Fire Protection Closure Plan

Stabilizing Fire Protection Regulatory 

Infrastructure 

October 2008

Accession Number 

ML082840659 

 ENCLOSURE 
ACRONYMS 

1Q First Quarter 

2Q Second Quarter 

3Q Third Quarter 

4Q Fourth Quarter 

AC Alternating Current 

CY Calendar Year 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

DC Direct Current 

EGM Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute 

ERFBS Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System 

FAQ Frequently Asked Question 

FPSC Fire Protection Steering Committee 

FRN Federal Register Notice 

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office 

GL Generic Letter 

IN Information Notice 

LAR License Amendment Request 

LER Licensee Event Reports 

ONS Oconee Nuclear Station 

OMA Operator Manual Action 

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute 

NFPA National Fire Protection Association 

NPP Nuclear Power Plant 

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

NUREG NRC Technical Report Designation (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 

NUREG/CR NUREG Contractor Report 

RIS Regulatory Issue Summary 

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 

SER Safety Evaluation Report 

SNP Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 

SRM Staff Requirements Memorandum
 1

Task #1 Stabilize the Regulatory Infrastructure Supporting Transition to RiskInformed and Performance-Based Fire Protection Regulation – 

10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805 

Objective To develop and validate regulatory processes that facilitate predictable, efficient, 

and effective transition of operating nuclear power plants to NRC's risk-informed 

and performance-based fire protection requirements. 

Definition of Closure 

 Closure is achieved when the regulatory infrastructure is in place and the safety 

evaluation reports of the NFPA 805 pilot plants are issued. Review and approval 

of subsequent LARs is considered routine staff activity. 

Background The NFPA Standards Council approved NFPA Standard 805, "PerformanceBased Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Electric Generating 

Plants, 2001 Edition," (NFPA 805) on January 13, 2001, as a performance-based 

standard for light-water nuclear power plants. The NRC staff cooperatively 

participated in the development of NFPA 805. Published in February 2001, 

NFPA 805 describes a methodology for existing light-water nuclear power plants 

to apply performance-based requirements and fundamental fire protection design 

elements to establish fire protection systems and features for all modes of 

operation as well as a methodology for establishing fire protection procedures, 

systems, and features for decommissioning and permanently shut down nuclear 

power plants. 

 The Commission approved the final rule incorporating NFPA 805 into 10 CFR 

Part 50 by reference via an SRM dated May 11, 2004, entitled, “Final Rule: 

Revision of 10 CFR 50.48 to Allow Performance-Based Approaches Using 

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, ‘Performance-Based 

Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating.’” The 

rule was published on June 16, 2004, and became effective July 16, 2004. The 

Commission provided certain enforcement discretion as an incentive for 

licensees to adopt NFPA 805. Two licensees, Progress Energy and Duke 

Energy, volunteered Shearon Harris and Oconee respectively to become pilot 

plants for the transition to NFPA 805. Consequently, the staff kicked off the pilot 

implementation in August 2005. The staff supported the transition effort with 

observation visits. These observation visits document pilot plant implementation 

through publicly available trip reports. 

 In June 2006, the staff issued Regulatory Guide 1.205, "Risk-Informed, 

Performance-Based Fire Protection for Existing Light-Water Nuclear Power 

Plants." In July 2006, the staff endorsed the industry proposal to establish an 

FAQ program to provide timely clarification of issues emerging at plants 

transitioning to NFPA 805. The staff is holding monthly public meetings with the 

industry to discuss emerging issues. 

 

As of today, operators of 48 reactor units have sent letters of intent indicating 

their commitment to transition to NFPA 805. In 2008, the two pilot plants 

submitted to the NRC their license amendment requests for review. 
 2

Steps to Closure Due CY Quarter 

Establish Regulatory Foundation 

 NFPA 805 issued Complete: 01/2001 

 10 CFR 50.48(c) promulgated Complete: 06/2004 

Structure for Enforcement 

New 10 CFR 50.48 enforcement policy for NFPA Complete: 06/2004 

805 provides a 2-year enforcement discretion 

period 

 NFPA 805 enforcement policy revised to address Complete: 01/2005 

licensee budgetary cycles to end of 2005 for 

existing non-compliances 

 NFPA 805 enforcement policy revised to provide Complete: 04/2006 

a 3-year enforcement discretion period 

 

Commission approves revised enforcement Complete: 09/2008 

discretion policy for enforcement discretion to 

extend 6 months past issuance of the second 

pilot plant’s SER 

 

Develop Implementation Guidance 

 Industry implementation guidance NEI 04-02, Complete: 09/2005 

Revision 1, issued 

 NRC and EPRI jointly issue NUREG/CR-6850, Complete: 09/2005 

Fire PRA NUREG Methodology 

 

 Regulatory Guide 1.205 issued as guidance for Complete: 05/2006 

plants adopting NFPA 805 

 Issue revised Regulatory Guide 1.205 and 2009-2Q 

Standard Review Plan for NFPA 805 

 Complete FAQ clarification of NUREG/CR-6850 2009-2Q 

Validate Implementation 

 Letter of intent for first pilot plant (Oconee) Complete: 02/2005 

 Letter of Intent for second pilot plant (Harris) Complete: 06/2005 
 3

 Pilot plant LAR received for Harris Complete: 05/2008 

 Pilot plant LAR received for Oconee Complete: 06/2008 

Final Closure

Pilot plant SERs issued 2009-3Q 

Complete development of post-transition 2009-3Q 

inspection procedures and inspector training 
 4

Task #2 Hemyc and MT Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier (ERFBS) Closure for Plants 

Transitioning to NFPA 805 

Objective To complete actions to address Hemyc and MT ERFBS questions. 

Definition of Closure 

 Closure of the safety issue has been achieved. This task remains open until the 

staff issues a report documenting closeout of Hemyc and MT barrier issues. 

Background In response to the Browns Ferry fire, the NRC created fire protection regulations 

and guidelines to ensure that NPPs can be safely shut down in the event of a 

fire. An important new requirement of these rules was the protection of 

redundant trains of equipment and cables required to place the plant in a safe 

shutdown state. When these redundant trains of cables and equipment were in 

the same room or fire area, licensees often installed ERFBS to achieve the 

required separation. 

 

Through the 1990's and 2000's, various concerns were raised about different 

designs and manufacturers of ERFBS. The NRC staff responded to these 

concerns by taking a variety of actions. One barrier material (Hemyc) raised 

more complex concerns. As a result, the NRC initiated full scale fire tests in 

2004 on Hemyc. The test results indicated that Hemyc did not perform 

consistent with its rating for the configurations tested. The NRC issued 

GL 2006-03, “Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier 

Configurations,” to aid in achieving final resolution of Hemyc issues. 

 

The GL required licensees to address the Hemyc issue and describe how other 

fire barrier materials are capable of providing the appropriate fire resistance 

rating. By the end of calendar year 2007, the NRC staff reviewed all responses 

to th e GL and concluded that the licensees have provided the requested 

information. Also, by the end of calendar year 2007, the NRC approved all of the 

licensing actions to address Hemyc issues at non-805 plants. Closure was also 

confirmed by inspections, which were completed at non-805 plans in September 

2008. 

Steps to Closure Due CY Quarter 

Establish Regulatory Foundation 

 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, Complete: 11/1980 

promulgated 

Structure for Enforcement 

Non-conformances with respect to regulatory N/A 

requirements are enforced using the normal 

enforcement process. 
 5

Develop Implementation Guidance 

Staff issued IN 2005-07, “Results of HEMYC Complete: 04/2005 

Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System Full 

Scale Fire Testing” 

 

Staff issued GL 2006-03, “Potentially Complete: 04/2006 

Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier 

Configurations ” 

Validate Implementation 

 Staff responded to all GL 2006-03 information Complete: 12/2007 

 requests 

 Confirm closure via inspections related to Complete: 09/2008 

GL 2006-03 Hemyc and MT 

Final Closure 

 

 Issue final close-out documentation 2008-4Q 
 6

Task #3 Stabilize Regulatory Infrastructure to Resolve Fire-Induced Circuit Failure 

Issue 

Objective To develop and validate a predictable, efficient, and effective process to resolve 

issues associated with possible fire-induced circuit failures at plants not 

transitioning to NFPA 805. 

Definition of Closure 

Closure is achieved when the regulatory infrastructure is in place and the staff 

completes validation of an application of the circuit resolution methodology. 

Review and approval of subsequent use of the circuit failure resolution 

methodology by individual licensees is considered routine staff activity. 

Background In response to the Browns Ferry fire, the NRC created fire protection regulations 

and guidelines to ensure that NPPs can be safely shut down in the event of a 

fire. An important requirement of these rules was the protection of redundant 

equipment and cables required to place the plant in a safe shutdown state. This 

included a requirement to protect circuits from failure or mal-operation. 

 

 Beginning in 1997, a series of LERs identified plant-specific problems related to 

potential fire-induced electrical circuit failures that could affect equipment 

necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The NRC staff issued 

IN 99-17, “Problems Associated with Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Analyses,” 

on June 3,1999, to document additional problems. 

 

In 2001, EPRI and NEI performed a series of cable functionality fire tests to 

further the nuclear industry’s understanding of fire-induced circuit failures, 

particularly spurious equipment actuations initiated by circuit failures. Based on 

the test results and continued interactions with industry, the NRC staff concluded 

that clarification of regulatory expectations was needed to assure safety and 

provide clear regulatory expectations in the area of fire-induced circuit failures 

and, where appropriate, to make plant changes to mitigate such failures. 

Steps to Closure Due CY Quarter 

Establish Regulatory Foundation 

 Letter from S. Collins (NRC) to R. Beedle (NEI) Complete: 03/1997 

regarding spurious actuations 

Structure for Enforcement 

 Staff issues EGM 98-002, “Disposition of Complete: 03/1998 

Violations of Appendix R, Sections III.G 

and II.L, Regarding Circuit Failures” 

Staff issues updated EGM for fire-induced 2009-1Q 

circuit failures, including Commission direction. 

 
 7

Develop Implementation Guidance 

 EPRI/NEI circuit failure testing completed at Complete: 06/2001 

Omega Point Laboratories, Elmendorf, Texas 

 

Staff and industry publish through EPRI, Complete: 05/2002 

“Spurious Actuation of Electrical Circuits 

Due to Cable Fires: Results of an Expert 

Elicitation” 

 

 Staff issued RIS 2004-03, Revision 1, “Risk- Complete: 12/2004 

Informed Approach for Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown 

Associated Circuit Inspections” 

 

 Industry published NEI 00-01, Revision 1 Complete: 01/2005 

 Staff issued RIS 2005-30, “Clarification of Complete: 12/2005 

Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Regulatory 

Requirements” 

 

Commission issued SRM-SECY-06-0196, Complete: 09/2006 

“Issuance of Generic Letter 2006-XX, ‘Post-Fire 

Safe-Shutdown Circuits Analysis Spurious 

Actuations’” 

Staff completes additional testing for Complete: 04/2008 

RIS 2004-03 and issues Cable Response to 

Live Fire (CAROLFIRE) NUREG/CR-6931 

Volumes 1, 2, and 3 

Staff transmitted SECY 2008-0093, “Resolution Complete: 06/2008 

of Issues Related to Fire-Induced Circuit 

Failures,” to Commission for action 

 

 Industry revises NEI 00-01, Revision 2 2008-4Q 

 Publish RIS including draft regulatory guide 2009-1Q 

clarification of circuits’ expectations 

 

 Issue final regulatory guide for fire induced 2009-3Q 

circuit failures 

Validate Implementation 

 Licensees begin work to resolve circuits issues 2009-1Q 

 Establish mechanism to validate circuits issue 2009-2Q 

disposition method 
 8

Final Closure 

Complete validation of the circuits issue 2010-2Q 

disposition method
 9

Task #4 Stabilize Regulatory Infrastructure to Resolve Post-Fire Operator Manual 

Action Issues 

Objective To ensure that licensees complete appropriate actions related to the 

inappropriate crediting of post-fire operator manual actions. 

Definition of Closure 

 Closure is achieved when the regulatory infrastructure is in place and the 

licensees submit requests for license amendments, exemptions, or complete 

modifications validating the effectiveness of the infrastructure. Review and 

approval of those applications is considered routine staff activity. 

Background In response to the Browns Ferry fire, the NRC created fire protection regulations 

and guidelines to ensure that NPPs can be safely shut down in the event of a 

fire. An important requirement of these rules was the protection of redundant 

equipment and cables required to place the plant in a safe shutdown state. 

Where separation of redundant equipment could not be achieved, licensees were 

permitted, under certain conditions, to use post-fire OMAs to mitigate the effects 

of the fire. 

 

In 2000, NRC inspections identified that some licensees compensated for the 

lack of approved separation by relying on operator manual actions under 

conditions not permitted by NRC. NRC issued RIS 2006-10 to clarify 

expectations. 

 

With the intention of providing licensees an opportunity to find and correct 

unapproved post-fire OMAs, the NRC issued enforcement discretion for 

licensee-identified unapproved post-fire OMAs. This discretion provided a period 

of time for licensees to self-identify unapproved post-fire OMAs and also 

provided time for the licensees to bring those unapproved post-fire OMAs into 

compliance without NRC taking enforcement action. The NRC expects the 

unapproved post-fire OMAs to be resolved through reanalysis, procedure 

changes, modifications, or by requesting approval from the NRC. Facilities 

transitioning to NFPA 805 will address OMAs as part of the transition. 

 

The NRC also issued NUREG-1852, "Demonstrating the Feasibility and 

Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to Fire," to assist NRC staff in 

reviewing post-fire OMA applications under conditions permitted by the NRC. 

NUREG-1852 is publicly available so that licensees are able to examine the 

factors that the NRC staff will review. 

 

Licensees are expected to complete their modifications or submit information for 

NRC acceptance by March 6, 2009, the date that the enforcement discretion 

expires. 
 10

Steps to Closure Due CY Quarter 

Establish Regulatory Foundation 

 Commission issues SRM-SECY-04-0233, Complete: 01/2005 

“Proposed Rulemaking - Post-Fire Operator 

Manual Actions,” dated January 18, 2005 

 

Staff issues Fire Protection Program - Post-Fire Complete: 03/2005 

Operator Manual Actions Federal Register Notice 

71 FR 11169, March 1, 2005 – Withdrawal of the 

proposed rule 

 

Structure for Enforcement 

Staff issues enforcement discretion for OMAs as Complete: 06/2007 

part of EGM 2007-004 for OMAs – Enforcement 

discretion ends March 2009 

Develop Implementation Guidance 

 Staff publishes NRC RIS 2006-10, “Regulatory Complete: 06/2006 

Expectations with Appendix R, Paragraph III.G.2, 

Operator Manual Actions” 

 

Staff published NUREG-1852, “Demonstrating Complete: 10/2007 

the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual 

Actions in Response to Fire” 

 

Validate Implementation 

 Licensees complete corrective actions and/or 2009-1Q 

request amendments/exemptions 

Staff validates the effectiveness of the 2010-2Q 

infrastructure completing review of one licensee’s 

resolution of the issue 

 

Final Closure

 Infrastructure stabilized and validated 2010-2Q
 11

Task #5 Assess Regulatory Effectiveness 

Objective Assess the effectiveness of the ongoing stabilization of the fire protection 

regulatory framework. 

Definition of Closure 

 Closure is achieved when a monitoring process is in place and the baseline is 

established. Ongoing implementation of the process is considered routine staff 

activity. 

Background On July 29, 2008, the Commission directed the staff in SRM M080717, “Briefing 

on Fire Protection Issues,” to provide the Commission a plan to assess the 

effectiveness of the ongoing improvements to the fire protection regulatory 

framework using recent plant data to establish a baseline. Such a baseline could 

be, for example, the number and general type of all open fire protection 

deficiencies that were compensated and the manner of compensation used in 

CY2007. 

The GAO Report 08-747, “Nuclear Safety: NRC’s Oversight of Fire Protection at 

U.S. Commercial Nuclear Reactor Units Could Be Strengthened,” June 2008, 

included a recommendation to, “Develop a central database for tracking the 

status of exemptions, compensatory measures, and manual actions in place 

nationwide and at individual commercial nuclear units.” 

 

The Chairman responded regarding the GAO report in a letter to Congress 

dated, September 11, 2008, committing to, “Implement a Fire Protection Closure 

Plan to resolve the issues contributing to the long term use of compensatory 

measures. The Commission has directed the staff to include meaningful metrics 

to gauge progress in implementation of the Closure Plan.” The issues of longterm compensatory measures and unapproved manual actions that have 

associated compensatory measures will be resolved by this action. 

 

Steps to Closure Due CY Quarter 

Commission Commitments 

 Determine metric for measuring effectiveness 2008-4Q 

of ongoing improvements 

 

 Develop metric monitoring methodology 2009-1Q 

Final Closure 

 Collect information and establish monitoring 2009-3Q 
 12

Task #6 Historical Lessons Learned From Fire Protection 

Objective Enhance confidence that the regulatory infrastructure challenges that existed in 

the fire protection area do not occur in other regulatory areas. 

Definition of Closure 

Closure is achieved when a lessons learned review is completed, lessons are 

incorporated into a knowledge management/training program and the adequacy 

of that knowledge management/training program is validated using a pilot 

application. Ongoing staff awareness/training is considered routine staff activity. 

Background On July 29, 2008, the Commission directed the staff in SRM M080717, “Briefing 

on Fire Protection Issues,” to provide a Closure Plan to the Commission that 

includes training to appropriate staff on the important historical lessons learned 

from the fire protection issue resolution activities since 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix R, was established. 

Steps to Closure Due CY Quarter 

Perform Lessons Learned Evaluation 

 Compile History 2009-1Q 

 Develop Lessons Learned 2009-3Q 

Develop Knowledge Management/Training Tool 

 Develop Training on Lessons Learned 2010-1Q 

 Pilot Training on Fire Protection Lessons Learned 2010-1Q 

Final Closure 

 Incorporate lessons learned from pilot training 2010-2Q 
 13

Task #7 Exemption Database 

Objective To develop a centralized database of fire protection exemptions for operating 

nuclear reactors. 

Definition of Closure 

 Closure is achieved when the exemption database is established and 

procedures/plans are in place for periodic updating of that database. Periodic 

updates to the database are considered routine staff activity. 

Background The GAO Report 08-747, “Nuclear Safety: NRC’s Oversight of Fire Protection at 

U.S. Commercial Nuclear Reactor Units Could Be Strengthened,” June 2008, 

included a recommendation to, “develop a central database for tracking the 

status of exemptions.” 

 

The Chairman responded regarding the GAO report in a letter to Congress 

dated, September 11, 2008, committing to, “develop a centralized database of 

fire protection exemptions for operating nuclear reactors.” 

Steps to Closure Due CY Quarter 

Commission Commitments 

 Collect data on Fire Protection Exemptions 2009-2Q 

 Complete development of database 2009-4Q 

Final Closure 

Establish procedure for updates 2010-1Q 
 14

Task #8 Establish Reasonable Assurance That All Past Regulatory Infrastructure 

Instabilities Are Identified

Objective Identify any additional fire protection regulatory infrastructure issues that require 

further action. 

Definition of Closure 

 Closure is achieved when the review is complete and appropriate actions are 

taken to any fire protection regulatory issues identified. Addressing any 

additional issues identified is considered routine staff activities. 

Background Since publication of the fire protection rule in 1981, the NRC has identified and 

dispositioned a large number of issues using regulatory practices that were 

deemed appropriate at the time these issues were identified. 

The NRC staff has initiated a review to identify any outstanding fire protection 

regulatory issues by surveying cognizant individuals concerning the regulatory 

history of fire protection. The effort to identify additional issues will give the staff 

a more complete understanding of the issues and documentation of how the 

NRC addressed all identified issues. 

Steps to Closure Due CY Quarter 

Commission Commitments 

 Complete Review 2009-1Q 

 Evaluate Responses 2009-2Q 

Final Closure 

 Identify Issues and Develop Recommendations 2009-2Q