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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

CASE NO.:

NOAH GREENBLATT

and

CODY TEAGUE,

Plaintiffs, 

v.

GREEN PLANET CORP.,

a Florida Profit Corporation,

Defendant.

________________________________/

COMPLAINT & DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs, NOAH GREENBLATT (“Mr. Greenblatt”) and CODY TEAGUE 

(“Mr. Teague”), collectively “Plaintiffs,” by and through undersigned counsel, file this 

Complaint against Defendant, GREEN PLANET CORP. (“Defendant” or “GPC”), and 

states as follows:

NATURE OF THE SUIT

1. This action is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) to 

recover from Defendant overtime compensation, liquidated damages, declaratory relief, 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other damages permitted by law. 

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE

2. Plaintiffs were employees who performed services on behalf of 

Defendant in Broward County, Florida, and nearby/adjacent counties.

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3. GPC is a Florida profit corporation located in Coral Springs, Broward

County, Florida, and which, at all times relevant, performed work in Broward County, 

Florida.

4. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court, as the claims are brought pursuant to 

the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., hereinafter “FLSA”), 

to recover unpaid overtime wages, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, to 

obtain declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

5. Venue is proper in this Court, as the actions giving rise to this lawsuit 

occurred in Broward County, Florida.

FLSA COVERAGE

6. At all times material hereto, Defendant was, and continues to be, an 

“employer” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

7. At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs were “employees” within the 

meaning of the FLSA. 

8. At all times material hereto, Defendant was Plaintiffs’ “employer” within 

the meaning of the FLSA. 

9. At all times material hereto, Defendant was, and continues to be, an 

“enterprise engaged in commerce” or in the production of goods for commerce as defined 

by the FLSA.

10. At all times material hereto, Defendant was primarily engaged in 

providing lawnmowing, landscaping, tree-trimming, and other groundskeeping services 

to local customers via its premises located in Broward County, Florida.

11. At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs were “engaged in commerce” 

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within the meaning of § 6 and § 7 of the FLSA, but not for purposes of the Motor Carrier 

Act.

12. At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs were engaged in the “production 

of goods for commerce” and subject to the individual coverage of the FLSA, but not for 

purposes of the Motor Carrier Act.

13. At all times material hereto, Defendant had two (2) or more employees 

handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that had been moved in or 

produced for commerce, such as lawnmowers, weedeaters, labor tools, equipment, and 

machinery, but which had come to rest within its warehouse location in Broward County, 

Florida. 

14. At all times material hereto, the work performed by Plaintiffs was directly 

essential to the business performed by Defendant, in that Defendant could not operate its 

business without crew leaders and tree trimmers like Mr. Greenblatt and groundsmen 

like Mr. Teague.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

15. Mr. Greenblatt has worked for Defendant under the title of Crew Leader, 

Operator, and Tree Trimmer for a landscaping crew from July 17, 2019, through the 

present.

16. Mr. Teague worked for Defendant under the title of Groundsman for a 

landscaping crew from August 1, 2019, until October 16, 2019.

17. Plaintiffs always worked in Broward County, Florida, and 

nearby/adjacent counties, and his activities were at all times controlled and closely 

supervised by Defendant’s managers and supervisors.

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18. Plaintiffs had no authority to hire or fire employees of GPC.

19. Plaintiffs had no authority to discipline employees of GPC.

20. Plaintiffs had no authority to determine the schedules to be worked by 

any employees of GPC, or to change the schedules.

21. Plaintiffs had no authority to set rates of pay for other employees or agents 

of GPC.

22. Plaintiffs had no input into performance reviews of other employees or 

agents of GPC.

23. All of Plaintiffs’ major decisions had to be cleared in advance by one of 

GPC’s supervisors.

24. Plaintiffs were closely monitored by GPC’s managers and supervisors at 

all times.

25. Plaintiffs followed procedures established by GPC and did exactly as he 

was instructed to do.

26. Plaintiffs’ duties were to perform lawnmowing, landscaping, treetrimming, and other groundskeeping services.

27. Throughout Plaintiffs’ employment, Defendant regularly required 

Plaintiffs to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week.

28. Defendant paid Mr. Greenblatt a day rate of $140.00 per day of work.

29. Defendant paid Mr. Teague a day rate of $105.00 per day of work

30. Plaintiffs regularly worked sixty (60) or more hours per week for 

Defendant.

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31. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs full and proper overtime compensation

for all hours worked over forty (40) per week during the above-noted time period.

32. When Plaintiffs worked more than forty (40) hours in a given work week, 

Defendant failed to properly pay them for all overtime hours worked. 

33. Defendant failed to show the number of hours worked by Plaintiffs in 

each pay period on Plaintiffs’ periodic pay stubs. Instead, only a dollar amount of wages 

was displayed on Plaintiffs’ paychecks.

34. Mr. Greenblatt’s Manager at GPC, Sergey Sadovoy, regularly put a 

notation stating “independent contractor” on Mr. Greenblatt’s paychecks.

35. Mr. Greenblatt was an hourly-paid employee of GPC, and not an 

independent contractor.

36. Plaintiffs should have been compensated at the rate of one-and-one-half 

times Plaintiffs’ regular rates for all hours that Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty (40) 

hours per week, as required by the FLSA, throughout their employment.

37. Defendant violated Title 29 U.S.C. §207 in that:

(a) Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty (40) hours in one or more workweeks for 

his period of employment with Defendant;

(b) No payments or provisions for payment have been made by Defendant to 

properly compensate Plaintiffs at the statutory rate of one-and-one-half times 

Plaintiffs’ regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per 

work week, as provided by the FLSA; and

(c) Defendant failed to maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA.

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38. Prior to violating the FLSA, Defendant did not consult with an attorney 

to evaluate whether Plaintiffs’ actual job duties and pay structure rendered them exempt 

from recovering payment for all overtime worked under the FLSA.

39. Prior to violating the FLSA, Defendant did not consult with the 

Department of Labor to evaluate whether Plaintiffs’ actual job duties and pay structure 

rendered them exempt from recovering payment for all overtime worked under the 

FLSA.

40. Prior to violating the FLSA, Defendant did not consult with an accountant 

to evaluate whether Plaintiffs’ actual job duties and pay structure rendered them exempt 

from recovering payment for all overtime worked under the FLSA.

41. Based on the allegations in Paragraphs 38-40, above, Plaintiffs are

entitled to liquidated damages, as Defendant had no objective or subjective good faith 

belief that its pay practices were in compliance with the FLSA.

42. Plaintiffs have retained the law firm of RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, 

P.A. to represent them in the litigation and has agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee 

for its services.

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF 29 U.S.C. §207 OVERTIME COMPENSATION

43. Plaintiffs reincorporate and re-allege paragraphs 1 through 42 of the 

Complaint as though set forth fully herein, and further allege as follows: 

44. Plaintiffs are entitled to be paid time-and-one-half their regular rates of 

pay for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) per work week. 

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45. During Plaintiffs’ employment with Defendant, Plaintiffs regularly 

worked overtime hours, but were not paid full and proper time-and-one-half

compensation for all hours worked. 

46. Plaintiffs were not exempt employees as defined by the FLSA.

47. As a result of Defendant’s intentional, willful, and unlawful acts in 

refusing to pay Plaintiffs time-and-one-half their regular rates of pay for each hour 

worked in excess of forty (40) per work week in one or more work weeks, Plaintiffs have

suffered damages, in addition to incurring reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 

48. As a result of Defendant’s willful violation of the FLSA, Plaintiffs are

entitled to liquidated damages. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that judgment be entered in 

their favor against Defendant, and that this Court:

a. Declare, pursuant to the FLSA, that the acts and practices complained 

of herein are in violation of the maximum hour provisions of the 

FLSA;

b. Award Plaintiffs overtime compensation in the amount due to them

for time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week;

c. Award Plaintiffs liquidated damages in an amount equal to the 

overtime award applicable to each Plaintiff; 

d. Award Plaintiffs reasonable attorney’s fees and costs and expenses of 

the litigation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b);

e. Award Plaintiffs pre-judgment interest; and order any other and 

further relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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JURY DEMAND

Plaintiffs demand trial by jury on all issues so triable as a matter of right by jury.

DATED this 9th day of July, 2020.

Respectfully Submitted, 

By: /s/Noah E. Storch

Noah E. Storch, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 0085476 

RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, P.A.

10368 W. SR 84, Suite 103

Davie, Florida 33324

Telephone: (866) 344-9243

Facsimile: (954) 337-2771

E-mail:noah@floridaovertimelawyer.com

Trial Counsel for Plaintiff

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