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STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND

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The Congress ofthe United States

Congressional Budget Office

|pwßUTY INSPECTED 9
NOTES

All costs are expressed in 1997 dollars of budget authority.

Unless otherwise indicated, all years referred to in this report are fiscal years.

Unless otherwise noted, Army forces in 1998 refer to levels requested in the President's budget for that year.

Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because ofrounding.

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-049378-1
Preface

The U.S. Army has changed dramatically in the past 10 years in both mission and size. Its

Cold War focus on deterring or defeating the Soviet Union has shifted to a more global

mission offighting smaller conflicts against less formidable foes anywhere in the world.

Today's Army is also 30 percent smaller than it was a decade ago.

In spite ofthose changes, the composition ofthe Army has not shifted markedly. The service

remains almost equally divided between active-duty and reserve soldiers (those in the National

Guard and Army Reserve), although the reserve component now has a slight majority. A question

under debate in defense circles is whether that composition is well suited to the Army's current role

offighting regional conflicts and taking part in peacekeeping operations.

The Army hopes to make its force structure better suited to its current mission by converting

some ofthe combat forces in the National Guard to support forces. That change would eliminate

some ofthe excess combat forces left over from the Cold War. But it would not enable the Army

to get to regional conflicts more quickly than it can today. Nor would it improve the Army's ability

to carry out the peacekeeping operations in which it is increasingly engaged. Finally, because the

Army's plan would not reduce the overall size ofthe service, it would not yield significant savings.

Without such savings, the Army may have difficulty finding the funds to acquire the modern

weapons it will need in the next two decades.

Are more extensive changes in the Army's structure feasible? This Congressional Budget

Office (CBO) study—conducted at the request of the Subcommittee on Personnel of the Senate

Committee on Armed Services—examines several alternative approaches for meeting the Army's

force requirements. It compares the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative with those of

the current Army and the Army's plan to reorganize the National Guard. In keeping with CBO's

mandate to provide objective analysis, the study makes no recommendations.

Frances M. Lussier of CBO's National Security Division prepared the study, with the assistance of Douglas J. Taylor, under the general supervision of Cindy Williams and R. William

Thomas. Jo Ann Vines of CBO's Budget Analysis Division provided the cost analysis. The

author also gratefully acknowledges the contributions of David Torregrosa, Lane Pierrot, and

Deborah Clay-Mendez ofCBO.

Christian Spoor edited the manuscript, Judith Cromwell and Cindy Cleveland produced drafts

ofthe study, and Kathryn Quattrone prepared it for publication. Laurie Brown prepared the electronic version for CBO's World Wide Web site.

June E. O'Neill

Director

December 1997

This study and other CBO publications

are available at CBO's Web site.

http ://www.cbo. gov/
Contents

SUMMARY XI

ONE INTRODUCTION

TWO

What Determines the Size ofthe Army? 1

How Is the Army Structured? 2

THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS

FOR VARIOUS MISSIONS

THREE

FOUR

Force Requirements for Two Major

Regional Conflicts 7

Force Requirements for Lesser Contingencies 12

Force Requirements for Maintaining U.S.

Presence Overseas 13

Force Requirements for State Missions 13

COMPARING ARMY FORCES WITH

REQUIREMENTS

Assessment of Army Forces for Two Major

Regional Conflicts 15

Assessment of Army Forces for Lesser

Contingencies and Overseas Presence 23

Assessment ofNational Guard Forces

for State Missions 24

Overall Assessment ofthe Army's Structure 25

ALTERNATIVES FOR MEETING THE ARMY'S

FORCE REQUIREMENTS

The Army's Plan 28

Alternative I: Increase Reliance on Host-Nation

Support and Civilian Contractors 33

Alternative II: Create Additional Support Forces

in the Active Army 36

Alternative III: Increase Reliance on Host-Nation

Support and Create Additional Support Forces

in the Active Army 41

15

27
vi STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

Alternative IV: Rely More Heavily on the Reserves

to Fight a Second MRC 43

Comparison ofthe Alternatives 45

APPENDIX Details About CBO's Mobility Analysis 49
CONTENTS vii

TABLES

S-1. Changes in Force Structure Under the Army's

Plan and Four Alternatives xvi

S-2. Effect ofthe Army's Plan and Four Alternatives on

Annual Costs, Deployment Times, and Number of Forces xviii

1. Planned Distribution ofActive, Guard, and Reserve Forces

in the Army at the End of 1998 3

2. Major Combat Units in the Army 4

3. Ratio of Support Personnel to Combat Personnel

in Defense Analyses and Actual Conflicts 10

4. The Army's Deployment Goals for a Major

Regional Conflict 16

5. Changes in Force Structure Under the Army's

Plan and Four Alternatives 28

6. Effect ofthe Army's Plan and Four Alternatives on

Annual Costs, Deployment Times, and Number of Forces 30

7. Army Personnel Levels Through 2000 Based on the

President's Budget and the Recommendations ofthe

Quadrennial Defense Review 33

8. Effect That Increased Support from Host Nations

and Civilian Contractors Would Have on Deployment

Times 35

9. Changes in the Number ofArmy Personnel

Under Alternative III 42

10. Average Annual Savings Under Alternative III 42

11. Average Annual Savings Under Alternative IV 44

A-1. Number of Sealift Ships Under the Control of

the U.S. Transportation Command and Their

Readiness Status 50

A-2. Characteristics ofVarious Types of Sealift Ships

Under the Control ofthe US. Transportation Command 51
viii STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

FIGURES

S-1. Army Forces Planned for 1998 xii

S-2. Number ofEmployable Army Forces Compared with

Requirements for Two Major Regional Conflicts xiii

S-3. Army Forces Under Various Alternatives xx

1. Army Forces Planned for 1998 4

2. Number of Deployable Army Forces Compared with

Requirements for Two Major Regional Conflicts 11

3. Number ofArmy National Guard Personnel,

by State, at the End of 1996 14

4. Total Equipment Required in Theater for a

Major Conflict in the Middle East 16

5. Army Forces Available for a Conflict in Korea

Followed by a Conflict in the Middle East,

Compared with Requirements 17

6. The Army's Deployment Schedule for the Combat

and Support Forces Required for Two Major

Regional Conflicts 18

7. The Army's Deployment Schedule for a Major

Conflict in the Middle East, Compared with

Deployment During the Persian GulfWar 19

8. Estimated Schedule for Delivering Equipment to

a Major Conflict in the Middle East Under Varying

Assumptions About Lift 20

9. Estimated Schedule for Delivering Equipment to

Two Major Regional Conflicts Under Varying

Assumptions About Lift 21

10. Estimated Deployment Schedules for Reserve Support

Forces for a Major Conflict in the Middle East 22

11 • Army Forces Available for Two MRCs After Reorganizing

the National Guard and Making Cuts Recommended by

the Quadrennial Defense Review 32

12. Total Combat Forces and Support Equipment in Theater

for a Second MRC Under the Army's Plan and Alternative II 38
CONTENTS ix

13. Army Forces Available for a Conflict in Korea

Followed by a Conflict in the Middle East

Under Alternatives II and III 39

14. Army Forces Under Various Alternatives 46

BOX

1. How Realistic Are the Two-MRC Requirements?
Summary

The U.S. Army provides the bulk ofthe ground

forces needed to carry out the nation's defense

strategy. That strategy has changed dramatically over the past 10 years—from the Cold War mission of deterring or defeating the forces of the Soviet

Union and its allies, to a strategy that emphasizes the

United States' role as a world leader and promoter of

democracy. The Army's role in furthering national security is to provide forces that can fight and win major

regional conflicts, take part in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts, and help maintain domestic

tranquility and civil order. To play its role in carrying

out those missions, the Army maintains three separate

organizations: the active Army, the Army National

Guard, and the Army Reserve.

Current Army Forces

In today's Army, reserve troops outnumber active-duty

ones. At the end of 1996, the Army's active component

contained 491,000 soldiers and its reserve component

596,000 soldiers. (As used in this study, the term "reserve" refers to members ofthe Army National Guard

as well as the Army Reserve.) During peacetime, most

reservists are not full-time soldiers, in the same sense

that volunteer firemen are not full-time firemen. Consequently, their costs are much lower than those of

active-duty soldiers. As a result, the Army's 1997 budget devoted $38 billion to the pay, operations, and

maintenance of active-duty forces but only about $9

billion to comparable spending for reserve forces.

The difference in funding results in part from the

difference in availability and readiness ofthe active and

reserve components. Soldiers on active duty are always

available to respond to orders from the Commander in

Chief. By contrast, most Army reservists are civilians

who practice or drill only part time during peacetime

but can be called to active duty in the event of a crisis.

The 226,000 members ofthe Army Reserve are federal

reservists and must first be called to active duty by the

President before they can be assigned military tasks

outside the scope ofregular training duty. The National

Guard, with 370,000 members at the end of 1996, reports during peacetime to state governors and forms the

state militias mandated in the Constitution. The Guard

provides a force that governors can call on to meet domestic emergencies and maintain civil order. During a

national crisis, the President can call members of the

National Guard to federal active duty.

Force Requirements

The Army employs more than 1 million soldiers to

carry out its assigned tasks as part of U.S. national security strategy. The Clinton Administration has declared that the United States must have enough forces

to fight two regional conflicts similar in size to the Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) ifthey break

out nearly simultaneously. (Not all military strategists

agree that the nation must be able to fight two conflicts

of such magnitude at the same time. Nevertheless, the

Congressional Budget Office based its analysis on that

requirement because it determines current Administra-
xii STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY December 1997

tion policy.) Forces that can meet that requirement are

likely to be more than adequate, at least in terms of

size, to meet the Army's less demanding tasks of conducting peacekeeping operations or responding to domestic emergencies (though perhaps not all at the same

time).

Based on a recent study of its force requirements

—the Total Army Analysis 2003—the Army says it

needs 672,000 troops in deployable units to fight two

nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs).

That number is more than the total number of activeduty troops in the Army but significantly less than total

Army forces when all reserves are included. However,

not all ofthe units in the Army's active or reserve forces

are designed to take part in overseas conflicts. A significant fraction of Army personnel—about 25 percent

ofthe active forces and 19 percent ofthe reserve forces

—are assigned to the "institutional" Army; they are responsible for teaching, training, and various administrative functions. Generally, they are not part of units that

are slated to deploy overseas. Of course, that still

leaves the majority of Army forces (slightly less than

780,000) assigned to deployable combat or support

units and thus available to military commanders worldSummary Figure 1.

Army Forces Planned for 1998

1,400

1,200

Thousands of Authorized Personnel

Total Forces Deployable Forces

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Ronald E.

Sorter, Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for

Major Regional Contingencies (Santa Monica, Calif.:

RAND, 1995); and General Accounting Office, Force

Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict

Strategy with Some Risks, GAO/NSIAD-97-66 (February 1997).

NOTE: Does not include cuts recommended by the Quadrennial

Defense Review.

wide to take part in regional conflicts (see Summary

Figure 1).

Although the Army has more deployable forces

than it says it needs to fight two MRCs, those forces

contain too many troops in combat units—divisions and

separate combat brigades—and not enough in support

units (see Summary Figure 2). The Army's combat

units contain more than 350,000 troops. But in planning for two MRCs, the Department of Defense (DoD)

and the Army assume that only about 195,000 of the

672,000 troops needed—or less than a third ofthe total

—would be combat forces. According to Army plans,

the other 477,000 troops would come from units that

perform supporting activities, such as providing military intelligence, transporting troops and cargo around

the battlefield, or providing medical care. That requirement for support forces, however, exceeds the number

of such forces now in the Army by approximately

58,000 troops:

The Administration and the Army have set an ambitious schedule for deploying forces overseas to fight a

major regional conflict. The notional timetable assumed in the Total Army Analysis 2003 would require

that most Army troops be in the theater of operations

within 30 days ofthe start ofthe conflict. Plans developed by other DoD agencies assume that all of the

troops and equipment needed for one MRC would be

delivered within 90 days. One reason for such a tight

schedule is that military planners do not believe a future

adversary would give the United States the luxury of

200 days to build up forces in a theater, as Iraq did during the Persian GulfWar.

A second major conflict would require a similar

number of troops to be sent to another theater. (The

two theaters DoD often mentions when discussing

MRCs are the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East.)

Ifconflicts were to break out in two areas nearly simultaneously, deployments to the second theater could begin shortly after the start ofthe first conflict—perhaps

within 40 to 45 days—and certainly before all forces

were delivered to the first theater. If deliveries to the

second conflict followed the same schedule as deliveries

to the first, the remainder ofthe 672,000 troops needed

to fight two MRCs would have to arrive overseas

within 90 days of the outbreak of the second conflict.

Put another way, all deliveries to both theaters would

have to be completed within 135 days ofthe start ofthe
SUMMARY xui

first conflict (assuming that all deliveries to the first

theater were finished in 90 days, that the second conflict began 45 days after the first, and that the buildup

in the second theater was also accomplished within 90

days).

Concerns About the Army's Current

Force Structure

Several aspects of the Army's current force structure

raise concerns among defense experts. Chief among

those is the excess of combat forces. The approximately 350,000 soldiers assigned to Army combat units

are many more than are needed to carry out current war

plans. Slightly over half ofthose soldiers are assigned

to the active component, and almost all ofthem have a

direct role to play in fighting two major regional conflicts. The other 175,000 are assigned to combat divisions and brigades in the National Guard. (The Army

Reserve has no combat forces.) But in the Total Army

Analysis 2003, just 30,000 of those reserve combat

troops are assumed to fight in either of the two major

conflicts. They would presumably be used as reinforcements in a second MRC, should one erupt shortly after

a first.

Those 30,000 reserve combat forces would come

from six of the National Guard's enhanced readiness

brigades. ERBs are combat brigades that the Administration plans to maintain at a higher level ofreadiness

than other combat forces in the Guard. Besides the six

ERBs included in the Army's planning for two major

regional conflicts, the Guard maintains another nine

enhanced brigades with 35,000 combat troops. Furthermore, it has an additional 110,000 combat forces

(organized into eight divisions) that have no direct combat role to play in likely conflicts. That fact led the

Commission on Roles and Missions to conclude in

1995 that the Army had 110,000 excess combat troops

that were good candidates for converting to support

roles or eliminating from the force structure.

The overemphasis on combat troops is partly a legacy of the Cold War. During that time, the military

believed it needed a large number of ground combat

forces to deter the Soviet Union from attacking U.S.

allies in Europe. Keeping excess combat troops also

Summary Figure 2.

Number of Deployable Army Forces Compared with Requirements for Two Major Regional Conflicts

Thousands of Personnel

1,000

800

600

400

200

Active H Guard FJ Reserve

Support

Total

Combat

Requirement Authorized Requirement Authorized Requirement Authorized

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Ronald E. Sorter, Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Contingencies

(Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 1995); and General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict

Strategy with Some Risks, GAO/NSIAD-97-66 (February 1997).

NOTE: Requirements are based on the results of the Total Army Analysis 2003.
xiv STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

provides some insurance against unforeseen circumstances. In addition, the Army may be reluctant to shed

combat forces, with their expensive weapons and intensive training requirements, because ofthe large amount

ofmoney and time it has invested in them.

In contrast to the overabundance of combat forces,

the Total Army Analysis 2003 identified a shortage of

units to support those forces. Specifically, it concluded

that the Army requires another 58,400 support troops

to carry out its mission of fighting two MRCs nearly

simultaneously.

Another concern is that the Army's large requirements for both support and combat units make it rely

heavily on the Navy and Air Force to provide transport

planes and ships (known as mobility assets) to move its

forces overseas. The Congressional Budget Office

(CBO) estimates that for just one major regional conflict, the Army would need to move at least 40 million

square feet of equipment. Because the number ofships

and planes available to carry equipment is limited, the

time needed to make multiple trips across oceans can

substantially delay the buildup offorces in a theater.

That delay could prevent the Army from meeting

its desired deployment schedule. Using relatively optimistic assumptions, CBO estimated how long it would

take the U.S. mobility assets proposed for early next

century—including equipment that the Army plans to

store overseas, an expanded sealift fleet, and a modernized airlift fleet—to transport all of the Army's forces

and associated equipment to two conflicts that broke

out 45 days apart. CBO's results indicate that getting

all Army forces to the theater for an initial conflict in

the Middle East could require as much as 140 days,

rather than the 90 days assumed in some DoD plans.

(CBO's mobility analysis is described in more detail in

the appendix.) The time required to complete deliveries

to a second theater could be almost 200 days. Although

such delays are similar to the ones experienced during

the Persian GulfWar, the Army had hoped to speed up

its deployments substantially in the future. All told,

CBO's analysis suggests that delivering all Army forces

to both theaters might take as long as 240 days—significantly longer than the 135 days consistent with

DoD's notional schedule.

Another possible concern with the Army's current

structure stems from the fact that most of its support

forces (almost 70 percent) are in the reserves. Because

oftheir part-time status, reserve units take longer to get

ready for deployment than comparable active-duty

units. The Army's planning calls for large numbers of

reservists to deploy to an initial MRC in 30 days. The

Army itself acknowledges that 79,000 ofthose reservists would typically need more than 30 days to deploy

overseas and thus would not be able to meet such a

schedule. This concern may be somewhat moot, however, because mobility assets would probably not be

available to move the reserve forces overseas even if

they were ready within 30 days.

Getting many ofthose reserve units ready to deploy

when mobility assets became available, however, could

still be difficult. For example, the Army's force requirements call for having more than 110,000 reservists

in Korea in 90 days for an MRC there. CBO estimates

that transportation delays would slow the schedule

somewhat but that those reservists would be needed in

theater within 110 days of the start of a conflict. By

contrast, in the Gulf War, approximately 200 days

elapsed before the Army assembled about 73,000 reservists in the Middle East.

Even in peacetime, some types of support unitssuch as water-supply battalions and prisoner-of-war

brigades—are found only in the reserve component.

That means reserve personnel have to be put on active

duty and deployed overseas to take part in even small

operations such as the recent ones in Haiti and Bosnia,

which involved less than 5 percent ofthe Army's activeduty troops. That dependence on reservists is in keeping with the Administration's Total Force Policy, which

is designed to involve all components ofthe military in

DoD operations. But activating and deploying reservists for small operations incurs both monetary and nonmonetary costs.

A final concern with the Army's force structure is

that it is expensive to maintain and equip. The service's

current annual budget of about $60 billion would be

stretched to operate and support all of the Army's

forces as well as outfit them with the new weapons and

materiel they will need in coming decades. Some defense experts believe that the Army's budget is unlikely

to grow appreciably in the near future—and may even

shrink when adjusted for inflation. As a result, the service may need to find ways to reduce the cost ofmaintaining and equipping its forces.
SUMMARY xv

The Army's Plan for Its

Force Structure

The Army has proposed relieving its perceived shortage

of support troops by converting some combat units in

the reserve component to units that perform support

functions. Specifically, the Army plans to turn 12 National Guard combat brigades into support units, thus

creating 42,700 additional support troops and eliminating all but 15,700 ofthe perceived shortfall. That reorganization would take about 10 years to complete and

cost almost $3 billion, according to the Army's preliminary estimates. However, the cost (primarily to buy

trucks for the new support units) could decrease as the

Army continues to evaluate and refine its estimates of

the equipment needed for those units.

The Department of Defense's recent Quadrennial

Defense Review (QDR) recommended additional

changes in the Army, including reductions in both the

active and reserve components. The suggested cuts are

relatively small: 15,000 active-duty soldiers and

45,000 reservists from the 1998 requested levels of

495,000 and 575,000, respectively. According to Defense Secretary William Cohen's report on the QDR,

those cuts reflect increased efficiency in support activities and an anticipated reduction in the size of some

Army divisions. In the case ofthe reserve component,

the report said, another reason to have a smaller force is

the reduced need for the large Cold War strategic reserve—typically assumed to mean the eight combat divisions in the Guard.

Beyond specifying that the active Army should retain all ofits current combat units, the QDR report contained little specific information about how and when

those reductions should be made. Thus, many of the

details—such as the time needed to carry out the cuts,

their distribution between deployable and nondeployable units, and whether to reduce the number of Guard

combat units (beyond the 12 brigades affected by the

Army's reorganization plan)—remain to be resolved.

Furthermore, changes in the size of any ofthe Army's

three organizations (active, Guard, or Reserve) would

require Congressional approval. Since little is yet

known about how the Army will resolve those details or

whether the Congress will approve them, CBO's analysis ofthe Army's plan to reorganize the National Guard

assumes no changes beyond those already outlined.

The Army's reorganization plan has much to recommend it. By converting some combat units that have

no direct role to play in an MRC into support units, the

plan would accomplish two goals at once: filling an

identified need for support forces and eliminating some

redundant combat forces. It would also carry out part

of the recommendation made by the Commission on

Roles and Missions in 1995. And in making those

changes, the Army would avoid cutting its active-duty

combat forces, which some observers believe are barely

adequate to carry out the missions assigned to them.

The Army's plan, however, would not address many

of the issues that have been raised about the current

force structure. For example, the Army would still face

many ofthe same problems in carrying out small peacetime operations or prosecuting two nearly simultaneous

MRCs that it does today. Specifically, the bulk ofthe

support forces would remain in the reserve component.

Thus, the Army would need to rely heavily on the reserves for early-deploying support forces in an MRC.

And some reserve units would still be needed to support

small operations during peacetime.

Among other concerns, the Army's plan would not

reduce the amount of equipment that would have to be

transported overseas for a major regional conflict. And

although the plan would cut the number of excess combat forces, it would not eliminate them entirely. In fact,

the Army would retain more than 60,000 combat troops

with no direct role in fighting anticipated conflicts. Finally, the reorganization plan would cost money in the

near term—at a time when the Army's budget is already

strained.

Alternatives to the Army's

Plan

The Army could take several other approaches to address the shortcomings in its current structure. It could

rely more heavily on the host nation—the country in
xvi STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

whose defense it was supplying combat troops—to provide logistical support early in a conflict. That would

reduce the need for large numbers ofsupport personnel

in the Army's ranks and for massive amounts oftransportation to move equipment overseas. Alternatively,

the Army could create more support forces among its

active-duty troops, which would reduce its dependence

on reserve forces in the early stages of a regional conflict or in small peacetime operations. Finally, the

Army could lower its peacetime costs by cutting the

size of the active force and relying more heavily on

combat troops in the reserves to fight in a second major

conflict, should one erupt.

CBO constructed four specific alternatives to illustrate how the Army might change if it followed those

strategies (see Summary Table 1). CBO then compared

and evaluated the alternatives based on how well they

would meet the Army's force requirements, whether the

resulting structure would be balanced between combat

and support forces, how quickly those forces could respond to crises overseas, and how much they would

cost (see Summary Table 2).

Recognizing today's fiscal constraints, none ofthe

alternatives would increase the overall size ofthe Army

or any of its three organizations. Nor would they inSummary Table 1.

Changes in Force Structure Under the Army's Plan and Four Alternatives

Option Changes in Force Structure

Army's Plan: Reconfigure the National Guard

Alternative I: Increase Reliance on Host-Nation

Support and Civilian Contractors

Alternative II: Create Additional Support Forces

in the Active Army

Alternative III: Combine Alternatives I and II

Alternative IV: Rely More Heavily on the Reserves

to Fight a Second Major Regional Conflict

o Convert 12 Guard combat brigades to support units

o Eliminate four Guard combat divisions

o Rely on host nations and civilian contractors for the

equivalent of 62,000 Army support troops in two

major regional conflicts

o Convert two active-duty heavy divisions and one

Guard combat division to support units

o Convert two active-duty heavy divisions to support

units

o Eliminate four Guard combat divisions

o Cut 35,000 support troops from the reserve component

o Rely on host nations and civilian contractors for the

equivalent of 62,000 Army support troops in two

major regional conflicts

o Eliminate three active-duty divisions (two heavy and

one light) and four Guard combat divisions

o Rely on host nations and civilian contractors for the

equivalent of 62,000 Army support troops in two

major regional conflicts

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: None of CBO's alternatives would carry out the Army's planned conversion of 12 Guard combat brigades to support units.
SUMMARY

crease the size ofthe Army at the expense ofthe Navy

or the Air Force. In addition, CBO focused solely on

options that would change the composition ofthe forces

that make up the Army's deployable units. None ofthe

alternatives examine the feasibility of converting forces

in the institutional Army to forces that would deploy to

fight in regional conflicts.

For options that would cut the Army's force structure (Alternatives I, III, and IV), CBO estimated the

savings that would result both directly and indirectly

from those cuts. Direct savings come from avoiding

costs to operate and support the deployable forces that

would be eliminated. Indirect savings come from reductions in the Army's infrastructure that might be possible because of the cuts in force structure. In other

words, indirect savings reflect the potentially reduced

need for medical support, training, repair facilities, and

other support associated with a smaller Army. As such,

indirect savings reflect cuts in the number of both Army

civilians and nondeployable forces.

Alternative I: Increase Reliance on

Host-Nation Support and Civilian

Contractors

The first option would reduce both the Army's need to

have support forces in theater early in a conflict and the

requirement for large numbers of ships and planes to

get them there. Under this alternative, the U.S. troops

that arrived earliest in the theater would receive some

support services from the host country and from civilian contractors hired by the Army. Such support could

include everything from housing to transportation to

supplies offood, water, and fuel.

The United States has used that type of assistance

in the past. During the Korean War, the Army relied on

the services of hundreds of thousands of Korean and

Japanese civilians. More recently, the government of

Saudi Arabia assisted the Army during the Persian Gulf

War by providing petroleum products and trucks to

transport them. Civilian contractors provided further

support services during the Gulf War, are providing

them now in Bosnia, and are on retainer to the Army to

furnish such services worldwide when needed.

Assistance from host countries and use of civilian

contractors could lessen the number of support forces

that the Army needs to maintain in its own ranks. Both

Saudi Arabia and South Korea—commonly considered

likely theaters for any major conflict involving U.S.

forces in the near future—have civilian infrastructures

that are more than capable of providing significant

amounts of host-nation support. (Army planning assumes that Saudi Arabia and South Korea would provide some support during an MRC. But the amount is

limited to what is explicitly spelled out in signed agreements and is much smaller than the amount of similar

support that host nations have provided in the past.) In

addition, civilian contractors working for DoD in the

theater could provide services such as laundry and food

that would otherwise have to be supplied by U.S. soldiers. The combined contributions of host-nation support and civilian contractors during two MRCs could

potentially replace the support and services provided by

62,000 Army soldiers (see Summary Figure 3 on

p. xx).

In terms offorce structure, Alternative I would cancel the Army's plan to convert National Guard combat

units to support units. It would eliminate four combat

divisions, including about 58,300 personnel, from the

Guard. It would also cut another 3,200 Guard members

from the institutional Army who indirectly support

those divisions.

Advantages. Alternative I would have two advantages

over the Army's plan. First, by cutting four Guard divisions and forgoing Guard reorganization, the Army

could save roughly $1.4 billion a year once all the divisions had been disbanded—$800 million in direct costs

and $600 million in indirect costs. Second, this alternative would reduce the amount of equipment to be

shipped overseas for two MRCs by more than 10 percent. The reason is that support equipment from the

host nation would already be in place, and civilian contractors generally provide services by subcontracting

with local suppliers that are also in the country already.

Any transportation from the United States that the contractors might need would generally be arranged

through the commercial sector. With less equipment to

transport overseas, the Army could get all ofits forces

in place for each regional conflict 10 to 30 days earlier

than under its current plan (see Summary Table 2).
xviii STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY December 1997

Disadvantages. Adopting Alternative I would have

some disadvantages, although they are roughly the

same as those associated with the Army's current force

structure. Relying on host nations and civilian contractors for support—which the Army would be forced to

do now if it had to fight two MRCs—entails risks.

Army planners cannot always predict where a conflict is

going to break out, and the civilian infrastructure may

not exist to support operations in some remote areas.

Some host nations might be reluctant or unable to provide such assistance, as was the case with Somalia.

Furthermore, host-nation civilians and civilian contractors may be unwilling or unable to provide services during some conflicts because of potential exposure to

harm, particularly from chemical or biological weapons.

For all of those reasons, the Army prefers not to

count on the availability of host-nation support and civilian contractors beyond levels guaranteed in signed

agreements. Instead, the Army's preference is to keep

all of the support forces it might need within its own

ranks.

Summary Table 2.

Effect of the Army's Plan and Four Alternatives on Annual Costs, Deployment Times, and Number of Forces

Army

in 1998

Army's

Plan"

Alternatives

I II III IV

1998-2010

Direct savings

Total savings

After 2010

Direct savings

Total savings

First Theater

Second Theater0

Combat Brigades

Soldier Equivalents

Average Annual Savings or Costs (-)

(Millions of 1997 dollars)

n.a. -200 to -400

n.a. -200 to -400

n.a. 0

n.a. 0

700

1,200

800

1,400

Deployment Time0

(Days after start of first conflict)

130

200

130

230

120

200

-200

-200

100b

100b

130

230

Combat Forces from the Guard Needed for the Second Conflict*

0 0 0 6

Assumed Extent of Host-Nation Support

15,000 15,000 62,000 10,000

850

1,550

1,300

2,150

120

200

2,500

4,500

2,950

5,250

120

200

62,000 62,000

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: n.a. = not applicable.

a. Does not include personnel cuts recommended by the Quadrennial Defense Review.

b. Some small savings in operation and maintenance costs may result from converting combat units to support units.

c. Time required to deliver all troops and equipment needed to fight each of two major regional conflicts.
SUMMARY

Alternative II: Create Additional

Support Forces in the Active Army

A second option would add support units to the activeduty Army to lessen its reliance on reservists early in a

conflict or during peacetime. Doing so would reduce

the risk that reserve support units might not be available during a crisis because of delays in mobilization.

It would also eliminate the need to activate reserve

forces in peacetime to support small operations.

Budget constraints limit the overall size ofthe active Army, and CBO did not examine alternatives that

would increase the number of deployable forces in the

Army. In particular, CBO did not consider creating

more deployable support forces by reducing the size of

the institutional Army. Thus, the only way to increase

support forces in the active component, given those

constraints, is to convert combat units to support units.

This alternative would turn two active divisions (with

their roughly 33,000 combat troops) into support units

Summary Table 2.

Continued

Army

in 1998

Army's

PlanAlternatives

I II III IV

Changes in Deployable Forces

Active Component

Combat divisions

Combat personnel

Support personnel

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

0

0

0

0

0

0

-2

-33,000

33,000

-2

-33,000

33,000

-3

-44,000

0

Reserve Component

Combat divisions (Guard)

Combat personnel (Guard)

Support personnel (Guard and Reserve)

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

-4'

-42,700

42,700

-4

-58,300

0

-1

-15,000

15,000

-4

-58,300

-35,000

-4

-58,300

0

Total Force Structure

Combat Divisions

Active component

Reserve component (Guard)

10

8

10

6

9

10

4

8

7

8

4

7

4

Deployable Support Forces

Active component

Reserve component

136,000

291,000

136,000

333,700

136,000

291,000

169,000

306,000

169,000

256,000

136,000

291,000

Total Personnel

Active Army

Army National Guard

Army Reserve

495,000

367,000

208,000

495,000

367,000

208,000

495,000

305,000

208,000

495,000

367,000

208,000

495,000

287,100

189,600

430,300

305,000

208,000

d. Assumes the second conflict begins 45 days after the first.

e. To form the equivalent of 5

1

/3 divisions.

f. Two divisions and six separate brigades.

g. Although the Army's plan would retain six combat divisions in the National Guard, it would reduce the number of separate brigades from 18 to 12,

an additional reduction equivalent to two combat divisions.
xx STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

using a process similar to the one the Army will use to

reconfigure National Guard units. Alternative II would

also create an extra 15,000 support forces in the reserves by switching one Guard combat division to support units. As with the Army's plan, the time and investment required for the conversion would be substantial—up to a decade and approximately $3 billion.

Under this alternative, the Army's combat forces

would total eight active divisions and seven Guard divisions. That reduced number of active-duty combat

units means the Army would have to call on the Guard

for combat forces in the event of a second MRC. Since

the Army's stated minimum is 5

1

/3 combat divisions for

each major regional conflict, it would need six Guard

brigades—roughly equivalent to the combat forces in

two divisions—to prosecute a second conflict.

This alternative could take advantage of the long

time needed to deliver equipment for two MRCs by

using that time to train and prepare the reserve combat

units for deployment overseas. CBO's analysis shows

that building up all ofthe forces necessary to fight and

support two nearly simultaneous major conflicts could

take up to 230 days. The Administration's goal is to

have enhanced readiness brigades prepared for combat

after 90 days of training. If it meets that goal, the

Army should be able to train and deploy six ofthe 15

ERBs in the National Guard during that 230-day window. Given the availability of 3

1

/3 active divisions to

provide the critical initial response during a second

conflict—and the long delays to complete deployments

to the second theater—relying on Guard units to fill out

the combat forces could be an efficient use of the

Army's resources.

Summary Figure 3.

Army Forces Under Various Alternatives

Thousands of Personnel

1,400

1,200 -

1,000 |-

800

600

400

200

Active B3 Guard FJ Reserve D HNS

Total Forces

sll ^jf #

Army Army Alt. Alt. Alt. Alt. Army Army Alt. Alt. Alt. Alt.

In Plan I II Ml IV in Plan I II III IV

1998 1998

Army Army Alt. Alt. Alt. Alt. Army Army Alt. Alt. Alt. Alt

in Plan I II III IV in Plan I II III IV

1998 1998

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office,

a. Host-nation support and civilian contractors.
SUMMARY

Advantages. Alternative II would address a number of

the concerns raised about the Army's current force

structure. It would yield a slightly larger increase in the

overall number of support personnel than would the

Army's plan (see Summary Table 2). And with more

support forces in the active Army, the service would not

have to rely on the reserves to provide a large number

ofsupport forces on short notice during the early stages

of a major conflict. If placed in the appropriate units,

the additional active-duty support personnel would also

eliminate the need to rely on reserve units during small

peacetime operations. Finally, by converting a total of

three combat divisions to support units, Alternative II

would reduce the number of excess combat forces in the

Army.

Disadvantages. Adopting this alternative could have

at least five disadvantages, however. First, some observers would argue that National Guard forces could

not be ready to play a combat role within the time required. For example, a study by RAND has concluded

that readying just one Guard combat brigade for deployment overseas would take more than 90 days. The

same study argued that training six ERBs could take at

least 159 days and might well take longer. Any delays

in calling up or training the reserves would further

lengthen that time.

Although that amount of time is less than the 230

days needed to complete deliveries of support equipment to the second conflict, waiting for the Guard brigades to arrive could delay a counterattack. The reason

is that counterattacks do not always require that all of

the support forces needed for a theater be in place.

During Operation Desert Storm, the coalition launched

a counterattack with far fewer support forces than

called for in the Total Army Analysis 2003. Support

levels comparable with those attained in Desert Storm

could be achieved in the second theater as early as 155

days after the start ofthe first MRC. But according to

RAND's analysis, it is unlikely that all six ERBs could

be in the theater that soon. Thus, relying on the Guard

to provide six combat brigades might postpone a counterattack. Alternatively, it might cause the rushing of

unprepared brigades into the theater and, possibly, into

combat.

Second, this alternative would not provide the same

capability for the second conflict as the Army's plan,

even if the Guard ERBs were fully trained when they

entered the theater. The reason is that six separate

combat brigades, although containing roughly the same

number of combat forces as two divisions, do not provide the same capability. Divisions include many units

besides combat brigades, such as those dedicated to

providing command and control, artillery, logistics, and

aviation support. Those units support and enhance the

combat potential ofthe combat brigades. Thus, if six

separate combat brigades from the Guard were attached

to the three active divisions sent to a second MRC under this alternative, the resulting force would not have

the same capability as one composed of five full divisions.

A third potential drawback is that adopting Alternative II would make it harder for the Army to provide

as many combat forces as it would like for a second

MRC. The Total Army Analysis 2003 calls for deploying six combat brigades to the second conflict as reinforcements for the initial 5

1

/3 combat divisions. Under

Alternative II, preparing a total of 12 combat brigades

from the Guard (six to fill out the initial combat force

and six for reinforcements) to participate in even the

second MRC might be impossible given the relatively

short expected duration ofsuch a conflict.

Fourth, adopting this alternative could run counter

to DoD's Total Force Policy. That policy, adopted in

the early 1970s, seeks to better integrate the military

into the fabric of U.S. society by involving soldiers

from the reserve component in all major military undertakings. Since 1985, the Army has used reservists in

increasing numbers in peacetime operations. Although

Alternative II would result in small savings by not requiring the call-up ofreservists to help support smallscale peacetime operations, it would also reverse the

Army's recent trend by limiting the involvement ofreservists in such operations.

Fifth, because this alternative would not reduce the

size of either the active or reserve component of the

Army, it would not produce significant savings compared with the Army's plan. In fact, converting combat

units to support units would cost an estimated $400

million per year for about 10 years. Those costs would

be partially offset by about $100 million a year in savings from not activating reserves in peacetime for small

operations. Those savings would continue after 2008,

when the restructuring envisioned in this alternative

would be complete.
xxii STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY December 1997

Alternative III: Increase Reliance

on Host-Nation Support and Create

Additional Support Forces in

the Active Army

The Army could, of course, adopt the strategies embodied in the two previous alternatives at the same time.

The resulting, more ambitious option would depend on

the host nation and civilian contractors to provide support early in a conflict and would also add more support

forces to the active Army. As noted in Alternative I, by

relying on in-country support, the Army would have no

need to convert Guard combat units to support units, as

it now plans. Instead, it could eliminate four Guard

divisions.

Like Alternative II, this option would also reconfigure two combat divisions in the active Army so as to

create 33,000 additional support forces. In turn, that

would allow the Army to eliminate a similar number of

support forces from the reserve component (for the purposes of this alternative, equally divided between the

National Guard and the Army Reserve). Those changes

would leave a smaller combat force than either of the

two previous options: a total of 12 divisions, eight in

the active component and four in the Guard (see Summary Table 2).

Advantages. By significantly reducing the size of the

reserve component, Alternative III would have several

advantages over the Army's plan. It would increase the

number ofsupport personnel from the active Army that

would be available early in a conflict. It would also

lessen the amount ofmateriel that the Army would have

to transport overseas to fight a major conflict. Thus,

the Army could have all of the forces it needed in theater about 10 to 30 days sooner than under its current

plan.

Finally, although this alternative would incur some

costs to reconfigure combat units to support units, it

could save the Army more than $1.5 billion a year in

the near term (with about $850 million coming directly

from savings associated with a smaller reserve force,

and the rest coming from indirect savings). After 2010,

total savings could reach $2.2 billion a year. About

$1.3 billion ofthat would be direct savings, and $850

million would be indirect savings from having a reserve

component that was roughly 20 percent smaller than the

authorized 1998 level.

Disadvantages. Adopting Alternative III would entail

some risk, however. It would mean that the Army

would not have enough forces in its own ranks to support two major conflicts simultaneously. Instead, the

Army would have to rely on the host nations and civilian contractors, and no guarantee exists that such support would be available in the event of a conflict.

A greater risk, however, might be associated with

cutting active-duty combat forces and relying on reserve combat units to augment them in the case of a

second conflict. Like the previous option, Alternative

III would require the Guard to deploy at least six brigades to the second theater. As noted earlier, those brigades would have less capability than the two full active divisions they were replacing, and their lack of associated divisional support structure might make them

less effective in combat.

Having to train and prepare six Guard combat brigades for deployment might extend the time required to

assemble all of the necessary forces in the second theater. Under this alternative, the support provided by

host nations and contractors would reduce the amount

of U.S. equipment delivered to each theater. As a result, all U.S. forces could be in theater for the second

MRC 30 days sooner than under either the Army's plan

or Alternative II. That accelerated schedule would decrease the time available for readying and transporting

the six Guard combat brigades—from 230 days under

Alternative II to 200 days. (To arrive in 200 days, the

Guard brigades would have to be ready to leave in

about 180 days to allow enough travel time.) As a result, some ofthe six Guard brigades might not be able

to arrive in theater with the rest of the forces, which

could delay military operations.

Alternative IV: Rely More Heavily

on the Reserve Component to Fight

the Second MRC

The final option would achieve significant savings by

placing more reliance on the Army's reserve component

to fight a second major regional conflict. That approach might be appealing if planners considered it un-
SUMMARY

likely that a second conflict would break out in the

midst of a first. If such a conflict did occur, under this

alternative a small number of active combat units

would deploy to the second theater and stabilize the

situation in order to give reserve units time to train and

prepare.

Alternative IV would cut the Army's combat forces

and rely on outside sources to provide some support

during MRCs. Consistent with the recommendation of

the Commission on Roles and Missions to reduce the

number of excess combat forces in the Army, this option would eliminate more than 100,000 combat troops

in the form of three active divisions and four Guard

divisions. No new support forces would be created in

either component; instead, like Alternatives I and III,

this option would rely on host nations and civilian contractors to provide some logistical support for both major regional conflicts.

Adopting this alterative would still leave the Army

with more than enough combat forces to fight two

MRCs nearly simultaneously. Today, the Army fields

18 combat divisions and 21 combat brigades in its active and reserve components combined—significantly

more than the 10% divisions it considers necessary to

conduct two MRCs at once. After making the cuts in

Alternative IV, the Army would still have almost

54,000 combat troops beyond the 195,000 it plans to

deploy overseas for two major regional conflicts. That

remaining combat force, however, would be less ready

and less capable than the Army's current force because

it would include fewer active combat divisions.

Alternative IV would require the Army to train and

prepare a significant number of the Guard's enhanced

readiness brigades for combat in a relatively short time.

Specifically, the Guard would have to deploy nine ofits

15 ERBs—the equivalent of three combat divisionsoverseas within 200 days in order not to delay the

buildup offorces in the second theater. The Army has

a strategy for preparing up to 10 Guard combat brigades to deploy in 160 days or less (indeed, five of

those brigades could be ready in roughly 100 days). If

the Army can meet that schedule, those Guard ERBs

should be able to play a significant role in a second

conflict.

Advantages. The biggest advantage ofAlternative IV

would be the substantial savings: about $5.3 billion a

year once all ofthe changes had been made. Almost $3

billion ofthose savings would come directly from eliminating three divisions from the active Army and four

divisions from the Guard. The other $2.3 billion would

be realized indirectly by reducing the size ofthe institutional Army. An orderly drawdown could take several

years to complete, which would delay the Army's realization of the full savings associated with this option.

Nevertheless, annual savings in the near term would

still be substantial.

The bulk of the savings from this alternative—almost $4 billion a year when it was fully implemented

—would result from reducing the size of combat forces

in the active Army. A much smaller amount would

come from cutting the size ofthe Guard and depending

on host nations and civilian contractors for support services.

Host-nation support would reduce the amount of

equipment the Army would need to ship overseas for

major conflicts, thus shortening the time required to

assemble all forces in theater. Even so, CBO's analysis

suggests that delivering all ofthe Army's equipment to

separate theaters for two nearly simultaneous MRCs

could take at least 200 days, time that the Army could

use to ready reserve units for combat.

Disadvantages. The biggest disadvantage of adopting

Alternative IV would be the increased risk associated

with relying heavily on reserve units to fight major regional conflicts. As in its own plan, the Army would

need to use large numbers of support forces from the

reserves to fight just one MRC. Perhaps ofmore concern, it would depend on the reserve component for a

much larger portion ofthe combat forces for a second

conflict. Although this option would leave the Army

with 2

1

/3 active divisions that could deploy to a second

MRC, an additional three divisions would have to come

from the reserves. The Army could train and ready nine

Guard brigades in less than 160 days, but doing so

would not be its preferred strategy. It would mean

training two brigades simultaneously at some training

sites, would require resources that some analysts doubt

are available, and would produce one brigade that

would be prepared for rear-area security but not for

frontline combat. Furthermore, any delays in calling up

the reserves would make it difficult, if not impossible,

to have nine fully trained combat brigades from the

Guard in the second theater within 200 days.
xxiv STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY December 1997

Like Alternatives II and III, this option would reduce the overall combat capability provided to the second conflict by substituting three Guard brigades for

each active division it eliminated. That effect would

probably be greater with this alternative, however, because it would eliminate one more active Army division

than the other options would. Furthermore, Alternative

rV would require the two active divisions and the corps

organization assigned to the second MRC to support

and control a total of nine separate brigades from the

National Guard. That task could be significantly harder

than the one assumed in the two previous options: having three active divisions and a corps controlling and

supporting only six Guard brigades.

Another disadvantage of Alternative IV is that it

might leave the Army with a less ready pool of Guard

combat units to act as reinforcements for a second

MRC. The first nine of the Guard's 15 ERBs would

form part of the initial 5Vz divisions sent to a second

conflict. Thus, the six least ready brigades would be

the ones available as reinforcements under this alternative, compared with the six most ready under the

Army's plan.

Conclusions

The Army, like the rest of DoD, is facing a serious dilemma in the next decade. It wants to maintain a large

number of ready and well-equipped forces so it can

fight two wars similar in size to Operation Desert

Storm nearly simultaneously without relying heavily on

allies or civilian support. However, the funds to pay for

and equip those forces are increasingly hard to come

by.

The Army plans to retain all ofthe units it needs to

conduct two major regional conflicts, relying primarily

on the active component for combat forces and the reserve component for support forces. It would keep additional combat units in the National Guard that have

no clear role in those conflicts, to act as a strategic

hedge and to provide troops to the states in the event of

domestic emergencies.

Alternatives to the Army's plan could save money,

provide more support forces earlier for the first conflict,

or both. However, they would generally entail increased risk in prosecuting a second (but perhaps unlikely) conflict.

o Alternative I would rely on host nations and civilian contractors to provide some support during the

conduct of major conflicts. By accepting the risk

that U.S. allies would not or could not help in defense oftheir territory—a small risk based on history—the Army could save $1.4 billion a year.

o Turning active-duty combat forces into support

forces, as illustrated by Alternative II, would give

the Army the most support personnel who would

be available during peacetime and would be ready

to deploy early in a major conflict. But that approach would save very little money from the

Army's plan and could even cost more than the current force structure in the short term. It would also

rely on combat units from the National Guard to

help fight a second major conflict.

o Alternative III would combine the changes (and the

risks) associated with Alternatives I and II and

would save $2.2 billion a year when fully carried

out.

o The riskiest approach, illustrated by Alternative IV,

would reduce the number of active-duty troops in

the Army. Instead, it would depend somewhat on

U.S. allies and very heavily on reserve forces in the

event of a second conflict. That approach would

save a significant amount of money—almost $5.3

billion a year compared with the Army's plan. It

would also rely on combat forces in the National

Guard that, although not as ready as those of the

active Army, could be prepared within several

months to defend U.S. interests.

All of the alternatives that CBO examined entail

varying degrees ofrisk that are greater than what is associated with the Army's plan. However, they all represent viable choices that differ from the Army's less

risky but more expensive plan for its force structure.
Chapter One

Introduction

The United States maintains a large military organization to carry out its two-pronged national

security strategy: remaining engaged abroad as

a world leader and enlarging the world's community of

democratic societies. Within the military, the Army is

responsible for providing, training, and equipping the

bulk of the land forces to carry out that strategy. Although the Army has shrunk in the past 10 years, it is

still large. Today's Army contains over 1 million

active-duty and reserve soldiers and commands an annual budget of approximately $60 billion. The mission

for those soldiers has changed dramatically in the past

decade. No longer is their goal to deter or defeat the

forces ofthe Soviet Union and its allies in a war in central Europe. Instead, they must be able to fight less

formidable foes (perhaps more than one at a time) anywhere in the world.

Although the size ofthe Army has changed over the

past decade, its composition has not. The nearly 1-to-l

ratio of active-duty to reserve soldiers has remained

roughly the same.1 The question now is whether the

Army's current makeup is well suited to its current mission. That issue is the subject of an ongoing debate

whose resolution could have potentially far-reaching

ramifications.

What Determines the Size

of the Army?

The U.S. Army has missions at both the federal and

state levels. The Department of Defense establishes the

size and composition of all three parts ofthe Army—the

active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army

Reserve—based primarily on the forces needed to carry

out the federal missions. However, the National Guard

also has a constitutionally mandated state mission to

provide military support to civil authorities.

The Clinton Administration has conducted two reviews of the military capability needed to implement

U.S. national security strategy: the Bottom-Up Review

under former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and the

Quadrennial Defense Review under current Secretary

William Cohen. Both reviews produced similar results.2

They concluded that conventional forces, including all ofthose in the Army, must have the capability to

fulfill three federal missions:

o Fighting two major regional conflicts—each the

size of the Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert

Storm)—nearly simultaneously;

o Conducting a wide range of lesser contingencies,

such as smaller-scale combat operations and peacekeeping missions; and

o Providing a permanent U.S. military presence in

such regions as central Europe and the Korean Peninsula.

Of those missions, the first one would most likely

place the greatest demands on the Army. At its peak,

Operation Desert Storm involved more than 300,000

Army troops. By contrast, the current peacekeeping

operations in Bosnia involved at their peak only onetenth as many U.S. soldiers. To provide overseas pres1. The active component, which made up 51 percent of the Army in

1986, now makes up 46 percent.

See Secretary ofDefense Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review

(October 1993); and Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Report

ofthe Quadrennial Defense Review (May 1997).
2 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

ence, the Army has approximately 64,000 troops permanently stationed in Europe and 27,000 in South Korea. (At least some ofthose troops are also available to

take part in regional conflicts and peacekeeping operations that occur nearby.)

Besides playing a role in federal missions, the

Army National Guard fulfills the constitutionally mandated requirement to provide state militias to maintain

civil law and order. National Guard units report to

state and territorial governors in peacetime.3They are

at the governors' disposal to quell domestic unrest or

provide disaster relief. Typical missions for the Guard

include riot control, such as in Los Angeles in 1992,

and relief and cleanup after natural disasters, such as

Hurricane Andrew in Florida (also in 1992).

How Is the Army Structured?

The total Army, with more than 1 million people in uniform, is made up of several different but overlapping

components (see Table 1). The major distinction is

between full-time (active-duty) and part-time (reserve)

soldiers.4 Other differences are based on the roles that

soldiers play. Deployable units are designed to be sent

overseas in case of emergency, whereas nondeployable

units are assigned tasks at their home base that preclude

them from deploying. Combat forces focus on fighting,

whereas support forces perform a variety of functions

to support combat troops. In order to determine how

many and what kind offorces the Army needs to carry

out its missions, it is necessary to understand how the

Army is organized.

majority ofits military personnel are part-time soldiers

in the reserves. The reserve component numbered

596,000 soldiers at the end of 1996, with 370,000 in

the National Guard and 226,000 in the Army Reserve.5

Members of the three organizations perform distinctly different missions in peacetime. Soldiers on active duty are always on call to respond to orders from

the Commander in Chief. The National Guard and the

Army Reserve are both part-time forces—but whereas

the Guard reports to the governors during peacetime,

members ofthe Army Reserve are federal soldiers. The

Reserve was created early this century to put a pool of

people (primarily doctors) at the President's disposal

who could be activated quickly during a national crisis.

At that time, some question existed about whether

members ofthe National Guard could be deployed out

of the country on federal missions. During the past

several decades, however, court rulings and legislative

changes have removed almost all impediments to Presidential call-up of National Guard units. Unless they

volunteer for federal duty, members of either the Guard

or Reserve must be called to active duty by an executive

order before they can be assigned to federal military

tasks outside the scope ofregular training duty.6

Even though reserve personnel outnumber activeduty soldiers, the bulk ofthe Army's resources are spent

on its active-duty forces. The service's 1997 budget

devoted $38 billion to the pay, operations, and maintenance of active-duty forces, compared with only $9 billion for reserve forces. The fact that part-time soldiers

cost so much less to maintain than full-time soldiers has

led some people to argue that reserve forces provide an

inexpensive insurance policy against an unknown future.

The Active and Reserve Components

Although the Army includes a large active-duty forcemore than 491,000 soldiers at the end of 1996—the

Territories other than states that maintain an Army National Guard

include the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S.

Virgin Islands.

In this study, the term "reserve" refers to all members of the Army

National Guard and the Army Reserve (including fiill-time members

and those part-time members who drill regularly in peacetime and are

known as selected reservists).

In his report on the Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary Cohen

recommended reducing the size of the Army by 15,000 active-duty

troops and 45,000 reserve troops—presumably from the authorized

1998 levels shown in Table 1. The report did not specify when those

cuts should be made or how the reserve reductions should be distributed between the National Guard and the Army Reserve, although

later deliberations within the Army yielded more information. The

Army's plans are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

The Secretary ofthe Army (rather than the President) can call up individual reservists for 15 days of active duty in a given year, but that

period is normally required for annual training.
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 3

Other Distinctions in the Army's

Force Structure

Besides the active and reserve components, the Army

can be divided into two parts based on the forces that

fight wars and those that equip, train, and sustain fighting forces. Indeed, each ofthe Army's three organizations is composed of both warfighting forces and forces

that are part of headquarters or ofthe training and sustainment base. Warfighting forces make up the bulk of

the Army's personnel and comprise all those assigned to

units that can be deployed to a conflict overseas. Those

deployable units can be further subdivided into combat

units and support units.

Deployable Versus Nondeployable Forces. Almost

three-quarters of the Army's total personnel are assigned to units that can deploy overseas to fight in wars

(see Table 1). Those units include the soldiers who

drive tanks, fly helicopters, and repair trucks in the

field. Most ofthe remaining one-quarter ofthe Army is

assigned to units that perform support functions at their

home base, such as training soldiers, developing new

weapons, or administering day-to-day operations.

Those units constitute the "institutional" Army (they

are sometimes referred to as Table of Distribution and

Allowances units). A small fraction of Army personnel—about 12 percent ofthe active Army and less than

6 percent ofthe service as a whole—is not assigned to

any unit, either deploying or nondeploying, but consists

ofpeople who are temporarily in school or in transition

between units. Those soldiers are also considered unavailable for deployment overseas.

The percentage of deployable forces varies in the

Army's three organizations. The active Army has just

63 percent of its personnel assigned to deployable

units, compared with 89 percent for the Guard and 67

percent for the Army Reserve. Those differences result

Table 1.

Planned Distribution of Active, Guard, and Reserve Forces in the Army at the End of 1998

(By number of authorized personnel)

Active Army National Guard Army Reserve Total

Deployable Units

Combat units

Support units3

Subtotal

176,000

136.000

312,000

175,000

152.000

327,000

0

139.000

139,000

351,000

427.000

778,000

Nondeployable Units

Institutional units"

Other0

124,000

59.000

40,000

0

69,000

0

233,000

59.000

Total 495,000 367,000 208,000 1,070,000

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Ronald E. Sorter, Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Contingencies

(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995); and General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict

Strategy with Some Risks, GAO/NSIAD-97-66 (February 1997).

NOTE: Total force levels are based on the President's budget request for 1998 and exclude cuts recommended by the Quadrennial Defense Review.

a. Forces not assigned to major combat units such as divisions or brigades.

b. Units in the Army's Table of Distribution and Allowances.

c. Includes trainees, transients, and students.
4 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

partly because the reserve component relies on the active Army for such institutional functions as developing

and purchasing equipment, formulating doctrine, and

performing other administrative tasks, and partly because members ofthe reserves remain assigned to their

units even when they are temporarily unavailable, such

as when they are attending school.

Combat Versus Support Forces. Not all ofwhat the

Army refers to as warfighting forces actually fight.

Indeed, most of the Army's warfighting—or, more accurately, deployable—forces do not engage directly in

combat (see Figure 1). Units that would deploy overseas for a regional conflict come in two general types:

combat forces (such as armored, infantry, and mechanized infantry brigades and divisions) and forces outside those combat brigades and divisions that provide

support for them (such as engineering, transport, and

medical units). Slightly more than half ofthe soldiers

assigned to Army combat brigades and divisions are in

the active component; the rest are in the Guard. (The

Army Reserve has no combat units.) The preponderance of support personnel, by contrast, are in the reserve component.

Figure 1.

Army Forces Planned for 1998

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

Thousands of Authorized Personnel

Active Guard D Reserve

Total

Combat

Total Forces Deployable Forces

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Ronald E.

Sortor, Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for

Major Regional Contingencies (Santa Monica, Calif.:

RAND, 1995); and General Accounting Office, Force

Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict

Strategy with Some Risks, GAO/NSIAD-97-66 (February 1997).

NOTE: Does not include cuts recommended by the Quadrennial

Defense Review.

Table 2.

Major Combat Units in the Army

Active

Army

National

Guard

Combat Units

Divisions"

Separate brigades and

armored cavalry regiments

Total Combat Brigades

Total Personnel Assigned to

Combat Units0

10

3

33

176,000

8

18b

42

175,000

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Secretary of

Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (April 1997); Ronald E. Sortor,

Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major

Regional Contingencies (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,

1995); and General Accounting Office, Force Structure:

Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy

with Some Risks, GAO/NSIAD-97-66 (February 1997).

a. A division typically includes three combat brigades.

b. Fifteen of the brigades are designated as enhanced readiness

brigades.

c. Authorized positions.

Size of Army Units. The Army's deployable forces,

both combat and support, are organized into units of

varying size. A division contains between 11,000 and

18,000 soldiers and is the unit most commonly used to

describe an army's combat forces. For instance, the

U.S. Army is generally characterized as including 18

divisions—10 in the active portion and eight in the

Guard (see Table 2). In another example, the BottomUp Review described the Army combat forces needed

for one major regional conflict as equaling four to five

divisions.7

Another common unit of combat forces is the brigade, with 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers. A division typically

includes three combat brigades, but combat brigades

can also exist independent of a division. One prominent example is the armored cavalry regiment, an inde7. Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. 19. The more recent

Quadrennial Defense Review did not alter that assessment, although it

did predict that the requirement would change as the effectiveness of

U.S. and enemy forces changed.
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 5

pendent brigade whose role is to act as modern cavalry.

Indeed, the National Guard includes almost as many

separate brigades as ones attached to divisions.

Three brigades, although not organized into a division, are often said to be equivalent to a division in

combat power. However, three separate brigades do

not equal a division in either personnel or overall capability. That is borne out by the fact that although the

Guard has more combat brigades than the active Army

(42 compared with 33), the active Army has more soldiers assigned to its combat units. The reason is that

the active Army has more divisions than the Guard, and

each division contains several thousand soldiers in addition to those assigned to the combat brigades.

Both divisions and brigades include support and

administrative personnel as well as the combat personnel who drive tanks or fire weapons. Those support

personnel are assigned to combat-support and combatservice-support units, such as headquarters, military

police, helicopter, engineer, air-defense, intelligence,

field artillery, finance, medical, and transport units.

(However, this report refers to all personnel assigned to

combat divisions and brigades as combat forces.)

The Army also has thousands ofsuch support units

that are not assigned to a combat division or brigade in

peacetime. In the event of war, they would be attached

to an even larger administrative organization, such as a

corps, which commands two to five divisions, or a theater army, which includes two or more corps.

Designing the Army

Many factors go into shaping the Army. The country's

national security strategy and the military capability

considered necessary to carry it out establish the requirements for combat forces. In the absence of other

considerations, those requirements would in turn determine the number offorces needed to support the combat units. Combat and support units between them

make up the deployable force. With the size of the

deployable force set, it would be possible to establish

the size of the necessary administrative structure and,

hence, ofthe entire Army. How often and how quickly

forces were needed would then determine whether they

were placed in the active component or the reserve

component.

That simple outline is fraught with complications,

however. Budget constraints limit the overall size of

the Army and influence which forces are in the active

component and which are in the reserves. Politics and

the demands of governors for state missions also shape

the Army, particularly the size and composition of the

National Guard.

In this study, the Congressional Budget Office uses

four criteria to look at how well the Army's forces

match the missions it is assigned. First, are those

forces large enough to meet the requirements that the

Army has established to carry out the Administration's

national security strategy? Second, are they balanced

appropriately between combat and support units?

Third, how quickly can the Army's forces deploy in response to crises overseas? And fourth, can the Army

afford to maintain and equip its forces in these times of

constrained budgets? After assessing the current force

structure based on those criteria, this study examines

the Army's plan for its forces and compares that plan

with several alternative approaches to meeting the

Army's force requirements.
Chapter Two

The Army's Force Requirements

for Various Missions

The U.S. Army is one ofthe largest in the world.1

Its size reflects the significant military capability that the Army must provide to support the

Administration's national security strategy. As outlined

in Chapter 1, that strategy includes various military

missions, such as fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs), conducting peacekeeping

operations and providing humanitarian assistance, and

maintaining a U.S. presence overseas.

In determining the size of the forces to carry out

those missions, the Administration has concluded that

the United States must field enough troops to fight and

win two major regional conflicts, each similar in size to

the Persian Gulf War, that occur at roughly the same

time. (In the Administration's view, ifthe military did

not have enough forces to deal with a second conflict,

other nations would be more likely to try to take advantage of the United States while it was involved elsewhere.) Forces that are large enough to fight two nearly

simultaneous MRCs should be more than sufficient to

carry out the less demanding missions of peacekeeping

and overseas presence, although perhaps not all at the

same time.

What foes should the United States be prepared to

fight in the near future? The Department of Defense's

(DoD's) Quadrennial Defense Review identified several

regional dangers that DoD believes will confront the

nation between now and 2015. First among those is the

The Army ranks fifth in the world based on total numbers (including

the reserves). It ranks seventh in the number of active-duty soldiers.

threat that Iran and Iraq pose to the free flow of Middle

Eastern oil. Next is the threat that North Korea presents to South Korea because ofits increasingly dire economic condition and its large military presence close to

the South Korean border.

In line with those threats, the forces of Iran, Iraq,

and North Korea form the backdrop for DoD's current

planning. Much ofthat planning is based on the ability

to provide enough military force to fight conflicts that

break out on the Korean Peninsula and in the Persian

Gulf region nearly simultaneously. Former Defense

Secretary Les Aspin, in his Report on the Bottom-Up

Review, postulated that the Army would need to provide four to five divisions of combat forces for each of

those conflicts. Some defense analysts have questioned

the validity ofthat requirement and ofthe two-conflict

scenario as a whole (see Box 1). Nevertheless, current

Defense Secretary William Cohen has reaffirmed

Aspin's requirement, at least for the near future.

Force Requirements for Two

Major Regional Conflicts

Fighting two MRCs at the same time would, according

to the Army, require nearly all ofthe deployable forces

in the active component and most of those in the reserves. However, the Army says it lacks enough

deployable support forces to conduct two major wars

simultaneously with sufficiently low risk. At the same
8 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

time, the Army has combat forces in the reserves that

would not take part directly in either of two MRCs as

those conflicts are now envisioned.

Determining Force Requirements

The Army relies on an analytic process to determine its

total force needs. Using a method called the Total

Army Analysis (TAA), the Army reviews its forcestructure requirements every two years. The TAA

method begins with the number of combat forces that

DoD has decided will provide the military capability

necessary to carry out U.S. national security strategy.

For each major regional conflict, the Army assumes

that it would need to provide a minimum of 5

1

/} divisions. Thus, to fight two MRCs, the Army would need

to deploy at least 10% divisions—or 32 out of the 33

combat brigades in the active Army.

Based on the number of combat forces, the TAA

process determines how many and what kind ofsupport

forces are necessary to accompany those combat units

overseas. Specifically, the analysis estimates how

many people the Army needs in combat-support and

combat-service-support units besides those belonging

to combat divisions and brigades. Combat-support

forces provide operational support, such as air defense

and combat engineering, for combat forces. Combatservice-support units typically perform personnel, medical, logistics, or administrative functions. The support

requirements in the Total Army Analysis also include

people whom the Army must dedicate to support other

services, primarily in transportation and quartermaster

Boxl.

How Realistic Are the Two-MRC Requirements?

Not all defense analysts believe that the U.S. Army must

be prepared to fight two major regional conflicts

(MRCs) similar to Operation Desert Storm at the same

time. According to Michael O'Hanlon ofthe Brookings

Institution, although the Administration's policy is to be

able "to fight and win two major regional wars at once,

the nation has probably never had that capability since

World War II, and it is hard to see why we should start

now."1

Even when analysts concede the validity ofthe twoMRC scenario, some argue that the Department of Defense (DoD) is overstating the number of U.S. forces

needed to fight those wars. Both O'Hanlon and Lawrence Korb, a former DoD official who is now also at

the Brookings Institution, contend that smaller forces

than those planned by the Pentagon would be more than

adequate to fight wars in Korea and the Persian Gulf

(the major regions of concern highlighted in the Quadrennial Defense Review). According to Korb, the U.S.

intelligence community has concluded that South Korea

is capable of defending itselffrom North Korea without

help from U.S. forces. Korb also asserts that the Iraqi

military is now less than half as powerful as it was durMichael E. O'Hanlon, "The New Order: Pentagon Lite," Los

Angeles Times, December 9, 1996, p. B5.

ing Operation Desert Storm. As a result, he concludes

that the U.S. military is already more than capable of

fighting two nearly simultaneous Desert Storms.2

Carrying the argument further, O'Hanlon postulates

that the United States could carry out its two-MRC

strategy with fewer combat forces than it has today.

That conclusion is based on two arguments. First, he

maintains that the Pentagon is too pessimistic about the

likely requirements for waging wars in Korea and the

Persian Gulfregion. As a result, smaller ground forces

than those called for in U.S. military planning would be

adequate to fight wars there. Second, O'Hanlon asserts

that the chance of such large U.S. forces being needed

in two places at once is remote. Instead, he argues that

a small U.S. ground force could hold the enemy at bay

in a second theater while U.S. air forces inflicted heavy

damage. That approach would require fewer ground

forces, in total, than the Administration plans to keep in

the U.S. military. Those two arguments lead O'Hanlon

to conclude that the Army and Marine Corps could

safely reduce their forces by about 10 percent.3

Lawrence J. Korb, "More Than Ready for Two Desert Storms,"

Washington Post, January 29, 1997, p. A21.

Michael E. O'Hanlon, The Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense

Review, Policy Brief No. 15 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, April 1997).
CHAPTER TWO THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR VARIOUS MISSIONS 9

units (they represent about 6 percent of total support

requirements).

The results ofthe Total Army Analysis released in

January 1996—the most recent that are publicly available—reflect work that was completed in the summer of

1995. Because it was designed to determine the shape

ofthe Army in 2003, that analysis is known as the Total Army Analysis 2003 (TAA-03).

The TAA-03 yielded a requirement for 672,000

deployable troops to fight two nearly simultaneous major conflicts. Of those, 195,000 would be combat

troops. The other 477,000 (over 70 percent) would be

support forces, which would outnumber combat troops

by almost 2.5 to 1. That requirement is not without

controversy, however, because it differs from both previous analytic results and actual combat experience.

Differences with Other DoD Studies. The Total

Army Analysis 2003 yielded a force requirement for

two regional conflicts that is significantly higher than

those associated with other DoD studies. Shortly before the TAA-03, DoD analyzed the military's need for

transport ships and aircraft. That analysis, called the

Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update, was based on an assumed need to deliver 457,000

Army troops and their equipment to fight two MRCs—

far fewer than the 672,000 troops that the Army says

would be necessary.2

Part of the difference between the forces assumed

to be deployed in the Mobility Requirements Study and

the Total Army Analysis 2003 is that the latter includes

six National Guard combat brigades that the Army

would send to the second MRC to reinforce the 5

1

/3

active divisions. Those reinforcing units account for an

additional 30,000 combat troops.

The other 185,000-person difference between the

number of Army forces deployed in the two studies

comes in the area ofsupport troops. A few ofthe additional support troops in the TAA-03 (about 10,000) are

associated with the six Guard combat brigades that the

Army includes in its analysis. Another 30,000 or so are

See John C.F. Tillson and others, Review ofthe Army Process for

Determining Force Structure Requirements (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 1996), for a comparison ofthe Army

forces deployed to two MRCs in the Mobility Requirements Study

Bottom-Up Review Update and the TAA-03.

associated with a second corps command structure that

the Army believes it would need in Korea. A corps typically has two to five divisions under its command, and

one Army corps organization is permanently stationed

in South Korea. Nevertheless, the Army assumed in the

TAA-03 that it would deploy another corps organization from the United States to help control operations in

the event of a conflict in Korea. Since adequate command structure already appears to be in place in Korea

for the 5

1

/3 divisions that would fight there, some people have questioned the need for the 30,000 extra support personnel.

Two other factors contributed to the large requirement for support troops in the Total Army Analysis

2003. First, the study assumed that citizens of the

countries where the conflicts were being fought would

provide very little logistical support. Previous analyses, including the Mobility Requirements Study, assumed that the host nations involved in the two wars

would provide greater levels of support—as much as

the equivalent of 42,000 support soldiers in all, including fuel-supply and transportation workers. (During

the Persian Gulf War, for example, Saudi Arabia provided trucks and drivers, thus reducing the number of

troops and the amount of equipment that the U.S. Army

had to transport to the region.) The Total Army Analysis 2003, however, assumed a much lower contribution

from the host nations, which boosted its requirement

for support troops by 28,000.

Second, the Army's analysis projected historically

high rates of fuel consumption and medical casualties.

One study performed for the Office ofthe Secretary of

Defense contends that the force requirements in the

TAA-03 are based in part on assuming that rates of

activity that represent historical peaks are sustained for

long periods oftime.3Those assumptions in turn lead

to large demands for fuel and generate large numbers of

casualties. The number of support personnel (truck

drivers, fuel pumpers, nurses, and doctors) needed as a

result is 68,000 higher than DoD assumed in its mobility analysis.

To some extent, the discrepancy between the numbers ofArmy troops sent to two MRCs in DoD's mobility study and the Total Army Analysis may result from

the different purposes ofthe two studies. The Mobility

Ibid.
10 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

Requirements Study was conducted to determine how

many transport planes and ships (so-called airlift and

sealift) the United States would need in order to move

military forces overseas to fight two major regional

conflicts. One of the constraints on that analysis was

that the resulting lift fleet would have to be affordable

under planned DoD budgets. As a consequence, the

study's authors may have limited the number and types

offorces deployed by the Army to those that an affordable lift fleet could move within a reasonable amount of

time and with an acceptable level ofrisk.

By contrast, the TAA process for determining force

requirements yields the number of forces that would be

needed to minimize the Army's risk in fighting two

MRCs. Furthermore, that process does not explicitly

consider the mobility assets or time needed to move its

resultant force—that is, it assumes a limitless availability of airlift and sealift.

Given the different approaches ofthe two studies,

therefore, it is not surprising that they produce different

results about how many Army forces would take part in

two overlapping MRCs. Because the Mobility Requirements Study took into account the problems associated with moving a large military force overseas, its

results are perhaps more representative of how the

United States would actually conduct two nearly simultaneous wars.

Differences with Military History. The force requirements resulting from the TAA-03, particularly for support personnel, are much larger than historical evidence

would suggest. In fact, the ratio of support to combat

forces in the Total Army Analysis 2003 is around 40

percent to 80 percent higher than the ratios from past

U.S. conflicts (see Table 3). That difference comes

partly from the Army's desire to provide all ofthe support that its combat units could possibly need using its

own forces, and partly from the questionable assumptions detailed above.

Two historical conflicts that exhibited low supportto-combat ratios—the Korean and Persian GulfWarswere ones in which the host nation contributed significantly to the war effort. During the Korean War, the

Army relied on the services of 150,000 Koreans and an

equal number ofJapanese employees in Japan in addition to numerous contractors. During the GulfWar, the

Saudi government provided or paid for more than 4,000

trucks, 1.5 million gallons per day of petroleum products, and over $2 billion worth of food. By contrast,

the TAA-03 assumed very little in the way of hostnation support.

Even excluding the extraordinary contributions during the Korean and Persian Gulf Wars, the support requirements derived from the Army's analysis are high.

They exceed those ofsuch extended conflicts as World

War II and the Vietnam War by about 40 percent. The

support-to-combat ratio in those two conflicts was approximately the same one used for DoD's recent study

of mobility requirements; the department labeled that

ratio as representing a moderate risk. The current

Army leadership may feel that additional support personnel will help reduce the risk in future conflicts below

even a moderate level.

Although the results of the Total Army Analysis

2003 are not universally accepted, they form the basis

for the Army's planning process and provide the serTable 3.

Ratio of Support Personnel to Combat Personnel

in Defense Analyses and Actual Conflicts

Ratio

Conflict or Analysis

(Support

personnel to

combat personnel)

World War II 1.7 to 1

Korean War 1.5 to 1

Vietnam War 1.8 to 1

Persian Gulf War8

1.4 to 1

Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up

Review Update 1.8 to 1

Total Army Analysis 2003 2.5 to 1

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on John OF.

Tillson and others, Rew'etv of the Army Process for

Determining Force Structure Requirements (Alexandria,

Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 1996); and

Department of Defense, Military Traffic Management

Command, Deployment Planning Guide (September

1994).

a. Just before the start of the ground war.
CHAPTER TWO THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR VARIOUS MISSIONS 11

Figure 2.

Number of Deployable Army Forces Compared with Requirements for Two Major Regional Conflicts

Thousands of Personnel

1,000

800

600

400

200

Active B9 Guard D Reserve

Support

Total

Combat

Requirement Authorized Requirement Authorized Requirement Authorized

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Ronald E. Sortor, Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Contingencies

(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995); and General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict

Strategy with Some Risks, GAO/NSIAD-97-66 (February 1997).

NOTE: Requirements are based on the results of the Total Army Analysis 2003.

vice's most recent publicly available estimate ofits requirements for deployable forces.4 Despite objections

by some people in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the assumptions, DoD's civilian leadership ultimately approved changes to the Army's force structure

based on the results ofthe analysis.

Forces Available to Fight Two MRCs

Overall, the Army has more deployable forces than the

Total Army Analysis 2003 calls for, but those forces

are not necessarily configured properly. The Army contains almost 780,000 soldiers in deployable units (40

percent in the active component and the rest in the reserves). That total exceeds the number of deployable

soldiers required for two major regional conflicts by

more than 100,000 (see Figure 2). However, an imbalance exists between the required mix of combat and

support forces and the mix currently in the Army. The

Army's analysis calls for 195,000 combat troops and

477,000 support troops to participate in two MRCs.

But the Army planned for 1998 will contain 351,000

combat troops and less than 430,000 support troops.

Some ofthe assumptions ofthe TAA-03 that analysts have questioned

may have been changed for the succeeding study—the Total Army

Analysis 2005. Although the Army completed the bulk ofthe work

for that analysis during the summer of 1997, the results were not publicly available at the time ofthis study.

(Those numbers do not include the cuts recommended

by the Quadrennial Defense Review.) In other words,

the service will face a shortfall of at least 47,000 support forces compared with what the TAA process determined was necessary to fight two regional wars. In

fact, when the analysis looked at the specific units required to support those wars, it yielded a larger shortage of support forces. It found that the Army needs

more than 58,000 additional support personnel, with

the largest needs in truck companies and units that handle fuel supplies.

At the same time, according to the Army's own

analysis, the service has an excess of combat forces.

About half of its combat troops are in the active component. Because they are composed of full-time soldiers, active-duty combat units are the most prepared to

fight in conflicts that erupt with little warning. For that

reason, Army planning assumes that the first 10%

combat divisions (165,000 out of the total 195,000

combat troops) deployed for two MRCs would come

from the active Army. The remaining 30,000 combat

troops would come from the National Guard. That

leaves 145,000 combat forces in the Guard with no specific role to play in fighting two MRCs, according to

the Total Army Analysis 2003 (see Figure 2).

In contrast to combat forces, most of the support

forces used in the two major conflicts would come from
12 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY December 1997

the reserve component. Of the Army's total support

forces, only 136,000 (less than one-third) are assigned

to the active Army. The Army would need at least

217,000 support troops for a conflict on the Korean

Peninsula, and even more—at least 250,000—for a war

in the Persian Gulf region, where the Army does not

have an extensive military presence and support structure.

Assembling so many support forces would require

the Army to mobilize large numbers ofreservists. That

need was demonstrated during the Persian Gulf War.

In January and February 1991, when the active Army

contained around 750,000 troops, about 300,000 soldiers participated directly in the war. Nevertheless,

more than 70,000 of the soldiers sent to the Persian

Gulf were reservists, all assigned to support units.

The Army takes somewhat contradictory approaches to providing combat forces and support forces

for its most demanding mission. In planning how to

fight two MRCs, the Army relies almost exclusively on

its active component for combat forces but leans very

heavily on the reserves for support forces. The Army

justifies that stance by arguing that it takes much less

time to prepare reserve support units for deployment

than reserve combat units. But at the same time, the

Army's overall structure contains excess combat forces

and (according to its analysis) insufficient support

forces.

Force Requirements for

Lesser Contingencies

The Army must also shape its forces to perform a host

of less demanding but more likely missions—such as

humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, and

smaller-scale combat operations. The Bottom-Up Review concluded that in planning for those types ofmissions, prudence would dictate using up to three Army

divisions and a total of 50,000 combat and support personnel from all ofthe services.5

It also declared that the

forces slated to take part in peacekeeping or other humanitarian missions could be part of the same collection of forces needed for major regional conflicts.6

That policy means that the United States would not be

able to carry out sizable peace-enforcement or other

operations at the same time that it was fighting two

MRCs. But it also means that ifthe United States had

sufficient forces to conduct two regional conflicts, it

would have more than enough for those lesser contingencies.

During the past decade, the nation has been involved in several operations ofmuch smaller scale than

the Persian Gulf War. The United States intervened

unilaterally in Panama in 1989 and in Haiti in 1994,

each time with about 18,000 soldiers. A force that at

one point included more than 19,000 U.S. soldiers is

taking part in international peacekeeping efforts in

Bosnia. By contrast, 16 times as many troops (about

300,000) were in the Middle East during the peak of

the Gulf War. On a similar scale, the TAA-03 estimated that the Army would need between 300,000 and

330,000 soldiers to fight one major regional conflict.

Although typical peacetime missions such as

peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance require

fewer troops than major conflicts do, they place other

difficult demands on Army forces. Some peacetime

missions last for a long time. Thus, even though they

do not require a large number of soldiers to deploy

overseas at any given time, over a period ofmonths or

years the total number of soldiers involved can be substantial. And many peacetime operations require a very

different mix of skills than those required for combat.

Rather than destroying enemy forces (which is the focus

of combat), peacekeeping emphasizes civilian control,

policing, and community liaison. As a result, some

units that participate in peacetime operations must train

for several weeks afterward to regain a sufficiently high

level of combat skills.

Despite those constraints, the nearly 780,000 deployable troops in the Army's active and reserve components should be sufficient to conduct smaller-scale

combat operations or to fulfill U.S. obligations to multilateral peacekeeping missions. Indeed, the active

Army alone contains more than 300,000 deployable

5. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review

(October 1993), p. 22.

Secretary Cohen has reiterated that point, stating that "U.S. forces

must ... be able to withdraw from smaller-scale contingency operations, reconstitute, and then deploy to a major theater war in accordance with required timelines." Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Report ofthe Quadrennial Defense Review (May 1997), p. 12.
CHAPTER TWO THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR VARIOUS MISSIONS 13

troops, made up of 176,000 combat troops and

136,000 support personnel. Those full-time forces are

many times larger than the number (around 50,000

from all services) that Administration policy says

would be needed for operations short of a major regional conflict.

Force Requirements for

Maintaining U.S. Presence

Overseas

One final mission identified by the Administration that

would require large numbers of Army forces is maintaining a military presence abroad to protect and advance U.S. interests. The two major permanent stations

for Army personnel overseas are in Europe and South

Korea. The U.S. presence in both areas has declined

since the 1980s, but it is still sizable. The Army has

about 64,000 troops stationed in Europe, down significantly from the 209,000 in 1989. It maintains some

27,000 soldiers in South Korea, a slight decrease from

the 32,000 in 1989.

Because those soldiers represent only a small portion (less than 30 percent) of the deployable troops in

the active Army, the bulk ofthe force is free to be sent

elsewhere. Moreover, as long as sufficient troops remain in central Europe or South Korea to protect U.S.

interests, the rest of the troops there are available to

participate in lesser contingencies. Such troops frequently have an advantage in that they are closer to

where such operations may occur. In the case of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, for example, many ofthe

U.S. Army personnel have come from forces stationed

in Germany. Similarly, U.S. forces in South Korea may

be better situated to deal with contingencies in the Pacific than troops stationed in the continental United

States. Finally, some of the U.S. forces based overseas—particularly those in Europe, where tensions are

currently low—would be available to take part in a major conflict should one erupt nearby. Indeed, large

numbers offorces from Germany were sent to the Persian GulfWar in 1991.

Force Requirements for

State Missions

During peacetime, the primary mission of the Army

National Guard is to support state and territorial governors by carrying out the full spectrum of tasks authorized in state law. Those tasks typically include defense

of the state from rebellion or disorder (that is, riot control); emergency and disaster relief; humanitarian assistance, such as aeromedical evacuation; and other efforts

to support the community. The demands ofstate missions do not determine the size ofthe National Guard;

the ability to conduct various federal missions forms

the basis for establishing the size of the entire Army,

including the Guard. That being the case, the Guard

may not be the correct size or configuration to carry out

its most common state missions—emergency and disaster relief.

Members of the National Guard are generally

called to state duty only in small numbers and for short

periods of time. There are several reasons for that

practice. Paying for members of the Guard on state

duty is a cost over and above a state's typical operating

expenses. State budgets usually provide either a small,

specific annual budget for the Guard—usually less than

$10 million—or contingency funds available only under

emergency conditions. As a result, Guard units are

generally used in only the most extreme circumstances

and only after other state and local resources are exhausted or overwhelmed. In addition, state and Guard

leaders try to minimize the disruption in the civilian

lives of Guard members by keeping them on state

active-duty status for as short a time as possible.

For all of those reasons, members of both the Air

and Army National Guard spent an average ofless than

one day per year on state active duty between 1987 and

1995.7In 1993, the peak year for state duty during that

period, no single activation required more than 6 percent of the National Guard's total strength. It is true

that in 1992, 1993, and 1994, natural disasters—inBecause ofthe way the National Guard Bureau maintains historical

records, the Congressional Budget Office could not obtain data about

activation rates for the Army National Guard separate from the Air

National Guard. The Air National Guard is roughly one-third the size

ofthe Army National Guard.
14 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

Figure 3.

Number of Army National Guard Personnel, by State, at the End of 1996

| | Less than 2,500 0 2,500 - 5,000 £|] 5,000 - 7,500 [|§ 7,500 -10,000 H 10,000 -15.000 More than 15,000

SOURCE: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, FY

1996 Summary (1997).

eluding hurricanes, severe flooding, and an earthquake—combined with isolated events such as riots in

Los Angeles to call large numbers of Guard forces into

action. In each of those three years, about 30,000

members of the Guard were called to state active-duty

status for an average of about two weeks.

Although 30,000 people represent only a small portion of the National Guard's total strength, some domestic emergencies can strain the resources available to

an individual state. In particular, during operations in

Florida in 1992 after Hurricane Andrew, almost half of

the state's National Guard members were on state active

duty at the same time. All told, Guard support extended for more than 80 days. Although federal assets

were brought in after the President declared a state of

emergency, and federal funds reimbursed some state

expenditures, Florida still spent almost $29 million of

its own money on tasks performed by the state National

Guard in the aftermath ofthe hurricane.

The Army National Guard forces available to individual governors vary appreciably from state to state

(see Figure 3). They range from as few as 600 soldiers

in Guam to almost 18,000 in California. Of course, in

cases ofsevere emergency, governors can ask the President to provide federal assets when state assets are

overwhelmed, as occurred after Hurricane Andrew.

(Presidents can call up members ofthe Army Reserve

in such cases, but they generally choose to call on members of the active Army instead.)8 Thus, states can

sometimes receive assistance beyond the Guard forces

within their borders.

Members ofthe Army Reserve can be called up for involuntary activeduty service by the Secretary ofthe Army for a maximum of 15 days

in any year. But because the two weeks of annual training must be

counted against that total, and because the President does not typically

mobilize Reservists for domestic emergencies, the 15-day limit effectively constrains the call-up ofReservists to assist in coping with state

crises.
Chapter Three

Comparing Army Forces

with Requirements

Numerically speaking, the Army has enough

total forces to carry out the federal and state

missions assigned to it. But are those forces

balanced appropriately between active and reserve soldiers and between support units and combat units? Can

they respond quickly enough to crises overseas? And

can the Army afford to maintain and equip them in

these times of budget constraints?

One of the primary issues addressed in this study

—whether the Army has the right distribution of activeduty personnel and reservists to carry out its missions—is determined not by total requirements but by

how often and how quickly forces will need to deploy

on specific missions. Ifforces must deploy frequently

and with little warning, active-duty troops are preferable. If particular types offorces are rarely needed and

are likely to have a long time to prepare, reserve forces

are more suitable. Unfortunately, predicting the frequency ofdeployment or the amount of available preparation time is not easy. Nevertheless, the Army makes

assumptions about those factors in planning how to

carry out its federal and state missions. This chapter

assesses how well those assumptions—and the requirements that arise from them—match the Army's current

force structure.

Assessment of Army Forces

for Two Major Regional

Conflicts

In terms of scale, the most daunting Army mission is

providing forces to fight two major regional conflicts

that break out nearly simultaneously. As currently configured, the Army has all ofthe combat forces and most

of the support forces it needs to fight those conflicts,

but it may have difficulty delivering them in a timely

fashion. The reason is twofold. First, although the

U.S. fleet of military transport aircraft and ships is one

ofthe largest in the world, it would still need considerable time to carry all of the Army forces and their

equipment to two distant theaters.1Second, the Army

depends heavily on the reserve component to provide

support forces for the conflicts, and reserve units may

not be able to deploy in time to arrive early in the first

theater, as Army planning requires.

Deployment Schedules

The Department of Defense's plans for fighting a regional conflict stress the importance of getting combat

forces into the theater of operations quickly to retard

the progress of a hostile invasion. In line with that

strategy, the Army's power-projection requirements call

for the capability to deliver a force comprising one light

division and one heavy brigade to any region of the

world within 15 days (see Table 4). (Heavy units include tanks and other armored vehicles; light units do

not.) The Army's requirements call for two additional

divisions, at least one of which would be heavy, to be

delivered within 30 days. The full 5

1

/3-division combat

force that the Army plans to send to an MRC would

arrive in theater within 75 days. That schedule would

require transporting some 80,000 combat troops and

their equipment (up to 6 million square feet) to a theater anywhere in the world in 75 days.

For more information about the U.S. military's airlift and sealift fleets,

see Congressional Budget Office, Moving U.S. Forces: Optionsfor

Strategic Mobility (February 1997).
16 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

Table 4.

The Army's Deployment Goals for a

Regional Conflict

Major

Forces in Theater

Approximate

Number of

Troops

Deadline for

Assembling

Forces in

Theater

Combat Forces3

1

1

/3 divisions

(One light division,

one heavy brigade) 20,000 15 days

3

1

/3 divisions

(At least 1

1

/3 heavy) 70,000 30 days

5

1

/3 divisions 80,000

Support Forces"

75 days

Not specified 190,000 30 days

Not specified 217,000 to

250,000

90 days

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the

Department of Defense.

NOTE: These deployment goals apply to a single conflict or the first

of two conflicts. They would vary slightly for the second of

two conflicts.

a. Based on the Army's power-projection requirements and timelines used in Department of Defense mobility studies.

b. Based on the Total Army Analysis 2003 and Department of Defense timelines.

Besides combat forces, the Army must deploy an

even larger number ofsupport forces to a regional conflict. According to the Total Army Analysis 2003, the

Army would need more than twice as many support

troops as combat troops in theater to fully prosecute a

single MRC—between 217,000 and 250,000, depending on the theater.

Specific timelines are classified, but publicly available delivery schedules from the Army and DoD indicate that the time allotted to building up forces in a theater ranges from 75 days to 90 days. During the Persian Gulf War, U.S. commanders had the luxury of dictating the schedule themselves. As a result, they waited

until all support forces were in place before launching

counterattacks. Iftheater commanders wanted to do the

same in future conflicts, the Army would need to have

217,000 to 250,000 support troops in theater within 90

days. Those troops—or, more specifically, their equipment—would account for most ofthe airlift and sealift

needed to move Army forces to a conflict overseas. In

the case of an MRC in Korea or the Middle East, the

lift requirements for support equipment (as measured in

square footage) would exceed the requirements for

combat equipment by a factor offive (see Figure 4).

The Total Army Analysis 2003 specified an intermediate goal for building up forces in theater: assembling 260,000 troops (approximately 70,000 combat

personnel and 190,000 support personnel) in theater

within 30 days of the start of the conflict. Those

260,000 troops represent about 80 percent to 90 percent ofthe forces ultimately needed for a single major

regional conflict.

According to Army plans, prosecuting an MRC

would require deploying large numbers of reservists

from both the National Guard and the Army Reserve.

None of the combat forces scheduled to participate in

an initial regional conflict would come from the reserves, but most ofthe support troops would. The reason is that the total requirement for support forces for

even one MRC far exceeds the approximately 87,000

Figure 4.

Total Equipment Required in Theater for a

Major Conflict in the Middle East

60

50

40

30

20

10

Millions of Square Feet

| Combat Equipment j Support Equipment

0 10 20 30 40 SO 60 70 80 90 100 110 120

Days After Start of Conflict

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on the Total Army

Analysis 2003 and Department of Defense timelines.

NOTE: Assumes unlimited lift capability.
CHAPTER THREE COMPARING ARMY FORCES WITH REQUIREMENTS 17

Figure 5.

Army Forces Available for a Conflict in Korea Followed by a Conflict in

the Middle East, Compared with Requirements

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Forces for First Conflict (Korea)

Thousands of Personnel

B Active Component D Reserve Component

Support

Combat

Requirement Authorized Requirement Authorized

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Army.

NOTE: Requirements are based on the results of the Total Army Analysis 2003.

350

300

250

200

150 -

100

50

0

Forces for Second Conflict (Middle East)

Thousands of Personnel

Active Component D Reserve Component

Support

Combat

Requirement

m Authorized H

Requirement Authorized

active-duty support personnel who are readily available

to take part in a major operation outside Korea.2 As a

consequence, the Army could need 117,000 to 140,000

reservists to support an initial MRC. They would be

needed quickly ifthe Army was to attain its goal of assembling 260,000 troops in 30 days and the entire force

in 90 days. That would require getting as many as

90,000 reservists overseas within a month and another

27,000 to 50,000 reservists there 60 days later.

In the scenario that the Administration uses to size

its military forces, a second MRC breaks out in another

region shortly after the United States becomes engaged

in the first conflict. The variation that taxes U.S. mobility forces most is the one in which the first conflict

breaks out on the Korean Peninsula and the second one

in the Middle East.3The planning assumptions that

some defense analysts have used for the separation of

the two conflicts range from 40 days to 45 days.

Besides those 87,000, an additional 13,000 active-duty support troops

are permanently stationed in South Korea and could participate in a

conflict if one erupted there. Another 36,000 active-duty support

troops are stationed in Europe.

Although the order in which the conflicts occur affects the demands

put on mobility forces, especially early in the conflicts, it does not significantly affect the amount oftime needed to deliver all Army forces

to both theaters.

For its assessment of Army forces in this analysis,

the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) assumed that

the first conflict would break out in Korea and the second in the Middle East 45 days later. CBO further assumed that the Army would want to deliver its forces to

the second theater on the same schedule that it outlined

for the first. That would mean getting two divisions to

the Middle East within 15 days (including two brigades

whose equipment would be permanently stored in the

region), a total offour divisions in 30 days, and the full

5

1

/3 divisions within 75 days. In addition, the Total

Army Analysis 2003 assumed that six combat brigades

from the National Guard would be sent to the second

conflict.

CBO also assumed that support forces for that conflict would follow a schedule similar to the one used for

the first MRC: about 190,000 in theater within 30 days

and all forces within 90 days. Since all of the activeduty support forces not stationed in Europe are assumed to take part in the first conflict in Korea, almost

all of the support forces for the second MRC would

come from the reserves (see Figure 5).

The rates of deployment that result from those delivery schedules are quite demanding. They would

mean that forces for the second conflict would have to

begin deploying before all forces for the first conflict
18 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

were in place. In all, for the Army to meet the schedules outlined above, it would have to deploy and deliver

almost 110,000 combat troops and more than 300,000

support troops (of which around 180,000 would be reservists) plus their equipment in 60 days (see Figure 6).

Thirty days later, an additional 40,000 combat forces

and 120,000 support forces would be required. And

within another month (a total of 120 days from the start

of the first conflict), the vast majority ofthe forces required for two MRCs—195,000 combat troops and

477,000 support troops—would need to be in place in

Korea and the Middle East.

Figure 6.

The Army's Deployment Schedule for the Combat

and Support Forces Required for Two Major

Regional Conflicts

Combat Forces

600

500

400

300

200

100

Thousands of Personnel in Theater Division Equivalents

Start of

Second

Conflict

(Day 45)

Active M Reserve9

35

30

25

20

H15

10

5

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

Days After Start of First Conflict

Support Forcesb

Thousands of Personnel in Theater

600

500

400

300

200

100

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Days After Start of First Conflict

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office estimate based on data

from the Army.

NOTE: The Army's current schedule is based on the results of the

Total Army Analysis 2003.

a. Enhanced readiness brigades from the National Guard.

b. The Army does not have enough support forces to meet this requirement.

i Active £} Reserve

Start of ' ^-—-"

Second ' /

Conflict ' /

(Day 45) ' /

Can the Army Meet Those Schedules?

The Army may not be able to meet its ambitious timetable for assembling the forces in theater to fight two

major wars at the same time. Its proposed rates of

buildup—both for combat and support units—would be

much more rapid than those achieved during the Persian

Gulf War, the U.S. military's most recent experience in

moving large forces overseas (see Figure 7). The

United States may not have felt compelled to build up

forces rapidly in that conflict after the first 60 days because of the diminished threat of a successful Iraqi attack. However, even the initial rates of buildup during

the GulfWar do not approach those needed to meet the

Army's current schedule.

Yes for Combat Forces in the First MRC. Part of

the Army's proposed schedule may be achievable, however, particularly with respect to combat forces for the

first conflict. As a result ofU.S. experience in the Gulf

War, the Administration has embarked on an ambitious

program to improve the military's ability to deliver

forces to distant regions. DoD is buying more transport

aircraft and ships, in part with the aim of being able to

meet the Army's delivery schedule for combat units (at

least for one theater) by early next century. In addition,

DoD plans to store (or "preposition") the equipment for

two heavy combat brigades in the Middle East and

equipment for one combat brigade in South Korea.

That way, combat personnel can fly rather than sail to

either region and meet up with their equipment, thus

speeding deployment.4The U.S. military also stores

equipment for one heavy combat brigade on ships stationed in the Indian Ocean. Those ships are ready to

sail to any trouble spot and can arrive in Korea or the

Middle East in about two weeks.

Heavy forces usually travel overseas by ship because a transport aircraft can cany only one or two tanks at a time. Heavy brigades include 100 to 180 tanks in addition to other armored vehicles.
CHAPTER THREE COMPARING ARMY FORCES WITH REQUIREMENTS 19

Prepositioning heavy combat equipment means that

less equipment would have to be transported overseas

to respond to a crisis. If a conflict broke out in the

Middle East, the Army would need to deliver the equipment for only 4

1

/3 divisions from the United States or

Europe. (The rest would come from the prepositioned

stores in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.) In the

Figure 7.

The Army's Deployment Schedule for a Major

Conflict in the Middle East, Compared with

Deployment During the Persian Gulf War

Combat Forces3

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Days After Start of Conflict

300

250

Thousands of Personnel In Theater Division Equivalents

-

200 -

150 -

•

100 Current Schedule .. '

50 / _ ^" Persian Gulf War

^/ *

Support Forces

300

Thousands of Personnel in Theater

250

Current Schedule^--'^

200 f^^

I rf»

150 / *

1 s

/ *

1 *

100

I s

1 *

I ^' Persian Gulf War

50 / -- "" "

7 — "* ** *"

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Days After Start of First Conflict

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the

Army and Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (April 1992).

NOTE: The Army's current schedule is based on the results of the

Total Army Analysis 2003.

a. Includes only active-duty forces.

case of a Korean conflict, just four divisions' worth of

equipment would have to come from the United States.

(The two combat brigades stationed in South Korea and

the equipment prepositioned there and in the Indian

Ocean would account for the rest.) Having that equipment prepositioned would mean transporting 1.5 million fewer square feet of combat equipment to the Middle East or almost 1 million fewer square feet to Korea

in the event of conflicts there. The Administration's

efforts to enlarge the airlift and sealift fleets and to

preposition equipment will probably allow the Army to

meet its ambitious delivery schedule for combat forces

for one MRC, even though that schedule envisions a

buildup nearly twice as fast as during the GulfWar.

Meeting that schedule, however, depends on the

presence of relatively benign conditions. For instance,

it assumes that equipment stored overseas has not been

captured or destroyed by the enemy or damaged by sabotage. Storage sites for that equipment are located in

friendly countries and are guarded by security personnel, but they are not invulnerable to attack. In addition,

any damage to port or airfield facilities would retard the

United States' ability to build up forces overseas. Finally, transport ships and aircraft en route to their destinations could be targets for enemy attack. Although no

such attacks occurred during the Gulf War, they are

certainly possible during any future conflict and present

a real threat to the ability ofthe United States to deploy

forces as quickly as it would like.

No for Support Forces in the First MRC. Even ifthe

Army can meet its timetable for delivering combat

equipment to a major conflict, it is unlikely to do so for

support equipment. As Figure 4 showed, the forces

that the Army would deploy to an MRC include at least

five times as much support equipment (by square footage) as combat equipment. Thus, support units contribute significantly more to the Army's total lift requirements than combat units do.

DoD officials do not believe that the Army can

meet its stringent timetable for support forces because

of lift constraints. CBO's analysis supports that view.

Based on the airlift and sealift capability likely to be

available in 2001, CBO estimated how long it might

take to deliver all of the equipment the Army says it

needs to fight conflicts in Korea or the Middle East.

(See the appendix for more information about how

CBO made its estimates.) For a single conflict, deploy-
20 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY December 1997

Figure 8.

Estimated Schedule for Delivering Equipment to a Major Conflict in the Middle East

Under Varying Assumptions About Lift

Assuming Unlimited Lift Capability

(Current Army schedule)

Millions of Square Feet of Equipment in Theater

Assuming Lift Capability Planned for 2001

(CBO estimate)

Millions of Square Feet of Equipment in Theater

70

60 |Combat Equipment Ü Support Equipment

70

60 Combat Equipment Support Equipment

50 50

40

30

20

-

/ > • m^ssssm*»

40

30

20

V*"^:

10

0

(

- 10

) 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 1) 20 40 60 80 100 120 1<10

Days After Start of Conflict Days After Start of Conflict

SOURCE Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.

ing 260,000 combat and support troops and their

equipment to Korea or the Middle East would take 90

to 100 days, CBO estimated. Deploying all ofthe necessary forces would require 110 days for Korea or 140

days for the Middle East. Thus, although all Army

forces would be in place in Korea not too long after

DoD's goal of 90 days, deliveries to the Middle East

would take more than a month longer because of lift

constraints. Assuming (as CBO did) that combat

equipment receives priority, those delays mean that the

buildup ofsupport forces in theater would not proceed

as rapidly as the Army's schedule envisions (see Figure

8).

No for the Second MRC. Lift constraints would have

an even more profound impact on the deployment of

forces for two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.

CBO assumed that the second MRC would start 45

days after the first—well before all forces were delivered to the first theater. Delivering combat forces as

quickly as possible after a conflict erupts is critical to

halt any further progress by an aggressor. Thus, during

the first 30 days of the second conflict, ships and aircraft would be needed to transport the equipment for

2% divisions to the second theater. Those deliveries,

plus the equipment already stored in Korea or the Middle East, would ensure that the Army could meet its

goal of having Vh divisions in theater within 30 days.

However, diverting lift assets to the second theater

would slow down the buildup of forces for the first

MRC. According to CBO's analysis, that delay could

be as long as 30 days. As a result, the buildup of forces

in the first theater (assumed in this analysis to be Korea) could take 140 days to complete rather than the

110 days it would take ifthere was only one conflict, or

the 90 days in DoD's schedule (see Figure 9).

The need to finish deliveries to the first theater

could in turn postpone completion of the buildup for

the second MRC. If, after three divisions were in place

in the second theater, priority was shifted back to finishing the buildup for the first conflict, completing delivery ofthe 5

1

/3 divisions' worth of combat forces for

the second conflict could end up taking more than 100

days from the start ofthat conflict. Such a delay would

put the combat force more than a month behind schedule.5 Buildup ofthe entire force would be similarly delayed. In all, 195 days—more than six months—could

Those results are based on the assumption that the presence ofthree

combat divisions in the second theater would be sufficient to halt an

aggressor's attack and that military commanders would prefer to complete the buildup ofsupport forces in the first theater before delivering

additional combat forces to the second theater. The commanders in

chief ofthe two theaters and the national command authorities would

be responsible for setting priorities for the use of airlift and sealift.

Decisions that differed from CBO's assumptions would yield different

delivery schedules and could result in a more rapid delivery of combat

forces to the second theater.
CHAPTER THREE COMPARING ARMY FORCES WITH REQUIREMENTS 21

elapse from the start of the second MRC before all

forces, including the six reinforcing combat brigades

from the National Guard, would be in theater.

The magnitude of those delays raises questions

about the Army's planning assumptions. Although they

are similar to delays experienced during the Persian

GulfWar, they run counter to the Administration's desire to build up forces more quickly in the future and to

not give an opponent the luxury of long periods when

U.S. troops could be vulnerable to attack. The sheer

volume of Army equipment that would have to be

transported overseas makes it unlikely that those delays

could be significantly reduced, despite the Administration's planned investment in airlift, sealift, and prepositioned equipment.

The delays have one potential benefit, however:

they could give the Army an opportunity to use some

less ready units in major conflicts. Since lift constraints

would significantly slow deliveries to the second MRC,

the Army could consider using reserve combat units

—which take longer than active forces to prepare for

battle—to help prosecute that conflict. In addition, limits on the availability of airlift and sealift would to

some extent reduce the urgency for mobilizing and deploying reserve support units.

Access to Reserve Units

The Army's deployment schedule would require mobilizing, activating, training, and transporting hundreds of

units from the reserve component in a very short time.

To provide sufficient support forces for an initial MRC,

the Army would, according to its own schedule, have to

deploy as many as 90,000 reservists overseas within 30

days. However, as the preceding discussion demonstrated, limits on lift capability render the Army's

schedule for support forces unworkable.

CBO's estimated deployment schedule for reserve

support units, which is based on the ability of U.S. lift

assets to transport Army equipment, represents a much

slower—and more realistic—rate of deployment than

the schedule assumed in the Total Army Analysis 2003

(see Figure 10). Because lift would not be available

sooner, CBO estimates that it would probably take at

least 90 days to assemble the 90,000 reservists and

their equipment in theater. Delivering all ofthe reserve

units needed to support one MRC (including as many

as 140,000 reserve personnel) could take up to 140

days from the start ofthe conflict.

Figure 9.

Estimated Schedule for Delivering Equipment to Two Major Regional Conflicts

Under Varying Assumptions About Lift

140

Assuming Unlimited Lift Capability

(Current Army schedule)

Millions of Square Feet of Equipment in Theater

Support Equipment

Combat Equipment

2nd MRC

1st MRC

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240

Days After Start of First Conflict

Assuming Lift Capability Planned for 2001

(CBO estimate)

140

Millions of Square Feet of Equipment in Theater

Support Equipment

120

Start of

Combat Equipment

100 -Second

Conflict

80

(Day 45)

: \

60

40

\

sfgZj>

20

^^

2nd MRC

1st MRC

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240

Days After Start of First Conflict

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.

NOTE: MRC = major regional conflict.
22 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

Although that slower buildup of reserve units is

undoubtedly more realistic than the one the TAA-03

called for, it is still much more ambitious than the

buildup achieved during the Persian Gulf War. Then,

support units that included a total of about 73,000 reservists were not assembled in theater until about 200

days after Operation Desert Shield began.

The Army and the Administration have made several changes since the 1991 war that could accelerate

the availability of reserve forces for a major conflict.

During Operation Desert Shield, a delay oftwo weeks

ensued between the deployment ofthe first Army forces

to the Middle East and the initial call-up ofreservists to

support the operation. Although it is impossible to predict how quickly reservists would be mobilized in a future conflict, legislation enacted since the Persian Gulf

War has made partial mobilization more flexible. As a

result, calling up reservists to take part in relatively

small contingencies, such as peacekeeping operations in

Bosnia, has become more routine. The next time reservists are needed in large numbers to support a major operation, less delay may occur between the initial deployment of active-duty troops and the mobilization of reservists.

Another factor that slowed down the deployment of

reserve units to the Persian Gulf War was the process

ofidentifying and federalizing specific reserve support

units to take part. During the war, the Army and its

commanders in the field identified on an ad hoc basis

what types of units were needed to further the campaign. The initial mobilization order covered 25,000

Army reservists, but the first activation called up only

31 units (less than 1,000 Guard and Reserve personnel)

for deployment to the Middle East. Additional activations of up to 120 units for deployment occurred every

few days for the duration ofthe war. In the end, more

than 700 reserve units were deployed to the region.

Upon activation, the members of each unit (which

ranged in size from two to 740 soldiers) would assemble at their mobilization station, complete their paperwork, train, and ready their equipment for shipment to

the Persian Gulf. Unit equipment generally was transported by ship, and personnel would fly over to meet up

with it when it arrived in port in the Middle East. The

whole process, from unit activation to arrival in theater,

took an average of 34 days (although some very small

units took less than 10 days, and some larger units required more than two months after activation to arrive

in theater).

That deployment process could have been accelerated if the Army had identified the units it might need

for such a conflict beforehand. In addition, activating

Figure 10.

Estimated Deployment Schedules for Reserve Support Forces for a Major Conflict in the Middle East

200

Thousands of Personnel in Theater

150 -

100

50

Total Army Analysis 2003

(Assuming unlimited lift capability)

Persian Gulf War

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200

Days After Start of Conflict

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense,

a. Assumes active forces are deployed before reserve forces.
CHAPTER THREE COMPARING ARMY FORCES WITH REQUIREMENTS 23

those units quickly rather than over a period of almost

six months would have made a significant difference. If

the President had mobilized large numbers ofreservists

at the same time that he first deployed U.S. forces to

the Middle East, if all 700 reserve units sent to the Gulf

had been activated at the same time, and if enough lift

had been available, virtually all of those units could

have been mobilized, deployed, and transported in

about 70 days rather than the 200 days actually required.

Since the war, the Army has identified hundreds of

Guard and Reserve units that would be needed to support an MRC and has designated them as part of its

Force Support Package. Those units are supposed to be

maintained at a high state ofreadiness, allowing them

to depart after call-up in 42 days or less. (Some small

units can theoretically embark immediately.) Those

units—with a total of about 75,000 troops—would form

the initial set of reserve support forces that the Army

would deploy to a major regional conflict.

In all, the Army would need to mobilize, prepare,

and transport up to 140,000 reservists and their equipment in less than five months for one MRC ifit was to

deploy them as quickly as the available airlift and

sealift allow. No historical precedent exists to establish

whether that is feasible. In fact, experience during the

GulfWar would argue against such a massive and rapid

deployment. However, the recent steps to make the

reserve component more accessible for operations that

do not require total mobilization might allow the Army

to meet that goal.

An even more daunting task would be assembling

as many as 90,000 reserve support personnel in 30

days, as the Army's schedule dictates. Even iflift constraints stretched out that schedule by another 60 days,

as CBO estimates, the requirements for getting so many

reservists overseas in that amount oftime—immediate

mobilization oftens ofthousands of people and activation of hundreds of separate units—are so stringent as

to make the Army's plan for reserve forces appear

overly optimistic to some analysts.

Assessment of Army Forces

for Lesser Contingencies

and Overseas Presence

In terms of overall numbers, the Army has plenty of

forces to carry out such lesser contingencies as smallscale combat operations, humanitarian aid missions,

and peacekeeping. During the past decade, those types

of operations have typically required deploying less

than 5 percent ofthe active-duty Army overseas at any

one time. However, all recent Army deployments of

note have included some reserve personnel. That reliance on reserves, although standard DoD policy, can

impose various costs.

The Army uses reservists for nearly all operations

because some types of support units are found exclusively or primarily in the reserve component. For example, all water-supply battalions and prisoner-of-war

brigades are in the reserves, as are 97 percent of the

Army's civil affairs units and 86 percent of its

petroleum-supply battalions. Because so many critical

support functions are performed solely by reserve personnel, recent U.S. operations in Panama, Haiti, and

Bosnia (which each involved no more than 20,000

troops) included increasingly large numbers ofreservists. About 500 reservists participated in Operation

Just Cause in Panama in 1989, roughly 1,000 reservists

went to Haiti in 1994, and at times more than 4,000

reserve personnel have supported ongoing operations in

Bosnia.6

Another reason that the Army has stepped up its

use ofreservists in small operations is the Administration's renewed emphasis on integrating the reserves into

all military activities. That practice has its roots in

DoD's Total Force Policy, which was adopted in 1973.

Then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger told the

services that the goal ofthe policy was to integrate "the

active, Guard, and Reserve forces into a homogeneous

whole."7 The current Defense Secretary has upheld the

6. The majority ofreservists deployed to Europe to support operations in

Bosnia have been stationed in Germany.

7. Reserve Forces Policy Board, Total Force 2010, a Symposium to

Address the Total Force Establishment in the 21st Century: Final

Report (January 3, 1997), p. 7.
24 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

Total Force Policy, saying that the reserve components

"are essential participants in the full spectrum of operations, from the smallest ofsmall-scale contingency operations to major theater war."8 The Administration

believes that using reservists in small-scale operations

not only provides unique skills to such operations but

also helps relieve active-duty units of some of their

peacetime commitments. As a result, active units have

to spend less time deployed overseas in peacetime and

can concentrate on higher-priority tasks.

Activating and deploying reservists for small operations incurs both monetary and nonmonetary costs,

however. According to Administration estimates, the

Army spent approximately $40 million in 1995 to pay

reservists activated for federal duty other than training.

In 1996, that figure may have been as high as $120 million because of U.S. operations in Bosnia. Although

such costs are small compared with the Army's overall

budget, they represent extra expenses beyond the ordinary costs of operating and supporting the reserve component.

On the nonmonetary side, frequent activation and

deployment ofreservists could take a toll on employers'

willingness to hire them. By law, reservists are guaranteed job protection during voluntary or involuntary service in both war and peacetime. They can notify their

employer of the imminent need to leave on service either orally or in writing. And reservists cannot be

forced to use vacation time to perform military service.

Those protections apply to absences for routine training

as well as to call-up for deployments such as the Persian GulfWar or operations in Bosnia.

The Department of Defense has conducted surveys

of employers to determine whether their attitudes have

been affected by the growing use ofreservists in recent

years. Those surveys seem to show that employers are

willing to support infrequent loss of their workers for

short periods, typically up to a month. However, they

are generally more supportive when reservists are absent to assist in local disaster-relief efforts than for

overseas operations. Moreover, deployment of entire

reserve units—which typically contain personnel from a

limited geographic area—could include several employees ofthe same company. In that situation, losing multiple employees for an extended period could have a

significant impact on a business, particularly a small

one. To discourage any erosion of support, DoD has

sent letters signed by the Secretary of Defense to many

employers explaining the important contributions that

reservists make to national security.

More frequent activations and longer deployments

during peacetime could also have a negative impact on

retention and recruitment in the reserves. DoD has not

reported any broad evidence ofthat occurring, but it has

had some problems recruiting and retaining doctors for

the Army Reserve.

No similar problems arise in the Army's other main

federal mission—providing overseas presence during

peacetime—because it does not require reserve personnel. The 91,000 Army troops permanently stationed in

Europe and South Korea are all active-duty soldiers.

Moreover, their number is relatively small (less than 30

percent of the deployable active Army) and has been

declining over the past decade. And although this mission ties up a considerable portion ofthe active Army's

forces, it places them in areas of the world where the

Administration believes they are best able to protect

U.S. interests abroad. Based on its current force structure and requirements, the Army should have no trouble

carrying out the mission to maintain overseas presence

in coming years.

Assessment of National Guard

Forces for State Missions

The size ofthe Army National Guard, as determined by

the force requirements for federal missions, should be

more than adequate to meet the needs of governors for

state missions. A study by RAND found that between

1987 and 1993, no single activation ofthe Guard (including both the Air and Army Guard) required more

than 6 percent of its total personnel.9In some states,

however, the resources of individual Air and Army

Guards were occasionally overwhelmed, as occurred in

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Report ofthe Quadrennial

Defense Review (May 1997), p. 32.

Roger Allen Brown, William Fedorochko Jr., and John F. Schänk,

Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard

(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995).
CHAPTER THREE COMPARING ARMY FORCES WITH REQUIREMENTS 25

Florida in August and September 1992 after Hurricane

Andrew.

Such occurrences raise concern among National

Guard officials when they consider the unlikely but

possible scenario that states will need Guard troops to

assist in domestic emergencies at the same time that the

United States is participating in two major regional

conflicts. According to Army plans, many of the

Guard's deployable forces would be involved in such

conflicts and therefore would be unavailable to aid state

governors. However, RAND found that almost half of

the current personnel in the Army National Guard are

not slated to deploy to either of two MRCs, so they

could assist in domestic emergencies.

Thus, although force levels in individual states may

on occasion be inadequate to deal with particularly demanding domestic crises (without additional assistance

from other states or the federal government), the forces

of the Army National Guard as a whole are more than

sufficient to fulfill their state missions. As a result,

RAND concluded that federal missions—rather than

state disaster- or emergency-response requirements—

should continue to be the primary factor determining

the force structure ofthe Guard.

Overall Assessment ofthe

Army's Structure

When measured against such criteria as the balance

between combat and support forces, the mix of active

and reserve units, the ability to respond quickly, and

affordability, the Army's force structure contains four

possible areas of concern. The first is the overabundance of combat forces, which is partly a legacy ofthe

Cold War. Approximately half of the Army's combat

troops are in the National Guard, and the vast majority

of them do not have a direct combat role in either of

two major regional conflicts. In 1995, the Commission

on Roles and Missions concluded that the Army contains 110,000 excess combat troops. Although those

forces may provide a strategic hedge against the emergence of an unforeseen threat, the expense of operating,

supporting, and equipping them may not be justifiable

in times oftight budgets.

Second, the Army does not have enough support

forces to meet its own requirements. That shortage results in part because the service says it needs almost

two and a half support soldiers (those not assigned to

combat divisions and brigades) for each combat soldier.

Thus, it would need 477,000 personnel to support the

195,000 combat troops slated to be involved in two

MRCs. Such high support requirements derive from

the Army's desire to rninimize the risk associated with

fighting two major regional conflicts at the same time.

By its latest estimate, however, the Army has just

418,600 of the necessary support personnel in its

deployable forces—a shortage of 58,400. Furthermore,

only about one-third ofthose personnel are in the active

component. That means the vast majority of soldiers

needed to support the Army in two MRCs would come

from the reserve component. Even for the first conflict,

most of the support forces would come from the reserves, and some ofthem would be needed overseas in

short order.

Third, the huge level ofsupport troops required by

Army doctrine creates the need for large amounts of lift

to transport forces overseas. In the event ofjust one

major regional conflict, delivering the Army's combat

and support, forces could take more than four months

(based on the transport aircraft and ships that DoD

plans to have in its fleet shortly after the turn of the

century). In the case of two nearly simultaneous

MRCs, assembling all ofthe forces the Army considers

necessary in the second theater could take more than six

months from the beginning of the second conflict.

Those delivery times are much longer than the Administration's optimal schedules.

Fourth, the Army's current structure is expensive to

operate, support, and equip. As a result, it is becoming

increasingly unaffordable. Several defense experts and

Administration officials have expressed doubt that the

Army can retain the current force structure and equip it

with modern weapons ifthe service's budget remains at

the level ofrecent years. The Army is planning at least

two major weapons programs that together will require

it to spend an additional $2 billion a year on weapons

purchases beginning in 2005. At the same time, it is

spending more than $1 billion each year for combat

forces that some analysts consider unnecessary. Ifthe

Army does not reduce its force structure and its total
26 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

budget does not increase, some analysts have argued,

the service will not be able to equip its forces adequately.

In contrast to those four areas of concern, the Army

appears to have enough forces in the National Guard to

provide state and territorial governors with militias for

their domestic needs. Although individual disasters or

emergencies might occasionally overwhelm the assets

of a particular state or territory, those occurrences are

rare. In such instances, governors can call on the federal government for assistance, which has been provided in the past. Even in the event of two MRCs—

which would require large numbers of National Guard

troops to deploy overseas—almost half of the Guard

would remain at home. That residual should be sufficient to meet domestic requirements, even though some

states could be left with fairly small Guard contingents.
Chapter Four

Alternatives for Meeting

the Army's Force Requirements

The Army's current force structure is expensive

to maintain, requires a great many support personnel and lift assets to deploy overseas, and

suffers from an imbalance between combat and support

units. The Army plans to partially rectify that imbalance by converting some combat forces to support

forces. However, its plan would not reduce the need for

large numbers of support personnel or make the force

structure significantly cheaper to maintain and equip.

The Congressional Budget Office investigated

ways that the Army could address some of its current

problems by changing its force structure more drastically than the Army's plan envisions (see Table 5). One

way to do that would be to rely more on allied governments and civilian contractors to provide support for

U.S. combat forces arriving in their country (Alternative I in this analysis). With such host-nation support,

the Army could reduce the amount of equipment it

would have to ship overseas in the event of a conflict.

Another approach (Alternative II) would create additional support forces in the active Army, thereby reducing the Army's reliance on reserve support units early in

a major regional conflict or for lesser contingencies in

peacetime. Finally, the Army could lower its costs by

eliminating some combat forces from the active component and relying more on existing combat units in the

National Guard to fight a second MRC (the approach

taken in Alternative IV). Of course, more than one of

those approaches could be pursued simultaneously; for

example, Alternative III in this analysis is a combination ofthe first two options.

CBO's four alternatives focus on solving the

Army's shortage of support forces. But given current

constraints on the Army's budget, none ofthe alternatives would increase the size of any ofthe three organizations within the Army (active, Guard, and Reserve).

CBO compared the alternatives based on such measures as the availability of forces to carry out the

Army's federal and state missions, how quickly those

forces could perform their missions, and how the risks

and costs of each alternative compare with those ofthe

current Army (see Table 6). For options that would

reduce the size ofthe Army's force structure (Alternatives I, III, and IV), CBO estimated the savings that

would result both directly and indirectly from those

cuts. Direct savings come from avoiding the costs to

operate and support the deployable forces that would be

eliminated. Indirect savings come from reductions in

the Army's infrastructure that might be possible because ofthe cuts in force structure. In other words, indirect savings reflect the potentially reduced need for

medical support, training, repair facilities, and other

support services associated with a smaller Army. As

such, they reflect cuts in the number of both Army civilians and nondeploying forces.

These alternatives are not exhaustive. The Army

could meet its force requirements in other ways, such as

converting some of its institutional (nondeploying)

forces to deployable support troops. But CBO had no

way to evaluate the impact of such a reduction in the

Army's infrastructure, so it did not investigate ap-
28 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

Table 5.

Changes in Force Structure Under the Army's Plan and Four Alternatives

Option Changes in Force Structure

Army's Plan: Reconfigure the National Guard

Alternative I: Increase Reliance on Host-Nation

Support and Civilian Contractors

Alternative II: Create Additional Support Forces

in the Active Army

Alternative III: Combine Alternatives I and II

Alternative IV: Rely More Heavily on the Reserves

to Fight a Second Major Regional Conflict

o Convert 12 Guard combat brigades to support units

o Eliminate four Guard combat divisions

o Rely on host nations and civilian contractors for the

equivalent of 62,000 Army support troops in two

major regional conflicts

o Convert two active-duty heavy divisions and one

Guard combat division to support units

o Convert two active-duty heavy divisions to support

units

o Eliminate four Guard combat divisions

o Cut 35,000 support troops from the reserve component

o Rely on host nations and civilian contractors for the

equivalent of 62,000 Army support troops in two

major regional conflicts

o Eliminate three active-duty divisions (two heavy and

one light) and four Guard combat divisions

o Rely on host nations and civilian contractors for the

equivalent of 62,000 Army support troops in two

major regional conflicts

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: None of CBO's alternatives would carry out the Army's planned conversion of 12 Guard combat brigades to support units.

proaches that would shrink the institutional Army in

order to create more deployable units. Rather, CBO

confined its analysis to changes in the Army's deployable active and reserve forces.

The Army's Plan

In the next decade or so, the Army plans to reorganize

some combat units in the National Guard into support

units as well as continue to reduce the number of personnel in all three Army organizations. The Guard reconfiguration is designed to address the shortage of

support troops identified by the Total Army Analysis

2003. The personnel cuts were recommended by the

Quadrennial Defense Review.

National Guard Reconfiguration

The Army plans to create more deployable support

forces for overseas conflicts by converting 12 Guard

combat brigades into combat-support and combatservice-support units. That reorganization would create

42,700 support forces in the National Guard from an

equal number of combat forces (see Table 6). The new

support units would be organized into six support brigades and two support divisions. After the conversion,

the Guard would retain eight divisions, although only

six ofthem would be traditional combat divisions.
CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR MEETING THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS 29

The conversion would mean a drastic change in

mission, equipment, and training for many ofthe units

involved. For example, units with a combat mission,

such as tank companies, would be converted to units

with a support mission, such as truck companies. In the

process, a tank company would trade in its 14 tanks for

various kinds of trucks, and its soldiers would have to

learn to drive trucks and deliver petroleum products or

other supplies rather than find and attack an enemy. In

converting 12 Guard brigades, the Army is planning to

inactivate some 600 tanks, 1,300 armored personnel

carriers, 50 attack helicopters, and 260 howitzers. In

their place, it plans to buy almost 7,000 medium-sized

and heavy trucks to equip the new units.

Carrying out the reorganization would require significant funds and time. According to the Army, the

total cost to convert the 12 combat brigades to support

units would be almost $3 billion. The bulk of that

($2.5 billion) would be spent on equipment—primarily

trucks—for the new units. Another $350 million would

go for new facilities and for training the combat soldiers for their new support roles. The Army plans to

complete the conversion by 2009. But if $400 million

is not available each year to buy trucks and carry out

the plan, converting all 12 brigades could take longer.

The reconfiguration of Guard units would alleviate,

but not eliminate, the Army's shortage ofsupport forces

for two MRCs. The Total Army Analysis 2003 identified a shortage of 58,400 support spaces in the Army,

but the planned reconfiguration would create about

42,700 support spaces—leaving a shortfall of 15,700.

Support from host nations, based on the Army's estimate, could reduce that shortfall to 1,000. But the

Army is reluctant to rely heavily on the availability of

such support in the absence of formal signed agreements with host nations.

Similarly, the Guard reorganization would reduce,

but not eradicate, the Army's oversupply of combat

forces (see Figure 11 on page 32). Converting 42,700

combat troops would still leave the service with many

excess combat forces. However, the Army's plan

would eliminate some ofthe Guard combat forces that

have been identified as having no direct role to play in

current warfighting plans.

Recommendations of the Quadrennial

Defense Review

In May 1997, Defense Secretary William Cohen recommended further changes to the Army in his report on the

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Besides reorganizing 12 Guard combat brigades into support brigades,

he recommended cutting the active component by

15,000 personnel and the reserve component by 45,000

personnel. Cohen's report contained only a few details

about when or where those reductions would be made.

It advocated retaining all ofthe combat units in the active Army, but it was not specific about how many of

the Guard's 30 combat brigades (the number that would

remain after the planned reorganization) should be retained. Furthermore, the report did not specify whether

the active and reserve personnel cuts would come from

deployable or institutional forces, or how the reserve

cuts would be distributed between the Guard and the

Army Reserve.

Subsequent press articles and an agreement between the Army's three organizations about how to

carry out some of the reductions have provided additional details. The active Army will make its 15,000-

person cut (from the force's 1997 authorized size of

495,000) at the rate of 5,000 soldiers per year in 1997,

1998, and 1999. The resulting active-duty force will

have 480,000 personnel (see Table 7 on page 33). On

the reserve side, the Army National Guard will lose

more than 17,000 soldiers by 2000, shrinking to

350,000 people. And the Army Reserve will be cut by

3,000 soldiers in 2000, for a total of 205,000 personnel.

The Army plans to cut the other 25,000 people

from the reserve component by 2002, but how that cut

would be distributed between the Guard and the Reserve was not spelled out in the agreement that the three

organizations reached. However, press reports indicate

that the Guard would bear the brunt, losing an extra

21,000 personnel to the Reserve's 4,000. If that happened, the Guard would number 329,000 soldiers by

2002 and the Reserve 201,000.
30 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY December 1997

Reductions ofthat size could yield significant savings when complete. All told, the Army could save

$1.6 billion a year in personnel costs alone (pay and

benefits). If it eliminated entire units from its force

structure as well as personnel, the Army could realize

additional savings in the costs to operate and maintain

its forces.

Although the Army has agreed on how many people to cut, it has not yet decided where in its force structure to make the reductions. The Quadrennial Defense

Review specified that the active Army would keep all

10 of its divisions. The Guard, too, would retain its

current eight divisions, though not all would be combat

divisions. Some press reports have suggested that the

Army is looking at converting seven of the Guard's

heavy divisions into light divisions. Such a conversion

could eliminate almost 34,000 combat soldiers from the

Guard, according to press reports. Ifthe remaining personnel cuts (the 15,000 active-duty troops, another

4,000 soldiers from the Guard, and a total of 7,000

Army Reserve troops) were distributed among the

Table 6.

Effect of the Army's Plan and Four Alternatives on Annual Costs, Deployment Times, and Number of Forces

Army

in 1998

Army's

Plan"

Alternatives

II IV

1998-2010

Direct savings

Total savings

After 2010

Direct savings

Total savings

First Theater

Second Theater0

Combat Brigades

Soldier Equivalents

Average Annual Savings or Costs (-)

(Millions of 1997 dollars)

n.a. -200 to -400

n.a. -200 to -400

700

1,200

-200

-200

850

1,550

2,500

4,500

n.a. 0

b

n.a. 0

b

800

1,400

100b

100b

1,300

2,150

2,950

5,250

Deployment Time"

(Days after start of first conflict)

130 130

200 230

120

200

130

230

120

200

120

200

Combat Forces from the Guard Needed for the Second Conflict*

0 0 0 6

Assumed Extent of Host-Nation Support

15,000 15,000 62,000 10,000 62,000 62,000

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: n.a. = not applicable.

a. Does not include personnel cuts recommended by the Quadrennial Defense Review.

b. Some small savings in operation and maintenance costs may result from converting combat units to support units.

c. Time required to deliver all troops and equipment needed to fight each of two major regional conflicts.
CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR MEETING THE ARMYS FORCE REQUIREMENTS 31

Army's institutional, combat, and support forces

roughly in proportion to the current distribution of

those forces within each organization, then 5,000 combat troops would be eliminated from the active Army.

Thus, carrying out the recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review could cost the Army some

39,000 active and Guard combat soldiers. When combined with the combat forces that would be lost through

the Army's planned reconfiguration of Guard combat

units to support units, the service could face a total cut

in combat forces of 81,700 personnel.

If the personnel reductions of the QDR were distributed as outlined above, they would greatly reduce

the number of excess combat forces in the Army (see

Figure 11). However, they would also reduce the number of support forces by 12,000. Such a reduction

would exacerbate the shortage ofsupport forces identified in the Total Army Analysis 2003, which the Guard

reconfiguration is designed to address.

Since the Army has not stated definitively how or

where it will make the QDR cuts, evaluating their imTable 6.

Continued

Army

in 1998

Army's

Plan8

Alternatives

I II III IV

Changes in Deployable Forces

Active Component

Combat divisions

Combat personnel

Support personnel

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

0

0

0

0

0

0

-2

-33,000

33,000

-2

-33,000

33,000

-3

-44,000

0

Reserve Component

Combat divisions (Guard)

Combat personnel (Guard)

Support personnel (Guard and Reserve)

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

-4'

-42,700

42,700

-4

-58,300

0

-1

-15,000

15,000

-4

-58,300

-35,000

-4

-58,300

0

Total Force Structure

Combat Divisions

Active component

Reserve component (Guard)

10

8

10

6

s

10

4

8

7

8

4

7

4

Deployable Support Forces

Active component

Reserve component

136,000

291,000

136,000

333,700

136,000

291,000

169,000

306,000

169,000

256,000

136,000

291,000

Total Personnel

Active Army

Army National Guard

Army Reserve

495,000

367,000

208,000

495,000

367,000

208,000

495,000

305,000

208,000

495,000

367,000

208,000

495,000

287,100

189,600

430,300

305,000

208,000

d. Assumes the second conflict begins 45 days after the first.

e. To form the equivalent of 5

1

/3 divisions.

f. Two divisions and six separate brigades.

g. Although the Army's plan would retain six combat divisions in the National Guard, it would reduce the number of separate brigades from 18 to 12,

an additional reduction equivalent to two combat divisions.
32 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

pact is difficult. In addition, the proposed personnel

reductions must be endorsed by the Congress, so their

fate is uncertain. Without additional specific knowledge about their disposition, CBO cannot use the proposed reductions as a basis for comparing alternative

approaches. Thus, subsequent discussions of the

Army's plan in this chapter exclude the personnel cuts

recommended by the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Assessment of the Army's Plan

The Army's plan to reorganize the National Guard

would not address many of the concerns with the current force structure identified in the previous chapter.

Specifically, it would not reduce the Army's need for

large numbers ofsupport forces to accompany its combat forces. Thus, it would not lessen the Army's need

to transport hundreds of shiploads of equipment overseas to fight major regional conflicts or the resulting

long delays associated with building up forces to fight

those conflicts. Nor would creating more support units

in the Guard lessen the Army's dependence on the reserve component to provide support forces relatively

early in an MRC or during peacetime operations. In

fact, the percentage of total support forces in the reserves would rise slightly after the restructuring.

Moreover, the Army's plan (excluding the personnel cuts recommended by the QDR) would not reduce

the cost of equipping and maintaining the Army, at

least not for the next decade. Although the Guard's

new support units might ultimately be a bit cheaper to

maintain and equip than the combat units they would

replace, converting them would cost almost $3 billion.

Overall, the plan to reorganize Guard combat units into

support units would address only a small subset ofthe

concerns about the current Army that CBO has identified.

Figure 11.

Army Forces Available for Two MRCs After Reorganizing the National Guard and Making Cuts

Recommended by the Quadrennial Defense Review

Thousands of Personnel

1,000

800

600

400 -

200

Require- Army

ment In

1998

After After

Guard QDR

Reorga- Cutsb

nlzatlon

Require- Army After After

ment In Guard QDR

1998 ReorganizationCuts"

Require- Army After After

ment In Guard QDR

1998 ReorganizationCuts'»

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Army.

NOTES: This figure represents deployable forces only. Requirements are based on the results of the Total Army Analysis 2003. All other forces

represent authorized levels.

MRC = major regional conflict; QDR = Quadrennial Defense Review.

a. Host-nation support and civilian contractors.

b. Force level in 2002.
CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR MEETING THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS 33

Table 7.

Army Personnel Levels Through 2000 Based on the President's Budget and

the Recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review

Actual Authorized

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Based on the President's 1998 Budget

Active Army

National Guard

Army Reserve

491,000 495,000 495,000

370,000 367,000 367,000

226,000 215,000 208,000

495,000

367,000

208,000

495,000

367,000

208,000

Based on Recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review

Active Army

National Guard

Army Reserve

491,000 490,000 485,000

370,000 367,000 362,000

226,000 215,000 208,000

480,000

357,000

208,000

480,000

350,000

205,000

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Department of Defense,

April 1997); and "Reimer/West Memo to Cohen," Inside the Pentagon, June 12,1997, p. 13.

NOTE: Personnel levels are for the end of the fiscal year.

Alternative I: Increase

Reliance on Host-Nation

Support and Civilian

Contractors

The Army could reduce its requirement for support

forces and speed deployments by relying more on host

nations and contractors for some support services. As

the Army built up forces in a theater to fight a major

regional conflict, the nation it was defending could be

expected to aid those forces by providing transportation, fuel, and other logistics support. Such host-nation

infrastructure could help sustain a sizable U.S. force

once it had safely secured airports, seaports, and air

cover. In addition, the Army could hire civilian contractors to provide such basic subsistence items as

food, laundry services, and shelter.

Ifhost nations and civilian contractors overseas can

provide support services when necessary, the Army

need not maintain as many support forces in peacetime.

Nor would it have to transport as much equipment

overseas in wartime. According to a recent analysis

commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the capacity of South Korea's civilian infrastructure exceeds the demands that the U.S. military would

probably place on it during a conflict by a factor of 12

or more in the areas of cargo transport, petroleum

transport, and availability of construction workers, hospital beds, and water supplies.1 The capability of Saudi

Arabia's civilian infrastructure exceeds U.S. wartime

needs by at least a factor offour, the analysis found.

The U.S. military has enlisted the help of host nations during past conflicts. During the early stages of

the Persian Gulf War, for example, Saudi Arabia provided extensive support in the form offood, fuel, water,

and transportation. In preparing some studies, planners

at the Department of Defense have assumed that the

Army could count on large contributions ofsimilar support in the future. For instance, in its analysis ofmobility requirements, DoD assumed host-nation contributions—primarily in the areas ofsupply and transportation units—equivalent to as many as 42,000 U.S. sup1. John C.F. Tillson and others, Review oftheArmyProcessforDetermining Force Structure Requirements (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for

Defense Analyses, May 1996).
34 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

port troops.2 By contrast, the Total Army Analysis

2003 assumed host-nation support equivalent to just

15,000 support forces.

Civilian contractors provide another source of outside personnel to perform support functions. The Army

established the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

(LOGCAP) in 1985 to plan how it could augment its

support forces with civilian contractors who would perform selected combat-support and combat-service-support activities during overseas deployments. The Army

has a contract with DynCorporation Aerospace Technology to develop a basic augmentation plan applicable

worldwide, as well as plans for operations in 13 specific countries. The contract also calls for DynCorporation to be able to receive, house, and sustain as many as

20,000 U.S. troops for up to 180 days with 30 days'

notice. The Army's previous LOGCAP contractor,

Brown and Root Service Corporation, provided similar

services to Army forces in Somalia and Bosnia.3

The current contract envisions support for relatively small deployments—no more than 40,000 troops.

Thus, LOGCAP services might be useful in providing

initial or limited support before a system of host-nation

support was established, or in managing that system

once it was in place. In any case, because a LOGCAP

contractor must have a global network of in-country

subcontractors, it can provide a ready-made network to

ease the entry of U.S. forces into a theater, without

putting demands on the military's transportation system.

Recent analyses have suggested that increased reliance on host nations and civilian contractors could reduce the Army's requirements for support forces by

42,000 to 77,300 troops. The first number is based on

the estimate of possible host-nation contributions used

in DoD's Mobility Requirements Study; the second reflects an assessment by the Institute for Defense Analyses of the potential of both host-nation support and civilian contractors.4

The 42,000-person estimate is

roughly equivalent to the number of new support troops

2. Ibid.

3. Brown and Root Service Corporation was the Army's LOGCAP contractor from 1992 until January 31, 1997. The Army awarded a fiveyear contract to DynCorporation Aerospace Technology to provide

LOGCAP services until January 31, 2002.

4. Tillson and others, Review ofthe ArmyProcess.

that would result from the Army's plan to reorganize

the National Guard.

Changes in Force Structure

This alternative assumes that host nations and civilian

contractors could provide support equivalent to that

afforded by 62,000 Army troops (see Table 6). Their

contributions would more than make up the Army's perceived shortfall in support forces.

With no shortage of support troops, this option

would cancel the Army's plan to turn Guard combat

brigades into support units and would eliminate four

Guard divisions from the force structure. That would

reduce the size of the Guard by about 58,300 personnel—more than half the excess combat forces in the

Army. To ensure an orderly drawdown of forces, one

division would be eliminated each year between 1998

and 2001. The Guard would lose an additional 3,200

soldiers who indirectly support the disbanded divisions.

Thus, by 2002, the National Guard would contain only

four combat divisions and 305,000 people overall.

Advantages

Alternative I would have several advantages. It would

make overseas deployments of U.S. forces easier, it

would eliminate more than 58,000 excess combat

forces from the National Guard, and it would result in

significant annual savings once complete.

Using host-nation support should make the job of

assembling large numbers ofU.S. forces in an overseas

theater faster and less difficult. When the first troops

arrived, some support personnel would already be in

place to assist them. Some support equipment would

also be on hand already and would not have to be

shipped from Army bases elsewhere. If host nations

and in-country contractors could provide support forces

equivalent to 62,000 soldiers during the conduct oftwo

MRCs, the Army could reduce the amount of equipment to be shipped overseas by more than 10 percent.

As a result, U.S. forces could finish deploying earlier

than under the Army's plan. Specifically, all forces

could be in place for an initial conflict in Korea 10 days

earlier and in place in the second theater 30 days earlier

(see Table 8).
CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR MEETING THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS 35

Another advantage of essentially substituting hostnation support and civilian contractors for Army personnel is that the U.S. government would have to pay

for their services only in the event of a conflict. In

some instances, such as during the Persian Gulf War,

the host nation might even provide some support services free of charge. Civilian contractors in the

LOGCAP program charge an annual fee for planning

support even iftheir services are not used, but that cost

is less than the cost of keeping thousands ofsoldiers in

uniform, even in the reserves.

After the drawdown in Alternative I was complete,

the Army would save $1.4 billion a year ($800 million

in direct savings and $600 million in indirect savings,

Table 8.

Effect That Increased Support from

Host Nations and Civilian Contractors

Would Have on Deployment Times

Army's Plan Alternative I

First MRC in Korea

Contribution from Host Nation

and Contractors (Soldier

equivalents) 9,000°

Time Required to Assemble All

Forces in Theater (Days after

start of conflict) 130

Second MRC in the Middle East

38,000

120

Contribution from Host Nation

and Contractors (Soldier

equivalents) 6,000 24,000

Time Required to Assemble All

Forces in Theater

Days after start of first MRC

Days after start of second

MRC

230

185

200

155

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on John C.F. Tillson

and others, Review ofthe Army Process for Determining

Force Structure Requirements (Alexandria, Va.: Institute

for Defense Analyses, May 1996), and Army data.

NOTE: MRC = major regional conflict.

a. Based on the Total Army Analysis 2003.

compared with the cost of today's Army) from the reduced number of people and divisions it would have to

support in the National Guard. Compared with its plan,

the Army would not have to pay for the restructuring of

Guard units, thus saving an additional $3 billion over

roughly a decade.

Disadvantages

Relying on host nations and civilian contractors for

some support services—even forjust a small fraction of

overall Army needs—would entail some risk. Today,

the Army uses civilian contractors primarily to provide

assistance for small peacetime contingencies; as a result, contractors may not be capable ofsupporting large

deployments. The Army argues that civilians may also

be reluctant to work in the hostile environments that

could develop during a major regional conflict, particularly if they risk exposure to chemical or biological

weapons.

Some host nations may be unable or unwilling to

provide support for U.S. forces. In recent examples,

U.S. forces operating in Somalia and Bosnia were not

invited into the country by the host government. Theoretically, the United States might someday need to operate in countries where the infrastructure was limited and

unable to support the large number offorces necessary

for a major conflict. However, it is hard to imagine

circumstances in which the Army would deploy hundreds ofthousands oftroops to a country that lacked an

extensive and developed infrastructure or one that was

unwilling to help support the U.S. forces sent to its aid.

The Army has also expressed the concern that even

where host nations have the capacity to support large

U.S. operations, there is no guarantee that they will do

so when needed without written agreements. That concern is a legitimate one. It motivates the Army's desire

to have enough deployable support forces for an MRC

in its own ranks. It also explains why the Total Army

Analysis 2003 assumed a relatively small amount of

host-nation support.

U.S. experience in the Persian GulfWar, however,

suggests that the Army's fears are overblown. During

that operation, the Saudis provided large amounts of

support at their own expense, even without prearranged
36 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

agreements. Contracts were negotiated in the country

even as U.S. soldiers were arriving.

Alternative I would suffer from at least three other

disadvantages. First, it would cut the number of Guard

divisions by half, significantly reducing the size ofthe

U.S. forces that are held in reserve to deal with unknown, unanticipated threats. Although the Army also

plans to cut the number of Guard divisions, this alternative would eliminate about 16,000 more Guard combat

troops than the Army's plan. Second, this option would

not significantly reduce the Army's need to call up reservists during peacetime to support even small operations. And third, by cutting the National Guard by 17

percent, it would reduce the forces available to meet the

needs ofstate governors. The Guard's overall ability to

carry out its state mission would probably not be affected, but some states could be left with much smaller

Guard contingents than they have today.

Alternative II: Create

Additional Support Forces

in the Active Army

One way to address the Army's shortage of support

forces is to create extra support units in the active component rather than in the reserves, as the Army's plan

envisions. The large numbers ofreservists necessary to

support just one MRC, and the fact that they would be

needed overseas shortly after a conflict began, raises

concerns about the feasibility of relying so heavily on

reserve support units in such an operation. Based on a

recent analysis by RAND, the reserves could not provide the level of support that the Army assumes for a

major regional conflict if the call-up of units was delayed by as little as 20 days.5 During the Persian Gulf

War, the first units were not called up until 20 days after the conflict started. For the rest of the units, even

longer delays, averaging 100 days, elapsed before their

activation. Increasing the number of active-duty sup5. SeeRonaldE. Sortor, ArmyActive/Reserve Mix: Force Planningfor

MajorRegional Contingencies (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995),

p. 31-39, for a discussion ofthe impact ofmobilization delays on the

availability ofreserve support forces.

port forces would lessen the Army's reliance on reserve

support forces and the risk that they might not be available in time.

The overall size of the active Army is limited by

budget constraints, so CBO did not investigate any alternatives that would increase the number of deployable

forces in the active component. The only way to add

support forces to the active Army without increasing its

size or converting institutional forces to deployable

forces—approaches CBO did not consider—is to turn

active combat units into support units.

Changes in Force Structure

Alternative II would convert two active-duty heavy divisions entirely into support units (thus eliminating the

divisions from the Army's combat forces). The process

would be similar to the one the Army plans to use to

reconfigure National Guard combat units. As explained in Chapter 1, divisions typically contain both

combat units and combat-support/combat-service-support units. In this alternative, the purely combat units,

such as tank and attack-helicopter companies, would be

reorganized and reequipped for support missions.

Some of the existing support units—such as signal,

maintenance, and transportation units—would be unchanged. Others, such as artillery units, would be converted to forces for which the Army has the greatest

need—primarily transportation and fuel-handling units.

In addition, ifthe new support forces were to be available to fill the roles that are most in demand for peacetime operations, some of them would need to become

military police and civil affairs units.

As with the Army's plan, turning active-duty combat divisions into support units would be a long process, taking up to a decade. New equipment would

have be purchased and exchanged for combat equipment, and personnel would have to be transferred or

retrained to staffthe new units. Costs would be similar

to those ofthe Army's plan: almost $3 billion over the

next 10 years. All in all, the process of converting two

active divisions to support units would require reassigning 33,000 people and hundreds of pieces of

equipment.

Creating an extra 33,000 support spaces in the active component would still leave the Army short about
CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR MEETING THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS 37

25,000 support spaces overall, based on the requirements ofthe Total Army Analysis 2003. Thus, Alternative II would also convert one combat division in the

Guard to support units, creating an additional 15,000

support troops (see Table 6). The remaining support

needs would have to be met by host nations or through

the use of civilian contractors.

Could the National Guard Play a

Greater Combat Role?

With two heavy divisions eliminated from the active

Army, the service would no longer have enough combat

forces in the active component to fight two major regional conflicts. As a result, it would have to rely on

combat units in the National Guard to help make up the

full complement of combat forces for a second MRC.

Reserve combat units may be more than adequate to

fight likely opponents. Although the Army has been

reluctant to use them for recent or potential regional

conflicts, some defense experts maintain that Guard

combat units are more capable than the standing armies

ofpotential adversaries around the world. For instance,

they are equipped with newer and more sophisticated

weapons than many national armies. And members of

the National Guard are better educated and receive

more realistic training than the soldiers ofmany ofthe

United States' potential enemies.

Assuming that Guard combat brigades can be

trained to the same level of proficiency as their activeduty counterparts, the feasibility of substituting them

for some active units in a second MRC hinges on how

quickly they can be ready to deploy. The Administration's goal is to have each ofthe 15 enhanced readiness

brigades (ERBs) in the National Guard ready to deploy

within 90 days.6(ERBs are combat brigades that the

Administration plans to maintain at a higher level of

readiness than other combat forces in the Guard. They

are intended to reinforce active combat units during a

major conflict.)

Some analysts have questioned the realism of that

90-day goal, however. A 1995 study by RAND estimated that readying a Guard brigade for combat could

take as long as 128 days, although its intermediate estimate was 104 days.7

Even that estimate is two weeks

longer than DoD's official goal. In contrast, a study by

the Institute for Defense Analyses claimed that at least

some Guard brigades could be ready to deploy in just

60 days.8

If some Guard combat units were ready for deployment after 60 to 104 days oftraining, and iftransit to

the theater took 22 days, Guard units could begin arriving in theater in 82 days to 126 days. Of course, any

time that elapsed between the start ofthe first conflict

and the mobilization ofreserves would be added to that

arrival time. Thus, if the second conflict started 45

days after the first (and the Guard was mobilized as

soon as the first conflict began), then Guard brigades

could begin to arrive about 40 days to 80 days into the

second conflict.

With that sort of timeline, Guard brigades would

not be able to provide an initial defense, or halting

force, during a second conflict. As in any major conflict, combat units would be needed early in a second

MRC to deter further progress by the aggressor. Only

active-duty combat units could deploy quickly enough

ifthe separation between two MRCs was as little as 45

days. Thus, they would have to provide the halting

force early in a second MRC (similar to the one that the

82nd Airborne Division and other early-arriving combat units provided during Operation Desert Shield).

In all, 3

1

/3 active divisions would be available for

the second conflict under this alternative. The Guard

would provide the remaining combat forces. In order

for the Army to deploy the rough equivalent of 5

1

/3 divisions, the Guard would have to send six of its 15

ERBs to the second theater.

Relying on the reserves to provide six combat brigades for a second MRC might not delay the Army's

ability to conduct large-scale operations. The first

Guard brigades could begin arriving 40 days to 80 days

Deborah R. Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,

was quoted as saying that this goal would be met by 1999. See Kristin

Patterson, "Lee, Full Guard Enhancement by 1999," Army Times,

July 1, 1996, p. 25.

7. Sorter, ArmyActive/Reserve Mix, p. 45.

8. John C.F. Tillson and others, Reserve Component Roles, Mix, and

Employment (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, May

1995).
38 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

after the conflict started. Given the long time needed to

transport all Army forces to a second MRC, waiting for

the remaining Guard units might not significantly slow

the arrival ofthe full combat force. In fact, even if all

six Guard brigades could be ready to deploy in 90 days

(or 45 days into the second conflict), there would not be

room on the transport ships to move all ofthem to the

theater.

A 1996 RAND study that examined the time and

resources needed to train Guard brigades for combat

concluded that training all six heavy ERBs for a major

conflict would require a minimum of 159 days.9 But

even if the last of the six took that long to get ready

—and thus did not arrive in theater until 140 days after

the start ofthe second conflict—all six would still be in

place over a month before all ofthe necessary support

equipment for that theater (see Figure 12). In short, the

Guard brigades that would form a significant part ofthe

combat forces for a second MRC in Alternative II

should be ready to deploy overseas well before all of

the support forces needed in the theater could be delivered there.

Advantages

Alternative II has several distinct advantages. By creating more support units in the active component, it

would make a rapid buildup offorces for an initial conflict less risky. And assuming that the new support

forces were ofthe appropriate type, it would also make

more active units available for small peacetime operations, thus eliminating the need to activate reservists for

such missions. Avoiding activation costs for thousands

ofreservists in peacetime could save the Army money.

Additional savings might result ifthe new support units

cost less to operate and maintain than the combat units

they replaced. Those annual savings would be small,

however. Once all ofthe units had been converted (after 2010), this alternative might save $100 million a

year compared with the current Army (see Table 6).

Actually converting the units would cost a total of almost $3 billion before 2010.

Unlike the previous option, this alternative would

not rely heavily on resources outside the Army, such as

Thomas F. Lippiatt and others, Postmobilization Training Resource

Requirements (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996).

Figure 12.

Total Combat Forces and Support Equipment

in Theater for a Second MRC Under the Army's

Plan and Alternative II

10 Division Equivalents

8 -

Army's Plan

Millions of Square Feet

Active-Duty Combat Forces

(Left scale) /

- 30

Support Equipment

(Right scale)

50

40

- 20

- 10

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Days After Start of Conflict

Alternative II

10 Division Equivalents Millions of Square Feet

Active-Duty

Combat Forces

(Left scale) /

Total Combat Forces,

Including Those from the

National Guard

50

40

30

- 20

Support Equipment

(Right scale)

- 10

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Days After Start of Conflict

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Army data and

Thomas F. Lippiatt and others, Postmobilization Training

Resource Requirements (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,

1996).

civilian contractors or allied nations, to provide support

for Army combat forces. Thus, it would avoid the risks

associated with that reliance, as outlined in the discussion of Alternative I. This option would also eliminate

more than 40 percent ofthe excess combat forces in the

Army, with a significant portion coming from the active

component. (The Army's plan, by contrast, would reduce the size of combat forces only in the Guard.) And

Alternative II would retain a large strategic hedge
CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR MEETING THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS 39

against future uncertainty by retaining seven combat

divisions in the Guard.

Disadvantages

Reducing the participation of reserve units in a single

regional conflict or in peacetime operations would run

counter to one ofthe cornerstones ofU.S. defense strategy, the Total Force Policy. As noted in Chapter 3, that

policy was adopted after the Vietnam War in an effort

to involve the civilian soldiers ofthe reserve component

in all major military operations. The Army and DoD

have reiterated their support for the Total Force Policy,

which they believe was validated during the Persian

Gulf War. Since then, they have expanded the use of

reserve forces in small peacetime operations. Some

members of the Army have argued that restructuring

the service in a way that eliminated reserve participation in all but two MRCs might make military leaders

and other Army personnel feel more cut off from society as a whole.

From the perspective of costs, adding support

forces to the active component could be inefficient because the Army would be paying for some full-time

units that received little use on a day-to-day basis.

Many forces that exist solely in the reserves, such as

civil affairs and prisoner-of-war units, are there because

they were originally perceived to be in low demand during peacetime. However, those types of units have been

called up for recent contingencies in Haiti and Bosnia.

Ifthe Army is going to conduct similar operations on a

regular basis in the future, the units it will require

should perhaps be in the active Army. But ifsuch operations will occur only infrequently, keeping those units

in the reserves until they are needed would make more

sense.

Perhaps the major disadvantage ofAlternative II is

that it would greatly reduce the number of active combat forces for a second MRC (see Figure 13). Just 3

1

/3

active divisions would be available to fight in a second

conflict under this option. Of course, the Army would

still have enough combat forces in the Guard—seven

Figure 13.

Army Forces Available for a Conflict in Korea Followed by a Conflict in

the Middle East Under Alternatives II and III

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Forces for First Conflict (Korea)

Thousands of Personnel

Active Component Reserve Component D HNSa

Support

350

300

250

200

150

Forces for Second Conflict (Middle East)

Thousands of Personnel

Active Component D Reserve Component D HNSa

Support

Require- Army Alt Alt.

ment Plan II III

Require- Army Alt. Alt.

ment Plan II III

Require- Army Alt. Alt.

ment Plan II III

Require- Army Alt. Alt.

ment Plan II III

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: Requirements are based on the results of the Total Army Analysis 2003.

a. Host-nation support and civilian contractors.
40 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

divisions and 18 brigades—to provide the two additional divisions needed. But according to DoD estimates, entire Guard divisions could not be ready in time

to participate in the second MRC. The Guard's enhanced readiness brigades should be ready in time, but

substituting six separate Guard brigades for two active

divisions would present at least four drawbacks.

First, six brigades do not provide the same combat

capability as two divisions, even if Guard brigades are

fully trained when they enter a theater. The reason is

that although three separate brigades contain roughly

the same number of combat troops as a division, they

do not include the supporting forces—such as command and control, artillery, logistics, and aviation

units—typically found in a division.10 Under Alternative II, separate combat brigades from the Guard could

be attached to the active divisions sent to the second

conflict, but the resulting force would not be as capable

as one composed offive full divisions.

The difference in capability extends to individual

soldiers as well. Although Guard combat brigades have

the same equipment and would be trained to the same

standards as active-duty brigades, their personnel do

not have the same level ofmilitary experience. Activeduty soldiers sent into combat—especially senior officers and enlisted personnel in positions ofleadership—

have many years of experience that shape their judgment and ability to act with other Army units and other

services. Members of the Guard, by contrast, are required to spend only weekends and an annual two-week

training period honing their skills and military knowledge. Many reservists do have some active-duty experience, but the fact that they are soldiers only part ofthe

time often means that their military skills are not as

broad and deep as those of their active-duty counterparts, even after a period of postmobilization training.

That difference, though impossible to quantify, is a

source of uncertainty and risk in relying on reserve

combat forces rather than active-duty combat forces.

Some defense experts believe it is a particular concern

in the case oflarge combat units such as brigades.

10. The Army is planning to create a division in the National Guard that

would include three enhanced readiness brigades and an active-component headquarters. That division would be well suited to participate in

a second MRC since its brigades would be accustomed to working

together and it would have a highly trained and ready command staff.

Second, Alternative II might not provide the same

level ofreinforcements as the Army's plan. In the case

of two MRCs, ifthe Army needed to reinforce the initial combat force of 5

1

/3 divisions in either theater, it is

unclear how many additional Guard combat brigades

could be ready in time. The Army's plan would rely on

the six most ready Guard brigades to act as reinforcements. Alternative II, by contrast, would use those brigades as part of the initial combat force in a second

theater. As a result, any reinforcements would have to

come from the second echelon ofthe Guard's 15 ERBs.

Third, relying on Guard units for initial combat

forces (even for the second conflict) means that any

delays in mobilizing the reserves after a crisis erupts

will lead to delays in deploying the full contingent of

combat troops overseas. That problem is even more

critical for combat units than support units because the

former take much longer to prepare for deployment.

The estimate that six Guard combat brigades could arrive in theater about 140 days into a second MRC assumes that the reserves are mobilized on the day the

first conflict breaks out. Ifthat did not happen, arrival

times would be pushed back, eventually calling into

question the ability ofthose brigades to participate in a

second conflict.

Moreover, even if mobilization occurred immediately, the job oftraining Guard units before deployment

could introduce delays. RAND's 1996 training study

examined the facilities and personnel that would be

available to train Guard combat brigades in the event of

a large-scale mobilization for one or more major conflicts. It determined that in order to train six Guard

brigades in 160 days (thus allowing them to be overseas in 180 days), the Army would need to operate

three brigade-level training sites simultaneously. That

would be possible, RAND concluded, but somewhat

risky. The main risk would be that the Army would not

have enough proficient active-duty trainers to conduct

large-scale training exercises at three sites. Running

only two training sites would pose much less risk, the

study asserted, but would mean that training four brigades would take 160 days, and training six brigades

would take almost 230 days—putting those forces in

the second theater 140 days and 210 days, respectively,

after the start ofthe second conflict.

Fourth, delays in the arrival of Guard combat brigades could hold up the start of a counterattack in the
CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR MEETING THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS 41

second theater. If either mobilizing the reserves or

training the combat brigades took longer than expected,

the fifth and sixth Guard brigades might not arrive

overseas until after all ofthe support equipment. Delays in both mobilization and training could even hold

up the arrival of the third and fourth brigades until

nearly all ofthe support forces were in place. Such delays could adversely affect the schedule for carrying out

military operations in the theater, putting U.S. ground

forces in danger while the commander awaited the arrival of all six Guard combat brigades.

Even if those brigades met the most optimistic

schedule outlined above (all six arriving 140 days into

the second conflict), they could still adversely affect the

pace of a campaign. The reason is that theater commanders need not wait until all support forces are in

place before mounting a counteroffensive. The Total

Army Analysis 2003 calls for a final ratio ofsupport to

combat forces of nearly 2.5 to 1 for an MRC. But during the Persian Gulf War, ratios were around 1.4 to 1

when the ground war and counteroffensive began.

Based on CBO's estimate of delivery rates, ratios of

that level could be achieved in a second theater within

about 110 days (or 155 days after the start ofthe first

conflict). Under the most optimistic conditions, only

three combat brigades from the Guard could be in theater in that time. Under less than optimal conditionsdelayed mobilization, fewer than three training sites—

none of the Guard brigades might be in theater that

quickly. In that case, relying on the Guard for part of

the initial combat force in a second MRC could delay a

counteroffensive, lengthen the exposure of U.S. forces

to attack, and lead to increased U.S. casualties.

A final disadvantage of Alternative II is that it

would not significantly reduce costs or requirements for

lift from the levels under the Army's plan. It would

convert roughly the same number of combat forces to

support forces as that plan. Thus, the additional costs

should be about the same—around $3 billion. Similarly, the Army would have to transport as much equipment overseas for two MRCs under this option as under

its plan, so there would be no lessening ofthe service's

taxing lift requirements.11

11. Like the Army's plan, Alternative II would send an additional six enhanced readiness brigades as reinforcements to the second MRC. If a

total of 12 ERBs could not be ready in time to take part in that conflict, the total lift requirement to move Army equipment would decrease by some 3.6 million square feet In that case, all forces could be

assembled in the second theater about two weeks earlier.

Alternative III: Increase

Reliance on Host-Nation

Support and Create Additional

Support Forces in the

Active Army

The Army could adopt the policies embodied in the first

two alternatives at the same time. To make up for its

shortage of support forces, it could place greater reliance on in-country resources as well as add support

units to the active component.

Changes in Force Structure

Like Alternative II, this option would convert two active combat divisions to support units, thereby creating

about 33,000 new support troops in the active Army.

In addition, it would assume that host nations and civilian contractors could furnish the equivalent of 62,000

support personnel should the United States need to

fight two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Thus, this alternative would provide the equivalent of 95,000 more

support spaces than the Army has today. Along with

creating additional support spaces, this option would

reduce the size of the reserves by eliminating four

Guard combat divisions and cutting 35,000 support

personnel from the reserve component, equally distributed between the National Guard and the Army Reserve

(see Table 9).

Advantages

Alternative HI would create an Army with more support

forces that were ready to deploy overseas quickly than

is the case today or than would result from the Army's

plan. An Army based on Alternative III would also

need less lift to fight a major regional conflict. If an

initial MRC broke out in Korea, the combined effect of

adding 33,000 support forces to the active Army and

relying on South Korea to provide substantial host-nation support would mean the conflict could be fought

with less than 50,000 reservists, as opposed to the approximately 110,000 needed under the Army's plan (see

Figure 13). Thus, the Army could proceed to build up

its forces without risking as many delays from the slow
42 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY December 1997

mobilization or activation of reserve units. Increased

use of host-nation support and civilian contractors

would also mean that the equipment for two MRCs

could be in place more quickly than under the Army's

plan. As a result, the completion of deliveries to the

first and second theaters could be accelerated by 10

days and 30 days, respectively.

This alternative could also realize significant savings. With additional support forces in the active component, the Army could avoid activating reserve units in

peacetime, thus saving about $100 million annually.

Eliminating four Guard divisions could save about $1.4

billion a year (including direct and indirect savings),

and cutting 35,000 reserve support troops could save

another $650 million annually (with $400 million in

direct savings from eliminating support units and $250

million in indirect savings). Total annual savings after

2010, when this alternative would be fully implemented, could reach almost $2.2 billion (see Table 10).

Disadvantages

Alternative III would suffer from the principal disadvantages of the two previous options. It would rely

Table 9.

Changes in the Number of Army Personnel

Under Alternative III

Active National Army

Army Guard Reserve Total

Deployable Units

Combat units

Support units8

Subtotal

Nondeployable

Units11

Total

33,000

33.000

0

-58,300

-17.500

-75,800

0

-17.500

-17,500

-91,300

-2.000

-93,300

0 -4.100 -900 -5.000

0 -79,900 -18,400 -98,300

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

a. Forces not assigned to major combat units such as divisions or

brigades.

b. Units in the Army's Table of Distribution and Allowances.

Table 10.

Average Annual Savings Under Alternative III

(In millions of 1997 dollars)

1998-2010 After 2010

Costs to Convert Two ActiveDuty Combat Divisions to

Support Units' -200 0

Savings from Not Deploying

Reserve Forces in Peacetime 0 100

Savings from Eliminating Four

Guard Divisions

Direct

Indirect

700

500

800

600

Savings from Cutting Support

Units in the Reserve Component

Direct

Indirect

350

200

400

250

Total Savings

Direct

Indirect

1,550

850

700

2,150

1,300

850

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

a. The total cost would be $2.9 billion through 2006

costs would be incurred.

; after that, no

heavily on outside personnel to support Army efforts in

MRCs. It would also depend on Guard combat units to

fight a second conflict should one erupt shortly after a

first. In addition, it would reduce the total combat

forces in the Army by more than either ofthe previous

two alternatives (26 percent) because it would eliminate

combat units from both the active Army and the Guard.

That means the United States would have fewer and

less ready forces in reserve to deal with an unanticipated threat or to reinforce major regional conflicts.

Finally, Alternative III would make the biggest reduction of all the options in the size of the National

Guard. It would eliminate a total of 79,900 people

from the Guard, a cut of more than 20 percent. As a

result, this alternative would have the largest negative

impact on the number of Guard personnel that governors have available to deal with crises in their states

and territories.
CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR MEETING THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS 43

Alternative IV: Rely More

Heavily on the Reserves to

Fight a Second MRC

The last alternative that CBO considered would achieve

significant savings by assuming that U.S. national security interests could be protected by a smaller active-duty

Army. That assumption results from two premises:

that there is little likelihood of a second MRC breaking

out shortly after a first, and that even if one did, a couple of active divisions would suffice to provide a halting force for that conflict.

Some defense experts have argued that the United

States does not need 5Vz divisions to fight each ofthe

two threats most likely to challenge its security interests

in the foreseeable future (see Box 1 in Chapter 2). Others have maintained that tactical aircraft could halt an

enemy attack and weaken it enough that fewer—or less

ready—ground forces would be needed to finish the job.

Based on those theories, Alternative IV would use a

smaller active-duty halting force in the event of a second MRC than previous options would. To supplement

that force, it would rely on a greater number of combat

units from the reserves.

As noted in the discussion ofAlternative II, reserve

combat units should have ample time to prepare for a

second MRC because of the long time required to deliver Army equipment to two theaters overseas. However, under this option the Guard would contribute

more forces for the second conflict than the six brigades

assumed in Alternatives II and III. More Guard brigades could be available in time for the second MRC if

some ofthem were light forces, ifsome were trained to

lesser standards, or ifthe field commander could afford

to wait until they were fully trained. In terms of numbers, the Army could call on nine ofthe Guard's 15 enhanced readiness brigades to make up part ofthe initial

combat force for the second MRC and still have six

ERBs in reserve for reinforcements.

The Army has devised a plan involving light brigades and limited training that would allow up to 10

ERBs to deploy in 160 days or less. Two ofthe 10 brigades would be light forces. They could train at separate, smaller training sites—since light units need less

space to practice maneuvers than heavy units do—at the

same time that the heavy brigades were being trained

elsewhere. Two ofthe eight heavy brigades would be

trained simultaneously with other heavy brigades at the

same site, but to a proficiency adequate only for operations in the rear of the combat area. Those two brigades would not be ready to participate in direct combat

at the end ofthe 160-day training period.

If the Army can meet that training schedule, the

nine Guard ERBs needed for the initial combat force

for the second conflict under this alternative could deploy overseas within 160 days of mobilization. (Of

those nine brigades, six would be fully trained heavy

brigades, two would be light brigades, and one would

be a heavy brigade prepared only for rear-area operations.) Assuming 22 days for transit, that would allow

the Guard to put nine brigades in the second theater

within 182 days ofmobilization. And assuming mobilization began as soon as the first conflict broke out,

that means the nine brigades would be in the second

theater 140 days after the start of the second conflict.

In that case, the Guard would be providing more than

half ofthe theater's 5

1

/3-division combat force.

Changes in Force Structure

This alternative would eliminate three divisions from

the active Army—two heavy divisions and one light

infantry division—and four divisions from the Guard.

Like most of the previous options, Alternative IV

would rely on host-nation support and civilian contractors to provide the equivalent of 62,000 support troops

for two MRCs. With such support, the Army would

have no need to reorganize Guard combat units into

support units, as it now plans. Alternative IV would

instead eliminate 58,300 combat personnel from the

National Guard.

This option would disband combat divisions in the

active Army like the two previous alternatives, but its

cuts would be larger (three active divisions rather than

two). Unlike those alternatives, this option would not

replace those combat units with an equal number of

support personnel. All told, Alternative IV would eliminate more than 100,000 combat troops (44,000 from

the active Army and 58,300 from the Guard), nearly as

many as the Commission on Roles and Missions identified as excessive in its 1995 report. Disbanding three

divisions would allow the Army to cut an additional
44 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

23,900 personnel indirectly associated with those divisions. As a result, the size of the active Army would

shrink by 64,700 soldiers and the size ofthe Guard by

61,500.

Advantages

The main advantage of Alternative IV would be the

significant savings it would produce (see Table 11).

The Army could spend almost $5.3 billion less each

year after 2010 by maintaining a smaller combat force

($3.9 billion less by having three fewer active divisions

and $1.4 billion less by having four fewer Guard divisions). Of those savings, almost $3 billion would be

direct savings and about $2.3 billion would represent

indirect savings. By adopting this option, the Army

would also avoid the costs associated with its own plan

to reorganize Guard combat units into support units.

Disadvantages

Although Alternative IV would generate more savings

than any other option in this report, it would also entail

more risks. Those risks include the ones associated

with previous options, such as relying on forces outside

Table 11.

Average Annual Savings Under Alternative IV

(In millions of 1997 dollars)

1998-2010 After 2010

Savings from Eliminating

Three Active Divisions

Direct 1,800 2,150

Indirect 1,500 1,700

Savings from Eliminating

Four Guard Divisions

Direct 700 800

Indirect 500 600

Total Savings 4,500 5,250

Direct 2,500 2,950

Indirect 2,000 2,300

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

the Army to provide support for major regional conflicts and calling on reservists to support even small

operations in peacetime.

The largest risk, however, would probably come

from significantly reducing the number of combat

forces in the active Army and relying on the reserves to

provide more than half ofthe combat brigades to fight a

second major conflict. The risks of depending on

Guard combat units that were discussed in Alternative

II would be heightened in this option because it would

cut active combat forces more deeply. Specifically,

nine separate Guard brigades would not provide the

same combat power or military experience as three active divisions. Moreover, coordinating and controlling

the activities of the nine brigades might be difficult

without the command structure associated with the divisions. Although the division configuration that the

Army is studying—with three Guard brigades and an

active-duty headquarters—might be able to command

and control three of the Guard brigades, the other six

would have to be attached to other divisions or a corps.

Even ifthose concerns could be addressed, dependence on Guard brigades for combat would create additional risks. Deploying the Guard brigades to the second theater could take longer than estimated because of

delays in mobilization or training. If the authors of

RAND's study on postmobilization training thought

that training six brigades at three sites was risky, then

training nine brigades at four sites in the same amount

oftime would be even riskier. Reducing that risk to the

level assumed in Alternative II (by training the heavy

brigades sequentially instead of simultaneously) could

require at least 216 days. In that case, the last of the

nine brigades would not be in theater until almost 240

days after the start of the first conflict, or almost 200

days after the start of the second. Such tardiness—

which late mobilization or longer training schedules

would only exacerbate—would certainly delay the start

of a counteroffensive because all support forces would

already be in theater.

Some defense experts might argue that the cuts in

Alternative IV are so large that they would limit the

Army's ability to respond to major crises. With three

fewer active divisions, the service would need nine

Guard brigades to complete the initial combat force

should a second conflict break out shortly after a first.

But ifthe circumstances ofthe second conflict required
CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR MEETING THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS 45

a larger combat force than 5

1

/3 divisions, it is questionable how many ofthe Guard's other six ERBs could be

ready to participate, and if so, when. Furthermore,

eliminating three divisions from the active Army and

four divisions from the reserve component would leave

the Army with only slightly more than 70 percent ofits

current combat forces.

Comparison ofthe

Alternatives

Based on the criteria that CBO used, each ofthe alternatives in this report would have at least one advantage

over the Army's plan. All of them (including the

Army's plan) would cut at least 40,000 excess combat

troops from the Army's force structure. Alternatives II

and III would create more support forces in the active

Army, thus reducing reliance on reserves in peacetime

or early in a major regional conflict. Alternatives I, III,

and IV would also reduce the amount of equipment that

the Army would need to ship overseas to fight major

conflicts. Finally, all ofthe options except Alternative

II and the Army's plan would reduce the annual cost of

the Army's force structure significantly.

All of CBO's alternatives would also entail more

risk than the Army's plan, however. Alternatives I, III,

and IV would save money in part by relying heavily on

the support of allies during the conduct of MRCs.

Those alternatives would also shrink the size ofthe National Guard, thus reducing the forces available to state

and territorial governors for domestic emergencies.

Finally, Alternatives II, III, and IV would cut activeduty combat forces, making the Army more dependent

on reserve combat units to fight a second MRC.

Better Fit with Federal Missions

Today's Army contains too many combat forces and

too few support forces compared with the numbers

needed for the Army's federal missions. All ofthe alternatives, as well as the Army's plan, would eliminate

some ofthe 110,000 excess combat troops identified by

the Commission on Roles and Missions. Alternative IV

would go farthest, reducing combat forces by more than

100,000, with cuts almost equally divided between the

active Army and the National Guard. Alternative III

would eliminate more than 91,000 combat forces, and

Alternative I would cut 58,300 (all from the Guard).

Alternative II would make the smallest reduction of all

the alternatives: 48,000 combat troops—a cut similar

to that in the Army's plan (see Figure 14).

Only one of CBO's alternatives would increase

Army support forces to counter the shortage identified

by the Total Army Analysis 2003. Alternative II would

create 48,000 additional support troops in the Army, a

few thousand more than the Army's plan.

Quicker Response

All ofthe alternatives that CBO examined would allow

the Army to carry out its federal missions more quickly.

They would do so by making the Army less reliant on

the reserve component for units that would deploy early

to a major regional conflict, by reducing the amount of

equipment that would have to be shipped overseas for

such a conflict, or both.

Alternatives II and III would add 33,000 support

forces to the active Army, thus reducing the number of

reservists needed for an initial MRC by an equivalent

number. As a result, those alternatives would have the

added advantage oflessening the need for reserve support forces for small operations in peacetime.

Three of the options would shorten the time required to transport all ofthe Army's support equipment

to a theater overseas. By relying on host nations and

civilian contractors for some support services, Alternatives I, III, and IV would require less airlift and sealift

to deploy Army forces to major conflicts overseas. The

three alternatives would make the same reduction in the

amount of equipment to be shipped: a cut ofmore than

6 million square feet in the case of an MRC in Korea

and of almost 4 million square feet in the case of an

MRC in the Middle East. Consequently, all U.S. forces

could be in theater 10 days earlier than under the

Army's plan for an initial conflict and 30 days earlier

for a second conflict.
46 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY December 1997

Figure 14.

Army Forces Under Various Alternatives

Thousands of Personnel

1,400

600

400

200

Active Guard U Reserve D HNS

1,200

Total Forces

1,000

800

Total

Deployable Forces

Army Army Alt. Alt. Alt. Alt.

in Plan I II I" IV

1998

Army Army Alt. Alt. Alt. Alt.

in Plan I II HI IV

1998

Army Army Alt. Alt. Alt. Alt.

in Plan I II I" IV

1998

Army Army AIL Alt Alt. Alt.

in Plan I II HI IV

1998

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

a. Host-nation support and civilian contractors.

Savings

All of CBO's alternatives would cost less than the

Army's plan in the long run, after all ofthe changes had

been made. Three ofthem would also cost less than the

Army's plan over the next 12 years (see Table 6). Alternative IV would reap the biggest long-term savings,

almost $5.3 billion per year after 2010. Alternatives I

and III would save considerably less, approximately

$1.4 billion and $2.2 billion a year, respectively. Like

the Army's plan, Alternative II would cost a total of

almost $3 billion to implement, but it could eventually

result in some small savings—about $100 million annually.

Fewer Forces for State Duty

Three of CBO's alternatives (I, III, and IV) would reduce the overall size ofthe National Guard and thus the

number of personnel available to state and territorial

governors in times of domestic crisis. The proposed

reductions range in size from 62,000 to almost 80,000

people. Depending on how they were distributed across

the country, such cuts could have a serious impact on

the size ofthe Guard in some states.

A cut of 80,000 personnel would represent a reduction of more than 20 percent in the overall size of the

Guard. Even though peak demands for state duties required no more than 6 percent ofthe National Guard's

total personnel (including both the Air and Army

Guard) between 1987 and 1995, disproportionate reductions could leave some states with not enough people to respond to particularly large domestic emergencies.

The Defense Department has suggested ways to

address local Guard shortages that could occur in times

of crisis.12 One option would allow members of the

12. See Department of Defense, Accessibility ofReserve Component

Forces (April 18, 1994); and Genera] Accounting Office, Reserve

Forces: Proposals to Expand Call-Up Authorities Should Include

Numerical Limitations, GAO/NSIAD-97-129 (April 1997).
CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR MEETING. THE ARMY'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS 47

Army Reserve to be used in a domestic emergency even

without Presidential call-up ifthe President declared the

emergency a federal disaster. As noted in Chapter 2, in

the absence of a Presidential call-up, Reserve members

are limited to 15 days ofinvoluntary active duty a year

—nearly all of which is taken up by the two weeks of

annual training they must receive. Changing that situation would require amending existing law to allow the

Secretary of the Army to call up reservists for longer

than 15 days. Besides making personnel available, doing that would allow states to use Reserve equipment to

help clean up after natural disasters.

A second approach, which could be pursued along

with the first, would be to establish national or regional

agreements under which states would share Guard assets. A national compact would ensure that all states

had access to the Guard's special capabilities, such as

its limited number of large cargo helicopters. A compact would also help guarantee an equitable sharing of

resources among large and small states. At least one

interstate Guard agreement already exists (between several southern states), but expanding such agreements to

cover the whole country would provide the greatest access to the largest pool ofresources.

Increased Risk

All ofCBO's alternatives accept a higher level ofrisk in

fighting two MRCs than the Army's plan does. The

increased risk comes from two main sources: relying

on host nations and civilian contractors to support

MRCs rather than trying to eliminate the Army's current shortfall in support forces, and depending on National Guard units to make up part ofthe initial combat

force for the second MRC because of cuts in the number of active-duty combat troops.

The risk associated with maintaining the Army's

current level ofsupport forces may not be a great one.

Some defense experts have questioned whether the

large number of support forces called for in the Total

Army Analysis 2003 is truly necessary. The country's

previous military experience would argue against needing that many. The amount of host-nation and contractor support assumed in Alternatives I, III, and IV is less

than what some analysts estimate has been provided in

the past in similar situations. Although there is a risk

that such services would not be available in a future

MRC, that risk is probably not very high.

Greater risks might be incurred by cutting activeduty combat forces, as Alternatives II, III, and IV would

do. Such cuts would leave the Army without the 10%

active divisions that it says it needs to conduct two

MRCs nearly simultaneously. If a second conflict did

occur, combat forces from the Guard would have to

make up the balance. However, mobilization delays or

insufficient resources for training could prevent the

Army from having enough well-trained Guard brigades

in theater in a timely fashion. Thus, relying on the

Guard for initial combat troops would run the risk of

slowing buildups, delaying counterattacks, or forcing

commanders to operate with less than fully trained

combat units.

Even ifthose problems failed to materialize, Alternatives II, III, and IV would provide less combat capability to the second conflict than the Army's plan would.

Three Guard brigades would replace each active division eliminated, but they lack the artillery, aviation, and

other supporting units typically found in a division.

Nor do three separate brigades have as much ability to

coordinate their maneuvers and operations as do brigades in a division, which are controlled by the division

headquarters.

In addition, Alternatives II, III, and IV risk limiting

the size and quality of reinforcements for a second

MRC. The reason is that under those alternatives, the

most ready combat brigades from the Guard would be

needed to form the initial combat force. The enhanced

readiness brigades left behind as reinforcements would

presumably be less prepared for combat than the ones

that deployed first. The Army's plan, by contrast,

would use the Guard's most ready ERBs as reinforcements

All ofthe risks associated with cutting active-duty

combat forces would be felt most acutely under Alternative IV. It would eliminate three active divisions,

compared with two under Alternatives II and III. As a

result, Alternative IV would require the Guard to deploy nine initial combat brigades to a second MRC

rather than six (see Table 6). That greater reliance on

Guard units amplifies the risk that they would be late in

deploying to the second theater or would not provide

sufficient capability once there.
48 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

When assessing the total risk associated with any

of these alternatives, readers need to weigh both support and combat forces. On that basis, Alternative I

appears to be the least risky because, although it would

rely on U.S. allies for some support, it would not lessen

the number of active-duty combat forces. Alternative

II, by contrast, would not rely on forces outside the

Army for support but would cut active combat forces,

thereby increasing dependence on combat units from

the Guard. Alternative III or IV would carry all ofthe

risks associated with the first two options. But because

Alternative IV makes the largest cuts in active-duty

combat forces (25 percent), it would be the riskiest of

all.

Conclusions

CBO's alternatives illustrate different approaches that

would generally entail increased risk in prosecuting a

second conflict but that could either save the Army

money or provide more support forces earlier for the

first conflict, or both. Alternative I basically follows

the Army's current philosophy by preserving a large

active-duty combat force (although it would rely on

allies and civilians to provide some support during a

conflict, thus saving a large amount of money). The

other options differ more sharply from the Army's current approach by relying on the Guard to provide some

of the initial combat forces for a second MRC. Those

alternatives will be more appealing to people who think

that a second MRC is relatively unlikely or that the

risks associated with the threats now facing the United

States are not as great as the Administration suggests.

Alternative IV carries the greatest risk and the greatest

savings; Alternative II the least. Despite their various

benefits and drawbacks, all ofthe approaches that CBO

analyzed represent viable choices that differ from the

Army's risk-averse but expensive plan for its force

structure.
Appendix

Details About CBO's Mobility Analysis

To evaluate how long it would take to deploy

Army equipment overseas for a major regional

conflict, the Congressional Budget Office

(CBO) developed a model of the U.S. military's intercontinental (or strategic) lift capabilities. CBO used

the model to evaluate the feasibility of the Army's

schedule for delivering forces to such a conflict. CBO

also used the model to determine the impact ofits various alternatives on the pace of Army deliveries. The

model purposely assumes that deliveries take place under favorable conditions, for two reasons: to see

whether the Army could meet its schedule even under

the best of circumstances and to provide a conservative

assessment ofthe impact of CBO's alternatives on the

Army's ability to deploy forces overseas.

Two major components—airlift and sealift—make

up strategic lift. CBO did not model airlift in detail.

Rather, it relied on an estimate by the Department of

Defense (DoD) to establish the total amount of airlift

that will be available shortly after 2000 to move the

U.S. military. CBO then assumed that the Army would

have access to roughly the same fraction oftotal airlift

that it did during the Persian Gulf War. To determine

sealift capability, CBO used its model, which tracks the

movement of all ships planned to be in the fleet ofthe

U.S. Transportation Command in 2001.

Assumptions ofthe

Sealift Model

The sealift model was designed to provide general approximations, not precise estimates, ofthe time needed

to deliver Army forces overseas. For that reason the

model operates on single-day increments, rounding all

activities to the nearest day. For example, if an SL-7

Fast Sealift Ship would take 17 days and five hours to

sail from Savannah, Georgia, to Pusan, South Korea,

the model treats the operation as requiring 17 days'

Additionally, instead of assigning ships to particular

ports (such as Long Beach or Oakland), the model assigns all ships based in the continental United States to

either the East Coast or the West Coast and assumes

that their destinations are somewhere in the Middle

East or South Korea. In reality, travel times differ for

ships going to or from different ports in the same general area, but those differences are relatively small and

would not substantially affect the output ofthe model.

CBO's model contains three key assumptions that

could have a considerable impact on the results. The

first assumption is that port constraints are nonexistent.

In other words, no matter how many ships (of any size)

arrive at a given port on a given day, it is assumed that

the harbor is sufficiently deep to accommodate them,

that there are enough berths for all ofthem to dock, and

that the port has enough workers and equipment to simultaneously load or unload every ship. That may be

true of the U.S. ports that the military uses and large

ports in South Korea and the Middle East. It is not the

case for all foreign ports, however, some ofwhich may

not be deep enough or big enough to handle several

large ships at once.

The second assumption is that all ships in the simulated fleet are fully operational over the entire course of

the sealift operation. In reality, at any time some ships

are in dry dock or otherwise unavailable because ofroutine maintenance or unanticipated problems. Moreover,

it is the nature of all mechanical systems to break down

over time, so it seems inevitable that a certain percent-
50 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY December 1997

age of ships would encounter problems during their

sealift operations that would either slow them down

considerably or render them temporarily inoperable.

Third, the model does not include any other unforeseen impediments that could adversely affect the transit

times of ships. An example of such an impediment

would be a critical area (the Panama Canal, Suez Canal,

or Straits ofHormuz, for example) that was treacherous

or impossible to navigate, possibly because of mines,

enemy forces, or physical damage to the waterway.

Another impediment might be severe weather conditions. Situations like those would require some ships to

alter (and thus lengthen) their course, increasing the

amount of time it would take them to reach their destination.

All three ofthose assumptions represent best-case

scenarios for delivering U.S. forces overseas. Thus, it

is entirely plausible that in reality, sealift operations

under different—and perhaps more likely—conditions

would take longer than this model predicts.

The Database and Variables

in the Model

The fleet ofships whose movement the model simulates

is the fleet that DoD plans to have available for sealift

operations by 2001. That fleet includes eight SL-7s; 52

roll-on/roll-off ships (ROROs); 19 large, mediumspeed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs); and 14 breakbulks (see Table A-l). Additionally, CBO assumed

that the military would supplement its sealift fleet by

hiring foreign charters with a combined carrying capacity roughly equivalent to 50 U.S. breakbulks.

Each ofthose ships has a total deck capacity measured in square feet. However, when equipment is

loaded onto the ships, it must be tied down and secured.

Furthermore, aisles must be left between rows of equipment for safety reasons. Consequently, only a certain

percentage of each ship's total capacity can actually be

used to carry equipment, and the model uses a variable

Number of Sealift Ships Under the Control of the U.S. Transportation Command and Their Readiness Status

Number of Ships in

(Davs until

Readiness Status

readv)

Total

Number

Type of Ship 2 4 5 10 20 35 of Ships

SL-7 Fast Sealift Ship

Roll-on/Roll-off Ship

LMSR

Breakbulk

Foreign Charter

0

16a

8

b

0

0

8 0

21 6

11 o

0 10

0 o

0

9

0

0

20

0

0

0

4

20

0

0

0

0

10

8

52

19

14

50

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.

NOTE: LMSR = large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ship.

a These ships hold prepositioned Marine Corps equipment in peacetime. CBO assumed that after they «*|v^ *^|J nt t0 a conflict'

half

of the ships would be available immediately to transport Army equipment and the other half would be available 45 days later.

b. These ships hold prepositioned Army equipment in peacetime. After delivering that equipment to a conflict, the ships would be available to

transport other Army equipment to the conflict.
APPENDIX DETAILS ABOUT CBO'S MOBILITY ANALYSIS 51

(STO, for stowage factor) to capture that relationship.

A typical value for STO is 0.75, meaning that only 75

percent of the ship's total capacity is actually used to

carry equipment (see Table A-2).

The remaining variables in CBO's model determine

the amount of time each ship requires to perform an

operation. The first ofthose variables is the readiness

status (RS), which indicates the number of days a ship

needs to be activated and begin steaming. Most ships

in the sealift fleet have an RS oftwo to five days, but a

few have an RS as high as 20 days (see Table A-l).

Another time variable (PORT) measures the amount of

time a ship needs to maneuver into a port, dock, load or

unload, and then head back out to sea. The typical

value for the PORT variable is three or four days.

The final variable in CBO's model is the transit

time between ports (TRANS). During the model's hypothetical sealift operation, the majority ofships sailed

directly between ports in the United States (East Coast

or West Coast) and ports in South Korea or the Middle

East. Exceptions were ships prepositioned in Diego

Garcia, Guam, or Saipan and a few ships that had to

load equipment belonging to troops in either Hawaii or

Germany. In all cases, the value for TRANS was determined using the maximum sustainable speed of a given

ship and the distance between its ports of embarkation

and debarkation.

The Sealift Process

in the Model

CBO's model begins on day zero, which is defined as

the day orders are issued to activate the fleet for sealift

operations. (That is assumed to be the day the first major regional conflict begins.) Each ship then becomes

available for service at the end of its RS period, at

which point it begins the following sealift process: it

loads equipment (a delay equal to the PORT variable)

and sails to its destination (TRANS). It then unloads

the equipment at the theater of conflict (another PORT

delay). When the PORT procedure is over, the equipment is defined as having arrived in theater. The ship

then returns home (TRANS) to begin the cycle again.

Table A-2.

Characteristics of Various Types of Sealift Ships Under the Control of the U.S. Transportation Command

Maximum

Days Typical Stowage Sustainable

for PORT Capacity Factor Speed

Type of Ship Procedure3

(Square feet) (Percent)" (Knots)

SL-7 Fast Sealift Ship 3 213,000 75 27

Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 3-4 150,000 75-80 17-19C

LMSR 3 375,000 75 24

Breakbulk 4 72,000 75 19-20

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense, Military Traffic Management Command, Logistics Handbook for

Strategic Mobility Planning (April 1994), and other data from the Department of Defense.

NOTE: LMSR = large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ship.

a. The amount of time necessary for a ship to enter a port, dock, load or unload, and then leave the port area.

b. The percentage of a ship's capacity actually used for carrying equipment.

c. One roll-on/roll-off ship in the fleet has a maximum sustainable speed of 25 knots.
52 STRUCTURING THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE ARMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY December 1997

The amount of equipment that each ship delivers is

its capacity times its STO. Each time a ship loads

equipment, the model takes note of what type of equipment is loaded. Every combat unit sent to a conflict has

unit equipment, such as tanks, helicopters, and the like.

The movement of combat units (typically divisions) is

modeled explicitly. In addition, large numbers of

combat-support and combat-service-support (CS/CSS)

units and associated equipment accompany each combat unit. Their equipment includes trucks, field kitchens, and myriad other items. The model keeps track of

the unit equipment assigned to specific Army divisions

and other combat units, but only the overall amount of

CS/CSS equipment.1

In general, CBO did not determine in what order

units would be sent to a conflict or which specific units

would be loaded onto each ship. Instead, the model

used the following guidelines to determine when different types of equipment would be shipped to the theater.

The equipment sent aboard prepositioned ships is,

for obvious reasons, predetermined. Additionally, a

CBO modeled the movement of unit equipment only. It did not estimate the time and ships necessary for deliveries of ammunition or

other supplies needed to sustain a major regional conflict.

number ofships are designated to carry equipment for

the Navy and Marine Corps on their first sailing and

only become available for Army use once that initial

delivery is completed.

For all other ships, the decision to load combat unit

equipment or CS/CSS equipment was made according

to the following criteria. Certain combat unit equipment takes first priority because it belongs to the halting force (the units that are intended to prevent the enemy from making further advances until the rest ofthe

Army's forces arrive and a counteroffensive can be

mounted). CS/CSS equipment is also sent during the

initial shipments to provide support for the combat

forces. In general, throughout the modeling of sealift,

support forces and their CS/CSS equipment are shipped

along with combat forces so that the ratio of support

equipment to combat equipment does not fall below a

minimum of roughly 1 to 1, based on square footage.

Once all combat unit equipment has been sent, the

model continues sending CS/CSS equipment until the

full complement has arrived in theater. (In deterrnining

how much ofthe required equipment has arrived in theater, the model includes not only equipment that has

been sent by sealift but also equipment that is in place

or airlifted. "In place" refers to equipment that is assigned to forces stationed in that theater as well as

equipment prepositioned on land near the theater.)