U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

www.cops.usdoj.gov

False Burglar

Alarms

by

Rana Sampson

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Series

No. 5

False Burglar Alarms

Rana Sampson

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 

#99-CK-WX-K004 by the Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions

contained herein are those of the author(s) and do not

necessarily represent the official position of the U.S.

Department of Justice.

www.cops.usdoj.gov

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Series

Guide No. 5

About the Guide Series i

About the Guide Series

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police summarize knowledge

about how police can reduce the harm caused by specific

crime and disorder problems. They are guides to prevention

and to improving the overall response to incidents, not to

investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. The

guides are written for police–of whatever rank or assignment–

who must address the specific problem the guides cover. The

guides will be most useful to officers who

• Understand basic problem-oriented policing principles and

methods. The guides are not primers in problem-oriented

policing. They deal only briefly with the initial decision to

focus on a particular problem, methods to analyze the

problem, and means to assess the results of a problemoriented policing project. They are designed to help police

decide how best to analyze and address a problem they have

already identified. (An assessment guide has been produced

as a companion to this series and the COPS Office has also

published an introductory guide to problem analysis. For

those who want to learn more about the principles and

methods of problem-oriented policing, the assessment and

analysis guides, along with other recommended readings, are

listed at the back of this guide.)

• Can look at a problem in depth. Depending on the

complexity of the problem, you should be prepared to

spend perhaps weeks, or even months, analyzing and

responding to it. Carefully studying a problem before

responding helps you design the right strategy, one that is

most likely to work in your community. You should not

blindly adopt the responses others have used; you must

decide whether they are appropriate to your local situation.

What is true in one place may not be true elsewhere; what

works in one place may not work everywhere.
ii False Burglar Alarms

• Are willing to consider new ways of doing police business.

The guides describe responses that other police

departments have used or that researchers have tested.

While not all of these responses will be appropriate to your

particular problem, they should help give a broader view of

the kinds of things you could do. You may think you

cannot implement some of these responses in your

jurisdiction, but perhaps you can. In many places, when

police have discovered a more effective response, they have

succeeded in having laws and policies changed, improving

the response to the problem.

• Understand the value and the limits of research knowledge.

For some types of problems, a lot of useful research is

available to the police; for other problems, little is available.

Accordingly, some guides in this series summarize existing

research whereas other guides illustrate the need for more

research on that particular problem. Regardless, research

has not provided definitive answers to all the questions you

might have about the problem. The research may help get

you started in designing your own responses, but it cannot

tell you exactly what to do. This will depend greatly on the

particular nature of your local problem. In the interest of

keeping the guides readable, not every piece of relevant

research has been cited, nor has every point been attributed

to its sources. To have done so would have overwhelmed

and distracted the reader. The references listed at the end of

each guide are those drawn on most heavily; they are not a

complete bibliography of research on the subject.

• Are willing to work with other community agencies to find

effective solutions to the problem. The police alone cannot

implement many of the responses discussed in the guides.

They must frequently implement them in partnership with

other responsible private and public entities. An effective

problem-solver must know how to forge genuine
About the Guide Series iii

partnerships with others and be prepared to invest

considerable effort in making these partnerships work.

These guides have drawn on research findings and police

practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,

Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia.

Even though laws, customs and police practices vary from

country to country, it is apparent that the police everywhere

experience common problems. In a world that is becoming

increasingly interconnected, it is important that police be

aware of research and successful practices beyond the borders

of their own countries.

The COPS Office and the authors encourage you to provide

feedback on this guide and to report on your own agency's

experiences dealing with a similar problem. Your agency may

have effectively addressed a problem using responses not

considered in these guides and your experiences and

knowledge could benefit others. This information will be used

to update the guides. If you wish to provide feedback and

share your experiences it should be sent via e-mail to

cops_pubs@usdoj.gov.

Acknowledgments v

Acknowledgments

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series is very much a

collaborative effort. While each guide has a primary author,

other project team members, COPS Office staff and

anonymous peer reviewers contributed to each guide by

proposing text, recommending research and offering

suggestions on matters of format and style.

The principal project team developing the guide series

comprised Herman Goldstein, professor emeritus, University

of Wisconsin Law School; Ronald V. Clarke, professor of

criminal justice, Rutgers University; John E. Eck, associate

professor of criminal justice, University of Cincinnati;

Michael S. Scott, police consultant, Savannah, Ga.; Rana

Sampson, police consultant, San Diego; and Deborah Lamm

Weisel, director of police research, North Carolina State

University.

Karin Schmerler, Rita Varano and Nancy Leach oversaw the

project for the COPS Office. Megan Tate Murphy

coordinated the peer reviews for the COPS Office. Suzanne

Fregly edited the guides. Research for the guides was

conducted at the Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers

University under the direction of Phyllis Schultze by Gisela

Bichler-Robertson, Rob Guerette and Laura Wyckoff.

The project team also wishes to acknowledge the members of

the San Diego, National City and Savannah police

departments who provided feedback on the guides' format

and style in the early stages of the project, as well as the line

police officers, police executives and researchers who peer

reviewed each guide.

Contents

About the Guide Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v

The Problem of False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Related Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Causes of False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 

The Effectiveness of Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Costs of False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Understanding Your Local Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Asking the Right Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Measuring Your Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Best Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Responses With Limited Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Response Not Recommended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Appendix: Summary of Responses to False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Contents vii
viii False Burglar Alarms

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Recommended Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

Other Guides in This Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
The Problem of False Burglar Alarms 1

The Problem of False Burglar Alarms

In the United States in 1998, police responded to

approximately 38 million alarm activations, at an estimated

annual cost of $1.5 billion.1 Most of the activations were

burglar alarms.† This guide examines current police responses

and presents alternative strategies to address the false alarm

dilemma. Purchasers of an alarm system expect a police

response if the alarm is activated, even though they bought

the system from a private alarm company with no link to a

police department. The vast majority of alarm calls–between

94 and 98 percent–are false (higher in some jurisdictions).††

In other words, reliability of alarms, which can be measured

using these false rates, is generally between 2 and 6 percent.

Nationwide, false alarms account for 10 to 25 percent of all

calls to police.2 In the United States alone, "solving the

problem of false alarms would by itself relieve 35,000 officers

from providing an essentially private service."3

The guide begins by reviewing factors that increase the risks

of false burglar alarms. It then identifies a series of questions

that might assist you in analyzing your local problem of false

burglar alarms. Finally, it reviews responses to the problem

and what is known about these from evaluative research and

police practice.

During the 1990s, consolidation within the alarm industry

began changing the way companies delivered services. Larger

companies purchased smaller ones, and a number of alarm

monitoring companies moved, sometimes out of state, to

achieve economies of scale. For example, a company in Texas

might monitor the alarms of tens of thousands of customers

in Utah or other distant states.††† If an alarm goes off, the

† Based on a review of police data

from several cities, burglar alarms

may account for as much as 90

percent of the alarm workload.

†† False alarms may also generate

calls for service from neighbors

concerning noise.

††† The mergers also mean that

alarm systems originally installed and

serviced by one company may now

be serviced by another. Many

politicians fearful of alienating their

local security industry often initially

support police response to all alarms.

However, the monitoring companies

they are supporting may not be local

at all.
2 False Burglar Alarms

monitoring company calls the owner. If no one responds or

the person who answers gives the wrong prearranged code,

the monitoring company calls the police, expecting them to

respond.†

Estimates show between 18 and 21 million security alarm

systems in the United States, and 15 million of these are

monitored. The industry adds roughly 1.5 million new

systems each year.†† Sixty percent of those are in residences,

the rest on commercial and institutional premises.4 Alarm

industry statistics indicate that the average security system

costs more than $1,600, with a $24 monthly monitoring fee.

One out of every seven U.S. businesses and one out of every

nine U.S. residences have alarms.5 The recent trend of wiring

new residential construction with alarm capacity has the

potential for significantly increasing the number of alarm calls

in the coming decade. Consequently, even those police

agencies with recently enacted false alarm policies and

ordinances should revisit their approach; otherwise, they

might find their workload further consumed with false alarm

calls.

Related Problems 

The false burglar alarm problem exhibits some similarities to

the related problems listed below. This guide does not

specifically address the following problems because each

requires its own analysis and response:

• false 911 calls,

• 911 hang-ups,

• false fire alarms,

• false vehicle alarms,

• false robbery alarms, and

• noise complaints about audible alarms.

† A few companies still respond as

part of their contract with customers,

but this is rare.

†† Estimates of the number of new

alarms installed differ (see

Blackstone, Hakim and Spiegel

2000a; Hakim and Blackstone 1997;

Spivey and Cobb 1997).
The Problem of False Burglar Alarms 3

The Causes of False Burglar Alarms

Research suggests that false burglar alarms result from three

main causes:

• faulty or inappropriately selected equipment,

• poor installation, and 

• user error (forgetful or unknowledgeable homeowners or

roaming pets).†

Research tells us that false burglar alarms are not evenly

distributed. Some alarm systems experience no false alarms,

and others, many. One study suggests that 20 percent of

alarm systems trigger 80 percent of false alarms.6 As a result,

officers responding to false alarms are often spending time

away from locations where crime and disorder are occurring.

For the purposes of this guide, it is assumed that the alarm

industry has the responsibility to improve the quality of its

equipment, more accurately install devices and increase user

knowledge of its product, all of which reduce false calls. This

guide focuses on police policy remedies to devise a more

appropriate response and stimulate the alarm industry to

further improve the overall reliability of its products.

The Effectiveness of Burglar Alarms

Urban areas have higher residential burglary rates than

suburban and rural areas. In 1999, the burglary rate for urban

areas was 46.2 per 1,000 households, compared with 27.1 for

† The alarm industry suggests user

error accounts for the largest portion

of false calls, poor installation is on

the decline, and faulty equipment is

less of a problem given recent

technological advances.

Every year, Chicago police respond to more than 300,000 burglar

alarms, 98 percent of them false, which translates to the equivalent of

195 full-time police officers.7
4 False Burglar Alarms

† The Bureau of Justice Assistance

annual crime-victim survey does not

include commercial burglary.

suburban and 32.6 for rural households. Residential burglaries

tend to concentrate in and around low-income areas,

victimizing low-income households.† In 1999, households

with annual incomes of $14,999 or less had two to three

times the rate of burglary as those with incomes above

$50,000, and burglary victimization rates were highest for

households with incomes of less than $7,500.8

The U.S. burglary rate declined substantially from 1982

through the late 1990s. During the same time, the number of

premises with alarms rose, but there is no evidence that there

is a tie between the two. During the 1990s, when alarm

ownership experienced a steep rise, other types of crime

declined just as sharply as burglary. This suggests that reasons

other than an increase in alarms fueled the burglary decline.

Burglary remains one of the most frequent crimes, with a

national clearance rate averaging below 15 percent.9 Clearly, a

central issue regarding police response to alarms is whether

alarms help police catch burglars or prevent burglary. If

alarms are highly reliable, the public benefits from police

catching burglars, taking them out of circulation and reducing

the risk of burglary for everyone in the community. However,

if alarms are unreliable, then automatic police response

becomes a personal service to the alarm owner, providing no

benefits to the public at large. Under these circumstances,

privatizing response or requiring a fee for service may be

more appropriate.

The available research does not provide overwhelming

support for alarms' value in catching burglars. In a Charlotte,

N.C., study, researchers found that police were slightly more

likely to catch burglars in the act on premises without alarms

than on those with alarms.10 As for the benefit to alarm
The Problem of False Burglar Alarms 5

owners, the few studies available are not definitive. They cover

only a few suburban jurisdictions (Hakim and Buck 1991;

Hakim 1995) or involve interviews with only small samples of

burglars (Wright and Decker 1994; Cromwell, Olson and

Avary 1991).†

Hakim and Buck (1991) conducted studies in three suburban

Pennsylvania areas and found that residences with alarms had

a 1.4 percent chance of burglary, while those without had a

2.3 percent chance.†† However, it is important to note that

suburban alarm effectiveness may vary from urban or rural

alarm effectiveness.††† As for businesses, in the same three

areas, Hakim and Buck found that those with alarms had a 4.2

percent chance of burglary, while those without had an 18.2

percent chance. Businesses in those areas appear to benefit

most from alarms, although the overall risk of burglary to

businesses, even those with an alarm, is higher than the risk to

residences without an alarm, suggesting that businesses in

those areas may need more than alarms to reduce their risk of

burglary.

As for security devices, only one study has been conducted to

determine which is most effective at deterring burglary, and

that study was of suburban areas. In reviewing data from

Hakim and Buck's study, Hakim and Blackstone found that

alarms are more effective than other security devices. For

residences, they found that additional security precautions

such as dead bolts, exterior lights, a dog, and a car in the

driveway further decrease burglary risk. There is no

comparable research for urban or rural areas, so it is unclear

† In interviews with small samples

of active residential burglars in

different jurisdictions, Cromwell,

Olson and Avary, and then Wright

and Decker, found that occupancy

and surveillability (whether the

burglars could be seen) were two of

the most important deterrents. While

most of the burglars said they would

avoid residences with alarms, they

also said they would avoid homes

with dogs and those with yard signs

indicating alarms.

†† They conducted an additional

study in Greenwich, Conn., one of

the wealthiest U.S. cities, and found

that "an alarm appears to be most

effective when household income is

above $150,000 and home value is

above $601,000" (Hakim 1995;

Hakim and Blackstone 1997).

††† Further, suburban Pennsylvania

and Connecticut alarm effectiveness

may not be the same as suburban

Florida, Ohio or California alarm

effectiveness.

In Salt Lake City, of the thousands of alarm calls responded to

during 1999, only 23–or three-tenths of 1 percent–turned out to

result from crimes.11
6 False Burglar Alarms

which specific security precautions–window bars, strong locks,

sturdy doors, alarms, alarm signs in the yard, security lights, or

dogs–most deter burglars in those areas. It may be that

security measures that are less expensive than alarms are as

effective in deterring burglars in those areas.†

The Costs of False Burglar Alarms 

Each false alarm requires approximately 20 minutes of police

time, usually for two officers. This costs the public as much as

$1.5 billion per year in police time.

In the vast majority of jurisdictions, the cost of responding to

false alarms is not recouped through fines. Jurisdictions that

try to recoup costs generally omit the lost-opportunity costs,

potentially a significant part of the equation.†† Typical costs

include:

† Britain's Home Office researched

residential burglary vulnerability from

its 1997 national victimization data.

A review of security devices,

including dead bolts, burglar alarms,

security lights, window locks, and

window bars or grilles, suggests they

reduce the risk of burglary, although

they do not completely prevent

victimization. Analysis of the value

of one type of security measure vs.

another was not done. An earlier

Home Office study of a public

housing area experiencing numerous

repeat burglaries showed significant

reductions in burglaries through use

of a series of prevention measures

that did not include alarms

(Forrester, Chatterton and Pease

1988).

†† Lost-opportunity costs might

include time that police could have

spent conducting problem-solving of

documented crime and disorder,

reducing repeat calls at crime hot

spots, and engaging the community

in public safety concerns. These all

compete with time spent on chronic

false alarm response.

Bob Morris

Proper installation of alarm systems is essential to prevent

false alarms.

In 1997, Fort Worth, Texas, police spent $1.5 million responding

to false burglar alarms.12
The Problem of False Burglar Alarms 7

• personnel costs of police call-takers and dispatchers;

• personnel, equipment and training costs of responding

officers, along with those of any backup personnel;

• personnel costs associated with analyzing false alarms;

• software, hardware, office space, and equipment costs for

false alarm management;

• administrative and staff costs of notifications, permitting,

billing, and education programs;

• costs of developing, printing and distributing publications to

educate the public and alarm companies about false alarms;

• lost-opportunity costs, since police are unavailable to work

on actual crime problems; and

• costs associated with call displacement, because other 911

calls take longer to respond to.†

As an inducement to buy an alarm, a number of companies

offer "free monitoring services" for the first few months.

Many insurance companies offer discounts–as much as 20

percent off property insurance–to commercial owners of

monitored alarms, slightly less to residential owners.13 In

addition, many police departments offer several "free" false

alarms before imposing any fine, even though the cost to

respond is significant right from the start. These practices

(free monitoring services by alarm companies and discounts

from insurers) call into question the appropriateness of the

current trend in U.S. policing of offering 3 or 4 "free" false

alarms within a calendar year because the result is an alarm

owner has no incentive upfront to prevent false alarms.

Certain burglary prevention measures have costs only to the

owner. Lights, locks, and bars installed by a property owner (if

within fire code) are cost-free to the rest of the community.

The individual purchaser bears these costs. On the other

† It should be noted that it is

unclear how many non-alarm calls to

police are actually false.
8 False Burglar Alarms

hand, alarm systems are not cost-free to the community

especially if up to 98 percent of alarms are false but still

require time and resources of a police response.

So, while alarm systems may have some benefit for alarm

owners as part of an overall security package, the question

remains whether non-alarm owners in the community should

shoulder a share of the cost.

In addition, another cost of burglar alarms is the noise

endured by neighbors when audible alarms sound, which then

fuels noise complaint calls to the police. Some callers seek to

alert the police that a neighboring alarm has rung. Others

merely desire that the police stop the noise. In many

jurisdictions, legislators have passed time restrictions for

audible alarms, limiting them to 15 or 20 minutes and

prohibiting extra sounding cycles.†

† In New South Wales, Australia, the

Environmental Protection Authority

prohibits the sale of building-intruder

alarms produced after September

1997 that sound for more than five

minutes or that can automatically reset

and sound again, since police and

insurance groups have reported that

most burglaries are over within five

minutes. See

www.epa.nsw.gov.au/download/risnoise.pdf

.

In Los Angeles in 1998, police received 3,000 alarm calls per week, with a

yearly average false alarm rate of approximately 97 percent, representing

the equivalent of 41 officers working 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.14

Bob Morris

User errors account for a high percentage of false burglar

alarms.
Understanding Your Local Problem 9

Understanding Your Local Problem

Asking the Right Questions

The information provided above is only a generalized

description of false alarms. The first step to address your

community's false alarm problem requires an analysis. You

must combine the basic facts with a more specific

understanding of your community's problem. Careful analysis

will help you design a more effective response strategy. This

analysis should, at a minimum, answer the following

questions:

• What percentage of your department's call-for-service

workload involves responding to alarms?

• What percentage of the department's alarm calls are false?

• What percentage of the department's alarm calls are burglar

alarms, and what percentage of those are false?

• What percentage of the department's noise calls relate to

alarms,† and what is the call-taking cost for these?

• What is the department's true cost of responding to alarms

(see "The Costs of False Alarms" above)?

• How many residential and commercial alarm systems are

there in your jurisdiction, and what is the anticipated rate of

growth for alarm installation?

• At what rate do police catch burglars at alarm calls in your

jurisdiction? 

• What are the false alarm rates for businesses, residences and

governmental, public or semipublic premises (such as

schools, city labs, museums, city storage yards, etc.) for your

jurisdiction?††

• Are there any identifiable patterns for commercial alarm

calls, such as at opening and closing times or during the

holidays? (This indicates that alarm companies must educate

specific groups of alarm owners.) 

† Do not include vehicle alarms,

as they are a different alarm

problem requiring separate

analysis.

†† For example, 87 percent of

Seattle's alarm activations are for

the following: commercial, 44

percent; residential, 38 percent;

banks, 2 percent; vehicle alarms,

2 percent; schools, 0.54 percent;

Varda police temporary alarms,

0.33 percent; and mobile

personal alarms, 0.02 percent.
10 False Burglar Alarms

• Are there any identifiable patterns for residential alarm calls,

such as percent of alarm calls that are cancelled by the

owner (or alarm company) within 15 minutes of the initial

activation? This would indicate alarm company

responsibility for educating owners about proper alarm

operation.

• Do some alarm companies have higher false alarm rates

than others?

• What does a review of websites for alarm companies in

your area suggest about the accuracy of their claims when

trying to gain new customers?

• What does a review of alarm company policies and

contracts suggest about alarm companies' obligations to

owners of alarms?

• Has your department identified jurisdictions that have

successfully reduced their total number of false alarms, not

just their rates (see "Responses to the Problem of False

Burglar Alarms" below, for examples)?

• Has the department interviewed alarm company personnel

to determine their perspectives on the false alarm problem

and their openness to new solutions?

• Has the department interviewed groups of property owners

(with and without alarms) to determine their perspectives

on the false alarm problem and their openness to new

solutions?

• Has the department met with police union or police

association leaders to determine their perspectives on the

false alarm problem, and their openness to new solutions?

Measuring Your Effectiveness

Measurement allows you to determine to what degree your

efforts have succeeded, and suggests how you might modify

your responses if they are not producing the intended results.
Understanding Your Local Problem 11

You should take measures of the false alarm problem before

implementing responses, to determine how serious the

problem is, and after implementing them, to determine

whether they have been effective. For more detailed guidance

on measuring effectiveness, see the companion guide to this

series, Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for

Police Problem-Solvers. The following are potentially useful

measures of the effectiveness of responses to false alarms:

• number of alarm calls;

• percentage of the police department's call load devoted to

false alarms;

• percentage of uncommitted time for officers to engage in

problem-solving concerning actual crime and disorder

problems;

• personnel hours devoted to handling false alarm calls;

• costs of handling false alarm calls;

• false alarm rates for various types of premises–commercial,

residential, governmental (such as schools, city labs,

museums, city storage yards, etc.);

• temporal patterns of false alarm calls, such as at opening

and closing times or during the holiday seasons;

• false alarm rates of alarm companies; and

• the rate at which police catch burglars at alarm calls. If false

calls are minimized, burglar apprehension rates should rise.

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms 13

Responses to the Problem of False

Burglar Alarms 

Your analysis of your local problem should give you a better

understanding of the factors contributing to it. Once you

have analyzed your local problem and established a baseline

for measuring effectiveness, you should consider possible

responses to address the problem.

The following response strategies provide a foundation of

ideas for addressing your particular problem. These strategies

are drawn from a variety of research studies and police

reports. Several of these strategies may apply to your

community's problem. It is critical that you tailor responses to

local circumstances, and that you can justify each response

based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy

will involve implementing several different responses. Law

enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in reducing

or solving the problem. Do not limit yourself to considering

what police can do: give careful consideration to who else in

your community shares responsibility for the problem and can

help police better respond to it.

Best Responses

1. Requiring alarm companies to visually verify alarm

legitimacy before calling the police. Under this approach,

alarm companies must visually verify the legitimacy of alarms

(except holdup, duress and panic alarms) at the scene or by

camera before calling the police. This approach, often referred

to as "verified response" or "limited response," can

significantly reduce false alarm calls, allowing police to focus

on true break-ins, actual attempts and holdup, duress and

panic alarms. Under this approach, only holdup, duress and

panic alarms require permits, whereas burglar alarms do not,

reducing the administrative costs associated with a police-
14 False Burglar Alarms

staffed false alarm program. The Salt Lake City Council

adopted a limited-response ordinance in 2000,† and the Las

Vegas Metro Police Department adopted this approach in

1992, changing departmental policy to require alarm company

visual verification before dispatch. Dispatches on burglary

alarms dropped from over 100,000 per year (before 1992) to

less than 10,000 a year (in 2000), a 90 percent reduction,

despite population growth from 678,190 in 1991 to over 1

million in 2000. In addition, Las Vegas burglary rates declined

by 8 percent for the three years following the change in

policy.15 In Salt Lake City, after enactment of the ordinance,

the first few months showed an 88 percent reduction in the

number of alarm calls. Alarm companies charge an extra $5

per month for response to alarms. Several other cities have

adopted verified response, as well. It requires an investment in

educating political leaders, the public and interested parties

(alarm companies, police unions, the media) about the costs

and benefits of a modified response;†† it also requires alarm

companies' availability for initial response to alarms.

2. Charging a fee for service for all false holdup, duress

and panic alarms. A fee for service is charged for that

portion of the alarm call load for which a "verified response"

is impractical. Under this approach, there is no cost-shifting

to police for false holdup, duress or panic alarms, so the

approach discourages false calls. Salt Lake City has adopted a

similar fining approach. However, it is recommended that

each department conduct a separate analysis of holdup,

duress and panic alarms.

3. Responding to holdup, duress and panic alarms only

if they come from a stationary building. This approach is

intended to stem the burgeoning use of mobile personal

alarms and should be used in addition to the strategies

† The ordinance is online at

www.slcgov.com/police

†† The International Association of

Chiefs of Police (IACP), with funding

from the National Burglar & Fire Alarm

Association and the Central Station Alarm

Association, studied the problem of false

alarms and, in 1999, recommended an

approach combining a number of

strategies for reducing them: enforced

ordinances, permitting, escalating fines,

alarm company dispatch cancellations,

notification of alarm companies regarding

customer-abusers, suspension of response

after a certain number of false alarms,

telephone (or other electronic) verification

by alarm companies, notification to alarm

owners every time their alarm activates,

and alarm-user classes (Alarm Industry

Research & Educational Foundation 1999,

www.adialarm.com/msr1999/00.htm.) A

study the three groups conducted showed

decreases in false alarms when this

combined strategy was used. Reductions

ranged from 17 to 62 percent and required

considerable cooperation from alarm

companies. The difference between this

approach and the one listed in the "Best

Practices" section is that the latter requires

alarm company visual verification,

eliminating police response to almost all

false alarms.

The U.K. Association of Chief Police

Officers (ACPO) has adopted a national

policy that incorporates a version of

verified response. Alarms installed after

October 2001 will require technology that

confirm the need for police response. For

those systems already in place, two false

alarms in a rolling 12-month period

prompt a lower-priority police response,

and after five false alarms, the police no

longer respond until upgraded

confirmation technology is installed and

the problem is solved:

www.acpo.police.uk/news/2000/q4/93sec

urity.html
Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms 15

discussed above.† New technology has prompted

entrepreneurs to market mobile alarms: some handheld, some

worn on clothing. If police response is promised as part of

these advances, there is the potential for dramatically

increased false alarms. To reduce this potential, police

agencies can adopt policies providing for police response only

when an alarm originates from a building. Salt Lake City's

ordinance includes a section to address this,†† but again, a

separate analysis of this problem is recommended.†††

Responses With Limited Effectiveness 

4. Establishing a fee for service for all false alarm calls.

A fee for service would cover all costs associated with

responding to false alarms. These include lost-opportunity

costs for officers responding to false alarms rather than

proactively working on reducing crime and disorder

problems.†††† A fee for service differs from a fine in that it is

not punitive; it is meant only to recover costs. It is unclear

whether a fee for service reduces false alarms, though it does

reimburse the city for providing a police response to a call

that is almost always false. Any policy would need to

incorporate follow-up action against nonpayers.

5. Establishing an ordinance with escalating fines for

false alarms. Many police agencies rely on a local alarm

ordinance to guide policy and establish false alarm fines.

Some ordinances provide for fixed fines, others include

escalating fines against repeat abusers, and a few apply a costrecovery system. Typically, fines are allocated to the general

fund and not to the police budget. Invariably, alarm owners

are not fined until they have several false alarms (usually three

or four). A fine system often includes a requirement for an

alarm permit. Alarm permits help police departments to track

and fine alarm abusers and to notify the most chronic abusers

† Those panic devices police provide to

victims of ongoing crimes, such as

domestic violence and stalking, may be

exempted.

†† The IACP noted in their report,

"Response to Mobile Security Alarm

Devices": "[M]obile security devices

(MSDs) are rapidly being adopted by

manufacturers of high-end automobiles. It

is only a matter of time before the feature

is offered broadly through all levels of

new car sales. The U.S. Postal Service is

contemplating the installation of such

mobile distress alarms in 85,000 of its

vehicles." 

††† Also, an Internet search by the

author revealed other examples of mobile

security companies that offer police

response as part of their product lines. In

January 2001, there were 42 Internet

stories on the "Techno-Bra." Sensors in

the bra send out a panic alarm to police

via global positioning satellite technology

when there is a sudden change in pulse

rate. The "Techno-Bra" is expected in

stores in the coming year and will cost

under $70. The U.K. ACPO adopted, as

part of its national policy, the requirement

that portable personal alarms contain

technology to pinpoint the exact location

of the person attacked

(www.acpo.police.uk/news/2000/q4/93sec

urity.html).

†††† Calculating lost-opportunity costs

might be less difficult for departments

engaged in problem-oriented policing. Line

officers in these departments proactively

address specific crime and disorder

problems, such as open-garage burglaries

in a four-block area or repeat burglary

victimization in one neighborhood. It is

the proactive time spent on specific crime

and disorder problems that is lost (or

lessened) when false alarm calls go

unchecked.
16 False Burglar Alarms

of no further police response. This approach has had some

impact in reducing false alarms, but it is administratively costly

and requires the dispatch of officers (except in the most

chronic cases). Some residents resent police fines for services,

as they mistakenly believe their taxes cover them. As a result,

some jurisdictions have found it difficult to collect fines;

collection rates can be as low as 60 percent without significant

follow-up.

6. Accepting dispatch cancellations. Some police agencies

will cancel a dispatch if an alarm company calls to cancel. The

alarm company cancellation is usually based on telephone, not

visual, verification. This approach can decrease the number of

calls officers must respond to, but does nothing to decrease

the number of incoming calls to dispatchers. In fact, it

increases them because cancellation calls must be fielded and

dispatched.

7. Alerting alarm companies about false alarm abusers.

Some police agencies contact alarm companies with the

names of customers who are false alarm abusers. This

practice can reduce false alarms if alarm companies work with

alarm owners to remedy the abuse. This approach depends on

the alarm company's willingness to follow up with its

customers, and its capacity to bring abusers into line. It works

best if both the alarm companies and the abusers are charged

for costs. Alerting alarm companies requires police

administrative staffing and police response to all alarm calls,

and it may necessitate additional police resources as the

number of alarm systems in buildings and elsewhere rises.
Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms 17

8. Publishing alarm companies' false alarm rates on

websites or elsewhere. Police can calculate and publish the

false alarm rates of individual alarm companies to help

potential buyers make informed decisions. This could prompt

companies with higher false alarm rates to improve their

practices.

9. Holding false alarm classes. Some police agencies hold

false alarm classes for abusers, usually with some success. This

approach requires police administrative staffing. However,

representatives from alarm companies, the group most

knowledgeable about reducing false alarm calls, often do not

attend.

10. Lowering the call priority of alarms. Avoiding the

political issues involved in disagreeing with the alarm industry

or in battling with city or county legislators, some police

agencies have simply lowered the call priority for alarms

(other than holdup, duress and panic alarms). This does not

reduce the number of false alarms, but it does reduce the

number of alarm calls competing for high-priority dispatch.

Response Not Recommended

11. Responding "priority one" to alarm calls. A number

of police agencies still respond to alarm calls with their

highest priority, often referred to as "priority one." The

research does not support this level of response due to the

high rate of false alarms. In addition, this approach does

nothing to address the underlying causes of false alarms.

Appendix 19

Appendix: Summary of Responses to

False Burglar Alarms

The table below summarizes the responses to false burglar

alarms, the mechanism by which they are intended to work,

the conditions under which they ought to work best, and

some factors you should consider before implementing a

particular response. It is critical that you tailor responses to

local circumstances, and that you can justify each response

based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy

will involve implementing several different responses. Law

enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in reducing

or solving the problem.

1.

2.

13

14

Requiring alarm 

companies to

visually 

verify alarm

legitimacy before

calling the police

Charging a fee for

service for all

false holdup,

duress and panic

alarms

The alarm

company responds

to the scene of an

alarm and calls the

police only if a

crime or 

attempted crime

has occurred. If

the alarm

company is in

visual contact with

the alarm site,

such as through

CCTV, and can

verify a crime or

an attempt, police

will respond

Used in

combination with

response 1, keeps

these types of

alarm calls from

becoming

unmanageable

...holdup, panic

and duress alarms

are exempted;

alarm companies

are prohibited

from routinely

including duress

alarms in most

alarm systems;

and combined

with responses 2

and 3

...the alarm

industry is

prohibited from

classifying

ordinary burglar

alarms as

"duress" alarms;

and combined

with responses 1

and 3

Requires

educating the

public, police

union and media

to enable police

leaders to

establish

departmental

policy, or to

encourage local

(and sometimes

state) legislators

to enact

ordinances 

Requires permits

for holdup, duress

and panic alarms,

as well as false

alarm reduction

management to

monitor trends in

such calls

Response

No.

Page No. Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations

Best Responses
20 False Burglar Alarms

3.

4.

5.

Responding to

holdup, duress

and panic alarms

only if they come

from a stationary

building

Establishing a fee

for service for all

false alarm calls

Establishing an

ordinance with

escalating fines

for false alarms

For an example,

see the Salt Lake

City ordinance at

www.slcgov.com/

police. Exception

may be made for

panic alarms

police give to

high-risk

domestic violence

and stalking

victims

The city

calculates the true

cost of false

alarm response,

including the lostopportunity costs

for police 

Requires permits

for alarm owners

and escalating

fines for false

alarms 

...publicized so

that mobile-alarm

manufacturers

know the police

will not respond

...the political

climate is more

supportive of fees

for service than

"verified

response"

...the community

has an extremely

low number of

false alarms, and

officers have

sufficient free

time so that

responding to

false alarm calls

does not impede

their ability to

work on actual

crime problems

Requires outreach

to mobile-alarm

manufacturers

Involves billing and

follow-up with

customers who fail

to pay; may involve

taking legal action

against nonpayers

Is often only a

stopgap

measure–police

agencies should

expect the number

of alarm calls to

rise in the coming

decade; involves

billing and followup with customers

who fail to pay; may

involve taking legal

action against 

non-payees

Response

No.

Page No. Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations

Responses With Limited Effectiveness

14

15

15
Appendix 21

6.

7.

8.

9.

16

16

17

17

Accepting

dispatch

cancellations

Alerting alarm

companies about

false alarm

abusers

Publishing alarm

companies' falsealarm rates on

websites or

elsewhere

Holding falsealarm classes 

The alarm

company verifies

(usually by

telephone) that

the alarm was

false, and then

calls the police,

who cancel their

response

Police sort

records of false

alarm abusers by

company, and

notify the

companies

Police post alarm

companies' false

alarm rates on

department

websites or

elsewhere

Police hold

classes for alarm

abusers and offer

a free alarm call

to those who

attend

...established by

ordinance, and

alarm companies

follow through

...accompanied

by sanctions for

noncompliance;

alarm companies,

along with

individual alarm

owners, are

charged for costs

...police alert

alarm companies

that they are

going to do so,

and give them

time to reduce

their false alarm

rates before

publication

...police have the

time and

resources to do so

Increases the

number of

incoming calls

dispatchers must

handle

Requires police staff

time to sort records,

and alarm company

cooperation in

dealing with alarm

owners

Requires accurate

and regular

updating, perhaps

quarterly. In the

United Kingdom,

an inspectorate

monitors

companies' falsealarm rates. For

those companies

unwilling to reduce

high rates, the

police do not

respond to alarms

without evidence of

a crime in progress16

Police who lead the

classes must

develop expertise in

typical alarm

systems and their

false-trigger

patterns. The

Phoenix Police

Department coteaches such classes

with members of

the alarm industry

Response

No.

Page No. Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations
22 False Burglar Alarms

10.

11.

17

17

Lowering the call

priority of alarms

Responding

"priority one" to

alarm calls

Police code alarm

calls as "low

priority" for

dispatch purposes 

Police treat alarm

calls as actual

emergencies,

despite extensive

research findings 

to the contrary

...police have

sufficient

resources to

respond to alarm

calls, and local

legislators are

unwilling to

address the

problem in any

other way

...the community

has few crime

problems, and

police have

sufficient

resources to do so 

Does not address

the underlying

causes of false

alarms. The U.K.

Association of

Chief Police

Officers suggests a

delayed, lowerpriority response

following two false

alarm calls in a

rolling 12-month

period

Assumes police

desire full

responsibility for

false alarms or the

community and

legislature are

unwilling to accept

extensive research

concerning the

frequency of false

alarms

Response

No.

Page No. Response How It

Works

Works

Best If...

Considerations

Response Not Recommended
Endnotes 23

Endnotes

1 Blackstone, Hakim and Spiegel (2000a). 2 International Association of Chiefs of Police (n.d.).

www.theiacp.org/pubinfo/pubs/pslc/pslc5.toc.html 3 Blackstone, Hakim and Spiegel (2000a). 4 Blackstone, Hakim and Spiegel (2000a). 5 Hakim and Blackstone (1997). 6 International Association of Chiefs of Police (n.d.).

www.theiacp.org/pubinfo/pubs/pslc/pslc5.toc.html 7 Chicago Police Department (2000)

www.ci.chi.il.us/CommunityPolicing/Contact/FalseBurglar

Alarms.html 8 Rennison (2000). 9 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1999. 10 LeBeau and Vincent (1998). 11 The Salt Lake Tribune (March 15, 2000). "Crying Wolf."

Opinion piece, A12. 12 ci.fort-worth.tx.us/ (city manager's web page, news dated

August 24, 1998.

13 Buck, Hakim, and Gaffney (1993). 14 The Christian Science Monitor (Feb. 24, 1998).

www.csmonitor.com/durable/1998/02/24/us/us.3.html 15 Las Vegas Police Department data (January 2001). 16 www.acpo.police.uk/news/2000/q4/93security.html

References 25

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Good." Unpublished paper, March 28.

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26 False Burglar Alarms
27

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About the Author 29

About the Author

Rana Sampson

Rana Sampson is a national problem-oriented policing

consultant and the former director of public safety for the

University of San Diego. She was previously a White House

Fellow; National Institute of Justice Fellow; senior researcher

and trainer at the Police Executive Research Forum; attorney;

and patrol officer, undercover narcotics officer and patrol

sergeant with the New York City Police Department, where

she was awarded several commendations of merit and won

the National Improvement of Justice Award. She is the

coauthor (with Michael Scott) of Tackling Crime and Other

Public-Safety Problems: Case Studies in Problem-Solving, which

documents high-quality crime control efforts from around the

United States, Canada and Europe. She is a judge for the

Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in ProblemOriented Policing, a former judge for the police Fulbright

awards, and a commissioner with California's Commission on

Peace Officer Standards and Training. Sampson holds a law

degree from Harvard and a bachelor's degree from Barnard

College, Columbia University.

Recommended Readings 31

Recommended Readings

• A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their

Environments, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This

guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners

to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying

public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It

provides guidance on whether and how to conduct costeffective surveys.

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory

Guide for Police Problem-Solvers, by John E. Eck (U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services, 2001). This guide is a companion to the

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. It provides basic

guidance to measuring and assessing problem-oriented

policing efforts. Available at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

• Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel

(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community

Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with

accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic

pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The

document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs.

• Crime Prevention Studies, edited by Ronald V. Clarke

(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of

volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing

opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of

initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems.
32 False Burglar Alarms

• Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 1999

Herman Goldstein Award Winners. This document

produced by the National Institute of Justice in

collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum

provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the

annual award program that recognizes exemplary problemoriented responses to various community problems. A

similar publication is available for the award winners from

subsequent years. The documents are also available at

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.

• Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime

Reduction, by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office

Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and

describes the factors that make problem-solving effective or

ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in

England and Wales.

• Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for

Crime Prevention, by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. Clarke

(Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98, 1998).

Explains how crime theories such as routine activity theory,

rational choice theory and crime pattern theory have

practical implications for the police in their efforts to

prevent crime.

• Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein

(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990).

Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented

policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses

how a police agency can implement the concept.
Recommended Readings 33

• Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20

Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice,

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000).

Describes how the most critical elements of Herman

Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have

developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes

future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report

is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

• Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport

News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman (Police

Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the rationale

behind problem-oriented policing and the problem-solving

process, and provides examples of effective problemsolving in one agency.

• Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime and

Disorder Through Problem-Solving Partnerships, by

Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott Phillips, Tammy

Rinehart and Meg Townsend (U.S. Department of Justice,

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 1998)

(also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Provides a brief

introduction to problem-solving, basic information on the

SARA model and detailed suggestions about the problemsolving process.

• Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies,

Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke (Harrow and

Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and methods of

situational crime prevention, and presents over 20 case

studies of effective crime prevention initiatives.
34 False Burglar Alarms

• Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: Case

Studies in Problem-Solving, by Rana Sampson and

Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available

at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective

police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder

problems.

• Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook for

Law Enforcement, by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services, 2001) (also available at

www.cops.usdoj.gov). Provides an introduction for police

to analyzing problems within the context of problemoriented policing.

• Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement

Managers, Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G.

LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains

many of the basics of research as it applies to police

management and problem-solving.
Other Guides in the Series 35

Other Guides in This Series

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series (available at

www.cops.usdoj.gov):

1. Assaults in and Around Bars. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

2. Street Prostitution. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

3. Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

4. Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes.

Rana Sampson. 2001.

5. False Burglar Alarms. Rana Sampson. 2001.

6. Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

7. Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

8. Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

9. Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002.

10. Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V.

Clarke. 2002.

11. Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002.

12. Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002.

13. Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002.

14. Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002.

15. Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002.

16. Clandestine Drug Labs. Michael S. Scott. 2002.

17. Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002.

18. Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel.

2002.

19. Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002.

Companion guide to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series:

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for

Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002.
36 False Burglar Alarms

Other Related COPS Office Publications

• Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook for Law

Enforcement. Timothy S. Bynum.

• Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20 Years.

Michael S. Scott. 2001.

• Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: Case

Studies in Problem-Solving. Rana Sampson and Michael S. Scott.

2000.

• Community Policing, Community Justice, and Restorative

Justice: Exploring the Links for the Delivery of a Balanced

Approach to Public Safety. Caroline G. Nicholl. 1999.

• Toolbox for Implementing Restorative Justice and Advancing

Community Policing. Caroline G. Nicholl. 2000.

• Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime and

Disorder Through Problem-Solving Partnerships. Karin

Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and

Meg Townsend. 1998.

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series

and other COPS Office publications, please call the Department of

Justice Response Center at 1.800.421.6770 or check our website at

www.cops.usdoj.gov.

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20530

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the

U.S. Department of Justice Response Center at 1.800.421.6770

Visit the COPS internet web site by the address listed below.

e05021556 Created Date: June 17, 2002

www.cops.usdoj.gov