 

proval, delineations such as this 

I Naw. - and Marines will train to- ; might help engineers determine ~ 

Strategic Level 1 gether soon at each of the services' : where to take force structure cuts 

A I engineer schools, based on the sol- i and justify their structure within 

t the st,rategic level the 1 diers'~~~. their services. 

rmy is internally deciding . A second RMS,under the direc- Basedon DOD experiences in Opits future through the Force XXI tion of t,he secretary of Defense, is erations Provide Comfort and Proeffort. Similarly, the Department 1 in progress. This study provides vide Hopc, the joint services need to 

of Defense (DOD) is deciding the I another opportunity for joint engi- develop more effective doctrine for 

future shape of jointness, includ- , neers at the strategic level to engineer planning and execution in 

ing engineers, through its Roles I shape the future ofjoint engineer- ; joint operations and contingencies. 

and Missions Studies (RMS). Be- ing. Shouldn't Army engineers try I The DOD schoolhouses should 

cause of funding reductions and I to tackle the hard questions of i 

; (Continued on page 42) 

32 Engineer. August 1994 
Old Ironsides Sappers Expand 


Traditional Roles During BCTP 


By Colonel Edwin J. Arnold and 

Lieutenant Colonel William J. Bayles 

uring the first two weeks I of doing business. When division I brigade commander to the critiof February 1994, the 1st I received the operations plans I cal BOS decisions, both in time 

Armored Division (AD) partici- I from V Corps, we surged the I and place. Figure 1 shows the 

pated in a highly successful bat- I whole planning capacity of the template. 

tle command training program I engineer brigade headquarters I Although the DST appeared to 

(BCTP) exercise. The 1st AD En- to give comprehensive mobil- I be time-based, it was actually 

gineer Brigade supported this ~ty/countermobilityisurvivability event-based. By referring to the 

warfighter exercise by deploying I (MCMS) input into the division I DST as the battle unfolded, the 

command posts at the brigade I orders process. By doing this, we I engineer main command post (CP) 

and battalion levels, thus provid- I developed a robust engineer an- I could anticipate MCMS demands 

ing the division with full doc- I nex that also doubled as the en- I and allocate resources where 

trinal engineer support. Some of I gineer operations order. This par- I needed. Because the DST was dethe techniques the brigade used I allel planning process assured I veloped early in the orders prochelped "expand the envelope" of I complete battlefield operating I ess, subordinate battalion mmnormal doctrine while enhancing I system (BOS) integration at the I manders could use it when they 

its contribution to the division's I division level and provided time I helped maneuver brigade comwarfighting effort. This article I to war-game engineer operations I manders develop their orders. 

describes the areas of expanded I in conjunction with war gaming I The DST helped the engineer batengineer planning and support I the division plan. We derived two I talion commanders understand 

that we believe exceed current I benefits from the process: a deci- I the engineer brigade commander's 

practice, so we can share the I sion support template (DST) and I intent for MCMS support to the 

ideas with the engineer commu- I engineer synchronization. I fight. 

nity The ideas apply to heavy I Decision Support Bmplate. I Engineer Synchronization. 

and light force engineer units I Because of the detailed war-game I The time gained by conductingdcthat support combat operations. I prooess, we were able to develop a I tailed planning in conjunction 

I 	 detailed engineer DST. Prepared I with the division planning procParallel Planning I I	 in . 	 matrix form similar to the di- I ess, provided an opportunity for 

vision DST, it helped track the I detailed synchronization of I 

ram the beginning, we ex- I numerous "on-order" and "be- I MCMS operations across the diviplored more efficient ways I prepared" missions and keyed the I sion and from the division to the 

August 1994 	 Engineer 33 
lAD Englnesr Wpde 

Decision Suppoe Template 

pronrrd- mery 10 Phases I and I1 * PL Nebmsk. 

m.,.,m p,"I 

PL MiChlg." 

rI.rross tha 

1.1on .act0 -

1v1.1on .actor/. 

Mns 1-7 EN 

1-1CAveconomy 

.es,or: presew. 

AFB .net* lor 

f",",. ops..tlon.. 

aoros. dl"l.lon 

maneuver by 

Kana1 Ilksly. pratacllnl

Inlar-BDE MBA 

boundary. 

Figure 1. Decision Support Template 

34 Engineer August 1994 
Largo 

(Here 

river 

than om 

-


platoon at AFB lor rromlng) Modified Combined 

Madlum msr 

(One orbr platoon or AFB lor cronlng) 

Small rhrer -' ----- (AVLB pomlbb tor ~tosslng) 

Bullt up ere8 Q

"/ (Not CY~IY~IC~) 

Rertrletlvo tarraln 

slop^ and vcgetallon) 

Z 

Figure 2. Commander's modified combined obstacle overlay (CMCOO) Is 


less detalled than a normal MCOO and does not obscure underlying maps. 


maneuver brigade. After publish- I rehearsal, given in sequence, pro- I 

ing a detailed warning order I vided subordinate commanders an I

I 

1 (WARNORD) (a nearly complete I opportunity to discuss, with the I 

version of the final annex), the bri- I engineer brigade commander and I 

gade S3 and the ADE conducted I each other, how they would sup- I 

an order "executability" session I port the maneuver brigade opera- I 

with subordinate battalion S3s. I tions. Crosstalk among command- I 

The session provided valuable in- I ers and between commanders and I 

itial insights into the maneuver I staffs ensured that the MCMS I 

brigade plans and helped eliminate I plan for the division accomplished I 

problems in the annex before the II two purposes: It could be executed 1 

final WARNORD was published. , with the allocated resources, and I 

Additional BOS synchroniza- I it supported the division and bri- I 

tion took place after the division I gade commanders'maneuver plans I 

published its order and while the I The common understanding that I 

maneuver brigades were complet- II the commanders and staffs devel- I

I 

ing theirs. An orders backbrief, a I oped of the MCMS plan paid off I 

synchronization drill, and a map I during the battle. I 

August 1994 

Obstacle Overlay 

aefore conducting train-up 

exercises. the division's 

supporting terrain detachment 

prepared a series of modified 

combined obstacle overlays 

(MCOO) to use during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process (Figure 2). 

These products were standard, 

multicolor overlays of the entire area of operations (AO). 

During the preliminary exercises, we rarely used the MCOO 

for continuous battlefield assessments because the colors 

obscured the underlying map. 

Instead, we developed a more 

usable product-a commander's 

MCOO (CMCOO). It was a distilled version of the standard 

MCOO that did not obstruct the 

underlying maps. 

The CMCOO highlighted the 

obstacle effects of the terrain so 

commanders and planners could 

use them during planning and 

execution. Using standard map 

colors (blue for water, black for cities, and brown for slope), we outlined the major sections of the A0 

that restricted movement. In the 

outlined areas, we showed if 

the obstacle effect was limited 

(crossed-hatched) or significant 

(solid color). We kept the overlay 

from becoming a 'heasles-sheet" 

by establishing two grid squares 

as the minimum-sized area for 

consideration. For division- and 

brigade-level operations, this 

seemed appropriate. Finally, we 

coded the waterways in the A0 

according to the amount of 

friendly resources required to 

cross them. We did not highlight 

very small streams and ditches 

(less than 15meters) because they 

offered little impediment to advancing battalions and usually required only an AVLB to cross. We 

used the following convention for 

waterways: 

Engineer 35 
COL Edwln J. Arnold, IAD 

DIVENG Commander,provldes planning guidance to 

the Assistant Dlvision Enainew, MAJ Alex ~ornstaucier 

and DIVENG HHC Commander, CPT Tony Wrlght. 

Small waterways - 15 to 50 me- I I bridges. The enemy's float-bridge 

ters wide, required either a ribbon I Execution I assets were relatively high payoff 

bridge platoon or a medium girder I targets because they were keys to 

bridge set to cross and were shown ith the CMCOO, the en- I maintaining the mass and tempo 

as fine blue lines. I gineer brigade S2 ana- I ofits 

Medium waternays - 50 to 100 l~zedthe enemy as Part the I As the enemy began deploying, 

meters wide, required a ribbon I engineer battlefield assessment. I we confirmed its march routes usbridge platoon to cross and were ' The CMCOO and visible road net I ing moving-target indicator plots, 

shown as medium blue lines. I i~~dicatedprobable enemy deploy- I which also showed the timing of 

Large waternays - 100 to 200 merit routes, and the Presence I enemy deployment. In this exermeters wide, a full ribbon I medium to large rivers I cise, an enemy vulnerability 50 

bridge company to cross and were I indicated where to impede its de- I kilometers from the FLOT allowed 

shown as heavy blue lines. I ployment. Continuing analysis of I Our commander to shape the batWaterways I enemy vulnerabilities led to the I tlefield in tirne and space. De- greater than 200 1 engineer brigade's involvement I .trOying fixed bridges well for. 

meters wide that required more I 

than a single ribbon brigade com- I 

in deep-~perationsplanning, I ward of the FLOT accomplished with excellent results. 

pany to cross would have been I I three important thine: 

I 

shown with very heavy blue lines. I Deep Targeting. In the AO, I It slowed enemy deployment 

This exercise did not have any I fivemajor approach routes led into I and increased enemy wlnervery large waterways. I the 1st AD sector. All routes I abilitv to deeD attack, -

crossed at least two rivers; three I The CMCOO was I routes crossed three rivers. our I .It forced the enemy to use its 

throughout the exercise. It clearly I .,,lFis made a vital connection I float-bridge assets primarily in 

facilitated the definition of move- I between two seemingly disparate I its main attack sector, thereby 

ment corridors for friendly and , fads: ~h~ enem" needed all five I telegraphing its probable main 

enemy forces. Because it did not : deDlovmentrout& to mass combat I attack location. I . "~~~ ~ ~ 

obscure the I power, and its float-bridge assets I .It increased the vulnerability and planners lefi the CMCOO on I were sufficient only to provide a I of the float-bridge units to their maps duringthe operations I few alternate bridges over the riv- I deep targeting by putting to integrate terrain considera- I ers in its way These facts pointed I them at predictable places, tions into their operations and I to a vulnerability-the enemy , 

understand enemy options for its I could be bottlenecked at the river I The enemy could not afford to 

operations. I lines if we could deny it fixed I lose more than five pontoon bridge 

36 Engineer August 1994 
8 Volcano reloads 225 8000m Minefield 8 Launcher hours 

17.55 Ton demolitions 17.5 40 Road craters 

10 Bridge demolitions 

110 Squad hours 

360 Concertinas 

99 Plckels 

113 Reels wire 

16.0 1800m Triple standard 

concertina fence or 

36 Road blocks 

6 Platoonhours 

15 MlCUCs with 220 15 Vehicle breaches 15 Squad hours 

Figure 3 

' 
 companies from its entire front attack, the enemy needed 24 to 36 1 obstacle plan and started work on 

without seriously impacting its I hours before resuming operations. I in-depth obstacles when the endeployment. We placed those five ' Besides giving the division lu- 1 emy attack started. Throughout 

companies on the division's high I crative targets for cross-FLOT at- I the process, supplies were readily 

payoff target list, and the engineer I tacks, our systematic attack of I available. Three factors contrih- I brigade 52 tracked them closely I bridges, enemy engineers, and I uted significantly to the availabil- I . throughout the deployment. I crossing sites successfully dis- I ity of supplies: developing standThus, by carrying the engineer , rupted the enemy's deployment ! ard resupply packages efficiently, 

battlefield assessment well for- I and plans. Although able to swim I moving barrier materials, and loward of the main battle area I or deep-ford many combat vehi- ] cating the Engineer Brigade S4. 

(MBA), we identified a major en- I .cles, the enemy could not mass ar- I Deueloprng Resupply Packages. 

emy vulnerability. I tlllely and bring critical engineer In recent years, the engineer and 

The engineer brigade S2 briefed I and logistics vehicles across the I logistics communities in V Corps 

the results of this analysis at an 1 river lines because the vast major- I have worked together to develop 

initial meeting with the 1st AD'S I ity of those vehicles required I engineer Class IV and V resupply 

deep-targeting cell. Once division I bridges. Without these combat packages (see Figure 3). They are 

leadership was convinced of the I multipliem, the enemy could not I a compromise between the engivulnerability, the division tar- I assemble enough combat power to I neers' obstacle requirements and 

geted it systematically. First, I overwhelm our main battle area I the wholesalesupply system'smabridges deep in the enemy's rear I defenses. In contrast, our defenses I terial packaging characteristics I

area were nominated for destruc- I were well developed because the I and movement capabilities. 

tion by corps's battlefield air inter- I initial fixed-bridge destruction I Each package represents a load 

diction CBAI). These targets en- I gave friendly engineers and ma- 1 for a standard 25-ton stake and 

sured that part of the enemy's I neuver forces time to prepare the I platform (S&P) trailer. The major 

float-bridge assets would be tied I defense. I subcomponents of each package 

up well away from the battlefield. I Barrier Maferial Manage- I are factory-palletized types ofmaThen, bridges along the next two 1 ment and Movement. The depth I terials, thus allowing them to be 

rivers were destroyed. As t,he en- I and density of engineer obstacles I efficiently loaded using forklifts. 

emy bypassed the rivers with float I in the division's main battle area These features make the resupply 

bridges, we dastroyed the bridges I were due to the efficiency with I packages readily acceptable to the 

and seeded the areas with Gator I which logisticians moved barrier 1 logistics community Engineer 

minefields. These mines stopped I materials. Number of engineer I planners like them because each 

the enemy fromusingits preferred I troops, rather than supply of bar- I package is defined by number and I . locations for bridging operations. rler material, was the limitingfac- 1 type of obstacles each will produce 

If we simply destroyed a float I

I tor in the 1st AD'S preparation. I and the work effort required to 

bridge, the enemy replaced it and I Becausedeep targetingandattack I emplace the obstacles. Obstacle 

resumed operations in 12 to 18 1 were effective, division completed I estimates for each package are not 

hours, Ifwn used Gator mines in the I all of its initial defensive area I always 100 percent accurate, but 

August 1994 Engineer 37 
~ 

they are precise enough to meet I essential in making the entire re- AD Engineer Brigade an opporplanningneedsat the brigadeand I supply process a "push" not a I tunity to validate and expand 

division levels. I "pull" system-a characteristic I the existing doctrine for employMoving Barrier Materials. In ' that was critical to success. Some '
 ment of divisional engineer brithis exercise, two aspects of mov- I DrVENGbrigade mmmanden may 

I

I gades. The kchniques described 

ing barrier materials were impor- argue that they want the services I produced very positive effects on 

tant: moving the initial lift of I and field grade experience of the I the total division effort by ensurpackagesandmovingroutinely re- I brigade S4 at the DnTENG Main I ing the total integration of the 

curring resupply For the initial I CP.Wefoundthattheofiicerismore I divisional engineer brigade into 

lift, the capacity of engineer haul I valuable to the division's overall en- I the combined arms operations of 

assets and the dedicated haul as- I gineer effort at the DREAR. I the division. 

sets attached to the forward sup- 1 I Our parallel planning and early 

port battalions (FSB) from V GObstacle Planning ' movement of barrier materials enCorps transportation units pro- I I sured that we were ready to previded the necessary capability enemll~we found the OM- I pare the defense as soon as the 

In the 1st AD Engineer Brigade, I cle planning doctrine I division controlled the battlefield. 

we found thatbydedicatingabout I i"itscu~ntfo~,withoneexcePI The CMCOO and battlefield 

50 percent of the M9 ACE bowl I tion, Because current doctrine I analysis enabled the engineers to 

capacity to hauling barrier mate- I specifies that obstacle zones and 1 play a pivotal role in the deep fight 

rial, we could carry about 12 bat- I belts not unit boundaries, we I by delaying the enemy's deploytalion hours of barrier material. I usually developed obstacle plans I ment, while our careful rehearsal 

This critical material allowed us to I that internal seams Or I and its product, our DST, enabled 

transition rapidly from offensive I gap that along intradivisional I us to make decisions quickly duror movement operations to a de. I boundaries. We realized these I ingthe battle. 

fensive operation. Assets with the I Seams presented excellent weak I The 1st -4D Engineer Brigade 

FSB carried an additional 12 bat- I points for At I will continue to use techniques 

talion hours of barrier material as I fmt we placed acrcss I such as the parallel planningprocpart of the division's combat con- I boundaries but abandoned that ess, engineer DST, CMCOO, and I figurod loads. Before we used up I technique because of the I standard barrier packages. We 

the 24-hours worth of material, we I and problems associated I recommend that others consider 

activated corps-delivered resupply I with it. However, the benefit was I their application when situations 

of barrier materials to engineer I that adjacent units were to I require their support of heavy and coordinate their boundary actions forward stockage points (EFSP) I 

very closely to prevent gaps. (one per maneuver brigade sector I I 

I light forces. Y

and one in the division's rear area) I The solution we adopted to han- I 

dle "boundary seamsn involved I Cohnel Edwin J. Anzold, Jr is the 

on a 12-hour, reoccurring basis. I commander of the 1st Anrwred DiuiEach push of supplies contained I placing division-directed obstacle I siorz Engilteer Brigade in Bad 

enough material for an additional 12 I belts in the covering force area I ~ ~ G~~~~~ ~H~ ~ 

1 (CFA) that covered the seam and I serued us the ereutive officer for the battalion hours of engineer effort, turned attackingenemy units into I newly fond E~zgi~gillee-rBrigade, 3d Locating the Engineer Brigade I the MBA brigades, battle areas, I Infantry Division, and as coin- S4. Field Manual 5-71-100 shows 1 nwnder of the 10th Eizginee-r Bnttaithe brigade S4 as part of the divi- I Engineers supporting the MBA I ion. COL AmoM received a nurstrrs 

sion rear (DREAR) command pt, I brigades emplaced these belts af- , of military arts and science degree 

separated from the engineer bri- I ter coordinating their location fi~nthe School ofAduancea! Military 

I with CFA forces. Since the belts I Studies. He is a graduate of the gade main command post (DI- I were actually part of the MBA, ) War Coz2ege VElNG Main). We found this to be 

correct. With a field grade ofiicer I MBA brigades covered the belts I LTC UIllia~n Bayles is the erecutive 

who understood engineer logistics I With observation and fire. We I oficet; 4th ID EngineerBrigo.de Durrequirements in the DREAR, we I found this technique be velY I ing ,the lst AD warfighter erercise, he 

had a virtually uninterrupted, I useful and experienced no enemy I the XO, 1st AD EIzgineer Britimely flow of engineer barrier I thrust "down the boundary" dur- I gnde. He was the S3, 1st AD Engimaterial toward the planned 1 ing the entire exercise. I neerBrigade during the 1992 1stAD 

I I warfighter exercise. A graduate of MBA. His expert guidance and II Applications I the School of Advanced iMilitary close cooperation with the divi- I Studies and CGSC, he is a regis- sion's logistics planners and mate- he 1st AD BCTP warfighter 1 tered Professional Engineer in New 

rial managers were absolutely I exercise afforded the 1st I Hainpshire. 

38 Engineer August 1994 
I 

I 

I 

Earn A Master of Science 

Depe atEOAC 

Wit11 the downsizing of en- 1 In the USAES-UMR 36-week directly to EOAC, where they will 

gineer forces in today's ' graduate program, the Engineer be consolidated and submitted to 

Army, it is difficult for engineer Branch extends an officer 16 UMR. Officers are responsible for 

! officers to take 18 to 24 months weeks after EOAC on permissive I obtaining their certified underi 	 from their caree,rs for advanced status, not TUY Officers accepted graduate transcripts for the UMR 

civil school. Additionally, funding will remain at Fort Leonard Wood admissiotls office. 

cuts have reduced the opportuni- to complete a master of science The Engineer School's goal is for 

ties for fully funded graduate degree in engineering manage- officers to complete the UMR mas- ,' 

school, and many civilian educa- ment. The program begins the first , ter's degree program and become 

tion slots for military personnel day of EOAC. Participants will re- eligible to take the Professional 

! have been distributed to other ceive a 3.0 credit-hour civil engi- Engineer Examination. Profesbranches or eliminated. So how neering project to complete during sional Engineer Registration for 

can engineer officers combine a EOAC, and partial credit hours will the State of Missouri requires four I 

! 

I, busy career with advanced pro- be granted for specific engineering years of engineeringexperience to 

fessional education? management courses. Students can qualify for the Professional EngiThe US, Army Engineer Schd earn additional credits during neer Examination. One year olexis working to develop alternate EOAC by attending courses after perience is granted for applicants ! ' j inethodsofprofessionaleducation. duty hours and on weekends. By who possess a master's degree in 

For example, engineer officers can EOAC graduation, officers will The Engineer School 

use their time at the Engineer Of- have earned 15 credit hours. After 


ficer Advanced Course (EOAC) to graduation, they will attend UMR 


i 	 complete a master's degree. The full time, for two8-weeksessions, 

University of Missouri-Rolla 

(UMR) will grant credit hours for 

the 20-week EOAC course. UMR 

is known internationally for its 

outstanding engineering programs and is accredited by the Ac- versity fees but not books. This courses for the PE andFundamencreditation Board for Engineering compares favorably with the nor- tals of EngineeringExaminations. 

and ~hnology. Active Component ma1 cost of more than $10,000 for These aids are available at Fort 

officers may remain for an addi- a master's degree. While the cost Leonard Wood for groups of 10 or I 

tional 16 weeks after EOAC gradu- is significant, the degree is an in- more students. 

ation to complete degree require- I 

vestment for the future, and some I Officers who are ready for the ' ' 

ments. Reserve Component off~cers financial assistance may be avail- 1 challenge can arrive at Fort 

may also attend, if their chain of . able. The Montgomery GI Bill can i Leonard Wood for EOAC and leave 

command authorizes the extension. I be used to pay for the program for i 36 weeks later with a completed 

To participate in this program, selected officers. Additionally, the 1 master of science degree and as a 

officers must meet UMR enroll- Engineer School is working to pro- ' Professional Engineer What better 

ment requirements. He or she vide student loans through local way for an officer to arrive at their 

must hold a bachelor's degree and credit unions. next duty station, fully focused on I 	 I 

should have a 3.0 GPA for their The USAES-UMR program is theirgreatestchallen~ommand 

last 60 credit hours ofundergradu- ' scheduled to begin with EOAC of an engineer company 

ate study AGPAless than 3.0 may class 1-95 in November 1994.Ap- The point of contact for the 

be accepted, but the student will plication forms will be included in USAES-UMR program is Captain 

be placed on a "special status" the EOAC welcome packets. Com- Anthony C. Funkhouser. He may 

similar to academic probation. pleted forms should be returned / be reached at (314) 563-4124. 

- - August 1994 	 ngineer 39 

1 
Restructured Heavy w Division Engineer Support: -, 

A Force Developer's Comments 


By Alan Schlie 

The engineer restructure initiati; encompassed a wide 

spukrum of engineer missions on 

the battlefield. It was not created 

solely for the heavy division's organic engineer unit; it also diredly affects the corps mechanized and wheeled battalions and 

wmbat support equipment companies (CSE). ~verall, the restructuring shifts mobility, wuntermobility, and survivability 

assets fornard to divisions, while 

sustainment engineering assets 

shift t,o corps and echelons above 

corps (EAC). In effect, engineers 

continue to ~mvide support to all 

areas of the force, but each organization's mission now is more 

sharply focused. 

At first glance, that sharpened 

focus may not lend itself to the 

versatility called for by Major 

General Joe Ballard during opening remarks at the 1994 Senior 

Engineer Leaders Tcaining Conference. After characterizing the 

future as one filled with uncerI 

ALO Tenets 

1 Initiative 

Agility 

I Depth 

I 

U.S. National Military Strategy 

Proiect and sustain 

Protect the force I 

Wln the battlefield information war I 

Synchronization Conduct precision strikes 

Dominate the manewer battle 

: more ways of making engineers a : field forward of the FLGT to mine 

: trusted wmbat multiplier in the : clearance during relief operations. i eyes of the maneuver commander, : Each engineer unit plays a part on 

: and more sharing of innovative : the mmbined am team and has a 

: techniques and procedures with i specific place. That place is deter- : other engineer commanders. : mined by the unit's mission, person- 

: ?b say that the concept focused : nel, training, and equipment. 

: solely on the offensively oriented : Before executing any mission, 

: tenets of AirLand Operations : the commander must make realisf (ALO)without recognizing the de- 1 tic decisions during mission plan- 

: fensive nature of conflicts creates i the impression that engineers have 

: fielded a dysfunctional, overly ag. 

i gressive organization. These units 

: are not only well suited for their 

i doctrinal battlefield missions, 

: ning, and those decisions are i based on the presence or absence 

: of equipment and personnel. 'Ikk 

completion is based on the capa- 

: bilities of equipment and penon- i nel, so the presence of specific 

: equipment or personnel indicates i an intent for the unit to undertake 

: certain tasks. For example, part of 

i one capability statement for each 

: organization deals with the "re- 

: pair of trails, roads, and fords." 

: The division battalion is equipped 

: to perform expedient repairs (fell 

taint35 change, and oppor+unity, : they also rank high on the list of 

MG Ballard called upon the gathered commanders to "challenge 

the status quo and exemplify engineer versatility" when dealing 

with engineer issues during the 

week's sessions. 

If engineers are to retain their 

valued position on the combined 

arms team, versatility must become their trademark! Versatility 

does not mean diversity; it does 

not mean more people or more 

equipment to do more missions. It 

means more innovative ways ofacwmplishing the current mission, 

: units called to clean up after a 

i hurricane or earthquake. The ten- 

: ets of ALO fit very well with the i missionoftheArmy andtheneeds 

: of the Force XX Army of today, 

: which emphasize versatility, as 

: the chart above shows, 

i The four formations (heavydivi- : trees for corduroy material and 

: sion, corps wheeled, corps mechai nized, and combat support equip 

: ment) are capable of executing the i mobility, countermobility, and 

: survivability missions required 

i across the operational contin- 

: uum-from shaping the battle- 

: emplace culverts), the corps

i wheeled battalions can do slightly 

: more (grade and compact and haul 

gravel), but it takes the attach- 

: ment of a CSE company to complete most major repairs (move 

: the earth). 

40 Engineer August 1994 
Engineer Battlefield Puzzle Pieces - Heavy 

Conversely, the absence of 

equipment or personnel indicates 

a limiting or exclusion of tasks, 

Heavy divisional and corps 

wheeled and mechanized battalions do not have carpenters, masons, or electricians. So those units 

can perform only the simplest vertical tasks. The rehabilitation of a 

warehouse facility to support relief 

operations mustbeaccomplished by 

another type of unit. 

All engineer battalions are not 

designed with equal capabilities, 

but that doesn't mean that one is 

better than another It means that 

each has a specific place and function on the battlefield. It also 

means that each unit can and 

should concentrate on maintaining proficiency in its METL tasks. 

And it means that commanders 

must ensure their superiors know 

which missions their unit can and 

cannot accomplish. 

The initiative was proclaimed to 

be a panacea for engineer woes. 

But almost immediately, perceived shortcomings were loudly 

August 1994 

i denounced-not by the maneuver i to the new designs. Current RC 

: community but from within the : commanders were last in troop 

engineer community. While not i units during AOE transitions and 

: perfect, it's also not finished. It is : before AirLand Battle. But the 

as dynamic as the living TOE (ta- i composition of the restructured 

: bles of organization and equip- : units is completely different, the 

1 ment) process and field adapta- i diversity of missions is focused for 

: tions will allow it to be. : specific task accomplishment, and 

1 Conversion to the new configu- : equipment bas migrated. In short, 

: ration is still an onguing activity. : it is an engineer world that has 

The 14th Engineer Battalion, the i changed drastically since their last 

: remaining unconverted Active : field exposure. Little or none of the 

Component battalion, will reor- "old and familiar" remains for them 

: ganize under the L-series TOE in : to feel comfortable with, so com- 

: October 1994.None of the Reserve : manders must prepare now for 

i Components'heavy divisional bat- : these new challenges and changes. 

: talions or CSEs have converted, : Just as the Engineer School dei and only a few of the corps battal- : veloped transition assistance 

: ions have converted. Units that : courses for those engineer pups 

are still organized under the older, i converting to divisional engineer 

: H-series TOE need to prepare for : brigades, it must develop a transithe conversion and step forward to tion assistance plan for the con- 

: become versatile members of : version of a corps wheeled battal1 Force XXI. They should not serve ion to a corps mechanized 

: as sentinels of tradition by retain- : battalion. It must deal with issues 

ing the H-series TOE missions. i across the entire DTLOMS spec- 

: TheEngineerSchwlmustdevelop : trum. The Directorate of Evalui leaders to handle the significant ation and Standardization is cre-

: emotionaleventofconvertingaunit : ating a central repository for the 

Engineer 41 
lessons learned by transitioning 

units. It is essential that new organization team training be provided for units whose principal 

mode of transportation will shift 

from a dump truck to a tracked 

armored box. The introduction of a 

completely new mechanic, the 63Y 

MOS, demands that special 

schooling or MOS-producing 

courses must be programmed. 

Without an information exchange, 

the conversion process will result 

in less than combat-ready, less 

than combat-capable units. 

The jumbled battlefield pieces 

must be assembled to form a clear 

picture (see figure, page 41). How 

so many units, each with a sharply 

focused capability, interact with 

one another and with the maneuver element or FEMA (Federal 

Emergency Management Agency) 

must be dealt with in all leadership courses-from BNCOC to 

EOAC. The Pre-Command Course 

must stress the missions, capabilities, and versatility of engineer 

units as they exist in the Army 

today, as well as their interdependence. They must not focus 

solely on the technological marvels of the future. 

When given a mission, leaders 

must understand the mmmander's 

intent, develop a plan according to 

the mources and time available, 

and execute the mission to the best 

of their ability This is especially 

critical for engineer leaders in redesigned units that now have 

sharply focused missions and capabilities. The key is communication! 

Exchanging ideas and sharing experiences opens the door to creative 

innovation. The resulting versatility allows engineers to be the combat multiplier maneuver forces will 

call upon first.Let us hear from you! 

Y 

Alan Schlie is a force deueloper 

in the Dzrectorate of Conzbat Developntents, U.S. Arnzy Engineer 

School. He is a retired contnzand 

sergeant ntajor with extensive experience in divisional and cop 

contbat engineer units. 

(Personal Viewpoint, continued) 

teach all engineer leaders about the 

capabilities and limitations of each 

services' engineers and provide lessons learned from previous joint 

operations and contingencies. 

With the second RMS, the stage is 

set strategically to determine the 

future ofjoint engineering. 

Operational Level 

he CINCs are responsible 

for operational and contingency planning, training and mission execution throughout their 

area of responsibility (AOR). The 

CINC engineer staff is critical in 

defining the roles of engineers 

tasked to execute that responsibility Joint operations are mentioned in some manuals, but 

currently there is no detailed 

guidance for CINC engineer 

sta& to follow across the spectrum of planning, training, and 

mission execution of joint operations and contingencies. The 

CINC staff engineer, regardless 

of his or her service, must make 

all that happen in the AOR in 

concert with the CINCs' guidance 

and operational plan. Again, at 

the CINC level, we now have a 

great opportunity for engineers 

to work together across service 

lines and shape the future of joint 

engineering. 

Each service component's engineer staff must ensure that the 

CINC engineer staff understands 

their respective capabilities, both 

military and civilian. The CINC engineer staff will use that information duringjoint planning, training 

and mission execution. I recommend that the CINC engineer staff 

include service engineer units in 

joint exercises and staff training. 

Those events provide excellent opportunities to train together. Additionally, CINC staff engineers 

should provide lessons learned to 

the Joint Staff engineers to assist 

them in developing and updating 

joint engineeringdoctrine. 

Tactical Level 

The JTF commander has 

three options when employing engineer forces: 

Assign a specific service component to execute all engineer 

missions. 

Assign several service components to execute the JTF engineer mission. This option was 

used in Operation Provide Comfort, in northern Iraq, and in 

Somalia. 

Task organize the STF primarily with joint engineers. This 

option is used frequently on 

missions in the USSOUTHCOMAOR. 

In the last two options, the JTF 

may be as small as company size. 

Therefore, even at the tactical 

level, engineer commanders and 

staff must become knowledgeable about joint operations. 

The Future 

Pngineer commanders should 

-Icontinually seek training opportunities with sister service engineers. Joint training allows soldiers down to the NCO and 

junior officer levels to operate together and become familiar with 

each service's capabilities and 

limitations. We must train as we 

will deploy and fight! 

W~thbudget reductions, downsizing and coalitions looming on 

the horizon, the emphasis onjointness will increase.Army engineers 

should lead the way in joint interoperability-at all levels. Now 

is the time to shape ourjoint engineering destiny! 

Colonel Lee Gibson is contntander 

of the 555th Combat Engineer 

Group and I Corps Engineer 

(FWD) at Fort Lewis, Washington. His previous assignment was 

staff engineer, the Joint Staff, 

Washington, D.C. 
The 66New 99 


CSE Company 


By Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Porter 

Active Component heavy division and corps 

mechanized engineers have been operating under the engineer restructure initiative concept for several years. Although the new structure has many 

strengths, commanders at all levels have ovemhelming empirical evidence that divisions have a serious 

shortfall in heavy engineer earthmoving capability. 

This shortfall results in problems with sustainment 

operations as part of close operations. 

These shortcomings are not a result of oversights 

or mistakes in the design. Instead, they exist because 

combat support equipment (CSE)companies have not 

yet reorganized to their new design and because the 

changed mission of the new CSE company has been 

poorly communicated to field commanders. 

Many engineer officers and soldiers mistakingly be. 

lieve that a CSE company is a specialized road-building unit, heavy in horizontal construction equipment. 

That's understandable because, previously, a CSE company spent most of its time in division and corps rear 

areas building and maintaining mads. It moved forward into maneuver brigade areas to augment division engineer earthmoving equipment only when 

needed. Formerly, a CSE company's priorities were 

clearly weighted to rear areas, with a secondary mission in forward areas. This is no longer true. Now, as 

implementation wntinues and CSE companies mrganize, these priorities will reverse. While retaining its 

versatility, the CSE company will evolve to a more forward-focused, combat-oriented organization. Its primary 

mission will change frum road building to countermobility and survivability position construction. 

Conceptual Underpinnings 

rganizational restructuring was profoundly 

affected by then-current (1990-91) concepts 

known as AirLand Battle Future and AirLand Operations. 

Fundamental to those concepts was the notion that 

divisions should be designed primarily for offensive 

operations. Thus, the design of heavy division engineer units focused on mobility operations in forward 

brigade areas, with major increases in the number of 

combat engineer vehicles, armored vehicle launched 

bridges, mine clearing line charges, and armored combat earthmovers (ACES) in the division. The design is 

not skewed to the offense-just the internal design of 

some of the units. To provide a limited countermobility capability, division engineer units were designed 

to employ highly mobile, "dynamic" obstacle emplacement systems such as Volcano. Virtually all heavy engineer equipment was removed from heavy division 

engineer battalions and corps mechanized engineer 

battalions. Today, not a single loader or dump truck 

remains in the design of heavy division engineer 

battalions. 

At about the same time but independent of the initiative, dozers in most heavy divisions were displaced 

when the ACE was fielded. By the time the new design was implemented, both the capabilities and limitations of the ACE were well known. With its ability 

to provide mobility support to attacking armor and 

mechanized infantry, plus its capability to dig to the 

standard required for a hasty defense, the ACE was 

an almost perfect complement to AirLand Battle 

Future concnprs. The ACE'S known limitations (mostly 

revolving around a lesser digging capability than 

that of the D7 dozer) seemed relativel3- unimportant. 

because it was envisioned that division units would 

rarely engage in major deliberate defensive operations that required heavy and prolonged digging 

and earthmoving. 

Army leaders recognized, however, that heavy engineer equipment would still be needed in the division 

area for many types of operations. In addition to requirements for the seldom-envisioned deliberate defense in forward brigade areas, heavy engineer equipment would be needed for such recurring missions as 

forward aviation combat engineering and sustainment 

engineering throughout the division area. In the 
rn l 

CSE ; L--....*-, 

Figure 1. The CSE Company is designed for attachment lo a corps 

(mechanized or wheeled) or division combat engineer banallon to 

provide heavy eanhmovlng capability for survivablllty, counterrnoblliry and sustainment englneerlng operations In forward brigade areas. 

division rear areas, those requirements could be 

accomplished by engineer combat heavy battalions. 

The shortfall lay in the forward maneuver 

brigades, where division engineer battalions operate. 

Their missions quire heavy engineer equipment for 

such tasks as digging tank ditches and survivability positions for maneuver and artillery units. Additionally, they 

pmvide mobility support and sustainment engineering 

to forward support battalions. Clearly, engineers need a 

way to provide heavy equipment to the forward brigade areas. The solution was to provide a module, a 

unit with heavy earthmoving capability that could be 

"plugged in" to a division or corps combat engineer 

battalion. 

Concept and Design 

The "new" CSE company is designed to be the 

plug-in unit. It is the repositoly of heavy enginew equipment needed to perform both the traditional mission of combat trail construction and maintenance and the new primary mission of providing assets for survivability and countermobility tasks in the 

forward brigade areas. This CSE company is carefully 

structured so that, when the corps is viewed as a whole, 

44 Engineer 

there is virtually no net loss of earthmoving 

equipment caused by the reorganization of 

units. Instead, the equipment migrates from the 

division and corps combat engineer battalions to 

the CSE companies. To maintain a constant 

amount of equipment within the corps, the number of CSE companies per heavy division will double to about three companies per heavy division. 

The modular design of the CSE company and 

its platoons allows efficient task organization to 

division or corps combat engineer battalions for 

mission acmmplishment (Figure 1). The CSE 

company headquarters is lean. Being austere, 

the headquarters provides only minimal command and control over its own assets, although 

it has direct support maintenance capability for 

engineer equipment. There is no capability for 

staff planning, engineering design, or construction management; these functions are provided 

by the division or corps combat engineer battalion to which it is task organized. Instead of one 

earthmoving platoon and two route clearing platoons, as in the old design (Figure 2, page 45), 

the new CSE company has three line platoons 

(Figure 3, page 46). This configuration facilitates task organization of the company and its 

platoons. When task organized to any type of 

combat engineer battalion, a CSE company's 

three platoons may be further task organized to 

the battalion's three line companies. When only 

a single CSE company is task organized to a division engineer brigade (asmight happen if the 

corps commander decides to weight the engineer 

effort elsewhere), the CSE company can task organize its thme platoons to the division's three 

organic engncer hnrr;ilions. 

Doctrine Takes An Unexpected 

Turn 

]Recent doctrinal changes in FM 100-5 have made the CSE company an even more important part 

of restructuring than originally envisioned. The concepts in AirLand Battle Future and AirLand Operations were, for the most part, never implemented. Instead of emphasizing the offense over the defense as 

envisioned in AirLand Battle Future and AirLand Operations, the 1993 version of FM 100-5 establishes a 

balance between offensive and defensive operations. 

This kevstone doctrinal manual reaffirms a continuous requirement for a heavy earthmoving capability 

in forward areas. It underscores the importance of the 

CSE company as augmentation to division engineers 

and as a major component of the combat engineer 

task organization in the maneuver brigade. 

Operations other than war (OOTW) are a primary 

feature in the new FM 100-5, and they were prominent in recent Army operations. Although organized 

under the old design, CSE companies played a major 

role in both Hurricane Andrew and Somalia relief 

operations, where they executed tasks vital to the 

August 1994 
mission. They cleared rubble, constructed and main- mutes between wrps and division support areas. The 

tained roads, and constructed base camps while under new CSE company retains the technical ability to acthe control of either division or wrps engineers. Be- complish many of these missions, although they are 

cause of their versatility and the need for more heavy not the primary responsibility of the division engineer 

engineer equipment when either heavy or light divi- battalion or the CSE company. Instead, engineer comsions conduct this type of operation, CSE companies bat heavy battalions, reinforoed when necessary by 

will play an important role in future OOTW scenarios. wnstruction support wmpanies (CSCs) with quany 

and asphalt equipment, usually have those missions. 

Thou& - it is feasible and mav be desirable based on a

commander's assessment ofiV%?~-~(mission, enemy, ter- and On the in, time, and tmops available), the new CSE company 

is not designed to be task organized to mmbat heavy 

he reversal of mission priorities for CSE compa- battalions to engage in rear area construction missions 

nies is shown by comparing the equipment densities in Figures 2 and 3. The changes in relative 

numbers and types of heavy equipment support their 

new primary combat mission: to reinforce division and 

corps combat engineers when executing survivability 

and countermobility tasks in forward brigade areas. 

For example, soldiers in CSE companies dig fighting 

positions and tank ditches; provide protective positions for artille~y,mortars, aviation and air defense 

systems, command and control nodes, and wmbat 

service support units and assets; and improve ford 

and river crossing sites. The CSE companies are IUbust enough to construct and maintain combat trails 

that enhance the mobility of maneuver units. They 

also can sustain the combat force by impmving the forward support battalion's ability to receive and move 

supplies and equipment. Note, however, the reduction 

in heavy equipment specifically geared for road building (except where necessary to increase equipment to 

make multiples of three). 

Division and corps rear areas also have large requipmen& for engineer earthmoving support. Requirements 

are generated by aviation brigades Qandingpads, maintenance facilities, refuel and rearm points); division support areas (with both the main support battalion and 

reinforcing corps support command units); hospitals; 

ammunition and other suu~lvmints: and main su~~lv 

A Battlefield Laydown 

aased on allocation rules, total Army force structure will ultimately authorize about three CSE 

companies per armored and mechanized infantry division (allocation rules are more complicated than this, 

but that is the result). Two additional CSE companies 

are allocated (again, indirectly) to each light divisionlight infantry, airborne, and air assault. While actual 

task organization depends on the commander's analysis of METI-T, a heavy division can expect to receive 

three CSE companies. If the division is the main effort, it may receive more. Even if assigned as a supporting effort, a heavy division can expect to receive 

at least one CSE company. A heavy division engineer 

battalion that is task organized to a combined arms 

maneuver brigade should be able to accept and employ augmentation ranging from one CSE platoon to 

a full CSE company. In addition to two CSE companies, each light division is allocated a light equipment company (or airborne light equipment cnmpany 

in the case of an airborne division). 

The scenario in Figure 4, page 47, shows how an armored division mieht initiallv conduct a deliberate de5 Onicen, 1Warrant. 177 Enlined 

.A" . A. " -

fense, then counterattack, and finally 

"Old" CSE Company II 

take the offense This division has received its "doctrinally correct" number of engineers from corps (two 

Major Equipment 

I II I neer brigadecommander is to: ' 

mechanized engineer battalions, one 

wheeled engineer battalion, three 

CSE companies, and one terrain 

team; the number of bridge companies shown is notional), plus some 

enPineers from echelons above corns.

I

I 1 

0.0 0.0 e.0 

1 Omcer. Iotlicer. r Officer. 

16 Enlisted 1 Oficer. 38 Enlisted 1 Warrant. 

31 Enlisted 61 Enlisted 

I I Task organize divisional engiFigure 2. The CSE Company design prior to restructuring. neer battalions to the maneuver 

August 1994 Engineer 45 

11 Dozers 

9 Scrapers 

5Y Loaders 

3 SEE 

10 Graders 

20 20T Dumps 

25T Cranes 

:~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l e r 

hi number of combat heavy battaxions is, for the most part, not allocated based on the division but is theater-workload driven. All engineem in 

the division area are under the mmmand of the engineer brigade cornmander unless they are further task 

organized in a command relationship 

to the division's maneuver units. In 

this scenario, the intent of the end-
I -

I conduct the assault crossing. In 

"New" CSE Company 

I 

6 Offhers. 1 Warrant 171 Enlisted 

I 

I'I 1 officer. 

Figure 3. The redesigned CSE company. 

brigades with whom they habitually train and 

fight. Weight the engineer effort to accomplish 

the division commander's intent. This results 

in priority to the 1st Brigade in the defense 

and to the 3rd Brigade in the counterattack. 

Task organize the CSE companies to division engineer battalions for survivability and counter 

mobility missions that require heavy earthmoving equipment in the forward brigade areas. The 

CSE effort initially is weighted to the 1st Brigade, with a platoon from the CSE company in 

the 3rd Brigade moved to operate with the 1st 

Brigade. Upon transition to the offense, CSE units 

with each maneuver brigade will construct the network of combat trails needed to conduct the attack, 

move the forward support battalion, and keep the 

forward support battalion linked to its supported 

combat units. 

Task organize corps mechanized engineers to 

weight the division's main effort and provide engineers to maneuver units that are not '%overed" by 

the organic division engineer structure. A wrps 

mechanized engineer battalion (minus one company) is assigned to the division cavalry squadrun 

to operate as a wvering force. The battalion's remaining company is attached to the engineer battalion in the 1st Brigade because it is both the 

main effort and the '%ealy" brigade with four 

maneuver battalion task forces. 

m Use corps engineers to conduct river crossings. 

This allows division engineers to cross with their 

maneuver brigade and to conduct combat operations on the far shore. In this scenario, the 3rd 

Brigade is the division reserve; it must conduct 

an assault river crossing as part of the wunterattack. A corps mechanized engineer battalion will 

command and control the engineer units that 

Major 

Equipment 

12 Dozers 

6 Scrapers 

3 5Y Loaders 

6 SEE 

6 Graders 

9 5T Durnos 

12 20T ~uh~s 

3 25T Cranes 

3 250 CFM 

3 2500 Water 

the initial stages of the operation, the CSE company in the 

3rd Brigade (minus one platoon) will harden the reserve 

against deep attack and prepare combat trails for the wunterattack. Later it will help 

execute the river crossing by 

constructing and continually 

improving crossing sites. 

Task organize corps wheeled 

engineers to other division and 

corps combat elements in the 

division area. A corps wheeled 

engineer battalion has elements that conduct operations 

with the division aviation brigade, such as planning and 

loading air Volcano and providing engineer expertise for air 

2reconnaissance missions. Other

elements of the wheeled battalion operate with division artillely units such as the target 

acquisition battery and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battery, as well 

as the corps field artillery brigade. Command 

and control nodes in forward areas will also receive support from the wheeled engineers. One 

company of the corps wheeled engineer battalion 

is attached to the 3rd Brigade engineers for the 

assault river crossing. 

Employ combat heavy engineers in the division 

rear area for sustainment engineering. 

Training Challenges 

The CSE company's new mission and organization have many implications. As it assumes new 

responsibilities, the CSE company is no longer a construction unit operating primarily in the rear area; it 

is part of the combined arms team. Therefore, the company and its platoons must train with division engineer and maneuver units. Training as part of the combined arms team will allow operators to learn how to 

employ their equipment in combined arms operations, 

and leaders to know how to coordinate and synchronize their efforts with supported and supporting 

units. Additionally, units of other branches will better 

understand the changed role and capabilities of the 

CSE company. 

Enein~r - leaders mntinuallv face challenws - and must

ovemme obstacles with initiative and innovation. Force 

structure is one example. Because the great majority 

of CSE companies are now, and will continue to be, in 

the Reserve Components (RC), Active Component (AC) 

divisions will rarely have the opportunity to train 

with "their" CSE companies. Therefore, both AC and 

RC commanders must make special efforts to provide 

training opportunities that allow reserve CSE 

46 Engineer August 1994 
I i 

Figure 4. Notional task organizatlon of division, corps, and echelon above corps engineer units in a division 

area. A divislon might be weighted wlth more enginen when it is the corps'main effort, or with fewer 

engineers when it is a supporting effort. 

companies to train with the active units with whom 

they will fight. One option is to coordinate training 

during the RC company's annual training period. 

Stationing is another challenge for both AC and RC 

commanders. In war, a CSE company is task organized to the division or corps combat engineer battalion 

with which it will fight. In peacetime, however, a CSE 

company is often attached to a noncombat corps or 

higher organization for administrative purposes. ?b 

compound the problem, a CSE company has many assets useful to installation and state support missions. 

Thus, in times of declining resources, CSE companies 

may be tasked to execute post or community-support 

projects instead of participating in combat-oriented 

training. Again, commanders must ensure their CSE 

companies receive the kind of tough, combat-oriented 

training they will require in war. 

Some of these challenges am evident in today's training environment, as full implementation of the reorganization has yet to be attained. For example, the task organization for a typical rotation at the National Training 

Center (NTC) includes a maneuver brigade headquarters, two maneuver battalion task forces, a field artillery 

battalion, and a forward support battalion. 

Augwt 1994 

At NTC, the engineer piece of the task organization 

consists of an engineer battalion headquarters and two 

engineer line companies. The maneuver task force almost always conduct several deliberate defenses that require a large number of tank and Bradley two-step fighting positions and tank ditches, and the forward support 

battalion generates many requirements for sustainment 

engineering. Yet, a CSE company or any of its components rarely is deployed as a part of the rotation. The 

Forces Command regulation governing NTC task organization does not permit deployment and employment of a 

CSE element. As a result, engineer units execute missions for which they are neither organized nor equipped. 

Because there are insufficient blade hours to accomplish 

all required tasks,not all tanks or Bradleys get dug in, 

and tank ditches are rarely dug at all. 

Equipment used by engineers to accomplish these 

missions, such as armored combat earthmovers and 

small emplacement excavators (ACES and SEES), a1-s not 

used for their intended purposes. As a result, there is 

excessive equipment wear and failure-the reputation of 

the ACE has particularly suffered. Additionally, combined arms commanders do not understand what assets 

they would receive and employ in actual combat, and 

Engineer 47 
- - 

CSE units are not given the opportunity to train as 

they would fight. 

Engineers in many units are trying innovative techniques to overcome these organizational challenges. 

At Fort Hood, for example, the 68th Engineer Company (Combat Support Equipment) is administratively attached to the 62d Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy), which is in turn attached to the 13th 

Corps Support Command, a combat service support 

headquarters. The 1st Cavalry Division Engineer Brigade is developing a memorandum of agreement to 

establish an habitual training relationship with the 

68th. This relationship will benefit both the division 

and the engineer company in terms of knowledge, 

training, and preparation for combat. It is not yet 

clear to what extent training will be integrated between the two organizations. Hopefully, it will result in 

routine joint home station training and lead to deployment of CSE elements on division NTC rotations. 

This agreement is the first step toward full implementation of the battlefield laydown envisioned in the 

redesign. 

Transition to the End State 

eorganlzation is an on-going process In the 

my's Active Component, the heavy division 

engineer battalions and corps mechanized engineer 

battalions have already transitioned. Active corps 

wheeled battalions, CSE companies, and RC units 

must also transition in order to train and fight as 

envisioned in the reorganization. In retrospect, engineers probably should have changed the name of the 

CSE company when it was redesigned to emphasize 

its changed configuration and mission. 

The CSE company has always been a versatile unit 

that operates across a wide spectrum of missions. The 

new design magnifies this versatility, provides a greater 

degree of modularity to the company, and weights its 

missions toward the fonvard areasof the battlefield. 

Proper integration of the CSE company into division 

taskorwnizations will omvide the earthmovine ca~ability so d&,perately need& when conducting sugivability 

and countermobility operations. L1 


Lieutenant Colonel Porter is commander of the 20th Engineer Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, Fo1-t Hood. Preuious 

positions include chief of Concepts Blanch, Directomte of 

Combat Developments, U.S. Aimy Engineer School; and 

operations officer, 5th Engineer Battalion, 24th Infantiy 

Division (Mech) in Saudi Alabia and Iraq. LTC Porter 

has two Master of Science degnes from Stanford University and is egraduate of the U.S. Military Academy and 

the Command and General Staff College. 

~n~ineer Problem 

r 

You are the commander of an engineer company in a mechanized engineer battalion. 

I 

Your mission is 


to encircle and secure, by protective wire, a brigade support area in the maneuver brigade's rear area. 


You must determine the following: 


A. Type and number of materials needed to secure the perimeter. 

B. Number ot man-hours needed to construct the protective wire. 

C. Type ot trucks and number of truck loads required to transport the material. 

You have been provided the following information: 

Number of belts: 3 


Perimeter: 4,500 meters 


Employment: Protective 


Type of entanglement: Triple standard concertina 


Type of pickets: U-shaped (long and short) 


The mission will use experienced troops and will be conducted during daylight hours. 

References: 	FM 5-34, page 3-5 and 3-6, table 3-4 


STP 5-12524-SM-TG,pages 3-195through 3-198 


ENGINEER Solution on page 55. 

48 Eng~neer 	 August 1994 
PicLett'e Charge: 

The Final Day at Qettysburg 

By Captain William G. Garrison, Jr. 

Bickett's Charge at the Battle of Gettysburg 

was the "hieh - tide" of the Confederate

Army's invasion of Pennsylvania in June and July 

of 1863. It was their strongest showing, but it was 

also the point where the Confederate troops were 

turned back. By analyzing Pickett's Charge and 

examining its key events in light of current Army 

doctrine, Army engineers can learn the following 

valuable lessons: 

A commander's orders must clearly state his 

intent and the end state he envisions for his 

mission. 

Indirect fire must be observed to be effective 

and to achieve the commander's intended 

effects. 

8 Actions that deceive an enemy into responding 

as we desire increase its vulnerability to losses 

in personnel and equipment. 

w Talcing the initiative can force a superior force 

to retire. 

The Battle 

The Battle of Gettysburg took place from 

1through 3 July 1863, when the Confederate 

Army of ~orthern~ir&nia,commanded by General 

Robert E. Lee, fought against the Union Army of 

the Potomac, under Major General George G. 

Meade, at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Pickett's 

Charge occurred two miles south of Gettysburg, 

Wrk from The Gelwbvrg Campaign:COuneSy 01 Combined Baoks, Ino. 

August 1994 

across and just east of Emmitsburg Road along 

Cemetery Ridge, on 3 July. 

The events that led these two armies to Gettysburg began with political issues that polarized the 

nation into North and South. During the 1860 

presidential campaign, the issues had centered on 

slavery and states' rights. On the slavery issue, 

President Lincoln's intent was not to lead a crusade against it but to prevent its extension into the 

western territories of the United States. The southern states made the right of states to secede from 

the Union their main issue. When Abraham Lincoln was elected President, they formed an independent confederation of slave-owningstates. The 

Unionists did not believe that states could secede 

from the union.' So in 1861, the nation went to 

war with itself. 

After two years of conflict, supplies and manpower were becoming scarce for the Confederate 

Army, while the Union Army was better able to sustain its forces logistically Despite this, Lee had defeated the Army of the Potomac in several battles 

before Gettysburg. Victories at Fredericksburg, in 

December 1862, and Chancellorsville, in May 1868, 

helped sustain the morale of Lee's troops and contributed to Lee's view that his army was invincible. 

An invasion of Pennsylvania seemed to be a viable 

option for resupplying his army 

After he defeated the Army of the Potomac at 

Chancellorsville, Lee knew that the Union Army 

would return to press his outnumbered and undersupplied army toward Richmond, Virginia, the 

Engineer 49 

capital of the Confederacy He felt that he had two 

choices: return to Richmond to await a siege that 

could lead to surrender or invade ~enns~lvania.~ Invading the North would give Lee's army relatively 

untouched areas in which to find badly needed supplies and would boost the morale of the South. The 

invasion could encourage Northern agitators who 

were in favor of an early end to the war. In addition, success might result in political recognition of 

the Confederacy by France and England and might 

cause them to intervene. By threatening Washington, Baltimore, and even Philadelphia, Lee would 

force the Army of the Potomac to react, which 

might open it up to destruction. In short, an offensive might win the war for the ~011th.~ It would 

also relieve some of the pressure on the Confederacy in other regions by drawing off forces to replace 

Union 10sses.~ Thus, Lee decided that invasion was 

his best course of action. 

14May 

Lee presented his case before Confederate President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet in Richmond. 

Three days later, President Davis granted him 

permission to invade Pennsylvania. 

4 June 

Lee's infantry started north up the Rappahannock River. 

9 June 

Major General Alfred Pleasonton's Union cavalry 

corps, with two brigades of infantry, attacked at 

Brandy Station to drive Major General J.E.B. Stuart's Confederate cavalry corps out of the Culpeper, 

Virginia, area. The Union troops were repelled, but 

they performed well against Stuart's cavalry, which 

previously had "ridden rings" around the Union cavalry This "made" the Union cavalry and bolstered 

their confidence for the rest of the war. 5 Criticism 

of Stuart's performance by the press embarrassed 

him and would influence events later at Gettysburg. 

13June 

At Winchester, Virginia, the vanguard of the Confederate Second Corps, under Lieutenant General 

Richard S.Ewell, attacked and defeated a Union 

force of 5,100 and captured an enormous store of 

munitions. Shortly afterward, Confederate forces 

crossed into Pennsylvania. 

23 June 

Stuart received orders from Lee telling him to 

pass around the Army of the Potomac, "without 

hindrance, doing all the damage you can, and cross 

the river east of the mountains. ... after crossing 

the river, you must move on and feel the right of 

Ewell's troops." Lee's only stipulation was that the 

Army of the Potomac "remains innctive." Stuart 

misinterpreted Lee's orders and thought that Lee 

was giving him permission to make up for his embarrassment at Brandy Station. 

25 June 

In the morning, Stuart took his three best brigades on an expedition that was to deprive Lee of 

his cavalry chief for eight days. This time period included the first one and one-half days of the Battle 

of ~ett~sburg.~ 

30 June 

Brigadier General James J. Pettigrew's Confederate infantry brigade went to Gettysburg to find a 

shoe factory that other Southern units had seen. 

Lee's troops did not have a standard uniform because of resupply difficulties in Virginia; some of 

them did not even have shoes. Pettigrew withdrew 

from Gettysburg when Union troops from Brigadier 

General John Buford's Ist Cavalry Brigade arrived. 

They had gone to Gettysburg to scout for Confederate 

units near Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. When they 

learned of each other's presence, Buford and Pettigrew sent messages to their respective armies. Because of this inadvertent contact between two small 

forces, the two armies converged on Gettysburg. 

1 July 

Confederate foragers appeared near Gettysburg, 

which resulted in a hard fight between the Union 

cavalry and the Confederate infantry. Although the 

Confederates won this battle, Union forces were 

able to establish a viable defense on the high 

ground along Cemetely ~idge.~ About 23,400 Union 

troops and about 42,700 Confederates were involved in the battle. The Union forces took about 

12,000 casualties; the Confederates took about 

8,000.~ 

2 July 

The fighting again ended in a Confederate victory, but the Army of the Potomac had escaped 

complete disaster and was ahle to occupy relatively 

secure positions.g By the end of the day, the Union 

had about 71,600 troops on the battlefield and the 

Confederates about 49,900. Each side took about 

8,000 casual tie^.'^ 

3 July 

Lee's plan was to hit both ends of the Union line 

simultaneously, collapse them, and force them to 
First Key Event. Longstreet did not fully understand Lee's intent, and his 

lack of understanding was 

the first key event of the battle. A commander must ensure that his intent and the 

desired end result are clearly 

understood when he gives an 

order. This will help his 

troops accomplish the mission the way he wants them 

to. FM 100-5, Operations, 

states, "The commander's 

intent describes the desired 

end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the 

operation and must be understood ... . It must clearly 

state the purpose of the mission. ... Its utility is to focus 

subordinates on what has to 

be accomplished to achieve 

success ... . 

..I2 This is a fundamental of plannin and executing ~perations.'~ Because 

he misunderstood Lee's intent, Longstreet failed to prepare his forces in time to synchronize with the other 

attacking forces. 

Longstreet commanded 

three divisions, which were 

under Major Generals George 

E. Pickett and Isaac Trimble 

and Brigadier General James 

J. Pettigrew. The Confederate 

divisions were on line, with 

Pettigrew on the left, Trimble 

just behind, and Pickett on 

the right. Pickett and Pettigrew their troops in The height of Pickett's Charge in which the attacking Confederate force of 13,000 men lost 

half its strength as casualties. This etching, taken from a sketch by illustrator Alfred Waud, waves. A third 

Is perhaps the only visual eyewitness account. 

retreat." Lieutenant General James Longstreet 

would attack the Union left and center with the 

three divisions that would take part in Pickett's 

Charge (named for Major General George E. Pickett, commander of one of these divisions). This 

would occur simultaneously with other attacks to 

exploit gains of the previous night. Stuart, who had 

arrived about noon the day before, would attack the 

Union's rear with his cavalry, which would interfere 

with Meade's lines of communication. Rather than 

call a meeting to discuss their views, Lee sent orders 

to his subordinate commanders by courier. 

52Engineer 

wave, 100 yards behind Pettigrew, was made up of two 

brigades under Trimble. To the front and right of 

Pickett were two brigades that guarded the right 

flank. There was no guard for the left flank. The 

terrain over which Pickett charged sloped upward 

toward Cemetely Ridge, which Union troops were 

defending. Pickett's troops attacked across a field 

in plain view of the defenders. In this case, the 

terrain clearly favored the defense. 

Meade's plan for the Union troops was to continue in a static defense. He expected Lee to attack 

the center of his defensive line in Major General 

Winfield S. Hancock's sector (see map), specifically 

August 1994 
along Brigadier General John Gibbon's division 

front. When asked why he thought so, Meade 

replied, 'Because he has made attacks on both our 

flanks and failed, and if he concludes to try it 

again, it will be in our center."14 

Three divisions of the Union I1 Corps, wmmanded by Hancock, defended against Pickett's 

Charge. These three divisions, consisting of about 

8,500 troops, were under Brigadier Generals John 

Gibbon and Alexander T. Hays and Major General 

Abner Doubleday They were on line along the top 

of Cemetery Ridge behind a low stone wall (see 

map). They had 26 artillery pieces facing the enemy, with more guns located on nearby hills. Adjacent Union forces were also in direct contact with 

the enemy l5 Few of the trees in the area provided 

cover to the defenders; their main cover was the 

low stone wall that also provided some concealment. 

Second Key Euent. At 1300 hours, Confederate 

artillery began bombarding Union positions with 

about 150 cannons to sofien the positions for a Confederate infantry attack.16 The barrage lasted two 

hours, but after the first few rounds smoke obscured their view of Union positions and the Confederate artillerymen began to shoot high. This was 

the second key event of the battle. The inaccurate 

fire was mostly ineffective, with no significant damage done to the defenders on Cemetery Ridge. The 

primary purpose of this artillery action was to destroy the Union artillery to prevent its use against 

the Confederate infantry. This objective was not accomplished. Without observation of its effects, indirect fire is usually ineffective. If artillery fire is not 

on target, it does not accomplish the commander's 

objective. FM 100-5 states, "Subordinate systems 

and processes for ... assessing battle damage must 

be fully integrated. Fire support provides for the 

planning and execution of fires so the right targets 

are adequately attacked to achieve the commander's intended effects."17 Fire support is a combat function that helps the commander build and 

sustain combat power. 18 

At first, Union artillerymen were told to hold 

their fire to conserve ammunition. Later, some 

were authorized to return fire to try and raise the 

morale of the troops that were under heavy artillery fire and to find the enemy guns. A Union artillery officer, Major Thomas W Osborn, upon learning that Meade actually wanted the Confederates 

to attack, suggested that the Union artillery cease 

fire, saying" ... I would cease fire at once, and the 

enemy could reach but one conclusion, that of our 

being driven from the hi11."19 At 1430 hours, Union 

guns began to cease fire to conserve ammunition 

and deceive the enemy into an early assault. The 

Union batteries fell silent one by one because it 

took time for each of the widely dispersed units to 

receive orders to do so. One battery, with all of its 

officers either killed or wounded and its ammunition nearly exhausted, was ordered to withdraw 

and was replaced by a fresh one." 

Third Key Euent. Earlier in the day, Longstreet had given his artillery chief, Colonel Edward 

P. Alexander, the discretion to decide if his bombardment was effective enough to follow up with an 

infantry attack. Seeing the single Union battery 

withdraw and the diminishing Union fire, Alexander decided that the bombardment was indeed effective and that the time was right for an attack. He 

sent a message to this effect to Pickett. Pickett 

received the message and asked Longstreet if he 

should advance. Longstreet bowed his head. Taking 

this as an affirmative, Pickett declared, "I shall 

lead my division forward, sir."" Thus, the Confederates attacked before their artillery had its desired 

effect, which was to destroy Union artillery and 

weaken the defense on Cemetery Ridge. This was 

the third key event of the battle. Deceiving the enemy into taking an action we desire increases its 

vulnerability to losses in personnel and equipment 

through the principle of surprise. FM 100-5 recognizes surprise as one of the nine principles of war. 

It states that 'kurprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power .. . The enemy need not be 

taken completely by surprise but only become 

aware too late to react effectively Factors contributing to surprise include.. . deception... and variations 

in tactics and methods of operation."22 

Fourth Key Euent. The Confederates attacked 

with about 15,000 troops. They advanced in parade 

ground formation and became perfect targets for 

rifle fire and canister shot by Union artillery As 

troops fell, survivors closed the gaps blasted in 

their ranks and re-dressed their lines.25 On the 

Confederate left, Colonel Robert Mayo's brigade of 

Pettigrew's division, which had lagged behind the 

advancing Confederate line, began to catch up and 

came under flanking artillery fire from Union batteries on the adjacent hills. Immediately, troops began to retreat. Though outnumbered five to one, an 

understrength regiment of Union skirmishers wunterattacked on the left flank of Mayo's brigade. 

These Confederate troops, already shaken by Union 

artillery, broke ranks and ran for safety The left of 

the next brigade was now exposed to a heavy crossfire, and it began to crumble. This was the fourth 

key event of the battle and marked the beginning 

of the Confederate withdrawal. The attack by the 

Union skirmishers shows that by taking the initiative, one of the tenets of Army operations, a weaker 

force can cause a superior force to retire. FM 100-5 

Engineer 53 
1 

states, "Attacking commanders gain and maintain 

the initiative by surprise in their selection of the 

time and place of attack and the violence with 

which they execute it. They concentrate forces and 

execute with speed, audacity, and violence, continually seeking soft spots and shifting their main 

effort when required."24 

Pickett's division reached the stone wall after 

taking grievous losses from artillery and musket 

fire. At one point, the Confederates came over the 

wall where Union artillery fire had stopped. This 

opportunity to penetrate the enemy line was lost as 

a Union regiment came forward to close the gap. 

Other Union units also came forward to help. 

'Within minutes, every Confederate who had 

crossed the wall was killed or captured." Then, by 

twos, threes, and finally by the hundreds, the Confederates began to withdraw down the slope of 

Cemetery ~idge.~~ After one last attempt by Trimble's division to break through the Union line to 

the north, the charge ended. 

The Results 

Dickett's Charge was clearly a defeat for the 

Confederate Army. ~bout~6,500 troops, onehalf of the attacking Confederate force, became 

casualties. In contrast, the Union suffered only 

1,500 casualties. Union troops also captured at 

least 28 Confederate battle flags, possibly 33, but 

did not lose any of their own. This was a significant indicator of victory by the standards of the 

day.'-he Union accomplished its tactical objective of repulsing the Confederate attack and its 

strategic objective of halting the invasion of 

Pennsylvania. 

This battle and its key events are still meaningful to military personnel today, over 130 years after 

they occurred. Studying the lessons learned in this 

battle enables us to see the mistakes of others so 

we will not repeat them. More than this, we can 

see that our military doctrine is rooted in many 

years of experience, accumulated through the blood 

and sweat of others who have gone before us. w 

Captain Garrison is the active duty operations officer, 

Active Guard /Reserve IAGR), 493rd Engineer Giaup, 

U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), Dallas, Tezas. Previous assignments include platoon leader and construction officer 

in D Company, 411th Engineer Battalion (C)(H), USAR, 

Guam. He was also an actiue duty platoon leader for the 

760th Engineer Company (CSEJ, USAR, in Marion, Virginia. Captain Garrison holds a bachelor's degree from 

the University of Portland, Oregon. He receiued the 

Thomas Jefferson Writing Award at the Engineer Officers' Advanced Course for his battle analysis of Pickett's 

Charge. 

Endnotes: 

'Macdonald, John. Great Bafflefields of the 

World. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984, p. 90. 

lark, Champ. Gettysburg: The Confederate 

High Tide. Alexandria: Time-Life Books, 1985, 

p. 12. 

3~ofi,Albert A. The Gettysburg Campaign: 

June -July, 1863, Revised Edition. Hong Kong: 

Combined Books, Inc., 1993, pp. 17-1 8. 

12Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-5, 

Operations. Washington: Government Printing 

Office, 1993, p. 6-6. 

'3~epartment of the Army, p. 6-0 

'7~epartment of the Army, p. 2-13. 

"Department of the Army, p. 2-12. 

"Department of the Army, p. 2-5 

24~epartmentof the Army, p. 2-6. 

54 Engineer 
~n~ineer Solution 

r I 

Before solving this problem, you must determine the effective length of the fence and the 


number of 300-meter sections needed for the fence. 


I Effective iength: 


4,500 meters x I. 10 x 3 = 14.850 meters 


Number of 300-meter sections: 

A. Using FM 5-34 and the following equation, determine the type and quantity of materials 

based on the number of 300-meter sections and the type of wire to be employed. Round up your 

answers to the nearest whole number. 

Table value x 49.5 300-meter sections 

1. 	Pickets: 


Long: 160 x 49.5 = 7,920 


Short: 4 x 3 (number of belts) = 12 


2. 	 Reels: 3 x 49.5 = 149 

3. Conceninas: 59 x 49.5 = 2,921 I 	 I 


4. 	Staples: 317 x 49.5 = 15.692 I 

B. 	Determine the number of man-hours needed to complete this project 

30 x .67x 49.5 = 994.94 


Round up to 995 man-hours. 


I C. Using FM 5-34, you determine that a 5-ton cargo truck will be used. Determine the 


number of truck loads required to transport the materials. 


Round up to 54 truck loads. 

Congratulations if you compieted the probiem correctiy. 

This Engineer Problem/Solution was submitted by Sergeant First Class Carl A. Curtice, chief 

enlisted advisor, engineer team, Readiness Gmup Pittsburgh. I 	 I 


August 1994 	 Engineer 55 
ENGINEER UPDATE 


Commercial numben are (314 563 xux and Defense System Network (OSN) numbers are 6i6-xxu unless othswise noted. 

Directorate of Training 62830 Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) 

(DOT) 	 Expanded. The 62830 BNCOC course. Construction Equipment Repairer Supervisor, has been extended to 10 weeks, 3 days, to allow for 

automation training in Unit Level Logistics System, Standard Army Maintenance System, and Battlefield Damage Assessment and Repair. POC is 

LeRoy Mello, 596-0837. 

Directorate of Evaluation Engineer Bulletin Board System (EBBS). A computer bulletin 

and standardization (DOES) 	 board system now links the Engineer School with units around the world. 

EBBS makes school resources such as action officers, fact sheets, and 

Engineer Branch initiatives available to field units. It also provides a way 

for field personnel to communicate with school personnel. Subscribers are 

provided "log-in" software and a user's manual. Minimum hardware requirements are: DOS 3.0, 5 114 inch drive, and a MODEM. POC is CPT 

Wolf, 3-4005. 

Engineer Branch Safety MAC1 2500L Fire Truck Warning. Four serious accidents have occurred recently when MAC1 transmissions slipped into gear during firefight- Office (EBSO) 	 ing operations. Users of the MAC1 2500L fire truck must lock the transmission in neutral and set the park brake before exiting the vehicle during 

firefighting operations. Operators must manually verify that the gear shift is 

locked in neutral and will not move into gear by vehicle and engine vibrations. The positive lock on the gear shift handle must click into place. 

Users who have experienced this or other problems with the MAC1 should 

call the EBSO office. POC is Mark Totzke, -4080. 

Reserve Components (RC) Engineer Officers Advanced Course--Reserve Components 

(EOAC-RC). As of 1 October 1993, RC officers have the option to complete EOAC through a two-phase course. Phase 1 consists of 208 hours 

of correspondence studies managed by the Army Correspondence Course 

Program. Phase 1 is a prerequisite to Phase 2. Phase 2 is two weeks of 

Instruction at Fort Leonard Wood (FLW) on both combined arms operations and technical engineering foundations. The course is listed under 

Army Training Reports and Requirements System (ATRRS) as course 

#4-5426. Phase 1 must be completed before the Pweek resident phase; 

students must have a Phase 1 completion certificate when they arrive at 

FLW for Phase 2. Graduates receive an academic efficiency report and an 

EOAC diploma. The following Phase 2 classes are scheduled for FY 95: 

Gka Rates 

1-95 2-1 6 December 94 

2-95 20 Janualy - 3 February 95 

3-95 10-24 March 95 

4-95 9-23 June 95 

5-95 8-22 September 95 

POC is MAJ Rene Belanger, -4132 
By Command Sergeant Major Roy L. Burns, Jr. 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

Physical Fitness 

Some permanent party leaders have recently 

voiced concerns about the physical fitness of 

soldiers graduating from Initial Entry Training (IET). 

They say that some new soldiers arrive at their units 

unable to meet Army physical fitness test (APFT) requirements and unprepared for the units' physical demands. Some believe soldiers graduating from Basic 

Training (BT) should be required to meet Army standards for the APFT. Contrary to their belief, the training 

standards for IET soldiers differ from those for permanent party soldiers. The IET requirements are clearly 

stated in FM 21 -20 and TRADOC Regulation 350-6. 

All leaders must understand that soldiers report for 

IET at various levels of fitness. At the reception station new soldiers are assessed to determine if they 

have sufficient upper body strength to begin training. 

Male soldiers must do 13 pushups and female soldiers must do Ipushup. Soldiers who do not meet 

these requirements are assigned to a fitness training 

unit before they attend BT. They have up to three 

lnitial Entry Training 


Phaae Duratlon Goab and Characteristics 


Iwasks) 

Bssk TmInIng 

1 1-2 - Soldiers srrlvs at unK 

- Instlll total control. 

- Perform dlagnostlc APFT 

-Form buddy toamr 

- Require strict sttentlon to detail. - Descrlbs Army's expcctatlonlr of soldiers. 

2 3-5 - Ousllh/ with the M16AlIbZ rifle. 

- Develop self-dlsclpllna and teambullding skllls. 

Perform dlsgnastlc APFT. 

Grad~allylessen total control. 


3 6-8 - Increase tralnee leadership. 


- Increase self-development. 

- Perform record APFT. - Deploy for flald tralnlng exercise (FW). 

-Complete end 01 courseten. 

.~raduate.* 

Advanced mdlvldual Tralnlng 

4 9-11 - Performdlagnaalc APFT. 

- Introdu~eMOS skills. - Contlnue common task tralnlng. 

- Reduce supervision by drill sergeants. 

5 	 12. - Sustain common task tralnlna.-


graduation .D*PIO~
 tor tactical FIX 

(dl"'m bl - Perform record APFT 

MOS) -Graduate. .*
 * One eutlon unit tnlnlng (OSUT) unlh pnlolpate in brench motlvles In plscs el 

pcaduatlon.t the and 01 phase III 

August 1994 

weeks to meet the minimum requirements of 20 pushups 

for males and 6 pushups for females New soldiers then 

begin the We phases of IET shown in the table. 

Be aware that physical training (PT) emphasizes 

the progressive conditioning of the whole body to 

minimize injuries. Unnecessarily injuring soldiers to 

achieve an unreasonable goal may cause them to 

miss training or be removed from training. 

Diagnostic APFTs (see table) enable drill sergeants 

to establish physical fitness goals for each phase. 

Before graduating from BT and AIT, soldiers are 

given a record APFT. They must score 50 points per 

event (150 total points) to graduate from BT and 

score the Army standard of 60 points per event (I 80 

total points) to graduate from AIT. 

Initial Entry Training is designed to be a positive experience that new soldiers can carry to their first unit. 

Requiring Army standards for AIT graduates ensures 

that soldiers have the minimum level of fitness to do 

their jobs in their units. However, new soldiers report 

to their permanent party unit at different levels of fitness. Most, but not all, soldiers must take a final 

APFT to graduate AIT. Those who cannot complete 

the Gal APFT due to a medical profile and who 

have successfully completed a diagnostic test 

will be given credit for having passed the APFT. 

Those soldiers will have an APFT waiver attached to the APFT scorecard (DA Form 705). It 

then becomes the responsibility of NCOs in the 

unit to develop physical training that will ensure all 

soldiers meet and maintain the Army standards. 

The PT program in permanent party units is 

designed by senior NCOs and should be tailored 

to support the unit's mission essential task list. 

For example, a light engineer unit will place 

more emphasis on road marching than a mechanized unit. 

Unit PT programs require a high degree of 

self-motivation and self-discipline, which is very 

dierent from the highly con1 :rolled en\ rironment 

in IET. There, drill sergeants closely nionitored 

the intensity level of training to ensure that sol- .- -----!.!-- ,- diers trained to their maximulli capatill .It.>. I11 

permanent party UInits, NCO: s muit ins ;till selfdiscipline!and self- motivatiorIin their s oldiers. .. .. . . 	 ,., . . A maic )r resoonsIDtIIw 01 NLUS IS to teacn. 

coach, and cdunse~ new soldiers. They must 

dedicate time and effort to producing disciplined, 

motivated, and physically fit soldiers who will be 

an effect ive part of the total Army team. 

Engineer 57