Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

August 2001 MILITARY

TRANSFORMATION

Navy Efforts Should

Be More Integrated

and Focused

GAO-01-853
Page i GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

Progress Being Made, but Key Issues Require Attention 5

Conclusions 16

Recommendations for Executive Action 17

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 17

Scope and Methodology 18

Appendix I Future Naval Capabilities 21

Appendix II Fleet Battle Experiments 23

Appendix III Navy-Wide Innovation Activities 24

Appendix IV Factors for Successful Transformation 25

Appendix V Comments From the Department of Defense 27

Appendix VI Organizations and Offices Contacted 31

Tables

Table 1: Future Naval Capabilities and Examples of Supporting

Technology Efforts 21

Table 2: Examples of Issues Addressed in Fleet Battle Experiments 23

Table 3: Examples of Navy Innovation Activities 24

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

Contents
Page 1 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

August 2, 2001

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John W. Warner

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

With the end of the Cold War, national security strategies changed and

dictated the need for the military to “transform” itself in order to meet new

global challenges. The Navy, recognizing the shift in strategy from a focus

on the global threat of the Soviet Union to a focus on regional challenges,

developed a new strategic direction in the early 1990s, shifting its primary

focus from open ocean, “blue water,” operations to littoral,1

 or shallow

water, operations closer to shore. The 1999 Maritime Concept added a

new thrust, emphasizing the role that Navy combat power could play in

ensuring access of joint forces to littoral areas.2

The Navy has made a concept known as network centric warfare the

centerpiece of its efforts to transform its forces. Under this concept, a data

network of advanced communications and computer technologies would

be developed to connect different and widely dispersed forces into an

effective, coordinated team. The Navy’s transformation also means

(1) using innovations to introduce new technologies and advanced

concepts, doctrine, and organizations to increase the Navy’s capabilities

 1

 Littoral areas extend from the shore to open ocean and inland from the shore over an

extensive area that can be supported and controlled directly from the sea.

2

 The Maritime Concept is the Navy’s latest strategic concept that describes the organizing

principles, operational concepts, and priorities by which future naval forces will exploit

new opportunities and capabilities to ensure access and influence, despite an adversary’s

efforts to preclude U.S. presence.

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

and (2) conducting organized events (experiments) to explore and validate

the major force and operational aspects of those innovations.

Because of the importance of military transformation and of the changing

threats faced by the United States, we assessed the Navy’s plans,

processes, and initiatives to transform its forces to meet the challenges of

the 21st century. This report provides our observations of key

management issues that are affecting the Navy’s progress. We are

addressing this report to you based on your role in overseeing military

programs.

Transforming an organization with the history and size of the Navy and

with a force structure that has longevity and large capital investment

presents a significant challenge. Although the Navy has recently placed

more emphasis on transformation, it does not have a well-defined and

overarching strategy for transformation. It has not clearly identified the

scope and direction of its transformation; the overall goals, objectives, and

milestones; or the specific strategies and resources to be used in achieving

those goals. It also has not clearly identified organizational roles and

responsibilities, priorities, resources, or ways to measure progress. These

shortcomings have had the following effects on its transformation efforts:

• Because transformation has not been clearly defined, there is some

confusion throughout the Navy about what constitutes transformation and

how all of its elements, such as network centric warfare, are related.

• The Navy’s “evolutionary” approach to transformation promotes

incremental changes to the existing force structure and operations. But

fiscal and technological challenges suggest that more fundamental

changes may be needed for the Navy to have sufficient and capable forces

to conduct future missions.

• The Navy has made important organizational changes that better support

its efforts, but the Navy Warfare Development Command, a key

organization with responsibilities for transformation, has not been

provided the necessary influence, resources, or management mechanisms

for achieving its goals.

• The Navy has not given sufficient attention to long-term technology and

concept experiments, which are necessary for the Navy to analyze and

implement more significant force structure and operational changes.

• Innovation activities have not been sufficiently coordinated and tracked

across the Navy.

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

We are recommending that the Navy develop a long-term strategic plan

and roadmap to manage and execute its transformation effort. We are also

recommending that the Navy adjust its experimentation efforts to include

exploration of long-term force structure and operational issues and that

the Navy establish a central clearinghouse to coordinate and track the

wide range of Navy innovation activities. In its comments on a draft of this

report, the Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with our

recommendations and said that our findings accurately reflect the Navy’s

transformation process, its current status, and the increased efforts in the

Navy toward transformation.

The need to transform the military services has been widely recognized in

a number of DOD policy papers, reports, and strategy documents. The

national security strategy, the national military strategy, the Secretary of

Defense’s guidance to the services, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review,

and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Vision statements

(2010 and 2020) all cite the need to transform U.S. armed forces to

maintain military dominance in the new security environment.

Over the last several years, the Navy has undergone some reorganization,

shifted its science and technology funding, and undertaken a wide range of

experiments and innovation activities. A key organization for carrying out

the Navy’s transformation has been the Navy Warfare Development

Command, which was established in June 1998 to develop new operational

and warfighting concepts to plan and coordinate experiments based on

new concepts and to develop doctrine. The Command has been preparing

a capstone concept3

 based on network centric warfare that is to serve as a

guide for future naval operations. The Command has also planned and

coordinated a series of major experiments involving the fleets4

 to evaluate

many of the concepts and technologies associated with network centric

warfare. Before it established the Command, the Navy did not have an

organization dedicated to operational experimentation. The Command’s

fiscal year 2000 and 2001 budgets are about $45.3 million and $44 million,

 3 Capstone Concept for Naval Operations in the Information Age, draft. A capstone

concept provides the organizing principles for future naval operations and force structure

required to meet the challenges of the projected future warfighting environment.

4

 The Navy’s operating forces are assigned to two principal, permanent fleets—the Atlantic

Fleet and the Pacific Fleet—that train, support, and provide forces to five numbered fleets.

The numbered fleets—Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Fleets—are major tactical

units that are organized for the purpose of prosecuting specific naval operations.

Background
Page 4 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

respectively. In fiscal year 2002, the Command’s budget is projected to

decline to about $41.7 million. Almost half of each annual budget is

allocated to experimentation-related activities.

Two other organizations important to transformation are the Naval War

College and the Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group. The

college conducts war games that test concepts and potential technologies.5

Its close working relationship with the Navy Warfare Development

Command provides an avenue for new concepts to be further evaluated

and integrated into experimentation efforts. The Strategic Studies Group,

comprised of a small group of senior Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast

Guard officers, generate and analyze innovative and revolutionary naval

warfighting concepts and reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Recent studies have centered on attacking land targets from the sea, future

surface ship deployments, new crewing concepts, and multitiered sensor

grids.

In 1999 the Navy reorganized its science and technology resources into

12 future naval capabilities to focus more sharply on the capabilities

needed over the next 10-15 years. Senior Navy and Marine Corps officials

lead integrated product teams that prioritize individual efforts in the

capability areas. The Navy’s science and technology budget has remained

relatively static over the last decade and has decreased as a percentage of

its total budget. The Navy currently allocates about 35 percent of its

science and technology budget to support its future naval capabilities. The

Navy plans further refinements to its science and technology structure,

including the possibility of adding or subtracting individual future naval

capabilities. Appendix I provides further information on the future naval

capabilities.

Since March 1997, the Navy has also conducted nine fleet battle

experiments. The experiments are assessed to determine which new

operational concepts, tactics, and technologies prove workable and what

follow-on experimentation to pursue. The Navy Warfare Development

Command is also coordinating with other military organizations to jointly

lease one or more dual hulled high-speed ships for a broad range of

experiments. For 18 months starting in September 2001, the Navy will

 5

 A war game is a simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or

more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or

assumed real life situation.
Page 5 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

conduct a series of experiments to explore potential uses for such vessels,

including amphibious lift, armament configuration, and helicopter

operations. Appendix II provides examples of issues explored in the fleet

battle experiments.

Finally, the Navy conducts a wide range of innovation activities. For

example, the Third Fleet has set aside a portion of its command ship, the

U.S.S. Coronado, to test innovations related to command, control,

communications, computers, and intelligence concepts. Appendix III

provides some examples of these innovation activities.

The Navy is conducting a variety of transformation activities: it is

experimenting with new technologies, it has made some organizational

changes, it has introduced the new network centric warfare concept, and

it is pursuing a wide range of innovations. However, the Navy has not

developed an overarching, long-term strategy that integrates these

activities or that clearly defines transformation goals, organizational roles

and responsibilities, timetables for implementation, resources to be used

to achieve its transformation goals, and ways to measure progress toward

those goals. In other words, the Navy does not have a strategic plan and

roadmap for its transformation that shows where it wants to go; how it

proposes to get there; and how transformation will be managed, funded,

implemented, or monitored. The lack of a plan and roadmap has

contributed to confusion within the Navy and DOD about what constitutes

the Navy’s transformation.

The adoption of an evolutionary approach to transformation has so far not

led the Navy toward careful and full consideration of all the strategic,

budgetary, and operational elements of transformation. Additionally, the

Navy’s progress has been adversely affected by insufficient support for

new organizations responsible for leading transformation efforts, limited

conduct of long-term experiments, and a variety of Navy-wide innovation

activities that are not well coordinated and tracked.

There is no clear consensus on the precise definition, scope, or direction

of Navy transformation. In discussions with Navy and DOD officials and

outside defense experts, we found there was some confusion about what

constitutes transformation and about the role of the network centric

warfare concept, which is the centerpiece of the Navy’s transformation

efforts.

Progress Being Made,

but Key Issues

Require Attention

Navy Does Not Have a

Defined, Integrated

Strategy for

Transformation
Page 6 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

The Navy has not developed a plan that clearly identifies what

transformation is and what its goals or components are. For example,

although network centric warfare is clearly a fundamental concept for the

Navy’s future operations, the Navy still has not made it clear how the

concept fits in with its many ongoing transformation activities or with its

overall transformation efforts, what effects the concept will have on the

types and composition of forces, or how the concept’s many components

will be integrated with each other or with those of the other services. The

Navy plans to soon publish a capstone concept document for its future

force. The concept document is expected to apply the tenets of network

centric operations to the Navy’s vision statements and identify some of the

capabilities required to implement these tenets. Navy Warfare

Development Command officials believe the concept document is critical

to the success of the Navy’s transformation, and they expect the concept

document to be approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in the near

future.

Good management practices and the advice of defense experts both inside

and outside the Navy suggest that a clear strategy is central to the success

of transformation efforts. DOD and Navy officials and outside defense

experts identified a number of benefits that can be obtained from strategic

planning. Navy officials at headquarters and several commands stated that

establishing an agreed-upon definition of transformation would be vital for

explaining what constitutes transformation. Most Navy officials we spoke

with believe that a strategic plan and roadmap would bring greater

coherence to the Navy’s transformation efforts. A strategic plan and

roadmap would also provide the Congress with a means to evaluate and

make optimal decisions on the Navy’s transformation. The need for a

strategic plan when attempting major organizational and operational

changes, such as those the Navy is undertaking, has also been long

recognized in the private sector as a best business practice.

We discussed the need for a strategic plan and roadmap with a wide range

of DOD and Navy officials and with outside defense experts, many of

whom have been directly involved in advising DOD on military

transformation. These individuals agreed that such a plan should clearly

articulate the Navy’s transformation goals and objectives, priorities,

specific responsibilities, and linkages with other organizations, as well as

the scope of activities and the resources necessary to carry them out.

These management tools should also identify the challenges and obstacles

that need to be addressed and should include understandable, simple, and

reasonable metrics to provide ways to gauge progress, provide

information to decisionmakers, and make necessary changes. Some Navy
Page 7 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

officials expressed caution that such a plan should not dictate a particular

force structure but rather provide the elements of the process to guide the

transformation efforts. Appendix IV provides additional information on the

key factors for successful transformation planning and management.

The same officials and experts said that further complicating Navy

transformation planning efforts is the absence of clearly articulated

transformation guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the military services. The Secretary and the

Chairman have provided only broad guidance on the direction and

progress of military transformation and on the types of future capabilities

required for transforming the military. The responsibility for clearly

identifying priorities and developing an implementation plan for their

transformations has been left to the individual services. However, it is

widely recognized that the success of future joint operations requires

careful joint planning and integration. Various organizations, including the

Defense Science Board, have cited the need for the Secretary of Defense

to provide clear guidance on transformation. In 1999, the Board called for

an explicit strategy, or a master plan; a roadmap; and outcome-related

metrics to assess progress.6

In its annual performance plan, issued pursuant to the Government

Performance and Results Act of 1993,7

 DOD identified the transformation

of U.S. forces among its performance goals. The act requires federal

agencies to clearly define their missions, set goals, link activities and

resources to goals, prepare annual performance plans, measure

performance, and report on accomplishments. However, we recently

reported that two of the transformation’s three underlying metrics—

procurement spending and defense technology objectives—do not provide

a direct link toward reaching that performance goal.8

 Without such

metrics, DOD cannot adequately assess its progress toward transforming

its forces for the 21st century. The Navy would be expected to provide

input to such a DOD effort and should therefore have its own clearly

articulated transformation plan.

 6 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Warfighting Transformation,

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Department of

Defense, Sept. 1999.

7

 Pub.L. 103-62, also known as the Results Act.

8 Department of Defense: Status of Achieving Outcomes and Addressing Major

Management Challenges (GAO-01-783, June 25, 2001).
Page 8 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

The Navy has adopted what it calls an evolutionary approach to

transformation, meaning that its effort is more about incremental changes

in its force posture than in its force structure.9 The Navy believes that this

is an appropriate path to follow since it already is an expeditionary, selfsustaining, and mobile force with worldwide reach. What it needs to do,

the Navy asserts, is to improve its expeditionary capabilities by focusing

less on the types of ships in its force structure and more on linking them

together through data networks—hence the network centric warfare

concept.

This evolutionary approach, however, has so far not led the Navy toward

careful and full consideration of all the strategic, budgetary, and

operational elements of transformation. Through its approach, the Navy

has also allowed almost a decade to pass with slow progress in a number

of key transformation areas. Without the benefit of an overarching

strategic plan and roadmap, the Navy has not taken the steps necessary to

explore the possibilities of long-term changes to its force structure and

operations to adequately address near- and long-term security

requirements within existing and projected fiscal parameters.

There are at least three reasons why the Navy may need to adopt a more

far-reaching and considered approach to its transformation: (1) it may not

be able to recapitalize its existing forces at current shipbuilding rates,

which might necessitate more fundamental changes in force structure and

operations than it currently plans; (2) new operational concepts and

technologies needed to operate in littoral areas may be coming into the

force too slowly, given the increased importance of littoral operations

recognized by the Navy; and (3) there are substantial technological

challenges presented by network centric warfare that could take a long

time and considerable effort to overcome. DOD in its comments to a draft

of this report, stated that the evolutionary approach followed by the Navy

for transformation was prudent and allowed the Navy to continuously

improve its combat capabilities. It also stated that Navy transformation

efforts, such as the Navy’s fleet battle experiment program, have not

excluded consideration of innovative force structures. DOD attributed the

majority of actual and perceived transformation shortfalls to the lack of an

 9

 Force structure refers to the numbers, size, and composition of the Navy’s forces, such as

ships and aircraft. Force posture refers primarily to how the ships and aircraft operate

together.

Approach Does Not

Adequately Address

Challenges
Page 9 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

overarching strategic plan and roadmap rather than to the approach

followed for transformation by the Navy.

The Navy has not been building enough ships to maintain the roughly

300-ship force mandated by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. The

high costs of supporting the current force, the time needed to acquire new

ships, and the prospect of a continued mismatch between fiscal resources

and force structure requirements increase the urgency of planning for and

carrying out transformation. Although we did not make an independent

assessment of the funds needed to maintain a force of 300 ships and its

associated inventory of aircraft and supporting infrastructure, the

Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the Navy would require

roughly $17 billion more each year for fiscal years 2001 through 2005 than

it is currently expected to receive to sustain this force level.10 If current

construction rates and funding levels remain the same, the Navy’s force

could decrease to approximately 260 ships or lower after 2020. Navy

officials believe they face even bigger challenges. As part of DOD’s

July 2000 report on naval vessel force structure requirements, the Navy

reported that its force needed to increase to about 360 ships over the next

15 to 20 years to better meet its total operational requirements and the

national military strategy.11

The recent establishment of an Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval

Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs may help focus the

Navy’s attention on analyzing the potential for changes that might be

needed to address fiscal concerns as well as current and future force

structure requirements. In addition, the President of the Naval War College

was recently chosen by the Chief of Naval Operations to lead a task force

to analyze the force structure implications of operating the Navy on

approximately the same budget level it now has.

A senior Navy headquarters official agreed that the shortfall in funding and

the mismatch between requirements and resources are major drivers for

transformation. But the official also acknowledged that the Navy’s

evolutionary approach to transformation might not address its fiscal

problems.

 10 Budgeting for Naval Forces: Structuring Tomorrow’s Navy at Today’s Funding Level,

Congressional Budget Office, October 2000.

11 Naval Vessel Force Structure Requirements, Department of Defense, July 2000.

Fiscal and Force Structure

Challenges Require Greater

Urgency
Page 10 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

The Navy has been slow in acquiring many of the capabilities that it needs

to successfully conduct littoral operations. We recently reported on the

Navy’s limited countermine, antisubmarine, and ship self-defense

capabilities and the lack of credible surface fire support capabilities.12

Although the Navy has had acquisition programs under way to improve its

capabilities in each of these areas for many years, we found progress has

been slow. We also found that unless current efforts can be accelerated or

alternatives developed, it will be another 10 to 20 years before the naval

services have the capabilities they say they need to successfully execute

littoral warfare operations against a competent enemy. Our ongoing

reviews of Navy chemical and biological defense capabilities have found

shortcomings in equipment and training for shipboard personnel and naval

personnel ashore in high-threat areas. Such deficiencies could also

seriously affect the Navy’s ability to operate successfully in littoral areas.13

The Navy faces significant challenges in developing the network centric

warfare capability. Navy officials told us that they have only just begun to

define and implement the concept and that making it operational involves

significant challenges. Officials in the Navy’s operating forces expressed a

lack of a clear understanding about what network centric warfare is and

how it is expected to change operations and forces. Some elements such

as the Cooperative Engagement Capability14 have recently deployed, while

others are in the early stages of research and development and are years

away from practical use. Most will rely on interoperability (compatibility

with equipment used by the Navy and the other services) for their ultimate

success. Yet the Navy does not have an implementation plan to integrate

all the different elements. Several Navy and joint officials have indicated

that some components require much more comprehensive planning and an

 12 Navy Acquisitions: Improved Littoral War-fighting Capabilities Needed (GAO-01-493,

May 18, 2001).

13 We plan to report on these shortcomings in Navy chemical and biological defense

capabilities later this year.

14 Cooperative Engagement Capability is a Navy sensors networking capability with

integrated fire control. This allows for various dispersed sensors measurements to be fused

together in real time to develop and distribute a common track picture. The initial

operational capability was achieved in 1996. The next group of ships with this capability

(an aircraft carrier battle group) is scheduled to deploy in 2002, but it will take a decade or

more to install this capability on select Navy ships and aircraft.

Slow Progress in Developing

Littoral Warfare Capabilities

Network Centric Warfare

Presents Significant Challenges
Page 11 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

integrated roadmap for their development. Others said that the Navy and

the other services were not doing enough to ensure interoperability.15

The Navy has carried out several organizational changes aimed at moving

transformation forward. But as with all of its other transformation

activities, these changes have not been carried out within the context of an

overarching strategy that clearly and authoritatively identifies roles and

responsibilities of different bodies and stakeholders. Thus, even though

the Navy Warfare Development Command was established primarily to

direct the Navy’s transformation efforts, the Command has had difficulty

building relationships with other Navy organizations and has not yet

achieved the priority for resources needed to make it an effective focal

point for transformation.

Several important activities are underway at the Command. For example,

it is pursuing a comprehensive review and reorganization of the Navy’s

doctrine structure, and it is coordinating all major Navy fleet battle

experiments as well as the Navy’s participation in joint experiments. Its

work on the capstone concept document based on network centric

warfare—the centerpiece of the Navy’s transformation activities—is

nearing completion. It has also established a constructive working

arrangement with the Naval War College and the Strategic Studies Group.

The Command has had less success establishing itself as the Navy’s focal

point for transformation and has sometimes faced resistance at the fleets

and at Navy headquarters while trying to carry out its responsibilities.

Atlantic and Pacific Fleet officials said that while they appreciate the

intent of the Command’s work, fleet personnel sometimes see the

Command’s experiments as disruptions to their everyday operations and

do not fully understand how the experiments can benefit them. They

explained that the fleets are focused more on immediate issues affecting

operations and are therefore less receptive to activities that might be

aimed at the Navy’s longer term interests. A number of senior Navy

officials said that the Command has had difficulty promoting its concepts

to the fleets because some fear that new concepts could threaten support

and funding for existing programs.

 15 For further information on interoperability issues, see Joint Military Operations:

Weaknesses in DOD’s Process for Certifying C4I Systems’ Interoperability (NSIAD-98-73,

Mar. 13, 1998).

Navy Warfare

Development Command

Not Firmly Established

and Supported
Page 12 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

Part of the difficulty of building relationships with other Navy

organizations is that the Command is just 3 years old, and its mission is

not well known throughout the Navy. During our fleet visits, we found that

with the exception of fleet battle experiments, the Command’s overall role,

responsibilities, and relationships were not fully understood. Several

senior Navy officials noted that the Command has not been afforded a

high priority for staffing. For example, only 46 of its 60 authorized

positions for military personnel were filled as of June 2001.16 The

Command’s detachments at the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets have several

important responsibilities, including providing support for

experimentation, innovation activities, and concept and doctrine

development and acting as the liaison between joint and fleet

organizations and the Command.17 However, they have only a skeletal

number of authorized staff to carry out these responsibilities, and even

these positions have not always been fully staffed. An official of the

Command’s Pacific Fleet detachment said that lack of personnel prevents

the detachment’s staff from attending key meetings and making visits to

Navy organizations throughout the region. Officials at the Command’s

Atlantic Fleet detachment expressed similar limitations to involvement

with organizations in that area. Additionally, the Command has been

unable to assign a permanent representative to the U.S. Joint Forces

Command to represent the Navy on joint experimentation issues.

The Command has also had some difficulties with funding needed to

support its activities. An official in the Command’s Pacific Fleet

detachment told us the detachment has had to rely on other Navy

organizations, such as the Third Fleet, to provide funds for basic support

such as office space, telephones, heating, and lighting. Plans for

prototyping of ships and other weapon systems will require additional

funds over the Command’s current funding. Navy Warfare Development

Command officials expressed concern that about 75 percent of the

Command’s research and development budget for fiscal year 2002 will be

spent to support its portion of one single experiment—the U.S. Joint

 16 As of June 2001, the Command’s total authorized personnel was 81 military and civilian

positions. All of its 21 authorized civilian positions are filled.

17 The Navy Warfare Development Command has detachments at Norfolk, Virginia, and San

Diego, California, to support the Command’s mission at the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets,

respectively.
Page 13 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

Forces Command’s Millennium Challenge.18 To cover its other

experimentation requirements, it will need to obtain additional funds from

the Navy and other organizations with which the Command cooperates on

experimentation projects.

Recent organizational changes at Navy headquarters should help

overcome some of these difficulties. The establishment of the Office of the

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs

provides a clearer link between headquarters and organizations vital to

transformation. This link may help increase the visibility of the Navy

Warfare Development Command’s efforts and could afford more support

for promising new ideas that may not otherwise be embraced by other

Navy organizations.

The Warfare Requirements and Programs Office was created to separate

requirements and resource allocation functions that had previously been

handled by a single office. The office’s responsibility for balancing

warfighting requirements with available resources could also provide a

better means for the Navy to assess its resource priorities and make the

necessary budget trade-offs between current and future needs. The Navy is

also considering establishing “mission capability packages.” Rather than

focusing on individual platforms (ships, submarines, or aircraft), the

packages would examine requirements in terms of all the capabilities

needed to perform a specific mission. Officials at Navy headquarters and

the Navy Warfare Development Command said these packages could help

the Navy focus more on the capabilities it needs to clarify funding

priorities.

Officials at Navy headquarters and the Navy Warfare Development

Command have told us that since the reorganization, the Command has

begun to obtain greater acceptance from other Navy organizations, and its

ties with headquarters have improved. The Navy is also considering

changing the Command’s link to the fleet to provide the Command with

more visibility and influence. One possibility under consideration is to

place the Command under the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet.

While this could increase the Command’s visibility and influence with the

fleet, some Navy officials said it could also have the consequence of

 18 Millennium Challenge 2002 will be the first major joint field experiment to incorporate

the Navy’s and each of the other military services’ individual experimentation efforts. The

Navy’s next fleet battle experiment—Juliet—will be conducted as part of the joint

experiment. The joint experiment is scheduled to take place during summer 2002.

Reorganization May Help
Page 14 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

focusing their efforts on more near-term fleet issues over longer term

transformation.

While the Navy has actively conducted experimentation over the last

4 years, it has focused its experiments on near- and mid-term operational

and force issues and much less on long-term issues.19 In spite of the

importance of experimentation for transformation, the Navy has not

developed a comprehensive strategy that places long-term goals and

resources for experiments within the context of its overall transformation

objectives and priorities.

Experimentation allows the Navy to explore new operational concepts,

identify alternative force mixes and capabilities, validate promising

technologies and system concepts, and serve as an overall mechanism for

transformation. Most importantly, it helps to shape and challenge ideas

and thinking about the future.

Despite the Navy’s increased experimentation effort since 1997, Navy

officials at headquarters, fleet, and other organizations believe the Navy

needs to expand its experimentation activities to explore major long-term

operational and force concepts to provide better information on future

requirements and capabilities. A wide range of Navy officials and defense

experts stated that the Navy needs to explore new ship design concepts—

possibly revolutionary ones—and employ prototypes to experiment with

them. Such experimentation is necessary for the Navy to analyze potential

force structure and operating options in the face of likely budgets and

opportunities possible in emerging technologies. An example of this type

of effort is the Navy’s current plan to begin at-sea experimentation with a

high-speed ship concept.

Resource priorities also affect the Navy’s ability to experiment and

address long-term issues. The Navy has stated that operating a smaller

force in a period of increased level of overseas operations has limited the

number of ships it can assign to experimentation. It has worked around

 19 The Navy defines the scope of near-term (or short-term) experimentation to be from the

present to 2 years out and is aimed more at enhancing current systems and processes. Midterm experimentation focuses on 2 to 4 years out and may affect budget and requirements

decisions. Long-term experimentation focuses on 5 to 15 years out and involves new

warfighting concepts and technologies that could cause significant force and operational

changes.

Long-Term

Experimentation Has Not

Received Adequate

Attention
Page 15 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

this limitation by conducting its experimentation, such as fleet battle

experiments, as part of its major fleet exercises.20 Another resource issue

is the limited staff available to support the Navy experimentation program.

Since 1997, the Navy has conducted fleet battle experiments at the rate of

two each year. In addition to drawing heavily on the staff and resources of

the Navy Warfare Development Command and the fleets, the Navy

believed this pace did not allow sufficient time to plan and prepare for

experiments beforehand and assess the results afterward. In 2001, it

changed the schedule to approximately one experiment each year.

We learned that many of the Navy’s innovation activities are not well

coordinated or tracked between different organizations. The Navy has

been undertaking a wide range of innovation activities. Some of these

activities are directed at specific problems, while others have a broader

servicewide focus. Some are aimed at best business practice innovations;

others are operational in nature. These activities contribute to the

incremental, evolutionary approach the Navy has adopted for

transformation, and if sufficiently orchestrated and sustained, they can

lead to substantial change.

Many Navy officials throughout the organizations we visited believed that

the Navy needs to improve the servicewide coordination and tracking of

innovation activities. An official at the Pacific Fleet headquarters stated

that the Pacific Fleet has attempted to identify and track these innovation

activities, both within the Fleet and in other parts of the Navy. However,

the official said that it was not possible to determine the extent to which

all activities were captured because of the large number of and differences

in activities. Several Navy officials from various fleet and headquarters

organizations stated that a central Navy clearinghouse for maintaining and

disseminating information about ongoing and past activities would benefit,

promote, and accelerate other innovation efforts. Various Navy officials

suggested that the Navy Warfare Development Command would be an

appropriate organization to manage and maintain this information. The

Navy Warfare Development Command has proposed an effort to provide

greater servicewide coordination of innovation and transformation-related

activities. According to the proposal, the Navy would develop web-based

 20 An exercise is a military maneuver or simulated wartime operation for the purposes of

training and evaluation. An experiment is an event to further define a new concept or refine

an established concept.

Innovation Activities Are

Not Well Coordinated or

Tracked
Page 16 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

tools to further enhance coordination efforts. It would also focus on

coordinating innovation efforts with the other services and the U.S. Joint

Forces Command. However, no decision has yet been reached by the

Navy’s leadership on who will lead the coordination effort.

The complexities and uncertainties that underlie the Navy’s

transformation require that clear direction and guidance be given to all

levels of the organization on what transformation is and how it will be

carried out. While the Navy has initiated a number of activities to

transform its forces, it has not articulated and promulgated a well-defined

transformation program. Current activities have not been conducted

within the context of an overall strategic plan and roadmap to provide the

direction, goals, priorities, scope, options, and resource requirements

necessary to achieve a successful transformation. The importance of such

planning to effective and efficient management of federal programs is

recognized under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.

Implementing the Navy’s transformation will be complicated and will

require careful consideration of near-term needs, as well as fundamental

changes in the force structure, concepts, and organizations required to

meet future security challenges within likely budgets. Actions need to be

planned and orchestrated as part of a broader, well-developed strategy

designed to achieve long-term objectives and not simply to satisfy

immediate requirements. Development of a long-term strategic plan and

roadmap would help to maintain the delicate balance between current and

future requirements as the Navy transforms. It would also provide the

necessary guidance to better focus and direct the Navy’s transformation

activities and tools to guide and oversee progress toward achievement of

goals and objectives. Such a plan, for example, could also address the

coordination and monitoring of innovation activities and delineate the

authority of the Navy Warfare Development Command in carrying out its

mission. Without such a plan, it can be difficult for senior leaders, the

Congress, and others to provide the necessary support and make optimal

decisions on priorities and the effective use of resources to successfully

transform Navy forces.

Although the Navy has stated that its transformation efforts are focused on

force posture and not necessarily force structure, there is a clear and

persistent need for the Navy to explore potential fundamental changes in

its force structure and operational concepts that would permit it to carry

out its requirements within certain fiscal parameters. The time required to

design and build ships further compels urgent action by the Navy. Without

Conclusions
Page 17 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

an experimentation effort that includes evaluating long-term issues such

as new ship designs and operational concepts, the Navy will be less able to

make the difficult but important decisions that will be needed regarding

the size, shape, and composition of its future fleet.

The wide range of innovation activities being conducted throughout the

Navy contributes to the Navy’s overall transformation efforts. But the lack

of adequate Navy-wide coordination and tracking limits the potential

benefits these activities could have for all organizations. The creation of a

Navy-wide clearinghouse would provide a central repository for all

organizations—in the Navy and elsewhere in the Department of Defense—

to exchange information and lessons learned on innovation activities.

To more clearly determine the Navy’s direction and promote better

understanding of actions taken to transform its forces for the 21st century,

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Navy to develop a long-term strategic plan and roadmap that clearly

articulates priorities, objectives, and milestones; identifies the scope,

resource requirements, and responsibilities; and defines the metrics for

assessing progress in achieving successful transformation.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of

the Navy to (1) adjust the Navy’s experimentation program to provide

greater exploration of long-term force structure and operational issues and

(2) create a clearinghouse for Navy-wide innovation activities to improve

coordination and monitoring of such activities.

We received written comments from the Department of Defense on a draft

of this report, which are included in their entirety as appendix V. The

Department agreed with our recommendations but did not elaborate on

how it would address them. DOD generally believed that our findings

accurately reflect the Navy’s transformation process, the current status,

and the increased efforts in the Navy toward transformation.

DOD agreed with our overall conclusion that the Navy needs to develop a

strategic plan and roadmap to manage and execute its transformation

efforts. In its comments, DOD stated that the Navy is implementing near-,

mid-, and far-term steps to achieve a transformation goal of assured

Recommendations for

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 18 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

access,21 which was identified by the Navy’s 1999 Maritime Concept as a

key operational challenge. We agree that these steps are an element in the

development of a comprehensive long-term strategic plan and roadmap

that we recommend for Navy transformation. However, such a plan and

roadmap must also articulate the priorities, objectives, and milestones;

identify the scope, resource requirements, and responsibilities; and define

the metrics for assessing progress. By including these additional elements,

the plan and roadmap would provide the clear direction, focus, and

integration necessary for the Navy to carry out a successful

transformation.

To develop criteria for assessing the Navy’s management of its

transformation, we identified several key factors important to success in

military transformation (see app. IV). We identified these factors from our

review of a wide range of DOD and Navy publications and statements,

open literature, academic research on the subject of military innovation

and transformation, and case studies of past transformation efforts. To

assess the reasonableness and completeness of these factors, we

discussed them with Navy and DOD officials and outside defense experts

from various research and academic organizations. We also used the

principles laid out in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993

as additional benchmarks for our assessment.

To determine the Navy’s transformation-related activities and develop our

observations of the key management issues affecting progress, we

obtained information, documents, and perspectives from officials at all

levels of the Navy, including Navy headquarters, the Navy Warfare

Development Command, the Naval War College, the Atlantic and Pacific

Fleets, and the Offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. We discussed Navy transformation with the former

Secretary of the Navy (1998-2001) and with several senior Navy leaders

who have responsibility for various aspects of the Navy’s transformation.

We also obtained perspectives from several defense experts and

academicians who have followed military and Navy transformation.

Appendix VI lists the principal organizations and offices where we

performed work. We reviewed an extensive array of policy, planning, and

guidance documents; intelligence documents; posture statements and

 21 Assured access is the ability of the U.S. military to have immediate and sustained access

to any region of the world at any time.

Scope and

Methodology
Page 19 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

speeches; congressional hearings and testimonies; open literature; and

studies and assessments. We also made extensive use of information

available on public and DOD Internet web sites.

To develop a better understanding of the Navy’s transformation and the

actions it has taken to carry out the transformation, we obtained

information on various areas related to concept development,

experimentation, innovation, research and development, and other

transformation activities. We reviewed the concept of network centric

warfare with Navy officials at several organizations and offices

responsible for developing and implementing the concept. To ascertain the

Navy’s experimentation and innovation efforts, we discussed the plans,

content, and results with officials at the Navy Warfare Development

Command, Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and research and development

organizations. To obtain information on the Navy’s participation in joint

experimentation efforts, particularly Millennium Challenge 2002, we met

with officials at the U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Joint Staff’s Joint

Vision and Transformation Division. To be cognizant of the security

environment in which the Navy is likely to operate its forces through 2020,

we obtained an intelligence briefing from the Defense Intelligence Agency.

To attain information on the Navy’s investment in research and

development to support transformation, we met with officials at the Office

of Naval Research, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, and

the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Although we did not

include a review of Marine Corps transformation activities in our review,

we did meet with a senior Marine Corps official responsible for the

service’s transformation to discuss coordination and joint transformationrelated efforts between the two services. We did not include the Navy’s

management of service Defense Reform Initiatives in our scope.

Our review was conducted from August 2000 through May 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 20 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations.

We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-3958 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were

Marvin E. Casterline, Mark J. Wielgoszynski, Joseph W. Kirschbaum, and

Stefano Petrucci.

Carol R. Schuster

Director, Defense Capabilities

 and Management
Appendix I: Future Naval Capabilities

Page 21 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

To more sharply focus on the capabilities the Navy will need in the next

10 to 15 years, in 1999 the Navy reorganized its science and technology

resources into 12 future naval capabilities. The objective is to focus on

capabilities and not platforms. The future naval capabilities are managed

by integrated product teams, which include senior Navy and Marine Corps

military and civilian officials. These teams focus on the overall capability

by prioritizing the individual efforts and supporting technology areas.

Table 1 lists the 12 future naval capabilities and provides examples of

individual technology efforts for each capability.

Table 1: Future Naval Capabilities and Examples of Supporting Technology Efforts

Future naval capability Examples of supporting technologies

Autonomous operations • Sensor data processing

• Unmanned aerial vehicle propulsion and power system

• Maritime reconnaissance

• Tactical unmanned ground vehicle

Capable manpower • Simulation-based warfighter test battery

• Cognitive modeling capability

• Artificial intelligence data quality tools

• Integrated maintenance training and performance support through distance technologies

Decision support system • Intuitive/interactive visualization tools

• Network-based knowledge operations

• Management of collaboration services and tools

• Resource/asset optimization

Expeditionary logistics • Automated warehousing system

• Asset visibility

• Optimization tools

• Shared data

Information distribution • VHF/UHF/L-band antenna systems

• Dynamic network for tactical links

• Underwater surveillance data link network

• Allied/coalition command and control applications

Littoral antisubmarine warfare • Lightweight broadband variable depth sonar

• Cross-platform data fusion—common tactical picture

• Deployable shallow water autonomous systems

• Weapon/platform connectivity

Missile defense • Infrared sensors

• Affordable ground based radar

• Distributed weapons coordination

• Reactive material advanced warhead

Organic mine countermeasures • Autonomous undersea vehicles

• Wide area surveillance

• Influence sweeping

• Remote buried mine detection

Platform protection • Surface ship acoustic control

• Advanced degaussing/deamping

• Missile warning system

• Damage tolerant advanced double hull

Appendix I: Future Naval Capabilities
Appendix I: Future Naval Capabilities

Page 22 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

Future naval capability Examples of supporting technologies

Time critical strike • Enhanced targeting acquisition and location system

• Barrage round

• Advanced gun barrel and propulsion technology

• Capabilities against moving and hard and deeply-buried targets

Total ownership cost reduction • Advanced coating and longer life components

• Corrosion preventive compounds for aircraft

• Real-time structural diagnostics

• Ground tests of components and materials

• Enhanced cost estimating tools

Warfighter protection • Hemostatic field dressing

• Portable medical water producer

• Agile laser

• Occupational fitness for injury reduction

Source: Office of Naval Research.
Appendix II: Fleet Battle Experiments

Page 23 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

Since March 1997 the Navy has conducted nine fleet battle experiments.

Each of these experiments has focused on some of the Navy’s core

missions, such as land attack, or those it expects to conduct in the future.

These experiments have also enabled the Navy to assess how new

technologies and approaches could enhance fleet capabilities and

operations with joint and allied forces. The experiments rotate among the

Navy’s fleets and are scheduled to coincide with a major fleet exercise.

Roughly $5 million is dedicated to each fleet battle experiment. This

amount does not include the operation and maintenance funds expended

by a fleet during the actual experiment. Upon completion, each

experiment is assessed to determine which concepts proved workable and

what follow-on experimentation should be pursued. Table 2 provides some

examples of issues addressed in the fleet battle experiments.

Table 2: Examples of Issues Addressed in Fleet Battle Experiments

Name and date Issues addressed

Alfa

Mar. 1997

• “Ring of Fire” naval surface fire support concepts and systems, such as the arsenal ship.

• C4ISRa systems and concepts for sea-based joint task force commander, including computer assisted

collaborative planning tools and common tactical picture.

Bravo

Aug.-Sept. 1997

• “Ring of Fire” joint fire support coordination processes and systems.

• Joint task force targeting for satellite-guided munitions.

Charlie

May 1998

• Systems and procedures for coordinating area air defense.

• Distributed collaborative planning tools and single air picture.

Delta

Oct.-Nov. 1998

• Data exchange between Navy and Army radar and mission coordination between the AEGIS combat

system and the 2nd Infantry Division.

• Collaborative planning tools and procedures for joint theater air and missile defense.

Echo

Mar. 1999

• Countering asymmetric threats in the littorals. Focus on urban warfare.

• Network centric antisubmarine warfare.

Foxtrot

Nov.-Dec. 1999

• Integrating and coordinating joint fires to destroy fixed and time critical targets.

• Concepts and procedures for mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and force protection.

Golf

Apr. 2000

• Effective response to time critical targets.

• Coordinating theater air and missile defense with U.S. allies.

Hotel

Aug.-Sept. 2000

• Application of network centric operational principles to ensure access in littorals, including

antisubmarine warfare, mine countermeasures, theater air and missile defense, information

operations, and strike support.

• Digital Fires Network.

• Concepts for remote sensors and underwater unmanned vehicles.

India

June 2001

• Operational and tactical concepts and procedures for littoral operations in the 2005-2010 time frame.

• Focus on forced entry and access for expeditionary/contingency operations.

a

Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Source: Navy Warfare Development Command.

Appendix II: Fleet Battle Experiments
Appendix III: Navy-Wide Innovation Activities

Page 24 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

A wide range of innovations and transformation-related activities are being

conducted at the fleet level and in many other Navy organizations. For

example, the Second Fleet has been evaluating the concepts, technologies,

and procedures for network centric antisubmarine warfare. This concept

employs collaborative tools to link ships and aircraft to greatly increase

the effectiveness of antisubmarine forces. It assists the Navy in

implementing its plan to distribute antisubmarine warfare capability

throughout its forces rather than in only a few dedicated platforms.

Table 3 provides examples of Navy innovation activities.

Table 3: Examples of Navy Innovation Activities

Activity Description Participants

Mission Support Center This center provides a central location for gathering data and

information from multiple sources and integrating it into a

single command picture.

Commander, Naval Special

Warfare Group One

Sea-Based Battle Lab A portion of the Third Fleet command ship, U.S.S. Coronado,

is dedicated to configuring technology for experiments with

new command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligence concepts.

Third Fleet

Smart Ship This program focuses on identifying and implementing labor

saving technologies in Navy surface ships with the potential

of saving funds and allowing personnel to concentrate on

their warfighting mission.

Fleets and Navy headquarters

Cross-functional Support Team These teams evaluate new concepts and projects for

command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligence and manage priorities within associated

programs.

Pacific Fleet

Manpower Personnel Database

Project

This system allows the Pacific Fleet submarine force to better

coordinate and manage its personnel.

Commander, Submarine Force,

Pacific Fleet

Afloat Supply Department of the

Future

This initiative optimizes supply operations to coincide with

such efforts as reduced manning aboard Navy ships.

Naval Supply Systems

Command and the Atlantic and

Pacific Fleets

Network Centric Innovation Center This small organization is focused on evaluating the

innovations possible within the 18-24 month range and

integrating them into the force.

Third Fleet

Disruptive Technologies A small staff cell has been dedicated to evaluating disruptive

technologies that could have a significant potential impact on

future operations.

Office of Naval Research

Source: GAO interviews and Navy data.

Appendix III: Navy-Wide Innovation Activities
Appendix IV: Factors for Successful

Transformation

Page 25 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

A number of factors are important for the Navy or any military

organization to successfully transform its forces and operations. On their

own or in combination, these eight factors are useful in establishing

effective planning mechanisms for managing transformation efforts. We

identified these factors from our review of a wide range of Department of

Defense (DOD) and Navy publications and statements, open literature,

academic research on the subject of military innovation and

transformation, and case studies of past transformation efforts. To assess

the reasonableness and completeness of these factors, we discussed these

factors with Navy and DOD officials and outside defense experts from

various research and academic organizations.

A clear and authoritative statement of vision, rationale, and direction of

transformation efforts is necessary. The precise shape and structure of the

future Navy is difficult to determine. But the direction of development for

required capabilities can be outlined to the extent that lines of effort can

be delineated, priorities established, and responsibilities for executing

them assigned. The Navy’s leadership must ensure that such policies are

communicated throughout its organization.

This factor involves the details of transformation and how an organization

should carry them out. This entails a delineation of organizational

elements responsible for converting concepts and ideas into practical

operational and force structure changes.

It is important that personnel and funds are dedicated to innovation and

transformation-related efforts. These efforts include experimentation,

prototype development, and acquisition. For example, the period of the

1920s and 1930s was one of fiscal constraint for the Navy. But it devoted

considerable resources to the development of aircraft carriers and naval

aviation, which later contributed to the Navy’s success during the Second

World War.

Clear and adaptable measures of effectiveness are required for

experiments to determine the value of innovations and for procedural

matters to determine the progress of transformation.

Appendix IV: Factors for Successful

Transformation

Policy

Organization and Process

Resources

Metrics
Appendix IV: Factors for Successful

Transformation

Page 26 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

Innovation and transformation must include changes in how the Navy

operates at all levels. There must be feedback among innovators,

operators, experimenters, doctrine writers, and the training and education

establishment. Many defense experts have recognized this linkage as one

of the most important elements of military transformation.

This is the “culture” aspect of transformation. Leaders from all levels of

the organization should provide tangible commitment to Navy

transformation and to those who make contributions to that end.

Innovators must be given incentives to innovate, allowed to take

reasonable risks in areas such as experiments, and given the authority to

conduct energetic analyses to address the Navy’s future warfare

challenges.

The active support of the Congress is vital to effecting transformation in

the Navy. In some cases, this may be resource-oriented. In others, such

support would involve congressional oversight, as it has in the past, and

provide incentives and direction when and where appropriate. For

example, during the development of naval aviation, the Congress

mandated that those officers seeking to command the new aircraft carriers

had to be flight qualified.1

 This mandate stimulated the career path. To

better ensure an effective transformation, the Navy needs to coordinate its

plans and efforts with the Congress as well as the other services and joint

organizations.

Individual Navy efforts must be interoperable with the other services in

order for future joint operations to be viable. This is applicable to the

specifications of individual capabilities, such as communication

equipment, as well as to the broader issue of developing integrated

operational level capabilities and concepts.

 1

 Flight qualified was determined to be that the officer was qualified as either a naval

aviator or as an “observer.”

Linkage Among

Technology, Concepts, and

Doctrine

Organizational Support

Congressional Support

Joint Interconnectivity
Appendix V: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 27 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

Appendix V: Comments From the

Department of Defense
Appendix V: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 28 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

Now on p. 17.

Now on p. 17.
Appendix V: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 29 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

Now on pp. 15-16.

Now on p. 15.

Now on p. 9.
Appendix V: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 30 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

Now on pp. 8 and 16.
Appendix VI: Organizations and

Offices Contacted

Page 31 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and

Logistics, Science and Technology Plans and Programs

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat

Reduction

• Defense Intelligence Agency

• Joint Vision and Transformation Division

• Joint Advanced Warfighting Program

• Office of the Director for Navy Test and Evaluation and Technology

Requirements

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and

Operations, Strategy and Policy Division

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements

and Programs

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources,

Requirements and Assessments

• Secretary of the Navy (November 16, 1998 – January 20, 2001)

• Office of Naval Research

• Marine Corps Combat Development Command

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

Brookings Institution

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Center for Strategic and International Studies

DFI International

Elliot School of Security Studies, George Washington University

Appendix VI: Organizations and Offices

Contacted

Washington, D.C.,

Area

Department of Defense

The Joint Staff

Department of the Navy

Other Organizations
Appendix VI: Organizations and

Offices Contacted

Page 32 GAO-01-853 Military Transformation

Naval War College

Navy Warfare Development Command

Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Experimentation Directorate

U.S. Atlantic Fleet

• Headquarters

• Naval Surface Force

• Naval Air Force

• Naval Submarine Force

U.S. Second Fleet

Navy Warfare Development Command, Norfolk Detachment

U.S. Third Fleet (U.S.S. Coronado)

Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Naval Special Warfare Command

• Naval Special Warfare Group One

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command

Navy Warfare Development Command, San Diego Detachment

U.S. Pacific Command

U.S. Pacific Fleet

• Headquarters

• Naval Submarine Force

Newport, Rhode

Island, Area

Norfolk, Virginia, Area

San Diego, California,

Area

Honolulu, Hawaii,

Area

(350009)
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