[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 219 (Monday, November 15, 2004)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 65523-65528]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-24933]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2002-NM-153-AD; Amendment 39-13859; AD 2004-23-04]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A319 and A320 Series 
Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), 
applicable to certain Airbus Model A319 and A320 series airplanes, that 
requires a modification and replacement affecting all fuel tanks. All 
affected airplanes require the installation of fuses in the wiring of 
the fuel quantity indicating probes of all fuel tanks. Some affected 
airplanes also require replacement of the high-level sensors of the 
additional center tanks (ACTs) with new sensors. For all affected 
airplanes, these actions are necessary to prevent overheating of the 
fuel probes due to a short circuit. For some affected airplanes, these 
actions are necessary to prevent fuel leakage due to inadequate space 
for thermal expansion within the ACTs. Such conditions could result in 
fuel vapors or fuel contacting an ignition source and/or consequent 
fire/explosion in the center fuel tanks. These actions are intended to 
address the identified unsafe condition.

DATES: Effective December 20, 2004.
    The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in 
the

[[Page 65524]]

regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of 
December 20, 2004.

ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be 
obtained from Airbus, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac 
Cedex, France. This information may be examined at the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the National Archives 
and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability 
of this material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 
International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 
227-2125; fax (425) 227-1149.

Relationship of This AD to SFAR 88

    The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in 
recent fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, 
including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of 
airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance 
practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we 
issued a regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design 
Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection 
Requirements'' (67 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new 
airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance 
requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation 
No. 88 (SFAR 88).
    Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., 
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders 
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition 
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design 
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for 
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to 
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance 
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety 
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to 
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary 
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
    In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four 
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel 
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of 
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable 
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address 
the failure types under evaluation: single failures, single failures in 
combination with another latent condition(s), and in-service failure 
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included 
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for 
further action.
    Based on this process, we have determined that the actions 
identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition 
sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel 
vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the 
airplane.

Proposed AD

    A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 
CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that is 
applicable to certain Airbus Model A319 and A320 series airplanes was 
published in the Federal Register on November 17, 2003 (68 FR 64823). 
That action proposed to require a modification and replacement 
affecting the center and wing fuel tanks. All affected airplanes would 
require modification of the wiring of the fuel quantity indicating 
probes of the center and wing fuel tanks. Some affected airplanes would 
also require replacement of the high-level sensors of the additional 
center fuel tank with new, improved sensors.

Comments

    Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate 
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to 
the comments received.

Supportive Comments

    One commenter supports the proposed AD; one commenter supports the 
intent of the proposed AD.

Requests To Extend Compliance Time

    One commenter notes a large disparity between the two limitations 
in the proposed accomplishment time of ``Within 4,000 flight hours or 
30 months after the effective date of the AD, whichever is first.'' The 
commenter suggests that the FAA consider changing the timeline to 
flight hours or a calendar month, which is more closely tied to actual 
airplane utilization. The commenter adds that utilization of these 
airplanes could be as high as 9,000 flight hours during the proposed 
30-month compliance time. The commenter asks that the compliance time 
be changed to 9,000 flight hours or 30 months, whichever is first. 
Another commenter also recommends that the compliance time be changed 
to 9,000 flight hours or 30 months, whichever is first, and provided no 
justification for the recommendation.
    A third commenter states that, based on airplane utilization, the 
flight-hour threshold will occur first, and result in a 14-month 
schedule for completion. The commenter adds that, based on the 
instructions outlined in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1087, 
accomplishment of the actions is possible only during a base 
maintenance visit. The commenter notes that the compliance limits will 
penalize operators with long-to-medium-range missions. The commenter 
recommends that the compliance time be extended to 5,500 flight hours 
or 30 months after the effective date of the AD, whichever occurs 
first. The commenter states that this will allow operators to utilize 
routine base maintenance visit opportunities where appropriate tooling, 
ground equipment, and qualified skill set are available.
    A fourth commenter states that including a flight-hour limit in the 
compliance time suggests that the failure mode being addressed by the 
mandatory activity is sensitive to flight hours in service. The 
commenter notes that the failure mode addressed by Service Bulletin 
A320-28-1087 (wiring insulation breakdown/damage) is primarily related 
to calendar age. The commenter adds that, while the flight-hour limit 
may have value, it is not the crucial parameter. The commenter's in-
service airplanes average about eight hours of flying per day, which 
means that the 4,000-flight-hour limit would require that the actions 
be done on all affected airplanes within about 500 days. This period is 
55 percent of the calendar time afforded by the compliance time, and is 
less than the C-check interval. The commenter states that doing the 
actions on all airplanes within 4,000 flight hours would put an 
additional burden and cost on its operation. The commenter suggests 
extending the compliance time to 6,000 flight hours, which will not 
compromise the level of safety.
    We do not agree with the commenters. In developing an appropriate 
compliance time for this action, we considered the safety implications, 
operators' normal maintenance schedules, and the compliance time

[[Page 65525]]

recommended by the airplane manufacturer for the timely accomplishment 
of the required actions. The compliance time is based on airplane 
utilization overall. In addition, operators provided no data to support 
that a compliance time extension will ensure safety. In consideration 
of these items, we have determined that compliance within 4,000 flight 
hours or 30 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever is 
first, will provide an acceptable level of safety and is an appropriate 
interval of time wherein the required actions can be accomplished 
during scheduled maintenance intervals for the majority of affected 
operators. However, according to the provisions of paragraph (b) of 
this AD, we may approve requests to adjust the compliance time if the 
request includes data that justify that a different compliance time 
would provide an acceptable level of safety. No change to the AD is 
made in this regard.

Request To Delay Issuance of the Proposed AD

    One commenter states that it previously elected not to do the 
actions required by the proposed AD on affected airplanes (reference 
Service Bulletin A320-28-1087, Revision 02). This was because the 
Direction G[eacute]n[eacute]rale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), which is 
the airworthiness authority for France, found the Special Federal 
Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' Amendment 21-78, and 
subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83) compliance solution proposal 
submitted by Airbus to be sufficient for compliance with French 
airworthiness directive 2002-220(B) R1, dated October 15, 2003; 
although further discussions with the FAA and the DGAC were necessary. 
These discussions were expected to include the possibility of a 
requirement to install transient suppression units. Correspondence 
between the commenter and Airbus confirmed that, in the event that 
transient suppression units were specified in future rulemaking, the 
fused adapter/connection installation specified in the service bulletin 
would be revised. The commenter adds that, according to its cost model, 
the proposed AD would cost over $500,000 for its fleet. The commenter 
objects to spending the money if the solution is only interim, with 
introduction of transient suppression units to follow. The commenter 
strongly encourages a permanent solution to be introduced and 
regulated, and is not aware of any in-service data that would suggest 
that airplane safety could be compromised by delaying the interim 
solution until introduction of a permanent solution.
    We do not agree with the commenter that an alternate solution is 
necessary, as the modification required by the proposed AD is not an 
interim action. We have examined the underlying safety issues involved 
in fuel tank explosions on several transport airplanes. As a result of 
those findings, we issued a regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel 
Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and 
Inspection Requirements.'' In addition to new airworthiness standards 
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule 
included SFAR No. 88. Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain 
type design holders to perform design reviews, and to develop design 
changes and maintenance procedures if necessary. We intend to adopt ADs 
to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions 
identified during these reviews. Based on this process, we have 
determined that the modification required by this AD is necessary to 
address the identified unsafe condition.

Request To Clarify Summary Section

    One commenter states that the Summary section of the proposed AD 
has significant inaccuracies due to the assimilation of two independent 
unsafe conditions, as identified in the referenced French airworthiness 
directive. The unsafe conditions require mandatory action, which is 
achieved by applying the two service bulletins referenced in the 
proposed AD. The commenter notes that the reason there are two service 
bulletins, and only one French airworthiness directive, is to minimize 
the cost impact on the three airplanes requiring correction of both 
unsafe conditions.
    Additionally, the commenter states that the Summary section does 
not properly distinguish between additional center tanks (ACTs) and 
center wing tanks, which could lead to misinterpretation of any 
corrective action necessary. The commenter notes that Airbus Service 
Bulletin A320-28-1086, Revision 01, dated October 23, 2002 (cited in 
the proposed AD as an appropriate source of service information for 
accomplishment of certain actions), affects the ACTs on the three 
airplanes specified above only. The commenter adds that the identified 
modifications reposition the high-level sensors to ensure there is a 
minimum of two percent expansion space in the applicable ACT, and 
correct a non-compliance to Joint Aviation Regulation (JAR) 25.969. 
This non-compliance issue could result in fuel overflowing from the ACT 
to the left wing surge tank in the event of thermal expansion of the 
fuel in the ACT. The commenter also adds that the bracket that the 
high-level sensor is attached to, not the high-level sensor, is the 
part that has been improved.
    The commenter also states that Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-
1087, Revision 02, dated June 10, 2003 (cited in the proposed AD as an 
appropriate source of service information for accomplishment of certain 
actions), affects all fuel tanks (all wing tanks and all ACTs), on the 
affected airplanes. The modification identified is to install fuses in 
the fuel quantity indicating (FQI) harnesses at or near the fuel tank 
walls, which corrects a non-compliance with JAR 25.981. This non-
compliance issue could result in the ignition of flammable fuel vapors 
in a fuel tank in the event of a short circuit between the FQI wiring 
and an unprotected 28-volt supply.
    In conclusion, the commenter states that the Summary section should 
clearly distinguish between these two unsafe conditions and should 
provide certain wording to more clearly define the two unsafe 
conditions.
    We agree with the commenter and have changed the applicable 
sections in this AD, for clarification, to separate the two unsafe 
conditions.

Request To Change Paragraph (a) of This AD

    In following up on his request to distinguish the two unsafe 
conditions, the commenter requests the following changes, which would 
include a new paragraph (b):
    ``(a) Within 4,000 flight hours or 30 months after the effective 
date of this AD, whichever is first: Do the applicable actions 
specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this AD. Accomplishment of the 
modification before the effective date of this AD per Airbus Service 
Bulletin A320-28-1087, dated July 17, 2001, or Revision 01, dated March 
3, 2003; is acceptable for compliance with the corresponding action 
specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this AD.
    (1) For airplanes defined in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1087, 
Revision 02, dated June 10, 2003: Modify the wiring of the fuel 
quantity indicating probes of all the fuel tanks by doing all the 
actions specified in paragraphs 3.A. through 3.D. (including 
operational testing and any applicable repair) of the Accomplishment 
Instructions of the service bulletin. Any applicable repair must be 
done before further flight.
    (b) Within 4,000 flight hours or 30 months after the effective date 
of this

[[Page 65526]]

AD, whichever is first: Do the applicable actions specified in 
paragraph (b)(1) of this AD. Accomplishment of the replacement before 
the effective date of this AD per Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1086, 
dated November 30, 1999; as applicable; is considered acceptable for 
compliance with the corresponding action specified in paragraph (b)(1) 
of this AD.
    (1) For airplanes defined in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1086, 
Revision 01, dated October 23, 2002: Prior to or concurrent with 
accomplishment of paragraph (a)(1) of this AD, replace the high-level 
sensors of the additional center fuel tanks by doing all the actions 
specified in paragraphs 3.A through 3.D. (including operational testing 
and any applicable repair) of the Accomplishment Instructions of the 
service bulletin. Do the actions per the service bulletin. Any 
applicable repair must be done before further flight.'' The commenter 
provided no justification for the requested changes.
    After reviewing the commenter's suggested changes to paragraph (a) 
of the proposed AD, we find that specifying ``all the fuel tanks'' 
instead of ``the center and wing fuel tanks,'' is the only significant 
change. We also find that moving the service bulletin references 
around, as suggested by the commenter, does not clarify the 
requirements of that paragraph. Therefore, we have changed the wording 
in paragraph (a)(1) of this AD to specify ``all the fuel tanks,'' for 
clarification; we made no further changes to paragraph (a) of this AD.

Request To Clarify Certain Sections in the Preamble

    The same commenter reiterates certain wording regarding compliance 
with JAR 25.989, as specified in the Discussion section of the proposed 
AD, and notes that the wording is incorrect. The commenter states that 
the referenced testing is specific to some ACTs that can be fitted only 
to Model A319 series airplanes with Airbus Modification 28238 
installed, and does not relate to other ACTs fitted to Models A319 and 
A320 series airplanes, or to center (wing) tanks. The commenter adds 
that the correct reference is JAR 25.969, not 25.989. The commenter 
notes that the high-level sensor is not improved and has no regulatory 
deficiency, and adds that it is the bracket that the sensor is attached 
to that is improved to provide the required expansion space. In 
addition, the commenter states that there is no connection between 
changing the high-level sensor position and the overheating of the FQI 
fuel probes in the event of an external 28-volt short circuit to the 
FQI fuel probe wiring. The commenter adds that there is no risk of the 
high-level sensor overheating in the event of an external 28-volt short 
circuit to its wiring.
    The commenter also states that there is no risk of fuel spillage 
resulting from inadequate expansion space, which could result in fuel 
vapors or fuel contacting an ignition source, and/or consequent fire/
explosion in the center fuel tank. Any fuel spillage will be contained 
within the fuel vent system until the left wing surge tank is 
overfilled and subsequent limited fuel spillage from the surge tank 
through a flame arrestor could occur. The commenter adds that in the 
event of fuel spillage from the surge tank, and in the presence of an 
ignition source on the ground, a ground fire could be ignited. In the 
event of a ground fire, the flame arrestor installed for this purpose 
will eventually protect the fuel tank.
    The commenter notes that the section titled ADDRESSES incorrectly 
identifies the airplane manufacturer as ``Airbus Industrie.'' The 
airplane manufacturer should be identified as ``Airbus.''
    The same commenter states that the Explanation of Relevant Service 
Information section in the preamble of the proposed AD is unclear in 
identifying which tanks apply to Service Bulletin A320-28-1087, 
Revision 02. The commenter states that the text should read, ``Airbus 
has issued Service Bulletin A320-28-1087, Revision 02, which describes 
procedures for modification of the wiring of the FQI probes of all fuel 
tanks.'' The modification includes the following:
    <bullet> Installation of fused plug connectors for the FQI probes 
of the wing tanks; and
    <bullet> Installation of fused adapters between the external wiring 
harness and the in-tank wiring of the connectors on the ACT and center 
wing fuel tank walls.
    The commenter notes that the term ``center tank'' is imprecise, as 
it could be interpreted to mean the center wing tank and not the ACT. 
This could lead to the exclusion of necessary corrective action for 
some fuel tanks. The fact that the modification is applicable to all 
fuel tanks is explicitly described by using the word ``all.''
    We acknowledge and agree with the commenter's remarks on the 
preamble of the proposed AD; however, most of the sections referred to 
are not restated in this final rule. The name of the airplane 
manufacturer specified in the ``ADDRESSES'' section has been changed to 
Airbus. No other change to the AD is made in this regard.

Inadequate Technical Information Provided in the Service Bulletins

    One commenter states that it is apparent that the information in 
the service bulletins lacks adequate technical detail for the commenter 
to form an opinion relative to the content. The commenter adds that 
Service Bulletin A320-28-1087 specifies adding fused connectors/
adapters to protect the fuel gauging lines from hot shorts to 28 volt 
direct current that enter the fuel tanks. However, there is no 
information regarding compliance with Advisory Circular (AC) 25.981, 
which provides guidance for the overall safe design of fuel systems 
under certain conditions. The commenter notes that compliance with the 
AC may require a different design approach, in which case issuance of 
the proposed AD, although improving the level of safety, would be 
premature and would cause an unnecessary financial burden for 
operators. The commenter is unable to render a sound technical opinion 
as to the accuracy of the proposed AD, due to insufficient data.
    We appreciate the commenter's concerns; however, it is not standard 
practice to provide technical details for design changes in service 
bulletins. The modification required by this AD is intended to prevent 
excessive currents from entering the FQI probes. Investigations have 
shown that a short of 28-volt direct current to the probes could cause 
certain parts of the probe to heat up to a temperature in excess of 200 
degrees centigrade. Additionally, all FQI probe wiring installed on 
Model A319 series airplanes is co-routed with 28-volt direct current. 
The service bulletin was issued to provide procedures to modify the 
airplane to the approved type design. We do not agree that this AD is 
premature. In this case, we find that to withdraw this AD and initiate 
new proposed rulemaking (providing for public opportunity to comment) 
would significantly delay the rulemaking process and would be 
inappropriate in light of the identified unsafe condition. We have 
determined that issuance of this AD is appropriate and warranted.

Request To Revise Cost Impact Section

    One commenter states that there are presently no airplanes 
registered in the U.S. for which Service Bulletin A320-28-1086 applies 
(Models A319-115 and A319-133 series airplanes). The commenter requests 
that the Cost Impact section of the proposed AD be revised to provide, 
for future imported

[[Page 65527]]

airplanes, accomplishment of the proposed actions through a Certificate 
of Airworthiness.
    We do not agree to provide for accomplishment of the proposed 
actions through a Certificate of Airworthiness for future imported 
Models A319-115 and A319-133 series airplanes. We do agree that those 
airplanes are not U.S.-registered; therefore, we have added a new 
paragraph to the Cost Impact section to provide the estimated costs for 
those airplanes should the airplanes be imported and placed on the U.S. 
Register in the future.

Conclusion

    After careful review of the available data, including the comments 
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public 
interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes described 
previously. We have determined that these changes will neither increase 
the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

Cost Impact

    We estimate that 468 Model A319-111, -112, -113, -114, -131, and -
132 and Model A320 series airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected 
by this AD.
    It will take between 10 and 22 work hours per airplane to 
accomplish the modification, at an average labor rate of $65 per work 
hour. Required parts will cost between $670 and $5,750 per airplane. 
Based on these figures, the cost impact of the modification required by 
this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be between $617,760 and 
$3,360,240, or between $1,320 and $7,180 per airplane.
    If an operator is required to replace the high-level sensors, it 
will take about 80 work hours, at an average labor rate of $65 per work 
hour. Required parts are free of charge. Based on these figures, the 
cost impact of the replacement required by this AD is estimated to be 
$5,200 per airplane.
    The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions 
that no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this 
AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the 
future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed 
in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform 
the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures 
typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to 
gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other 
administrative actions.
    Currently, there are no affected A319-115 and A319-133 series 
airplanes on the U.S. Register. However, if an affected airplane is 
imported and placed on the U.S. Register in the future, the required 
modification would take between 10 and 22 work hours per airplane, at 
an average labor rate of $65 per work hour. Required parts will cost 
between $670 and $5,750 per airplane. Based on these figures, we 
estimate the cost of this AD to be between $1,320 and $7,180 per 
airplane.

Regulatory Impact

    The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct 
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national 
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it 
is determined that this final rule does not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is 
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866; 
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a 
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial 
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action 
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained 
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption 
``ADDRESSES.''

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of 
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive:

2004-23-04 Airbus: Amendment 39-13859. Docket 2002-NM-
153<radical>AD.

    Applicability: Model A319 and A320 series airplanes, 
certificated in any category; as listed in Airbus Service Bulletin 
A320-28-1087, Revision 02, dated June 10, 2003; and Airbus Service 
Bulletin A320-28-1086, Revision 01, dated October 23, 2002.
    Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished 
previously.
    To prevent overheating of the fuel probes due to a short 
circuit, and fuel leakage due to inadequate space for thermal 
expansion within the additional center tanks, which could result in 
fuel vapors or fuel contacting an ignition source, accomplish the 
following:

Modification/Replacement

    (a) Within 4,000 flight hours or 30 months after the effective 
date of this AD, whichever is first: Do the applicable actions 
specified in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD. Accomplishment 
of the modification before the effective date of this AD per Airbus 
Service Bulletin A320-28-1087, dated July 17, 2001; or Revision 01, 
dated March 3, 2003; or accomplishment of the replacement before the 
effective date of this AD per Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1086, 
dated November 30, 1999; as applicable; is considered acceptable for 
compliance with the corresponding action specified in paragraph 
(a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD.
    (1) For airplanes defined in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-
1087, Revision 02, dated June 10, 2003: Modify the wiring of the 
fuel quantity indicating probes of all the fuel tanks by doing all 
the actions specified in paragraphs 3.A. through 3.D. (including 
operational testing and any applicable repair) of the Accomplishment 
Instructions of the service bulletin. Do the actions per the service 
bulletin. Any applicable repair must be done before further flight.
    (2) For airplanes defined in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-
1086, Revision 01, dated October 23, 2002: Prior to or concurrent 
with accomplishment of paragraph (a)(1) of this AD, replace the 
high-level sensors of the additional center fuel tanks by doing all 
the actions specified in paragraphs 3.A through 3.D. (including 
operational testing and any applicable repair) of the Accomplishment 
Instructions of the service bulletin. Do the actions per the service 
bulletin. Any applicable repair must be done before further flight.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (b) In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, the Manager, International 
Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, is authorized 
to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD.

Incorporation by Reference

    (c) Unless otherwise specified in this AD, the actions shall be 
done in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1086, 
Revision 01, dated October 23, 2002; or Airbus Service Bulletin 
A320-28-1087, Revision 02, dated June 10, 2003; as applicable. This 
incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the 
Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 
51. For copies, contact Airbus, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 
Blagnac Cedex, France. Inspect copies at the FAA, Transport Airplane 
Directorate,

[[Page 65528]]

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the 
availability of this material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go 
to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

    Note 1: The subject of this AD is addressed in French 
airworthiness directive 2002-220(B) R1, dated October 15, 2003.

Effective Date

    (d) This amendment becomes effective on December 20, 2004.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 1, 2004.

Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 04-24933 Filed 11-12-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P