MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jonathan M. Young

Law Office of Jonathan M. Young, P.C.

Newburgh, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

B. Michael Macer

Benjamin R. Aylsworth

Biesecker Dutkanych & Macer, 

LLC

Evansville, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Paternity of

Ember Mazzotti-Dill

Sherry Mazzotti,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Heath Dill,

Appellee-Respondent

February 24, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

87A01-1506-JP-725

Appeal from the Warrick Superior

Court

The Honorable J. Zach Winsett,

Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

87D02-1310-JP-224

Crone, Judge.

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Case Summary

[1] Sherry Mazzotti (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order establishing Heath 

Dill’s (“Father”) paternity of Ember Mazzotti-Dill (“Child”) and postsecondary education expenses for her. Mother argues that the trial court erred 

by declining to require Father to pay child support retroactive to the date of 

Child’s birth. Mother also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

apportioning the parents’ obligation toward Child’s remaining college expenses

and ordering her to pay $6000 per year when she allegedly lacks income and 

ability to earn wages sufficient to pay that amount.

[2] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to 

order Father to pay retroactive child support. We also conclude that the trial 

court’s finding regarding Mother’s ability to pay is not clearly erroneous and 

supports its decision. Therefore, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The facts most favorable to the judgment show that on December 26, 1995, 

Child was born. Father acknowledged paternity and signed the paternity 

affidavit. 

[4] At the time of Child’s birth, Mother and Father were living with Child’s 

grandmother. In April 1996, Father moved out. However, he and Mother had 

an “off and on relationship,” and Father sporadically lived at grandmother’s 

home until November 1999, when he and Mother ended their relationship. Tr. 

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at 66. Between 1995 and November 1999, Father’s visitation with Child was 

sporadic. During this period, Father worked at Barnes and Noble Cafe and at 

St. Mary’s Health. He also attended one full-time semester at University of 

Southern Indiana (“USI”). Father’s earnings ranged from approximately $6760

in 1996 to $17,930 in 1999. Father obtained health insurance for Child 

whenever it was available through his employer. Between 1998 and 2000, 

Mother worked as a part-time waitress.

[5] In 2000, Father got married. He began to have regular weekend visitation with 

Child. In June or July of that year, he voluntarily began to pay Mother child 

support in the amount of $120 every four weeks. In 2001 and 2002, Father 

worked at St. Elizabeth Ann Seton Hospital. In 2002, Father began working for 

the Town of Newburgh. Between 2000 and 2005, Father made about $20,000 a 

year. In 2006, Father made about $24,000 a year.

[6] Mother and Child continued to reside with grandmother during Child’s 

elementary school years. Grandmother was very active in Child’s life. 

Grandmother usually took Child to school and prepared her meals. When 

Child needed or wanted something, she turned to her grandmother more often

than Mother, although “sometimes” she turned to Mother. Id. at 192. Child 

lived with grandmother through fifth grade.

[7] In 2006, Mother moved out of grandmother’s home and began living with 

Stephen Wargel. A couple months later, Child moved in with Mother and 

Wargel. However, Child “never actually lived [with Mother and Wargel] 

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completely.” Id. at 192-93. Child still spent most of her time at grandmother’s 

and “just slept at [Mother’s] house.” Id. at 193. From 2007 to 2009, Mother 

worked parttime at her father’s dental lab. Mother gave birth to another child

in 2009. Since 2009, she has been a stay-at-home mom, and she has continued 

to reside with Wargel.

[8] In 2007, Father earned approximately $31,000. In 2008, he was promoted and 

made about $41,000. Father then voluntarily increased the amount of child 

support to $150 every four weeks. “There were a handful of times over the 

years” when Father asked Mother if there was any extra help he could give her. 

Id. at 71. Mother always replied that the amount of child support that he 

provided was fine. At no time did Mother tell Father that the child support he 

was providing was not enough or that she needed more child support. Id. at 72. 

[9] In 2009, Father made about $48,990. In 2010, he made $52,630. During this 

time, Father continued to provide child support of $150 every four weeks. He 

never increased child support. In 2010, Father divorced. By that time, he had 

two additional children. In 2011, Father made $42,190. In 2012, he made 

$44,040. At some point, Father remarried.

[10] In February 2013, when Child was a high school junior, she went to live with 

Father and his wife, Margaret Dill. In March 2013, Father stopped paying 

child support. In 2013, Father made about $41,170. At the beginning of the 

summer, Child went to live with her grandmother. In November 2013, Mother 

filed a paternity action against Father and a petition to establish post-secondary 

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education expenses. In December 2013, after Child turned 18, she went to live 

with Father, and she remained with him until the end of the summer in 2014.

In January 2014, Father filed a petition for child support and education support. 

[11] Child applied and was admitted to Butler University and USI. Child wishes to 

become a teacher. Child decided to attend Butler. The cost to attend Butler is 

about $48,587 per year, but after Child’s scholarships, grants, and other 

financial aid is applied, the remaining out-of-pocket cost is $24,387. The cost to 

attend USI is about $18,000 per year. Mother did not want Child to attend 

Butler because Mother did not believe that an expensive private school justifies 

a teacher’s salary and she does not have the ability to pay for Child to attend a 

private school. Father offered to pay $7000 a year toward Child’s college 

expenses. Child began her first year at Butler in the fall of 2014. Father took 

out a Direct Parent Plus Loan in the amount of $26,574. Mother did not 

contribute.

[12] In June 2015, following a hearing on both parties’ petitions, the trial court 

entered its order establishing paternity and for post-secondary education 

expenses (“Order”). Appellant’s App. at 9-10. In its Order, the trial court 

established Father’s paternity and found that neither party owed the other a 

child support arrearage. As for post-secondary education expenses, the trial 

court found that Child has the aptitude and ability to succeed in post-secondary 

education. The trial court determined that Mother and Father should 

contribute no more than $6000 per year toward Child’s college expenses. The 

trial court “based its order regarding parental contribution amounts on the 

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[USI] cost of $18,000, with each the Mother, Father, and [Child] being 

responsible for 1/3 of the cost of attendance, beginning with the 2015-2016 

school year.” Id. at 10. In addition, the trial court ordered Father to maintain 

Child on his health insurance plan. 

[13] The trial court attached two additional pages to its Order. The first attachment 

is an explanation, which begins as follows: “The court is not issuing Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law but will explain some of the reasons for the 

court’s ruling in this matter.” Id. at 12. The second attachment is a PostSecondary Education Worksheet (“PSEW”) completed by the trial court. The 

explanation states that Father’s share of the parents’ total weekly adjusted 

income is 72% and Mother’s is 28%. It further states that the trial court used 

the cost of attending USI in setting Mother’s and Father’s contribution at no 

more than $6000 per year for Child’s remaining years. The explanation shows 

that based on what each parent contributed toward Child’s first year and on 

each parent’s $6000 annual contribution, Father’s total contribution to Child’s 

college expenses will be $47,574 and Mother’s will be $21,000.1

 The 

explanation concludes that the total parental post-secondary responsibility is 

$68,574 with Father contributing 69% and Mother contributing 31%. The 

explanation provides that the “court considers that the Mother is voluntarily 

unemployed and has been so for the vast majority of her adult life.” Id. The 

1

 The amounts are different because Father contributed $26,574 to Child’s first year of college while Mother 

contributed nothing. Also, these amounts are based on four and a half semesters of college.

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explanation also states that “Mother is able to pay, or cause to be paid, the 

amount ordered by the court” because she presented an extensive list of all the 

things she had provided for Child in one of Father’s interrogatories. Id. 

[14] The PSEW differs from the trial court’s explanation in certain respects. The 

PSEW shows that Father’s share of total weekly adjusted income is 72.28% and 

Mother’s is 27.72%. Total education costs are based on the cost to attend 

Butler, not USI. The PSEW provides that Child’s total yearly education cost is 

$48,587, and the parents’ total obligation of that is $24,387. Father’s share of 

$24,387 is 72.28%, or $17,626.92, and Mother’s share is 27%, or $6760.08. 

Mother appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

finding that Father did not owe child support retroactive to 

Child’s birth.

[15] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to require 

Father to pay child support retroactive to the date of Child’s birth. When 

dealing with family law matters, appellate review is conducted with “‘a 

preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges.’” Kicken v. 

Kicken, 798 N.E.2d 529, 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting In re Marriage of 

Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 178 (Ind. 1993)). 

A trial court’s decision regarding child support will be upheld 

unless the trial court has abused its discretion. A trial court 

abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic 

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and the effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if 

the court has misinterpreted the law. 

Sexton v. Sedlak, 946 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. 

[16] In a paternity action, the initial child support order must include the period 

dating from the filing of the paternity action and may, at the trial court’s 

discretion, include the period dating from the birth of the child. Ind. Code § 31-

14-11-5. The trial court may order either parent to pay any amount reasonable 

for support of a child, after considering all relevant factors, including

(1) the financial resources of the custodial parent;

(2) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed if:

(A) the marriage had not been dissolved;

(B) the separation had not been ordered; or

(C) in the case of a paternity action, the parents had been 

married and remained married to each other;

(3) the physical or mental condition of the child and the child’s 

educational needs. 

Ind. Code §§ 31-14-11-2.3; 31-16-6-1(a).

[17] Mother likens this case to In re McGuire-Byers, 892 N.E.2d 187 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008), trans. denied, in which this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by ordering the father to pay child support retroactive to the child’s 

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birth. Id. at 192. There, the child was born in 1987 and filed a petition for 

paternity in 2006. The trial court found that the father was aware of the child’s 

birth and “then purposefully disappeared and made himself impossible for 

mother to locate,” and the mother bore “the entire burden” of supporting the 

child. Id. at 191. The trial court issued a child support order that was

retroactive to the date of the child’s birth, and the father’s arrearage amounted 

to $118,560. On appeal, the father claimed that the trial court failed to consider 

his financial resources and the hardship that the arrearage would place on his

four other young children. The McGuire-Byers court was unpersuaded by the 

father’s arguments and concluded, “Given that [the father] was aware that he 

was [the child’s] father from the time of his birth and knowingly avoided his 

responsibility to support him, it was within the trial court’s discretion to order 

retroactive child support.” Id. at 192.

[18] McGuire-Byers is distinguishable in two important respects. There, the father 

purposefully avoided taking any responsibility for financially supporting the 

child, and the trial court in its discretion ordered child support retroactive to the

child’s date of birth. Here, in contrast, Father voluntarily paid child support 

from 2000 to March 2013, and the trial court in its discretion decided that 

retroactive child support to the date of Child’s birth was not appropriate under 

the circumstances. Secondly, McGuire-Byers’ holding that it wasn’t an abuse of 

discretion to order retroactive support payments does not mean that it is an 

abuse of discretion to deny it.

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[19] Nevertheless, Mother contends that Father paid only $17,740 in child support

over the years, and she alleges that he would have been required to pay $72,280

under the Indiana Child Support Guidelines. She argues that Father’s 

contributions were wholly inadequate, that he merely paid what he felt that his 

budget would allow, and that he must have known that he should have been 

paying more. She also asserts that she “deserves recognition for devoting her 

time and her life to her daughter.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3.

[20] The trial court heard evidence regarding each parent’s earnings over the course 

of Child’s life, how much child support Father paid, that Mother and Child 

lived with grandmother through Child’s fifth-grade year, and that grandmother 

provided significant assistance in raising Child. In addition, Father testified 

that he sometimes asked Mother whether she needed more child support and 

she replied that the amount that he was providing was fine. Accordingly, we 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to order Father 

to pay retroactive child support.

Section 2 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion by

ordering Mother to contribute $6000 per year toward Child’s 

remaining college expenses.

[21] “An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision to order the payment of 

post-secondary educational expenses for an abuse of discretion.” Hirsch v. 

Oliver, 970 N.E.2d 651, 662 (Ind. 2012) (citing Carr v. Carr, 600 N.E.2d 943, 945 

(Ind. 1992)). The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is “against 

the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances” before it. Id. In determining 

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whether the trial court abused its discretion, we do not reweigh the evidence or 

judge the credibility of witnesses, and we consider only the evidence and 

reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment. Lovold v. Ellis, 988 N.E.2d 

1144, 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[22] Although the trial court stated that it did not issue findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, it provided limited findings in its explanation attached to its 

Order. ‘“When the trial court enters such findings sua sponte, the specific 

findings control only as to the issues they cover, while a general judgment 

standard applies to any issue upon which the court has not found.’” Scoleri v. 

Scoleri, 766 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Nelson v. 

Marchand, 691 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)). “For findings of fact 

to be clearly erroneous, the record must lack probative evidence or reasonable 

inferences from the evidence to support them.” Id.

Under Indiana law, there is no absolute legal duty on the part of 

parents to provide a college education for their children. 

However, the statutory authorization for the divorce court to 

order either or both parents to pay sums toward their child’s 

college education constitutes a reasonable manner in which to 

enforce the expectation that most families would encourage their 

qualified children to pursue a college education consistent with 

individual family values. In determining whether to order either 

or both parents to pay sums toward their child’s college 

education, the court must consider whether and to what extent 

the parents, if still married, would have contributed to the child’s 

college expenses.

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Hinesley-Petry v. Petry, 894 N.E.2d 277, 280-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting 

McKay v. McKay, 644 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)), trans. denied

(2009).

[23] “[C]ollege expenses are in the nature of child support.” Panfil v. Fell, 19 N.E.3d 

772, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (2015). “[A]lthough a trial court has 

broad discretion to tailor a child support award in light of the circumstances 

before it, ‘this discretion must be exercised within the methodological 

framework established by the guidelines.’” Quinn v. Threlkel, 858 N.E.2d 665,

670 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting McGinley-Ellis v. Ellis, 638 N.E.2d 1249, 1251-

52 (Ind. 1994)). “This principle applies with equal force to orders regarding 

post-secondary education expenses.” Id. Indiana Child Support Guideline 8(b) 

provides that “the court should consider post-secondary education to be a group 

effort, and weigh the ability of each parent to contribute to payment of the 

expense, as well as the ability of the student to pay a portion of the expense.” 

Absent an evidentiary justification in the record and a finding by the trial court 

that a proportional obligation would be unfair, the Child Support Guidelines 

require that apportionment of educational expenses between the parents be 

roughly proportional to their share of income. Carr, 600 N.E.2d at 946. 

[24] Indiana Code Section 31-16-6-2(a) provides that a child support order or an 

educational support order may include

(1) amounts for the child’s education in elementary and 

secondary schools and at postsecondary educational institutions, 

taking into account:

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(A) the child’s aptitude and ability;

(B) the child’s reasonable ability to contribute to 

educational expenses through:

 (i) work;

 (ii) obtaining loans; and

(iii) obtaining other sources of financial aid 

reasonably available to the child and each parent; 

and

(C) the ability of each parent to meet these expenses.

[25] Here, there is no dispute that Child has the aptitude and ability to attend 

college. Mother asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating

the parents’ share of total weekly adjusted income and in apportioning their 

college contribution. She also challenges its finding that she has the means to 

pay $6000 per year. 

[26] Regarding total weekly adjusted income, we observe that the PSEW shows that 

Father’s share is 72.28% and Mother’s share is 27.72%. Mother contends that 

the trial court did not provide the underlying income figures that it used to 

calculate those percentages and that her Child Support Obligation Worksheet 

indicates that Father’s share is 77% and her share is 23%. Our own estimates 

are not far off the trial court’s numbers. In 2013, Father earned $41,172, or 

$762 per week. Ex. S; Appellant’s Br. at 5. Even though Mother has chosen to 

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be a stay-at-home mother, she acknowledged that she is physically and mentally 

able to be employed and “requested that the trial court figure her income at the 

federal minimum wage.” Appellant’s Br. at 4. The current minimum wage is 

$7.25 per hour, which comes to $290 per week based on a forty-hour work 

week. Based on Father’s weekly income of $762 and Mother’s weekly income 

of $290, Father’s share of the total weekly income is 73.20% and Mother’s is 

26.8%. This is roughly equivalent to the trial court’s figures, and therefore we 

find no abuse of discretion here. See Eppler v. Eppler, 837 N.E.2d 167, 177 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2005) (“While the statutes and our guidelines do not require 

apportionment based on precise parity, they do require rough proportionality.”) 

(quoting Carr, 600 N.E.2d at 946).

[27] Mother next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in apportioning the 

parents’ college contribution. Specifically, she assert she should not be required 

to pay 50% of the parents’ annual obligation of $12,000 for Child’s remaining 

years. Mother ignores that she did not contribute anything for Child’s first year 

while Father contributed $26,574 and that the trial court considered these 

amounts when calculating the parents’ share of their obligation toward Child’s 

total college cost. When these amounts are considered, the total parental 

obligation for all of Child’s years at Butler is $68,574. Father’s share of that is 

69% and Mother’s is 31%. That is roughly equivalent to the parties’ share of 

total weekly income. We find no abuse of discretion here.

[28] As for Mother’s ability to pay $6000 annually for Child’s remaining college 

years, the trial court made some findings in that regard:

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The court considers that the Mother is voluntarily unemployed 

and has been so for the vast majority of her adult life. The 

Mother agreed that she is physically and mentally able to be 

employed if she would so choose. Even though the Mother has 

never earned any regular income, she otherwise testified that she 

always provided financially for [Child], and for her subsequent 

child. In addition, the court notes, in support of its finding that 

Mother is able to pay, or cause to be paid, the amount ordered by 

the court for post-secondary expenses, portions of Mother’s 

answer to Interrogatory No. 16, which was entered into evidence 

as Father’s Exhibit U: ...I paid almost every school fee: book 

fees, lunch fees, field trip fees, sports enrollment fees and 

equipment fees (basketball, dancing and ballet, lacrosse, etc.), 

activity fees, school supplies, backpacks, costumes, uniforms, 

SAT fees, ACT fees, college application fees, gas, school clothes, 

winter coats, yearbook fees, school picture fees, etc. I made sure 

she had access to all the tools needed for her education: 

computers, laptops, printers, scanners, copiers, software, flash

drives, digital cameras, cell phones, an automobile, etc....We 

took her to museums, zoos, nature reserves, aquariums, historic 

sites, 4-H fairs, and other areas for learning.”

Appellant’s App. at 12. We conclude that the trial court’s finding is not clearly 

erroneous. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 

requiring Mother to pay $6000 per year toward Child’s remaining college 

expenses.

[29] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.

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