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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
Airman Scholar Journal

Volume 19 Spring 2013

Published by the Department of 

MILITARY & STRATEGIC STUDIES (DFMI)

United States Air Force Academy

Dean of Faculty 

Brig. Gen. Dana Born

Department Head 

Lt. Col. Steven Pomeroy

Editor 

Dr. Brent J. Talbot

The opinions in Airman Scholar Journal do not represent any official policies of the Dean of Faculty, 

US Air Force Academy, US Air Force or US Government. They are presented to stimulate discussion on 

current military issues and domestic and international affairs.
Table of Contents

Featured Article

1 Responsible Power: Space Deterrence in a 

Labrynthine World

Zachary Crippen and Andrew Hilton

Topical Focus: Proliferation and Deterrence

11 Racism: A Stumbling Block to Deterrence 

Strategy

Elisha Henry

18 A Trading Decisions Scheme: A Novel Solution to 

the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Application to Nuclear 

Proliferation

Zachary Adams and Ian Gibson

Topical Focus: Regional Proliferation Concerns

27 Killing Them Softly? Putting the Brakes on North 

Korean Nuclear Proliferation

Zachary Esau

40 Nuclear Patience: Charting a New Course for the 

Iranian Nuclear Crisis

Kevin Beuchemin and 

Reuben Luoma-Overstreet

49 Saddam and the Bomb: An Unusual Case of 

Counterproliferation Success

David Ptacek

Book Review

54 Prodigal Soldiers by James Kitfield

reviewed by Mark Melville

From The Editor

Our feature article focuses upon the complex 

issue of Space Deterrence. Written by two 

cadet scholars bringing together engineering 

and foreign area studies insights, Zachary 

Crippen and Andrew Hilton focus upon 

the complexities of the modern day world 

as influencers in determining what space 

deterrence should look like, requiring a new 

model beyond Cold War thinking. Following 

their important insight is Cadet Scholar 

Elisha Henry’s winning essay submitted to 

the STRATCOM Strategic Deterrence Essay 

Contest (she placed second overall from 

entrants across all Air Force domains). Elisha 

reminds Americans of our own past and 

how racist tendencies of a foregone era are 

a reminder of our need to understand other 

cultures--and not underestimate them due to 

our own percieved cultural superiority. Next, 

Cadet scholars Ian Gibson and Zack Adams 

discuss an insightful Trading Decisions Scheme 

based upon economic theory and how it might 

prevent future proliferation in states seeking 

nuclear energy capability as cover for a secret 

weapons program. From there, we move to 

three regional proliferation studies, evaluating 

states labeled by former President Bush as the 

‘Axis of Evil,’ a term that Elisha’s thesis would 

likely caution against. This issue closes with 

a book review of Prodigal Soldiers, an MSSrelevant study of US military transformation 

in the Vietnam to Gulf War era. 

ASJs mission is to feature topical and 

regionally-focused articles of interest to 

the military academic community. Both 

military and civilian academic faculty and 

staff are encouraged to submit articles for 

publication and nominate outstanding cadet 

papers. We also encourage reviews of militaryrelevant topics. Send all submissions in word 

format (with Chicago-style endnotes) to 

ASJeditor@usafa.edu

On the cover: Demonstration of the laser 

adaptive optical system at the European 

Southern Observatory (ESO) in Chile; photo 

courtesy of ESO.
The space age began in a time 

of ideological, economic, 

and political rivalry between two 

superpowers. Motivated by a desire 

to defeat the statist leviathan of the 

Soviet Union, the United States 

embarked on one of the most 

ambitious technological programs 

in the history of the world. The 

culmination of that program with 

Neil Armstrong’s July 1969 walk 

on the moon was an international 

icon of technological prowess and 

a symbol of ideological victory 

over communism. The Apollo 

program, which Stephen Johnson 

has called the United States’ most 

prestigious entry in the propaganda war with the Soviet Union, 

cost an estimated nineteen billion 

dollars, galvanizing the efforts of 

300,000 workers and 200 universities in 80 countries.2

 Since then, 

the space arena has attracted the 

gaze of many other governments, 

eager to share in the prestige and 

power that space proficiency and 

superiority provide. 

Outer space represents an area 

of critical strategic importance for 

several reasons. First, space represents the ultimate high ground 

in issues of military engagement. Although the space arena 

is not weaponized with offensive or defensive technologies, it 

remains a potent strategic territory 

with the potential to accommodate critical strike or deterrence 

capabilities. Second, space represents an avenue for unlimited 

ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance) operations. 

Unlike airspace and ground territory, space does not belong to 

any single sovereign entity, and 

therefore its use cannot be dictated 

accordingly. Third, space offers the 

possibility of unprecedented 

and unlimited natural resources, 

including solar power and mineral 

mining. Fourth, but perhaps most 

importantly, space is man’s final 

frontier. As such, space represents an unprecedented opportunity for international cooperation. But history suggests that 

where the potential for cooperation between rival powers exists 

alongside the possibility to co-opt 

that potential for ill, the latter has 

too often occurred. The United 

States has long leveraged a strong 

majority of hard power in space, 

but others are quickly emerging as possible contestants for 

that leadership position. The next 

quarter-century will be pivotal in 

determining the bounds of space 

interaction, including contestation 

and partition between sovereign 

entities. This future requires bold 

approaches to strategic thinking, 

especially in the realms of cooperation and deterrence. 

A New Paradigm 

We are fortunate that we have 

arrived in the present day with the 

benefit of hindsight. The threat of 

nuclear war that clouded much of 

the postwar 20th century indirectly 

produced a plethora of literature 

on the concept of deterrence. The 

scholarship of Lawrence Freedman, Bernard Brodie, Thomas 

Schelling, and Robert Jervis has 

done much to illuminate the complexities of the Cold War and the 

“We must learn to bear the responsibilities of power in America without imagining either 

that the exercise of our power will be perfectly just or that we would be a better nation if we 

disavowed our responsibilities for the sake of being pure. It is foolish to hope that America 

could bear its present responsibilities in the world without regard to national self-interest. It is 

equally foolish to deny that national self-interest may always become so narrow as to corrupt 

the virtue of what we are doing.” -Reinhold Niebuhr1

2Lt ZACHARY CRIPPEN is a 

Class of 2012 Foreign Area Studies 

major and Rhodes Scholar. Cadet 

ANDREW HILTON is a Class of 2013 

Astronautical Engineering major. 

Responsible Power

Space Deterrence in a Labyrinthine World 

Zac hary Crippen and Andrew Hilton
Responsible Power 2

global threat of nuclear weapons. 

In this respect, contemporary 

scholars of deterrence have the 

benefit of standing on the shoulder of giants, to use the language of 

Isaac Newton. Unfortunately, the 

vantage point afforded us by such 

giants is not an accurate picture of 

the world today. The scholars of 

the bipolar world, while not ignorant of the possibility for increased 

international cooperation and economic interconnectedness in the 

future, were writing for a different 

age. Cultural dispersion and global 

media have brought the people 

of the world closer together, economic interdependence makes 

the greatest nations of the world 

mutually reliant on each other for 

their prosperity and vitality, and 

technology has made all of this 

possible. In short, the contemporary world requires us to look 

upon the literature of yesterday 

with an eye open to new possibilities and applications that our new 

paradigm requires. 

Our aim is not to expound upon 

the effects of globalization—an 

overused word that does little to 

shape debates of strategic theory. 

Instead, we hope to construct a 

clear and practical picture of what 

space deterrence should look like, 

synthesizing new and old ideas 

into a coherent framework with 

implications for the United States’ 

national security posture. In this 

essay, we seek to answer several 

questions. We propose a clear definition of terms and concepts: What 

is deterrence? How is it achieved? 

Furthermore, our project outlines 

the difficulties of adapting deterrence concepts to meet the evolving 

technology of the space arena. We 

embark on this adaptation boldly 

but imperfectly, acknowledging 

that strategic thinking requires 

generalization and the sacrifice of 

specificity for the benefit of theory. 

We argue against the monopolization of space power, favoring 

increased US-led international 

cooperation but not yielding our 

unrivaled technological, positional, and normative influence. 

In articulating a way ahead for 

the United States, we adopt and 

explain a rationalist framework 

for deterrence theory, exploring 

simple game theory concepts to 

illustrate the complexities of deterrence. Second, we explore how the 

space arena affects traditional cost/

benefit structures, examining how 

we can achieve deterrence in a nonterrestrial arena. Third, we provide 

a brief picture of the current 

international structure of space 

governance and suggest ways for 

the United States to remain in 

its position of global leadership, 

gaining in institutional leverage 

what it cedes in material power. 

Fourth, we articulate the potential ways—in technical detail—in 

which the United States can alter 

the architecture of its space-based 

assets, retooling its resources and 

dispersing its capabilities in a 

way that makes aggression both 

more costly and less rewarding 

for potential challengers. Ultimately, successful space deterrence 

will necessitate the exercise of 

responsible power. It will mean 

that the United States needs to lead 

a move towards an international 

structure of space that eschews 

a global commons view but 

establishes rules for the advancement of space technology, while 

at the same time remaining out of 

reach—both in development and 

prowess—of potential challengers 

to that order. This essay explores 

how each can be done. 

What is Deterrence? 

The most concise and conceptually clear definition of 

deterrence that we have found in 

our research comes from the 1988 

National Security Strategy of the 

United States: Deterrence works by 

persuading potential adversaries 

that the costs of their aggression 

will exceed any probable gains.3

Logically proceeding from this 

definition, there are three conceivable ways to achieve deterrence. 

The first is by increasing the costs 

of aggression for adversaries, the 

second is to decrease the expected 

gains of adversaries, and the third 

is to do both simultaneously. This 

view of deterrence proceeds from 

a transactional view of conflict: 

Thomas Schelling writes that most 

conflict situations are essentially 

bargaining [emphasis original] 

situations in which the actions of 

one participant are dependent to a 

large degree on the actions of one 

or more other actors.4 A perfect 

account of deterrence assumes the 

rational nature of states, implying 

that state decisions are made, and 

activities pursued, in the interest of 

expected payoffs. 

Unfortunately, the neatness of 

pure rationality is not matched 

in the real world. Instead, behavior is based on bounded ratiothe United States can alter 

the architecture of its spacebased assets, retooling its 

resources and dispersing its 

capabilities in a way that 

makes aggression both more 

costly and less rewarding for 

potential challengers.
Responsible Power 3

nality, which incorporates the 

importance of perceptions into an 

analytical framework. This term, 

first used by Herbert Simon in the 

1950s, is used to designate rational choice that takes into account 

the cognitive limitations of the 

decision maker.5

 Authors Gerd 

Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten 

use the St. Petersburg Paradox6

 to 

illustrate the effects of bounded 

rationality: outcomes that are so 

at odds with the dictates of good 

sense will not be pursued, even 

if the probably of the outcome 

makes it mathematically rational 

to do so.7 One possible solution to 

the paradox involves an explanation of expected utility instead of 

expected value, the former being 

the primary determinant of social 

behavior. The purpose of this discussion, of course, is not to revive 

what is largely a debate for social 

theorists, but rather to illustrate 

the limited extent to which pure 

rationality can illumine our predictions of social behavior. Even 

so, while it might be useful to 

theorize about extricating rationality from policymaking in part or 

in whole, the empirical nature of 

policymaking demands rationalist 

assumptions. We proceed to 

outline a policy of space deterrence using a rationalist approach, 

acknowledging its possible shortcomings but working within its 

constraints to develop a coherent 

national security strategy for space 

deterrence. 

As we state in the beginning of 

this section, deterrence involves 

the manipulation of an adversary’s 

potential costs and benefits from a 

certain course of action. A purely 

rational actor will not pursue an 

action whose costs outweigh its 

benefits. As such, the deterrer seeks 

to pursue policies that decrease 

benefits and/or increase costs for 

would-be aggressors. Cost can 

refer to either the resource costs 

of pursuing an action or punitive 

measures taken after the fact by the 

deterrer against the aggressor. For 

example, cost in a space deterrence 

context can include both research 

and development expenses for an 

anti-satellite program and possible consequent terrestrial retaliation for its deployment. Benefits, 

on the other hand, we understand 

to have the singular meaning of 

advantages8

 received by the aggressor as a result of its pursuit of a 

certain course of action. To keep 

our language conceptually clear, 

we will also assume that negative 

benefits equal positive costs, and 

vice versa.9

 Either can be the direct 

or indirect result of the aggressive 

action. 

We have already pointed 

out that rationality cannot perfectly encapsulate the complexities of cognition and psychology. 

A second—and for our purposes, more crucial—limitation 

of rationality is that its predictive 

capacity is based largely on the 

extent to which uncertainty is 

introduced into the problem. 

Actors may have opportunities to maximize their gains, but 

will not take those opportunities because of their opponents’ 

unwillingness to cooperate. The 

Prisoners’ Dilemma is a good 

illustration of the effects of communication and trust on behavior.10 At first glance, it would appear 

that the rational course of action 

would be for each actor facing the 

“dilemma” to pursue a strategy of 

cooperation. Instead, we find that 

the dominant strategy is to defect.11

Absent a guarantee of mutual cooperation, which is the case when 

there is a lack of trust (particularly 

common between nation-states) or 

an iterative framework, actors will 

end up effectively reducing each 

other’s possible benefits and forfeiting their own--always acting to 

minimize risk. We have chosen to 

highlight the prisoners’ dilemma 

as an example of the difficulty of 

cooperation, even when predicated 

upon rational assumptions. We do 

not claim that prisoners’ dilemma 

is the best singular framework for 

assessing deterrence. Long form 

models can be more accurate, and 

even the simple stag hunt example 

of Rousseau can be helpful.12 The 

point is that deterrence theory 

is often not intuitive, and its successful use demands nuance, both 

in development and application. 

In the following paragraphs we 

explore the character of deterrence 

in the space arena, bearing in mind 

the difficulties posed by examples 

such as the one outlined above. 

Deterrence in Space 

Deterrence in space is rendered 

especially difficult for three distinct 

reasons. First, as Forrest Morgan 

has pointed out, space inherently 

favors the challenger.13 The dominant power in space is more likely 

to base its terrestrial capabilities on 

its space dominance. For example, 

the United States is reliant on a 

host of satellite-based technologies (navigation, positioning, communication, and observation) for 

its effectiveness on the battlefield. 
Responsible Power 4

A successful satellite denial action 

by a challenger, even if limited in 

scope, could have exponential 

effects on the ground. If a potential 

military challenger is less reliant 

on space technology than the 

power being challenged, it would 

likely be the challenger that would 

emerge from space conflict with 

the advantage, even if that space 

conflict led to tit-for-tat retaliation.14 This is especially the case 

because of the crowded nature of 

space: it is becoming increasingly 

congested, contested, and competitive.15 As of April 2013, the United 

States Department of Defense was 

tracking 39,156 orbital objects, of 

which less than 4,000 were active 

payloads.16 The numbers are also 

rising rapidly: in the three-day 

window between 24 April and 26 

April 2013, three separate launches 

put nine objects into eight different orbits.17 The increasing number 

of orbital objects poses severe 

hazards for functioning satellites, 

and any conflict in space will multiply that hazard. 

The 2009 collision of a Russian 

Cosmos satellite and US Iridium 

satellite created 1500 pieces of 

debris; the Chinese ASAT test of 

2007 created 3000 pieces,18 counting only those large enough to be 

tracked. It has been estimated that 

the vast majority (99.3 percent) 

of space debris is too small to be 

tracked,19 an issue that has severe 

implications for orbiting payloads. 

The problem is multiplicative: 

more collisions yield more debris, 

which yield more collisions, etc. 

For this reason, any action in space 

that increases the amount of space 

debris favors the actor(s) with the 

least to lose. For example, a ten 

percent mutual loss of functioning 

payloads for both the United States 

and China would eliminate 112 US 

satellites but only 14 Chinese satellites.20 This problem is not one with 

a ready solution, but the inherently global and common nature 

of space demands institutional and 

technical solutions.

Second, space deterrence is difficult because the international 

space regime has inappropriately 

leveled the field for space development. International institutions in their current form have 

created an environment stagnant 

for technical innovation, diminishing payoffs for governments to 

develop deterrent technologies, 

even if those technologies would 

serve only peaceful purposes. 

Everett Dolman’s formulation is 

especially poignant: the OST 

and the existing socialized space 

regime discouraged productive 

competition among space capable 

states . . . space development is 

trapped in LEO [low earth orbit] 

parochialism.21 While counterfactual history is extraordinarily 

speculative, it is useful to question 

whether or not the United States 

would have put Neil Armstrong on 

the moon if it was not engaged in 

an intense geopolitical competition 

with the Soviet Union. Our most 

ambitious space projects were born 

before the 1967 OST.22 We do not, 

of course, mean to suggest that the 

international space regime should 

be abolished. Instead, it needs to 

be reshaped in order to allow for 

enterprising nations to reap the 

benefits of their endeavors, especially because of the proliferation 

of commercial actors in space. We 

explore this theme more in the 

next section. 

Third, space deterrence is difficult because it demands innovative approaches to research and 

development that are not being 

employed today. Our national 

abilities have been redirected from 

the space arena: since 1965, with 

the brief exception near the end of 

the Cold War, the budget of NASA 

has been steadily shrinking as a 

percentage of GDP.23 Deterrence 

requires technical mastery of the 

arena in which we are trying to 

deter. Redundancy of our spacebased systems would diminish the 

benefits of any perceived aggressor, 

ensuring that our reliance is spread 

across a number of different assets. 

Satellite fractionation, which we 

discuss at length in the following 

pages, could be one significant way 

to achieve this. Ultimately, successful deterrence will require that we 

aggressively pursue the technological prowess needed to make 

aggression difficult and fruitless. 

Deterrence through the 

International Space Regime 

Space governance is complicated. Its history spans just over 

half a century, beginning with 

the establishment of the United 

Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) 

in 1959. It has evolved today to 

include a variety of multilateral 

and bilateral agreements between 

states, and these agreements are 

undergirded by the increasing 

Telescopic photo of US-Russian 

Sattelite collision in 2009
Responsible Power 5

private sector use of space. The 

1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)24

provides a basic structure for space 

governance, establishing principles 

of peaceful use and exploration of 

space for the benefit and in the 

interests of all countries. (Article 

I), designating the arena as fully 

subject to the confines of international law (Art III), pledging at 

least limited mutual cooperation 

for astronaut assistance (Art V) 

and treaty enforcement (Art VI), 

and promising to conduct all space 

activities guided by the principle of 

cooperation and mutual assistance. 

(Art IX). Although the OST is the 

most obvious example of multilateralism in space, it is far from the 

only one: others include the Rescue 

Agreement of 1968, the Liability 

Convention of 1972, the Registration Convention of 1976, and the 

Moon Agreement of 1984.25

Unfortunately, existing international agreements regarding 

space have a history of problems 

and loopholes. First, universality 

is rarely present.26 COPUOS was 

so fraught with political wrangling 

that it wasn’t able to successfully 

convene for the first two years of its 

existence.27 The OST was strongly 

opposed to the 1976 Bogotá 

Declaration in which several developing equatorial countries claimed 

sovereignty over the geostationary 

orbit, 22,000 miles above the earth’s 

equator.28 The dispute has since 

been resolved, but is indicative of 

a wider divide over issues of space 

governance, as some treaties lack 

the signatures of even ten percent 

of the world’s nations. Most importantly, existing space law lacks 

sufficient enforcement mechanisms 

for violators. The iconic OST fails 

to specify a single punitive measure 

for potential violators, and in fact 

allows for unilateral withdrawal 

from the treaty as long as one year’s 

prior notice is given. The resulting international framework is a 

half-hearted attempt at norm construction, with insufficient coercive power over nations of ill will 

(consider China’s 2007 ASAT test 

and associated debris) but with 

enough behavioral influence on 

the leadership of law-abiding, representative democracies.29

We reject the realist notion that 

multilateralism holds no promise 

and that conflict is inevitable, but 

we assert that an institution devoid 

of material power only serves to 

constrain the wrong actors. As 

such, the United States’ leadership 

in the international arena should 

have two components. First, the 

United States should lead initiatives to increase costs for violators 

of international space law. A revision of the Outer Space Treaty, to 

include definitive punitive measures (launch bans, economic 

sanctions, etc.) would be an excellent start. Such a revision should 

be led by the United States and 

other major actors—particularly 

Russia and China—to improve 

the universality of the regime. It is 

reasonable, after all, to think that 

the active participation of Russia 

and China in such an arrangement 

would also facilitate the participation of Japan, South Korea, the 

Commonwealth of Independent 

States, India, Iran, and the European Union. 

Of course, a redesign of existing 

space law should be accompanied 

by the United States’ aggressive 

pursuit of continued technological superiority. For this to take 

place, the United States needs to 

also attempt sweeping institutional reform that will allow for 

the non-global use of extraterrestrial bodies. Such a move could 

be made under the auspices of 

boosting private enterprise, 

and such a reason would not be 

disingenuous. The untapped 

potential of resources in space and 

of private actors who are currently 

designing technologies to harness 

those resources (asteroid mining, 

for example) means that the private 

use of space will, in all likelihood, 

eventually be adopted. The effect 

of space law should be to level the 

strategic playing field of space and 

ensure the rules are fair; the regime 

in its current form is restrictive to 

technical development that would 

allow for promising, practical 

deterrent solutions. 

Framing the international space 

regime to allow for technological development is not fatalistic. 

Competition need not mean antagonism. A revised international 

space regime must clearly articulate the peaceful uses of outer space 

and encourage its development, 

while prohibiting antisatellite 

operations and the development 

of space-based weapons. When 

coupled with strong punitive measures for offenders, an international space regime that does not 

have chilling effects on innovation 

A revised international space regime must clearly articulate 

the peaceful uses of outer space and encourage its 

development, while prohibiting antisatellite operations and 

the development of space-based weapons.
Responsible Power 6

is the most conducive to peace. In 

the following pages, we embark on 

an exploration of innovations that 

could come about as a result of a 

reinvigorated international space 

regime, thus rendering spacecraft 

more secure from potential adversaries. 

Spacecraft Design 

Technology in space has 

become a major component of 

our military capability on land, 

in the sea, and in the air. Military 

communications, guidance, and 

weaponry that utilize space assets 

have become pivotal to successful 

military operations. Adversaries 

looking to level the playing field in 

those domains will certainly gain 

from a decisive attack on our space 

assets. In this section we detail the 

traditional systems engineering 

process employed in the United 

States, which in its current form 

produces capable but highly vulnerable spacecraft. Space systems 

are vulnerable because individual 

satellites are easy to attack, impossible to replace or repair in orbit, 

and failing or damaged parts can 

have catastrophic impacts on their 

respective systems. Often, a single 

satellite carries multiple payloads, each performing a variety 

of missions. The traditional design 

process makes space assets like 

these easy to target because a successful attack on one key component can render the entire spacecraft ineffective. 

As we have previously discussed, 

American dependence on space 

for its military superiority could 

also make it difficult for the United 

States to respond conventionally 

against an opponent attacking us 

in space, as our retaliation against 

terrestrial targets would likely be 

construed as disproportional.

Current satellites are designed 

using a requirements-driven 

approach in which requirements 

are defined and then the system 

is designed to meet those requirements while minimizing cost.30 The 

satellite system is broken down 

into smaller bus subsystems and 

then again into components. Each 

subsystem is designed separately 

to meet its own requirements and 

then integrated with the rest of 

the system as the program develops. Space systems are generally 

made up of six subsystems: attitude determination and control 

(ADCS), telemetry, tracking, and 

command (TTC), command and 

data handling (CDH), electrical 

power (EPS), thermal control, and 

structures. In addition to the subsystems, the payloads or experiments on board also carry separate 

requirements. The systems engineering process is often referred to 

as iterative because each subsystem 

has constraints dictated by decisions made on another part of the 

spacecraft. For example, a decision 

to use solar arrays on multiple sides 

of the spacecraft for the electrical 

power subsystem can take away 

space for cooling radiators used in 

the thermal subsystem. The consequent higher internal temperatures will likely result in a lower 

efficiency rating for the battery 

charge regulators in the electrical 

power subsystem, decreasing the 

amount of converted solar energy. 

The result is a constant feedback 

loop that requires the optimization 

of all subsystems and components. 

Quite obviously, the complexity of 

the integrated system makes the 

failure of one component on a subsystem a potentially catastrophic 

event for the whole spacecraft. 

In the context of deterrence, the 

integrated nature of satellites both 

reduces the cost and increases the 

benefits of attacking our assets—

quite the opposite of a successful 

deterrence strategy. 

Once a spacecraft is launched, 

it cannot be fixed by a mechanic 

in the way an airplane or a car 

can be repaired after it comes off 

the assembly line. For this reason, 

a great deal of money and time 

is allocated toward testing every 

aspect of the satellite before it is 

launched. Such a rigorous testing 

and qualification program is 

required to ensure that the satellite doesn’t fail on orbit. All components are tested individually 

before being integrated and tested 

at the subsystem level. Finally, 

the verified subsystems are integrated and tested at the systemic 

level. Each level includes multiple 

iterations of functional and environmental testing.31 In addition 

to the high costs associated with 

space programs, the testing campaign also has significant impact 

on the scheduling of the program 

that the systems engineer, program 

manager, and politician all need to 

consider. To the potential adverInternational Space Station
Responsible Power 7

sary, this method of design means 

that we are not capable of quickly 

replacing our current space assets. 

Large, complex space missions 

typically require 10 to 15 years to 

develop, whereas relatively simple 

missions require as few as 12 to 18 

months.32 This means that in one 

strike, a potential adversary could 

limit our operational effectiveness for 10 to 15 years. In addition 

to strong restraints embedded in 

institutions, the US should transition to a spacecraft architecture 

and design process that is consistent with the peaceful purposes 

that should guide international 

cooperation (i.e. does not weaponize space), but strengthens the 

resiliency and durability of spacebased assets for the purpose of 

maintaining stability and deterring 

aggression. 

Improving Deterrence through 

Spacecraft Architecture 

Despite their incredible technical and performance capabilities, 

modern spacecraft lack robustness 

and flexibility. Robustness refers 

to a system’s ability to continue 

performing its intended function despite the introduction of 

an internal or external stimulus. 

Flexibility is the ability of a system 

to change on demand at any time 

during its lifecycle.33 Robustness and flexibility are important 

traits to consider when evaluating 

the deterrent capability of space 

systems. Improving these qualities will enable the United States 

to decrease the perceived benefit 

gained from an attack and increase 

the United States’ capacity for 

retaliation, even in a degraded 

environment. This would have the 

effect of altering both sides of the 

cost/benefit equation in favor of 

the deterrer. 

By de-integrating the spacecraft, we can remove much of the 

complexities involved in current 

design. In essence, the result would 

be to transform a large, expensive, attractive target and split it 

into multiple smaller, cheaper, 

less attractive targets that would 

function as an emergent system to 

achieve the same overall mission. 

Modular approaches to software 

have already demonstrated advantages over traditional software 

architectures in flexibility and 

robustness by breaking code into 

standalone modules that are adaptable to any mission.34 Breaking the 

bus subsystems and payloads into 

standalone modules with standard interfacing would offer many 

of the same benefits in the hardware domain that have already 

been demonstrated in the software 

realm. Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA) scientists Shah and Brown have used the 

word fractionation to describe the 

process of physically decomposing a spacecraft into a distributed 

network of wirelessly connected 

modules.35

Fractionation would give 

systems engineers the flexibility to 

break up spacecraft modules in different ways to accomplish a given 

set of mission needs. For example, 

an electrical power subsystem 

could be segregated into its own 

module while power was wirelessly 

beamed to other modules using 

lasers, millimeter radio waves, or 

specially tuned induction.36 Decoupling the subsystems would enable 

an EPS module to be designed with 

a sole focus on its independent 

optimization, irrespective of the 

limiting requirements of an entire 

payload. Even the propulsion 

system could be separated out into 

a module that held fuel and was 

responsible for the navigation of 

the entire cluster. The propulsion 

module would control all other satellites in the cluster using electromagnetic formation flight (EMFF) 

technology. EMFF technology uses 

electromagnetic forces and torques 

created by induced magnetic 

fields generated from individual 

spacecraft to control each vehicle 

relative to one another. The Space 

Systems Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

has already demonstrated EMFF 

capability in the laboratory using 

a ground test-bed37 and will begin 

demonstrating this capability in 

orbit in June 2013 with the University of Maryland’s RINGS project 

DARPA conception of F6 Fractionated Satellite Modules
Responsible Power 8

on the International Space Station 

(ISS).38 DARPA has been working 

to demonstrate working fractionation since 2010. 

Fractionated systems would 

prove to be less vulnerable to 

failure resulting from an attack. 

Over time, fractionated architecture would have a significant 

impact on the system’s survivability, vastly improving robustness. 

System risk is assessed by weighing the probability of a failure 

event occurring against the consequence of that failure on the 

overall system. Non-fractionated 

sattelites, like the current generation of monolithic (one structure) 

spacecraft, comprise a one-strikeand-you’re-out design.39 The only 

real option to mitigating risk in 

this architecture is to invest time 

and energy into reducing the 

probability of failure through the 

intensive testing program described 

above—a process that can drain 

both time and money. With 

fractionated spacecraft, however, 

risk management is easier because 

most failures within a module will 

not cause overall system failure. 

An analysis conducted by Owen 

Brown for the Aerospace Corporation Risk Management Symposium found that the variability 

of total lifecycle cost for a highly 

modular (fractionated) system is 

nearly half that of a large monolithic spacecraft.40

Repair and upgrade of failed or 

outdated hardware would be easier 

with a system using this building 

block approach. As systems are 

updated individually by module 

replacement, the older version 

can remain nearby as a spare. 

Having a relatively cheap and fast 

replacement capability will reduce 

a potential adversary’s benefit 

from attacking space assets. The 

potential impact of an attack on a 

space-based asset would be marginal, as the affected module(s) 

could be repaired on orbit by 

maneuvering a replacement into the 

formation. Even if the replacement 

required ground production and 

launch, the time required to get 

a replacement module into orbit 

would be significantly reduced, 

because fractionated architectures 

would enable faster and cheaper 

module production of spacecraft. 

Ideally, standardized modules 

that would combine to make a 

fractionated architecture would 

enable assembly-line production 

that could reduce the frequency 

of testing, leaving its post-production purpose to be quality control 

rather than functionality. 

In addition to increasing the 

robustness of US space assets, 

fractionated architecture will help 

deter space aggression by enlisting 

additional actors to join the space 

domain. A communal network of 

less expensive and economically 

viable space modules could enable 

international sharing between 

nations, commercial businesses, 

research, and educational institutions. DARPA’s Paul Eremenko has 

compared System F6’s impact on 

the space industry to the Internet 

impact on the computer industry.41 It is an apt comparison, as 

DARPA has developed a layer of 

software that will act as a universal 

translator between modules with 

different software packages and 

integrate them seamlessly into the 

network. Multiple nations can now 

mount commercial and scientific 

payloads as separate modules onto 

a shared launch vehicle and integrate them using a shared network 

of bus modules. The reduced 

cost could enable nations that 

previously couldn’t get over large 

start-up costs to finally become 

participants in the space arena, 

which would result in a stronger 

space regime to deter potential 

aggressors. 

Attacking a shared space 

network would impact multiple 

nations and commercial partners 

instead of just one. The transition 

to fractionated architecture offers 

many advantages to the United 

States with respect to deterrence in 

the space domain. By reducing the 

strategic impact of an attack on a 

United States satellite, a fractionated system will simultaneously 

increase an adversary’s cost and 

reduce the possible benefit as a 

result of the attack. The cost will be 

increased from the segmentation 

of the target (making it harder to 

hit) and the incorporation of more 

space-faring nations and private 

actors into a space regime. The 

benefit offered to the enemy will 

be reduced due to the increased 

robustness and flexibility that 

fractionation enables. The best 

choice a potential adversary could 

make would be to play the game 

fairly. 

Conclusion

In our analysis, we explored 

the nature of deterrence in 

space. Assuming a rationalist 

By reducing the strategic 

impact of an attack on a 

United States satellite, a 

fractionated system will 

simultaneously increase an 

adversary’s cost and reduce 

the possible benefit as a result 

of the attack.
Responsible Power 9

model, we examined the different 

conditions that make space a 

unique strategic arena. First, 

space disfavors first strike stability, making it easier for the actor 

committing the first strike to 

achieve decisive victory. Second, 

the international space regime 

is inadequate to the task of space 

regulation. It is a hollow shell that 

claims normative influence but 

has none. Third, our current technologies are not amenable to space 

deterrence, lacking the robustness and flexibility needed to 

prevent adversaries from gaining 

decisive advantages through an 

attack against space-based assets. 

In the preceding pages, we have 

attempted to establish a twopronged approach to space deterrence, simultaneously reducing an 

adversary’s benefits and increasing an adversary’s costs through 

shaping the international space 

regime and fostering international 

cooperation, while innovating to 

keep our spacecraft out of reach of 

aggressors. 

The international space regime 

is woefully unprepared for aggression in space. Its response to the 

2007 Chinese ASAT test was barely 

perceptible, and was hardly the 

exception to the rule. The history of 

international space governance is a 

troubled one, raising serious questions about the prospects for its 

future success. But with the leadership of the United States, there is 

promise for constructing a multilateral framework of space cooperation. Such a framework will need 

to do two things. First, it will need 

to make strong promises of punitive measures to be exacted against 

actors who offend the peaceful 

uses of outer space outlined in the 

Outer Space Treaty. Contrary to 

the existing treaties that constitute 

merely a notion of corporate goodwill, a new regime will need to have 

teeth for enforcement. Second, any 

revision of international space 

governance needs to provide an 

environment ripe for technological innovation and multilateral 

partnerships, ensuring that wellmeaning nations can cooperate to 

keep their space-based assets safe 

from adversaries. To that end, we 

have also called for increased technological innovation in the United 

States, specifically targeting the 

systems engineering processes that 

dictate the creation of new spacecraft. We have discussed the excessive costs and time taken through 

current development processes, 

and outlined methods for reducing both. Second, we have argued 

for the design of fractionated space 

architecture, reducing the benefits 

of adversaries by building redundancy and flexibility directly into 

our spacecraft 

As the preceding pages articulate, the United States’ approach 

to deterrence must be dualistic. 

It must simultaneously affect any 

potential adversaries’ costs and 

benefits. To do so, we will need 

to exercise responsible power by 

leading—not dictating—the continued dialogue on international 

governance of space, and by ensuring that our own technological 

superiority remains unrivaled. 

United States leadership in the 

arena of international institutions 

must be towards an end that will 

benefit all nations participating in 

the regime, and our pursuit of continued technological dominance 

must render the costs of adversarial 

action too great for any challengers. We are hopeful and optimistic 

that the United States will respond 

to these challenges with the vigilant leadership and unmatched 

prowess that have distinguished it 

in history thus far. 

1 Reinhold Niebuhr, cited in Paul 

J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta, and Collins 

G. Shackelford Jr., American Defense 

Policy, John Hopkins University Press, 

2005. 

2 Stephen B. Johnson, The Secret of 

Apollo: Systems Management in American and European Space Programs, John 

Hopkins University Press, 2002, 5. 

3 The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States,” 1988, 

13 <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1988.

pdf>. 

4 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy 

of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 

1980, 5.

5 Simon Herbert Alexander, Models 

of Bounded Rationality: Empirically 

Grounded Economic Reason, MIT Press 

(MA), 1982. 

6 In the St. Petersburg Paradox, a 

casino offers a game of chance in which 

a fair coin is flipped. The pot starts at 

one dollar but doubles every time the 

coin is flipped and lands heads. The 

player receives all the money as soon as 

the coin lands tails. Mathematically, the 

expected payoff is: (1*1/2+2*1/2+4*1/2 

. . .) = ∞, so players should be willing 

to bet an infinite amount of money, in 

accordance with their expected payoff. 

Strictly speaking, such behavior would 

be rational. In reality, the player hesitates to put more than five dollars down 

because of bounded rationality. See 

Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten, 

Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive 

Toolbox, The MIT Press, 2002, 2-3. 

7 Ibid, 2.

8 Our use of the word advantages 

here is synonymous with benefits. It 

does not imply superiority or ascendancy. An actor does not need to have 

gained a strategic, operational, or tactical superiority over an opponent to have 

gained a benefit. 

9 To use an example: Iran’s pursuit 

of nuclear technology has entailed the 

international community’s application of severe economic sanctions in 
Responsible Power 10

recent years. This is a received and indirect condition, and quite clearly a cost 

for Iran. It could also be viewed as a 

negative benefit, but the distinction is 

unnecessary. We eliminate the language 

of negatives for the sake of conceptual 

clarity.

10 Let us clarify the Prisoner’s 

Dilemma with the following common 

example: two actors are faced with two 

possible choices in this (non) cooperative game: each can either cooperate, or defect. If both cooperate, each 

will receive the highest payoff If both 

defect, each receives much less. But if 

one defects while the other cooperates, 

the defecting actor will both maximize 

its own gain and minimize that of its 

opponent. Note that the payoff for both 

actors is less when both defect than it 

is when both cooperate. Still, the lack 

of trust in what the other actor will do 

drives decisionmaking of both actors 

toward non-cooperation. See Merrill 

M. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” 

US Air Force Project RAND Working 

Paper, 20 June 1952.

11 This point of equilibrium is more 

specifically known as the Nash Equilibrium, named for its discoverer. See John 

Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, University of Princeton (Dissertation), May 

1950. 

12 In the stag hunt, Rousseau discusses the concept of a group of hunters 

who go off in search of a deer. In the twoplayer game, both players can cooperate to catch the deer, or each player can 

act on his own (defect) to catch a hare 

for himself. The example differs from 

the prisoners’ dilemma because there 

are two Nash Equilibria; i.e. if Actor A 

nows that Actor B is cooperating, he 

will choose to cooperate (equilibrium); 

if Actor A knows that Actor B is defecting, he will also defect (equilibrium). 

See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse 

on Inequality, Penuin, 2003.

13 F. E. Morgan, Deterrence and 

First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment, The RAND Corporation, 2010, 23.

14 Ibid, 27.

15 Department of Defense and 

Director of National Intelligence, 

“National Security Space Strategy” 

(Unclassified Summary), January 2011.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid, 2. 

18 Robert D. Lawrence, “Addressing 

the Problem of Orbital Space Debris: 

Combining International Regulatory 

and Liability Regimes,” 15 B.C. Int’l & 

Comp. L. Rev. 51 (1992), 54.

19 This is chiefly because potential 

collisions cannot be foreseen. A small 

piece of metal traveling in geostationary 

orbit (at a speed of approximately 3,000 

m/s) can be of devastating consequence 

to a satellite. 

20 Data collected from www.spacetrack.org.

21 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: 

Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, 

Routledge, 2001, 137.

22 Ibid.

23 Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, 

eds., Toward a Theory of Space Power, 

National Defense University Press, 

2011, Ch. 10.

24 The OST is officially known as 

the Treaty on Principles Governing the 

Activities of States in the Exploration 

and Use of Outer Space, including the 

Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, a title 

that both lacks brevity and lends itself to 

a poor acronym. For obvious reasons, 

we use its colloquial name here.

25 All documents are freely available 

on the website of the United Nations 

Office for Outer Space Affairs <http://

www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/

SpaceLaw/treaties.html>. 

26 Li Daoyu, “Safeguarding Space 

Security: Prevention of an Arms Race in 

Outer Space,” Conference Report, 21–22 

March 2005, United Nations Institute 

for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 

44-45.

27 Dolman, 127.

28 Officially known as the Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial 

Countries. Signatories included Brazil, 

Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, 

Uganda, Congo, and Zaire.

29 Dolman, 135.

30 Wiley Larson, and Jason Wertz, 

Space Mission Analysis and Design, 

Microcosm Press, 2005, 73.

31 Functional tests are used to verify 

that the component, subsystem, or 

system is functioning properly. Environmental tests are used to verify that the 

component, subsystem, or system can 

survive the vibration and shock environments from the launch vehicle, as 

well as operate in the thermal-vacuum 

environment that will be expected on 

orbit. Test flow generally follows functional vibration post-vibe functional 

shock post-shock functional thermalvacuum chamber testing. 

32 Larson and Wertz, 7.

33 Naresh Shah and Owen Brown, 

“Fractionated Satellites: Changing the 

Future of Risk and Opportunity for 

Space Systems,” High Frontier Journal 5, 

no. 1 (November 2008), 29.

34 Advanced Solutions Inc. (ASI) 

has developed Modular flight software 

that can be adapted to a wide variety 

of C&DH hardware architectures and 

mission requirements. Each module is 

a standalone piece of code that can be 

integrated with other modules depending on the requirements. Modular 

Command and Data Handling (MCDH) 

has been flown on the Space Systems 

Research Center’s FalconSAT-5 spacecraft. 

35 Shah and Brown, 32.

36 Daniel Kwon and David Miller, 

“Electromagnetic Formation Flight of 

Satellite Arrays,” (Master’s Thesis), 2005.

37 Ibid.

38 Raymond Sedwick, “Resonant Inductive Near-Field Generation 

System (RINGS),” University of Maryland Energy Research Center, 2012. 

39 Shah and Brown, 34.

40 Owen Brown, “Reducing Risk 

Through a Modular Architecture,” 

Aerospace Corp Risk Management 

Symposium, 2005.

41 Michael C. Sirak, “Game Changers,” Air Force Magazine, September 

2009.
While the term “deterrence” 

is usually associated with 

Cold War nuclear strategy, its 

underlying principles have a much 

longer history in conventional 

armed conflict. Thus, it is important to turn to history for lessons 

regarding deterrence during conflict to apply to modern security 

challenges. The example of the 

Japanese surprise attack on Pearl 

Harbor in 1941 reveals that racism 

can impose a potential blind spot 

upon strategic deterrence. This 

historical lesson is applicable 

today due to the possible influence 

that racism is having on American deterrence policy toward the 

North Korean nuclear program, 

an international security threat 

of increasing concern. While the 

United States has come a long way 

in combating racism since World 

War II, it can never be too careful 

in ensuring that racial prejudices 

do not handicap its understanding 

of its deterrent capabilities.

Important Definitions: 

Deterrence and Racism

Before proceeding to the historical analysis, it is first important 

to define key terms essential to this 

argument. In his book, Deterrence, 

author Lawrence Freedman defines 

deterrence as “the idea that demonstrations of military strength 

might lead adversaries to restrain 

themselves . . .”1

 This concept has 

prevailed throughout centuries 

of military conflict. The Roman 

legions, for example, held to the 

motto of “si vis pacem, para belum 

(if you wish for peace, prepare for 

war).”2

 Giulio Douhet, Sir Hugh 

Trenchard, and other airpower 

theorist pioneers of the 1920s and 

1930s likewise advocated for colossal bomber squadrons to deter the 

aggression of other nations.3 Thus, 

the idea of deterrence most certainly had an influence on strategic 

US military doctrine in the years 

leading up to World War II.

The second key term requiring 

definition is “racism.” According 

to the Oxford dictionary, racism 

is “prejudice, discrimination, 

or antagonism directed against 

someone of a different race based 

on the belief that one’s own race 

is superior.”4

 The United States 

unfortunately holds a long history 

of racism, including racism toward 

those of Asian ancestry. American racism toward the Filipinos 

is a prime example. Americans 

have been quoted as referring to 

the Filipinos as “our little brown 

brothers.”5

 Under the principles 

of Social Darwinism, the Filipinos were an inferior race and 

were treated accordingly.6

 In 

1900, Major General Elwell S. Otis 

declared, “As biologically inferior 

and treacherous savages, the Filipinos did not rate conventional 

modes of warfare.”7 The Filipinos 

were by no means the only Asians 

suffering the consequences of 

American racism. It is well known 

that Chinese immigrants also 

suffered racial discrimination. 

Racial tensions with the Japanese, 

however, were particularly acute 

and would play an important role 

in ensuring American surprise 

at the Japanese attack on Pearl 

Harbor.

Historical Lesson: Pearl 

Harbor, Racism, and Faulty 

Deterrence

As already indicated, history 

provides evidence that racism 

caused the United States to become 

overconfident in its deterrent capability toward the threat of the Japanese Empire. This guaranteed the 

United States would be surprised 

on December 7, 1941 when the 

Japanese attacked at Pearl Harbor. 

To establish this conclusion, it is 

necessary first to substantiate the 

Racism: A Stumbling Block 

to Deterrence Strategy

Elis ha Henry

Cadet ELISHA HENRY is a Class of 

2013 History major. This essay placed 

second overall in the 2013 STRATCOM 

Deterrence Essay Contest.
Racism: A Stumbling Block to Deterrence Strategy 12

history of American racism against 

the Japanese and follow with a discussion of the nature of the Japanese culture and its response to 

American discrimination. This 

progression is important because 

these factors culminated into the 

failure of deterrence to prevent the 

surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. 

American Anti-Japanese 

Racism

American racism toward the 

Japanese people originated in the 

early 1900s, as Japan emerged victorious from the Russo-Japanese 

War. Western powers began to see 

Japan as a rival threat to their imperialistic interests in the Far East.8

Indicative of these sentiments, an 

American naval attaché to Beijing 

(Peking) shared his thoughts about 

the Japanese in 1920. He said that 

“he liked the Chinese because they 

knew their place; he despised the 

Japanese because they wanted to 

be treated as equals.”9 Such a mentality led many Americans to make 

Japanese immigrants feel unwelcome. In 1922, the Supreme Court 

denied Japanese nationals the 

ability to apply for naturalization. 

Two years later, the United States 

closed its doors to Japanese immigration entirely.10 As previously 

mentioned, many Americans subscribed to Social Darwinism and 

saw the racial tension against the 

Japanese as survival of the fittest, 

or a struggle for white supremacy.11

Perhaps the best reflection of 

anti-Japanese sentiment in American society in the years leading up 

to World War II is found in past 

editions of the New York Times. On 

May 2, 1920, the Times reviewed 

Lothrop Stoddard’s then-new book 

The Rising Tide of Color, the thesis of 

which reflected the growing American concern for the “yellow peril” 

and the “red, black, and brown 

menace.”12 One of Stoddard’s prevalent messages of that era was the 

American fear 

of the expansion of the Japanese race. His 

warning was 

of the need to 

counter the 

threat of Japanese and other 

n o n - w h i t e 

A m e r i c a n s : 

“within the 

white world, 

migration of 

lower human 

types like 

those which 

have worked 

such havoc in the 

United States must be rigorously 

curtailed.”13 Likewise, one year 

later, a New York Times headline 

read, “Japanese Race Problem.” In 

this article, US Senator from California, James Phelan argued that, 

“The negros were and are unassimilable and so are the Japanese 

. . . here we have a people that 

cannot be assimilated and make a 

homogenous population, and it is a 

real struggle for race supremacy.”14

Senator Phelan’s assertion of the 

desire to protect the racial superiority of American society provides 

a measurable reflection of the 

racism of American society during 

that time period.

American racism toward the 

Japanese people also manifested in 

the propaganda that materialized 

for American consumption during 

World War II. The following propaganda posters illustrate the racist 

sentiments that had been festering 

in American society for years. 

Observe how the propaganda 

poster in Figure 1 dehumanizes 

the Japanese foe. The enlarged 

ears allude to an ape-like creature, signifying 

that the Japanese 

race occupies a 

lower, perhaps 

subhuman class. 

The Japanese 

soldier’s teeth 

are transformed 

into fangs, relating him to bestiality and savagery. Figure 2, 

however, takes 

this interpretation to its fullest 

extent as it portrays the Japanese 

as a rat—one of 

the lowest animals 

in the food chain. As the following 

paragraphs demonstrate, the Japanese society was not amused at the 

barrage of American insults.

Japanese Culture and Its 

Response to American Racism

The Japanese culture of the 

early twentieth century was one of 

pride, honor, and timeless tradition. It was “a sacred land, ruled by 

a godlike . . . emperor. Its citizens 

were the members of a great family 

Figure 115

Figure 216
Racism: A Stumbling Block to Deterrence Strategy 13

headed by the emperor, and they 

were expected to serve the state 

with unquestioning loyalty.”17 Thus, 

a people who held their land to be 

sacred and their leader as a god 

would understandably take great 

offense to insults directed against 

either of these entities. American racism, for example, angered 

Tokyo as early as 1906, when San 

Francisco segregated its schools 

against Japanese children.18 As 

time progressed, Japanese leaders 

grew to believe that “submission 

to ‘Anglo-American oppression’ 

would be an ‘unbearable humiliation’ and would result in ‘the most 

serious threat’ to Japan’s security.”19

Japan did not want to stoop any 

further to the West. 

These cultural factors facilitated 

the increased militarization of Japanese society in the years leading 

up to World War II. The military 

had “the holy mission of expanding Japanese influence abroad . . 

.”20 In response to the affront of 

western racism, Japanese military leaders began to believe that 

the road to global power was only 

attainable if Japan overcomes the 

stifling interference of the AngloSaxon powers.21 The racism of 

American diplomacy had bruised 

the honor of the Japanese society 

writ large. The Japanese people 

desired to earn the respect of the 

West once and for all. Pearl Harbor 

was a direct result of Japan’s quest 

for global power and recognition.

Pearl Harbor: Racism and 

Faulty Deterrence

Given that American racism 

greatly offended the honor, dignity, 

and pride of the Japanese Empire, 

American leaders should have 

foreseen that conflict was inevitable. Pearl Harbor, however, turned 

out to be a complete surprise for 

the United States. This was because 

racism caused the United States 

to be overconfident in its deterrent capability against the Japanese 

threat.

As a reminder, deterrence is 

essentially the act of building 

up one’s own forces to discourage another force from attacking. 

Thinking that they were dealing 

with an inferior opponent, many 

American military leaders assumed 

that Japan would not be foolish 

enough to attack a military might 

such as the United States. In War 

and Empire: the American Way of 

Life, author Paul Atwood recounts 

that, “On the eve of war, Chief of 

Staff General George Marshall 

observed that the Japanese would 

be ‘stupid’ to attack the base.”22

There were several others who 

overestimated the deterrent capability of the United States military 

and underestimated Japan’s military capabilities and resolve. Joseph 

Daniels, former US Secretary of 

the Navy said, “I can hardly believe 

that it would be possible for any 

man to be crazy enough to invade 

this hemisphere.”23 Even more 

resolutely, Atwood affirms that “in 

May 1941 Adolf Berle, Assistant 

Secretary of State, declared that 

‘a naval invasion of the Western 

Hemisphere is out of the question.’”24 Thus, racism blinded these 

and many other American leaders 

to the inadequacy of the deterrent against the Japanese. Author 

Roberta Wohlstetter perhaps sums 

up this situation most eloquently. 

She writes, “What these examples 

illustrate is rather the very human 

tendency to pay attention to the 

signals that support current expectations about enemy behavior.”25

Racism caused Americans 

to formulate incorrect expectations concerning the behavior of 

their Japanese counterparts. They 

did not realize that their military 

deterrent was inadequate to stem 

the tide of the Japanese ambition 

to defeat the West and redeem 

the country’s bruised pride. The 

United States did not realize that 

it had proverbially backed Japan 

into a corner. Both Great Britain 

and the Netherlands looked to the 

United States to protect Western 

interests in Asia, particularly 

those in Indonesia and Malaya, 

against Japanese interference.26 As 

a result, the United States extended 

financial aid to support Japan’s 

enemies, stifled exports from 

the Philippines, froze Japanese 

assets, and disrupted the majority of trade that had been bound 

for the Japanese island.27 Racism 

blinded Americans as to the consequences of these actions, namely 

that US policies stripped Japan off 

all options short of military conflict to secure the raw materials 

it needed to sustain its empire.28

Many, although not all, American 

leaders appear to have assumed 

that the inferior Japanese race 

would not be able to do anything 

about these sanctions. Author 

Takeo Imuchi provides important 

insight into the Japanese response 

to the racist-inspired imperialism 

of the United States in his book, 

Thinking that they were 

dealing with an inferior 

opponent, many American 

military leaders assumed 

that Japan would not be 

foolish enough to attack a 

military might such as the 

United States. 
Racism: A Stumbling Block to Deterrence Strategy 14

Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A 

New Perspective from Japan. He 

writes, “The basic aim in war is to 

win. However, sometimes nations 

go to war because the fear of defeat 

is outweighed by the perceived 

consequences of being intimidated 

into humiliating submission by a 

stronger opponent. This happens 

when the leaders are more concerned with defending the honor 

of the nation than the lives and 

fortunes of its citizens.”29 Again, 

racism is “the prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed 

against someone of a different race 

based on the belief that one’s own 

race is superior.” The United States 

did not expect an attack from an 

inferior power and thus misjudged 

its ability to deter a surprise attack. 

As a disclaimer, racism is by no 

means the only reason for which 

the United States failed to anticipate the attack at Pearl Harbor, nor 

is this an attempt to categorize all 

Americans as racists. The purpose 

of this analysis, rather, is to provoke 

thought into how prejudices and 

biases can affect the judgment of an 

individual or an entire nation. The 

success of deterrence rests on one’s 

confidence that one has the necessary power to discourage another 

force from attacking. This is why 

overconfidence is so dangerous 

because it creates vulnerability. If 

one is overconfident about a deterrent capability, one may eventually 

be faced with an unpleasant surprise. This scenario can be hypothesized regarding North Korea’s 

nuclear threat.

 Historical Lesson Applied to 

North Korea

The lessons learned from Pearl 

Harbor can be applied to the 

current security situation with 

North Korea to assess whether or 

not the United States is overestimating its deterrent power against 

another Asian foe. To accomplish 

this objective, it is necessary first 

to examine the evidence for the 

subtle presence of racism toward 

North Korea in modern American society. An analysis of North 

Korean culture and its similarities to Japanese culture will also 

prove helpful as North Korea is 

also a proud, militaristic society 

that is insecure with its place in 

the globalized world. These factors 

together conclude the potential for 

serious consequences in overestimating the US deterrent against 

the North Korean nuclear threat. 

This analysis provides important 

insight as to the possible courses of 

action for the future. 

Traces of American Racism 

toward North Korea

In today’s day and age, overt 

examples of racism are far less 

evident than in the years leading 

up to Pearl Harbor. As a reminder, 

racism is “the prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed 

against someone of a different race based on the belief that 

one’s own race is superior.” In the 

modern age, this paper proposes 

that racism has evolved into a different form. Traces of racism, for 

example, are evident in the United 

States’ skepticism that North Korea 

could develop a successful nuclear 

program. As members of the 

world’s foremost nuclear power, 

many Americans seem to underestimate or discount North Korea’s 

pursuit of a militarized nuclear 

capability. They swiftly seem to 

discredit North Korea’s inferior 

technology and lack of resources. 

While these sentiments are not 

overtly racist in and of themselves, 

they eerily conjure up memories 

of the same overconfidence that 

Americans had in its deterrent 

capabilities against Japan in 1941.

In 2012, Markus Schiller, in 

conjunction with the RAND 

Cooperation, published a technical report entitled, Characterizing 

the North Korean Nuclear Missile 

Threat. Schiller concluded that 

the strongest hypothesis was the 

“Bluff ” hypothesis. The “Bluff ” 

hypothesis essentially suggests that 

North Korea has no intention of 

using its nuclear missiles for any 

other purpose but as bargaining 

chips in foreign politics.30 In fact, 

this hypothesis greatly assuages 

the threat of North Korea’s nuclear 

missile program. Schiller writes, 

“According to this hypothesis, in its 

testing, North Korea has launched 

Soviet/Russian made missiles . . 

. to maximize the appearance of 

performance, but may never have 

tested missiles from its own production—any such indigenous 

missiles cannot have noteworthy 

reliability or accuracy.”31

Andrew Scobell and John M. 

Sanford agreed with Schiller’s conclusions in their report for the Strategic Studies Institute back in 2007. 

While they cautioned that the 

United States cannot completely 

rule out the potential for a North 

Korean nuclear first strike capability, they also agreed that North 

Korea’s nuclear success is exaggerated. They write, “As impressive 

as the statistics on North Korean 

conventional and unconventional 

North Korea is also a proud, 

militaristic society that is 

insecure with its place in 

the globalized world. 
Racism: A Stumbling Block to Deterrence Strategy 15

forces are, their actual capabilities 

are less than the raw data suggest, 

given the obsolescence of most 

KPA equipment, shortage of spare 

parts and fuel, and poor maintenance.”32

While these researchers 

undoubtedly arrived at these conclusions after much careful study 

and analysis of reliable data, it is 

still dangerous to assume anything 

about North Korea’s intentions or 

capabilities as this might breed 

overconfidence and encourage 

Americans not to take the threat 

seriously. To make matters worse, 

popular media gets a hold of this 

message and misconstrues it with 

overconfident declarations of 

American nuclear superiority in 

the face of inferior North Korean 

technology, all with the typical 

flare of American humor. Examine 

the following images that surface 

with every popular search engine 

on the internet today. Notice 

how each image discredits North 

Korean nuclear missile technology, 

all effectively relaying the underlying message that many Americans 

do not think that North Korea is 

capable of a nuclear attack against 

the United States. In other words, 

Americans see North Korea as 

primitive and backward—telltale 

hallmarks of the potential blind 

spots racism can produce. It is 

important to remember that this 

superior to inferior, racist dichotomy was one of the trademarks that 

led to the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. 

American leaders must be wary 

of these pitfalls and not allow the 

United States 

to underestimate the very 

real threat that 

a belligerent 

nuclear power 

poses to the 

rest of the 

world, even 

if it is considered underdeveloped. 

The Photoshopped images of 

Kim Jong Un on this page also 

demonstrate yet another aspect of 

the enduring influences of American racism. They portray North 

Korea as an immature child, which 

is nothing more than a throwback 

to the American racism against 

the Japanese as an inferior people. 

There is a story in a 1998 Stanley 

Foundation publication entitled, 

“Emerging from Conflict: Improving US Relations with current 

and Recent Adversaries,” that also 

reflects this sentiment.

When asked by a skeptic 

why a country would expect 

that aggressive actions such as 

missile launches would lead 

to increased engagement, one 

participant replied with the 

example of a school boy throwing 

pebbles at a girl in an attempt to both 

impress her and attract her attention. The North Koreans have also 

learned that the United States pays 

close attention to the relationship 

only when North Korean behavior 

is viewed as threatening.35

In other words, some Americans see North Korea as no more 

than a child who throws a tantrum 

to get her way. The danger with this 

perspective derives from the 

moment the “child” unexpectedly decides she is going to carry 

out her threat. 

The United 

States needs to 

be careful in 

disregarding 

North Korea’s 

behavior as 

primitive or 

child-like just 

in case North 

Korea decides 

to act upon its 

threat.

North Korean Culture

There are many similarities 

between the Japanese culture of 

the 1940s and the North Korean 

culture of today. The Japanese citizens swore their loyalty to their 

emperor. In the same way, “North 

Korea is an isolated and authoritarian one-party state; the political 

system is based upon an extraordinary cult . . . [idolizing its leader].”36

Just as the Japanese Empire placed 

a great deal of emphasis on the military, North Korea has cultivated 

a militaristic society that holds 

to the ideology of “military first 

politics.”37 Finally, North Korea 

is experiencing the same kinds 

of insecurities that the Japanese 

Empire faced in the mid-1900s. 

It does not trust the West and 

has attempted to develop a policy 

of complete independence and 

self-reliance, or “juché.”38 North 

Korea views its missile and nuclear 

development programs as crucial 

insurance against foreign interKim Jong Un with toy rocket33

Kim Jong Un with fireworks34
Racism: A Stumbling Block to Deterrence Strategy 16

vention and vital assurance for 

continued domestic control over 

its population.39 This mentality can 

be compared to Japan’s aggressive, 

although ultimately unsuccessful, 

efforts to keep the United States 

out of its Pacific sphere of influence. Thus, when considering the 

proper deterrent strategy toward 

North Korea, American leaders 

must be cognizant of the motivations and mentality that is driving 

North Korean nuclear and foreign 

policy. 

The Way Ahead

History has demonstrated that 

racism can prove to be a fatal 

blind spot in developing an effective deterrent strategy. The United 

States must not underestimate 

North Korea’s nuclear potential. In 

spite of the fact that up until this 

point, North Korea has only used its 

nuclear capability as mere bargaining chips on the international spectrum, the United States should not 

develop the expectation that this 

is the rule. It must not get caught 

up in racial stereotypes leading to 

overconfidence in its nuclear deterrent diplomacy. Rather, the United 

States needs to follow the advice 

of former Representative James A. 

Leach of Iowa, who wisely advised 

Congress that, “Despite the fact 

that leaders can be vain or villainous and policies irrational, even 

evil countries themselves are not 

intrinsically evil. Negative terms 

that apply to peoples as opposed 

to people are almost always counterproductive.”40 The United States 

must refrain from insulting North 

Korea if any progress is to be made 

on the nuclear issue. Moreover, 

the United States should also heed 

California Representative Diane 

E. Watson’s recommendation that 

“we must remember diplomacy 

when dealing with not only North 

Korea, but South Korea, China, 

and the other Asiatic nations, for it 

is a fundamental belief in this area 

of the world that you deal with 

people with respect and dignity. 

Threatening them is not the way to 

go.”41 Thus, the United States must 

be wary of the diplomatic pitfalls 

of racism in ensuring successful 

deterrence. The condescension and 

bullying that accompany racism 

will only back North Korea into a 

corner from which there may be 

no peaceful escape. 

1. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence, 

(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 7.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 9.

4. “Racism,” Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

2013)<http://oxforddictionaries.

com/us/definition/american_english/

racism>.

5. Melvin Steinfield, Cracks in the 

Melting Pot: Racism and Discrimination 

in American History, 2d ed. (New York: 

Glencoe Press, 1973), 105-6. 

6. Ibid., 106.

7. Ibid., 120.

8. Michael L. Krenn, Race and US 

Foreign Policy from 1900 through World 

War II, 3 (New York: Garland Pub., 

1998), 190-4.

9. Sadao Asada, Culture Shock and 

Japanese-American Relations: Historical Essays, (Columbia: University of 

Missouri Press, 2007), 33.

10. Herbert Passin and American 

Assembly, The United States and Japan, 

2nd ed. (Washington: Columbia Books, 

1975), 13.

11. Asada, 36-8.

12. T. R. Ybarra, “Can White Races 

be Submerged by Colored Hordes?” New 

York Times, May 2, 1920.

13. Ibid.

14. James D. Phelan and Joseph B. 

Gilder, “Japanese Race Problem: Senator 

Phelan Insists Anti-Alien Land Law 

Must Stand. A State Constabulary 

Needed.,” New York Times, February 11, 

1921.

15. Louis Hirshman, “Stop and Get 

Your Free Fag Bag Careless Matches 

Aid the Axis,” still image, 1941 <http://

w w w.lo c.gov/pic tures/res ource/

cph.3b49005/>.

16. Edward T. Grigware, “Alaska - 

Death-Trap for the Jap,” still image, 1941 

<http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/

cph.3b48885/>.

17. H. Paul Varley, Japanese Culture, 

4th ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 

Press, 2000), 297.

18. Steinfield, 141.

19. Ibid., 113.

20. Varley, 297.

21. Ryūsaku Tsunoda, Sources of Japanese Tradition, (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 1958), 800.

22. Paul Atwood, War and Empire: The 

American Way of Life (New York: Pluto 

Press, 2010), 129-30.

23. Ibid., 137.

24. Ibid.

25. Larry Madaras and James 

SoRelle, Reconstruction to the Present, vol. 

2, 14th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 

2011), 280.

26. Malcolm Caldwell, “Imperialism in the Malay World,” 

Social Scientist 1, no. 11 (June 1, 

1973): 3–17 <http://www.jstor.org/

stable/3516505?origin=JSTOR-pdf>.

27. Madaras and SorRelle, 268.

28. Caldwell, 7.

29. Takeo Iguchi, “Demystifying 

Pearl Harbor: a New Perspective from 

Japan,” LTCB International Library 

Selection ; No. 27 (Tokyo: International 

House of Japan, 2010), 62.

30. Markus Schiller, “Technical Report: Characterizing the North 

Korean Nuclear Missile Threat” (Santa 

Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012), xv.

31. Ibid.

32. Andrew Scobell and John M. 

Sanford, “North Korea’s Military Threat: 
Racism: A Stumbling Block to Deterrence Strategy 17

Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, and 

Ballistic Missiles, Demystifying North 

Korea” (US Army War College: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2007), xi.

33. “Latest North Korean Rocket 

Launch. We Know Memes” <http://

weknowmemes.com/2012/12/latestnorth-korean-rocket-launch/>.

34. “North Korea Memes: Kim 

Jong Un Ballistic Rockets”<http://

memeblender.com/tag/north-koreamemes/>.

35. Strategy for Peace Conference 

1998 : Warrenton, Va., Stanley Foundation, “Emerging from Conflict: Improving US Relations with Current and 

Recent Adversaries,” 1998, 31.

36. Daniel A. Pinkston, “The North 

Korean Ballistic Missile Program, 

Demystifying North Korea” (Carlisle: 

Strategic Studies Institute, US Army 

War College, 2008), v.

37. Ibid., 9.

38. Ibid., 2.

39. Ibid., 1.

40. “North Korea’s Nuclear Program: 

The Challenge to Stability in Northeast 

Asia” (House of Representatives: US 

Government Printing Office, 2003), 3.

41. “North Korean Nuclear Negotiations: Strategies and Prospects for 

Success” (Washington: US Government 

Printing Office, 2005), 13.
While society can certainly 

claim progress toward 

achieving Reagan’s goal, it is 

hard, even in the present era, to 

imagine a world completely free of 

nuclear weapons. In fact, a recent 

report by “The Center for Arms 

Control and Non-Proliferation” 

estimates that 17,325 nuclear 

weapons remain in the hands of 

the world’s nuclear power states.1

While drawing down this stockpile through treaties such as “New 

START” is no doubt necessary, 

such an approach focuses only on 

those weapons which are presently 

in existence. Perhaps of greater 

import, we must consider how to 

prevent other states from crossing the threshold between peaceful nuclear energy prospects and 

more nefarious attempts at acquiring a nuclear weapon capability. 

Problematically, it is substantially 

simpler for nations with nuclear 

energy technology to build the 

bomb than those without nuclear 

technical prowess. Given the 

political and security advantages 

a nuclear capability presents in the 

face of other proliferating countries, a weapons program is often 

in the national interest. However 

these state centric incentives 

contrast with the global advantages of halting proliferation. 

Until now, scholars and policy 

makers alike have largely failed 

at designing effective schemes 

to solve this Prisoner’s Dilemma 

type challenge. We propose a new 

mechanism for solving Prisoner’s 

Dilemmas based on a decision 

trading scheme. Implementing 

this strategy could be applied to 

peacefully harness the atom globally without substantially increasing the risk of proliferation.

To best frame this argument, 

one must first understand the 

overwhelming benefits of peaceful 

nuclear energy programs. Nuclear 

energy is a primary source of 

electricity throughout the world. 

In the US alone, 20% of all electricity consumed is generated 

through nuclear powered plants.2

Experts predict this number could 

grow to 25% by 2030.3 Not only 

does nuclear energy provide a reliable source of electricity, when 

compared to petroleum, natural 

gas, and coal, it is also the most 

affordable method of doing so. In 

an age of environmental awareness, 

nuclear power also stands as one 

of the cleanest sources of energy. 

It is referred to as an “emissionfree source” of power.4

 Whereas 

traditional biofuels emit greenhouse gasses as a product of producing power through chemical 

combustion, nuclear power plants 

split atoms to power their generators, containing all of the waste. 5

While this contained radioactive 

waste has caused concern in the 

past, recent technological developments promise to recycle fuel at 

the power plant itself, minimizing 

the hazards of disposal.6 Nuclear 

power also serves a strategic 

purpose. Due to growing volatility among petroleum producing 

nations, it is increasingly important for countries, both big and 

small, to create internal avenues 

for energy production. Nuclear 

power is a preeminent method for 

accomplishing this goal. 

But if nuclear power is such a 

valuable tool in energy production, 

why then is there any concern that 

other countries implement this 

technology? It would seem that the 

The Trading Decisions Scheme

A Novel Solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma with Application to 

Nuclear Proliferation

Zac hary Adams AND Ian Gibson

Cadet IAN GIBSON is a Class of 2013 

Scholar and Economics major and 

winner of both the Truman and Marshall graduate Scholarships. Cadet 

ZACHARY ADAMS is a Scholar and 

Aerospace Engineering major in the 

Class of 2013.

“Our moral imperative is to 

work with all our powers for 

that day when the children 

of the world grow up without 

the fear of nuclear war.” 

– Ronald Reagan
The Trading Decisions Scheme 19

whole world stands to benefit from 

an increased spread of nuclear 

power. While on the surface, this 

statement contains some degree of 

truth, it overlooks a crucial detail. 

Historically, pursuits of peaceful 

power programs have consistently 

morphed into full-fledged nuclear 

weapons programs. Proliferation in Israel and South 

Africa validates this assertion. 

Less than a decade after 

the creation of the Israeli 

state in 1948, Ben Gurion, 

Israel’s first prime minister was in pursuit of a 

nuclear weapon capability.7

Although Israeli officials 

have refrained from publically recognizing their 

weapons program, by 1970 

the international community implicitly deemed 

Israel a nuclear state.8

 

Israel’s first nuclear energy facility, located at Nachal-Soreq, was a 

gateway for eventually developing 

nuclear weapons.9 Not only did it 

serve as a front, masking Israel’s 

weapon’s program, it also precipitated the US agreeing to train Israeli 

students in the area of nuclearphysics.10 Dimona, Israel’s second 

reactor was originally labeled a 

“research facility” to further investigate peaceful energy applications. In reality, it was employed 

to produce plutonium necessary 

in nuclear weapons production. 

While much of the Israeli nuclear 

story has never been revealed, this 

much is clear: Israel’s nuclear pursuits began with the creation of a 

peaceful nuclear energy program. 

South Africa’s road to nuclear 

proliferation is strikingly similar. 

In 1957, the US signed an agreement with South Africa to provide 

a Safari 1 nuclear research reactor 

in addition to uranium enriched 

sufficiently for use in a power 

plant with the stipulation that 

both would be used exclusively 

for peaceful energy purposes.11

Additionally 94 students and technicians were allowed to study in 

US nuclear training centers.12 Less 

than a decade later, a second facility, known as the Y-facility was 

constructed to produce weapon’s 

grade uranium. By the early 1980’s 

South Africa had produced six 

gun-type nuclear bombs. What, 

if any, impact did South Africa’s 

peaceful energy program have in 

this outcome? As Robert Jastor 

puts it, “These earlier developments – access to Western nuclear 

technology, and the acquisition of 

a research reactor – enabled South 

Africa to take the most important step toward achieving independent nuclear capability.”13 In 

other words, South Africa’s nuclear 

weapons program was born out of 

its peaceful energy pursuits. 

Israel and South Africa’s path 

to proliferation demonstrate an 

important point. Historically 

there has been inextricable links 

between peaceful nuclear programs and the eventual pursuit 

of nuclear weapons. Not only can 

these programs serve as covers for 

less peaceful activities, in the worst 

case, they can precipitate and 

directly aid in the development of a nuclear weapon 

capability. 

While it is important to note that peaceful programs often lay the 

groundwork for nuclear 

weapons, it is more vital to 

appreciate the danger 

these weapons pose. The 

hazards inherent to nuclear 

weapons make proliferation an undesirable and 

problematic outgrowth of 

peaceful energy programs. 

First nuclear weapons 

can lead to preventive 

war. For a country whose adversary is attempting to develop a 

nuclear weapon, the only reasonable response may be a preventive strike which seeks to remove 

the opponent’s ability to develop 

nuclear weapons. 

Israeli strikes on Iraq are a 

fitting example. On June 7, 1981 

Israeli fighters dropped nearly 

32,000 pounds of bombs on Iraq’s 

Osirak nuclear reactor.14 Intelligence reports suggested that the 

Iraqis were employing this reactor 

as part of their nuclear weapons 

program. Earlier, in 1980, the Iranians carried out a similar preventive strike and destroyed the 

Tuwaitha Atomic Center housing 

the Tammuz I nuclear reactor.15

The case of Iran provides an even 

more recent application of preventive strikes. In 2009 the Stuxnet 
The Trading Decisions Scheme 20

computer virus infiltrated the 

Natanz nuclear plant in Iran and 

commanded one-fifth of its operational centrifuges to spin beyond 

their design limits, causing them 

to self-destruct.16 

Critics may argue that the fact 

that none of these attacks led to 

an outbreak of war undermines 

the argument that preventive war 

can result from nuclear proliferation. However, to accept this argument is to miss the central point. 

Namely, these attacks did occur in 

response to nuclear proliferation 

and are themselves “acts of war.” 

Moreover, one can hardly argue 

that preventive strikes will never 

lead to war. The bottom line is that 

nuclear proliferation raises the 

probability of preventive attacks 

which in-turn increases the potential for major conflict. 

A second concern of nuclear 

proliferation is that it increases 

the liability for nuclear accidents. 

If proper safeguards both technical and procedural are not established, a nuclear weapon could be 

launched or detonated inadvertently.

Nuclear weapons accidents 

are far more common than most 

would care to admit. The US alone, 

arguably the safest of nuclear 

power states, has incurred multiple 

mishaps which could have been 

catastrophic. Take for example a 

situation during the Cuban missile 

crisis. In response to the heightened Soviet missile activity in 

Cuba, the US Air Force readied 

9 ICBM’s with nuclear warheads 

and placed a dummy warhead on 

a 10th.17 Shortly thereafter, Strategic Air Command launched the 

10th ICBM as part of a prescheduled test. No one considered the 

possibility that the Soviets, having 

learned of the Air Force’s nuclear 

deployment, might misinterpret this test for an actual nuclear 

attack. Fortunately, they did not. 

A second near accident 

occurred later in 1962. The commander of North American 

Defense Command received 

notification that a missile had been 

launched from Cuba and was en 

route to the United States.18 The 

commander ordered that the 

US initiate a launch sequence in 

response. Fortunately, the missile 

failed to detonate. After some time, 

officers realized that the radar operator had inadvertently “inserted a 

test tape simulating an attack from 

Cuba into the system, confusing 

control room officers who thought 

the simulation was a real attack.”19 

Preventive strikes and accidents are just two among many 

arguments which purport that 

nuclear proliferation is undesirable. Increasing the prevalence of 

nuclear weapons only amplifies 

these concerns. Herein lies the 

central dilemma presented within 

this paper: if nuclear weapons 

proliferation is undesirable and 

problematic, how then are countries to reap the benefits of peaceful nuclear power if such programs naturally give rise to nuclear 

weapons? Is there a method which 

allows for peaceful nuclear energy 

acquisition while simultaneously 

precluding the creation of nuclear 

weapons? US policy makers once 

believed there was. 

Prior to the 1950’s, traditional 

policy recognized that nuclear 

technology had the potential to 

inflict interminable harm and 

ought to be denied to non-nuclear 

states.20 This belief was all but 

abandoned when Congress passed 

the 1954 Atomic Energy Act which 

actively facilitated the exchange of 

nuclear know-how, technical information, materials and reactors to 

developing countries.21 The intent 

was to allow countries access to the 

benefits of peaceful nuclear energy 

while monitoring to prevent military applications. Countries such 

as Pakistan, Iran, South Africa and 

Israel have all received nuclear aid 

in one form or another as a result of 

the Atomic Energy Act.22 Incidentally, all of the above countries are 

or once were nuclear powers with 

the exception of Iran which is currently seeking a nuclear weapon 

capability. Few can argue that this 

program has not increased global 

access to nuclear information and 

technology; however, given the 

condition of the above countries, 

one would be hard-pressed to find 

evidence that this program was 

also effective in retarding weapons 

proliferation. 

Given the apparent shortcomings of previous nuclear policies, 

what, if anything, can be done to 

foster access to peaceful nuclear 

technologies while preventing the 

Congress passed the 1954 Atomic Energy Act which actively 

facilitated the exchange of nuclear know-how, technical 

information, materials and reactors to developing countries. 

The intent was to allow countries access to the benefits of 

peaceful nuclear energy while monitoring to prevent military 

applications.
The Trading Decisions Scheme 21

proliferation of nuclear weapons? 

Centrally, the problem is that the 

decision to build nuclear weapons, 

given nuclear knowhow, is a 

Prisoner’s Dilemma. 

A prisoners’ dilemma arises 

when, in a non-cooperative game, 

individual incentives produce an 

undesirable outcome, despite the 

possibility of a mutually beneficial one. The classic example of the 

prisoners’ dilemma gives rise to 

its name. Two prisoners, perhaps 

Harry and Jane, are arrested on the 

suspicion of robbery. The police 

have only enough evidence to 

convict them of trespassing, which 

is punishable by six months in jail, 

but could have enough evidence 

for a full ten year conviction if one 

testifies against the other. If they 

both testify, the evidence will not 

be as strong and the sentence will 

be less—perhaps seven years. So, 

understanding game theory, the 

police tell Harry that he will walk 

free if he testifies (defects) against 

Jane, so long as she remains silent 

(cooperates).23

Now consider Harry’s options. 

No matter what he does, it is much 

better for Jane to defect. If Jane 

cooperates and Harry defects, then 

he will walk away free. On the other 

hand, if Jane defects, then Harry 

will receive a shorter sentence 

by defecting as well. Given these 

incentives, the rational outcome of 

the scenario is for both Harry and 

Jane to defect and thus end up in 

a worse scenario than if they had 

made the individually irrational 

choice (because it requires each 

to trust the other not to testify) of 

remaining silent. 

Real world Prisoner’s Dilemmas arise frequently and in many 

forms. An arms race between rival 

countries is a common example. 

While it might have been in the 

interest of both the United States 

and the Soviet Union to quit manufacturing weapons capable of 

destroying the world many times 

over, doing so would risk that the 

other maintained a military advantage, so the race continued at enormous economic cost. Yet examples 

need not have just two participants. Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) are engaged 

in a Prisoner’s Dilemma each day. 

Decreasing oil production would 

increase the price of oil and gains 

in the long term. However, a single 

defector could make a lion’s share 

of the profits by exporting more 

than their fair share at the expense 

of their OPEC comrades. Thus, in 

part, the price of a gallon of gas 

persists below five dollars a gallon 

despite the possibility of rapid 

increases in the price of “black 

gold,” all as a result of a Prisoner’s 

Dilemma on a worldwide scale. 

The world has been unable to 

halt nuclear weapons programs 

while peacefully spreading fission 

energy as a result of the same phenomenon. The Prisoner’s Dilemma 

in the case of nuclear proliferation arises from two sources. First 

is the relative ease with which a 

nuclear energy country can build 

atomic weapons in comparison to 

a country without that technology. The second arises from the 

political and security advantages of 

building the bomb given straightforward development of the technology. 

Fortunately the technical challenge required to construct a 

nuclear weapon is immense. A 

country must not only have scientific and engineering expertise 

in nuclear fields, but also must 

possess sufficient nuclear fission 

material to construct weapons. 

The nuclear fuel consists of either 

highly enriched uranium 235 or 

plutonium 239. Enriched uranium 

is tedious and time consuming to produce. The 235 isotope 

composes only 0.7% of natural 

uranium ore. Since the isotopes are 

chemically identical they must be 

separated, or enriched, by a minute 

discrepancy in their mass. Correspondingly, sustainable weapons 

programs require thousands of 

precisely manufactured centrifuges to isolate the fission capable 

235 isotope. Contrarily, plutonium is simpler to manufacture 

if a nuclear power plant is available for that purpose. Some of the 

neutrons released during fission in 

the core of a nuclear power plant 

are absorbed by uranium 238 to 

form plutonium 239. Since plutonium is chemically different from 

uranium, it is straightforward to 

separate from a nuclear reactor’s 

spent fuel rods. 

Possessing a nuclear power plant 

not only provides easier access 

to fissionable material, but in the 

process, the nuclear engineering 

and scientific expertise necessary 

to develop a nuclear weapon. In 

other words, a nuclear power plant 

transforms a “technically” absurd 

notion of accessing “the bomb” 

Obtaining a nuclear 

deterrent without one’s 

enemies following suit is 

a potent national security 

“guarantee.” Contrarily 

failing to proliferate when an 

enemy possesses the bomb 

may undermine a nation’s 

international ambitions.
The Trading Decisions Scheme 22

into an attainable choice.

The problem is that this choice 

forms a Prisoner’s Dilemma. While 

it may be best for society for nuclear 

energy countries to decide not to 

arm, the incentives for each individual nation do not necessarily 

facilitate this outcome. Obtaining 

a nuclear deterrent without one’s 

enemies following suit is a potent 

national security “guarantee.” Contrarily failing to proliferate when 

an enemy possesses the bomb may 

undermine a nation’s international 

ambitions. Either way it is often 

more rational for a nation to apply 

nuclear technology experience 

to a weapons program, especially 

where it can deter outside intervention. 

No matter what the other 

country does, it is in each nation’s 

interest to proliferate. Of course, 

while the simple case of two nations 

is straightforward to consider, in 

reality this dilemma is distributed 

among many countries simultaneously. Thus, how can the Prisoner’s 

Dilemma be resolved?

Scholars have devised many 

methods to solve Prisoner’s Dilemmas, but none with universal 

application. One such example, 

“Rational solutions” to the Prisoner’s dilemma, alters the incentives 

of each player so that cooperation 

is the most profitable outcome. 

A third party to any Prisoner’s 

Dilemma can add extra punishments for defection or offer extra 

rewards for cooperation. For 

instance in the classic Prisoner’s 

Dilemma example, Harry and Jane 

might threaten each other so that 

if one defects, the other will ask 

their friends to take action against 

the rat. In that scenario being let 

out of prison immediately via 

defection is no longer the rational choice. With respect to the 

acquisition of nuclear weapons the 

international community serves as 

this third party. Sanctions against 

Iran, North Korea, Iraq, and South 

Africa’s nuclear weapon’s programs 

attempted to make “going nuclear” 

the unattractive option. However, 

in each case this third party 

intervention failed. North Korea 

and South Africa both obtained 

nuclear weapons, Saddam Hussein 

never openly demonstrated a halt 

of his nuclear program, and Iran 

is persistently working towards a 

weapon at present despite tough 

international sanctions and the 

Stuxnet cyber attack on the Natanz 

Uranium enrichment complex. In 

short, each of the sanction efforts 

failed because the international 

community could not leverage a 

sufficient incentive to make proliferation entirely unattractive. 

Future attacks, whether cyber or 

kinetic, will likely end similarly. 

Some Prisoner’s Dilemmas can 

alter the incentives without a third 

party. If the game is repeated—an 

iterated prisoners’ dilemma—then 

a player can punish another player 

by defecting in future games and 

thereby decrease the total payoff 

for the cheating player. Thus the 

punishment scheme does not 

require any outside intervention. 

The most famous example of a 

cooperation strategy in iterated 

games is “Tit-for-Tat.” This strategy cooperates or defects based on 

the other player’s choice in the previous game. Unfortunately, acquisition of nuclear weapons is not 

an iterated game. Once a country 

obtains a nuclear weapon the Prisoner’s Dilemma has ended. Tit-forTat or other cooperation strategies 

are not applicable 
The Trading Decisions Scheme 23

Fortunately, human nature 

allows for solutions that are not 

explicitly logical. Texas A&M conducted a classroom experiment of 

a multiple part prisoners’ dilemma 

where students would obtain more 

or less money based on their and 

their peers decision to cooperate or defect. When the decision 

to defect or cooperate remained 

private, a majority of the persons 

defected,24 but if the decisions to 

defect or cooperate were made 

publically known, all of the students cooperated even in a onetime game.25 Although any single 

student would have made more 

money by defecting, the fear of 

ostracism from their peers kept 

them from doing so if their peers 

might find out. Trust between 

members of a group, and altruistic 

tendencies explain the plausibility 

of “irrational” solutions to prisoners’ dilemmas in other situations. 

Arguably Japan is an example of 

where such an “irrational” opposition to nuclear weapons exists. 

The Japanese population is largely 

opposed to weapons of mass 

destruction as a result of the suffering they endured at the end of 

the Second World War. 

Unfortunately irrational solutions to prevent nuclear proliferation are often not feasible. Leaders 

may not be swayed by discussion of 

the moral high ground, or be held 

back by a pacifist population. Thus 

the Prisoner’s Dilemma surrounding nuclear weapons requires an 

alternative solution. 

Although counter intuitive, we 

suggest that players locked in a 

Prisoner’s Dilemma could achieve 

cooperation if they simply traded 

their decision making power. Consider the original example: each 

player exercises his or her own 

power to collaborate or defect. 

However, what if both Harry and 

Jane agree to give their own decision to each other? Harry would 

then decide whether Jane would 

testify or remain silent and vice 

versa. 

No matter what Jane decides 

to choose for Harry, it would be 

in Harry’s best interest to decide 

that Jane should collaborate. If 

Harry decides Jane will collaborate he would either get off free 

or receive a minimum sentence, 

but if he decides that Jane will 

defect he would be in the brig for a 

minimum of seven years. Since the 

same is true for Jane, this trading 

decision scheme should always 

result in a collaborating outcome. 

The prisoners’ dilemma is resolved 

if the parties involved make the 

other party’s decision as to which 

action to take. Further it resolves 

the dilemma even if there is ample 

room for any party to cheat and 

if the game is played only a single 

time. However, the question must 

be asked: “What situations actually 

allow this to happen?” 

Imagine that a class is about 

to take a final exam. The teacher 

established the test is curved so 

that the highest mark becomes 

100% and then a linear progression from zero to that the highest 

score will determine the remainder 

of the grades. For example if the 

highest score was a 50% and Becca 

was fortunate enough to obtain a 

40% on the original scale, then her 

score after the curve would be an 

80%. The students quickly realize 

that everyone can obtain a perfect 

score on the test if each student 

writes only their name on the test. 

A zero would then be the highest 

score and after the curve everyone 

would score one hundred percent. 

Yet, how could all of these students actually execute this plan? 

All of the students know that if they 

just answered a few of the questions correctly then they would not 

only obtain a perfect score on the 

test, but that they would gain other 

rewards such as respect from their 

teacher and higher marks than their 

peers. Furthermore, it is obvious 

to every student that every other 

student has an immense incentive 

to defect. It would be disastrous for 

any student to cooperate and not 

put any correct answers on their 

test if another student in the class 

answers some questions correctly.

In this scenario most strategies 

do not work to resolve the prisoners’ dilemma. When the students 

are taking the test, it is impossible for them to know whether 

or not any of the other students 

are defecting. Therefore, students 

cannot immediately “punish” their 

peers by trying their hardest on 

the test instantly after determining 

someone has defected (since test 

scores are often kept confidential 

a defector may never be revealed). 

Further since this is the final, and 

the last test in the course, the threat 

of future defection is not a viable 

threat.

However, consider the outcome 

of this scenario if each student 

decides how hard another student 

will try on the test. This could 

be accomplished if the students 

simply wrote their name on the 

test, and then switched the test 

with another student. No student 

would want another student to 

score better himself since, with the 

curve, it would lower his grade. 

Therefore the safest bet for every 

student would be to decide that 

the other student scores a zero 

percent. In effect, trading the 
The Trading Decisions Scheme 24

power to make decisions resolves 

the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The students would cooperate regardless 

if this is the only test, the number 

of tests is fixed, or the number of 

tests is unknown. 

Of course the previous example 

is an idealized situation and the 

Trading Decisions solution to the 

Prisoner’s Dilemma only applies 

to a fraction of the situations classified as Prisoners’ Dilemmas. 

There are two conditions that must 

be met in order for this trading 

decision scheme to achieve cooperation. 

First there must be a way for 

both parties entirely to give the 

decision in question to the other 

party. There can be no way for 

either party to cheat by withholding some power to influence 

their own decision. In the testing 

example the test is a complete unit. 

It could either be entirely withheld 

or given to another student. Once 

the student gives his or her test 

away, it is impossible for them to 

influence their own grade. Many 

real life examples of the prisoners’ 

dilemma violate this condition. 

Consider nuclear disarmament: 

If two countries agree to disarm 

by giving each other the location 

and ability to disarm their own 

weapons, a country could easily 

withhold the location of some of 

their nuclear arms. Often there is 

no practical way to give party B 

the complete power to make party 

A’s decision, and the prisoners’ 

dilemma cannot be resolved. 

Additionally, there must not be 

any incentives that leave the prisoners’ dilemma unresolved. In the 

testing example, there is no incentive for any student to give another 

student a higher score than the 

score he will receive on his own test. 

Indeed, it is safest to give the other 

student a zero percent. Many production cartels violate this condition and could not trade the power 

to make their decision to resolve 

the Prisoners’ Dilemma. For 

instance, OPEC could not use this 

method to increase their profits. 

If each OPEC country gave a different OPEC member the decision 

as to how much oil they export—

probably an impossible task in 

and of itself—then the incentives 

would still not align to produce 

an ideal situation for OPEC. The 

incentive would be for each OPEC 

member to decide that another 

OPEC member should export no 

oil. This would maximize the price 

of any oil and its own profits. 

However some real world Prisoner’s Dilemmas—importantly the 

choice to obtain nuclear weapons 

given a nuclear power plant—

satisfy these conditions and can 

be solved via the Trading Decisions Scheme. Any country could 

take advantage of nuclear power 

without an increased risk of proliferation so long as a different unallied country or group of countries 

constructed and operated their 

power plant for them. In doing 

so, a country effectively “trades” 

its decision to develop nuclear 

weapons to a partner country or 

countries. 

In this situation the choice of 

whether or not to proliferate using 

the nuclear power plant is entirely 

given to the nation or nations operating the power plant. Access to 

the spent fuel is secured by another 

nation and cannot be secretly 

diverted into a plutonium separation plant as the country operating 

the plant would control the spent 

fuel. Further, the nation operating 

the plant cannot utilize the spent 

fuel itself as the host country could 

easily monitor operations at the 

plant given its location. 

Additionally, the nuclear engineering expertise acquired or 

maintained by the host country 

and the country or countries building and operating the power plant 

is transparent to outside powers 

concerned about proliferation. The 

experts from each country can be 

monitored by the other countries 

since their identities are known. 

Moreover, countries that already 

possess nuclear power could be the 

ones who operate the power plants 

in other countries. That way the 

nuclear expertise is held by trustworthy nations. 

Fortunately both of the requirements for the Trading Decisions 

Scheme to work are satisfied in 

this application. It is possible to 

entirely grant the operation of a 

nuclear power plant, and control 

of the spent fuel rods, to another 

sovereign entity. Furthermore 

the incentives align so that the 

Prisoner’s Dilemma is solved. 

Clearly another non-allied nation 

or group of nations would not 

want the country in which they 

are operating the nuclear power 

plant to obtain a nuclear warhead. 

However, each country participating in such a scheme might 

only engage in it if they can gain 

some nuclear technical expertise 

by operating or helping operate 

power plants in other countries. 

This nuclear experience could 

prove vital if a local nuclear disaster occurs or if the scheme breaks 

down and a weapons program 

becomes necessary. 

While the requirements are 

in place for the Trading Deci-
The Trading Decisions Scheme 25

sions Scheme to function on a 

theoretical basis, it is important to 

consider how this theory might 

apply to real-world instances of 

nuclear proliferation. The historical case of India and Pakistan 

provides such an example. India 

tested its first nuclear device in 

May of 1974.26 Ultimately Pakistan responded in 1998 by testing 

six nuclear devices.27 Recognizing 

that both countries stand today as 

nuclear powers, is less important 

than appreciating why they pursued 

this capability in the first place. In 

short, both countries believed that 

if the other had the capability, they 

too must acquire the bomb. This 

sentiment is best conveyed in a 

remark made by Pakistan’s former 

President Z.A. Bhutto in 1965, “If 

India builds the bomb, we will eat 

grass or leaves, even go hungry, 

but we will get one of our own.”28

More recently, a military official 

made the following comment: 

“[Our] Nuclear weapons are aimed 

solely at India.”29 The upshot of this 

adversarial relationship, namely 

that both countries stand today 

as nuclear powers, demonstrates 

the Prisoner’s Dilemma in action. 

Could things have gone differently 

for India and Pakistan? We submit, 

by applying a Trading Decisions 

Scheme, both players could have 

reaped the benefits of nuclear 

energy while containing the reciprocal threat of nuclear weapons. 

Under such a scheme India may 

have never harnessed plutonium 

from its nuclear energy plant to 

develop its bomb. As a result, Pakistan may not have established its 

own nuclear weapons program. 

By guaranteeing that the opponent would not use their peaceful 

nuclear plants for the development 

of nuclear weapons, the underlying motivation for both countries 

to proliferate would be nullified. 

While the case of India and 

Pakistan may demonstrate how 

the Trading Decisions Scheme 

could apply to a real-world proliferation dilemma, the case of 

Iran’s Bushehr power plant provides evidence of how this scheme 

was applied in a real-life scenario. 

In 1974, under the Atoms for 

Peace Program, the United States 

agreed to build a nuclear power 

reactor for the American-backed 

Shah.30 As the Islamic revolution 

gained momentum in Iran, the US 

pulled its support for the program. 

However in 1992, the Russians 

agreed to finish construction on 

the Busehr nuclear power plant 

with the agreement that they would 

operate the facility and administer 

complete control of the separated 

plutonium waste.31 A Russian official as recent as last May released 

a statement confirming that “all 

operations related to the reactor 

equipment control and operations 

were being carried out by Russian 

specialists.”32 Above all, this agreement shows that the Trading Decisions Scheme can pass the nuclear 

litmus test and does in fact have 

real-world application. 

The only question that remains 

is, “Who is next?” What countries 

are on the brink of proliferation? 

What countries could benefit from 

a Trading Decisions Scheme such 

as this? As global nuclear tensions 

continue to heighten, answering 

these questions well could be the 

key to preventing the spread of 

nuclear weapons. 

The power of the atom both 

binds us in a game of apocalyptic 

brinksmanship and offers a solution for limitless, clean, and inexpensive energy. While the distinction between weapons and power 

plants is clear from an engineering 

standpoint, it has so far proved 

politically inseparable. Nuclear 

energy historically precedes 

nuclear weapons. Disturbingly, 

a nuclear power plant mandates 

that a nation choose whether or 

not to proliferate. Generally, that 

choice forms an opaque one-time 

multi-party Prisoner’s Dilemma 

where third parties have limited 

Bushehr Nuclear Reactor Complex in Iran. Russia supplies the 

enriched uranium fuel and removes and recycles the spent fuel rods.

Over the last year, North Korea 

(DPRK) under Kim Jong Un 

has increased tension in Northeast 

Asia by violating numerous United 

Nations Security Council (UNSC) 

resolutions banning the testing and 

development of nuclear weapons 

and ballistic missile technology. 

Korean weapons development has 

been matched by an increase in 

bellicose rhetoric aimed at South 

Korea (ROK) and the United 

States. This paper argues that, at 

this time, North Korean nuclear 

posturing since Kim Jong Un’s 

succession represents a continuation of the DPRK’s historic policy 

of using intermittent international 

cooperation to progress its nuclear 

program. Additionally, this paper 

analyzes the international response 

to North Korea’s recent provocations, concluding that the international community has reacted 

appropriately but will require a 

greater commitment from China, 

North Korea’s powerful benefactor, to impede and eventually rollback Pyongyang’s illicit weapons 

program. 

North Korea’s Nuclear 

Program Before Kim Jung Un

The North Korean nuclear 

program began in the 1950s after 

the Soviet Union agreed to help 

develop a research reactor at Yongbyon; this effort produced an operational research reactor in 1967. 

In 1986 North Korea began operating a 5 Megawatt (MWe) nuclear 

reactor at Yongbyon with the capability of producing approximately 6 

kg of plutonium per year. Despite 

acquiescing to Soviet pressure and 

signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, by late 

1986 evidence began to surface of 

a “serious clandestine effort” to 

develop nuclear weapons technology. 1 Evidence included efforts 

to construct two nuclear reactors (with power outputs of 200 

MWe and 50 MWe), intelligence 

detecting high explosive testing, 

and identification of a plutonium 

reprocessing plant used to convert 

spent plutonium fuel rods into a 

form useable in a nuclear weapon. 2

Amidst growing concern of 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons 

program, North and South Korea 

agreed on 31 December 1991 to 

ban nuclear weapons from the 

Korean Peninsula. The agreement, the “Joint Declaration on the 

Denuclearization of the Korean 

Peninsula,” stipulated that all 

nuclear technology on the peninsula be used solely for “peaceful purposes” and that neither 

side would possess a nuclear fuel 

reprocessing plant. The initial 

agreement expressed consent for 

limited inspections; however, it 

failed to specify a viable inspection 

procedure.3

 On 30 January 1992, 

North Korea signed an accord 

permitting International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors 

to examine facilities inside of the 

DPRK. Notably, North Korea indicated that its Yongbyon nuclear 

facilities could be included in a 

list of places for eventual inspections. While the DPRK claimed 

that Yongbyon housed a research 

reactor, many believed that it was 

a key facility in a nuclear weapons 

program and contained a nuclear 

fuel reprocessing plant. Despite 

the initial agreement, North Korea 

cautioned that it might take six 

months to ratify the accord in its 

national legislature, prompting 

many to worry that the DPRK was 

using the negotiations to buy time 

for further nuclear development.4

In March 1993, North Korea 

announced its intent to be the 

first country to withdraw from 

the NPT after the United States 

and the IAEA petitioned for more 

extensive inspections of DPRK 

nuclear facilities. In June 1993, 

amidst substantial international 

pressure, North Korea decided to 

“suspend” its treaty withdrawal.5

In early 1993, North Korea conducted its first successful test of the 

Nodong 1 midrange missile, which 

could potentially deliver a chemiKilling them Softly? 

Putting the Brakes on North Korean Nuclear Proliferation

Zac hARY Esau

Cadet ZACHARY ESAU is a Class of 

2013 Scholar and Engineering Mechanics major.
Killing them Softly? 28

cal, biological or nuclear payload.6

In May 1994, North Korea refused 

to allow the IAEA to inspect 8,000 

fuel rods from its 5 MWe reactor. 

In response, China cautioned the 

DPRK that it would not use its 

UNSC veto authority to halt a first 

round of US proposed economic 

sanctions. This led Kim Il Sung 

to invite former President Jimmy 

Carter to Pyongyang to negotiate. 

These efforts and additional negotiations culminated in the Agreed 

Framework on 21 October 1994.7

 

With the Agreed Framework, 

the Clinton administration aimed 

to freeze the North Korean nuclear 

program by preventing further 

reprocessing of spent plutonium 

fuel rods, halting construction of 

the 200 MWe and 50 MWe reactors 

(the reactors would have the potential to provide enough nuclear 

material for 30 bombs annually), 

and precluding Korea from possessing nuclear missile capacity that could threaten American 

Pacific territories, Japan or South 

Korea.8

 In exchange for a halt to 

its nuclear program, the Agreed 

Framework stipulated that North 

Korea would receive two 2,000 

MWe light water reactors (LWRs) 

and 500,000 metric tons of heavy 

oil annually from the United States 

until the first reactor became operational. Additionally, the United 

States guaranteed progress towards 

establishing full diplomatic relations with the DPRK, a pending 

agreement that the US would not 

employ nuclear weapons against 

the DPRK, and elimination of 

many American imposed economic sanctions.9

In 2002, the Agreed Framework 

collapsed after the United States 

learned that North Korea had 

subverted the plutonium focused 

agreement and had embarked on 

an alternative route to a nuclear 

weapon using uranium enrichment.10 Pyongyang’s highly 

enriched uranium (HEU) program 

dates back to the 1990s and relied 

upon Pakistani enrichment technology that had been employed at 

Khan Research Laboratory in the 

1980s. It is believed that Pakistan 

exchanged enrichment technology 

for North Korean Nodong missiles, which Pakistan later used 

to develop the Ghauri missile.11

While the Agreed Framework did 

not specifically outlaw uranium 

enrichment, it did call for North 

Korea to make progress towards 

implementing the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the 

Korean Peninsula that forbade the 

possession of uranium enrichment 

facilities.12 In response, the Bush 

administration worked with the 

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to 

end oil shipments to North Korea 

in November 2002. North Korea 

promptly expelled IAEA inspectors, restarted its plutonium based 

Yongbyon nuclear complex in North Korea
Killing them Softly? 29

nuclear reactors, and announced 

that it would reprocess the 8,000 

nuclear fuel rods previously in 

storage.13 In January 2003, citing 

the fuel shipment halt and “charging that the Bush Administration 

planned a ‘pre-emptive nuclear 

attack,’” North Korea withdrew 

from the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty. 

In the wake of the dissolution of the Agreed Framework, 

delegates from the United States, 

South Korea, Japan, China, Russia 

and North Korea began meeting 

in August 2003 to address the 

mounting nuclear crisis in North 

Korea. “In September 2005, the 

Six Parties issued a Joint Statement on how to achieve verifiable 

denuclearization of the Korean 

Peninsula.”14 However, negotiations soon stalled, and North 

Korea tested its first nuclear device 

on 9 October 2006. Seismic data 

revealed that the test yield was less 

than 1 kiloton, leading many analysts to conclude that the test was 

only a partial success.15

Following its nuclear test, North 

Korea returned to the six-party talks 

and in 2007 agreed to a Denuclearization Action Plan that included 

the disablement and shutdown of 

some of it “key plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon.”16

Over the next two years, North 

Korea alternated between bellicose 

threats and international cooperation. In doing so, the DPRK was 

able to effectively use a series of 

promises related to the shutdown 

of Yongbyon facilities to persuade 

the United States to resume heavy 

fuel oil deliveries and remove the 

DPRK from the American Trading 

with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and 

State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) 

lists.17 In April 2009, North Korea 

halted its deactivation activities at 

Yongbyon18 and launched a rocket 

which violated its ban on longrange missile tests.19 On 25 May 

2009, North Korea announced 

that it conducted a second underground nuclear test; the second 

test improved upon the first and 

achieved an approximate yield of 

a “few” kilotons.20 In 2009, North 

Korea acknowledged the existence 

of a uranium enrichment program 

to produce fuel for nuclear power, 

and in November 2010 North 

Korea revealed construction on 

a 100 MWT light-reactor reactor 

and a new gas centrifuge uranium 

enrichment plant.21 In December 

2011, Kim Jong Il died and Kim 

Jong Un was hailed as his “Great 

Successor.”22

From the early 1990s until Kim 

Jong Il’s death, North Korea has 

alternated between apparent international cooperation and vigorous 

pursuit of nuclear weapons. This 

discontinuous approach has left a 

wake of failed international agreements, notably the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of 

the Korean Peninsula, the Agreed 

Framework, and the six-party 

talks, and has enabled North Korea 

to attain nuclear weapons capabilities. Following Kim Jong Un’s 

succession, it is critical to assess 

whether recent North Korean 

actions indicate a departure from 

the DPRK’s historic policy of intermittent international cooperation 

on denuclearization. 

Recent Developments

Kim Jong Il, North Korea’s “Dear 

Leader,” died on 17 December 2011 

and was immediately replaced by 

“the great successor,” his son, Kim 

Jong Un. Within several weeks, 

Kim Jong Un became head of the 

party, state and army. On 29 February 2012, Kim Jong Un undertook his “first major policy move”23

and “committed North Korea to 

moratoria on nuclear and longrange missile testing as well as 

uranium enrichment suspension 

at Yongbyon under IAEA monitoring”24 in exchange for American 

food aid. Despite hope that the 

leadership change would soften 

North Korean nuclear posturing, 

Kim Jong Un has retreated from 

his initial bout with international 

cooperation. Instead, the young 

leader has conducted a series of 

provocative nuclear actions over 

the last year, beginning with a 

failed satellite launch in April 2012 

that prompted the collapse of the 

February 2012 agreement and the 

suspension of American food aid.25

North Korea followed the failed 

April test by placing a 200 pound 

surveillance satellite into orbit in 

December 2012. This successful launch indicated that North 

Korea has cleared some of the 

hurdles required to develop longrange ballistic missile capabilities. In response to the launch, the 

United States called upon China 

to exert greater influence over its 

ally, threatening that further North 

North Korea has alternated between apparent international 

cooperation and vigorous pursuit of nuclear weapons. This 

discontinuous approach has left a wake of failed international 

agreements...
Killing them Softly? 30

Korean provocation could lead to 

a greater American military presence in the region.26 Additionally, the missile test prompted the 

UNSC to sanction the DPRK for 

the fifth time since 1993. North 

Korea threatened the United States 

and warned South Korea that any 

attempt to enforce tighter sanctions 

would prompt “physical countermeasures.” Likewise, North Korea 

declared that it “had no interest in 

talks on denuclearizing itself and 

would forge ahead with its missile 

and weapons development, with 

the goal of attaining the capability 

to hit American territory.”27 

On 12 February 2013, North 

Korea conducted its long-threatened third nuclear test. The South 

Korean Ministry of Defense estimates that the weapon attained a 

yield of between 6 and 7 kilotons. 

Policymakers worry that this test 

could be a critical step towards 

mastering the technology required 

to make a miniaturized warhead 

deliverable by ballistic missile.28

Amidst tightening UN sanctions 

and routine military drills between 

South Korea and the United States, 

the DPRK continued to threaten 

nuclear attacks against the US and 

ROK and declared the 1953 armistice that halted the Korean War 

void.29 In late March, North Korea 

cutoff the last military hot line with 

South Korea and ordered “missile 

units to be ready to strike the 

United States and South Korea.”30

In early April, North Korea positioned missiles on its East coast, 

warned foreign embassies to 

evacuate their staffs from Pyongyang, removed its workers from 

the Kaesong industrial park—one 

of the last remaining symbols of 

Korean cooperation—and threatened further missile tests and 

imminent nuclear war.31 In recent 

weeks, North Korea has toned 

down some of its rhetoric and 

expressed a willingness to negotiate. However, the DPRK has conditioned negotiations on the termination of all joint US and South 

Korean military exercises and the 

cessation of the most recent round 

of United Nations sanctions. 32 

Though the situation remains 

tense and the future of the Korean 

nuclear crisis uncertain, recent 

North Korean actions suggest that 

Kim Jung Un’s succession has done 

little to alter the DPRK’s approach 

toward nuclear weapons development. Specifically, shortly after 

assuming power, Kim Jung Un 

used the promise of greater international cooperation to attain 

needed American food aid. In 

short order, North Korea violated 

these agreements, increased its 

belligerent rhetoric and tested a 

third nuclear device. In recent 

weeks, mounting international 

pressure has coincided with a more 

moderate tone out of Pyongyang. 

The apparent lack of change in the 

rogue state’s approach to nuclear 

weapons development over the 

last year and a half is particularly 

troubling, because, historically, the 

DPRK’s strategy has succeeded; 

the international community has 

neither prevented North Korea 

from attaining nuclear weapons 

nor mounted a significant challenge to the Kim regime’s control. 

Motivations for the North 

Korean Nuclear Program

 The North Korean motivation 

to develop a nuclear capacity is 

likely aimed at achieving “deterrence [safeguarding national security], international prestige, and 

coercive diplomacy” rather than 

attaining a tactical war fighting 

capability.33 Correspondingly, 

Hughes suggests that during the 

Clinton administration, Pyongyang may have attempted to use its 

nuclear program to “secure negative security guarantees from the 

United States and then, during the 

period of the Bush administration, has been looking to establish 

a declared nuclear deterrent as a 

cheap security equalizer against 

the United States and North Korea’s 

neighbors and the perceived threat 

of regime change.” 34 The DPRK 

has repeatedly claimed that its 

nuclear weapons program serves 

its national security by deterring 

external threats, most notably in 

April 2013 when the party congress 

adopted the “Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons 

State.” This statement reaffirmed 

the alleged deterrent and retaliatory nature of the DPRK’s nuclear 

weapons program.35

Hughes asserts that “states may 

seek nuclear weapons to assert 

their identity—for domestic or 

international political consumption—as autonomous nations.”36

Internationally, Denny Roy 

suggests that the Kim regime 

has used nuclear weapons to 

make the outside world “take it 

On 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted its longthreatened third nuclear test. The South Korean Ministry of 

Defense estimates that the weapon attained a yield of between 

6 and 7 kilotons. 
Killing them Softly? 31

seriously.”37 Furthermore, Pyongyang’s nuclear program is certainly 

aimed at achieving domestic prestige. Accordingly, Hong Yung Lee 

has argued that “North Korea has 

credited Kim Jong Il for ‘having 

transformed North Korea into a 

politically undefeatable and ideologically strong state—an invincible military power in possession of nuclear weapons—that 

no enemy can touch.’”38 In this 

sense, nuclear weapons serve as 

a means of solidifying a common 

North Korean identity and reinforcing the legitimacy of the Kim 

dynasty. Furthermore, Hughes 

suggests that North Korea’s nuclear 

weapons have enabled it to “extract 

economic concessions” from the 

international community, confirming the charge that the DPRK’s 

program aims to utilize “coercive 

diplomacy.” 39 North Korea has 

often used threatening rhetoric 

to extort economic concessions, 

such as in 2008 when it threatened 

to increase its nuclear capability 

to protests its position on the US 

State Sponsor of Terrorism list.40

Former American Ambassador to the United Nations Bill 

Richardson discussed Kim Jong 

Un’s motivations for the most 

recent incidents of North Korean 

saber rattling on the 7 April 2013 

episode of Meet the Press. Ambassador Richardson asserted that 

the DPRK’s provocative actions 

are aimed at three audiences: the 

North Korean generals and the 

Korean workers party, the North 

Korean people, and the new South 

Korean leadership.41 Efforts to 

appease the general staff are in 

recognition of the authority of the 

generals in controlling the North 

Korean military, one of the DPRK’s 

most often flexed sources of power. 

Secondly, Ambassador Richardson 

suggests that Kim Jung Un’s recent 

militancy has been aimed at restoring his legitimacy with the North 

Korean people after a failed missile 

test last year. Correspondingly, Roy 

supports the idea that recent DPRK 

actions are aimed at bolstering 

the regime’s domestic legitimacy: 

“if Kim Jong Il gave his country 

the Bomb, his youngest son, Kim 

Jong Un, who desperately needs 

a signature accomplishment, can 

hope to claim credit for a reliable 

nuclear missile that could change 

the game between the DPRK and 

its adversaries.”42 Lastly, Ambassador Richardson suggests that Kim 

Jong Un’s recent actions have corresponded to leadership changes 

in South Korea, suggesting that 

hostile DPRK actions are aimed 

at testing the response of the new 

South Korean president.43

If North Korean policymakers 

truly believe that nuclear capability 

is necessary to safeguard the Kim 

regime from external threat (which 

appears likely), then only very 

substantial, broadly-supported, 

sustained international pressure 

(potentially with the threat of military force) has a chance of reversing the DPRK’s nuclear program. 

Recent actions indicate that the 

DPRK will continue to pursue 

its successful strategy to further 

develop nuclear weapons, signifying that the international community must reassess the effectiveness 

of its current and historic actions 

to restrain North Korea.

The International Response

 The United Nations

North Korea’s nuclear program 

has prompted numerous resolutions and sanctions from the 

United Nations Security Council 

over the last two decades. UNSC 

resolution 825 was passed on 11 

May 1993 in response to North 

Korea’s announcement of its intent 

to withdraw from the NPT. Resolution 825 called upon the “DPRK 

to reconsider the announcement,” 

to “honour its non-proliferation 

obligations,” and for “all Member 

States to encourage the DPRK to 

respond positively to this [UNSC 

825] resolution, and encourages 

them to facilitate a solution.”44 In 

2006, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1695 

UN Security Council
Killing them Softly? 32

condemning a series of North 

Korean ballistic missile tests. The 

resolution further implored the 

DPRK to avoid actions that could 

jeopardize the peace and security 

of the region, to reengage with the 

six-party talks, to return to the 

NPT, and to submit to IAEA safeguards.45 Following North Korea’s 

first nuclear test on 9 October 

2006, the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1718 

which reiterated resolution 1695’s 

demands and imposed economic 

and commercial sanctions against 

North Korea. Notably, the resolution prohibited the transfer of 

a wide variety of military equipment, authorized the inspection of 

North Korean cargo for weapons of 

mass destruction, and ordered the 

freeze of foreign financial assets 

of North Koreans involved in the 

nuclear program.46 In response to 

North Korea’s second nuclear test, 

the UNSC unanimously passed 

resolution 1874 on 12 June 2009. 

Resolution 1874 further condemned North Korea’s weapons 

programs, called for its return to 

the NPT and IAEA safeguards, 

and increased commercial and 

economic sanctions, including the 

expansion of the arms embargo.47

A year later, the Security Council 

passed resolution 1928, extending 

the mandate of a panel of experts 

charged (created with resolution 

1874) with investigating North 

Korea’s nuclear program.48 Resolution 1985 in June 2011 and resolution 2050 in June 2012 further 

extended the panel’s mandate by 

an additional year each.49

Though the United Nations 

Security Council has repeatedly 

reprimanded North Korea for its 

nuclear and ballistic missiles programs, the North Korean actions 

since the succession of Kim Jong 

Un prompted two resolutions in 

the first three months of 2013 

alone. On 22 January 2013, the 

Security Council adopted resolution 2087 in response to the DPRK’s 

12 December 2012 satellite launch. 

The Security Council alleged that 

this launch utilized ballistic missile 

technology that violated resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). 

Additionally, resolution 2087 

“reaffirms[ed] its current sanctions 

measures contained in resolutions 

1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009),” 

demanded that the “DPRK not 

proceed with any further launches 

using ballistic missile technology,” 

suspend its missile program, and 

charged the international community with monitoring North Korea’s 

program and implementing the 

UN dictates.50 On 7 March 2013, 

the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 2094, the 

fifth UNSCR against North Korea 

for nuclear and ballistic missile 

programs since 2006, following the 

DPRK’s third nuclear test on 12 

February. Resolution 2094 ratcheted up the pressure on North 

Korea by making some of the 

existing financial sanctions mandatory, introducing new economic 

measures aimed at limiting Korean 

access to hard currency, mandating 

the interdiction and inspection of 

all suspicious ships and cargo, and 

by focusing international efforts 

on monitoring the activities of 

North Korean diplomats.51 Victor 

Cha and Ellen Kim have indicated 

that, while resolution 2094 stands 

out as an increase in severity, it was 

passed under Chapter 7, Article 41 

of the UN Charter, thus limiting its 

measures to nonmilitary actions. 

Cha and Kim contend that “a more 

serious and harsher resolution 

would have been for the UNSC to 

invoke Chapter 7, Article 42 under 

which UN member countries are 

allowed to use air, sea, or land 

forces to enforce sanctions.”52 

Though 20 years of United 

Nation’s opposition has not prevented North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, the use of 

international sanctions has been 

appropriate given the structural 

constraints of the Security Council. 

Over the last two decades, the 

UNSC has been forced to address 

the threat to peace and stability 

posed by North Korea’s nuclear 

weapons program at various stages 

of development. As with most 

other actions, the UNSC utilized 

a gradual approach to the DPRK, 

ratcheting up sanctions and other 

punitive measures as the rogue 

state attained greater and greater 

weapons capabilities. While this 

approach may have provided North 

Korea with the “wiggle room” 

required to pursue its weapons 

programs, it is unlikely that drastically stronger measures could have 

been imposed. As a permanent 

member of the Security Council, 

China has veto authority over 

council resolutions. While China 

has supported most measures to 

limit North Korean nuclear developments, China has historically 

been reticent to impugn its ally 

(see discussion on the Chinese and 

North Korean relationship below). 

Accordingly, as the sanctions have 

generally made it more difficult for 

the DPRK to pursue its weapons 

programs, and it is unlikely that 

significantly “stronger” UNSC resolutions could have been passed 

any earlier, this author must 

conclude that the international 

community (acting through the 

UNSC) has generally responded 

appropriately to North Korea’s 
Killing them Softly? 33

nuclear developments. However, if 

the new round of “harsher” sanctions fail to compel North Korea 

to abandon its nuclear program, 

it may be necessary for the UNSC 

to invoke Chapter 7, Article 42. 

Notably, such an action would still 

require Chinese consent. 

Geopolitics and the Regional 

Balance

While the United Nations 

Security Council has responded 

to North Korean actions in order 

to maintain regional peace and 

stability and to limit further 

nuclear proliferation (within 

Northeast Asia and beyond), a 

brief look at the regional balance of 

power related to North and South 

Korea, China, Japan, and Taiwan 

illustrates the potential dangers of 

the DPRK’s weapons program and 

the importance of further international action. Chiefly, foreign 

policymakers worry that the 

proliferation of nuclear material 

out of Korea could set a dangerous 

precedent that might embolden 

other states to seek nuclear material from abroad. 

Many foreign policy thinkers have long held that the unbridled pursuit and maintenance of 

nuclear weapons by North Korea 

could lead to a “nuclear cascade” 

throughout much of Northeast 

Asia. “This ‘nuclear cascade’ might 

begin with Japan reconsidering its 

nuclear option, closely followed 

by South Korea reacting to the 

change of stance by both North 

Korea and Japan.”53 Furthermore, 

the nuclearization of Japan and the 

Korean Peninsula could prompt 

China to upgrade its nuclear capabilities and doctrine which could 

then trigger Taiwan to reassess 

its nuclear weapons options.54 In 

2007 Christopher Hughes analyzed the likelihood that any of the 

states surrounding North Korea 

would reconsider their nuclear 

stance in relation to advances in 

North Korean nuclear technology. He concluded that none of 

the principle drivers of nuclear 

programs, national security, 

prestige, identity and norms, 

domestic political economy, or 

technological capability, were 

sufficient to push Japan, South 

Korea, or Taiwan towards an active 

nuclear weapons program at that 

time.55 However, Hughes determined that the “common factor 

influencing and restraining all of 

the potential drivers for nuclear 

proliferation [in this region] is the 

stance of the United States.”56 

Hughes contends that national 

security is typically the primary 

driver of nuclear proliferation; 

states seek nuclear weapons to 

address security dilemmas arising 

from an existential threat and 

to restore the balance of power. 

Correspondingly, national security dilemmas are related to alliance dilemmas as motivations 

for nuclear proliferation. States 

may fear the alliance dilemmas of 

“abandonment” or “entrapment.” 

Abandonment occurs when a state 

doubts the reliability of the security guarantee provided by an ally 

and entrapment when a state fears 

being implicated in the aggressive 

policies of an ally.57 To address 

these potential problems and 

dissuade Northeast Asian states 

from proliferating, Hughes recommends that the United States 

upgrade its alliances and reassert 

its nuclear guarantees while minimizing military doctrine involving preemption.58 He argues that 

the United States must confront 

the security dilemma by helping 

to upgrade the conventional capabilities of its Northeast Asian allies; 

with greater conventional capabilities, American allies in the region 

will be able to confront North 

Korean threats without resorting to a nuclear equalizer. Additionally, the United States must 

maintain a sizeable troop presence in the region and reaffirm 

its commitment to providing a 

nuclear umbrella for Japan and 

South Korea to combat feelings 

of “abandonment.” Furthermore, 

by emphasizing deterrence over 

pre-emption, the United States 

can alleviate potential feelings of 

“entrapment,” whereby allies are 

persuaded to seek nuclear weapons 

in order to escape the security 

umbrella provided by an overeager 

United States.59 

The previous discussion on the 

nuclear balance in Northeast Asia 

has assumed that greater proliferation would have a destabilizing effect on the region; however, 

Denny Roy from the East-West 

none of the principle drivers of nuclear programs, national 

security, prestige... were sufficient to push Japan, South Korea, 

or Taiwan towards an active nuclear weapons program... the 

‘common factor influencing and restraining all of the potential 

drivers for nuclear proliferation [in this region] is the stance 

of the United States.’
Killing them Softly? 34

Center has argued that: though 

the world is generally more stable 

with fewer nuclear weapons 

states, the introduction of nuclear 

weapons into South Korea could 

have a “constructive influence on 

international security.”60 Roy suggests that South Korea should 

cite “extraordinary events” that 

threaten national security and 

respond to North Korean threats 

by withdrawing from the NPT. 

South Korea should then launch 

a program that will parallel North 

Korean weapon developments 

while maintaining a commitment 

to the mutual denuclearization of 

the Korean Peninsula. Simultaneously, the United States should 

modify its nonproliferation policy 

to tolerate proliferation to peaceful countries facing threats from a 

nuclear armed rogue state.61 Roy 

argues that this approach would 

deter North Korean aggression 

and demonstrate that their nuclear 

policy will only worsen their security vis-à-vis South Korea. Additionally, a South Korean nuclear 

capacity would “close the credibility gap in the US-ROK alliance,” 

severing South Korea’s reliance 

on America’s nuclear umbrella.62

Moreover, Roy contends that this 

move would “signal to Beijing that 

the cost of failing to discipline 

their client state [North Korea] is 

rising dramatically,” prompting the 

Chinese to put greater pressure 

on North Korea to relinquish its 

nuclear arsenal.63 

Roy agrees that regional nuclear 

proliferation throughout Northeast Asia could have a destabilizing effect. However, he asserts 

that by emphasizing the transient 

and expedient nature of the South 

Korean program, the United States 

and the ROK could prevent Japan 

from acquiring a weapon.64 It is 

this author’s assessment that Roy’s 

proposal dangerously assumes 

that other states in Northeast Asia 

can be convinced to acquiesce 

to South Korea’s rise as a nuclear 

power without pursuing their own 

programs. While this may be the 

case, it seems far from certain and 

has the potential to compound 

the already extensive challenge of 

maintaining a regional balance of 

power in Northeast Asia. Lastly, 

as the threshold for “extraordinary events” is not clearly defined, 

international acceptance of South 

Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT 

could embolden other nations, 

such as Iran, to do the same. The 

threat of regional destabilization 

as a result of nuclear proliferation 

in Northeast Asia underscores the 

need for the global community 

to effectively thwart the DPRK’s 

nuclear ambitions. 

China and North Korea

As a global power bordering 

North Korea, China is intimately 

concerned with nuclear proliferation and the balance of power in 

Northeast Asia. Many Chinese 

policymakers feel the Obama 

administration’s tilt to Asia was 

directed at containing the nation’s 

rising influence in the region. 

Accordingly, Chinese policymakers who are already apprehensive 

about the United States’ role in 

the region are disquieted by the 

thought of encirclement by a series 

of nuclear-armed American allies 

(South Korea and Japan). This 

could be particularly troubling for 

China, if Taiwan were to reconsider its 1960s decision not to 

pursue nuclear weapons.65 Thus, 

China has an interest in limiting 

nuclear proliferation in the region. 

Chinese concerns over limiting 

regional proliferation are counterbalanced by China’s traditional 

interest in maintaining a stable 

communist North Korea. China 

worries that the collapse of North 

Korea could lead to a flood of 

refugees entering northern China 

and to a reunified Korean Peninsula.66 A unified Korean Peninsula controlled by Seoul and allied 

with the United States is deeply 

alarming for China. This anxiety 

is compounded by the prospect 

of American troops stationed at 

China’s Korean border. Ultimately, 

Beijing harbors a deep seeded fear 

of “territorial vulnerability” stemming from “memories of Japan’s 

invasion of China via the Korean 

Peninsula.”67 Currently, North 

Korea serves as a Chinese client 

state; China provides necessary 

trade and investment with the 

hope of promoting regime stability, “reduce[ing] any incentive to 

extort aid through military provocation,” encouraging Pyongyang to 

pursue Chinese-styled economic 

reforms, and maximizing Chinese 

influence over the country.68 

Thomas Plant and Ben Rhode 

argue that Chinese policymakers 

recognize that the use of North 

Korean nuclear material abroad 

would cause severe damage to 

Chinese interests; however, they 

assert that Chinese policymakers 

underestimate the potential consequences to China and overestimate 

the ability for Chinese financial 

support to disincentivize nuclear 

exports.69 Furthermore, they 

emphasize that the damage done to 

Chinese interests from the deliberate sale of or leakage of nuclear 

materials from North Korea to a 

non-state actor would far exceed 

the damage associated with the 
Killing them Softly? 35

collapse of the Kim regime.70 In 

the case of the use of North Korean 

nuclear material abroad, it is likely 

that the victimized state would find 

itself compelled to retaliate against 

the DPRK, leading to a potentially 

devastating war in Asia. China 

would likely suffer from refugee 

flows, economic dislocation and 

the possibility of an unintentional 

war with the United States on the 

Korean Peninsula.71

Despite China’s interest in 

limiting North Korean nuclear 

ambitions, some Chinese policymakers argue that Chinese leverage over its Korean ally is greatly 

exaggerated. Contrarily, Plant 

and Rhode maintain that China 

has constituted approximately 

20-30% of North Korea’s foreign 

trade for the last decade and more 

than 50% since 2011. Additionally, North Korea is dependent on 

China for most of its imported oil 

needs (potentially almost 100%).72

Over the last two decades, China 

has generally opposed North 

Korea’s nuclear program by reluctantly supporting the UNSC resolutions aimed at inhibiting the 

DPRK’s programs. Over the last 

several months, “China has been 

discomfited by the behavior of the 

North’s leader, Kim Jong Un, but 

it has refrained from making pronouncements that would signal 

what, if anything, it planned to do 

to rein in North Korea.”73 Thankfully, China has reluctantly supported the most recent rounds 

of UN sanctions. China must 

recognize and accept that it has 

substantial interests in limiting North Korean proliferation. 

Accordingly, this author agrees 

with American foreign policy 

leaders, such as Senator John 

McCain, who have urged China 

to use its substantial economic 

leverage to pressure North Korea 

to accept a more conciliatory 

approach.74 

American Interests

During its first 

term, the Obama 

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 

highlighted American interests in 

Northeast Asia by 

announcing a diplomatic and military 

pivot toward Asia. 

Suzanne DiMaggio, 

vice president of 

Global Policy Programs at the Asia 

Society asserts that 

“the US sees the 

pivot toward Asia 

as a way to counterbalance China’s 

growing influence 

in the region.”75

Kurt Campbell, 

Assistance Secretary of State for 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs 

stated that “it is clear that America’s success in the 21st century is 

tied to the success of the dynamic 

Asia-Pacific region.”76 Accordingly, Campbell reinforced the 

importance of the trilateral coordination between the United States, 

Japan and the Republic of Korea in 

maintaining “peace and stability” 

in Northeast Asia and in responding to North Korea’s “destabilizing 

policies and provocations.”77

More tangibly, the United States 

maintains a significant military 

presence that is potentially vulnerable to North Korean military 

attacks, including forces in Japan, 

Guam, and South Korea. While it is 

unlikely that North Korean nuclear 

weapons have the capability to hit 

American bases in Guam, Hawaii 

or the mainland, it is estimated 

that North Korea has the ability to 

devastate Seoul with conventional 

artillery and possibly overrun 

South Korea, threatening the 

30,000 American personnel stationed in the South.78 While there 

is little question that the United 

States and South Korea would be 

able to counter a DPRK invasion, 

in the first days, it is likely that 

there would be heavy American 

and South Korean loses.79 Amitai 

Etzioni contends that “Kim Jong 

Un has [the United States] over 

a barrel.” If he were to initiate an 

attack, the United States would be 

“left with very few and very tough 

options: either using nuclear arms 

or engaging in a large-scale conventional war, drawing on our wornout army in a faraway country—

all this just as our [the American] 

economy requires retrenching.”80

In addition to damaging nonproliferation efforts in Northeast 
Killing them Softly? 36

Asia, a failure of the United States 

and the international community to appropriately respond to 

North Korea could inflict irreparable damage to the NPT. Lee 

argues that “Pyongyang wants to 

be recognized as a de facto nuclear 

power so that it can bargain with 

Washington on equal terms. But 

legitimizing North Korea’s nuclear 

capability would mean the end to 

the international non-proliferation treaty. This, in turn, would 

be tantamount to admitting that 

the protracted US-North Korean 

talks, including all agreements 

reached since 1994, have been 

essentially futile.”81 Representative Tom Cotton illuminated this 

issue when speaking to the House 

of Representatives on 15 February 2013, following North Korea’s 

third nuclear test. Cotton argued 

that the current problem related to 

containing nuclear North Korea is 

a bellwether of the challenges that 

will be faced if Iran is allowed to 

obtain nuclear weapons.82 Moreover, by failing to stop North 

Korea’s nuclear weapons program, 

countries such as Iran may be 

emboldened to pursue their own 

weapons programs without fear of 

international repercussions. 

In addition to encouraging 

other states to pursue nuclear 

weapons, North Korea’s willingness to sell whatever to whomever 

will pay for it, including conventional weapons, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, narcotics, counterfeit 

currency, and ballistic missiles, 

worries American policymakers 

who fear that North Korea will 

assist other states or non-state 

actors in attaining nuclear weapons 

technology. In fact, North Korea 

has a history of proliferation; 

Pyongyang sold slightly enriched 

uranium hexafluoride to Libya 

and reactor technology to Syria.83 

However, “on neither occasion was 

Pyongyang directly punished or 

held accountable for its actions. 

North Korean decision-makers 

thus recognize that their nuclear 

expertise and technologies can be 

used as trade goods.”84 While Plant 

and Rhode note that North Korea’s 

history of nuclear proliferation 

indicates that the DPRK would be 

unlikely to export nuclear technology directly to non-state actors or 

terrorist groups (due to the greater 

likelihood of international repercussions and the inability for most 

groups to access the sufficient 

level of funds),85 they maintain 

that the international community should still be worried about 

potential nuclear transfer to terrorist groups. Firstly, as North 

Korea’s nuclear stockpile increases, 

Plant and Rhode caution that it 

may become easier for unauthorized actors within the government 

to sell nuclear material to nonstate actors. Secondly, terrorist 

groups, such as Hezbollah working 

through Iran, could obtain nuclear 

materials indirectly through 

another state’s purchase of DPRK 

technology.86 

The United States is chiefly concerned with North Korea’s nuclear 

program because North Korean 

actions pose a threat to regional 

stability and peace, the DPRK 

has directly threatened American 

assets, and a failure to restrain 

North Korea could undermine the 

NPT, resulting in greater regional 

and global proliferation. Given the 

United States’ role as a world leader 

and its substantial interest in limiting Korean proliferation, it is necessary to examine the effectiveness 

of the American response to the 

DPRK’s most recent provocations. 

The American Response

Historically, the United States 

has opposed the North Korean 

nuclear weapons program using a 

mixture of negotiations, economic 

sanctions and international pressure. Following North Korea’s 

most recent nuclear test, the United 

States proceeded with its annual 

joint military exercises with South 

Korea, known as “Foal Eagle,” 

in March 2013. American commanders in Korea have described 

the drills as “designed to improve 

the alliance’s readiness to defend 

the Republic of Korea.”87 Contrarily, North Korea alleged that 

the operations aimed at preparing 

for an invasion of the DPRK. Over 

the course of the two month long 

exercises, North Korea nullified 

the 1953 Korean War truce, shut 

down its military hotlines to South 

Korea, ordered its missile forces to 

the ready, threatened to restart the 

Yongbyon reactors and closed the 

Kaesong industrial complex.88 In 

addition to utilizing over 10,000 

American troops, the United States 

flew 2 B-2 and 2 B-52 nuclear 

capable bombers over South Korea 

during the exercises, “underscoring Washington’s commitment 

to defend its ally amid rising 

the United States military responded to DPRK threats of nuclear 

attack on Guam, Hawaii and the US mainland by announcing 

the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 

System (THAAD) ballistic missile defense shield to Guam.
Killing them Softly? 37

tensions with North Korea.”89 

Secretary of Defense Chuck 

Hagel announced on 15 March 

2013 that the United States would 

increase the number of groundbased ballistic-missile interceptors 

positioned along America’s Pacific 

Coast from 33 from 44 by 2017.90

Subsequently, on 3 April 2013 the 

United States military responded 

to DPRK threats of nuclear attack 

on Guam, Hawaii and the US 

mainland by announcing the 

deployment of the Terminal High 

Altitude Area Defense System 

(THAAD) ballistic missile defense 

shield to Guam. In addition to 

the THAAD truck-mounted 

missile interceptors, the United 

States positioned the destroyer 

USS John McCain (with ballistic 

missile intercept capability) off 

the Korean Peninsula.91 The Pentagon indicated the deployment 

would “strengthen our [the United 

States’] regional defense posture 

against the North Korean regional 

ballistic missile threat”.92 Similarly, 

on 3 May the US Navy confirmed 

that the Nimitz Strike Group, led 

by the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier, 

joined the US 7th fleet off the coast 

of the Korean Peninsula to participate in a series of exercises with the 

ROK Navy.93

In mid-April Secretary of State 

John Kerry traveled throughout 

Asia, meeting with South Korean, 

Chinese and Japanese leaders. 

Secretary Kerry confirmed the 

United States’ security commitment to its Asian allies and urged 

Chinese leaders to increase pressure on North Korea to denuclearize. Meanwhile, President Obama 

canceled several planned military 

exercises to diffuse tension in the 

region. Secretary Kerry continued 

to call on North Korea to cease 

further ballistic missile tests and 

pressed the DPRK to commit to 

denuclearization and return to the 

negotiating table.94 The United 

States has advised North Korea 

to avoid any actions that could 

provoke a devastating miscalculation in the hopes of safeguarding 

the interests of all parties in the 

region.95 

American actions in response 

to North Korea’s recent provocations have been largely appropriate. First, it is important that the 

United States reaffirmed its commitment to its regional allies and 

increased its military assets in 

the region (notably anti-ballistic 

missile defense assets). This will 

help to restrain American allies 

from pursing their own nuclear 

programs. Second, the United 

States has continually reaffirmed 

its commitment to negotiations. 

This is essential to help provide 

North Korea with a potential 

avenue to diffuse tension while 

also serving as a prerequisite to 

more drastic actions; only after 

the United States has exhausted 

its diplomatic options will it have 

enough international credibility 

to develop broad-based international support for military action. 

Lastly and most importantly, the 

United States has appropriately 

urged China to put great pressure 

on North Korea to abandon its 

weapons program. Etzioni agrees, 

arguing that the best avenue for the 

United States to limit proliferation 

in Northeast Asia is to pressure 

China toward exploiting its leverage over North Korea to “defang” 

its nuclear program. He suggests 

that this could be accomplished 

by guaranteeing China that the US 

would not move troops beyond 

the demilitarized zone if North 

Korea were to implode.96 This 

author is skeptical that the United 

States would make such a guarantee. Rather, it would likely be more 

fruitful for the United States to 

stress the damage to Chinese interests that could result from North 

Korean proliferation activities. 

Conclusion 

North Korea’s most recent 

nuclear posturing suggests that 

the DPRK under Kim Jong Un will 

continue the country’s successful 

policy of alternating between international cooperation and nuclear 

provocation to further its nuclear 

program. North Korea’s nuclear 

ambitions appear to be driven by 

a desire to elevate its international 

status, attain a nuclear deterrent 

to protect from external regime 

change and to solidify domestic support. Because the regime 

has linked its survival to nuclear 

weapons, it is likely that drastic 

means will be required to reverse 

the DPRK’s nuclear program. 

In an attempt to preserve 

international norms and protect 

peace and security, the UNSC has 

issued a series of resolutions condemning North Korean nuclear 

weapons development since 1993. 

While ineffectual, this policy was 

appropriate given the constraints 

imposed by Chinese membership 

on the Security Council. Regionally, it is necessary to restrain 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons 

program to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout Northeast Asia and to maintain 

regional stability. As North Korea’s 

benefactor and neighbor, China 

must recognize that nuclear proliferation by the DPRK would likely 

have a greater impact on Chinese 

interests than the feared collapse of 
Killing them Softly? 38

the Kim regime. 

As a Pacific power with farreaching economic and military 

interests in Asia, the United States 

has been intimately involved with 

the current North Korean nuclear 

crisis. The United States worries 

that North Korean actions could 

undermine international nonproliferation norms and make it more 

difficult to restrain other “rogue” 

states, such as Iran, from attaining 

nuclear weapons. To counter recent 

North Korean threats, the United 

States has appropriately worked 

to reassure its allies of American 

security guarantees, has increased 

its military presence in the regions, 

and has pushed for further negotiations with the DPRK. However, 

due to China’s membership on the 

Security Council and close economic relationship with North 

Korea, China is likely the key 

to resolving the North Korean 

nuclear crisis. Accordingly, the 

United States must continue to 

pressure the Chinese to use their 

leverage with North Korea to work 

towards eventual denuclearization 

of the Korean Peninsula. 

1 Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s 

Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, 

Congressional Research Service, report 

for Congress (April 3, 2013), 1.

2 Ibid.

3 “2 Koreas Agree on Nuclear 

Ban, But Not on Method of Inspection,” New York Times, January 1, 1992, 

<http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/01/

world/2-koreas-agree-on-nuclear-banbut-not-on-method-of-inspections.

html>.

4 Steven R. Weisman, “North Korea 

Signs Accord on Atom-Plant Inspections,” New York Times, January 31, 1992, 

<http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/31/

world/north-korea-signs-accord-onatom-plant-inspections.html>.

5 Douglas Jehl, “North Korea Says it 

Won’t Pull Out of Arms Pact Now,” New 

York Times, June 12, 1993, <http://www.

nytimes.com/1993/06/12/world/northkorea-says-it-won-t-pull-out-of-armspact-now.html>.

6 David E. Sanger, “Missile is Tested 

by North Koreans,” New York Times, 

June 13, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.

com/1993/06/13/world/missile-istested-by-north-koreans.html>.

7 Larry A. Niksch, North Korea’s 

Nuclear Weapons Program, Congressional Research Service, report for Congress (January 27, 2005), 10.

8 Ibid., 11.

9 Ibid., 12.

10 Ibid., 2.

11 Sharon A. Squassoni, Weapons 

of Mass Destruction: Trade Between 

North Korea and Pakistan, Congressional Research Service, report for Congress (October 11, 2006), 10.

12 Niksch, 5.

13 Ibid. 

14 Ibid.,1.

15 Ibid., 15.

16 Ibid., 2.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 “North Korea Profile,” BBC News, 

May 2, 2013, under “Asia-Pacific,” 

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldasia-pacific-15278612>.

20 Nikitin, 14.

21 Ibid., 2.

22 “North Korea Profile.”

23 Shreeya Sinha and Susan C. Beachy, 

“Timeline of North Korea’s Nuclear 

Program,” New York Times, April 26, 

2013, under “Asia Pacific,” <http://www.

nytimes.com/interactive/2013/02/05/

world/asia/northkorea-timeline.

html?ref=nuclearprogram&_r=1&#/

time238_7119#time238_7085>.

24 Nikitin, 2.

25 Ibid.

26 David E. Sanger and William J. 

Broad, “After Rocket Launching, a Call 

for New Sanctions,” New York Times, 

December 12, 2012, under “Asia Pacific,” 

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/

world/asia/north-korea-rocket-launching.html>.

27 Choe Sang-Hun and Rick Gladstone, “North Korea Warns of Retaliation if South Helps Enforce Tightened 

Sanctions,” New York Times, January 25, 

2013, under “Asia Pacific,” <http://www.

nytimes.com/2013/01/26/world/asia/

north-korea-turns-its-ire-on-southkorea.html>.

28 Nikitin, 14.

29 Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea 

Declares 1953 War Truce Nullified,” 

New York Times, March 11, 2013, under 

“Asia Pacific,” <http://www.nytimes.

com/2013/03/12/world/asia/northkorea-says-it-has-nullified-1953-korean-war-armistice.html?ref=world>.

30 Sinha and Beachy, “Timeline of 

North Korea’s Nuclear Program.”

31 Ibid.

32 Choe Sang-Hun and Rick Gladstone, “North Korea Tones Down 

Language, Giving Hope for Dialogue,” New York Times, April 18, 

2013, under “Asia Pacific,” <http://

w w w. ny t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 3 / 0 4 / 1 9 /

world/asia/north-korea-tension.

html?pagewanted=1&ref=world>.

33 Nikitin, 17.

34 Christopher W. Hughes, “North 

Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Implications 

for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, 

South Korea, and Taiwan,” Asia Policy 3 

(January 2007): 82.

35 Nikitin, 81.

36 Hughes, 81.

37 Denny Roy, “South Korea: Give 

Nukes a Chance,” East-West Center, 

March 27, 2013, <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/south-koreagive-nukes-chance>.

38 Hong Yung Lee, “North Korea in 

2012: Kim Jong Un’s Succession,” Asian 

Survey 53, no. 1 (February 2013): 177.

39 Hughes, 82.

40 Nikitin, 17.

41 Bill Richardson, interview by 

David Gregory, Meet the Press, NBC, 

April 7, 2013.
Killing them Softly? 39

42 Roy.

43 Richardson.

44 UN Security Council, Resolution 

825, 1993.

45 UN Security Council, Resolution 

1695, 2006.

46 UN Security Council, Resolution 

1718, 2006.

47 UN Security Council, Resolution 

1874, 2009.

48 UN Security Council, Resolution 

1928, 2010.

49 UN Security Council, Resolution 

1985, 2011.

UN Security Council, Resolution 

2050, 2012.

50 UN Security Council, Resolution 

2087, 2013.

51 Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, “UN 

Security Council Passes New Resolution 2094 on North Korea,” Center for 

Strategic & International Studies, March 

7, 2013, <http://csis.org/publication/

un-security-council-passes-new-resolution-2094-north-korea>.

UN Security Council, Resolution 

2094, 2013.

52 Cha and Kim, “UN Security 

Council.”

53 Hughes, 77.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., 76.

56 Ibid., 102.

57 Ibid., 80.

58 Ibid., 76.

59 Ibid., 103.

60 Roy.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Thomas Plant and Ben Rhode, 

“China, North Korea and the Spread of 

Nuclear Weapons,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55, no. 2 (April 2013): 

71.

66 Ibid., 61.

67 Ibid., 62.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid., 71.

70 Ibid., 62.

71 Ibid., 71.

72 Ibid., 63.

73 Jane Perlez and Choe Sang-Hun, 

“China Hints at Limits to North Korea 

Actions,” New York Times, April 7, 

2013, under “Asia Pacific,” <http://www.

nytimes.com/2013/04/08/world/asia/

from-china-a-call-to-avoid-chaos-forselfish-gain.html?pagewanted=all&gwh

=1B1E6958517EAB90552990E64B86A

8DC>.

74 Ibid.

75 Scott Neuman, “Why Obama 

Put Asia on the Agenda Now,” NPR, 

November 19, 2012, <http://www.

npr.org/2012/11/16/165302731/whyobama-put-asia-on-the-agenda-now>.

76 US Department of State, Bureau 

of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony Before the House Committee on 

Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia 

and the Pacific (March 2011), by Kurt 

M. Cambell, testimony. Washington, 

DC: 2011.

77 Ibid.

78 Amitai Etzioni, “North Korea and 

US Priorities,” The National Interest, 

April 15, 2013, <http://nationalinterest.

org/commentary/north-korea-us-priorities-8344>.

79 Andrea Mitchell, interview by 

David Gregory, Meet the Press, NBC, 

April 7, 2013.

80 Etzioni, 1.

81 Lee, “North Korea in 2012,” 183.

82 Representative Cotton of Arkansas, speaking on countering a nuclear 

North Korea, on February 15, 2013, 

113th Cong., 1st sess., Cong. Rec.159, 

H 554.

83 Plant and Rhode, “China, North 

Korea,” 75.

84 Ibid., 66.

85 Ibid., 69.

86 Ibid. 

87 “US and South Korea Wrap 

Up ‘Foal Eagle’ Military Drills,” BBC 

News, April 30, 2013, under “Asia,” 

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldasia-22348488>.

88 Sinha and Beachy, “Timeline of 

North Korea’s Nuclear Program.”

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 “North Korea Threats: US to 

Move Missile Defences to Guam,” BBC 

News, April 4, 2013, under “Asia,” 

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-uscanada-22021832>.

92 Ibid.

93 “Nimitz Strike Group Enters 7th 

Fleer AOR,” USS Nimitz Public Affairs, 

May 3, 2013, <http://www.navy.mil/

submit/display.asp?story_id=73880.>

94 Michael R. Gordon and Choe 

Sang-Hun, “In Seoul, Kerry Warns 

North Korea Against Missile Test,” 

New York Times, April 12, 2013, under 

“Asia Pacific,” <http://www.nytimes.

com/2013/04/13/world/asia/in-seoulkerry-warns-north-korea-against-missile-test.html?pagewanted=all>.

95 Mitchell, Meet the Press.

96 Etzioni,1.
I

n the world of crisis management, waiting is always the least 

fashionable option. Crises lead to 

panic, and panic leads to a demand 

for immediate action, which 

often results in misjudgment and 

lasting failure. The United States’ 

desire for a quick solution to the 

Iranian nuclear crisis has unwittingly resulted in divergent strategies which have failed to produce 

the desired end state. The West is 

desperately in need of a single, 

coherent, and sustainable policy 

for engaging Tehran on the nuclear 

issue. We propose a policy of 

“Nuclear Patience.” This strategy 

is comprised of a single, defined 

red line, tiered economic sanctions, a credible military option, 

and a willingness to forego the 

active pursuit of regime change. 

We believe this policy provides the 

international community with the 

most potent option for eliminating 

Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 

The Role of Red Lines

Red lines play an integral role in 

any strategy for deterring Iranian 

nuclear development. In order for 

any red line to be effective it must 

be well defined, based upon a clear 

objective, and have clear negative 

consequences strong enough to act 

as a deterrent. Iran has managed 

to cross practically every red line 

previously set by the West without 

invoking any consequences, which 

emboldens the country when confronted with future ultimatums. 

Other complicating factors include 

how the regime in Tehran views 

US actions towards red lines set 

in other countries, most recently 

North Korea and Syria. In order to 

develop our own red line strategy, 

we first look to the western precedent set over the last two decades.

Although analysts have found it 

fashionable in recent years to proclaim that President Obama has 

set a true red line, Tehran does not 

share this belief.1

 Simply put, no 

red line will be effective unless the 

Iranian government has a convincing reason to believe the United 

States will enforce it. Iran is not 

short on supporting evidence for its 

belief that American-set red lines 

lack legitimacy. The most practical 

example Tehran can look to is the 

red line the Bush administration 

set for North Korea in the early 

2000s which barred the DPRK 

from conducting any nuclear 

testing.2

 The Koreans defied that 

red line in 2006 by conducting 

a test and were hit with another 

round of economic and diplomatic 

sanctions.3 The same occurred 

after North Korea’s nuclear tests 

in 2009 and 2013. Looking to the 

North Korean example, the West 

has functionally told Iran that if 

it crosses future nuclear red lines 

it will simply be punished with 

increased sanctions which the government may be willing to absorb 

if it means acquiring and testing a 

functional weapon.

 Another problem with the 

current strategy for setting red 

lines has been the exceedingly 

liberal use of the term ‘red line’ in 

recent diplomacy. In 2012, President Obama stepped up to the 

microphone and proclaimed with 

regard to Bashar al-Assad’s regime 

in Syria that “a red line for us is if 

we start seeing a whole bunch of 

chemical weapons moving around 

or being utilized” and that Assad 

would be “held accountable by the 

international community” if chemical weapons were used.4

 Given 

the recent allegations of chemical warfare in Syria, the American 

administration has been put in a 

tough position. The situation in 

Syria is complicated, with each side 

Nuclear Patience

Charting A New Course for the Iranian Nuclear Crisis

Kevin Beauc hemin Reuben Luoma -Overstreet

Don’t worry, about a thing, 

‘cause every little thing, 

gonna be alright. 

-Bob Marley

Cadet KEVIN BEAUCHEMIN is a 

Scholar and Class of 2013 Humanities major. Cadet REUBEN LOUMAOVERSTREET is a Scholar and Class 

of 2014 Environmental Engineering 

major.
Nuclear Patience 41

blaming the other for the use of 

chemical weapons, and the international community is currently 

bogged down in an attempt to 

determine the truth of the matter. 

Tehran is watching the situation 

very carefully, and will likely base 

future judgments regarding its 

own red lines upon the response to 

any finding in Syria. The western 

response in Syria will strongly 

influence Iranian perception as 

to whether current red lines carry 

legitimacy, or if they have further 

devolved into mere rhetorical 

bluster.

Add these examples to Iran’s 

own experience with western red 

lines, and it is easy to see why they 

tend to ignore such pronouncements. In a presentation for the 

Aspen Strategy Group in August 

2012, Graham Allison outlined a 

series of what he called “Retired 

Red Lines.” These retired red lines 

constitute former technical thresholds which the West deemed Iran 

must not cross.5

 They are retired, of 

course, because each was achieved 

by the Iranian nuclear program 

at some point in the past. In each 

case the violation of a red line 

was met with either a new round 

of economic sanctions or a stern 

warning and a new red line further 

down the technological road. With 

that in mind, it is easy to understand why Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would chide the United States 

with words like these, “We say to 

you today that you are in a position 

of weakness. Your hands are empty, 

and you can no longer promote 

your interests from a position of 

strength.”6

 From the Iranian perspective, Washington is unwilling 

to follow through on its red lines, 

rendering them practically useless.

A Line in the Sand

With these factors in mind, we 

propose a new red line strategy. 

Rather than defining intermediate 

red lines which the USG and international community have been 

reluctant to provide with teeth, 

we believe in setting a single red 

line which will serve as the final 

ultimatum. Iran shall not develop 

a nuclear weapon, regardless of 

any formal declaration of its existence or test thereof. This includes 

the development of the individual 

components necessary for the construction of a weapon. If Iran does 

develop a nuclear weapon then it 

will face invasion, destruction of 

any nuclear capability, and its government will be answerable to the 

United Nations and International 

Court of Criminal Justice for violating its obligation under the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. 

When the United States invaded 

Iraq in 2003, Iran halted development of its nuclear weapons 

program out of fear that it might be 

invaded next.7

 Putting invasion by 

an international coalition on the 

table as the final response to Iran 

crossing the nuclear threshold, 

will deter Tehran through the only 

method which has proved effective 

in the past.

The goal of setting this red line 

is to convince Iran that it will be 

safer without a nuclear weapon 

than with one. Looking to Libya 

as an example, Khamenei believes 

that the fate of Iran without a 

bomb is particularly grim.8

 The 

United States must make it clear 

that regime change is not a goal, 

assuming Iran refrains from building a nuclear weapon. In so doing, 

the West gives Tehran the option of 

choosing not to develop weapons 

without fearing an invasion. Iran 

already has the knowledge and 

technical infrastructure to enrich 

uranium, and that fact is not going 

to change. Reserving an invasion or kinetic action for weapons 

construction while utilizing a 

system of economic sanctions proportionate to enrichment violations allows the West to make a clear 

distinction between the two activities and provide Iran a way out. As 

Robert Litwak has stated, uncertainty in our own system of red 

lines has led to ambiguity on behalf 

of the Iranian regime.9

 Our red 

line plan attempts to eliminate that 

 Retired Red Lines, Source: Allison, 2012.
Nuclear Patience 42

ambiguity

Why the West CanWait 

Ultimately, history has shown 

that western estimates of Iranian 

progress along the nuclear timeline 

have been consistently exaggerated. Like the boy who cried wolf, 

the West cannot afford to continue 

overestimating Iranian nuclear 

capabilities. This consistent alarmism has cost the United States 

dearly in terms of global cooperation and credibility on the Iranian 

issue. China and Russia have 

begun to turn away from American leadership on the Iranian issue 

by backing off on sanctions due 

to this loss of faith in the West. 

The United States and Israel have 

continuously overestimated 

Tehran’s nuclear program for the 

last twenty years; since Israel first 

estimated in 1992 that Iran would 

achieve a nuclear bomb by 1999, 

American and Israeli estimates 

have been revised multiple times, 

always placing Iran a short time 

away from nuclear weapons.10

There are political, institutional, 

and social reasons as to why the 

United States has trended towards 

threat construction, but the US 

must recognize and counteract 

these considerations in order to 

maintain any sort of international 

coalition on the Iranian issue.

The Republican Party in the 

US has long benefitted from the 

perception that it takes a tough 

stance on foreign military threats. 

Given this platform, it benefits the 

Republicans to play up the international threat posed by Iran in an 

American society which demands 

tough action against foreign 

threats.11 The American political 

system also forces the Democrats 

to hype up the Iranian issue and 

take a tougher political stance in 

order not to appear weak. There 

is no easy way out of this vicious 

political circle unless politicians 

are willing and able to reach across 

the aisle and take bipartisan action 

to downplay the threat. Furthermore, there are powerful bureaucratic and institutional interests 

which play up the threat posed 

by Iran and ultimately emphasize 

military solutions to the problem. 

The State Department budget pales 

in comparison to the military and 

intelligence budgets and a powerful infrastructure made up of contractors, lobbies, and think tanks 

is intertwined into the national 

security bureaucracy of the United 

States.12 These institutions naturally 

benefit from playing up military 

solutions to the Iranian problem 

and emphasizing the gravity of the 

problem. Additionally, the emphasis on the military aspects of the 

Iranian question serves to radicalize the Iranian government, which 

sees an ever-escalating discourse 

of hard power from the United 

States. Finally, this increased military emphasis also entrenches 

warnings about the violent effects 

of attempting to rebalance foreign 

policy.13

The United States must realize 

these institutional biases towards 

the militarization of the Iranian 

problem and attempt to refocus its 

calculations away from an exaggerative discourse. The ultimate 

method for analyzing the Iranian 

nuclear timeline must account for 

the socio-political state of Iran and 

attempt to calibrate for western 

biases. This is why we suggest that 

a single, tangible redline clearly 

delineated at obtaining a nuclear 

weapon is a crucial part of nuclear 

patience. Estimates and speculations may be skewed by these 

biases, but our proposal offers an 

empirical method of determining whether that red line has been 

crossed. The United States must 

ultimately rely on tangible evidence rather than political bluster 

and institutional recommendations to decide whether action 

should be taken against Iran.

Israel was recently embarrassed in the light of new intelligence estimates on Iran’s timeline 

to the bomb. During the recent 

Israeli elections, Netanyahu played 

up the immediacy and danger of 

the Iranian bomb, warning that 

“D-Day might come as early as 

2013.”14 Recently revised Israeli 

estimates now put an Iranian 

bomb between two and three 

years out. This intelligence failure 

is far from an isolated occurrence, 

and American intelligence agencies have similarly overestimated 

Iranian capabilities. One of the 

largest reasons for these miscalculations is a consistent failure to 

account for the realities of Iranian 

society and politics.15

The West must revise its models 

of Iranian proliferation to account 

for the organizational aspects 

unique to Iranian government and 

society.16 Iraq provides an interesting case study for the setbacks a 

nuclear program often suffers in a 

society rife with a variety of political agendas and heavy top-down 

management. When Saddam’s 

son-in-law, Kamel al-Majid, took 

over the Iraqi nuclear program, he 

forced scientists to compete against 

Recently revised Israeli 

estimates now put an Iranian 

bomb between two and three 

years out.
Nuclear Patience 43

each other, resulting in work duplication rather than healthy competition.17 When Kamel became frustrated with the lack of progress on 

the program he mothballed entire 

portions and restarted them.18

The case of Libya also provides an 

example of a government structure 

similar to Iran’s. History has shown 

that Libya was not able to develop 

nuclear weapons despite extensive 

help from the A.Q. Khan Network 

and thirty years of effort due to 

these organizational constraints.19

Jacques Hymans argued in a 

May 2012 article in Foreign Affairs

that nuclear research relies heavily 

on “intense commitment, creative 

thinking, and a shared spirit of 

cooperation.”20 The United States 

and Israel must consider the setbacks and delays caused by the 

lack of a productive scientific environment for their models of the 

Iranian nuclear timeframe. A year 

after Netanyahu’s dire predictions 

about Iran, Israel has been forced 

to revise its nuclear estimates once 

more; it seems certain that the 

West has failed to account for critical political and social factors in 

Iranian government and society. 

Simply put, American and Israeli 

estimates have been based on 

theoretical timelines influenced 

by alarmist political, institutional, 

and social factors which fail to 

account for the realities of Iranian 

society. The longer the West continues along this alarmist path, 

the more it will lose international 

support and credibility on the 

Iranian issue. The West must recognize these important considerations and ensure it does not cry 

wolf any more.

The military establishment justifies its heavy focus on the Iranian 

nuclear threat by arguing that 

the potential effects of an Iranian 

nuclear bomb would be devastating for the world as a whole. While 

we agree that it would not be good 

if Iran were to obtain a nuclear 

bomb, we contend that the United 

States is in a powerful position to 

take military action if it becomes 

necessary. The US has a massive 

presence around Iran, with at least 

40,000 troops in the Persian Gulf 

and thousands more in Afghanistan and Central Asia.21 These 

numbers are already greater than 

the troops used to deter the DPRK 

and would provide a strong base 

for an attack on Iran.

Dramatic increases in intelligence-gathering technology practically assure that the US would 

have sufficient notice before Iran 

obtained a nuclear weapon. Additionally, the best estimates indicate that Iran would have to rely 

on currently declared facilities 

under IAEA auspices to develop 

the enriched uranium needed for 

a nuclear weapon and it is highly 

unlikely that Iran could have 

hidden enrichment facilities from 

the outside world for so long. Even 

if they could hide these facilities, 

they would still be plagued by the 

technical difficulties observed at 

the Natanz and Qom sites.22 Moreover, in the event that Iran developed nuclear weapons, the United 

States could almost certainly count 

on regional support from other 

countries that do not want to see 

Iran become a nuclear power. Ultimately, the United States can count 

on sufficient time and resources 

to counteract Iran if it decides to 

cross the nuclear threshold.

Finally, there is no reason to 

believe that Iran will go ahead 

with its attempt to build nuclear 

weapons if the United States 

engages with them in a measured 

and patient manner. There is 

nothing to show that Ayatollah Ali 

Khamenei has made the final decision to develop nuclear weapons.23

Additionally, the United States 

has demonstrated a willingness to 

engage in military action through 

recent events such as the surge 

in Afghanistan, the air campaign 

in Libya, and the strike on Bin 

Laden.24 These events would act 

as deterrents to Iran, and would at 

least force caution on its path to a 

nuclear weapon.

Sanctions: A Strategy of 

Patience

Economic sanctions have been 

one of the most effective diplomatic measures with regard to 

punishing Iran for proceeding 

along the developmental path to 

a nuclear bomb. The evidence 

that sanctions are having some 

success is, ostensibly at least, the 

fact that Iran has been willing to 

talk about its nuclear program 

with the P5-plus-1 council. For a 

fifteen month period after January 

2011, Iran refused to even consider 

discussing its program until the 

P5-plus-1 affirmed Tehran’s right 

to enrich uranium. Then in March 

of 2012, after damaging new 

rounds of sanctions were enacted, 

Iran put its nuclear program back 

on the table for discussion at a 

series of talks in Istanbul.25 It has 

been argued that sanctions will not 

bring a resolution to the conflict, 

but if they can cause a change in 

the dynamic of Iran’s negotiating 

strategy they are worth a deeper 

look.

Economic sanctions imposed 

against the Islamic Republic by the 

United States are not new. Sanctions against Iran have been a 
Nuclear Patience 44

popular diplomatic weapon in the 

West since the late 1970s and have 

been imposed for various reasons 

throughout the Islamic Revolution, 

Iranian Hostage Crisis, Iran-Iraq 

War, the Global War on Terror, 

and, most recently, in an attempt 

to deter Iranian nuclear development.26 Since 2003, the European 

Union, United Nations, and United 

States have made decrees limiting Iran’s ability to engage in the 

international marketplace.27 The 

majority of these sanctions have 

focused on petrochemical exports, 

foreign investment in construction 

and industrial development, individuals with alleged human rights 

violations, trade of technology 

(especially dual-use components), 

transfer of funds through world 

banking organizations, and access 

to the marketplace for organizations associated with terrorists.28

While the ultimate effect of 

these sanctions on diplomacy has 

been debated, the role they have 

played in Iran’s economic downturn is certain. In 2012, Iran’s 

economy contracted by 1.1% of 

GDP and encountered deflation of 

roughly 21%; it also ran a budget 

deficit of about 6% of GDP. Most 

notably, perhaps, Iran’s oil production has declined by nearly 

one-million barrels per day over 

the past decade.29 While the rising 

price of oil has helped keep Iran’s 

economy afloat in spite of ongoing 

sanctions, Iran is incapable of 

boosting its production without 

more foreign investment and its 

economy has begun to stagnate.30

But what does it all mean? 

For the most part sanctions are 

affecting the quality of life for the 

average Iranian. It is believed that 

economic downturn helped fuel 

the street riots in 2009, and gasoline shortages led to rations which 

infuriated the masses in 2007. 

While Iran is flush with crude 

oil, its limited domestic refining 

capability requires it to import 

as much as forty-percent of its 

gasoline supply.31 In our opinion, 

the best route for economic sanctions would be to target Iran’s 

ability to import foreign gasoline. 

The Economist recently reported 

that Iranian oil traders are 

managing to dodge economic 

sanctions—with difficulties that 

result in a loss of about thirtypercent of their revenue—by 

falsifying documents or transferring crude to tankers affiliated with 

other countries. Additionally, the 

few banks that find it worthwhile 

to deal with Iranian oil traders 

are able to charge roughly fivepercent on each transaction, as 

opposed to the normal rate of a few 

fractions of a percent.32 If Iranians are willing to take such costly 

routes to continue trading, so be 

it. The economic results are still 

obvious, and by targeting gasoline 

imports the international community can impose real hardships on 

the Iranian people and the regime. 

In the past, a common argument 

amongst the Iranian population 

has been that a nuclear program is 

simply not worthwhile economically and the regime is to blame 

for the downturn as a result of 

its continued pursuit of nuclear 

weapons.33 If gasoline prices and 

rationing increase, then the people 

may become angry enough to 

demand the money be redirected 

to refining capability, or that the 

nuclear program be abandoned to 

relieve sanctions. By dividing the 

people and the regime, sanctions 

may help accomplish the goal of 

disbanding the program. 

The most viable objection to 

the use of economic sanctions is 

that the current strategy “offers 

no viable endgame for dealing 

with Iran’s current leadership. The 

impression that the sanctions are 

permanent—indeed, the [new] 

law does not specify any conditions that Tehran might satisfy in 

order to lift the siege on its central 

bank—conforms to the Iranian 

hard-liners’ darkest delusions 

about Washington’s intentions.”34

But that can be rectified. Rather 

than engaging in the traditional 

model which rewards Iran with 

reduced sanctions every time it 

comes to the negotiating table—a 

method which encourages halfhearted gestures on Tehran’s 

part—we should provide a simple 

statement outlining levels of sanctions for various levels of uranium 

enrichment. If Iran continues to 

enrich to medium or high levels, 

the sanctions tighten; if the regime 

converts its medium-enriched 

uranium back below 5 percent, 

sanctions are reduced, and so forth. 

Providing a tiered system which 

relies on reductions in enrichment, 

while still acknowledging Iran’s 

technical capability to enrich, will 

provide Iran with an exit strategy 

and a way to appease its population without appearing weak. In 

the words of former Secretary of 

Defense, Robert Gates, “If there is 

enough economic pressure placed 

on Iran, diplomacy can provide 

them with an open door through 

which they can walk if they choose 

to change their policies.”35

It is true that economic sanctions 

alone will not fully deter weapons 

development if Iran believes the 

current economic downturn is 

worth the perceived security of 

possessing a nuclear bomb. But 
Nuclear Patience 45

we have already attempted to 

eliminate that perceived security increase through our red line 

strategy. While economic sanctions 

take time to work, it appears that 

they are beginning to have tangible 

effects. By boosting sanctions on 

gasoline imports, we can further 

intensify those effects. The fact is 

that utilizing sanctions effectively 

will take time and patience. But 

based on the most recent Israeli 

estimates that Iran will not have 

the bomb for another two years or 

more, time appears to be on our 

side.36

Maintaining a Credible 

Military Option

As we have already mentioned, 

in order for a red line to be effective 

the United States must maintain a 

credible military option. Considering we have already established 

the one scenario that would elicit 

a full-scale military invention, 

namely Iran’s construction of a 

nuclear weapon, maintaining a 

credible military option simply 

means ensuring that the terms of 

that red line can be enforced. As 

a general rule, it is best to reserve 

military action until no other 

option is available. In our strategy, that situation only exists once 

Iran possesses all the components 

for rapid construction of a nuclear 

weapon. By maintaining the readiness of the Fifth Fleet, continuing joint military exercises in the 

Persian Gulf, and demonstrating a 

military capability of keeping the 

Strait of Hormuz open, the international community will have 

guaranteed the option to use force 

in the future.

Our strategy does not allow for 

an overt attack on Iran’s nuclear 

facilities under any other circumstances. It has been suggested that 

an attack on Iran would bolster 

nationalist sentiment among the 

population and unify the people 

and government in an anti-American frenzy.37 Additionally, any 

limited strike would only delay, 

not destroy, Iran’s nuclear program 

and would likely exacerbate the 

regime’s belief that it will not be 

territorially secure until it has a 

bomb.38 Finally, a limited, overt 

attack may bolster international 

sentiment for Iran and delegitimize the current economic sanctions, thereby jeopardizing their 

effectiveness. Unilateral American, 

or Israeli, action will not be an 

effective solution in the long run.

In April 2012, Colin Kahl 

insightfully noted that escalation 

and spillover are among the negative effects of a military strike on 

Iran. Any attack on Iran would 

likely lead to an escalation of proxy 

attacks by Hezbollah, the Quds 

Force, and elements of the Revolutionary Guard. Such actions would 

spill over into other countries in 

the region and could potentially 

result in rising conflict throughout 

the region.39 Thus the paradox is 

that in order to maintain the utility 

of a credible military option, it 

cannot be used; that is, until it is 

absolutely necessary.

The major issue with maintaining a credible military option is, 

once again, the precedent set with 

respect to North Korea. The United 

States set red lines for North Korea 

which it crossed without any 

military consequences. Perhaps 

the only way of overcoming this 

obstacle is (to reiterate our earlier 

point) for the US to clearly outline 

the one condition under which 

military power will be exercised 

and demonstrate the capability 

and willingness to do so. Another 

option would be to act militarily 

in North Korea, thereby reasserting American military credibility 

and perhaps scaring Iran as the US 

did after invading Iraq in 2003. The 

consequences of such an action are 

broad however, and outside the 

scope of this analysis.

Maintaining a credible military 

option ultimately applies real pressure on the regime and plays to 

their worst fear-an invasion which 

would remove the current regime 

from power. Again, maintaining 

the option does not mean using 

it. Our standpoint remains that 

time is on the West’s side, and the 

best option is to be patient with 

regards to military action. Maintain the option, but reserve it for 

the extreme case. 

A Kennedyesque Solution 

Through Compromise and a 

Credible Threat

Policymakers continue to draw 

on the lessons learned from the 

Cuban Missile Crisis to deal with 

nuclear issues today. Unfortunately for the future of diplomacy, 

the most common perception 

surrounding the Cuban Missile 

Crisis tends to romanticize the 

issue into Dean Rusk’s portrayal 

of a macho stare-down decided by 

the question, “who blinked first?” 

In reality, Kennedy resolved the 

conflict in a much more diplomatic way. Although there was 

certainly a threat to wage war with 

the Soviet Union, Kennedy gave 

the Soviets a crucial concession 

in terms of American missiles in 

Turkey.40 The ultimate lesson that 

policymakers should take from the 

Cuban Missile Crisis is that successful conflict resolution relies 

on finding an acceptable compro-
Nuclear Patience 46

mise between parties rather than 

playing hard-ball.41

However, carrots alone do not 

always work; adding a stick to 

emphasize the carrot helps push 

the other side towards your end 

of the compromise. In relation to 

the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham 

Allison argues that the compromise of withdrawing American 

missiles from Turkey alone would 

not have been enough to get the 

Soviet Union to withdraw from 

Cuba. The threat of American military force played a more crucial 

role in pushing the Soviet Union to 

accept American terms.42

The current problem with the 

Islamic Republic is that Iranian 

leaders believe that any compromise resulting in a non-nuclear 

Iran will only threaten Iran in 

the future. According to Khamenei, “Qaddafi gathered up all his 

nuclear facilities and gave them 

to the West. And now, you can 

see the conditions our nation is 

living in versus their conditions.”43

Lessons from Iraq and Libya have 

taught dictators that their regime 

faces danger without a nuclear 

program.44 Thus, the US strategy 

must be twofold: show the Iranian 

regime that it would face a much 

greater danger if it decided to 

obtain a nuclear weapon, and be 

willing to compromise on regional 

goals—to include regime change—

in order to credibly assure Iran that 

the US will not seek its overthrow 

if and when it gives up its quest 

for nuclear weapons. It is a delicate balancing act for US foreign 

policy-if the threat for crossing the 

nuclear threshold is not great or 

credible enough, Iran will believe it 

is worth the risk to obtain a nuclear 

weapon. On the flip side, if Iranian 

leaders see an American threat in a 

world in which Iran does not have 

access to nuclear weapons, they 

will believe that nuclear armament 

is their only feasible option.

As has already been discussed, 

the United States must find ways 

to make its military threat credible 

and important. However, the US 

must also come to terms with the 

fact that Iran may have legitimate 

regional goals. The essence of compromise is that both sides must 

realize that they have to modify 

their goals to achieve agreement. 

The United States must realize that 

there are ways to contain Iran other 

than acting as the “global policeman.” Countries in the region will 

check back against Iranian imperialism because they do not want 

a neighboring Iran with hegemonic power. The US should work 

to strengthen ties in the region, 

with both Israel as well as other 

Arab states. These ties will ensure 

that Iranian hegemony does not 

become a reality in the Gulf region. 

As part of this effort, the United 

States must be willing to provide 

these countries military and economic aid in order to empower 

them to balance against Iran.

This sort of policy will allow the 

United States to extend tendrils of 

economic growth and democratic 

ideals to the Iranian people. In 

the years since the Cold War, economic ties and increasing democracy have contributed far more to 

global peace and stability than a 

large American military.45 As long 

as Iran remains isolated by economic sanctions and the threat of 

military force, the United States 

cannot increase economic ties and 

spread democratic ideals to the 

Iranian people.

As long as Iran faces military 

opposition to its regime with no 

opportunity to back out while 

saving face, its nationalist and 

imperialist tendencies will only be 

exacerbated. Economic and diplomatic checks against Iran are a 

much more subtle way to avoid 

conflict. These checks are only 

feasible in a world where the US 

concedes the legitimacy of Iranian 

regional interests and is not faced 

with the imminent threat of a 

nuclear bomb. Kennedy summed 

up his experiences from the Cuban 

Missile Crisis, saying “nuclear 

powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary 

to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.”46 As 

long as Iran faces a military threat 

without an attractive alternative, 

the regime cannot back down and 

still save face, as it would have to 

admit it had caved to US military 

pressure. The US must be willing 

to endure Iranian gloating in the 

short term to ensure long term 

peace and stability.

Ultimately, the United States 

must use soft power to contrast 

hard power. If there is no clear 

delineation for the consequences 

of crossing the nuclear threshold, 

there is no reason for Iran to avoid 

the bomb. However, offering a clear 

and satisfying alternative to Tehran 

will allow the regime to save face 

while avoiding the dangers of a 

nuclear Iran. This approach necessitates an acceptance of the consequences that accompany recognition of Iran as a legitimate state, 

but they are far better than the 

alternative of a nuclear Iran.

Appeasing Israel

Israel may pose the biggest 

threat to a potential US strategy 

of “nuclear patience.” Because 
Nuclear Patience 47

of its proximity to Iran as well as 

long-standing enmity between 

the two countries, Israel may 

be justified in believing it faces 

an existential threat from a 

nuclear Iran. Moreover, there 

is concern that after abandoning a nuclear weapons program 

Iran may continue to sponsor 

terrorism and asymmetric attacks 

against Israel. For the most part, 

the United States has been able 

to ignore the occasional Iranian 

terrorist attack on its interests by 

retaliating with warnings, sanctions, or by casting doubt on 

whether Iran is actually to blame 

for a specific attack.47 Unfortunately, due to its small size and 

proximity to Iran, Israel does 

not have this luxury. Thus, Israel 

stands to lose the most if a strategy 

of nuclear patience is unsuccessful.

Israel must be reassured against 

the occurrence of three different 

scenarios. The first scenario is one 

in which Iran does not take the soft 

power alternative and appears to 

be nearing a nuclear bomb. In this 

scenario, Israeli worry would be 

focused on preempting the Iranian 

nuclear establishment before it can 

get any closer to a nuclear bomb. 

The red line strategy proposed 

above would play a significant role 

in bolstering Israeli confidence in 

this situation. The United States 

must reassure Israel that it will 

respond immediately and efficiently as soon as Iran crosses the 

nuclear threshold. Providing Israel 

with military materiel to ensure 

that it could effectively and immediately participate in enforcing this 

red line would assuage its worries 

that it must act before Iran gets the 

bomb.

The second scenario is one in 

which Iran chooses to abandon its 

nuclear ambitions but still threatens Israel with a conventional 

missile force. To prevent Israel 

from escalating this conflict to the 

nuclear level, the United States 

should aid Israel in developing 

both its defensive forces and conventional weapons systems, with 

the ultimate goal of deterring or 

neutralizing an Iranian attack. This 

aid would come in the forms of 

technological assistance as well as 

arms sales to adequately supplement Israel’s forces.

The final scenario is perhaps 

the trickiest, where Iran does not 

threaten Israel conventionally, but 

instead uses asymmetric warfare 

and its connections to Hamas 

and Hezbollah to attack through 

proxies. This scenario is problematic due to the dangers inherent in implicating Iran directly in 

these attacks. If the United States 

overtly accuses Iran of sponsoring 

specific acts of terrorism, Iran 

could be pushed to a situation 

where it attempts to develop a 

nuclear deterrent once more. 

Thus, the United States must find 

other methods of dealing with this 

problem. First, the United States 

should dramatically increase diplomatic ties with Tehran in order 

to attempt to solve this problem 

diplomatically. Additionally, the 

United States should work with 

other Middle Eastern countries 

to pressure Hamas and Hezbollah to engage in cease-fires and 

begin peace talks with Israel. This 

has been proven to work in past 

instances where Egypt has negotiated a ceasefire between Israel 

and Hamas.48 Finally, the US must 

support Israeli retaliation against 

any legitimate terrorist targets. 

Retaliation by Israel against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon was 

effective insofar as it avoided direct 

implication of Iran and halted the 

Hezbollah offensive. This approach 

would also drive a wedge between 

Iran and its proxy terrorist organizations as those groups realize 

that they will suffer Israeli retaliation without gaining open support 

from Iran. In the short term, the 

crisis in Syria may provide the best 

opportunity to implement this 

strategy. 

Conclusion

Through these components of a 

single, defined red line, tiered economic sanctions, a credible military option, and a willingness to 

forego the active pursuit of regime 

change, our policy of “Nuclear 

Patience” will provide Iran with the 

incentive and ability to step away 

from its nuclear ambitions without 

sacrificing its pride. An important part of that methodology will 

involve placating Israel’s desire 

to strike. This will likely involve 

allowing, and perhaps even supporting, covert operations aimed 

towards delaying Iran’s weapons 

development. There are many 

forces within the Israeli government that still believe an attack is 

not a good option at the moment, 

and by playing to those individuals 

the US can keep Israel from acting 

rashly.

Ultimately, the success of this 

policy requires patience on many 

fronts and from many entities. In 

the past, faulty estimates of counour policy of “Nuclear 

Patience” will provide Iran 

with the incentive and ability 

to step away from its nuclear 

ambitions without sacrificing 

its pride.
Nuclear Patience 48

tries’ nuclear capabilities have 

led to dramatic intelligence failures and embarrassing foreign 

policy criticisms. A policy of 

“Nuclear Patience” allows for more 

thorough analysis of the sociopolitical factors affecting Iran’s 

nuclear timetable, while maintaining a credible deterrent factor. For 

this reason, we advance it as the 

methodology with the greatest 

potential for successfully mitigating the Iranian nuclear crisis.

1 Dennis Ross, “Calling Iran’s Bluff: 

It’s Time to Offer Tehran a Civilian 

Nuclear Program,” The New Republic,

last modified June 15, 2012, <http://

www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/104085/calling-iran%E2%80%99sbluff-its-time-offer-iran-civiliannuclear-program>.

2 Robert S. Litwak, “Living With 

Ambiguity: Nuclear Deals with Iran and 

North Korea,” Survival: Global Politics 

and Strategy 50, no. 1 (2008): 92.

3 David E. Sanger, “US Weighs Sanctions Against North Korea,” New York 

Times, last modified October 6, 2006, 

<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/06/

world/asia/06nuke.html>.

4 James Ball, “Obama issues 

Syria a ‘red line’ warning on chemical weapons,” Washington Post, last 

modified August 20, 2012, <http://

www.washingtonpost.com/world/

national-security/obama-issues-syriared-line-warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-

b811-09036bcb182b_story.html>.

5 Graham Allison, “Iran: Bomb or Be 

Bombed,” (presentation, Annual Convention of The Aspen Strategy Group, 

Aspen, CO, August 3-7, 2012). 

6 Dore Gold, The Rise of Nuclear 

Iran: How Tehran Defies the West

(Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 

2009), 271.

7 Ibid., 268.

8 James A. Nathan and Graham 

Allison, “The Cuban Missile Crisis 

Revisited: Why It Matters Who Blinked,” 

Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (2012): 163-166.

9 Litwak, 93.

10 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “Iran 

Is Still Botching the Bomb,” Foreign 

Affairs, last modified February 18, 2013, 

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139013/jacques-e-c-hymans/iranis-still-botching-the-bomb>. 

11 Micah Zenko and Michael A. 

Cohen, “Clear and Present Safety: The 

United States is More Secure Than 

Washington Thinks,” Foreign Affairs 91, 

no. 2 (2012): 81.

12 Ibid., 81.

13 Ibid., 81.

14 Hymans.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., 49.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., 51.

20 Ibid., 47.

21 Colin Kahl, “Not Time to Attack 

Iran,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (2012), 

166-169.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Patrick Clawson, “Sanctions Are 

Only a Stop-Gap,” Foreign Affairs, last 

modified May 8, 2012, <http://www.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/137617/

patrick-clawson/sanctions-are-only-astop-gap>. 

26 Robert Caswell, “Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience,” Foreign 

Affairs, (Winter 1981), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/35846/robertcaswell/economic-sanctions-and-theiran-experience>.

27 “Iran–A Timeline of Sanctions,” The Israel Project, <http://www.

theisraelproject.org/site/apps/nlnet/

content3.aspx?c=ewJXKcOUJlIaG&b=

7712195&ct=11576561¬oc=1#time

line>.

28 Jason Starr and Helia Ighani, 

”Timeline of US Sanctions,” United 

States Institute of Peace, <http://

iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timelineus-sanctions>.

29 “The World in Figures,” The 

Economist, last modified November 

21, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/

news/21566487-iran>.

30 Clawson.

31 Gold, 295.

32 “Dodging Sanctions in Iran: How 

Iranian Companies Manage to Keep 

Trading With Foreigners,” The Economist, last modified March 30, 2013, 

<http://www.economist.com/news/

business/21574540-how-iranian-companies-manage-keep-trading-foreigners-around-block>.

33 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Hugs From 

Iran,” New York Times, last modified 

June 13, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.

com/2012/06/14/opinion/kristof-hugsfrom-iran.html>.

34 Suzanne Maloney, “Obama’s 

Counterproductive New Iran Sanctions,” Foreign Affairs, last modified 

January 5, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137011/suzannemaloney/obamas-counterproductivenew-iran-sanctions>.

35 Gold, 268.

36 Hymans.

37 Stephen Hadley, “Iran Options 

Outline,” (presentation, Annual Convention of The Aspen Strategy Group, 

Aspen, CO, August 3-7, 2012).

38 Ibid.

39 Kahl, 166-169.

40 Nathan and Allison,163-164.

41 Ibid., 164.

42 Ibid., 165-166.

43 Ibid., 165.

44 Ibid.

45 Zenko and Cohen, 84.

46 Nathan and Allison, 166.

47 Gold, 135-141.

48 David D. Kirkpatrick and Jodi 

Rudoren, “Israel and Hamas Agree 

to a Cease-Fire, After US-Egypt 

Push,” New York Times, last modified November 21, 2012, <http://

w w w. ny t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 2 / 1 1 / 2 2 /

world/middleeast/israel-gaza-conflict.

html?pagewanted=all>.
I

raq was a signatory of the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), but 

there were always strong suspicions 

that Saddam Hussein’s Baathist 

regime wanted to acquire nuclear 

weapons. Saddam demonstrated 

his willingness to use chemical and 

biological weapons on Iranians 

during the Iran-Iraq war, so when 

the French built a nuclear reactor 

near Baghdad and Iraq began to 

enrich uranium the world started 

to worry. Iraq spent billions of 

dollars to research methods for 

enriching uranium and building nuclear weapons technology only to have their program 

set back by the Iranians and the 

Israelis, and finally dismantled by 

the Americans. Iraq developed 

plans for enriching and weaponizing large amounts of uranium, but 

its program was unable to produce 

the desired results and Saddam 

was never permitted to achieve his 

goal of a nuclear weapon. 

Saddam’s Motivation

Saddam’s motivation to construct an atomic weapon seems to 

have come from both his hatred 

of Israel and his desire for prestige and power in the Arab world. 

During the Six Day war in 1967 

Israel took control of previously 

Arab lands in the Sinai, Gaza 

Strip, Jerusalem, the West Bank, 

and the Golan Heights. Saddam 

believed it was within his power to 

retrieve these territories. Saddam 

expressed desires to destroy all 

of Israel, but he also realized that 

even if he could stand up to the 

Israeli state and push some of the 

borders back to pre-1967 lines, he 

would “...weaken Israel’s geopolitical position and make [himself] a 

hero throughout the Arab world.”1

Although Saddam had clearly 

expressed his anti-Zionist and 

anti-sematic views, it seems his 

main source of motivation may 

have been the reputation and prestige that would come to him from 

the Arab world. When contemplating between a quick war or 

a drawn out confrontation with 

Israel, Saddam was quoted saying 

that “...even more important is 

the widespread cheering from the 

masses that will accompany each 

step we take forward.”2

Saddam knew that Israel was 

a formidable opponent and that 

conventional forces alone would 

not be able to stand up to a nuclear 

attack by the Israelis. Saddam 

needed a bomb. He believed that 

if Iraq was able to acquire nuclear 

weapons it could successfully deter 

a nuclear attack on Arabs. This 

then would give the Arab nations 

enough time to overwhelm Israel 

with conventional forces. Saddam 

was confident that even a single 

nuclear weapon in the hands of 

the Arab armies could deter any 

nuclear threat from Israel. He said, 

“The Arab atom will finish you off, 

but the Israeli atom will not end 

the Arabs.”3

Proliferators

The Iraqi nuclear program 

began with the purchase of a 

Soviet-made research reactor in 

the late 1950s and accelerated 

when Saddam became head of the 

Iraqi Atomic Energy Committee in 

1973. In the 1970s France agreed to 

build a research reactor and all of 

the necessary laboratories in Iraq. 

The reactor was named “Osirak” 

by the French and was a 40 megawatt light-water reactor built near 

Baghdad. In addition to the reactor 

and the laboratories, France also 

provided approximately 27.5 

pounds of 93% U-235 to be used 

for research.4

France was not the only country 

to significantly aid Iraq on its 

quest for nuclear weapons. During 

the late 1970s and into the early 

1980s Iraq purchased uranium in 

various forms from Portugal, Italy, 

Niger, and Brazil.5

 The IAEA was 

aware of some, but not all of these 

uranium transactions. German 

companies and engineers gave 

Iraq data on centrifuges and an 

Austrian company provided caluSaddam and the Bomb

An Unusual Case of Counterproliferation Success

David Ptacek

Cadet DAVID PTACEK is a Class of 

2014 Civil Engineering major.
Saddam and the Bomb 50

trons for uranium isotope separation. Both of these countries’ contributions aided in Iraq’s nuclear and 

chemical weapons programs.6

 Even 

the United States played a role in 

developing the nuclear weapons 

program in Iraq. Advanced 

computers were sent to Iraq 

during the Iran-Iraq war to aid 

the war effort and the computer 

transactions were approved by the 

Commerce Department; but 

eventually the computers were 

actually used to advance Iraq’s 

nuclear program.7

Osirak Reactor

The Osirak reactor at the AlTuwaitha Nuclear Center provided 

Iraq its best chance at obtaining 

a nuclear weapon; yet, scientists 

still disagree about whether or not 

Iraq could have been producing 

weapons grade material on a large 

enough scale to make weapons. 

Richard Wilson, an inspector of 

the damaged reactor in December 

1982, claimed that “...it would’ve 

taken decades, not years...” to 

produce enough plutonium for a 

nuclear weapon.8

 Both Iraq and 

France claimed that the reactor was 

only used for peaceful purposes, but 

it may have been possible that Iraq 

was taking steps towards a weapon 

in secrecy. Roger Richter, a former 

IAEA inspector, admitted that the 

safeguards were not foolproof and 

that not all of the nuclear facilities 

at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center 

were under IAEA’s watch.9

 The true 

threat of the Osirak reactor may 

never be known, but its perceived 

danger was very real. 

Operation Scorch Sword

Israel and Iran were both 

extremely concerned about the possibility of an Iraqi nuclear weapon. 

Israel feared an Arab bomb and 

knew that Saddam had been supporting the Palestinian Liberation 

Organization and terrorist acts in 

Israel. Even though Iraq claimed 

that any such weapons would 

only be used against an Israeli 

enemy, Iran did not trust Iraq with 

a weapon either.10 Saddam confirmed Iran’s rationale of distrust 

when, upon observing how disorganized Iran’s leadership structure 

was after the Islamic Revolution, 

he launched an all-out invasion 

in September 1980.11 The Israelis, 

who had already been attempting 

to set back the Osirak program, 

allegedly assassinated Dr. Yahya 

al-Meshad, the supervisor of the 

reactor deal, and managed to 

surreptitiously destroy reactor 

housings. These developments 

encouraged Iran to attack the 

Tuwaitha complex.12

Only a few days after the 

Iran-Iraq war began, Iran began 

preparations for an air attack 

on Tuwaitha. “...The first ever 

mission in the history of warfare 

to be undertaken against a nuclear 

reactor—even one still being 

built—was planned under the 

operation name of scorch sword.”13

Iran sent four F-4 Phantoms on 

the mission. After refueling the 

fighters flew to their targets. Two 

Phantoms attacked a power plant 

while the other two struck their 

targets at the Tuwaitha site with 

twelve Mark 82 500 pound bombs. 

The F-4s were not fired upon and 

returned to Iran untouched. 

Operation Scorch Sword was 

widely regarded as a failure in 

the West because of the minimal 

amount of damage caused by the 

bombing, but there were some 

benefits to be capitalized on as 

well. ‘Only’ several million dollars 

of damage was caused along with 

a ‘slight delay’ in the construction 

of the facility.14 The real benefits 

of the operation came in the form 

of intelligence from frightened 

French personnel and reconnaissance flights flown over Osirak 

after the attack. Many of the French 

and Italian workers at the Osirak 

site fled after the Iranian bombing. 

Some of the personnel returned, 

but others were able to provide the 

Artist rendering of Israeli attack on Osirak, 1981
Saddam and the Bomb 51

Israeli secret services much needed 

intelligence. Iran shared reconnaissance photos with the Israelis 

and Israel discouraged Iran from 

re-attacking.15 Now it was Israel’s 

turn to prevent the creation of an 

Iraqi nuclear weapon.

Operation Opera

Immediately after the unsatisfying results of Operation Scorch 

Sword were known, Israel began 

planning and practicing for its 

own attack on the Iraqi nuclear 

program. The initial attack, scheduled for 10 May 1981 was almost a 

complete failure. The fuses on most 

of the ordnance to be dropped on 

the Tuwaitha complex were incorrectly set. Luckily, the mission 

was called off because of political 

opposition and a series of events 

in Lebanon.16 Once things settled, 

a new date was set and on 7 June 

1981, eight F-16s and six F-15 

Eagles were deployed to Etzion air 

base in the still-occupied Sinai.17

The Israeli goal was to exploit a 

hole in Iraqi radar. They planned to 

do this by flying through the Saudi 

desert. All the fighters took off on 

time, but made a potentially deadly 

mistake en-route. They accidentally flew through Jordanian airspace. At just 2,100 ft, they flew 

over tourist filled beaches and King 

Hussein’s private yacht.18 Although 

this could have spelled the end 

for the mission, no negative consequences ensued. The Israeli aircraft flew low and in silence as they 

made their way through northern 

Saudi Arabia. The external fuel 

tanks, which were needed in order 

to make the long trip into Baghdad 

and back to Israel, were dropped 

over the desert. 

Once the F-16s arrived over 

Tuwaitha, all eight aircraft each 

dropped two Mark 84 2000 pound 

bombs on the reactor.19 Only 

after the reactor was completely 

destroyed did the Iraqi air defense 

system finally react. Unguided 

anti-aircraft artillery fired toward 

the Israeli aircraft, but none 

actually threatened them. The 

departing Israelis met no resistence 

and the mission was a success. The 

combination of Operation Scorch 

Sword and Operation Opera was 

estimated to have set Iraq’s nuclear 

program back ten years.20

Israeli Justification

After the raid Israel issued a 

statement saying that it had evidence from “...‘sources of unquestioned reliability’ that Iraq was 

producing nuclear bombs at the 

Osiraq plant, and, for this reason, 

Israel had initiated a preemptive 

strike.”21 Invoking Article 51 of 

the Charter of the United Nations 

(UN), Israel claimed it had a legitimate right to self-defense. But were 

they under any real threat? The 

IAEA was accused of failing to tell 

the world about events and developments at Tuwaitha. The IAEA 

stood by their earlier conclusions 

that Iraq was not making nuclear 

weapons with the Osirak reactor 

and that it had been complying 

with all IAEA guidelines. It was, in 

fact, Israel who was not a signatory 

to the Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT) and who was operating a 

nuclear facility at Dimona that 

was not open to UN inspections or 

complying with IAEA safeguards.22

Renewed Motivation

Iraq planned to rebuild the 

destroyed facilities at Tuwaitha. 

Talks with France failed and Iraq 

decided to construct a new heavy 

water research reactor. This undertaking, named Project 182, would 

have been similar to the Canadian 

NRX reactor had it been completed. However, as a result of 

scarce resources, the project was 

never finished.23

Gulf War and Inspections

After the 1990 invasion of 

Kuwait, Iraq accelerated its 

efforts for a nuclear weapon. A 

“crash program” was started in 

the summer of that year which 

was supposed to recover highly 

enriched uranium from the Osirak 

reactor fuel. If it were not for the 

United States intervention in 

1991, this program “...could have 

resulted in the availability by the 

end of 1991 of a quantity of HEU 

sufficient to manufacture a single 

low-yield nuclear device.”24

In the winter of 1990 President George H.W. Bush used Iraqi 

pursuit of nuclear weapons as 

one of his justifications for taking 

military action against Saddam 

and Iraq. In National Security 

Directive 54 he made it clear 

that use of any weapons of mass 

destruction against United States 

or allied forces would justify the 

removal of Saddam from power.25

Needless to say, Saddam did not 

use WMDs on allied forces which 

attacked in January 1991, and was 

still in power, and in possession 

of his weapons stockpiles, at the 

Osirak after the Israeli attack
Saddam and the Bomb 52

end of Operation Desert Storm in 

March 1991. 

The IAEA was in put in charge 

of finding and removing anything 

that was left of Saddam’s nuclear 

program. Initially, Iraq denied 

having any hidden or secret stockpiles of fissile material that could 

be used to construct a nuclear 

weapon, but after some pressure 

from the IAEA, a second declaration was produced that admitted 

the existence of nuclear material and facilities that were not 

previously known to the inspection teams.26 Still much of the 

biological, chemical, and nuclear 

weapons programs were hidden 

from the West until Saddam’s sonin-law, Kamel Hussein, defected in 

1995.27 Kamel provided the United 

States with information on the 

hidden stockpiles of chemical and 

biological weapons and the intent 

of Saddam to keep plans and 

designs for his weapons programs. 

According to IAEA reports in 

1997, if the war had not interrupted 

the Iraqi nuclear weapons program 

in 1991, it is entirely possible 

that Iraq may have been able to 

complete a functional nuclear 

weapon by the end of 1992.28

The IAEA found and destroyed 

uranium enrichment facilities, 

stockpiles of high explosives, 

facilities for weapon component 

construction, and computer simulations of nuclear weapon detonations. In 1998 the IAEA concluded 

that even though $10 billion was 

spent in the 1980s on enrichment 

and weapons programs, ‘There 

were no indications to suggest that 

Iraq was successful in its attempt to 

produce nuclear weapons.”29

Second Gulf War

Iraq had never been very 

forthcoming with inspectors and 

because they came so close to 

completing a nuclear weapon in 

the early 1990s, the West knew 

that Iraqi scientists and engineers had the technical know-how 

to build a weapon. In 1996 the 

IAEA stated that “the know-how 

and expertise acquired by Iraqi 

scientists and engineers could 

provide an adequate base for 

reconstituting a nuclear weapons-oriented program.”30 These 

scientists, along with other 

intelligence suggesting that Iraq 

did have weapons of mass destruction, led to the decision by the 

United States, Great Britain, and 

other allies to launch Operation 

Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. 

No weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq after the 

invasion by the US and coalition 

forces. The intelligence analysis 

and the informants were heavily 

criticized. One of the high profile 

informants was Rafid Ahmed 

Alwan al-Janabi, also known as 

“Curveball.” Curveball left Iraq 

in 1995 and fled to Germany. He 

claimed to have worked in biological weapons programs under 

Saddam’s regime. His claims were 

used to justify Iraqi Freedom, but in 

2011 he publicly admitted to lying 

saying, “Believe me, there was no 

other way to bring about freedom 

to Iraq. There were no other possibilities.”31 Although the United 

States had faulty intelligence and 

no weapons were found, Saddam 

was removed from power and the 

world was reassured that Iraq no 

longer had any nuclear, biological, 

or chemical weapons capabilities. 

Technological Achievements

Iraq’s nuclear program had 

quite a bit of help from foreign 

countries, but that help could only 

get the Iraqis so close to producing a bomb. The two largest challenges in producing a weapon in 

Iraq were not unlike the challenges 

faced by any other nation seeking 

nuclear weapons: they needed to 

produce or acquire a large amount 

of fissile material and they needed 

a way to deliver and detonate 

that critical mass. Iraq attempted 

to attack their challenges all 

simultaneously and from a few 

different angles. Four groups were 

created to: 1) produce uranium 

235 by using diffusion barriers and 

centrifuges 2) produce uranium 

235 by way of chemical and electromagnetic methods 3) computer 

modeling 4) perform “special 

tasks,” or weaponization.32

Iraq’s attempts at Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) 

took place at Tuwaitha and 

Tarmiya. By time the Gulf War 

ended and UN inspections ensued, 

Iraq had eight 1200 mm separator units with plans to make seventeen more operational. It also 

had enriched about 1350 grams 

of uranium to between three and 

eight percent.33

Iraq had other plans for centrifuges, Laser Isotopic Separation 

(LIS), chemical and ion-exchange 

separation, and gaseous diffusion, 

The IAEA estimated that once Iraq machined its planned steel 

centrifuges and built its cascades that it could have produced 

enough enriched uranium for 1.5 bombs per year.
Saddam and the Bomb 53

but they were not able to get very 

far before the Gulf war. Iraq was 

successful at obtaining plans centrifuges and the maraging steel 

needed to make them. The IAEA 

estimated that once Iraq machined 

its planned steel ecntrifuges and 

built its cascades that it could 

have produced enough enriched 

uranium for 1.5 bombs per year.34

The other programs, some still in 

the design stage, did not receive 

enough money or time to prove 

effective. 

The “special tasks” group had 

more success than the others. 

While Iraq struggled to get the 

fissile material it needed to produce 

a bomb, they were successful at 

creating an implosive shock wave 

strong enough to start the nuclear 

explosion. They were also able to 

produce tritium which could be 

used to increase the yield of any 

nuclear weapon through a process 

of boosting. Inspectors concluded 

that Iraq could have made a 

functional, weaponizable bomb if 

only they had had enough enriched 

fuel.35

Closing

The goal of obtaining a nuclear 

weapon was never achieved 

in Iraq. Many other countries 

contributed materials and technologies that Saddam planned to 

use to his advantage and quicken 

the arrival of his nuclear objectives. During the Iran-Iraq war the 

French made Osirak reactor near 

Baghdad became a target for the 

Israelis and the Iranians. Iranian 

Operation Scorch Sword was the 

first preemptive strike on a nuclear 

program in history and although 

it did not destroy the reactor, the 

operation provided intelligence 

that Israel would later use to 

destroy the complex at Tuwaitha. 

Israel’s air attack set Saddam’s 

program back, but it did not deter 

him from investing even more 

in his nuclear weapons program. 

By 1990, the IAEA estimated that 

Iraq could have had an operational 

nuclear weapon by 1992. This was 

as close as Iraq would get. The Gulf 

war and the subsequent inspections removed the nuclear weapons 

capabilities in Iraq. Although 

Saddam was not very cooperative with inspectors and the Iraqi 

scientists and engineers still 

possessed the knowledge required 

to develop a nuclear weapon, the 

United States and its allies did not 

find any weapons of mass destruction when they invaded during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. 

Saddam was removed from power 

and the dismantlement of the 

nuclear weapons program in Iraq 

was confirmed.

1 Hal Brands and David Palkki, 

“Why Did Saddam Want the Bomb?” 

Foreign Policy Research Institute (Aug 

2011). 

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Maggie McGee, “We Have Surprises” Der Spiegel, October 10, 1990, 

148–152.

7 “Iraq’s Nuclear Weapon Program,” 

<http://www.iraqwatch.org/profiles/

nuclear.html>. 

8 Richard C. Ragaini, International 

Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary 

Emergencies: 29th session, (World Scientific Publishing, 2003), 33. 

9 “10 Years Ago in the Bulletin”. 

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47 

(1991): 5. 

10 “Nuclear Capabilities of Iraq - A 

Chronology of Events,” International 

Atomic Energy Agency, < http://www.

iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Iraq/

event.html>.

11 Ibid. 

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop. 

“TARGET: SADDAM’S REACTOR.” 

Angel Fire. AIR ENTHUSIAST (Mar.-

Apr 2004). 

15 Ibid. 

16 Ibid. 

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid. 

19 Ibid. 

20 Ibid. 

21 “Osiraq / Tammuz I 33°12’30”N 

44°31’30”E.” 09 Oct. 2000, <http://informant38.blogspot.com/2004/08/osiraktammuz-i-331230n-443130e-at-1555.

html>.

22 Ibid. 

23 Ibid. 

24 “Iraqi Nuclear Weapons - Iraq 

Special Weapons.” <http://www.fas.org/

nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm>.

25 “Iraq and Weapons of Mass 

Destruction.” Iraq and Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. Ed. Jeffrey Richelson. The 

National Security Archive, 11 Feb. 2004. 

26 Cooper and Bishop.

27 “Saddam Hussein’s Weapons of 

Mass Destruction,” PBS, 2001.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid. 

30 Ibid. 

31 “’Curveball’: I Lied about WMD 

to Hasten Iraq War,” Msnbc.com, 15 Feb 

2011. 

32 “Iraq’s Nuclear Weapon Program.” 

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid. 

35 Ibid.
J

ames Kitfield’s book, Prodigal 

Soldiers, is an entertaining telling 

of the dramatic transformation of 

the US military after the debacle of 

Vietnam through the 70s and 80s to 

the resounding success of the 1991 

Gulf War.   This narrative tracks 

the individual military careers 

and observations of Army, Navy, 

Air Force and Marine officers who 

were key leaders and commanders in the Gulf War.  It answers the 

important question “what changed 

in the US military between the failures of Vietnam and the success of 

the Gulf War?”   The book begins 

in the mid-1960s with the young 

officers early experiences in 

Vietnam. Each chapter is devoted 

to a specific person and in fascinating story-telling style describes 

key events that would later 

provide the impetus for the military transformation.   

The author, Kitfield, divides the 

book into four parts spanning five 

to seven year increments starting 

in 1965 and ending after the 1991 

Gulf War.  In each part he provides 

ten chapters with each chapter 

highlighting one of the several 

officers and their experiences and 

observations that will affect the 

military transformation.   For Air 

Force followers the author uses 

Chuck Horner, the Joint Force Air 

Component Commander (JFACC) 

in the Gulf War,  from his first formative experiences in Vietnam as 

a captain through his career as an 

instructor pilot at Nellis Air Force 

Base, his contribution to the development of Red Flag  to his eventual 

command of a fighter wing. There 

are also chapters on key issues, 

events and individuals that shape 

the US and its military forces over 

the time period.  Issues, such as the 

all-volunteer force, the elimination of the draft, and its near ruin 

of the military in its first few years 

of implementation to its eventual 

success in providing the US an 

unsurpassed and motivated core 

of soldiers, sailors, airmen and 

marines, are discussed by Kitfield 

in his novel-like style.  He brings in 

major events like Desert One, the 

ill-fated rescue of the Iranian hostages, and Urgent Fury, the 1983 

invasion of Granada, to tell the 

story of the need for major reform 

in the military chain of command 

and the Department of Defense.  It 

is in the chapter on Urgent Fury 

that we first are introduced to the 

young two star, Norman Scharzkopf, who would eventually 

command all US forces in the 1991 

Gulf War.  

Of special interest to Air Force 

members, is the chapter on an 

important individual whose 

next generational leadership and 

command style would be a vital 

element of the transformation.  In 

1978 General Bill Creech, the 

namesake of Creech Air Force 

Base, would take command of 

the USAF Tactical Air Command 

(TAC, now ACC or Air Combat 

Command) and foster a new style 

and focus of command that would 

eventually permeate the entire US 

military.  Creech had learned early 

in his career as an Air Force fighter 

pilot and commander of an aerial 

demonstration team in Europe, the 

value of precision, teamwork and 

pride.   He would take those elements of command and force them 

into the very fabric of the squadrons and wings in TAC, including the restive wing commander 

Chuck Horner.

In Prodigal Soldiers, Kitfield 

documents the many innovations that would lead to remarkable transformation of the US 

Military.   He knits together such 

diverse issues as the all-volunteer force, the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act in Congress, the impact of 

the information revolution and a 

push for better and more realistic 

training and their impacts on the 

armed forces.  While the US Navy 

Book Review

Prodigal Soldiers:  How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam 

Revolutionized the American Style of War

Reviewed by Mark Melville

Colonel MARK MELVILLE (USAF Ret) 

is a volunteer Instructor in the Department of Military & Strategic Studies.
Book Review 55

would lead the other services with 

the development of Top Gun air 

to air combat course, providing 

realistic training for fighter pilots, 

the Air Force would expand the 

idea at Nellis Air Force Base with 

the establishment of its Red Flag 

training exercise and high tech 

training ranges.

Kitfield’s thesis meshes nicely 

with Max Boot’s work, War Made 

New. In his later chapters Boot 

describes the same time frame and 

comes to similar conclusions.  

The US military’s edge lies not 

simply in recruiting high-quality 

personnel but in its methods for 

training and organizing them.  Initiatives undertaken in earlier 

decades, such as setting up realistic 

training centers to simulate combat 

conditions and forcing the services 

to work more closely together (the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act), continue 

to bear fruit. 1

Prodigal Soldiers also directly 

supports the curriculum for a 

senior level Military & Strategic 

Studies core course at the Air Force 

Academy, where the cadets explore 

various models of innovation and 

the important lessons from the past 

dealing with innovation in military 

forces.   The course teaches that,” 

Innovation is more than incorporation of equipment and technical 

change into doctrine, practices, 

and tactics.   Innovation in tactics 

and operational concepts can prove 

as important on the battlefield as 

changes in equipment.”2

   Kitfield 

also demonstrates, through the 

life stories of his prodigals, that 

changes in the US armed forces’ 

organization, doctrine and training 

were a fundamental part of the 

transformation.  

Criticism of Prodigal Soldiers

is almost universally positive. 

However in a review by Gregg 

Easterbrook in the Washington 

Monthly, Easterbrook complains 

that Kitfield “dismisses the constructive efforts...of the military 

reform movement”3 and gives 

too much credit to congressional 

investigations. Easterbrook, who is 

familiar with one of the examples 

Kitfield uses in his book, highlights 

that those acquisition problems 

had been discovered by the military and were being addressed but 

had gained the attention of congress.  It must be apparent that in 

writing Prodigal Soldiers, Kitfield 

was supporting a thesis about the 

catalysts of change that brought the 

US from the defeat of Vietnam to 

the success of Desert Storm.  One 

of those key changes was the Goldwater-Nichols Act that reformed 

the DoD and forced the services to 

become more reliant on each other 

and to work together (jointness), a 

secondary result of the Act was to 

improve the military acquisitions 

system.  Kitfield uses the example 

of failed weapon system testing 

to discuss the need for reform of 

the DoD, not just in the realm of 

jointness but also in the area of 

acquisitions.  

A second area of criticism 

is Kitfields use of attention 

getting novel like setups for each 

chapter.  In a review by Warren L. 

Nelson in the Chicago Tribune in 

1995 He complains that “Kitfield 

has gone overboard to make his 

book readable.”4

   Strangely many 

consider this to be  was one of the 

book’s strong points, the story-like 

vignettes of the prodigals in their 

military careers was praised by 

Major C.H. Wesely in his review of 

the book “Kitfield combines oldfashioned story-telling and blunt 

analysis in this tremendously readable illustration of the importance 

of moral courage to military failure 

or success.”5

To summarize, Prodigal Soldiers is an interesting and 

enjoyable book that provides valuable insights to professional military officers and leaders. Kitfield 

tells the remarkable story of the 

dramatic transformation of the 

US military from the jungles of 

Vietnam to the deserts of Iraq. 

The author develops his thesis by 

following the careers of selected 

military officers from their experience in Vietnam and the turbulent 

years that follow to their eventual 

command of key forces in the 

1991 Gulf War. The officers that 

Kitfield selects, his prodigals, are 

from all four services and in additional chapters he highlights other 

officers and leaders that had significant impacts on the transformation of US forces. There is a 

fascinating account in Prodigal 

Soldiers of the efforts to reform 

the DoD and require the services 

to work together during combat 

operations and training. The back 

story of what we now call GoldwaGeneral Creech, one of Kitfield’s 

Prodigal Soldiers
Book Review 56

ter-Nichols, one of several significant improvements made in the 

US military during the transformative years. For readers that are air 

power disciples the book has many 

profound insights into the role 

of the Air Force, and our leaders 

in the transformative years. The 

Air Force’s love of, and constant 

quest for advance technologies is 

told by Kitfield in his chapters on 

the development of new digital 

weapons systems and the air war. 

Kitfield’s analysis provides an 

excellent case study in transformation and innovation in the difficult 

to change US Military bureaucracy. 

He tells the story of visionary 

officers and their quest to heal the 

wounds of the Vietnam era. This 

book is an insightful study for any 

future military leader.

1.   Max Boot, War Made New: 

Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of 

the Modern World (New York: Gotham, 

2007).

2.   Williamson Murray, Military 

Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 

1996), 306.

3. Political Booknotes Review of 

Prodigal Soldiers, Washington Monthly

(Jan/Feb 1995), 53. 

4. Warren L. Nelson, “From 

Vietnam to the Gulf; A ‘Hollow Army’ 

becomes Whole,” Chicago Tribune

April 16, 1995,<http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1995-04-16/entertainment/9504160023_1_military-historyvietnam-anti-war>. 

5. “Prodigal Soldiers Review,” Military Law Review, Vol. 158 (1998), 172. 

Air Force Chief of Staff’s Reading List, 2013

Bert Frandsen, Hat in the Ring (2010)

Beryl Markham, West with the Night (1982)

David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand (2009)

Daniel Ford, Flying Tigers (2007)

Lee Ellis, Leading with Honor: Leadership Lessons from the Hanoi Hilton (2012)

Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, Dressmaker of Khair Khana (2012)

Anna Simmons, Joe McGraw and Duane Lauchengco, The Sovereignty Solution (2011)

Wolfgang W.E. Samuel, I Always Wanted to Fly (2001)

Chris Dubbs and Emeline Paat-Dahlstrom, Realizing Tomorrow: The Path to Private Space Flight 

(2011)

Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign 

Against Al Qaida (2011)

James Fallows, China Airborne (2012)

Malcom Gladwell, Outliers (2008)

Charles Kupchan, No One’s World (2012)

Vijay Vaitheeswaran, Need, Speed, and Greed (2012)

The Chief ’s reading list--what better place to start your professional reading program, then write a review for 

publication in ASJ? We anxiously await your submission to ASJeditor@usafa.edu