PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee,

v.

No. 95-7620

WILLIAM BARRY ROBINSON,

a/k/a/ Barry,

Petitioner-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CR-79-93-A, CA-95-638-A)

Argued: September 25, 1996

Decided: February 10, 1997

Before HALL and ERVIN, Circuit Judges,

and HALLANAN, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

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Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Ervin wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Hall and Judge Hallanan joined.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Neal Lawrence Walters, Supervising Attorney, Appellate

Litigation Clinic, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW,

Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Sharon A. Gervasoni,

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, Chevy Chase, Mary-
land, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Jeri Kaylene Somers, Assistant United States Attorney,

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

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OPINION

ERVIN, Circuit Judge:

I

William Barry Robinson (Robinson) appeals from an order of the

district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the

reasons hereinafter set forth we reverse the district court's order and

remand with instructions to grant the writ.

Robinson was convicted in 1979 of conspiracy to distribute and of

distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.§§ 841 (a)(1) and

846. He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and a five-year

term of special parole. In 1990, after Robinson had been out of prison

for more than three years, the United States Parole Commission

issued a warrant charging him with violating the terms of his special

parole. In 1991 the Commission revoked his parole and sentenced

him to fifteen months' imprisonment. The Commission denied him

credit for time served on special parole. The Commission also

imposed a new term of special parole to begin upon his release and

last until October 14, 1995. In 1992, following his release, Robinson

again violated his parole, was sentenced to twelve months in prison,

and was released to a third term of special parole. In 1993, less than

two months after Robinson's third release from prison, his parole was

again revoked and he was incarcerated for sixteen months. In 1994 he

was released to a fourth term of special parole, set to last until the end

of December 1996. This term of special parole was violated in March

1995 and Robinson was sentenced to sixteen additional months of

incarceration and a new term of special parole.

Robinson challenged his most recent incarceration in a petition to

the district court for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241. The district court denied all of Robinson's claims and did not

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grant a writ of habeas corpus. Robinson appealed the lower court's

denial of relief on October 11, 1995. On April 17, 1996, we granted

Robinson's request to be released on bond pending appeal.

Robinson challenges the current sentence against him on several

grounds. His first assertion is that the Commission was without power

to return him to special parole status following the first revocation of

his parole in March 1991, and was also without power to repeat the

process four times. We agree with Robinson on this point and reverse

the district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus. Because of our

decision to grant the relief requested, we do not reach Robinson's

other challenges.

II

The question before us is whether the Parole Commission exceeded

its power when it assigned Robinson a new term of special parole

after it had revoked his original term of special parole for parole violations. At the time Robinson was originally sentenced, 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(c) required the court to sentence him to a mandatory period of

special parole because he was convicted of a drug crime.1 The relevant statute provided:

A special parole term imposed under this section . .. may

be revoked if its terms and conditions are violated. In such

circumstances the original term of imprisonment shall be

increased by the period of the special parole term and the

resulting new term shall not be diminished by the time

which was spent on special parole. A person whose special

parole term has been revoked may be required to serve all

or part of the remainder of the new term of imprisonment.

21 U.S.C. § 841(c). Robinson argues that once the special parole term

has been revoked, it is terminated. He asserts that because the Parole

Commission itself is without power to create and impose a new sen-

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1 This statutory provision was repealed by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,

Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, § 224(a)(2), 98 Stat. 2030 (1984). Special

Parole has been replaced in all sentencing provisions with "supervised

release."

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tence of special parole, no term of special parole remains to be

enforced following re-release from prison. The Commission can

instead require Robinson to serve the full original term of special

parole in prison, or it can release him after some incarceration to a

term of regular parole.

We have previously held, in the context of the supervised release

provisions which replaced special parole, that "revoke" means to

"annul" or "extinguish." United States v. Cooper, 962 F.2d 339, 341

(4th Cir. 1992). In Cooper we held that, when a court revoked a term

of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), it was without

the authority to impose any new term of supervised release. A strong

majority of our sister circuits also concluded that once revoked pursuant to § 3583(e), supervised release could not be reimposed.2 Our

decision in Cooper guides us in the instant case and requires us to

find that, once revoked, Robinson's term of special parole could not

be reimposed by the Parole Commission.

The Parole Commission tries to persuade us that we need not be

controlled by our decision in Cooper, but its arguments are unpersuasive. First, the Commission asserts that supervised release and special

parole are entirely different penal entities and the word "revoke" has

distinct meanings in the two statutes. While it is certainly undeniable

that there are small variations in the way the two programs are handled, and in the entities which handle them, these are mere "distinc-

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2 See United States v. Koehler, 973 F.2d 132, 134-36 (2nd Cir. 1992);

United States v. Malesic, 18 F.3d 205, 206 (3rd Cir. 1994); United States

v. Holmes, 954 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Truss, 4

F.3d 437, 441 (6th Cir. 1993); United State v. McGee, 981 F.2d 271,

274-76 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Behnezhad, 907 F.2d 896, 898-

99 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rockwell , 984 F.2d 1112, 1116-17

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 966 (1993); United States v. Tatum,

998 F.2d 893, 895-96 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). But see United

States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 293 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v.

Schrader, 973 F.2d 623, 625 (8th Cir. 1992). The Circuit for the District

of Columbia has yet to decide this issue.

In response to these interpretations, Congress amended § 3583 in 1994

to specifically authorize a court to reimpose supervised release after

revocation. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h).

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tion[s] without a difference." United States v. Molina-Uribe, 853 F.2d

1193, 1197 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied , 489 U.S. 1022 (1989);

United States v. Smith, 840 F.2d 886, 890, n.3 (11th Cir.), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 859 (1988). The Parole Commission is not able to

point to differences between the two types of post-release supervision

that would justify employing radically different definitions of the

word "revoke."

The Parole Commission next argues that in Cooper we were motivated, not by an interpretation of the word "revoke," but by the disjunctive phrasing of § 3583(e).3 It is true that there we pointed out that

other courts addressing the power of the Parole Commission under

§ 3583 had relied upon the fact that the court could either extend the

term of supervised release or revoke the term of release and reincarcerate the person. Cooper, 962 F.2d at 341 (discussing United States

v. Behnezhad, 907 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1990)). In Cooper, however, we

also discussed a decision of the Fifth Circuit which relied upon the

plain meaning of the word "revoke," rather than upon the structure of

§ 3583. Id. (discussing United States v. Holmes, 954 F.2d 270 (5th

Cir. 1992)). We therefore explicitly embraced both lines of analysis

in deciding that a term of supervised release, once revoked, could not

be reimposed. Id. at 343. We will follow both Cooper's plain interpretation of the word revoke, and its interpretation of the disjunctive

phrasing of § 3583 in deciding the instant case.

Finally, the Parole Commission asserts that we should adopt the

reasoning of other circuits which have found that§ 841(c) allows the

Commission to reinstate special parole following revocation. The

Parole Commission relies on United States Parole Commission v.

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3 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) provides that a court may:

(1) terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the

defendant released . . . ;

(2) extend a term of supervised release . . . ;

(3) revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised

release . . . without credit for the time previously served on

postrelease supervision . . . ; or

(4) order the defendant to remain at his place of residence.

 5
Williams, 54 F.3d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and United States v. Billis,

83 F.3d 209 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 1996 WL 686611 (1996). For two

reasons we are not persuaded by the reasoning of those decisions.

First, the majority of the circuit courts which have addressed the very

issue before us today have rejected the position advocated by the

Parole Commission and found that the Commission lacks the power

to reimpose special parole. Fowler v. United States Parole

Commission, 94 F.3d 835 (3rd Cir. 1996); Evans v. United States

Parole Commission, 78 F.3d 262 (7th Cir. 1996); Artuso v. Hall, 74

F.3d 68, 72 (5th Cir. 1996).

Second, neither the Billis court nor the Williams court was bound

by a previous interpretation of the word "revoke" in the § 3583 context. The District of Columbia Circuit had never addressed the § 3583

issue, and the Eighth Circuit had interpreted § 3583 to allow reimposition of supervised release. We, in contrast, are bound by our own

recent interpretation of "revoke."

The Commission also points to United States v. Gozlon-Peretz, 894

F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd, 498 U.S. 395 (1991). The Third Circuit, in a footnote, suggested that a defendant could be "reparoled"

after special parole was revoked. Id. at 1405 n.5. It is not clear from

that brief note whether the court meant to suggest that the new parole

term could also be special parole, or whether the Parole Commission

only retained the power to impose a new term of regular parole. Since

oral argument in this case, however, the Third Circuit has clarified its

position on this matter and has rejected the interpretation of the Parole

Commission. In Fowler v. United States Parole Commission, 94 F.3d

835 (3d Cir. 1996), the court joined the Evans and Artuso courts in

deciding that once special parole has been revoked, the Parole Commission is without power to issue a new term of special parole. Id. at

841.

The plain language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c), our own prior interpretation of the word revoke in Cooper, and the reasoned decisions of the

majority of our sister circuits all compel us to find that the Parole

Commission was without power to reassign Robinson to any of his

four additional terms of special parole.

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III

We therefore reverse the district court's decision and remand for

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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