Report to the Ranking Minority

Member, Committee on Governmental

Affairs, U.S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

July 2001 NASA

Status of Achieving

Key Outcomes and

Addressing Major

Management

Challenges

GAO-01-868
Page i GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Assessment of NASA’s Progress and Strategies in Accomplishing

Selected Key Outcomes 5

Comparison of NASA’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report With

the Prior Year Report 10

NASA’s Efforts to Address its Major Management Challenges

Identified by GAO 12

Scope and Methodology 12

Agency Comments 13

Appendix I Observations on NASA’s Efforts to Address Its

Major Management Challenges 15

Appendix II Comments From the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration 23

Tables

Table 1: Major Management Challenges 16

Contents
Page 1 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

July 31, 2001

The Honorable Fred Thompson

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Dear Senator Thompson:

As you requested, we reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration’s (NASA) fiscal year 2000 performance report required by

the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to assess

the agency’s progress in achieving selected key outcomes that you

identified as important mission areas for NASA.1

 We did not review

NASA’s fiscal year 2002 performance plan because it had not been issued

by the time we completed our work. NASA was in the process of making

substantive changes to the plan based on comments from the Office of

Management and Budget and the NASA Advisory Council. Thus, we are

unable to discuss NASA’s fiscal year 2002 goals and strategies for the

selected outcomes. Also, we could not compare NASA’s fiscal year 2002

performance plan with its fiscal year 2001 performance plan for the

selected outcomes. These are the same outcomes we addressed in our

June 2000 review of the agency’s fiscal year 1999 performance report and

fiscal year 2001 performance plan to provide a baseline by which to

measure the agency’s performance from year-to-year.2

 These selected key

outcomes are to

• expand scientific knowledge of the Earth system,

• expand the commercial development of space, and

• deploy and operate the International Space Station safely and cost

effectively.

 1

This report is one of a series of reports on the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act

agencies’ fiscal year 2000 performance reports and fiscal year 2002 performance plans.

2

Observations on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Fiscal Year 1999

Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2001 Performance Plan (GAO/NSIAD-00-192R, June

30, 2000).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

As agreed, using the selected key outcomes for NASA as a framework, we

(1) assessed the progress NASA has made in achieving these outcomes

and the strategies the agency has in place to achieve unmet performance

goals; and (2) compared NASA’s fiscal year 2000 performance report with

the agency’s prior year performance report for these outcomes.

Additionally, we agreed to analyze how NASA addressed its major

management challenges, including the governmentwide high-risk areas of

strategic human capital management and information security, that we and

NASA’s Office of Inspector General identified. Appendix I provides

detailed information on how NASA addressed these challenges. (App. II

contains NASA’s comments on a draft of our report.)

NASA reported mixed progress in achieving its key outcomes. In general,

NASA’s strategies for achieving unmet performance targets for these

outcomes are clear and reasonable. As described below, NASA reported

that it achieved most targets related to expanding knowledge of the Earth

system. However, its progress in other areas was more limited.

• Planned outcome: Expanding scientific knowledge of the Earth system.

NASA’s performance report indicated that NASA made progress toward

achieving this outcome. NASA reported meeting nearly all of its

planned performance targets, which included developing models to use

time-varying gravity observations for the first time in space and

completing an initiative to reduce the size and weight of certain aircraft

instruments. NASA’s planned actions and time frames for achieving its

unmet targets were clear and reasonable. The NASA Advisory Council,

which independently evaluated the performance report, also generally

found that good progress had been made with this outcome.

• Planned outcome: Expanding the commercial development of space.

NASA’s performance report indicated limited progress toward

achieving this outcome. Over half of the performance targets that we

assessed for this outcome were reported as having been met. But a

number of targets were not achieved, including two that were

associated with NASA’s X-33 and X-34 programs. These programs,

designed to develop and demonstrate technologies needed for future

reusable spacecraft, were not competitively selected for additional

funding. The NASA Advisory Council expressed concern that program

efforts related to NASA’s new Space Launch Initiative were elusive.

NASA provided clear and reasonable explanations for targets that were

not met. But it did not provide strategies and time frames for achieving

its unmet target of pursuing the commercial marketing of space shuttle

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

payloads, even though it stated in the report that the target remained

feasible.

• Planned outcome: Deploying and operating the International Space

Station safely and cost-effectively. NASA’s performance report showed

that NASA made limited progress toward achieving this outcome. Most

performance targets related to the space station effort were tied into a

specific launch, which did not take place as planned in fiscal year 2000.

NASA provided clear explanations for missing these targets, noting that

delays were caused by Russian Proton failures and Service Module

launch schedule slips. It also provided reasonable strategies and time

frames for achieving them. NASA did not directly address the problem

of continuing space station cost growth, despite the fact that this has

been a long-standing problem. In fact, NASA now projects cost

overruns to exceed $4 billion.

NASA has made improvements in its fiscal year 2000 performance report

in comparison to its fiscal year 1999 performance report. Specifically,

NASA is describing its verification and validation efforts and disclosing its

data sources for each performance target, providing greater confidence

that the performance results are credible. Also, it has added discussions

on why performance results are meaningful, and it is explaining why

changes in performance targets are needed. However, NASA can still be

more specific in addressing the outcome of deploying and operating the

space station safely and cost-effectively and it needs to identify

performance measures that directly address cost growth. NASA can also

improve its discussions on data verification and validation by (1) more

clearly identifying validation methods used for some targets, (2)

highlighting data limitations, and (3) communicating these discussions in a

less technical manner. Lastly, as we noted in our review of the fiscal year

1999 report, NASA still relies heavily on output measures. NASA’s

explanations of why performance results are meaningful help to better

understand the linkage between the performance targets and results.

However, we believe that continued use of output measures burdens

NASA by requiring it to continuously demonstrate the linkages between

program efforts and results and to make improvements to strengthen such

linkages.

In assessing how NASA addressed major management challenges, we

found that NASA’s report partially addressed the governmentwide highrisk area of strategic human capital management but not the other area of

information security. Addressing this issue is important since we have

previously found that NASA lacks an effective agencywide security
Page 4 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

program. We also identified three other challenges facing NASA. We found

that NASA’s report addressed two of these critical management

challenges: (1) correcting weaknesses in contract management and (2)

effectively implementing the faster, better, cheaper approach to space

exploration projects. However, as mentioned above, it did not address the

challenge of controlling space station costs.

In commenting on a draft of our report, NASA said that it had no issues

with the report.

GPRA is intended to shift the focus of government decisionmaking,

management, and accountability from activities and processes to the

results and outcomes achieved by federal programs. New and valuable

information on the plans, goals, and strategies of federal agencies has been

provided since federal agencies began implementing GPRA. Under GPRA,

annual performance plans are to clearly inform the Congress and the

public of (1) the annual performance goals for agencies’ major programs

and activities, (2) the measures that will be used to gauge performance, (3)

the strategies and resources required to achieve the performance goals,

and (4) the procedures that will be used to verify and validate

performance information. These annual plans, issued soon after

transmittal of the President’s budget, provide a direct linkage between an

agency’s longer-term goals and mission and day-to-day activities.3

 Annual

performance reports are to subsequently report on the degree to which

performance goals were met. The issuance of the agencies’ performance

reports, due by March 31, represents a new and potentially more

substantive phase in the implementation of GPRA—the opportunity to

assess federal agencies’ actual performance for the prior fiscal year and to

consider what steps are needed to improve performance, and reduce costs

in the future.4

NASA’s mission encompasses human exploration and development of

space, the advancement and communication of scientific knowledge, and

research and development of aeronautics and space technologies. Its

activities span a broad range of complex and technical endeavors—from

investigating the composition, evaluation, and resources of Mars; to

working with its international partners to complete and operate the

 3

The fiscal year 2002 performance plan is the fourth of these annual plans under GPRA.

4

The fiscal year 2000 performance report is the second of these annual reports under

GPRA.

Background
Page 5 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

International Space Station; to providing satellite and aircraft observations

of earth for scientific and weather forecasting purposes; to developing

new technologies designed to improve air flight safety.

This section discusses our analysis of NASA’s performance in achieving its

selected key outcomes and the strategies the agency has in place to

achieve unmet performance goals and measures in the future. In

discussing these outcomes, we have also provided information drawn

from our prior work on the extent to which the agency provided assurance

that the performance information it is reporting is credible.

The performance report indicated that NASA made progress toward

achieving its key outcome of expanding the scientific knowledge of the

Earth system. NASA reported that all performance targets for this

outcome were met, except two. However, NASA provided reasonable

explanations for not meeting them in fiscal year 2000. For example, NASA

reported that a lack of science quality spectroradiometer ocean color data

prevented one of the targets from being fully achieved,5

 and difficulties

with an international partner prevented the other target, “Launch the

NASA-National Center for Space Studies Jason-1 mission,” from being

achieved.

The NASA Advisory Council provided an independent evaluation of

NASA’s fiscal year 2000 performance and the evaluation was included in

the performance report. Its evaluation of performance related to this

outcome was positive, indicating the failure to launch the Jason-1

spacecraft as the most significant shortfall. However, the Council

concluded that many of the performance targets across all of NASA’s

Enterprises were too vague and did not sufficiently relate to the actual

programs being implemented. The Council did not identify which targets it

viewed as vague in its report, but it recommended that the targets be

better written and that NASA communicate to the public the reason the

metric or program is important. In response to the Council’s

 5

That target stated that “Sensor Intercomparison and Merger for Biological and

Interdisciplinary Oceanic Studies (SIMBIOS) will merge Moderate Resolution Imaging

Spectroradiometer (MODIS) ocean color data into global ocean color time series, which

began with Ocean Color Temperature Sensor and Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor

(SeaWiFs).”

Assessment of NASA’s

Progress and

Strategies in

Accomplishing

Selected Key

Outcomes

Scientific Knowledge of

the Earth System
Page 6 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

recommendation, NASA added statements to performance targets that

explain why the performance results are meaningful.

Regarding data credibility, NASA disclosed the methods used for verifying

and validating the data and the data sources for each performance target

associated with this outcome in the fiscal year 2000 report. This is an

important step toward providing confidence that performance results are

credible. However, for many performance targets, NASA did not discuss

limitations in the data and steps it would take to correct them. A recent

NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) report states that beginning with

the fiscal year 2002 final performance plan, NASA will discuss anticipated

data limitations.6

 Also, in some cases, NASA did not clearly address how

the data was validated. For example, the verification and validation

narrative for the performance target, “Continue the ocean color time with

60 percent global coverage every four days—a 35 percent improvement

over fiscal year 1999,” reads as follows.

“The two-day coverage is required to account for the losses due to the tilt maneuver of the

sensor and interorbit gaps. When clouds are taken into consideration, the coverage is

reduced to 50-60 percent. The Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor Project has increased

the Global Area Coverage data beyond that expected by eight percent by collecting data to

higher latitudes than planned on all orbits. However, pole-to-pole coverage each day is not

possible since data at low Sun angles are not scientifically useful for ocean color research.

The Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer instrument aboard Terra is beginning

to supply additional data to meet to meet the ocean color requirement.”

For some targets, NASA’s discussions were simply too technical to provide

a good understanding of the approach used to verify and validate the data.

For example, the verification and validation narrative for the performance

target, “Develop remote-sensing instrument/technique for ocean surface

salinity measurements from aircraft” is articulated as:

“Salinities in the ocean are typically 33-32 PSU. In 1998, they got +/- 1 PSU, so the target for

a 10x improvement would be 0.1 PSU. Due to pointing error on the plane L-Band,

radiometer accuracy is adversely affected. From a satellite sensor this error is much

reduced. The airborne results coupled with theoretical studies now show that a monthly

average of sea surface salinity, at a resolution of 1degree latitude x 1 degree longitude can

be produced with an accuracy of <0.1-0.2 PSU, which will meet the target. Important to this

 6

Validation And Verification Of Selected NASA FY 2000 Performance Data Related To

The Government Performance And Results Act (GPRA), (IG-01-020, Mar. 30, 2001).
Page 7 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

analysis is getting the sea surface temperature right, and also getting sea surface roughness

from scatterometers. The monthly data product is suitable for ocean circulation studies. It

will also be possible to produce a weekly data product, more for meteorological use.”

Regarding its plans for achieving the two unmet targets for this outcome,

NASA established reasonable strategies and time frames. It reported that

progress was significant in one of the performance targets (footnote 5)

and that full achievement of that target, anticipated in fiscal year 2001, is

dependent on the “availability of valid moderate resolution imaging

spectroradiometer data.” The report noted that the planned delivery of

new processing software in November 2000 was expected to improve data

quality to a level sufficient for an initial merging of SeaWiFs and MODIS

oceans products. Achievement of the other target, “Launch the NASANational Center for Space Studies Jason-1 mission,” is also anticipated in

fiscal year 2001.

Lastly, NASA credits the contribution of the other agencies for the

successful achievement of performance targets related to this outcome.

For example, for the achieved target, “Demonstrate the utility of

spaceborne data for flood plain mapping with the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA),” the report credits FEMA, the Army Corps

of Engineers, and NASA for conducting cooperative demonstration

projects to evaluate NASA and commercially provided digital topographic

and image-based information products to re-map flood plains.

The performance report indicated that the agency made some progress

toward achieving its key outcome of expanding the commercial

development of space. Over half of the performance targets that we

assessed for this outcome were reported as having been met. For example,

NASA reported that it achieved its targets to (1) promote privatization and

commercialization of space shuttle payload operations through the

transition of payload management functions by fiscal year 2000 and (2)

establish up to two new commercial space centers. NASA provided clear

and reasonable explanations for targets that were not met. For example,

NASA reported that its performance target to promote privatization of

space shuttle operations and reduce civil service requirements for

operations by 20 percent in fiscal 2000 was not met following the agency’s

decision to hire additional staff to ensure that safety would not be

compromised for space shuttle missions. In August 2000, we reported that

several internal NASA studies had shown that the agency’s space shuttle

Commercial Development

of Space
Page 8 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

program’s workforce had been affected negatively by NASA’s downsizing,

much of which occurred after 1995.7

NASA reported that its performance target to complete small payload

focused technologies and select concepts for flight demonstration of a

reusable first stage was not met because the agency decided to terminate

this activity once it was clear that the cost objectives could not be met.

Furthermore, the performance targets for the X-33 and X-34 programs—

which sought to develop and demonstrate technologies needed for future

reusable spacecraft in partnership with private industry—were not met

since they were not competitively selected for additional funding.

The NASA Advisory Council had concerns about this outcome. In

particular, the Council noted that efforts planned under the new Space

Launch Initiative appear to be elusive, at best. The Council also stated that

this highlights the time-lapse between definition and evaluation of specific

(and critical) performance targets, but the Council did not provide further

elaboration.

NASA did not provide strategies and time frames for achieving the unmet

target of pursuing the commercial marketing of space shuttle payloads by

working to allow the space flight operations contractor to target two

reimbursable flights, one in fiscal year 2001 and one in fiscal year 2002.

NASA stated the target remains feasible, but no reimbursable flights in

fiscal 2001 and fiscal year 2002 are planned due to policy limitations

impeding the marketing process. Regarding strategic human capital

management, NASA set one related target to promote privatization of

space shuttle operations and reduce civil service resource requirements

for operations by 20 percent (from the fiscal year 1996 full-time equivalent

levels) in fiscal year 2000. However, this target was not met since NASA

had decided to end its downsizing efforts.

The performance report indicated that NASA’s progress toward achieving

the key outcome of deploying and operating the space station safely and

cost-effectively was limited with respect to achievement of the agency’s

planned performance targets. Since the key outcome is not included in the

report as a specific goal or objective, we based our assessment of it on a

 7

Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require Continued

Attention (GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186, Aug. 15, 2000).

International Space Station

Deployment, Operation,

and Cost
Page 9 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

related objective in the report. The related objective is to deploy and

operate the space station to advance scientific, exploration, engineering,

and commercial objectives. All of the performance targets for this

objective are associated with a NASA launch, except one, and none was

achieved as planned for fiscal year 2000. The explanations for not

achieving these targets were reasonable. For the launch-dependent targets,

NASA reported that a schedule slip caused by Russian Proton failures and

Service Module launch delays slowed down the entire space station

assembly sequence. This, in turn, prevented NASA from achieving the

launch-dependent targets in fiscal year 2000. NASA also reported that

nonachievement for the one remaining target, “Complete the production of

the X-38 first space flight test article in preparation for a Shuttle test flight

in 2001,” was due to budget reductions.8

 The NASA Advisory Council’s

report indicated that the ISS program had a “productive year” after the

schedule slip caused by the Russian Proton rocket failures, but it did not

provide further elaboration.

In the fiscal year 2000 performance report, NASA identified reports that

we and NASA’s OIG issued in fiscal year 2000 that addressed space station

cost overruns and other issues. From the reports, NASA briefly

summarized some of the concerns and corrective actions it agreed to take

in relation to these issues, including space station cost growth. However,

the agency did not set performance measures that more directly address

cost growth, despite drastic increases in space station costs over the past

several years and recent agency projections of potential cost overruns in

excess of $4 billion. Furthermore, the issue of space station growth has

been a long-standing problem. Although the NASA Advisory Council did

not comment on the issue of cost-control measures for the space station in

its evaluation of NASA’s performance, we continue to believe—as we have

reported in the past—that NASA should develop performance measures

that directly address space station cost-control issues, including risk

mitigation and contingency planning activities.9

 8

The X-38 is a prototype for a potential U.S. crew return capability from the International

Space Station in case of an emergency.

9

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (GAO-01-258, Jan. 2001)., Observations on the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration’s Fiscal Year 1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2001

Performance Plan (GAO/NSIAD-00-192R, Jun. 30, 2000).
Page 10 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

NASA’s strategies and time frames for achieving the unmet targets were

reasonable. For example, as of April 2001, NASA had launched four of the

missions that were delayed in fiscal year 2000. The other two unachieved

missions are also anticipated for launch in 200l. For the one target that

was affected by budget reductions, “Complete the production of the X-38

first space flight test article in preparation for a Shuttle test flight in 2001,”

the report stated that it would be achieved in fiscal year 2001. The shuttle

test flight that was planned for September 2001 was extended to mid-2002.

For the selected key outcomes, this section describes major improvements

or remaining weaknesses in NASA’s fiscal year 2000 performance report in

comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report. It also discusses the degree to

which the agency’s fiscal year 2000 report addresses concerns and

recommendations by the Congress, GAO, NASA’s OIG, and others.

NASA’s portrayal of its verification and validation efforts applicable to all

outcomes is an improvement over the fiscal year 1999 report, and it

provides greater confidence that the performance results are credible. In

our review of NASA’s fiscal year 1999 report, we criticized NASA for not

describing procedures used to verify and validate performance

information and addressing data limitation issues in the data. Unlike the

prior year report, the fiscal year 2000 report provides a description of the

methods used for verifying and validating the data as well as the data

sources for each performance target. However, NASA can further improve

the usefulness of the performance information by highlighting the

limitations in the data and including steps it will take to correct them. This

can be done by adding a separate data limitations narrative for each

performance target and by using terminology such as “none” where there

are no limitations in the performance data. Additionally, for a few

performance targets, the reliability and validity of the performance

information would be strengthened if the related verification and

validation narratives were conveyed in a manner that would more clearly

(1) demonstrate actual validation of the performance and (2) identify the

validation methods. This is particularly true for the Earth Science

Enterprise. This can be done by writing the narratives in a more

convincing tone and in less technical language to enhance understanding

of the validation approach.

NASA’s OIG report commended NASA for a significant improvement in the

reporting of actual performance for fiscal year 2000. The OIG report found

Comparison of

NASA’s Fiscal Year

2000 Performance

Report With the Prior

Year Report

Comparison of

Performance Reports for

Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000
Page 11 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

weaknesses in the accuracy and reliability of reported performance for 4

of 23 selected performance targets it reviewed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report. (NASA’s performance report includes a total of 211

performance targets). The OIG report indicated that based on OIG

recommendations, NASA management made the necessary corrections or

clarifications before issuing the fiscal year 2000 report.

For the most part, the performance targets continue to be output

measures. Explanations are added to the performance targets as to why

the performance results are meaningful. Generally, these explanations

help to better understand the linkage between the targets and results. In

our review of NASA’s fiscal year 1999 performance report, we noted that

the continued use of output measures burdens the agency by requiring it

to continuously demonstrate the linkages between program efforts and

results and to make improvements to strengthen such linkages. Moreover,

in its evaluation of NASA’s fiscal year 2000 performance, the NASA

Advisory Council asked NASA to portray its performance in a way that is

more understandable to the public. As previously mentioned, NASA’s

fiscal year 2000 report adds explanations of why the performance results

are meaningful. NASA acknowledges that developing annual outcomerelated performance metrics for multiyear research and development

programs is particularly challenging since these programs may not be

mature enough to deliver outcome results for several years. The report

notes that the stated objectives of programs within the agency are longterm in character. However, NASA also states in the report that it would

continue to strive to meet the challenge of developing science and

technology metrics that are outcome-oriented and useful in demonstrating

how these outcomes benefit the public.

Lastly, in our review of the fiscal year 1999 report, we suggested that

NASA document in its performance plans and reports the rationale for

newly established performance targets to clarify the reasons for such

targets. We had noted that while many of NASA’s performance targets

were new each year, there was no stated basis for the changes. In its fiscal

year 2000 report, NASA provides the rationale that in many cases, new

targets are developed in response to program changes or as a result of

experience gained in the performance planning process. NASA also

includes charts at the end of each Enterprise and Crosscutting Process

section that provide a trend assessment when a fiscal year 2000 target has

a corresponding fiscal year 1999 target. Newly developed targets that have

no corresponding fiscal year 1999 target to facilitate an assessment are

characterized as “new target.”
Page 12 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

GAO has identified two governmentwide high-risk areas: strategic human

capital management and information security. NASA’s performance report

does not fully explain NASA’s progress in resolving human capital

challenges. The report states that NASA has begun to focus on workforce

renewal and revitalization, but it does not elaborate on strategies for

undertaking this effort or address human capital challenges in other key

areas. In addition, the report does not address the challenge of information

security. Doing so is important for NASA. In 1999, we reported that the

agency lacked an effective agencywide security program and that tests we

conducted at one of NASA’s 10 field centers found that mission-critical

information systems were vulnerable to unauthorized access.10

In addition, we have identified three major management challenges facing

NASA: (1) correcting contract management weaknesses, (2) controlling

International Space Station costs, and (3) effectively implementing the

faster-better-cheaper approach to space exploration projects. We found

that NASA’s report addresses the problems of contract management and

implementing the faster-better-cheaper approach. With respect to contract

management, it is important to note that until NASA’s Integrated Financial

Management System—-which is central to providing effective management

and oversight over its procurement dollars—is operational, performance

assessments relying on cost data may be incomplete, and full costing will

be only partially implemented.

As we discussed under outcomes, NASA did not address the challenge of

controlling space station costs. As we reported in January 2001, the

International Space Station program continues to face cost-control

challenges. As with contract management, until NASA’s Integrated

Financial Management System is operational, NASA may lack the cost

information needed to control space station costs.

As agreed, our evaluation was generally based on the requirements of

GPRA, the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, guidance to agencies from

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for developing performance

plans and reports (OMB Circular A-11, Part 2), previous reports and

evaluations by us and others, our knowledge of NASA’s operations and

programs, our identification of best practices concerning performance

planning and reporting, and our observations on NASA’s other GPRA-

 10Information Security: Many NASA Mission-Critical Systems Face Serious Risks

(GAO/AIMD-99-47, May 20, 1999).

NASA’s Efforts to

Address its Major

Management

Challenges Identified

by GAO

Scope and

Methodology
Page 13 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

related efforts. We also discussed our review with NASA officials and with

NASA’s OIG. The agency outcomes that were used as the basis for our

review were identified by the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate

Committee on Governmental Affairs as important mission areas for NASA

and do not reflect the outcomes for all of NASA’s programs or activities.

The major management challenges confronting NASA, including the

governmentwide high-risk areas of strategic human capital management

and information security, were identified in our January 2001 performance

and accountability series and high risk update, and by NASA’s OIG in

December 2000. We did not independently verify the information

contained in the performance report, although we did draw from other

GAO work in assessing the validity, reliability, and timeliness of NASA’s

performance data. We conducted our review from April 2001 through June

2001 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing

standards.

In written comments on a draft of our report, NASA said that it had no

issues with the report. NASA stated that as it develops its next

performance plan, it is looking into the decreased use of output metrics,

so as to focus more on outcomes. NASA also stated that it is reviewing its

coverage of such areas as the International Space Station and information

security in the performance plan. NASA’s comments are reproduced in

appendix II.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate

congressional committees; the NASA Administrator; and the Director,

Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to

others on request.

Agency Comments
Page 14 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-4841.

Key contributors to this report were Richard J. Herley, Shirley B. Johnson,

Charles W. Malphurs, Cristina T. Chaplain, John de Ferrari, Diane G.

Handley, and Fannie M. Bivins.

Sincerely yours,

Allen Li

Director, Acquisition and

Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Observations on NASA’s Efforts

to Address Its Major Management Challenges

Page 15 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

The following table identifies the major management challenges

confronting NASA, including the governmentwide high-risk areas of

strategic human capital management and information security. The first

column of the table lists the management challenges that we and/or

NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) have identified. The second

column discusses what progress, as discussed in its fiscal year 2000

performance report, NASA made in resolving its challenges. We found that

NASA’s performance report discusses the agency’s progress in resolving

many of its challenges but does not discuss progress in resolving the

governmentwide challenge of information security. In addition, the report

does not address the major management challenge: The Need to Control

International Space Station Development and Support Costs.

Appendix I: Observations on NASA’s Efforts

to Address Its Major Management Challenges
Appendix I: Observations on NASA’s Efforts

to Address Its Major Management Challenges

Page 16 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Table 1: Major Management Challenges

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major management challenges as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report

GAO-designated governmentwide high risk

Strategic Human Capital Management: GAO has identified

shortcomings at multiple agencies involving key elements of

modern human capital management, including strategic human

capital planning and organizational alignment; leadership

continuity and succession planning; acquiring and developing

staffs whose size, skills, and deployment meet agency needs;

and creating results-oriented organizational cultures.

In August 2000, we reported that several internal NASA studies

had shown that the agency’s space shuttle program’s workforce

had been affected negatively by NASA’s downsizing, much of

which occurred after 1995. We also reported that NASA had

begun taking actions to address its shuttle workforce problems.a

In January 2001, we also reported the need to implement a

human capital approach in NASA’s workforce management

strategies as a major management challenge.b

The report does not directly address agencywide key elements of

modern human capital management, including strategic human

capital planning and organizational alignment; leadership continuity

and succession planning; acquiring and developing staffs whose

size, skills, and deployment meet agency needs; and creating

results-oriented organizational cultures.

The report states that NASA’s performance targets to (1) reduce

the civil service workforce level to below 18,200 and (2) promote

privatization of space shuttle operations and reduce civil service

resource requirements for operations by 20 percent (from the fiscal

year 1996 full-time equivalent levels) in fiscal year 2000 were

overtaken by events. In December 1999, NASA declared an end

to downsizing, based on key indicators and recommendations from

the NASA Advisory Council that the agency had gone too far in

downsizing, particularly at the Office of Space Flight Centers. In

January 2000, NASA began focusing on workforce renewal and

revitalization. NASA’s full-time equivalent budget ceiling was

changed in the fiscal year 2001 congressional budget for fiscal

year 2000 to 18,622. Furthermore, the report states that NASA

achieved its performance target to maintain a diverse NASA

workforce throughout the downsizing efforts.

Information Security: Our January 2001 high-risk update noted

that the agencies’ and governmentwide efforts to strengthen

information security have gained momentum and expanded.

Nevertheless, recent audits continue to show federal computer

systems are riddled with weaknesses that make them highly

vulnerable to computer-based attacks and place a broad range

of critical operations and assets at risk of fraud, misuse, and

disruption.

In 1999, we reported that NASA lacked an effective agencywide

security program that includes improvements in five areas:

assessing risks and evaluating needs, implementing policies

and controls, monitoring compliance with policy and

effectiveness of controls, providing computer security training,

and coordinating responses to security incidents. The need for

such a framework was serious; tests we conducted at 1 of

NASA’s 10 field centers found that mission-critical information

systems were vulnerable to unauthorized access. We

successfully penetrated several of these systems, including one

responsible for calculating detailed positioning data for earth

orbiting spacecraft and another that processes and distributes

scientific data received from these spacecraft.

The report provides no specifics to judge whether progress has

been made in improving information technology security.

GAO-designated major management challenges

The Need to Correct Weaknesses in NASA’s Contract

Management: We have reported that NASA’s contract

management is a continuing area of high risk. Implementation

The report states (1) NASA failed to meet its target to begin the

implementation of the Integrated Financial Management System at

NASA installations; and (2) extended system testing demonstrated
Appendix I: Observations on NASA’s Efforts

to Address Its Major Management Challenges

Page 17 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

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Progress in resolving major management challenges as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report

of the financial management system and its integration with full

cost accounting have been delayed. Until the Integrated

Financial Management System is operational, performance

assessments relying on cost data may be incomplete. We have

also reported that NASA is continuing to rely on undefinitized

change orders—that is, contract changes initiating new work

before NASA and the contractor agree on a final estimated cost

and fee—to complete work on its largest space station contract.

We stated that this is a risky way of doing business because it

increases the potential for unforeseen cost increases and

scheduling delays.

that the software was not ready for deployment and would not

meet NASA’s needs, so NASA terminated the contract. NASA

then reformulated the program, breaking implementation into

individual software modules and recently selected a contractor for

the Core Financial System (CFS). The report states NASA will

begin the CFS Agency Design Phase in fiscal year 2001, complete

pilot center activities in fiscal year 2002, and implement the system

at the remaining centers in fiscal year 2003.

The Need to Control International Space Station (ISS)

Development and Support Costs: We have reported that the ISS

program continues to face cost-control challenges.c NASA’s

OIG also reported that the ISS program continued to experience

cost overruns and scheduling delays.

The report does not directly address the ISS cost control issue and

contain performance measures that address ISS cost control

issues. This challenge is discussed in detail in the outcomes

section of this report.

The Need to Effectively Implement the Faster-Better-Cheaper

Approach to Space Exploration Projects: We have reported that

NASA faces significant challenges as it attempts to create highly

reliable missions and foster open communications under the

budget constraints of the agency’s faster-better-cheaper space

exploration strategy. In addition, real success will require a

comprehensive integration of lessons learned from failures on

an agencywide basis. Until NASA resolves these problems, its

financial resources are vulnerable to inefficient use.

This was designated as a new major management challenge in

January 2001.

The report states NASA failed to achieve its performance target for

the Mars Climate Orbiter. The spacecraft was lost during orbit

insertion in fiscal year 1999. The report states NASA failed to

achieve its performance target to successfully land the Mars Polar

Lander (MPL) on Mars in December 1999 and to operate its

science instruments for the 80-day prime mission with at least 75

percent of planned science data returned. However, related to this

management challenge, the report states (1) NASA achieved its

performance target to release an announcement of opportunity

(AO) for the next Discovery mission; (2) NASA’s Discovery

program of lower-cost, highly focused scientific spacecraft

represents the implementation of NASA’s vision of planetary

missions that are “faster, better, cheaper;” and (3) three highly

successful discovery spacecraft have completed their missions.

The report also states that NASA failed to achieve its performance

target to capture a set of “best practices/ lessons learned” from

each program. However, the report states that NASA expects all

programs will provide lessons learned in fiscal year 2001.

OIG-designated major management challenges

Safety and Mission Assurance: NASA’s OIG has reported that

safety and mission assurance has become a serious challenge

for NASA. Key considerations to ensure safety in future NASA

operations include (1) ensuring an appropriate level of training

for staff who conduct safety reviews and evaluations; (2)

maintaining adequate safety reporting systems; (3) ensuring

variances to standard safety procedures are appropriately

justified, reviewed, and approved; (4) maintaining an effective

emergency preparedness program; (5) ensuring NASA and

contractor compliance with safety standards and regulations; (6)

ensuring product safety and reliability; and (7) ensuring the

space shuttle and the ISS maintain crew safety.

The report discusses several safety-related targets. The report

states that NASA set a target for ontime successful space shuttle

launches, but NASA management concluded that the indicator

might compromise safety; failed to achieve its performance target

to have in place an aggressive shuttle program that ensures the

availability of a safe and reliable shuttle system; decided to hire

additional staff to ensure that safety would not be compromised for

space shuttle missions; and did not achieve its performance target

to flight-demonstrate a conceptual aircraft flight deck integrated

with evolving ground-based runway incursion avoidance

technologies installed at a major airport. The report also states

NASA achieved its performance targets to (1) achieve seven or

fewer flight anomalies on average for missions flown and (2) (a)

develop medical protocols and test the capability of the Crew

Health Care System; (b) evaluate and develop for flight testing a

minimum of three major research protocols intended to protect

bone, muscle, and physical work capacity and prepare a minimum

of 10 biomedical research experiments to study human responses
Appendix I: Observations on NASA’s Efforts

to Address Its Major Management Challenges

Page 18 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

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Progress in resolving major management challenges as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report

to the gravitational environment; (c) complete the first phase of the

Advanced Life Support System Integration Test Bed facility; (d)

provide training to the appropriate NASA supervisors to prevent

injury and illness on-the-job, increase employee participation in the

wellness program by at least 25 percent over the fiscal year 1997

baseline and achieve a 10-percent reduction in workers’

compensation claims over the fiscal year 1998 baseline; and (e)

reduce the number of lost workdays by 5 percent from the fiscal

year 1994-96 3-year average. Furthermore, the NASA Advisory

Council states management needs to focus attention on the

Shuttle Safety Upgrades Program until it is properly defined and

proper cost estimates are developed.

International Space Station: NASA’s OIG has reported that the

ISS is a significant management challenge due to significant

problems related to ISS cost, contingency planning, and the X38/Crew Return Vehicle. Key considerations for continued ISS

assembly and operation are (1) managing the political, financial,

technical, and safety challenges presented by an international

partnership; (2) overcoming technical challenges inherent in

manufacturing, assembling, and testing complex hardware and

software components provided by different nations and

integrated in space; (3) safely maintaining, upgrading, and

operating a structure as complicated as the space station; and

(4) maximizing the beneficial use of the space station for

scientific research and technology development.

NASA OIG’s description of the ISS major management challenge

is more broadly focused than our related management challenge.

(See discussion under GAO-designated major management

challenge, the need to control ISS development and support

costs.) The report states that NASA made excellent progress on its

objective to deploy and operate the ISS to advance scientific,

exploration, engineering, and commercial objectives and that more

than 90 percent of the prime contractor’s development work has

been completed. The report states several ongoing issues

continued to constrain the ISS program and prevent achievement

of the fiscal year 2000 performance targets such as deploying and

activating the U.S. Laboratory Module to provide a permanent on

orbit laboratory capability, the Canadian-built space station remote

manipulator system, and the Airlock to provide an ISS-based

extravehicle activity capability. Others include (1) conducting

operations with a three-person human presence on the ISS; (2)

delivering to orbit the first of three Italian built multi-purpose

logistics modules; (3) completing preparations for the initial ISS

research capability through the integration of the first rack of the

human research facility; and (4) completing the production of the

X-38 first space flight test in preparation for a shuttle test flight in

2001. The Russian Proton failures and Service Module launch

schedule delayed the entire assembly sequence into fiscal year

2001. The report states: (1) outyear propulsion ISS contingency

planning included plans to augment Russian and logistics

capabilities with the space shuttle and development of a

permanent U.S. propulsion module and (2) a new design approach

has been selected, and a formal decision to proceed will be

reviewed in the spring of 2001. The report briefly addresses

concerns related to space station cost overruns by listing GAO and

NASA OIG reports issued in fiscal year 2000.

Information Technology: NASA’s OIG has reported that

information technology has become a serious challenge for

NASA. Key considerations for an effective information

technology program include (1) ensuring data security, integrity,

and application controls; (2) protecting operations and

communications with spacecraft; and (3) monitoring and

evaluating the streamlining of operations through outsourcing

information technology operations for cost efficiencies,

dependency on the vendor for technological direction,

vulnerability of strategic information to outsiders, and

The report states that NASA met all agency IT customer

satisfaction and cost performance targets in fiscal year 2000 and

improved performance of agencywide IT support while maintaining

customer ratings of “satisfied” to “very satisfied.”
Appendix I: Observations on NASA’s Efforts

to Address Its Major Management Challenges

Page 19 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

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Progress in resolving major management challenges as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report

dependency on the viability of the vendor.

NASA’s OIG reported that during fiscal year 2000 NASA

continued to have a fragmented information technology (IT)

security program without clear lines of authority, policies,

guidelines, or enforcement. The OIG reported that audits of

several mission critical information systems disclosed that

NASA had not implemented adequate basic controls in areas

such as system access, protection of critical files, system

backup and restore procedures, privileged operations controls,

and system audit and monitoring capabilities.

(See discussion under governmentwide high-risk challenge:

information security for additional details.)

Procurement: NASA’s OIG has reported that procurement is an

ongoing challenge for NASA. Key considerations for effective

procurement at NASA include (1) ensuring proper levels of

staffing to perform contracting requirements; (2) providing

sufficient controls over and monitoring both prime and

subcontractors; (3) implementing or increasing the use of

innovative procurement procedures such as earned value

management and performance incentive fees; and (4) ensuring

costs billed to NASA cost-type contracts, due to the changing

industry environment, are reasonable and allowable.

The report states that NASA failed to meet its target to begin the

implementation of the Integrated Financial Management System at

NASA installations following the completion of system testing. The

report states that NASA achieved its performance targets of having

funds available for performance based contracts (PBC),

maintaining PBC obligations at 80 percent; achieving at least the

congressionally mandated 8-percent goal for annual funding to

small disadvantaged businesses; and competitively awarding 80

percent or more of the available research resources in these

programs based on peer review for selecting and

funding/conducting research and analysis and core technology

projects, the Space Science Enterprise, the Earth Science

Enterprise and the Life and Microgravity Science and Applications

program. However, the report does not directly address (1)

ensuring proper levels of staffing to perform contracting

requirements; (2) providing sufficient controls over and monitoring

of both prime and subcontractors; (3) implementing or increasing

the use of innovative procurement procedures such as earned

value management and performance incentive fees; and (4)

ensuring costs billed to NASA cost-type contracts, due to the

changing industry environment, are reasonable and allowable.

However, the report lists and describes fiscal year 2000 GAO and

NASA OIG reports that identify ISS concerns related to prime

contract changes and contractor cost overruns and cost control.

Furthermore, the report states that NASA’s management is in

general agreement with these reports.

Fiscal Management: NASA’s OIG has reported that fiscal

management continues to be a significant challenge for NASA.

Key considerations to improved fiscal management include: (1)

monitoring contractor performance of financial statement audits

to ensure that the statements are properly prepared and

thoroughly reviewed; (2) ensuring adequate integration and

testing of newly developed automated accounting modules or

capability; and (3) ensuring that NASA continues to properly

account for and record financial transactions as new capability is

implemented.

The report states that NASA achieved its performance target to

cost 70 percent or more of available resources by using NASA’s

Financial and Contractual Status (FACS) reports. However, at the

same time, NASA failed to meet its target of implementing the

Integrated Financial Management System at NASA installations.

This system is key to producing accurate and reliable information

for full-cost accounting. Until the system is operational,

performance assessments relying on cost data may be incomplete

and full costing will be only partially implemented. Measuring costs

is key to measuring performance in terms of efficiency and costeffectiveness. The lack of relevant and reliable cost information

affects NASA’s ability to make economic choices, and to estimate

and control cost increases.
Appendix I: Observations on NASA’s Efforts

to Address Its Major Management Challenges

Page 20 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

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Progress in resolving major management challenges as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report

Program and Project Management: NASA’s OIG has reported

that NASA faces significant challenges in program and project

management. Key considerations to effectively managing

NASA programs include (1) improving planning to enable NASA

to accomplish its missions in the face of budget and human

capital issues; (2) eliminating duplication in programs and

improving coordination with other research and development

organizations; (3) ensuring that programs and projects

accurately assess their progress and successfully achieve their

goals; and (4) effectively using technology developments to

increase NASA productivity.

The report states NASA failed to achieve its performance target to

meet schedule and cost commitments by keeping the development

and upgrade of major scientific facilities and capital assets within

110 percent of cost and schedule estimates, on average, and

capture a set of “best practices/lessons learned” from each

program. This element materially affects the improvement of

NASA’s program/project management. The report also states that

NASA achieved its performance target to dedicate the percentage

of NASA’s budget that is established in the fiscal year 1999

process to commercial partnerships. The percentage of NASA’s

research and development budget dedicated to commercial

partnerships affects integrated technology planning and

development with NASA partners. According to the report, NASA

achieved its performance target to increase the amount of

leveraging of the technology budget with activities of other

organizations, relative to the fiscal year 1999 baseline that is

established during the process development, and two of the three

performance targets for objective 2 (Plan and set priorities) of the

Generate Knowledge Crosscutting Process.

Launch Vehicles: NASA’s OIG reported on challenges in (1)

ensuring the availability of small expendable launch vehicles to

ensure schedule milestones and cost-effectiveness of NASA

missions; (2) evaluating whether NASA is providing the majority

of developmental funds and assigning technology rights to its

industry partners in the development of the new reusable launch

vehicles in the best interest of the government; and (3) ensuring

that plans are in place and are effectively implemented to

address shuttle systems obsolescence, logistics support,

technical/safety upgrades, and funding.

Although we did not identify the X-33 advanced technology

demonstrator as a major management challenge, we have

reported and testified that the program must overcome key

technological challenges before the development of launch

vehicles.d

The report states that the X-33 and X-34 advanced technology

demonstrators are part of NASA’s ongoing efforts to pave the way

for commercial development of reusable launch vehicles that will

dramatically reduce cost and increase the reliability of space

transportation. NASA states that it failed to achieve its

performance target to conduct the flight testing of the X-33 vehicle.

The report acknowledges the X-33 project experienced a

significant setback as a result of the X-33 hydrogen tank failure in

November 1999. NASA did not achieve its performance target to

complete vehicle assembly and begin the flight test of the second

X-34 vehicle. NASA does not explain how it determined how much

funding and what data rights to give to its industry partners in the

X-33 and X-34 programs. Thus, it is difficult to assess the extent

cost-effectiveness was achieved. However, the report states that

NASA determined if additional government funds were to be

provided for the programs, these programs would be subject to a

competitive proposal process. The selection process did not result

in either program being selected for additional government funding.

Technology Development: NASA’s OIG has reported that

technology development has become a serious challenge for

NASA. Key considerations to effective technology development

include (1) achieving a balance between scientific research and

technology development and demonstration projects; (2)

continuing to refine the technology transfer process to ensure

that U.S. industry achieves the maximum benefit from the new

technologies identified; (3) determining if NASA’s organizational

structure effectively supports technology development and

transfer; (4) forming innovative partnership arrangements with

U.S. industry to share both the risk and costs of technology

demonstration and commercialization; (5) ensuring that NASA

technology demonstrations do not unfairly distort the

marketplace; (6) ensuring that adequate controls exist on

cooperative technology development programs; and (7)

ensuring adequate protection of NASA-developed technology.

The report states NASA (1) met the three performance targets for

the earth science objective to develop and transfer advanced

remote-sensing technologies; (2) achieved its performance target

to complete the development and initiate the implementation of a

comprehensive technology investment strategy to support future

human exploration; (3) did not achieve its performance target for

the objective to invest in enabling high-leverage exploration

technologies; (4) failed to achieve its performance target to

complete and deliver a technology development plan for the

Terrestrial Planet Finder mission by June 2000; (5) did not

achieve two of the three performance targets for the space science

enterprise objective to develop innovative technologies for

enterprise missions and for external customers; and (6) met or

exceeded 8 of the 16 targets to measure progress toward the 10

specific objectives of the aerospace technology enterprise. Three

targets were not fully accomplished, but they are projected to be
Appendix I: Observations on NASA’s Efforts

to Address Its Major Management Challenges

Page 21 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major management challenges as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report

met during fiscal year 2001; the remaining five targets not

achieved involved recovery plans with projected completion

beyond fiscal year 2001. The report also states NASA (1) did not

achieve the one performance target for the objective to capture

and preserve engineering and technological process knowledge to

continuously improve NASA’s program/project management; (2)

achieved the two performance targets for the objective to focus on

integrated technology planning and development in cooperation

with commercial industry and other NASA partners and customers;

and (3) achieved its performance target to increase new

opportunities to transfer technology to private industry from 19,600

to 19,800.

International Agreements: NASA’s OIG reported that

international agreements are needed to ensure effective and

efficient programs. Key considerations include (1) program and

project vulnerability to schedule delays and cost overruns that

require diplomatic rather than contractual solutions; (2) security

controls on technology that impacts national security; (3)

controls to assure the quality and timeliness of the goods and

services provided; (4) mechanisms to assure a balance between

program needs and national considerations; (5) plans with

specific critical paths and planned alternative courses of action

to maintain program/project continuity; and (6) proper controls

over access to NASA facilities by foreign national visitors.

Although we did not identify this issue as a major management

challenge, in November 1999, we recommended measures to

enhance NASA’s ability to oversee and implement its export

controls of ISS-related technologies.e

The report states (1) in fiscal year 2000, NASA and its international

partners passed a major test in the assembly of the ISS; (2) the

STS-99 was the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, which was

part of an international project spearheaded by the National

Imagery and Mapping Agency and NASA, with participation from

the German Aerospace Center; (3) NASA Medical Informatics and

Technology Applications Consortium has established a

memorandum of understanding in telemedicine with MEDES, a

French research consortium, which has laid the groundwork for the

development of an international telemedicine program; (4) NASA

and the Canadian Space Agency signed an agreement for basic

imaging coverage plus additional interferometric mapping; (5)

NASA supports both American and international scientific teams

that examine Earth and its environment and foster dialogs among

researchers that conduct sound scientific research and explore

new scientific frontiers; and (6) the Rosetta project delivered the

electrical qualification models for the four U.S.- provided

instruments to the European Space Agency in May 2000 for

integration with the Rosetta Orbiter. The report states NASA

achieved other performance targets associated with making

significant contributions to international scientific assessments and

cooperation, including: providing the first global, regional, and

country-by-country forest cover inventory in support of national and

international needs of research, operational, and policy

communities; and launching three spacecraft and delivering two

instruments for international launches within 10 percent of budget

on average. However, NASA failed to achieve its target of

conducting the first regional international assessment in South

Africa to quantify the effects of climate variability and management

practices on the environment.
Appendix I: Observations on NASA’s Efforts

to Address Its Major Management Challenges

Page 22 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major management challenges as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report

Environmental Management: NASA’s OIG reported that

environmental management is a significant management

challenge. Key considerations include: (1) prioritizing and

addressing environmental obligations; (2) developing consistent

procedures under an agencywide policy; and (3) negotiating

cost-sharing agreements for environmental cleanup with

previous government and private sector tenants that are also

responsible parties.

The report states that NASA significantly exceeded its

performance target to demonstrate, in a laboratory combustion

experiment, an advanced turbine-engine combustor concept that

will achieve up to a 70-percent reduction of oxides of nitrogen

emissions based on the 1996 International Civil Aviation

Organization standard and achieved its performance target to

validate the technologies to reduce noise for large commercial

transports by at least 7 decibels relative to 1992 production

technology. However, the report does not address three key

management actions: (1) ranking and addressing liabilities; (2)

developing consistent procedures under NASA policy; and (3)

negotiating cost-sharing agreements for environmental cleanup

with previous government and private sector tenants that are also

responsible parties.

a

Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require Continued Attention

(GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186, Aug. 15, 2000).

b

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(GAO-01-258, Jan. 2001).

c

GAO-01-258, Jan. 2001.

d

Space Transporation: Status of the X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle Program (GAO/NSIAD-99-176,

Aug. 11, 1999); Space Transportation: Progress of the X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle Program

(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-243, Sept. 29, 1999); and Space Transportation: Critical Areas NASA Needs to

Address in Managing Its Reusable Launch Vehicle Program (GAO-01-826T, Jun. 20, 2001).

e

Export Controls: International Space Station Technology Transfers (GAO/NSIAD-00-14, Nov. 3,

1999).
Appendix II: Comments From the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 23 GAO-01-868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Appendix II: Comments From the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration

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