United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation, U.S. Senate

For Release

on Delivery

Expected at

2 p.m. EDT

Thursday

August 1, 1996

AVIATION SECURITY

Immediate Action Needed

to Improve Security

Statement of Keith O. Fultz,

Assistant Comptroller General,

Resources, Community, and Economic

Development Division

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We appreciate the opportunity to testify before this Committee as it

assesses aviation security and the measures needed to reduce the

vulnerabilities that exist in the current system. Protecting civil aviation

against a terrorist attack is now an urgent national issue. The 1988

terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103, which killed 270 people, and the more

recent, but as yet unexplained, explosion of TWA flight 800 have shaken

the public’s confidence in the safety and security of air travel. The Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA), using information provided by federal

intelligence agencies, is responsible for analyzing the threat to aviation

security of terrorist attacks and prescribing and enforcing security

measures.

Mr. Chairman, our testimony today responds to the Committee’s request

for information about the threat to aviation and what can be done to

increase aviation security. The testimony is based on several issued GAO

reports and work we have undertaken for the House International

Relations Committee and Senator D’Amato. Today, we will discuss (1) the

threat to aviation from terrorist attacks; (2) the roles of FAA, the airlines,

and airports in providing aviation security and the vulnerabilities in the

existing security system; and (3) the availability of explosives detection

technology and other methods used to address the threat. Finally, we want

to emphasize that the Congress, the administration—including FAA and the

intelligence community, among others—and the aviation industry need to

agree on methods of improving and financing security procedures. To the

extent necessary, the international aviation community should be

involved.

In summary:

• The threat of terrorism against the United States has increased. Aviation is

and will remain an attractive target for terrorists.

• Aviation security is a shared responsibility of FAA and the airlines and

airports. FAA has mandated additional security procedures as the threat

has changed; however, the domestic and international aviation system has

numerous vulnerabilities. For example, conventional X-ray screening of

checked baggage has performance limitations and offers little protection

against a moderately sophisticated explosive device.

• Explosives detection devices are commercially available for checked and

carry-on baggage and could improve security, but all of the devices have

shortcomings. Some of these devices are already being used in foreign

Page 1 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
countries. Other devices are under development and may be available in

the next 2 years for screening passengers, but technologies for cargo and

mail at airports are not as far along. A mix of technology and procedures

will likely be needed to improve security. FAA has estimated that the cost

of adopting some new technology and other methods to counteract

terrorism, such as identifying for additional security checks those

passengers who meet specific profiles associated with terrorist groups,

could cost as much as $6 billion over 10 years.

• Recent events underscore the need for improved security to protect the

traveling public. To improve security, the Congress, the

administration—including FAA and the intelligence community, among

others—and the aviation industry need to agree and take action on what

needs to be done to meet the threat of terrorism and who will pay for new

security measures. On July 25, the President asked the Vice-President to

lead a commission to review aviation safety and airport security and to

report within 45 days on actions to be taken. The international aviation

community also may need to be involved to improve security procedures.

The Threat Has

Increased, and

Aviation Is an

Attractive Target

The threat of terrorism against the United States has increased, according

to the intelligence community. The experts believe that aviation is likely to

remain an attractive target for terrorists well into the foreseeable future.

Until the early 1990s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State

Department, FAA, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and airline

officials had maintained that the threat of terrorism was far greater

overseas than in the United States. However, the World Trade Center

bombing and the recent convictions of individuals charged with plotting to

bomb several landmarks in the New York area revealed that the

international terrorist threat in the United States is more serious and more

extensive then previously believed.

By 1994, reports by several agencies indicated a change in the pattern of

terrorism. In 1994, the State Department reported a decline in attacks

worldwide by state-sponsored, secular terrorist groups but an increase in

attacks by radical fundamentalist groups, who operate more

autonomously. The FBI reported in the same year that the most important

development in international terrorism inside the United States was the

emergence of international radical terrorist groups with an infrastructure

that can support terrorists’ activities. These groups are more difficult to

infiltrate, and consequently, it is also more difficult to predict and prevent

their attacks.

Page 2 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
As we reported in January 1994, terrorists’ activities are continually

evolving and present unique challenges to FAA and law enforcement

agencies.1

 We further reported in March 1996 that the bombing of

Philippines Airlines Flight 434 in December 1994, which resulted in the

death of one passenger and injuries to several others, illustrated the

potential extent of terrorists’ motivation and capabilities as well as the

attractiveness of aviation as a target for terrorists.2

 According to

information that was accidentally uncovered in early January 1995, this

bombing was a rehearsal for multiple attacks on specific U.S. flights in

Asia. Officials told us that they rarely have the advantage of a detailed,

verifiable plot to target U.S. airlines. They also said that the terrorists were

aware both of airports’ vulnerabilities and how existing security measures

could be defeated.

Aviation Security

System and Its

Vulnerabilities

Even though FAA has changed security procedures as the threat has

changed, the domestic and international aviation system continues to have

numerous vulnerabilities. Aviation security is a shared responsibility. The

intelligence community—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the

National Security Agency, the FBI, among others—gathers information to

prevent actions by terrorists and provides intelligence information to FAA.

On the basis of this information, FAA makes judgments about the threat

and establishes procedures to address it. The airlines and airports are

responsible for implementing the procedures. For example, the airlines are

responsible for screening passengers and property, and the airports are

responsible for the security of the airport environment, including security

personnel. FAA and the aviation community rely on a multifaceted

approach that includes information from various intelligence and law

enforcement agencies; contingency plans to meet a variety of threat levels;

and the use of screening equipment, such as conventional X-ray devices

and metal detectors. However, many of these measures, such as

walk-through metal detectors, were primarily designed to avert hijackings

during the 1970s and 1980s, as opposed to the more current threat of

sophisticated attacks by terrorists that involve explosive devices.

For flights within the United States, basic security measures include the

use of walk-through metal detectors for passengers and X-ray screening of

carry-on baggage; these measures are augmented by additional procedures

1

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Challenges

(GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).

2

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technology

(GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).

Page 3 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
that are based on an assessment of risk. These additional procedures are

contained in the contingency plans developed by FAA in coordination with

the aviation industry. FAA’s plans describe a wide range of procedures that

can be invoked, depending on the nature and degree of the threat. Among

these procedures are (1) passenger profiling, a method of identifying

potentially threatening passengers who are then subjected to additional

security measures, and (2) passenger-bag matching, a procedure to ensure

that a passenger who checks a bag also boards the flight; if the passenger

does not board, the bag is removed. FAA mandated higher levels of

temporary security measures several times in 1995 because of the

increased threat of terrorism, and the current measures in place are at the

highest level invoked since the Gulf War.

Because the threat of terrorism had been considered greater overseas, FAA

has mandated more stringent security measures for international flights.

Currently, for all international flights, FAA requires U.S. carriers to

implement the International Civil Aviation Organization standards at a

minimum, including the inspection of carry-on bags and passenger-bag

matching.3 FAA also requires additional, more stringent

measures—including interviewing passengers that meet certain criteria,

screening every checked bag, and screening supplementary carry-on

baggage—at all airports in Europe and the Middle East and many airports

elsewhere.

In the aftermath of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103, a Presidential

Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism was established to

examine the nation’s aviation security system. This Commission reported

that the system was seriously flawed and failed to provide adequate

protection for the traveling public. In spite of the Commission’s finding

and the Congress’s enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of

1990, our work illustrates that many vulnerabilities are persistent.4

Aviation Security System

Has Vulnerabilities

Providing effective security is a complex problem because of the size of

the U.S. aviation system, differences among airlines and airports, and the

unpredictable nature of terrorism. In our January and May 1994 reports on

aviation security, we highlighted a number of vulnerabilities in the overall

3

The International Civil Aviation Organization is a United Nations organization that develops standards

and recommended practices for aviation safety and security.

4

Aviation Security: Development of New Security Technology Has Not Met Expectations

(GAO/RCED-94-142, May 19, 1994); Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives

and Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).

Page 4 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
security framework, such as the screening of checked baggage, mail, and

cargo. We also raised concerns about unauthorized individuals gaining

access to critical parts of an airport and the potential use of sophisticated

weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles, that could be deployed against

commercial aircraft. More recent security concerns include smuggling

bombs aboard aircraft in carry-on bags or on passengers themselves.

Specific information on the vulnerabilities of the nation’s aviation security

system is classified and cannot be detailed here, but we can provide some

information. We have a classified report in process that discusses the

system’s vulnerabilities in greater detail. FAA believes the greatest threat to

aviation is explosives in checked baggage. For those bags that are

screened, we reported in March 1996 that conventional X-ray screening

systems (comprising the machine and operator who reads the X-ray

screen) have performance limitations and offer little protection against a

moderately sophisticated explosive device. There are also vulnerabilities

in screening passengers because the walk-through devices that currently

screen for metal objects are unable to detect explosives carried by

passengers.

Although Not Without

Shortcomings,

Technologies Are

Available or in

Development for

Detecting Concealed

Explosives

Aviation security rests on a careful mix of intelligence information,

procedures, technology, and security personnel. New explosives detection

technology will play an important part in improving security, but it is not

the panacea. In response to the Aviation Security Improvement Act of

1990, FAA accelerated its efforts to develop explosives detection

technology, and devices are now commercially available to address some

vulnerabilities. Since October 1, 1990, FAA has invested about $150 million

in developing technologies specifically designed to detect concealed

explosives. FAA relies primarily on contracts and grants with private

companies and research institutions to develop these technologies. The

act specifically directed FAA to develop and deploy explosives detection

systems by November 1993. However, this goal has not been met.

In September 1993, FAA published a general certification standard that

explosives detection systems must meet before they are deployed. The

standard sets certain minimum performance criteria, such as what kinds

of explosives must be detected and how many bags per hour the device

processes.5

 However, the specifics of the standard are classified. To

5

The certification standard sets minimum performance criteria for (1) the explosive substances to be

detected, (2) the probability of detection, by explosive, (3) the quantity of explosive, and (4) the

number of bags processed per hour. In addition, the standard specifies the maximum allowable false

alarm rate, by explosive.

Page 5 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
minimize human error, the standard also requires that the devices

automatically sound an alarm when explosives are suspected; this feature

is in contrast to currently used conventional X-ray devices, where the

operator has to look at the X-ray screen for each bag. In 1994, we reported

that FAA had made little progress in meeting the law’s requirement because

of technical problems, such as slow baggage processing. Since then, one

system has passed FAA’s certification standard and is being operationally

tested at two U.S. airports in Atlanta and San Francisco.

Explosives detection devices can substantially improve airlines’ ability to

detect concealed explosives before they are brought aboard aircraft. While

most of these technologies are still in development, a number of devices

are now commercially available. For example, some devices are in use in

foreign countries, such as the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Israel. None

of the commercially available devices, however, is without shortcomings.

On the basis of our analysis, we have three overall observations about

detection technologies:

• First, these devices vary in their ability to detect the types, quantities, and

shapes of explosives. For example, one device excels in its ability to detect

certain explosive substances but not others. Other devices can detect

explosives but not in certain shapes.

• Second, explosives detection devices typically produce a number of false

alarms that must be resolved either by human intervention or other

technical means. These false alarms occur because devices use various

technologies to identify characteristics, such as shapes, densities, and

properties, that could potentially indicate an explosive. Given the huge

numbers of passengers, bags, and cargo processed by the average major

U.S. airport, even relatively modest false alarm rates translate into several

hundreds, even thousands, of items per day needing additional scrutiny.

• Third, and most important, these devices ultimately depend upon human

beings to resolve alarms. This activity can range from closer inspection of

a computer image and a judgment call to a hand search of the item in

question. The ultimate detection of explosives depends on security

personnel taking extra steps—or arriving at the correct judgment—to

determine whether or not an explosive is present. Because many of the

devices’ alarms signify only the potential for explosives being present, the

true detection of explosives requires human intervention. The higher the

false alarm rate, the more a system needs to rely on human judgment. As

we noted in our January and May 1994 reports, this reliance could be a

weak link in the explosives detection process. This fact has implications

for the selection and training of operators for new equipment.

Page 6 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
Devices Are Available to

Address Some System

Vulnerabilities, and FAA

Has Developed Some Cost

Estimates

A number of explosives detection devices are currently available or under

development to determine whether explosives are present in checked and

carry-on baggage or on passengers, but they are costly. FAA is still

developing systems to screen cargo and mail at airports.

Checked Bags Four explosives detection devices with automatic alarms are commercially

available for checked bags, but only one has met FAA’s certification

standard (the CTX 5000). FAA’s preliminary estimates are that the one-time

acquisition and installation costs of the certified system for the 75 busiest

airports in the United States could range from $400 million to $2.2 billion,

depending on the number of machines installed.

• A computerized tomography (CT) device, which is based on advances

made in the medical field, offers the best overall detection ability but is

relatively slow in processing bags and has the highest price, costing

approximately $1 million each. This device was certified by FAA in

December 1994.

• Two advanced X-ray devices have lower detection capability but are faster

and cheaper, costing approximately $350,000 to $400,000 each.

• The last device, which uses electromagnetic radiation, offers

chemical-specific detection ability but only for some of the explosives

specified in FAA’s standard. The current price is about $340,000 each.

All of these devices require additional steps by security personnel when

there are indications that an explosive is present. FAA is funding the

development of next-generation CT devices from two different

manufacturers. These devices are being designed to meet FAA’s standard

for detecting explosives and processing speeds; they could sell for about

$500,000 each. Advanced X-ray devices with improved capabilities are also

in development.

Carry-on Items Explosives detection devices are commercially available for carry-on bags,

electronics, and other items but not yet for screening bottles or containers

that could hold liquid explosives. Devices for liquids, however, may be

commercially available within 2 years.

Carry-on bags and electronics. At least five manufacturers sell devices that

can detect the residue or vapor from explosives on the exterior of carry-on

bags and on electronic items, such as computers or radios. These devices,

Page 7 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
also known as “sniffers,” are commonly referred to as “trace” detectors

and range in price from about $45,000 to $170,000 each. They have very

specific detection capability as well as low false alarm rates. The main

drawbacks are (1) the possibility of insufficient residue on the exterior of

the item concealing the bomb and (2) nuisance alarms, where the device

accurately detects explosive material—for example, a heart patient’s

nitroglycerin medication—but the source is not a bomb.

An electromagnetic device is also available that offers a high probability of

chemical-specific detection, but only for some explosives. The price is

about $65,000.

Detecting liquid explosives. FAA is developing two different

electromagnetic systems for screening bottles and other containers, likely

to sell for $25,000 and $125,000 per device. A development issue is

processing speed. These devices may be available within 2 years.

Passengers Although a number of commercially available trace devices could be used

on passengers if deemed necessary, passengers might find their physical

intrusiveness unacceptable. In June 1996, the National Research Council,

for example, reported that there may be a number of health, legal,

operational, privacy, and convenience concerns about passenger screening

devices. Accordingly, FAA and the Department of Defense (DOD) are

developing devices that passengers may find more acceptable. FAA

estimates that it would cost $1.9 billion to provide about 3,000 of these

devices to screen passengers.

• A number of trace devices in development will detect residue or vapor

from explosives on passengers’ hands. Two devices screen either

documents or tokens that have been handled by passengers. These devices

should be available in 1997 or 1998 and sell for approximately $65,000 to

$85,000 each.

• Five devices under development use a walk-through screening checkpoint

similar to the current metal detectors. Three will use trace technology to

detect particles and vapor from explosives on passengers’ clothing or in

the air surrounding their bodies. Ranging in expected selling prices from

approximately $170,000 to $300,000, one of these devices will be tested at

an airport as early as this month, and another device may undergo airport

testing next year. Two other devices, based on electromagnetic

technology, are in development. Rather than detecting particles or vapor,

Page 8 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
these devices will provide images of items concealed under passengers’

clothing. Prices are expected to be approximately $100,000 to $200,000.

Cargo/Mail Cargo and mail continue to represent vulnerabilities in the system.

Screening cargo and mail at airports is difficult because individual

packages or pieces of mail are usually batched into larger shipments that

are more difficult to screen. Although not yet commercially available, two

different systems for detecting explosives in large containers are being

developed by FAA and DOD. Each system draws vapor and particle samples

and uses trace technology to analyze them. One system is scheduled for

testing in 1997.

In addition, FAA is considering for further development three nuclear-based

technologies, originally planned for checked-bag screening, for use on

cargo and mail. These technologies use large, heavy apparatus to generate

gamma rays or neutrons to penetrate larger items. However, they require

shielding for safety reasons. These technologies are not as far along in the

development process as many other devices. They are still in the

laboratory development stage rather than the prototype development

stage. If fully developed, these devices could cost as much as $2 million to

$5 million each.

Blast-Resistant Containers To reduce the effects of an in-flight explosion, FAA is conducting research

on, among other things, blast-resistant containers. FAA’s tests have

demonstrated that it is feasible to contain the effects—blast and

fragments—of an internal explosion. However, because of their size,

blast-resistant containers can be used only on wide-body aircraft that

typically fly international routes. FAA is working with a joint

industry-government consortium to address concerns about the cost,

weight, and durability of the new containers and is planning to blast test

several prototype containers later this year. Also this year, FAA will place

about 20 of these containers into airline operations to see how well they

function in actual use.

Other Methods to Improve

Aviation Security

In addition to technology-based security, FAA has several procedures that it

uses, and can expand upon, to augment domestic aviation security or use

in combination with technology to reduce the workload required by

detection devices, such as random hand searches. On July 25, the

President announced additional measures for international and domestic

Page 9 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
flights that include, among other things, stricter controls over checked

baggage and cargo as well as additional inspections of aircraft. Two

procedures that are routinely used on many international flights and could

be implemented in the short term for domestic flights are passenger

profiling and passenger-bag matching. FAA officials have said that profiling

can reduce the number of passengers and bags that require additional

security measures by as much as 80 percent.

Profiling and bag matching are unable to address certain types of threats.

However, in the absence of sufficient or effective technology, these

procedures are a valuable part of the overall security framework. These

methods may also be expensive. FAA has estimated that incorporating bag

matching in everyday security measures could cost up to $2 billion in

startup costs and lost revenue. The direct costs to airlines include, among

other things, equipment, staffing, and training. The airlines’ revenues and

operations could be affected differently because the airlines currently

have different capabilities to implement bag matching, different route

structures, and different periods of time allowed for connecting flights.

The Congress, the

Administration, and

the Aviation Industry

Need to Agree on

Actions to Improve

Security and Who Will

Pay for It

Aviation security has become an issue of national importance, but no

agreement currently exists among the Congress, the

administration—including FAA and the intelligence community, among

others—and the aviation industry on the steps necessary to meet the

threat and improve security in the short and long terms or who will pay for

new security initiatives. While FAA has increased security at domestic

airports on a temporary basis, FAA and DOT officials believe that more

permanent changes are needed. The cost of these new security initiatives

will be significant and may require changes in how airlines and airports

operate and will likely have an impact on the traveling public. The law

makes airlines responsible for screening passengers and property.

In November 1995, senior FAA officials stated that they planned to

recommend a high-level national policy review of civil aviation to develop

a consensus in government and industry on the nature and extent of the

threat, appropriate types of responses, and who would pay for those

responses. FAA officials told us that standard cost-benefit analyses would

likely reject many initiatives and that a consensus was needed among the

Congress, industry, and the executive branch before any regulatory action

is taken. There has been considerable debate about how to fund the

deployment and operational costs for new security initiatives. Several

options have been discussed: (1) government funding, if viewed as a

Page 10 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
national security issue, (2) industry financing as a cost of doing business,

and (3) a fee assessed on air travelers.

In January 1996, FAA briefed the National Security Council (NSC) on the

threat to civil aviation and the need for a high-level national policy review

on ways of increasing aviation security. FAA recommended the

establishment of a presidential commission as a means of obtaining the

essential elements of consensus and a legislative mandate. At that briefing,

FAA provided preliminary estimates on the cost of various options,

including the deployment of new explosives detection technology for

passengers and baggage and other new security procedures. Depending on

the option selected, FAA estimated that costs would range from $1 billion

to more than $6 billion over a 10-year period. While no agreement was

reached on how to finance these improvements, FAA estimated that it

would cost the traveling public between $0.20 and $1.30 per one-way

ticket. As a result of this meeting and two others, FAA and NSC agreed to

submit a proposal to FAA’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee to

establish a working group to review the threat against aviation and

recommend options for improving security.

In addition to FAA’s effort, on July 15, 1996, the President established a

Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, whose mission includes

assessing the threat and vulnerabilities and making recommendations on

how to protect telecommunications, electrical power, banking and

finance, water supply, gas and oil storage, emergency services, and

transportation. Senior DOT officials told us that they intend to provide

several staff to this effort but that it is uncertain how much attention will

be placed on transportation and, specifically, aviation security. However,

recent events will likely influence the focus of this effort and place greater

emphasis on aviation security.

On July 17, 1996, the same day that TWA Flight 800 exploded, FAA

proposed a joint government-industry working group to its security

advisory committee. The committee agreed to establish a working group

that will include representatives from FAA, the aviation community, the

NSC, the CIA, the FBI, the Departments of Defense and State, and the Office

of Management and Budget. This group will (1) review the threat to

aviation, (2) examine vulnerabilities, (3) develop options for improving

security, (4) identify and analyze funding options, and (5) identify the

legislative, executive, and regulatory actions needed. The working group

established a goal of submitting a final report to the FAA Administrator by

October 16, 1996. Any national policy issues would then be referred to the

Page 11 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
President by the FAA Administrator through the Secretary of

Transportation.

Recognizing the importance of aviation security as a national policy issue,

the President established a commission on July 25, 1996, headed by the

Vice-President, to review aviation safety and airport security. This

commission is to report back to the President within 45 days.

The international aviation community may need to be involved in

developing new procedures to improve security. The administration is

working with the Group of Seven industrial nations on additional ways to

cooperate on countering terrorism.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, we face an urgent national problem that needs

to be addressed at the highest levels of government now. The threat of

terrorism has been an international issue for some time, with events such

as the bombing in Saudi Arabia of U.S. barracks. But other incidents such

as the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York, the federal

building in Oklahoma City, possibly at the Olympics in Atlanta, and

perhaps of TWA 800—if in fact this is determined to be an act of

terrorism—have made terrorism a domestic as well as an international

issue. Public concern about aviation safety, in particular, has already been

heightened as a result of the ValuJet crash, and the recent TWA 800 crash

has increased that concern. If further incidents occur, public fear and

anxiety will escalate and the economic well-being of the nation will suffer

because of reductions in travel and the shipment of goods.

Three separate initiatives are under way that may address the concerns

about aviation security. In our view, a unified and concentrated effort is

needed to address this national issue. The commission that the

Vice-President heads could be the focal point to build a consensus on the

actions that need to be taken to address a number of long-standing

vulnerabilities. As we noted, procedures and technology can be used to

improve aviation security but will require substantial resources.

We believe several steps need to be taken immediately: (1) conduct a

comprehensive review of the safety and security of all major domestic and

international airports and airlines to identify the strengths and weaknesses

of their procedures to protect the traveling public, (2) identify

vulnerabilities in the system, (3) establish priorities to address the

system’s identified vulnerabilities, (4) develop a short-term approach with

Page 12 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
immediate actions to correct significant security weaknesses, and

(5) develop a long-term and comprehensive national strategy that

combines new technology, procedures, and better training for security

personnel. Because terrorism is an international problem, close

cooperation with foreign governments is also required. In addition, the

time has come to inform and involve the American public in this effort. If

there was ever a time that public will accept new security measures, it is

now. This concludes my prepared statement. I would be glad to respond to

any questions.

(341501) Page 13 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237
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