64510 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 214 / Friday, November 5, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 1.—COMPLIANCE TIMES FOR INSPECTIONS SPECIFIED IN PARTS 2 THROUGH 6, AND 8 AND 9 OF SERVICE

BULLETIN—Continued

For airplanes identified in the service 

bulletin as—

Threshold— Grace period— Repetitive

interval— Do—

(6) Group 2 ............ Before 20 years since the date of 

issuance of the original Airworthiness Certificate or the date of 

issuance of the original Export Certificate of Airworthiness, whichever 

occurs first.

Within 2 years 

after the effective date of this 

AD.

At intervals not to 

exceed 2 years.

An exterior detailed inspection of the 

upper and lower chords of the front 

and rear spars from WBL 70.5 to 

the wing tip for cracks, corrosion, 

minor surface defects, and existing 

stop-drilled repairs of cracking (initial inspection only), in accordance 

with paragraph 3.B., Work Instructions, Part 5, of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of the service bulletin. 

(7) Group 2 ............ Before 20 years since the date of 

issuance of the original Airworthiness Certificate or the date of 

issuance of the original Export Certificate of Airworthiness, whichever 

occurs first.

Within 4 years 

after the effective date of this 

AD.

At intervals not to 

exceed 4 years.

An HFEC inspection of the upper and 

lower chords of the front and rear 

spars from WBL 70.5 to the wing tip 

for cracks, corrosion, minor surface 

defects, and existing stop-drilled repairs of cracking (initial inspection 

only), in accordance with paragraph 

3.B., Work Instructions, Part 6, of 

the Accomplishment Instructions of 

the service bulletin. 

Corrective Actions 

(i) If any crack, corrosion, or minor surface 

defect is detected during any inspection 

required by this AD, before further flight, do 

the applicable corrective actions in 

accordance with Part 7 of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of the service 

bulletin, except as provided by paragraph (j) 

of this AD. 

(j) If any crack or corrosion is detected 

during any inspection required by this AD 

that exceeds the limits specified in the 

service bulletin, and the bulletin specifies to 

contact Boeing for appropriate Action: Before 

further flight, repair in accordance with a 

method approved by the Manager, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA; or 

in accordance with data meeting the type 

certification basis of the airplane approved 

by a Boeing Company Designated 

Engineering Representative who has been 

authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to 

make such findings. For a repair method to 

be approved, the approval must specifically 

reference this AD. 

(k) If any existing stop-drilled repair of 

previous cracking is detected during any 

inspection required by this AD, before further 

flight, permanently repair crack in 

accordance with paragraph 3.B., Work 

Instructions, Part 7, paragraph 2., ‘‘Crack 

Repair’’ of the Accomplishment Instructions 

of the service bulletin. 

(l) Before further flight following any 

inspection or repair required by this AD, 

apply a wet layer of BMS 3–23 organic 

corrosion inhibiting compound or Boeing 

equivalent, in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of the service 

bulletin. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(m)(1) The Manager, Seattle ACO, FAA, 

has the authority to approve AMOCs for this 

AD, if requested using the procedures found 

in 14 CFR 39.19. 

(2) Alternative methods of compliance, 

approved previously in accordance with AD 

2002–24–05, amendment 39–12970, are 

approved as alternative methods of 

compliance with this AD. 

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for any repair 

required by this AD, if it is approved by a 

Boeing Company Designated Engineering 

Representative who has been authorized by 

the Manager, Seattle ACO, to make such 

findings. For a repair method to be approved, 

the approval must specifically reference this 

AD.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 

26, 2004. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 04–24730 Filed 11–4–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2004–19541; Directorate 

Identifier 2004–NM–129–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell 

Douglas Model DC–8 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a 

new airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

McDonnell Douglas Model DC–8 

airplanes. This proposed AD would 

require an inspection of the pushrod 

assemblies for the left and right elevator 

control tabs to determine if the pushrod 

assemblies are made of aluminum or 

steel, replacing any assembly made of 

aluminum with an assembly made of 

steel or modifying existing steel 

assemblies, and other specified actions. 

This proposed AD would also require an 

inspection of the crank assemblies for 

the inboard and outboard geared tabs of 

the elevator to determine if the crank 

assemblies are made of aluminum or 

steel, replacing any assembly made of 

aluminum with an assembly made of 

steel, and other specified actions. This 

proposed AD is prompted by an 

accident involving a DC–8 airplane. The 

probable cause of the accident was a 

loss of pitch control resulting from the 

disconnection of the pushrod for the 

right elevator control tab. The pushrod 

dropped down and jammed in front of 

the control tab crank, causing a large 

deflection of the control tab. We are 

proposing this AD to minimize the 

possibility of a control tab offset. A 

control tab offset could cause elevator 

deflection, an elevator airplane-nose-up 

condition, and reduced controllability 

of the airplane. This proposed AD is 

also prompted by a report that the 

elevator on a McDonnell Douglas Model 

DC–8 airplane did not respond to 

command inputs from the flightcrew. 

We are also proposing this AD to 

minimize the possibility of crank 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 214 / Friday, November 5, 2004 / Proposed Rules 64511

assembly failure when the assembly is 

exposed to abnormal load conditions. 

Failure of a crank assembly could result 

in a jammed elevator and consequent 

reduced controllability of the airplane.

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by December 20, 

2004.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to submit comments on this 

proposed AD. 

• DOT Docket Web Site: Go to

http://dms.dot.gov and follow the 

instructions for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Government-Wide Rulemaking Web 

Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov

and follow the instructions for sending 

your comments electronically. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street SW., Nassif Building, 

room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590. 

• By Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this proposed AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach 

Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, 

Long Beach, California 90846, 

Attention: Data and Service 

Management, Dept. C1–L5A (D800–

0024). 

You can examine the contents of this 

AD docket on the Internet at http://

dms.dot.gov, or at the Docket 

Management Facility, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street 

SW., room PL–401, on the plaza level of 

the Nassif Building, Washington, DC. 

This docket number is FAA–2004–

19541; the directorate identifier for this 

docket is 2004–NM–129–AD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Technical Information: Maureen 

Moreland, Aerospace Engineer, 

Airframe Branch, ANM–120L, FAA, Los 

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 

3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, 

California 90712–4137; telephone (562) 

627–5238; fax (562) 627–5210. 

Plain Language Information: Marcia 

Walters, marcia.walters@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Docket Management System (DMS) 

The FAA has implemented new 

procedures for maintaining AD dockets 

electronically. As of May 17, 2004, new 

AD actions are posted on DMS and 

assigned a docket number. We track 

each action and assign a corresponding 

directorate identifier. The DMS AD 

docket number is in the form ‘‘Docket 

No. FAA–2004–99999.’’ The Transport 

Airplane Directorate identifier is in the 

form ‘‘Directorate Identifier 2004–NM–

999–AD.’’ Each DMS AD docket also 

lists the directorate identifier (‘‘Old 

Docket Number’’) as a cross-reference 

for searching purposes. 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to submit any relevant 

written data, views, or arguments 

regarding this proposed AD. Send your 

comments to an address listed under 

ADDRESSES. Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–

2004–19541; Directorate Identifier 

2004–NM–129–AD’’ in the subject line 

of your comments. We specifically 

invite comments on the overall 

regulatory, economic, environmental, 

and energy aspects of the proposed AD. 

We will consider all comments 

submitted by the closing date and may 

amend the proposed AD in light of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http://

dms.dot.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. We will also 

post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact with FAA 

personnel concerning this proposed AD. 

Using the search function of that Web 

site, anyone can find and read the 

comments in any of our dockets, 

including the name of the individual 

who sent the comment (or signed the 

comment on behalf of an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You can 

review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

Statement in the Federal Register

published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 

19477–78), or you can visit http://

dms.dot.gov.

We are reviewing the writing style we 

currently use in regulatory documents. 

We are interested in your comments on 

whether the style of this document is 

clear, and your suggestions to improve 

the clarity of our communications that 

affect you. You can get more 

information about plain language at 

http://www.faa.gov/language and http://

www.plainlanguage.gov.

Examining the Docket 

You can examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov, or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The Docket 

Management Facility office (telephone 

(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza 

level of the Nassif Building at the DOT 

street address stated in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after the DMS 

receives them. 

Discussion 

On February 16, 2000, a McDonnell 

Douglas Model DC–8–71F was involved 

in an accident shortly after takeoff, 

while attempting to return to 

Sacramento Mather Airport, Rancho 

Cordova, California, for an emergency 

landing. The National Transportation 

Safety Board determined that the 

probable cause of the accident was a 

loss of pitch control resulting from the 

disconnection of the right elevator 

control tab. The disconnection was 

caused by the failure to properly secure 

and inspect the attachment bolt. The 

disconnected control tab pushrod 

dropped down and jammed in front of 

the control tab crank, resulting in a large 

deflection of the control tab. A control 

tab offset could cause elevator 

deflection, an elevator airplane-nose-up 

condition, and reduced controllability 

of the airplane. 

We have also received a report that 

the elevator on a McDonnell Douglas 

Model DC–8 airplane did not respond to 

command inputs from the flightcrew. 

The flightcrew had to perform a rejected 

take-off. Investigation revealed that, 

prior to departure, the left elevator was 

shifted to an abnormal position by 

engine blast from another airplane. A 

preliminary inspection of the affected 

airplane revealed a broken geared-tab 

mechanism on the inboard aluminum 

crank assembly. The inspection also 

revealed a broken drive mechanism on 

the outboard aluminum crank assembly. 

Broken crank assemblies, if not 

corrected, could result in a jammed 

elevator and consequent reduced 

controllability of the airplane. 

Relevant Service Information 

We have reviewed Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin DC8–27A281, dated 

June 2, 2004. The service bulletin 

describes procedures for visually 

inspecting the pushrod assemblies for 

the left and right elevator control tabs to 

determine whether the pushrod 

assemblies are made of aluminum or 

steel, or using a magnet to make this 

determination. The service bulletin also 

describes procedures for replacing any 

assembly made of aluminum with an 

assembly made of steel or modifying 

existing steel assemblies, and other 

specified actions. Depending on the 

inspection results, the airplanes are 

divided into two groups, Condition 1 

and Condition 2. Condition 1 airplanes 

have aluminum pushrod assemblies 

installed, and Condition 2 airplanes 

have steel pushrod assemblies installed. 

Depending on whether the airplane is 

Condition 1 or Condition 2, the other 

specified actions include:

64512 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 214 / Friday, November 5, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

• Installing new steel pushrod 

assemblies, or modifying existing steel 

pushrod assemblies by installing new 

aft end assemblies, as applicable. 

• Identifying modified pushrod 

assemblies. 

• Performing balance checks on the 

elevators. 

• Calculating the weight and balance 

of the airplane with the new steel 

assemblies installed to determine if the 

values for the elevator nose heavy over 

balance limits are within the specified 

limits. 

• Performing an elevator and tab 

inspection/check on the left and right 

sides of the airplane. 

We have also reviewed Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin DC8–27A280, dated 

June 2, 2004. The service bulletin 

describes procedures for a general visual 

inspection of the inboard and outboard 

geared tab crank assemblies on the left 

and right elevators to determine 

whether the crank assemblies are made 

of aluminum or steel, or using a magnet 

to make that determination. The service 

bulletin also describes procedures for 

replacing any assembly made of 

aluminum with an assembly made of 

steel, and other specified actions. The 

other specified actions include 

removing aluminum crank assemblies 

and installing steel crank assemblies. 

Depending on the inspection results, the 

airplanes are divided into three groups, 

Condition 1 airplanes, Condition 2 

airplanes, and Condition 3 airplanes. 

Condition 1 airplanes have steel crank 

assemblies installed. Condition 2 

airplanes have aluminum crank 

assemblies installed and replacement of 

the assemblies with steel crank 

assemblies will exceed the ‘‘nose heavy 

over balance’’ limits. Condition 3 

airplanes have aluminum crank 

assemblies installed and replacement of 

the assemblies with steel crank 

assemblies will not exceed the nose 

heavy over balance limits. Depending 

on whether the airplane is Condition 1, 

Condition 2, or Condition 3, the other 

specified actions include: 

• Calculating the weight and balance 

of the airplane to determine if the values 

are within the specified limits. 

• Performing a balance check of the 

affected elevator. 

• Performing an elevator and tab 

inspection/check on the left and right 

sides of the airplane. 

Accomplishing the actions specified 

in the service information is intended to 

adequately address the unsafe 

condition. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of the Proposed AD 

We have evaluated all pertinent 

information and identified an unsafe 

condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on other airplanes of this same 

type design. Therefore, we are 

proposing this AD, which would require 

an inspection to determine if the 

pushrod assemblies for the left and right 

elevator control tabs are made of 

aluminum or steel, replacing any 

assembly made of aluminum with an 

assembly made of steel, and other 

specified actions. This proposed AD 

would also require an inspection to 

determine if the crank assemblies for the 

inboard and outboard elevator geared 

tabs are made of aluminum or steel, 

replacing any assembly made of 

aluminum with an assembly made of 

steel, and other specified actions. The 

proposed AD would require you to use 

the service information described 

previously to perform these actions. 

Clarification of Applicability 

The Summary section of the service 

bulletins states the effectivity as all DC–

8 airplanes. However, the detailed 

effectivity in paragraph 1.A.1 of the 

service bulletins does not include DC–

8–11, –12, –21, –31, and –32 airplanes. 

Those models are listed on the type 

certificate data sheet for the DC–8. We 

have determined that the effectivity of 

the service bulletins did not list those 

model numbers because those airplanes 

are permanently removed from service. 

The applicability of this proposed AD 

will be all DC–8 airplanes. 

Clarification of Inspection Terminology 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC8–

27A280 specifies to do a general visual 

inspection to determine the part number 

of the inboard and outboard geared tab 

crank assemblies. Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin DC8–27A281 specifies to do a 

visual inspection to determine the part 

number of the pushrod assemblies. Each 

service bulletin includes a table that 

lists the applicable part numbers and 

whether the part is made of aluminum 

or steel. Both service bulletins also note 

that if a part number is difficult to read, 

a magnet may be used to determine if 

the part is made of aluminum or steel. 

This proposed AD would require an 

inspection of the crank and pushrod 

assemblies to determine if a part is 

made of aluminum or steel, but would 

not require a general visual inspection 

or a visual inspection. 

Costs of Compliance 

There are about 227 airplanes of the 

affected design in the worldwide fleet. 

The following table provides the 

estimated costs for U.S. operators to 

comply with this proposed AD.

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Work hours Average labor 

rate per hour Parts Cost perairplane 

Number of 

U.S.-registered 

airplanes 

Fleet cost 

Inspection, crank assemblies .................. 1 $65 None .............. $65 170 $11,050

Inspection, pushrod assemblies .............. 1 65 None .............. 65 170 11,050

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this 

proposed AD would not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This proposed AD would not 

have a substantial direct effect on the 

States, on the relationship between the 

national Government and the States, or 

on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that the proposed regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this proposed AD. See the ADDRESSES

section for a location to examine the 

regulatory evaluation.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator,

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 214 / Friday, November 5, 2004 / Proposed Rules 64513

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD):

McDonnell Douglas: Docket No. FAA–2004–

19541; Directorate Identifier 2004–NM–

129–AD. 

Comments Due Date 

(a) The Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) must receive comments on this AD 

action by December 20, 2004. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability: (c) This AD applies to all 

McDonnell Douglas Model DC–8 airplanes, 

certificated in any category. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD was prompted by an accident 

involving a DC–8 airplane. The probable 

cause of the accident was a loss of pitch 

control resulting from the disconnection of 

the pushrod for the right elevator control tab. 

The pushrod dropped down and jammed in 

front of the control tab crank, causing a large 

deflection of the control tab. We are issuing 

this AD to minimize the possibility of a 

control tab offset. A control tab offset could 

cause elevator deflection, an elevator 

airplane-nose-up condition, and reduced 

controllability of the airplane. This AD was 

also prompted by a report that the elevator 

on a McDonnell Douglas Model DC–8 

airplane did not respond to command inputs 

from the flightcrew. We are also issuing this 

AD to minimize the possibility of a crank 

assembly failure when the assembly is 

exposed to abnormal load conditions. Failure 

of a crank assembly could result in a jammed 

elevator and consequent reduced 

controllability of the airplane. 

Compliance: (e) You are responsible for 

having the actions required by this AD 

performed within the compliance times 

specified, unless the actions have already 

been done. 

Inspection of Pushrod Assemblies and Other 

Specified Actions 

(f) Within 24 months after the effective 

date of this AD: Do an inspection of the 

pushrod assemblies located in the left and 

right elevator control tabs to determine 

whether the assemblies are made of 

aluminum or steel. Replace any pushrod 

assembly made of aluminum with a new, 

improved pushrod assembly made of steel, or 

modify any existing steel pushrod assembly 

by replacing the aft end assembly with a new, 

improved aft end assembly, as applicable. Do 

the inspection, replacement or modification, 

and all other applicable specified actions by 

accomplishing all of the actions in the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin DC8–27A281, dated June 2, 

2004. The replacement or modification and 

other applicable specified actions must be 

done before further flight. 

Inspection of Geared Tab Crank Assemblies 

and Other Specified Actions 

(g) Within 24 months after the effective 

date of this AD: Do an inspection of the 

inboard and outboard geared tab crank 

assemblies, located in the left and right 

elevators, to determine whether the 

assemblies are made of aluminum or steel. 

Replace any crank assembly made of 

aluminum with a new, improved crank 

assembly made of steel. Do the inspection, 

replacement, and other applicable specified 

actions by accomplishing all of the actions in 

the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Alert Service Bulletin DC8–27A280, dated 

June 2, 2004. The replacement and other 

applicable specified actions must be done 

before further flight. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(h) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft 

Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in 

accordance with the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 

26, 2004. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 04–24729 Filed 11–4–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2004–19540; Directorate 

Identifier 2004–NM–110–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing 

Model 757 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a 

new airworthiness directive (AD) for 

certain Boeing Model 757 airplanes. 

This proposed AD would require 

inspections of certain wire bundles in 

the left and right engine-to-wing aft 

fairings for discrepancies, and other 

specified and corrective actions. This 

proposed AD is prompted by a report 

indicating that a circuit breaker for the 

fuel shutoff valve tripped due to a wire 

that chafed against the structure in the 

flammable leakage zone of the aft 

fairing, causing a short circuit. We are 

proposing this AD to prevent chafing 

between the wire bundle and the 

structure of the aft fairing, which could 

result in electrical arcing and 

subsequent ignition of flammable vapors 

and possible uncontrollable fire.

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by December 20, 

2004.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to submit comments on this 

proposed AD. 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to 

http://dms.dot.gov and follow the 

instructions for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Government-wide rulemaking Web 

site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov

and follow the instructions for sending 

your comments electronically. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street SW., Nassif Building, 

room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590. 

• By fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this proposed AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. 

You can examine the contents of this 

AD docket on the Internet at http://

dms.dot.gov, or at the Docket 

Management Facility, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street 

SW., room PL–401, on the plaza level of 

the Nassif Building, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Technical information: Thomas 

Thorson, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98055–4056; telephone 

(425) 917–6508; fax (425) 917–6590. 

Plain language information: Marcia 

Walters, marcia.walters@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Docket Management System (DMS) 

The FAA has implemented new 

procedures for maintaining AD dockets 

electronically. As of May 17, 2004, new 

AD actions are posted on DMS and 

assigned a docket number. We track 

each action and assign a corresponding 

directorate identifier. The DMS AD 

docket number is in the form ‘‘Docket 

No. FAA–2004–99999.’’ The Transport 

Airplane Directorate identifier is in the 

form ‘‘Directorate Identifier 2004–NM–

999–AD.’’ Each DMS AD docket also 

lists the directorate identifier (‘‘Old