COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF

OCTOBER 2015

WORKER VOICE IN A TIME OF RISING INEQUALITY

Introduction

The rise of wage and income inequality in the United 

States over the last 40 years has been well-established. 

However, the factors that may have contributed to the 

fall of earnings at the bottom of the wage distribution 

relative to the top continue to be the subject of research 

and debate. 

Research suggests that one important factor may be 

institutional changes in labor markets, perhaps the most 

notable being declining union density. Unions

traditionally helped bolster the wages of lower- and 

middle-wage workers, thereby reducing inequality. The 

correlation between unionization and inequality is clear 

in the last century of data: in the middle of the 20th

century, as union membership rose and remained high, 

lower-wage workers earned a larger share of total 

income. However, in recent years this trend has 

reversed, with union membership falling and the share 

of income going to the top 10 percent increasing at the 

expense of lower- and middle-income groups. In the 21st

century, the decline in the number of unionized workers 

has coincided with overall rising inequality. The 

correlation between unionization and inequality likely 

reflects the causal impact of unionization on wages for 

workers at the bottom of the income distribution

1 Between 1951 and 1978, the Bureau of Labor Statistics 

published estimates of total U.S. union membership in its 

The overall effect of unions on the wage distribution 

depends on both the union wage premium and the types 

of workers who are unionized. Unionized workers still 

command a sizable wage premium of up to 25 percent

relative to similar nonunionized workers, but that 

premium has fallen slightly over the past couple of 

decades. Union membership has also become more 

representative of the population, with the share of 

members who are female or college-educated rising 

quickly. Studies have shown that union wage effects are 

largest for workers with low levels of observed skills and 

that unionization can reduce wage inequality among 

workers partially by increasing wages at the bottom of 

the distribution and by reducing pay dispersion within 

unionized firms and industries. Since both the union 

wage premium and the coverage of low-skilled workers, 

who receive the highest wage premium, have fallen, 

unionization’s ability to reduce inequality has very likely 

been limited in recent years.

Unionization Rates: Then and Now

While no consistent data series for union membership 

over the entirety of the last century exists, multiple data 

sources1 point to a relatively consistent story: union 

membership as a share of total employment expanded 

rapidly in the years following the Great Depression and 

World War II, plateaued between 1955 and 1975, and 

has declined consistently since then. In 1955, 

approximately one-quarter of all U.S. workers belonged 

to a union; by 2014, the share had dropped to just below 

10 percent, around the same level as the mid-1930s. In 

addition to the nearly 14.6 million wage and salary 

workers who are members of unions, there are an 

additional 1.6 million workers who are covered by a 

collective bargaining agreement, but who are not 

Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the 

United States. For data prior to 1951, these data were 

Troy and 

Sheflin (1985) CPS: 

Membership

2014

0

20

40

60

80

1917 1937 1957 1977 1997 2017

Union Membership as a Share of Total Employment and 

Share of Income Accruing to Bottom 90 Percent 

of the Income Distribution Percent

Note: Total employment from 1901 to 1947 is derived from estimates in Weir (1992). For 1948 

to 2014, employment data are annual averages from the monhtly Current Population Survey.

Source: Troy and Sheflin (1985); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey; Weir 

(1992); CEA calculations.

Bottom 90 Percent Share of Income

 
themselves members of a union.2 It should be noted that 

unionization and collective bargaining are not always 

synonymous: due to the parameters governing union 

operations, union members may not be able to bargain 

collectively3 and those who have access to collective 

bargaining may not always be members of unions.

At the same time as union membership has declined, the 

composition of union membership by industry has 

shifted dramatically. In 1960, 88 percent of U.S. union 

members worked in the private sector. By 2014, that 

figure had fallen to 50 percent. Public-sector unions have 

become increasingly important in the economy: in 2014, 

36 percent of public-sector workers were union 

members and 39 percent were covered by a union 

contract. These rates have held relatively constant in 

recent decades. In contrast, just 6.6 percent of privatesector workers were union members in 2014, and 7.4 

percent were covered by a union-negotiated contract. 

However, these trends vary on a state-by-state basis, 

with union membership climbing over the last 5 years in 

assembled by aggregating AFL and CIO reports on 

membership and estimates of independent union 

membership derived from a number of sources, including 

union publications and Statements by union leaders. 

Beginning in 1951, BLS estimates of union membership in 

the United States were derived from a biennial survey of 

unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO and those unaffiliated 

unions with CBAs with different employers in more than 

one State. Troy and Sheflin (1985) use annual financial 

disclosure forms filed by national unions to derive 

estimates of annual average dues-paying members. 

Between 1973 and 1981, and from 1983 to the present, a 

question on union membership has been included in BLS’s 

some states, such as Colorado and Kentucky, while falling 

in others, like Wisconsin and Michigan.

As unionization rates have declined and public-sector 

union membership has grown as a share of total 

membership, the demographic characteristics of the 

unionized workforce have also shifted. Women now 

make up an appreciably larger share of union members: 

in 2014, women made up 46 percent of unionized wage 

and salary workers, up from one-third in 1983. In 

addition, union members now have greater educational 

attainment: in 1983, 19 percent of U.S. union members 

were college graduates, while in 2014, more than twice 

as many (40 percent) had a bachelor’s degree or higher. 

(By comparison, the corresponding figures for all wage 

and salary workers are 22 percent in 1983 and 35 percent 

in 2014.)

Current Population Survey (CPS) for wage and salary 

workers (i.e. those who are not self-employed). In this 

section, we use data from Troy and Sheflin (1985) for 

years prior to the introduction of the union membership 

question in the CPS, both because they do not rely on selfreported membership data and because they include a 

number of unions (especially public-sector unions) and 

professional organizations that BLS did not include in its 

survey in some years.

2 Due to data constraints, this brief looks at union 

membership.

3 For instance public sector workers often join unions, but 

cannot always collectively bargain.

Private Union Membership as a 

Share of Private-Sector Workers

Public Union Membership as a 

Share of Public-Sector Workers

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1948 1961 1974 1987 2000 2013

Public Versus Private Union Membership 

As a Share of Workers

Percent

Note: Data from 1983 and earlier come from Troy and Sheflin (1985); more recent data come 

from the Current Population Survey. Troy and Sheflin (1985) include Canadian members of U.S. 

unions in their figures. Due to unavailability of data prior to 2000, public-sector workers 

exclude those in agriculture.

Source: Troy and Sheflin (1985); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey; CEA 

calculations.

2

 
These demographic shifts have been driven in part by the 

rise of public-sector unions, since public-sector union 

members are more likely to be female and collegeeducated than their private-sector counterparts. 

Among private-sector workers, unionization rates vary

substantially by industry: in 2014, only 2 percent of 

workers in financial activities were members of unions 

versus 10 percent of manufacturing and 14 percent of 

construction employees. Paralleling union membership 

overall, unionization rates for the manufacturing and 

construction workers have declined dramatically over 

the last six decades. In 1953, 42 percent of 

manufacturing workers and 84 percent of construction 

workers were members of a union.4

4 Troy and Sheflin (1985), Table 3.63.

5 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey; 

CEA calculations.

Union membership also varies greatly by State, in part 

because of State-level policies such as “right-to-work” 

laws. Right-to work (RTW) laws prohibit requirements of 

union membership or payment of union membership 

dues as a condition of employment. In 2014, union 

membership ranged from a maximum of 25 percent of 

workers in New York to a minimum of 2 percent in North 

Carolina. 

Public-sector unions are strongest in the Northeast, with 

public-sector union membership of over 60 percent in 

New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, 

and New Jersey and weakest in the South, with less than 

6 percent of public-sector workers unionized in 

Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Privatesector unions have membership rates of over 12 percent

in New York, Alaska, and Nevada, and rates under 2 

percent in North Carolina.5

Union membership in construction and manufacturing 

also varies widely by State, from around one-half of 

workers in Alaska to less than 2 percent of workers in 

North Carolina and Arizona. In the service sector, union 

membership ranges from 23 percent in New York to just 

under 2 percent in Mississippi and North Carolina.6

The decline in overall unionization rates—particularly, in 

traditional stalwart industries such as manufacturing and 

construction—and the growth of public-sector unions 

have changed the union landscape. Unions today 

represent a very different workforce—one less male, 

more concentrated in the Northeast, and more 

educated—than they did at their peak in the 1950s. For 

these workers, unions provide an important channel for 

worker voice and have historically afforded benefits for 

both union members and other workers. 

6 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey; 

CEA calculations. 

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

50

1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013

Women as Share of Union Members, 1983-2014

Percent

Note: Data are not adjusted to account for the 1994 redesign of the Current Population Survey.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (Outgoing Rotation Groups); CEA 

calculations.

All Wage and 

Salary Workers

Union Members

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013

College Graduates as Share of Union Members, 1983-2014

Percent

Note: Data are not adjusted to account for the 1994 redesign of the Current Population Survey. 

Prior to 1992, "college graduates" are those who have completed at least 4 years of college. 

From 1992 on, "college graduates" are those with a bachelor's degree or higher.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (Outgoing Rotation Groups); CEA 

calculations.

Union Members

All Wage and 

Salary Workers

3

 
Union Impact on Compensation

There are a number of reasons why unions may be able 

to negotiate higher wages and benefits for their workers 

without adversely affecting businesses. One reason is the 

potential for rent-sharing. Opportunities for rent-sharing 

can occur if firms are earning high profits or if there are 

frictions in the labor market, such as search costs, that 

create a disconnect between what firms are willing to 

pay and what workers would accept. In these cases, 

unions may be able to negotiate higher compensation 

without sacrificing employment. Unions may also be able 

to negotiate higher wages and benefits if these increases 

in turn raise worker productivity, creating benefits for 

businesses from higher worker wages. Efficiency wage 

theory suggests that wage increases can increase 

productivity as turnover decreases and workers are more 

motivated. 

7 A large literature on the union wage premium suggests 

that the premium is overall highly positive. See, for 

example, Lewis (1986); Budd and Na (2000); Hirsch (2004); 

Wages

One of the primary goals of collective bargaining is to 

raise the compensation of a union’s members. Economic 

research shows that union workers do have higher wages 

relative to their nonunion counterparts and that 

unionization can reduce wage inequality. Union workers 

are also more likely to have benefits such as paid leave, 

health care coverage, and pension coverage.

Estimates generally find that between the late 1960s and 

late 1990s, union members earned up to 25 percent 

higher wages than their comparable nonunion 

counterparts, though this wage premium differed by 

occupation and region.7 Professional and technical 

occupations and laborers saw the highest wage premia 

(19 and 25 percent, respectively), along with workers in 

the rural South (18 percent).

Hirsch and Schumacher (2001); Vella and Verbeek (1998); 

Pierce (1999).

4

 
Other research corroborates this variation in wage 

effects among workers. One study findsthat unions raise 

wages more for workers with lower levels of observed 

skills. Average union wage gains are higher than median 

union wage gains, due to the fact that a majority of large 

wage gains are found among this relatively small share of 

lower-skilled workers.

More recent studies show that the overall union 

membership wage premium may have peaked in the 

mid-1990s in the United States for private-sector 

workers, in tandem with the overall decline of 

unionization.8 This premium decline has occurred in 

many but not all industries. A 2015 study findsthat while 

the median union wage premium across public and 

private-sector unions is about 9 percent, it ranges from 

zero to over 30 percent. It should be noted that the 

research on union wage premiums does not identify 

what drives these wage premiums. The union wage 

premium may reflect unions providing workers with 

bargaining power to better negotiate for a larger share 

of firm profits. However, selection may also play some 

role: more productive workers may be more likely to join 

unions, and they would receive commensurately higher 

wages due to their additional productivity. 

There is also evidence that declining unionization has 

contributed to increases in inequality, since unions tend 

to raise the wages of lower-wage workers, pulling up the 

bottom of the wage distribution and reducing inequality. 

Estimates suggest that unionization declines account for 

15 to 20 percent of the increase in inequality among 

male wages between 1973 and 1993. Sector 

comparisons suggest that unionization substantially 

slowed wage inequality growth in the public sector. 

More recent research shows that this has persisted 

through at least 2001. A recent paper finds that declines 

in unionization explain one-fifth of the increase in wage 

inequality between 1973 and 2007 for women and onethird of the increase for men. For men, the effect is 

comparable to the effect of the increasing stratification 

of wages by education (for women, the effect of 

deunionization is about half that of education).

8 A number of papers support this finding. See, for 

example, Hirsch, Macpherson, and Schumacher (2002); 

Bratsberg and Ragan (2002).

Non-Wage Benefits

While representation by a union tends to substantially 

raise worker earnings, it also has a dramatic impact on 

access to benefits through an employer. According to 

March 2015 data, the Bureau of Labor Statistics finds

that union workers are far more likely than nonunion 

workers to have access to health insurance to retirement 

benefits, to life insurance, and to paid sick leave and paid 

holidays. 

After controlling for observable differences between 

union and nonunion workers, research finds that 

workers who are represented by a union are about 30 

percent more likely to be covered by health insurance at 

their job than similar nonunion workers. In addition, 

union workers are about 25 percent more likely to have 

retiree health benefits than similar nonunion workers, 

and of workers who are covered by such plans, unionized 

employers contribute more toward those plans. 

The decline in unionization has been linked to the decline 

in the provision of health benefits from employers and 

the fall in pension coverage. Though expanded options 

for health insurance coverage are now available through 

the Affordable Care Act (ACA), many employees continue 

to value coverage through their workplace. 

Frequently, when union workers bargain for benefits, 

these benefits spill overto nonunion workers in the same 

workplaces. When union density is high, unions create 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Retirement Medical Care Life

Insurance

Paid Sick

Leave

Paid Holidays

Access to Benefits by Union Membership Status

Percent with Access

Union

Nonunion

Source: National Compensation Survey, March 2015.

5

 
norms for fair pay, benefits, and working conditions, 

norms that become established more broadly and 

improve compensation and working conditions for union 

and nonunion workers alike. One study using data from 

1973 to 1989 finds evidence of crowding effects, where 

nonunion employers raise wages to retain talent and 

attract workers.

Helping to communicate and amplify the perspective of 

workers allows unions to negotiate significant non-wage 

benefits, like sick leave, health insurance, and retirement 

pensions, which can in turn improve the productivity and 

retention of all workers.

Workplace Conditions

Unions can also affect workplaces in other ways, 

including safety and training.

Safety

Organized labor has also contributed to broad 

improvements in workplace safety through both the 

legislative process and health advocacy. Unions were 

critical in the establishment of the Occupational Safety 

and Health Act in 1970. Unions have also played a 

fundamental role in linking occupational hazards such as 

coal dust,9 cotton dust,10 asbestos,11 radium,12 and 

dibromochloropropane13 to life-threatening diseases. 

Through advocacy and persistence, unions have 

increased awareness of occupational disease and altered 

the treatment of these occupational hazards as a result, 

improving working conditions in both unionized and 

nonunionized workplaces. 

Organized labor also contributes to the safety of 

workplace environments through advocating for workers 

in contracts and ensuring employer compliance with 

regulations. Unions affect safety improvements, for 

example, through providing information and training

about occupational hazards. Furthermore, unionized 

workplaces are more likely to be inspected for safety and 

comply with safety and health regulations. In addition to 

direct training and regulatory compliance, many union 

contracts include explicit safety protections for workers. 

Unions often negotiate for the use of protective 

9 Smith (1987).

10 Botsch (1993). 11 Rosner and Markowitz (1991).

equipment and protect the right of workers to refuse to 

work under hazardous conditions. 

Because of their record of promoting safety, it seems 

likely that unions would improve safety outcomes in the 

workplace. However, past economic research on the 

relationship between unions and safety has often found 

a negative relationship, a finding in contrast to a history 

of union advocacy for safety. In part, this may stem from 

workers in jobs with high injury risk having a greater 

desire to unionize in order to better protect themselves. 

Additionally, union safety efforts may effectively shift the 

injury composition from more serious to less serious 

incidents, increasing total safety in a way that requires 

detailed data to measure. A 2014 study investigates the 

union safety relationship using individual data and finds 

that accounting for some of these explanations reduces 

observed safety differences between union and 

nonunion jobs to zero. Given the measurement 

challenges in this area of research, more studies are 

needed to estimate the magnitude of the impact that 

unions have had on the safety of unionized professions. 

A difference in injury reporting between union and 

nonunion workplaces may also account for some of the 

mismatch. According to a 2013 study, workers may be 

more likely to report injuries in unionized positions 

because they are more likely to be aware of their right to 

a safe workplace and have a protected channel for their 

collective voice. They may therefore be less afraid of 

management retaliation, and nonunionized firms may 

have an incentive to underreport injuries to lower legal 

and compliance costs. Using detailed injury data in the 

coal mining industry, the study also found that while 

unionization was associated with higher levels of total 

injuries, unions reduced traumatic injuries by 14 to 32 

percent and fatalities by 29 to 83 percent.

Training

Unions play an active role in training workers, equipping 

union employees with the skills necessary to succeed in 

their jobs. Given that unions have historically provided 

training, the decline of unionization and the general 

decline in workplace training may be related. A recent 

review of the training literature shows that employer12 Clark (1997). 13 Robinson (1991).

6

 
provided training has been declining since the 1990s, as 

have other sources like registered apprenticeships, 

technical education, and union training. 

Evidence from other countries shows that unions ensure 

that workers are trained and gain the skills they need for 

work. Studies in the United Kingdom and Germany have 

found that unions increase the probability of workers 

receiving any training and the amount of training 

received. Further research in the United Kingdom finds

that union workers also enjoy greater returns to training 

and higher wage growth. 

Australian data suggest that workplaces with more active 

unions have greater access to employer-provided 

training, and research has also shown that unionization 

affects the type of training workers receive. A study in 

Canada finds that unions tend to invest in firm-specific 

training, both to arm union workers with skills they need

to succeed with specific employers and to reduce staff 

turnover. Other work examining unionized workers in 

the United States and Canada also finds that unionized 

workers tend to develop skills that are relatively jobspecific. However, some work suggests little to no 

difference in training between union and nonunion 

firms, while other research suggests that employers in 

unionized workplaces offer less training than those in 

nonunionized workplaces. 

Evidence from the United States and abroad shows that 

union efforts have provided safety and training benefits 

in addition to compensation gains. These workplace 

benefits also have the potential to increase worker 

productivity, affecting both workers and firms. 

Union Impact on Firm Performance

While unions provide substantial benefits to workers, 

evidence demonstrates that firms benefit as well, for 

example through higher retention and productivity. One 

study finds that unionization led to higher worker 

productivity, which is associated with lower turnover and 

potentially higher profits and better firm performance. 

Additional studies corroborate these findings; despite 

common claims about unions’ negative impact on 

businesses, studies find no negative effect on short- and 

long-run employer survival rates or the solvency of firms. 

Finally, evidence shows that unionized firms with 

workplace practices that give workers input into the 

production process have the highest productivity, above 

that of both nonunionized firms and unionized firms 

without these workplace practices.

Spillover Effects of Unions

Research has shown that the benefits of unionization 

tend to spill over to other industries and firms. For 

instance, virtually all coal mines (and steel plants) were 

unionized in the 1950s. A study finds higher rates of 

unionization among healthcare workers today in the 

areas surrounding those past mines and plants, 

indicating historical spillovers from unionized industries 

to nonunionized industries in particular geographic 

locations. In addition, there are spillovers across firms 

within industries. Another study finds that nonunionized 

firms within an industry raise wages in response to 

increased unionization at the city-level, indicating that 

compensation increases in unionized firms may spill over 

to geographically proximate nonunionized firms. 

Unionization is even associated with intergenerational 

spillover effects. Recent research examining the impact 

of union membership on the income mobility of the 

children found striking results. Among teenagers whose 

parents’ incomes were typical of the bottom half of the 

income distribution, a 10 percentage-point increase in 

the union membership rate in the area they grew up in 

was associated with a 1.3 percentile increase in their 

income when they were 29 to 32 years old. Union density 

is a significant predictor of mobility, even after 

controlling for race, industry, inequality, and more. 

Low-income children were not alone in benefiting from 

higher unionization; the study found that a 10 

percentage point increase in union membership was 

associated with a 3 to 4.5 percent increase in average 

incomes overall. Using panel data that links parents and 

children over decades, the researchers also found that 

the children of union members have higher wages than 

the children of nonunion members who grew up in 

similar households. Children of fathers with less than a 

college education, for example, earn 28 percent more if 

their father was in a union, after controlling for father’s 

age, race, marital status, industry occupation, and urban 

status, though not the union status of the children 

themselves when they are adults. Overall, the study 

suggests that parental union membership can be an 

important factor in upward mobility for children, 

especially for children of less-skilled parents. 

7
Effect of Right-to-Work Laws

Since unions can bolster compensation and reduce wage 

inequality, weakening unions may have the opposite 

effect. A long history of legislative and judicial decisions 

have weakened unionization by restricting the right to 

unionize, reducing the workplace decisions in which 

unions have a say, and allowing employers to openly 

combat unionization. Right-to-work statutes, one such 

method of reducing union power by limiting the ability of 

unions to collect dues, have been shown to depress the 

rate of unionization. 

Research suggests that right-to-work laws may lower 

wages. Historically most common in the South, right-towork laws have spread in recent years to rust-belt states 

such as Michigan and Indiana in 2012 and Wisconsin in 

2015. Research has shown that statutes with the 

opposite effect of right-to-work laws, such as allowing 

fair share agreements that require employees to become 

dues-paying members of the union (to cover the cost of 

the services that the union provides) within a fixed 

period of time after hiring, are associated with higher 

union density and higher earnings. Because states with 

right-to-work laws tend to have lower wages than the 

nation as a whole, identifying the impact of right-to-work 

statutes on wages is challenging. After controlling for 

state-specific factors, the same study found that in areas 

with prohibitions on the ability to negotiate fair share 

agreements, state and local government workers have 

earnings about 4 percent lower. 

A new paper that examines the effect of right-to-work 

laws created by the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 

1947 suggests that, overall, the average effects of rightto-work laws on wages are slightly negative, ranging 

from zero to around 2 percent. Sectors with higher union 

density experience larger drops in wages relative to 

lower-density sectors, suggesting that union density and 

power are important factors in determining the union 

wage premium.

8
Alternative Forms of Worker Bargaining

While unionization rates have declined over the past 

decades, alternative forms of worker bargaining and 

negotiation have emerged. Although unions play an 

important role in representing many workers, these 

alternative models can also help ensure that workers 

who are not or who cannot be represented by unions will 

have their voices heard. However, there is little research 

on the effectiveness of such models in advancing 

workers’ causes, and thus the evidence contained in this 

section is based primarily on theory and case studies, 

rather than empirics. Further research is needed to 

better understand the implications of this relatively 

recent phenomenon—and in particular whether, in the 

absence of collective bargaining, alternative 

arrangements can lead to increases in wages.

Works Councils

Works councils, groups of workers that represent all 

employees in discussions with their employer but are not 

part of a formal trade union, are a common form of 

worker voice outside of trade unions in Germany and, 

under the authority of the German Works Constitution 

Act of 1952, can be set up in any private workplace with 

at least five employees. Works councils ensure that 

workplace decisions, such as those about pay, hiring, and 

hours, involve workers – they have both participation 

rights (where works councils must be informed and 

consulted about certain issues) and co-determination 

rights (where the works council must be involved in the 

decision). Works councils are separate from trade 

unions: trade unions exist to protect their members, 

while works councils exist to integrate workers with 

management into the decision making process. 

While research into works councils is limited, research on 

the German model has shown that they positively impact 

productivity in covered firms and that those firms are 

less likely to be engaged in rent-seeking activities. 

Similarly, German works councils are also associated

with reduced turnover and higher wages, and, in larger 

companies, with higher productivity. Another study of 

Germany also showed that firms with works councils 

made significantly higher investments in workplace 

training and retained a higher percentage of former 

trainees over a five-year period; the effects of works 

councils were especially pronounced in firms also 

covered by collective bargaining agreements. While 

advocates have expressed interest in bringing the works 

council model, or aspects of it, to the United States, 

questions remain about how the model would fit into 

existing systems and statutes governing collective 

bargaining.

Alternative Labor Organizations

Alternative labor organizations, a growing phenomenon, 

allow groups of nonunion workers with a common 

interest, such as increasing the minimum wage or 

exposing labor violations, to advocate for workplace 

change. These associations are generally a form of 

worker voice for workers not eligible to collectively 

bargain under the National Labor Relations Act, such as 

independent contractors, supervisors, domestic 

workers, or government employees (government

workers can in some cases join a union, but collective 

bargaining may be restricted). 

In many cases, these alternative labor organizations 

comprise workers advocating for a single cause, but 

often cut across employer and industry boundaries, such 

as the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 

backed Fight for $15. These types of organizations 

became more visible during and after the Great 

Recession, likely due in part to the potential growth in 

the ‘on-demand economy’ in which workers are often 

treated by their employers as independent contractors 

rather than employees. 

A similar organization for workers not covered by the 

National Labor Relations Act, and that operates closely 

with the organized labor community, is the New York 

Taxi Workers’ Alliance. Formed in 1998, the New York 

Taxi Workers’ Alliance helps advocate for taxi drivers, 

who are primarily independent contractors rather than 

employees. The organization expanded nationally in 

2011 as the National Taxi Workers’ Alliance, and became 

the first charter for non-traditional workers since the 

farm workers in the 1960s, and the first one ever of 

independent contractors; they are recognized by the 

AFL-CIO as an affiliate organization. The group advocates 

for its members in much the same way as a traditional 

union, but their right to collectively bargain is not 

protected under the National Labor Relations Act due to 

their non-employee status. 

9
Paralleling the efforts of organized labor, workers 

themselves have come together to express their 

collective voice, utilizing resources such as online 

platforms to amplify their message. For example, groups 

like the Freelancers’ Union provide a forum for workers 

who work in the gig economy to organize and collectively 

negotiate certain group benefits (such as retirement 

accounts or health care) with third-party providers. Such 

groups can be an important resource for workers who 

are not officially associated with a particular company 

and are thus constantly renegotiating their place in the 

workforce.

Another grassroots effort, the National Domestic 

Workers Alliance (NDWA) was founded in 2007 to 

represent another group of nonunion workers: the 

domestic workforce. Although the group is not affiliated 

with a union, NDWA has worked to strengthen the rights 

of domestic workers through government advocacy and 

by raising public awareness via a network of affiliated 

organizations around the United States. NDWA’s efforts 

have resulted in legislative victories, including Domestic 

Workers Bill of Rights laws in five states. In addition, 

NDWA has partnered with Care.com to encourage higher 

standards among employers of domestic workers 

through the Fair Care Pledge. Signatory employers agree 

to establish clear expectations, provide fair pay, and 

allow for paid time off, and domestic workers searching 

for employer matches can see which potential employers 

have sign on to the pledge. 

Large advocacy campaigns that have been driven by both 

workers and consumers have had success in improving 

the workplace policies of large companies, by enlisting 

consumers as allies, who may not have a direct stake in 

the desired outcome, but whose voices can be even 

more effective in encouraging an employer to change. 

One example is Coworker.org, which connects workers 

across the world to one another through online 

campaigns and petitions, but also to community 

stakeholders such as consumers. These kinds of groups 

raise awareness in the larger community and encourage 

employers to make changes in response to worker and 

consumer advocacy. 

Conclusion

Over the past forty years, unionization rates and the role 

that worker voice plays in the labor market have changed 

significantly. Since peak membership in the 1950s, 

unionization rates have fallen, most notably in traditional 

sectors like manufacturing and construction, and the 

demographics of union members have changed, with 

unionization becoming more concentrated in the public

sector and incorporating more female workers and 

college-educated workers. As recently as the mid-1970s, 

U.S. union membership was concentrated among men 

with average or slightly-below average education levels 

working in the private sector. But by the early 1990s, 

alongside many other concurrent changes in the 

structure of the labor market, highly educated women in 

the public sector had the highest union membership 

rates. 

Along with these changes in union membership have 

come changes in unions’ impact on the workplace. While 

unionization has historically had an equalizing effect on 

the U.S. wage distribution by boosting wages for lowerskilled workers, unions’ ability to lower wage inequality 

has become more limited as membership has shifted to 

cover fewer low-skilled workers. 

The decline of unionization rates in recent decades has 

prompted important questions regarding the role of 

worker voice in quelling growing inequality going 

forward. Unions have also served as a key channel for 

communicating worker views in decisions regarding 

wages, benefits, and workplace conditions, and 

unionization has been associated with higher wages, 

expanded benefits, and safety protections for both union 

members and nonunion workers. In recent years, 

traditional organizing efforts have faced new challenges 

with the rise of the “fissured” economy where workers 

who share a common workplace are less likely to share a 

common employer as different functions within a 

workplace are subcontracted or where workers are less 

likely to share a common workplace with others in their 

industry and instead work in separate locations. The 

changing organization of work has in turn given rise to 

new forms of union organizing as well as new forms of 

worker alliance and new ways to advocate for worker 

rights. Workers not eligible for collective bargaining have 

developed alternative ways to organize, including 

movements that combine workers from across an 

industry rather than a particular employer. Over time, 

unions and other worker associations have adapted to 

changes in the structure of the labor market and worker 

demographics, and they will continue to play a pivotal 

role going forward in ensuring fair and safe workplace 

practices that benefit workers across the country. 

10
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