Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

August 2001 INS’ SOUTHWEST

BORDER STRATEGY

Resource and Impact

Issues Remain After

Seven Years

GAO-01-842
Page i GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

Scope and Methodology 6

INS Continues to Implement Its Southwest Border Strategy and

Estimates Significantly More Resources Are Needed to Fully

Implement It 7

Strategy’s Effect on Reducing Overall Illegal Entry Unclear, but

Border Control Initiatives Have Had Positive and Negative

Community Impacts 10

Experience Gained With Strategy Implementation; the Importance

of Communication; and Aliens’ Determination to Enter Illegally 21

Conclusions 28

Recommendation for Executive Action 28

Agency Comments 29

Appendix I INS Border Patrol Authorized Staffing and Alien

Apprehensions in Southwest Sectors 31

Appendix II Comments From the Department of Justice 32

Tables

Table 1: Onboard Border Patrol Agents by Southwest Border Patrol

Sector, Fiscal Years 1993 Through 2000 8

Table 2: Migrant Deaths by Cause of Death 25

Table 3: Authorized Border Patrol Agent Positions in Southwest

Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 1993 Through 2000 31

Table 4: Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal

Years 1993 Through 2000 31

Figures

Figure 1: Nine Southwest Border Patrol Sectors 4

Figure 2: Apprehensions in Southwest Border Patrol Sectors in

Fiscal Years 1995, 1998, and 2000 12

Figure 3: Southwest Border Apprehensions in Fiscal Years 1992-

2000 13

Contents
Page ii GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

Figure 4: Apprehensions in Selected Southwest Border Sector

Stations 17

Figure 5: Road Infrastructure in the Southwest Border Region 18

Figure 6: Border Patrol Migrant Rescues in Fiscal Years 1999

Through June 1, 2001 27

Abbreviations

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

IDENT INS’ automated biometric identification system

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
Page 1 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

August 2, 2001

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy

Chairman

The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on the Judiciary

United States Senate

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.

Chairman

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

With the illegal alien population in the United States estimated to be

between 5 and a reported 11 million people, the issue of illegal

immigration continues to attract the attention of policymakers, the media,

and the public. In 1994, the Attorney General announced a five-part

strategy to strengthen enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws,

including a strategy to deter illegal entry along the Southwest border. To

deter illegal entry between the nation’s ports of entry, the strategy called

for the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) Border Patrol to

incrementally increase control of the border in four phases to make it so

difficult and costly for aliens to attempt illegal entry that fewer individuals

would try. The four-phased approach involved adding resources along the

Southwest border, starting with the areas that had the highest known

levels of illegal alien activity.

Seven years later, INS continues to make record numbers of arrests for

illegal entry along the Southwest border—over 1.6 million in fiscal year

2000. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of

1996 requires us to track, monitor, and evaluate the Attorney General’s

strategy and to report annually for 6 years.1

 We have issued two previous

 1

P.L. 104-208, sec. 107.

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

reports on INS’ Southwest border strategy and two others dealing with

other parts of the Attorney General’s strategy.2

As agreed with your Committees, this report focuses on the component of

the Attorney General’s strategy that deals with INS’ efforts to deter illegal

entry between the ports of entry along the Southwest border. Specifically,

this report addresses (1) INS’ progress in implementing the strategy, (2)

the strategy’s effects to date, and (3) experience gained as the strategy has

unfolded over the past 7 years.

Since fiscal year 1998, INS has been implementing phase II of its fourphased strategy. In phase II, INS has added almost 1,200 Border Patrol

agents and other resources primarily to Arizona and South Texas, reaching

an onboard strength of nearly 8,500 agents along the Southwest border. To

fully implement the Southwest border strategy, INS’ preliminary estimates

show it may need an additional 3,200 to 5,500 Border Patrol agents,

additional support personnel, and hundreds of millions of dollars in

additional technology and infrastructure, such as new roads and facilities.

It would take at least 5 more years to add the minimum number of agents

INS believes it needs along the Southwest border if the administration’s

current agent hiring goals are maintained and met.

The primary discernable effect of the strategy, based on INS’ apprehension

statistics, appears to be a shifting of the illegal alien traffic. Between 1998

and 2000, apprehensions declined in three Border Patrol sectors, San

Diego, CA, and El Paso and McAllen TX, but increased in five of the other

six Southwest border sectors. The extent to which INS’ border control

efforts may have affected overall illegal entry along the Southwest border

remains unclear, however. Although INS maintains data on apprehended

aliens in its automated fingerprint system, it has not analyzed the data to

determine how many aliens have been arrested, how many times they have

been arrested, where they have been arrested, and how these numbers

have changed over time in response to border enforcement efforts. Such

information would provide a better understanding of the relationship

 2

Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation

Needed (GAO/GGD-98-21, Dec. 11, 1997); Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing

Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist (GAO/GGD-99-33, Apr. 2, 1999); Illegal

Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation (GAO/GGD-99-44,

May 19, 1999); and Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements

Needed to Address Growing Problem (GAO/GGD-00-103, May 1, 2000).

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

between INS’ strategy and overall illegal entry along the Southwest border.

We are recommending that INS use the data in its automated fingerprint

system to help it measure the results of its border control efforts and

enable it to refine its border enforcement strategy. In commenting on a

draft of this report, INS’ Executive Associate Commissioner for Field

Operations concurred with our recommendation and stated that INS will

begin developing specific performance indicators using data from its

automated fingerprint system.

At the community level, implementation of the strategy and the resulting

changes in the level of illegal alien apprehensions, a proxy for the level of

illegal alien traffic, have reportedly had both positive and negative effects.

When increased INS enforcement resulted in apprehensions declining in

certain border communities, some of the communities reported

experiencing lower crime levels, civic and economic improvements, and

an improved quality of life. When apprehensions surged in communities in

which the illegal alien traffic was reportedly pushed, officials and

residents in one community reported experiencing loss of business,

destruction of private property, and environmental degradation.

As the strategy has unfolded, there has been an accumulation of

knowledge and experience regarding factors that could impede INS’ ability

to implement the strategy; the importance of communications between

INS and border communities; and aliens’ determination to cross the

border. First, it has taken INS longer to implement the strategy than

originally planned because, among other things, INS experienced

difficulties hiring Border Patrol agents and delays in obtaining approvals

needed to deploy technology and build fences. Second, INS has recognized

that it needs to make outreach efforts to communities because its initial

failure to warn some communities about anticipated increases in illegal

alien traffic caught community officials by surprise. Third, although INS

has realized its goal of shifting illegal alien traffic away from urban areas,

this has been achieved at a cost to both illegal aliens and INS. In

particular, rather than being deterred from attempting illegal entry, many

aliens have instead risked injury and death by trying to cross mountains,

deserts, and rivers. This has prompted INS to create a media campaign to

warn aliens about the dangers of crossing illegally, as well as to establish

search-and-rescue units.

In 1997 and 1999, we reported that INS was implementing its border

strategy generally as planned. The strategy called for concentrating

personnel and technology in a four-phased approach, starting first with the

Background
Page 4 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

sectors with the highest levels of illegal immigration activity (as measured

by apprehensions) and moving to the areas with the least activity. The four

phases of the strategy called for allocating additional Border Patrol

resources to sectors along the border in the following order: (1) Phase I:

San Diego, CA, and El Paso, TX, sectors; (2) Phase II: Tucson, AZ, sector

and three sectors in south Texas—Del Rio, Laredo, and McAllen; (3) Phase

III: the remaining three sectors along the Southwest border; (4) Phase IV:

the Northern border, Gulf Coast, and coastal waterways. The Southwest

border, which has been the focus of INS’ buildup in Border Patrol

resources to date, represents 9 of the Border Patrol’s 21 sectors

nationwide (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: Nine Southwest Border Patrol Sectors

Source: GAO.

The strategy’s objectives are to (1) close off the routes most frequently

used by smugglers and illegal aliens (generally through urban areas) and

(2) shift traffic to ports of entry, where travelers are inspected, or to areas

that are more remote and difficult to cross. With the traditional crossing

routes disrupted, INS expected that illegal alien traffic would either be

MEXICO

Del Rio

Laredo

Tucson

Pacific

Ocean

Gulf of

Mexico

El Paso

San Diego

McAllen

Marfa

Yuma

El Centro

California Arizona New Mexico Texas Oklahoma
Page 5 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

deterred or forced over terrain less suited for crossing, where INS believed

it would have the tactical advantage.

INS’ Border Patrol is responsible for preventing and detecting illegal entry

along the border between the nation’s ports of entry. To carry out the

strategy, the Border Patrol was to

• concentrate personnel and resources in a four-phased approach, starting

with the areas of highest illegal alien activity;

• increase the time Border Patrol agents spend on border control activities;

• make maximum use of physical barriers; and

• identify the appropriate quantity and mix of personnel and technology

needed to control the border.

The Border Patrol’s fiscal year 2001 budget is about $1.2 billion, a 9-

percent increase over its fiscal year 2000 budget of about $1.1 billion. As of

September 30, 2000, there were 9,096 Border Patrol agents nationwide;

8,475, or 93 percent, were located in the nine sectors along the Southwest

border.

INS’ phased approach to implementing its strategy has included several

operations in which INS allocated additional Border Patrol agents and

other resources—such as fencing, lighting, night vision scopes, sensors,

cameras, vehicles, and aircraft—to targeted locations along the Southwest

border. In October 1994, the Border Patrol launched Operation Gatekeeper

in its San Diego sector. Initially, the operation focused enforcement

resources along the 5 miles that at that time accounted for nearly 25

percent of all illegal border crossings nationwide. Since then, the sector

has expanded Gatekeeper to include the entire 66 miles of border under

the sector’s jurisdiction.3

In 1994, the Border Patrol began Operation Safeguard in the Tucson

sector. Initially, the operation focused enforcement resources in the

Nogales, AZ, area. Since then, the sector has expanded operations to the

Douglas and Naco, AZ, area to respond to the increase in apprehensions in

that area.

 3

In September 1993, before officially implementing of the strategy, the El Paso sector

launched Operation Hold-the-Line. Initially, the sector assigned its agents directly to a 20-

mile section of the border in the metropolitan area of El Paso. The high-profile presence

was intended to deter illegal aliens from attempting to cross the border.
Page 6 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

In August 1997, INS launched Operation Rio Grande in the Rio Grande

Valley area in south Texas. The Border Patrol focused enhanced resources

in the McAllen and Laredo, TX, sectors. In fiscal year 1998, the Border

Patrol extended Operation Gatekeeper to the El Centro sector in

California’s Imperial Valley, east of San Diego. This was done to respond

to the increase in illegal alien traffic in that area and to target the alien

smuggling rings that moved there after the Border Patrol increased its

presence in San Diego. INS has reported that each of these initiatives

reduced the number of alien apprehensions in some of the targeted areas.

INS’ apprehension statistics have been its primary quantitative indicator of

the results of the strategy. INS anticipated that the following changes,

among others, would provide evidence of the interim effectiveness of the

strategy:

• Locations receiving an infusion of resources would experience an initial

increase in the number of illegal alien apprehensions, followed by a

decrease in apprehensions when a “decisive level of resources” had been

achieved.

• Illegal alien traffic would shift from sectors that traditionally accounted

for most illegal immigration activity toward other sectors.

One of the major technological initiatives deployed along the Southwest

border has been IDENT, INS’ automated biometric identification system,

which captures apprehended aliens’ fingerprints, photos, and biographical

data, as well as information on the date and location of the apprehension.

IDENT was developed to help INS determine whether an apprehended

alien is an aggravated felon, smuggler, or repeat illegal crosser. Since fiscal

year 1995, INS has deployed the system incrementally along the Southwest

border, and it is now deployed in all Border Patrol stations within the nine

Southwest border sectors. INS spent about $34 million on IDENT

development and deployment through fiscal year 2000.

To address our three objectives, we (1) analyzed Border Patrol staffing

and workload data; (2) reviewed INS’ strategy, INS planning documents,

and reviews of INS’ Annual Performance Plans; (3) interviewed INS

officials at Border Patrol headquarters in Washington, D.C., and in the San

Diego, El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, and Del Rio sectors; (4) interviewed local

officials in Calexico, CA; Yuma, Douglas, Santa Cruz County, and Pima

County, AZ; and Cameron County and Eagle Pass, TX; (5) interviewed the

Mexican Consuls General in Nogales and Douglas, AZ; and (6) held a

group discussion with members of the Citizens Advisory Group to the

Scope and

Methodology
Page 7 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

local Border Patrol station in Douglas, AZ. We chose these locations

because, except for San Diego, Border Patrol apprehensions in these areas

increased as INS implemented its strategy. We also reviewed statistics on

migrant deaths and studies on Operations Gatekeeper and Rio Grande that

were prepared by an INS contractor. Finally, we observed border

enforcement activities in the El Centro, Yuma, and Tucson sectors.

We conducted our work between October 2000 and June 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As INS continues to implement the second phase of its four-phased

strategy, its preliminary estimates show that it may need 3,200 to 5,500

more agents, additional support personnel, and hundreds of millions of

dollars in additional technology and infrastructure to fully implement the

Southwest border strategy.

Since fiscal year 1998, INS has been implementing the second phase of its

four-phased approach, which called for primarily increasing resources in

the Tucson sector and the three sectors in south Texas—Del Rio, Laredo,

and McAllen. In accordance with the strategy, INS allocated 1,140 (80

percent) of the additional 1,430 agent positions authorized in fiscal years

1999 and 2000 to these sectors. The strategy noted that Border Patrol

needed to be flexible in responding to changing patterns in illegal traffic.

Consequently, INS added some of the additional enhancements in fiscal

years 1999 and 2000 to the Yuma and El Centro sectors, scheduled for

phase III, in order to respond to the shifts in illegal alien traffic to those

sectors.

Onboard strength in all nine sectors along the Southwest border increased

by 1,183 agents (16 percent) to almost 8,500 between fiscal years 1998 and

2000. As shown in table 1, INS has added over 5,000 agents to sectors

along the Southwest border since fiscal year 1993, the year preceding the

initial implementation of the strategy. This represents a 150-percent

INS Continues to

Implement Its

Southwest Border

Strategy and

Estimates

Significantly More

Resources Are

Needed to Fully

Implement It

Implementation of the

Strategy
Page 8 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

increase between fiscal years 1993 and 2000 in the total number of

onboard agents in the nine sectors along the Southwest border. (App. I,

table 3, provides additional information on Border Patrol agent

enhancements along the Southwest border.)

Table 1: Onboard Border Patrol Agents by Southwest Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal

Years 1993 Through 2000

Fiscal year

Sector 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Phase I

San Diego, CA 980 1,272 1,422 1,955 2,268 2,257 2,117 2,039

El Paso, TX 602 641 739 835 913 962 951 1,023

Phase II

Tucson, AZ 281 276 400 695 868 1,010 1,325 1,513

Del Rio, TX 290 283 394 398 464 580 632 750

Laredo, TX 347 332 416 411 446 623 680 790

McAllen, TX 386 385 467 501 754 1,100 1159 1,370

Phase III

El Centro, CA 194 185 187 185 246 378 420 499

Yuma, AZ 178 172 182 170 171 224 222 307

Marfa, TX 131 124 130 131 131 158 139 184

Total 3,389 3,670 4,337 5,281 6,261 7,292 7,645 8,475

Source: INS data.

As a result of the increased number of agents along the Southwest border,

the amount of time spent on border enforcement activities in these sectors

increased by 27 percent, from about 8.5 million hours in fiscal year 1998 to

almost 11 million hours in fiscal year 2000. The proportion of time Border

Patrol agents spent on border enforcement increased from 66 percent to

69 percent during this time.

INS has continued to erect barriers as called for in its strategy. Since fiscal

year 1999, INS has completed about 12 miles of fencing and other types of

barriers, bringing the total to about 76 miles along the Southwest border as

of May 2001.4

 INS had plans to erect an additional 32 miles, some of which

was under construction as of May 2001. In addition, in fiscal years 1999

 4

The San Diego sector has an additional 9 miles of secondary fencing just north of the

fencing that is along the border.
Page 9 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

and 2000, INS installed 107 remote video surveillance systems along the

Southwest border bringing the total to 130.5

According to INS’ year-end review of its fiscal year 2000 Annual

Performance Plan, INS estimated it may need between 11,700 and 14,000

agents to fully implement the Southwest border strategy. This is between

3,200 and 5,500 more agents than the roughly 8,500 agents INS had on

board along the Southwest border at the end of fiscal year 2000.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

mandated that the Attorney General increase the number of agents on

board by no less than 1,000 agents per year during each of fiscal years 1997

through 2001.6

 INS was able to meet this goal in fiscal years 1997 and 1998,

but not in the following 3 years. We reported that in fiscal year 1999, INS

was only able to achieve a net increase of 369 agents out of the goal of

1,000 because INS was unable to recruit enough qualified applicants and

retain them through the hiring process.7

 In fiscal year 2000, INS stated that

it requested no additional agents because of its concern that the ratio of

inexperienced-to-experienced agents was getting too high and law

enforcement experts said this was risky. Congress, however, funded 430

additional agents. In fiscal year 2001, INS requested 430 agents. In her

March 2000 testimony, the former INS Commissioner stated that the 430

agents represented the level that was achievable in the existing tight labor

market. It also allowed INS to have sufficient funds to increase the

journeyman level from a GS-9 to a GS-11 and for signing bonuses for those

who successfully completed the Border Patrol Academy training program.8

It would take between 5 and 9 years and congressional approval for INS to

obtain the additional Border Patrol agents it believes it needs to control

the Southwest border. As noted above, INS estimates it needs between

3,200 and 5,500 more agents than the roughly 8,500 agents it had on board

 5

Remote video surveillance cameras include daylight and low-light cameras mounted on

poles that allow Border Patrol personnel to monitor the border from a central station area.

6

P.L. 104-208, sec. 101.

7

Border Patrol Hiring: Despite Recent Initiatives, Fiscal Year 1999 Hiring Goal Was Not

Met (GAO/GGD-00-39, Dec. 17, 1999).

8

Testimony of INS Commissioner Doris Meissner before the Subcommittee on Commerce,

Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Senate Committee on Appropriations, President’s FY 2001

Budget Request, March 7, 2000.

Plans for Additional

Personnel
Page 10 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

along the Southwest border at the end of fiscal year 2000. INS plans to hire

430 agents and reach an onboard agent strength of about 8,900 agents by

the end of fiscal year 2001. The President’s fiscal year 2002 budget

requests 570 Border Patrol agents per year in 2002 and 2003. If the growth

rate of the Border Patrol continued to be 570 agents per year beyond 2003,

INS would reach the lower limit of the number of agents it believes it

needs in 2006 and the upper limit in 2010, assuming that all of the new

agents would be assigned to the Southwest border.

INS’ April 2000 Border Patrol Technology Plan outlines a 5-year plan for

adding new technology along both the Northern and Southern borders.

According to an INS official, Southwest border sectors have requested

new technology estimated to cost roughly between $450 million and $560

million, nearly all of it for about 1,100 remote video surveillance systems.

INS is also developing sector-level, integrated border infrastructure plans

(e.g. barriers, roads, and lighting) for each Southwest border sector. The

plan also states that INS will need additional support personnel, such as

Law Enforcement Communications Assistants to monitor the cameras and

technicians to repair cameras and other equipment. INS will need to

construct additional space to house both the additional equipment and

personnel. In May 2001, INS budget officials told us that they estimated it

might take between 7 and 10 years to deploy the additional staff and

equipment INS believes it needs for the Southwest border.

In commenting on our draft report, INS’ Executive Associate

Commissioner for Field Operations stated that the long–term resource

requirements we discuss above are preliminary and subject to change.

As the Border Patrol has increased enforcement in certain locations,

illegal alien apprehensions have shifted to other locations, as the Border

Patrol predicted would result from its strategy. However, until very

recently, apprehensions borderwide continued to increase. The Border

Patrol is attempting to supplement its apprehension data with additional

indicators to measure the effectiveness of its border control efforts, but it

could learn more about the results of its border control efforts if it

capitalized on using the automated fingerprint data that it collects on

apprehended illegal aliens. The shift in illegal alien apprehensions has had

both positive and negative effects on local border communities.

Plans for Additional

Technology

Strategy’s Effect on

Reducing Overall

Illegal Entry Unclear,

but Border Control

Initiatives Have Had

Positive and Negative

Community Impacts
Page 11 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

We reported in 1997 and 1999 that illegal alien apprehensions shifted as

expected after INS allocated additional resources to targeted border

sectors, such as El Paso and San Diego. This continued to occur,

especially in San Diego. As shown in figure 2, apprehensions were notably

lower in San Diego in fiscal year 2000 compared with fiscal year 1998.

Apprehensions in El Paso were slightly lower in fiscal year 2000 than in

fiscal year 1998.9

 In the McAllen sector, as resources were applied in 1997,

there was an initial increase in apprehensions in 1998, followed by a

decline in apprehensions in fiscal year 2000. However, illegal alien

apprehensions shifted to other sectors in fiscal year 1998, as indicated by

the increased apprehension levels in the El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, Laredo,

and Del Rio sectors.

 9

The greatest decline in apprehensions occurred in El Paso in fiscal year 1994, the year

after Operation Hold-the-Line began. Apprehension levels in El Paso increased in the years

after fiscal year 1994, although the total number of apprehensions in each of fiscal years

1998 through 2000 was still less than half that in fiscal year 1993.

Illegal Alien

Apprehensions Have

Continued to Shift, but

Have Increased Overall
Page 12 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

Figure 2: Apprehensions in Southwest Border Patrol Sectors in Fiscal Years 1995, 1998, and 2000

Source: INS data.

Although implementation of the strategy has shifted the areas in which

illegal aliens are apprehended, total Border Patrol apprehensions along the

Southwest border have increased overall since the strategy was

implemented in 1994. Figure 3 shows the total number of apprehensions

along the Southwest border, and table 4 in appendix I shows the

apprehension numbers for each of the nine Southwest border sectors.

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

San Diego, CA El Paso, TX Tucson, AZ McAllen, TX Laredo, TX Del Rio, TX El Centro, CA Yuma, AZ Marfa, TX

Apprehensions

Phase I Phase II Phase III

FY1995

FY1998

FY2000

Sector
Page 13 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

Figure 3: Southwest Border Apprehensions in Fiscal Years 1992-2000

Source: INS data.

Very recently, apprehensions have been declining. For the period January

through April 2001, Border Patrol apprehensions along the Southwest

border declined by 26 percent compared with the same period in fiscal

year 2000. Although the reasons for the decline are unclear and it is too

early to tell whether the decline will persist, INS and Mexican Consulate

officials we spoke with as well as some researchers offered various

theories, including the following:

• INS’ strategy is effectively deterring illegal entry.

• Substantially fewer Mexican illegal aliens went home for the holidays in

December 2000 as a result of (1) legislation that enabled them to apply for

permanent residency or (2) their believing that it would be too difficult to

get back into the United States.

0

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

1,400,000

1,600,000

1,800,000

FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000

Apprehensions
Page 14 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

• Mexicans are more optimistic about the future in Mexico and less likely to

migrate because of improvements in the Mexican economy and a change

in the Mexican government.

• Prospects for finding employment in the United States have diminished

with the slowing economy, so fewer aliens have attempted to enter

illegally.

Whether INS’ strategy has deterred illegal entry overall or whether it has

merely shifted the traffic to different locations is unclear. INS has taken

some steps to design an overall evaluation of the strategy’s effectiveness,

and it has issued reports on the effects of Operations Gatekeeper and Rio

Grande. Both these reports stated that the operations were successful in

reducing illegal entry in the locations where INS had concentrated its

enforcement resources. However, INS has not conducted a

comprehensive, systematic evaluation of the strategy’s effectiveness in

detecting and deterring aliens from entering illegally, as we recommended

in our 1997 report. With no baseline data to compare results against and

with the passage of 7 years since INS began implementing its Southwest

border strategy, undertaking such an evaluation becomes increasingly

difficult. By necessity, the evaluation would be a retrospective study that

relied on available data rather than systematically gathered evaluation

data (1) based on clearly defined indicators of the range of effects the

strategy might have and (2) collected expressly to answer the research

questions. As a result, what effect the strategy has had on overall illegal

immigration along the Southwest border may never be fully known.

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)10 requires agencies

to establish performance indicators to measure or assess the desired

outcomes of their program activities. As a way of gauging the effectiveness

of its strategy in deterring illegal entry, the Border Patrol is attempting to

measure its effectiveness in apprehending aliens. For example, in certain

locations, called corridors, the Border Patrol attempts to estimate the

number of aliens who entered or attempted to enter illegally in a given

time period. Border Patrol officials told us that agents count the number of

(1) aliens they have physically observed crossing and those that have

turned back and (2) aliens detected by video cameras and sensors. In

addition, agents examine footprints along the border to estimate the

number that may have crossed, a technique the Border Patrol calls signcut. The Border Patrol measures its effectiveness as the ratio of aliens

 10P.L. 103-62 (1993).

INS Has Not Evaluated the

Strategy’s Overall Effects

on Illegal Entry and Has

Not Analyzed Key

Performance Data
Page 15 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

arrested plus those that have turned back to the estimated number of

illegal entries. INS officials told us that the effectiveness ratios only apply

to areas where INS can monitor the border either electronically or by

using agents. Because it is difficult to determine the accuracy or

completeness of INS’ estimates of the number of aliens turned back and

those entering illegally, we do not know how valid or generalizable INS’

effectiveness measures are.

The Border Patrol began reporting the corridor effectiveness ratios

through its annual performance plan review process in fiscal year 2001.

For example, from October 2000 through March 2001, the effectiveness

ratios in the 12 corridors in California and Arizona ranged from 37 percent

in the west desert area in Tucson to 92 percent in west desert area of El

Centro. We did not independently assess INS’ methodology for calculating

this performance information.

Department of Justice guidance on GPRA states that agencies should use a

variety of indicators to evaluate program performance. In 1997, we

reported that immigration researchers and INS officials stated that IDENT

data, when more fully available, could be quite useful for examining the

flow of illegal aliens across the border. For example, using IDENT data,

INS could conduct a borderwide analysis of the number of individuals

arrested attempting illegal entry; the number of times they have been

arrested; and how these numbers have changed over time and by location.

The results of such analyses could supplement the effectiveness ratios that

INS currently calculates for GPRA reporting, and it could lead to a better

understanding of the apprehension statistics that INS routinely reports.

This is because the number of apprehensions—although frequently used

as a proxy indicator for the magnitude of illegal alien traffic—provides

information on INS arrests rather than on the number of different

individuals arrested or the number of illegal aliens who eluded arrest by

the Border Patrol.11 Analysis of the IDENT data offers the potential for

better understanding the effects of INS’ enforcement operations on shifts

in illegal alien traffic and for statistically modeling the flow of illegal aliens

across the border and their probability of apprehension.

 11An individual might be arrested more than one time and, therefore, the number of

different individuals arrested would be lower than the number of arrests.
Page 16 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

According to the Director of INS’ Statistics Branch, the IDENT system is

now at a point where meaningful analyses can be done for the period

January 1998 to the present.12

INS’ border control efforts have resulted in some communities

experiencing an unprecedented surge in illegal alien traffic. As shown in

figure 4, apprehensions from fiscal year 1994 to 1998 increased over 10-

fold in Calexico more than doubled in Nogales. In fiscal year 2000,

apprehensions in these locations declined even with the addition of new

Border Patrol agents, although apprehensions were still higher than in

fiscal year 1994. In Douglas and Yuma, apprehensions continued to

increase in fiscal year 2000 compared to fiscal year 1994, with Douglas

experiencing an eightfold increase and Yuma experiencing a nearly sixfold

increase. Apprehensions in Brownsville, TX, peaked in fiscal year 1996 and

since then have been declining as border enforcement has increased there.

 12INS began collecting IDENT data in fiscal year 1995. According to the Director, INS

Statistics Branch data from the early years of IDENT usage would not yield meaningful

performance information because there were hardware and software changes to IDENT

and because the system was not fully implemented. IDENT data from January 1998 forward

can be meaningfully analyzed because IDENT has been deployed to enough stations along

the Southwest border and contains data on a sufficiently large percentage of apprehended

aliens.

INS’ Border Control

Efforts Had Positive and

Negative Community

Impacts
Page 17 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

Figure 4: Apprehensions in Selected Southwest Border Sector Stations

Source: INS data.

According to INS officials, an increase in illegal alien traffic is more likely

to occur in border communities that have the infrastructure—for example

roads and housing—that facilitate aliens transiting through them. This is

because aliens and alien smugglers use the network of roads leading to the

border from Mexico as well roads leading away from the border once in

the United States (see fig. 5). Also, smugglers need towns that have

sufficient housing available to hide aliens from authorities, as well as

access to vehicles to transport the aliens out of the area.

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

Calexico, CA Yuma, AZ Nogales, AZ Douglas, AZ Brownsville, TX

Apprehensions

Sector

FY1994

FY1996

FY1998

FY2000
Page 18 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

Figure 5: Road Infrastructure in the Southwest Border Region

The shift in illegal alien traffic to certain small, border communities has

had varied effects on the communities, depending on such factors as the

routes illegal aliens used to transit through them; the level of Border Patrol

presence in specific locations; how much barrier fencing was in place; and

how the community perceived the situation. For example, in Calexico, a

border town approximately 125 miles east of San Diego with

approximately 27,000 residents, local police officials told us they noted a

significant increase in prowler calls and vehicle thefts as illegal alien

traffic shifted from San Diego to Calexico. However, according to police

officials, there was a drop in reported prowler incidents and auto thefts

after INS added resources and completed erecting a fence in downtown

Calexico in 1999.

Gulf of

Mexico

Pacific

Ocean

8 8

15

19

20

Major interstate road

State road

Desert areas

Mountain ranges

37

5

California Arizona New Mexico Texas Oklahoma

35

35

25

10

10

10

10

10

98

2

2

191

2

2

45

2

90

57

85

59

77

16

85

86

8

2

67 377 277

281

15

77

Mexicali

Mexico

Del Rio

Laredo

Deming

Tucson

Douglas

Brownsville

Monterrey

El Paso

Calexico

Nogales

San

 Antonio

San Diego

Eagle

Pass

Marfa

Yuma

Presidio

Colorado

River

Rio Grande

River

Rio Grande

River

Hermosillo

15

45

1

1

5

49

49
Page 19 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

An official in Nogales, a border community of about 20,000 residents, told

us that illegal immigration contributed to the city’s crime rate. According

to the Santa Cruz county attorney, before the Border Patrol increased its

presence in the downtown area, thieves would frequently cross illegally

into the United States and steal items they could carry back into Mexico.

When the Border Patrol increased resources and enforcement operations

and built a larger and less penetrable fence in the downtown area, thefts

along the border dropped. The county attorney attributed a 64-percent

decline in the number of felony filings against Mexican illegal aliens

between 1998 and 2000 to INS’ increased border control efforts. The

county attorney also attributed improved business conditions in Nogales

to the Border Patrol’s efforts to deter illegal aliens from entering in the

downtown area. As apprehensions in downtown Nogales dropped, many

small shops that benefited from the illegal alien trade closed. With these

small, locally-owned shops going out of business, large national retailers

began to locate in Nogales. Community residents and legal entrants from

Mexico could now shop locally instead of having to travel to Tucson.

However, the county attorney also stated that crimes against illegal aliens

have increased because the migrants are forced to attempt entry into the

United States through remote areas outside town, where criminal activity

is less likely to be detected and more difficult to respond to. These crimes

are difficult to prosecute because they typically involve Mexican nationals

harming other Mexican nationals. Cases are difficult to make and prove

because assailants are seldom captured, crime scenes in remote areas are

rarely located, and victims disappear. The Mexican Consul General in

Nogales told us that there is strong evidence that some alien smugglers

work in collusion with border bandits who prey on the illegal aliens.

Officials in Douglas, a small border community with about 14,000 residents

about 125 miles east of Nogales, also told us about both positive and

negative effects of the strategy. According to a city official, the additional

Border Patrol agents assigned to the Douglas area have had a positive

effect on the local economy; many agents live and shop in the community,

and tax revenues are increasing. Illegal immigration in the downtown area

has decreased with the Border Patrol’s increased presence and additional

fencing. Residents stopped encountering agents chasing groups of 30 to 40

illegal aliens through town. A key reported negative effect was that illegal

aliens were diverted to the rural area on the city’s outskirts and began to

cross over private ranchland as the Border Patrol increased enforcement

in the downtown area. Ranchers living in these areas told us that they have

incurred economic losses because illegal aliens transiting their property

have torn their fences and stolen fencing material, which has allowed their
Page 20 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

livestock to get loose. The ranchers also said that their livestock have been

killed, personal belongings stolen, and ranches littered with trash. The

large number of illegal crossers has reportedly ruined some grazing fields.

According to Border Patrol officials, the increase in illegal alien traffic has

increased tensions in the Douglas community. Some residents have grown

frustrated with the large influx of illegal aliens and begun making citizen’s

arrests of illegal aliens while patrolling their property with loaded

weapons; at least two aliens have been shot. According to the city

manager, the negative national publicity Douglas has received as a result

of the increase in illegal alien traffic may have long-term detrimental

effects on economic development. He expressed concern that tourists

might no longer want to visit; businesses might not want to locate there;

and it might be more difficult recruiting professionals, such as teachers

and physicians. City officials believe that negative publicity about illegal

immigration—the perception that the town was unsafe—might have been

a factor in a company’s decision not to relocate to Douglas. The business

would have employed 250 people.

According to one Tucson sector official, Border Patrol officials had

anticipated that the illegal alien traffic would shift to Douglas as the sector

began increasing enforcement in Nogales. However, the sector did not

have enough agents to simultaneously build up its agent resources in both

Nogales and Douglas.

In Yuma, a city of about 77,000 in western Arizona, city officials told us

that unlike other border communities, the increase in apprehensions have

not had negative effects on their community. They said that this was

because illegal aliens use the town as a transit route to other parts of the

United States and generally do not cross in populated areas. According to

Border Patrol officials, most of the illegal alien apprehensions are made in

the outskirts of the city on uninhabited public lands.

Brownsville is the largest city in the lower Rio Grande Valley, with a

population of about 140,000. According to an evaluation,13 before

Operation Rio Grande began in August 1997, illegal immigration was

having a significant, negative impact on Brownsville. According to the

study, citizens reported routinely watching 100 to 200 illegal aliens enter

 13Border Management Evaluation of Operation Rio Grande (Lawton, OK: Advancia Corp.,

June 27, 2000).
Page 21 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

the United States by crossing the Rio Grande River from Mexico and

passing through a local golf course. Citizens also reported being harassed

by Mexican youths who crossed the border and posed as street performers

while panhandling, hustling, or causing trouble in downtown Brownsville.

Shopkeepers reported two or three shoplifting incidents a day and

complained that certain illegal aliens harassed them and their customers.

The evaluation also quoted a police official as saying that there were

nearly daily occurrences in which citizens at a local park near the Rio

Grande River were accosted and frequently robbed by illegal aliens.

As the Border Patrol increased its presence in the downtown area, the

situation reportedly improved. According to the evaluation, as of January

2000, fewer illegal aliens attempted to enter the United States in

Brownsville. Citizens reported that they were seeing about one alien a

week crossing the river and passing through the golf course. Brownsville

police and Border Patrol agents now take immediate action against illegal

aliens posing as street performers. The study reported that, according to a

police official, shoplifting incidents dropped to about one per year, and the

park near the river was again a safe recreational area for adults and

children.

As the strategy has unfolded, there has been an accumulation of

knowledge and experience concerning (1) factors that can impede INS’

implementation of the strategy, (2) the importance of communications

between INS and border communities, and (3) aliens’ determination to

cross the border.

Experience has indicated to INS that it cannot implement its border

strategy at the pace that it originally anticipated. In March 1997, INS

submitted a 5-year staffing plan to Congress covering fiscal years 1996

through 2000. According to the plan, INS was to bolster border control

efforts along the Northern U.S. border and Gulf Coast beginning in fiscal

year 1998 and continuing into fiscal year 2000. INS had planned to deploy

between 245 and about 400 agents to sectors in these areas, but during

these 3 years, INS added 47 agents to the Northern border and none to the

Gulf Coast sectors.

INS officials identified various factors as having impeded their ability to

implement the strategy faster. According to a sector chief, a shortage of

support personnel has required him to use Border Patrol agents for jobs

that should be performed by support staff. In this sector, agents who

would otherwise be patrolling the border are used instead to monitor

remote video surveillance cameras because the sector does not have

Experience Gained

With Strategy

Implementation; the

Importance of

Communication; and

Aliens’ Determination

to Enter Illegally
Page 22 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

enough Law Enforcement Communications Assistants. According to a

Western Region Border Patrol official, this is a problem in many sectors.

Agents are doing work, such as building fences, monitoring sensors, and

performing dispatching duties, that could be done by support personnel.

This has detracted from INS’ goal of increasing the amount of time Border

Patrol agents spend on their core activity of patrolling the border.

According to INS budget officials, INS has requested funds for additional

support personnel, but these positions have not been fully funded.

Border Patrol officials also identified a lack of technology, fencing, and

lights as having impeded their ability to implement the strategy faster.

According to officials in one sector, additional remote video surveillance

systems, lighting, and fencing would allow them to monitor a greater

portion of their border area than is now possible. According to a Border

Patrol headquarters official, the deployment of technology, fencing, and

lights has been slower than anticipated because it has taken longer than

planned to prepare environmental impact assessments and coordinate

with other federal, state, and local agencies. Also, the Border Patrol has

had to build new stations to house the increased number of agents.

According to a Border Patrol official, construction funding for fencing has

been limited by the competing need to build new stations.

After several instances in which border communities expressed dismay at

having been caught unaware by the sudden increase in illegal alien traffic,

INS recognized the need to establish channels of communication to

discuss the potential implications of its strategy with local communities.

Officials from border communities, such as Nogales and Douglas, AZ, told

us that they were unaware that INS even had a strategy until they saw a

dramatic increase in illegal alien traffic in their towns. A Douglas city

official told us he first became aware that something was going on when

the Border Patrol began building a fence in the downtown area. Local

officials became increasingly concerned when they learned that the

Border Patrol was transporting aliens apprehended in Nogales to Douglas

and returning them to Mexico through the port of entry there. Many would

then try to renter at Douglas.

According to local officials, had they known about the strategy and its

potential impact, they might have been able to do some things to mitigate

its impact on the community. For example, a Douglas police official said

that the department could have rearranged shift schedules to have more

police on duty to respond to the increase in prowler calls and provide

more support to Border Patrol agents needing assistance. He also said that

the city could have strengthened city taxicab ordinances to prevent alien

Importance of INS

Communicating With

Border Communities
Page 23 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

smugglers from establishing “taxi companies” to shuttle illegal aliens to

Phoenix and other locations. They said the number of taxicabs in Douglas

increased from 2 or 3 cabs to between 20 and 40 taxi companies almost

overnight.

Pima County, AZ, officials told us that the Border Patrol should have put

local jurisdictions “on notice” regarding their strategy. They said this

would have helped local officials respond to constituent questions and

concerns. It would also have allowed time for local governments to try to

obtain additional funding to deal with the expected influx or, for example,

to add more law enforcement. The officials added that if they had been

forewarned, they might have requested the Border Patrol to deploy

additional agents to certain areas to mitigate the destruction of the pristine

areas in the wildlife refuge.

INS has recognized the need to increase communications with the public

regarding the strategy and its potential implications. According to INS’

fiscal year 2000 Annual Performance Plan, one of INS’ major goals was to

improve INS’ involvement with communities in the development and

implementation of INS operations. To improve communications with the

community, the Tucson sector appointed a full-time community relations

officer in November 2000. The sector also has a community advisory group

made up of local citizens in each of three cities, Nogales, Douglas, and

Naco, AZ. Members of the Douglas group told us they find these meetings

helpful and that the Border Patrol has been responsive to their concerns.

Since 1999, the sector has had a toll-free number to improve

communications with local residents. Agents assigned to the sector’s

“ranch patrol” monitor the private ranchland surrounding the city of

Douglas, where many aliens now cross.

According to Border Patrol officials, the Del Rio sector, and in particular

the Eagle Pass, TX, area may be the next location to experience a

significant increase in illegal alien traffic. They believe this because, like

the other areas that have experienced significant increases in illegal alien

traffic, it has the infrastructure of roads leading to and from the border

area that alien smugglers need to transport the illegal aliens.

The Del Rio sector chief believes the sector is better prepared than were

other sectors, such as Tucson and El Centro, when they experienced

significant increases in alien traffic. In February 2001, the Del Rio sector

had slightly over 1,000 agents, of whom about 300 were assigned to the

Eagle Pass station. The sector recently received airboats to patrol the Rio

Grande River and additional lights and remote video surveillance systems
Page 24 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

to better monitor the border. The sector chief told us that he has been

conducting community outreach efforts for several years to inform the

community about INS’ strategy. He said the sector has a Rancher Liaison

Program that informs and educates the community about Border Patrol

activities and operations. This program has, according to the chief, opened

channels of communication between the community and the Border Patrol

that have helped the sector gain access to private lands. He believes

working with ranchers and the public helps reduce the potential for

violence between the citizens and illegal aliens as well as the negative

publicity that can befall a community because of significant increases in

illegal immigration.

According to the Police Chief of Eagle Pass, the Del Rio sector began its

outreach efforts several years ago. For example, after Operation Rio

Grande began in the summer of 1997, Border Patrol sector officials gave a

briefing to the Eagle Pass City Council on INS’ Southwest border strategy.

They explained that increased enforcement in locations south of Eagle

Pass and the ongoing enforcement in El Paso to the north might increase

the illegal alien traffic in Eagle Pass. The police chief stated that since

then, the Del Rio Border Patrol sector chief has given numerous

presentations before community organizations, such as the local Rotary

Club. He stated that such outreach efforts have kept the lines of

communication open, and the city has not experienced any instances of

citizens detaining illegal aliens as has occurred in other locations along the

border.

The strategy assumed that as the urban areas were controlled, the traffic

would shift to more remote areas where the Border Patrol would be able

to more easily detect and apprehend aliens entering illegally. The strategy

also assumed that natural barriers such as rivers, mountains, and the harsh

terrain of the desert would act as deterrents to illegal entry. However, INS

officials told us that as the traffic shifted, they did not anticipate the

sizable number that would still attempt to enter through these harsh

environments. A study of migrant deaths along the Southwest border

concluded that while migrants have always faced danger crossing the

border and many died before INS began its strategy, the strategy has

resulted in an increase in deaths from exposure to either heat or cold.

INS Taking Steps to

Reduce Migrant Deaths
Page 25 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

Border Patrol data indicated that 1,013 migrants died trying to cross the

Southwest border illegally between October 1997 and June 1, 2001 (see

table 2).14 Nearly 60 percent died from either heat exposure or drowning.

Table 2: Migrant Deaths by Cause of Death

Fiscal year

Cause of death 1998 1999 2000 2001a

Total Percent

Exposure to heat 87 57 135 27 306 30

Drowning 89 72 92 40 293 29

Unknown 29 38 43 45 155 15

Motor vehicle accident 16 21 48 22 107 11

Other 16 15 27 10 68 7

Exposure to cold 16 18 17 4 55 5

Train 8 14 5 1 28 3

Confined space 0 1 0 0 1 <1

Total 261 236 367 149 1,013 100

a

Through June 1, 2001.

Source: Border Patrol data.

To reduce the number of illegal aliens who die or are injured trying to

cross the border illegally, INS began a Border Safety Initiative in June

1998. The initiative focuses on (1) educating those who may be

contemplating crossing illegally on the dangers of crossing and (2)

searching for and rescuing those who may become abandoned or lost.

Working in conjunction with the Mexican government, INS has produced

public service announcements that are shown on television in Mexico to

warn people of the dangers of crossing—for example, exposure to heat

and cold, dehydration, snakes, and bandits that rob and assault those who

cross in remote areas. Border Patrol sectors show detained aliens a similar

video announcement. Signs have been posted on both sides of border

fences in various locations that also warn about the dangers of crossing.

Toll-free numbers in both Mexico and the United States can be used to

report migrants in trouble.

 14Although the Border Patrol reports these numbers as the number of migrant deaths per

year, the data actually reflect the number of migrants who were found dead by INS during

the year. Therefore, migrants who died attempting to cross the border during one year but

were not found until the following year would be included in the migrant death statistics

for the year in which they were found. Because the bodies of some migrants may never be

found and others may have died while still in Mexico, the actual number of deaths may be

higher.
Page 26 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

The Border Patrol has created special search-and-rescue units in areas

where it is becoming more dangerous to cross. For example, the El Centro

sector has a desert rescue team whose members have been trained in

emergency medical procedures or first aid. The team uses a desert rescue

ambulance equipped with water and lifesaving equipment. To deter

crossings, El Centro agents are positioned, and high-powered lights have

been installed, at dangerous crossings along the All American Canal,

which runs along the border. The sector’s air unit flies along the canal and

in desert areas to search for those who may be in danger.

According to the Border Patrol’s Border Safety Initiative coordinator, most

of the border safety-related expenses, such as agent time and acquisition

and maintenance of equipment, have been funded out of Border Patrol

general operations funds. Therefore, detailed cost data for all safetyrelated costs were not readily available. According to the coordinator, in

fiscal years 1998 through 2001, INS will have spent about $1 million

primarily for public service announcements, signs, mapping potential

danger areas, and liaison with Mexican counterparts. For fiscal year 2002,

INS’ proposed border safety budget is $1.5 million.

As shown in figure 6, there was a significant increase in Border Patrol

rescues of migrants from 1999 to 2000.
Page 27 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

Figure 6: Border Patrol Migrant Rescues in Fiscal Years 1999 Through June 1, 2001

Source: INS data.

The Border Patrol has also given search-and-rescue training to Mexican

law enforcement officials. In June 2001, a joint U.S.-Mexico safety

conference was held in San Antonio, TX.

Another aspect of the initiative is to identify and prosecute alien smugglers

who use dangerous smuggling practices. The Border Patrol has

established procedures for identifying such smugglers to facilitate

coordinated efforts to target them for arrest and prosecution. According to

INS’ year-end review of its fiscal year 2000 Annual Performance Plan,

apprehending and prosecuting the smugglers will require full cooperation

from Mexico.

The Border Patrol has incorporated the issue of border safety into its

overall strategy. In November 2000, the Border Patrol issued a Border

Safety addendum to the strategy that emphasizes the need to incorporate

safety issues into any future operations.

On June 22, 2001, the United States and Mexico announced plans to

enhance border safety in the wake of the death of 14 undocumented aliens

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

FY1999 FY2000 FY2001

Number

Number of Rescue

Operations

People Rescued
Page 28 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

in the Arizona desert in May 2001. The plans call for the United States and

Mexico to

• strengthen the public safety campaign to alert potential migrants of the

dangers of crossing the border in high-risk areas;

• reinforce plans for the protection and search and rescue of migrants,

including increased aerial surveillance of the U.S. side and increased

presence of Mexican law enforcement on the Mexican side; and

• implement a cooperative, comprehensive, and aggressive plan to combat

and dismantle alien smuggling organizations.

INS has spent 7 years implementing its Southwest border strategy, but it

may take INS up to a decade longer to fully implement the strategy. This

assumes that INS obtains the level of staff, technology, equipment, and

fencing it believes it needs to control the Southwest border. Although

illegal alien apprehensions have shifted, there is no clear indication that

overall illegal entry into the United States along the Southwest border has

declined. INS’ current efforts to measure the effectiveness of its border

control efforts could be enhanced by analyzing data in its IDENT system.

These data offer INS an opportunity to develop additional performance

indicators that could be incorporated into its Annual Performance Plan

review process and could help INS assess whether its border control

efforts are associated with an overall reduction in the flow of illegal aliens

across the border. Borderwide analysis of the IDENT data could be used

to address several important questions related to illegal entry.

The strategy’s impact on local communities has been affected by the

timing of INS’ infusion of agent and other resources intended to protect

the local community from a surge in illegal alien traffic; what routes the

illegal aliens have used in crossing the border; and INS’ involvement with

the community. INS has learned the importance of outreach efforts in

attempting to mitigate the potential negative effects the strategy can cause

a community and the harm that can befall illegal aliens who risk injury and

death to cross the border.

To better gauge the effects of its border control efforts, we recommend

that the INS Commissioner develop specific performance indicators using

the IDENT data and incorporate these indicators into INS’ Annual

Performance Plan.

Conclusions

Recommendation for

Executive Action
Page 29 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney

General. In a letter dated July 24, 2001, which we have reprinted in

appendix II, INS’ Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations

concurred with our recommendation and said that INS will begin

developing specific performance indicators using IDENT data. However,

he also stated that “INS will continue to evaluate the use of IDENT data for

analyzing shifts in illegal alien traffic,” and a “Congressional moratorium

on the deployment of new IDENT sites, as well as efforts to integrate

IDENT [with the automated fingerprint system used by the Federal Bureau

of Investigation], have an operational impact that delays comprehensive

data collection along the southwest border.”

We believe that IDENT, which has been incrementally deployed to all

Border Patrol stations along the Southwest border since 1995, already

contains data that could be used to determine the number of aliens Border

Patrol agents have arrested between ports of entry, how many times they

have been arrested trying to enter illegally, and what shifts in illegal entry

attempts between ports of entry have occurred over time along the

Southwest border. Therefore, while future improvements to the collection

of fingerprint data will be useful, we believe that the IDENT data currently

available puts INS in the position to develop the types of performance

measures discussed in our report and to use the measures to gain a better

understanding of the results of its enforcement efforts.

INS’ Executive Associate Commissioner also stated that the long-term

resource requirements we refer to in our report are based on preliminary

information and are subject to change. He indicated that further

discussions among INS, the Department of Justice, and the administration

are needed to finalize the requirements. We have added wording to our

report to clarify that INS’ estimates of its long-term resource requirements

are preliminary and subject to change.

We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General;

Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service; Director,

Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. Copies of

this report will also be made available to others upon request.

Agency Comments
Page 30 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please

contact me or Evi Rezmovic on (202) 512-8777. Michael P. Dino, James R.

Bancroft, and Brian J. Lipman made key contributions to this report.

Richard M. Stana

Director, Justice Issues
Appendix I: INS Border Patrol Authorized

Staffing and Alien Apprehensions in

Southwest Sectors

Page 31 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

Table 3: Authorized Border Patrol Agent Positions in Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 1993 Through 2000

Authorized increases each fiscal year

Sector

1993 authorized

agents 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total

San Diego, CA 980 300 229 428 278 0 0 0 2,215

El Centro, CA 194 0 0 0 50 134 78 45 501

Yuma, AZ 178 0 0 0 0 56 50 10 294

Tucson, AZ 281 0 128 246 228 140 350 100 1,473

El Paso, TX 602 50 93 101 107 45 25 10 1,033

Marfa, TX 131 0 0 0 0 25 25 0 181

Del Rio, TX 290 0 100 0 52 135 80 95 752

Laredo, TX 347 0 75 0 49 205 120 45 841

McAllen, TX 386 0 75 25 228 260 250 100 1,324

Total 3,389 350 700 800 992a 1,000 978b 405c 8,614

a

8 additional agents allocated to Puerto Rico.

b

22 additional agents allocated to northern border sectors.

c

25 additional agents allocated to northern border sectors.

Source: INS data.

Table 4: Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 1993 Through 2000

Fiscal year

Sector 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

San Diego, CA 531,689 450,152 524,231 483,815 283,889 248,092 182,267 151,681

El Centro, CA 30,058 27,654 37,317 66,873 146,210 226,695 225,279 238,126

Yuma, AZ 23,548 21,211 20,894 28,310 30,177 76,195 93,388 108,747

Tucson, AZ 92,639 139,473 227,529 305,348 272,397 387,406 470,449 616,346

El Paso, TX 285,781 79,688 110,971 145,929 124,376 125,035 110,857 115,696

Marfa, TX 15,486 13,494 11,552 13,214 12,692 14,509 14,952 13,689

Del Rio, TX 42,289 50,036 76,490 121,137 113,280 131,058 156,653 157,178

Laredo, TX 82,348 73,142 93,305 131,841 141,893 103,433 114,004 108,973

McAllen, TX 109,048 124,251 169,101 210,553 243,793 204,257 169,151 133,243

Total 1,212,886 979,101 1,271,390 1,507,020 1,368,707 1,516,680 1,537,000 1,643,679

Source: INS.

Appendix I: INS Border Patrol Authorized

Staffing and Alien Apprehensions in

Southwest Sectors
Appendix II: Comments From the Department

of Justice

Page 32 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy

Appendix II: Comments From the

Department of Justice
Appendix II: Comments From the Department

of Justice

Page 33 GAO-01-842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy (183645)
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