### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs S eptember 11, 2001
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHARLE S E. JONES
Appeal as of Right from the Criminal Court of Shelby County

No. 98-10037 James C. Beasely, Jr., Judge

No. W2000-02606-CCA-R3-CD - Filed November 2, 2001

The appellant, Charles E. Jones, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient for a jury to find him guilty of first degree murder. Following a review of the r

ecord and the pa

rties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appe al as of Right; Judgme

nt of the Criminal C

ourt is Affirmed.

N ORMA M C G EE O GLE , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which T HOMAS T. W OODALL and R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER , JJ., joined.

A.C. Wharton, Jr., Garland Ergüden, Trent Hall, and Robert Parris, Memphis Ten nessee, fo r the appellant, Charle

s E. Jones.

Paul G. S umm ers , At tor ney G ener al a nd R epo rte r; J . Ro ss D yer, A ssi sta nt A tto rney G eneral ; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; Paul Goo

dman and Paula

Wulff, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee

. OPINION I. Factual Backgr

ound On May 29, 1998, Officer Jeff Dennison of the Memphis Police Department wason patrol when he was flagged down by Hubert Stu

rdivant. Sturdivant advised Officer Dennison that there was a dead body in Sturdivant’s house at 1357 Taylor

Street in Memphis. Officer Dennison immediately

radioed for assistance and was followed to the scene by Of ficer Stephen Thaggard. When the officers arrived at the scene, they saw broken glass on the steps and porch of the house. As the officers stepped onto the front porch, the door opened and the appellant stood in thedoo rway.
When the appellant opened the door, the officers were able to see a dead body rolled up in carpet lying on the living room floor. Officer Dennis on immediately

ordered the app

ellant to get down, then handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of

Officer Thaggard’s car. Both officers-2-

observed that the appellant was calm during the entire episode and never appeared to be upset. The appellant had scratches on his neck, blood splatters on his left ear, a scratch on his check, blood splatters in his hair, and a cut on his finger.

Officer Thaggard proceed ed into the house. He testified at trial that the victim’s bloody head was sticking out of the carpet . He saw blood spla

tters in the living room, on

the shades,
on the floor, “everywhere--it’s blood every where.” In the dining area, he saw blood on the floor and marks on the floor that indicated tha t something had been dragged across the area. Next to the victim's body, Officer Thaggard discove red a bucket

of soapy wa

ter with a rag in it. He noted that the water was red, as if discolored by blood. A garbage can in the room contained broken glass and blood.

The appellant was taken fr om the scene to the Regional Medical Center (Med) for examination and treatment. Captain Joseph E ldridge of the Memphis Poli ce Department interviewed the appellant at

the Med. Captain Eldridge recounted that he advised the appellant of his Miranda rights and asked the app

ellant if he wante

d to give a statement. The a ppellant answer

ed affirmativel

y andresponded that he

had killed the vict

im because she ha

d “disrespected

” him a nd k nocked his crack pipe ou t of his han d. Captain Eldridge di d not reduce this stat ement to wri ting.

The appellant was tak

en from the Med to t

he Criminal Justice Ce

nter. After ag

ain being advised of his rights, the appellant gave a written statement. The appellant related that he met the vic tim whe n he “wen t to the dop e ho use ” to buy c rack c ocaine. After purchasing the crack cocaine, the appellant

went to a store up th

e street and purc

hased beer and c

igarettes. The victim, who was standi ng i n the parkin g lot of the store, began following the appellant. The appellant invited her to accompany

him to his house. When they arrived at his house, the two drank beer and smoked “$50 dollars worth of crack.” After smoking crack cocaine, the appe llantasked the victim to have sex with him. The victim agreed and removed her clothes. Later, the victim beca me angry when the appellant refused to give her more crack cocaine. Accor ding to the appellant, t

he victim knocked a crack pipe from the appellant’s hand and they “ got to wrestling.”

The appellant alleged that the victim had a box cutter, which she began swinging at him, and cut him on the finger. The appellant insisted that he cut the victim only three times in an effort to defend himself

. He admitted that d

uring their stru

ggle, the vict

im was u nclothed. He claimedthat, after being cut, the victim attempted to jump through a window. However, there were bars on the windo w and she was unable to escape. He contended that the glass from the broken window caused mos

t of the victim’s inju

ries.
When the struggle ended, the appellant claimedthat he panicked and did not know what to do with the victim. He taped the victim’s ankles and wrists together and placed

a garbage bag on the upper portion of her body. He then rolled the body inside a piece of carpet. Attempting to clean up th

e blo od, he placed the victim’s clothes, his clothes, a wig, and the broken glass in a garbage bag. He then walked out onto his porch and smoked a cig arette.-3- The appellant admitted that he did not call for medical assistance for the victim or call the police. He did not know the victim’s name and explained that he had never met her before the day of the in

cident.

Dr. O’ B rian Cleary Smith, the Shelby County medical examiner, testified that the autopsy of the victim revealed eighty-three separa te wounds on the victim’s bod y. He described approximately

sixty-eight stab and

incised wounds to the head, neck, torso, and extremities, opining that seven of the wounds were fatal. The primary cause s of death were: a stab wound through the esophagus;a stab wound through the left jugular vein; a stab wound through thesubclavicula vein;
a stab wound to the ri

ght lu ng; a stab wound involving tissues of the center of the chest; a stab wound to the left lung; and a stab wound to the back. He concluded that the wounds were consistent withinjuries from a box cutter, although he acknowledged that some of the wounds could have been caused by broken g

lass. However, n

o glass was foundin a ny of the vic tim ’s w oun ds. Add iti ona lly, Dr. Smith reported that the appellant’s bloo d was te sted for the pres ence of cocain

e. Dr. Smith related that a result of .1 or .2 micrograms of cocaine per milliliter is considered normal street level usage. The appellant’s test results showed a level of .13 micrograms per milliliter.

At the conclus ion of the t rial, the j ury found the ap pellant gu ilty of fir st degree murder. The trial court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction.
II. Analysis

The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidenc e underlying his conviction of fir st degree murder. In order to prevail, the appellant must demonstrate to this cou rt that n o “rational trier

of fact” could ha

ve found the esse

ntial elements of t

he offense

beyond a re

asonable doubt. Jackson v. V irginia , 4 43 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979) ; State v. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 198 2); Tenn. R. App. P. 1 3(e). In othe r words, on appea

l, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Williams , 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). All factual issues raised by the evidence, including questions concerning the credibility of witnesse s and the weight

and value to be given the evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact and not the appellate courts. State v. Pruett , 788 S.W .2d 559 , 56 1 (T enn . 19 90) . Th ese s tan dard s ap ply to convictions based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or both. State v. Carruthers , 35 S.W.3d 516, 557 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied , __ U .S. __ , 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001 ); State v. Vann , 976 S.W.2d 93, 111-112 (Tenn. 1998) (appendix). Thus, a s in the case of dir

ect evidence, th

e weight to be given circumstantial evidence and “‘[t]he inferences to be drawn from such e vidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury.’” Marable v. State , 313 S .W.2d 451, 457 (Tenn. 1958). In addition, because conviction by a trier of fact destroys the presumption of innocenc e and imposes a presumption of guilt, a convictedcriminal appellant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient. See McBeev. State , 372 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tenn. 1963); see also State v. Buggs , 995 S.W.2d 102, 105- 106 (Tenn. 1999).-4- At trial, the State mus

t prove all elemen

ts of first degre

e mu rder, including premeditation, beyond a reasonab le d oubt. State v. Brown , 836 S.W.2d 530, 543 (Tenn. 1992). Premeditation requires “the exercise of reflection and judgment,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d) (2000 Supp.), and a “previously formed design or intent to kill,” State v. West , 844 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tenn. 1992) (cit ing McGill v. State , 475 S.W.2d 223, 227 (1971) ). Notably,

the intent to

kill does nothave to

pre-exist for any definite period of time. State v. Vincent C. Sims , No. W1998-00634- CCA-R3-DD, 2000 WL 298901, a t *7 (Tenn. Crim.App. at Jackson, March 14, 2000), aff’d , State v. Sims , 45 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tenn.), Cert. denied , _US_, _S Ct_ (2001).

Although there is no concr ete test for dete

rmining the exist

ence of premeditation, Tennesseecourts have relied upon certain circumstances to infer premeditation. See State v. Pike , 978 S.W.2d 904, 914 (Tenn. 1998). Specifically, the following factors have been used to support
a jury’s inference of premeditation: (1) the appellant’s prior relationship to the victim which might suggest a motive for the killing; (2) the appellant’s d eclarations of in

tent to kill; (3) the appellant’s planning activities before the killing; (4) the manner of the killing, including the appellant’s using
a deadly weapon upon an unar med victim, killing the victim while the victim is retreating or attempting escape, or killing the victim in a particularly cruel manner; (5) the appellant’s demeanor before and after the killing, including a calm demeanor immediately af ter the killing. See Pike , 978 S.W.2d at 914-915; State v. Bland , 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997 ) (citing Brown , 836 S.W.2d at 541-42, an d West , 844 S.W.2d at 148); State v. Gentry , 881 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Anderson , 835 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

A jury, upon consideration of the facts adduced at trial in this case, could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant premeditated ki lling the victim. In this written statement, the ap

pellant describe

d the events in deta

il:

Then when she started to act crazy after I wouldn’t give her any more dope, then she smacked the crack pipe o ut of my hand, and the crack hit the floor. I wa s sitting on the floor and she was sitting in the chair. I pushed her out of the chair for knocking the crack on the floor. That’s when she pulled up a box cutter

and went to swing at me, cutting me

on my finger. Me defending my self, we got

to wrestling with
one another. I was able to get the box cutter fr om her. That’s when she started scratching on me. That’s when I took charge and picked the box cutter up and cut her
once. She ran for the door; the door was locked, so she ran and tried to jump

out the window not realizing the bars were on it. I had the do

or keys in my pocket, and the door had a deadbolt lock on it. After she ran into the window, I could see glass from the window sticking in her. Then I a sked her if she wa

s alright, and she

grabbed me again and we

got to tuss ling. I picked up the box cutter again and cut her to get her off me. She throwed the glass her beer was in at me. She hit me in the side with it. After that, she ran toward the other window ho llering for help and broke the

glass trying to get out. Me getting frustrated, I got the box cutter again; t

hat’s when she fe

ll to the floo r bleeding.-5- Dr. Smith testified that the victim had a total of eighty-three separate wounds, seven of which were sufficient to cause death. Additionally, Dr. Smith testified that the wounds were of varying ty pe s, including “flick marks” which he described as “where the tip of the knife can be buried under the skin surface and then twisted out.”

After the appellant killed the victim, he attempted to conceal his crime. The appellant admitted that he taped the victim’s ankles and wrists together, placed a garbage bag over the upper po rtion of her body, and rolled her body inside a piece of carpet. He then attempt ed to wash th

e blood f rom the area and clea

n up the broken g

lass and bloody

clothes. The appe

llant stated that, following these actions, he walked out on his porch and smoked a cigarette. Officer Thag gard and Captain Eldridge described

the appellant’s d

emeanor as calm

, specifically noting that the appellant never appeare

d to be upset.
The appellant claims that he killed the victim in self-defense; therefore, the appellant argues,his use of force was justified. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(a) ( 1997). If evi dence is introducedsupporting self-defense, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant did not act in self-defense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-201 ( a)(3) (1997). However, whether an appellant acted in self-def ense is a factual determination to be made by the jur y. State v. Goode , 956 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Although the trial court properly charged self-defense to the jury, t he jury cle

arly rejected this defense. The appellant admitted to investigators

th at he killed the victim because she “disrespected” him. As noted, the victim had more than eighty-three wounds, all inflicted while she w as unc lothed. The appellant admitted that the victim unsuc cessfully a

ttempted to escap

e. The trial cour

t correctly observed that the nature and number of the injuries indicate that this murder did not occur quickly. The jury had ample evidence from w

hich it could concl

u de that the a ppellant d

id not act i

n self-de fense. We cannot second-guess the jury in light of the evidence.

II. Conclusion For the foreg

oing reasons, w

e affirm the judg

ment of the trial c

ourt.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE