1

Key Judgments

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of 

UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as 

well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it 

probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. 

Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq’s WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war 

starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. 

Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, 

energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; 

most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

• Iraq’s growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad’s capabilities to finance 

WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled.

• Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during 

Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure 

under the cover of civilian production. 

• Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is 

working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means 

to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents. 

• Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material 

to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. 

How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires 

sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.

• If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could 

make a nuclear weapon within a year. 

• Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a 

weapon until the last half of the decade. 

— Iraq’s aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are 

of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear 

weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. 

Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe 

that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.
2

— Based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire, a few tens of thousands of 

centrifuges would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a 

couple of weapons per year. 

Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably 

including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. Its capability was reduced during the 

UNSCOM inspections and is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the 

Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved.

• Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents. 

• The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and 

projectiles, and probably possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a 

limited number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds. 

All key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW 

program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they 

were before the Gulf wa r.

• Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly 

producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery 

by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially 

against the US Homeland. 

• Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent 

production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade 

detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to 

the Gulf war. 

Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including 

for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological 

warfare agents.

• Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of 

up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km. 

• Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, which are capable of 

flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit. 

• Baghdad’s UAVs—especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare 

(CBW) agents—could threaten Iraq’s neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and 

the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland. 

• Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign 

assistance in building specialized facilities. 
3

Discussion

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

In April 1991, the UN Security Council enacted Resolution 687 requiring Iraq to declare, 

destroy, or render harmless its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal and 

production infrastructure under UN or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

supervision. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 also demanded that Iraq 

forgo the future development or acquisition of WMD. 

Baghdad’s determination to hold onto a sizeable remnant of its WMD arsenal, agents, 

equipment, and expertise has led to years of dissembling and obstruction of UN 

inspections. Elite Iraqi security services orchestrated an extensive concealment and 

deception campaign to hide incriminating documents and material that precluded 

resolution of key issues pertaining to its WMD programs. 

• Iraqi obstructions prompted the Security Council to pass several subsequent 

resolutions demanding that Baghdad comply with its obligations to cooperate with the 

inspection process and to provide United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) 

and IAEA officials immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wished to 

inspect. 

• Although outwardly maintaining the facade of cooperation, Iraqi officials frequently 

denied or substantially delayed access to facilities, personnel, and documents in an 

effort to conceal critical information about Iraq’s WMD programs. 

Successive Iraqi declarations on Baghdad’s pre-Gulf war WMD programs gradually 

became more accurate between 1991 and 1998, but only because of sustained pressure 

from UN sanctions, Coalition military force, and vigorous and robust inspections 

facilitated by information from cooperative countries. Nevertheless, Iraq never has 

fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in its declarations and has 

provided no credible proof that it has completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles 

and production infrastructure . 

• UNSCOM inspection activities and Coalition military strikes destroyed most of its 

prohibited ballistic missiles and some Gulf war-era chemical and biological 

munitions, but Iraq still has a small force of extended-range Scud-variant missiles, 

chemical precursors, biological seed stock, and thousands of munitions suitable for 

chemical and biological agents. 

• Iraq has preserved and in some cases enhanced the infrastructure and expertise 

necessary for WMD production and has used that capability to maintain a stockpile of 

WMD and to increase its size and sophistication in some areas. 
4

UN Security Council Resolutions and Provisions for Inspections 

and Monitoring: Theory and Practice

Resolution Requirement Reality

Res. 687 (3 April 1991) Requires Iraq to declare, 

destroy, remove, or render harmless under UN or IAEA 

supervision and not to use, develop, construct, or 

acquire all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic 

missiles with ranges greater than 150 km, and all 

nuclear weapons-usable material, including related 

material, equipment, and facilities. The resolution also 

formed the Special Commission and authorized the 

IAEA to carry out immediate on-site inspections of 

WMD-related facilities based on Iraq’s declarations and 

UNSCOM’s designation of any additional locations.

Baghdad refused to declare all parts of each WMD 

program, submitted several declarations as part of its 

aggressive efforts to deny and deceive inspectors, and 

ensured that certain elements of the program would 

remain concealed. The prohibition against developing 

delivery platforms with ranges greater than 150 km 

allowed Baghdad to research and develop shorter-range 

systems with applications for longer-range systems and 

did not affect Iraqi efforts to convert full-size aircraft into 

unmanned aerial vehicles as potential WMD delivery 

systems with ranges far beyond 150 km.

Res. 707 (15 August 1991) Requires Iraq to allow UN 

and IAEA inspectors immediate and unrestricted access 

to any site they wish to inspect. Demands Iraq provide 

full, final, and complete disclosure of all aspects of its 

WMD programs; cease immediately any attempt to

conceal, move, or destroy WMD-related material or 

equipment; allow UNSCOM and IAEA teams to use 

fixed-wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq; and 

respond fully, completely, and promptly to any Special 

Commission questions or requests.

Baghdad in 1996 negotiated with UNSCOM Executive 

Chairman Ekeus modalities that it used to delay 

inspections, to restrict to four the number of inspectors 

allowed into any site Baghdad declared as “sensitive,” 

and to prohibit them altogether from sites regarded as 

sovereign. These modalities gave Iraq leverage over 

individual inspections. Iraq eventually allowed larger 

numbers of inspectors into such sites but only after 

lengthy negotiations at each site.

Res. 715 (11 October 1991) Requires Iraq to submit to 

UNSCOM and IAEA long-term monitoring of Iraqi WMD 

programs; approved detailed plans called for in 

UNSCRs 687 and 707 for long-term monitoring.

Iraq generally accommodated UN monitors at declared 

sites but occasionally obstructed access and 

manipulated monitoring cameras. UNSCOM and IAEA 

monitoring of Iraq’s WMD programs does not have a 

specified end date under current UN resolutions.

Res. 1051 (27 March 1996) Established the Iraqi 

export/import monitoring system, requiring UN members 

to provide IAEA and UNSCOM with information on 

materials exported to Iraq that may be applicable to 

WMD production, and requiring Iraq to report imports of 

all dual-use items.

Iraq is negotiating contracts for procuring—outside of 

UN controls—dual-use items with WMD applications. 

The UN lacks the staff needed to conduct thorough 

inspections of goods at Iraq’s borders and to monitor 

imports inside Iraq.

Res. 1060 (12 June 1996) and Resolutions 1115, 1134, 

1137, 1154, 1194, and 1205. Demands that Iraq 

cooperate with UNSCOM and allow inspection teams 

immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to 

facilities for inspection and access to Iraqi officials for 

interviews. UNSCR 1137 condemns Baghdad’s refusal 

to allow entry to Iraq to UNSCOM officials on the 

grounds of their nationality and its threats to the safety 

of UN reconnaissance aircraft.

Baghdad consistently sought to impede and limit 

UNSCOM’s mission in Iraq by blocking access to 

numerous facilities throughout the inspection process, 

often sanitizing sites before the arrival of inspectors and 

routinely attempting to deny inspectors access to 

requested sites and individuals. At times, Baghdad 

would promise compliance to avoid consequences, only 

to renege later.

Res. 1154 (2 March 1998) Demands that Iraq comply 

with UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and endorses the 

Secretary General’s memorandum of understanding with 

Iraq, providing for “severest consequences” if Iraq fails 

to comply.

Res. 1194 (9 September 1998) Condemns Iraq’s 

decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and the 

IAEA.

Res. 1205 (5 November 1998) Condemns Iraq’s 

decision to cease cooperation with UNSCOM.

UNSCOM could not exercise its mandate without Iraqi 

compliance. Baghdad refused to work with UNSCOM 

and instead negotiated with the Secretary General, 

whom it believed would be more sympathetic to Iraq’s 

needs.

Res. 1284 (17 December 1999) Established the United 

Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection 

Commission (UNMOVIC), replacing UNSCOM; and 

demanded that Iraq allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, 

unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all 

aspects of Iraq’s WMD program.

Iraq repeatedly has rejected the return of UN arms 

inspectors and claims that it has satisfied all UN 

resolutions relevant to disarmament. Compared with 

UNSCOM, 1284 gives the UNMOVIC chairman less 

authority, gives the Security Council a greater role in 

defining key disarmament tasks, and requires that 

inspectors be full-time UN employees.
5

Since December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as required 

by the Security Council resolutions. Technical monitoring systems installed by the UN at 

known and suspected WMD and missile facilities in Iraq no longer operate. Baghdad 

prohibits Security Council-mandated monitoring overflights of Iraqi facilities by UN 

aircraft and helicopters. Similarly, Iraq has curtailed most IAEA inspections since 1998, 

allowing the IAEA to visit annually only a very small number of sites to safeguard Iraq's 

stockpile of uranium oxide.

In the absence of inspectors, Baghdad’s already considerable ability to work on 

prohibited programs without risk of discovery has increased, and there is 

substantial evidence that Iraq is reconstituting prohibited programs. Baghdad’s 

vigorous concealment efforts have meant that specific information on many aspects 

of Iraq’s WMD programs is yet to be uncovered. Revelations after the Gulf war 

starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. 

• Limited insight into activities since 1998 clearly show that Baghdad has used the 

absence of UN inspectors to repair and expand dual-use and dedicated missiledevelopment facilities and to increase its ability to produce WMD. 

Nuclear Weapons Program

More than ten years of sanctions and the loss of much of Iraq’s physical nuclear 

infrastructure under IAEA oversight have not diminished Saddam’s interest in acquiring 

or developing nuclear weapons. 

• Iraq’s efforts to procure tens of thousands of proscribed high-strength aluminum 

tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking 

nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment 

program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some 

believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventiona l weapons programs.

Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that 

focused on building an implosion-type weapon using highly enriched uranium. Baghdad 

was attempting a variety of uranium enrichment techniques, the most successful of which 

were the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge programs. After 

its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq initiated a crash program to divert IAEA-safeguarded, highly 

enriched uranium from its Soviet and French-supplied reactors, but the onset of hostilities 

ended this effort. Iraqi declarations and the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process revealed 

much of Iraq’s nuclear weapons efforts, but Baghdad still has not provided complete 

information on all aspects of its nuclear weapons program.

• Iraq has withheld important details relevant to its nuclear program, including 

procurement logs, technical documents, experimental data, accounting of materials, 

and foreign assistance. 
6

• Baghdad also continues to withhold other data about enrichment techniques, foreign 

procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraqi security services in concealing its 

nuclear facilities and activities. 

• In recent years, Baghdad has diverted goods contracted under the Oil-for-Food 

Program for military purposes and has increased solicitations and dual-use 

procurements—outside the Oil-for-Food process—some of which almost certainly are 

going to prohibited WMD and other weapons programs. Baghdad probably uses 

some of the money it gains through its illicit oil sales to support its WMD efforts.

Before its departure from Iraq, the IAEA made significant strides toward dismantling 

Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and unearthing the nature and scope of Iraq’s past 

nuclear activities. In the absence of inspections, however, most analysts assess that Iraq 

is reconstituting its nuclear program—unraveling the IAEA’s hard-earned 

accomplishments.

Iraq retains its cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians, its program documentation, and 

sufficient dual-use manufacturing capabilities to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons 

program. Iraqi media have reported numerous meetings between Saddam and nuclear 

scientists over the past two years, signaling Baghdad’s continued interest in reviving a 

nuclear program.

Iraq’s expanding international trade provides growing access to nuclear-related 

technology and materials and potential access to foreign nuclear expertise. An increase 

in dual-use procurement activity in recent years may be supporting a reconstituted 

nuclear weapons program. 

• The acquisition of sufficient fissile material is Iraq’s principal hurdle in developing a 

nuclear weapon. 

• Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a 

deliverable nuclear weapon until the last half of this decade . Baghdad could 

produce a nuclear weapon within a year if it were able to procure weaponsgrade fissile material abroad. 

Baghdad may have acquired uranium enrichment capabilities that could shorten 

substantially the amount of time necessary to make a nuclear weapon.
7
8

Chemical Warfare Program

Iraq has the ability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents within its chemical 

industry, although it probably depends on external sources for some precursors. 

Baghdad is expanding its infrastructure, under cover of civilian industries, that it 

could use to advance its CW agent production capability. During the 1980s Saddam 

had a formidable CW capability that he used against Iranians and against Iraq’s Kurdish 

population. Iraqi forces killed or injured more than 20,000 people in multiple attacks, 

delivering chemical agents (including mustard agent1 and the nerve agents sarin and 

tabun2) in aerial bombs, 122mm rockets, and artillery shells against both tactical military 

targets and segments of Iraq’s Kurdish population. Before the 1991 Gulf war, Baghdad 

had a large stockpile of chemical munitions and a robust indigenous production capacity. 

Documented Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons

Date Area Used Type of Agent Approximate 

Casualties

Target 

Population

Aug 1983 Hajj Umran Mustard fewer than 100 Iranians/Kurds

Oct-Nov 1983 Panjwin Mustard 3,000 Iranian/Kurds

Feb-Mar 1984 Majnoon Island Mustard 2,500 Iranians

Mar 1984 al-Basrah Tabun 50 to 100 Iranians

Mar 1985 Hawizah Marsh Mustard/Tabun 3,000 Iranians

Feb 1986 al-Faw Mustard/Tabun 8,000 to 10,000 Iranians

Dec 1986 Umm ar Rasas Mustard thousands Iranians

Apr 1987 al-Basrah Mustard/Tabun 5,000 Iranians

Oct 1987 Sumar/Mehran Mustard/nerve agents 3,000 Iranians

Mar 1988 Halabjah Mustard/nerve agents hundreds Iranians/Kurds

 

1

 Mustard is a blister agent that causes medical casualties by blistering or burning exposed skin, eyes, 

lungs, and mucus membranes within hours of exposure. It is a persistent agent that can remain a hazard for 

days.

2

 Sarin, cyclosarin, and tabun are G-series nerve agents that can act within seconds of absorption through 

the skin or inhalation. These agents overstimulate muscles or glands with messages transmitted from 

nerves, causing convulsions and loss of consciousness. Tabun is persistent and can remain a hazard for 

days. Sarin and cyclosarin are not persistent and pose more of an inhalation hazard than a skin hazard. 
9
10

Although precise information is lacking, human rights organizations have received 

plausible accounts from Kurdish villagers of even more Iraqi chemical attacks against 

civilians in the 1987 to 1988 time frame—with some attacks as late as October 1988—in 

areas close to the Iranian and Turkish borders.

• UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than 40,000 chemical munitions, nearly 

500,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of chemical precursors, and seven 

different types of delivery systems, including ballistic missile warheads. 

More than 10 years after the Gulf war, gaps in Iraqi accounting and current production 

capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains a stockpile of chemical agents, probably 

VX,3 sarin, cyclosarin, 4 and mustard. 

• Iraq probably has concealed precursors, production equipment, documentation, 

and other items necessary for continuing its CW effort. Baghdad never supplied 

adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its CW agents and 

munitions. Thousands of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of 

unfilled munitions, including Scud-variant missile warheads, remain unaccounted for.

• UNSCOM discovered a document at Iraqi Air Force headquarters in July 1998

showing that Iraq overstated by at least 6,000 the number of chemical bombs it told 

the UN it had used during the Iran-Iraq War—bombs that remain are unaccounted for. 

• Iraq has not accounted for 15,000 artillery rockets that in the past were its preferred 

means for delivering nerve agents, nor has it accounted for about 550 artillery shells 

filled with mustard agent. 

• Iraq probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 

MT of CW agents.

Baghdad continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could 

divert quickly to CW production. The best examples are the chlorine and phenol plants 

at the Fallujah II facility. Both chemicals have legitimate civilian uses but also are raw 

materials for the synthesis of precursor chemicals used to produce blister and nerve 

agents. Iraq has three other chlorine plants that have much higher capacity for civilian 

production; these plants and Iraqi imports are more than sufficient to meet Iraq’s civilian 

 

3

 VX is a V-series nerve agent that is similar to but more advanced than G-series nerve agents in that it 

causes the same medical effects but is more toxic and much more persistent. Thus, it poses a far greater 

skin hazard than G-series agents. VX could be used for long-term contamination of territory.

4

 See footnote 5.
11

needs for water treatment. Of the 15 million kg of chlorine imported under the UN Oilfor-Food Program since 1997, Baghdad used only 10 million kg and has 5 million kg in 

stock, suggesting that some domestically produced chlorine has been diverted to such 

proscribed activities as CW agent production. 

• Fallujah II was one of Iraq’s principal CW precursor production facilities before the 

Gulf war. In the last two years the Iraqis have upgraded the facility and brought in 

new chemical reactor vessels and shipping containers with a large amount of 

production equipment. They have expanded chlorine output far beyond pre-Gulf war 

production levels—capabilities that can be diverted quickly to CW production. Iraq 

is seeking to purchase CW agent precursors and applicable production equipment and 

is trying to hide the activities of the Fallujah plant.
12
13

Biological Warfare Program 

Iraq has the capability to convert quickly legitimate vaccine and biopesticide plants 

to biological warfare (BW) production and already may have done so. This 

capability is particularly troublesome because Iraq has a record of concealing its BW 

activities and lying about the existence of its offensive BW program.

After four years of claiming that they had conducted only “small-scale, defensive”

research, Iraqi officials finally admitted to inspectors in 1995 to production and 

weaponization of biological agents. The Iraqis admitted this only after being faced with 

evidence of their procurement of a large volume of growth media and the defection of 

Husayn Kamil, former director of Iraq’s military industries. 
14
15

Iraqi-Acknowledged Open-Air Testing of Biological Weapons

Location-Date Agent Munition

Al Muhammadiyat – Mar 1988 Bacillus subtilis5250-gauge bomb (cap. 65 

liters)

Al Muhammadiyat – Mar 1988 Botulinum toxin 250-gauge bomb (cap. 65 

liters)

Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989 Bacillus subtilis 122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)

Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989 Botulinum toxin 122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)

Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989 Aflatoxin 122mm rocket (cap. 8 liters)

Khan Bani Saad – Aug 1988 Bacillus subtilis aerosol generator – Mi-2 

helicopter with modified 

agricultural spray equipment

Al Muhammadiyat – Dec 1989 Bacillus subtilis R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)

Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989 Botulinum toxin R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)

Al Muhammadiyat – Nov 1989 Aflatoxin R-400 bomb (cap. 85 liters)

Jurf al-Sakr Firing Range – Sep 

1989

Ricin 155mm artillery shell (cap. 3 

liters)

Abu Obeydi Airfield – Dec 1990 Water Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank 

(cap. 2,200 liters)

Abu Obeydi Airfield – Dec 1990 Water/potassium 

permanganate

Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank 

(cap. 2,200 liters)

Abu Obeydi Airfield – Jan 1991 Water/glycerine Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank 

(cap. 2,200 liters)

Abu Obeydi Airfield – Jan 1991 Bacillus subtilis/Glycerine Modified Mirage F1 drop-tank 

(cap. 2,200 liters)

• Iraq admitted producing thousands of liters of the BW agents anthrax, 6 botulinum 

toxin, (which paralyzes respiratory muscles and can be fatal within 24 to 36 hours), 

and aflatoxin, (a potent carcinogen that can attack the liver, killing years after 

ingestion), and preparing BW-filled Scud-variant missile warheads, aerial bombs, and 

aircraft spray tanks before the Gulf war. 

Baghdad did not provide persuasive evidence to support its claims that it unilaterally 

destroyed its BW agents and munitions. Experts from UNSCOM assessed that 

Baghdad’s declarations vastly understated the production of biological agents and 

estimated that Iraq actually produced two-to-four times the amount of agent that it 

acknowledged producing, including Bacillus anthracis—the causative agent of 

anthrax—and botulinum toxin. 

The improvement or expansion of a number of nominally “civilian” facilities that were 

directly associated with biological weapons indicates that key aspects of Iraq’s offensive 

BW program are active and most elements more advanced and larger than before the 

1990-1991 Gulf war. 

 

5

Bacillus subtilis is commonly used as a simulant for B. anthracis.

6

 An infectious dose of anthrax is about 8,000 spores, or less than one-millionth of a gram in a non 

immuno-compromised person. Inhalation anthrax historically has been 100 percent fatal within five to 

seven days, although in recent cases aggressive medical treatment has reduced the fatality rate. 
16

• The al-Dawrah Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Vaccine Facility is one of two 

known Biocontainment Level-3—facilities in Iraq with an extensive air handling and 

filtering system. Iraq admitted that before the Gulf war Al-Dawrah had been a BW 

agent production facility. UNSCOM attempted to render it useless for BW agent production in 1996 but left some production equipment in place because UNSCOM 

could not prove it was connected to previous BW work. In 2001, Iraq announced it 

would begin renovating the plant without UN approval, ostensibly to produce a 

vaccine to combat an FMD outbreak. In fact, Iraq easily can import all the foot-andmouth vaccine it needs through the UN. 

• The Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute is an ideal cover location for BW research, testing, production, and storage. UN inspectors discovered documents related 

to BW research at this facility, some showing that BW cultures, agents, and 

equipment were stored there during the Gulf war. Of particular concern is the plant’s 

new storage capacity, which greatly exceeds Iraq’s needs for legitimate medical 

storage. 

• The Fallujah III Castor Oil Production Plant is situated on a large complex with an 

historical connection to Iraq’s CW program. Of immediate BW concern is the 
17

potential production of ricin toxin.7 Castor bean pulp, left over from castor oil 

production, can be used to extract ricin toxin. Iraq admitted to UNSCOM that it 

manufactured ricin and field-tested it in artillery shells before the Gulf war. Iraq 

operated this plant for legitimate purposes under UNSCOM scrutiny before 1998 

when UN inspectors left the country. Since 1999, Iraq has rebuilt major structures 

destroyed during Operation Desert Fox. Iraqi officials claim they are making castor 

oil for brake fluid, but verifying such claims without UN inspections is impossible.

In addition to questions about activity at known facilities, there are compelling reasons 

to be concerned about BW activity at other sites and in mobile production units and 

laboratories. Baghdad has pursued a mobile BW research and production capability to 

better conceal its program.

• UNSCOM uncovered a document on Iraqi Military Industrial Commission letterhead 

indicating that Iraq was interested in developing mobile fermentation units, and an 

Iraqi scientist admitted to UN inspectors that Iraq was trying to move in the direction 

of mobile BW production.

• Iraq has now established large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production 

capabilities based on mobile BW facilities. 

Ballistic Missile Program

Iraq has developed a ballistic missile capability that exceeds the 150km range 

limitation established under UNSCR 687. During the 1980s, Iraq purchased 819 

Scud B missiles from the USSR. Hundreds of these 300km range missiles were used to 

attack Iranian cities during the Iran-Iraq War. Beginning in 1987, Iraq converted many of 

these Soviet Scuds into extended-range variants, some of which were fired at Tehran; 

some were launched during the Gulf war, and others remained in Iraq’s inventory at 

war’s end. Iraq admitted filling at least 75 of its Scud warheads with chemical or 

biological agents and deployed these weapons for use against Coalition forces and 

regional opponents, including Israel in 1991.

Most of the approximately 90 Scud-type missiles Saddam fired at Israel, Saudi Arabia, 

and Bahrain during the Gulf war were al-Husayn variants that the Iraqis modified by 

lengthening the airframe and increasing fuel capacity, extending the range to 650 km. 

Baghdad was developing other longer-range missiles based on Scud technology, 

including the 900km al-Abbas. Iraq was designing follow-on multi-stage and clustered 

medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) concepts with intended ranges up to 3,000 km. 

Iraq also had a program to develop a two-stage missile, called the Badr-2000, using solidpropellants with an estimated range of 750 to 1,000 km.

 

7

 Ricin can cause mult iple organ failure within one or two days after inhalation. 
18

• Iraq never fully accounted for its existing missile programs. Discrepancies in 

Baghdad’s declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of extended-range 

Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads. Further, 

Iraq never explained the disposition of advanced missile components, such as 

guidance and control systems, that it could not produce on its own and that would be 

critical to developmental programs. 
19

Iraq continues to work on UN-authorized short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)—those 

with a range no greater than 150 km—that help develop the expertise and infrastructure 

needed to produce longer-range missile systems. The al-Samoud liquid propellant SRBM 

and the Ababil-100 solid propellant SRBM, however, are capable of flying beyond the 

allowed 150km range. Both missiles have been tested aggressively and are in early 

deployment. Other evidence strongly suggests Iraq is modifying missile testing and 

production facilities to produce even longer-range missiles.

• The Al-Rafah-North Liquid Propellant Engine Research, Development, Testing, and 

Evaluation (RDT&E) Facility is Iraq’s principal site for the static testing of liquid 

propellant missile engines. Baghdad has been building a new test stand there that is 

larger than the test stand associated with al-Samoud engine testing and the defunct 

Scud engine test stand. The only plausible explanation for this test facility is that Iraq 

intends to test engines for longer-range missiles prohibited under UNSCR 687. 
20
21

• The Al-Mutasim Solid Rocket Motor and Test Facility, previously associated with 

Iraq’s Badr-2000 solid-propellant missile program, has been rebuilt and expanded in 

recent years. The al-Mutasim site supports solid-propellant motor assembly, rework, 

and testing for the UN-authorized Ababil-100, but the size of certain facilities there, 

particularly those newly constructed between the assembly rework and static test 

areas, suggests that Baghdad is preparing to develop systems that are prohibited by 

the UN. 

• At the Al-Mamoun Solid Rocket Motor Production Plant and RDT&E Facility, the 

Iraqis, since the December 1998 departure of inspectors, have rebuilt structures 

damaged during the Gulf war and dismantled by UNSCOM that originally were built 
22

to manufacture solid propellant motors for the Badr-2000 program. They also have 

built a new building and are reconstructing other buildings originally designed to fill 

large Badr-2000 motor casings with solid propellant. 

• Also at al-Mamoun, the Iraqis have rebuilt two structures used to “mix” solid 

propellant for the Badr-2000 missile. The new buildings—about as large as the 

original ones—are ideally suited to house large, UN-prohibited mixers. In fact, the 

only logical explanation for the size and configuration of these mixing buildings is 

that Iraq intends to develop longer-range, prohibited missiles.

Iraq has managed to rebuild and expand its missile development infrastructure 

under sanctions. Iraqi intermediaries have sought production technology, machine 

tools, and raw materials in violation of the arms embargo. 

• The Iraqis have completed a new ammonium perchlorate production plant at Mamoun 

that supports Iraq’s solid propellant missile program. Ammonium perchlorate is a 

common oxidizer used in solid propellant missile motors. Baghdad would not have 

been able to complete this facility without help from abroad.

• In August 1995, Iraq was caught trying to acquire sensitive ballistic missile guidance 

components, including gyroscopes originally used in Russian strategic nuclear 

SLBMs, demonstrating that Baghdad has been pursuing proscribed, advanced, longrange missile technology for some time. Iraqi officials admitted that, despite 

international prohibitions, they had received a similar shipment earlier that year. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program and Other Aircraft

Iraq is continuing to develop other platforms which most analysts believe probably 

are intended for delivering biological warfare agents. Immediately before the Gulf 

war, Baghdad attempted to convert a MiG-21 into an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to 

carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents. UNSCOM 

assessed that the program to develop the spray system was successful, but the conversion 

of the MiG-21 was not. More recently, Baghdad has attempted to convert some of its 

L-29 jet trainer aircraft into UAVs that can be fitted with chemical and biological warfare 

(CBW) spray tanks, most likely a continuation of previous efforts with the MiG-21. 

Although much less sophisticated than ballistic missiles as a delivery platform, an 

aircraft—manned or unmanned—is the most efficient way to disseminate chemical and 

biological weapons over a large, distant area. 

• Iraq already has produced modified drop-tanks that can disperse biological or 

chemical agents effectively. Before the Gulf war, the Iraqis successfully 

experimented with aircraft-mounted spray tanks capable of releasing up to 2,000 liters 

of an anthrax simulant over a target area. Iraq also has modified commercial crop 

sprayers successfully and tested them with an anthrax simulant delivered by 

helicopters.
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• Baghdad has a history of experimenting with a variety of unmanned platforms. Iraq’s 

use of newer, more capable airframes would increase range and payload, while 

smaller platforms might be harder to detect and therefore more survivable. This 

capability represents a serious threat to Iraq’s neighbors and to international military 

forces in the region. 

• Iraq used tactical fighter aircraft and helicopters to deliver chemical agents, loaded in 

bombs and rockets, during the Iran-Iraq War. Baghdad probably is considering again 

using manned aircraft as delivery platforms depending on the operational scenario. 

Procurement in Support of WMD Programs

Iraq has been able to import dual-use, WMD-relevant equipment and material through 

procurements both within and outside the UN sanctions regime. Baghdad diverts some 

of the $10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian 

needs to support the military and WMD programs instead. Iraq’s growing ability to 

sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad’s capabilities to finance its WMD programs. Over the 

last four years Baghdad’s earnings from illicit oil sales have more than quadrupled to 

about $3 billion this year.
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• UN monitors at Iraq's borders do not inspect the cargo—worth hundreds of millions 

of dollars—that enters Iraq every year outside of the Oil-for-Food Program; some of 

these goods clearly support Iraq's military and WMD programs. For example, 

Baghdad imports fiber-optic communication systems outside of UN auspices to 

support the Iraqi military. 

• Iraq imports goods using planes, trains, trucks, and ships without any type of 

international inspections—in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. 

Even within the UN-authorized Oil-for-Food Program, Iraq does not hide that it wants to 

purchase military and WMD-related goods. For example, Baghdad diverted UNapproved trucks for military purposes and construction equipment to rehabilitate 

WMD-affiliated facilities, even though these items were approved only to help the 

civilian population.

• Iraq has been able to repair modern industrial machine tools that previously supported 

production of WMD or missile components and has imported additional tools that it 

may use to reconstitute Baghdad’s unconventional weapons arsenal.

• On several occasions, Iraq has asked to purchase goods—such as neutron generators 

and servo valves—that the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission 

(UNMOVIC) views as linchpins for prohibited Iraqi programs; alternative, non-dualuse items would serve the civilian purpose purportedly intended for this equipment. 

UNMOVIC began screening contracts pursuant to UNSCR 1284 in December 1999 and 

since has identified more than 100 contracts containing dual-use items as defined in 

UNSCR 1051 that can be diverted into WMD programs. UNMOVIC also has requested 

that suppliers provide technical information on hundreds of other goods because of 

concerns about potential misuse of dual-use equipment. In many cases, Iraq has 

requested technology that clearly exceeds requirements for the stated commercial end-use 

when it easily could substitute items that could not be used for WMD. 

• On some UN contracts, Baghdad claimed that the requested goods are designed to 

rehabilitate facilities—such as the Al Qa'im phosphate plant and Fallujah—that in the 

past were used to support both industrial and WMD programs.