J-S05026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHRISTOPHER STEELE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 848 WDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-25-CR-0001105-2018

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: MARCH 7, 2023

Christopher Steele appeals, pro se, from the order, entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Erie County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful 

review, we affirm.

1

In December 2018, Steele was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 

66-180 months’ incarceration after being found guilty by a jury of aggravated 

assault, reckless endangerment, possession of an instrument of crime, and 

criminal use of a communication facility. Steele filed a timely motion for 

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1 On December 7, 2022, our Court granted the Commonwealth’s application 

for an extension of time within which to file its brief. We ordered that the brief 

be filed on or before January 4, 2023. To date, the Commonwealth has not 

filed a brief.
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reconsideration asserting an Apprendi2issue as well as an excessiveness of 

sentence claim. While his motion was pending, Steele filed a direct appeal3

and a pro se PCRA petition, a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and a 

motion for the appointment of PCRA counsel.

4

 On February 7, 2019, the trial 

court denied Steele’s motion to reconsider. On February 28, 2019, the trial 

court dismissed, “as prematurely filed,” Steele’s pro se PCRA petition and 

motions, due to his pending direct appeal.

5 See Order, 2/28/19.6

 On July 6, 

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2 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding every factor 

necessary to defendant’s punishment must either be admitted or found by 

jury beyond reasonable doubt).

3 Technically, our Court should have quashed Steele’s appeal as premature. 

See Commonwealth v. Borrero, 692 A.2d 158, 159-60 (1997) (if postsentence motions filed, judgment of sentence does not become final for 

purposes of appeal until trial court disposes of motion or motion deemed 

denied by operation of law; Court required to quash appeal “[b]ecause we are 

precluded from exercising jurisdiction over appeals from non[-]final orders or 

judgments.”); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720, Comment (“No direct appeal may 

be taken by a defendant while his or her post-sentence motion is pending.”).

4 The Erie County Clerk of Records forwarded these pro se motions to counselof-record, Robert Barbato Jr., Esquire. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4). See also

Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2011) (petitioner’s pro se

motion filed while petitioner represented by counsel is impermissible hybrid 

representation). “[I]ndeed, [such] pro se motion[s] have no legal effect, and, 

therefore, are legal nullities.” See Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 

621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2016).

5 The pro se petition alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel, a constitutional

violation, after-discovered evidence, and an illegality of sentence claim.

6 On March 5, 2019, counsel filed a motion to reinstate Steele’s appellate 

rights nunc pro tunc due to counsel’s failure to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. On March 12, 2019, this Court 
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2020, our Court reversed Steel’s criminal use conviction on the basis of 

insufficient evidence, affirmed his remaining convictions, and remanded for 

resentencing. See Commonwealth v. Steele, 234 A.3d 840 (Pa. Super. 

2020). Steele was resentenced on August 18, 2020, to an aggregate term of 

57-180 months of incarceration, followed by a three-year probationary tail. 

On August 21, 2020, Steele filed a pro se PCRA petition. On September 

2, 2020, the trial court appointed PCRA counsel, who filed a “supplement” to 

Steele’s PCRA petition.

7

 On October 20, 2020, the PCRA court gave Steele 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intention to dismiss his petition without a 

hearing. Steele did not file a response. On December 3, 2020, the PCRA court 

denied the petition. Steele filed a timely collateral appeal. Our Court affirmed 

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granted the motion to reinstate Steele’s appellate rights nunc pro tunc and 

ordered Steel to file his Rule 1925(b) statement by March 25, 2019. However, 

on May 7, 2019, our Court dismissed the appeal due to counsel’s failure to file 

an appellate brief. See Order, 5/7/19. On July 22, 2019, counsel filed a 

motion to reconsider dismissal of the appeal, alleging that he had recently 

been appointed to represent Steele and “had not been able to obtain the case 

file for th[e] matter” by the briefing deadline. See Motion To Reconsider, 

7/22/19. Subsequently, Steele filed a pro se application for relief seeking 

appointment of new counsel. On August 2, 2019, our Court entered an order 

reinstating Steele’s appeal, directing the trial court to determine whether 

counsel has abandoned Steele and to “take further action as the court may 

deem necessary.” Order, 8/2/19. On remand, the trial court held a hearing 

and determined that Steele’s new attorney “will comply with all necessary 

requirements pursuant to [Steele’s] pending appeal.” Trial Court Order, 

8/29/19.

7 Steele alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek enforcement 

of a plea agreement that was purportedly reached at the magisterial level.
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the PCRA court’s order. Commonwealth v. Steele, 270 A.3d 1152 (Pa. 

Super. 2021) (Table). 

On April 14, 2022, Steel filed the instant pro se PCRA petition. On April 

20, 2022, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition 

without a hearing, pursuant to Rule 907. Steele filed a pro se response to the 

court’s Rule 907 notice and, on June 8, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed 

Steele’s petition. 

Steele filed a timely pro se notice of appeal and court-ordered Rule

1925(b) statement. On appeal, Steele presents the following issues for our 

consideration:

(1) Whether the [PCRA court] abused [its] discretion and 

committed reversible error in denying [Steele’s] PCRA 

petition without an evidentiary hearing . . . where disputed 

issues of factual matters exist involving [d]ue [p]rocess and 

[d]ouble [j]eopardy violations of the United States and 

Pennsylvania Constitutions that entitle [Steele] to [PCRA] 

relief[.]

(2) Whether the [trial judge] failed to find that Magistrate Paul 

A. Bizzarro erred and abused his discretion when he failed 

to record the terms of the original plea agreement arrived 

at before him in [c]ourt [which] substantially prejudiced 

[Steele] and violated [his] [d]ue [p]rocess [rights.]

(3) Whether the [PCRA court erred by] fail[ing] to find that the 

Magistrate Paul A. Bizzarro erred and abused his discretion 

when he failed to conduct a colloquy record of [Steele’s] 

original plea of guilt [which] substantially prejudice[d 

Steele] and violat[ed Steele’s] [d]ue [p]rocess [rights.]

(4) Whether the [PCRA court erred by] fail[ing] to find that the 

Magistrate Paul A. Bizzarro erred and abused his discretion 

when he arbitrarily cancelled [Steele’s] original 

disposition/[Steele’s] original plea of guilt [and] violated 

[Steele’s] [d]ue [p]rocess and [d]ouble [j]eopardy [rights.]
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(5) Whether the [PCRA court erred by] fail[ing] to find that the 

District Judge John A. Bozza erred and abused his discretion 

in failing to make the necessary determination to conduct 

an adequate search into the ambiguities with the plea 

agreement [and] violate[d Steele’s] [d]ue [p]rocess 

[rights.]

(6) Whether the Hon[orable] John J. Mead failed to find that the 

[Honorable] John J. Gerhart erred and abused his discretion 

when he failed to remain fair and impartial towards [Steele] 

before, during, and after trial [and, thus,] violat[ed Steele’s] 

[d]ue [p]rocess and [d]ouble [j]eopardy [rights.]

(7) Whether the [PCRA court erred by] fail[ing] to find that the 

totality of the Commonwealth’s conduct substantially 

prejudiced [Steele] before, during, and after trial [and, 

thus,] violated [Steele’s] [d]ue [p]rocess and [d]ouble 

[j]eopardy [rights.]

(8) Whether the [PCRA court] failed to find that all [of Steele’s] 

prior counsel prejudiced [him] in their combined layered 

ineffective assistance of counsel [by] failing to provide 

[Steele] with meaningful counsel[.]

(9) Whether the [a]ppellate [c]ourt erred and abused its 

discretion in denying [Steele’s] (1st) PCRA [a]ppeal attempt 

when it made its determination based upon a self-serving 

statement from ineffective counsel[,] rather than 

independently investigating the record . . . especially where 

there was no record[.]

(10) Whether the [PCRA court] erred and abused [its] discretion

when he failed to find that [Steele’s] current (2nd) PCRA 

petition should be an extension of [his] (1st) PCRA appeal 

attempt since [Steele] was prejudiced by ineffective 

assistance of counsel on his (1st) PCRA attempt[.]

Appellant’s Brief, at x-xii.

When reviewing an order denying PCRA relief, we must "determine 

whether it is supported by the record and is free of legal error." 

Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017). Furthermore, 

we note:
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[T]he PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without a 

hearing when the court is satisfied “there are no genuine issues 

concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled to postconviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose would be 

served by further proceedings. To obtain reversal of a PCRA 

court’s decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an 

appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of fact which, 

if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that 

the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.”

Id. at 297 (citations and some punctuation omitted).

Before we may address Steele’s issues on appeal, we must first 

determine whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to consider his PCRA 

petition. Generally, a petition for PCRA relief, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

of sentence is final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); see also 

Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054 (Pa. Super. 1997). There are, 

however, exceptions to the time requirement, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

9545(b)(1)(i),(ii), and (iii). Where the petition alleges, and the petitioner 

proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met, the petition 

will be considered timely. These exceptions include interference by 

government officials in the presentation of the claim, after-discovered facts or 

evidence, and an after-recognized constitutional right. Id. See 

Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000). A PCRA 

petition invoking one of these exceptions must “be filed within one year of the 

date the claims could have been presented.” Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(2). The timeliness requirements of the PCRA are jurisdictional in 
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nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely petitions. 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003). 

Here, Steele’s judgment of sentence became final on September 18, 

2020, when the time expired for him to file a direct appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 

902. Thus, Steele had until September 18, 2021, to file a timely PCRA 

petition. The current petition, filed on April 14, 2022, is, therefore, patently 

untimely. Thus, unless Steele pleads and proves a timeliness exception to the 

PCRA time-bar, the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to consider the merits of 

his petition. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 845 (Pa. 2012) (if 

PCRA petition deemed untimely and no exception pled and proven, petition 

must be dismissed without hearing because court lacks jurisdiction to consider 

merits of petition).

Because Steele’s petition does not plead, let alone prove, any PCRA 

timeliness exception, his petition is time-barred. See Commonwealth v. 

Brown, 111 A.3d 171 (Pa. Super. 2015) (where petitioner neither 

acknowledged untimeliness of petition nor alleged any exception to PCRA 

time-bar, petitioner failed to “plead and prove” any section 9545(b)(1) 

exception); see also Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1126 

(Pa. 2005) (“Exceptions [to the PCRA jurisdictional time-bar] cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal[.]”). Thus, the trial court properly dismissed 

Steele’s petition. Cousar, supra.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/7/2023