65340 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 244 / Thursday, December 20, 2018 / Notices 

1The Regulations originally issued under the 

Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50 

U.S.C. 4601–4623 (Supp. III 2015) (‘‘the EAA’’), 

which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President, 

through Executive Order 13,222 of August 17, 2001 

(3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which has been 

extended by successive Presidential Notices, the 

most recent being that of August 8, 2018 (83 FR 

39,871 (Aug. 13, 2018)), continued the Regulations 

in full force and effect under the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701, 

et seq. (2012) (‘‘IEEPA’’). On August 13, 2018, the 

President signed into law the John S. McCain 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2019, which includes the Export Control Reform 

Act of 2018, Public Law 115–232, tit. 17, subtitle 

B, 132 Stat. 2208 (2018) (‘‘ECRA’’). While Section 

1766 of ECRA repeals the EAA (except for three 

sections which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 

of ECRA provides, in pertinent part, that all rules 

and regulations that were made or issued under the 

EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant to 

IEEPA, and were in effect as of ECRA’s date of 

enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue in 

effect according to their terms until modified, 

superseded, set aside, or revoked through action 

undertaken pursuant to the authority provided 

under ECRA. 

2The Regulations are currently codified in the 

Code of Federal Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730– 

774 (2018). The charged violations occurred in 

2011–2013. The Regulations governing the 

violations at issue are found in the 2011–2013 

versions of the Code of Federal Regulations (15 CFR 

parts 730–774). The 2018 Regulations set forth the 

procedures that apply to this matter. 

education intervention materials and 

projects; program providers at State and 

local levels; program participants; grant 

recipients, and other relevant 

informants associated with FNS 

programs. 

Findings from all data collection will 

be included in summary reports 

submitted to USDA–FNS. The reports 

will describe the data collection 

methods, findings, conclusions, 

implications, and recommendations for 

the development and effective 

dissemination of nutrition education 

materials and related tools for FNS 

population groups. There will be no 

specific quantitative analysis of data. No 

attempt will be made to generalize the 

findings to be nationally representative 

or statistically valid. There are no 

recordkeeping or third party disclosure 

burden requirements. 

Reporting Burden 

FNS estimates the total annual burden 

hours are 16,003 x 3 year approval for 

a total of 48,010 burden hours for 3 

years. Additionally, the total annual 

responses are 34,166.66 x 3 year 

approval for a total of 102,500 total 

responses for 3 year approval. See the 3 

year approval estimates below. 

Affected Public: State, Local and 

Tribal Government; Individuals and 

Households; and Business or Other for 

Profit. 

Estimated Number of Respondents: 

102,500 respondents. 

Estimated Number of Responses per 

Respondent: 1 response. 

Estimated Total Annual Responses: 

102,500. 

Estimate of Time per Respondent: 

.46839024 hours. 

Estimated Total Annual Reporting 

Burden Hours: 48,010 hours. 

Collection instruments 

Estimated 

number 

respondents 

Responses 

annually per 

respondent 

Total annual 

responses 

Estimated 

average 

number of 

hours per 

response 

Estimated total 

hours 

Focus Group Screeners ....................................................... 10,000 1 10,000 0.167 1,670 

Interview Screeners/Surveys ............................................... 5,000 1 5,000 0.167 835 

Focus Groups ...................................................................... 5,500 1 5,500 2.00 11,000.00 

Intercept Interviews .............................................................. 5,000 1 5,000 0.50 2,500.00 

Dyad/Triad Interviews .......................................................... 2,000 1 2,000 1.00 2,000.00 

Telephone Interviews ........................................................... 10,000 1 10,000 0.25 2,500.00 

Surveys ................................................................................ 10,000 1 10,000 0.50 5,000.00 

Web-based Collections ........................................................ 40,000 1 40,000 0.50 20,000.00 

Confidentiality Agreements .................................................. 15,000 1 15,000 0.167 2,505.00 

Total Reporting Burden ................................................ 102,500 1 102,500 .468 48,010 

Dated: December 11, 2018. 

Brandon Lipps, 

Administrator, Food and Nutrition Service. 

[FR Doc. 2018–27443 Filed 12–19–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410–30–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Order Relating to Eric Baird 

In the Matter of: Eric Baird, 647 

Norsota Way Sarasota, FL 34242; 

Respondent; 16–BIS–0002. 

The Bureau of Industry and Security, 

U.S. Department of Commerce (‘‘BIS’’), 

has notified Eric Baird, of Sarasota, 

Florida (‘‘Baird’’), that it has initiated an 

administrative proceeding against Baird 

pursuant to Section 766.3 of the Export 

Administration Regulations (the 

‘‘Regulations’’),1 through the issuance of 

an Amended Charging Letter to Baird 

that alleges that Baird committed one 

hundred sixty-six (166) violations of the 

Regulations.2 Specifically, the charges 

are: 

Charges 1–166 15 CFR 764.2(b)— 

Causing, Aiding or Abetting a Violation 

1. On at least one hundred sixty-six (166) 

occasions beginning on or about August 1, 

2011, and continuing through on or about 

January 7, 2013, Baird caused, aided, abetted, 

commanded, induced and/or permitted 

(‘‘caused, aided or abetted’’) the doing of an 

act prohibited by, or the omission of an act 

required by, the Regulations. As further 

alleged below, Baird caused, aided or abetted 

the filing of false or misleading export 

control documents, namely Shipper’s Export 

Declarations and Automated Export System 

filings (‘‘SED/AES filings’’), and the failure to 

make required SED/AES filings, in 

connection with the export or attempted 

export of items subject to the Regulations. 

Baird also caused, aided or abetted the export 

and attempted export without the required 

BIS licenses of items subject to the 

Regulations and listed on the Commerce 

Control List (‘‘CCL’’). 

2. At all times pertinent hereto, Baird was 

Chief Executive Officer (‘‘CEO’’) of Access 

USA Shipping, LLC, d/b/a MyUS.com and 

f/k/a Access USA Shipping, Inc. (‘‘Access’’), 

a company originally registered in Florida 

that he founded in 1997. Baird was directly 

or indirectly Access’s primary shareholder 

until on or about August 28, 2012. After a 

partial sale of Access on or about August 28, 

2012, Baird continued to serve as its CEO and 

maintained a minority equity stake in the 

company with the right to appoint two 

members of Access’s board of directors. Baird 

was replaced as CEO of Access in or about 

September 2013. Baird’s interests, however, 

were not fully divested until on or about 

March 22, 2016, at which time he no longer 

had an equity interest in Access or the right 

to appoint board members. 

3. Access provided foreign customers with 

a U.S. physical address for items purchased 

from U.S. merchants for ultimate export from 

the United States. For a fee, Access provided 


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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 244 / Thursday, December 20, 2018 / Notices 65341 

3The maximum penalty figure that currently 

applies in this case is $295,141 per violation. See 

15 CFR 6.3(b); 83 FR 706 (Jan. 8, 2018). Since 

January 2008, the maximum penalties have been 

adjusted for inflation multiple times pursuant to the 

Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act 

Improvements Act of 2015, Sec. 701 of Public Law 

114–74, enacted on November 2, 2015. See also 15 

CFR 6.5. 

4A Schedule B number is a ten-digit number used 

in the United States to classify physical goods for 

export to another country. 

such customers a ‘‘suite,’’ which was a 

designated place or space at Access’s 

warehouse facilities to which customers 

could have items delivered from U.S. 

merchants. When Access received items that 

a foreign customer had ordered from a U.S. 

merchant, Access employees entered into 

Access’s order management system 

information regarding the name of the 

merchant, shipment tracking number, a 

detailed description of the item, and the 

value of the item. Before the shipment was 

exported from the United States, however, 

Access employees would revise the original 

item information, including the item’s value 

and/or its description, to generate an invoice 

that contained false or misleading 

information for use in connection with the 

export of the items. At times, Access’s order 

system included account notes that directed 

packaging or price tags be removed or that a 

shipment’s declared value be kept below a 

certain dollar amount. 

4. Baird established, directed, controlled, 

and/or authorized Access’s policy and 

practice of falsifying the value and 

description of items being exported or 

intended for export, including items listed on 

the CCL. Baird also at times personally 

participated in the undervaluing and misdescription of such items. 

5. Access routinely undervalued items 

using multiple different strategies or 

schemes, including, for example, by lowering 

values of items by 25%–50% depending on 

the country of destination. The extent of 

undervaluation reached or exceeded 75% on 

some occasions, and for some customers 

maximum declared values of no more than, 

for example, $50 or $100, were used, 

regardless of the true value of the items. 

6. Similarly, on numerous occasions, 

descriptions of CCL items or other items 

subject to the Regulations were altered to 

help avoid export control scrutiny and 

detection by law enforcement, including on 

occasions when the items also were 

undervalued. For example, a night vision 

lens converter was described as ‘‘camera 

lenses’’; laser sights as ‘‘tools and hardware’’; 

and rifle scopes as ‘‘sporting goods’’ or 

‘‘tools, handtools.’’ In one instance, rifle 

stocks and grips were described as ‘‘toy 

accessories.’’ Access’s October 2010 and 

October 2012 Customer Service Training 

Manuals illustrate the pervasiveness of 

altering descriptions of items, in part, to 

avoid export control scrutiny and detection, 

including those related to firearms and 

related parts that were considered prohibited 

or restricted items. 

7. Baird also established, directed, 

controlled, and/or authorized Access’s 

‘‘personal shopper program’’ or ‘‘alternative 

program.’’ Under this program, Access or an 

Access employee was presented to U.S. 

merchants as the purchaser and/or end-user 

of the items in situations where foreign 

customers were seeking products from U.S. 

merchants that did not accept foreign 

payment methods or had raised concerns that 

Access was not an end user and refused to 

sell or ship to Access because they wished 

to prevent the export of their goods, such as 

companies that sell weapons or weapon 

parts. Through this evasive program, Access 

purchased items for export to its foreign 

customers without informing the U.S. 

merchants that the items were intended for 

export. Foreign customers would email an 

Access employee their shopping list, and the 

Access employee would purchase the items 

using credit cards in Baird’s name, or using 

a credit card account or other payment 

mechanisms opened in the name of the 

individual employee, whom Access would 

subsequently reimburse. At times, shipments 

were delivered to the homes of Access 

employees so that, in addition to being 

misled to believe that a domestic customer 

was involved, the U.S. merchant would be 

misled to believe that Access itself was not 

involved in the transaction. 

8. As part of this ‘‘personal shopper 

program,’’ Baird directed or authorized 

Access employees to use his credit cards and 

driver’s license information to make 

purchases of items for export. In addition, 

Baird personally asked Access employees to 

apply for credit card accounts and have 

customer deliveries sent to their personal 

addresses to make the shipments appear as 

if they were for domestic customers. 

9. At all times relevant hereto, Baird knew 

of the Regulations and Access’s export 

control compliance obligations, including the 

need for items to be accurately valued and 

described for purposes of SED/AES filing 

requirements and the need to determine 

licensing requirements. Baird received this 

information through, for example, outreach 

visits from and other communications with 

BIS special agents and other federal law 

enforcement agents, as well as at various 

occasions through other Access officials or 

personnel and through companies that 

regularly served as freight forwarders or 

carriers in connection with export 

transactions involving Access. 

10. For example, on or about July 11, 2007, 

BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’) 

conducted an outreach visit to Access, during 

which a BIS Special Agent provided detailed 

oral and written information regarding 

compliance with the EAR and other U.S. 

export control laws and regulations. As part 

of this outreach visit, the BIS Special Agent 

met with Baird, including explaining that 

items should be checked for export license 

requirements and that customers should be 

screened. In addition, Access documents 

indicate that by no later than January 2008, 

Baird knew that false or misleading 

statements on SED/AES filings could lead to 

penalties of up to $250,000 per violation,3

and that by March 2008, Baird knew that a 

SED/AES filing must be made for each export 

when the value of the items under a single 

Schedule B number is more than $2,500.4

Access subsequently received Shield 

America outreach visits from the Department 

of Homeland Security, Homeland Security 

Investigations (‘‘HSI’’) on March 27, 2009, 

June 9, 2010, and January 10, 2012, 

respectively, during which HSI special agents 

provided compliance information. Baird 

attended the January 10, 2012 outreach visit. 

In addition, the BIS Special Agent provided 

detailed information on properly valuing 

items on export control documents during a 

telephone discussion with CEO Eric Baird on 

January 18, 2012, and a related follow-up 

email with him. 

11. Access documents also include 

correspondence among Baird and Access’s 

then-Chief Technology Officer (‘‘CTO’’) and 

other company officials indicating that Baird 

remained fully aware at and around the time 

of the violations alleged herein of SED/AES 

filing requirements and the potential 

significant sanctions for false or misleading 

statements on SED/AES filings. In emails in 

September 2011 to Baird, the CTO, who is 

Baird’s sister, provided information on a BIS 

enforcement case involving false or 

misleading reporting of declared value on 

export documents. In an email dated 

September 20, 2011, she included 

information describing BIS’s imposition of 

civil penalties as part of the settlement of a 

case involving repeat undervaluing of exports 

on Shipper’s Export Declarations and stated, 

inter alia: ‘‘I will not be a party to 

[undervaluation]. I know we’re doing it now. 

I know we have the means to avoid doing it. 

I know we are WILLINGLY AND 

INTENTIONALLY breaking the law.’’ 

(Emphasis in original). In the same email 

chain later that day, Baird suggested that 

Access could undervalue by 25% and if 

Access was ‘‘warned by [the U.S.] 

government,’’ then it ‘‘can stop ASAP.’’ 

12. Baird, however, did not stop Access’s 

undervaluing of exports or its or his related 

violations of the Regulations. Rather, almost 

immediately following this September 20, 

2011 email exchange, Baird and the CTO 

discussed on September 21, 2011, how 

Access’s order system would be modified to 

either automatically or manually undervalue 

where there was no merchant invoice. The 

order system would be and was in fact 

modified to enable undervaluing by a set 

percentage based on the country of 

destination for the export, if there was no 

U.S. merchant’s invoice or no value listed on 

the U.S. merchant’s invoice. Additionally, 

when a U.S. merchant’s invoice was included 

in a package received from a U.S. merchant, 

Access would remove the invoice at its 

customer’s request, both before and after the 

September 2011 modification of the order 

system. 

13. While Access for a short time did 

reduce the extent it engaged in its unlawful 

undervaluing activities, it fully resumed and 

even expanded those activities in no later 

than January 2012, pursuant to Baird’s 

direction and/or authorization. Beginning no 

later than on or about January 16, 2012, Baird 

directed or authorized that Access customers 

be notified that Access’s order system was 

being modified to remove the recent 

limitation on undervaluing and that Access 

would work together with them so that false 

values could be declared and undervalued to 

the extent of the customers’ choosing. 


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65342 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 244 / Thursday, December 20, 2018 / Notices 

5See note 1, supra. 

14. In doing the foregoing, Baird caused, 

aided or abetted Access, as well as 

forwarders and carriers involved in export 

transactions with Access, to make false or 

misleading SED/AES filings with the U.S. 

Government. Such false or misleading filings 

violate Section 764.2(g) of the Regulations. 

Baird also caused, aided or abetted the failure 

by Access and its forwarders and carriers to 

make required SED/AES filings. The failure 

to make a required SED/AES filing violates 

Section 764.2(a) of the Regulations. Baird 

also caused, aided or abetted the export and 

attempted export of items classified under 

Export Control Classification Number 

(‘‘ECCN’’) 0A987 and controlled for Crime 

Control reasons without the BIS licenses 

required pursuant to Section 742.7 of the 

Regulations to export the items to Argentina, 

Austria, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Libya, Saudi 

Arabia, South Africa and Yemen. Such 

unlicensed exports and attempted exports 

violated Section 764.2(a) and 764.2(c), 

respectively, of the Regulations. 

15. In so doing, Baird committed one 

hundred sixty-six violations of Section 

764.2(b) of the Regulations. 

Whereas, BIS and Baird have entered into 

a Settlement Agreement pursuant to Section 

766.18(b) of the Regulations, whereby they 

agreed to settle this matter in accordance 

with the terms and conditions set forth 

therein; 

Whereas, I have taken into consideration 

the admission of liability by Baird set forth 

in the Settlement Agreement with regard to 

the violations in the Amended Charging 

Letter; 

Whereas, I have also taken into 

consideration the plea agreement that Baird 

has entered into with the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office for the Middle District of Florida (‘‘the 

plea agreement’’); and 

Whereas, I have approved of the terms of 

such Settlement Agreement; 

It is therefore ordered: 

First, Baird shall be assessed a civil penalty 

in the amount of $17,000,000. Baird shall pay 

the U.S. Department of Commerce 

$10,000,000 not later than 30 days from the 

date of this Order. Payment of the remaining 

$7,000,000 shall be suspended for a period of 

five (5) years from the date of this Order, and 

thereafter shall be waived, provided that 

during this five-year payment probationary 

period, Baird has made full and timely 

payment of $10,000,000 as set forth above 

and has otherwise complied with the 

provisions of the Settlement Agreement and 

this Order, has complied in full with the plea 

agreement and any sentence imposed upon 

him following his conviction, and has 

committed no violation of the Export Control 

Reform Act of 2018 (‘‘ECRA’’) 5 or the 

Regulations or any order, license, or 

authorization issued thereunder. If Baird fails 

to comply with the terms of the Settlement 

Agreement or of this Order, or the terms of 

the plea agreement or sentence, or commits 

a violation of ECRA or the Regulations or any 

order, license, or authorization issued 

thereunder, during the five-year payment 

probationary period under this Order, the 

suspension of the civil penalty may be 

modified or revoked by BIS and the 

remaining $7,000,000 may become due and 

owing immediately. 

Second, pursuant to the Debt Collection 

Act of 1982, as amended (31 U.S.C. 3701– 

3720E (2012)), the civil penalty owed under 

this Order accrues interest as more fully 

described in the attached Notice, and if 

payment is not made by the due date 

specified herein, Baird will be assessed, in 

addition to the full amount of the civil 

penalty and interest, a penalty charge and an 

administrative charge, as more fully 

described in the attached Notice. 

Third, for a period of five (5) years from 

the date of this Order, Eric Baird, with a last 

known address of 647 Norsota Way, Sarasota, 

FL 34242, and when acting for or on his 

behalf, his successors, assigns, 

representatives, agents, or employees 

(hereinafter collectively referred to as the 

‘‘Denied Person’’), may not, directly or 

indirectly, participate in any way in any 

transaction involving any commodity, 

software or technology (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’) exported or 

to be exported from the United States that is 

subject to the Regulations, or in any other 

activity subject to the Regulations, including, 

but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any 

license, license exception, or export control 

document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or 

ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, 

delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the Regulations, or engaging in any 

other activity subject to the Regulations; or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported or to 

be exported from the United States that is 

subject to the Regulations, or from any other 

activity subject to the Regulations. 

Fourth, no person may, directly or 

indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of the 

Denied Person any item subject to the 

Regulations; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by the 

Denied Person of the ownership, possession, 

or control of any item subject to the 

Regulations that has been or will be exported 

from the United States, including financing 

or other support activities related to a 

transaction whereby the Denied Person 

acquires or attempts to acquire such 

ownership, possession or control; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or to 

facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from the Denied Person of any 

item subject to the Regulations that has been 

exported from the United States; 

D. Obtain from the Denied Person in the 

United States any item subject to the 

Regulations with knowledge or reason to 

know that the item will be, or is intended to 

be, exported from the United States; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service any 

item subject to the Regulations that has been 

or will be exported from the United States 

and which is owned, possessed or controlled 

by the Denied Person, or service any item, of 

whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or 

controlled by the Denied Person if such 

service involves the use of any item subject 

to the Regulations that has been or will be 

exported from the United States. For 

purposes of this paragraph, servicing means 

installation, maintenance, repair, 

modification or testing. 

Fifth, after notice and opportunity for 

comment as provided in Section 766.23 of 

the Regulations, any person related to the 

Denied Person by ownership, control, 

position of responsibility, affiliation, or other 

connection in the conduct of trade or 

business may also be made subject to the 

provisions of this Order. 

Sixth, the five-year denial period set forth 

above shall be active for a period of four (4) 

years from the date of this Order. As 

authorized by Section 766.18(c) of the 

Regulations, the remaining one (1) year of the 

denial period shall be suspended, and shall 

thereafter be waived five (5) years from the 

date of this Order, provided that Baird has 

made full and timely payment as set forth 

above, has otherwise complied with the 

provisions of the Settlement Agreement and 

this Order, has complied with the plea 

agreement and any sentence imposed upon 

or following the entry of his plea and 

conviction, and has committed no other 

violation of ECRA or the Regulations or any 

order, license, or authorization issued 

thereunder. If Baird does not make full and 

timely payment as set forth above or 

otherwise fails to comply with the Settlement 

Agreement or this Order, does not fully and 

timely comply with the plea agreement or 

sentence, or commits another violation of 

ECRA or the Regulations or any order, 

license, or authorization issued thereunder, 

the suspension of the remaining one year of 

the denial period may be modified or 

revoked by BIS. If Baird fails to comply with 

any of the above conditions after the fouryear active portion of the denial period but 

before five years from the date of this Order, 

the full one year suspended portion of the 

denial order may be imposed from the date 

BIS determines such violation occurred, and 

any license issued pursuant to ECRA or the 

Regulations in which the Denied Person has 

an interest at that time will be revoked. 

Seventh, Baird shall not take any action or 

make or permit to be made any public 

statement, directly or indirectly, denying the 

allegations in the Amended Charging Letter 

or this Order. 

Eighth, the Amended Charging Letter, the 

Settlement Agreement, and this Order shall 

be made available to the public. 

Ninth, this Order shall be served on Baird, 

and shall be published in the Federal 

Register. 

This Order, which constitutes the final 

agency action in this matter, is effective 

immediately. 

Issued on December 14, 2018. 

Douglas Hassebrock, 

Director, Office of Export Enforcement, 

performing the non-exclusive functions and 

duties of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce 

for Export Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2018–27572 Filed 12–19–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 


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