# C_2018343EN.01000101.xml

| 25.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 343/1 |
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25.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 343/1

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Resolution by the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly on security challenges in the Eastern Partnership countries and enhancing the role of the EU in addressing them

(2018/C 343/01)

THE EURONEST PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,

| — | having regard to the Constituent Act of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly (Euronest PA) of 3 May 2011, |
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having regard to the Constituent Act of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly (Euronest PA) of 3 May 2011,

| — | having regard to the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit of 24 November 2017 in Brussels and its previous declarations, |
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having regard to the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit of 24 November 2017 in Brussels and its previous declarations,

| — | having regard to the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy of June 2016 entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’, |
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having regard to the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy of June 2016 entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’,

| — | having regard to the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) Joint Staff Working Document of 9 June 2017 entitled ‘Eastern Partnership – 20 Deliverables for 2020: Focusing on key priorities and tangible results’ (SWD(2017)0300), |
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having regard to the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) Joint Staff Working Document of 9 June 2017 entitled ‘Eastern Partnership – 20 Deliverables for 2020: Focusing on key priorities and tangible results’ (SWD(2017)0300),

| — | having regard to the joint report of 18 May 2017 by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Review (JOIN(2017)0018), |
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having regard to the joint report of 18 May 2017 by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Review (JOIN(2017)0018),

| — | having regard to the European Parliament recommendation of 15 November 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit (1), |
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having regard to the European Parliament recommendation of 15 November 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit (1),

| — | having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties (2), |
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having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties (2),

| — | having regard to the bipartisan resolution of the Parliament of Georgia of 21 March 2018 on grave violations of human rights in occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region, and the Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili list, |
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having regard to the bipartisan resolution of the Parliament of Georgia of 21 March 2018 on grave violations of human rights in occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region, and the Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili list,

| — | having regard to the conclusions of the Euronest PA's sixth plenary session held in Kiev on 31 October and 1 November 2017, in particular with respect to the issue of cybersecurity; |
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having regard to the conclusions of the Euronest PA's sixth plenary session held in Kiev on 31 October and 1 November 2017, in particular with respect to the issue of cybersecurity;

| A. | whereas the EU and Eastern European Partners share a vital interest in ensuring peace and security in Europe as a primary precondition of their stability, prosperity and development; |
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A.

whereas the EU and Eastern European Partners share a vital interest in ensuring peace and security in Europe as a primary precondition of their stability, prosperity and development;

| B. | whereas internal security, stability and peace in the EU and Eastern European Partners require respect for and the upholding of international law and order, sovereignty and the fundamental values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; |
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B.

whereas internal security, stability and peace in the EU and Eastern European Partners require respect for and the upholding of international law and order, sovereignty and the fundamental values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;

| C. | whereas the Eastern Partnership pursues the common goals of promoting stability, confidence-building and cooperation, supporting democratic reforms, strengthening and consolidating democratic institutions, good neighbourly relations, peaceful conflict resolution and regional cooperation, enhancing people-to-people contacts and boosting trade, in order to enhance political dialogue and association as well as economic cooperation and integration; whereas, alongside the principle of differentiation, every partner country is offered the opportunity to enhance its political and economic relations with the EU, to the extent that this corresponds to its ambition; whereas pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and in line with the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017, any European state may apply to become a member of the EU, provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, that it respects fundamental freedoms and human rights, including those of minority groups, and that it upholds the rule of law; |
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C.

whereas the Eastern Partnership pursues the common goals of promoting stability, confidence-building and cooperation, supporting democratic reforms, strengthening and consolidating democratic institutions, good neighbourly relations, peaceful conflict resolution and regional cooperation, enhancing people-to-people contacts and boosting trade, in order to enhance political dialogue and association as well as economic cooperation and integration; whereas, alongside the principle of differentiation, every partner country is offered the opportunity to enhance its political and economic relations with the EU, to the extent that this corresponds to its ambition; whereas pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and in line with the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017, any European state may apply to become a member of the EU, provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, that it respects fundamental freedoms and human rights, including those of minority groups, and that it upholds the rule of law;

| D. | whereas all of the Eastern European Partners as sovereign states should decide freely on the course of their foreign and security policies without external pressure or being exposed to the risk of military or economic reprisals, as is required by international law; |
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D.

whereas all of the Eastern European Partners as sovereign states should decide freely on the course of their foreign and security policies without external pressure or being exposed to the risk of military or economic reprisals, as is required by international law;

| E. | whereas, at the 2017 Brussels Eastern Partnership Summit, the participants highlighted the role of the Eastern Partnership in strengthening state, economic and societal resilience in the EU's neighbourhood as also outlined in the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy and the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy; |
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E.

whereas, at the 2017 Brussels Eastern Partnership Summit, the participants highlighted the role of the Eastern Partnership in strengthening state, economic and societal resilience in the EU's neighbourhood as also outlined in the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy and the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy;

| F. | whereas good governance and progress towards democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as sustainable economic development and poverty reduction, are important elements for ensuring stability and strengthening internal security and reinforcing the resilience of partner countries, helping them to create an enabling environment for the development of more resilient and competitive economies; whereas a vibrant and independent civil society, as well as independent media, are vital in creating resilient societies; |
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F.

whereas good governance and progress towards democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as sustainable economic development and poverty reduction, are important elements for ensuring stability and strengthening internal security and reinforcing the resilience of partner countries, helping them to create an enabling environment for the development of more resilient and competitive economies; whereas a vibrant and independent civil society, as well as independent media, are vital in creating resilient societies;

| G. | whereas unprecedented security challenges in Europe, encompassing both conventional and hybrid warfare, extremism and radicalisation, cybercrime, terrorism and organised crime, have emerged and cannot be solved without shared responsibility and cooperation; |
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G.

whereas unprecedented security challenges in Europe, encompassing both conventional and hybrid warfare, extremism and radicalisation, cybercrime, terrorism and organised crime, have emerged and cannot be solved without shared responsibility and cooperation;

| H. | whereas the EU has renewed its commitment to promote the stabilisation and resilience of its Partners, and has earmarked further resources in the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy framework for this purpose; whereas the EU has included the fight against cybercrime and corruption, and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, among its priorities in the security field; whereas it is of the utmost importance to ensure that the EU's post-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF) maintains a separate financial instrument for the neighbourhood as clear evidence of the political importance the EU attaches to the region, and to ensure the long-term tangible impact of reforms; |
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H.

whereas the EU has renewed its commitment to promote the stabilisation and resilience of its Partners, and has earmarked further resources in the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy framework for this purpose; whereas the EU has included the fight against cybercrime and corruption, and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, among its priorities in the security field; whereas it is of the utmost importance to ensure that the EU's post-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF) maintains a separate financial instrument for the neighbourhood as clear evidence of the political importance the EU attaches to the region, and to ensure the long-term tangible impact of reforms;

| I. | whereas, both in the EU and the Eastern European Partners, citizens, companies and administrations rely heavily on information and communication technologies and are therefore increasingly vulnerable to cybercrimes; whereas responding to cyber incidents requires abilities, expertise, technologies and intelligence that need to be developed in the EU Member States and Eastern European Partners; whereas it is obvious that the Russian Government has been responsible for cyber-attacks against several EU and partner states; |
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I.

whereas, both in the EU and the Eastern European Partners, citizens, companies and administrations rely heavily on information and communication technologies and are therefore increasingly vulnerable to cybercrimes; whereas responding to cyber incidents requires abilities, expertise, technologies and intelligence that need to be developed in the EU Member States and Eastern European Partners; whereas it is obvious that the Russian Government has been responsible for cyber-attacks against several EU and partner states;

| J. | whereas, since November 2017, the Commission has been engaging in a consultation on the issues arising from the spread of false information across traditional and social media and the best means of countering it; |
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J.

whereas, since November 2017, the Commission has been engaging in a consultation on the issues arising from the spread of false information across traditional and social media and the best means of countering it;

| K. | whereas, in September 2015, the EU established the East Strategic Communication Task Force (East StratCom) as an instrument to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation, which remains insufficiently funded; |
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K.

whereas, in September 2015, the EU established the East Strategic Communication Task Force (East StratCom) as an instrument to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation, which remains insufficiently funded;

| L. | whereas unresolved conflicts affecting Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, and ongoing Russian military aggression in eastern Ukraine have caused grievous loss of life and remain a major challenge to the democratic development and security of the region; |
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L.

whereas unresolved conflicts affecting Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, and ongoing Russian military aggression in eastern Ukraine have caused grievous loss of life and remain a major challenge to the democratic development and security of the region;

| M. | whereas Russia has generated and sustained some of these conflicts as part of its strategy of playing a predominant regional role in Eastern Europe as well as of using a military presence as leverage to exert pressure on partner countries, in contradiction with its international commitments to uphold the international legal order; whereas Russia illegally maintains military forces in the occupied territories and separatist regions of Georgia and Moldova respectively, and provides leadership, personnel and military equipment to separatist forces in Ukraine; whereas Russia illegally maintains military forces and considerable amounts of ammunition and military equipment in the occupied territory and separatist region of Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova, and has conducted joint military exercises with the military forces of the Transnistrian regime; |
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M.

whereas Russia has generated and sustained some of these conflicts as part of its strategy of playing a predominant regional role in Eastern Europe as well as of using a military presence as leverage to exert pressure on partner countries, in contradiction with its international commitments to uphold the international legal order; whereas Russia illegally maintains military forces in the occupied territories and separatist regions of Georgia and Moldova respectively, and provides leadership, personnel and military equipment to separatist forces in Ukraine; whereas Russia illegally maintains military forces and considerable amounts of ammunition and military equipment in the occupied territory and separatist region of Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova, and has conducted joint military exercises with the military forces of the Transnistrian regime;

| N. | whereas the occupation by the Russian Federation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia following the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation in 2014, have been a brutal demonstration of a disregard for international law; whereas the total militarisation of these territories by the occupying Russian authorities poses a significant threat to regional and pan-European security; whereas a deterioration in the human rights situation is visible in the occupied territories, most notably the killing and political persecution of Georgian and Ukrainian citizens, particularly Crimean Tatars; |
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N.

whereas the occupation by the Russian Federation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia following the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation in 2014, have been a brutal demonstration of a disregard for international law; whereas the total militarisation of these territories by the occupying Russian authorities poses a significant threat to regional and pan-European security; whereas a deterioration in the human rights situation is visible in the occupied territories, most notably the killing and political persecution of Georgian and Ukrainian citizens, particularly Crimean Tatars;

| O. | whereas the EU supports the full and genuine implementation of the Minsk arrangements in eastern Ukraine and the prolongation of sanctions tied to full implementation; whereas the EU supports the 1999 Istanbul decision of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as regards the Republic of Moldova as well as the conversion of the current peacekeeping operation on the Dniester river into a civilian mission with an international mandate, and the OSCE Minsk Group and its Co-Chairs in their efforts to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and avoid any new eruption of violence and military fighting; whereas the EU insists on the full implementation of the EU-brokered ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Russia by the Russian Federation and supports the Geneva International Discussions (GID) established to address the consequences of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war employing instruments of conflict resolution such as GID co-chairmanship, the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia's occupied territories, full support for the non-recognition and engagement policy, and the reversal of ethnic cleansing carried out by the Russian Federation; |
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O.

whereas the EU supports the full and genuine implementation of the Minsk arrangements in eastern Ukraine and the prolongation of sanctions tied to full implementation; whereas the EU supports the 1999 Istanbul decision of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as regards the Republic of Moldova as well as the conversion of the current peacekeeping operation on the Dniester river into a civilian mission with an international mandate, and the OSCE Minsk Group and its Co-Chairs in their efforts to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and avoid any new eruption of violence and military fighting; whereas the EU insists on the full implementation of the EU-brokered ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Russia by the Russian Federation and supports the Geneva International Discussions (GID) established to address the consequences of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war employing instruments of conflict resolution such as GID co-chairmanship, the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia's occupied territories, full support for the non-recognition and engagement policy, and the reversal of ethnic cleansing carried out by the Russian Federation;

| P. | whereas the EU carries out actions aimed at complementing these efforts by promoting confidence- and peace-building activities across the conflict divide, inter alia, through the positive efforts of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, and through the implementation of the ‘European Partnership for the peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh’ (EPNK) programme, aimed at bringing the respective civil societies closer; |
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P.

whereas the EU carries out actions aimed at complementing these efforts by promoting confidence- and peace-building activities across the conflict divide, inter alia, through the positive efforts of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, and through the implementation of the ‘European Partnership for the peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh’ (EPNK) programme, aimed at bringing the respective civil societies closer;

| Q. | whereas the hazards posed by chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials are a major concern for the security of populations; whereas the nerve gas attack by the Russian government on former intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal, in Salisbury on 4 March 2018 must be seen as a threat to European security as such; |
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Q.

whereas the hazards posed by chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials are a major concern for the security of populations; whereas the nerve gas attack by the Russian government on former intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal, in Salisbury on 4 March 2018 must be seen as a threat to European security as such;

| R. | whereas a more coherent and assertive EU approach and a resolve to address the Russian Federation with one voice using all the instruments at the EU's disposal, in particular conditionalities and sanctions, can make EU action more effective in addressing the security challenges of the Eastern Partnership countries; |
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R.

whereas a more coherent and assertive EU approach and a resolve to address the Russian Federation with one voice using all the instruments at the EU's disposal, in particular conditionalities and sanctions, can make EU action more effective in addressing the security challenges of the Eastern Partnership countries;

Advancing stability by strengthening Eastern European Partners' democratic governance, economic and social development

| 1. | Stresses that progress towards good democratic governance, respect for human rights, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and a reduction in corruption in the Eastern European Partners is the key for maintaining their security and reducing societal vulnerabilities to internal and external destabilising attempts; calls on the Eastern European Partners to pursue political reforms or initiate new ones on the basis of democratic principles and the rule of law, bearing in mind that these reforms are essential to building up citizens' confidence in state institutions; calls for the Eastern European Partners, as well as the EU, to ensure equal rights for all citizens, including for national minorities and their languages; |
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1.

| 2. | Stresses that upholding good governance in law enforcement, security and defence institutions is key to protecting the Eastern European Partners from attempts at destabilisation; urges the Partners' parliaments to fully exercise their democratic oversight over law enforcement agencies and military and security services; |
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2.

| 3. | Underlines the role of human rights defenders organisations, the independent media and civil society organisations in contributing to democratisation processes and exercising civic oversight; calls on the Partners to ensure that they enjoy robust protection; urges the Partners to fully implement the outstanding judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, particularly those pertaining to violations of Article 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights; |
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3.

| 4. | Supports the Partners' efforts aimed at developing or transforming their economies, removing monopolies and the concentration of ownership in the private sector, guaranteeing a stable economic and legal framework, promoting international trade and making them attractive for foreign investors; takes the view that the Partners should give a new impetus to economic reforms in order to advance towards well-functioning and sustainable social market economies; stresses that further steps need to be considered to deepen bilateral and multilateral regional integration among the Eastern European Partners, as appropriate, and to strengthen regional infrastructure, including energy infrastructure; |
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4.

| 5. | Encourages the Commission and the Partners' governments to engage in discussions on the prospects for helping the Partners to advance along their European trajectory by seeking new avenues for deeper integration, that, by way of illustration and depending on the depth and scope of the individual Partner's ambitions, could lead to the accession of associated countries to the EU's customs union, energy union and digital union, in line with mutual interests; |
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5.

| 6. | Underlines that EU financial support to its Partners should be conditional on concrete reform steps and their effective implementation, and that the EU's incentive-based approach will continue to benefit the Partners most engaged in ambitious reforms, on the basis of the ‘more for more’ principle; stresses further that EU support should be tailor-made to match the level of shared ambition for cooperation with each Partner; calls on the Commission, in this context, to further reinforce programmes dedicated to Association countries to provide robust assistance for complex reforms by Associated Partners, notably to support legal approximation and sectoral integration efforts; |
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6.

| 7. | Recommends that parliamentarians and civil servants from central administrations and the judiciary of partner countries make the most extensive use of the Commission's Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX) in the process of adapting national laws, regulations and quality standards to match those of EU Member States; |
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7.

Strengthening cooperation in the field of security and defence

| 8. | Calls for dialogue in the field of security and defence between, on the one hand, the EU and its Member States, and, on the other, the Eastern European Partners, to be strengthened where appropriate, and for further cooperation in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP); welcomes the EU's value-based engagement in a number of CSDP missions, for instance the EUMM in Georgia and the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) in Ukraine; welcomes the Partners' contributions, in particular those by Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, to CSDP; |
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8.

| 9. | Expresses deep concerns over the use of CBRN weapons and Russia's involvement in the attack against former intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal on 4 March 2018; calls on Russia to respect its commitment to the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their precursors; calls for the EU to reinforce cooperation with its Partners in order to mitigate the risks arising from CBRN materials and related technological expertise; |
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9.

Advancing towards a peaceful settlement of regional conflicts

| 10. | Reiterates that sovereignty, independence and the peaceful settlement of disputes are key principles of the European security order; stresses that the resolution of conflicts in Eastern Europe is essential to enhance the security and stability of the entire continent; considers that these conflicts remain a major threat to the independence and sovereignty of the Partners, to the security of the region and beyond, and a potential source of instability for the whole of Europe; continues to firmly support the principle of territorial integrity of the Partners within their internationally recognised borders; maintains that the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 OSCE Charter of Paris represent the cornerstones of a peaceful European continent; |
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10.

| 11. | Is of the opinion that the EU should assume greater responsibility in tackling security crises in its neighbourhood; calls for increased efforts on the part of the EU in the mediation processes of conflicts, in formats in which the EU is already present; believes that the EU, in particular the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), should play a more active and effective role as an actor in conflict resolution and peacebuilding; strongly supports EU assistance to partner countries in building up their capacities and fostering resilience, including in relation to counterterrorism, strategic communications, cyber-defence, ammunition storage and security sector reform; calls for the upcoming negotiations on the post-2020 EU financial instruments devoted to the European Neighbourhood Policy, to take due account of the needs in this respect; |
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11.

| 12. | Condemns Russia's foreign policy that aims to maintain an influence in the policy-making of its neighbours, through encouraging and supporting de facto authorities of separatist regions in Ukraine and Moldova and of occupied territories of Georgia, thereby undermining the restoration of their sovereignty over these regions and their territorial integrity, and preventing the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons (IDPs); considers the ongoing Russian military aggression in eastern Ukraine to be the most important challenge to security in Europe; reiterates its support to the full implementation of the Minsk arrangements, but is disappointed by the lack of progress; takes note of the ongoing talks between US and Russian Special Representatives on a possible deployment of a UN-mandated peacekeeping operation in eastern Ukraine; invites the leaders of the Normandy Format to engage in discussing this option and to take new initiatives; continues to support all efforts to secure a lasting peaceful solution which respects the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, in particular by the deployment – with the consent of the Ukrainian authorities – of a peace-building and peacekeeping mission to the whole territory of Ukraine; calls for safe and unrestricted access for international monitoring along the Ukrainian Russian border; |
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12.

| 13. | Welcomes the fact that the EU's policy of non-recognition of Georgia's and Ukraine's occupied territories by the Russian Federation has remained firm; calls on all EU political actors as well as those from the partner countries to refrain from engaging in any initiatives that would undermine the policy of non-recognition; |
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13.

| 14. | Believes that the prolongation of sanctions against individuals and entities in Russia is an inevitable outcome of the failure to implement the Minsk arrangements, and continues to see such implementation by all sides as the basis for a sustainable political solution to the conflict caused by Russian military aggression in eastern Ukraine; insists that the EU should keep open the option of further progressively applied sanctions if Russia continues to violate international law to the detriment of its neighbours; stresses that the annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation remains illegal under international law; calls on the international community to elaborate the international format of negotiations on de-occupation of the peninsula (in line with the European Parliament's resolution of 16 March 2017 (3)); strongly condemns, in this connection, the systematic violations of the human rights of the citizens of Georgia by representatives of the Russian Federation occupation forces, including their murder, torture and kidnapping, while welcoming the adoption of the bipartisan resolution of the Parliament of Georgia of 21 March 2018 on grave violations of human rights in occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region, and the Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili list, the latter a blacklist of those responsible for, or who have covered up, such violations, and calls on the Member States and the Council to blacklist, through national and EU-wide sanctions, those who appear or who will appear on the Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili list; |
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14.

| 15. | Condemns the continuous infringement of basic human rights, including freedom of movement and residence and the right to property and education in one's native language, by the de facto authorities of Transnistria; |
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15.

| 16. | Calls on the EU to step up its diplomatic efforts in the GID on the consequences of the Russia-Georgia conflict, and in the 5 + 2 format for the settlement process of the Transnistrian conflict; welcomes all efforts at peaceful conflict-resolution and initiatives aimed at facilitating reconciliation, confidence-building and the engagement of societies divided by conflict and occupation lines through providing more opportunities for trade, education and improved livelihoods; |
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16.

| 17. | Condemns further reinforcement by the Russian Federation of the military build-up in the occupied territories of Georgia, fortification of the occupation line through the installation of barbed wire fences and other artificial barriers, the continuous infringement of basic human rights, including violations of the right to life, freedom of movement and residence, property, education in one's native language, as well as arbitrary detentions and kidnappings; condemns the killing in custody, in Tskhinvali, on 22 February 2018, of Archil Tatunashivili, and the murder of another Georgian citizen, Giga Otkhozoria, along the occupation line of Abkhazia in 2016; highlights that hundreds of thousands of IDPs and refugees are still deprived of the right to a safe and dignified return to their homes, while ethnic Georgians in the occupied territories of Georgia remain the target of an intensified policy of ethnic discrimination; |
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17.

| 18. | Calls on the Russian Federation to reverse the recognition of so-called independence of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia and to fulfil its international obligations, including under the EU mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement between Georgia and Russia, inter alia, by withdrawing its military forces from the territory of Georgia; urges the Russian Federation to immediately provide the EUMM with unimpeded access to the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia; |
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18.

| 19. | Takes the view that the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be based on international law and the Basic Principles of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs of 2009, based in turn on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act; urges all parties concerned to concentrate on negotiations to be conducted at the highest level, with the objective of defining a roadmap of concrete steps for the resolution of the conflict; calls on the sides of the conflict to maintain the ceasefire, to reduce tensions on the line of contact and to implement confidence-building measures; |
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19.

| 20. | Calls for closer cooperation and further coordination between the EU, the OSCE and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in implementing field activities aimed at reaching peaceful settlements of the conflicts in Eastern Europe; |
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20.

| 21. | Observes that the economies of the occupied territories of Georgia and breakaway regions of Moldova remain heavily dependent on Russia; takes the view that the EU should facilitate economic, cultural and social links between these regions and the Partners concerned by proposing specific trade arrangements that would comply with the principles and provisions of the EU-Moldova and EU-Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, and finding ways to include them in certain EU programmes; |
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21.

| 22. | Commends the efforts of the European Parliament to bring together young leaders and NGO representatives from Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to facilitate dialogue, promote mutual understanding and pave the way for the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; takes the view that such an initiative should be held on a regular basis and that similar initiatives should be launched, including in relation to the protracted conflicts in Georgia and Moldova; |
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22.

Overcoming information warfare

| 23. | Reiterates its condemnation of subversive policies of propaganda, disinformation and social media infiltration that aim to weaken democratic societies, by discrediting institutions, manipulating public opinion, spreading false narratives, feeding social tensions and fostering general mistrust in the media; denounces, in this context, the information warfare waged by Russia among its neighbours, using state-controlled media outlets to plant deliberately false news in order to influence targeted countries' domestic politics, including elections, and to undermine the Eastern Partnership; |
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23.

| 24. | Commends the efforts of East StratCom to explain, analyse and raise awareness of Russia's disinformation narratives; calls for the EU and its Member States to allocate more human and financial resources to the Task Force in order to enhance its capacity to collect and analyse data and provide the relevant national bodies of EU Member States and the Partners with its expertise on countering disinformation; |
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24.

| 25. | Urges the EEAS and the EU Delegations to step up efforts to counter the false information spread in partner countries, through providing support to local media, and communicating fact-based information in response to the falsehoods exposed; |
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25.

| 26. | Takes note of the Commission's proposals for new policy initiatives to counter ‘fake news’ and the spreading of disinformation online following a public consultation and a High-Level Expert Review; calls on the Commission to share the knowledge and expertise acquired with the relevant bodies in partner countries; |
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26.

| 27. | Calls on the Partners to take measures to counter Russian disinformation campaigns and propaganda, through concrete policy measures and legislative steps; takes the view, in this context, that disinformation should be tackled in an efficient way, safeguarding freedom of expression and excluding censorship as well as protecting media freedom and improving media resilience to outside pressures; calls for the EU and its Partners to set up structured cooperation on the legislative and regulatory issues pertaining to media and social platforms, including penalties under criminal law that may punish disinformation practices and their perpetrators; takes the view, in this context, that penalties under criminal law should target as a priority platforms airing hate-speech content and their sponsors; |
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27.

| 28. | Proposes that new sanctions be imposed on Russian oligarchs who hide and launder illicit funds in Member States, helping Russia to carry out its anti-democratic activities, and who fund, cover and manage multibillion euro operations such as election meddling, cyber-attacks, fake news and propaganda campaigns; |
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28.

| 29. | Urges the Partners to develop education programmes and campaigns aimed at a wide public, raising awareness of the practices of malicious manipulation of opinions and of how to identify propaganda media outlets; |
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29.

Building up cybersecurity defence

| 30. | Underscores the increasingly aggressive nature and sophistication of malicious cyber-attacks against information systems that aim to destabilise public and private communication infrastructures; |
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30.

| 31. | Welcomes the Commission's cybersecurity package adopted on 13 September 2017, aiming to further improve the EU's cyber resilience and response; commends its external dimension, including the objective of establishing ‘cyber dialogues’ with non-EU countries to facilitate cooperation in cybersecurity; takes the view that engaging in ‘cyber dialogues’ with the Partners should be given priority; |
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31.

| 32. | Supports the framework for a joint EU diplomatic responses to malicious activities – the cyber diplomacy toolbox; welcomes the development of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) by the EU to promote cyber-culture and foster the proper functioning of the digital internal market, as well as the creation of a European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in the framework of EU-NATO cooperation; |
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32.

| 33. | Welcomes various other initiatives at international level, aimed at reducing the risk of cyber-attacks and boosting national cyber-capabilities, in particular the setting up of a UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, and the OSCE Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to foster ‘cyber diplomacy’; |
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33.

| 34. | Urges the EU, its Member States and their Partners to develop cyber security resilience, by creating new capabilities for mitigating cyber threats, deterring potential aggressors, analysing cyber incidents and attacks and investing in research on new cyber-defence tools; recommends that Commission set up or develop cyber security cooperation activities with the Partners, including through the effective use of ENISA and the European Centre of Excellence, with a view to developing joint expertise, response mechanisms and interoperability in case of cyber-attacks; |
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34.

| 35. | Is concerned that various State actors, such as Russia, have been involved in malicious cyber activities pursuing political, economic or security objectives that include attacks on critical infrastructure, cyber-espionage, disinformation campaigns or limiting access to the internet; underlines that such activities could constitute wrongful acts under international law and could lead to a joint EU response, such as using the EU cyber-diplomacy toolbox; |
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35.

| 36. | Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the President of the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Vice President of the Commission/High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States and the Eastern European partner countries. |
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36.

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(1)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0440.

(2)  OJ C 224, 27.6.2018, p. 58.

(3)  European Parliament resolution of 16 March 2017 on the Ukrainian prisoners in Russia and the situation in Crimea, Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0087.

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