United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

November 1998 COMBATING

TERRORISM

Opportunities to

Improve Domestic

Preparedness Program

Focus and Efficiency

GAO/NSIAD-99-3

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278556 

November 12, 1998

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 International Affairs and Criminal Justice

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

Concerned that terrorists might move beyond using conventional weapons

to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—chemical, biological, radiological,

or nuclear devices—Congress authorized the federal government to

improve capabilities to respond to such incidents, particularly at the local

level. As requested, we reviewed the status and other aspects of the

Domestic Preparedness Program, a training, assistance, and equipment

loan program led by the Department of Defense (DOD). Specifically, we

evaluated (1) the training and other benefits offered to cities under the

Domestic Preparedness Program and (2) the methodology for designing

and implementing the program, including the way in which cities were

selected to participate, how cities’ capabilities and needs were assessed,

and the effectiveness of interagency coordination on this and other similar

consequence management training and equipment programs. You also

asked us to determine the potential cost of equipping and maintaining the

capability of a city to respond to a terrorist incident involving WMD. This

matter will be the subject of a report to be issued later.

Results in Brief The training and equipment that DOD is providing to cities through the

Domestic Preparedness Program have clearly increased cities’ awareness

of and should better prepare them to deal with a potential chemical or

biological terrorist incident. Local officials in the seven cities we visited

praised the training program’s content, instructors, and materials as well

as DOD’s willingness to modify the program based on suggestions from

local officials. They also credited the program with bringing local, state,

and federal regional emergency response agencies together into a closer

working relationship.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
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In designing the training and equipment program, DOD selected 120 cities

based solely on city population. This decision resulted in 14 clusters of 44

cities within 30 miles of at least 1 other city selected. By dealing directly

with cities, DOD did not build upon the states’ existing emergency

management and training structures. Had it used existing structures such

as counties, response regions, mutual aid agreements, or other similar

arrangements that reflect how emergency response is actually organized,

DOD could have consolidated training and equipment purchases to cover

more jurisdictions in fewer locations than presently planned, at less cost.

Because less than one-third of the cities had received training at the time

of our review, DOD or any subsequent lead agency could still refocus its

approach for greater efficiency, economy, and effectiveness.

DOD’s loan of equipment in support of the training program has caused

frustration and confusion among local officials. The legislation authorized

DOD to lend rather than give or grant equipment to local jurisdictions, and

DOD established a 5-year renewable loan agreement to govern the provision

of about $300,000 worth of equipment to each city. This agreement

restricts the use of the equipment to training and requires the cities to

repair, maintain, and replace the equipment, even though DOD program

officials intend for the loans to be permanent and will allow the use of

equipment for operational purposes. Cities were concerned about the lack

of federal sustainment money to maintain, repair, and replace the

equipment. Also, the program has raised expectations among some local

officials that the federal government may provide additional funding for

operational equipment.

The interagency coordination process provided a valuable

information-sharing forum but was of limited success in helping steer the

design and development of the program. According to some Senior

Interagency Coordination Group members, DOD did not heed their advice

on designing the program. For example, DOD did not adequately leverage

existing training programs. However, the Group did influence the timing of

the first cities to be trained. The Group also disapproved of DOD’s method

of assessing the 120 cities’ needs or requirements but did not develop an

acceptable alternative assessment approach. No threat and risk

assessment1

 was applied to help determine cities’ requirements or needs

or to establish a roadmap or defined end state of preparedness. While it is

not possible to eliminate or reduce the risk to all potential targets against

WMD terrorism, threat and risk assessments can help ensure that localities

1

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program

Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
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receive the most appropriate training and equipment based on the level of

protection desired.

Federal agencies’ individual efforts to enhance consequence management

of possible incidents involving WMD terrorism are not guided by an

overarching strategy for achieving a defined end state. Local officials in

most of the cities we visited raised the issue that the many WMD training,

equipment, and consequence management programs are evidence of a

fragmented and possibly wasteful federal approach toward combating

terrorism. Cities pointed to similar federal agency training and equipment

programs, such as those offered by the Department of Justice and FEMA

and the new initiative to give the National Guard a WMD response role, as

examples of the unfocused federal approach to combating terrorism.

Background Concerned that WMD are increasingly available to terrorists, Congress

passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996,

commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act (P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23,

1996). The act designates DOD as the lead agency to enhance domestic

preparedness for responding to and managing the consequences of

terrorists’ use of WMD.

2

 Under the act, DOD can provide training, exercises,

and expert advice to emergency response personnel and lend equipment

to local jurisdictions.

The Secretary of Defense designated the Assistant Secretary for Special

Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict as the policy office and the

Secretary of the Army to carry out the Domestic Preparedness Program.

Because of its subject matter expertise, the Army’s Chemical and

Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) was tasked to implement the

program through the Army Director of Military Support. The Director of

Military Support and CBDCOM designed a training program to build on the

existing knowledge and capabilities of those who would first deal with a

WMD incident locally—fire, law enforcement, and medical personnel and

hazardous materials technicians. This generally week-long program takes

a train-the-trainer approach. On the last day of the week-long program,

local officials role-play their responses to a specific terrorism scenario

through a tabletop exercise. The act also authorizes (1) funds for DOD to

assist the Secretary of Health and Human Services in establishing

Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams (MMST) to help improve local

jurisdictions’ medical response capabilities for a WMD incident; (2) a

2

Training for consequence management would include measures to alleviate damage, loss of life, or

suffering; protect public health and safety; restore essential government services; and provide

emergency assistance.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

telephonic link to provide data and expert advice for the use of state and

local officials responding to emergencies involving WMD; (3) a rapid

response information system, including an inventory of rapid response

assets and a database on chemical and biological materials; and (4) a

chemical/biological rapid response team.

Agencies that participate in the program include the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the

Department of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services’

Public Health Service (PHS), and the Environmental Protection Agency.

The act also requires that DOD coordinate with state and local emergency

preparedness agencies. Until June 1998, the coordinating body for the

Domestic Preparedness Program was the Senior Interagency Coordination

Group on Terrorism.3

DOD received $36 million in fiscal year 1997 to implement the program. An

additional $6.6 million was provided for PHS to establish medical strike

teams. DOD’s fiscal year 1998 and 1999 budget estimates are $43 million and

$50 million, respectively, to continue the program. DOD estimates that the

last 2 years of the 5-year program will cost about $14 million to $15 million

each year. DOD expects its portion of the 5-year program to cost at least

$157 million, but it expects to incur costs of about $5 million per year in

fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to conduct program-related exercises.

Appendixes I through III show more detailed actual and projected DOD

Domestic Preparedness Program costs for fiscal years 1997-99.

Cities Benefit From

Domestic

Preparedness

Program

Cities that have received training under the Domestic Preparedness

Program have a greater awareness of how to respond to a potential

chemical or biological terrorist incident. Local officials praised the

training program content, instructors, and materials as well as DOD’s

willingness to act on constructive criticism and adjust the courses. They

also credited the program with bringing local, state, and federal regional

emergency response agencies together into a closer working relationship.

By December 31, 1998, DOD expected to have trained about one-third of the

120 cities it selected for the program and planned to complete the entire

training program by fiscal year 2001. Those trained—fire fighters,

hazardous materials technicians, emergency medical services personnel,

3

In March 1998, FEMA, which established and chaired the Senior Interagency Coordination Group,

withdrew from the Group. Currently, a National Security Council working group under the new

National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism—a position

established in May 1998 by Presidential Decision Directive 62—is responsible for interagency

coordination.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

law enforcement personnel, hospital personnel, and dispatchers—are

expected to train other emergency responders through follow-on courses.

The seven cities we visited were planning to institutionalize various

adaptations of the WMD training, primarily in their fire and law enforcement

academies. A related exercise program to allow cities to test their

response capabilities also has begun. As authorized under the

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, DOD is in the process of providing

$300,000 in training and operational equipment—personal protection,

detection, decontamination, and training aids4

—selected by each city after

it is trained. As of June 1998, nine cities had received equipment and other

cities were developing their lists. See appendix IV for DOD’s suggested

equipment list.

Other Program Aspects

Are Being Implemented

The other aspects of the Domestic Preparedness Program either have been

implemented or are in process. DOD established a hot line for reporting

incidents and requesting technical assistance through the existing National

Response Center for hazardous materials spills, and a help line was

established through which CBDCOM experts can provide information and

advice. The Command also has an internet web site to provide information

on the Domestic Preparedness Program. FEMA established the Rapid

Response Information System to allow federal and state agencies

controlled computer access to a database on federal response capabilities,

WMD substances, equipment, and other information. (An internet web site

allows general access to an abbreviated version of the system.) A number

of city and state officials we interviewed had limited knowledge about

these communications systems, and some were skeptical of their value

during a crisis. These officials indicated that the systems seemed

redundant to existing emergency response reporting channels and

information sources, and they did not expect to take the time to use any of

these systems in the event of an incident.

In association with the cities of Baltimore and New York, CBDCOM is

identifying ways to improve the response to chemical and biological WMD

incidents, respectively. The Command is also testing first responder

equipment, such as protective clothing and chemical detectors, to enable

cities to make more informed decisions about equipment purchases or

requests through the DOD equipment program. At the time of our review,

DOD had not finalized a joint command structure for a Chemical/Biological

Rapid Response Team, which is intended to support federal, state, and

4

Training aids are a standard package provided by DOD. Cities have flexibility in selecting items from

the other three equipment categories as long as the items relate to WMD response. Vehicles are not

among the authorized equipment items.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

local agencies in dealing with a WMD incident. The team will comprise

existing military units from more than one military service and possibly

from National Guard and Reserve units.

PHS continues to establish and equip MMSTs for which the initial 27 program

cities are developing concept of operations plans for medical systems. PHS

has contracts with the 27 cities and expects them to complete their plans,

including how MMSTs are being incorporated into the local emergency

response and medical systems, by December 31, 1998. At the time of our

review, PHS further planned to establish MMSTs in all 120 program cities.

These teams are eligible for unmatched federal funding to acquire an

average of $350,000 worth of equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals

based on the requirements related to their concept of operations plans.5

Cities Selected Based

Upon Population

DOD decided to implement its Domestic Preparedness Program in the 120

largest U.S. cities based on city population (1990 census, revised

Apr. 1995).6

 This equated to all U.S. cities with more than 144,000 people at

the time. Figure 1 lists the cities DOD selected. The 120 cities represent

about 22 percent of the U.S. population and cover at least 1 city in 38

states and the District of Columbia. Twelve states7

 and the U.S. territories

have no cities in the program, and 25 percent of the cities are in California

and Texas.

5

Unmatched federal funding for equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals ranges from $300,000 for

smaller cities to $800,000 for New York City. All MMST cities are required to have sufficient

pharmaceutical stocks to initially treat at least 1,000 casualties. See appendix V for an example of the

types of equipment being acquired for MMSTs.

6

The decision to select the most populated 120 cities was discussed within the Senior Interagency

Coordination Group.

7

Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, South

Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

Figure 1: Cities Selected for Domestic Preparedness Program (in order of population)

 1. New York, N.Y.

 2. Los Angeles, Calif.

 3. Chicago, Ill.

 4. Houston, Tex.

 5. Philadelphia, Pa.

 6. San Diego, Calif.

 7. Detroit, Mich.

 8. Dallas, Tex.

 9. Phoenix, Ariz.

10. San Antonio, Tex.

11. San Jose, Calif.

12. Baltimore, Md.

13. Indianapolis, Ind.

14. San Francisco, Calif.

15. Jacksonville, Fla.

16. Columbus, Ohio

17. Milwaukee, Wis.

18. Memphis, Tenn.

19. Washington, D.C.

20. Boston, Mass.

21. Seattle, Wash.

22. El Paso, Tex.

23. Cleveland, Ohio

24. New Orleans, La.

25. Nashville, Tenn.

26. Denver, Colo.

27. Austin, Tex.

28. Fort Worth, Tex.

29. Oklahoma City, Okla.

30. Portland, Oreg. 

31. Kansas City, Mo.

32. Long Beach, Calif.

33. Tucson, Ariz.

34. St. Louis, Mo.

35. Charlotte, N.C.

36. Atlanta, Ga.

37. Virginia Beach, Va.

38. Albuquerque, N. Mex.

39. Oakland, Calif.

40. Pittsburgh, Pa.

41. Sacramento, Calif.

42. Minneapolis, Minn.

43. Tulsa, Okla.

44. Honolulu, Hawaii

45. Cincinnati, Ohio

46. Miami, Fla.

47. Fresno, Calif.

48. Omaha, Nebr.

49. Toledo, Ohio

50. Buffalo, N.Y.

51. Wichita, Kans.

52. Santa Ana, Calif.

53. Mesa, Ariz.

54. Colorado Springs, Co.

55. Tampa, Fla.

56. Newark, N.J.

57. St. Paul, Minn.

58. Louisville, Ky.

59. Anaheim, Calif.

60. Birmingham, Ala.

61. Arlington, Tex. 

62. Norfolk, Va.

63. Las Vegas, Nev.

64. Corpus Christi, Tex.

65. St. Petersburg, Fla.

66. Rochester, N.Y.

67. Jersey City, N.J.

68. Riverside, Calif.

69. Anchorage, Alaska

70. Lexington, Ky.

71. Akron, Ohio

72. Aurora, Col.

73. Baton Rouge, La.

74. Raleigh, N.C.

75. Stockton, Calif.

76. Richmond, Va.

77. Shreveport, La.

78. Jackson, Miss.

79. Mobile, Ala.

80. Des Moines, Iowa

81. Lincoln, Nebr.

82. Madison, Wis.

83. Grand Rapids, Mich.

84. Yonkers, N.Y.

85. Hialeah, Fla.

86. Montgomery, Ala.

87. Lubbock, Tex.

88. Greensboro, N.C.

89. Dayton, Ohio

90. Huntington Beach, Calif. 

 91. Garland, Tex.

 92. Glendale, Calif.

 93. Columbus, Ga.

 94. Spokane, Wash.

 95. Tacoma, Wash.

 96. Little Rock, Ark.

 97. Bakersfield, Calif.

 98. Fremont, Calif.

 99. Fort Wayne, Ind.

100. Newport News, Va.

101. Arlington, Va.

102. Worcester, Mass.

103. Knoxville, Tenn.

104. Modesto, Calif.

105. Orlando, Fla.

106. San Bernardino, Calif.

107. Syracuse, N.Y.

108. Providence, R.I.

109. Salt Lake City, Utah

110. Huntsville, Ala.

111. Amarillo, Tex.

112. Springfield, Mass.

113. Cleveland, Ohio

114. Irving, Tex.

115. Chesapeake, Va.

116. Kansas City, Kans.

117. Metairie, La.

118. Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.

119. Glendale, Ariz.

120. Warren, Mich.

a

a

a

aNot a city government.

Source: U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command.

DOD took a city approach because it wanted to deal with a single

governmental entity that could select the most appropriate personnel for

training and to receive equipment. But in selecting cities, DOD did not take

into account a city’s existing level of preparedness or financial need. Also,

DOD did no analysis to determine whether all cities on the list actually had

a perceptible level of threat and risk of terrorism or whether a smaller city

with high risk factors might have been excluded from the program due to

its lower population. No federal agency determined and assessed cities’

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

risk factors based on intelligence assessments, critical infrastructure

points, national symbols, future special events drawing large crowds,

sensitive government or corporate activities, or similar analyses and data

to help evaluate cities’ key assets and vulnerabilities to WMD. In fact, in no

city we visited did the FBI determine there was a credible threat of a WMD

attack, which would be one factor considered in a threat and risk

assessment.8

Linking Future

Training to Existing

Structures Would Be

More Efficient and

Economical

DOD has set out to deliver training without taking advantage of existing

state emergency management structures, mutual aid agreements among

local jurisdictions, or other collaborative arrangements for emergency

response. By delivering the program to cities based on population size, DOD

replicates training sessions in nearby cities that also qualified for the

program and might even be part of the same response system or mutual

aid jurisdiction. Mutual aid agreements, unified emergency service

districts, councils of government, hazardous materials response regions,

and traditional state roles in fire and emergency management training (as

well as links to the federal response system),9

 would allow DOD to

consolidate training and could result in far fewer training iterations.

Training in fewer locations and taking advantage of existing emergency

response structures could hasten the accomplishment of program goals

and have the added benefit of reinforcing local response integration. Such

an approach could also cover a greater percentage of the population and

make effective use of existing emergency management training venues.

Under this approach, WMD training could be delivered over the long term

through existing state training systems. Table 1 compares the difference in

coverage that results from selecting 120 cities, counties, or

standard/primary metropolitan statistical areas.

8

Although the FBI and the intelligence community see growing interest in WMD by groups and

individuals of concern, the intelligence community concluded that explosives or other conventional

weapons will continue to be the most likely form of terrorist attack over the next decade.

9

Federal, state, and local responders have a well-established command structure that can expand and

contract as needed. FEMA uses this incident command structure in disaster response to coordinate

activities with state and local authorities.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

Table 1: U.S. Population Covered

Based on Size of Area Selected Size of area

selected

Total population

of area (millions)

Percentage of U.S.

population covered

City population 54.9 22.0

County population 108.9 43.6

Standard/primary metropolitan

statistical area 160.2 64.1

Note: Largest 120 areas based on 1990 census, updated 1994-95.

Table 2 shows that DOD could have selected fewer areas to cover

22 percent of the population.

Table 2: Areas Needed to Cover 22

Percent of the U.S. Population, by

Type of Area

Type of area selected Total area

City 120 cities

County 24 counties

Standard/primary metropolitan statistical

area

12 statistical areas

DOD’s approach resulted in clusters of program cities, each of which is to

receive training and equipment. Figure 2 shows the location of the cities

nationwide and the clustering effect resulting from DOD’s decision to base

training delivery on city population.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

Figure 2: Clustering of Cities Selected for Domestic Preparedness Program

1 Omaha, NE

Lincoln, NE

Kansas City, KS

Wichita, KS

Tulsa, OK

Oklahoma City, OK

Garland, TX

Dallas, TX

Arlington, TX

Austin, TX

Houston, TX

Corpus Christi, TX

San Antonio, TX

El Paso, TX

Fort Worth, TX

Irving, TX

Lubbock, TX

Amarillo, TX Albuquerque, NM

Colorado Springs, CO

Aurora, CO Denver, CO

Salt Lake City, UT

Phoenix, AZ

Mesa, AZ

Tucson, AZ

Glendale, AZ

Seattle, WA

Tacoma, WA Spokane, WA

Portland, OR

Fremont, CA

Sacramento, CA

San Francisco, CA Oakland, CA

San Jose, CA Stockton, CA

Modesto, CA

Fresno, CA

Bakersfield, CA Las Vegas, NV

Glendale, CA San Bernardino, CA

Los Angeles, CA Riverside, CA

Long Beach, CA Anaheim, CA

Santa Ana, CA Huntington Beach, CA

San Diego, CA

Anchorage, AK

Honolulu, HI

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

Worcester, MA

Boston, MA

Providence, RI

Yonkers, NY

Jersey City, NJ

Philadelphia, PA

Baltimore, MD

Washington, DC

Newport News, VA

Virginia Beach, VA

Chesapeake, VA

Greensboro, NC

Raleigh, NC

Charlotte, NC

Jacksonville, FL

Orlando, FL

Tampa, FL

Ft. Lauderdale, FL

Miami, FL

St. Petersburg, FL

Hialeah, FL

New York, NY

Syracuse, NY

Rochester, NY Springfield, MA

Cleveland, OH Newark, NJ

Akron, OH

Pittsburgh, PA

Columbus, OH

Toledo, OH

Dayton, OH Arlington, VA

Richmond, VA

Louisville, KY Lexington-Fayette, KY

Buffalo, NY

Norfolk, VA

Knoxville, TN

Nashville, TN

Chattanooga, TN

Huntsville, AL

Atlanta, GA

Birmingham, AL

Columbus, GA

Montgomery, AL

Mobile, AL

New Orleans, LA

Metairie, LA

Baton Rouge, LA

Shreveport, LA

Jackson, MS

Memphis, TN

Cincinnati, OH

Indianapolis, IN

Fort Wayne, IN

Chicago, IL

Detroit, MI

Warren, MI

Grand Rapids, MI

Milwaukee, WI

Madison, WI

Minneapolis, MN

St. Paul, MN

Des Moines, IA

Kansas City, MO

St. Louis, MO

Little Rock, AR

Note: City locations are approximate.

Source: U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
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Figure 3 shows 14 clusters of 44 different cities within 30 miles of at least 1

other program city, or 37 percent of the total number of cities, that DOD

selected for the program. Increasing the distance to 60 miles between

cities produces 18 clusters involving 58 cities, or nearly half of the total

number of cities in the program.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
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Figure 3: Program Cities Within 30

Miles of Another Program City

Southern California Los Angeles

Santa Ana

Long Beach

Riverside

Santa Ana

Anaheim

Long Beach

Long Beach

Los Angeles

Los Angeles

Long Beach

Anaheim

Glendale

Anaheim

Huntingon Beach

San Bernardino

Huntington Beach

Huntington Beach

Anaheim

Santa Ana

Long Beach

Anaheim

Glendale

Glendale

5.6

10.9

13.4

17.0

17.4

18.1

19.9

20.2

25.3

26.0

29.6

30.3

Cluster Program city Program city Distance in miles

Northern California San Francisco

San Jose

Oakland

Oakland

Fremont

Fremont

8.8

12.9

30.1

New York Metro Newark

New York

New York

New York

Jersey City

Newark

Jersey City

Yonkers

Jersey City

Newark

Yonkers

Yonkers

5.4

13.4

13.6

19.0

19.1

23.7

Dallas Metro Fort Worth

Dallas

Arlington

Dallas

Fort Worth

Arlington

Irving

Irving

Arlington

Irving

12.3

15.6

20.8

25.2

26.0

Tidewater Norfolk

Virginia Beach

Norfolk

Virginia Beach

Newport News

Chesapeake

Norfolk

Newport News

Chesapeake

Chesapeake

5.4

18.1

21.4

22.5

27.1

Arizona Phoenix

Phoenix

Mesa

Glendale

Mesa

Glendale

7.3

20.7

28.0

Central Florida Tampa St. Petersburg 24.6

a

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
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Kansas City Kansas City, Mo. Kansas City, Kans. 1.7

Capitol Washington, D.C. Arlington. Va. 3.3

Louisiana New Orleans Metairie 5.0

Minnesota Minneapolis St. Paul 9.6

Colorado Denver Aurora 10.0

Michigan Detroit Warren 12.1

Cluster Program city Program city Distance in milesa

Southern Florida Miami

Miami

Hialeah

Hialeah

Ft. Lauderdale

Ft. Lauderdale

5.4

23.4

25.6

aDriving distance, city center to city center.

Source: GAO analysis, based on mileage from GeoSystems Global Corporation, Inc.

The Southern California area shows the greatest effect of clustering.

Under the California Standardized Emergency Management System, there

are countywide operational areas within six mutual aid regions (see fig. 4).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
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Figure 4: California’s Mutual Aid Regions

Imperial

Inyo

Mono

Riverside

San Bernardino

San Diego

Fresno

Kings

Tulare

Kern

Madera

Mariposa

Merced

Alpine

Amador

Calaveras

El Dorado

Nevada

Placer

Sacramento

San Joaquin

Stanislaus

Tuolumne

Yolo

Butte

Colusa

Glenn

Lassen

Modoc

Plumas

Shasta

Sierra

Siskiyou

Sutter

Tehama

Trinity

Yuba

Alameda

Contra Costa

Del Norte

Humboldt

Lake

Marin

Mendocino

Monterey

Napa

San Benito

San Francisco

San Mateo

Santa Clara

Santa Cruz

Solano Sonoma

Los

Angeles

Orange

San

Luis

Obispo

Santa

Barbara

Ventura

VI

V

I

II

III

IV

Source: California State Emergency Management System Guidelines.

In Los Angeles County, the sheriff is in charge of the consolidated

interagency response to an incident occurring in any of the 88 cities and

136 unincorporated areas within the county. The Los Angeles county

operational area includes the cities of Los Angeles, Long Beach, and

Glendale, all of which are treated as separate entities in the Domestic

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
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Preparedness Program. Further, the nearby cities of Anaheim, Huntington

Beach, Santa Ana, San Bernardino, and Riverside are within 30 miles of at

least one other program city and are also treated as separate entities.

Through mutual aid and under California’s statewide system, Los Angeles

county could conceivably assist or be assisted by these other neighboring

cities or any other jurisdictions in the state in the event of a major

incident.

Similarly, as shown in figure 5, Virginia has 13 regionalized hazardous

materials teams to respond to a WMD incident. Through these regional

teams that operate under state control, four adjacent program

cities—Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Newport News, and Chesapeake—could

assist one another in the event of a WMD incident.

Figure 5: Virginia’s Regional Hazardous Materials Response Teams

Legend:

AE I - Wise County Team - Danville Team - Northern Virginia Team

B

C

D

- Bristol Team

- Giles County Team

- Roanoke Valley Team

F

H

G - Henrico County Team

- Winchester Team

- Central Shenandoah Valley Team

K

L

M

J

- Eastern Shore Team

- Fredericksburg Team

- Newport News City Team

- Southside Tidewater Team

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H I

J

K

L

M

Virginia Beach

Alleghany Augusta Bath

Bedford

Botetourt

Craig

Roanoke

Montgomery

Giles

Pulaski

Floyd Franklin

Henry

Patrick

Carroll

Grayson

Wythe

Bland

Tazewell

Buchanan

Smyth

Washington

Russell

Dickenson

Scott

Wise

Lee Pittsylvania

Amherst

Campbell

Charlotte

Halifax Mecklenburg

Lunenburg

Nottoway

Amelia

Brunswick

Dinwiddie

Greensville

Sussex

Prince

George

Surry

Southampton

Isle

of Wight

Suffolk

Chesapeake

Hampton

Newport

News

James Gloucester City

New Kent Mathews

Middlesex

Northampton

Accomack

Lancaster

Northumberland

AppomattoxPrince

Edward

Cumberland

Buckingham

Albemarle

Fluvanna

Rappahannock

Loudoun Fairfax

Arlington

Prince

William

Stafford

Spotsylvania

King George

Caroline

Westmoreland

Essex

Richmond

King and Queen

King

William Henrico

Hanover

Louisa

Goochland

Powhatan

ChesterfieldCharles

City

Clarke

Culpeper Fauquier

Frederick

Greene

Highland

Madison

Nelson

Orange

Page

Rockbridge

Rockingham

Shenandoah

Warren

York

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

Texas has four program cities less than 30 miles from each other: Dallas,

Fort Worth, Irving, and Arlington. And the Washington, D.C., MMST is based

on a metropolitan area council of governments agreement involving six

jurisdictions (and two program cities) in Virginia, Maryland, and the

District of Columbia that would support Washington, D.C., or other

metropolitan area first responders in the event of a WMD incident. MMSTs in

other cities are also designed to be integrated into the local emergency

response and medical systems for that particular area.

In response to comments by state and local officials, DOD began holding

regional meetings to introduce the program. Nevertheless, each program

city still receives its own training program and training equipment

package. Cities may invite representatives from neighboring jurisdictions

and state agencies, but classroom space tends to be limited, and if the

neighboring city is a program city, it will eventually receive its own on-site

training.

States have existing training structures that DOD could have used to deliver

its training courses. California’s Specialized Training Institute, for

example, provides emergency management training to first responders

statewide. In Texas, the state’s Division of Emergency Management

conducts training for local first responders, and fire protection training is

provided through the Texas Engineering Extension Service. FEMA said that

it delivers numerous courses through and in cooperation with state and

local fire training academies and emergency managers.

Under current circumstances, it is up to the individual cities whose

personnel were trained as trainers to ensure the appropriate courses are

delivered to the rank-and-file emergency response personnel. Cities we

visited were adapting the DOD courses differently and used different

venues to deliver the training. Cities plan to deliver the courses through

their local academies and in most cases will also deliver the courses

directly. One delivery method that DOD could consider to reach large

numbers of first responders while minimizing travel costs is distance

learning. For example, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of

Infectious Diseases has successfully used distance learning techniques

through satellite-to-television links, and FEMA provides training to

emergency responders nationwide through its Emergency Education

Network. CBDCOM has been considering distance learning technology to

provide training to cities other than the 120 selected for the Domestic

Preparedness Program but is not using it to train first responders in

multiple cities in the existing program.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

Terms of DOD

Equipment Agreement

Concern Cities

Because of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislative language authorizing DOD

to lend equipment (50 U.S.C. 2312 (e)), DOD provided equipment as a 5-year

renewable loan for training purposes rather than giving or granting

equipment to the cities. DOD’s loan agreement terms have caused

frustration and confusion among local officials. Under the terms of the

loan agreement, cities are to repair, maintain, and replace the equipment

and are to use it only for training purposes. Officials from some cities we

visited viewed the acceptance of the equipment as tantamount to an

unfunded federal mandate because DOD is providing no funds to sustain

the equipment. At least two cities were reluctant to accept the equipment

unless DOD would assure them that the equipment could be used

operationally and that DOD did not intend for the equipment to be returned.

Although such assurances contradict the loan agreement, DOD program

officials acknowledged that DOD will not require cities to repair, maintain,

replace, or return the equipment and that cities can use it for operational

purposes as well as for training. DOD officials also pointed out that much of

the equipment has no more than a 5-year useful life and is largely

incompatible with standard military-specification equipment.

Further, expectations have been raised among some local officials that the

federal government may eventually provide funds to sustain the program,

if not to provide even more equipment toward meeting cities’ perceived

operational requirements. DOD officials said that the $300,000 equipment

package was intended only for cities’ training needs. Also, DOD wanted to

encourage cities to share in the burden of preparing for WMD terrorism by

funding additional equipment themselves. DOD’s basis for determining the

$300,000 value of the equipment program and allowing all cities the same

amount, regardless of their existing capabilities or financial need, is

unclear and undocumented. Moreover, no federal agency has made

assessments as a part of the program to help determine requirements

needed for WMD over and above what is needed for a response to an

industrial hazardous materials incident.

Interagency

Coordination Has

Been Limited

Congress intended the Domestic Preparedness Program to be an

interagency effort with DOD as lead agency. Under FEMA leadership, the

Senior Interagency Coordination Group provided a forum for DOD and the

other involved agencies to share information. However, in developing the

program, some member agency officials stated that DOD did not always

take advantage of the experience of agencies that were more accustomed

to dealing with state and local officials and were more knowledgeable of

domestic emergency response structures. For example, some agency

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

representatives said that they offered suggestions such as taking a

metropolitan area approach and coordinating with state emergency

management agencies instead of dealing directly and only with cities.10

DOD made most program decisions and presented them to the Group for

discussion. According to DOD, the Group was often unable to form

consensus or reach a decision, DOD was obligated to move forward with

the program without interagency agreement.

According to participants, the Group did influence two decisions. DOD

initially planned to cover 20 cities in the first phase of the program, but the

Group raised the number to 27 and gave 7 cities higher priority in terms of

timing for the training than their population would otherwise warrant. The

Group made this decision to account for special events, geographical

balance, and the remoteness of Honolulu, Hawaii, and Anchorage, Alaska,

from the continental United States. Also, concerned about an assessment

guide that DOD developed for the cities and cities’ presumed negative

perceptions, the Group recommended that DOD abandon its plan to have

cities conduct formal self-assessments of their capabilities and needs. The

Group did not press for a more acceptable assessment methodology,

which resulted in the lack of any analytical basis for cities to determine

their requirements for a prudent and affordable level of preparedness for

WMD or to guide DOD in defining individual cities’ requirements.

In addition, the Senior Interagency Coordination Group did not resolve the

issue of similar or potentially overlapping terrorism-related courses. Some

agency officials told us that in developing its training program, DOD did not

take advantage of existing terrorism-related courses or curriculums. For

example, a joint Department of Justice and FEMA 2-day basic concepts

course on emergency response to terrorism was being developed at about

the same time as the Domestic Preparedness Program. Department of

Justice officials described the course as being more detailed and technical

than the WMD awareness portion of the 5-day DOD program. They said that

the training materials were available if DOD had wanted to use them for the

awareness and operations modules of its training program, but a DOD

program official said that the materials were draft at the time and could

not be used.

FEMA and Department of Justice officials said they made available to DOD

materials from existing Emergency Management Institute and National

Fire Academy courses or workshops on terrorism-related subjects. Other

10The International Association of Fire Chiefs said that it also recommended a metropolitan area

approach, given that many fire departments are countywide. Another firefighter organization criticized

DOD’s city approach because it excludes large numbers of first responders in smaller jurisdictions.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

federal agencies also have training that includes WMD or other

terrorism-related topics. DOD did not adopt these materials, and the

Department of Justice and FEMA continued developing additional

terrorism-related courses as well. Some city and state officials and

national first responder organizations faulted DOD for not seeking their

input or heeding their advice in the early stages of program development

so that DOD could have a better appreciation of state and local emergency

management and training structures and incident command systems.11

Strategy Needed to

Coordinate and Focus

Multiple Training,

Equipment, and

Response Elements

Some local officials viewed the growing number of WMD consequence

management training programs, including the Domestic Preparedness

Program, the Department of Justice and FEMA courses, FEMA Emergency

Management Institute courses, National Fire Academy courses, and a

National Guard Bureau’s National Interagency Counterdrug Institute

course, as evidence of a fragmented and possibly wasteful federal

approach toward combating terrorism. Similarly, multiple programs with

equipment segments—such as the separate DOD and PHS initiatives and the

new Department of Justice equipment grant program—are causing

frustration and confusion at the local level and are resulting in further

complaints that the federal government is unfocused and has no

coordinated plan or defined end state for domestic preparedness.12

The DOD and PHS equipment segments of the Domestic Preparedness

Program, which were designed and implemented separately, overlap as

both include personal protection, decontamination, and detection

equipment. The separation of the DOD equipment and, where applicable,

the PHS equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals required local officials

to develop separate equipment lists and to ensure compatibility and

interoperability of the equipment, optimize the available federal funding,

and avoid unnecessary duplication. This was particularly important

because the two equipment initiatives overlap. According to the Office of

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and

Low-Intensity Conflict, DOD intentionally separated the two equipment

11DOD did include local representatives in discussion groups used to help establish training objectives.

12In Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23,

1998) and Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness

Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998), we testified before the Subcommittee on National

Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, House Committee on Government Reform and

Oversight, on the growing number of players in the counterterrorism arena and the need for improved

interagency coordination. Also, in Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs

Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997), we recommended

that governmentwide priorities for terrorism-related spending be established and that resources be

allocated based on the established priorities and assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist attack.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

segments of the program. A joint, coordinated equipment program could

have alleviated the administrative burden on city officials and lowered the

level of confusion and frustration. Although PHS circulated cities’ proposed

equipment lists among the Domestic Preparedness Program’s interagency

partners for comments, this coordination at the federal level did little to

simplify the process for the cities.

The separation of the two equipment packages also required local officials

to deal with two federal agencies’ differing requirements and procedures.

Since the PHS equipment program is offered through a contract with

unmatched federal funds, the cities had to meet certain requirements,

including the development of a concept of operations plan for MMSTs to fit

into the local area’s overall medical response system. The DOD equipment

loan program required a different process. Other equipment initiatives,

such as a new Department of Justice equipment grant program, may add to

the local governments’ perception of an unfocused federal strategy.

State and local officials and some national firefighter organizations also

raised concerns about the growing number of federal response elements

being formed, including the new initiative to train and equip National

Guard units for a WMD response role. These officials did not believe

specialized National Guard units would be of use because they could not

be on site in the initial hours of an incident and numerous other military

and federal agency support units can already provide assistance to local

authorities as requested. These units include the Army’s Technical Escort

Unit, the Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, and

the PHS’ National Medical Response Teams.13 State and local officials were

more supportive of the traditional National Guard role in providing

requested disaster support through the state governor. We are currently

reviewing the proposed role of the National Guard and reserves in WMD

consequence management.

As noted in our December 1997 report and in our April 1998 and

October 1998 testimonies, the many and increasing number of

participants, programs, and activities in the counterterrorism area across

the federal departments, agencies, and offices pose a difficult management

and coordination challenge to avoid duplication, fragmentation, and gaps.

Recent interagency coordination initiatives to deal with the increasing

number of consequence management training and equipment programs

are underway both within and outside the National Security Council. A key

13For a more comprehensive overview of federal support capabilities, see Combating Terrorism:

Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26,

1997).

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

proposal involves the transfer of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic

Preparedness Program to the Department of Justice. We did not examine

the effectiveness of these coordination efforts or the details of the

proposed transfer of the program to the Department of Justice.

Conclusions Because DOD has trained only about one-third of the program cities and the

FBI and the intelligence community conclude that conventional weapons

will be terrorists’ weapons of choice for the next decade, there is adequate

time to refocus the Domestic Preparedness Program and to conduct the

threat and risk assessments recommended in our April 1998 report. DOD or

any subsequent lead agency could improve the efficiency, economy, and

effectiveness of the Domestic Preparedness Program if it consolidated

training on a more regional basis, particularly where it will reinforce

existing state, mutual aid, and other similar multijurisdictional emergency

response structures. The program could also benefit from involvement of

the states, particularly where state or regional training structures are in

place and could be leveraged to provide first responder training.

Additionally, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislative language providing for

the loan of equipment could allow for greater flexibility, given the issues

arising from the equipment segment of DOD’s Domestic Preparedness

Program and the practical difficulty of implementing DOD’s loan

agreements. Moreover, the many federal WMD consequence management

training, equipment, and response initiatives could benefit from a

coordinated, integrated approach with a defined end state.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense—or the head of any

subsequent lead agency—in consultation with the other five cooperating

agencies in the Domestic Preparedness Program, refocus the program to

more efficiently and economically deliver training to local communities.

We also recommend that the Secretary, or the head of any subsequent lead

agency, use existing state and local emergency management response

systems or arrangements to select locations and training structures to

deliver courses and consider the geographical proximity of program cities.

We recommend that the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure

Protection and Counter-Terrorism actively review and guide the growing

number of WMD consequence management training and equipment

programs and response elements to ensure that agencies’ separate efforts

leverage existing state and local emergency management systems and are

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

coordinated, unduplicated, and focused toward achieving a clearly defined

end state.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

Congress may wish to amend the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation to

provide DOD or any subsequent lead agency greater flexibility in the

conditions under which it provides the $300,000 worth of equipment to

local jurisdictions. That is, the legislation could be amended to allow DOD

or any subsequent lead agency to provide equipment to local jurisdictions

on such terms and under conditions that it deems appropriate.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD, the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services, and FEMA

provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD did not agree

with our recommendation to refocus the Domestic Preparedness Program

or that Congress should consider amending the program’s legislation to

allow greater flexibility on the provision of equipment to local

jurisdictions. It also provided specific comments on our findings related to

threat and risk assessments. Justice generally agreed with the substance of

our report but did not comment specifically on our recommendation to

refocus the program. FEMA noted that our report provided an in-depth

examination of the program. Health and Human Services and FEMA

provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The

comments of these four agencies and our evaluation of them appear in

appendixes VI to IX. We also provided a draft of this report to the

Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the

National Security Council, and they did not provide comments.

DOD stated that we suggest a regional approach to domestic preparedness

but that such an approach is not efficient because the command and

control structure is more difficult to define and is less able to control first

responder training resources within multi-entity jurisdictions. DOD also

stated that it is better to have redundant coverage than to wait until

regional first responders can reach the scene of the incident—the

bureaucratic process at the city level is such that each city would likely

exhaust its integral resources before calling on regional actors for support.

Our report discusses gains in efficiency and effectiveness in delivering

training that could occur if DOD or a succeeding lead agency were to take

advantage of and reinforce the existing emergency response and training

structures at the local and state levels. Our evaluation showed that local

jurisdictions, states, and federal agencies are already linked through

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

long-standing emergency response plans and structures with defined

command and control systems. A number of localities respond to, or

receive back-up support for, emergencies through well-established county

or regional response structures and through mutual aid arrangements.

Under a more consolidated approach to the training, emergency response

personnel from nearby cities who might be called upon to assist one

another could receive program training together in one location rather

than in separate training sessions.

Further, DOD stated that critical to the goal of helping municipalities

establish their own emergency response programs is the ability to

interface with a single entity authorized to direct appropriate and

competent first responder trainers to attend the instruction. Regarding

DOD’s goal of helping municipalities establish their own emergency

response programs, we note that the legislation authorized support to

improve state and local emergency response agencies’ capabilities and did

not mandate that municipalities receive assistance to establish their own

emergency response programs. Regarding the selection of training

participants, a consolidated approach to delivering training would not

prevent participating jurisdictions from selecting appropriate and

competent personnel to attend the training sessions. Conversely, DOD’s

city-by-city approach does not guarantee that the most appropriate

personnel receive the DOD training. Some program cities we visited filled

their training slots on the basis of who was available rather than the

training qualifications of participants.

DOD also commented that redesigning the program would negatively

impact cities’ readiness because cities scheduled to receive training in

fiscal year 1999 have already begun to prepare. We do not believe that

refocusing the program to use existing emergency response and training

structures or to train nearby cities together would materially delay

program completion or harm cities’ readiness. First, the cities we visited

did not spend lengthy periods in advance of the training to identify training

venues or participants. Second, under the approach we recommend,

nearby program cities currently in clusters could receive training earlier, if

appropriate. The efficiencies gained should compensate for any time spent

to reconfigure the program. This approach should enhance readiness.

Also, if existing state emergency management training structures were

used, the training could be institutionalized statewide and ensure the

training is sustained over the longer term.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

DOD noted that conducting threat and risk assessments would negatively

affect cities’ readiness. However, as discussed in our April 1998 report, it

would take only about 2 weeks per city to conduct a threat and risk

assessment and determine a prudent and affordable level of response

capability. DOD further said that sufficient data is not available to conduct

threat and risk assessments, there is no credible pre-attack predictor, and

the FBI has not identified a specific WMD threat. As discussed in our

April 1998 report, perfect intelligence data or pre-attack predictors are not

needed to perform a sound qualitative threat and risk assessment,

although threat information would be one factor to consider. Our prior

report showed that a multidisciplinary risk assessment team would use the

best available intelligence information to generate valid scenarios to

perform the risk assessment process.

DOD also stated that the threat and risk methodology described in the

report is intended for point targets with controlled perimeters and internal

traffic, not for area targets such as cities with virtually no control over

entry, exit, or internal traffic. The model highlighted in our April 1998

report has diverse applications and is not limited to point defense

applications. Additionally, the President’s Commission on Critical

Infrastructure Protection recommended that threat and risk assessments

be performed on such nonpoint targets as the telecommunications and

banking and finance infrastructures. A rational, businesslike, collaborative

assessment by city, state, and federal representatives can help determine

the appropriate minimum requirements for preparedness, given the

threats, risks, and vulnerabilities for that city. In our view, such

assessments are conducive to preparedness and awareness. Assessments

can enhance preparedness by helping decisionmakers prioritize and target

investments of federal and local resources. Moreover, in nearly every city

we visited, local officials told us they would welcome such an assessment

because they currently have no sound basis for determining their

requirements.

DOD stated that it does not recommend that Congress amend the

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation to provide greater flexibility for

providing equipment to local jurisdictions as it intends to transfer the

program lead to another agency—the Department of Justice—as soon as

possible. As stated in our report, DOD’s equipment loan agreement terms

have caused frustration and confusion among local officials. As a practical

matter, because the loan agreement terms are not likely to be fully

implemented, we question the benefits of using this type of instrument for

providing equipment. Regardless of which agency leads the program to

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

completion, the program would benefit from a more practical, less

confusing arrangement for providing equipment to local jurisdictions.

Scope and

Methodology

We reviewed the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation to determine the

Domestic Preparedness Program’s objectives, and we discussed program

design, coordination, and implementation with—and obtained documents

from—several Department of Defense organizations, including the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity

Conflict, the U.S. Army Director of Military Support, and the U.S. Army

Chemical and Biological Defense Command. We discussed the same topics

with headquarters and many regional officials of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Public

Health Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department

of Energy and also with the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the

International Association of Fire Fighters, the National Volunteer Fire

Council, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

We interviewed and obtained documents regarding the Domestic

Preparedness Program, including MMSTs, from local officials of emergency

management agencies, fire departments, law enforcement agencies, and

health departments in New York, New York; Los Angeles, California;

Denver, Colorado; Seattle, Washington; Honolulu, Hawaii; Columbus,

Ohio; and Washington, D.C. We also interviewed state emergency

management officials for most of these locations and obtained information

on their organizations for emergency planning and response. We observed

domestic preparedness training and examined equipment in Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, and discussed MMSTs with the Arlington County, Virginia,

fire department. We discussed related initiatives with the Department of

Justice.

We analyzed Domestic Preparedness Program city clusters based on city

center to city center mileage calculations, and we based our analysis of

population coverage on 1990 census data, revised in 1994-95. We also

obtained information on and examined and analyzed, in the context of

program city clusters, state and local emergency response and training

systems and structures in California, Colorado, the District of Columbia,

Hawaii, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. We did not analyze and

compare the content of program training courses with other agencies’

terrorism-related courses to evaluate the extent of commonality, nor did

we fully evaluate other program initiatives to assist cities by providing

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
B-278556 

equipment or training. While we obtained information about PHS’ MMST

program, we did not evaluate its implementation.

We conducted our work from October 1997 to August 1998 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 

5 days after its issue date. At that time we will send copies to the

appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, Energy,

Health and Human Services, and Justice; the Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency; and the Directors of the Federal

Emergency Management Agency and the Office of Management and

Budget. We will make copies available to other interested parties upon

request.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at

(202) 512-3504. Major contributors to this report were Davi M. D’Agostino,

Richard A. McGeary, Marc J. Schwartz, and Madelon B. Savaides.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

DOD Domestic

Preparedness

Program Costs, by

Fiscal Year

32

Appendix II 

DOD Contractor

Costs, Fiscal Year

1997

33

Appendix III 

DOD Contractor

Costs, Fiscal Year

1998

34

Appedix IV 

DOD Equipment

Categories and

Suggested Items

35

Appendix V 

Metropolitan Medical

Strike Team

Equipment Categories

36

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Contents

Appendix VI 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

37

Appendix VII 

Comments From the

Department of Justice

41

Appendix VIII 

Comments From the

Department of Health

and Human Services

42

Appendix IX 

Comments From the

Federal Emergency

Management Agency

47

Related GAO Products 51

Tables Table 1: U.S. Population Covered Based on Size of Area Selected 9

Table 2: Areas Needed to Cover 22 Percent of the U.S.

Population, by Type of Area

9

Figures Figure 1: Cities Selected for Domestic Preparedness Program 7

Figure 2: Clustering of Cities Selected for Domestic Preparedness

Program

10

Figure 3: Program Cities Within 30 Miles of Another Program City 13

Figure 4: California’s Mutual Aid Regions 15

Figure 5: Virginia’s Regional Hazardous Materials Response

Teams

16

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Contents

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

CBDCOM Chemical and Biological Defense Command

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

MMST Metropolitan Medical Strike Team

PHS Public Health Service

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix I 

DOD Domestic Preparedness Program

Costs, by Fiscal Year

Dollars in millions

Program category 1997 actual

1998

projected

1999

estimated

Emergency response preparedness

Assessment, training development, training $9.5 $7.9 $8.6

Hot line, help line, database 2.8 3.8 3.2

Technical support 0.2 0.4 0.5

Equipment testing 0.9 1.9 1.2

Equipment 5.1 12.1 11.0

Exercises and preparedness testing

Training exercises 1.4 4.4 4.4

Response improvement, testing, and exercise 4.0 3.7 9.2

Major exercise 2.4 1.5 1.5

Chemical/biological response

C/B-RRTa support 1.0 0.8 0.8

C/B-RRTa equipment 5.5 2.0 5.1

Training 0.0 0.2 0.2

Program management 3.2 4.5 4.1

Total $36.0 $43.1 $49.8

aChemical/Biological Rapid Response Team.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity

Conflict.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II 

DOD Contractor Costs, Fiscal Year 1997

Contractor

Fiscal year

1997 awarda

Percentage of

fiscal year

1997 total Main purposes

Booz-Allen & Hamilton $12,554,500 59.7 Equipment packages, training support and preparation,

program management integration and support, hot line

concept, help line, web page, database

Response Planning, Inc. 2,769,300 13.2 Exercise support

Science Applications

International Corporation

1,495,300 7.1 Medical training support

Battelle 1,404,700 6.7 Technical and program support, training assessment

Sonalyst 833,100 4.0 Training videos

Innovative Emergency

Management

799,000 3.8 Hot line setup, operations, and equipment database

EA Procurement 485,200 2.3 Personal protection equipment for testing

GEO Centers 298,100 1.4 Response communications study

Others (4) 374,500 1.8 Hardware, storage containers

Total $21,013,700 100.0 Program management, expert assistance, training,

exercises, chemical/biological response

aIncludes subcontractor costs. For example, EAI Corporation is a subcontractor of Booz-Allen &

Hamilton for equipment packages.

Source: U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III 

DOD Contractor Costs, Fiscal Year 1998

Contractor

Fiscal year

1998

awarda

Percentage

of fiscal

year 1998

total Examples of purposes

Booz-Allen & Hamilton $16,811,850 58.0 Equipment packages, training support, program management, help

line, database, workshops

Response Planning Inc. 5,817,683 20.1 Exercise support, response improvement support

Science Applications International

Corporation

2,992,148 10.3 Medical training support

Battelle 1,069,708 3.7 Response improvement support, training assessment

Innovative Emergency

Management

999,948 3.4 Hot line operation

GEO Centers 521,757 1.8 Equipment testing, response improvement support, rapid response

team support

SoBran 335,000 1.2 Multimedia development

Others (4)b 442,849 1.5 Information technology, cell phones, assessment, support

Total $28,990,943 100.0 Program management, expert assistance, training, exercises,

chemical/biological response

Note: Projected contractor costs for fiscal year 1999 total $29,796,551, but contractors have not

yet been selected. Costs are expected to include equipment packages for cities, training support,

hot line operation, exercises, multimedia development, and program management.

aIncludes subcontractor costs. For example, EAI Corporation is a subcontractor of Booz-Allen &

Hamilton for equipment packages.

bAlso includes contractors who provided materials for equipment testing.

Source: U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appedix IV 

DOD Equipment Categories and Suggested

Items

Personal Protection Fully encapsulated chemical suits with boots and gloves (level A

maximum protection)

Chemical suits with boots and gloves (level B medium protection)

Self-contained breathing apparatus

Disposable decontamination suits

Detection M256A1 chemical agent detector kit

Chemical warfare agent detector kit and tubes

Improved chemical agent detector

Decontamination Portable shower kits

Emergency shelter

Sample collection equipment kits

Training Aids M256A1 training detector kit

M28 simulator detector tickets

M29 simulator detector tickets

Biological detection tickets

M18A2 chemical detector kit

M8 chemical agent detector paper

M9 chemical agent detector paper

Chemical warfare agent detector kit and tubes

Mark I auto injector trainers

Chemical agent monitor simulator

Reference materials

Course materials

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V 

Metropolitan Medical Strike Team

Equipment Categories

Personal protection (level A maximum protection for entry into

contaminated zone and level C protection for decontamination operations)

Detection

Decontamination

Communications

Ancillary equipment

Antidotes and pharmaceuticals for 1,000 casualties

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO’s comment

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this appendix.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated October 2, 1998.

GAO Comment 1. We modified the text to reflect DOD’s comments, as appropriate.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VII 

Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Department of Health

and Human Services

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Department of Health

and Human Services

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 2.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Department of Health

and Human Services

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

See comment 8.

See comment 8.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Department of Health

and Human Services

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Health and

Human Services’ letter dated September 22, 1998.

GAO Comments 1. We disagree that the lack of valid intelligence depicting an actual threat

prevents a threat and risk assessment. The threat and risk process requires

assumptions regarding a number of inputs and is not dependent on

definitive intelligence on terrorists.

2. This comment pertains to a matter discussed in the draft report that is

not included in the final report.

3. We acknowledge in the report that the Department seeks to develop

health systems through the Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST)

program, but there is also an equipment segment of the program that

overlaps with the equipment segment of the DOD Domestic Preparedness

Program. The fact that the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici initiative contains two

separate, unintegrated, federally funded equipment components has

caused confusion and placed the full burden of coordination on local

agencies.

4. We agree that federal agencies should work with locally developed

response structures and believe the report is consistent with this

comment.

5. Our report suggests that efficiencies can be gained by using and

reinforcing existing response structures for domestic preparedness

training or by otherwise consolidating training for nearby cities. We

believe that federally funded equipment should be allocated as best fits the

state and local response structure. The report does not suggest creating

new regionalized response systems for a weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) incident.

6. Both the DOD and the Health and Human Services portions of the

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici initiative have equipment components. Reference to

National Medical Response Team equipment in the draft report was

deleted in the final report.

7. The report discusses the design and implementation of DOD’s training

program. We did not evaluate the integration of MMSTs into state and local

response structures. We do note, however, that the Public Health Service

(PHS) plans to replicate MMSTs in all 120 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Department of Health

and Human Services

cities, which is not clearly leveraging state and local emergency response

structures.

8. We modified the text to reflect the Health and Human Services’

comments, as appropriate.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IX 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IX 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Now on p. 4.

See comment 1.

Now on pp. 2 and 19.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 3.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 5.

See comment 4.

Now on p. 8.

See comment 5.

Now on p. 8.

See comment 5.

Now on pp. 17 and 19.

See comment 5.

Now on p. 17.

See comment 5.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IX 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Now on pp. 8 and 22.

See comment 6.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IX 

Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

The following are GAO’s comments on the Federal Emergency Management

Agency’s (FEMA) letter dated September 25, 1998.

GAO Comments 1. The legislation did not direct FEMA to establish a telephonic link. The

Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) established the hot

line. FEMA established the Rapid Response Information System.

2. Reference to FEMA’s National Fire Academy and Emergency

Management Institute is made on page 19. We did not review in detail

federal training programs other than the Domestic Preparedness Program.

3. We agree that an overarching strategy for consequence management

training, equipment, and response initiatives should be developed with full

consideration of legislative and statutory requirements.

4. City and state officials commented on the newly established

communications systems in general. At the time of our review, they had a

limited understanding of the Rapid Response Information System and its

intended use.

5. We modified the text to reflect FEMA’s comment, as appropriate.

6. We accurately portrayed the intelligence community’s assessment of the

WMD threat. We did not suggest that the domestic preparedness effort be

canceled or substantially delayed.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Related GAO Products

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize

and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires

Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the

Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National

Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas

(GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management

Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June 11,

1997).

State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167, May 20,

1997).

Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices

(GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection

Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing

Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95, Apr. 15,

1997).

Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13

Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996).

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
Related GAO Products

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept. 11, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives

and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).

Passports and Visas: Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud (GAO/NSIAD-96-99,

May 9, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and

Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear

Material Controls in Newly Independent States (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89,

Mar. 8, 1996).

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and

International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).

(701125) Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-99-3 Combating Terrorism
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