NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MARY JEAN M., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, E.L., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0055

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. B8015JD201604027

The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Lauren J. Lowe

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety

FILED 9-11-2018
MARY JEAN M. v. DCS, E.L.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Mary Jean M. (“Mother”) appeals from the trial court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her son, E.L., on the ground of 15 months’ 

time in an out-of-home placement. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother is the natural parent of M.L., born in May 2001, and 

E.L., born in May 2003. She lived with the children in or near Arizona for 

several years, while Donald L. (“Father”) lived in another state.1 Mother has 

a considerable medical history and has survived 11 strokes. Those strokes 

left her severely physically impaired; she could not prepare food, feed 

herself, hold utensils, speak clearly, or bathe on her own. Hence, she could 

not meet her own or the children’s daily needs. Accordingly, at young ages, 

the children became her primary caretakers. E.L. unstintingly took on this

caregiving role, doing most everything for Mother and often skipping

school to care for her. Mother’s only source of income came from child 

support, and she could not provide the children with a stable home. Just 

before the current dependency, they were living in various hotels and 

shelters.

¶3 In March 2016, while trying to light a cigarette, Mother 

burned herself severely. Upon her hospitalization for the burns, the 

Department of Child Safety took custody of the children because they had 

no legal caregiver supervising them. After her release from the hospital, 

Mother moved in with her sister in Pennsylvania who became her full-time 

caregiver.

¶4 Because of Mother’s severe and seemingly static functional 

limitations, the Department asked her for medical documentation 

 

1 The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights, and he is not 

a party to this appeal. M.L. is in an independent-living program and is also 

not a party to this appeal. 
MARY JEAN M. v. DCS, E.L.

Decision of the Court

3

explaining whether she could participate in services and whether services 

could restore her ability to parent the children. The Department never 

received this information and therefore only provided Mother with casemanagement services, team decision-making meetings, and visitation. The 

Department also believed that Mother had mental-health issues; it therefore 

asked her to enroll in behavioral-health services and to take a psychological 

evaluation if she could. Mother never did so, but she participated in regular 

telephonic visits with E.L. E.L. struggled with visits because, according to 

him, Mother was very difficult to understand on the phone due to her 

medical condition. He also expressed that he could not “handle” the calls 

when Mother would share the difficulties that she was going through, but 

he did not wish to stop talking to Mother altogether.

¶5 Meanwhile, by March 2017, Father had engaged in the case 

plan and the court returned the children to his custody. The next month, 

Mother visited E.L. once in person. Shortly after that, E.L. disclosed to 

Father that he had been sexually abused for several years by a family friend.

E.L. also disclosed that he cared for the alleged perpetrator who had 

introduced E.L. to methamphetamine. The Department notified police, and 

they arrested the alleged perpetrator. Over the next few months, E.L.

suffered from methamphetamine withdrawal and his mental health 

declined. In June, Father took him to the emergency room. E.L. required 

hospitalization, and the next day the Department took custody of him 

because Father refused to care for him any longer.

¶6 Upon E.L.’s release from the hospital, the Department placed 

him with a foster family while it arranged inpatient psychiatric care and 

other intensive support services for him. In October 2017, the Department

moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the 15 months’ time in an 

out-of-home placement ground. Two months later, just before his support 

services began, E.L. ran away and remained missing for four months.

¶7 In January 2018, the court held a contested termination

hearing. At the hearing, Mother’s counsel conceded that “reunification is 

[not] possible with Mother. . . . [Her] medical condition is such that it 

continues to deteriorate. She’s . . . been at the point for an extended period 

of time now where she’s unable to parent.” Likewise, the case manager 

testified that “Mom herself, needs someone to care for her. So, therefore, 

she’s not able to care for anyone else[.]” She also testified that having been 

Mother’s caregiver for much of his childhood, E.L. expressed a strong sense 

of guilt and responsibility towards her. She further testified that E.L. 

recognized that these feelings inhibited him from addressing his own 

extensive special needs. The case manager explained that without 
MARY JEAN M. v. DCS, E.L.

Decision of the Court

4

termination of Mother’s parental rights, E.L. would likely remain in foster 

care for three-and-a-half more years—until he turned 18—denying him any 

chance at progressing towards permanency. Next, the case manager 

testified that as soon as the Department located him, she was committed to 

doing “whatever we need to do to help him.” The case manager anticipated 

placing E.L. in a facility that could holistically address his mental-health, 

sexual-abuse, and methamphetamine-addiction issues. She testified that 

the Department was already working on facilitating those intensive 

support services “so that once he is found we will be able to . . . help him.” 

¶8 Also during the hearing, Mother’s counsel indicated that she 

had disclosed some medical information to the State, but the case manager 

testified that the Department did not receive it. Nevertheless, at the hearing, 

Mother conceded that her impairments were degenerative and that she 

could not parent E.L. The court found that continuing the parent-child 

relationship would harm E.L. because “it would delay permanency, leaving 

[him] to linger in [foster] care for an indeterminate period since [he] doe[s] 

not have parents who are able to care for him.” The court later terminated 

Mother’s parental rights on the ground alleged. Mother timely appealed.

Two months after Mother initiated this appeal, the Department located E.L.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Mother argues that the court erred by terminating her 

parental rights on the 15 months’ time in an out-of-home placement

ground. She also contends that insufficient evidence supports the court’s 

finding that terminating her parental rights was in E.L.’s best interests. The 

court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights 

because (1) Mother failed to challenge the Department’s provisions of 

services, thereby waiving that argument on appeal; (2) sufficient evidence 

showed that Mother was incapable of exercising proper parental care and 

control in the near future; and (3) termination was in E.L.’s best interests.

¶10 A juvenile court’s termination order is reviewed for an abuse 

of discretion. E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 58 ¶ 9 (App. 2015). 

“The juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in the 

best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 4 (App. 2002). This Court will accept 

the juvenile court’s factual findings unless no reasonable evidence supports 

them and will affirm a termination order unless it is clearly erroneous. 

Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 508 ¶ 1 (App. 2008).
MARY JEAN M. v. DCS, E.L.

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¶11 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find by 

clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for 

termination exists and by a preponderance of the evidence that termination 

is in the child’s best interests. Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 

286 ¶ 15 (App. 2016). As pertinent here, the juvenile court may terminate 

parental rights when (1) the Department made a diligent effort to provide 

appropriate reunification services, (2) the child has been in an out-of-home 

placement for a cumulative total period of 15 months or longer pursuant to 

court order, (3) the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that 

caused the child to be in an out-of-home placement, and (4) a substantial 

likelihood exists that the parent will be incapable of exercising proper and 

effective parental care and control in the near future. A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(8)(c).

A parent’s failure “to raise a timely objection if [she] believes services are 

inadequate” may waive such a claim on appeal. Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178 ¶ 13 (App. 2014).

1. Statutory Ground for Termination

¶12 Here, Mother did not raise any issues with services (or the 

lack thereof) at any time during the dependency proceedings or at the 

termination hearing. The case manager testified that although Mother had 

trouble speaking clearly, her attorney kept in regular contact with the 

Department for her. Mother therefore could have voiced any concerns

about services through her counsel at the numerous dependency hearings

that spanned almost two years; yet, she raised no issues. Nor did she 

request any additional services from the case manager. She also failed to 

ensure that the Department had received her medical documentation. 

Without it, the case manager could not assess what, if any, services would 

be appropriate for her given her severe functional limitations.2 Finally, 

Mother did not raise any issues with services at the termination hearing 

 

2 We note that the court never relieved the Department from its duty 

to provide services to Mother, and the Department did not seek a futility 

finding from the court at any time during the case. Nor did Mother “ask the 

. . . court to conduct a hearing to determine whether [the Department] could 

suspend services or refrain from providing them[.]” See Christina G. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 236–37 ¶¶ 21–25 (App. 2011). Nevertheless, 

when the dependency began, Mother admitted that her severe functional 

limitations prevented her from parenting the children. Therefore, the 

Department’s request that Mother provide medical documentation to 

assess what further services were appropriate for her was reasonable under 

these unique facts.
MARY JEAN M. v. DCS, E.L.

Decision of the Court

6

through cross-examination or argument. She has therefore waived her 

argument on appeal and we decline to address it further.

¶13 Mother also argues that insufficient evidence supports the 

court’s findings that she was unable to remedy the circumstances that 

caused E.L. to be in an out-of-home placement and that a substantial 

likelihood exists that she will be incapable of exercising proper and effective 

parental care and control in the near future. Her argument consists of only 

two sentences and she provides no supportive record or legal citations. 

Because she failed to develop her argument, it is waived. See ARCAP 

13(a)(7)(A) (stating that opening briefs must contain an “[a]ppellant’s 

contentions concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting 

reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and 

appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the appellate 

relies”); see also Childress Buick Co. v. O’Connell, 198 Ariz. 454, 459 ¶ 29 (App. 

2000) (stating that “issues not clearly raised in appellate briefs are deemed 

waived”); see also State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) (“In Arizona, 

opening briefs must present significant arguments, supported by authority, 

setting forth an appellant’s position on the issues raised. Failure to argue a 

claim usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.”).

2. Best Interests

¶14 Mother next argues that insufficient evidence supported the 

court’s finding that terminating her parental rights served E.L.’s best 

interests. Terminating parental rights is in a child’s best interests if the child 

will benefit from the termination or will be harmed if the relationship 

continues. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 (2016). Relevant factors 

in this determination include whether (1) the current placement is meeting 

the child’s needs, (2) an adoption plan is in place, and (3) the child is 

adoptable. Id. at 3–4 ¶ 12. 

¶15 Moreover, “[i]n a best interests inquiry . . . we can presume 

that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has 

already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination 

by clear and convincing evidence.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286 

¶ 35 (2005); see also In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS–6831, 155 Ariz. 556, 

559 (App. 1988) (“In most cases, the presence of a statutory ground will 

have a negative effect on the children[,]” which supports a best interests 

finding.). Once a juvenile court finds that a parent is unfit, the focus shifts 

to the child’s interests. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 285 ¶ 31, 287 ¶ 37. Thus, in 

considering best interests, the court must balance the unfit parent’s 

“diluted” interest “against the independent and often adverse interests of 
MARY JEAN M. v. DCS, E.L.

Decision of the Court

7

the child in a safe and stable home life.” Id. at 286 ¶ 35. Of foremost concern 

in that regard is “protect[ing] a child’s interest in stability and 

security.” Id. at ¶ 34.

¶16 The juvenile court found that continuing the parent-child 

relationship would harm E.L. because it would delay permanency and 

cause him to stay in foster care for an indeterminate period. Reasonable 

evidence supports this finding. At the time of the termination hearing, E.L. 

had already spent two years in foster care, and Mother’s condition had not 

improved. While Mother undoubtedly loves E.L. and shares a bond with 

him, nothing disputes that she could not meet his extensive needs at the 

time of the termination hearing and would be unable to do so in the near 

future. The record shows that throughout the dependency, Mother could 

not accomplish basic self-care tasks without a caregiver’s assistance. Her 

inability to meet her own needs or E.L.’s did not improve during the 

dependency; if anything, her condition declined. 

¶17 Mother’s counsel conceded at the termination hearing that 

reunification was not possible with Mother because she was unable to 

parent due to her medical condition. Likewise, the case manager testified 

that Mother needed someone to care for her, and therefore could not care 

for anyone else. The case worker also noted that E.L. had expressed a strong 

sense of guilt and responsibility towards Mother, which kept him from 

addressing his own needs. Furthermore, the case manager testified that 

without termination of her parental rights, E.L. would likely remain in 

foster care until he became 18 years old, which would deny him any chance 

at permanency. As such, sufficient evidence supported the court’s finding

that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in E.L.’s best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.