[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-12872

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cv-00106-LGW-RSB

TERRY N. TAYLOR, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

MELISA COMBS FORSYTH, 

Prison Psychologist, Jesup FCI, 

P. G. RIENHARD,

Judge, 

RICHARD A. POSNER,

Judge, 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, 

Judge, 

ROSEMARY COLLINS, 

Judge, et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees. 

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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

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(October 26, 2017)

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Before HULL, WILSON, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Terry Taylor, proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte dismissal of his 

complaint. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.1

Mr. Taylor, a then-federal prisoner, filed a complaint in the Southern District 

of Georgia against several federal and state judges in Illinois, the Clerk of the 

Court for the Seventh Circuit, Gino J. Agnello, and two psychologists, Melisa 

Forsyth and Terrance Lichtenward, claiming that they violated his constitutional 

rights and certain federal statutes. Although difficult to decipher, it appears that 

Mr. Taylor alleges that Ms. Forsyth, who was a psychologist at the Federal 

Correctional Institution in Jesup, Georgia, committed “identity theft” and “fraud”

by assuming someone else’s identity and convincing him to marry her in Illinois. 

D.E. 1 at 5. He alleges that certain of the defendants conspired to put him in an 

Illinois mental institution as retaliation for attempting to bring Ms. Forsyth’s 

actions to light. He also claims that his constitutional rights were violated through 

actions related to his court proceedings in Illinois state court, the Northern District 

of Illinois, and the Seventh Circuit.

Upon conducting a frivolity review, a magistrate judge recommended that 

the complaint be dismissed as to all of the defendants because the Southern District 

 1 We deny Mr. Taylor’s petition for rehearing but issue this revised opinion, which does not 

address the statute of limitations governing Mr. Taylor’s claims against Ms. Forsyth. 

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of Georgia was not the proper venue for Mr. Taylor’s lawsuit, among other 

rationales. After reviewing Mr. Taylor’s objections to the magistrate judge’s 

report and recommendation, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge in 

part and concluded that venue was improper as to all of the defendants except

Ms. Forsyth because it assumed as true Mr. Taylor’s assertion that Ms. Forsyth 

lived in the Southern District of Georgia. Notwithstanding this assumption, the 

district court dismissed Mr. Taylor’s claims against Ms. Forsyth because he failed 

to state a claim against her. The district court also denied Mr. Taylor in forma 

pauperis status on appeal. 

Mr. Taylor then filed several motions for reconsideration related to the 

district court’s dismissal of his complaint, denial of in forma pauperis status, and 

prior ruling on his request for the appointment of counsel. The district court 

denied Mr. Taylor’s motions.2

I

We review the district court’s dismissal of a lawsuit for improper venue for 

an abuse of discretion, see Algodonera De La Cabezas, S.A. v. Am. Suisse Capital, 

Inc., 432 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005), and a district court’s sua sponte 

dismissal of a prisoner’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim de novo. See Boxer X v. 

 2 Mr. Taylor argues on appeal that he should have counsel appointed on his behalf. We have 

already reviewed and denied his motion for appointment of counsel and corresponding motion 

for reconsideration. See App. D.E. 11, 14. We deny his current request as well. 

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Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). We construe Mr. Taylor’s filings 

liberally because he is proceeding pro se, but keep in mind that we cannot act as de 

facto counsel for Mr. Taylor either. See Campbell v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 760 F.3d 

1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014). 

II

On appeal, Mr. Taylor argues that the district court improperly dismissed his 

complaint. Although he reiterates certain of his allegations against some 

defendants, he fails to address the district court’s bases for dismissing his 

complaint and explain why the district court erred.

As to Ms. Forsyth, Mr. Taylor reiterates that she resides in the Southern 

District of Georgia and argues that a Georgia state court would not be the 

appropriate venue to bring his claims against her. Although unclear, it appears that 

Mr. Taylor argues that Ms. Forsyth’s actions violated his Eighth Amendment right 

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and that he has a claim under the 

“Mental Cruelty Act.” He also asserts that her actions caused him to lose his First 

Amendment right to seek redress from the courts. 

We, however, agree with the district court that Mr. Taylor has failed to state 

a claim against Ms. Forsyth. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Mr. Taylor’s complaint 

is devoid of any allegation connecting Ms. Forsyth’s alleged acts and a 

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corresponding constitutional violation, notwithstanding Mr. Taylor’s efforts to 

explain his claims now. 

As to the other defendants, Mr. Taylor does not address why his claims 

against them should be adjudicated in the Southern District of Georgia. He merely 

reiterates his allegations against some of the defendants and presents broad

statements about venue being proper. Mr. Taylor does not attempt to explain how

any of the bases for proper venue apply, and with the limited information at our 

disposal, we cannot determine how any basis applies either. 

Therefore, we similarly affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims 

against the other defendants. See Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 

(11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n appellant’s simply stating that an issue exists, without 

further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue and 

precludes our considering the issue on appeal.”).3

III

The district court properly dismissed Mr. Taylor’s claims and Mr. Taylor has 

failed to provide a basis for us to conclude otherwise. As a result, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED. 

 3 A district court may dismiss a suit sua sponte for lack of venue if it gave the parties an 

opportunity to present their views on the issue. See Algodonera De Las Cabezas, S.A., 432 F.3d 

at 1345. Mr. Taylor had the opportunity to object to the magistrate’s report and recommendation 

before the district court entered its final order and the district court reviewed the report de novo, 

so there is no due process concern here. See Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 

(11th Cir. 2001).

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