Perspectives on 2015: 

A look forward.

In this issue you will nd a series of 

articles which look at the future. None of the 

authors pretend to be prophets but it is altogether tting that an attempt to foresee the 

future be undertaken. It is extremely difcult 

to prepare now for an uncertain future if that 

future cannot be forecast with some degree 

of certainty. It therefore behooves those who 

have the responsibility for shaping the future 

to peer into a crystal ball from time to time. 

Having done that , we must be responsible to 

both prepare for that future and also realize 

that through those efforts of preparation we are 

shaping that future to a great extent.

Traditionally, in doing analysis of this 

type an easy way of prioritizing the information is by looking at the regions of the 

world. It naturally falls to hand as we have 

regional CINCs, regionally focused analysts, 

and regional focused forces. However, transnational organizations and threats have emerged 

as major players on the world scene, especially 

since September 11, 2001. These organizations 

threaten not only our security but our paradigms of analysis. For our purposes there is 

still utility in the old paradigm and the articles 

contained herein are arranged in a predominately regional fashion. There are, additionally, 

articles prognosticating in the elds of economics, chemistry and physics. 

The theme of looking forward will also 

provide the theme for our fall issue. In that 

issue we hope to present additional focus on 

how the military proposes to address the future 

in the light of our war on terrorism, the uncertainty of the international environment, and 

current operational issues. In this issue we look 

at the over arching context of the future, in the 

next we will look at specic futures for the services and commands

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From the Editor:
2

AIRMAN SCHOLAR

Published by the 34th Education Group 

at the 

United States Air Force Academy

Spring 2002

Vol VIII, No 1

Commandant of Cadets

Commander 34th Training Wing

Brig Gen S. Taco Gilbert III

Commander and Permanent Professor, 

34th Education Group

Col Thomas A. Drohan

Editor 

Glenn Ferguson

Assistant Editor

Maj William R. Pearson

The 34th Education Group’s mission is to oversee curriculum 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 From the Editor

Perspective on the Future: 2015

Glenn Ferguson

2 Sub-Saharan Africa

African Studies Group, USAFA

4 The Americas

Col Douglas Murray, PhD.

Professor Curtis Cook, PhD

Lt Col (Ret) Vic Nell

Maj Matthew Anderson

Maj Dave Spoon

10 Europe 2015: The Old World in a New 

Century

Charles Krupnick, PhD.

Deron Jackson

18 Proliferation Drivers in the Middle East

27 Northeast Asia: Japan, China and The Two 

Koreas

Col Thomas A. Drohan, PhD.

Paul J. Bolt

William E. Berry, Jr PhD.

33 Russia

36 “All Our Tomorrows”

Ed. Maj Susan E. Hastings

Capt Jim F. Blankenship, PhD.

Capt Jennifer S. Gresham

Capt Kyle D. Gresham, PhD

Barry W. Hicks, PhD.

Maj Luke A .Lorang

Maj Ronald C. Marks, PhD.

Capt Daniel b. Ryan

Capt Curtis L. Weeks

John S. Wilkes, PhD.

39 Economics: Global Issues 2015

Lt Col Sohan

Lt Col Frank

Dr. Waller

Capt Carpenter

Capt Paik

41 Physics & Nuclear/Radiological Science

Lt Col Geoff McHarg

Maj Mike Dearborn

Capt Andy Dills
3

Sub-Saharan Africa

Rather than paint a picture of different possible scenarios with a guess at 

their probability, this report identies seven 

major areas that will have direct implications for U.S. foreign policy in 2015. 

They are: transitions of states from fragile 

democracies into authoritarian regimes with 

the concomitant curtailment of civil, political, and economic liberties; the continuing outbreaks of internal, civil conict in 

states, with possible increasing involvement of other African states; the phenomenon of the failed state, in which all of the 

normal mechanisms that serve to maintain 

order within a state have collapsed; recurring humanitarian and natural disasters; 

the increasing importance of some African 

states as sources of important resources; 

the pandemic of AIDS and other virulent 

diseases; and the possibly increasing inuence of anti-Western Islamic leaders in the 

politics of Sub-Saharan states.

Transitions from Fragile Democracies to 

Authoritarian States

Transitions to democracy will remain 

incomplete and will follow unpredictable 

courses in many states. In some cases, optimism about political liberalization and the 

development of the rule of law will fade, 

as political elites will seek to consolidate 

their power and reap personal gain from the 

control of the state. In other instances, there 

will be military coups. As in other areas 

of the world, criminal syndicates will operate and even in the more stable democratic 

states, cronyism and corruption is likely to 

be prevalent. In West Africa and increasingly in Southern Africa, narcotics trafcking will be present. Where demagogues 

choose to play the ethnic card to rally 

political support, relations between ethnic 

groups will be problematic; where there are 

white minority landholdings (as in Zimbabwe), racial violence, politically motivated, 

may erupt.

South Africa will continue to experience problems involving law enforcement 

and criminal activity. However, its political 

institutions will remain relatively strong, as 

long as its leadership remains committed 

to a multiracial society that stresses ethnic 

cooperation. The importance of South 

Africa to the United States will continue 

to grow; the strengthening of law enforcement capabilities and the enhancement of 

understanding of civil-military relations 

will be of paramount concern to the U.S. 

in this state, which is capable of resuming 

a nuclear program, should the political/

military elite change its current anti-nuclear 

disposition.

Continued Internal Conict

Many African states will continue to 

be wracked by internal conict. These kinds 

of conicts will be fueled primarily by a 

desire for control of wealth and resources 

rather than by ideological divisions. “Blood 

diamonds” will continue to be a factor in 

West African conicts, and the triangular 

trade of resources for weapons used in civil 

conicts, especially through illicit operations, has to be of paramount concern to the 

United States. 

Because of the nature of these con-

icts, in which paramilitary groups and 

irregular forces are the primary actors, wartime atrocities are likely to continue. It will 

remain difcult if not impossible to expect 

these forces to respect the laws of armed 

conict. In addition, international security 

forces, sent in to assist with cease-res and 

other peacekeeping measures, will increasingly come under attack, as the inviolability of these kinds of operations will not be 

respected. Even aid workers and non-governmental operations will increasingly be 

at serious risk in these internal crises. 

The primary weapons of these irregulars will be small arms. Therefore, arms 

transfers and trafcking should be of critical concern to the United States. Organized 

crime may become even more involved in 

arms trafcking, which is often combined 

with drug peddling in a volatile mix. The 

proliferation of small arms on the subcontinent fuels internal conicts and makes 

them more difcult to resolve. This undermines efforts toward stability and democratization.

 Land mines will continue to be 

a problem where conict has ceased. 

Although some conicts may be impacted 

positively by the intervention of regional 

forces, in some cases these forces will plunder the areas in which they operate. 

The Failed State

This report predicts that the phenomenon of the failed state in Africa is likely 

to recur. Somalia is as yet unstabilized, 

and the DRC (Democratic Republic of 

the Congo) will remain essentially ungoverned, in spite of increased involvement of 

the international community in the conict 

over territory, governance, and resources. 

In both the cases of failed states and internal chaos – in fact, wherever the rule of law 

is weak or nonexistent – we may expect to 

see the development of criminal activities 

and syndicates, and fertile ground for terrorist cells to ourish.

Continuing Humanitarian and other 

Disasters

While not the only global source of 

humanitarian problems, Africa will gure 

prominently in these concerns. Internal 

conict will continue to produce massive 

population movements both within and 

between African states. The difference will 

be that refugee populations will be increasingly unwelcome in some host states that 

were formerly cooperative in receiving and 

helping displaced people. The barriers 

between African states are likely to go up, 

rather than come down, as African states 

are further divided into stable, better-off 

states and unstable, less well-off states.

In addition, requirements for the protection of these large refugee populations 

will become ever more important. Vehicles 

for the security of refugee movements and 

camps and also for the protection of aid 

workers involved in humanitarian operations will be sorely lacking. Therefore, disturbances and human suffering will accompany every large population movement.

Population movements may be used 

as covers for insurgent operations – refugees may be human shields in some 

cases and refugee populations may actually harbor and serve as bases for guerilla 

operations in others. In all cases, humanitarian supplies will be at risk in civil con-

icts. The demilitarization of camps will 

in all cases be problematic and will require 

substantial law enforcement support.

...wartime atrocities are 

likely to continue

Organized crime may 

become even more 

involved in arms trafcking, which is often combined with drug peddling 

in a volatile mix
4

South Africa is likely to continue 

to emerge as the main force for conict-resolution in the Southern portions of the subcontinent. Nigeria will likely exert some 

inuence in Western Africa, but may itself 

undergo considerable internal disruption 

due to regional differences and instability.

Desertication will continue to 

affect portions of the northernmost zones, 

and drought and ooding will undoubtedly 

continue in other areas of Africa due to climactic global changes and other factors. 

Some of the more important 

human rights issues emanating from Africa 

will be issues concerning slavery, trafcking in narcotics and women, landmines, 

wartime atrocities, suppression of civil liberties and political dissidents, corruption, 

and lack of law enforcement to protect civil 

society and its operations. 

Growing Importance of Some African 

Resources

While much of Africa will remain 

economically peripheral to the world economic community, South Africa and Nigeria will become increasingly important. Oil 

from Nigeria will gure more importantly 

in international economics as the world 

searches for alternatives to usual sources 

of oil; South Africa will continue to be an 

important trading partner for many developed nations and several African nations. 

Unless the civil unrest and internal chaos of 

several African nations can be curtailed, the 

prospects for foreign investment in Africa 

and increased involvement of the subcontinent in the global economy looks somewhat 

dim. Tourism will only return to important 

levels as the security situation in Africa 

improves.

The Pandemic of AIDS and the Danger 

of other Diseases

Africa, where health care expenditures per person are substantially lower 

than in any other part of the world, will 

continue to experience a tragic crisis in the 

form of AIDS. This crisis will not abate, 

but may be impacted by good governance 

in some states and substantial international 

assistance. In other states, in which leaders deny the importance of the crisis, or 

in which resources to combat the disease 

are severely lacking, the future will see 

states with disrupted families and communities, a depleted labor force, and a substantial number of children who have been 

orphaned by AIDS. These children will in 

many cases become alienated – many will 

have lived their entire lives on the streets. 

State facilities to assist orphans and families will be overwhelmed by the disaster. 

The disease will continue to run rampant 

in Sub-Saharan Africa due to large migrant 

populations, lack of education, the patriarchal society and a culture of sexual permissiveness, and the poor immunological 

health of the general population.

The population that will be hit the 

hardest by AIDS in many countries is the 

military, civil service, and middle management in the private sector. The high infection rates among these leaders will have 

devastating effects on political stability in 

the near future.

In addition, the subcontinent is likely 

to experience outbreaks of Ebola-like diseases. Until the general health environment 

and resources or Africa are improved, the 

risk of these diseases being transmitted outside of Africa is likely to grow with everincreasing global interconnectedness.

Possibility of Growing Inuence of AntiWestern Islamic Leaders in Africa

There is a possibility that the inuence of Libya in African politics will 

increase. Kadda’s desire to become a 

regional leader and to spread Libyan and 

Islamic inuence throughout the subcontinent may not subside, and he may have a 

growing impact on the region. Portions of 

the substantial Islamic population of many 

African states may become increasingly 

open to anti-Western rhetoric, as the gap 

between the rich and poor states continues 

to grow and as governments are unable or 

uncommitted to meeting the needs of the 

general population. Libya and Sudan may 

be less likely to harbor terrorist training 

operations as they become more integrated 

into the global economy.

However, Western symbols and 

institutions are likely to continue to be vulnerable to terrorist attack in Sub-Saharan 

Africa, as the weakness of the rule of law 

affects the protection of foreign nationals in 

the region and inhibits prevention or early 

detection of terrorist activities.

African Studies Group

Dr Fran Pilch, 

LtCol Deb Schmitt, 

Maj Jim Faber, 

Capt Jennifer Joyce

United States Air Force Academy

Kadda’s desire to 

become a regional leader 

and to spread Libyan and 

Islamic inuence ...may 

not subside,
5

The Americas

OBJECTIVE: To Identify trends in the 

political, military, and economic arenas in 

order to develop three or four alternative 

futures for the region dened as the Americas – specically North and South America 

– the Western hemisphere. These alternative futures will be used to determine the 

future direction of arms control.

TASK 1: Identify trends in the following 

issue areas from which we will then build 

our view of alternative futures.

Military Trends

Canada

Trends do not point toward increased military spending or a radically different role 

for the military in Canadian security matters. Canada will continue to look to the US 

for overall North American security and as 

such will continue to maintain numerous 

defense relationships such as NORAD and 

NATO with the US. A change in this 

relationship would most likely occur as 

a result of action taken by the US in terms 

of their overall security strategy in supporting defense organization and structures. Canada will continue to regard 

defense issues as secondary to economic 

and domestic political questions. The 

Canadian military has a keen interest in 

obtaining helicopters and other force-mod 

equipment from the United States. The 

National Missile Defense (NMD) system 

will play an increasingly important role as 

the new administration pushes toward further development of the NMD. The Canadians strongly desire to remain under the 

umbrella of protection that encompasses 

North America, yet are wary of increased 

nancial burdens that the NMD may impose 

upon their military budget. The Canadian 

military also seeks to continue, if not expand 

their role in international peacekeeping 

operations through the UN and other Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). Traditionally, the Canadian government has 

championed arms control agreements, and 

most recently has led the charge in developing an Anti-personnel Mine Treaty, the 

Ottawa Treaty. The government was also a 

strong supporter of a western-hemispheric 

nuclear free zone. Economically, Canada 

seeks to open military arms markets with 

Latin America and expand economic ties to 

Latin America through the FTAA.

Canada has a weaker constituency for national security than does the 

U.S. Canada’s traditional association with 

multinational peace operations persists but 

recent experiences (Somalia, Rwanda) in 

this arena have been discouraging. While 

a weakening the national motivation along 

these lines is not detectable at the moment, 

these recent Canadian experiences are no 

plus for support of peace operations assignments. Nor does Canada have an arms 

industry to carry the arguments. The willingness, albeit reluctant, to follow America’s lead as to North American defense is 

not likely to change.

With these parameters in mind, 

increases in defense spending in Canada are 

likely to follow a social welfare criterion 

(pay and benets). Force modernization 

is not likely to occur under its own terms, 

although necessary replacement of aging 

equipment might lead to some improvements in capabilities. The Canadian military would be more likely to obtain 

helicopters and other force-mod equipment 

from the United States than from other suppliers.

Opposition to NMD seems to be 

softening. Canada has many reasons to 

be apprehensive about NMD (expense, diplomatic alignments). The Canadians can 

be expected to choose to remain under the 

umbrella of protection that encompasses 

North America. As the other democracies 

accommodate to NMD, and the sharper 

objections of Russia and China are dealt 

with, then Canada can be expected to accept 

the results. We should not expect Canada 

to contribute to NMD nancially.

Latin America

Trends in Latin America are difcult to 

characterize due to the diffuse nature of 

the countries considered “Latino”. Each 

country pursues its own agenda and also 

seeks to establish regional development and 

common goals in military operations and 

inter-operability. Globalization has cast a 

fragile shadow of cooperation in the region, 

which may be threatened by increased 

regional instability resulting from the drug 

trade. Currently, there exists a vacuum in 

policy regarding Latin America. Current 

trends indicate that the militaries will continue to develop their conventional capabilities in the near term. Specic cases point 

toward increased operational and equipment demands: Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Curacao. 

The trends also point toward a 

growing scope of military use in internal 

matters as the mission, technology and 

use of conventional forces adapts toward 

anti-drug warfare. Currently in the southern cone, Argentina, Chile and Brazil are 

engaged in an active and productive arms 

trading industry. Specically, Brazil has 

made great progress toward mid-sized aircraft industry, and currently supplies the 

commercial US ag carriers with many 

commuter jets and turbo-props. Also, in the 

Brazilian case, Brazil has retained the right 

to construct and utilize rocket launch platforms as a condition to ratication of the 

nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the test 

ban treaty. As regional technology continues to develop, jamming potential for EW 

and monitoring programs continues to draw 

concern. 

Threats to Latin American militaries center around narco-trafc and narcoterrorist activities that stem from the drug 

trade. Politically, the control of society has 

become a military matter in densely populated urban areas such as Sao Paulo and 

Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, 

and others. Narco-terrorists and extremist 

groups have also increased their activity in 

terms of political kidnappings for monetary gains as well as for political purposes. In some cases, the military has been 

called upon to assist in the resolution of 

such events such as in Peru during the 

Tupac Amaru hostage crisis at the Japanese 

Embassy. Insurgency movements in Latin 

America have traditionally served as avenues for social and political change, and 

have been more readily accepted as legitimate and viable means of affecting change. 

Many documented cases serve to illustrate 

this point: Colombia, Mexico, Peru, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Chile, Argentina, and 

Brazil all have experienced social and political change as a result of insurgency movements. This trend seems to be waning in 

light of global awareness and human rights 

Globalization has cast a 

fragile shadow of cooperation in the region, which 

may be threatened by 

increased regional instability resulting from the 

drug trade
6

movements on a truly world scale. Other 

threats to the militaries of Latin America 

include the social and economic plight of 

the urban poor, and the ideological based 

insurgencies that these conditions generate. 

Politically motivated insurgencies 

such as in Colombia, El Salvador and 

Nicaragua further illustrate the deeply 

etched lines of the insurgent mentality in 

Latin America. In Colombia, this ideological movement attempts to legitimize 

itself through a grassroots social revolution, 

which is counter-productive to the political 

process. This mentality, although exposed 

on the global scale, is not likely to disappear until lasting reforms and political 

equality can be instituted throughout the 

region. Indigenous movements in Chiapas, 

Mexico and in the Brazilian Amazon further 

illustrate the political and ideological based 

movements that remain common throughout the area. Two cases merit special mention in terms of military threats in Latin 

America during the rst decades of the 21st

Century. 

Cuba must come to terms with the 

issue of Castro’s successor and his legacy. 

They must determine the ultimate goal of 

their revolutionary movement and how to 

best obtain those goals. Issues that will 

need to be addressed in this respect include: 

political ideology, opening of trade, foreign 

investment in Cuba, and tourism. Ideologically, Cuba must determine if it intends to 

remain the bastion of communism in the 

western hemisphere along with Venezuela, 

and whether or not it intends to remain the 

prototype for Chinese communism in the 

Caribbean basin. Finally, Cuba must decide 

if it will maintain an authoritarian political 

and military base, or whether it will adopt 

a neo-liberal economic model for development in both the political and economic 

arenas. The second case, Venezuela, exhibits other unique tendencies. As the only 

OPEC member in Latin America, Venezuela maintains a unique position to affect 

the world oil supply and petroleum prices. 

Hugo Chavez remains, like Castro, a self 

proclaimed social democrat (we use this 

term loosely) and often resists US pressures and policies in the Americas. As in 

the Cuba case, Venezuela must determine 

for itself, what direction the country will 

take in the 21st Century. In terms of US 

policy toward Latin America, generally we 

see two trends. First, in the 20th century, the 

primary impetus of US policy in the region 

was the containment of communism. 

Second, in the 21st century, the primary impetus of US policy in the region 

has shifted to economic and trade relations. The direction of these changes points 

toward an eventual union such as the FTAA 

in order to keep pace with the economic 

power of the EU. Finally, our analysis of 

military issues in Latin America led to the 

discussion of the Panama Canal and issues 

surrounding the transition of the canal operations from US to Panama in December 

1999. The Chinese based rm, HutchinsonWhampoa, now controls the canal ports 

while the Panamanian government controls 

the canal itself. In terms of military application, the US has reserved the right for rst 

use in cases of emergency, a very loosely 

worded condition to the canal treaty signed 

by Presidents Carter and Torrijos. Furthermore, the modern military surface vessels 

cannot navigate the canal due to size restrictions, and must travel in open seas. The 

possibility of widening the Panama Canal 

has been discussed, as well as construction 

of a new sea-level canal through Nicaragua. 

However, the main threat to canal security 

remains the illicit drug trade and military 

use of the areas in the Canal Zone for counter-drug operations.

Political Trends:

Role of Military in 

Political Process and 

Democratization

Canada

A well-established parliamentary government with a multi-party system, Canada is 

as committed to the Anglo-Saxon model 

of civil-military relations as the U.S. is, if 

not more so. Moreover, Canada’s system 

is stable, despite the pulls of Quebec separatism and alienation in the west. A parliamentary system is capable of sharp changes 

in direction if the voters provide such a 

mandate. And Canadian parties are in a 

state of ux, with a new western and especially conservative party attempting, so far 

with little success, to become national. That 

effort is not propitious, however, unless 

the party (Canadian Alliance Party) moderates. So Canada’s foreign policy is likely 

to proceed along the track already established. Military inuence in Canadian foreign policy is slight and likely to remain so. 

Canadians traditionally use diplomatic and 

economic tools for bargaining and negotiation rather than resort to military force.

The separatist movement in 

Quebec is alive and well, although according to public opinion actual separation from 

Canada commands somewhat less than a 

majority. This is likely to remain the case. 

But some unexpected shock to Canada, or 

gross mismanagement of separatism from 

Ottawa, could fall to the advantage of the 

Parti Quebecois. Were Quebec to vote for 

secession, however unlikely, then all bets 

are off.

The military has remained outside 

the separatist political debate and has played 

no role in the separatist movement. Military service academies, for example, have 

been integrated into one bilingual campus 

at the Royal Military College (RMC).

Canada continues to support open 

borders with the United States and encourages immigration with no quotas on immigrants. One of the security concerns for 

the US must be the access to US territory 

through Canada for terrorists and subversive elements opposed to the government 

of the United States.

Latin America

Legitimacy has been the key for most 

political, social and military movements 

throughout Latin America. This trend seems 

likely to continue as most Latin American 

countries further develop economically and 

politically. The military in countries such 

as Argentina and Brazil, have made great 

progress toward legitimacy in recent years. 

Both countries have sent missions to Africa 

and the Far East in support of UN peacekeeping operations, and both countries have 

created a civil-military chain of command 

that closely resembles that of the United 

States. In fact, military professionalism as 

a subset of civilian democratic rule seems 

to be the key to legitimacy for most Latin 

American countries. Exceptions to this are 

Paraguay, Chile and Venezuela. In Paraguay, for example, the strong gaucho culThe Americas

Cuba must decide if it 

will maintain an authoritarian political and military base...
7

ture indicates a continued authoritarian 

view of civil-military relations. In Chile, 

similarly, a large percentage of the lifetime 

federal senators are former military (who, 

incidentally, are immune from prosecution 

for human rights abuses during the Pinochet regime). Finally, in Venezuela, the 

Chavez regime with its socialist platforms 

maintains a more authoritarian approach 

toward the political process. On the democratization side, countries such as Mexico 

and Guatemala have both made progress 

toward a more democratic society with the 

assistance of the military. In Mexico, the 

PRI peacefully turned over control of the 

presidency last year when Vicente Fox won 

the presidential elections. In Guatemala, 

the civil war led to democratic reform, yet 

the long-term effects of the Guatemalan 

democratization case remain to be seen. 

Generally in Latin America the 

trends point toward more open elections 

and further development of civilian controlled militaries. Stability and democratization within a multi-party system seems to 

remain constant with continuing erosion of 

military inuence in the political process. 

The US serves as the role model for most 

of these nascent democracies, and political-military relations seem to continue on 

current paths toward greater cooperation 

in pursuit of international legitimacy and 

democratization. The social impact of miscegenation between Iberain, African, and 

America peoples has perpetuated a lovehate relationship with the United States. 

Most ‘Latinos’ prefer US products from 

Coca-Cola to Ford automobiles, yet they 

disdain US inuence over economic and 

political freedom and sovereignty of their 

nations. Here, the tendency is toward maintaining sovereignty at all costs; pride and 

nationalism among the Latin American 

democracies lead them to see US inuence 

as a double-edged sword.

Trends identied in Global Trends 

2015, cite the possible difculty for the 

Caribbean basin in dealing with increasing 

violence and social-democratic problems 

resulting from proximity to other South 

American countries in turmoil. We believe 

that this problem goes beyond the Caribbean and will begin to adversely affect 

the incremental consolidation of the more 

“stable” Latin American democracies. Most 

notably, the current situations in Colombia 

and Mexico will have increasingly negative inuence on neighboring countries and 

the Caribbean region.

The drug trade in Colombia, along 

with other narco-trafc and terrorist activities will impact more than simply the Caribbean and Central American countries. As 

noted in the Global Trends 2015 paper, the 

drug trade has far reaching consequences. 

The continued failures of Colombia to 

combat vast social and institutional problems will continue to have adverse impact 

on the region as a whole, not simply the 

Caribbean Basin.

Mexican involvement as a transshipment area also raises concern for the 

entire region when addressing the issues of 

drug related international crime. Furthermore, Mexico, with a new political party 

leading the country has taken on increased 

importance in US economic policy and diplomatic relations. Indigenous movements, 

as in Chiapas, we believe will continue 

to inuence the Mexican government’s 

programs and policies. The legitimacy 

and consolidation of the Mexican social 

and political systems will most likely be 

reected by the government’s ability to successfully deal with the indigenous movement’s demands through compromise and 

negotiation.

Economic Trends

NAFTA

Trends indicate that the United 

States, Canada and Mexico will continue 

toward greater economic cooperation. 

Largely characterized as a success in the 

north, in term of real economic development and stabilization, the NAFTA members would like to expand the free trade 

agreement to other states in the western 

hemisphere. The labor practices and standards have not been characterized as successful in NAFTA cooperation, and the 

environmental protection aspects of NAFTA 

have met with mixed success. Economic 

growth and stabilization indicate clearly 

that future potential for expansion of the 

free trade agreement and future border 

openings. Trends also point toward less 

controls on immigration between the US, 

Canada, and Mexico and greater economic 

cooperation as well. The success of NAFTA 

has spurred Canada to consider adoption of 

the US$ as its formal currency. This trend 

also is seen in some Latin American countries that have already adopted the US$: 

Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama; and 

others that have pegged their currency to 

the US$: Argentina, Costa Rica, and Brazil 

(recently taken off the US$ standard). 

MERCOSUR

As a trading bloc, MERCOSUR 

(whose membership includes Argentina, 

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) has little impact on US trade in the 

northern hemisphere. This is a trend that 

will certainly change with increased trade 

relations between MERCOSUR and the 

EU. The western hemisphere must consider 

these trade opportunities and act upon them 

before losing out to European competition. 

As a trading bloc, the western hemisphere 

could exert as much inuence on global 

economic trade as the EU currently demonstrates. Economically, Latin America is 

moving away from the category of “underdeveloped” and into the category of “developing” or even “developed” economies. 

Many scholars now believe that a 2nd World 

exists that exhibits tendencies of both developed and developing countries. These countries show tremendous extremes between 

poverty and afuent sectors of society. 

They are also characterized by “pockets 

of poverty” in regionally depressed areas. 

The goal of MERCOSUR inevitably is to 

expand economic potential and growth for 

member countries and press for further 

economic independence from the global 

north. 

CBI

The Caribbean Basin Initiative has had 

less impact in recent years than the Caribbean states would have liked, however, the 

region remains economically important due 

to the nature of current offshore banking 

practices. Often referred to as the new Switzerland of nancial safety, the Caribbean is 

replete with legitimate and shadow nancial organizations used to shelter money 

and launder money respectively. The offshore nancial industry has somewhat setback the efforts of NAFTA to promote free 

trade in the region and has created difculty 

for law enforcement agencies in tracking 

The Americas

 The drug trade in Colombia, along with other narco 

trafc and terrorist activities will impact more than 

simply the Caribbean and 

Central American countries.
8

the money laundered in relation to narcotrafc. 

FTAA

Trends and talk of a Free Trade Association 

of the Americas have recently revived in 

the face of the European Union’s success. 

A western hemispheric trade union would 

certainly strengthen the developing economies of Latin America, but may cause some 

nancial difculty for the developed northern countries. The principle opponent to 

the FTAA remains the US due to a lack 

of political support for a regional trading 

bloc. Chile has applied to both NAFTA 

and MERCOSUR and has already established a free trade agreement with Mexico, 

which points toward the increasing trend 

to establish favorable trade relations within 

the regional context. Similarly, Canada has 

opened trade with Cuba, again pointing to 

the importance of regional trade and the 

increasing trade between American states 

and other Caribbean islands.

Black Market

In order to avoid import and export tariffs, 

the black market in Latin America has 

grown in recent years. This is due largely 

to the popularity of US music, lms, and 

goods. Illegal copies of cultural recordings, 

electronics, and clothing are the biggest 

source of income for black marketers. In 

fact, Paraguay is often referred to as the contraband capital of the hemisphere because 

so much illegal trade passes through that 

small country. Ironically, this illicit trade 

reects the goal of increased regional 

trading unions and free trade agreements 

because the demand is so high for foreign 

goods. 

Energy

The Global Trends 2015 paper notes that 

Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil will increase 

in Oil production by 2015. While the region 

has potential and interest in increasing 

petroleum exploration and production, the 

Brazilian impact on this may not be as signicant as many believe. Brazil’s recent 

difculty with a drilling platform near 

Rio points to the technological and operational problems remaining in Latin America. Brazil, in particular, remains reliant 

on the production of alcohol in addition to 

gas (gasohol) for vehicle use. Therefore, 

we believe that the ability of Brazil to produce enough oil for domestic consumption 

will be difcult during the next decade. The 

probability for export of petroleum remains 

low for Brazil, but may very well increase 

in Mexico and Venezuela. 

Social Trends

Canada

Quebec City’s FTAA meeting of April 2001 

witnessed the recurrence of movements 

protesting the concept of a free trade association, as were seen earlier in Seattle, WA. 

This protest was not directed against the 

Canadian government, any ofcial party 

or individual leader, rather it focused its 

efforts against globalization. Students from 

the University of Montreal taking a course 

on civil disobedience marched in protest 

and promoted a new progressivism program 

against current trends of globalization, the 

WTO the IMF, and scal policy. Transnational linkages within the protest groups, 

such as environmental protection organizations, labor unions, and human rights 

organizations, seemed to contradict the 

underlying message of the protest in the 

rst place. The trend points toward continued development of international pressure against free trade and its implementing 

organizations, with an increasing linkage 

between the protest groups and increasing 

impact of student movements on campuses 

across North America. 

Latin America

Human development index and trends 

toward increased health care, welfare and 

civil rights seems to indicate that the 

trends in Latin America are toward greater 

awareness improved social relations among 

classes and ethnic groups. Urbanization has 

been a key factor in the rising awareness 

and international visibility of social conditions in Latin America. Free trade unions 

and agreements would also be of great assistance to the developing areas in Latin America encouraging further development, industrialization, and infrastructure improvements. Problems with social development 

in Latin America can be categorized into 

three separate and distinct elements: outmigration, the spread of AIDS, and the 

technological revolution. 

First, out-migration trends indicate that some countries such as Colombia 

are experiencing an increased level of citizens eeing the country for fear of persecution or for their own safety. Clearly this 

is a result of the ever-increasing problems 

associated with narco-trafc and the illegal drug trade. Other examples of outmigration can be seen in such cases as 

Haiti refugees in the United States, the massive migration from Nicaragua to neighboring Central American countries during 

the 1980s, and the Cuban exodus to the 

United States during the cold war, Guatemalan migration to Texas, and Brazilian 

migration to the United States and Canada. 

This out-migration also causes problems 

for the country that include such phenomenon as “brain drain”, or the lack of scientic, intellectual, and research potential 

caused by widespread out-migration. Many 

Latinos are attracted to the US or Canada 

to study and seek employment in the technology-oriented elds. The trend of outmigration points to the ow of political refugees to the northwest, generally out of 

Latin America in into the developed countries of the north. These trends may be 

reversed as economic and political conditions in developing Latin American countries improve. 

Secondly, the spread of AIDS in 

Latin America indicates a further trend 

in society. Largely Roman Catholic, Latin 

America represents the greatest concentration of Catholics in the world. Religious 

doctrine concerning birth control has created an environment that has seen a tremendous increase in the spread of infectious 

disease; to such an extent that the Roman 

Catholic Church has debated the condoning 

of birth control practices for prevention in 

the spread of disease. Other health factors 

such as Dengue and Hoof and Mouth Disease remain problematic as well for social 

improvements in Latin America. 

Finally, the Technology Revolution in Latin America has created a unique 

environment where entire generations of 

infrastructure development have been completely passed over. Most of the developed 

regions, mostly urban, in Latin America 

have extensive technological capabilities 

without the deeper infrastructure in similar 

cities in the north. A prime example is 

abundant wireless communication capabilities in the urban areas, little wireless capability in rural areas, and no hard-wired 

ber optic infrastructure in either. While 

the urban centers may have phone and data 

capacities, these are limited to the uppermiddle classes due to the expense of obtaining a phone line. The computer industry, 

The Americas
9

television, radio and satellite technology in 

Latin America, in general, comes close to 

resembling that of the US or Canada, however, access to such technology remains 

limited in remote areas. The potential for 

electronic warfare seems to be increasing 

with the world’s reliance on technology 

and the future for digitized battleelds of 

the future. Certainly the trends in Latin 

America point toward a greater exibility 

in terms of jamming potential, especially 

since the systems in Latin America do not 

possess redundant backups in hard-wire or 

ber optic systems. The electric demands 

and integration across nations indicate that 

the electrical grids between neighboring 

countries will continue to grow in proximity and interdependence. For example, 

the Itaipu Dam in South America supplies 

energy to Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, 

while the integration of the US, Canada 

and Mexico indicate increased vulnerability to electronic warfare. Social movements 

in the western hemisphere have increased 

international visibility on arms control and 

nonproliferation agreements. Trends in this 

area would seem to indicate that we study 

the possibility of increased awareness for 

the possibility of further arms control movements that, like the anti-personnel mine 

movement, focus on conventional arms and 

forces rather than on weapons of mass 

destruction. Other non-traditional forms of 

arms control could include: information 

warfare, satellite jamming, economic warfare and subversion, political kidnappings 

and assassinations, and conventional weapons bans.

TASK 2: Assess projected trends identied in the Global Trends 2015 report, 

and other trends emerging from Task 

#1.

The validity of trends assessments discussed in section I, generally parallels those 

that were identied in Global Trends 2015 

paper. The only exceptions were the following:

- Narco-trafcking already has had 

an adverse effect on other countries in the region, in addition to 

adversely affecting the Caribbean 

basin countries. Regional disruptions and criminal activity impede 

the democratization process and 

consolidation of stable governments.

- Legitimacy of political and military institutions, key focus for 

Latin American governments.

- Brazilian Oil production potential 

not as great as predictors.

- Technological leapfrogging may 

provide temporary relief but 

negates the benets of redundant 

systems in terms of power and 

telecommunications. The degree 

to which the Latin American countries continue to prosper economically and politically will depend in 

large part on technology, communication and security of the power 

and telecommunications systems. 

Therefore stability in the region 

will depend on the region’s technological development, and its 

ability to deter and defeat technological threats. 

Task 3: Alternative futures for the Americas and their impact on Arms Control 

Initiatives in the Future.

We identify three broad possible futures for 

the Americas.

Our projected trends focus primarily 

on the countries still in developing stages of 

democratization and economic and political 

stability. We recognize the importance of 

the United States and Canada in taking the 

initiative for hemispheric development, solidarity, and cooperation. Traditional arms 

control discussions have centered on the 

control, reduction, and limitations of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical 

and biological weapons, and the means to 

deliver these weapons. Very little attention 

is paid to the western hemisphere in terms 

of global arms control and non-proliferation issues, this in spite of the fact that 

the Brazilian-Argentine bilateral non-proliferation agreements prompted these two 

South American powers to adopt the nonproliferation and nuclear test ban treaties. 

As we attempt to dene Americas’ futures, 

two important caveats stem from the fact 

that the US is a part of this region and is not 

included in our analysis. It must be noted, 

as we outline the futures the following two 

caveats:

1. The United States itself is not analyzed and therefore the trends outlined 

in parts 1 and 2 relate to Latin America and Canada only. 

2. To a large extent, the various futures 

of the region will depend on the 

foreign policy direction, orientation, 

goals, and objective that the US has 

toward the region. In other words, 

which future develops will be a function of the role, and degree to which 

the US determines it will be involved 

and integrated into the region. For 

example, recent administrations have 

signaled an increased involvement and 

continued regional cooperation. This 

began with the Bush Administration 

in 1988, continued through the Clinton years, and remains important with 

the new Bush Administration today. 

But history clearly tells us that The 

US involvement has been cyclical, 

ranging from a high degree of interest (Kennedy alliance for progress) 

to reactionary policy, to benign if 

not malignant neglect, and nally to 

active interventionism and even invasion

TREND ONE: 

Continuation of the Status Quo

Globally the developing countries in 

the Western Hemisphere take on little 

importance. Internally, the trends identi-

ed above will continue on a national 

basis. Internationally, these states will continue to be marginalized by the US due to 

high visibility of other regional conicts. 

For example, the Middle East, Africa, and 

Asia, all contain issues that are demanding the focus of US policy makers. This 

characterizes the US history of benign 

neglect toward the Western Hemisphere 

when faced with other crisis areas that 

demand more attention and lessen the ability or desire to look toward Western Hemisphere issues. In this future, arms control 

concerns will focus on maintaining the 

viability of the existing on nuclear free 

zone and nonproliferation agreements, as 

well as controlling the conventional military arms sales agreements and regional 

trans-national arms trade. We believe that 

in addition, a new aspect of arms control 

must be considered, particularly in the 

Americas. Arms control addresses not just 

traditional armaments, but also non-traditional armaments such as jamming, power 

interception, cyber-warfare, and telecommunications systems. Arms control of the 

instruments of information warfare, and 

other non-traditional threats to regional 

security become increasingly important in 

this scenario

.

The Americas
10

TREND TWO: 

Regional Cooperation

In this future we see growing economic 

interdependence, positive movement in all 

trends identied in part I, such as FTAA, as 

it has in Europe, it will lead to greater economic unication, leading to greater political cooperation and the development of 

some type of federal system similar to the 

European Union. In pursuing a Western 

Hemisphere version of the EU, the United 

States must capitalize on the potential for 

increased interdependence, and must take 

direct interest in the region. This outcome 

is more likely to occur if the US takes a 

positive outlook and puts the region high 

on its priority list. The US must strive to 

further regional cooperation and development, stability, political democratic consolidation, etc... One small indicator is the 

growing number of WH countries either 

using the US Dollar as their currency, pegging their currency to the dollar, and as 

seen in the black markets in many areas 

that trade almost exclusively with dollars. 

This future would have the least impact on 

the need for arms control initiatives in the 

region. There would be no need for further 

agreements beyond the current non-proliferation and test ban agreements.

TREND THREE: 

Regional Disintegration

In this future, the concept of a region 

all but disappears, other than a geographical reference; individual Latin American 

states now think more of relations with 

outer-regional countries in Europe and Asia 

than they do with neighboring and regional 

partners. This scenario developed from the 

failure of past US policy in dealing with 

the region. Some factors that might bring it 

about include:

1. US disengages from the region 

(which might occur if US felt no 

economic gain or extra-regional 

threat) generated by lack of a 

world-wide peer competitor that 

would use Latin America as a 

surrogate to achieve their goals 

and objectives much as the USSR 

did during the Cold War. The US 

might not care to maintain presence due to lack of interest in 

region. Or, US economic wellbeing may no longer be tied to 

region.

2. Internal instabilities that would 

tear cooperation apart. Renewal of 

historical animosities. No external 

inuence, rather, internally development and alliance with outerregional powers. A resurgent Cuba, 

or ties between Cuba and Venezuela to seek regional sponsor or 

hegemonic benefactor, may constitute a new political threat to 

regional stability. Hugo Chavez’s 

anti-US stance and Castro type 

leadership may emerge in other 

countries as well, giving rise to 

leaders whose interests may center 

on building personal power base 

as opposed to regional cooperation. This scenario may occur if 

the social, political, and economic 

conditions deteriorate to the point 

of pushing these types of nationalistic leaders to seek support in 

alternative avenues.

3. Continued fragmentation and the 

rise of trans-national guerilla, 

terrorist and narcotics organizations that cut across traditional 

nation state boundaries, may further destabilize the region. For 

example Fujimori’s exit may open 

the doors to another resurgent 

movement. Power vacuums created by other regional leaders, may 

spawn narcotics funded and guerilla led social-political difculties 

and fragmentation. Trans-national, 

trans-governmental organizations 

may increase in cooperation, further destabilizing the region in 

spite of the lack of a unifying 

characteristic such as Islam in the 

Middle East. Rather, this type of 

cooperation might occur as the 

result of economic ties between 

narco-trafckers and guerillas. The 

exception, or wild card, would 

be native indigenous movements, 

whose unication and continued 

activism may eventually lead to the 

“Balkanization” of Latin America. 

This scenario, our worst case one, will provide the greatest difculty for arms control, 

proliferation and non-proliferation policy 

makers. This will result from the new focus 

on regional fragmentation. It is the most 

contentious scenario and offers the greatest 

danger as new contending powers compete 

for arms and simultaneously develop their 

capabilities to pursue nationalistic goals 

and objectives. 

CONCLUSION

The three futures identied above 

are derived from the trends discussed in 

part one of this paper. They represent archtypes of what may be. What does occur 

might become variations of these. Also not 

considered was a future in which the United 

States would be the hegemon for the region 

– a true Pax Americana. We doubt such a 

future, but it is a possibility. With respect to 

global arms control issues, this region will 

be the least signicant unless there are signicant real changes of the type described 

in the worst-case scenario. One issue of 

continued importance will be arms sales 

and the development or expansion of arms 

industries in the Latin American nations. 

However, concerning arms control, what is 

signicant about this region is that it foreshadows the need for a new type of arms 

control, one focused on controlling nontraditional instruments of force and coercion such as those associated with information warfare and possessed by transnational and trans-governmental actors.

Panel Membership

Colonel Douglas Murray, PhD.

Professor Curtis Cook, PhD.

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Vic Nell

Major Matthew Anderson

Major Dave Spoon

The Americas
11

Europe

The Old World in a 

New Century

Deron Jackson and Charles Krupnick

Introduction

The vast majority of big issues concerning 

Europe from now until 2015 will involve 

the European Union and its evolution into 

a deeper and wider institution. America’s 

role in Europe during the Cold War was 

shaped by a division of the continent into 

two camps, East and West; America’s relationship with Europe in 2015 will reect a 

continent divided into two new camps, the 

countries that are members of a prosperous 

European Union and those that are not.

Absent the unlikely development 

of a signicant military threat, the EuroAtlantic community epitomized by the 

US-led NATO alliance will suffer from 

increasing neglect in 2015 as the members 

of the European Union focus their energies 

inward, building an ever closer union 

among themselves and leaving little in the 

way of resources and attention to deal with 

global trends that do not directly affect EU 

development. The dynamics of the European Union’s institutional evolution hold 

the potential for friction with the United 

States as EU members struggle to reconcile 

their own interests and differences in forging common policies.

Dening Europe

An important question shaping the environment of Europe to 2015 is one of ultimate goals: what will be the end-state of 

the European Union? Will it be a fully integrated super-state where national governments become lost in the shufe like the 

individual “states” in the United States, or 

will it remain something short of that – a 

combination free trade and currency zone, 

inchoate military alliance, and assemblage 

of other institutional and ad hoc arrangements where strong national governments 

still decide how and to what extent they are 

going to cooperate with each other? And 

will the Union remain a well-to-do white 

Christian club or will it change character 

by including countries like Turkey, with 

very different histories and cultures, and 

Ukraine, with terrible economies and troubled political and social conditions? How 

far will Europe reach out and what will 

be the political repercussions of membership exclusion for certain states? Nearly a 

decade since the breakthrough Maastricht 

Treaty, the European Union has still to 

resolve the basic questions deepening and 

widening – how tightly it must bind its 

members together in order to be successful 

and how far it should expand its membership.

Trends in European Integration

Economically the die is essentially cast 

in favor of greater integration among the 

existing members of the European Union, 

but the political and security futures of 

Europe are more uncertain. What troubles 

American ofcials is the prospect that USEuropean political relations might follow a 

pattern similar to economic affairs. Since 

the 1960s EU trade has been centrally managed by the European Commission, with 

the US government dealing with the Commission as an equal partner – not with individual European governments. The relationship has been rocky: Airbus vs. Boeing, 

subsidized agriculture, and limitations on 

Hollywood have a venerable history of 

conict. Added in recent years are con-

icts over banana imports, hush kits for 

aircraft, and so called “cultural disputes” 

like Europe’s aversion to hormone-fed beef 

and genetically altered agricultural products. Such disputes seem never to go away, 

with endless litigation and public posturing 

but with rare nal solutions; in April 2001, 

a breakthrough was reached in the “banana 

war” but interest groups could still scupper the deal. Trade conict can be expected 

to continue and possibly increase by 2015, 

barring an unlikely increase in support for 

global trade regimes like the WTO or in 

amity between trade representatives.

Since the Single European Act of 

1988, the Europe 1992 project, and the 

Maastricht Treaty of 1991, other economic 

issues in the European Union – such as 

national budgets, environmental and safety 

regulations, and labor mobility – have 

become subject to common decisions or at 

least common scrutiny. This has been a 

generally successful endeavor for Europe, 

despite policy disasters like recent outbreaks of deadly disease in farm animals. 

Integration in the economic sector will 

deepen as internal barriers continue to fall 

through further deregulation and business 

rationalization, leading to an even greater 

European economic superpower than today. 

In the late-1990s, the European Union represented about 375 million people with an 

annual GDP of about $8 trillion and a trade 

surplus, comparing favorably with the 280 

million people, $9 trillion GDP, and enormous trade decit of the United States. 1

The European common currency, 

the Euro, was launched with much fanfare 

in January 1999 and will be available in 

notes and coins in January 2002. It has 

been surprisingly weak, declining by as 

much as 25% relative to the dollar since its 

inauguration. 2 12 of the 15 EU states are 

in the Euro-zone, with Denmark, Sweden, 

and the United Kingdom still outside. The 

Danes rejected the Euro in a 2000 referendum and the Swedes and British are 

unlikely to adopt it in the near future. The 

Danish vote has been interpreted by some 

as a vote against further European integration, which to some means German domination. Yet all three governments retain 

Euro-zone membership on the agenda and 

their accession seems likely before 2015, 

particularly if the Euro strengthens. Its partial recovery as the US economy slowed 

in 2001 and decisions like Argentina’s to 

shift from a dollar-only currency peg to 

a blend of dollar and Euro may be the 

start of a general trend toward true rivalry 

with the dollar as a world currency, perhaps 

well before 2015. 3 The United States has 

enjoyed controlling the world’s reserve currency for half a century; reducing this prerogative will constrain US economic policy 

and activism and change the perception 

and reality of the United States as the sole 

superpower.

Institutional Reform

How will the European Union be governed 

in 2015 and what will be the balance of 

power between the Union and its member? 

With 15 members, the European Union 

2015

...what will be the endstate of the European 

Union?

European governments 

are reluctant to move 

forward with dramatic 

reform to EU structures 

for fear of losing their 

own authority...
12

already has trouble with its decision-making structure. The executive body, the 

Commission, is too large – every country 

has a post or two – and the Council of Ministers – where real decisions are made – 

requires unanimous voting on most important issues, giving both Luxembourg and 

Germany a veto on common action. 

European governments are reluctant to move forward with dramatic reform 

to EU structures for fear of losing their own 

authority to the Union and, worse, of losing 

power to another country that did a better 

job of defending its interests. The current 

system also suffers from a democratic deficit, with too powerful a bureaucracy and 

too little meaningful voting by Europe’s citizens. Growing regionalism within countries like France and the United Kingdom 

may also be difcult for the Union and the 

countries themselves to reconcile. Hence, 

EU institutional reform is a hot-button issue 

for politicians sensitive to skeptical populations.

Pending enlargement is driving 

EU institutional rationalization, however. 

With an almost doubling in size of the 

Union likely by 2015, decision-making 

under current arrangements will be virtually impossible. The EU Nice Summit 

of December 2000 endorsed the results of 

a year-long Intergovernmental Conference 

(IGC), but failed to make dramatic headway in reform. More progress should occur 

during the next IGC, likely in 2004, with at 

least 2 or 3 more IGCs likely before 2015. 

Europe’s institutional structure should be 

dened by then, with streamlined Commission and Council processes and perhaps 

a European Parliament with real power; 

national vetoes will likely remain but be 

rarely used. In 2015, the European Union 

should be as nimble as, say, the US Congress and civil service! Europe will still 

be a hybrid with varying degrees of issuedependent integration, but with increasing 

social, institutional, and geopolitical imperatives to speak with one voice. Its decisions will come only after complex negotiations between countries and EU bureaucracies – making inputs from external sources 

difcult to accept and implement. Such a 

future will have signicant repercussions 

on the United States and its policies.

Enlargement and National Interest

How large should the Union be and what 

character will it develop? The 15 current 

members are all reasonably well-to-do, with 

Greece perhaps the least developed, and 

have been attached to Western traditions 

for a long time. Prosperous Norway and 

Switzerland, while geographically a part of 

Western Europe, have remained wary of 

joining the European Union but could do 

so at any time and would not change its 

character. The Czech Republic, Hungary, 

Poland, Slovenia, and Estonia are developing rapidly and are reasonably “Western” 

countries that may be easy for the Union 

to digest – although Poland’s large agricultural sector is a concern. 

But poverty-stricken Bulgaria and 

Romania will require substantial economic 

aid should they be allowed to join, and 

Ukraine’s economy and politics are so unreformed that the country is not currently a 

candidate for accession nor is it likely to 

be by 2015. Nor are Russia and Belarus, 

effectively setting the eastern boundary of 

the European Union. In the Balkans, the 

overthrow and arrest of Slobodan Milosovic 

in Serbia has removed some of the impediments to political and economic progress in 

the region and has signicantly increasing 

the prospects for EU enlargement in Southeast Europe beyond Slovenia.

EU membership for Turkey is an 

enormously controversial issue. The country’s large population, stumbling economy, 

Islamic culture, and questionable human 

rights record make it a difcult country for 

the current membership to accept. The historic rivalry with EU-member Greece adds 

a prickly security dimension to the problem. On the other hand, Turkey’s recent 

efforts at reform have warranted a place 

as a candidate for accession while its strategic position centered between the West, 

the untamed countries of the former-Soviet 

Union, and the volatile Middle East, make 

it a prize too valuable to lose to radicalism 

or chaos. Much of Turkey’s future depends 

on its own leadership and population, but 

it seems likely that the country will have a 

relationship very close to membership with 

the European Union by 2015. The European Union’s commissioner in charge of 

enlargement, Günter Verheugen, recently 

visited Ankara and encouraged the country 

to undertake “additional efforts” to draw 

nearer to the Union, citing in particular 

Turkey’s failure to renunciation clearly the 

death penalty and the issue of cultural rights 

for the Kurdish population. 4

EU enlargement, particularly to 

economically needy and culturally divergent accession candidates like Turkey, is 

causing tremors within the Union’s populations. Will the economies of current 

EU countries suffer from the social welfare 

costs of new members and will a host of 

poor people from new members migrate to 

established and prosperous EU countries? 

Romania has been described as “a sea of 

poverty,” for example, with vast unemployment, obsolete factories, and subsistence 

agriculture. Membership means personal 

mobility within the Union, and some of 

the current European citizenry are not prepared for signicant changes to the composition of their cities and towns. Even 

without enlargement, illegal immigration – 

often criminally sponsored – has become an 

enormous problem for EU countries, with 

refugees arriving from the Southern Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and increasingly 

from remote countries like Afghanistan and 

China via the Balkans entrepôt. Europe is 

particularly concerned about the 2 million 

or so Roma (Gypsies) in Central and Eastern Europe, some who have already ed 

to Western European capitals and prompted 

visa restrictions from affected countries. To 

combat illegal immigration from the East, 

the European Union is creating a “paper 

curtain” around the European Union and 

its accession candidates, restricting access 

from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, and 

likely harming the economies and furthering instability in those countries. 5

The participation of Jörg Haider’s 

Freedom Party in Austria’s ruling coalition 

is the most visible political result of antiforeigner sentiment in Europe. In Denmark 

the similar Danish People’s Party helped to 

defeat the Euro; in Norway, Sweden, and 

Belgium, nationalist groups have surged in 

popularity while in Germany anti-foreigner 

violence has increased dramatically. All of 

this is causing European leaders to pause in 

their enthusiasm for EU enlargement. By 

2015, it seems likely that nationalist parties 

or sentiment will play a greater role in the 

politics of even the larger European countries, certainly Italy and perhaps France and 

Germany as well.

EU membership for 

Turkey is an enormously 

conroversial issue.
13

Yet immigration may be just what 

the European Union needs. An aging population in means that both skilled and 

unskilled positions in industry and service 

will go unlled in the future and that further strains will develop in Europe’s generous welfare systems. 6 But an American 

solution allowing substantial immigration, 

both legal and illegal, will run afoul of 

Europe’s Haiders. To address these issues 

adequately, the policy focus of EU countries and institutions will be on European 

domestic issues from now until 2015.

External Relations

Despite its inward bias, Europe will have 

to deal with the rest of the world. Europe 

is less connected than the United States to 

the giant states, dynamic economies, and 

potential problems of Asia, but will certainly work hard to develop and maintain 

good economic relations. It has important 

ties with Latin America and is something 

of a US political and economic rival in 

the region, but has no conicts there that 

affect its vital interests – even Argentina 

and the United Kingdom enjoy relatively 

good relations these days. In sub-Saharan 

African Europe is more engaged than the 

United States as a legacy of its colonial 

past, but again with few vital interests in 

the region – other than investments and a 

felt obligation to mitigate civil and tribal 

violence. Europe will no doubt deploy 

security forces to central Africa from time 

to time as it has in the past to protect its 

nationals, restore order, and perhaps support a favored client. But Europe in 2015 

will be much more concerned with what 

former British foreign secretary Douglas 

Hurd calls the “arc of danger” to its east 

and south, stretching from Kaliningrad in 

the north through Belarus and Ukraine, east 

to the Caucasus and Caspian, west to the 

Balkans and the Middle East and along the 

north African shoreline. 7 Russia, of course, 

is crucial to what happens in this zone, as is 

the United States.

Middle East

In the center of the arc of danger is the 

Middle East. Europe’s dependence on oil 

imports and access to the Suez Canal makes 

its relationship with this region crucial. 

The percentage of oil imports from the 

Middle East may decrease by 2015 as new 

resources from the Caspian region become 

available, but Europe will by then be on the 

wrong side of a seller’s energy market as 

economies like China and India continue 

to grow and develop ever greater energy 

appetites.

In part because of its greater need 

for Middle East oil, Europe has often been 

less committed to Israel than the United 

States and more sanguine about allegations that states in the region sponsor terrorism and are developing weapons of mass 

destruction. This has led to frequent policy 

disputes with the United States over Middle 

East policy, with the 1973 Arab-Israeli 

War and subsequent oil embargo the foremost example. Europe has also sold sensitive equipment and technology to Middle 

Eastern states identied as “rogue” by the 

United States and France in particular has 

contributed to recent weakening of sanctions against Iraq.

By 2015, the Middle East situation is likely to be even more turbulent 

and dangerous than it is now. Pro-Western 

states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan (to extend the Middle East to the 

Islamic portion of South Asia) could have 

regime changes bringing to power groups 

in no mood to work with Europe or the 

United States and creating substantial political and energy uncertainty. Iraq and/or 

Iran may have nuclear weapons by 2015 to 

complement their chemical and biological 

weapons capabilities; they may also have 

ballistic missiles capable of reaching the 

capitals of Europe. This could further decouple US and European security interests, 

particularly if the United States proceeds 

with a parochial national missile defense 

system. On the other hand, the shared 

dangers of economic turmoil from energy 

shortages and weapons of mass destruction 

in the Middle East could drive the US and 

Europe closer together.

Russia

By 2015 the European Union will have 

enlarged to include the Czech Republic, 

Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, the Baltic states 

of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Bulgaria, 

and perhaps Romania – in addition to Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus. Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine will not be members and the union of Russia and Belarus 

should have occurred by 2005. The European Union will confront the border of 

Russia itself and will surround the Russian 

Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad. What issues 

will arise from this eventuality?

Much will depend on the evolution of Russia’s economy and politics and 

on the policy choices made by Russian 

leaders. The country is currently poised 

between East and West and between the 

developed world and its periphery. Russia’s transition from the Soviet era has been 

difcult, which is not surprising considering its 70 years of centralized control 

and management. According to University 

of California scholar Martin Malia, “the 

Soviet state left behind only administrative 

and economic rubble, devoid of the judicial accounting and police procedures necessary for a modern society.” 8 The whole 

basis for a democratic and capitalist society 

must be created, with issues such as ownership, taxation, and legal responsibility still 

in play. Those that acted quickly and had 

friends in high places when communism 

came to an end have done well, as the billions of dollars amassed by the 20 or so 

Russian oligarchs testify. But cronyism and 

corruption, identied in the Russian case 

as nomenklatura capitalism, have greatly 

harmed Russia’s people and impeded its 

transition to a modern state.

Russia now has a GDP less than 

Switzerland and lurches from political to 

economic crises and back again with disturbing regularity, surviving in part through 

IMF and other loans from the West. The 

nancial collapse of 1998, however, had the 

benet of reducing the ruble to a more realistic value and stimulating local production. 

As an energy supplier, Russia has beneted 

recently from higher energy costs, yet so 

many structural problems remain that most 

economists foresee a return to stagnation in 

the next few years if not months. Hopes of 

stability and economic reform rest on President Vladimir Putin, as do fears of reduced 

freedom and increased repression and concerns about arms and technology transfers 

to states like Iran and Iraq. Russians 

are also experiencing a demographic crisis 

because of low birth rate and drastically 

shortened life-span for its male citizens. 

The country’s depopulation could have profound effects upon its economic and social 

conditions in 2015.

Europe is committed to helping 

...Europe in 2015 will be 

much more concerned 

with...the “arc of danger” 

to its east and south.
14

Russia join the West. The EU TACIS program alone has invested $300 million primarily to encourage nuclear power plant 

safety. European business investment and 

commitment to the country are much greater 

than the United States, making it tempting 

to conclude that Russia will be drawn close 

to the European Union because of mutually benecial relationships in raw materials, services, and manufactured goods. 

Russia’s long-term prosperity would benet greatly from a close association with 

the European Union. On the other hand, 

Russia’s great power pretensions and shortterm economic interests may take it to the 

south and east. There are ready markets 

for Russian military technology in Iraq and 

Iran, while China and India are using Russian assistance to move up the ladder of 

military capability faster than they otherwise might. EU measures to prevent 

impoverished Russians from heading west 

and to keep tabs on the virulent Russian 

maa are reinforcing the already mentioned 

paper curtain and will discourage Russian 

contacts with the West. It is too difcult to 

tell which trend will be most in evidence by 

2015, only that Russian politics and economics will be high on the agenda for European policy makers. Watch for increased 

investment and perhaps even joint arms 

production between the European Union 

and Russia as bell-weathers for more extensive security cooperation and perceived 

common interests.

From a balance of power perspective, either result will affect the national 

interests of the United States. Russia going 

south and east will increase the proliferation of conventional and unconventional 

arms in regions unfriendly to the United 

States; Russian instability could require US 

intervention in far-corners of the world, 

such as the various ‘Stans of south-central 

Asia – even more remote regions than 

Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. On the other 

hand, a close EU-Russia relationship might 

be good for global stability but would add 

the human and industrial capital and enormous natural resources of the world’s largest country to those of an already powerful 

European Union. Both results can be mitigated by a vigorous US political and economic presence in Russia.

Transatlantic Relationship

A major question mark for the future is 

the continued vibrancy of the US-Europe 

security relationship. The collapses of 

the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union 

changed the relationships between enemies 

and friends and has tested the resiliency of 

Cold War regimes and institutions. Political 

scientist Stephen Walt wrote that NATO’s 

three unifying forces have either greatly 

diminished or vanished since the end of the 

Cold War: rst, the Soviet threat; second, 

America’s stake in Europe’s economy; and 

third, the existence of a generation of European and American elites whose personal 

backgrounds and life experiences left them 

strongly committed to the idea of an Atlantic community. 9 Alliance solidarity, of 

course, is not a new concern and has been 

the subject of countless books over the last 

50 years chronicling “the crisis in NATO.” 

But NATO is now clearly a preference, not 

a necessity, and the crises could be fatal.

Post-Cold War frustration has been 

growing on both sides of the Atlantic. In 

the United States, neo-isolationism emerges 

with each new crisis requiring US military 

action and may be a trademark of the new 

Bush administration. The argument goes, 

“NATO’s European members are wealthy, 

and they will be able to provide for their 

own conventional defense without American help.” 10 The United States demands 

greater military expenditure from the European members of NATO but is quick to 

cast a suspicious eye on any project that 

bolsters European capability apart from 

NATO. Lord Robertson, Secretary General 

of NATO, noted that:

The US suffers from a sort of schizophrenia. On the one hand, the Americans say, ‘you Europeans have got to 

carry more of the burden.’ And then 

when the Europeans say, ‘Okay, we 

will carry more of the burden,’ the 

Americans say, ‘Well, wait a minute, 

are you trying to tell us to go home?

11

On the other side of the Atlantic, “Ameribashing” is increasingly accepted. Books 

entitled No Thanks, Uncle Sam, The World 

is not Merchandise, and Who is Killing 

France? The American Strategy bluntly 

reect this anti-American sentiment. New 

York Times reporter Suzanne Daley cited 

CSA Opinion polls that showed 68% of 

the French were worried about America’s 

superpower status and only 30% found anything admirable about the United States. 12

Recent Problems

Europeans remain particularly bitter regarding the manner in which the United 

States handled the Bosnian Peace Process. 

According to this argument, the United 

States did not support the largely European Vance-Owen Peace Plan because the 

United States claimed it did not do enough 

for the Bosnians. The American-brokered 

Dayton Accords, on the other hand, were 

largely successful although many Europeans believe the Bosnians received less than 

they would have under Vance-Owen. Many 

Europeans are also increasingly dissatis-

ed with the manner in which the United 

States becomes involved in military operations like Bosnia and Kosovo. According 

to this argument, when the United States 

gets involved in an multinational operations, it demands to be in charge of the 

effort but not at the expense of casualties. 

The United States also restricts American 

military hardware and technology that can 

be bought by or transferred to Europeans. 

Europeans are also concerned about the 

inuence of domestic ethnic interests on 

US foreign policy, with the pro-Israel lobby 

a long-standing issue. Extra-territorial laws 

like the Helms-Burton amendment, attributed to the power of the Cuban exile community in Florida, allow US court action 

against companies trading with Cuba and 

have been vigorously opposed by Europe,

These issues contribute to a perception of US unilateralism despite rhetorical multilateralism, and to a belief in 

American overemphasis on military means 

while forgoing greater diplomacy and other 

non-violent means of dispute resolution. 

Foreign minister Hubert Vedrine of France 

coined the term “hyperpower” to describe 

the current place of the United States in 

the world, and questioned whether it was 

a very healthy situation. Several issues 

are testing the transatlantic relationship, but 

defense budgets and defense industry consolidation, national missile defense, and 

Europe’s plans for autonomous security and 

defense will require the most attention to 

Europe’s spending on military research and development is much lower 

than the United States 

...revealed vividly in the 

1999 Kosovo campaign
15

prevent a breach in the alliance.

Spending and Technology

With the exception of Britain, France, 

and Greece, the members of the European 

Union spend much less as a percentage of 

GDP on defense than the United States – 

below 2% in most cases. And what they 

spend it on does not contribute very well to 

allied capabilities, concentrating on mass 

armies that are of little use against the 

threats of the 21st century. According the 

Rand Strategic Assessment, about 80 percent of European forces conduct territorial 

defense at medium readiness. The remaining are high-readiness, reaction forces totaling 10 divisions, 470 combat aircraft, and 

160 ships that are mostly tailored for local 

missions. 13

Europe’s spending on military 

research and development is much lower 

than the United States, a “technology gap” 

revealed vividly in the 1999 Kosovo campaign. 80% of the air strikes were American and most of the high tech command and 

control was American as well. Europe also 

lacks airborne ground surveillance capability, heavy lift, long range cruise missiles, 

and comprehensive reconnaissance satellite coverage. As a singular example, the 

United States has 10 times the airborne tankers of Europe. 14 NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) is designed to identify 

and help remedy some of these problems; 

the European security and defense policy 

discussed below also has greater capability 

as a goal. The gap will not be closed by 

2015 although some progress may be made, 

such as several European countries acquiring the Airbus A400 transport for strategic 

lift. Because of the extremely large expenditures needed to develop modern weapons systems, Europe has been slowly 

moving toward defense consolidation across 

national borders, a trend that should facilitate better use of assets and contribute to 

greater capability.

This again will cut two ways. 

Greater and smarter defense expenditures 

will enhance the ability of Europe and the 

United States to remain partners in defense; 

the down side will be the tendency to procure exclusively from European industry. 

Part of the reason for consolidation is to 

compete better with a US military industry 

that has gone through its own consolidation since the end of the Cold War – leaving 

giants like Boeing and Lockheed in control of enormous research and production 

capability. The United States usually buys 

American and Europeans will buy European, setting the stage for further trade 

conict and possible interoperability problems in NATO. In 2000, the United Kingdom ordered the Airbus A400 instead of 

C-17s and C-130s and Meteor missiles 

from a European consortium instead of 

AMRAAMs from Raytheon – in part due 

to the appeal of European solidarity. Further and perhaps even more dramatic examples of local preference in European weapons acquisition are likely by 2015. Some 

believe that defense industry consolidation 

is the key to developing a really functional 

common European security and defense 

policy.

National Missile Defense

In July 1999, President Clinton signed 

the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 

which committed the United States to 

deploying an “effective National Missile 

Defense system [NMD] capable of defending the territory of the United States against 

limited ballistic missile attack” as soon as 

technologically possible. 15 After a string 

of test failures, he deferred a deployment 

decision to the next administration. President Bush and his top ofcials, particularly Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 

are enthusiastic proponents of NMD and 

seem likely to receive vigorous support 

from much of Congress. 

Europe is concerned that the 

United States will bolster its own defense 

without concern for its European allies and 

will abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, perhaps rekindling an 

arms race with Russia and/or China. At 

their July 2000 summit, Russian President 

Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Jiang 

Zemin issued a joint statement that “implementing this plan [NMD] will have the 

most grave adverse consequences not only 

to the national security of Russia, China, 

and other countries, but also to the security 

and international strategic ability of the US 

itself.” 16 Vladimir Yakovlev, commander in 

chief of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, 

said Russia might even withdraw from the 

INF Treaty and resume the manufacture of 

medium-range missiles if the United States 

proceeded with NMD. 17 Many believe the 

Chinese reaction will be most important, 

with qualitative and quantitative improvements to its strategic nuclear arsenal and 

perhaps accelerated sales of sensitive equipment and technology to rogue states.

Europeans are also coming to the 

belief that their opinions do not matter 

much in Washington and that a deployment 

decision will be made regardless of their 

concerns, a path already taken with the 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 

In 1999, British Prime Minister Tony 

Blair, French President Jacques Chirac, 

and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder 

wrote a letter to the New York Times stating that rejection of the CTBT “would also 

expose a fundamental divergence within 

NATO.” 18 In spite of these appeals and 

support from President Clinton, the US 

Senate rejected the treaty, particularly telling since the Russian Duma subsequently 

ratied it. President George W. Bush is on 

record as supporting the Senate rejection.

National missile defense is an 

issue that can alter geopolitics. While 

a case can certainly be made for such a 

system, it is presented by US ofcials as the 

only possible option to counter the proliferation of long range ballistic missiles and the 

weapons that go along with them. Other 

issues should be considered, including the 

well-known “security dilemma” where the 

actions taken to increase a country’s security may actually reduce it because of the 

reaction it stimulates in others. The United 

States is gaining a reputation for cavalier 

treatment of friends and foes alike, reected 

in US diplomat Richard Holbrook’s disinterest in Russian reaction to NATO enlargement – stating abruptly that “they’ll get 

over it.” NMD is divisive and is likely to 

cause tense relations between Europe and 

the United States in the coming years. Yet 

by 2015, particularly if conditions in the 

Middle East and/or South Asia deteriorate, 

Europe may well have accepted the US 

NMD initiative and become a part of it. 19

Common European Security and Defense 

Policy

Europe could distance itself from the United 

States through the development of its own 

Some believe that defense 

industry consolidation is 

the key to developing a 

really functional common 

European security and 

defense policy.
16

security and defense apparatus. 20 Although 

the evolution of the EU common foreign 

and security policy (CFSP) and European 

security and defense identity (ESDI) has 

been set in terms of strengthening the transatlantic relationship, it is fraught with tension between a suspicious United States and 

an assertive though often uncertain European Union. 21 This included the alleged 

but infamous “letter of rebuke” to several 

European countries in 1991 that hinted at 

US withdrawal from Europe should CFSP 

develop in a way considered unacceptable 

to US interests. 22 The EU’s CFSP was 

nonetheless approved at Maastricht and 

came into force on 1 November 1993, with 

a permanent secretariat to assist the Council of Ministers in negotiations and procedures for collective decision-making. The 

October 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (put into 

force on 1 May 1999) strengthened CFSP 

by stipulating that the Council of Ministers could decide on some security issues 

by qualied majority vote, subject to 

appeal based on important national interests. Amsterdam also created the position 

of High Representative for the Common 

Foreign and Security Policy, the General 

Secretariat of the Council, and the Policy 

Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPU), 

all designed to help formulate and implement the political decisions of the Council 

of Ministers.

Maastricht included an EU connection to the Western European Union 

(WEU) alliance, which was also pursuing 

a strengthening of mission. In 1992, WEU 

members adopted the Petersberg Declaration listing the types of missions the 

WEU might pursue on its own (i.e., without NATO and the United States), such as 

humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, and combat forces in crisis management – including peacemaking. 23 In 

1996 at Berlin, NATO leaders approved 

the Petersberg tasks as appropriate for the 

WEU and offered the possibility of using 

NATO staff and equipment. Policies and 

procedures like the Combined Joint Task 

Forces (CJTF) were developed to facilitate 

autonomous WEU operations. 24 CJTF 

would enable Europe to conduct operations that were not a high priority for 

the United States while avoiding duplicate 

force structures and equipment, and would 

also allow associate countries (non-members of NATO, the WEU, or the European 

Union) to participate in Europe-led operations.

But the WEU lacked the popular 

appeal and deep roots of the European 

Union and never received more than token 

support from the leading European countries. The NATO-WEU rubric began to 

break down with an initiative by the most 

NATO-friendly of countries. In December 

1998 at St. Malo, France, Prime Minister 

Tony Blair of Great Britain, along with 

President Jacques Chirac of France, issued 

a declaration on European defense that 

cleared the way for EU defense development. They wanted the European Union to 

be able to launch military operations without the United States in the lead, as seemed 

necessary in Bosnia in 1995. This was a 

sharp departure from the previous British 

reluctance to associate the European Union 

with defense and military matters. 

Europe’s poor performance in 

Kosovo in spring 1999 encouraged EU 

leaders to follow up the St. Malo initiative 

at Cologne in June 1999. They stated their 

intent “to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its 

responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defense.” This 

included preparing for the “inclusion of 

those functions of the WEU which will 

be necessary for the EU to fulll its new 

responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg 

tasks.” The European Union took over 

WEU duties at the end of 2000 and the 

WEU was dissolved. 25

These initiatives took on the new 

acronym CESDP (common European security and defense policy) and continued 

development at the EU Helsinki summit of 

10-11 December 1999. EU leaders decided 

that “cooperating voluntarily in EU-led 

operations, Member States must be able, 

by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of 

up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the 

full range of Petersberg tasks.” 26 They also 

committed to new political and military 

bodies to direct the operations, to develop 

cooperation and transparency with NATO, 

to dene arrangements with non-EU European NATO members, and to establish nonmilitary crisis management mechanisms.

27 These were all part of the so-called 

EU Headline Goals for 2003. In November 2000, EU members and other countries 

made formal troop and equipment commitments to the rapid reaction force.

US opinion on autonomous European security and defense has been “ercely 

ambivalent,” according to Paul Cornish of 

Kings College, while British sources note 

that the current EU-NATO negotiations are 

driving the Americans “nuts.” And this 

is because, at a very profound level, the 

development of the European security and 

defense policy is likely to be the beginning 

of the end of NATO. All except France forswear such a motive, but the internal and 

external dynamics for CESDP to develop 

as a military alliance are in place. It will 

take some time for the agreements of Helsinki to be transformed into actual capability, yet easy to visualize a Europe in 2015 

with its own military force and some successful peacekeeping operations under its 

belt occasionally rejecting US involvement 

and all the baggage that comes with it.

ESDP is a logical follow-on to the 

EU’s economic, nancial, social, and political cooperation. By 2015, NATO could 

regress to a mere talking shop, a place 

where the United States and EU alliance 

coordinate activities on a grand scale but 

no longer a functional collective defense 

organization. This may be sufcient to 

manage regional security issues, but a far 

cry from the powerful alliance NATO once 

was. NATO has been a metaphor for USEurope cooperation and the vehicle for US 

military and political inuence in Europe; 

its demise would be represent a signicant 

American loss in an important part of the 

world.

A European Nuclear Force?

Will the European Union develop a nuclear 

component to its common European security and defense policy? It might want 

one to help maintain its place among the 

world’s great powers following the nuclear 

weapons tests of India and Pakistan and 

the changes to the international structure 

the tests imply. European politics might 

also desire a nuclear ESDP if their interests diverge substantially from those of the 

United States, their primary nuclear protector, or if they lose faith in the US/NATO 

commitment to their defense. Without the 

unity inspired by a common threat from 

the Soviet Union, issues like trade, defense 

burden sharing, and environmental policy 

could lead to serious disputes. The US 

quest for a National Missile Defense system 

and the EU’s own defense initiatives might 
17

presage a European military alliance that 

may “someday need a single nuclear power 

to speak as a deterrent force for [the] 

whole continent,” as French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine noted in July 2000. And 

it would not be very difcult to do operationally, pooling the British and French submarine-based nuclear deterrent forces into 

a European nuclear capability that would 

receive doctrinal and operational guidelines 

for an EU version of the NATO Nuclear 

Planning Group. 

The difculty, of course, is political. Powerful counter-tendencies make a 

nuclear ESDP anytime soon improbable. 

The European Union enjoys considerable 

power, prestige, and security without the 

responsibility and opprobrium of a collective nuclear force. Most Europeans see no 

need for a nuclear CESDP, including residents of the United Kingdom and France 

where national nuclear weapons provide 

part of their deterrent protection and most 

of their great power status. Passions 

against nuclear energy in any form have 

a home in European political parties, like 

the German Greens, that now occupy positions of power. And, as a French defense 

paper points out, there will not likely be 

a European nuclear doctrine without European vital interests, and these are inchoate 

at best. Europe is unlikely to have a 

common nuclear force by 2015, but discussions on the topic will be more frequent 

and more urgent.

Arms Control and 

Proliferation

Europe has been a vigorous backer of arms 

control regimes. Although the arms control 

agreements of the Cold War were primarily between the United States and Soviet 

Union, Europe supported them as means 

to reduce tension and the likelihood of 

war. As a group, European nations have 

helped strengthen the Nonproliferation 

Treaty and other portions of the nonproliferation regime, including the Nuclear 

Supplier Group agreements, Biological 

and Chemical Weapons Conventions, and 

the Missile Technology Control Regime. 

Europe’s nuclear safety initiatives are helping to stabilize dangerous environmental 

and potential proliferation hazards in the 

former Soviet bloc. Although France and 

Great Britain were noticeably lenient in 

sanctions placed on India and Pakistan for 

testing nuclear weapons and, too frequently, 

European suppliers have been enthusiastic 

about selling sensitive material to rogue 

states, Europe in 2015 is likely to remain 

an enthusiastic supporters of efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction.

Conclusion

Europe 2015 is not set in stone. Choices 

made by the United States, Russia, and 

other countries, not to mention the Europeans themselves, will profoundly affect 

the shape of Europe in the future. This is 

particularly true since traditional military 

threats to the region are absent and other 

threats – such as from mass migration, civil 

disorder, economic collapse, and environmental degradation – are relatively new 

to the security realm and much harder to 

defend against by normal means. The 

recent US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol on CO2 emissions and the new EU 

visa regime with Eastern Europe, for example, could both become security issues in 

some way. The European Union is beginning to act more like a coherent political 

entity and the United States will just have 

to deal with the situation as best it can. 

Europe has the people, resources, and organization to become a true rival to the United 

States. And at some point, probably before 

2015, consideration will be given on both 

sides of the Atlantic to reducing further the 

number of US bases in Europe.

But unless US leaders are grossly 

incompetent – particularly in their 

management of missile defense initiatives – the Union will not develop into 

a military superpower by 2015. Such a 

transition would cost a great deal to do 

so, require much more political consolidation in the region than now seems 

likely, and go against a non-military 

self-image among Europeans, perhaps 

post-modern, in the conduct of their 

affairs. Europeans (with perhaps the 

French excepted) are comfortable and 

not imperial, reactive and not assertive, 

and used to following the US lead. 

And this may suit the times, making 

Europe a force for restraint and nonmilitary options to conict – even 

a force for peace. And despite the 

potential for great power rivalry in several issue areas, as Robert Blackwill 

pointed out, neither the United States 

nor Europe threatens the vital interests 

of the other side. In 2015, the marriage is likely to remain successful if 

not always happy.

(Endnotes) 1 Strategic Assessment 1999 and CIA Factbook. 2

 “The Darling Dollar,” The Economist, 7 

April 2001.

3 New York Times, 12 April 2001.

4

’’“ Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 March 2001.

5

’s Strategic Engagement with Ukraine,” 

presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, March 2000, 

Los Angeles, CA.

6

 “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About 

the Future With Nongovernmental Experts,” 

NIC 2000-02, December 2000, prepared 

under the direction of the National Intelligence Council.

7 Financial Times, 28 March 2001.

8 New York Times, 3 September 1999.

9

 Stephen M. Walt, “The Ties That Fray: 

Why Europe and America are Drifting 

Apart,” The National Interest, Winter 

1998/99, 3.

10 Charles Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, 

and Harvey M. Sapolsky, Come Home 

America: A Military Strategy for the 21st 

Century, 218.

11 Dr. Guenther Burghardt, “European Security: Past, Present and Future,” speech at 

the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Seminar, Washington, DC, 15 March 2000, . 

12 Denver Post, April 9, 2000, 26A.

13 Strategic Assessment 1999, 83.

14 See David Yost, “The NATO Capabilities 

Gap and the European Union,” Survival, 

Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter 2000-01.

15 U.S. Public Law 106-38. .

16 Financial Times, 18 July 2000.

Europe has the people, 

resources, and organization to become a true rival 

to the United States.
18

17 Sharon LaFraniere, “Russian Threatens 

Action Over U.S. Missile Plan,” Washington Post Foreign Service, June 23, 2000, . 

18 Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, and Gerhard 

Schröder, “A Treaty We All Need,” Britain 

in the USA, , 8 Oct 99. 

19’s Fundamental Divergence Over Proliferation,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 

Vol. 23, No. 3, Sept 2000, who argues that 

Europeans need to accept the US position 

on NMD because arms control policy for 

the past decade has been a failure.

20 See “In Defence of European Defence: 

An American Perspective” by Charles A. 

Kupchan, Survival’s need for force projection capability to be able to manage properly its security affairs and that a reassessment of the transatlantic bargain is taking 

place.

21 “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue 

About the Future With Nongovernmental 

Experts,” NIC 2000-02, December 2000, 

prepared under the direction of the National 

Intelligence Council.

22 Charles Krupnick, “Not What They 

Wanted,” Disconcerted Europe: The Search 

for a New Security Architecture, Alexander 

Moens and Christopher Anstis, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 124-5.

23 Petersberg Declaration, 19 June 1992, 

Part II, Paragraph 4. Cited from Towards a 

Common Defence Policy, Laurence Martin 

and John Roper, eds. (Alençon, France: 

Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 

1995), 9.

24 For the development of EU security cooperation up to 1996, see Charles Krupnick, 

“Europe Without the United States?: Prospects for European Defense Cooperation 

after the 1996 European Union Intergovernmental Conference,” Airpower Journal, 

Special Edition 1996, 48-58.

25 “Presidency Conclusions: Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, European 

Council Declaration on Strengthening the 

Common European Policy on Security and 

Defense.”

26 “Presidency Conclusions: Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999.”

27 “European Security and Defense Policy,” 

in “European Union: Policies & Legislation” at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/

Defense/espweb.htm.
19

PROLIFERATION DRIVERS

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Overview: The Middle East region 

contains many of the world’s greatest proliferators. It is home to the largest concentration of states spending a large portion of 

GDP’s on defense. It is a territory prone 

to conict, and one in which states have 

purposely used chemical weapons against 

each other, and in the case of Iraq, one in 

which a state used such weapons against an 

ethnic group within its own borders. It is 

also habitat to the likes of Saddam Hussein, 

Muhammar Qaddaf, and the former Ayatollah Khomeni, leaders who at one time 

or another declared themselves as enemies 

of the United States. Each was determined 

to gain/maintain regional hegemony by 

developing weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). They and others like them antagonized neighbors and induced instability in 

the region. Why then, is this such an unstable region? How does instability contribute 

to proliferation and what drives it? It is the 

purpose of our analysis to begin to answer 

these questions as they relate to predicted 

capabilities in the region during the next 15 

years.

First, a note about our research 

team. It includes four members of the 

Political Science Department of the United 

States Air Force Academy. Dr Barbara 

Presgrove is a State Department visiting 

scholar, having previously served in the US 

embassy in Cairo. Major Brent Talbot currently serves as the Deputy Director for 

INSS and is an adjunct Assistant Professor 

who specializes in Middle East politics and 

US national security affairs. Captains Troy 

Thomas and Tim Uecker, both Instructors 

in the department, previously served as 

Intelligence ofcers in the Middle East. 

Thus, we bring a diverse background to the 

subject area. 

In order to fully analyze the world 

of 2015 as it will exist in the Middle Eastern region, our team decided upon a novel 

approach. Rather than review and summarize other studies predicting the future of 

the region, we decided to brainstorm a list 

of all the probable reasons why state and 

non-state actors in the region might proliferate during the next 15 years. Our original list included over 66 reasons, or what 

we labeled as ‘proliferation drivers.’ We 

then decided upon seven general categories 

under which these various drivers could be 

grouped. We then divided the Middle East 

into four sub-regions so that we could 

each provide a more detailed analysis of 

drivers and actors in each of the subregions after reviewing the literature and 

applying our own knowledge bases to the 

analysis. These were scrutinized during a 

series of meetings where we met and compared notes. Our analysis is summarized 

in Table 1 (see page 3) and includes a rank 

ordering of the actors based upon drivers. 

The more drivers that affect an actor, the 

more likely it is to proliferate. Thus, those 

actors at the top of the chart are the ones 

that should be of greatest concern to the 

United States. Moreover, we also added 

a capabilities analysis by making an effort 

to predict the types of weapons that each 

would likely pursue depending on its capabilities and the rationale driving proliferation efforts. It should be understood that 

the drivers we identied might also be used 

to measure instability and the likelihood 

of conict in addition to the bias toward 

proliferation. 

The body of the report is organized into 4 sections: I) Actors, II) Drivers, 

III) Weapons, and IV) Threat Scenarios. 

Each section (except the last) includes de-

nition and analysis subdivisions. The actors 

section includes both state and non-state 

actors and summarizes concerns related to 

actors primarily at the top of our analysis 

chart (Table 1). Section II is the meat of 

our report and explains each of our categories of drivers and describes why they 

affect the major actors of concern as well 

as other potential actors that could become 

obstacles to US policy. By understanding 

the drivers, it is also hoped that policymakers may be enabled to actually nd 

solutions to the problems behind proliferation. By eliminating the drivers, the reasons 

for proliferation and conict might also be 

reduced, which in turn, could attenuate the 

threat to US interests in the region. Thus, 

understanding the drivers is key to countering them and developing the best policy 

for the Middle East. Section III is included 

in order to illuminate the most dangerous 

threats. Actors with the most drivers are not 

always the most capable, and therefore, may 

not evoke the level of concern that those 

with WMD capability or advanced conventional weapons might provoke. Finally, 

we thought we should spell out the most 

likely threat scenarios as well as wild 

card scenarios that should be of utmost 

concern to policy-makers when determining which types of arms control and non/

counterproliferation policies might apply 

to the region. Indeed, these scenarios are 

likely to be a catalyst for rapid proliferation 

or sudden changes in acquisition and development strategies.

ACTORS

Denition: Actors are both state 

and non-state entities that are capable of 

proliferation and deemed as those having a 

probable inclination to do so. For our purposes, the actors in this analysis are limited 

to the Levant-Arabian peninsula and the 

North Africa coastal region, which regions 

comprise most of the existing Arab states, 

plus the non-Arab central Asian states 

of Afghanistan and Iran, and internal or 

regional non-state entities comprising the 

same territory. All possible actors are not 

included because the study group focused 

on probable rather than possible actors.

Probable actors are those deemed 

most likely to proliferate during the next 15 

years (2001-2015). One should also realize 

that our emphasis is on drivers (as dened 

in the next section) and is therefore suggestive of other important actors emerging 

in the future, such as MNCs and/or terrorist networks that do not currently exist, or 

are too new to be of any consequence at 

present. In those circumstances, the cur1. State Actors: Legal state entities in the Middle Eastern region dened 

above that are administered by legal sovereign governments. They include the 

following states: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 

Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, 

Yemen, Iran and Afghanistan. Turkey was 

not included because it falls under NATO 

and the European analysis (although we 

mention it briey). Other Central Asian 

states in the Caspian Sea basin fall under 

the analysis of the Russia group as former 

Soviet Republics. And other African-Arab 

states (such as Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia) are included in the Africa analysis section.

2. Non-state Actors: All internal 

or transnational active groups other than 

...home to the largest concentration of states spending a large portion of 

GDP’s on defense.
20

Table 1.

Drivers Weapons

 Proliferation Drivers in the R = Resource/Environmental C = Conventional

 Middle East S = Socio-Economic A = Advanced Conv

 Actors (State and Non-State) L = Leadership/Regime Control M = Adv Conv Missiles

 Ranked by Drivers and Weapons I = Indigenous Factions W = Bio/Chem WMD

 Capabilities D = Defense/Deterrence N = Nuclear WMD

 O = Offense/Coercion

 E = External Relations

Actors Drivers Weapons

1. Israel R, S, L, I, D, O, E C, A, M, W, N

2. Iran R, S, L, I, D, O, E C, A, M, W, N

3. Iraq R, S, L, I, D, O, E C, A, M, W, N

4. Syria R, S, L, I, D, O, E C, A, M, W

5. Palestine/PLO/PNA R, S, L, I, D, O, E C, W

6. Egypt R, S, L, I, D, E C, A, M, W (N if regime change)

7. Iraqi Opposition (INC/Families) R, S, I, D, O, E C, A 

8. Jordan R, S, L, I, D, E C, A

9. Kurds R, S, I, D, O, E C, W

10 Libya S, L, D, O, E C, A, M, W, N

11. Saudi Arabia R, L, I, D, E C, A, M

12. Yemen R, S, L, I, D C, A, W, M

13. UAE R, L, I, D, E C, A

14. Mujahhadin e-Khalq (Iranian Opposition) S, I, D, O, E C, A

15. Bahrain R, S, L, I, D C, A

16. Saudi Shi’a S, I, D, O, E C, W

17. Kuwait R, L, D, E C, A

18. Tunisia S, L, D, E C, A

19. Algeria S, L, I, D C, A (W, N if regime change)

20. Hamas/Extremists (Palestine) S, D, O, E C, W

21. Hizbollah (Lebanon) S, D, O, E C, W

22. Qatar R, S, L, D C

23. Marsh Arabs (Iraqi Shi’a) R, S, I, D C

24. Bahraini Shi’a S, I, D, E C

25. GCC R, D, E C, A, M

26. Taliban (Afghanistan) S, I, O C, A, W

27. ARAMCO/Other MNC R, S, D C, A

28. Algerian Islamic extremists S, I, O C

29. Lebanon S, I, E C

30. Jewish Settlers/Extremists R, I, O C

31. Egyptian Islamic extremists S, I, O C

32. Oman R, D, E C

33. Azeri Ethno-political Group (Iran) S, I, E C

34. Morocco D, E C, A

35. Tuareg (border ethnic group-Algeria) S, I C

36. Arab League E C

37. OPEC R C

states, which include ethnic groups without sovereignty that desire such, political 

groups out of power, international governmental organizations (IGOs) that seek to 

bring states together for economic or military purposes, and MNCs or other non-governmental organizations seeking the same, 

which are usually more resource driven 

(such as OPEC or ARAMCO). 

Potential Examples: Palestine is represented in our analysis as both a quasi-government entity (PLO--Palestine Liberation 

Organization /PNA--Palestinian National 

Authority) and as an ethnic unit ghting 

for independence and/or control of the government (Hamas/Extremists). Hamas has 

repeatedly acted beyond the control of PLO/

PNA Chairman Yasir Arafat and must thus 

be viewed as a separate entity that could be 

driven to proliferate in both opposition to 

Israel and to an established and sovereign 

Palestinian state government controlled by 

the PNA. 

Analysis: Weapons proliferation is a major 

problem of concern in the Middle East. 

Actors in the region make up six of the top 

nine states worldwide spending the greatest share of GDP on defense, according 

to the International Institute for Strategic 

Studies annual report (see table 2). Moreover, Anthony Cordesman, a leading expert 

on Middle East proliferation, claims that 

this is a region where the reasons for prolif-
21

erating often outweigh the perceived risks. 

The lessons from the Iran-Iraq War and 

the Gulf War make it clear to many states 

in the region that missiles and chem/bio 

weapons are likely to be used and therefore 

must be developed as a deterrent, or at least 

one must posses the advanced conventional 

weapons that are capable of deterring and 

repelling WMD attacks. It is a region of 

unstable rivalries and arms races: EgyptIsrael-Syria, Iran-Iraq-Southern Gulf states; 

it is a region where it is difcult to predict 

the future behavior of one’s neighbors, and 

one in which state, proxy, even private 

terrorism nds sponsorship.1 Thus, the 

Middle East will remain a region where 

state and non-state actors must continually 

be watched for signs of proliferation, and 

where US policy to counter proliferation 

remains a necessary part of providing security in the region.

As our own analysis will show, the 

number of probable proliferators or ‘actors’ 

identied in this study (37) shows that the 

Middle East must remain of utmost concern 

to US foreign policy-makers (see Table 1 

for the complete list of actors). Our ‘drivers’ analysis identies seven major reasons 

that drive Middle Eastern state and nonstate actors towards proliferation (see section II). Five of the region’s actors are 

driven by all 7 of them; an additional four 

actors are driven by 6 of 7, and another six 

are affected by 5 of the 7 drivers. In sum, 

this means that at least the top15 actors 

should be of great concern to US policymakers and a focus of intelligence efforts, 

and 33 of the 37 (having three or more 

drivers) should be closely watched during 

the next 15 years for signs of proliferation, 

especially those showing up as WMD proliferators (see weapons column in Table 1). 

Of the top 15, ve are likely to seek nuclear 

weapons, eight are likely to seek chem/bio 

weapons, and all but three are likely to buy/

build or already posses advanced conventional weapons (see section III for a more 

detailed weapons analysis).

Those actors topping the list (with 

all 7 drivers) include Israel, Iran, Iraq, 

Syria, and the PLO/PNA (Palestine quasigovernment). All have been or are currently 

involved in conict during the past decade 

and the number of drivers would indicate 

that all are likely to be involved again. Current US policy is focused on these states 

(or incipient states) of the region. The US 

has actively pursued a peace treaty between 

Israel and the PNA (to include statehood 

for Palestine). The Clinton administration 

Dual Containment policy focused on IraqIran in an effort to curb proliferation in 

those states; and efforts to bring Syria into 

bilateral negotiations with Israel have also 

been high on the agenda of the last two 

presidential administrations. Thus, past US 

policy has been rightly focused on the major 

states of concern and efforts should continue in this direction. Achieving success in 

the Arab-Israeli peace process would go a 

long way toward curbing violence and proliferation among these critical states of the 

region. Moreover, it would take away drivers for non-state actors that are among the 

most likely WMD proliferators, namely, 

Hamas and Hizbollah.

The second group of actors: Egypt, 

Iraqi opposition, Jordan, and the Kurds 

(with 6 of 7 drivers), reveals actors that 

have not been a major focus of US policy. 

While both Egypt and Jordan benet signicantly from US relations and are considered deeply entrenched in the US camp, 

the Kurds and the Iraqi opposition receive 

only minor support from the government. 

The high number of drivers inuencing both 

groups would indicate 

likelihood for stepped-up 

levels of violence in the 

future as they seek independence or other outlets 

to vent political frustrations. For Iraq, this 

means continued opposition to Saddam’s regime. 

US policy during the past 

administration was aimed at overthrowing 

Saddam and congressional support included 

a bill that funded the Iraqi opposition. Still, 

with the opposition weakened and divided 

due to regime efforts to suppress it as 

well as internal disputes between opposition groups, there has been little chance of 

the opposition gaining enough strength to 

overthrow Saddam. The same applies for 

Iraqi Kurds. Divisions between Iraqi Kurdish groups let alone between Iranian, Syrian 

and Turkish Kurds make it most difcult 

for any kind of unifying cause to unite 

them and allow success through increased 

numbers. Still, the large number of drivers 

is an indication that proliferation efforts 

and violence will continue among them and 

against the anti-Kurdish governments of 

the region.

One of the key concerns of this 

region is the number and proximity of 

antagonistic actors that may be provoked to 

attack one another. Major uncertainties that 

arise due to this proximity include: Who 

is the enemy and who is the ally (consider 

Jordan’s role vis-a-vis the coalition during 

the Gulf War)? If an attack occurs, will 

it be possible to determine which actor 

launched it, especially if it is a non-state 

actor using terrorist tactics (consider the 

2000 terrorist attack on the USS Cole in 

the port of Aden)? Does the US presence 

in the region contribute to security, or inuence actors in a negative way (induce additional drivers)? The type of governments is 

also a concern. Most are authoritarian leaders who may not understand the full effects 

of advanced technology and WMD weapons. Should such a leader have possession 

of WMD weapons during a crisis, how will 

he react? Will he fully understand the consequences of his actions? 

The next section of the paper will 

focus on the drivers themselves and give 

more insight into the rationale behind proliferation in the Middle East.

DRIVERS

Denition: forces and/or factors impacting on a state or non-actor in a manner 

that encourages weapons proliferation; core 

incentives for developing and acquiring 

weapons. For a driver to be linked to an 

actor, it must be assessed as a probable catalyst for weapons proliferation. To increase 

utility and deliver focus, all potential drivers have been aligned under the seven core 

drivers provided here. Drivers are generally interrelated, reinforcing and modifying the others. Drivers have global 

relevance. Armed with an understanding of 

the motivations for regional weapons proliferation, policy-makers can focus resources 

and energies on reducing or eliminating the 

incentives for proliferation. 

Table 2.

States Spending Greatest Percent of GDP on Defense2

1. Eritrea 35.8%

2. Saudi Arabia 15.7%

3. Afghanistan 14.5%

4. North Korea 14.3%

5. Oman 13.6%

6. Kuwait 12.9%

7. Qatar 12.0%

8. Angola 11.7%

9. Israel 11.6%
22

1. Resource/Environmental: 

Weapons proliferation manifesting from a 

need to protect and/or control resources 

and/or the environment. Factors include 

among others water, arable land, oil, 

minerals, strategic geography, pollution, 

deforestation, and lines of communications. Resources/environmental forces are 

a salient driver if it can be assessed that 

the actor is probably motivated to acquire 

weapons as a means to protect or gain 

access to a resource and/or enter a dispute 

with another actor over resource use and/or 

environmental effects. For state actors, 

resource issues often involve disagreements 

with other states over access or use of vital 

resources. States may also see weapons 

as necessary protect resources from indigenous factions. Non-state actors are often 

motivated by a desire to gain access to 

resources restricted by states. Weapons are 

also acquired for use in disrupting state 

control of resources as part of a broader 

opposition strategy. 

Potential Examples: Egypt acquires an air 

refueling capability to enable offensive 

operations against Sudan resulting from 

Sudan’s restriction of the Nile ow. The 

Mujahhadin e-Khalq (MEK) attack Iranian 

oil facilities as part of a broader campaign 

to dislodge the current regime.

2. Socio-economic: Weapons 

proliferation resulting from social and economic factors. Social tensions and economic disparities can lead actors to seek 

weapons as a means to survive in the context of a failed state or society, redress grievances through the use of violence, exact 

revenge for perceived or actual oppression/

aggression, or change the status quo. Socioeconomic forces include a “youth explosion” with regard to overall population, 

which can lead to high levels of unemployment and un-realized expectations. Disaffected youth, particularly in the developing 

world, are prone to militant or extremist 

inuences. Displaced persons are another 

source of socio-economic tension. Rapid 

urbanization combined with poverty creates 

conditions ripe for violence from state and 

non-state actors. Socio-economic forces 

are salient if it can be assessed that the actor 

is probably motivated to acquire weapons 

as result of tensions and/or unrest created 

by social dynamics and economic factors. 

For state actors, socio-economic forces can 

often generate a need for military forces 

capable of exerting control over the population, preventing state disintegration, or 

protecting resources and high-value assets. 

Non-state actors are the most effected by 

socio-economic conditions, which often 

lead individuals and groups to seek weapons for the reasons outlined. 

Potential Example: Persistent high unemployment levels in Iran lead to increasing 

social unrest as disenfranchised students 

take up arms against the regime, and the 

regime acquires armored personnel carriers 

to support urban population control operations.

3. Leadership/Regime Control: 

Weapons proliferation intended to enable 

leadership to exert control over the regime 

through coercion, accommodation, cooptation, intimidation or competition. Prestige 

and reputation also gured in to weapons 

acquisition efforts, particularly if regional 

status is correlated to the size of one’s 

military or the sophistication of weapons 

technology. Leadership/regime control is 

a salient driver if it can be assessed that 

the actor is probably motivated to acquire 

weapons as a means to maintain power or 

enhance perceptions of power domestically, 

regionally and internationally. For state 

and non-state actors, weapons are often 

necessary to ensure balance among military 

organizations, particularly when the competition is manipulated to prevent any one 

organization from threatening the regime 

while also maintaining a sufcient force to 

deter foreign aggression. Weapons development and acquisition may also result 

from the need to accommodate or co-opt 

factions within the regime. 

Potential Example: The United Arab Emirates acquires more advanced ghter aircraft 

than demanded by the threat in order to 

ensure the dominant Emirates of Dubai and 

Abu Dubai have a rough balance in capabilities.

4. Indigenous Factions: Weapons 

proliferation manifesting from a challenge 

posed to the state from a non-state actor, 

such as an ethno-political group, a religious 

movement, an multi-national corporation, 

or an ideological party (among others). An 

indigenous faction is a salient driver if it 

can be assessed that the non-state actor is 

probably motivated to acquire weapons as 

a means to challenging the state or that 

the state is motivated as a means to countering the real or imagined non-state challenge. For state actors, indigenous factions 

include those groups that are not part of 

current leadership or regime. State motivations are wide-ranging and may include 

perceptions of a potential threat to regime 

control or stability. Racism, intolerance 

and hate should not be minimized as inuential factors. For non-state actors, such 

as an ethno-political group, this driver is 

applicable if the group has achieved some 

degree of self-identication, loyalty from 

its members, and has or will undertake 

efforts to challenge the regime. This challenge may be limited to seeking greater 

autonomy or political representation. It 

may also include complete subversion and 

toppling of an existing regime. 

Potential Example: The Egyptian government acquires advanced conventional weapons to counter an increasingly aggressive 

challenge from Islamist extremists such as 

the Gamat al-Ismaliyya, which is using 

chemical agents to disrupt tourism near 

Luxor.

5. Defense/Deterrence: Weapons 

proliferation intended to enable an actor to 

deter aggression and defend against perceived or actual threats. Defense/deterrence 

is a salient driver if it can be assessed that 

the actor is probably motivated to acquire 

weapons due to the current or future existence of a threat. For state actors, defense/

deterrence often manifests from concerns 

over the hostile intentions of another state 

or group of states, or from concerns over 

indigenous challenges. Non-state actors 

can be motivated to seek weapons for 

defense/deterrence as a result of a threat 

from other non-state actors or more likely, 

from a state that it perceives as hostile to its 

activities or even existence. 

Potential Examples: Kuwait acquiring 

advanced ghters to defend its airspace 

against an Iraqi incursion. Iraqi Marsh 

Arabs (Shi’a) acquiring conventional weapons to defend against government destruction of homes in Southern Iraqi towns.

6. Offense/Coercion: Weapons 

proliferation intended to enable an actor to 

conduct offensive military action against 

another actor or use its weapons as a means 

Disaffected youth...are 

prone to militant or 

extremist inuences.
23

to coerce or compel. Offense/coercion is 

a salient driver if it can be assessed that 

the actor is probably motivated to acquire 

weapons as a means to intimidate and/or 

attack for non-defensive reasons. For state 

actors, offense/coercion is often a salient 

driver if it has interests beyond its borders. 

This driver is also relevant if the state 

has aggressive or hostile intentions toward 

another actor. Non-state actors can be motivated to seek weapons for offense/coercion 

if they seek to harm another actor for reasons not limited to revenge, removal or restoration. 

Potential Examples: Syria acquiring main battle tanks for a planned offensive to retake the Golan Heights. Kurds 

acquiring chemical agents for a planned 

attack on a Turkish population center.

7. External Relations: Weapons 

proliferation manifesting from an actor’s 

desired or current participation in an alliance or collective security organization. 

Also includes weapons proliferation resulting from an actor’s bilateral relations with 

another actor, which may entail political 

support, military assistance, or economic 

incentives among others. Finally, external 

relations also entail incentives manifesting 

from a rejection of extra-regional, foreign 

inuences such as Western presence. External relations is a salient driver if it can be 

assessed that the actor is probably motivated to acquire weapons due to the imperatives of its desired and/or existing relations 

with other actors for reasons other than 

offense and defense. For state actors, this 

driver often results from the requirement 

to develop or acquire weapons that enable 

participation in security structures, military 

operations or peace operations. Protable 

alliances may also result in states proliferating weapons as a condition of the continued relationship. Non-state actors are 

often inuenced by geographically separated state and non-state actors. These relations may be so extensive as to entail direct 

control, or they may be a balanced relationship based on shared interests that involves 

political and economic support. 

Potential Examples: Bahrain acquiring 

advanced command and control systems to 

enable its Air Force to coordinate operations with other Gulf Cooperation Council 

members and/or the United States. Bahraini Shi’a acquiring training and explosive 

through its relations with the Lebanonbased Hizbollah.

Analysis: Middle Eastern state and nonstate actors are impacted by the full range of 

drivers. Drivers are mutually reinforcing, 

compelling most regional actors to engage 

in weapons proliferation through 2015. 

Although traditional defense/deterrence and 

offense/coercion incentives persist, our 

analysis reveals the increasing importance 

of non-traditional motivators. Moreover, 

our analysis suggests a core set of “usual 

suspects” as continuing to be effected by 

the full range of drivers: Israel, Iraq, Iran, 

Syria, and Palestinians. As indicated in 

the table, a select group of non-state actors 

are also likely to be active in the weapons 

business through 2015: Palestinians, Kurds, 

Shi’a minorities, Islamic extremists (Hizbollah, Hamas, Gamat al-Ismaliyya), and 

others. Contrary to conventional wisdom, 

our analysis suggests that several high pro-

le actors will have less than the expected 

incentive to develop and acquire weapons. 

For example, Libya and Lebanon are only 

motivated by 4 and 3 drivers respectively. 

Even with this lower ranking, our analysis 

makes it clear that the imperatives for weapons proliferation are strong from Morocco 

to Iran.

Defense/deterrence remains one 

of the most important drivers, applying to 

28 of the actors we identied. Its salience 

is linked to the persistent number of actors 

(16) that seek weapons as a means to coerce 

and/or for offensive military action. Nearly 

every state actor is probably motivated by 

the need to defend its territory, resource and 

regime with the exception of Lebanon. Our 

analysis of Lebanon suggests that defense/

deterrence, currently and for the foreseeable future, is provided by Syria and the 

Hizbollah. The defense/deterrence driver is 

also relevant to non-state actors, such as the 

Marsh Arabs (Shi’a) and Kurds, who will 

seek weapons for protection against attacks 

by the state or other non-state actors. Given 

the limited access by non-state actors to 

infrastructure and resources, they are most 

likely to seek conventional weapons and/or 

chemical and biological agents. The Middle 

East warrants special consideration in part 

due to the high numbers of non-state actors 

seeking weapons. To a greater extent than 

other regions, the Middle East is also home 

to a broad range of actors that we assess 

as having probable aggressive intentions or 

seeking offensive capabilities as a means 

to coerce and compel behaviors. Notably, 

these actors are concentrated in the Northern Persian Gulf and Levant sub-regions. 

Iraq, Iran, Israel and Syria stand out as state 

actors with probable coercive intentions. 

Of these, we assess Iraq as the most likely 

candidate for aggressive, offensive action 

against its neighbors. Iran’s motivations 

are linked to its perceptions of the threats 

from the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

Western intervention. Offensive drivers in 

the Levant are principally a function of 

the Arab-Israeli conict. The major participants assert the need for an offensive 

capability to take the ght in to the adversaries’ territory and strengthen bargaining 

position. Changes in leadership may result 

in a shift away from offensive strategies, 

which would in turn reduce the potency of 

the defense/deterrence driver.

Among the non-traditional drivers, 

socio-economic forces stand out. Our analysis suggests that socio-economic factors 

impact 27 actors in a manner that increases 

the likelihood that they will engage in 

weapons proliferation. Social tensions and 

economic disparities exist throughout the 

region. Population growth rates of over 

2.0% are the highest outside of sub-Saharan Africa. More than 40% of the population is under the age of 15. Combining 

this “youth explosion” with low earnings 

potential (Gross National Product per capita 

between $786 and $3,125 for non-oil rich 

Gulf states), literacy rates averaging less 

than 50%, limited political participation, 

and an urban population of 70% on average, 

results in an unprecedented pool of angry 

youth.3 Wealth disparities resulting from 

corrupt authoritarian regimes also contribute to the disaffection. The overall result 

is a substantial segment of the population 

that is increasingly volatile and susceptible 

to militant or extremist factions. For example, the failure of the Iranian revolution 

to deliver on its many promises, particuthe Middle East is...home 

to ...actors ...having probable aggressive intentions 

or seeking offensive capabilities as a means to 

coerce and compel behaviors.
24

larly in terms of economic development, 

has led to persistent unrest among students 

and merchants. Displaced persons will also 

persist as a challenge to host states, particularly in Lebanon and Jordan, as well as 

to those states to which they seek return. 

Non-state actors, such as the Kurds or the 

Azeris, will continue to be motivated by 

actual and perceived inequities, particularly 

in terms of economic investment and access 

to the political process. The Middle East is 

not exempt from the developmental challenges facing 3⁄4 of the world’s states. Nor 

is the region exempt from the ethnic and 

political forces of disintegration that have 

emerged on the heels of the Cold War.

Indigenous factions are also gaining prominence in regional weapons trade 

as independent non-state actors and as reasons for states to seek weapons. Our analysis suggests that 24 of the identied actors 

are motivated by a non-regime challenge. 

As discussed, many of these challenges 

exist in the Northern Persian Gulf and 

Levant, although growing concerns exist 

over factions in the Gulf States, Egypt, 

Israel and the Palestinian polity. Among 

the many regional factions, the Kurdish 

populations will remain especially relevant 

given their large population and their transboundary presence in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and 

Syria. Not only will weapons proliferations 

persist as an aspect of their struggle against 

the state, but relentless inghting will also 

remain a potent driver. Other Iraqi opposition groups are likely to remain active even 

with a regime change given the fractious 

ethnic, social and political nature of the 

Iraqi society. Islamic extremist groups will 

also continue to challenge regimes, and 

the increasingly likelihood of cooperation 

through global networks, such as Osama 

bin Laden’s al-Qaida network, is certain 

accelerate the pace and scope. Evidence 

already exists to suggest that bin Laden 

emissaries are working to acquire WMD 

and provide training to a wide range of 

non-state actors throughout the Middle 

East. The increasing inter-connectively 

of extremist groups is certain to dramatically complicate arms control efforts. The 

Middle East is not unique due to the 

presence of numerous indigenous factions; 

however, the region is noteworthy for the 

extent to which these actors have become 

permanent and prominent players. 

Resource/environmental factors 

will remain a highly relevant source of 

competition and conict in the region with 

existing and potential resource disputes as 

a primary motivator for at least 20 actors 

to seek weapons. Water scarcity and oil 

will continue to be at the locus of resource 

disputes among state and non-state actors. 

In particular, water will remain at the core 

of Israeli-Arab disputes. Control of the 

Jordan River Basin and its headwaters are 

a central issue of the on-going peace process. Egypt will continue to be wary of 

Sudanese use of Nile waters. Syria and 

Iraq will continue to square off over the use 

of the Tigris and Euphrates river basins, 

but increasingly turning their attention to 

Turkey’s damming of both. There is 

widespread agreement that water disputes 

will become “super-critical” in the coming 

10-20 years. Relatedly, water scarcity also 

impacts agriculture. As water resources 

dwindle or actors lose access, there will be 

increasing incentives to gain access to more 

arable land-a limited asset in the region. Oil 

is an equally important resource, contributing to several conicts in the past and certain to remain a source of conict in the 

future as resources dwindle. Not only will 

states jealously guard their resources from 

other states such as Iraq, but they will also 

face challenges from indigenous factions 

bent on disrupting oil production as means 

of attacking the states. These concerns are 

especially relevant in the oil-rich Gulf State 

of Saudi Arabia. Access to resources is 

closely inter-connected, and a prominent 

factor in the Iran-Iraq War. Expect access 

issues to continue to be a source of tension 

and a motivator for acquiring weapons 

capable of controlling, gaining or denying 

access.

External relations serve as an 

important driver, impacting on 25 of the 

actors. Our analysis indicates that this 

driver is equally valid for state and non-state 

actors. Notably, participation in regional 

security frameworks and support to international peace operations are not principal 

motivators as they are in other regions. 

The possible exception is Gulf state participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC); however, we assess that participation in the GCC is not a primary reason for 

member states to acquire weapons beyond 

what they would acquire individually for 

defense/deterrence purposes. Rather, incentives primarily derive from participation 

in a protable alliance and inuence from 

dominant state actors. For example, GCC 

states will probably continue to seek weapons as a function of their bilateral defense 

relationships with Western powers-particularly the US. Gulf states such as 

Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman and 

the U.A.E. are likely to continue to seek 

weapon systems from multiple companies 

that exceed their infrastructure capacity as 

an explicit or implicit aspect of their bilateral security relations with the particular 

trading partner. It could be said that they 

are buying protection from the seller rather 

than the seller’s weapons. Dominant state 

actors will continue to direct, manipulate 

or otherwise control other actors as an element of foreign and defense policy. Nonstate actors are particularly vulnerable or 

willing participants to such a patron-client 

relationship. We assess that Syria will continue to proliferate weapons as a function of 

its relationship with Lebanon, the Hizbollah and Palestinian groups. Iran and Iraq 

both provide support for a range of opposition groups and possibly terrorist groups 

throughout the region, such as the MEK, 

Marsh Arabs, and possibly the Shi’a in 

Saudi Arabia. A decline in client relations 

or a decrease in Western interest would 

reduce the inuence of this driver on weapons proliferation.

Leadership/regime control was the 

least salient driver, affecting 15 of the 

actors. Although prestige was considered a 

possible motivator for all actors, our analysis indicates that it only existed as probable motivator for state actors such as Iraq, 

Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Egypt and others. 

The more potent motivator in this driver 

category was regime control. The authoritarian nature of many Middle Eastern states 

causes many leaders to use weapons as 

a means of exerting control over factions 

within the regime. In Iraq, for example, 

weapons are apportioned to the Republican 

Guards, Air Force, Special Security Service and others in manner that prevents 

any one group from dominating and thus 

threatening the regime. Weapons are distributed within the U.A.E. in a manner that 

achieves balance between Dubai and Abu 

Dhabi, thus accommodating the inuential 

factions. Absent a transition to more democratic forms of government, which we 

assess as unlikely, this tendency to accommodate, co-opt, balance and coerce will 
25

continue. 

WEAPONS

Denition: in an analysis of weapons proliferation, it is necessary to break 

out the categories of weapons that the 

actors both desire and/or have the capability to acquire. For the purposes of this 

analysis, weapons are divided into ve categories (described below), which capture 

the essence of general capabilities the various actors desire to acquire. However, it 

is also important to note that while drivers 

may motivate actors to desire various categories of weapons, their capability to actually acquire them may be constrained by 

factors such as purchasing capital, adequate infrastructure to support a particular 

category of weapon, proper connections/

relations with neighbors/allies/suppliers to 

buy from, etc. For this reason, the matrix 

displays the actual probability of arms proliferation to the various actors based on 

both desire and capability. 

1. Conventional: This category of 

weapons encompasses readily available and 

relatively low-technology weapons generally available on the open market, from 

small arms to commonly exported Soviet 

manufactured tanks and aircraft. In short, 

these weapons are the staples of any military and have relatively few sales and 

export restrictions. Examples of this category range from AK-47/M-16 small arms, 

to naval patrol craft and minor combatants, 

to third-generation ghter aircraft (MiG21/MiG-23/Mirage III/IV).

2. Advanced Conventional: This 

category includes newer classes/generation 

of weapons, weapons upgrade kits, or 

advanced munitions that are usually not 

widely exported or at least are exported 

under close scrutiny or restrictions. While 

obviously more expensive, acquisition of 

weapons of this category reects a signicant upgrade in an actors defensive 

and offensive military capabilities and may 

greatly alter the actual/perceived “balance 

of power” in a particular region or relationship. Classes of weapons include US 

M1A1/2 Abrams, UK Challenger tanks; 

US F-15/16, Russian MiG-29/SU-27 aircraft; US Patriot, UK Rapier 2000, Russian 

SA-10 Surface to Air Missile systems; US 

Aegis destroyers. 

3. Advanced Conventional-Missiles: Although of the advanced conventional class of weapons, we felt it was 

signicant to break ballistic missiles out 

as a separate category. This allows better 

analytical capability when discussing the 

overlap between an actors desire/capability 

to acquire advanced conventional weapons 

versus the capability to have long range 

delivery capability for weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD). The intent here is to 

describe a category of weapons that provides the actor with some “beyond the 

FEBA” capability. In essence, this category describes a range of missiles from 

those meant for battleeld use (FROG-7/9) 

to MRBMs or ICBMs. 

4. Biological/Chemical WMD: 

Biological and Chemical weapons of mass 

destruction are grouped together because 

they both employ dual-use technology, both 

are difcult to monitor, and the fact that 

similar justications, drivers, and geopolitical circumstances lead an actor to pursue 

either capability. Chemical proliferation 

has typically been the more common of the 

two in recent years. Chemical weapons are 

relatively inexpensive and easy to produce. 

They are easy to deploy in a manner which 

is safe to the user, but which can also be 

very lethal against the intended target, if 

unprepared. They have often been used in 

warfare but are also easily countered with 

CW training and equipment. Although biological weapons are also relatively inexpensive, they are much more difcult to 

deploy on a massive scale and via means 

that is safe to the attacker. Thus, they have 

only demonstrated effectiveness at an individual or small group level. However, as 

actors gain the technological know-how, 

the potential lethality of biological weapons is much greater and thus, bio weapons 

may become the weapon of choice to terrorists or actors attempting to deter nuclear or 

other large scale attack against their interests. 

5. Nuclear WMD: Although 

still considered a weapon of mass destruction, there is enough distinction between 

Nuclear and Chem/Bio acquisition drivers, 

development process, and capability to warrant establishing a separate weapons category. 

Analysis: Based on the likely sequence of 

events over the next fteen years, it should 

not be a surprise that each actor (of the 37 

listed) will likely be driven to acquire conventional weapons, as each has sufcient 

motivation, drivers, desire, and capability 

to do so. Conventional weapons are effectively the common denominator in proliferation, but the types of conventional 

weapons desired and acquired will differ 

based on availability and need. However, 

the proliferation of conventional weapons 

is not likely to drive signicant arms control initiatives or paradigm changes in the 

region. It must also be noted that the actual 

purchase of conventional weapons is on a 

downward trend in the region.

Regarding advanced conventional 

weapons, the predominant actors in this 

area of arms proliferation are state actors 

that are already the focus of US foreign 

policy in the region. These actors are 

already the subjects of signicant US scrutiny and their arms transactions should 

not go unnoticed. What is signicant is 

the potential of certain non-state actors to 

acquire advanced conventional weapons, 

specically the relatively high ranking Iraqi 

Opposition and Mujahhadin e-Khalq (Iranian opposition) on the proliferation matrix. 

The ability of non-state actors to acquire 

advanced conventional weapons will almost 

certainly be based on some manner of sponsorship on the part of one or more state 

actors. In each of these cases, funding is 

available from an outside source. The US 

has promised funds to the Iraqi opposition, 

and the Iranian opposition are exiled in Iraq 

and have the support of Saddam Hussein.

Moreover, it should not be a surprise that the primary concern regarding 

weapons proliferation in the Middle East 

centers on weapons of mass destruction. 

Again, the primary concern regarding proliferation is the likelihood of acquisition by 

state actors. Of the rst six actors on the 

prioritized list, ve are state actors. Egypt 

falls just below the PLO/PNA (Palestine) 

simply because of the number and nature 

of the drivers. Nuclear weapons have yet to 

emerge among the Arab states, but Israel is 

an undeclared nuclear power and as such 

serves as a driver to its potential enemies in 

the region. Moreover, recent CIA assessments claim that that Iran may already have 

a limited nuclear capability. Iran is driven 

by Israeli weapons, the US presence in 

the Gulf and its own desire for hegemony, 

which means that its pursuit of nuclear 

weapons as well as IRBMs capable of 

carrying nuclear warheads will probably 
26

continue as a means of obtaining deterrence and access-denial capabilities. Iraq 

was also a nuclear threshold state until the 

Gulf War introduced intrusive UN weapons 

inspections and the discovery and dismantling of the Iraqi nuclear program. Despite 

the Gulf War aftermath, it is also probable 

that Iraq, without sanctions, will be able to 

build nuclear weapons and ICBM capable 

missiles by 2015. It is now believed that 

it would only take Iraq several years after 

the ending of UN sanctions to rebuild its 

nuclear program.4 Iraq remains the most 

dangerous of the three states mentioned 

above. Saddam has shown a willingness 

to use force against neighbors, to challenge Israel and the US directly, and he will 

likely rebuild his WMD program as soon as 

sanctions are lifted or become meaningless, 

which is highly probable during the next 5 

years. Even a post-Saddam Iraq is likely 

to remain dangerous due the Iraqi ambitions that will likely succeed him. The 

only other actors seeking nuclear weapons 

in our assessment are Libya, which currently lacks sufcient resources to obtain 

the required technology, will continue to 

do so and will thus not obtain a weapon 

during our timeframe; Egypt, which will 

not seek such weapons under the current 

regime, but would perhaps do so if a more 

radical regime were to come to power; and 

Algeria, but again, only if a radical regime 

were to take power.5 

However, it is the non-state actors 

on the list that require additional attention 

because such actors have not traditionally 

been a focus of US foreign policy. Signicantly, there are ve non-state actors 

that rank relatively high on the list (those 

with 4 or more drivers) that have the desire 

and capability to acquire biological and/or 

chemical weapons (PLO/PNA, Kurds, 

Hamas and Hizbollah). Of these, four of 

the ve are located in the Levant, a development that deserves further study. The 

fth (Saudi Shi’a) is also signicant, especially if combined with the wild card development of a sudden Saudi regime change 

or collapse. A further discussion of potential threat scenarios follows.

Finally, a note on information 

operations/warfare. Although IO/IW was 

not part of this analysis, the reader must be 

reminded of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian 

conict and note that indications are present that these two actors are actively using 

the information weapon against one another 

in the ongoing conict, which began during 

fall 2000 in what is now known as the AlAqsa Intifada.6 As more details come forward and as this eld of warfare becomes 

further developed, the Middle East could 

emerge as the rst region to actively test 

its precepts. Further thought and analysis 

is needed to understand the effects of this 

potentially destabilizing asymmetric means 

of warfare.

THREAT SCENARIOS

Major Proliferation Threats: Many 

of our concerns have already been expressed 

in the sections above, especially WMD 

concerns in the last section. However, the 

major concern that must be highlighted is 

the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli peace 

process. This has resulted in an environment for the most probable scenarios of 

conict in the Middle East. War between 

Palestine and Israel is a strong possibility 

given the increasingly desperate conditions 

of the Palestinians that will result from continued conict, border closures, and lack 

of economic activity. Palestinian extremist 

groups and Hizbollah already use conventional small scale attacks against Israel and 

in the future are likely to resort to larger 

scale attacks including chemical weapons, 

perhaps within the next 5 years. Hizbollah 

also acts as a non-state surrogate for Syria 

and has its support, which could include 

the transfer of more advanced conventional 

and WMD weapons for use against Israel 

as tensions continue to build. The Palestinians are also likely to gain weapons 

and funding from other Arab states if con-

ict continues, suggesting escalation to a 

regional-level war is also possible (though 

less likely). Likewise, Arab tensions with 

Israel contribute to the Iran-Iraq-Israel 

rivalry, the three actors of most concern to 

our study. Arab-Israeli peace would remove 

some of the natural animosity between Iraq 

and Israel. Although the rivalry is likely to 

continue due to a balance-of-power rationale that exists in the region, Arab-Israeli 

peace would open opportunities for dialogue, which in turn would improve the 

prospects for introducing condence and 

security building measures (CSBMs) among 

these key players, a rst step in the arms 

control process. US policy should focus on 

serious efforts to move the peace process 

forward as a rst step to lowering tensions 

in the region. 

Another concern is the potential 

rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 

Although these actors have recently moderated their stance toward one another due 

to Iran’s moderating behavior and SaudiIranian diplomacy, which recently led to 

the signing of a security agreement, the 

Iranian effort is likely aimed at reducing 

Saudi threat perceptions so that US forces 

will eventually be told by the Saudis to go 

home. If US forces are asked to depart 

Saudi territory, then it will be much more 

difcult to counter the growing ability of 

Iran to project power in the region. The US 

departure could lead to Iranian bullying 

of the Gulf states, but more importantly, 

could also result in another Iran-Iraq war 

as hostilities between those states would 

not be kept in check by US presence in 

the region. American diplomacy should 

focus on improving relations with Iran to 

reduce its perception of the need for accessdenial of US forces in the region. The US 

presence deters Iraq and protects our Gulf 

allies. 

Wild Card Scenarios: Listed here are the 

less likely developments, but those that 

should not be overlooked when developing 

foreign policy for the region:

1. Iraqi Regime Collapse/Civil 

War. A civil war is probable after Saddam’s 

passing as a result of competition among 

the other Iraqi non-state actors mentioned 

in our driver analysis (Iraqi Opposition/

Kurds/Marsh Arabs). This could fractionate the state of Iraq and would likely have 

spillover effects, especially if the Kurds 

established their own state in northern Iraq. 

A Kurdish sovereign actor might appear as 

a threat to Turkey and Iran since both states 

harbor signicant Kurdish populations.

2. Mujahhadin e-Khalq. This 

Iranian opposition group regularly operates against the Iranian government from 

its “safe-haven” in Iraq and was recently 

attacked by the Iranian government with 

Scud missiles. Such attacks increase tenPalestinian extremist 

groups and Hizbollah 

...are likely to resort to 

larger scale attacks including chemical weapons... 
27

future.

SUMMARY

Our analysis is an attempt at a new 

approach to understanding proliferation in 

the Middle East by analyzing the reasons 

that drive it. Those actors having the most 

drivers are those most likely or probable 

to stir up trouble, to proliferate-in order 

to acquire the capability requirements that 

might allow them to achieve their objectives. The drivers represent reasons for tension and it is assumed that actors will work 

to lessen tensions by eliminating the drivers that cause them. We identied seven 

major categories of drivers and 37 major 

actors that are affected by the drivers. We 

also attempted a brief capabilities analysis 

by including the types of weapons actors 

will seek to acquire. Actors with greater 

capabilities may be driven to go after 

WMD and advanced conventional weapons, although in some instances we have 

identied more capable states that are not 

seeking WMD, such as Saudi Arabia. As a 

signatory of the NPT, BWC and CWC, the 

Saudis want to remain compliant to international treaties and instead seek advanced 

conventional weapons as well as western 

assurances and help to satisfy their security 

concerns. We also mentioned their recent 

security agreement with Iran, which is perhaps an additional hedge in case western 

assistance is not forthcoming. Our most 

signicant concerns revolve around the 

three top actors: Israel, Iran and Iraq for 

the reasons mentioned. Not only have past 

wars involved all three, recent events indicate adversity for all three actors, and our 

driver’s analysis shows that they are the 

most probable proliferators as well as the 

most capable in the region. 

sions between the Iranian and Iraqi governments and increase the likelihood of 

conict between them. The group’s presence in Iraq is surely to continue to be a 

source of conict between two of our top 

actors of concern.7

3. Egyptian Regime Collapse/

Extremist Takeover. Should extremists 

take over the Egyptian government, the 

cold peace between Egypt and Israel would 

end and hostilities would very likely erupt. 

Egypt would likely support Palestinians 

and make every effort to renew a two front 

war (to include Syria) against Israel. 

4. Saudi Regime Collapse/Extremist Takeover. Should extremists take over the Saudi 

government, the US would be barred from 

the region and the oil supply would be 

threatened. Iran or especially Iraq would 

likely attempt to gain control of the oil 

supply, even the territory of Saudi Arabia.

5. Iranian Civil War, or IranAfghanistan War. Currently, Iran has a 

favorable regime in power, although it continues to struggle with the clerics on moderating its stance vis-à-vis the West and 

improving its economy through greater 

contacts with the West. However, should 

the clerics depose President Khatami, a 

civil war might erupt and such a disruption 

could return Iran to the unstable conditions 

of the 1980s. Such instability could result 

in closure of the Gulf and/or another war 

with Iraq. Another potential wild card that 

could leave Iran in a vulnerable state is 

war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. 

The Iranians would likely win such a war, 

but would be severely weakened and again 

vulnerable to the same threats mentioned 

above as a result.

6. Turkey-Israel Alliance. 

Although Turkey was not evaluated in this 

study, there is a growing alliance between 

Turkey and Israel. Should either or both 

states feel shunned or abandoned by the 

US or the West, they are likely to become 

more aggressive against neighbors and may 

act preemptively against perceived threats. 

Some Turks have expressed this sentiment 

already;8 and Israel could also sense a loss 

of support if public opinion in the US turns 

against it due to its current actions against 

the Palestinians. Since both control vital 

water resources, wars over water are also a 

growing possibility as populations continue 

to grow among Arab neighbors and serious 

water shortages are projected for the near 

1. Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Arms Control in the Middle East, CSIS 

Study, January 2000. 3-4. Online at www.csis.org. 

Accessed during March 2001.

2. Actually seven if we were to include Eritrea in our 

analysis, an African state bordering the Red Sea. Data 

from the IISS Annual Report, 1999. As reported in 

Gulfwire, 25 October 1999 (on online email subscription weekly news service provided by the National 

Council on US-Arab Relations, Washington, DC)

3. John L. Allen, Student Atlas of World Politics, 4th 

edition, 2000.

END NOTES

4. See CIA, Global Trends 2015, December 

2000. Onlineat www.cia.gov/

publications/globaltrennds2015/ Accessed during 

April 2001.

5. The current Algerian Ambassador to the UN led 

the recent NPT renewal efforts, perhaps demonstrating that Algeria’s current government is very much 

against nuclear proliferation. Ambassador Abdullah 

Baali, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the 

United Nations, speech at the Eleventh Annual International Arms Control Conference, Sandia National 

Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM 21-22 April 2001. 

It must also be noted that Algeria created a covert 

nuclear research program that was active until the 

early 1990s. Sufcient infrastructure is in place to 

resume the program should the government change 

directions. See Anthony Cordesman, WMD in the 

Gulf and Greater Middle East, CSIS Study, 9 November 1998, 50. Online at www.csis.org. Accessed 

during April 2001.

6. Named such because of then candidate (now Prime 

Minister) Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Al Aqsa Mosque 

(located on the Jewish Temple mount) in Jerusalem. 

This provocative visit to the third most Islamic holy 

site acted as a catalyst for the fall 2000 Palestinian 

uprising against Israel which continues to the present 

date (April 2001).

7. “Tensions Between Iraq, Iran Rise After a Missile 

Attack On Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, 19 April 

2001. Online at www.WSJ.com. Accessed on 19 

April 2001.

8. Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, a Professor at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey expressed Turkish concern 

over being abandoned by NATO, Europe, and perhaps the US in a speech at the Eleventh Annual International Arms Control Conference, Sandia National 

Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM 21-22 April 2001.
28

NORTHEAST ASIA

Northeast Asia continues to be an 

unpredictable region with issues such as 

Taiwan and Korean unication inuencing 

the possible arms control scenarios to the 

year 2015. Colonel Thomas A. Drohan, 

Commander and Permanent Professor of 

the 34th Education Group at the Air Force 

Academy, presents his views on likely 

events occurring in Japan. Dr. Paul J. Bolt 

from the Academy’s Department of Political Science addresses China, and Dr. William E. Berry, Jr., also of the 34th Education 

Group, makes some predictions about the 

Korean peninsula. Colonel Drohan stresses 

the importance of the U.S.-Japan security 

relationship and its inuence on Japan’s 

defense policies. He argues that as long 

as this relationship remains viable, it is 

unlikely that Japan will change its policies 

appreciably. However, if the United States 

disengages, Japan will have to reevaluate its 

defense strategies, particularly if changes 

occur in the region such as a unied Korea 

with nuclear weapons or a more militarily 

potent China. 

Professor Bolt examines some of 

the domestic political and economic factors 

at work in China and their likely inuence 

on China’s military modernization policies. 

While China desires regional peace and 

stability in order to concentrate on economic growth and development, resolving 

the Taiwan problem will continue to be of 

extreme importance. Professor Berry also 

explores domestic political and economic 

issues in both North and South Korea 

and their effects on defense policies. As 

in the case with China and Taiwan, how 

the Korean peninsula is unied and which 

country’s direction will have a major inuence on the security of the region and 

arms control considerations to 2015 and 

beyond.

Japan

Thomas A. Drohan

Historical Analysis

Rather than agreement on common 

threat, the basis of US-Japan security cooperation is an exchange of interests designed 

to achieve relative economic and military 

advantage over various threats. Institutionalized in a series of occupation documents after WWII, the founding exchange 

of interests constituted the following quid 

pro quo: democratized Japan would pursue 

economic reconstruction, rearm for selfdefense within constitutional limits and 

economic priorities, and allow US forces to 

continue to be based in Japan. In exchange, 

the US would guarantee Japan’s military 

security until Japan could achieve selfdefense, extend aid for re-industrialization, 

and provide defense assistance for rearmament.

This original exchange has been 

quite resilient and is reected in Japan’s still 

operative 1957 Basic Policy for National 

Defense: manage the US-Japan defense 

relationship as the basis of Japan’s defense 

policy and subsequent moderate defense 

strengthening; maintain an exclusively 

defensive orientation; adhere to the three 

non-nuclear principles; secure civilian control of the military. 

Subsequent Japanese policies and 

constitutional interpretations include rejecting the UN-recognized state right of collective self-defense and devoting no more 

than one percent of the GNP to defense 

(although personnel costs are excluded).

Japan’s faction-ridden domestic 

politics have generally reinforced dependence on the US military security guarantee 

while allowing the self-defense forces to 

build a formidable capability. Prior to 1993 

internal politics have been dominated by 

the business establishment oriented, conservative Liberal Democratic Party. In 1993 

the LDP splintered and a temporary coalition of opportunist small parties emerged 

which have proven to be acutely vulnerable 

to any swings in the economy, US-Japan 

security relations, or charges of political 

corruption. In 1994, reform of the 1947 

electoral law replaced the exclusive multimember district system with a combination 

of single-member plurality and multi-member proportional representation in largersized districts. These changes increased 

political competition and led to the rise 

of more new parties, which has led to 

further fragmentation and weaker governments. Domestic politics have been interesting but fundamentally irrelevant to the 

framework of Japan’s security policy, frustrating its management but leaving its 

parameters unchanged. Japan’s only reasonable strategic option – alliance with the 

predominant regional power -- has been 

modied by economic and technological 

developments rather than any new directions advocated by any credible and nationally attractive political leader. For example, 

former LDP member and current Liberal 

Party leader Ichiro Ozawa has advocated 

Japan as a “normal country” (revised constitution with an unfettered military), but 

currently seems more connected with the 

Japan Communist Party in a frantic search 

for an opposition coalition.

There have been four major, “rstever,” adjustments to the original exchange 

of security interests, each of which has 

been politically controversial at the time, 

but which overall have preserved the military-economic exchange:

1. 1960 Treaty of Mutual Security & 

Cooperation: the only revision of the original 1951 Security Treaty; Prime Minister 

forced to resign

2. 1981 Reagan-Suzuki Communiqué: 

the rst division of military roles; Foreign 

Minister forced to resign

3. 1989 FS-X Fighter Aircraft Agreement: the rst co-development of military 

technology; strained economic competition 

in military technology

4. 1997 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation: rst coordination of military roles 

(the 1978 Guidelines continued the existing division of roles, rather than expand 

toward coordination of roles); intensied 

local political opposition to US bases in 

Japan

The rst three adjustments have expanded 

the US military guarantee and increased 

Japan’s economic contribution to security, 

while gradually increasing Japan’s military 

role. Japanese economic growth has led 

to more nancial support of US basing, 

and more development aid that promoted 

mutual interests. Domestic opposition in 

Japan to US bases has tended to spike over 

specic incidents (from the 1954 Girard 

case to the 1995 Okinawa rape case), fading 

away after concessions are gained. Technological advances and US rearmament 

programs have enabled increases in Japanese military capability within constitutional interpretations. Except in the mutually maligned FS-X ghter aircraft codevelopment agreement (a compromise 

between Japanese indigenous development 

and an American sale to Japan), policy 

makers have succeeded in insulating defense 

cooperation from economic disputes.

The current US-Japan defense 

guidelines adjust the security arrangement 
29

toward more equivalent military commitments. If actually implemented as 

approved, the self-defense forces would 

coordinate specic military roles within 

constitutional limits which on a case-bycase basis could provide rear area support 

of US combat operations. By specifying 

Japan’s military commitments, the guidelines raise expectations of an alliance based 

on mutual commitments (a military quid 

pro quo). But the guidelines also provide 

Japan a bilateral foundation for greater multilateral freedom of action.

Defense Plans

Following a series of four ve-year defense 

plans (1956-1975), Japan’s National 

Defense Program Outline (NDPO) of 1976 

established annual plans through 1990, 

(Mid-Term Defense Planning Estimates) 

that eventually fullled the NDPO’s target 

force structure. All was still justied within 

the US-Japan security embrace. This was a 

more politically acceptable way to ll Japan 

Self-Defense Force (JSDF) requirements 

with an unspecied timetable and reected 

the weak bargaining position of JSDF in the 

interagency process. The 1990’s saw Japan 

pass the UN Peacekeeping Operations Law 

with JSDF participation in UN operations 

in Cambodia, Mozambique, Zaire, Syria 

and Israel. Japan attempted closer defense 

ties with South Korea through exchange 

visits, port calls and air safety coordination. A new NDPO in 1995 streamlined and 

modernized the force (more reliance on satellites, improved logistics, reduced ground 

divisions and tanks, explicit US-Japan joint 

defense planning operations). The current 

plan (2001-6) emphasizes diverse roles with 

power projection capability, although the 

Japanese government adamantly denies that 

it is developing an offensive option. Equipment includes 13,500-ton helicopter-carrying destroyers (larger than Italy’s Garibaldi which accommodates 18 helicopters 

or 16 AV-6 Harriers) replacing smaller 

destroyers; airborne tanker/transport aircraft; and reconnaissance satellites (prelaunch or early warning).

Alternative Futures

Any speculation about Japan’s security role 

must address the persistent question of constitutional revision.

A. NO REVISION OF JAPAN’S CONSTITUTION

Absent revision of Japan’s “no 

defense ties with Japan; reunication of 

an aggressively oriented Korea; a signi-

cant terrorist attack on Japan with ineffective JSDF or US response; and deteriorated 

Japan-China, Japan-Russia or Japan-Korea 

relations. In all of the following scenarios, 

constitutional revision could be prevented 

by a strong, credible US military commitment in East Asia.

1. US disengagement from East 

Asia, or the reduced credibility of the US 

security guarantee to Japan or regional stability.

Some who argue for a “fortress 

America” retraction from East Asia suggest that aerospace and information capabilities might provide a margin of advantage needed for credible extended security. 

A serious public education and security 

awareness campaign would have to be conducted in Japan and the United States for 

this to be seen as credible by Japanese, or 

be seen as desirable by Americans. Without a rm aerospace or ground presence in 

Asia, US maritime presence may only deter 

nuclear SSBN with JL-2 ballistic missiles 

rather than conventionally armed ballistic 

missiles. As China and North Korea proliferate (particularly the latter to earn hard 

currency during economic distress) into 

longer-range missiles that threaten the US, 

American and Japanese interests converge 

but also favor a US national missile defense 

(NMD) option. A capable NMD could 

decouple the US security guarantee from 

Japan and encourage a Japanese preemptive strike capability unless accompanied 

by a robust theater missile defense (TMD) 

justied by strong and enduring US interests in East Asia. On the other hand, Chinese or North Korean medium range missiles that threaten Japan and deployed US 

forces encourage TMD under a tighter USJapan alliance. However, TMD would 

also facilitate the defense of Taiwan. In 

the absence of a clearly credible US security guarantee, technologically enabling 

the defense of Taiwan without combined 

(assisted by Japanese forces) courses of 

action against the PRC entices Chinese 

aggression and forces the US to respond 

without regional support

2. A South Korea or reunied 

Korea looking to forge closer defense ties 

with Japan.

South Korea might attempt to balance against China and x Japan’s military 

war” constitution, the US-Japan security 

alliance can best respond to external challenges with three types of limited adjustments.

1. First, military-economic agreements can retain the US military guarantee 

in exchange for Japanese nancial compensation and economic contributions to security. The limits are American reluctance 

to provide mercenary services, reduced 

Japanese ability to pay (such as the prolonged recession), and the exclusive bene-

ts of economic aid. The recent decision 

to reduce Japan’s host nation support payments in the next ve-year agreement indicates Japan’s reduced ability to pay. If the 

US economy stalls for an extended time, 

US-Japan economic tension may rise and 

the “unfair” terms of security alliance may 

become an issue.

2. Second, enhanced military 

cooperation can replace the military-economic quid pro quo with mutual commitments against clear threats such as terrorism, drug trafcking, and external aggression. Japan’s constitutional and political 

restrictions on its military role will limit its 

contribution to homeland defense capabilities.

3. Third, technological advances 

can produce new areas of security cooperation within existing restrictions, such as 

information network defense and theater 

missile defense. Information operations 

provide a non-lethal alternative to physical 

application of force and may extend the 

boundaries of bilateral military cooperation. The limits are economic interests that 

are deemed to be matters of national security and therefore not areas for cooperation. 

On a case-by-case basis Japanese forces 

could participate in non-combat or information support of UN multinational operations. This will likely depend on the 

domestic standing of the Prime Minister 

which is likely to be very weak.

B. REVISON OF JAPAN’S CONSTITUTION

Revision of Japan’s constitution 

expands the possibilities of Japanese security roles. It is highly unlikely constitutional revision would occur without a signicant external event prompting it. Such 

external events could include US disengagement from East Asia or a reduced 

credibility of the US security guarantee to 

Japan; a reunied Korea looking to expand 
30

power potential in place with a proposed 

security alliance if the US presence were 

not seen as credible. Japan would not 

want to be dominated by a constitutionally 

unfettered Korean military in a relationship 

prompting constitutional revision. Japan 

forces Korea to balance with Japan either 

through a trilateral arrangement including 

the United States, or on a bilateral basis. 

For Japan, ties with Korea could reduce 

dependence on the US, presenting the prospect of an Asian liberal tandem against Chinese military power. Due to mutual historical distrust stemming from Japan’s 1905-45 

occupation of Korea, Japan is more likely 

to develop more offensive capabilities in 

a Japan-Korea security arrangement if the 

US were excluded. Accordingly the best 

option is a trilateral US-Japan-ROK alliance based on maintaining regional stability and non-aggression.

 3. Reunication of an aggressive 

offensively capable Korea.

Failure to dismantle 1300-km 

range No Dong missiles might indicate 

Korean intent to become a Northeast 

Asian sub-regional power outside the USJapan relationship. This would almost certainly reinforce constitutional revision and 

revive Japanese competition against potential Korean dominance. Without a US military commitment, Japan’s strategic choices 

would be to enter into an agreement with 

Russia (unlikely given economic state and 

military budgets), with China to maintain 

stability and deter Korea, or develop a 

nuclear deterrent capability. With a credible US military commitment, the US-Japan 

security relationship would likely become 

a traditional alliance to dissuade undue 

Korean inuence.

4. A signicant terrorist incident 

in Japan.

A deliberate attack such as a North 

Korean sponsored conventional, biological 

or chemical weapons, or an effective computer attack against the nance system or 

energy grid. North Korea’s employment of 

weapons through agents rather than missile 

munitions might intimidate a weak Japanese coalition government to support North 

Korea terms in a transition to unication. 

A JSDF just waiting to prove its mettle 

could earn domestic credibility for subsequent mission expansion and constitutional 

revision with an effective performance. 

Ineffective US and Japanese Self-Defense 

Force response could trigger constitutional 

revision on less favorable terms.

5. Deteriorated Japan-China, 

Japan-Russia or Japan-Korea relations.

Territorial conict with China over 

the Senkaku islands, with Russia over the 

northern territories, or with Korea over the 

island in the Korea (Tsushima) Straits. 

A serious China-Russia security pact, or 

a Korean tilt toward China would leave 

Japan isolated looking for a major power. 

North Korean ring of another missile over 

Japan after a period of worsening USNorth Korean relations or a due to a spiraling North Korean economy could drive 

a wedge into US-Japan relations, attract 

US attention and extract US aid to North 

Korea. Japan’s reaction is likely to be different (if the 1998 North Korean missile 

shot is a precedent) with a curtailment of 

aid and alarmism that might result in constitutional revision.

China

Paul J. Bolt

China’s relationship with the United States 

is marked by conict and cooperation, 

both in the economic and political-military 

realms. Many analysts expect to see an 

intensifying rivalry between the two states 

in coming decades, driven by a realist logic 

that inevitably will lead to clashes between 

a rising power in the East and a status quo 

power in the West. Others are hopeful that 

commercial interaction and global interdependence will liberalize Chinese politics 

and create a more cooperative relationship, 

one akin to that between the US and Japan. 

While the United States can shape the outcome of its relationship with China in the 

year 2015, other factors will be outside 

of its control. These include changes in 

China’s domestic politics, developments in 

China’s economy, shifts in the regional 

and international balance of power, and the 

actions of Taiwan.

Changes in China’s domestic politics are difcult to predict. However, 

because of China’s rapid economic growth 

and the ensuing social changes, it is becoming increasingly problematic for the Communist Party to cling to a monopoly of 

power. This raises questions as to how 

long the political status quo can continue. 

There are several signs which indicate that 

the party must change the way it does business. First, with the Internet, international 

contacts, and the upgrading of communication links, the party has lost its control 

over information. Even the Chinese press 

is more open than in the past. Second, 

the party is facing social problems that 

are directly related to the party’s monopoly on power. These include corruption, 

organized crime, the Falun Gong movement, and efforts to reverse the Tiananmen 

Square verdict. Third, the party has failed 

to establish reliable and legitimizing succession policies. The result is that future 

leaders will be weaker and less capable of 

resisting political pressure from the military or nationalistic forces that advocate a 

strident defense of perceived Chinese interests. Finally, the current system gives little 

incentive to separatist groups in Xinjiang or 

Tibet to return to the fold, nor to Taiwan.

The current challenges to the Communist Party could lead to four outcomes 

by 2015. The most desirable is a gradual 

liberalization in policies that eventually 

lead to democratization. While a democratized China would still present challenges 

to the United States, these issues would 

likely be resolved by peaceful means. 

The second scenario is for the party to 

somehow muddle through without fundamental change. The third scenario is a 

party crackdown on dissent, with an imposition of greater authoritarianism justied 

by extreme nationalism. Such a scenario 

would intensify the rivalry with the United 

States. The nal, and perhaps least likely 

scenario, is a break-up of China. This 

too would damage US interests due to the 

ensuing destabilization of all of Asia, creating unprecedented refugee ows, weapons 

transfers, and a possibly aggressive successor state.

If China maintains political stability, it is likely to enjoy healthy economic growth, surpassing the US in total 

GNP sometime in the next quarter century. 

Nevertheless, growth will primarily bene-

t urban areas and the coastal provinces, 

Failure to dismantle 

1300-km range No Dong 

missiles ...indicate Korean 

intent to become a Northeast Asian sub-regional 

power...
31

in spite of Beijing’s efforts to develop its 

central and western regions. Thus in 2015 

areas of poverty will remain. In fact, unrest 

caused by relative deprivation has the possibility of impeding China’s growth rate 

and fueling ethnic separatist movements.

In the early phases of its reforms, 

growth in China was driven by cheap and 

abundant labor. By 2015, Chinese growth 

will be propelled more by high-tech industries, such as the design and production of 

computer hardware and software. Much 

of the know-how behind such industries 

will be provided by Taiwanese, and Chinese high-tech rms will be rmly linked 

with US companies as both suppliers and 

competitors. China’s manufacturing capabilities and overall standard of living will 

also increase by 2015, leading to the necessity to import large quantities of oil from 

Central Asia or the Middle East.

Militarily, the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) will be an improved force by 

2015. Its strategic focus will continue to 

be “Local Wars Under High-Tech Conditions,” and it will have made progress in 

actually being able to project the force necessary for such a strategy through enhanced 

naval and air platforms and rapid reaction 

forces. The Chinese military will also have 

enhanced missile capabilities both at the 

strategic and theater level, capable of striking the US and America’s Asian allies. For 

example, the DF-31 is a three-stage, solid 

fuel, mobile missile capable of striking 

the western United States, with the JL-2 

being its sea-based variant. Across from 

Taiwan China is also deploying hundreds of 

intermediate-range and short-range ballistic 

missiles, the CSS-6s and CSS-7s. US antimissile systems will give the Chinese political justication for their expanded arsenals. 

Clearly the PLA’s overall capabilities will be continue to be inferior to those 

of the US in 2015. While the military’s 

budget is expanding, China’s highest priority will continue to be economic growth. 

Nevertheless, in spite of this inferiority, the 

Chinese military will have certain advantages over the US in any foreseeable Asian 

conict. These include shorter supply 

lines and potentially greater political will 

to accept casualties and win a conict. 

The PLA will also have new capabilities 

to threaten American information systems, 

both at the civilian and military levels, 

more involved in Central Asia due to its 

oil needs. It will also have an increasing 

rivalry with India, as both states seek a 

dominant position in Asia and inuence in 

the Indian Ocean.

In sum, China’s leaders expect to 

maintain a communist monopoly of power 

and hope to preserve a peaceful international environment over the coming years 

so that China can expand its economic, 

technological, and military power. Nevertheless, it faces serious challenges, especially in regard to its domestic political situation and Taiwan. The resolution of these 

issues will have important ramications for 

China’s relations with the United States.

The Two Koreas

William E. Berry, Jr.

Historical Background

The Soviet Union and United States divided 

the Korean peninsula at the conclusion of 

World War II, and then were unable to agree 

on a plan for reunication. When the United 

Nations also failed to resolve this issue, 

largely because of Cold War tensions, the 

Republic of Korea (ROK) (South Korea) 

and the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea (DPRK) (North Korea) came into 

existence as independent countries in 1948. 

The Korean War further alienated the two 

Koreas, and the U.S. and ROK negotiated 

the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in 1953 

with the primary intent to deter North Korea 

from another attack. The MDT provides 

the basic justication for the stationing of 

American military forces in South Korea 

that total approximately 37,000 in 2001. 

North Korea entered into a similar security 

arrangement with the Soviet Union and 

China. As a result of these actions, the 

Korean peninsula remains a legacy of the 

Cold War and one of the most dangerous 

regions in the international system.

Political Issues

During the rst 40 years of the ROK’s existence, its political system was dominated by 

authoritarian military regimes. The rationale for these regimes generally included 

references to the severe threat from the 

DPRK and the need to rapidly develop 

the South Korean economy. There is no 

question that South Korea made impressive 

progress with its economy, but at the cost 

of political freedoms. The democratization 

as the fruit of Chinese efforts to develop 

asymmetric means to confront the United 

States.

On the international scene, China 

will still consider the United States its biggest rival. Nevertheless, China recognizes 

its need for a peaceful regional environment for many years to come if it is ever 

to equal the US in economic, political, and 

military power. But in spite of China’s 

desire for regional stability, the most likely 

event to trigger a US-China military confrontation is Taiwan. Conict over Taiwan 

could erupt over two issues. The rst is 

movement by Taiwan toward formal independence. Such a move would force China 

to take action. The second trigger is Chinese loss of patience over its continuing 

inability to solve the Taiwan problem, leading it to attempt to resolve the situation by 

force. However, in spite of China’s declaration that the Taiwan issue will not be 

left unresolved indenitely, it is not likely 

that China will provoke military action due 

to lack of progress unless there is a fundamental shift in China’s domestic politics. China has waited over 50 years for 

reunication with Taiwan, and the results 

of an unsuccessful effort to retake Taiwan 

by force would be devastating. If China 

does take military action against Taiwan, it 

is likely to be done in a surprising fashion 

intended to have maximum political effect, 

including the use missiles based in southeastern China. In light of the experiences 

of the United States in the Korean War, the 

US should not be overcondent in its ability to win a cheap victory in the Taiwan 

Strait.

In the rest of Asia, in 2015 China 

will continue to work toward both the prevention of war on the Korean peninsula and 

discourage, although not openly, Korean 

reunication. While North Korean belligerence justies an American and Japanese 

military buildup, a united Korea with or 

without a US military presence is seen to 

pose a potential threat on China’s border. 

China will continue to be extremely sensitive to any buildup of the Japanese military. Therefore the United States presence in Japan is seen as both a blessing and 

a curse. While enabling American force 

projection, it also serves as a restraint on 

Japan. Russia will still be recovering from 

its long slide, and thus will not pose a major 

threat to China. However, China will be 
32

process began in earnest during the 1980s 

as the expanding middle class demanded 

more participation in the political process 

and international attention increased when 

the ROK was selected to host the 1988 

Olympics. Popular elections were held for 

president in 1987 and again in 1992 when 

a civilian was elected. The most dramatic 

example of the democratization process 

occurred in late 1997 when the Korean 

population elected Kim Dae Jung who had 

for many years been the most outspoken 

critic of military rule as well as an advocate for democracy and human rights. President Kim will complete his term of ofce 

in 2003 and cannot succeed himself under 

the Constitution. As is true for any democratic political system, he has attempted to 

build public support for his programs, but it 

remains to be seen how the outcome of the 

next election will affect his policies, particularly those involving the DPRK and possible reunication of the peninsula.

President Kim Il Sung dominated 

the DPRK from 1948 until his death in 

1994. The cult of personality associated 

with Kim as the “Great Leader” is difcult 

to explain, but is perhaps best understood 

by the fact that Kim has been designated 

as the Eternal President after his death. He 

began to prepare for his political succession in the early 1980s by designating his 

son, Kim Jong Il, as the heir apparent. The 

elder Kim appointed his son to important 

positions in the Korean Worker’s Party and 

on the Military Commission in the effort 

to shore up support for the transition. After 

Kim’s death, his son appears to have solidi-

ed his position over the past several years, 

particularly with the Korean People’s Army. 

Since his deceased father has the title of 

Eternal President, Kim exercises his power 

primarily through his position as Chair of 

the Military Commission. Looking to the 

future, a critical issue for continued political stability in North Korea involves the 

succession process once Kim Jong Il passes 

from the scene. It does not appear that he 

has designated a successor and whether or 

not this hereditary succession will continue 

remains to be determined. Because the two 

Kims have dominated North Korea for so 

long, it is difcult to foresee who may be 

the next leader, and even more difcult 

to predict what policies this person may 

pursue toward the ROK and reunication.

President Kim Dae Jung initiated 

his Sunshine Policy toward the DPRK soon 

after coming to ofce in 1998. This policy 

is designed to separate politics from economics and to address the extremely dire 

economic problems in North Korea. He has 

established bilateral assistance programs to 

provide food to the starving DPRK population, encouraged South Korean direct 

investment in the North, and worked hard 

to gain American, Japanese, and international support for North Korea. His policy 

initiatives have had some success with the 

most important achievement to this point 

coming in his visit to Pyongyang in June 

2000 and the summit meeting with Kim 

Jong Il. North Korea’s Kim is scheduled to 

pay a visit to Seoul sometime in 2001, but 

the exact date has yet to be determined. 

Despite the fact that a signicant 

majority of South Koreans support eventual reunication with North Korea, Kim’s 

Sunshine Policy remains controversial. As 

the ROK has been rocked with a series of 

economic crises in recent years, part of the 

concern in South Korea involves the probable costs associated with reunication that 

the South will have to assume. Another 

issue concerns reciprocity since most of the 

concessions to this point have been made 

by South Korea with few coming from 

Pyongyang. Several leaders of the Grand 

National Party, the major opposition party, 

have been critical of Kim and his policies 

so that questions remain as to what direction the ROK will take after the next presidential election. Further complicating this 

political situation is the change in American administrations. President Clinton was 

very supportive of Kim’s policy, but President Bush is much more cautious as evidenced by the rst Kim-Bush summit in 

Washington during March 2001. Because 

of the long-standing U.S.-South Korean 

relationship, the position that the American 

government takes on issues such as this is 

considered very important in Seoul.

Economic Issues

As indicated earlier, South Korea experienced impressive economic growth and 

development beginning in the early 1970s. 

However, the Asian economic crisis in 1997 

came as a major shock and sent the economy into a severe downturn. The International Monetary Fund provided a $57 billion loan which the ROK has now repaid. 

Although reforms were initiated in the 

nancial (banking), corporate, and labor 

sectors, it remains to be seen whether these 

reforms have gone far enough in addressing 

the severe structural problems the ROK’s 

economy confronts. The indicators in early 

2001 are not encouraging as the economy 

continues to contract. 

Economists disagree on the likely 

costs of reunication, but the estimates 

range from several billion dollars to as 

much as a trillion dollars. Whichever is correct, these are substantial sums of money 

that the ROK will have difculty providing 

even with the assistance of the U.S., Japan, 

and international lending institutions. This 

reality is particularly apparent based on 

the current economic problems the ROK 

confronts. When considering reunication 

costs, a comparison with Germany is frequently cited. However, it is quite possible 

the proportionate costs for South Korea will 

exceed those of West Germany because the 

population of North Korea is greater than 

that of East Germany and the gross domestic product of the DPRK is less in relation to 

that of the ROK than was the East German 

GDP in comparison with West Germany’s. 

In any event, the substantial costs that 

will be associated with reunication have 

contributed signicantly to some of the 

public criticism of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and may inuence future initiatives to the DPRK. 

By any standard measurement, the 

DPRK economy is in shambles. Starvation 

and malnutrition are rampant as reported 

by a number of international food agencies 

which have visited North Korea to monitor 

how their food assistance is being distributed. Part of this economic failure is attributable to Kim Il Sung’s Juche policy which 

remains an extreme form of self-reliance 

and has been continued by Kim Jong Il. 

Also important is the economic relationship which the DPRK and the Soviet Union 

established. The Soviets subsidized Kim’s 

policies and provided other economic assistance over the years. When the U.S.S.R 

collapsed, this economic support ceased. 

A further complication is that China used 

to provide assistance based on “friendship 

prices,” but has begun to charge market 

value for its programs in part because it no 

longer is in competition with the Soviets 

for inuence in North Korea. 

One of the only sources of DPRK 

foreign exchange is the export of military 

equipment, particularly missiles and mis-
33

sile parts. These exports have led to con-

icts with the United States and remain a 

major source of contention. Regardless of 

the economic difculties Kim Jong Il faces, 

he has been reluctant to initiate necessary 

reforms that would address these difculties. To do so would probably result in the 

introduction of foreign ideas and concepts 

that he and his father before him have been 

dedicated to preventing. Also, to change 

from adherence to the Juche policy could 

undermine the very political legitimacy he 

relies upon to remain in power. Nonetheless, Kim visited Shanghai early in 2001 

and expressed support for some of the 

economic reforms China has introduced. 

Whether he decides to try some of these 

reforms in his own country remains a major 

issue, but there is little likelihood that the 

North Korea economy will improve appreciably any time soon if ever. The possibility 

of a total collapse remains real even though 

the North Korean people have become used 

to extreme economic deprivation over the 

years. 

Military Issues

The South Korean-American security relationship and the stationing of U.S. forces 

along strategic invasion routes north of 

Seoul remain extremely important to the 

ROK. But Seoul has also expended signi-

cant resources to assist in providing for its 

own defense. It has a 675,000 strong military that is equipped with modern hardware. In 1998, South Korea had a GDP of 

approximately $426 billion and allocated 

about $13.2 billion for defense or in the 

range of 3% of GDP. Earlier in 2001, the 

United States and the Republic of Korea 

reached an agreement that will enable the 

Koreans to develop missiles with a range of 

300 km and carry conventional warheads 

of up to 500 kg. The two countries had previously agreed in 1979 that South Korea 

would limit the range of its missiles to 180 

km, so this change is important because 

it provides the ROK with a deterrent missile capability which can strike anywhere 

in North Korea. It also is indicative of the 

expanding North Korean missile program 

and how this program is viewed in Seoul. 

Because of concern about the credibility of the American commitment to 

South Korea’s defense in the early 1970s, 

the government in Seoul began to pursue a 

nuclear weapons option. The United States 

opposed this policy and applied severe 

its missile development programs both for 

defense purposes and as a source of foreign 

exchange. 

The Nodong missile, a variation 

of the old Soviet scud missile, can reach 

any point in South Korea. The Taepodong 

I is a three-stage missile with a range of 

2,500 km, and the DPRK test red a prototype over Japan in August 1998 which de-

nitely got Japan’s attention among others. 

The Taepodong II is currently under development and has a suspected range of 5,000 

km. The 1998 Rumsfeld Report on ballistic missile threats to the United States designated the DPRK as one of the “rogue” 

states that the U.S. needs to take seriously, 

particularly as the Taepodong II comes on 

line. This report predicts the Taepodong 

II will be ready by 2003 and has become 

a major justication for the national missile defense program in the United States. 

During the latter stages of the Clinton 

administration, the two countries reached 

an agreement that in exchange for the lifting of some American economic sanctions 

and progress on establishing diplomatic 

relations, North Korea would not test any 

more missiles. However, since the Bush 

administration has taken a harder line on 

North Korea, it remains to be seen how 

long this agreement will remain in effect. 

The broader issue is that North Korea needs 

some sort of military threat to be taken seriously by the United States and other countries. How far it is willing to go in foregoing this type of threat is unclear.

Regional Issues

Northeast Asia remains a dangerous neighborhood and an area of concern for future 

arms control initiatives. Japan’s historical 

legacy presents problems in its relations 

with China and the Koreas in particular. 

These countries watch warily for any sign 

that Japan may expand its military capabilities. The DPRK remains particularly hostile to Japan impeding efforts to improve its 

economy. Although the ROK established 

normal diplomatic relations with China in 

1990, many Koreans are concerned about 

China’s military modernization program. 

Increased Japanese and Chinese competition for inuence could present problems 

for both Seoul and Pyongyang.

In the nal analysis, the U.S. security arrangements continue to be critically 

important for regional stability. Reportedly, 

even Kim Jong Il acknowledged this imporpolitical pressure on the government to 

reverse this policy which it did in the 

mid 1970s. Since that time, the ROK has 

continued its non-nuclear weapons policy 

and is a signatory of the Non Proliferation 

Treaty and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency Safeguards Agreement. Although 

Korean nationalism is a very strong force, 

it is unlikely that any South Korean government will reverse this policy unless there 

is a major change in the American presence and/ or unexpected developments in 

the region.

Despite the severe economic problems confronting North Korea, it remains 

one of the most militarized countries in the 

world. Again, using 1998 statistics, North 

Korea had an estimated GDP of $14 billion, but yet committed almost $2 billion to 

its military or more than 14% of its GDP. 

The active duty forces exceed 1 million, 

and there are large reserve and paramilitary 

components available too. Approximately 

70% of these active duty forces are forward 

deployed within 60 miles of the border 

with South Korea, and the DPRK has an 

extensive artillery capability that threatens 

Seoul, only 30 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone. Beginning in the late 1980s, 

American intelligence detected a suspected 

North Korean nuclear weapons program. 

Although the DPRK denied these reports, 

evidence mounted that such a program was 

underway. As tensions increased, the U.S. 

and North Korea entered into a series of 

negotiations that resulted in the Agreed 

Framework of October 1994 whereby the 

North Koreans promised to forego any 

nuclear weapons program in exchange for 

assistance in building two light water reactors for electricity generation. This project 

continues, and it appears that North Korea 

is fullling its part of the agreement. 

The DPRK does have an active chemical 

weapons program, and there are estimates 

that between 2,500-5,000 tons of chemical 

agents are stored. Because of its large artillery force capable of striking Seoul and 

other parts of South Korea, this is major 

concern to both the ROK and U.S. It is 

also suspected that North Korea has conducted some biological weapons research, 

but because of climatic conditions on the 

Korean peninsula and an atrocious public 

health system in the DPRK, use of biological weapons could be extremely problematic. North Korea has gone forward with 
34

tance during his summit with Kim Dae 

Jung in June 2000. If the United States 

decides for whatever reasons to change its 

security commitments with the ROK and 

Japan in particular, this development would 

have profound effects on the military policies of all regional actors with the attendant 

implications for arms control.

Future Scenarios Affecting Arms 

Control

Based on the political, economic, and military issues outlined above, there are a 

number of future scenarios regarding the 

Korean peninsula which likely will affect 

arms control initiatives. These scenarios are 

presented in the order of their most likely 

occurrence by 2015. 

1. A unied Korea under South Korea 

control without nuclear weapons.

2. The continuation of the status 

quo with North Korea introducing some economic reforms along 

with external assistance that allows 

it to survive.

3. A unied Korea under South 

Korean control with nuclear weapons. As indicated previously, South 

Korea contemplated a nuclear 

weapons program in the 1970s 

but backed off under heavy American pressure. Events in the region 

or a reduction in the U.S. commitment could convince future 

Korean political leaders to pursue 

this option regardless of external 

pressure although the costs of so 

doing would be substantial.

4. A unied Korea under North 

Korean control. This remains 

highly unlikely unless the United 

States discontinues its dominant 

role in Northeast Asia, and even 

then, the ROK has sufcient capabilities to deny North Korea this 

type of success in reunifying the 

peninsula by force.

Russia

Major Conclusions

Russia will be trying to gure out 

who it is and to establish an identity for 

several more years. Russia is likely to continue “muddling through” as a weak, semistable, quasi-democracy through 2015. The 

Russian government will likely be able 

to control or contain major political, economic and military activities in the country. Although political and labor-related 

“hot spots” are likely to erupt, as they have 

in the past, such incidents are likely to 

remain isolated, with the Russian government retaining the ability to exercise at least 

“loose control” over the entire Federation. 

However, there is a chance that the geopolitical and economic system could destabilize radically, making our ability to conduct arms control operations much less predictable. It is also possible that the Russian government my not be able to maintain positive control of certain dangerous 

weapons materials. Overall, Russia is not 

likely to make signicant progress in reestablishing itself as a dominant regional 

power, is not likely to realize a signicant 

revival of its military, and is likely to 

lose regional inuence to Western European countries, China, Japan, and to Islamic 

fundamentalism.

Politico-economic trends

Russia’s future will depend, to a 

great extent, on how well the central government can steady the economic, political, military and regional chaos created 

by the attempted conversion to democracy 

and to free market economic principles. 

Russia is likely to undergo at least one 

more change in the presidency by 2015. 

President Putin’s successors, however, are 

unlikely to differ radically from Putin’s 

political ideology. They will wield signicant power, tempered somewhat by the 

Duma and by international pressures. It is 

unlikely that the political climate, over next 

few years, will allow for a liberal president 

like Yeltsin.

The economy will play a major 

role in Russia’s future. Despite ofcial 

reports that the Russian economy is nally 

beginning to grow, there is little real faith 

in the Russian economy, and reinvestment 

in the Russian economy is slow in coming. 

Struggling to produce nished products of 

export quality, Russia has been selling off 

its natural resources, such as oil, just to 

keep aoat. The ailing Russian economy 

could quickly be thrust into a “crisis mode” 

if oil prices drop signicantly. 

One of the keys to economic stability in Russia will be a practical system 

of taxation. The average Russian believes 

that it is virtually impossible to “get ahead” 

playing by the rules. Bribery and tax evasion are a way of life. Russia is making 

progress in codifying a reasonable tax code 

and in tax collection, but the tax system is 

still being crudely managed and is inef-

cient. An estimated 60-70 percent of the 

Russian economy is operated on the black 

or gray market, and many of the transactions are barter deals, making tax collection 

very difcult. Tax collection is a major priority in the Russian government, and signicant progress can be expected in this 

area by 2015.

The real wild card in Russia’s 

future appears to be its powerful maa(s). 

Corruption and graft have always been pervasive in Russia/Soviet society, but criminal and political maas now control, or 

greatly inuence, virtually all signicant 

day-to-day operations in Russia. This powerful and corrupt segment of the Russian 

population will continue to bilk Russia of its 

reinvestment capital, making it extremely 

unlikely that Russia will be able to develop 

a progressive industrial infrastructure by 

2015. While western governments and 

banks have loaned Russia billions of dollars 

to support its fragile economy and “edgling democracy,” approximately 20 billion 

dollars a year is leaving Russia in what is 

being called “capital ight.” Russians, who 

have the means to do so, are not reinvesting 

in the Russian economy—they have little 

faith in the long-term viability of the Russian economy, and they have no faith in 

the rule of law or in the viability of longterm business without excessive government interference. They prefer to build 

up their foreign bank accounts and to buy 

property abroad. Despite numerous new 

laws intended to curb capital ight, Russians and foreigners have, so far, been able 

skirt those laws via legal loopholes as well 

as illegal means. The Russian economy is, 

in essence, a house of cards. It is being 

articially propped up by loans, but Russia’s foreign dept payments are likely to be 

unmanageable in the next few years. The 

payment will soon be over 15 billion dollars annually—roughly triple the Russian 
35

defense budget. The moral decay, lack 

of ethics, and lack of trust in Russia will 

likely preclude Russia, and most of its 

people, from prospering economically by 

2015. Additionally, another major downturn in the Russian economy is likely to kill 

off the small amount of hope that Russians 

still have in a sustained economic and standard-of-living improvement.

Complicating Russia’s moral and 

ethical problems is pervasive government 

corruption. Although the Russian central 

government’s rhetoric is strictly anti-maa, 

often political and maa leaders are onein-the same, or at least cooperate with one 

another. As Russia gradually passes laws 

that institutionalize governmental and economic dealings, this chaotic relationship 

between maa and government is, in practice, being codied. It is quite possible 

that, in the course of time, the relationship 

will be more than just “accepted;” it will be 

legitimized.

Up until now, the Russian Federation has had clear and undeniable political 

and economic incentives for cooperating on 

arms control issues. Cooperation, however, 

is not a “given.” The United States Congress and new Presidency are viewed, in 

Russia, as “less likely” to continue the level 

of economic support that Russia enjoyed in 

the past. Despite gross corruption and misappropriation of economic aid in Russia, 

Russian hardliners blame the United States 

for Russian economic woes and for Russia’s huge foreign debt. Additionally, Russia’s relationship with western democracies 

is viewed as a zero-sum game by many 

Russian leaders, who have difculty envisioning a win-win relationship with the 

West—particularly with the United States. 

Politically, Russians generally resent NATO 

expansion, U.S. plans to build an ABM 

system, and American dominance in general. Many Russian leaders continue to 

see arms control as an effective Russian 

bargaining chip in negotiations with the 

West, and this bargaining chip will likely 

continue to be played as Russia tries to 

maintain some semblance of “world power 

status.” Also, Russia never has approached 

arms control in the “reverent” way that 

the West has—it’s a much more practical 

approach in Russia. If the level of antiAmericanism rises in Russia, or if incentives for arms control cooperation are, in 

other ways, no longer perceived as outweighing the liabilities, then cooperation in 

the arms control arena may be withheld. 

Furthermore, as evidenced by the recent 

expulsion of Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA) personnel, unimpeded 

access for arms control monitoring purposes is not a given in Russia.

In the unlikely event that the Russian Federation were to develop major 

geopolitical ssures resulting in serious 

regional declarations of independence, the 

international community would likely be 

forced to re-structure nearly all agreements, 

and deal with new governments. In that 

event, it is conceivable that some regions/

ethnic groups in Russia would turn to the 

West for help in legitimizing their independence from Moscow, which in turn would 

further sabotage the West’s relations with 

Moscow.

Even if the Russian Federation 

remains intact, and regional tensions do not 

materialize, it is possible that the United 

States’ and other governments may not be 

able to deal exclusively with the Russian 

central government matters related to arms 

control. Even now, Russian businessmen 

sometimes conduct business (to include 

military sales) in extra-governmental/extralegal ways in order to avoid taxes, and 

to bypass internal or international export 

controls. If, as is speculated, this type of 

business includes nuclear, biological and/or 

chemical agents, then monitoring and dealing with these types of transactions is of 

critical importance. Monitoring such transactions will be complicated by Russian 

reluctance to cooperate with foreign investigative bodies.

Military

The Russian military, in general, 

is not likely to be increased appreciably by 

2015. With the myriad of other economic 

priorities in the country, there simply is 

not enough money to initiate large-scale 

buying of military hardware. This is especially true when the costs of infrastructure 

maintenance and training are considered. 

The Russian military is more likely to be 

downsized even further in terms of personnel, hardware and viable facilities. However, Russia continues to perceive a threat 

from stronger Western powers and from 

China, as well as from its Islamic neighbors 

to the south. Just the war in Chechnya has 

greatly challenged Russia’s conventional 

forces and encroached on the meager military budget. Realizing this, Russian military leaders have made it no secret that they 

will have to rely more on weapons of 

mass destruction to deal with the bigger 

threats. The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) 

are getting, and will likely continue to get, 

more than it’s “fair share” of resources. 

While virtually no new conventional military equipment has been purchased in 

recent years, the SRF continues to eld new 

upgraded equipment such as the TOPOL 

ICBM.

In all probability, chemical and 

biological weapons are, and will in the 

future, receive increased consideration 

along with nuclear weapons. Russia still 

has sizeable stockpiles of chemical and 

biological weapons. The location of most 

of these weapons is known—has been 

declared. Given the Russian propensity 

to deceive, however, along with the Russian realization that its conventional forces 

are inadequate to respond to the perceived 

threat, it is possible that Russian may have 

secret supplies, or may attempt to clandestinely assemble an arsenal of biological 

and chemical weapons. Numerous existing underground facilities could be used 

for such a purpose. Additionally, new 

underground facilities, such as the massive 

Yamantau complex, could be used for such 

a purpose.

Positive control of chemical, biological and nuclear materials will likely 

be a problem in Russia over the next 

several years. It is unclear whether the 

Russian central government really knows 

exactly how much of these materials exist 

in Russia; but even if they do, theft and illegal sales are a realistic possibility. There is 

clearly a market for these kinds of materials—especially in the Middle East. Russia 

has a history of clandestine military arms 

deals with Middle-East clients, and a more 

recent history of helping “rogue nations” 

to develop sensitive military technologies. 

According to Russia’s own account, such 

help is not always state-sponsored, but is 

...Russian central government’s rhetoric is strictly 

anti-maa, often political 

and maa leaders are onein-the same...
36

arranged by shady Russian entrepreneurs. 

Furthermore, Russian military and security 

forces personnel, who maintain physical 

control of such materials, may not be trustworthy. Many are demoralized by their 

plight, their future looks bleak, and the prospect for “supplemental income” through 

the sale of such materials is certain to be a 

temptation for some. Additionally, Russian 

military commanders have been known to 

exploit/and or sell military assets to earn 

extra cash. 

It is possible that Russia will 

use its conventional military forces to counter Islamic fundamentalist threats in and 

around central Asian countries, similar to 

what has been done in Tajikistan. Such 

a shift in military emphasis would likely 

cause Russia to deploy increased amounts 

of military hardware to that region. Considering the poor state of Russia’s conventional forces, however, Russia may also 

consider the use of chemical weapons to 

counter regional threats if faced with a 

“desperate situation” such as the geopolitical erosion of the Russian state. 

Russia has desperately tried to preserve and expand military ties with certain 

former Soviet republics. Russia has also 

made overtures toward India and China. 

Although a common enemy would probably be required before any signicant military treaty/union with India or China could 

be realized, Russia has made some progress 

with some former republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 

Although no fundamentally different political or military relationship is anticipated 

with between Russia and the former republics, military relations could gradually progress over the next several years toward 

larger-scale exercises, which could include 

temporary larger-scale cross-border military deployments.

Demographics

The size of the ethnic Russian 

population in Russia is likely to continue 

its decline, largely due to a low birth rate 

resulting from economic and moral hopelessness. Because of poverty and environmental problems, the percentage of healthy 

Russians is also likely to decrease as well. 

Meanwhile, the average age of ethnic Russians is increasing, despite decreased life 

expectancy (the result of alcoholism and 

general despair). As a result, government 

social support systems for the elderly are 

likely to remain inadequate. There are also 

likely to be less able-bodied young Russians t for military service, and since the 

upper strata of young Russians are generally able to bribe their way out of military service, conscripts will likely constitute, primarily, the lower strata of Russian 

young men. In general, demographics of 

the ethnic Russian population will contribute to the downsizing of the standing military.

As the ethnic Russian population 

contracts, minority ethnic populations in 

and around Russia are increasing rapidly. 

In coming years, ethnic minorities are likely 

to encroach more upon Russian politics and 

perhaps play a greater role in regional economies. The result will likely be increased 

friction between Russian and other ethnic 

populations. Despite years of forced “Russication,” ethnic minorities in Russia were 

never truly integrated into Russian culture, 

and have, as a general rule, maintained 

their ethnic identity. Russians are inwardly 

and outwardly prejudiced against minorities, and the anticipated shift in the relative 

balance of power is likely to kindle ethnic 

tensions.

Environment

Russia will continue to pay the 

price for decades of “irresponsible industrialization” through 2015 and beyond. The 

problems of radioactive, chemical, toxic 

and corrosive waste in Russia are well 

known, but certain areas could get worse. 

Aging and leaking containers may pose 

a signicant threat to anyone in the area, to 

include installation guards/security personnel, the surrounding civilian population, and 

to on-site arms control monitors. Russia 

has “extended” the service life of many 

weapons, but maintenance is an acknowledged problem, and it is likely that such 

weapons, or their components/materials, 

will continue to be neglected as the Russian 

military stagnates in a “hunker down” mentality.

Technology

A technology breakthrough that 

would fundamentally alter Russia’s economic or military posture is unlikely, and is 

beyond the scope of this study/think piece. 

Even so, due to decreased funding, dwindling markets, and aging research facilities, 

Russia’s position in the high tech arena visà-vis western industrialized nations is not 

likely to grow. Russia’s proven ability to 

steal sensitive technology and other information via espionage and spying, however, 

will remain a viable threat. Due to its costeffectiveness, Russia is likely to sustain its 

efforts to “acquire” industrial and military 

technologies and to compromise sensitive 

monitoring protocols. It cannot be ruled 

out that sensitive elements of our arms control monitoring capabilities are, or will be 

compromised. 

Russian defense industries, with 

tacit government approval, will almost certainly continue seeking foreign funding 

for research and development. Therefore, 

cutting-edge Russian military technologies 

will, by default, be “for sale,” which may 

necessitate increased arms control monitoring in other countries as well.

...proliferation of fourth 

generation and binary 

chemical weapons, and 

the advances in genetic 

manipulation of biologically active materials may 

supply the experimental 

data, equipment, and 

expertise necessary to produce smaller and more 

lethal weapons
37

Chemistry:USAFA Cemistry

“All Our Tomorrows”

Phase I Input

Edited by

Maj Susan E Hastings

Contributors

Capt Jim F. Blankenship, PhD

Capt Jennifer S. Gresham

Capt Kyle D. Gresham, PhD

Dr Barry W. Hicks

Maj Luke A. Lorang

Maj Ronald C. Marks, PhD

Capt Daniel B. Ryan

Capt Curits L Weeks

Dr John S. Wilkes

Advances in chemistry will very 

likely change the face of future warfare. 

Signicant chemistry advances that will 

impact the war-ghting environment can 

be categorized by technology or application. The following information has 

been grouped into Chemical and Biological 

Weapon (CBW) related technology, electrical power, and rocket propellants. Our list 

of potential chemical breakthroughs is not 

exhaustive. The majority of the information covers CBW because the majority of 

the department expertise falls in this area. 

Materials chemistry areas involving electronics and sensors need to be pursued further through AFRL. Initials of the author 

of each paragraph are included in parenthesis, and a key to these initial appears at the 

end of the document. (seh)

Recent advances in Chemical and 

Biological Warfare Agents

Over the next few years there 

could be signicant advancement in the 

development and weaponization of chemical and biological agents. The proliferation of fourth generation and binary chemical weapons, and the advances in genetic 

manipulation of biologically active materials may supply the experimental data, 

equipment, and expertise necessary to produce smaller and more lethal weapons. 

(jfb)

Mass production of such weapons would be unlikely, however, as it would 

be difcult to obtain the large amount of 

instrumentation, materials, and chemical/

biological expertise necessary without 

arousing international attention. Nevertheless, smaller, laboratory-scale facilities could relatively easily obtain enough 

material to produce a small terrorist-sized 

weapon. (jfb)

First, second, and third generation chemical agents are rather difcult 

to synthesize safely under standard laboratory conditions, and with the ratication of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 

the usual starting materials are now under 

close supervision and regulations. Biological agents, however, are much easier to 

obtain through overt and covert collection 

methods. Larry Harris, a member of a 

white supremacy group in Ohio, ordered a 

sample of plague from a US commercial 

source through the mail. It is not inconceivable that one person could covertly 

bring a sample of “hoof and mouth” disease back from Europe to devastate the US 

sheep and cattle industry. These are old, 

well known agents that can be made more 

effective with proper weaponization and 

genetic modication. (jfb)

Detection

One of the keys to defending 

against a CBW attack is early detection. 

Current eld detection systems for chemical agents are based on ion-mobility mass 

spectrometry, a rather old and non-selective method of analysis. These spectrometers have become portable (the size of a 

Geiger Counter), but they often give false 

positives, especially when exposed to commercially available pesticides. (jfb)

Non-specic biological agent 

detection is now being accomplished with 

an instrument based on spin cycler technology. The instrument, slightly bigger than 

a briefcase, is currently being investigated 

for use as an automated warning system 

for large open areas, such as air bases. 

This system, however, does not identify 

the agent, which is critical in treatment of 

exposed personnel. Identication of the 

agent is accomplished by HUMMV-sized 

unit employing sensitive bioanalysis techniques, such as PCR, which unfortunately 

can take on the order of days to identify the 

agent present. (jfb)

Over the past few years the area of 

micro and nano-analytical instruments has 

been a hot area of development. The journal of Analytical Chemistry has had quite 

a few articles on the progress in this eld. 

These instruments are etched on modied 

silicon wafers (the same as those used in 

computer chips), and depending upon the 

design, can be an inch or even smaller. 

These micro devices have been used primarily for chromatography-types of analysis, but it is possible that these instruments 

could be used to detect CBW agents in the 

eld. The small size and relative low cost 

of these devices present an economical and 

militarily viable option to the expensive 

and heavy detection systems in use today. 

(jfb)

Enabling Technologies

In recent unclassied reports, the 

Aum Shinrikyo, prior to their Sarin attack 

on the Tokyo subway system, had attempted 

to use botulinum toxin and anthrax in the 

streets of Tokyo and Yokohama. There 

were no reported cases of botulinum or 

anthrax exposure because the release mechanisms, spraying the agents from rooftops 

and from the back of a moving truck, were 

extremely crude and inefcient. (jfb)

There are, however, commercially 

available methods to make the dissemination of such agents much more efcient and 

thus, much more lethal. Microencapsulation has been a technology exploited by 

the chemical and pharmaceutical industry 

since the 1950’s. Microcapsules of biomaterial or liquid chemicals can be made from 

a variety of biodegradable plastics. These 

capsules, much smaller than the over-thecounter liquid cold capsules, allow the 

chemical or biological arms manufacturer 

to optimize the size of the capsules for 

inhalation-related dosage or allows for the 

inner material to be slowly released over a 

set period of time. Microencapsulation, as 

applied to biological weapons specically, 

makes the dissemination of the agent much 

more efcient as well as protects the agent 

from damaging sunlight or other possible 

sources of disinfectant. (jfb)

Dissemination methods do not 

have to be overly complicated. Current 

agricultural sprayers are more than capable 

of providing adequate coverage of a target 

area, if the weather conditions are right. 

Some of these sprayers are even specially 

designed to spread live benecial bioagents 

on crops. These sprayers would be ideally 

suited for limited biowarfare, such as acts 

of terrorism. (jfb)

Microencapsulation and agricultural sprayers are just two examples of how 

Department
38

commercially available technologies can 

be used to radically enhance the effectiveness of a small-scale biological or chemical weapon attack. Both technologies are 

not currently covered by counterpoliferation legislation and are widely available on 

the world market. (jfb)

A very simple, inexpensive 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) could 

also be used as a platform for spreading 

chemical/biological agents. Radio-controlled airplanes are cheap and can be built 

and own by children. The vehicle only 

has to be big enough to hold some agent 

and an atomizer. Any street will work as 

a runway and the RC airplane doesn’t have 

to land to accomplish its mission. It could 

be very difcult to bring down such an airplane in an urban environment and would 

not appear to be a threat until too late. 

Imagine 100 of these RC airplanes ying 

over the Washington Mall during the 4th

of July spraying chemical/biological agents 

and you have a potentially catastrophic situation. (kdg)

Biochemistry technology advances that 

may lead to biological weapons 

Several near term biochemistry 

advances were identied that could provide 

new forms of chemical or biological weapons or chemical or biological defenses. 

(seh)

Real Time Polymerase Chain 

Reaction: Real time Polymerase Chain 

Reaction (PCR) would allow you to identify an organism through its DNA, most 

likely in biowarfare ops, in a matter of minutes. This would also be more reliable than 

a method that looks for specicity of proteins on the exterior of the organism. (jsg 

and bwh) The likely application of this 

technology would be biological weapon 

identication.

Molecular Biology: Molecular 

biology could be used to bypass biowarfare 

detectors/vaccines. There are two variations on this theme. One would be to analyze our vaccines, like the one for anthrax 

for example, and develop anthrax agents 

with mutations in the protein used in the 

vaccine. This would essentially make the 

vaccine worthless while requiring no major 

changes to the bacteria itself. The other 

variation is to take relatively harmless bacteria and give them virulent genes from 

other bacteria. On the outside, the bacteria 

would seem harmless and might bypass 

detectors while still doing considerable 

damage. (jsg and bwh)

Agent Neutralization: Agent 

defeat programs have traditionally looked 

at targeting and destroying agent production and storage facilities using high explosives to incinerate the agent. There has not 

been much (or any) research at conducting 

agent neutralization after the employment 

of a chemical/biological agent. This could 

be a last-ditch effort to save military and 

civilian lives after a battleeld dissemination or a terrorist attack at a major 

event such as a sporting event or political 

rally. Are there chemicals available that 

could neutralize a chemical and/or biological agent after it has been disseminated 

without itself posing a hazard? (kdg)

Selective Vaccines: Selective vaccines could be used by an enemy to make 

a vaccine for a particular agent they were 

planning on releasing, one that had not been 

seen exactly like this before. This would 

require the enemy to also mutate an existing strain, perhaps an inuenza strain with 

important mutations to increase virulence. 

(Note: this strain would also be difcult 

to pinpoint as “biowarfare” per se, and 

thus the enemy might remain anonymous.) 

Once the enemy had vaccinated his own 

people, the agent could be released without 

harming his side. (jsg and bwh)

Fluorescent Biosensors: Fluorescent biosensors use could enable identi-

cation of biological agents using satellites. 

Imagine an airplane with a number of very 

small beads that serve as uorescent biosensors, specic for some biological agent. 

The plane drops them over an area we suspect of producing or manufacturing biological agents. The beads would interact 

with the agent, yet would be small enough 

that people might not realize what had happened. The organism would uores like 

a lightning bug when illuminated with the 

proper wavelength of light. Satellites or 

UAVs could then detect the resulting uorescence, identifying either buildings or 

possibly people who were associated with 

the biological agents of interest. (jsg and 

bwh)

Chemical Tracers: A variant of 

this idea is the use of chemical tracer to

track movement of mechanized forces and 

artillery pieces. The chemical would be 

invisible to the naked eye, but would uoresce when illuminated with the proper 

wavelength of light (IR, UV). Daily ights 

by a UAV armed with a laser could perform 

wide-area illumination and record weapons movements with an onboard spectral 

sensor. (kdg)

Urban Warfare/Riot Control: 

Urban Warfare/Riot Control could be 

accomplished by disperse incapacitating or 

nauseating agents over crowds to disperse 

angry mobs or civilian insurgents. This 

would be most desirable in situations where 

non-lethal methods would be desired. Minimizes risk to ground forces in close quarters with armed mobs. (kdg)

Human Genome Project: When 

we’ve truly unlocked the secrets of the 

human genome, it will be relatively straightforward to use molecular biology to design 

virus’s specic to certain ethnic groups or 

genders. Even without vaccination, the 

enemy would be safe, and the target would 

not. (jsg and bwh)

Electrical Power

Personal Electric Power: Sometime between the Vietnam conict and the 

Gulf war the need for personal electric 

power by individuals (military and civilians) changed dramatically. In the last 15 

years the power sources have gone from 

39¢ ashlight batteries to $100 lithium batteries. The amount of energy contained 

in the batteries has risen in approximately 

the same proportion. In the next 15 years, 

there will be a similar need for a similar 

increase in electrical energy needs for individuals not tied to a xed power source, 

but with a major decrease in weight. The 

technology to do this will be fuel cells with 

solid-phase hydrogen storage that are the 

size of today’s notebook PC battery packs, 

but will have 10-100 times the energy. 

The effects on military logistics will be 

a 10X-100X less frequent re-supply cycle 

compared to today’s best lithium batteries. 

(jsw)

Electric Power From Logistics 

Fuels: Diesel generators are a noisy, hot, 

heavy, inefcient, maintenance intensive 

way to convert stored chemical energy 

(diesel fuel) to electricity. Fuel cells are a 

quiet, cool, light, efcient, no-moving-parts 

way to convert chemical energy (hydrogen) 

to electricity. Diesel fuel and JP8 are logistics fuels; hydrogen is not. In the next 15 

years fuel cells will be a viable means to 

generate electric power in stationary (command post and larger) installations and 
39

for transportation (even electric airplanes). 

The breakthroughs will be in two areas; 

1) development of small high efciency 

reformers that will convert the logistics 

fuel to hydrogen, and 2) development of 

fuel cells that can use non-hydrogen fuels 

directly. The basic chemistries for both 

of those technologies have had laboratory 

breakthroughs recently, and eld ready in 

5-15 years. (jsw)

Rocket Propellants

Metastable Propellants: Rocket propellant 

research efforts seek to optimize specic 

impulse, molecular weight, stability and 

reliability. The ideal propellant would provide a high specic impulse and secondarily remain chemically stable under a wide 

range of environmental conditions so that 

rockets would not have to be de-fueled for 

launch delays. Aerozine-50, a 50/50 mix 

of hydrazine and monomethylhydrazine, 

which has fueled heavy lift launch vehicles 

such as the Titan IV, is an example of an 

environmentally stable liquid rocket propellant with a moderate specic impulse and 

represents a baseline for future improvements. Hydrazine-based fuels such as Aerozine-50 do not provide a high enough specic impulse to fuel the Titan IV upper stage 

for heavy or high orbit payload delivery. 

Liquid hydrogen/oxygen, which is not environmentally stable and must be removed 

and replaced for launch delays, must be 

used in these cases due to its very high specic impulse. (dbr)

As propellant research efforts 

come to fruition in the near term, we expect 

to see fuels that provide better specic 

impulses but will not meet the goal of being 

more environmentally stable. Researchers 

often refer to these emerging propellants 

as “metastable” or “preserved in cryogenic 

solids.” We therefore predict that near term 

advances in rocket fuels will impact the 

battle space by signicantly increasing payload capacity and easing access to distant 

orbits at a reduced cost per pound delivered. Higher specic impulse fuels may 

also make it feasible to launch heavy payloads into difcult-to-achieve orbits from 

Vandenberg AFB, CA rather than just Patrick AFB, FL. (Vandenberg AFB is more 

distant from the earth’s equator.) However, 

we do not expect the next generation of 

high-impulse rocket fuels to be sufciently 

environmentally stable to reduce launch 

preparation times, especially in the case of 

launch delays where the vehicle must be 

de-fueled. (dbr)

References:

bwh Dr Barry W. Hicks 

dbr Capt Daniel B. Ryan

jfb Capt Jim F. Blankenship, PhD

jsw Dr John S. Wilkes

jsg Capt Jennifer S. Gresham

kdg Capt Kyle D. Gresham, PhD

seh Maj Susan E. Hastings
40

Economics 

Global Issues 2015

Panel Discussion Members:

Lt Col Sohan (Panel Chair)

Lt Col Frank

Dr. Waller

Capt Carpenter

Capt Paik

Global Economic Outlook – 2015

While it may be true that a rising tide 

raises all ships, the size of the tide will 

vary across the globe. Increasing technology, more open global trade and increased 

access to information will be the major 

growth engines of the international economy as we move toward the year 2015. 

This growth will occur primarily in those 

countries that have the most access to the 

engines of growth, particularly in countries 

with free market economies and the rule 

of law. Poorer economies, those nations 

in transition from formerly socialist economies and those nations experiencing political upheaval or oppression will experience 

less growth compared to countries with 

more advanced, stable economies.

It is important to distinguish 

between the speed of growth and the size of 

growth. While countries often referred to 

as emerging markets may experience phenomenal percentage growth in per capita 

income, sometimes on the order of 15% per 

year, the world income distribution may 

become more unbalanced, since 4% growth 

in $25,000 per capita real income is greater 

than 15% growth in $3,000 per capita real 

income. To the extent that emerging economies continue their growth, the populations will be content that their economic 

situation is improving. To the degree that 

developing nations are aware of the growing inequality in world income distribution, 

this increasing income gap could become a 

destabilizing force.

The poorest economies may see 

the smallest amount of growth. These 

countries tend to be the victims of repressive regimes combined with fewer natural 

resources and a smaller capital base. These 

countries also traditionally suffer from poor 

educational systems. All of these factors 

result in slower growth. To make a long 

story short, the rich will get richer and the 

poor will be less poor, but continue to fall 

further behind the rich.

Areas of Concern:

Information Technology:

The increasing availability of information 

will have both stabilizing and destabilizing 

elements. Stabilization will occur with the 

increasing ease of technology transfer facilitating global economic growth. In addition, heightened awareness of the benets 

of the market system and the rule of law 

will aid those countries saddled with less 

efcient markets and political structures. 

To the extent that existing regimes resist 

this process, tensions could develop. If 

developing countries are unable to sustain 

high economic growth rates, the population 

could become dissatised, particularly in 

those countries within the third quartile of 

the global income distribution. Countries 

in the top two economic quartiles will be 

relatively more satised with their lots and 

will lean toward more stability. Those in 

the lowest quartile will remain too poor to 

be any serious threat to global stability at 

other than a local level.

Greater access to information and 

improvements in technology have made the 

production of weapons more economical. 

Smaller entities will now nd it more feasible to produce relatively deadly weapons 

of mass destruction, whether nuclear, biological or chemical. While global stability 

may be increasing, fringe elements may be 

less stable. The likelihood of global con-

ict has decreased while the likelihood of 

local violence has increased.

Changing Population Patterns Within 

Countries and Regions:

Western Europe and Japan are experiencing 

aging populations. Their generous social 

programs will put an increasing strain on 

the working age population and in the end 

will prove to be unsustainable. Retirement 

ages will have to increase and benet programs will decrease, leading to dissatisfaction among older generations.

The Middle East, on the other 

hand, is experiencing a rapid decrease in the 

average age of their populations. This has 

the potential to create a generation of relatively well-educated individuals with poor 

job prospects, fostering instability. This 

outcome is even more ominous given that 

younger workers in this region have typically been more closely associated with 

religious unrest. These concerns, coupled 

with the fact that many governments in 

the region are not democratically elected, 

could present a signicant problem.

Immigration:

Less restrictive immigration policies could 

help reduce but not eliminate both the 

aging and declining population problems. 

Immigration may cause additional problems affecting both ends of the skill spectrum. Poorer countries tend to lose their 

most skilled workers to more advanced 

economies drawn by the prospect of greater 

monetary compensation. This “brain drain” 

tightens the downward economic spiral the 

countries ght to overcome. In addition, 

immigration will tend to displace lower 

skilled workers within the receiving country causing wages to fall for the lower 

skilled workforce. The result is increasing 

wage dispersion and dissatisfaction within 

the receiving countries. Immigration has 

the potential to alter the demographic patterns within the receiving country placing 

greater stress on their political and social 

systems.

Natural Resources:

Energy shortages have drawn considerable 

media attention recently. We feel this should 

not be a real problem for the near future. 

Energy production and distribution, particularly on the international trade level, has 

largely been left to market forces. As greater 

amounts of oil are discovered in non-OPEC 

nations, there should be no reason to have 

any sustained increases in energy prices as 

we move toward 2015.

Of greater concern is global water 

usage. Governments have tended to take 

responsibility for water allocation. While 

the global water availability was relatively 

stable, the tendency of governments to 

severely mismanage resources was overlooked. As regional water shortages appear, 

Western Europe and 

Japan are experiencing 

aging populations. Their 

generous social programs 

will put an increasing 

strain on the working age 

population and in the end 

will prove to be unsustainable.
41

particularly in areas with rapidly increasing 

populations, this tendency toward bureaucratic mismanagement will only intensify 

the problem. Governments will be too 

slow to efciently and correctly react. 

For nations relying on the government or 

bureaucratic food distribution, these same 

inefciencies may become a problem.

Environment:

Damage to the environment tends to be a 

symptom of local problems and tensions 

rather than a necessary byproduct of economic growth. As an economy becomes 

more advanced, there is a tendency for its 

population to demonstrate greater concern 

for the environment. Hence, the best cure 

for environmental problems is economic 

growth.

Regional Trouble Spots:

Unrest will primarily occur in 

countries in the third income quartile. There 

is a temptation for governments to export 

their economic troubles in terms of increasing regional tensions designed to divert 

attention away from domestic problems. 

In this scenario countries often attempt to 

blame their problems on outsiders rather 

than the true cause - governmental mismanagement.

China: 

The Chinese may have trouble 

sustaining their recent growth. They would 

desperately like to have increased international trade but have demonstrated a lack 

of respect for intellectual property rights. 

This will slow their entrance into the WTO. 

Their recent altercation with the United 

States may jeopardize their MFN status. 

Taiwan continues to plague US – China 

relations. China may seek to redirect attention from internal economic hardships by 

exerting military inuence in the region.

India/Pakistan: 

India will have a difcult time 

sustaining its economic growth. They too 

have demonstrated a blatant disrespect for 

intellectual property, which reduces their 

ability to increase international trade. They 

have a rapidly increasing population, are 

mired in a stratied culture, and struggle 

under the weight of an oppressive governmental bureaucracy. Pakistan and India will 

be convenient scapegoats for one another 

during the foreseeable future. The presence 

of nuclear weapons on both sides complicates the situation signicantly.

Israel and the Middle East: 

Peace in this region seems implausible. However, with the exception of Iraq, 

the likelihood of a major economic disruption in the region is small.

North Korea: 

North Korea is in dire economic 

straits. Their economy is poised on the 

brink of collapse. It is difcult to judge 

what will happen there. In the absence 

of any signicant ideological or economic 

change, they will continue to fall further 

and further behind the rest of the world. 

Aggression on their part to counteract their 

economic failure is not out of the question.

Former Soviet Union: 

Each of these nations has its individual problems. Most political entities 

are saddled with the yoke of bureaucracy 

from the failed communistic experiment. 

If these nations can successfully transform 

themselves into market economies under 

the rule of law, they will succeed and 

prosper. Unfortunately, vestigial bureaucratic structures have transformed themselves into a culture of organized, almost 

legitimized, graft and corruption. Unless 

property rights are ensured, these states are 

doomed to failure and will likely attempt 

to blame this failure on the market economies of the world. This region will also 

suffer from capital ight; both physical and 

human (brain drain). Due to the limited 

resources available to the countries, con-

icts here will most likely be regional. This 

region is in possession of tremendous natural resources that have largely been squandered by ill-advised government policies.

Sub-Saharan Africa: 

Crushed by disease, corruption, 

internal and regional strife, this region may 

never see sustained economic development. 

In general, these countries are too weak and 

overcome by internal conict to affect the 

rest of the world.

Most Likely Situation in 2015:

While the world will still be subject to 

the business cycle, the general trend will 

remain one of continued economic growth. 

The major economies of the world will 

grow fastest. The United States will remain 

the dominant economy. Europe will benet from the European Union. Japan will 

eventually correct its economic missteps 

and continue to grow. 

An individual nations’ economic 

growth will depend upon adherence to free 

market and trade principles. The rule of 

law and respect for property rights are the 

key to development and growth. The international economic hierarchy demonstrates 

this fact. Growth, derived from these very 

principles, will be greatest in the largest 

economies. 

The greatest instability will occur 

in the third quartile of the global economic 

distribution. Countries at the lower extreme 

of the economic spectrum will be too weak 

to disrupt the global economy. Regions 

of conict will be characterized by nations 

having the potential for increased growth 

but stymied by governmental policies and 

interference. The increase in global information will cause dissatisfaction in their 

populations and may lead to local and 

regional altercations.

Alternative Scenarios:

Sustained Global Economic Recession:

While a sustained global economic 

recession is highly unlikely, recession in 

the United States, the European Union or 

Japan may spread to other countries. Normally, free-oating international monetary 

exchange rates help prevent the full impact 

of recessions from spreading across international borders. However, the European 

Monetary Union eliminates this cushion. 

In addition, many smaller countries nd it 

in their best interests to link their currencies 

to one of the primary international currencies. As a result, a recession in the primary 

currency area could spread to every country using that currency as its standard. Sustained recessions are more likely to occur in 

Japan or in the European Union as opposed 

to the United States. This risk stems from 

their changing demographic structure and 

draining governmental social support structures. 

Major Middle East Conict:

The risk of a major religious 

upheaval in the Middle East is always a 

potential threat to global stability. While 

this will cause a temporary energy crisis, 

there are enough alternative oil sources 

worldwide to compensate. It may be dif-

cult for the U.S. to avoid entanglement in 

such a situation. Water crises in this region 

are also a signicant danger.

Failure of China or India to Sustain 

Growth:

Either of these situations is possible and should be monitored closely. If 
42

economic growth falters and unrest ensues, 

a major regional conict could develop 

especially if a country acts externally to 

pass the blame for its troubles.

Regional Factionalization:

While free trade increases the welfare of all countries involved, regional free 

trade agreements may potentially undermine global free trade. To the extent 

that regional free trade agreements increase 

trade, the world is better off. If regional 

agreements divert trade from one region 

to another, net international welfare may 

decrease.

It is likely that regional free trade 

agreements will be trade increasing since 

countries already tend to trade with those 

countries in geographic proximity to themselves. However, any trade diversions 

could cause regional tensions and may 

result in trade wars, or worse. Global tensions would be diminished to the extent 

that the WTO can help avoid these situations.

If regional factionalzation occurs, 

the expectation is that political tensions 

will increase. This has the potential to 

spread into other regional trade zones. With 

increased globalization, countries will have 

closer economic ties than political ties. 

International trade regions will become 

more of a factor in international politics. 

The European Union is an excellent example, particularly with respect to its relationship with NATO.

Physics &Nuclear/

Radiological Science:

Lt Col Geoff McHarg

Major Mike Dearborn

Capt Andy Dills

Introduction

The Institute for National Security 

Studies (INSS) tasked our panel to provide 

the Physics and Nuclear/Radiological input 

for a study who’s objective is to “... identify a broad range of interdisciplinary global 

trends, and the resultant technology issues, 

affecting the arms control environment in 

the year 2015.” This resulting report tries 

to answer that tasking while straying a bit 

into technology investment recommendations that are perhaps more appropriate for 

a future trends in defense technology rather 

than arms control technology study. 

We decided not to summarize and 

revisit the basic ideas presented in other 

future trend reports, but rather concentrate 

on important scientic trends and technologies that we feel have not been given suf-

cient attention in these ne documents. 

We do however recommend the reader 

to the Central Intelligence Agency report 

“Global Trends 2015: A Dialog About the 

Future with Nongovernmental Experts,” 

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/

globaltrends2015/, and to a somewhat lesser 

degree the Air Force 2025 Study, http:/

/www.maxwell.af.mil/au/2025/. To some 

extent this decision renders our report 

somewhat narrow in focus, and some would 

say low in probability. We understand 

and accept this criticism, but believe this 

narrow focus allows us to contribute something new to the “future studies” type document, which All Our Tomorrows certainly 

is. 

We understand and assume that familiar 

technologies under consideration are important, and will be developed--we simply 

choose not to discus these in this report. 

Such technologies include Hyperspectral 

sensors, Moving Target Indicator (MTI) 

to include various radar and electro-optic 

sensors, Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) 

guided munitions and the directed energy 

weapons such as the Airborne Laser 

(ABL). 

To explore these scientic trends and 

technologies we use two basic example scenarios. The rst of the two scenarios is is 

a decrease in effective world governance, 

followed with a dramatic increase in global 

terrorism. The second is a rising East/West 

tension and possible conict with Sinoforces. These scenarios are not seen as particularly probable, but do allow a convenient forum for discussion of the trends and 

technologies we have selected for study. In 

particular both scenarios present asymmetric challenges to the United States in terms 

of arms control and defense. We feel that 

such asymmetric challenges will be ever 

more probable as other countries and organizations come to understand they cannot 

compete with the United States on our 

terms. 

Overarching both of these scenarios 

is a common scientic thread, which we 

feel has not been given enough consideration. Global climate change will become 

an important driver in the geo-political climate in the next 15-20 years. We begin 

by discussing the basic science associated 

with global warming, and then turn to how 

it effects the security situation around the 

globe

. 

Basic Science Trends--Global 

warming

The basic science behind the greenhouse effect of the atmosphere has been 

understood since the time of the French scientist Jean-Baptist Fourier in 1827. The 

idea behind the greenhouse effect is that 

long-wave (infrared) radiation emitted from 

the earth which has been warmed by the 

visible portions of the suns light is absorbed 

and re-emitted by the so called greenhouse 

gases in the atmosphere. Water vapor, 

carbon dioxide (CO2 ), methane (CH4), and 

nitrous oxide (N2O) are called greenhouse 

gasses because they mimic the function 

of glass in a greenhouse, the effectively 

reect long-wave radiation (heat) back to 

the Earth. Incorporating their concentration in the atmosphere and their relative 

“insulating” characteristics can compare 

the importance of the greenhouse gasses. 

When this is accomplished water vapor 

is found to be the dominant greenhouse 

gas. While human activity causes on small 

changes in the concentration of water vapor, 

the anthropogenic (human activity) increase 

on the other greenhouse gasses are substantial. Indeed as early as 1896 a Swedish chemist named Svante Arrhenius calcu-
43

lated the effect on the global average temperature if the dominant greenhouse gas 

of carbon dioxide were doubled. Today 

this increase in carbon dioxide and other 

greenhouse gasses is understood to be due 

to human industrial activity, especially the 

burning of fossil fuels. An excellent primer 

on the basic science can be found in “Global 

Warming” by John Houghton.1 

The increases in global carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere are 

readily detectable from both ground and 

space based observations. The increase of 

carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere from roughly 280 parts per million 

by volume (ppmv) in the pre-industrial era 

of 1700 to over 360 ppmv today can be 

deduced from the historical record. These 

results are determined through a combination of ice core measurements made in 

Antarctica and direct measurements made 

at the Mauna Loa observatory in Hawaii.2

Indeed a recent report comparing global 

infrared measurements made by two similar 

instruments, which ew on spacecraft 27 

years apart (1971 and 1998), reveal a global 

increase in CO2 concentrations seen in the 

outgoing longwave radiation of approximately 0.6%.3

 

There is little argument among 

the scientic community that increases in 

atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 

gasses will eventually be accompanied by 

increases in temperature. Whether these 

increases in temperature can currently be 

detected above the natural variation of such 

measurements is less well resolved. Reasonable people disagree on our current ability to detect global warming resulting from 

increases in greenhouse gasses. The most 

recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 

Change (IPCC) report issued in 1995 is 

worth stating in full.4

“Our ability to quantify the human 

inuence of global climate is currently limited because the expected 

signal is still emerging from the 

noise of natural climate variability, and because there are uncertainties in key factors. These 

include the magnitude and patterns of long-term variability and 

the time-evolving pattern of forcing by, and response to, changes in 

the concentrations of greenhouse 

gasses and aerosols, and land surface changes. Nevertheless, the 

balance of evidence suggests a discernable inuence on global climate.

If uncertainties and disagreements are 

present with regards to the current ability to 

detect global warming they abound when it 

comes to the ability to predict what longerterm effects will be on the global climate. 

Indeed recent studies indicate that the full 

effect of global warming due to increases 

already in the atmosphere may not be evident for another 20 years.5

 This is mainly 

due to the complicated problem associated 

with modeling the global climate. A successful model must contain all the important physics that describes the sources, sinks 

and interactions of different greenhouse 

gasses. For instance both the soil and the 

ocean serve as a very large, but dynamic, 

source and sink for carbon dioxide, with 

proper modeling of the biota (living organisms) required for both ecosystems. Modeling of the biota is an example of the importance of feedback mechanisms to understanding this problem. 

Since water can absorb carbon dioxide, carbonated drinks prove this point, the 

upper 100 meters or so of the oceans serve 

as a very important sink for CO2. However full three-dimensional modeling of the 

ocean is required to properly include the 

effects of mixing of this upper surface water 

with the much deeper oceans. When this 

modeling is accomplished we nd a positive feedback mechanism indicated such 

that increased temperatures reduce the ability of both the soil and oceans to absorb 

CO2, thus increasing the future warming by 

some 10-20%.6 This is just one example of 

the difculties associated with attempting 

to resolve the effect of increases of anthropogenic greenhouse gasses. 

Importance of climate change as a global 

geo-political driver 

Given the uncertainties in the modeling, in addition to the politically charged 

nature of the global warming controversy 

the logical question to ask is why worry 

about including it in All Our Tomorrows? 

The simple answer is that the potential 

effects of climate change directly effect the 

geo-political global scene. In addition 

there is little scientic dissent that such 

changes will come, the arguments occur 

on the rapidity and the location of these 

effects. 

Global climate change is more than 

simply raising the average temperature 

around the world. Distinct effects have 

already been identied which greatly complicate the regional assessment of political 

and economic trends and the military 

futures of those regions. Figure 1 shows 

the results of two different models, which 

show the geographic distribution of temperature increases.7

 The upper panel of Figure 

1 shows the results of a transient fully coupled atmosphere-ocean general circulation

model (TAOGCM, the state of the art in 

such models) run for the year 2000. The 

colorbar on the right of the panel shows the 

change in the temperature in degrees Celsius from start of the model. The lower 

panel shows a more simple (more computer 

efcient) model run for the same radiative 

forcing and time period. While the interested reader is referred to the article the 

lower panel can be thought of as the geographical distribution of temperatures in 

approximately 2020. Notice that most of 

the temperature increases are in the higher 

latitudes, and have regional variations. In 

conjunction with increased temperatures 

are changes in sea level, fresh water precipitation, runoff, and eventually soil moisture. 

The results of these changes to future geopolitical calculations can be appreciable. 

Consider for instance one of the primary 

drivers considered in the CIA Global Trends 

2015 report.9 In the Natural Resources 

and Environment section the report predicted that overall food and energy supplies 

would be adequate on the global level, but 

poor infrastructure and distribution, political instability and chronic poverty would 

lead to regional imbalances (especially in 

Sub-Saharan Africa). They further point 

out that in contrast to food and energy 

fresh “water scarcities and allocation will 

pose signicant challenges to governments 

in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, 

South Asia, and northern China. Regional 

...the potential effects of climate change directly effect 

the geo-political global 

scene.
44

tensions over water will be heightened by 

2015.” This assessment apparently does not 

consider any effect from global climate 

change. 

We suggest that given the current state of 

scientic knowledge, continued ignorance 

of the regional effects of global climate 

Type of Effect Primary Results of Effect Primary regions affected

Sea Level Rise Flooding of delta regions Netherlands, Bangladesh,

Eastern China, Central US

Increased precipitation/runoff Flooding in some places, 

 increasd crop porduction n others South East Asia, high latitudes in 

Winter

Decreased precipitation/runoff Drought or desertication Central US, Southwestern Europe

Sub-Saharan Africa

change on future world scenarios is unwarranted and ill advised. 

Two scenarios to introduce technology 

trends

We turn now to some specic technologies 

we think merit attention with respect to 

the arms control and international security 

environment of 2015. We report 

on advances in electromagnetic 

compression in basic nuclear 

physics in our rst scenario, 

which deals with an increase in 

global terrorism. We then follow 

this with a scenario describing a 

possible conict with China, and 

detail how emerging technologies may fundamentally change 

the security status in such a con-

ict. In particular we concentrate on the enabling technologies of MicroElecroMechanical 

Systems (MEMs) for development of highly miniaturized sensors. In addition we feel broadband free space communications and directed energy weaponry may allow signicant 

advances in Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicles (UAV’s). These three 

enabling technologies were 

chosen because they have not 

been given premier status in 

other reports, and we believe 

they are as important as other 

more familiar technologies.

Decrease in effective world governance, followed with a dramatic increase in global terrorism

Assumptions: Governance in some currently nuclear capable countries deteriorates 

to the level where terrorist organizations 

acting in concert with criminal groups can 

obtain small amounts of ssile material, 

entire nuclear devices or other materials 

required for weapons of mass destruction.

While this is an admittedly small 

probability scenario we chose it because 

it points out the fundamentally different 

problems associated with proliferation 

when a non-governmental organization is 

the one developing or using a weapon of 

mass destruction. 

When we assume that terrorists can 

obtain either some small amounts of ssile 

material, or worse yet an actual device, the 

proliferation problem is radically changed. 

We move from prevention of obtaining the 

technology, to produce the ssile materials and then the device, to a problem of 

how to prevent use of the device. This 

appears to be a much more challenging 

problem. 

For instance delivery of a device 

is eased for the terrorist when one can 

attempt to sneak it into the target country 

on ship or truck. While our group claims 

no expertise in the area of nuclear device 

detection, research into detection technologies suitable for use in ports; rail crossings and road entry points are clearly 

important. Such research should be immediately started in not currently underway. 

In addition even small amounts of ssile material can potentially be very devastating when considering the contamination they could cause. A conventional 

explosive on the order of the Oklahoma 

City bomb (approximately 1 ton of TNT) 

combined with powdered ssile material 

would cause a large contamination problem. Indeed one can envision a terrorist 

using a slightly larger conventional explosive at the waste storage facility of a commercial nuclear plant to achieve the same 

effect. 

Figure 1 from Wetherald et al., 2001, 

Plate 1

Table 18 identies several of the associated water related effects of global climate 

change, the positive or negative impact, and 

the regions most susceptible to that particular type of change. 
45

While advances in basic nuclear physics are high tech they continue to offer the 

possibility of sub-critical or even critical 

explosions with extremely small masses of 

ssile material. Most of these ideas rely 

upon the basic idea that the critical mass 

for a nuclear explosion scales with density 

( ) as ~ .10 Thus the normal requirement 

for approximately 16 kg for an unreected 

Solid liner implosions are typically hollow 

shell z or theta pinches which use the mass 

of the liner to prevent vaporization during 

the implosion. Problems with such implosions include that a spherical implosion is 

difcult to achieve, and nonuniformities in 

the implosion can cause the compression 

to tear apart. Such difculties have been 

overcome however, with reports of greater 

than 6 times solid density being achieved 

for a small portion of the implosion.15 In 

addition the use of a hot hydrogen working 

uid has been theoretically investigated. 

“The advantages of a working uid include 

decoupling of outer implosion uniformities 

from the central implosion and the possibility of transferring non-spherical liner 

energy onto a spherical target.”16

While such experiments are certainly futuristic, and currently require large 

complex experimental apparatus, the possibility exists of using explosively driven 

magnetic ux compression generators to 

drive them. These generators take chemical 

explosive energy and turn it into a one shot 

high current electrical pulse of energy perfect for running such an implosion. Indeed 

Mokhov discussed calculations of a spherical shell liner driven in such a manner and 

presented experimental evidence that such 

investigations were underway in the Soviet 

Union in 1979.17

Even more exotic are ideas to use 

a small number of antiprotons to catalyze 

a subcritical microssion/fusion device.18 

While the device was intended to serve as 

the power source for a high thrust, high ISP 

outer solar system space drive, the quoted 

results are a terrorist’s dream. The calculated yield was 390 GJ (0.1kT, or about 

100 Oklahoma City bombs), with 98% of 

the energy released in prompt radiation and 

neutron kinetic energy. The actual device 

design used only 3 grams of nuclear fuel 

(molar ratio of 9:1 DT:U235).19

The reader should understand we 

do not project such devices being available 

to the common, or even uncommon terrorist, by 2015. However even small advances 

in technology might signicantly reduce 

the amount of ssile material required to 

make a particularly nasty terrorist weapon. 

After all the best terrorist weapon is one 

that kills a moderate number of people, 

leaves a huge cleanup mess, and leaves 

more people alive to be afraid of further 

terrorist actions. 

This section was intended to lead 

the reader to consider whether conventional arms control techniques are appropriate when considering use of nuclear and 

nuclear related weapons by a non governmental organization who’s main intent is 

the spreading of terror. This discussion 

indicates that mitigation effects after the 

fact of such a terror attack are prudent, and 

research on decontamination techniques in 

urban areas is warranted. 

Rising East/West tension and possible con-

ict with Sino-forces 

Our second scenario is more closely related 

to the international security environment of 

2015. 

Assumptions: Greatly increased 

tensions between the West and China, 

resulting in a conventional, but very asymmetric, war on either the mainland (more 

probably Korea or less probably the border 

with the former Soviet Union and us being 

dragged into the conict) or across the 

South China Sea with Taiwan. 

In either case the resulting conict 

would be very challenging for the United 

States. History indicates that the Chinese 

would use large numbers of moderately 

trained troops equipped with moderately 

sophisticated weaponry. In both examples 

we would be have very little room for 

defense in depth, and are forced into trying 

to stop an attack before it is delivered 

home. 

Planning for this type of war has 

been very taxing for the United States. Our 

forces in Korea and Japan are structured 

so we can withhold such an attack for a 

sufcient time to bring follow-on forces to 

the region and prevail by cutting the lines 

of communication on the Korean peninsula. An attack across the Sea of China 

into Taiwan is much more problematic for 

us. We have little in the way of dedicated 

forces available, and the distances and terrain involved are much more in China’s 

favor. 

To overcome these disadvantages, 

while minimizing a build up in US longterm dedicated forces, requires a breakthrough in the way we plan for such a 

conict. One possible solution is the use of 

an unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) 

with variable payloads suitable for missions 

ranging from surveillance, suppression of 

enemy air defense, strike and interdiction, 

air superiority, and missile intercept. 

The required technologies for 

many of the engineering challenges of 

UAV’s have been reported on in past studies. In this report we choose to explore 

the new scientic breakthrough technologies related to possible payloads for 

these UAV’s. Specially we discuss the 

enabling technologies of MicroElecroMechanical Systems (MEMs), broadband free 

space communications, and directed energy 

weapons. We will not discuss these technologies in great detail, but choose to pro-
46

vide references to work being done in these 

areas. We end this brief discussion with 

a possible scenario, showing how the technologies are related, and can have a potentially revolutionary effect on the battleeld 

of 2015. 

MEMs are given a good description on the DARPA webpage.20

MEMS to date have evolved from the fabrication technologies used for semiconductor devices. The ability of MEMS to gather 

and process information, compute a course 

of action, and control the environment or a 

macro system through actuators increases 

the affordability, functionality, and performance of smart systems. The enhanced 

capability of smart systems enabled by 

MEMS increasingly will be the product 

differentiator of the 21st century, pacing 

the level both of defense and commercial 

competitiveness.

Advances in MEMs technology 

are extremely rapid right now. The commercial market due to the many civilian 

applications is fueling these advances. We 

project their advancement to be very rapid, 

and bring about a fundamental change in 

the size and capability of future sensors and 

weapon systems. Indeed it is possible to 

envision entire sensor packages on the hundreds of micron scale size. Such sensors 

would probably have one designated mission, but due to their small size and cost 

literally thousands of the sensors could be 

carried in a macroscopic payload. One 

could envision saturation of critical areas 

with miniaturized sensors or weapons for 

specic applications. 

One of the advantages of a UCAV 

is that it can be made smaller since there 

is no longer the restriction of being able 

to put a human in the aircraft. Miniaturization of the systems onboard the UCAV 

are a driving factor in increasing capability while reducing the mass and volume. 

We believe that MEMs represent a major 

change in the way weapon systems of the 

future will be developed. 

The second critical technology 

is broadband free space communications. 

Global Hawk, a current experimental UAV, 

has a line of sight communications bandwidth of approximately 274 megabits per 

second, and a SATCOM bandwidth of only 

50 megabits per second using a Ku band 

system.21 Such a capability while seemingly impressive is actually far short of 

what is required. A live feed at standard 

TV frame rates (30 frames per second) 

with a 1000x1000 array sensor digitized 

at 12 bits is seen to be approximately 360 

megabits per second. A useful reconnaissance platform will need the capability to 

support several such data feeds over long 

distances. A bare bones requirement would 

seem to be in the realm of several gigabits 

per second per platform. Current technology is approaching this mark over limited 

ranges using laser communication techniques.22 While none on our panel claims 

expertise in such technology it seems to 

be a critical limiting technology in getting 

people out of the cockpits of future aircraft. 

The nal technology area we 

briey discuss is that of directed energy. 

Currently the Air Force is elding the rst 

airborne laser (ABL) weapons system. The 

rst generation device relies on a chemical 

oxygen iodine laser mounted in a 747 aircraft capable of several hundred kilometers range.23 These systems were designed 

specically to provide a limited defense 

against theater missiles, and are scheduled 

to come into the force in 2007. One limiting factor on the range of the ABL is 

correction for atmospheric turbulence, and 

atmospheric absorption. 

In addition to the use of Infrared 

(IR) lasers, is the possibility of both 

non-lethal and lethal microwave weapons. 

These weapons use a short pulse of current 

to drive a very high power microwave generator. Such an arrangement is very suited 

for use with an explosive magneto cumulative generator discussed in the previous section. In this manner a microwave weapon 

would turn the energy in explosives into 

electromagnetic energy which could be 

used to destroy enemy radar, electronic 

surveillance equipment etc. This type of 

weapon might allow very small munitions 

for use in SEAD missions. 

The common thread behind the 

technologies is the development of a multipayload UCAV for remote power projection around the world. Such an aircraft 

would be designed to be very stealthy, and 

extremely high-ying (technology to support long duration aircraft at ~35,000m is 

currently being discussed by NASA24) in 

order to defeat the capabilities of current 

and future air defense technology. MEMs 

would be used extensively in the onboard 

systems and payloads in order to minimize 

the size of the aircraft. Specialized micron 

sized sensors would be dropped from the 

UCAV and be used to provide passive insitu intelligence estimates within the enemy 

country. These would be one-use nanosensors that would be almost impossible to 

nd, negate or jam due to their size and 

number. 

Wide bandwidth would be required 

to allow full two-way data transfers which 

would include multi-sensor feeds for the 

nano-sensors as well as control inputs for 

the UCAV from the remote operations site. 

The great circle distance between the central US and the Chinese coast is approximately 10,600 km. Assuming the UCAV 

range can be extended over that of Global 

Hawk by approximately a factor of 4 would 

allow central positioning of the UCAV 

assets within the US. This is true global 

reach, no forward deployment, no last 

minute redeployment, no refueling, just nd 

and then strike the target and go home. 

One technology obstacle to overcome is the travel time of radio waves from 

the central US around the world. The 

round trip time to and from geo-synchronous orbit is on the order of 0.3 seconds, 

which might preclude remote combat operations. A string of high-ying communications relay UAV’s could reduce this 

travel time 0.07 seconds to any point on 

the globe. Such a relay system would 

require the wide bandwidth discussed 

above. We anticipate some sort of cryptography using quantum or chaotic principles 

will need to be developed to provide secure 

communications.25-26

Once hostilities had broken out, 

both SEAD, strike and air superiority functions would be required. The SEAD 

missions would best be served with and 

explosively driven microwave weapon 

which would act as an “EMP bomb” to 

take out enemy acquisition radars. The 

air superiority functions using a UCAV 

would be signicantly different from that 

of manned aircraft. Rather than engaging 

enemy forces one on one in a traditional 

maneuver engagement followed by ring a 

missile or gun at the enemy27, the UCAV 

would be used to shape the air combat by 

employing its enhanced altitude and stealth 

characteristics to remain unseen and unassailable. 

Strikes on enemy airelds and 
47

supply depots would be the best way for 

the UCAV to gain air superiority. The best 

way to take out enemy aircraft is before 

they launch. Reality however dictates that 

some enemy will have to be destroyed in 

the air. To do this the UCAV could use a 

very small stealthy gravity assisted munition to take out enemy aircraft. Assuming 

the UCAV can remain unseen it can position itself with respect to the enemy so that 

it can “drop” an aerobody munition on the 

enemy aircraft. This weapon would use 

the energy gained from dropping from the 

UCAV altitude to maneuver horizontally 

so it is behind the enemy ight. When 

at the proper altitude, the munition would 

explode into several small passively guided 

terminally powered missiles and take out 

the enemy aircraft. Such a scenario is more 

analogous to submarines shooting torpedoes at ships that never detected them, 

rather than traditional ghter maneuvers. 

The strike portion of the UCAV 

capability would also use the aerobody concept to maneuver the bomb during the terminal portion of its drop directly onto the 

target. These very precise strikes would 

allow the use of small advanced munitions 

to take out many targets at once. We 

expect increased energy would be required 

to kill shipping targets, which would reduce 

the numbers of weapons that could be carried in each aerobody munition for these 

missions. 

The nal mission we envision for 

the UCAV is as a relay platform for an 

ABL. As mentioned before the limiting 

factors on ABL range are atmospheric turbulence and 

atmospheric attenuation. Both of these 

effects will be reduced in the reduced density of the upper atmosphere where the 

UCAV will be ying. If this proves to be 

the case then the ABL can afford to standoff 

at a further range, reducing its vulnerability to enemy forces, and increasing the area 

it can protect. Such a relay system would 

consist of a sensor package extending the 

detection range for the ABL, a deformable 

mirror system that intercepts the beam from 

the ABL, and a small onboard laser system 

needed to probe the atmosphere between 

the UCAV and the target. Obviously this 

kind of relay system would entail more risk 

than simply using the ABL by itself, and 

use of an unmanned vehicle for the “target” 

vehicle on the relay might be warranted. 

Conclusions

In this report we have looked at the 

important general scientic trend of global 

warming, and the enabling technologies of 

MicroElecroMechanical Systems (MEMS), 

broad band free space communications, and 

directed energy weapons. Our principle 

recommendations for development of scientic research and technology developments in the arms control and international 

security arena of 2015 are:

Incorporation of global warming 

trends in future geo-political analyses

Technologies to detect nuclear 

devices in non conventional delivery systems such as ships and ground transports 

Radiological decontamination and 

cleanup technologies for urban areas

Continuing assessment of electromagnetic compression and other techniques 

which signicantly reduce the amount of 

ssile material needed for a nuclear device

Development of a high altitude 

UCAV capable of multiple missions using 

multiple payloads. The enabling technologies for this are: 

Development of MEMS for miniaturized one shot sensors and weapons

Development of broad band free 

space communications and associated cryptography

Development of one shot explosively driven microwave weapons

Development of aerobody munitions which convert gravitational potential 

energy into lift for horizontal maneuver

Development of a high energy 

laser relay system for a UCAV to extend 

the ABL range

END NOTES

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