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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

October 28, 2006 

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

 U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING 

 COMMAND-IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY 

TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ 

 DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 

 OFFICE 

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense 

Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-033) 

We are providing this report for your information and use. This review was requested by the 

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United State Senate. In his request, the Chairman 

stated that a critical element of the reconstruction effort in Iraq is the development of 

logistics support capabilities for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) within the Ministries of 

Defense and Interior, including providing and maintaining weapons. 

We considered comments from the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq on the 

draft of this report when preparing the final report. Their comments are addressed in the 

report where applicable, and a copy of their comments is included in the Management 

Comments section of this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott (joseph.mcdermott@sigir.mil / 703-604-0982, or in 

Baghdad at 703-343-7926); or Mr. Clifton Spruill (clifton.spruill@iraq.centcom.mil / 703-

343-9275). See Appendix D for the report distribution. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: See Distribution 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i

Introduction 1

Weapons Type, Quantity, and Quality 4

Sustainment Capabilities and Accountability Issues 7

Conclusion and Recommendations 11

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 15 

B. Weapons Photos and Specifications 17 

C. Acronyms 19 

D. Report Distribution 20 

E. Audit Team Members 22 

Management Comments 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 23 
i

Iraqi Security Forces: 

Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense 

Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

SIGIR-06-033 October 28, 2006

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

The capacity of the Iraqi government to provide national security and public order is 

partly contingent on arming the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), under the Ministries of 

Defense and Interior. The United States is supporting the Iraqi ministries by providing 

arms from a variety of sources, including those captured, donated, and purchased. The 

United States plans to provide equipment for approximately 325,500 ISF personnel by 

December 2006. Of these, 277,600 have been issued weapons as of August 2006. 

Responsibility for determining weapons requirements and the initial equipping and 

training of ISF personnel primarily rests with the Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), a subordinate command of the Multi-National Force-Iraq 

(MNF-I). 

Objectives 

This audit, requested by the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

addresses the type, quantity, and quality of weapons purchased with the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) for the ISF, as well as the ISF’s capability to independently 

maintain and sustain these weapons. 

Although a review of the accountability of the IRRF-funded weapons was not requested, 

its relevance to sustainment warranted a limited assessment of weapons property records 

compared to the quantities purchased with IRRF funds. Further, given the importance of 

controlling these sensitive items—particularly considering the security environment in 

Iraq—we also reviewed compliance with Department of Defense (DoD) policies for 

registering weapons’ serial numbers. 

Results 

About $133 million of the IRRF was used to purchase more than 370,000 weapons 

through 19 contracts with 142 separate delivery orders. The weapons were small arms, 

comprising 12 types that ranged from semiautomatic pistols and assault rifles to heavy 

machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The contracts required that the 

quality of the weapons either be new or weapons not previously issued. 
ii

We identified the following factors as limiting ISF’s capability to independently maintain 

and sustain these specific weapons, and possibly any identical weapons obtained by other 

means than IRRF: 

• the lack of spare parts to conduct maintenance and repairs for most types of 

weapons purchased 

• the lack of a requirement to provide technical repair manuals to ISF maintenance 

personnel 

• the apparent decision by ISF units not to fill vacant arms maintenance positions 

• the questionable accuracy of MNSTC-I inventories for 3 of the 12 types of 

weapons purchased with IRRF funds 

In addition, during our review of contract files, we did not locate sufficient 

documentation to show that MNSTC-I had fully complied with the requirement to 

register the serial numbers of all weapons in the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program. 

Material Management Control Weaknesses 

We identified two material management control weaknesses: 

• the incomplete accountability of weapons procured by DoD for the ISF 

• the apparent non-compliance for the registration of weapons serial numbers under 

the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Commanding General, MNSTC-I, direct his staff to take these 

actions: 

1. Determine the requisite spare parts and technical repair manual requirements by 

weapons type and, if applicable, weapons model and provide this information to 

the Ministries of Defense and Interior. 

2. Review policies and procedures for filling vacant arms maintenance positions and 

implement corrective actions for sustainment. 

3. Establish accurate weapon inventories. 

4. Initiate action to provide weapons serial numbers for compliance with the DoD 

Small Arms Serialization Program. 
iii

Management Comments and Audit Response 

We received written comments on the draft of this report from MNSTC-I officials who 

generally concurred with recommendations 1 through 3, but did not concur with 

recommendation 4. The concurrences were accompanied with comments that identified 

actions underway or planned relating to the recommendations. MNSTC-I officials nonconcurred with recommendation 4, stating that there is no provision or mechanism to 

register foreign-owned weapons in the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program. 

The comments received are responsive to recommendations 1 and 2. However, we do not 

believe that the actions described in MNSTC-I’s comments for recommendation 3, 

including a recently established serial number weapons inventory system, will address a 

method for identifying the inventory of weapons previously purchased and the 

accountability of such weapons. As for MNSTC-I’s basis for non-concurrence with 

recommendation 4, we requested an opinion from: 

• officials at the U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Agency involved 

with the DoD Small Arms Registry 

• Chairman, DoD Small Arms Coordination Committee 

• U.S. Army Executive Agent for Small Arms Logistics at the U.S. Army TankAutomotive Command, Rock Island Arsenal 

They all agreed with our conclusion that the weapons purchased for the ISF with 

appropriated funds under a DoD contract and subsequently transferred to a foreign entity 

should be recorded in the registry. Further, these officials stated that, “weapons bought 

under a DoD contract may be recorded in the small arms registry after they have 

physically transferred to a foreign entity to document that they were shipped outside the 

control of DoD.” 

MNSTC-I’s comments are included in the Management Comments section of this report. 
1

Introduction 

Background 

The capacity of the Iraqi government to provide national security and public order is 

partly contingent on arming the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), composed of Iraqi security 

forces under the Ministries of Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI). The United States is 

supporting the Iraqi ministries by providing arms from a variety of sources, including 

those donated, captured, and those purchased. The United States plans to arm some 

325,500 ISF personnel by December 2006. Of these, 277,600 have been issued weapons 

as of August 2006. Responsibility for determining weapons requirements and the initial 

equipping and training of ISF personnel primarily rests with the Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), a subordinate command of the Multi-National 

Force-Iraq (MNF-I). 

MNSTC-I receives weapons requirement requests from two of its subordinate 

commands—the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) on behalf of MoI 

forces, and the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) on behalf of MoD 

forces. Upon receipt of a weapons request, MNSTC-I personnel assess the stockage 

levels of the existing weapons. If sufficient, a distribution order is submitted and the 

weapons are distributed; if insufficient, a procurement request is forwarded to the 

servicing contracting organization following delivery of the procured items, a distribution 

order is placed. In both instances MNSTC-I receives a copy of the issue document for 

recording. 

In July 2005, to record both MoD and MoI equipment requirements and issues, including 

weapons, MNSTC-I developed two Excel spreadsheets—hereafter referred to as 

“property books.” The two property books (one each for MoD and MoI) reflect the 

equipment1

 provided to each Ministry for their respective ISF units. In the latter part of 

2005 and early 2006, MNSTC-I logistics personnel began entering equipment issue data 

into the spreadsheets, based on file copies of issue documents. Subsequently, at the time 

of this audit, they were in the process of migrating from Excel to Access; the latter 

database offering more management utility and versatility for retrieving equipment issue 

data. 

The MNSTC-I Support Division of the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

(JCC-I/A), is the in-theater servicing contracting organization that provides operational 

contracting support for non-construction projects, such as this U.S. effort to equip and 

train the ISF. JCC-I/A was the repository for the majority2

 of the weapons contracts 

awarded from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). The others were obtained 

from the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM). 

 

1

 The property books also include some non-equipment items such as uniforms and bedding. 

2

 The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) in Warren, Michigan, was the 

repository for files pertaining to three weapons contracts: W52H09-05-C-0058, W52H09-05-C-0059, and 

W56HZV-04-D-0181. 
2

IRRF funds, totaling about $133 million, were used to purchase over 370,000 weapons 

through 19 contracts with 142 separate delivery orders. The first of nineteen contracts for 

IRRF-funded weapons was awarded on November 15, 2003, and the last known contract 

awarded was on April 26, 2005. Three organizations—the Coalition Provisional 

Authority until June 2004, the Project and Contracting Office until November 2004, and 

thereafter the JCC-I/A—performed the requisite procurement actions in Baghdad, Iraq. 

TACOM in Warren, Michigan, administered three contracts—one to obtain complete 

battalion-size sets of equipment, including small arms, and two to procure only weapons. 

Table 1—Contracts Containing IRRF-funded Weapons 

Number Type Date 

Delivery 

Orders Quantity Cost 

W914NS-03-D-0002 IDIQ,a

 FFPb 11/15/2003 8 9,519 $7,015,436

W914NS-04-D-0115 IDIQ, FFP 04/27/2004 53 149,834 $48,820,733

W914NS-04-D-0116 IDIQ, FFP 04/27/2004 35 109,006 $40,385,572

W914NS-05-M-9374 POc 04/27/2004 4 801 $531,312

W914NS-04-C-0110 FFP 04/23/2004 1 225 $111,375

W56HZV-04-D-0181 IDIQ, FFP 05/25/2004 9 32,221 $8,240,706

W914NS-04-D-9003 IDIQ, FFP 05/30/2004 3 1,598 $2,230,700

W914NS-04-M-1204 PO 09/22/2004 1 200 $370,000

W914NS-05-D-9003 IDIQ, FFP 10/18/2004 5 4,050 $3,250,193

W914NS-05-D-9005 IDIQ, FFP 11/15/2004 1 100 $120,000

W914NS-05-M-9320 PO 12/14/2004 1 30 $15,300

W52HO9-05-C-0058 FFP 12/22/2004 1 5,000 $1,271,700

W52HO9-05-C-0059 FFP 12/22/2004 1 5,000 $1,756,550

W914NS-05-C-9047 FFP 02/20/2005 2 600 $1,820,272

W914NS-05-C-9048 FFP 02/26/2005 2 1,900 $4,429,395

W914NS-05-D-9010 IDIQ, FFP 04/26/2005 6 18,072 $5,548,965

W914NS-05-D-9011 IDIQ, FFP 04/26/2005 2 1,480 $472,080

W914NS-05-D-9012 IDIQ, FFP 04/26/2005 6 27,115 $5,652,642

W914NS-05-D-9014 IDIQ, FFP 04/26/2005 1 3,500 $1,221,500

Total 142 370,251 $133,264,430

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A and TACOM contract files 

a IDIQ: Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contracts provide for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of supplies 

or services during a fixed period. Orders are placed for individual requirements. b FFP: Firm Fixed-Price contracts provide for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of contractor’s 

cost experience in performing the contract. The contractor assumes maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs 

and resulting profit or loss. 

 c PO: Purchase Orders are used for supplies and services that exceed the micro-purchase threshold but do not exceed 

the simplified acquisition threshold. 
3

Of the nineteen contracts, two accounted for 67% of the weapons cost,3

 and adding a 

third contract,4

 these three accounted for 73% of the weapons cost. The weapons 

purchased with IRRF funds were small arms5 (see Appendix B for descriptions). Typical 

small arms include 9mm semiautomatic pistols and 7.62mm assault rifles, as well as .50 

caliber heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG-7). The single 

largest groups of weapons, by type, were the Avtomat Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle 

and the GlockTM 9mm semiautomatic pistol, the latter constituting 79% of the pistols 

purchased. 

Objectives 

This audit, requested by the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

addresses the type, quantity, and quality of weapons purchased with the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) for the ISF, as well as the ISF’s capability to independently 

maintain and sustain these weapons. 

Although a review of the accountability of the IRRF-funded weapons was not requested, 

its relevance to sustainment warranted a limited assessment of weapons property records 

compared to the quantities purchased with IRRF funds. Further, given the importance of 

controlling these sensitive items—particularly considering the security environment in 

Iraq—we also reviewed compliance with Department of Defense (DoD) policies for 

registering weapons’ serial numbers. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, and a summary of prior coverage, 

see Appendix A. For photos and specifications of the weapons purchased, see Appendix 

B. For definitions of the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix C. For the report 

distribution, see Appendix D. For the audit team members, see Appendix E. 

 

3

 Contract numbers W914NS-04-D-0115 and W914NS-04-D-0116. 

4

 Contract number W56HZV-04-D-0181. 

5

 Man-portable, individual, and crew-served weapon systems used mainly against personnel and lightly 

armored or unarmored equipment. 
4

Weapons Type, Quantity, and Quality 

Weapons Type and Quantity 

A total of 370,251 weapons, costing about $133 million, have been purchased with IRRF 

funds since November 15, 2003. The two most prevalent types of weapons purchased and 

provided to the ISF personnel in the MoD and MoI were the Avtomat Kalashnikov AK47 assault rifle and the GlockTM 9mm semiautomatic pistol (Table 2). 

Table 2—IRRF-funded Weapons by Type and Quantity 

Typea Total MoDc MoIc

Under Barrel Grenade Launcher 3,900 0 3,900 

Launcher, RPG-7 1,528 100 1,428 

Machine Gun, M-2 .50 caliber 12 12 0 

Machine Gun, MP-5 518 0 518 

Machine Gun, PKM 5,221 1,170 4,051 

Machine Gun, RPK 14,982 6,310 8,672 

Pistol, 9mm, Genericb 38,053 15,329 22,724 

Pistol, 9mm, GlockTM b 138,813 13,650 125,163 

Rifle, Assault, AK-47 165,409 71,493 93,916 

Rifle, Assault, M1-F 751 751 0 

Rifle, Assault, M-4 620 320 300 

Shotgun 384 10 374 

Sniper Rifle 60 0 60 

Total 370,251 109,145 261,106 

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A and TACOM contract files 

a The full name of the weapons types are not given because they are not material to the issues discussed in this 

report. b

 Although two categories of 9-mm pistols were procured, this report discusses all pistols as one type and thus refers 

to an aggregate total of twelve weapon types in this report. c The depicted weapons distribution between MoD and MoI is based on contracts and delivery orders information. 

Actual distribution may have been different. 

Weapons Categories 

The weapons purchased generally fell into two categories; Warsaw Pact6

 and nonWarsaw Pact (see Appendix B). Because ISF personnel were generally familiar with 

Warsaw Pact small arms, a large quantity of the weapons procured with IRRF funds were 

Warsaw Pact weapons. These weapons accounted for 52% of those purchased with IRRF 

 

6 Warsaw Pact is the informal term for the former Warsaw Treaty Organization, a mutual defense body 

founded in 1955. Its members included the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German 

Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
5

funds and 44% of the associated costs. A total of 191,791 Warsaw Pact weapons were 

obtained on 13 of the 19 contracts (Table 3). 

Table 3—IRRF-funded Warsaw Pact Weapons 

Type Total MoD* MoI* 

Launcher, Grenade, Under Barrel 3,900 0 3,900 

Launcher, RPG-7VM 1,528 100 1,428 

Machine Gun, PKM 5,221 1,170 4,051 

Machine Gun, RPK 14,982 6,310 8,672 

Rifle, Assault, AK-47 165,409 71,493 93,916 

Rifle, Assault, M1-F 751 751 0 

Total 191,791 79,824 111,967 

 Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A and TACOM contract files 

* The depicted weapons distribution between MoD and MoI is based on contracts and delivery orders 

information. Actual distribution may have been different.

A total of 178,460 non-Warsaw Pact weapons were procured with IRRF funds (Table 4), 

accounting for 48% of those purchased with IRRF funds and 56% of the associated costs. 

The GlockTM 9mm semiautomatic pistol constituted the largest procurement of the nonWarsaw Pact weapons; 138,813 were purchased primarily on 6 of the 19 contracts, with 2 

contracts accounting for 85%. The GlockTM 9mm pistol, the weapon selected by 

MNSTC-I as the sidearm for the Iraqi police forces, is widely used by police departments 

within the United States because of its safety and reliability features. 

Table 4—IRRF-funded Non-Warsaw Pact Weapons 

Type Quantity MoD*

 

MoI*

Machine Gun, M-2 .50 caliber 12 12 0 

Machine Gun, MP-5 A3 518 0 518 

Pistol, 9mm, Generic 38,053 15,329 22,724 

Pistol, 9mm, Glock TM 138,813 13,650 125,163 

Rifle, Assault, M-4 620 320 300 

Shotgun 384 10 374 

Sniper Rifle 60 0 60 

Total 178,460 29,321 149,139 

 Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A and TACOM contract files 

* The depicted weapons distribution between MoD and MoI is based on contracts and delivery orders 

information. Actual distribution may have been different.
6

Weapons Quality 

The contracts that procured weapons with IRRF funds specified that either new weapons 

or weapons that had not been issued were to be acquired. In spite of the harsh 

environment in Iraq that exposes weapons to dust, sand, and high temperatures, we found 

no reported problems with the quality of any of the weapon types, including the more 

prevalent AK-47 assault rifle and GlockTM 9mm pistol. The latter weapons are widely 

recognized as weapons of proven design and reliability. 
7

Sustainment Capabilities and Accountability Issues 

The effective and efficient sustainment of any piece of equipment is dependent upon a 

few key factors: the availability of spare parts needed to replace broken, worn, or 

defective parts, as well as a means to obtain and distribute them; technical information, 

normally in the form of maintenance and repair manuals, that provides the equipment’s 

design and identifies the component parts; the availability/assignment of trained 

maintenance personnel; and a process for determining maintenance and repair 

requirements (typically based on inventory quantity). 

Repair Parts 

Repair parts were not procured for all weapons. For those parts procured, none was 

available at any of the seven ISF units from which we obtained information. Further, the 

property books did not reflect all procured parts. Specifically, 

• Nearly $269,000 was spent to obtain parts for only 5 of the 12 types7

 of 

weapons procured with IRRF funds. For example, over 5,700 spare parts kits 

were purchased to support the 22,000 PKM and RPK machine guns, but no 

spare parts were procured for the 140,000 GlocksTM. 

• None of the parts procured for the 5 weapon types was available at any of the 

seven MoD and MoI units we contacted. Also, the units did not have any 

existing procedures to requisition and obtain parts. 

• Neither the MoD nor the MoI property books even listed the parts 

nomenclature for 3 of the 5 weapon types for which parts were procured. 

o Generic 9mm pistol -- no listing but 2,163 kits procured 

o AK-47 assault rifle -- no listing but 26,032 kits procured 

o Shotguns -- no listing but 180 kits procured 

• For the 2 procured parts kits reflected in the property books (the RPK and 

PKM machine guns, a total of 5,700 parts kits), the MoD property book 

showed no issues for either type of part kit, and the MoI property book 

identified only 1,133 kits issued. 

Repair Manuals 

We did not identify any contract requirements to acquire weapons repair manuals. The 

nine MoD and MoI units that responded to our inquiries reported that they had no repair 

manuals for any weapons, with the exception of one ISF unit. The latter had a user’s 

manual, written in Kurdish, for the GlockTM pistol that did not include technical repair 

information. 

 

7

 The weapons were RPK and PKM machine guns, AK-47 rifles, one model of BernelliTM semiautomatic 

shotguns, and the 9mm generic semiautomatic pistols purchased under contract W56HZV-04-D-0181. 
8

Based on the decision to obtain Warsaw Pact weapons, it would be reasonable to expect 

that the ISF personnel would not be familiar with the maintenance and repair of the 

GlockTM pistol or any other non-Warsaw Pact weapon. Without repair manuals and the 

spare parts lists normally contained in repair manuals, the ability of the ISF maintenance 

personnel to efficiently and effectively repair the weapons is in question. 

Maintenance Personnel 

Feedback from eight MoD and MoI units indicated that they had no assigned weapons 

maintenance personnel. However, MNSTC-I officials provided data that over 200 MoD 

personnel had received armorer maintenance training as of the end of April 2006. The 

data did not identify any training of MoI arms maintenance personnel. 

Accountability 

Weapons accountability, as reflected in the property books maintained by MNSTC-I for 

MoD and MoI equipment and issues, was questionable. Specifically, the property books 

did not contain a combined inventory of sufficient quantities for three weapons types to 

account for the quantities procured using IRRF funds (see Table 5). 

• 751 M1-F assault rifles were purchased with IRRF funds, but none of these rifles 

were listed in either the MoD or MoI property book—a variance of 100%. 

• 176,866 9mm semiautomatic pistols were acquired with IRRF funds, but only 

163,386 were recorded in the property books and warehoused on-hand quantities 

—a difference of 13,180 pistols, or a variance of over 7%. 

• 518 MP-5 machine guns were acquired with IRRF funds, but property book totals 

were 419 —a difference of 99 weapons, or a variance of 19%. 

It is important to note that the combined quantities8

 of these three items from the MoD 

and MoI property books could reasonably be expected to also include arms from a variety 

of sources, including those donated, those captured, and those purchased with other than 

IRRF funds. Considering this, it would be reasonable to view the IRRF-funded weapons 

as a subset of the total weapons reflected in the property books. 

 

8

 Our use of the term “combined quantities” includes the total amounts, by weapon type, reflected in each 

of the two property books as well as any warehoused quantities that are on-hand pending issue and 

identified for either MoD or MoI distribution. 
9

Table 5—Comparison of Weapons Issued and On-hand to those Procured with IRRF Under Barrel Grenade Launcher Launcher, RPG-7 

Machine 

Gun, 

M-2, 

.50caliber Machine Gun, MP-5 Machine Gun, PKM Machine Gun, RPK Pistol, 9mm (all) Rifle, Assault, AK-47 Rifle, Assault, M1-F Rifle, Assault, M-4 Shotgun Sniper Rifle 

TOTAL 

Issued to MoDa 782 2,724 151 185 8,953 12,207 22,136 139,267 0 4,711 654 982 192,752 

Issued to MoIa 22 572 61 234 7,482 4,839 138,742 140,534 0 0 214 225 292,925 

Total Issued 804 3,296 212 419 16,435 17,046 160,878 279,801 0 4,711 868 1,207 485,677 

Quantity On-hand at 

PWC Warehouseb 3,534 4,132 0 0 400 3,342 2,808 4,862 0 0 139 0 19,217 

Total Issued and 

Warehoused 4,537 7,428 212 419 16,835 20,388 163,686 284,663 0 4,711 1,007 1,207 505,093 

Total Weapons Procured 

with IRRFc 3,900 1,528 12 518 5,221 14,982 176,866 165,409 751 620 384 60 370,251 

IRRF-procured Quantity 

Exceeding Total Issued 

and Warehoused 

 99 13,180 751 14,030 

Source: SIGIR analysis of MoD and MoI property books, JCC-I/A and TACOM contract files, and Public Warehousing Company database inventory 

report. Public Warehousing Company operates the U.S. government-controlled warehouse.

a These are the total issued quantities, by weapons type, as reflected in the MoD and MoI property books as of September 4, 2006. The 

property books reflect all weapons regardless of funding source; therefore, these counts are not exclusive to IRRF-procured weapons. b This is the quantity identified as on-hand for issuance to MoI or MoD organizations, as listed in the Public Warehousing Company 

database inventory report, as of September 4, 2006, regardless of funding source. c The quantity of weapons procured for ISF with IRRF funding was determined by a review of delivery orders and other expenditure 

documents in contract files and financial information generated from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management 

System. 

Recording and Maintaining Weapons Serial Numbers 

All serial numbers for the weapons purchased by DoD and provided to the ISF were not 

registered in the DoD Registry of the Small Arms Serialization Program.9

 Specifically, 

only two10 of the nineteen contracts for IRRF-funded weapons contained a contract data 

requirements list specifying that the contractor provide weapon serial numbers for the 

Small Arms Serialization Program. This information suggests that only about 10,000 of 

the over 370,000 IRRF-funded weapons, or about 2.7%, may have been registered in the 

DoD Registry of the Small Arms Serialization Program. 

 

9

 The Chairman, DoD Small Arms Coordination Committee, the Army Executive Agent for Small Arms 

Logistics, and a representative for the U.S. Army Materiel Command, Logistics Support Agency, Redstone 

Arsenal, Alabama; identified the following DoD small arms policies and procedures, including serial 

number registration, as applicable to these weapons: DoD 4140.1-R, DoD Supply Chain Materiel 

Management Regulation, May 23, 2003; DoD 4000.25-M, Defense Logistics Management System 

(DLMS), March 10, 2003; DoD 400.25-2-M, Military Standard Transaction Reporting and Accounting 

Procedures (MILSTRAP), October 20, 2003. 

10 The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command issued contracts W52HO9-05-C-0058 and 

W52HO9-05-C-0059, each for 5,000 9mm semiautomatic pistols. 
10

However, MNSTC-I did have many file copies of equipment issue documents, and most 

appeared to contain the serial numbers of weapons issued to various ISF organizations. 

Further, the property books contained serial numbers for only 12,128 of the 505,093 total 

weapons issued and warehoused, or only about 2% of weapons provided from all funding 

sources for both MoD and MoI. The sensitivity of weapons accountability, as specified 

in DoD guidance, requires DoD components to register all small arms in the DoD 

Registry of the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program, to include those transferred 

outside their inventories. 
11

Conclusion and Recommendations 

Conclusion 

We identified the following factors as limiting ISF’s capability to independently maintain 

and sustain the 370,251 IRRF-funded weapons: 

• the lack of spare parts to conduct maintenance and repairs for most types of 

weapons purchased 

• the lack of a requirement to provide technical repair manuals to ISF maintenance 

personnel 

• the apparent decision by ISF units not to fill vacant arms maintenance positions11

Complicating the ability to sustain the weapons is the issue of equipment accountability, 

as indicated in the disparity between the recorded property book and warehouse inventory 

balances for 3 of the 12 weapons types and quantities procured with IRRF funds. 

Furthermore, MNSTC-I has not complied with the requirement to register the serial 

numbers of all weapons in the DoD Registry of the DoD Small Arms Serialization 

Program. Most importantly, information in contract records suggests that only about 

10,000 of the over 370,000 IRRF-funded weapons may have been registered in the 

program. 

Material Management Control Weaknesses 

We identified two material management control weaknesses: 

• Not all weapons procured by the DoD for the ISF were properly accounted for, 

which hampers effective sustainment planning and could also indicate physical 

security concerns over weapons. 

• Not all weapons procured with IRRF funds were registered in the DoD Registry 

of the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program. This registry serves as a ready 

means to track and maintain visibility of small arms, to include those transferred 

from the organization’s inventory. 

 

11 The sustainment assessment was limited to the IRRF-funded weapons, but the findings may indicate a 

problem of wider scope. SIGIR addressed U.S. government plans for transitioning a sustainable and 

maintainable logistics operation to the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior in a separate report, “Iraqi 

Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities,” (SIGIR-06-032, October 28, 2006). 
12

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Commanding General, MNSTC-I, direct his staff to take these 

actions: 

1. Determine the requisite spare parts and technical repair manual requirements by 

weapons type and, if applicable, weapons model and provide this information to 

the Ministries of Defense and Interior. 

2. Review policies and procedures for filling vacant arms maintenance positions and 

implement corrective actions for sustainment. 

3. Establish accurate weapons inventories. 

4. Initiate action to provide weapons serial numbers for compliance with the DoD 

Small Arms Serialization Program. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

We received written comments on the draft of this report from MNSTC-I officials who 

generally concurred with recommendations 1 through 3, but did not concur with 

recommendation 4. The concurrences were accompanied with comments that identified 

actions underway or planned relating to the recommendations. MNSTC-I officials nonconcurred with recommendation 4, stating that there is no provision or mechanism to 

register foreign-owned weapons in the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program. 

The comments received are responsive to recommendations 1 and 2. However, we do not 

believe that the actions described in MNSTC-I’s comments for recommendation 3 will 

achieve the desired outcome, and we disagree with the basis for the non-concurrence to 

recommendation 4. 

In response to recommendation 3 regarding accountability, MNSTC-I concurred and 

stated, in part, 

“...MNSTC-I has established a serial number weapons inventory system to 

maintain accountability. MNSTC-I has a process to accurately issue weapons by 

quantity and serial number listing....” 

However, the process it describes was not developed and implemented until after 

weapons purchased for the ISF had begun to arrive and were issued. Consequently, 

reliance on a process that did not exist prior to the procurement, receipt, and issue of the 

weapons will not result in establishing and maintaining accountability of all weapons 

purchased and provided to the ISF prior to that process. MNSTC-I’s comments regarding 

weapon accountability also state, 

“...The weapons are then hand receipted to the appropriate unit [ISF]. Any hand 

receipts created before the establishment of this property book are also used to 

update and improve the accuracy of the record keeping.” 
13

Without first determining how many weapons were in fact purchased and received 

(IRRF-funded or otherwise) there is no assurance full accountability is established for all 

weapons. For example, there could have been undetected losses prior to issuance to the 

ISF, thereby resulting in no issue documents and hand receipts. In effect, management’s 

comments do not recognize that accountability was not established upon receipt for all 

weapons purchased and that any procedures implemented subsequent to the receipt of the 

first weapons will not account for all small arms. A fundamental principal of 

accountability is to establish and maintain accountability from point of purchase/receipt 

to the point of transfer beyond control of DoD. The management comments and stated 

actions will not result in accountability of all weapons purchased. 

In response to recommendation 4, pertaining to compliance with the DoD Small Arms 

Serialization Program, MNSTC-I non-concurred and stated, in part, 

“The recommendation requires MNSTC-I to comply with the DoD Small Arms 

Serialization Program. MNSTC-I contacted the U.S. Army Materiel Command 

Logistics Support Agency (LOGSA). The DoD Small Arms Serialization 

Program provides a national registry of DoD weapons. Only DoD weapons are 

included in this registry. There is currently no provision or mechanism to register 

foreign owned weapons in this program. Therefore, the recommendation to 

comply with the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program is unattainable...” 

We do not agree. MNSTC-I fails to recognize U.S. ownership of the weapons prior to 

transfer to the ISF. The weapons were owned by the Department of Defense, obtained 

using DoD contracts, and were received by DoD employees or contractors. According to 

officials at LOGSA, located at the Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, who are involved with 

the DoD Small Arms Registry; along with the Chairman, DoD Small Arms Coordination 

Committee; and the U.S. Army Executive Agent for Small Arms Logistics at the U.S. 

Army Tank-Automotive Command, Rock Island Arsenal, the weapons purchased with 

appropriated funds under a DoD contract and subsequently transferred to a foreign entity 

should be recorded in the registry. Further, these officials stated that, “weapons bought 

under a DoD contract may be recorded in the small arms registry after they have 

physically transferred to a foreign entity to document that they were shipped outside the 

control of DoD.” 

These officials identified the relevant DoD policy regarding the Small Arms Registration 

Program to include DoD 4000.25-M, Defense Logistics Management System Manual, 

Volume 2 – Supply Standards and Procedures, Chapter 18 – Small Arms Serial number 

Registration and Reporting. This policy states: 

“Shipments Outside the Control of the Department of Defense. When small arms 

are selected for shipment outside the control of the Department of Defense, or when a 

DoD agency assumes title and accountability for U.S. weapons purchased or produced 

under a DoD contract then shipped directly to Security Assistance or other customers 

outside DoD, the shipping activity shall provide DS 140A with Small Arms Transaction 

Code N (Shipment to Other Agencies) or Small Arms Transaction Code F (Shipment to 

FMS/GA) (depending on type of shipment) to the shipping DoD Component Registry. 
14

The shipping DoD Component Registry shall code each weapon in the shipment and 

enter the small arms shipment data into the inactive file.” 

Also identified as applicable was DoD 4140.1-R, DoD Supply Chain Material 

Management Regulation, which states: 

 “The DoD Components shall establish, control, and fund the automated 

registration of all small arms and Category 1 missile and rockets in their inventories, 

including all small arms transferred outside their inventories, such as those released to 

the GSA and those released under foreign military sales arrangements.” 

All of the weapons included in our review were purchased with appropriated funds under 

DoD procurement contracts. The weapons fit the classification as DoD property from 

procurement to receipt by personnel authorized to receive the weapons on behalf of the 

U.S. government and until the point in time they were physically transferred/issued to 

representatives of the Iraqi government. Therefore, all ISF small arms received as a 

result of these contracts should be registered in the DoD Small Arms Registry Program. 

MNSTC-I comments to recommendation 4 did propose an alternative action and stated, 

 “We are in effect moving forward to establish our own automated registry to meet 

the intent of your recommendation.” 

We believe both the time and effort MNSTC-I personnel will spend to “...establish our 

own registry to meet the intent of your recommendation.” will neither meet the intent of 

our recommendation nor would be necessary to satisfy the DoD weapons registration 

policy. 

MNSTC-I’s comments are included in the Management Comments section of this report. 

 
15

Appendix A–Scope and Methodology 

This review was requested by the Chairman of the United States Senate Armed Services 

Committee. This audit was announced on June 26, 2006, (Project No. 6021) to ascertain 

the type, quantity, and quality of weapons purchased with the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and provided to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), as well as 

the ISF’s capability to independently maintain and sustain these weapons. 

To perform this audit, we discussed with and received information from representatives 

from the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the Joint 

Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) regarding weapons procurement, and 

also from the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) for field assessment of weapons 

quality and sustainment aspects. 

To identify the types and quantities of weapons purchased, we obtained from MNSTC-I a 

listing of all IRRF-funded weapons procurements; cross-checked the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers financial management reports of IRRF non-construction expenditures to 

identify any weapon purchases not recorded as weapon purchases in the MNSTC-I data; 

and researched applicable JCC-I/A and U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments 

Command contract files for each contract and delivery order associated with the IRRFrelated expenditures to determine the actual number of weapons obtained, relying on 

either contract documents or financial information contained in the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS). 

To determine weapons quality, we identified contract specifications for weapons quality 

factors and obtained field assessments from MNC-I coalition forces embedded with the 

ISF units. 

To determine the ISF’s capability to independently maintain and sustain the weapons, we 

identified if weapons procurement contracts included either spare parts or repair manuals, 

if property books reflected the procured parts, and the number of trained arms 

maintenance personnel. In addition, the team requested and obtained statements from 

nine Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) ISF units regarding 

the availability of spare parts, repair manuals, and trained maintenance personnel. 

To obtain a limited assessment of weapons accountability, we compared the weapon 

quantities, by weapon type, listed in the MNSTC-I property books for MoD and MoI or 

in the warehouse inventories maintained by the Public Warehousing Company (that 

operates the U.S government-controlled warehouse)12 to the weapon quantities procured 

with IRRF funds. The limited assessment provided sufficient information to question 

 

12 This is the quantity identified for MoD or MoI organizations as listed in the Public Warehousing 

Company database inventory report as of September 4, 2006. 
16

accountability and was consistent with previously reported accountability concerns, 

raised by the Departments of State and Defense Offices of the Inspector General. 

To conduct a limited test of weapons serial number requirements, we contacted the Army 

Executive Agent for Small Arms Logistics to determine applicable policies and 

requirements; reviewed both the IRRF-funded weapons contracts for serial number 

requirements and the MNSTC-I property books for serial numbers of issued weapons; 

and performed a cursory review of issue documents for any evidence of recorded serial 

numbers. 

This audit was conducted from July 2006 through September 2006, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data 

To perform this audit we used data that originated in CEFMS. However, we did not test 

the general and application controls of CEFMS, determining data validity by comparing 

the system data to source documents (contract delivery orders, shipment receiving 

documents, and contractor invoices). This assessment indicated the data was sufficiently 

reliable to fairly portray the cost of weapons purchased for ISF personnel with IRRF 

funds. 

Prior Coverage 

We found no prior audits addressing procurement of IRRF-funded weapons for ISF units. 

However, we conducted an audit of the ISF logistics capabilities, which included a 

review of U.S. government plans and processes underway for the transition of equipment, 

including weapons, to the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior. Our conclusion and 

recommendations included the need to complete and implement the plans, ensure an 

adequate number of logistics personnel are trained, and ensure adequate budgets are 

established to sustain and maintain logistics capabilities. See Iraqi Security Forces: 

Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities, (SIGIR-06-032, October 28, 2006). 

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued, Stabilizing Iraq: An 

Assessment of the Security Situation (GAO-06-1094T, September 11, 2006), which 

includes a discussion of DoD and DoS progress reports on the development of ISF. GAO 

found that these reports did not provide detailed information on specific capabilities that 

affect individual ISF units’ readiness levels. 

The Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training,13 issued jointly by the DoS and 

DoD Inspectors General, contained one recommendation related to areas covered in our 

audit. Specifically, the report recommended coalition authorities should establish internal 

controls to track transfer and accountability of equipment to the Iraqi Police Service. 

 

13 DoS Report No. ISP-IQO-05-72 and DoD Report No. IE-2005-0002 were jointly issued on July 15, 

2005. 
17

Appendix B–Weapons Photos and Specifications 

WEAPONS TYPE SPECIFICATIONS 

Launcher, Grenade, Under Barrel (on AK-47)

Caliber: 40mm 

Launcher Capacity: 1 grenade 

Rate of Fire: 5-6 per minute 

Maximum Effective Range: 400 meters 

Launcher, RPG-7VM (with rocket loaded) 

Caliber (launcher): 40mm 

Warhead Caliber: 72mm to 105mm 

Magazine Capacity: N/A 

Rate of fire: 6 rounds/minute 

Maximum Effective Range: 300-500 meters 

Machine Gun, PKM

Caliber: 7.62mm 

Magazine Capacity: 100-250 rounds 

Rate of fire: 250-650 rounds/minute 

Maximum Effective Range: 1,000 meters 

Machine Gun, RPK (with bipod folded under barrel)

Caliber: 7.62mm. 

Magazine Capacity: 40 rounds 

Rate of fire: 150-600 rounds/minute 

Maximum Effective Range: 800 meters 

Rifle, Assault, AK-47

Caliber: 7.62mm x 39mm 

Magazine Capacity: 30 rounds 

Rate of fire: Up to 600 rounds/minute 

Maximum Effective Range: 300 meters 

Rifle, Assault, M1-F 

Caliber: 5.56mm 

Ammo Box Capacity: 30 rounds 

Rate of fire: 700 rounds/minute 

Maximum Effective Range: 600 meters 
18

WEAPONS TYPE SPECIFICATIONS 

Machine Gun, M2 .50-caliber

Caliber: .50-inches (12.7-mm) 

Magazine Belt Feed, varies 

Rate of Fire: 550 rounds per minute 

Maximum Effective Range: 2,000 meters 

MP-5

Caliber: 9mm x 19mm 

Magazine Capacity: 30 

Rate of Fire: 800 rounds per minute 

Maximum Effective Range: 100 meters 

Pistol, Semiautomatic, GlockTM

Caliber: 9mm x 19mm 

Magazine Capacity: 15 

Rate of Fire: 800 rounds per minute 

Maximum Effective Range: 100 meters 

 

 Note: 85% of the pistols purchased 

M-4 Assault Rifle

Caliber: 5.56mm 

Magazine Capacity: 30 rounds 

Rate of fire: 700-950 rounds/minute 

Maximum Effective Range: 600 meters 

Shotgun 

Gauge: 12 gauge 

Magazine Capacity: 4 (plus 1 in chamber) 

Rate of fire: N/A 

Maximum Effective Range: N/A 

Sniper Rifle (telescopic sight below) 

Caliber: 7.62mm 

Magazine Capacity: 4 rounds 

Rate of fire: Single or automatic up to 600 

rounds/minute 

Maximum Effective Range: 1,350 meters 

Source: JCC-I/A contract files and DoD 
19

Appendix C–Acronyms 

CEFMS Corps of Engineers Financial Management System 

CMATT Coalition Military Assistance Training Team 

CPATT Civilian Police Assistance Training Team 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoS Department of State 

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office 

ISF Iraqi Security Forces 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

LOGSA U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Agency 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

MoD Ministry of Defense 

MoI Ministry of Interior 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
20

Appendix D–Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq* 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 

* Recipient of the draft audit report. 
21

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and 

International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 

Relations 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 
22

Appendix E–Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of Joseph T. 

McDermott, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Mark Comfort 

Walt Keays 

Larry Monson 

Jack Van Meter 
23

Management Comments 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 
24