Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D 

Interagency Working Group 

REPORT ON THE FEDERAL AGENDA IN 

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

RESEARCH VISION, OBJECTIVES, AND PROGRAMS 

January 2001 

i

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary iii 

I. Foreword 1 

II. Introduction and Background 3 

III. Vision and Goal 6 

IV. The Challenge and the Threat 8 

V. Objectives 9 

VI. Sector Summaries of Current Programs and R&D Shortfalls 11 

• Information and Communications 12 

• Banking and Finance 16 

• Energy 18 

• Transportation 20 

• Vital Human Services 22 

• Interdependencies 26 

VII. Developing a Federal R&D Agenda 31 

VIII. International Dimensions of CIP R&D 33 

IX. Management Challenges and Related Issues 36 

• Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection 36 

• Addressing the Shortage of CIP R&D Personnel 37 

• Other Management Challenges 40 

X. Updating the Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D Agenda 43 

XI. Observations 44 

XII. Recommendations 48 

APPENDICES 

 

A. Glossary of Acronyms and Terms 49 

B. IWG Organization Chart 51 

C. Roster of Agency Points of Contact in the R&D IWG 52 

D. Policy and Procedures Statement on International Research and 53 

Development Cooperation in Critical Infrastructure Protection 

E. White Paper on the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection 56
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iii

Executive Summary

This report summarizes the work of the Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D 

Interagency Working Group (IWG) over the period of March 1998 - November 2000. This 

working group, chartered jointly under the National Science and Technology Council's 

Committees on National Security and Technology and PDD-63, drew upon existing reports, 

analyses, and expertise resident within twenty federal departments and agencies. Readers 

should recognize that while the analyses and recommendations of this report represent the 

collective thoughts and opinions of the interagency working group, they have not been 

formally vetted through the respective agencies. 

In response to tasking from the National Science and Technology Council’s Committees 

on National Security and Technology, as well as from the Critical Infrastructure 

Coordination Group established under PDD-63, the report proposes a federal research and 

development (R&D) strategy, as one element of a broader federal response, to the challenge 

of critical infrastructure protection (CIP). The report provides a vision, a set of objectives to 

achieve that vision, a proposed federal R&D agenda to achieve those objectives, budget 

options, and sets forth a management process to keep the strategy current in the months and 

years to come. 

The report highlights eight priority R&D issues: 

• Establishment of an Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection 

• The education and training of research personnel in CIP R&D 

• Interdependency analyses 

• Threat, vulnerability and risk assessment studies 

• System protection and information assurance 

• Reconstitution of damaged or compromised systems 

• The security of automated infrastructure control systems 

• Intrusion detection and monitoring 

The IWG makes the following recommendations: 

• Existing and planned CIP R&D activities need to be coordinated with other initiatives 

such as information technology and weapons of mass destruction prevention to preclude 

overlap and promote synergy among these initiatives. 

• A proper balance between fiscal restraints and responsiveness to the threats to the 

nation’s critical infrastructures calls for greater levels of funding in the future over 

current FY 2001 levels of CIP R&D. 

• The new Administration should explore options for R&D management models 

embodying the flexibility and nimbleness needed to ensure that the CIP R&D process can 

keep pace with the revolutionary technology environment for critical infrastructure 
iv

protection in the years ahead. The Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 

which has been recommended by the President's Committee of Advisers on Science and 

Technology (PCAST), should be reconsidered for support. 

• Senior officials of the new Administration should receive a briefing in the very near 

future from the Intelligence Community on the nature of the critical infrastructure threat 

to the U.S. and its allies. 

• A program to strengthen university training and research in disciplines that support CIP 

R&D should be proposed in the FY2002 or FY2003 budget cycle. 
 1

I. FOREWORD 

In January 2000, the federal government published the National Plan for Information 

Infrastructure Protection, part of which addressed research and development (R&D) issues. 

Since that time, an aggressive and fruitful investigation of the need for solutions to Critical 

Infrastructure Protection (CIP) R&D issues has taken place under the auspices of the CIP 

R&D Interagency Working Group (IWG). This report summarizes the work and 

recommendations of the IWG from March 1998 to November 2000 and updates both the 

previous November 1998 report on this same topic and the R&D work in the 2000 National 

Plan. It describes R&D to protect the increasingly interconnected infrastructures that are 

critical both to the functioning and growth of the U.S. economy and to our ability to defend 

this country’s national security interests. 

This working group, chartered jointly under the National Science and Technology 

Council’s Committee on National Security and Committee on Technology, and the Critical 

Infrastructure Coordination Group, drew upon existing reports, analyses, and expertise 

resident within twenty federal departments and agencies, as well as a variety of outside 

expertise available to the IWG. Readers should recognize that while the analyses and 

recommendations presented below represent the collective thoughts and opinions of the 

interagency working group, they have not been formally vetted through the respective 

agencies. 

Origins

In March 1998, the National Science and Technology Council set up a Critical 

Infrastructure Protection Research and Development Interagency Working Group (CIP R&D 

IWG) under the joint oversight of the Committee on National Security and the Committee on 

Technology. This CIP R&D IWG was established to develop and sustain a coherent 

roadmap on what technologies to develop that, if implemented within critical national 

infrastructure sectors, would reduce vulnerabilities and counter threats that could cause major 

damage to the security, economic vitality, and social well-being of the United States. This 

roadmap would address both physical and cyber threats, as well as new threats arising from 

the growing complexity of, and interdependencies among, our critical infrastructures. While 

the agenda presented in this report primarily addresses hostile threats, it recognizes that 

natural and non-hostile problems also pose important challenges to our national wellbeing, as 

the Year 2000 problem demonstrates. 

In PDD-63, the President directed that within 180 days, a schedule for a National 

Infrastructure Assurance Plan be submitted to him from the CICG Principals Committee with 

milestones for accomplishing, inter alia, 

“Research and Development: Federally sponsored research and development in support 

of infrastructure protection shall be coordinated, be subject to multi-year planning, take 

into account private sector research, and be adequately funded to minimize our 

vulnerabilities on a rapid but achievable timetable.” 
2

To implement this part of the directive, the CICG decided to utilize the CIP R&D 

IWG already in existence. As a result of PDD-63, the IWG’s charter was expanded to 

develop a process of ongoing R&D planning and appraisal, as well as to provide appropriate 

R&D support to the CICG and the National Coordinator. 

The IWG in this report reviews the work of the last two years and sets out an R&D 

agenda that looks primarily at both ongoing work and new initiatives for the period FY2002-

2007, although the IWG was sensitive to the further outyear implications of the agenda. For 

the purposes of this agenda, a new initiative is defined as either a new program start, or a 

previously unplanned expansion of an existing program. 

Research and development is a critical component of the federal government’s efforts 

to address the critical infrastructure protection challenge. The explosive growth in new 

technology, particularly in the information infrastructure, requires constant efforts to stay 

abreast of the new technologies, and new vulnerabilities and threats they bring in their wake. 

R&D’s importance can also be seen by the fact that it represents 33% of the overall $1.47 

billion in critical infrastructure protection funding requested for FY2001. 

The position of the CIP R&D IWG in the science and technology structure of the 

executive branch is shown in the attachment at Appendix B. 
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II. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 

The economy and national security of the United States are increasingly dependent on 

a spectrum of critical infrastructures, which can be broadly grouped in the following five 

sectors: 

• Banking and Finance • Transportation

• Information and Communications • Vital Human Services

• Energy 

These sectors were drawn from the 1997 Marsh Commission report on Critical 

Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations. As that report did, the IWG merged 

Emergency Services, Government Services, and Water Supply Systems into the Vital Human 

Services category, and Electrical Power and Oil and Natural Gas Production and Storage into 

the Energy category. The IWG established subgroups that correspond to each of these 

sectors, as well as a separate subgroup to address interdependencies among these sectors, and 

also set up special subgroups to address outreach and budget issues. 

The above five critical infrastructures are highly interdependent, both physically and 

in their greater reliance on the national information infrastructure. This trend has been 

accelerating in recent years with the explosive growth of information technology (IT) and 

shows no sign of abating. Potential threats to the normal functioning of these infrastructures 

are both natural (“Murphy’s Law and Mother Nature”) and man-made. Individual outages 

can be serious enough, but this growing degree of interconnectedness can make possible a 

whole new scale of synergistic, nonlinear consequences. 

Despite the fact that the private sector owns and operates the vast majority of the 

nation’s critical infrastructures, it does not invest heavily in long-term, high-risk securityrelated technologies, especially if they are too easily adopted by competitors, or otherwise 

unlikely to generate returns that investors can capture. Such technologies are “public goods” 

– their development and adoption would benefit the nation as a whole, but they would not 

benefit any single firm enough for that firm to shoulder their investment cost. Therefore, 

government becomes the only realistic underwriter to ensure that these technologies are 

developed – a need that extends beyond funding, since these technologies will serve no 

useful purpose if they are not adopted and deployed. Just as our government defends the 

nation's airways and sea lines of communications, so too should it play a leadership role in 

defending the nation’s critical infrastructures. At the same time, the private sector has a key 

partnership role to play, given its major ownership share of the infrastructures, its business 

interests, and the expertise that it possesses. 

The obligation to ensure that technologies to strengthen the critical infrastructures are 

placed into operational practice differentiates infrastructure protection R&D from other areas 

where government invests in development of industrially relevant R&D. Existing 

government technology programs do an excellent job of developing and implementing new 

technology in those areas where industry is eager to participate, and where the risk of failure 

affects only the original investment. In infrastructure protection, however, failure to adopt 
4

new security technologies means that vulnerabilities in the nation’s critical infrastructures 

will persist. To eliminate these vulnerabilities, the government cannot afford to deal only 

with those firms that are highly motivated to collaborate – it should also engage, for example, 

those private sector owners, operators, providers, and users of critical infrastructure products 

and services that may not know of, or may not be particularly motivated to adopt, 

technologies developed through government investment. To enlist the participation of these 

more reluctant partners, government should adopt innovative business incentives that provide 

the private sector with a greater degree of visibility, participation, and “buy-in” than is 

associated with many traditional government agency programs and procedures. 

While the U.S. economy has long depended on several critical infrastructures, the 

coupling among them has historically been rather loose. Thus there has understandably been 

little need for concern about the possibility of cascading effects spreading to all the 

infrastructures based on an important failure in just one. The major 1965 failure of the 

electric power grid in the northeast United States had little lasting impact on the other 

infrastructures despite important, though non-cascading, short-term effects on other 

infrastructures. Yet important technological, economic, and regulatory changes have 

dramatically altered the relationships among infrastructures. 

As the U.S. economy becomes ever more tightly connected through 

telecommunications, electronic signaling systems, power generation, information lines, 

financial connections, transportation modes, and other connections involving critical 

infrastructures, possible disruptions have far greater potential than ever before to ripple 

throughout the economy. This unprecedented degree of infrastructure interconnectedness 

will result in an increasingly enmeshed U.S. economy. In this situation, outage “ripples” in 

one infrastructure could become cascades of economic malfunction, as individual outages 

lead to outages in other infrastructures, which in turn intensify the first outages in a 

firestorm-type of phenomenon. This negative synergy could create havoc in an economy that 

did not have mechanisms in place to quell these effects. 

One recent, and fortunately modest, example of this was the May 1998 failure of the 

Galaxy 4 telecommunications satellite, which led to an outage of 90% of pagers nationwide. 

However, the effects of the loss of this single satellite were not confined to the information 

and communications infrastructure – hundreds of thousands were unable to conduct routine 

financial transactions such as gasoline and other credit card purchases, using ATM’s, etc., 

and there is evidence that hospitals and other vital services were affected as doctors and 

emergency workers could not receive pages. In this case, a point failure in the information 

and communications infrastructure created disturbances in the financial and vital human 

services infrastructures, among others. Were a 1965-type power failure to happen today, the 

effects of that outage would be far greater than they were 35 years ago. 

At the same time that the information technology revolution has led to substantially 

more interconnected infrastructures with generally greater centralized control, the advent of 

“just-in-time” business practices has reduced margins for error in infrastructures. In addition, 

the trend toward deregulation and growth of competition in key infrastructures has 

understandably eroded the willingness of infrastructure participants to pay for spare 
5

infrastructure capacity that could serve a useful “shock absorber” role in cushioning key 

infrastructures from failures elsewhere in the economy. Furthermore, the growth of mergers 

among infrastructure providers has led to further pressures to reduce spare infrastructure 

capacity as managers have sought to wring costly “excess” costs out of merged companies. 

In addition, the rapid growth of IT and the Internet have also enabled skilled 

individuals and small groups of people to have impact all across the globe without leaving 

their homes. The “Iloveyou” and Melissa viruses wrought substantial financial and other 

damage as the result of individual actions, yet highly trained units in countries that are hostile 

to the U.S. could potentially inflict far more damage without ever leaving their homelands. 

This has particularly troubling implications for the security of our economy and our military 

forces. The Defense Department has made it a key priority to establish a Global Information 

Grid linking its forces and decision-makers far more tightly than ever before, thereby making 

sophisticated threats to information networks far more dangerous to us from a national 

security perspective than ever before. 

While in many cases better management over networks and infrastructures, including 

implementation of existing security protocols, could have averted these problems, they 

nonetheless illustrate the new dimension of challenges that our ever-more-interconnected 

world presents to us. In addition, policymakers must deal with the reality that lapses in 

security and failure to fully implement proper configuration management practices will 

repeatedly occur, given the realities of human nature. 

Any one of these trends would be a cause for uneasiness. The convergence of all five 

at the same time has no precedent in American economic history. Concern over these 

converging trends led the Defense Science Board in 1996 to decry this emerging situation as 

a “tunnel of vulnerability previously unrealized.” While important steps have been taken on 

individual infrastructures since 1998, the issue of interdependent and cascading effects 

among infrastructures has received much less attention. This situation calls for concerted 

private sector and federal efforts to build “shock absorbers and circuit breakers” of both a 

physical and policy nature into our economy to protect against major infrastructure 

breakdown, yet little is known about what these effects are or how they propagate. 
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III. VISION AND GOAL 

The vision to which the CIP R&D IWG has directed its efforts is that of a United 

States whose critical infrastructures are trustworthy and resilient. That is, they are able to 

provide the level of performance expected under a variety of conditions. To achieve this, 

they should have the ability to absorb intentional or unintentional outages with minimal 

impact on their ability to deliver needed levels of service, both directly to consumers and to 

the other infrastructures that depend upon it. This would be a daunting challenge even if the 

technology of these critical infrastructures were static. As we know, the technology 

embedded throughout the U.S. economy is undergoing a continuous and profound 

transformation. Accordingly, the IWG has sought to support the development of 

technologies that will counter threats and reduce vulnerabilities in those areas having 

potential for causing significant national security, economic, and/or social impacts.1 

Such a robust set of critical infrastructures would have assured continuity and 

viability and be protected from hostile acts and natural outages that would significantly 

diminish the abilities of: 

• the Federal Government to perform essential national security missions and to ensure the 

general public health and safety. 

• state and local governments to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public 

services. 

• the private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and the delivery of 

essential information and communications, energy, financial, transportation, and other 

services. 

As part of the vision, any interruptions or manipulations of these critical functions 

would be brief, predictable in impact, infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated, and 

minimally detrimental to the welfare of the United States. 

To help realize this vision, the CIP R&D IWG has as its goal to identify and support a 

vigorous and effective program of federal R&D in critical infrastructure protection. This 

program, along with private sector efforts, should enhance the security of our nation’s critical 

infrastructures by rapidly identifying, developing, and facilitating the fielding of 

technological solutions and management tools and techniques to address existing and 

emerging infrastructure threats and vulnerabilities. The process to achieve this should be 

characterized by: 

 

1

Transition Office of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Critical 

Infrastructure Assurance Office, Preliminary Research and Development Roadmap for Protecting and Assuring 

Critical National Infrastructures, Washington D.C., July 1998, p.xiii. 
7

• an awareness of the state of new technological developments as they become embedded 

in infrastructures and the new avenues they present for hostile and non-hostile disruption 

of these architectures; 

• an ability to produce an affordable agenda of R&D programs in critical infrastructure 

protection in time to be useful to those who make resource allocation and infrastructure 

protection planning decisions in government and the private sector; 

• a functioning, effective interaction with the private sector, academia, and other countries 

so that R&D overlap is minimized and programs are pursued that best meet the needs of 

the private sector and government; 

• an innovative management structure that is sufficiently flexible and responsive to a 

rapidly changing infrastructure environment in terms of technology and threats. 
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IV. THE CHALLENGE AND THE THREAT 

Technical specialists and policy makers are increasingly concerned that as our 

national infrastructures become more tightly coupled, disruptions will have much greater 

potential to reverberate throughout the economy. The spare capacity in our infrastructures, 

which was generally sufficient to shield us from major outages in the past, may no longer be 

enough to deal with major disruptions. The level of spare capacity in our economy has in 

many cases declined as well, thanks to the economic restructuring and forces mentioned 

earlier. We only have the vaguest idea of how hostile or non-hostile infrastructure 

disruptions could propagate in our tightly coupled economy. 

As the attack on the USS Cole, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and recent 

hostile hacker attacks on information networks (Moonlight Maze, Solar Sunrise, etc.) have 

shown, asymmetric warfare against the U.S.—striking our vulnerabilities rather than our 

superior military forces—will likely grow in the future, as well as non-hostile disruptions. 

Threats of infrastructure attacks, especially involving information warfare techniques, have 

grown over the last few years and threaten to become a common feature of conflict between 

countries, and not just involving the United States. The China-Taiwan confrontation, which 

has seen threats and counter-threats of cyber attacks, and the escalating cyber-skirmishing 

that has occurred between Palestinian and Israeli hackers are just two examples of this. 

Increasing numbers of countries and sub-national groups are developing the ability to 

attack lightly or unprotected sectors of the U.S. economy. Failure to understand how such 

attacks could propagate throughout our economy leaves economic and military planners 

unprepared to deal with infrastructure failures during military contingencies. In the highly 

interconnected economy of the future, hostile—and non-hostile—disruptions will have much 

greater potential to reverberate throughout the U.S. economy unless we take steps to build in 

the “shock absorbers and circuit breakers” to prevent it. 

Additional classified information on the nature of the cyber and physical threat to our 

critical infrastructures is available from the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA briefed the 

CIP R&D IWG on this threat in 1998, 1999, and 2000. It is essential that decision-makers 

on this issue receive such a briefing in 2001 and the years to come. 

Generally, the private sector funds near-term R&D to develop tools to address 

infrastructure outages, but the federal government does more fundamental R&D. Federal 

funding for all critical infrastructure protection R&D has increased only modestly over the 

last few years and is now about $600 million overall. As a proportion of the exploding level 

of IT investments in our economy, this R&D funding has seriously declined. Specific R&D 

areas that need to be addressed are presented below. 

Beyond R&D funding, the country needs greater awareness of the critical 

infrastructure protection issue, especially of the interdependencies among these 

infrastructures and the catalytic effect this can have on our security. As Y2K taught us, it is 

best to take precautionary measures and plan ahead for a challenge like this. 
9

V. OBJECTIVES 

 The overall objectives of the federal program in critical infrastructure protection 

R&D are to promote and coordinate research to reduce vulnerabilities in our nation’s critical 

infrastructure, and to promote the research and development of technologies that will detect, 

contain, and mitigate attacks against or other failures in these infrastructures. The CIP R&D 

IWG has three sets of more specific objectives, one each for the short-, medium-, and longterm. 

The IWG’s long-term objective is to achieve the goal of maintaining and supporting a 

vigorous and effective program of federal R&D in critical infrastructure protection that 

rapidly identifies, develops, and facilitates the fielding of technologies and management tools 

that provide protection against existing and emerging infrastructure threats and 

vulnerabilities. 

In the medium-term, the IWG’s objectives are to: 

• Sustain the process that has evolved since 1998 to develop and maintain an agenda for 

federal critical infrastructure protection R&D. This agenda should be comprehensive 

and include information on ongoing federal programs, near- and long-term research 

plans, budget information, and proposed R&D policy. 

• Foster conditions for the development of a close partnership with the private sector, 

academia, and international community. Given the volume of CIP R&D performed by 

and the expertise resident in industry, academia, and the international community, the 

federal program should be developed in close conjunction and partnership with these 

communities. 

• Facilitate the smooth and timely transfer of technology among government agencies and 

between them and the private sector. This objective is closely aligned with the previous 

one. Technology developed in government laboratories should be rapidly transferred to 

the private sector, particularly if the federal government concentrates primarily on 

research and the private sector on development. 

In the short term, the IWG annually develops and coordinates the federal 

government’s critical infrastructure protection R&D agenda in accordance with guidance 

from PDD-63. The ideal agenda generally does not reflect budgetary constraints. While the 

IWG seeks to prioritize the R&D, the ultimate decisions on what level of CIP R&D to 

include in the federal budget rest will be made as the President's budget request is assembled 

each year. In developing the federal CIP R&D agenda, the IWG should: 

• Share with other members of the IWG the program, technical, and budgetary information 

on the CIP R&D programs that each agency has under way or planned, which in its 

entirety constitutes the CIP R&D baseline. 
10

• Monitor and coordinate ongoing and planned federal CIP R&D. The IWG provides a 

forum to identify and resolve issues in recommending a national R&D agenda, policy, 

and programs. 

• Develop an ideal CIP R&D agenda that would allow the IWG to meet its long-term 

objective of a robust set of national critical infrastructures. 

• Identify the gaps and shortfalls in CIP R&D by comparing the ideal R&D agenda with 

the R&D baseline, taking into account what is known about private sector R&D. 

• Prioritize the unmet R&D programs needed to fill the gaps and shortfalls and provide this 

information as requested to the NSTC, CICG, etc. 

• Maintain a dialogue with the private sector and academia on infrastructure challenges, 

R&D needs, and R&D resources. 

• Maintain a dialogue with the intelligence community and private sector on infrastructure 

threats. 

In addition, the IWG responds to the needs of the NSC, OSTP, National Coordinator, CICG, 

and infrastructure stakeholders as appropriate. 
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VI. SECTOR SUMMARIES OF CURRENT PROGRAMS AND R&D 

SHORTFALLS 

Agency Summaries

Some of the critical infrastructure sectors fit neatly into individual departments, 

though even here there is overlap. For example, the energy infrastructure is directly 

associated with the Department of Energy, and Transportation with the Department of 

Transportation. Yet information and communications R&D is performed in several 

departments, most notably the Department of Defense, though Commerce, the National 

Science Foundation, and even Energy are also involved. And there is no “Department of 

Interdependencies,” so this critical area has no obvious agency home, though Energy and 

Defense are gaining in their recognition of how this issue affects their mission, as is 

Treasury. Funding by department for FY2000 and FY2001∗

 is shown in the table below.

Federal CIP and Related R&D FY2000-01 

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY FY00 FY01(*) 

Agriculture 0.0 9.0 

Commerce 9.5 63.3 

National Security 418.5 463.48 

Energy 3.03 14.8 

Environmental Protection Agency 0.0 2.0 

Health and Human Services 0.0 2.0 

Interior 4.0 0.0 

Justice 3.4 0.0 

NASA 2.6 0.0 

National Science Foundation 26.02 32.98 

Transportation 0.0 10.4 

Treasury 3.9 8.0 

Veterans 0.45 0.30 

 TOTAL 471.4 606.26 

Sector Summaries

Summaries of the sector activities and R&D recommendations are presented on the 

following pages. 

 

 

∗

 FY2001 Budget, as submitted. Details of final FY2001 Congressional action unavailable. 
12

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 

Introduction

The information and communications (I&C) infrastructure sector of the nation’s 

critical infrastructures generates more revenue than most nations produce. Far more than any 

other nation, the U.S. has been able to utilize the potential of the new technologies to reshape 

its governmental and commercial processes. The United States has generally led the world 

into the information age, and in so doing has become critically dependent on its technologies 

to conduct national and international commerce, governmental functions, and military 

operations. These technologies enable the U.S. to keep its economy competitive, its 

government efficient, and its people secure. Thus, as the Director of OSTP, Neal Lane, 

testified in March 2000 before a subcommittee hearing of the House Armed Services 

Committee, ensuring the robust and reliable operation of our critical infrastructures “... is 

truly a national challenge - one that goes way beyond the traditional bounds of national 

security as our economic security, competitiveness, and our way of life rest upon the 

continuous and assured availability of the services provided by our infrastructures...”2

As is true for most critical infrastructures, developing the ability to protect the I&C 

infrastructure is neither an entirely public nor an entirely private responsibility. 

Infrastructure risks are common to government, business, and citizen alike and create a zone 

of shared responsibility and cooperation among industry, government, and academia. 

Reducing those risks requires coordinated effort within and between the private and public 

sectors. If we are to retain and build upon the competitive edge that information technology 

has given us, we need to work together on CIP R&D and in other pursuits to substantially 

improve the trustworthiness of our information systems and networks. 

Goals

The goal of the I&C Subgroup of the CIP R&D IWG is to coordinate federal I&C 

infrastructure R&D efforts. Specifically, the Subgroup supports the development of 

technologies that will counter threats and reduce vulnerabilities in those areas having 

potential for causing significant national security, economic, and/or social impacts.3 

Recognizing that it is impossible in the near-term to assure fully the continuity and viability 

of the I&C critical infrastructure, the I&C Subgroup’s approach is to continuously improve 

the protection of the many components comprising the I&C infrastructure from identified 

security threats, vulnerabilities, and shortcomings. Accordingly, the Subgroup seeks to: 

 

2

From a statement of Dr Neal Lane, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, 

during his testimony in which he addressed critical infrastructure protection matters in a joint meeting of the 

Readiness Subcommittee and the Research and Development Subcommittee of the U.S. House of 

Representatives Committee on Armed Services, March 8, 2000. 

3

Transition Office of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Critical 

Infrastructure Assurance Office, Preliminary Research and Development Roadmap for Protecting and Assuring 

Critical National Infrastructures, Washington D.C., July 1998, p.xiii. 
13

• Ensure that the recommended federal government I&C CIP R&D agenda is responsive to 

the needs of the NSC; National Coordinator for Security, Critical Infrastructure and 

Counter Terrorism; CICG; IWG; and infrastructure stakeholders as appropriate. 

• Develop and coordinate the federal government I&C CIP R&D agenda in accordance 

with guidance from PDD-63 such that the agenda is comprehensive and includes 

information on ongoing federal I&C CIP R&D programs, near- and long-term research 

plans, budget information, recommended funding priorities, and proposed R&D policy, 

as applicable. 

• Monitor and coordinate ongoing and planned federal I&C CIP R&D by providing a 

forum to identify and resolve issues in recommending a national I&C CIP R&D agenda, 

policy, and program. 

• Foster conditions for the development of a close partnership with the private sector, 

academia, and the international community by developing the federal program in close 

conjunction and partnership with these communities. This is especially important given 

the volume of I&C CIP R&D performed by, and the expertise resident in, these 

communities. We need to maintain a functioning, effective, 2-way interaction among the 

Federal Government departments and agencies (to include the Critical Infrastructure 

Assurance Office, Sector Liaison Offices, etc.) as well as with the private sector (to 

include Sector Coordinators), academia, and other countries, which will allow us to gain 

synergy in critical infrastructure protection efforts. We will also minimize I&C CIP 

R&D overlap with other CIP R&D sectors as well as to counter-terrorism, Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Prevention, and other federal R&D. We will pursue federal I&C CIP 

R&D programs that best meet the needs of the private sector and government. 

• Closely aligned with the previous goal, facilitate the smooth and timely transfer of 

technology among government agencies and between them and the private sector; 

technology developed in government laboratories should be rapidly transferred to the 

private sector, particularly if the Federal Government concentrates primarily on research 

and the private sector on development. 

• Maintain an awareness among Subgroup members of the current threat environment as 

well as the new technological developments being incorporated into the I&C 

infrastructure and the new vulnerabilities they present relative to hostile/non-hostile 

disruption of this critical infrastructure. 

• Support the CIP R&D IWG and its process in being an innovative coordination structure 

that is sufficiently flexible and responsive to a rapidly changing infrastructure 

environment in terms of technology and threats. Coordinate closely with the 

Interdependencies Subgroup concerning R&D programs applicable to: (1) protection of 

both the I&C infrastructure and other critical infrastructures, (2) interdependencies 

among the I&C and other critical infrastructures, and (3) overlapping I&C CIP, 
14

counterterrorism, WMD, or other threats; 

• Develop and coordinate an overall federal government I&C CIP R&D program agenda 

that takes into account R&D applicable to protection of the I&C infrastructure even when 

it is primarily conducted in response to a counter-terrorism, WMD, or other threat or 

concern, and that supports the following four primary thrusts, each of which draws on the 

resources of multiple agencies and covers a broad spectrum of cyber security issues: 

(1) Threat/Vulnerability/Risk Assessments - focusing on threat, vulnerability, 

and risk assessments of the I&C critical infrastructure to include modeling and 

simulation programs, metrics, and testbeds; 

(2) System Protection - focusing on cyber protection of individual systems, to 

include programs such as encryption, public key infrastructures, network 

security products, reliability and security of computing systems, robust I&C 

control systems, and secure supervisory control and data acquisition 

(SCADA) systems; 

(3) Intrusion Monitoring and Response - focusing on technologies to detect 

and provide immediate responses to intrusions or infrastructure attacks to 

include such programs as network intrusion detection, information assurance 

technologies, mobile code and agents, network alarm systems, forensic tools 

for electronic media, and network defensive technologies; and 

(4) Recovery and Reconstitution - focusing on those technologies required to 

reconstitute and restore the I&C critical infrastructure in the aftermath of 

disruptions to include such programs as risk management studies and tools, 

system survivability technologies, and consequence analysis tools and 

supporting technologies. 

Objectives

The I&C Subgroup’s objectives are intended to achieve the foregoing vision and 

goals. They are based on the direction from PDD-63, the National Plan for Information 

Systems Protection (Version 1.0), and guidance from the Committees on National Security 

and Technology as well as the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG), and the 

IWG in turn. Those objectives are to continue to develop, coordinate, and annually publish 

an I&C Subgroup: 

• Statement of Vision/Goals/Objectives (so that all who are interested in making the vision 

a reality will share a common frame of reference). 

• Assessment of Vulnerabilities/Shortcomings of the I&C Infrastructure (so that Federal 

Government I&C CIP R&D programs may be targeted, coordinated, prioritized, and 

proposed to address the identified vulnerabilities/shortfalls). 

• Summary of Federal Government ongoing and completed I&C CIP R&D Programs (that 

are tied to identified vulnerabilities and/or shortcomings in critical I&C infrastructure). 
15

• Summary of Gaps and Shortfalls I&C CIP R&D Programs (those proposed Federal 

Government I&C CIP R&D programs considered necessary to address the voids in 

federal R&D and thereby correct the identified vulnerabilities and shortcomings relative 

to the I&C critical infrastructure). 

• Table of Federal Government I&C CIP R&D Programs Versus 

Vulnerabilities/Shortcomings that reflects: (1) specific identified 

vulnerabilities/shortcomings of the I&C critical infrastructure, (2) the specific, ongoing 

federal programs addressing each of the specific identified vulnerabilities and 

shortcomings, (3) the new initiative federal programs also needed to address the 

identified gaps and shortfalls in R&D that are not addressed fully by the ongoing 

programs, and (4) the expected products (outcomes) of each program. 

• Summary of Federal Government I&C CIP R&D Program Priorities that reflects a 

general prioritization scheme for use by those who make resource allocation and critical 

infrastructure protection planning decisions in government, academia, and the private 

sector. This summary will reflect a general assessment of the most important I&C CIP 

R&D needs and will reflect program priorities within agencies; however, it will not be a 

rank-ordered, prioritization of all Federal Government I&C CIP R&D programs based on 

an overall interagency, program-by-program review. 

Major Efforts Underway

For FY 2001, nine federal departments requested funds in the President’s budget 

submitted to Congress for 85 ongoing I&C CIP R&D programs. Some of these programs, 

however, are funded out of other programs and therefore do not appear as separate budget 

line items. The research areas or topics these programs address run the gamut from public 

key infrastructure and Internet security to mobile agents and advanced authentication 

systems. As part of the strategic oversight of these programs, the CIP R&D IWG has worked 

with other interagency, government/industry, and industry groups in sponsoring several 

government/private sector workshops which have greatly facilitated coordinating both 

ongoing programs and new initiatives planned for FY 2002 and beyond. 

Many of these programs are cooperative endeavors or joint efforts among different 

departments, and a few are joint efforts between Government and academia. The 

Department of Defense’s “Critical Infrastructure Protection and High Confidence, Adaptable 

Software University Research Initiative” is an example of expanded research opportunities 

across a range of selected topics that are deemed crucial to our CIP needs. A second DoD 

Broad Area Announcement was issued for the creation of a CIP and Information Assurance 

(IA) academic fellows program to expand the opportunities for scientists and researchers in 

related fields to enter into the arena of CIP/IA R&D. 

Indeed, DoD plays a major role in addressing CIP issues across the full spectrum of R&D 

efforts. Active CIP R&D programs are present throughout DoD, and they continue to receive 

strong congressional support. 
16

Major Challenges in the Information and Communications Infrastructure

The information and communications (I&C) Subgroup identified gaps and shortfalls 

after mapping the currently funded R&D against identified vulnerabilities and shortcomings 

in the U.S. I&C infrastructure. This year, Subgroup members compared the baseline of 

ongoing I&C CIP R&D programs against the identified vulnerabilities and shortcomings in 

the I&C infrastructure. They coordinated extensively to ensure that each of the planned 

programs was indeed directly addressing one or more of the identified vulnerabilities and 

shortcomings relative to the I&C infrastructure. They previously identified the R&D gaps 

and shortfalls relative to the identified vulnerabilities and shortcomings that the ongoing 

programs do not address. Those gaps and shortfalls fall into the four primary thrust areas 

previously listed under the I&C goals. 

Conclusion

In summary, it is vitally important to recognize that the overall effort to accomplish 

the R&D necessary to address all of the identified gaps and shortfalls in federal I&C 

infrastructure R&D is a cooperative effort. Many programs are complementary, while others 

are joint efforts. Accordingly, funding disapproval for a program in one department ripples 

across other departments and the programs involved in a very negative fashion. The end 

result is that the effectiveness in developing new technology applications to address the 

identified vulnerabilities to the nation’s I&C critical infrastructure is compromised. 

BANKING AND FINANCE 

While the Banking & Finance Sector Critical Infrastructure has some unique 

elements, it primarily consists of important subsets of the other infrastructures, especially the 

Information and Communications infrastructure. While there are some vulnerabilities and 

threats unique to the Banking & Finance Sector, the greatest part of the sector’s risk is 

inherited from the underlying supporting infrastructure. 

Another factor in coordinating R&D in this sector is that there has been little R&D of 

any kind done in this community. The only work that fits a traditional definition of R&D 

would be the development of new derivatives and financial forecasting tools. Consequently, 

there is no tradition of R&D being done in this area, in addition to the present lack of R&D 

managers to oversee the required work. 

To address the new and expanding threats from foreign nation states, criminal 

enterprises and terrorists, the community has sponsored a number of initiatives with the 

support of the Treasury Department. In addition to the Information Sharing and 

Vulnerability Assessment Center, there is a Research and Development working group under 

Mr. Charles Blauner of J.P. Morgan & Co. This working group has identified what research 

is being done within the community and vetted the efforts underway within the government 
17

and Information and Communications Sector. It also supports the protection of the Banking 

& Finance Sector Critical Infrastructure. 

The major focus of the Fiscal Year 2001 program is a modeling effort to identify the 

vulnerabilities in the Banking & Finance Sector Critical Infrastructure. This builds on work 

of the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications under the NCS, which has 

completed an extensive model of the United States backbone communications network. This 

object-oriented model is aimed at understanding the properties, vulnerabilities and required 

remediation for our national communications infrastructure. 

As mentioned before, almost all banking and financial services ride over some 

portion of the communications infrastructure. This R&D effort is examining essential 

services such as funds transfer, clearing houses, stock markets, refunding, etc. in order to 

identify the inherited vulnerabilities from the communications infrastructure and best 

remediation strategies. For example, we may know that there is an existing or pending attack 

against a certain type of switch. Examination of the model would show where the switches 

are located and which essential financial services depend on them. Further examination 

would also show the extent of the impact if the switches were compromised and what 

alternatives are available to address the loss of the switch. As the tool develops a better 

understanding of the financial processes, the model will also be able to identify malicious 

intervention or criminal activity. While this level of sophistication will take time to develop, 

the simple mapping of financial transaction and funds flows in the communications model 

should reap substantial benefits: 

• identification of potential vulnerabilities; 

• the testing of remediation alternatives to find the best option; 

• a tool for executive crisis management training and exercises; and 

• during an actual crisis or information warfare attack, a means to identify the extent of 

impact and to evaluate responses in real time. 

This effort will also serve as a model technology for identifying infrastructure 

interdependencies with other sectors. 

The secondary focus of the Banking and Finance R&D program is on developing the 

forensic tools that the U.S. Secret Service and other law enforcement agencies need to 

combat electronic crimes and attacks on our Banking & Finance Infrastructure. This work is 

being done in coordination with efforts at the Justice Department but focus on the specific 

nature of electronic financial crimes. 

The total budget request in Fiscal Year 2001 for this program was $4 million, which 

will only provide “seed money” for these research efforts. The task of examining the 

vulnerabilities and interdependencies of the entire Banking and Finance Sector will require 

resources that far exceed this initial investment in developing modeling tools. Once we have 

the resources and are able to develop the modeling tools, then we can start R&D efforts to 

develop remediation steps for the vulnerabilities that the modeling efforts will identify. 
18

ENERGY 

Introduction

Our nation’s energy infrastructure — composed of increasingly interdependent 

industries that produce and distribute electric power, oil, and natural gas — is undergoing 

rapid and dramatic changes. Advances in information technology, an increased reliance on 

electronic commerce, restructuring and deregulation initiatives, and other market forces are 

motivating much of these changes. The purpose of the Energy subgroup is to develop a 

research and development (R&D) program agenda that will address a wide range of needs for 

protecting this critical energy infrastructure. Applicable R&D encompasses both the physical 

and cyber components of the electric power, oil, and gas infrastructures, the 

interdependencies among those components, and the interdependencies with the other critical 

national infrastructures. The energy R&D program is aimed at developing cost-effective 

technologies and capabilities (e.g., databases, methodologies, and tools) that can be used to 

achieve several goals:

• Increase our understanding of physical and cyber disruptions (natural, accidental, 

deliberate) to the energy infrastructure, especially those that could result in cascading or 

widespread regional outages. 

• Develop energy infrastructure assurance “best practices” through vulnerability and risk 

assessments. 

• Protect against, mitigate the impacts of, and improve the ability to recover from 

disruptive incidents within the energy infrastructure. 

Major Research Efforts Under Way

The R&D agenda consists of two primary thrust areas: 

• Analysis and Risk Management 

• Protection and Mitigation Technologies 

Specific topical areas include: 

• Infrastructure Interdependencies. Development of methodologies and tools for 

characterizing and analyzing interdependencies among the energy infrastructures and 

with other critical infrastructures. This capability will help DOE and others within the 

Energy Sector identify critical system nodes and assess the technical, economic, and 

national security implications of energy technology and policy decisions designed to 

ensure the security of our nation’s interdependent energy systems. 

• Vulnerability Assessment. Focus on collaboration with the Energy Sector to conduct 

physical and cyber vulnerability assessments that identify infrastructure vulnerabilities, 
19

raise awareness about these vulnerabilities, and enable the development of guidelines and 

“best practices” for industry to use in limiting vulnerabilities. 

• Scale and Complexity Analysis. Research on the fundamental operational characteristics 

of large-scale, complex, nonlinear energy infrastructures. This program will develop 

technologies and capabilities that focus on stability, countermeasures, reduction of 

complexity, the effects of uncertainty, and behavior. 

• Consequence Analysis and Management. Development of data, methodologies, and tools 

for evaluating the public health and safety, national security, and economic consequences 

of disruptions to energy infrastructures and the processes needed to assist in restoration 

and reconstitution following such disruptions. 

• Risk Management. Development of risk management methodologies and tools to assist 

decision makers in quantifying system risks and in planning and implementing critical 

infrastructure protection strategies. 

• Policy Effects and Institutional Barriers. Examination of the barriers between 

government and industry stakeholders in sharing Critical Infrastructure Protection-related 

information (e.g., threat and vulnerability information) and identification and 

implementation of solutions to barriers that may inhibit the ability to protect U.S. critical 

infrastructures. 

• Real-time Control Mechanism Technologies. Identification of vulnerabilities inherent in 

real-time energy control systems and development of technologies to protect against 

disruption or unauthorized control of, or intrusion into, these systems. 

• Integrated Multi-sensor and Warning Technologies. Improvement of existing integrated 

systems and/or development of new ones to warn of attacks and impending failures at 

critical nodes. Focus on anomaly detection and failure warning technologies. 

Major Challenges in the Energy Infrastructure

The R&D areas that DOE has selected are structured to complement and reinforce 

each other and related efforts. Capitalizing on the links and synergies across the initiatives to 

meet requirements is a major technical and programmatic challenge. Additional challenges 

in the energy sector which complicate the R&D picture include: 

• Inadequate information to determine susceptibility to disruption of the energy 

infrastructure 

• Lack of a coordinated process to collect and distribute threat information 

• Inadequate response and recovery procedures and technology 

• Interdependence of energy infrastructure and other infrastructures 

• Increasing system interconnectedness and complexity of the energy system 

• Increasing reliance on real-time system control 
20

• Gaps in physical protection for energy infrastructure facilities 

• Limited cyber security for SCADA systems 

• Inadequate protection of energy-related information 

• Reliance on unique, hard to procure equipment and materials 

• Susceptibility to cascading failures 

• Reliance on rapid access to accurate information 

Conclusion

Coordination and partnerships among agencies and the private sector are of 

paramount importance. Identifying and developing mechanisms to transfer the technologies, 

capabilities and “best practices” developed through this program to industry and public 

organizations at the federal, state, and local levels are key to the success of the program and 

to protection of our nation’s critical infrastructure. 

TRANSPORTATION 

Introduction

The Transportation Subgroup of the Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D 

Interagency Working Group (CIP R&D IWG) includes representatives from a number of 

DOT offices as well as several federal agencies. Incorporating relevant projects and 

proposals from these organizations, the subgroup formulated the Interagency Transportation 

Infrastructure Assurance (TIA) Research and Development (R&D) Plan. This plan provides 

a coordinated federal government response to multiple mandates: the 1997 Marsh 

Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, White House Commission on Aviation 

Safety and Security (1997), the 1999 DOT Surface Transportation Vulnerability Assessment, 

the 1999 National Research Council report, “Improving Surface Transportation Security: A 

Research and Development Strategy,” and related Presidential Decision Directives (e.g., 

PDD-62, PDD-63, PDD-67). These activities and initiatives are essential to protect the 

nation’s transportation infrastructure, operators, and users against future acts of terrorism and 

crime and will enable the transportation system to adapt rapidly to natural or intentional 

disruptions. Critical transportation infrastructure elements include: aviation, space 

transportation, highways, mass transit, pipelines, rail, waterborne shipping, intermodal 

connections, and interfaces with other transportation-dependent infrastructures, such as 

energy and telecommunications. 

The Interagency TIA R&D Plan represents a comprehensive approach to assessing 

threats to the security of the nation’s transportation system and to preparing R&D projects 

that provide integrated security solutions (e.g., technologies, procedures) tailored to these 

threats. It addresses the: 

• Physical security of transportation modes and intermodal connections (e.g., roads, 

railroad lines, bridges, tunnels, terminals, locks and dams, piers, etc.); 
21

• Security of vital communications, navigation and information systems and networks 

(e.g., Global Positioning System); 

• Susceptibility of transportation operators and users to weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD); and 

• Development and dissemination of information about system threats, vulnerabilities 

and best practices to transportation system developers, operators and users. 

Major Efforts Under Way:

Traditionally, aviation has conducted the bulk of transportation CIP R&D through the 

Federal Aviation Administration. This tradition continues today as aviation comprises 88 

percent of ongoing transportation CIP R&D in the area of aviation security in FY 2000. 

Other current major transportation CIP R&D efforts include analysis of Global Positioning 

System (GPS) vulnerabilities; intelligence and security risk assessments, TIA training and 

awareness, information dissemination; chemical/biological agent detection; and research on 

operational methods for improving the performance of transportation systems. 

Additional TIA R&D activities requested in the FY 2001 budget submission to 

Congress include aviation information systems security, intermodal terminal security at 

major transportation nodes, and human factors analysis on the transportation security system. 

However, Congress denied funding for the Information Systems Security program in its 

consideration of the FY2001 budget request. 

 

Major Challenges to the Transportation Sector:

Responsibility for assuring the safety and security of the nation’s transportation 

infrastructure and its continued operations is scattered among thousands of private companies 

and agencies at every level of government. This decentralized approach to transportation has 

resulted in transportation system security gaps, especially in areas where both responsibility 

and resources are divided or uncertain. 

A second major challenge is managing the control of information on vulnerability 

assessments. The crux of the challenge is to restrict dissemination of sensitive information to 

malefactors while allowing private companies to obtain the vulnerability information they 

need. Additionally, many vulnerability assessments could involve the gathering of sensitive 

or proprietary information which, if provided to competitors, would be damaging to the 

participating private company. This information needs to be protected while still allowing it 

to be used to protect the infrastructure. Furthermore, many private companies fear that 

vulnerability assessments of their operations could open the door to tort liability suits. 

Although these questions have yet to be fully resolved, efforts are underway to address these 

concerns. 

Specific analysis of gaps and shortfalls in this sector are in the final stages of review 

and are unavailable at this time. 
22

Conclusion

Aviation has a strong history of robust R&D efforts on transportation infrastructure 

assurance and security, a tradition that will continue. Given surface transportation’s 

importance and vulnerability, as highlighted by several recent studies and high-profile 

incidents, it is essential to improve surface transportation security, given the emerging 21st

Century threats of cyber terrorism and chemical/biological weapons. The interagency 

development of the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance (TIA) R&D Plan addresses and 

coordinates these challenging tasks of protecting our nation’s transportation infrastructure 

from terrorist threats. The Plan’s next stage will include heightened involvement of private 

industry in developing and honing transportation infrastructure assurance R&D. 

Vital Human Services 

Introduction

The Vital Human Services (VHS) sector includes three of the critical infrastructures 

named in Executive Order 13010: 

• water supply 

• emergency services 

• government services, including defense. 

These three VHS infrastructures differ from other critical infrastructures in that, with 

the exception of defense, they are focused largely at the state and local level and are largely 

governmental responsibilities. In spite of these differences, the VHS infrastructures face 

similar problems and vulnerabilities in communities across the country. The R&D efforts 

underway in the water supply and emergency services sectors are highlighted below. 

National Security is treated in a separate section immediately following. 

Background

The water supply sector CIP effort is primarily focused on the 330 large water supply 

systems, which serve communities of more than 100,000 people. The U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA), as lead agency for the water supply sector, is working in 

cooperation with various associations on this issue, especially the American Water Works 

Association (AWWA) and the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA). 

Through these partnerships, EPA hopes to raise awareness of water sector vulnerabilities, 

encourage information sharing, and develop remediation protocols for the vulnerabilities that 

are discovered. The initial research effort is small and is focused on developing a 

vulnerability assessment methodology. Additional federal agencies including the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) also assist with efforts in the water supply sector. 
23

HHS requested funding in FY2001 to focus on emergency services infrastructures. 

Efforts include identifying key areas of interdependence among hospital and health care 

response and communications and transportation infrastructures, working with hospitals and 

related emergency services to identify operational vulnerabilities, and to determine ways to 

mitigate those vulnerabilities. 

Major Efforts Underway

In FY 2000, EPA entered into an interagency agreement with the Department of 

Energy to develop a vulnerability assessment methodology for the water supply sector. This 

methodology is an extension of the methodology developed for the federal dam community, 

which includes the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, Bonneville Power Authority, 

and Tennessee Valley Authority. The American Water Works Association (AWWA) – 

Research Foundation, a private not-for-profit organization that sponsors research for the 

drinking water industry, has also entered into a contract with Sandia National Laboratory to 

further support this vital work. Funds requested by HHS are also expected to assist in this 

effort. In the fall of 2000, a workshop with six to eight representatives of large water utilities 

outlined the approach of the methodology. This effort will extend into FY 2001, and the 

effort will be expanded to include field-testing and training for users. 

In August 2000, EPA held a joint meeting on the water supply infrastructure with 

DOE at their Argonne National Laboratory. Most of the major federal water agencies and 

approximately 30 water utilities were represented. Meeting attendees reached an agreement 

on the approach and the priorities for water supply sector research. 

Funds were requested in the FY2001 budget submission to Congress to initiate a 

more robust water sector CIP program. OMB has provided the following direction to the 

EPA: 

“Through partnerships with AMWA and AWWA, EPA will work with water utilities 

undertaking measures to safeguard water supplies from terrorist and seditious acts. EPA 

will also implement an assessment of the vulnerability and methods to reduce 

vulnerability of the drinking water supply to terrorists acts.” 

Other areas of interest include remediation measures, threat analysis and 

communications techniques, methods to identify and characterize chemical and biological 

agents, and a university or industry-based center of excellence in risk assessment and risk 

reduction. Specific efforts are underway, in cooperation with the FBI, to develop an 

Information Sharing and Analysis Center for the water supply sector to facilitate the 

exchange of threat and vulnerability information. 

FEMA is also leading an effort to produce valid and verified databases of water 

distribution systems and to develop assessment tools for evaluating the threat to public health 

and safety posed by the introduction of a biological or chemical agent into a water system. 

Two prototype databases and assessment tools will be developed covering: 
24

1) broad area populations at risk (statewide) and 2) local area populations at risk (citywide). 

The broad area prototype will allow the user to track an agent, under variable flow 

conditions, from the point of introduction to downstream water supply intakes and will 

determine the concentration and decay rate of an agent as it is dispersed within the water 

source. The local area prototype will allow the user to model the flow and concentration of 

an agent within a city or municipal water system, will assess the effects of water treatment on 

the agent, and will model the flow and concentration of an agent through the water 

distribution system. 

The HHS program will focus on three of the VHS sector’s high priority research and 

development issues identified by the NSC-lead interagency Critical Infrastructure 

Coordinating Group that need to be addressed to protect our critical infrastructures. First is 

the previously mentioned effort to develop a vulnerability assessment methodology for the 

water supply sector. Emergency services infrastructure issues include studying critical 

interdependencies between hospital and health care response systems and the 

communications, essential transportation, public safety, and emergency medical systems. 

This effort will look at how threats or damage to communications and transportation systems 

may affect the response capabilities of the hospital and health care community. A related 

effort will look at protection of hospital infrastructures. This effort will focus on critical 

hospital operations in response to a chemical or biological incident including 

decontamination, preventing cross-contamination, hospital capacity, etc. 

Major Challenges in the VHS R&D Area

Ongoing water sector research is a small effort and leaves gaps and shortfalls in 

addressing identified vulnerabilities and shortcomings in U.S. water supplies. EPA is 

coordinating its efforts closely with other federal agencies and the private sector to identify 

the highest priorities and to work jointly to develop solutions to vulnerabilities and 

shortcomings. 

The gaps and shortfalls in four major areas: 

• Threat/Vulnerability/Risk Assessments – Focusing on threat, vulnerability, and risk 

assessment of the water supply sector critical infrastructure to include methodologies, 

benchmarks, field testing and analysis and communication of results. 

• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems. Application of information 

assurance techniques to water supply SCADA systems and development of appropriate, 

cost-effective protocols. This work will rely heavily on efforts being conducted by DOE. 

The SCADA systems used in water utilities are similar to those used in the gas, oil, and 

electric power sectors. 

• Identify and Characterize Biological and Chemical Agents. In conjunction with the 

Centers for Disease Control and other agencies, identify and characterize the behavior of 

chemical and biological agents in water. Determine the effects of water treatment on 

these agents and characterize the risks posed by these agents to the nation’s water supply. 
25

• Center of Excellence for Risk Assessment of Water Supplies. Establish a center of 

excellence to support communities in conducting vulnerability and risk assessments and 

in making decisions regarding water supply assurance. 

Conclusion

The cooperation of the water supply industry is essential in developing realistic 

research needs and in developing the tools that they need to evaluate and correct 

vulnerabilities. EPA has succeeded this year in establishing a good relationship with the 

major water association and has an agreement with them as to the priorities for the FY 01 

budget. 

 

National Security

National Security Community CIP efforts are concentrated on understanding and 

protecting defense, national, and international infrastructures critical to national security 

during times of peace, crises, and war. Department of Defense (DoD) CIP addresses the 

relationship between critical assets and force readiness. It requires the identification, 

assessment, protection, monitoring, and operational assurance of cyber and physical 

infrastructures essential to the execution of the National Military Strategy. The challenge 

ahead is to maintain and build on the momentum and experience of recent years that 

demonstrated both the need for CIP and the ability of DoD to address CIP challenges on a 

global scale. 

DoD has traditionally supplied the lion’s share of R&D support for CIP R&D almost 

exclusively in the area of Information Assurance. Total federal CIP R&D funding has been 

between $480-600M over the last few years, with defense providing typically about 80% of 

the total funding in this area. 

 

Recognizing the increasing reliance on information systems by other critical 

infrastructures and their potential susceptibility to attacks, DoD is engaged in a wide range of 

activities that focus on protection of computer networks. The rapid advances in information 

and communications technology mean that as the years pass, entirely new infrastructure 

interdependencies embodying new technologies will emerge, and each will be accompanied 

by its own set of new vulnerabilities. The protection of information networks will require 

continuous improvement, and vigorous, focused research. The increasing reliance on 

information and communications systems by other critical infrastructures requires new 

efforts in the science, technology, and development of information and network security to 

achieve the most secure information network system possible, and to maintain our current 

position within the digital landscape. 

The warfighting missions of the combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) span the 

globe and extend into space. With the draw down of overseas military force presence and the 

increasing dependence on outsourcing, DoD has increased its dependence on commercial and 

private infrastructures, many of which are neither U.S. owned nor controlled. The 

implications of the increasing interconnectivity and interdependence of commercial 
26

infrastructures and defense sector assets demand that the DoD take steps to understand the 

vulnerabilities of and threats to the critical infrastructures on which it depends for mission 

assurance. Research efforts are required to understand and characterize the fundamental 

interdependencies of the DoD critical assets and infrastructures in order to circumvent 

potential vulnerabilities that may exist. The potential cascading effects of attacks on or 

failures of individual critical infrastructures need to be known. DoD must ensure that 

national and international infrastructure dependencies do not adversely affect the military’s 

ability to fulfill its mission of national defense and global force projection as required by the 

National Security Strategy. 

INTERDEPENDENCIES 

Introduction 

The economy and national security of the United States are becoming increasingly 

dependent on a spectrum of U.S. and international infrastructures, which themselves are 

becoming increasingly interdependent. This trend has accelerated over the last ten years with 

the proliferation of information technology and concomitant infrastructures, and shows no 

signs of abating. And while the U.S. economy has long depended on several critical 

infrastructures, the coupling among them had historically been rather loose. 

In recent years, however, important technological, economic, and regulatory changes 

have dramatically altered the relationships among infrastructures. At the same time as the 

information technology revolution led to substantially more interconnected infrastructures 

with generally greater centralization of control, “just-in-time” business practices have 

reduced margins for error in infrastructure support. Deregulation and growth of competition 

in key infrastructures has eroded spare infrastructure capacity that served as a useful “shock 

absorber” in key infrastructures. Furthermore, the growth of mergers among infrastructure 

providers has led to further pressures to reduce spare infrastructure capacity as management 

has sought to wring “excess” costs out of merged companies to realize savings. Any one of 

these trends would be a cause for uneasiness. The collision of all four has no precedent in 

American economic history. While important steps have been taken in individual 

infrastructures, the issue of interdependent and cascading effects among infrastructures has 

received almost no attention. Accordingly, a greater understanding of the nature and 

implications of these infrastructure connections motivates this effort. 

What Are Interdependent Effects? 

Interdependent effects are the effects that occur when an infrastructure disruption 

spreads beyond itself to cause appreciable impact on other infrastructures, which in turn 

cause more effects on still other infrastructures. When an infrastructure suffers an outage, it 

is often possible to estimate the impact that outage has on the infrastructure’s ability to 
27

deliver the service it provides. These are the “directly dependent effects” of the outage. 

However, that outage may also diminish the ability of other infrastructures, through no 

malfunction of their own, to deliver the level of services that they normally provide. These 

indirect effects make up a first-order interdependent effect. 

Of course, the impact of the outage may not stop at these first-order effects. They 

may then go on to adversely affect still other critical infrastructure components, including 

even the infrastructure that was the original source of the problem, further aggravating the 

situation. These effects become second-order effects, which can propagate still further, 

causing still higher order effects. How far these effects propagate, and how serious they 

become, depend on how tightly coupled the infrastructure components are, how potent the 

effects are, and whether or not countermeasures such as spare capacity are in place. Either 

the outage effects will die out as they move further away from the base outage, limiting 

overall damage, or they will gather force in successively stronger waves of cascading effects 

until part or all of the infrastructure network breaks down. 

In the latter case, the loss of some key component creates a much broader failure out of all 

proportion with the original failure. Given the linkages among infrastructures, a cascading 

failure might cross infrastructure boundaries, as it did with the 1998 Galaxy IV satellite 

failure mentioned earlier. 

Major Efforts Underway

Several efforts are underway to try to tackle the difficult issues of interdependencies. 

These include efforts to learn about the secure operation of complex interactive 

networks/systems, and furthering the understanding of the dynamics of complex interactive 

networks/systems; technology development and vulnerability analysis capability R&D, 

aimed at analyzing national and defense infrastructures and their critical interdependencies; 

efforts to develop an easy-to-use, deployable state-of-the-art hazard and consequence 

prediction, digital databases, and a Geographic Information System (GIS), within a Graphical 

User Interface (GUI); collaborative work between the Disaster Research Center at the 

University of Delaware and the Research Center for Disaster Reduction Systems, a unit 

within the Disaster Prevention Research Institute at Kyoto University to better understand 

various aspects of damage caused by earthquakes; and interagency efforts to build upon a 

number of ongoing programs and laboratory testbed facilities 

Major Challenges in the Interdependencies Area

The major efforts underway, as well as those being investigated for the future, are 

designed to meet the following research challenges. 

• Build a theoretical framework for understanding and predicting the nature of 

interdependencies and their effects on the country as a whole. 

• Develop the capability to model and simulate in real time the behavior of the nation’s 

interconnected infrastructures by developing an architecture and related enabling 

technologies that can be used to integrate infrastructure-specific and interdependence 
28

databases and analysis tools to study the linkages among the interdependent critical 

infrastructures, the interdependencies associated with those linkages, their impacts, and 

their likely causes. 

• Develop a set of quantitative metrics for measuring the scale of impacts of 

interdependency-related disruptions. 

• Develop new technologies and techniques to contain, mitigate, and defend against the 

effects of interdependency-related disruptions, such as escalating, cascading, latent, and 

cross-infrastructure failures. 

• Develop capabilities to adequately and realistically test new methodologies, techniques, 

and technologies. 

• Define a set of tasks for further work on specific national security policy issues that could 

be analyzed using these tools and methodologies. This could include, for example, 

characterizing the potential interdependence implications, from national security and 

economic perspectives, of current trends within the private sector (e.g., restructuring, 

deregulation, increased reliance on cyber monitoring and control systems) and their 

implications for national security; identifying interdependency vulnerabilities in the U.S. 

economy; and developing metrics for interdependencies. 

• Develop the ability to characterize and incorporate new critical infrastructures into the 

models and methodologies as such infrastructures develop. 

Guiding Principles of Interdependencies Research and Development

The Interdependencies Subgroup, in developing its draft agenda for interdependencies 

R&D, developed a set of six guiding principle characteristics that it believes the R&D 

programs in this area should follow: 

• Focus on True Cross-Infrastructure Behavior. The research should address the effects 

from interactions among the different infrastructures and not be stove-piped on one 

infrastructure only. It may be necessary to focus on subsets of the entire set of 

infrastructures to make progress on interdependencies, but this should be only a waystation on the road to full interdependency analysis. At the same time, the focus should 

be on the interdependent behavior effects and impacts, and on measures to address these 

effects and impacts, and not the total behavior of the overall system of infrastructures. 

• Holistic Approach. The research program as a whole needs to examine the entirety of the 

interdependency issue, to include positive interdependencies during the recovery and 

reconstitution phases as well as the negative interdependencies during the deterioration 

phase. 

• Near- and Long-Term Focus. Individual research projects should have both near-term 

(3-5 years) and long-term (5+ years) relevance. At some point, it may be desirable to 
29

pursue research that is strictly long-term in nature, but given the need for near-term 

research and the modest levels of funding that are likely to be available, long-term-only 

research is a luxury that is unaffordable at the present time. 

• Enhanced Resiliency and Robustness. The research should have as a general goal the 

enhancement of the resiliency and robustness of the overall set of U.S. infrastructures. 

While the research objective of any specific project may be narrower than this, it should 

in some way contribute to this larger goal. 

• Vulnerability Orientation. The research should be oriented toward interdependency 

vulnerabilities, as opposed to studying interdependent effects that do not threaten the 

viability of the U.S. economy or national security. As earlier, at some point it may be 

desirable to pursue research that studies relatively benign interdependent effects, but 

given the need for near-term research and the modest levels of funding that are likely to 

be available, such research is a luxury that is unaffordable at the present time. 

• Consequence Orientation. The research should also be oriented toward interdependency 

consequences, as opposed to studying just the interdependent effects themselves. 

Research Issues

In planning for and conducting this research, there are several issues that will need to 

be addressed: 

• The level of dynamicity that is to be characterized in the architecture. Technology levels 

are dynamic over the long-term but relatively fixed in the short term. How technological 

change is characterized and the scale of “permitted” change will need to be addressed. 

Likewise, commodity costs and availability could be treated as either fixed or variable. 

Physical plant available could likewise be treated as either fixed or variable, depending 

both on the level of architecture sophistication and time scale desired. A similar situation 

exists for operating practices. 

• Standards for inter-model data exchange. Interdependency research will likely involve 

the combining of different sets of models, data bases, and related tools. While legacy 

components cannot be changed, new software and data, including that needed to integrate 

legacy inputs into an architecture, should be developed according to common standards. 

• Characterization of non-U.S. influences on U.S. infrastructures. The U.S. economy and 

its associated infrastructures are becoming increasingly global in nature. While the focus 

of the modeling and related efforts is on the United States, the rest of the world plays an 

important role in the functioning of U.S. infrastructures. How and to what extent these 

influences should be represented will need to be addressed. 
30

Conclusion

Interdependencies among critical infrastructures is what makes this set of problems 

significantly different than those we have faced in the past, and it is what makes them 

difficult. Great work is being done in government, the national labs, academia and private 

industry to build an understanding of these issues, and tools to solve these problems. Clear 

challenges lie ahead for government, industry and academia to work on together. 

In considering the interdependencies issue, the IWG noted the following factors: 

• The CIP R&D IWG in 1998, 1999, and 2000 has been unanimous in its support for 

greater government research in the interdependencies area. Based on three years of 

interaction with the private sector and academia, the IWG has continued to find virtually 

unanimous support in these sectors for more government research into the question of 

interdependencies among the major infrastructures of the U.S. economy. Of all the CIP 

research areas, the IWG review continues to find that the issue of interdependencies had 

received little attention relative to that which the individual infrastructures have received, 

though there is a broad awareness of the need for and importance of the 

interdependencies issue. The IWG also has found that there was a critical lack of 

research underway on this issue in government, the private sector, and academia. 

• The issue of interdependencies among critical infrastructures is a fundamental dimension 

of the critical infrastructure protection issue. Relative to the other infrastructure-specific 

concerns, interdependencies has been the least-studied and is probably the most in need 

of more comprehensive research. At the heart of this lack of attention to such a critical 

issue is the fact that unlike the individual infrastructures, there is no federal “Department 

of Interdependencies,” as there is a Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, 

etc. The agencies with the most relevant work in this area are the Departments of 

Energy, Defense, Transportation as well as the National Science Foundation. 
31

VII. DEVELOPING A FEDERAL R&D AGENDA 

Background and Methodology

While research and development is a broad term that covers activities from the most 

basic research through field R&D on deployed systems, the IWG has restricted its review to 

the following: 

• Basic Research. This is research that increases the fundamental knowledge necessary for 

developing infrastructure assurance technologies. 

• Applied Research. This is research that investigates the feasibility and practicality of 

proposed technological solutions. 

• Advanced Technology Development. This is research that includes efforts to develop 

technologies and test their feasibility, effectiveness, and interoperability. 

• Proof of Principle and Validation. This is research that evaluates the effectiveness of 

technologies in an infrastructure environment and assesses the performance, costeffectiveness, and practicality of the technology from the perspective of the 

infrastructure. 

Those familiar with R&D categories in the Department of Defense will recognize 

these categories as corresponding to 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, respectively. These are the 

categories that come before engineering and manufacturing development. 

The CIP R&D IWG adopted a straightforward approach to developing a federal 

government R&D agenda. After preliminary briefings on the nature of the problem, the IWG 

identified the major vulnerabilities of each sector, as well as the existing CIP R&D work and 

programs already funded by the federal government in each sector. The IWG then sketched 

out an ideal, fiscally unconstrained set of programs to address these vulnerabilities in each 

sector. The gaps between the ideal and what was currently being undertaken then formed the 

raw material from which to develop an R&D agenda for FY2000 and beyond. Program 

initiatives were defined by the sector subgroups, taken from the Critical Infrastructure 

Assurance Office (CIAO) R&D Roadmapping study (dated June 10, 1998), or added by the 

IWG as a whole. The initiatives represent either an expansion of existing efforts beyond 

what is currently planned, or an entirely new set of initiatives. While in general the 

initiatives described are at the program level, in a few cases the IWG has identified specific 

projects. 

“A Work-in-Progress” Comprehensive Federal CIP R&D Agenda

Given the dynamic nature of the technologies involved, any comprehensive set of 

programs that is presented as a complete agenda for addressing critical infrastructure 

protection is at best a snapshot in time. Any program set will need to be updated on an 
32

almost continuous basis. Accordingly, the IWG has assembled what it believes is a 

comprehensive but necessarily incomplete agenda of CIP R&D initiatives. 

Understanding the Agenda

A review of the extensive list of initiatives that the IWG identified illustrates the 

extent to which information technology has embedded itself in U.S. critical infrastructures. 

Of the initiatives that the IWG has identified as candidates for increased funding, less than 

one-third of these initiatives are not cyber-related. These represent less than 20% of the 

funding of the comprehensive agenda. 

In reviewing these sector initiatives, the IWG found that while there are many 

important R&D issues to be addressed, eight stand out as the highest priority R&D issues: 

• Establishment of an Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection 

• The education and training of research personnel in CIP R&D 

• Interdependency analyses 

• Threat, vulnerability and risk assessment studies 

• System protection and information assurance 

• Reconstitution of damaged or compromised systems 

• The security of automated infrastructure control systems 

• Intrusion detection and monitoring 

While some work has been done on the intrusion detection problem, this work has 

clearly not been sufficient to provide the level of detection needed. Thus it is included here, 

but ranked eighth because of the work already under way. The IWG also found that 

automated infrastructure control systems, especially SCADA systems, are important 

throughout the U.S. economy, and they appear especially vulnerable based on vulnerability 

work done to date. Accordingly, initiatives that address these two issues also merit priority 

attention. 

The IWG emphasizes that these are program proposals only for the federal 

government. Although the IWG has briefed these programs to several private sector 

organizations, and to some extent the programs reflect gaps that may exist in the private 

sector, these proposals do not directly address the R&D the private sector is conducting. The 

IWG made some attempts to identify private sector R&D programs but found great 

reluctance to reveal any but the most general descriptions of their work. The IWG will 

prepare a more comprehensive listing of current federal CIP R&D programs after the results 

of congressional action on the FY2001 budget and OMB’s final FY2002 budget data request 

are available. 

The IWG wishes to emphasize that the program proposals described herein represent 

only the opinion of the IWG and do not necessarily represent the views of any agency. These 

recommendations, and the funding options discussed later, are made only to facilitate 

discussion among agencies for determining further steps in CIP R&D activity. 
33

VIII. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CIP R&D 

Just as our critical infrastructures are inherently international, so too is the global 

science and technology base that will generate solutions to current and future infrastructure 

protection vulnerabilities. In general, the U.S. has no monopoly over the relevant 

technologies. Research and development in the field of information technology is a fully 

international enterprise today. In fact, it is even difficult to define a “domestic” science and 

technology base, given the substantial technical contributions made by foreign scientists and 

engineers within the U.S., by the overseas laboratories of U.S. companies, and by foreign or 

multinational firms with U.S. research facilities. 

Moreover, the technologies relevant to infrastructure protection are largely 

unclassified, having been developed in the commercial sector or academia rather than in 

government or its contractors. Therefore, unless a particular R&D project involves classified 

material or is identified by its sponsoring U.S. government agency as raising particular 

sensitivities, it serves the U.S. national interest to draw on the global science and technology 

base, and to have the project done by the most qualified technical experts, wherever they may 

be. Indeed, the U.S. has a history of pursuing international science and technology 

collaboration as a means of stretching development dollars, broadening and deepening the 

talent pool that can be brought to bear, and building an international constituency for U.S. 

views. Many of the international science and technology activities, now considered to be 

CIP-related, reflect longstanding and continuing, collaborative efforts of private industry, 

academia, and government to resolve emerging information technology issues. 

Appendix D of this document provides a Policy and Procedures Statement on 

International Research and Development Cooperation in Critical Infrastructure Protection. 

This Statement governs international cooperation on unclassified CIP R&D projects. 

The Department of State has undertaken a variety of activities in response to PDD-63 

including multilateral negotiations in the European Union (EU), Asia-Pacific Economic 

Cooperation forum (APEC), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 

(OECD), and other fora that addressed existing and emerging threats and vulnerabilities to 

our economic security. State has also led and coordinated bilateral negotiations and meetings 

with Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia aimed at identifying, developing and 

facilitating science and technology solutions for CIP. 

Multilateral Agenda

• EU. A United States and European Union (EU) Task Force on Critical Infrastructure 

Protection (CIP) Science and Technology was established in October 1998 to enhance the 

security of critical infrastructures by identifying, developing, and facilitating technology 

and policy solutions to existing and emerging threats and vulnerabilities. The US 

Department of State co-chairs this Task Force with a senior European Commission 

representative from the Directorate General for Information Society. Over the past year 

the Task Force has sponsored a series of workshops and conferences resulting in 

cooperative exchanges between U.S. technical agencies and EC research organizations; 
34

reciprocal exchange of information on cyber security research programs on an annual 

basis; coordinated research projects; visits and exchanges of scientists; and mutual 

exchanges of scientific and technological information. 

• APEC. Within the APEC forum the U.S. (Department of State) succeeded in establishing 

a dialog on critical infrastructure protection telecommunication issues. At the APEC 

Telecommunications 21 Working Group meeting in March 2000, the Department worked 

closely with the Business Facilitation Steering Group (BFSG) to address the relationship 

and importance of infrastructure protection to e-commerce in each of the economies 

represented. By working closely with other APEC economies, the Department was also 

able to get infrastructure protection added to the APEC Telecommunication Program of 

Action during the Fourth Ministerial Meeting, held in Cancun, Mexico, in 2000. The 

Department continued to expand the APEC agenda on infrastructure protection science 

and technology (S&T) issues and arranged for State sponsorship of a half-day workshop 

at TEL 22 in October 2000 to develop a forum and advance proposals to facilitate 

awareness and sharing of information on critical infrastructure S&T issues in the 

Asia-Pacific region. At the APEC Telecommunications 22 Working Group meeting, in 

October 2000, the US, Australia and Canada sponsored a proposal for the development of 

cyber security training modules at both undergraduate and graduate level, to be used by 

member economies to increase the level of information security awareness and ultimately 

the protection of critical infrastructure. In the APEC Industrial Science and Technology 

Working Group, the U.S. successfully laid the groundwork for introduction of CIP 

technology cooperation with the aim of identifying all relevant research and development 

in the Asia-Pacific region. 

• OECD. The U.S. initiated a discussion on cyber security issues within the Organization 

for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2000. At the last meeting of the 

OECD Working Party on Information Security and Privacy (WPISP), State sponsored a 

presentation highlighting global aspects associated with information security, the 

economy’s dependence on the internet, technical vulnerabilities of the internet, and 

possible solutions such as the concept of a center for analysis of global incidents, global 

intrusion detection and identification, research and development, and awareness raising 

through education and the media. This resulted in a discussion among economies and 

agreement for future work in this area. The U.S. was also successful in obtaining WPISP 

agreement in the Work Program for 2001-2002 to examine the present and future state of 

cyber security, including emerging threats and vulnerabilities. The U.S.’s efforts in 

subsequent meetings of the OECD have resulted in widespread agreement on the 

importance of cyber security and the role that OECD should take in progressing work in 

this area including an early review of security guidelines. 

Bilateral Agenda

• Canada. The U.S. and representatives from the Canadian Government discussed CIP 

cooperative efforts at the national and departmental/agency levels, and in international 

fora at a bilateral meeting in September 2000. They agreed to establish a CIP R&D 

Working Group to take stock of current efforts and to identify potential synergies, and a 
35

short list of area of further cooperation/joint action. There was also interest expressed in 

the idea of developing an International Center for Analysis of Global Incidents. 

• UK. The U.S. met with representatives from the UK Information Assurance Advisory 

Council (IAAC) to discuss critical infrastructure protection science and technology issues 

and to exchange information on respective national and international policies on 

information assurance. The IAAC, whose membership includes the Cabinet Office, 

CESG, private industry and academia, has created five working groups to address CIP 

issues: Threat Assessment & Attack Warning, Risk Assessment & Critical Dependencies, 

Standards, R&D, Education and Outreach. The IAAC stressed the importance of industry 

involvement in addressing the increasing volume of attacks on infrastructure and 

expressed a desire to work cooperatively with US information sharing and analysis 

centers. 

• Australia. The U.S. (Department of State) met on several occasions with Australian 

counterparts throughout 2000 to coordinate strategy for promoting both science and 

technology research and policy. Australia chairs the Working Party on Information 

Security and Privacy at OECD and in APEC they chair both the Business Facilitation 

Steering Group and the E-Security Task Force Group. Each of these forums are 

extremely important to U.S. outreach efforts. At present the Australian government only 

focuses on the information infrastructures and relies on existing arrangements to cover 

physical attacks on critical infrastructures. However, apart from this distinction between 

physical and information infrastructures, there is similarity between U.S. and Australian 

infrastructures and economic security interests. The Australian government has agreed to 

conduct a survey of all ongoing CIP R&D and meetings have already been scheduled 

over the next year to discuss areas for possible joint projects. 

Conclusion

The globalization of technology is a dominant force shaping today’s world economy. 

In fact, calls for a more vigorous federal technology policy stem in large part from the 

recognition of this shift in the geographic distribution of the world’s technological 

capabilities. What is not always noted, however, is that the very process of globalization 

calls into question the notion that technologies, industries, or even corporations have 

distinctive nationalities. It is impossible for any country to achieve its national science and 

technology objectives in isolation from other countries. Increasingly, the development of 

many high-payoff technologies is a high-risk, and costly venture, which exceeds the capacity 

and capabilities of individual firms, and even of countries. International S&T relations have 

become an integral part of overall U.S. foreign policy and play a vital role in meeting the 

challenges of infrastructure protection. 
36

IX. THE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES OF AN INFORMATIONINTENSIVE FUTURE 

There are a vast number of management challenges confronting government and 

society as a whole in the years immediately ahead that the advance of information technology 

and the growing interconnectedness of our critical infrastructures present us. Even within the 

R&D field, the number and magnitude is daunting. The first two presented below are the 

ones that the IWG believes are most important, followed by a number of others that also 

deserve serious attention. 

Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection

Of the five broad classes of critical infrastructures, the one that will probably be the 

most powerful and pervasive in the years ahead, and the one most susceptible to widespread 

outages, will be our information and communications infrastructure. U.S. security, 

prosperity, and well-being will be highly dependent on this information infrastructure. The 

United States must therefore be able to assure its robust, reliable, and continuous operation. 

The federal government and the private sector are now making substantial investments in 

cyber security technologies, yet neither the private nor public sectors are adequately 

exploring the fundamental principles that underlie complex, interconnected infrastructures, or 

developing key technologies or analytic methodologies crucial to protecting the information 

infrastructure. 

The rapid – indeed, explosive – pace of technology change presents its own R&D 

management challenges. Commercial product cycles can be as short as three or four months, 

whereas government budget cycles span two to three years. It is difficult for the government 

to anticipate – years in advance – the technologies needed to mitigate future information 

infrastructure vulnerabilities and reduce future threats. Conventional government technology 

acquisition processes, which often require months to years to execute major procurements, 

may not be flexible or nimble enough to address the pressing – and rapidly evolving – 

technology requirements to ensure the security of our information infrastructure. Finally, the 

government’s time cycle for hiring (and firing) and providing incentives for employees is 

incompatible with everyday practices in the global information-based human resource 

marketplace. 

Given these conditions, the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and 

Technology (PCAST) recommended the establishment of a non-governmental Institute for 

Information Infrastructure Protection (IIIP). In response to this recommendation, the Clinton 

Administration proposed $50 million for such an Institute through the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology (NIST) in its proposed FY2001 budget. Unfortunately, Congress 

did not fund this effort during 2000. Instead, Congress took three much more limited actions. 

The first was Section 8140 of the FY 2001 Defense Appropriations Bill, which permitted – 

but did not require – DoD to provide $5 million to establish an “Institute for Defense 

Computer Security and Information Protection of the Department of Defense.” The second 

was in HR 4577, which provides $5 million to NIST for CIP R&D grants, while the third was 

the provision of $3 million in construction funds to create an Institute for Information 
37

Infrastructure Protection at the Institute of Security Technology Studies (ISTS) at Dartmouth 

University in New Hampshire. Notwithstanding the name, this Institute does not necessarily 

share the features of the Administration’s proposal for an IIIP. 

The original OSTP White Paper describing the Institute for Information Infrastructure 

Protection concept, written with input from PCAST members, industry and academia is 

included at Appendix E. 

Addressing the Shortage of CIP R&D Personnel

For over two years, the IWG has heard repeated stories of the shortage of trained 

R&D personnel available to do research in this area. The lure of high salaries in the private 

sector are enough to make fewer 4-year college graduates interested in pursuing advanced 

degrees that would better enable them to conduct such research. In 1999, the Committee on 

National Security, co-chaired by OSD and OSTP, called for a study of this problem. This 

section reports on this study and examines options for increasing the number of people both 

graduating with advanced degrees and teaching and performing basic research in the field of 

information security/assurance and critical infrastructure protection (ISA/CIP). 

Background 

The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) has examined possible 

solutions to the problem of insufficient numbers of researchers and professors in ISA/CIP. 

What follows is the view from the field – the input from experts in different fields concerned 

with ISA/CIP. It reflects these experts’ ideas and seeks to generate discussion and policy. It 

is not a statement of U.S. Government policy. 

The explosion in the U.S. information technology (IT) sector and the corresponding 

increase in demand for Information Security (IS) specialists within the past decade has 

caused a severe shortage in the number of academic professionals who are teaching and 

performing basic research in this field. According to the Marsh Commission report, Critical 

Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructure, “There is a significant deficiency in the 

number of university faculty members equipped to teach information and computer 

security.”4

 Dr. Corey Schou of Idaho State University has stated, “Evidence suggests that 

job growth in information technology fields now exceeds the production of talent. Between 

1994 and 2005, more than a million new computer scientists and engineers, systems analysts, 

and computer programmers will be required in the United States — an average of 95,000 per 

year.”5

 Additionally, graduate and doctoral students in information security are being 

recruited out of their academic programs and into the private sector, depriving academia of 

future professors and researchers. Consequently, there are not enough professors currently 

teaching and performing basic research in information security, nor will there be enough 

future professors to maintain this current number. 

 

4

 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s 

Infrastructures (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997), 70. 5

 Corey Schou, “Meeting the Information Assurance Crisis-Now,” EDP Audit and Control Systems Journal, 

January 2001. 
38

According to The Supply of Information Technology Workers in the United States, 

“doctoral programs are critical in the production of trained workers for both the occupations 

involving conceptualization and advanced development, and for faculty positions that will 

educate the next generation of IT workers.”6 Additionally, “advanced researchers, such as 

faculty members in research universities or principal scientists in industrial research 

laboratories, almost always have a doctorate in an IT-related discipline, usually computer 

science or computer engineering (or occasionally in a closely related field such as physics, 

mathematics, or electrical engineering).” Doctoral level programs and researchers are 

essential to maintaining the critical U.S. lead in information technology, by supporting and 

conducting basic research and supporting students coming into the field. 

ISA/CIP, as a sub-field of information technology, has gained importance in the past 

few years, as the private-sector has become more reliant on secure information systems. 

Consequently, private-sector demand for IS specialists has increased. However, there are 

only a few academic programs dedicated to advance research in this field, in turn meaning 

that there is a limited pool of qualified IS specialists.7

 The demand on the part of the private 

sector for this limited pool means that it is extremely difficult for dedicated academic 

programs to recruit IS-qualified instructors and researchers. 

According to various sources, private-sector salaries and incentives are proving 

extremely attractive to IS doctoral students.8 This has led to a further problem, the 

recruitment by private industry of IS doctoral students from their academic programs.9

Referred to as a “seed-corn” problem, this means that not only is there a current shortage of 

educators in the field, but there will be an ongoing shortage into the future as long as there is 

a low number of doctoral students moving into academia. 

A final problem is the emphasis of applied, short-term research over basic, long-term 

research. According to the President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee 

(PITAC), “during the past decade both industry and Government have altered the balance 

between basic research and the later stages of technology development and 

commercialization,” leading to “a serious decline in basic research activities.” 10 As basic 

research is critically important to long-term scientific advances, this decline threatens the 

current U.S. lead in secure information systems. 

Although market forces will gradually increase the number of people going into this 

field, they will not solve the problem. The focus of private-sector research is on applied 

 

6

 Peter Freeman and William Aspray, The Supply of Information Technology Workers in the United States

(Washington, D.C.: Computing Research Association , 1999), 71. 

7

 According to the National Security Agency, fourteen academic institutions have been labeled as “Centers of 

Excellence” in the teaching of information security (Vic Maconachy, National Security Agency, Interview, July 

6, 2000). However, this estimate has proved controversial, with some sources stating that there are as few as 

five academic programs that are focused directly on information security (Gene Spafford, Purdue University, 

Interview, July 24, 2000). 

8

 Various interviews with respondents. 

9

 Freedman and Aspray, 117. 

10 President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee, Information Technology Research: Investing in 

our Future, 22. 
39

research that emphasizes getting products to the market. According to the PITAC, 

“American businesses, in an ever-shrinking and more highly competitive world, have 

devoted less and less of their precious resources to long-term R&D, directing their efforts 

instead to reducing costs and getting new products in the pipeline today at the expense of the 

future.”11 Neither is the private-sector focused on security issues that do not directly 

translate into marketable products and services or avoided costs. Accordingly, the influence 

of the private-sector will not directly increase the number of researchers and educators in the 

IS field. 

In summary, there are not enough information security/critical infrastructure 

protection (ISA/CIP) experts currently teaching and performing basic research to meet the 

current demand; there are not enough doctoral students currently specializing in information 

security and intending to pursue academic careers to meet future demand; short-term applied 

research is being emphasized over long-term basic research; and industry-efforts alone will 

not solve these problems. 

Summary of ISA/CIP Education Recommendations: The CIP IWG, under the leadership of 

OSTP and in cooperation with other federal efforts in the area of information technology 

research and education, set out to develop a list of recommendations designed to provide a 

solution to the shortage in ISA/CIP researchers and educators. Various members of 

academia, the private-sector, and government were interviewed to determine options for 

solving this problem. A brief summary of their recommendations includes the issues 

presented below. Details will need to be worked out, but any program developed should 

reflect their recommendations, which are briefly presented below: 

• Support for ISA/CIP Education and Basic Research 

• Support for Students Concentrating on ISA/CIP 

• Support for Faculty Early Career-Development in ISA/CIP 

• Support for Faculty Teaching and Research in ISA/CIP 

• Support for Faculty Development in a New Area 

• Support for Industry and Government Partnerships with Academia in 

Developing/Expanding ISA/CIP Education 

• Support for IS Programs 

• Consider New Business Models for CIP Education Programs, especially at the Graduate 

Level 

 

11 Ibid., 79. 
40

Other Management Challenges

The characteristics of the proposed R&D program, coupled with the sheer size and 

significance of the critical infrastructure assurance problem, virtually mandate new and 

innovative management concepts and structures to carry out the federal government’s CIP 

R&D agenda. This gives rise to a number of management challenges that OSTP and the 

larger IWG process must address on an ongoing basis. Some of these are highlighted below. 

• Relations with the Private Sector. While the government will fund a significant portion 

of the research, the private sector will probably perform the bulk of the developmental 

work. Market forces will drive this development and direct it toward products that have a 

market. Coordinating federal R&D with ongoing private sector programs will be 

complicated by industry’s desire to guard proprietary programs and trade secrets. 

Performing the right research at the right time, synchronizing government programs 

appropriately with those in industry, and ensuring timely transfer of governmentdeveloped technologies to industry will require close coordination and partnership with 

the private sector. 

• Coordination of Federal Efforts. The government CIP R&D agenda by its very nature 

cuts across a large number of federal departments and agencies. Ensuring proper 

coordination of individual R&D programs within agencies, let alone across agency 

boundaries, is an important task for the IWG to address. Likewise, the IWG should 

ensure that technologies are rapidly transferred among the agencies, and out to the private 

sector. In its activities to date, the IWG has already observed cases in which agencies 

had specific R&D needs yet were unaware that such programs were ongoing elsewhere 

within the federal government. In addition, a variety of federal government working 

groups manage related programs, such as the Technical Support Working Group12 and 

the Weapons of Mass Destruction Protection IWG.13 It will be crucial to ensure proper 

coordination and communications among such groups. The crosscutting nature of critical 

infrastructure protection R&D budgets further complicates program management and 

demonstrates the need for innovative, new approaches. 

• Emergency Law Enforcement Sector (ELES). The proliferation of e-mail, the internet, 

and other cyber activity has placed demands on our law enforcement and national 

 

12 The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), which conducts the national interagency R&D and rapid 

prototyping program for combating terrorism, contributed $4.5 million to research and development in support 

of CIP during Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000. TSWG projects supporting CIP requirements included development 

of an electric power infrastructure database and analysis tool, characterization of the effects of Radio Frequency 

Weapons on infrastructure systems, development of the water pipeline database and analysis tool referred to in 

the VHS section, development in cooperation with the natural gas industry of an encryption algorithm for 

pipeline SCADA systems, the ongoing development of improved computer forensic tools for use by law 

enforcement, and development of improved physical protection and blast mitigation capabilities that could be 

used to protect critical infrastructure facilities. TSWG is also exploring collaborative CIP research and 

development programs with our allies through its International Program. 

13 The WMDP is a parallel effort to the CIP effort. It, too, falls under the policy auspices of the National 

Coordinator for Security, Critical Infrastructure and Counterterrorism, and the OMB National Security 

Crosscut. 
41

security processes, straining our traditional legal structures and challenges our accepted 

thinking on the interplay between law enforcement and national security. Continued Law 

Enforcement R&D on the legal and forensic implications of emerging technologies 

would help reduce unrecognized vulnerabilities and dependencies and ensure new and 

innovative investigative techniques. These steps would also ensure that the right tools 

and methodologies are available at the time of attack. This would mean that we do not 

simply investigate and respond to attacks after they occur, but we try to learn about them 

and prevent them beforehand. In addition, better methods of accountability tracing could 

allow us to find the perpetrators of cyber crime while fully protecting the rights of others. 

In the course of 2000, the IWG became more aware of the challenges that CIP issues 

pose in the law enforcement realm, along with the potential of CIP R&D to deal with 

these challenges. Accordingly, the IWG plans to address these issues in 2001 and to 

make R&D recommendations to the CICG and NSTC. 

• Keeping Abreast of the Technology. The technology, vulnerabilities, and threats to U.S. 

critical infrastructures are evolving extremely rapidly, such that it will quickly outpace 

the traditional lengthy budgetary process. This year’s technological fix to a vulnerability 

could be obsolete within a few years, if not months. Entirely new systems could evolve 

in this time period, with their own vulnerabilities. Indeed, members of the Defense 

Science Board’s 2000 Task Force on Defensive Information Operations have noted that 

as good as the 1996 DSB recommendations were, they already were out of date just four 

years later. Given the three-year nature of the government budget cycle (one year to 

develop the budget, one year to pass agency funding bills in Congress, and one year to 

begin to execute the programs), the rapid pace of technological innovation in critical 

infrastructures will stress any system put in place to develop and coordinate a 

government-wide R&D program. The federal R&D agenda should have the flexibility to 

deal with rapid changes in technologies and threats. 

• Interaction with State and Local Government. The federal R&D program should be 

coordinated with state and local governments. In particular, the needs of “first 

responders” to emergencies and other assistance providers will determine many of the 

research directions in the vital human services sector. Factoring these needs into the 

federal R&D agenda is a step that can only be done through innovative management and 

partnership with the state and local levels. 

• Managing a Large Program. The sheer magnitude of the program alone will require 

close attention, coordination, and dedicated management. Given the estimated FY2001 

program resources (in excess of $600 million), the federal CIP R&D program could 

easily exceed $1 billion annually before long if future budgets place greater emphasis on 

this issue. These factors demonstrate the need for innovative management concepts and 

structures in order to effectively develop and administer a successful R&D agenda. 

• Data Sharing. A general problem that every infrastructure faces is how to encourage the 

sharing of vulnerability and incident information in a way that does not deter companies 

from doing so and that does run afoul of anti-trust concerns, competitive concerns, and 
42

other issues. Cooperation would in theory help everyone involved, but there are clear 

risks involved in cooperation that to date have been major obstacles. 
43

X. UPDATING THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

R&D AGENDA 

The IWG has identified the following thirteen tasks that will need to be performed on 

an annual basis to keep the R&D agenda current and to ensure that the federal government 

remains abreast of current technology in infrastructure protection: 

1. Identify and update threats to and vulnerabilities in the nation’s critical 

infrastructures that are amenable to technological solutions. 

2. Identify and maintain a database of ongoing and proposed federal government 

CIP R&D programs and known private sector, academic, and international 

programs. 

3. Develop and update a comprehensive, conceptual agenda of R&D programs 

required to address known and emerging infrastructure vulnerabilities. 

4. Identify and update gaps and shortfalls in the existing programs based upon the 

comprehensive program and vulnerabilities. Develop an appropriate set of 

criteria for judging the priorities for federal government action. 

5. Work in close conjunction with relevant department and agency personnel and 

sector liaison officials and recommend R&D areas for increased focus and 

resources. Identify budget requirements needed to fulfill the recommendations of 

the CIP R&D agenda. Coordinate this activity closely with Administration annual 

budget cycles. 

6. Provide a forum and develop proposals to facilitate collaboration and the sharing 

of information on ongoing and planned CIP R&D programs among government 

agencies. 

7. Develop and maintain means to harmonize federal CIP R&D with other existing 

federal R&D programs with which there may be overlaps or similar interests 

(such as those related to weapons of mass destruction, high performance 

computing, and force protection). Coordinate with other interagency forums and 

working groups (such as the Technical Support Working Group [TSWG], high 

performance computing, etc.) as appropriate. 

8. Develop and maintain means to harmonize federal CIP R&D with programs in the 

private sector, state and local governments, academia, and the international 

community. 

9. Develop proposals to facilitate technology transfer among government agencies 

and between the government and the private sector. 
44

10. Establish and utilize a review group of outside industry and academic experts in 

critical infrastructure protection R&D disciplines to review existing and proposed 

programs. 

11. Propose mechanisms to encourage and provide the environment to foster a 

partnership among the government, private sector, and academia for CIP R&D. 

12. Develop an maintain means to coordinate public outreach on R&D issues. 

13. Monitor foreign program and policy developments that may affect the direction or 

effectiveness of the federal program, and address possible relevant international 

cooperation. 

The IWG should perform the first nine steps between January and May of each year. 

In June, the IWG should transmit an updated R&D agenda to the NSTC and the CICG for 

their review and use, which will allow the agencies and OMB sufficient time for the updated 

agenda to be integrated into the budget process. 

In the period of July through November, the IWG should monitor the process of 

developing agency budgets. Synchronizing with agencies should help improve agency 

support for the agenda and avoid program disruption during the summer/fall period.

Oversight of Existing Programs

This will be an ongoing process, involving the monitoring of ongoing programs and 

new starts. The IWG will initiate a three-step oversight program to coordinate current 

programs, monitor their implementation, and assess their effectiveness against simulated or 

actual infrastructure outage events: 

1. Coordination of current programs

• Work closely with other IWGs (such as Weapons of Mass Destruction and 

Information Technology) – invite members of these IWGs as observers of the 

CIP R&D IWG. 

• Share/coordinate program information with other IWGs as appropriate. 

2. Implementation monitoring

• Maintain/update the database on a continuing basis. 

• Coordinate with agency program shops. 

• Recognize that status of program implementation may influence next FY 

agenda. 

3. Infrastructure outage events

• Coordinate with intelligence community on evolving threats. 

• Monitor actual attacks and draw lessons from these attacks for CIP R&D, and 

determine technological fixes if applicable. 
45

• Use these inputs in developing future agendas – crash programs if necessary 

(e.g., a new, significant vulnerability appears that requires immediate 

attention). 

Outreach

Outreach to the private sector, academia, and other countries will be an ongoing 

process throughout each year. However, the IWG will emphasize outreach during the 

October – February period. The IWG will work closely with sector coordinators and sector 

liaison officials from each sector and agency in conducting its outreach efforts. 

The IWG has held a number of workshops on CIP R&D over the last two years. 

Topics discussed include interdependencies, information assurance, and others. IWG 

members have also participated in a number of workshops and conferences on CIP R&D 

sponsored by industry associations, universities, government labs, and others. The IWG will 

also deepen its contacts with industrial associations (e.g., IEEE, computer security 

associations, etc.) and advisory committees such as NSTAC, PITAC, and others.

IWG Organization

At present, the IWG plans to maintain its current structure of six subgroups, 

organized around the five major infrastructures, plus interdependencies. 
46

XI. OBSERVATIONS 

 Based on the three years' work of the R&D IWG to date, the IWG has made a number 

of observations on CIP R&D and the interagency budget and program process that may be 

useful to the Bush Administration. 

• The IWG is prepared to address FY2002 budget issues in CIP R&D. The issue of 21st

century threats is a daunting one, especially cyber attacks and other attacks directed at the 

critical infrastructures that underpin the U.S. economy. R&D, as well as effective 

management, will be key to the 21st century solutions to these problems. 

• Determining the appropriate level of increased funding for CIP R&D will need to take 

into account existing budgeted activities and proposals for increases from the other CICG 

groups. In addition, it will need to be considered in the context of other new budget 

initiatives such as weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism, and information 

technology. 

• Opportunities for individual programs to respond to this IWG’s recommendations and 

those of other groups should be grasped to maximize the benefits for given levels of 

spending. 

• Important R&D needs will be foregone at FY2002 funding levels below the FY2001 

baseline. 

• Shortages of R&D professionals in disciplines relevant to CIP R&D could constrain our 

ability to execute a major increase in CIP R&D funding, not to mention our ability to 

provide IT professionals. 

• There is a potential problem in ensuring that our academic institutions will be able to 

conduct the basic research needed in this area and to train the numbers of scientists and 

engineers needed for critical infrastructure protection, in no small part due to the 

appealing opportunities in the private sector. Steps such as outlined above, as well as 

others, will be needed to address this problem. 

• The IWG believes this report’s CIP research agenda will need continuing review and 

revision in the years ahead because of the dynamic nature of the technological 

environment it seeks to harness. The IWG also should monitor the research underway to 

ensure that the objectives for the research are being met. 

• The extent to which agencies have experience in CIP R&D management will affect the 

pace at which they can ramp up their efforts on the programs identified in this agenda. 

The wide variation in CIP R&D management experience across different agencies 

underscores the importance of coordinated R&D oversight and innovative management 

solutions for addressing the CIP R&D agenda. 
47

• Critical infrastructure protection presents one of the most demanding federal management 

challenges of the post-Cold War era. The pace of technological change in information 

technology and microelectronics ensures that the technological landscape of 

infrastructures and infrastructure protection will likely transform itself much faster than 

in the Cold War, for many years to come. The two-edged sword nature of this rapid pace 

of change will mean that the benefits from these changes will be accompanied by new 

avenues for hostile and non-hostile disruption. 

• Any R&D process to manage our response to these new challenges should be sufficiently 

flexible and nimble enough to keep pace with this revolutionary environment. 
48

XII. RECOMMENDATIONS 

• The IWG believes that a proper balance between fiscal restraints and responsiveness to 

the threats to the nation’s critical infrastructures calls greater levels of funding in the 

future over current FY2001 levels of CIP R&D. Either of the funding options presented 

in this report would be an important step forward. 

• Existing and planned CIP R&D activities need to be coordinated with other technology 

initiatives to preclude overlap and promote synergy among these initiatives. 

• The new Administration should explore options for R&D management models 

embodying the flexibility and nimbleness needed to ensure that the CIP R&D process can 

keep pace with the revolutionary technology environment for critical infrastructure 

protection in the years ahead. Following the PCAST recommendation, an “Institute for 

Information Infrastructure Protection,” or something like it, should be established. 

• The new Administration should receive a briefing in the very near future from the 

Intelligence Community on the nature of the critical infrastructure threat to the U.S. and 

its allies 

• A program to strengthen university training and research in disciplines that support CIP 

R&D should be proposed in the FY2002 or FY2003 budget cycle. 
49

APPENDIX A 

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms 

Advanced Technology Development – research that includes efforts to develop 

technologies and test their feasibility, effectiveness, and interoperability. Cooresponds to the 

Department of Defense 6.3 research category. 

Applied Research – research that investigates the feasibility and practicality of proposed 

technological solutions. Cooresponds to the Department of Defense 6.2 research category.

Basic Research – research that increases the fundamental knowledge necessary for 

developing infrastructure assurance technologies. Cooresponds to the Department of 

Defense 6.1 research category. 

CIAO – Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 

CICG – Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group 

CIP – critical infrastructure protection 

CIP R&D IWG – Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D Interagency Working Group 

CNS – Committee on National Security 

Critical Infrastructure – those infrastructures that are so vital that their incapacity or 

destruction would have a debilitating impact on our defense and economic security. 

CT – Committee on Technology 

GPS – global positioning system 

I&C – Information and Communications infrastructure

Infrastructure - a network of independent, mostly privately-owned, man-made systems and 

processes that function collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a 

continuous flow of essential goods and services. 

IWG – interagency working group 

LNG – liquified natural gas 

NSC – National Security Council 

NSTAC – National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee 

NSTC – National Science and Technology Council 

OMB – Office of Management and Budget 

OSTP – Office of Science and Technology Policy 

PCCIP – President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 

Proof of Principal and Validation – research that evaluates the effectiveness of 

technologies in an infrastructure environment and assesses the performance, cost-
50

effectiveness, and practicality of the technology from the perspective of the infrastructure. 

Cooresponds to the Department of Defense 6.4 research category. 

PTN – public telephone network 

R&D – research and development 

SCADA – supervisory control and data acquisition system. A computerized control system 

that automates many infrastructures such as oil and gas pipelines, electrical grids, etc. 
51

APPENDIX B 

CIP R&D IWG in the 

S&T Structure of the Executive Branch

National 

Security 

Council

National 

S&T 

Council

Critical 

Infrastructure 

Coordination 

Group

Committee 

on 

Technology

Committee 

on 

National 

Security

CIP R&D 

 IWG
52

APPENDIX C 

CIP R&D IWG Agency POC Roster

Brigham Edward DOT 202-366-4434

Clark Bill HHS 301-443-9464 

202-619-0193

Clark Steve EPA 202-260-7159

Coyne A. Heather OMB 202-395-4545

Edwards Betsy NASA 202-358-4639

Gergely Curt TSWG/NSR 202-462-7161

Greene Jim FEMA 202-646-4302

Hagerling Don Treasury 202-622-2780

Kelly Terry OSTP 202-456-6057

King Steven DOD/ODUSD(S&T) 703-588-7414

LeBlanc Mark E. State 202-647-3517

Potter Marshall FAA 202-267-9828

Rosenthal Robert DOC/NIST 301-975-3603

Scalingi Paula DOE/OCIP 202-586-0588

Wright Robert NIPC 
53

APPENDIX D 

Policy and Procedures Statement on 

International Research and Development Cooperation in 

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Introduction 

Research and development (R&D) plays a key role in addressing the challenges posed by the 

Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) issue. The rapid evolution of technology, particularly 

in the information and communications sector, requires robust public and private CIP R&D 

programs to keep pace. International cooperation is an important component of an overall 

strategy to help meet this challenge. On one hand, such cooperation: 

• Provides a way to make our R&D dollars go further. 

• Brings a larger number of minds to bear on technical problems. 

• Recognizes that U.S. infrastructures are becoming increasingly interconnected and 

interdependent with those of other countries. 

• Helps to build an international constituency for the issue. 

On the other hand, if not carefully managed, cooperative R&D in some technical areas could 

inadvertently reveal U.S. infrastructure vulnerabilities to potentially hostile parties. Once 

revealed, those parties could exploit this information to our detriment. Inappropriate R&D 

collaboration could also place the United States in a position where it is dependent upon 

foreign organizations for development of vital technologies, and cause other adverse effects 

as well. To counter such risks, this R&D policy establishes a mechanism to coordinate and 

monitor international cooperation with U.S. government-sponsored CIP R&D, and provides 

guidelines for program managers and review groups to use in making decisions on the 

suitability of R&D programs for international cooperation. 

Background 

Presidential Decision Directive 63 states in Section V that "the Federal Government shall 

encourage international cooperation to help manage this increasingly global problem." 

Section VIII of PDD-63 states that "there shall be a plan to' expand cooperation on critical 

infrastructure protection with like-minded and friendly nations, international organizations, 

and multinational corporations:" In Annex B of PDD-63, the National Coordinator for CIP is 

tasked to commission a study, inter alia, of the implications of sharing information with 

foreign entities. 

 
54

General Procedures for International Research and Development Cooperation 

The CIP R&D Interagency Working Group (IWG) will review proposals for international 

collaboration that federal agencies seek to initiate in CIP R&D programs. Upon receipt of a 

proposal, the IWG shall circulate it among its member agencies. Any international R&D 

cooperation that may have existed prior to the effective date of this policy. and procedures 

statement need not be reviewed. For cooperative agreements in which agencies or 

departments have statutory authority, the CIP guidelines on international cooperation shall be 

incorporated into the policy documents on international cooperation of the respective agency 

or department. The review of critical infrastructure protection issues shall be conducted 

within the normal review process for these agreements. The record of this review will be 

provided to the CIP R&D IWG. 

In preparing proposals for international collaboration in CIP R&D, federal agencies shall 

ensure that the proposals meet guidance contained in this policy and procedures statement. 

Federal agencies shall also be governed by provisions and guidance contained in Presidential 

Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) on Critical Infrastructure Protection and guidance from the 

Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG). 

In addition, agencies should: 

• Follow future R&D cooperation guidelines issued by the CIP R&D IWG to cover 

specific situations. 

• Evaluate and be prepared to address the cumulative effect of international R&D 

cooperation with foreign entities in the area they propose for cooperation. 

• Maintain a permanent, retrievable record of all decisions concerning international CIP 

R&D cooperation with foreign entities including a description of the cooperation. 

• Proposals for international cooperation in CIP R&D should: 

• Serve a specific U.S. national purpose. 

• Be driven by analyses of the benefits to the U.S. from the R&D collaboration against the 

risks to U.S. technology leads and security of information sharing. 

• Support the mission of the overall U.S. CIP R&D program. 

Agencies should recognize that R&D proposals will not be approved which involve: 

• The release or disclosure of information that would be contrary to U.S. law or to 

agreements or treaties between the U.S. and foreign nations. 
55

• Information that reveals the existence of specific collection, counterintelligence, or 

special activities such as information operations capabilities that are not publicly 

known14. 

• R&D the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to jeopardize ongoing U.S. 

diplomatic, military, or law enforcement activities. 

• R&D on specific U.S. vulnerabilities that are not publicly known15. 

Oversight and Record-keeping Provisions 

As noted, Federal agencies should maintain a permanent, retrievable record of all 

international CIP R&D cooperation including a description of the decisions concerning such 

cooperation. Additionally, this record will identify essential information including the parties 

involved; the sectors) for cooperative activity; the CIP R&D topic areas) to which the 

cooperation applies; the type of research (basic, applied, advanced technology development, 

or demonstration and validation); description of R&D cooperation; expected research 

products) and, estimated funding by each party by fiscal year. This information should be 

kept current and a copy provided to the Chair, CIP R&D IWG. 

 

14 May be approved on a case-by-case basis, subject to appropriate controls

15 May be approved on a case-by-case basis, subject to appropriate controls.
56

APPENDIX E 

White Paper 

on the 

Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection 

July 11, 2000 

Information technologies have revolutionized virtually every aspect of life during the past 

decade, affecting our Nation in ways as diverse as how business is transacted, to how our 

government functions, to the manner in which the military responds to crises. Importantly, 

every critical infrastructure upon which our security, our economy, and our way life depend 

is linked to or reliant upon the information infrastructure. The United States must therefore 

be able to assure the robust, reliable, and continuous operation of the national information 

infrastructure. 

Our nation’s information infrastructure is a tightly coupled, highly complex, highly nonlinear 

system – and our current understanding of its robustness, resilience, and behaviors is 

rudimentary at best. New features and software are continually being developed and 

deployed on this complex system, without understanding their potential interactions or 

unintended operating characteristics. The susceptibility of the information infrastructure to 

cascading failures, the network architectures or operating conditions that would foster such 

breakdowns, and the theoretical basis for understanding and analyzing the infrastructure’s 

operation are not well known. System architectures that would improve survivability, allow 

graceful degradations under stress, and ease reconstitution following failures – whether due 

to attacks, natural disasters, or human error – could dramatically improve the robustness, 

resilience, and security of the infrastructure. 

The federal government and the private sector are now making substantial investments in 

cyber security technologies. However, neither the private nor public sectors are adequately 

elucidating the fundamental principles that underlie complex, interconnected infrastructures, 

or developing key technologies or analytic methodologies crucial to protecting the 

information infrastructure. Despite the fact that it owns and operates the vast majority of the 

information infrastructure, the private sector will not invest in security-related technologies if 

those technologies are too long-term, too high risk, too easily adopted by competitors, or 

otherwise unlikely to generate returns that can be captured by an investor. Such technologies 

are “public goods” – their development and adoption would benefit the nation as a whole, but 

they would not benefit any single firm enough for that firm to shoulder their investment cost. 

Therefore, government becomes the only realistic underwriter to ensure that these 

technologies are developed – a need that extends beyond funding, since these technologies 

will serve no useful purpose if they are not adopted and deployed. Just as our government 

defends the nation’s highways, airways and sea lines of communications, so too must it play 

a leadership role in defending the nation’s information and communications highways. 
57

The obligation to ensure that these technologies are placed into operational practice 

differentiates infrastructure protection R&D from other areas where government invests in 

development of industrially relevant R&D. Existing government technology programs do an 

excellent job of developing and implementing new technology in those areas where industry 

is eager to participate, and where the risk of failure affects only the original investment. In 

infrastructure protection, however, failure to adopt new security technologies means that 

vulnerabilities in the nation’s information infrastructure will persist. To eliminate these 

vulnerabilities, the government cannot afford to deal only with those firms that are highly 

motivated to collaborate – it must also engage those private sector owners, operators, 

providers, and users of information technology products and services that may not know of, 

or may not be particularly motivated to adopt, technologies developed through government 

investment. To enlist the participation of these more reluctant partners, government must 

adopt innovative business incentives that provide the private sector with a greater degree of 

visibility, participation, and “buy-in” than is associated with many traditional government 

agency programs and procedures. 

The rapid – indeed, explosive – pace of technology change presents its own R&D 

management challenges. Commercial product cycles can be as short as three or four months, 

whereas government budget cycles span two to three years. It is difficult for the government 

to anticipate – years in advance – the technologies needed to mitigate future information 

infrastructure vulnerabilities and reduce future threats. Conventional government technology 

acquisition processes, which often require months to years to execute major procurements, 

may not be flexible or nimble enough to address the pressing – and rapidly evolving – 

technology requirements to ensure the security of our information infrastructure. Finally, the 

government’s time cycle for hiring (and firing) and providing incentives for employees is 

incompatible with everyday practices in the global information-based human resource 

marketplace. 

Given these conditions, the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology 

(PCAST) has recommended the establishment of a non-governmental Institute for 

Information Infrastructure Protection (IIIP). In response to this recommendation, the 

Administration proposes to create such an Institute, funded through a cooperative agreement 

with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The Institute will be an 

innovative public/private partnership that will have the required agility to address these 

pressing needs with the best talent the Nation has to offer. Given our ever-growing 

dependence upon information technologies, the increasingly sophisticated threats to 

information systems and networks, the ongoing possibility of natural disaster or human error, 

and the extraordinarily rapid pace of information technology change, the Institute offers the 

greatest promise of rapidly creating, disseminating, and ensuring the early adoption of those 

technologies and fundamental knowledge most urgently needed to protect our information 

infrastructure. 
 58

I. Background

In late 1998, PCAST’s Security Panel became concerned that existing government 

research mechanisms were not responsive enough to address security challenges in the 

rapidly growing and evolving information infrastructure. In a December 10, 1998, letter 

to the President, PCAST expressed its concerns and proposed that the government 

establish a “Laboratory for National Information Infrastructure Protection” (LNIIP). 

PCAST noted, 

At present there is no technical organization dedicated to developing the 

know-ledge and common technology base required to successfully address 

this problem and provide the basis for long-term protection. The private 

sector does not have the incentive to develop the public knowledge and 

technology base required for the development of competing interoperable 

proprietary systems--thus federal support is needed. The justification for 

acquiring the needed knowledge and technology through government 

support of a new not-for-profit laboratory is that while most of the critical 

infrastructure lies outside the government, only the government is in a 

position to derive and make broadly available the information needed to 

assure the integrity of our nation’s information network. 

In his February 22, 1999, response to PCAST, the President agreed with the importance 

of protecting the Nation’s critical infrastructures, including interconnected electronic 

networks. He directed the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the 

National Security Council (NSC) to perform a priority review of PCAST’s proposal. 

This review, supported by an analysis of the concept by the Institute for Defense 

Analyses, concluded that there is a need for such an Institute. During an OSTP-PCAST 

meeting with the chief technology officers of 15 leading information and 

communications corporations, the private sector representatives unanimously endorsed 

the concept of a non-governmental, not-for-profit Institute to develop and disseminate 

technologies addressing urgent information infrastructure security issues of the type not 

normally addressed by individual private sector firms. In January 2000, the President 

announced his intent to establish an Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 

and in February he requested $50 million in fiscal year 2001 funding for the Institute in 

the NIST budget. 

II. Strategic Objective 

The Institute will foster the creation and dissemination of knowledge and technologies 

that are crucial to protecting the information infrastructure, and that will not otherwise be 

sufficiently developed by the private sector, government, or academia. 
59

59

III. Guiding Principles 

• The Institute must stay abreast of the rapid evolution of information technology. 

This requirement has direct implications for Institute operations and funding 

procedures: the Institute must be able to identify, fund, develop, disseminate, 

and encourage the early adoption of technologies on time scales rapid enough 

to keep pace with evolving vulnerabilities in and threats to the information 

infrastructure. 

• The Institute must define and assure the execution of an R&D portfolio that will 

help protect the national information infrastructure. It must therefore have 

broad access to both executive and technical leadership in government and the 

private sector. Likewise, the Institute must be aware of relevant ongoing and 

planned research in the private sector, government, and academia. 

• The Institute must reach out broadly to the nation’s technical community to seek 

solutions to the problems it and others have identified, complementing and 

leveraging the very substantial base of R&D already being conducted in 

separate but related fields. Moreover, it must be organized and operated in a 

way that maximizes the implementation of technologies developed under its 

auspices. Consequently, it must enlist the active and widespread participation 

of the largely-private sector owners, operators, vendors, and users of 

information infrastructure equipment and services in defining and executing the 

Institute’s R&D agenda. It must not restrict its research support to a small or a 

closed set of institutions, particularly institutions that may be involved in its 

own management. 

• The federal government must retain ultimate oversight, strategic guidance, and 

accountability for the expenditure of public funds. Technologies developed 

under the auspices of the Institute must support the protection of personal 

privacy and civil liberties. 

IV. Organizational Structure 

• The Institute will be a nongovernmental organization funded through a 

cooperative agreement with NIST. 

• NIST will select the management organization for the Institute through a full 

and open competition, using criteria that include ones discussed in the following 

section. NIST will re-compete the cooperative agreement every five years. 

• Through its cooperative agreement with the Institute, NIST will exercise 

strategic guidance and oversight over the Institute without becoming involved in 

the Institute’s day-to-day management or activities. 
60

60

• NIST will also coordinate with other Federal Government Departments and 

Agencies to ensure that the Federal Government’s interests as a major developer 

and user of information technologies are conveyed to the Institute. 

• The Institute’s management organization shall be a non-profit entity, a for-profit 

organization, a university, or some consortium or association of institutions in 

one or more of these categories. The Institute shall be governed by a private 

sector Board of Directors, as described in the following section. The Board of 

Directors, among other duties, shall be responsible for selecting the Institute’s 

Chief Executive Officer. 

• The Institute will strive to have the highest caliber technical experts on its small 

staff, which will consist of employees of the management organization as well 

as recognized experts from government, industry, academia, and other 

personnel who have been detailed or assigned to the Institute. The Institute’s 

Chief Executive Officer shall be authorized to hire and fire employees of the 

management organization and shall be able to approve or terminate on short 

notice details or assignments of personnel from other organizations. Staff will 

rotate through the Institute on 3 to 5-year terms, thus constantly renewing itself 

and ensuring that staff members have the requisite subject matter currency and 

expertise. Subject to Board approval, the Institute will set its own personnel 

practices and standards that will be binding on employees of the management 

organization and that will set a standard that employees of other organizations 

who have been assigned or detailed to the Institute would be expected to follow 

where appropriate. 

• The Institute will heavily focus its R&D funding on extramural research at those 

organizations most qualified to perform it, whether in the private sector, 

government, or academia. It will conduct little or no research in-house. 

• The Institute’s staff shall include an analytic core with the intellectual capability 

not only to manage the current research portfolio but to integrate and synthesize 

the disparate research activities supported by the Institute and elsewhere; to 

chart the course for future work; and to recommend modifications to the 

information infrastructure, taking into account technical findings as well as 

legal/social considerations. The staff shall also develop, for approval by the 

Board of Directors, long-term strategic plans, R&D roadmaps, and proposed 

research “Grand Challenges.” 

• The Institute will cultivate and maintain close relationships with organizations 

responsible for related, non-R&D missions such as setting standards, 

promulgating best practices, evaluating products, etc. Although the Institute 

will not directly set standards or develop best practices, it will ensure that 

relevant research results are made available to the appropriate organizations. 
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• Given the nature of its organizational structure and mission, the Institute must 

establish a set of policies related to intellectual property rights. The Institute 

must carefully balance the need to protect intellectual property and to provide 

incentives for the implementation of technology developed under its auspices, 

with the need to disseminate as broadly and rapidly as possible the research 

results and technologies developed under its programs.

V. Award Selection Criteria 

Proposals by entities seeking to manage the Institute shall be evaluated according to 

criteria that include the following: 

• Preference for Consortia. Proposals from consortia that include academic 

institutions will be preferred. For-profit firms and non-profit institutions would 

also be eligible to bid, either alone or as a member of such a consortium. 

• Breadth of Representation on the Board. The proposal will specify a Board of 

Directors providing widespread participation from academia and from the private 

sector. No more than one-third of the Board shall be affiliated with any of the 

institutions involved in managing the Institute. Private sector participants would 

represent – or have experience with – firms that manufacture, provide, and 

operate information infrastructure-related products and services; they would also 

represent customers of those products and services. Board members would recuse 

themselves from actions pertaining to institutions they were personally associated 

with, and they should not have potential conflicts of interest that would be so 

pervasive as to preclude effective contributions to the Board. 

• Quality, Openness, and Flexibility of Research Agenda. The proposal should 

describe the general research agenda to be supported by the Institute, delineating 

the topics to be addressed and time scale over which results would be anticipated. 

This research agenda should not be so detailed that it overly constrains the 

Institute’s flexibility to follow the rapid evolution of information technology. The 

proposal should delineate what areas of research, if any, would be done internally 

to the Institute, what would be done outside the Institute but by organizations 

involved in the Institute’s management, and what would be supported through 

subcontracts or grants from the Institute to outside parties. One evaluation 

criterion for award – and renewal – of the Institute contract would be the degree 

to which the Institute engaged a wide and open pool of potential contributors and 

resisted the tendency to support a small and restricted set of participants. Ability 

to respond in a flexible and timely manner to new developments would also be 

important. 

• Replenishing the Pool of Information Security Researchers. Given the 

importance of developing an adequate supply of information security researchers, 

one selection criterion for proposals will be the degree to which they support 
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multi-year, university-based research that provides a sufficiently stable funding 

stream to support graduate students and faculty hiring. 

• External Review. Proposals shall discuss the review mechanisms to be used to 

ensure the relevance and technical excellence of the Institute’s R&D agenda, such 

as provision for independent external review by bodies such as the President’s 

Information Technology Advisory Council, the National Infrastructure Assurance 

Council, and/or the National Research Council. External reviews provided to the 

Board of Directors shall be shared with NIST.

• Technology Transition. Another selection criterion would be the expectation 

that research results or new technologies supported by the Institute would be 

adopted by firms or entities that are appropriate to implement them. Factors such 

as the participation of relevant firms in the research would be one way to 

demonstrate this. However, this criterion must be balanced against the need to 

conduct fundamental research that may be more difficult to translate directly into 

the marketplace.

• Headquarters Location. Proposals shall specify a location for the Institute’s 

headquarters that will facilitate accomplishment of the Institute’s mission. The 

headquarters should be located convenient to centers of information infrastructure 

R&D, easily accessible for travel, and attractive to the type and caliber staff that 

will need to be recruited to make it effective. The Institute’s headquarters are not 

envisioned to be located on federal government property. 

• Cost-sharing by industry, while acceptable, is not intended to be a selection 

criterion. The Institute is intended to support research that is not being done in 

the private sector and for which there is little expectation of economic return to a 

particular firm. Therefore, at least initially, it is not expected that industry will 

contribute significant financial support. The Institute will, however, make 

provision to accept contributions and/or in-kind support from such non-federal 

sources. 

VI. Research Agenda 

• The Institute’s staff shall periodically propose, for review and approval by the 

Board of Directors, updates to the Institute’s general R&D agenda. 

• The agenda should include a set of research Grand Challenges, centering on 

research themes crucial to protecting and enhancing the security of the 

information infrastructure that are not likely to be sufficiently supported by the 

private sector or by government in the absence of the Institute. Examples are 

provided in the Annex. Ideally, Grand Challenges would pose questions whose 

solutions will drive significant advances in scientific understanding and 

technology development. While Grand Challenges may complement existing 
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research programs, they should not duplicate ongoing or planned government, 

private sector, or academic research. 

• The defining characteristic for Grand Challenges and other Institute-sponsored 

R&D is that they address important concerns that would not otherwise be 

sufficiently addressed. This characteristic does not necessarily imply a time 

horizon for the research – although it is expected that a considerable portion of 

the Institute’s work portfolio will consist of high payoff/high risk endeavors, it 

would also be appropriate for the Institute to support important shorter-term 

R&D that the private sector has little incentive to conduct. 

• The research agenda shall include development of a better fundamental 

understanding, including theoretical work, of the general properties of the 

information infrastructure, such as how it degrades and how it can be made 

resilient under stress. 

• Given the global nature of the information infrastructure, the multinational 

character of many leading information technology vendors and service 

providers, and world-class research institutes abroad, the Institute shall draw on 

the global technology base in the absence of specific reasons to limit such 

participation, and it shall pursue international collaborative research programs 

when desirable. 

• The Institute is not anticipated to sponsor any classified activity. However, the 

Institute must have provisions to handle, safeguard, and restrict the 

dissemination of sensitive or proprietary research results, information, or data. 

Moreover, it would be inappropriate to exclude the possibility that special 

circumstances calling for security classification could arise. 

• The education of the next generation of researchers and professors in 

information assurance and security technologies is of critical national 

importance. One task of the Institute is to encourage support of research in 

university settings, which will help develop this next generation of information 

security researchers and educators. For example, this could include sponsorship 

of significant multi-year research activities at universities in collaboration with 

corporations and national laboratories, or equipment grants to establish test beds 

and laboratories for these collaborations. These actions would provide 

opportunities for graduate student support and a sufficiently stable research 

environment to justify and support faculty hiring. 
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ANNEX: CANDIDATE TOPICS TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE INSTITUTE 

FOR INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

A number of high priority research areas to meet the needs of both public and 

private components of the national information infrastructure have been identified 

in the process of planning the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 

and the Institute’s initial R&D agenda might include any of the following. These 

topics, either individually or combined in technically related groups, could 

constitute candidate “Grand Challenges”: 

• Robustness, resilience, and behavior of tightly coupled, highly complex, highly 

nonlinear systems 

• Network system interactions and vulnerabilities to cascading effects 

• System architecture to ensure survivability; graceful degradation under stress; ease of 

reconstitution 

• Develop fundamental principles, scientific basis, methodologies, and metrics for 

information assurance as an engineering discipline 

• Next-generation intrusion and malicious code detection 

• Visualization of system security information 

• Self-healing systems 

• Security and forensics toolkits 

• Increasing resistance to penetration 

• Concepts for high-confidence systems and software 

• Information assurance for emerging information technologies 

• Design of “testbeds” and other means for experimentally validating network security 

technologies 

• Physical/cyber/human interfaces 
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