ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 

 ANNUAL REPORT

 Calendar Year 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Enforcement 

Washington, DC 20555
 

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Contents

Abstract.................................................................................................................................... iii 

Calendar Year 2007 Summary ................................................................................................. v 

Introduction and Overview .......................................................................................vii 

 Mission and Authority ............................................................................................... vii 

About the Office of Enforcement ............................................................................. viii 

I. Escalated Enforcement Actions................................................................................... 1 

A. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties..................................................... 1 

B. Civil Penalty Actions ......................................................................................... 2 

C. Orders ............................................................................................................... 3 

D. Enforcement Actions Supported By the Office of Investigation.................... 3 

E. Timeliness of Enforcement Actions................................................................. 3 

F. Escalated Enforcement Trends ........................................................................ 4 

G. Demands for Information.................................................................................. 5 

II. Actions against Individuals and Non-Licensees......................................................... 5 

III. Cases Involving Discrimination ................................................................................... 6 

IV. Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOEDs) .............................................................. 6 

V. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate Enforcement 

Sanctions...................................................................................................................... 7 

VI. Withdrawn Actions........................................................................................................ 8 

VII. Hearing Activities.......................................................................................................... 8 

VIII. Enforcement Policy Changes and Enforcement Guidance Memoranda................... 9 

IX. Ongoing Activities ...................................................................................................... 10 

A. Safety Culture.................................................................................................. 10 

B. Alternative Dispute Resolution....................................................................... 11 

C. Fire Protection................................................................................................. 12 

D. Rulemaking...................................................................................................... 12 

E. Public Involvement ......................................................................................... 13 

F. Reviews and Self Assessments ..................................................................... 13 

X. Regional Accomplishments ...................................................................................... 14 
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- TABLES – 

Table 1. Civil Penalty Information ........................................................... 2 

Table 2. Escalated Action Trends ........................................................... 4 

Table 3. CY 2007 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Regions 

and Program Office ................................................................. 16 

Table 4. CY 2007 – Escalated Enforcement Actions By Type Of 

 Licensee, Non-Licensee, or Individual ................................... 18 

- FIGURES – 

Figure 1. How NRC Regulates ................................................................ vii 

Figure 2. Escalated Enforcement By Type .............................................. 1 

Figure 3. Escalated Action Trends (2003 – 2007) .................................... 5 

Figure 4. CY 2007 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Regions 

and Program Office ................................................................. 16 

Figure 5. CY 2007 – Escalated Enforcement Actions By Type Of 

 Licensee, Non-Licensee, or Individual ................................... 20 

- APPENDICES - 

A. Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties ...........A1 

B. Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties ................................................B1 

C. Summary of Orders.........................................................................................C1

D Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions against Individuals...............D1 

E Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions against Non-Licensees 

(Vendors, Contractors and Certificate Holders) ...........................................E1 
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Abstract

Since 1995, the Enforcement Program Annual Report has provided information addressing the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC or Commission) enforcement activities during a 

given fiscal year (FY). Since 2005, the Office of Enforcement (OE) has employed a Calendar 

Year (CY) time-frame to align this report with the annual reports of other programs under the 

responsibility of OE, such as the Allegations Program, as well as alignment with the Reactor 

Oversight Process. 

This report contains information about the escalated enforcement actions that the NRC has 

taken during CY 2007 as well as changes to the NRC Enforcement Policy, new initiatives, and 

revised staff guidance. 

Please note that security-related escalated enforcement actions involving, for example, notices 

of violation, civil penalties, and orders, are included for statistical purposes but are not described 

in this report. 
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Calendar Year 2007 Summary

→ The Agency issued 118 escalated enforcement actions, including: 

▪ 77 escalated Notices of Violation without civil penalties 

▪ 18 proposed civil penalties totaling $383,200 

▪ 22 orders modifying, suspending, or revoking a license, including prohibiting 

involvement in NRC-licensed activities 

▪ One order imposing a proposed civil penalty of $3,250 

→ The Agency’s timeliness performance metric for issuing enforcement actions against 

NRC licensees was met for all cases (see page 3). 

→ A Demand for Information (DFI) was issued (see page 5). 

→ Effective oversight of the Agency’s Safety Culture initiative in the Reactor Oversight 

Process (ROP) continued as well as assessment of applicability of the Agency’s Safety 

Culture initiative to fuel cycle facilities, security issues, and new reactors (see page 10). 

→ The Agency continued the successful use of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 

program in 11 enforcement cases (see page 11). 

→ The Agency published a final rule which amended the employee protection regulations 

to allow the Commission to impose civil penalties on contractors and subcontractors for 

certain violations of NRC requirements (see page 12). 

→ A major revision of the Enforcement Policy was initiated. 
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Introduction and Overview 

Mission and Authority

The NRC regulates the civilian 

uses of nuclear materials in the 

United States to protect public 

health and safety, the 

environment and the common 

defense and security. This 

mission is accomplished 

through: licensing of nuclear 

facilities and the possession, 

use and disposal of nuclear 

materials; the development and 

implementation of requirements 

governing licensed activities; 

and inspection and enforcement 

activities to assure compliance 

with these requirements. 

The NRC conducts various 

types of inspections and 

investigations designed to Figure 1- How NRC Regulates

ensure that NRC-licensed activities and activities associated with NRC-licensed activities are 

conducted in strict compliance with the Commission’s regulations, the terms of the license, and 

other requirements. 

The NRC’s enforcement authority is contained in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 

(AEA) and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended (ERA). These statutes provide 

the NRC with broad authority. The Agency implements its enforcement authority through 

Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 2, which is utilized in the enforcement program. The Administrative 

Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (ADRA), provides the statutory framework for the Federal 

Government to utilize alternative dispute resolution. 

The NRC Enforcement Policy sets out the general principles governing NRC=s enforcement 

program and provides a process for implementing the agency=s enforcement authority in 

response to violations of NRC requirements. This statement of policy is predicated on the 

NRC=s belief that compliance with NRC requirements is essential to assuring safety, maintaining 

security, and protecting the environment. The Enforcement Policy applies to all NRC licensees, 

to various categories of non-licensees, and to individual employees of licensed and nonlicensed firms involved in NRC-regulated activities. 

The NRC enforces compliance as necessary. Enforcement actions are used as a deterrent to 

emphasize the importance of compliance with regulatory requirements and to encourage prompt 

identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations. In addition, because 

violations occur in a variety of activities and have varying levels of significance, the NRC 

Enforcement Policy contains graduated sanctions. 
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Most violations are identified through inspections and investigations. Enforcement authority 

includes the use of Notices of Violation (NOVs), civil penalties, Demands for Information (DFIs), 

and orders to modify, suspend, or revoke a license. Discretion may be exercised in determining 

the severity levels of violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions to be taken. 

About the Office of Enforcement

The Office of Enforcement (OE) develops policies and programs for enforcement of NRC 

requirements. In addition, OE exercises oversight of NRC enforcement, providing programmatic 

and implementation direction to regional and headquarters offices conducting or involved in 

enforcement activities, and ensures that regional enforcement programs are consistently 

implemented. 

The Director of OE reports directly to the Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste, 

Research, State, Tribal, and Compliance Programs (DEDMRT), and is responsible for ensuring 

the DEDMRT is kept apprised of certain escalated actions. The DEDMRT is consulted on any 

case involving novel issues, substantial legal, programmatic, or policy issues raised during the 

enforcement review process, or where the Director believes it is warranted. The Director’s 

responsibilities include: 

• preparation and issuance of enforcement actions, including individual actions 

• approval of enforcement actions to be taken by offices in the regions or in headquarters 

• preparation of letters requesting investigations, confirming actions, or obtaining 

information under §§161(c) or 182 of the AEA 

• preparation of subpoenas to licensees, companies, individuals, or other persons to 

assist the Commission in the administration and enforcement of the AEA 

• initiation of the necessary or appropriate action in accordance with the decision of an 

Administrative Law Judge, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, or the Commission 

after enforcement hearings pursuant to 10 CFR Part 2 

• approval, after consultation with the Deputy Executive Directors for Operations (DEDOs), as 

warranted, of the decision to disposition a willful violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) 

• preparation of recommendations to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO), through 

the DEDOs, regarding changes to rules and policies concerning enforcement matters for 

Commission consideration 

The Deputy Director, OE, assists the Director in overseeing, managing and directing the 

development of enforcement policies and programs, and in issuing enforcement actions. 

The Chief of the Enforcement Branch is responsible for supervising the OE staff involved with 

enforcement activities. 

The Chief of the Concerns Resolution Branch is responsible for supervising the OE staff 

involved in allegations, employee protection/discrimination issues, safety culture, and Freedom 

of Information Act (FOIA) requests. 

To provide accurate and timely information to all interested stakeholders and enhance the public’s 

understanding of the NRC’s Enforcement Program, information about the Enforcement Program 

is available on the NRC’s public Web site where it can be retrieved and downloaded at 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organization/oefuncdesc.html. The NRC’s Enforcement Web site 

includes a variety of information such as the Enforcement Policy, the Enforcement Manual, and 
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current temporary enforcement guidance contained in Enforcement Guidance Memoranda 

(EGMs). This Web site also contains information regarding significant enforcement actions 

issued to reactor and materials licensees, non-licensees (vendors, contractors, and certificate 

holders), and individuals and upcoming predecisional enforcement conferences. Although, 

consistent with NRC practices and policies, most security-related actions and activities are not 

included on the NRC’s public Web site, OE does include security orders that impose 

compensatory security requirements on various licensees in its enforcement documents 

collection. 

In 2007, there were 19 full-time employees (FTE) authorized for the Office of Enforcement in 

headquarters. This number includes not only the FTE assigned to work on enforcement cases 

in the headquarters office, but also includes the FTE assigned to work on the NRC external 

allegations process, the FTE assigned to the Differing Professional Opinion Program, the 

non-concurrence process, and the FTE to work on the Safety Culture Initiative. There were 

8 FTE assigned to regional enforcement activities, although these FTE report directly to their 

respective Regional Administrators. 
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I. Escalated Enforcement Actions

Escalated enforcement actions include: 

▪ Notice of Violations (NOVs), including Severity Level I, II, or III violations; 

▪ NOVs associated with Red, Yellow, or White Significance Determination Process (SDP) 

 findings (for operating reactor facilities); 

▪ Civil penalty actions; and 

▪ Orders 

Figure 2 provides 

information addressing 

the types of escalated 

enforcement actions 

issued in CY 2007. The 

tables and figures on 

pages 16 through 20 of 

this report break this 

information down further 

by identifying the 

region/program office 

which initiated the action, 

as well as the licensees, 

non-licensees, and 

individuals that were 

involved. 

 Figure 2 – Escalated Enforcement by Type 

A. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties

During CY 2007, the agency issued 77 NOVs without civil penalties. Eleven of these 

violations were associated with White Significance Determination Process (SDP) 

findings under the Reactor Oversight Program (ROP). Two additional violations were 

associated with Yellow SDP findings. 

Appendix A of this report provides brief summaries of each of these NOVs without civil 

penalties issued to licensees as well as the NOVs associated with SDP findings. 

As noted previously, security related issues involving NOVs, civil penalties, orders, etc, 

are not addressed in the appendices of this report, however, the number of NOVs 

associated with security related issues are included in the agency value quoted above. 

Civil Penalties 

 15%

Orders 

 20% 

Escalated NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

 65% 
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B. Civil Penalty Actions

During Calendar Year (CY) 2007, the agency processed 18 cases involving proposed 

civil penalties. Six of these involved willfulness. Willfulness is defined as either 

deliberate misconduct or careless disregard. 

Information regarding willful violations is identified because such violations are of 

particular concern to the Commission. The NRC’s regulatory program is based on 

licensees and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and 

communicating with candor; therefore, a violation involving willfulness may be 

considered more egregious than the underlying violation taken alone would have been, 

and the severity level may be increased. 

Table 1 provides information comparing civil penalty assessments for the current CY as 

well as the previous four years. When reviewing the information in this table, it is 

important to note that an enforcement action may include more than one civil penalty 

and/or more than one violation. In addition, a civil penalty may be proposed in one year 

and paid or imposed in another year. Finally, the amount of a proposed civil penalty 

may be reduced, for example, as a result of exercising discretion as part of a settlement 

agreement developed during Alternative Dispute Resolution. 

Appendix B includes a brief description of each of the civil penalty actions for 2007.

Table 1 – Civil Penalty Information 

1 This amount reflects a $5,450,000 civil penalty that was issued on April 21, 2005, to FirstEnergy Nuclear 

Operating Company for multiple violations, some willful, that occurred at its Davis-Besse Nuclear Power 

Plant.

2

 The NRC issues an “Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty” when a licensee refuses to pay a 

proposed civil penalty, unless a basis exists for withdrawal of the proposed penalty. 

CY 2007 CY 2006 CY 2005 CY 2004 CY 2003 

Number of 

Proposed Civil 

Penalties 

18 15 24 26 32 

Number of 

imposed Civil 

Penalties 

1 - 3 3 2 

Number of Civil 

Penalties Paid 17 16 22 22 33 

Amount of 

Proposed Civil 

Penalties Paid 

$383,200 $332,350 $6,099,9501 $498,700 $400,600 

Amount of 

Imposed Civil 

Penalties2 $3,250 $0 $112,100 $31,200 $8,500 

Amount of Civil 

Penalties Paid $446,500 $375,500 $5,891,900 $526,900 $510,100 
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C. Orders

During CY 2007, the NRC issued 23 orders to licensees and to individuals. These 

included eight confirmatory orders that were issued to confirm commitments associated 

with Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) settlement agreements, nine security-related 

orders, an order suspending licensed activities, and an order imposing a proposed civil 

penalty. 

Appendix C includes a brief description of the orders that were issued in CY 2007, 

including the order that was issued imposing a proposed civil penalty. Included in the 

appendix is a brief description of a Demand for Information issued in CY 2007 (see 

Section G below). 

The nine security-related orders issued by the NRC contain requirements for licensees 

to implement security measures beyond these currently required by NRC regulations 

and as conditions of licenses. Some of the requirements formalize a series of security 

measures that licensees took in response to advisories NRC issued in the aftermath of 

the September 11 terrorist attacks. Other requirements reflect additional security 

enhancements that have emerged from NRC's ongoing comprehensive security review. 

A list of these orders is located on the Enforcement Web page. The documents on this 

Web page do not include specific compensatory measures or safeguards information. 

Specific compensatory security requirements (which include safeguards information) 

were addressed in separate attachments to the orders and these attachments have not 

been released to the public. 

D. Enforcement Actions Supported By the Office of Investigations

 In CY 2007, 25 percent of the 118 escalated actions were supported by an Office of 

Investigations (OI) Report. Breaking this down further: 

• 6 of the 18 escalated NOV cases with CPs (33 percent) 

• 15 of the 77 escalated NOVs without CPs (19 percent) 

• 9 of the 23 enforcement orders (39 percent) 

E. Timeliness of Enforcement Actions

The protection of public health and safety, as well as the common defense, remains 

paramount among the agency’s goals and drives its decisions. However, the NRC 

recognizes that it must consider other key issues, including the effect of its decisions on 

the public's trust in the NRC’s regulatory process, the industries the NRC regulates, and 

its own effectiveness and efficiency. Efficiency includes recognition that regulatory 

decisions should be made without undue delay. 

The agency’s performance measure goals for issuing the initial escalated enforcement 

action for a case are: 

• 100 percent of non-investigation cases are completed within 180 calendar days; and 

• 100 percent of investigation cases are completed within 360 process days. 
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During CY 2007, the agency’s performance measures goals were met with all 88 

non-investigation cases completed within 180 days and all 30 investigation cases 

completed within 360 days. 

In addition, the Enforcement Program has established administrative goals for 

completing cases. These are: 

• 100 percent of non-investigation cases are completed within an average of 120 

calendar days; and 

• 100 percent of investigation cases are completed within an average of 180 

process days. 

During CY 2007, the agency’s administrative measures goal for non-investigation cases 

were met with an average case processing time of 78 days for the 88 non-investigation 

cases. However, the agency’s administrative measures goal for OI investigation cases 

was not met. Due to the complexity of several cases and the difficulty of the issues 

involved in the reactor and materials areas, and the use of ADR to settle some disputes 

with licensees, the average processing time for the 30 investigation cases was 227 days. 

These cases include Nuclear Fuel Services (EA-2006-129; 329 days), University of 

Pittsburgh (EA-2006-266; 286 days), and Point Beach (EA-2006-178; 272 days). 

For CY 2007, the measuring period started on the latest of the following dates: 

• The date of the inspection exit (for non-investigation cases); 

• The date of the Office of Investigations (OI) memorandum forwarding the OI 

investigation to the staff (for investigation cases); 

• The date that the Department of Justice (DOJ) informs the NRC that the NRC 

may proceed (for cases referred to DOJ); or 

• The date of the Department of Labor (DOL) decision that is the basis for the 

action. 

F. Escalated Enforcement Trends 

During CY 2007, the agency issued 118 escalated enforcement actions. This number is 

slightly greater than the average number of 104 escalated enforcement actions issued 

for the last five years and significantly greater than the number of escalated enforcement 

actions issued in CY 2006. Table 2 provides information regarding the total number of 

escalated enforcement actions from FY 2004 to CY 2007. Figure 3 provides this 

information in graphical form. 

. 

Table 2 – Escalated Action Trends 

CY 2007 CY 2006 CY 2005 FY 2004 FY 2003 Average 

Escalated NOVs (w/o CPs) 77 57 70 58 68 66 

Civil Penalties 18 15 24 26 32 23 

Orders 22 15 17 7 6 13 

Orders Imposing CPs 1 0 3 3 2 2 

Total 118 87 114 94 108 104 
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Figure 3. Escalated Action Trends (FY2003 – CY 2007) 

6 7

17 15

22

2 3 3 1

77

57

70

58

68

18

15

24 26

32

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Escalated NOVs

(w/out Civil

Penalty)

Civil Penalties

Orders

Orders Imposing

Civil Penalties

G. Demands for Information 

When the NRC concludes that additional information is necessary, the NRC may 

issue to a licensee or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission a 

Demand for Information (DFI) (see 10 CFR 2.204). A DFI requires the licensee 

or other person to provide more information or a context for its action(s) so that 

the NRC is able to determine whether an order or other action is warranted. 

During CY 2007, one DFI was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 

(FENOC) to provide the Commission with reasonable assurance that FENOC 

was able to continue to operate its licensed facilities in accordance with the terms 

of its license and the Commission’s regulations. (EA-07-123) 

II. Actions against Individuals and Non-Licensees

During CY 2007, the agency issued 12 escalated actions to licensed and unlicensed 

individuals. This number is included in the total number of escalated enforcement 

actions (NOVs and orders) that the Agency issued in CY 2007. Appendix C provides 

brief summaries of the orders that were issued to individuals prohibiting or limiting their 

participation in NRC-licensed activities. Appendix D provides brief summaries of the 

NOVs that were issued to individuals in CY 2007. 
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The agency issued two escalated enforcement actions to non-licensees in CY 2007. 

Appendix E provides a brief summary of the non-security related case involving a 

contractor. 

III. Cases Involving Discrimination 

During CY 2007, two cases involving allegations of discrimination were resolved using 

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). 

On January 3, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to the 

Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC), documenting a number of actions 

the licensee agreed to take as part of an ADR settlement agreement. An ADR session 

was held at the licensee’s request to address the apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7, 

"Employee protection." The actions the licensee agreed to take include: 

(1) revising NMC’s policy on writing corrective action program reports; 

(2) training NMC supervisory employees on safety conscious work environment 

principles; (3) communicating NMC’s safety culture policy to its employees; and 

(4) conducting a safety culture survey at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. As reflected in 

the Order, in response to these actions, the NRC agreed not to pursue further 

enforcement action; however, the NRC will evaluate the implementation of the 

Confirmatory Order during future inspections. (EA-06-178) 

On April 4, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to the Indiana 

Michigan Power Company (I&M) as part of a settlement agreement between I&M and 

the NRC regarding an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee Protection," issued 

by the NRC to I&M. In response to an NRC choice letter, I&M requested to resolve the 

apparent violation. As part of the settlement agreement that resulted from the ADR 

session, I&M agreed to complete a number of actions, including the completion of the 

training of all non-supervisory plant workforce and long-term contractors on the subject 

of a safety-conscious work environment (SCWE), the completion of a Nuclear Safety 

Culture (including SCWE) survey, the reinforcement of I&M’s policy and expectation of 

its management relating to a SCWE as communicated by an executive level manager, 

and the implementation of a periodic assessment of I&M’s compliance with its hours of 

work limitation program and evaluation of the results for trends. In exchange for I&M’s 

actions, the NRC agreed to not pursue further enforcement action; however, the NRC 

will evaluate the implementation of the Confirmatory Order during future inspections. 

(EA-06-295) 

IV. Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOEDs) 

Occasionally, circumstances may arise where a power reactor licensee’s compliance 

with a technical specification (TS) or other license condition would involve an 

unnecessary plant transient or performance testing, inspection, or other system 

realignment that is inappropriate for the specific plant conditions. In these 

circumstances, the NRC staff (staff) may choose not to enforce the applicable 

requirement(s). This enforcement discretion, designated as a Notice of Enforcement 

Discretion or NOED, is exercised only if the staff is clearly satisfied that the action is 

consistent with protecting the public health and safety. The staff may also issue NOEDs 

in cases involving severe weather or other natural phenomena, when the determination 

is made that safety will not be compromised by exercising this discretion. NOEDs 
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require justification from a licensee or certificate holder that documents the safety basis 

for the request and provides whatever other information the staff deems necessary to 

issue an NOED. 

In 2007, the NRC issued two NOEDs: 

• NOED 07-3-01 issued on January 24, 2007, to Exelon Generation Company, 

LLC (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), providing enforcement discretion 

allowing the licensee to extend the 8-hour Completion Time for Technical 

Specification 3.1.7 Condition B to 72 hours to accomplish restoration of the 

Standby Liquid Control System to an operable statue. 

• NOED 07-4-01 was issued on July 12, 2007, to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating 

Corporation (Wolf Creek Generating Station), providing enforcement discretion 

allowing the license to extend the length of Allowed Outage Time (AOT) in 

Technical Specification 3.8.1, “AC Sources - Operating,” an additional 48 hours 

to support corrective maintenance activities on the diesel engine cooling water 

system without having to shut down. 

V. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate 

Enforcement Sanctions 

After considering the general tenets of NRC’s Enforcement Policy and the 

safety-significance of a violation and its surrounding circumstances, judgment and 

discretion may be exercised in determining the severity levels of violations and the 

appropriate enforcement sanctions to be taken. In exercising discretion, the NRC may 

either escalate or mitigate the enforcement sanctions to ensure that the resulting 

enforcement action takes into consideration all the relevant circumstances of the 

particular case, and is in the interest of public health and safety. 

Cases where OE exercises enforcement discretion occur for various reasons. For 

example, in CY 2007, enforcement discretion was applied to several materials cases 

where licensees had not implemented specific security requirements regarding 

increased controls (IC) of certain radioactive material in their possession in accordance 

with NRC Orders issued in CY2005. A total of 48 IC cases were the subject of escalated 

enforcement in CY 2007. Using the criteria in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 

2006-003, “Guidance for Dispositioning Enforcement Issues Associated With Orders 

Imposing Increased controls for Licensees Authorized to Possess Radioactive Material 

Quantities of concern,” September 28, 2008. 31 of these cases resulted in the use of 

enforcement discretion. In these cases, the licensee was issued a close-out letter in lieu 

of a notice of violation. 

Enforcement discretion was also applied to an Agreement State materials user who 

conducted licensed activities in an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction. After a review 

of the facts, it became clear that the company believed it was operating in an area of 

State jurisdiction. In addition, the NRC determined that, based on inspections, the 

company has had sustained good performance conducting the activities authorized in its 

Agreement State license. 
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VI. Withdrawn Actions 

Enforcement actions can be challenged for several reasons, e.g., a licensee might 

dispute the requirements, the facts of the case, the agency’s application of the 

Enforcement Policy, or the significance of the violation. Licensees may provide clarifying 

information that was not available at the time of the inspection and this may affect 

whether a noncompliance exists. 

During CY 2007, the Agency did not withdraw any escalated enforcement action. 

In addition, OE has established a metric for quality of enforcement actions based on the 

number of disputed and withdrawn non-escalated enforcement actions. The goal is less 

than 30 withdrawn non-escalated enforcement actions in a calendar year. Violations 

that are withdrawn based on supplemental information that was not available to an 

inspector prior to assessing an enforcement sanction are not included in this metric. 

During CY 2007, approximately 1332 non-escalated enforcement actions were issued to 

reactor, materials, and fuel facility licensees. Of these actions, nine non-escalated 

enforcement actions were disputed. In CY 2007, the Agency withdrew all or part of five 

of these disputed actions. 

VII. Hearing Activities 

During CY 2007, two hearings were pending before the Atomic Safety and Licensing 

Board (ASLB) involving two individuals who worked at the Davis Besse Nuclear Power 

Plant (Davis-Besse). 

In the first case, the NRC issued an Order on April 21, 2005 against Mr. Andrew 

Siemaszko, a former system engineer at Davis-Besse, for deliberately providing 

inaccurate and incomplete information to the NRC. The Order prohibited him from 

involvement in NRC-licensed activities for 5 years from the effective date of the Order. 

On April 22, 2005, Mr. Siemaszko requested a hearing before the ASLB. As of 

December 31, 2006, the hearing has been on hold with the ASLB because of the 

concurrent proceeding brought by U.S. Department of Justice against Mr. Siemaszko in 

the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, arising out of 

the same set of facts and circumstances. 

In the second case, the NRC issued an Order on January 4, 2006 against 

Mr. David Geisen, a former Manager of Design Engineering at Davis-Besse, for 

deliberately providing inaccurate and incomplete information to the NRC. The Order 

prohibited him from involvement in NRC-licensed activities for 5 years from the effective 

date of the Order. On February 23, 2006, Mr. Geisen requested a hearing before the 

ASLB. As of February 1, 2007, the hearing has been on hold with the Commission 

because of the concurrent proceeding brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against 

Mr. Geisen in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, 

arising out of the same set of facts and circumstances.
OE Annual Report

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VIII. Enforcement Policy Changes and Enforcement Guidance Memoranda 

The NRC Enforcement Policy is a living document and is revised to reflect experience 

and stakeholder input. On January 25, 2007, the NRC published notice in the Federal 

Register (FRN) (72 FR 3429) announcing that the agency was undertaking a major 

revision of its Enforcement Policy to clarify the use of terms and to update the Policy, 

removing outdated information and adding information addressing enforcement issues in 

areas that are currently not directly addressed in the Policy. The FRN pointed out that 

the NRC does not intend to modify its emphasis on compliance with NRC requirements 

and solicited written comments from interested parties. The comment period expired on 

March 26, 2007. 

OE completed an initial draft of the revised Policy which was provided to the program 

and regional offices for comment, and is currently reviewing the comments that were 

provided and making the appropriate changes to the draft Policy. The Supplements are 

also being revised. The next step will be to publish the revised, draft Policy for public 

comment. After review and incorporation of appropriate stakeholder comments, a final 

draft of the Policy will be forwarded to the Commission. 

In addition, five Enforcement Guidance Memoranda (EGM) were issued in CY 2007 to 

provide guidance in the interpretation of specific provisions of the Enforcement Policy. A 

link to the full text of these EGMs, summarized here, can be found in the Agencywide 

Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) and in Appendix A of the NRC 

Enforcement Manual located on the OE Web site at: 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/guidance.html. 

A. January 9, 2007, Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 07-001 – 

Enforcement Discretion For Certain Violations Associated With DOE 

Legacy Documents Found In Certain Leased Space 

The purpose of this EGM is to provide guidance for the exercise of enforcement 

discretion for non-willful involvement of United States Enrichment Corporation 

(USEC) in discoveries of Department of Energy (DOE) legacy information or 

materials found in NRC regulated site areas at the Paducah or Portsmouth 

Gaseous Diffusion Plant. (ML070090074)

B. January 26, 2007, Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 07-002 – Interim 

Guidance for Dispositioning Violations of 10 CFR 74.19(c) 

 The purpose of this EGM is to provide guidance for dispositioning inspection 

findings related to a licensee’s implementation of 10 CFR 74.19(c) involving 

physical inventories of special nuclear material (SNM) prior to November 26, 

2005. (ML063180178) 
OE Annual Report

 10 

C. February 12, 2007, Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 07-003 – 

Disposition of Violations of 10 CFR 50.47(B)(4) for Failure to Maintain a 

Standard Emergency Action Level Scheme. 

 The purpose of this EGM is to provide guidance pertaining to the disposition of 

noncompliances of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) for failure to maintain a standard 

emergency action level (EAL) scheme and 10 CFR 50.54(q) which states that 

EAL changes resulting in a decrease in the effectiveness of the emergency plan 

must be approved by the Commission before implementation. (ML070230310) 

D. June 30, 2007, Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 07-004 – Enforcement 

Discretion For Post-Fire Manual Actions Used as Compensatory Measures 

for Fire Induced Circuit Failures 

 The purpose of this EGM is twofold: (1) to define September 6, 2007, as the end 

date for licensees to initiate corrective actions and to implement compensatory 

measures for noncompliances related to post-fire operator manual actions, 

except those operator manual actions that are relied upon as the mitigating 

mechanism for fire induced multiple-spurious actuations; and (2) to emphasize 

that March 6, 2009, is the date for the completion of corrective actions associated 

with noncompliances involving operator manual actions. (ML071830345) 

E. September 28, 2007, Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 07-006 

Enforcement Discretion for Heavy Load Handling Activities 

 The purpose of this EGM is to provide guidance for exercising enforcement 

discretion in dispositioning current unresolved and future potential performance 

deficiencies related to handling of heavy loads, particularly reactor vessel heads 

at nuclear power plants. (ML072550190) 

IX. Ongoing Activities 

A. Safety Culture 

 

Beginning in CY 2005, OE was the lead office for an initiative to develop changes to the 

Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to more fully address safety culture, in response to 

Commission direction in SRM-SECY-04-0111, “Recommended Staff Actions Regarding 

Agency Guidance in the Areas of Safety Conscious Work Environment and Safety 

Culture”. The safety culture changes in the ROP were implemented in July 2006. In CY 

2007, OE continued to be the lead office for agency safety culture policy development. 

As such, OE chairs the agency’s Safety Culture Working Group (SCWG), and provides 

assistance and guidance to other offices in safety culture developmental activities. OE 

also participates as the vice-chair of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation’s Safety 

Culture Focus Team (SCFT). The purpose of the SCFT is to promote the 

implementation of the ROP safety culture changes in an effective and consistent manner 

across the regions. The Agency’s Allegation Advisor, located in OE, chairs the SCFT’s 

subgroup, the Safety Conscious Work Environment Findings Review Group, whose 

purpose is to ensure regulatory consistency by reviewing and dispositioning all potential 

inspection findings in the safety conscious work environment 
OE Annual Report

11 

(SCWE) cross-cutting area of the ROP. Additional information on SCWE activities can 

be found in the “Allegation Program, 2007 Annual Trends Report.” 

In an effort to continue the Commission’s broad review of issues related to safety 

culture, a pilot study was developed in CY 2007 to assess the agency’s safety culture 

components for applicability to the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards 

oversight of their fuel cycle facility licensees to better address safety culture. The pilot 

study is being conducted at two volunteer fuel facility licensees and will be accomplished 

in two phases. The first phase of the pilot study, which consists of data gathering, was 

initiated in CY 2007. 

In addition, OE and the SCWG are involved in coordinating with the Office of New 

Reactors and the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response to assist in their 

developmental approaches related to aspects of safety culture. 

B. Alternative Dispute Resolution 

At the beginning of FY 2005, the agency implemented a pilot program to evaluate the 

use of Alternative Dispute resolution (ADR), specifically mediation, in the Allegation and 

Enforcement Programs. The enforcement portion of the pilot program was initiated after 

OI had completed its investigation and based on the results of the investigation, the 

enforcement staff had concluded that further consideration of the issues identified in the 

OI report was warranted. This portion of the pilot program was typically referred to as 

“post-investigation” ADR. 

Having decided to pursue enforcement based on the OI investigation report, ADR was 

offered at three points in the enforcement process: (1) prior to a predecisional 

enforcement conference; (2) when an NOV was issued; and (3) when cases resulted in 

the issuance of an order imposing a civil penalty. The post-investigation ADR pilot 

included an evaluation of the position that ADR would be less adversarial, less formal, 

and could promote greater communication which, in turn, could promote greater 

cooperation between parties at these points in the enforcement process. The potential 

for resource savings and a more timely resolution of issues was also anticipated. 

The pilot program operated through the first quarter of 2006. On May 5, 2006, 

SECY-06-0102, “Evaluation of the Pilot Program on the Use of Alternative Dispute 

Resolution in the Allegation and Enforcement Programs” was issued. In SECY-06-0102, 

the staff concluded that the use of ADR was, in general, a success and indicated that the 

program would be continued, pending formal incorporation of ADR into a subsequent 

Enforcement Policy revision. Despite limited resource savings overall in the 

enforcement portion of the ADR program, the opportunity for the staff to communicate 

openly with other parties in mediation with the assistance of a trained mediator helped 

the staff reach effective agreements that met NRC’s interests. Corrective actions were 

broader and/or more comprehensive than typically achieved through the traditional 

enforcement process. Parties commented, both formally and informally, that ADR was a 

less confrontational means to resolve issues, due in large part to the improved 

communication. 

During CY 2007, a total of eleven confirmatory orders documenting settlement 

agreements were issued (i.e., seven in reactor-related cases, two in fuel facility-related 

cases, and two in materials-related cases). Of the eleven cases, all but one was 
OE Annual Report

 12 

negotiated prior to a Predecisional Enforcement Conference (PEC). The one exception 

was negotiated after issuance of the NOV and proposed civil penalty. 

On December 14, 2007, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued a 

memorandum report titled “Audit of NRC’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Program” 

(OIG-08-A-03). In its report, the OIG found that the NRC had deemed the ADR pilot 

program a success and that NRC staff, ADR participants, and other external 

stakeholders expressed continuing satisfaction with the post-investigative ADR process. 

OIG also noted weaknesses in the program’s guidance and management controls. Most 

of the issues identified by OIG were already known to the staff; however, insufficient time 

had elapsed between completion of the pilot program and the initiation of the OIG audit 

for the staff to address the weaknesses. As part of the audit, those weaknesses are 

tracked to completion. 

Certain ADR process improvements, some generically described in the pilot program 

evaluation, were addressed during the period, including: (1) guidance, based on lessons 

learned during the pilot program, was developed on preparing and issuing confirmatory 

orders after a preliminary agreement is reached; (2) presentations, to further 

understanding of the process, were provided to NRC senior management development 

classes, mediator orientation sessions, various internal counterpart meetings, and 

industry groups; and (3) guidance was developed regarding interaction with agreement 

states in cases where the party is an agreement state licensee that was operating in 

NRC’s jurisdiction at the time of the apparent violation. 

C. Fire Protection 

In June 2007, OE issued an EGM (see page 10) which provided September 6, 2007, as 

the end date for licensees to initiate corrective actions and to implement compensatory 

measures for noncompliances related to post-fire operator manual action. EGM-07-004 

“Enforcement Discretion For Post-Fire Manual Actions Used as Compensatory 

Measures for fire Induced Circuit Failures”, emphasized that March 6, 2009, is the date 

for completion of corrective actions associated with noncompliances involving operator 

manual actions. 

D. Rulemaking 

On November 14, 2007, the NRC published in the Federal Register (71 FR 5015) a final 

rule entitled “Clarification of NRC Civil Penalty Authority over Contractors and 

Subcontractors Who Discriminate against Employees for Engaging in Protected 

Activities.” It became effective on December 14, 2007. The final rule amended the 

Commission’s employee protection regulations to allow the Commission to impose civil 

penalties on contractors and subcontractors for violations of the requirements in 10 CFR 

30.7, 40.7, 50.7, 52.5, 60.9, 61.9, 63.9, 70.7, 71.9, 72.10, and 76.7. The final rule also 

amended 10 CFR 76.7 to bring it into conformance with the provisions of the other 

NRC’s employee protection regulations by providing that the Commission may impose a 

civil penalty on the United States Enrichment Corporation or a contractor or 

subcontractor of the United States Enrichment Corporation. Notice of a revision to the 

Enforcement Policy clarifying the Commission’s civil penalty authority over contractors 

and subcontractors was published in the Federal Register on January 7, 2008. 
OE Annual Report

13 

E. Public Involvement 

The NRC views building and maintaining public trust and confidence as an important 

performance goal for the agency as it carries out its mission. To reach this goal, the 

NRC must be an independent, open, efficient, clear and reliable regulator and must find 

appropriate ways to convey this message to the public, including providing stakeholders 

with clear and accurate information about, and a meaningful role in, our regulatory 

programs. 

To further these goals, the NRC’s Enforcement Program has been structured to actively 

engage stakeholders by educating them on how the enforcement program is conducted 

and how it is changing to support new initiatives in the agency’s oversight programs. 

To provide accurate and timely information to all interested stakeholders and enhance 

the public’s understanding of the NRC’s Enforcement Program, information about the 

Enforcement Program has been placed on the NRC’s public Web site where it can be 

retrieved and downloaded. The NRC’s Enforcement Web site includes a variety of 

information such as the Enforcement Policy, the newly revised Enforcement Manual, and 

current temporary enforcement guidance contained in Enforcement Guidance 

Memoranda (EGMs). This Web site also contains information regarding significant 

enforcement actions issued to reactor and materials licensees, non-licensees (vendors, 

contractors, and certificate holders), and individuals and upcoming predecisional 

enforcement conferences. Although consistent with NRC practices and policies, most 

security-related actions and activities are not included on the NRC’s public Web site. 

OE does include security orders that impose compensatory security requirements on 

various licensees in its enforcement documents collection. 

In an effort to increase stakeholder involvement in the development of enforcement policy 

and guidance, OE also established a public participation page on the Enforcement Web 

site which allows interested stakeholders to provide input on various enforcement 

issues, e.g. the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in enforcement. 

F. Reviews and Self Assessments 

Review of Open Predecisional Enforcement Conferences 

The Office of Enforcement completed a review of predecisional enforcement 

conferences (PECs) that were open to the public from January 1, 2004, through 

August 30, 2007. The purpose of the review was to determine whether the meeting 

announcements for these PECs (1) were posted within the required time in ADAMS and 

(2) followed the guidelines provided in Chapter 4 of the NRC Enforcement Manual and 

Management Directive 3.5 which requires the staff to prepare and issue a complete and 

clear meeting summary within 30 working days of the meeting. The review also included 

identifying whether any open PECs had been transcribed. The review evaluated PECs 

Agency-wide rather than examining individual office performances. 

The review concluded that in all cases, the summary was sent to the licensee either 

before or when the enforcement action was issued in accordance with the guidance 

provided in Chapter 4 of the Enforcement Manual. The summaries were clear and 

concise and usually had the accession number for material that was relevant to the 
OE Annual Report

 14 

meetings (such as slides, licensee or NRC handouts) available in the body of the 

document. However, some summaries were difficult to find due to the fact that 

enforcement action (EA) numbers were not directly linked to the package. 

Based on the results of the review, several recommendations were provided and are 

being implemented. These are that: (1) the Regions ensure that meeting notices and 

summaries include the EA number for the case to make it easier to find all materials that 

are related to the case; (2) ADAMS templates are revised to include the use of an 

ADAMS package that will link all material associated with the case including inspection 

reports, meeting notices, meeting summaries, and notices of violation; and (3) accession 

numbers of material that was relevant to the PEC in the conference summary continue 

to be included. 

 Review of Enforcement Assessments - Recommendation Implementation 

 The Office of Enforcement completed a review of recommendations resulting from the 

 quarterly enforcement assessments. The purpose of the review was to verify that 

 enforcement assessment recommendations were being implemented and/or tracked in 

 OE Action Item Tracking System (AITS). The assessments reviewed included: 

 1. Review of Office of Enforcement Action Tracking System, dated July 29, 2005. 

 2. Review of Factual Summaries of Office of Investigations Reports Attached to 

 Regional Inspection Reports and Choice Letters, dated September 26, 2005. 

 3. Review of the Enforcement Action Tracking System, dated January 13, 2006. 

 4. Review of the 3 Week E Mail Process, dated April 11, 2006. 

 5. Office of Enforcement Review of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Green 

 Non-Cited Violations, dated July 17, 2006. 

 OE found that, for the most part, all of the assessment recommendations were either 

 completed, currently being implemented, or included in the AITS database to be 

 completed. The staff noted that the recommendation to develop an internal office 

 procedure for assigning, opening, extending and closing tasks within the AITS was 

 closed in AITS; however, although a procedure was developed, it had not been 

 approved by OE management. 

X. Regional Accomplishments 

 Reviews 

During CY 2007, the regions conducted both routine and focused self assessments of 

the enforcement area to ensure effective performance and to identify opportunities for 

continuous improvement. The self assessments encompassed both the reactor and 

materials arenas; considered performance associated with development and issuance of 

both non-escalated and escalated enforcement actions; and included activities that 

required a high degree of coordination with other NRC stakeholders, such as the Office 

of Investigations. 
OE Annual Report

15 

These assessments included the following reviews: 

• reactor and materials non-escalated enforcement actions to ensure 

consistent implementation of the enforcement policy; 

• the three-week email process for handling unsubstantiated OI cases; 

• effectiveness of the Enforcement Panel Worksheet when considering 

willfulness; 

• draft notices of violation used to support OI investigations 

 

Overall, the self-assessments showed the regions were effectively implementing the 

Enforcement Program. However, opportunities for improvement were identified 

associated with some of the administrative tools used to facilitate the enforcement 

process and with draft and final enforcement products associated with wrong-doing 

cases. The regions developed recommended corrective actions for each of the items 

and shared the results of the self assessments with OE. For example, the Enforcement 

Panel Worksheet was modified to improve effectiveness of enforcement panels. 

Training 

During CY 2007, the regions provided initial and refresher enforcement training to their 

respective staff, provided directed training to regional staff in response to 

recommendations developed as a part of the routine and focused self assessments, and 

provided outreach training to both internal and external stakeholders. 

The regional efforts to ensure quality initial and ongoing training to all regional staff has 

been a critical component in facilitating the timely qualification and contribution of the 

large number of newly hired staff, including nuclear safety professional program 

participants. Headquarters and regional enforcement staff provided outreach training to 

internal stakeholders on the allegation, enforcement, and Alternate Dispute Resolution 

processes during an annual Office of Investigations Counterpart Meeting. External 

outreach training on the allegation and enforcement processes was also provided by 

headquarters and regional staff during licensee employee concerns program forums and 

regional utility groups. Training provided as a part of the internal and external 

stakeholder outreach efforts has increased the staff’s understanding of the key interests 

of important stakeholders. 
OE Annual Report

 16 

Table 3. CY 2007 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Regions and Program Office

 

Program Office 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

Civil 

Penalties Orders 

Orders 

Imposing Civil 

Penalty 

TOTAL 

Region I 33 7 3 1 44 

Region II 15 2 2 0 19 

Region III 17 3 1 0 21 

Region IV 12 6 5 0 23 

NRR 0 0 1 0 1 

NMSS 0 0 8 0 8 

NSIR 0 0 0 0 0 

OE 0 0 2 0 2 

TOTAL 77 18 22 1 118 

Figure 4. CY 2007 – Escalated Enforcement Actions 

by Regions and Program Office 

12

17

15

33

6

3

2

7

2

8

1

5

1

2

3 1

OE

NSIR

NMSS

NRR

Region lV

Region lll

Region ll

Region l

Escalated NOVs

Civil Penalties

Orders

Orders Imposing Civil

Penalties

 
OE Annual Report

17 

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OE Annual Report

 18 

Table 4. CY 2007 – Escalated Enforcement Actions 

By Type Of Licensee, Non-Licensee, or Individual 

Type of Licensee 

Escalated 

NOVs 

(w/o Civil 

Penalty) 

Civil 

Penalty Orders

Orders 

Imposing 

Civil 

Penalty 

TOTAL

Operating Reactor 20 3 5 0 28 

Radiographer 20 4 1 0 25 

Hospital 15 1 1 0 17 

Gauge User 6 8 1 1 16 

Licensed Individual (Reactor) 6 0 2 0 8 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Materials) 3 0 1 0 4 

Unlicensed Individual 

(Reactor) 2 0 2 0 4 

Irradiator 2 0 0 0 2 

Fuel Facility 1 1 3 0 5 

Materials Distributer 1 0 0 0 1 

Non-Licensee 1 0 0 0 1 

Academic 0 0 1 0 1 

Mill 0 0 0 0 0 

Pharmacy 0 0 0 0 0 

Physician 0 0 0 0 0 

Radiographer Fabricator 0 0 0 0 0 

Research Reactor 0 0 1 0 1 

UF Conversion Facility 0 0 0 0 0 

Waste Disposal 0 0 0 0 0 

Well Logger 0 0 0 0 0 

Other 0 1 4 0 5 

TOTAL 77 18 22 1 118 
OE Annual Report

19 

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OE Annual Report

 20 

Figure 5. CY 2007 - Escalated Enforcement Actions By Type of 

Licensee, Non-Licensee, or Individual

1

1

1

2

2

3

6

6

15

20

20

1

1

8

1

4

3

4

1

1

3

2

1

2

1

1

1

5

1

Other

Well Logger

Waste Disposal

Uf Conversion Facility

Research Reactor

Radiographer Fabricator

Physician

Pharmacy

Mill

Academic

Non-Licensee

Materials distributer

Fuel Facility

Irradiator

Unlicensed Individual

(Reactor)

Unlicensed Individual

(Materials)

Licensed Individual (Reactor)

Gauge User

Hospital

Radiographer

Operating Reactor

Escalated NOVs (w/o Civil

Penalty)

Civil Penalty

Orders

Orders Imposing Civil

Penalty
OE Annual Report

A1 

Appendix A: Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation 

Without Civil Penalties*

Alaska Industrial X-ray EA-06-304 

Anchorage, AK 

On June 21, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving a 

failure to notify the NRC within 24 hours after the discovery of an event in which equipment 

failed to function as designated. Specifically, following the determination that a radiographic 

exposure device had failed to automatically secure the source assembly when it had been 

cranked back into the fully shielded position, the licensee failed to make the initial report. 

Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. 

 EA-07-261 

Anchorage, AK 

On October 19, 2007, an Order Suspending Licensed Activities (Effective Immediately) was 

issued to Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. (AIX) based on the NRC’s determination that all AIX 

radiographers, including AIX’s Radiation Safety Officer, and assistants, violated 10 CFR 

34.41(a) by performing industrial radiographic operations at a temporary job site with only one 

qualified individual present during operations. The evidence the NRC relied on indicates that 

these activities have occurred on numerous occasions, for a period of up to three years. 

Because the NRC issued a Notice of Violation on April 25, 2001, for a willful violation of 10 CFR 

34.41(a) at the same client facility location, serious concerns were raised regarding AIX’s 

willingness to comply with the Commission’s requirements and its ability to conduct licensed 

activities without undue risk to the public’s health and safety, resulting in the issuance of this 

order suspending all radiographic operations authorized by AIX’s license. 

Arizona Public Service Company EA-06-296 

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 

On February 21, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a WHITE 

Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure to develop adequate instructions 

or procedures for corrective maintenance activities on the Unit 3, Emergency Diesel generator 

(EDG) A K-1 relay and the failure to identify and correct the cause of the erratic K-1 relay 

operation prior to installation of the relay. This resulted in the emergency diesel generator being 

inoperable for almost four weeks. The violation was cited against 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, 

Criteria V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings” and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, 

“Corrective Action.” 

Blakemore Construction Corporation EA-07-174 

Rockville, VA 

On October 11, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation of 

10 CFR 30.34(i). The violation involved the failure to maintain a minimum of two independent 

physical controls that formed a tangible barrier to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized 

removal during a period when the gauge was not under direct control or surveillance. 

Specifically, two portable gauges were stored in an unlocked storage room located in an 

unlocked building at one of the licensee’s job sites. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included 
OE Annual Report

 A2 

Cal Testing Services, Inc. EA-07-191 

Griffith, IN 

On September 7, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation 

involving a radiographer who, contrary to the requirements in 10 CFR 34.37(a), did not wear a 

personnel dosimeter on the trunk of the body, during radiographic operations. Specifically, the 

radiographer placed his personnel dosimeter into his coat pocket and subsequently removed his 

coat and left the coat (with dosimeter in the pocket) in the vicinity of the camera prior to 

radiographic operations. 

Carolina Power and Light Company EA-07-024 

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant 

On April 20, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White 

Significance Determination Process (SDP) finding involving: (1) inadequate corrective actions to 

prevent a repeat failure of the #9 main crankshaft bearing on emergency diesel generator 

(EDG) #1: (2) the failure to follow the foreign material exclusion procedure during maintenance 

performed on EDG #1; and (3) the failure to promptly identify and implement adequate actions 

to prevent EDG #1 from tripping on low lubricating oil pressure. These conditions ultimately 

contributed to an EDG #1 trip and a bearing failure during a Unit 2 loss-of-offsite-power event. 

The violation was cited against Technical Specification 3.8.1, “AC Sources-Operating,” because 

EDG #1 was inoperable from October 30 to November 7, 2006. As a result, while Unit 1 was 

operating in Mode 1, only three of four EDGs were operable for a period in excess of 7 days. 

Constellation Nuclear EA-07-001 

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 

On March 13, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a WHITE 

Significance Determination Process finding involving an activity that compromised the integrity 

of the annual Licensed Operator Requalification (simulator) exam at Unit 1 for calendar years 

2005 and 2006. Specifically, the process used by the licensee to select and validate the 

simulator exam scenarios resulted in the licensed operators being knowledgeable of a 

significant portion of the exam prior to its administration, affecting the equitable and consistent 

administration of the exam. The violation was cited against 10 CFR 55.49, “Integrity of 

examinations and tests.” 

Cooper Health System EA-07-102; EA-07-126 

Camden, NJ 

On June 8, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for two Severity Level III violations. The first 

violation involved a failure to verify that a high dose rate remote afterloader brachytherapy 

treatment was administered in accordance with the treatment plan and written directive. The 

second violation involved a failure to report a medical event. Specifically, a high dose rate 

remote afterloader treatment fraction was delivered in which the source was positioned outside 

of the patient’s body for a portion of the treatment. The dose delivered to the treatment site 

differed from the prescribed dose by more than 50 rem to an organ or tissue and the 

fractionated dose differed from the prescribed dose, for a single fraction, by 50 percent or more. 
OE Annual Report

A3 

Department of the Army EA-07-152 

Fort Hood, Texas 

On October 25, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for three Severity Level III violations 

involving the failure to implement Increased Controls. Specifically, the licensee failed to have a 

program to monitor and immediately detect, assess, and respond to unauthorized access to 

radionuclides of concern during all periods of time when a blood irradiator containing 

radionuclides of concern at or above threshold limit; the licensee failed to arrange a plan with 

Fort Hood security forces that addressed a response to an unauthorized access to radioactive 

material quantities of concern or devices; and the licensee had not developed, maintained, and 

implemented policies and procedures for controlling access to, and for proper handling and 

protection against unauthorized disclosure of its physical protection information for radioactive 

material. 

Department of the Navy EA -07-91 

Albany, Georgia 

On June 29, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

failure to control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is in a controlled or 

unrestricted area and that is not in storage. Specifically, when an Ir-192 radiography source 

was received, it was improperly stored, and controlled. In addition, the device was not secured 

from unauthorized removal nor was it maintained under constant surveillance. 

Dept. of the Navy EA -07-93 

Portsmouth, Virginia 

On June 29, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

failure to maintain continuous direct visual surveillance during a radiographic operation to 

protect against unauthorized entry into a high radiation area. Specifically, a radiographer 

exposed a Cobalt-60 sealed source in an area that was occupied by three individuals, creating a 

high radiation area, without first clearing the area to protect against unauthorized entry into a 

high radiation area, and without providing visual surveillance of the area. 

Dominion Energy Kewaunee EA-07-058 

Kewaunee Power Station 

On April 3, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Yellow 

Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of licensee personnel to follow 

procedural requirements and enter a fuel leak on the “A” emergency diesel generator into the 

corrective action program on June 28, 2006, when the leak was first identified. This failure 

resulted in the leak not being appropriately evaluated and repaired until August 17, 2006. The 

NRC has determined that this failure is a performance deficiency and is also a violation of the 

licensee’s Technical Specifications which state, in part, that written procedures and 

administrative policies shall be established, implemented, and maintained. 
OE Annual Report

 A4 

Duke Power Company, LLC, d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC EA-06-294 

Oconee Nuclear Station 

On February 13, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a WHITE 

Significance Determination Process finding involving the identification of foreign material in the 

Unit 3 A and B train reactor building emergency sump (RBES) suction lines during the end-ofcycle 22 refueling outage. Specifically, some time prior to and for the duration of Oconee Unit 3 

operating cycle 22, adequate foreign material exclusion controls had not been implemented 

resulting in the discovery of foreign material in the A and B train RBES suction lines. The 

violation was cited against Technical Specification 5.4.1, “Procedures,” and Section 9.e of the 

referenced Regulatory Guide 1.33 for the failure to comply with Nuclear System Directive 104, 

“Material Condition/Housekeeping, Cleanliness/Foreign Material Exclusion, and Seismic 

Concerns,” for the failure to maintain the Unit 3 RBES free of foreign material. 

EGS Associates, Inc. EA 06-288 

Atlantic City, NJ 

On January 10, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure, on two separate occasions, to provide a minimum of two independent physical 

controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal when 

not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. Specifically, on September 21, 

2006, a portable nuclear gauge was not secured within an unlocked company vehicle; and, a 

second gauge was not secured within a locked storage shed. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-07-212 

Indian Point, Units 1 and 2 

On August 30, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for failure to meet the conditions of a 

July 30, 2007, Order which required the licensee to implement an Emergency Notification 

System (ENS) with backup power capability by August 24, 2007. Specifically, the licensee 

failed to obtain necessary approvals by August 24, 2007. The NRC will determine the severity 

level, any additional civil penalty, and any required responses from Entergy regarding the matter 

at a later time. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-06-291 

Clinton Power Station 

On February 7, 2007, a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination 

Process finding was issued involving the failure to select an appropriate method for calculating 

the minimum elevation (i.e., the analytical level) of water above the high pressure core 

spray (HPCS) pump suction line to preclude vortex formation and subsequent air entrainment in 

the pump’s suction. As a result, the analytical level would result in significant air entrainment 

potentially causing the HPCS to be incapable of completing its safety function. 

Exelon Generation Co., LLC EA-07-085 

Limerick Generating Station 

On August 13, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation based on 

the acts of a security supervisor who deliberately violated requirements to remain attentive while 

standing watch. 
OE Annual Report

A5 

Florida Power and Light Energy EA-07-017 

Duane Arnold Energy Center 

On April 2, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White 

Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of the licensee’s 2006 full-scale 

exercise critique to identify a weakness associated with a Risk Significant Planning Standard 

which was also a Drill and Exercise Participation Performance Indicator. The NRC has 

determined that this failure is a performance deficiency and is also a violation of emergency 

preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and associated risk significant planning 

standard 10 CFR 50.54(b)(4). 

General Testing & Inspection Company EA-07-025 

Bordentown, NJ 

On March 12, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the licensee’s failure to implement Increased Controls. Specifically, on May 13, 2006, the 

licensee possessed approximately 27.6 curies of iridium-192 and did not have a documented 

program to monitor and immediately detect, assess, and respond to unauthorized access to 

such radioactive material and failed to have a pre-arranged plan with a local law enforcement 

agency for assistance in response to an actual or attempted theft of such radioactive material. 

Hackley Hospital EA-07-071 

Muskegon, Michigan 

On June 20, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving a 

failure to develop written procedures to provide high confidence that each administration was in 

accordance with the written directive. Specifically, the licensee’s written procedures for prostate 

seed implant treatment did not include appropriate steps or guidance to ensure that radioactive 

sources were positioned in the patient in accordance with the written directive and treatment 

plan. 

Hirata & Associates, Inc. EA-06-300 

Aiea, Hawaii 

On June 5, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

failure to use a minimum of two independent physical controls that formed tangible barriers to 

secure portable gauges from unauthorized removal when the gauges were not under the control 

and constant surveillance of licensee personnel. 

JCK & Associates EA-07-217 

Commerce Township, MI 

On June 8, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion were issued for 

two Severity Level III violations. The first violation involved the licensee’s failure to meet the 

terms and conditions of an order issued to the licensee for not paying its annual fees. The 

second violation involved the licensee’s failure to use a minimum of two independent physical 

controls that form tangible barriers to secure three portable gauges from unauthorized removal, 

when the portable gauges were not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. 

Specifically, the licensee stored the gauges in unlocked transportation cases located inside an 

unoccupied, unlocked hallway that could be accessed by unauthorized individuals. Although a 

civil penalty would normally be issued in this case, enforcement discretion was exercised 
OE Annual Report

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because the licensee has transferred all licensed material to an authorized recipient, its NRC 

license has been terminated, and the licensee has no intention of conducting NRC-licensed 

activities in the future. 

Mercy Hospital EA-07-018 

Scranton, PA 

On April 5, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

failure to secure from unauthorized removal or limit access to a High Dose Rate Afterloader 

which was stored in a treatment room, access to which was not restricted as required. 

Milton A. Hershey Medical Center EA-07-048 

Hershey, PA 

On April 4, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

failure to secure from unauthorized removal or limit access to radioactive material located in the 

nuclear medicine department hot lab, which is a controlled area. In addition, the licensee did 

not control and maintain constant surveillance of this licensed material. 

Nebraska Public Power District EA-07-090 

Cooper Nuclear Station 

On August 17, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White 

Significance Determination Process finding involving a violation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, 

Criterion XVI. The licensee failed to establish measures to promptly identify and correct a 

significant condition adverse to quality (SCAQ) and failed to assure that the cause of a SCAQ 

was determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. Specifically, the licensee’s 

inadequate procedural guidance for evaluating the suitability of parts used in safety related 

applications presented an opportunity in which the licensee failed to promptly identify a 

defective voltage regulator circuit board used in Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2 prior to 

its installation. Following installation of the defective EDG 2 voltage regulator circuit board, the 

licensee failed to determine the cause of two high voltage conditions, and failed to take 

corrective action to preclude repetition. As a result, an additional high voltage condition 

occurred resulting in a failure of EDG 2. 

Nuclear Management Company, LLC EA-06-274 

Point Beach Nuclear Plant 

On January 29, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The 

violation involved the licensee’s failure to update its Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) in 

1983 which, combined with the licensee’s continued failure to fully understand the facility’s 

licensing and design basis since that time, impacted the licensee’s ability in 2005 to understand 

the current Point Beach licensing and design basis, and resulted in a performance deficiency. 

The performance deficiency also impacted the NRC’s ability to perform its regulatory function. 

The licensee’s failure to update the FSAR and understand the facility’s licensing and design 

basis represented a challenge to the regulatory envelope upon which certain activities were 

licensed, such as reactor vessel head lift activities. 
OE Annual Report

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Omaha Public Power District EA-07-047 

Fort Calhoun Station 

On May 29, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White 

Significance Determination Process finding involving the improper installation of the valve disk 

of a Containment Spray Header Isolation Valve. The improper installation resulted in a 

condition in which the actual position of the valve was nearly opposite of the indicated position. 

This condition resulted in an inoperable train of the containment spray system for an entire 

operating cycle and also provided a reactor coolant system diversion flow path if shutdown 

cooling was initiated following certain postulated accident conditions. The violation was cited 

against 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” for 

conducting maintenance activities without procedures that were appropriate to the 

circumstances. Specifically, the maintenance and post-maintenance procedures did not require 

actions to verify the correct orientation of the valve. 

Omaha Public Power District EA-07-194 

Fort Calhoun Station 

On December 7, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for violations associated with a White 

Significance Determination Process finding involving a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, 

Criterion XVI, and a violation of the Fort Calhoun Technical Specifications. Specifically, the 

licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality involving 

high resistance across the field flash contacts of a relay in the Train A emergency diesel 

generator voltage regulator circuit and failed to provide a written procedure for maintenance that 

could affect the performance of safety-related EDG voltage regulator relay auxiliary contacts. 

PK Associates, Inc. EA 07-166 

dba Briggs Engineering & Testing 

Rockland, MA 

On August 2, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 

30.34(i). The violation involved the failure to maintain a minimum of two independent physical 

controls that formed a tangible barrier to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal 

during a period when the gauge was not under direct control or surveillance. Specifically, a 

Troxler portable gauge was found unattended on top of a two foot wall, adjacent to a new road 

construction project. The authorized user was out of the direct line of sight to the gauge, leaving 

the gauge unattended for approximately ten minutes. 

Professional Service Industries, Inc. EA-06-255 

Oakbrook Terrace, IL 

On February 23, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation involving the failure to use 

a minimum of two independent physical controls that formed tangible barriers to secure portable 

gauges from unauthorized removal when the gauges were not under the control and constant 

surveillance of licensee personnel. 
OE Annual Report

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South Carolina Electric & Gas Company EA-07-079 

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station 

On October 12, 2007, a Severity Level III Notice of Violation and Exercise of Enforcement 

Discretion were issued to South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G). The violation 

resulted from changes the licensee made to its Emergency Plan between October 1980 and 

July 2006. Contrary to 10 CFR 50.54(q) which allows a licensee to make changes to 

emergency plans without Commission approval when such changes do not decrease the 

effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the standards of 10 CFR 

50.47(b), SCE&G made changes without Commission approval which decreased the 

effectiveness of their Emergency Plan and resulted in the use of a non-standard scheme of 

Emergency Action Levels. 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company EA-07-155 

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant 

On August 17, 2007, parallel White finding was issued to Southern Nuclear Operating Company 

as a result of inspections at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. The parallel White finding was 

identified during a supplemental inspection to assess the licensees evaluation associated with 

unreliability and unavailability reporting in the Support Cooling Water Systems Performance 

Indicator (PI) within the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI). Failures of the 

licensees existing safety-related breakers associated with this PI predominantly contributed to 

the indicator crossing the threshold to White in the second quarter of 2006. This PI was 

subsequently reported Green in the 3rd quarter of 2006. The supplemental inspection for the 

White PI identified significant weaknesses related to the thoroughness and quality of several 

root cause evaluations that challenged the licensee’s ability to implement effective overall 

corrective actions. The licensees evaluations of the individual failures that contributed to the 

White PI did not effectively review for systemic aspects of circuit breaker failures. In addition, 

more recent problems were identified concerning the thoroughness of design reviews for the 

installation of new breakers. Based on these NRC identified weaknesses, a parallel PI 

inspection finding (White) was opened to allow the NRC to continue to monitor activities in this 

area. 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company EA-07-173 

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 

On October 31, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Yellow 

Significance Determination Process finding involving a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, 

Criterion XVI. Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a significant 

condition adverse to quality that resulted in the Unit 2 containment sump suction to residual heat 

removal pump 2A, an encapsulated valve, failing to stroke full open during testing on two 

occasions. The licensee did not assure that the causes of the condition, including rust/corrosion 

accumulation on valve components in the valve encapsulation dating back to 2001, were 

determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. 

St. Luke’s Hospital of Kansas City EA-06-315 

Kansas City, MO 

On March 14, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the licensee’s failure to develop written procedures to provide high confidence that each 

administration is in accordance with the written directive. Specifically, the licensee’s written 
OE Annual Report

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procedures for high dose rate (HDR) brachytherapy treatment did not include a requirement to 

verify that the correct HDR catheter length was entered into the treatment planning computer. 

Tome & Ubinas Radio Oncology Center EA-07-103 

San Juan, PR 

On October 11, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure to meet the physical presence requirements in 10 CFR 35.615(f)(2) during High Dose 

Radiation (HDR) brachytherapy treatments. Specifically, on two occasions the licensee willfully 

performed HDR brachytherapy treatments without the physical presence of an authorized user 

and on two additional occasions the licensee willfully performed HDR brachytherapy treatments 

without the physical presence of an authorized user and continued patient treatments without 

the authorized user or a physician under the supervision of an authorized user physically 

present. 

University of Pittsburgh EA-06-266; EA-06-278 

Pittsburgh, PA 

On July 23, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) were 

issued to the licensee, for a Severity Level III violation. As a result of an Alternative Dispute 

Resolution (ADR) mediation session conducted at the licensee’s request, the NRC agreed to 

final disposition of this matter by citing a single violation of the requirements in 10 CFR 35.24(b). 

Specifically, the licensee through the Radiation Safety Officer (a) failed to ensure the physical 

presence requirements of 10 CFR 35.615(f)(3) from May 13, 2004, to March 10, 2005; and (b) 

failed to ensure that written directives were consistently signed by all three members of a 

Gamma Knife team prior to administration of gamma stereotactic radiosurgery treatments in 

accordance with 10 CFR 35.32 between 1998 and 2000. The NRC concluded that certain 

aspects of the 10 CFR 35.24(b) violation were willful. The licensee disputed this conclusion. 

The NRC and the licensee have agreed to disagree regarding any willful aspects of this 

violation. In light of the actions that the licensee has taken, or has committed to take, as 

described in the Confirmatory Order, as well as the fact that the violation did not result in any 

known safety consequences to patients, workers, or the public, the NRC agreed to issue a 

Notice of Violation without a civil penalty. 
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OE Annual Report

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Appendix B: Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties *

Accurate NDE and Inspection, LLC EA-06-281 

Broussard, LA 

On March 20, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $13,000 was issued for a Severity Level III problem. The violations involved the 

failure to secure from unauthorized removal or limit access to a radiographic exposure device 

that was being improperly stored on an offshore platform, which was in a controlled area or 

unrestricted area; the failure to wear required personnel dosimetry during radiographic 

operations; and the failure to provide complete and accurate information on documents provided 

to an NRC inspector. Because wilfulness was associated with the problem, the NRC 

considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance 

with the civil penalty assessment process in the NRC Enforcement Policy, and determined that 

in this case, it was not. 

Alpha Omega Services, Inc. EA-07-215 

Bellflower, CA 

On December 20, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $19,200 were issued for a Severity Level II violation. In January 2003, the company 

deliberately provided materially inaccurate information to an NRC licensee and to a contractor 

for the licensee in violation of 10 CFR 71.8(b)(2). The company Operations Manager/Assistant 

Radiation Safety Officer signed a maintenance checklist indicating that a package was in 

compliance with the NRC Certificate of Compliance and approved for use, when he knew it was 

not. Additionally, in violation of 10 CFR 71.8(b)(1), Alpha Omega Services deliberately caused 

the NRC licensee to violate NRC requirements for a license when the licensee exported 

licensed material in nonconforming packages. 

C & W Enterprises, Inc. EA-07-022 

Sioux Falls, SD 

On July 13, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i) involved 

the licensee’s failure to use a minimum of two independent physical controls that formed 

tangible barriers to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal when the portable 

gauges was not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. Specifically, no 

tangible barrier was used to secure a portable gauge that was stored in a warehouse, prior to 

November 27, 2006, and on April 24, 2007, only one physical control that formed a tangible 

barrier was used to secure the portable gauge from unauthorized removal. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included 
OE Annual Report

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Englewood Hospital and Medical Center EA-06-309 

Englewood, New Jersey 

On April 30, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving the submittal of inaccurate 

information to the NRC in support of a request to amend the license to add an individual as an 

Authorized Medical Physicist. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-07-092 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station 

On April 23, 2007, a Severity Level III Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil 

Penalty in the amount of $130,000 was issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for failure to 

meet the requirements of a Confirmatory Order (EA-05-190) issued on January 31, 2006. The 

Order required that the licensee provide and maintain a backup power supply for the Indian 

Point Emergency Notification System (ENS). Specifically, the “radio only activation” feature, the 

portion of the ENS for which the backup power capability was provided, was required to meet its 

test acceptance criteria by April 15, 2007. The licensee did not meet its test acceptance criteria, 

resulting in the ENS not being fully operable by April 15, 2007. 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-07-200 

Dresden Nuclear Power Station 

On November 27, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Exercise of Discretion for Proposed 

Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $65,000 was issued for a Severity Level III problem 

consisting of four violations involving the licensee’s failure to comply with 10 CFR 74.19 

between 1959 and 2007. In summary, the licensee failed to (a) keep complete records showing 

the inventory (including location and unique identity), transfer, and disposal of all special nuclear 

material (SNM) in its possession; (b) establish, maintain, and follow written MC&A procedures 

that were sufficient to enable the licensee to account for SNM in its possession; and (c) conduct 

a physical inventory of all SNM in its possession at intervals not to exceed 12 months. This 

resulted in the failure to account for two fuel pellets and a number of incore detectors containing 

SNM. 

Indiana Department of Transportation EA-07-253 

Greenfield, Indiana 

On December 12, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III problem. The licensee twice failed to use a 

minimum of two independent controls that form tangible barriers to secure portable gauges from 

unauthorized removal during a period when the portable gauges were not under the control and 

constant surveillance of the licensee, resulting in a violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i). Specifically, a 

gauge was stolen from a temporary job site when the gauge operator walked away from the 

gauge while the gauge was on the ground behind the back of a pick-up truck. On another 

occasion the gauge was secured to the truck bed with only one physical control while not under 

the constant surveillance of an authorized user. 
OE Annual Report

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MC Squared, Inc. EA-07-101; EA-07-104 

Tampa, FL 33610 

On November 30, 2007, an Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty was issued to MC Squared, 

Inc. Following the NRC’s September 13, 2007, Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a 

Civil Penalty in the amount of $3,250, the licensee requested negating or significantly reducing 

the civil penalty. The Notice of Violation and proposed civil penalty was issued to the licensee 

for its failure to maintain a minimum of two independent physical controls that formed tangible 

barriers to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal during a period when the 

portable gauge was not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee. This failure 

may have contributed to the theft of the gauge. In addition, the license failed to file NRC Form 

241 at least three days prior to engaging in licensed activities in areas of exclusive NRC 

jurisdiction. MC Squared, Inc., did not present an adequate basis for the NRC to retract the 

violation or mitigate the civil penalty, and in addition, did not provide any evidence that payment 

of the civil penalty would create a financial hardship. Accordingly, NRC concluded that the 

violation remains valid and issued an order imposing Civil Monetary Penalty in the amount of 

$3,250. 

R&M Engineering, Inc. EA-07-180; EA- 07-181 

Juneau, AK 

On October 23, 2007, a Notice of Violation (NOV) and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in 

the amount of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i) involving 

the licensee’s failure, on two instances, to maintain a minimum of two independent physical 

controls that formed tangible barriers to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal 

during a period when the portable gauge was not under the control and constant surveillance of 

the licensee. In the second instance, this resulted in the loss of the gauge into the public 

domain. Specifically, in the first instance, an authorized portable gauge user left the portable 

gauge unattended and unsecured in the bed of a company truck as he returned to the office to 

retrieve paperwork. In the second instance, the licensee failed to use two independent physical 

controls to secure a portable gauge after it fell out of a company vehicle onto a public highway 

and until it was retrieved and returned by a member of the public a few minutes later. 

TRC Engineers, Inc. (Formerly SITE-Blauvelt Engineering, Inc.) EA-06-286 

Mount Laurel, NJ 

On January 30, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $3,250, was issued for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.34 (i), involving the 

reported theft of a portable nuclear density gauge containing licensed material. The licensee 

failed to use a minimum of two independent physical controls to secure a portable gauge while it 

was not under the control and surveillance of your staff, as required. Specifically, the licensee 

provided one independent barrier by securing the gauge in a locked container and placing it in a 

locked shed for overnight storage at a temporary job site. However, the licensee failed to 

provide a second independent barrier when it did not secure the gauge to the shed. 
OE Annual Report

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Universal Testing, LLC EA-06-259 

Clearfield, Utah 

On February 23,2007, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $6,500 was issued for a violation involving the failure to secure from unauthorized 

removal or access licensed material that was stored in an unrestricted area. Specifically, while 

transporting a radiography exposure device, a radiographer stopped for about 90 minutes 

leaving the device unattended and unsecured in the open bed of a pickup truck. Later that 

evening, the radiographer was involved in a traffic accident, resulting in his arrest and the 

impoundment of the pickup truck (with the unsecured radiography source in the bed of the truck) 

by the Wyoming State Police. The radiographer informed the police that the radioactive source 

was in the bed of the truck and requested that the truck be locked inside a garage at the 

impound yard. 

U.S. Engineering Laboratories, Inc. EA-07-035 

Rahway, NJ 07065 

On May 22, 2007, a Notice of Violation (NOV) and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $9,750 was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to secure 

licensed material from unauthorized removal resulting in the loss of a portable nuclear density 

gauge. The gauge was missing for approximately 5-months before it was found in the public 

domain in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. A second NOV involved the failure to immediately report 

the loss of the licensed material to the NRC. 

Valley Quarries, Inc. EA-07-156 

Chambersburg, PA 

On August 16, 2007, a Notice of Violation (NOV) and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $3,250 was issued for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.34(i) involving the 

failure to maintain a minimum of two independent physical controls that formed tangible barriers 

to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal during a period when the portable gauge 

was not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee, which may have contributed 

to the theft of the gauge. Specifically, a portable nuclear gauge was stolen from an unattended 

licensee vehicle that was parked at an employee residence. While the gauge was unattended, 

the licensee had only a single tangible barrier in place to prevent the theft. 
OE Annual Report

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Appendix C: Summary of Orders* 

Orders Issued To Licensees

Arizona Public Service Company EA-07-162 

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station 

On October 19, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Arizona 

Public Service Company (APS) to formalize commitments made as a result of a successful 

alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session. The commitments were made by APS 

as part of a settlement agreement between APS and the NRC concerning the falsification, by a 

qualified senior reactor operator, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), of a 

record related to a steam generator blowdown. As part of the settlement agreement, APS 

agreed to take a number of actions. In recognition of these actions, and those corrective actions 

already completed by APS, the NRC is satisfied that its concerns will be addressed. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-07-189 

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station 

On July 30, 2007, an Immediately Effective Order was issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, 

Inc., to ensure compliance with the regulations and implementation of the requirements of the 

Energy Policy Act of 2005. The Order supplemented the requirements of NRC Confirmatory 

Order (EA-05-190) which required, in part, a backup power system for the Emergency 

Notification System (ENS). The Confirmatory Order was issued to the Indian Point Nuclear 

Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 on January 31, 2006, and was amended by the NRC on 

January 23, 2007, extending the implementation date for the required ENS backup power 

system to April 15, 2007. The requirements of the January 31, 2006, Confirmatory Order 

remain in effect except as specifically modified or supplemented by this Order. 

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company EA-07-199 

Davis Besse, Perry, Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Plants 

On August 15, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to FirstEnergy 

Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) to formalize commitments made by FENOC following the 

NRC staff’s issuance of a Demand for Information (DFI) on May 14, 2007. The DFI was issued 

in response to the information provided by FENOC relative to its re-analysis of the time line and 

root causes for the 2002 Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event following 

its receipt of a report prepared by Exponent Failure Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions 

Corporation (Exponent). On June 13, 2007, FENOC provided its response to the DFI. On 

July 16, 2007, FENOC provided a supplemental response to the DFI which provided additional 

detail regarding the planned implementation of commitments established in its June 13, 2007, 

response to the DFI. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included 
OE Annual Report

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Indiana Michigan Power Company EA-06-295 

D.C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant 

On April 4, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to the Indiana 

Michigan Power Company (I&M) as part of a settlement agreement between I&M and the NRC 

regarding an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee Protection," issued by the NRC to 

I&M. In response to an NRC choice letter, I&M requested Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 

to resolve the apparent violation. As part of the settlement agreement that resulted from the 

ADR session, I&M agreed to complete a number of actions, including the completion of the 

training of all non-supervisory plant workforce and long-tern contractors on the subject of a 

safety-conscious work environment (SCWE), the completion of a Nuclear Safety Culture 

(including SCWE) survey, the reinforcement of I&M’s policy and expectation of its management 

relating to a SCWE as communicated by an executive level manager, and the implementation of 

a periodic assessment of I&M’s compliance with its hours of work limitation program and 

evaluation of the results for trends. In response to I&M’s actions, the NRC agreed to not pursue 

further enforcement action; however, the NRC will evaluate the implementation of the 

Confirmatory Order during future inspections. 

Nuclear Management Company, LLC EA-06-178 

Point Beach 

On January 3, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to the Nuclear 

Management Company, LLC (NMC), documenting a number of actions the licensee has agreed 

to take as part of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) settlement agreement. An ADR 

session was held at the licensees request to address the apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7, 

"Employee protection." The actions the licensee has agreed to take include: (1) revising NMCs 

policy on writing corrective action program reports; (2) training NMC supervisory employees on 

safety conscious work environment principles; (3) communicating NMCs safety culture policy to 

its employees; and (4) conducting a safety culture survey at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. As 

reflected in the Order, in response to these actions, the NRC agreed not to pursue further 

enforcement action on this issue. 

Universal Testing, LLC EA-06-259; EA-07-230 

Clearfield, Utah 

On November 6, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to confirm 

commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) settlement 

agreement. The licensee requested ADR following the NRC’s February 23, 2007, Notice of 

Violation and Proposed civil penalty of $6,500 for a willful violation involving the licensee’s 

failure to secure from unauthorized removal or access licensed material that was stored in an 

unrestricted area. As part of the agreement, Universal Testing has agreed to implement a 

comprehensive management review and oversight program. In addition, Universal Testing has 

agreed to write and submit an article for publication by the Non-Destructive Testing Managers 

Association (NDTMA) addressing the value that the new Universal Testing management 

oversight program adds to overall safe and effective operations. In recognition of Universal 

Testing’s extensive corrective actions, the NRC agreed to reduce the civil penalty originally 

proposed to $500. 
OE Annual Report

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University of Pittsburgh EA-06-266; EA-06-278; EA-07-206 

Pittsburgh, PA 

On July 23, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) were 

issued to the licensee, for a Severity Level III violation. As a result of an Alternative Dispute 

Resolution (ADR) mediation session conducted at the licensee’s request, the NRC agreed to 

final disposition of this matter by citing a single violation of the requirements in 10 CFR 35.24(b). 

Specifically, the licensee through the Radiation Safety Officer (a) failed to ensure the physical 

presence requirements of 10 CFR 35.615(f)(3) from May 13, 2004, to March 10, 2005; and (b) 

failed to ensure that written directives were consistently signed by all three members of a 

Gamma Knife team prior to administration of gamma stereotactic radiosurgery treatments in 

accordance with 10 CFR 35.32 between 1998 and 2000. The NRC concluded that certain 

aspects of the 10 CFR 35.24(b) violation were willful. The licensee disputed this conclusion. 

The NRC and the licensee have agreed to disagree regarding any willful aspects of this 

violation. In response to the actions that the licensee has taken, or has committed to take, as 

described in the Confirmatory Order, as well as the fact that the violation did not result in any 

known safety consequences to patients, workers, or the public, the NRC agreed to issue a 

Notice of Violation without a civil penalty. 

Orders Issued To Individuals

Robbie E. Balentine IA-06-043 

On April 13, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Mr. Balentine as 

a result of a settlement agreement entered into as a result of Alternative Dispute Resolution 

requested by the individual. The settlement agreement acknowledges the NRC and the 

individual’s agreement to disagree that the individual deliberately violated 10 CFR 50.5, 

"Deliberate Misconduct," when, as Lead Foreman for Stone and Webster Engineering 

Company, he directed and allowed unauthorized open blasting to be performed inside the torus 

of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, causing the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant to be in 

violation of its procedures associated with radiation protection. The individual did acknowledge 

that, as Lead Foreman, his communications to employees in the area of safe work practices 

must be especially clear and unequivocal and that, contrary to this, his communications were 

poor and failed to convey clear instructions or expectations. 

Keith Davis IA-07-014 

On November 26, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Mr. Davis, 

former Senior Reactor Operator at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), as a result 

of a settlement agreement entered into as a result of Alternative Dispute Resolution requested 

by the individual. This action relates to an incident that occurred on June 27, 2007, when 

Mr. Davis reported to work and failed to report an arrest which occurred on June 19, 2007, for 

driving under the influence of alcohol, coincident with a single motor vehicle accident. Mr. Davis’ 

SRO license and site access was immediately terminated and he was assigned other duties. 

Subsequently, his employment at SSES was terminated. During the mediation session, 

Mr. Davis agreed, among other things to: (1) write an operating experience report addressing 

lessons learned from this violation; (2) provide a written report to the NRC for review, 

subsequently submitting the report to a minimum of three national organizations for possible 
OE Annual Report

 C4 

publication, including the Institute of Nuclear Plant Operations (INPO) and the Nuclear Energy 

Institute (NEI); (3) provide a written response to the NRC explaining the reasons why the NRC 

can have confidence in his following procedures in the future; (4) provide a training plan for 

licensed and non-licensed operator training at SSES regarding procedure compliance; and (5) 

agree to the issuance of a Severity Level III Notice of Violation. The agreement did not prohibit 

Mr. Davis from all 10 CFR Part 50 activities but required Mr. Davis to inform the NRC before 

resuming work involving NRC licensed activities. In light of Mr. Davis’ agreement, the NRC will 

not pursue any further enforcement action related to the incident. 

Cary W. Hedger IA-07-048 

On December 20, 2007, an Immediately Effective Order was issued to Mr. Cary Hedger, the 

Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), President, and an owner of Alpha Omega Services, Inc., 

prohibiting him from involvement in all NRC-licensed, certificate, and Quality Assurance 

Program Approval activities for a period of three years from the date the Order. The Order was 

issued because Mr. Cary Hedger violated 10 CFR 71.8, “Deliberate Misconduct.” In January 

2003, Mr. Cary Hedger, both the Operations Manager and Assistant RSO at the time, performed 

a maintenance inspection of a shipping package and signed a maintenance checklist indicating 

that the package was in compliance with the NRC Certificate of Compliance and approved for 

use, when he knew it was not. The materially inaccurate information was then provided to an 

NRC licensee and to a contractor for the licensee. Additionally, Mr. Cary Hedger deliberately 

caused the NRC licensee to violate NRC requirements for a license when the licensee exported 

licensed material in nonconforming packages. 

James Francis Mattocks IA-07-008 

On March 21, 2007, an Order (Immediately Effective) Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed 

Activities was issued to Mr. Mattocks for engaging in deliberate misconduct as defined in 

10 CFR 50.5, "Deliberate misconduct." Specifically, while Mr. Mattocks was employed as a 

security officer at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, he deliberately removed a Bushmaster 

.223 caliber assault rifle and thermal imaging scope from the facility without authorization, 

causing an NRC licensee to be in violation of its Physical Security Plan. This order is in effect 

for five years from its issuance. 

Mark Sharp IA-07-039 

On October 19, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued as part of a 

settlement agreement confirming commitments reached during alternative dispute resolution 

(ADR) mediation. In this case, the NRC concluded that the individual deliberately falsified a 

steam generator blowdown log entry in order to cover up an error he had made. As part of the 

settlement agreement, the individual agreed to take a number of actions including: restricting his 

10 CFR Part 55 related activities until certain specified actions were accomplished; submitting a 

letter to the NRC outlining why the NRC can have confidence in his future activities in the 

industry; and sharing his lessons learned with the industry through several venues. 
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Orders Imposing a Civil Penalty

MC Squared, Inc. EA-07-101; EA-07-104 

On September 13, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $3,250 were issued for a Severity Level III problem composed of two Severity Level 

III violations. The first violation involved the failure of MC Squared, Inc., an Agreement State 

licensee (licensee), to file NRC Form 241 at least three days prior to engaging in licensed 

activities within NRC jurisdiction. Specifically, the licensee stored or used a portable gauge 

containing byproduct material (americium-241 and cesium-137) at two Indian Reservations 

which are areas of exclusive NRC jurisdiction regarding the use of NRC-licensed materials. The 

licensee did not file NRC Form 241 prior to using the material at these sites. The second 

violation involved the licensee’s failure to use a minimum of two independent physical controls 

to secure a portable gauge from unauthorized removal when the gauge was not under the 

control and constant surveillance of the licensee. This failure may have contributed to the theft 

of the gauge which was reported. Specifically, the licensee stored the gauge in an unlocked 

trailer, located in an unrestricted area when an authorized user was not present. Although the 

gauge was in a locked container, the gauge had no physical control to form tangible barriers to 

secure the gauge from unauthorized removal, because the gauge container was not secured to 

the trailer, nor was access to the trailer controlled. 

Orders Suspending Licensed Activity

Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. EA-07-261 

On October 19, 2007, an Order Suspending Licensed Activities (Effective Immediately) was 

issued to Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. (AIX) based on the NRC’s determination that all AIX 

radiographers, including AIX’s Radiation Safety Officer, and assistants, violated 10 CFR 

34.41(a) by performing industrial radiographic operations at a temporary job site with only one 

qualified individual present during operations. The evidence the NRC relied on indicates that 

these activities have occurred on numerous occasions, for a period of up to three years. 

Because the NRC issued a Notice of Violation on April 25, 2001, for a willful violation of 10 CFR 

34.41(a) at the same client facility location, serious concerns were raised regarding AIX’s 

willingness to comply with the Commission’s requirements and its ability to conduct licensed 

activities without undue risk to the public’s health and safety, resulting in the issuance of this 

order suspending all radiographic operations authorized by AIX’s license. 

On November 8, 2007, a Relaxation of Order Suspending Licensed Activities (Effective 

Immediately- dated October 19, 2007) was issued to Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc. (AIX) based 

on the licensee’s proposal to implement several actions to provide the NRC with assurance that 

AIX will comply with the 2-person rule during NRC-licensed radiographic operations. 

Specifically, the licensee’s actions include: use of a capable, independent consultant to perform 

unannounced audits of AIX's radiographic activities, with emphasis on the 2-man rule and 

results of the audits will be reported to NRC monthly; strengthening of the controls over 

personnel access to the radiography location; construction of a dark room at the radiographic 

locations; communication of AIX's schedule for radiographic activities in advance to both the 

consultant and NRC; and designation of a different Radiation Safety Officer. However, this 
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relaxation does not have any effect on the ongoing Office of Investigation’s investigation or any 

potential enforcement action that may be taken based on the outcome of that investigation. 

Demand for Information

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company EA-07-123 

Davis Besse, Perry, Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Plants 

On May 14, 2007, a Demand for Information (DFI) was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating 

Company (FENOC) in response to information provided by FENOC in a report, dated 

December 15, 2006, prepared by its contractor, Exponent Failure Analysis Associates and 

Altran Solutions Corporation (Exponent), associated with the root causes and time line for the 

2002 Davis Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event. In particular, the DFI 

required FENOC to provide detailed and specific information relative to the timing of FENOC’s 

review of the Exponent Report and the factors FENOC considered when determining whether 

the conclusions in the report should be communicated to the NRC. The DFI also required 

FENOC to provide information in order for the NRC to understand the depth and completeness 

of FENOC’s evaluation of the assumptions, methods, and conclusions of the Exponent Report 

and to understand the differences between the Exponent Report and the technical and 

programmatic root cause reports previously developed by FENOC relative to the 2002 

Davis-Besse event. In addition, the DFI required information in order for the NRC to understand 

FENOC’s position regarding a second contractor report prepared for FENOC entitled, "Report of 

Reactor Pressure Vessel Wastage at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant," dated December 

2006. Regarding the second report, the DFI required specific information relative to FENOC’s 

endorsement of the report’s conclusions and the implications of any new positions taken by 

FENOC compared to those previously communicated to the NRC in response to the Notice of 

Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties, dated April 21, 2005.
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D1 

Appendix D: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions Against 

Individuals* 

Notices of Violation 

John Branyan IA-07-010 

 

On May 22, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

individual’s deliberate misconduct which caused his former employer, U.S. Engineering 

Laboratories, Inc., to be in violation of 10 CFR 20.2201. Specifically the individual failed to 

report a portable nuclear density gauge as lost or missing when the location of the gauge was 

unknown for approximately 5-months. The gauge was subsequently found in the public domain. 

Mr. Brandon Fontenot IA-07-002 

 

On March 20, 2007, a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level III violation was issued for a 

violation involving the individual’s deliberate misconduct which caused his former employer, 

Accurate NDE & Inspection, LLC, to be in violation of 10 CFR 20.1801 and 1802, and 10 CFR 

30.9. Specifically the individual failed to (1) secure a radiographic exposure device, and (2) 

provide complete and accurate information in the daily radiation survey form which was 

provided to the NRC inspector. 

Robert E. Galloway IA-07-001 

 

On February 23, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the individual’s deliberate failure to secure a radiographic exposure device while the device was 

in the open bed of a pickup truck. The truck was located in an unrestricted area and was not 

under the control or constant surveillance of the individual. The individual’s deliberate behavior 

caused his employer, Universal Testing LLC, an NRC licensee, to be in violation of 10 CFR 

20.1801 and 1802. 

Michael R. Hess IA-07-015 

On May 1, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

10 CFR 55.53, “Conditions of Licenses” and “Exelon Nuclear’s Fitness-for-Duty Program,” which 

is required by 10 CFR 26.20. Specifically, the individual, a licensed operator, reported for duty 

at the Braidwood Station, operated by Exelon Nuclear, after having used an illegal substance. 

Lee-Cheng (Jean) Peng IA-07-023 

On April 30, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

deliberate submittal of information that the individual knew to be inaccurate, to an NRC licensee. 

The licensee subsequently submitted the inaccurate information to the NRC causing the 

licensee to be in violation of NRC regulations. 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included 
OE Annual Report

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Ching Chong Yang, Ph. D. IA-07-022 

 

On April 30, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

individual’s deliberate misconduct that caused two NRC licensees to be in violation of 10 CFR 

30.9. Specifically, the individual submitted information to each licensee that he knew to be 

inaccurate in violation of 10 CFR 30.10. The licensees subsequently submitted the inaccurate 

information to the NRC causing them to be in violation of NRC regulations. 

Orders

Five Orders were issued to individuals during 2007 and are discussed in Appendix C. 
OE Annual Report

E1 

Appendix E: Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions Against 

Non-Licensees 

(Vendors, Contractors and Certificate Holders)* 

Notice of Violation 

Alpha Omega Services, Inc. EA-07-215 

Bellflower, CA 

On December 20, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $19,200 were issued for a Severity Level II violation. In January 2003, the company 

deliberately provided materially inaccurate information to an NRC licensee and to a contractor 

for the licensee in violation of 10 CFR 71.8(b)(2). The company Operations Manager/Assistant 

Radiation Safety Officer signed a maintenance checklist indicating that a package was in 

compliance with the NRC Certificate of Compliance and approved for use, when he knew it was 

not. Additionally, in violation of 10 CFR 71.8(b)(1), Alpha Omega Services deliberately caused 

the NRC licensee to violate NRC requirements for a license when the licensee exported 

licensed material in nonconforming packages. 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included