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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DAVID DERRY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 79 MDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 25, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Union County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-60-CR-0000078-2016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2019

Appellant, David Derry, appeals from the order denying his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 

We affirm.

On direct appeal, a panel of this Court set forth the history of this case 

as follows:

Briefly, on January 11, 2016, Appellant and two coconspirators stole merchandise from Walmart on two separate 

occasions during the same day and used a stolen vehicle to leave 

the store with the merchandise. Based on these incidents, 

Appellant was charged with the following: (1) receiving stolen 

property, (2) conspiracy to receive stolen property, (3) retail theft 

(amount of $1,935.21), (4) retail theft (amount of $186.48), (5) 

conspiracy to commit retail theft (amount of $1,935.21), (6) 

conspiracy to commit retail theft (amount of $186.48), 7) theft by 

unlawful taking, and (8) conspiracy to commit theft by unlawful 

taking. See Amended Criminal Information, 3/8/2016.

On March 9, 2016, the Commonwealth filed notice of its 

intent to consolidate the trials of Appellant and his co-conspirators 
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pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(B)(1). After one continuance was 

granted at Appellant’s request, the trial court ordered that jury 

selection occur on July 25, 2016. Jury selection only for 

Appellant’s case occurred that day. Also on that day, the trial 

court ordered that trial would begin on September 20, 2016.

On September 20, 2016, 31 minutes prior to trial’s 

commencement, Appellant filed a motion in limine arguing, inter 

alia, that because he was not being tried together with his coconspirators, the “conspiracy charges [should] be dismissed.” 

N.T., 9/20/2016, at 4; see also Motion in Limine, 9/20/2016. The 

Commonwealth responded that it was the prerogative of the 

prosecutor to decide whether to try co-conspirators together, and 

despite its prior notice, the Commonwealth had chosen not to do 

so in this situation. The Commonwealth also suggested it was too 

late to raise this issue, as Appellant was aware he was being tried 

separately at jury selection in July. The trial court denied 

Appellant’s motion in limine, and Appellant proceeded to his jury 

trial. At the conclusion of the jury trial, the trial court granted 

Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to counts 7 and 8. 

N.T., 9/20/2016, at 188. The jury found Appellant guilty of the 

first six counts in the information. The trial court did not schedule 

sentencing.

On January 4, 2017, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss this 

case because he was not sentenced within 90 days of his 

conviction pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 704. On the following day, 

the Commonwealth filed a motion to request expedited sentencing 

in this matter. On January 9, 2017, Appellant was sentenced [to 

serve an aggregate term of incarceration of forty-two months to

ten years]. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion. The 

motion was denied by order docketed on March 3, 2017. Appellant 

timely filed a notice of appeal.

Commonwealth v. Derry, 181 A.3d 1264, 614 MDA 2017 (Pa. Super. filed 

December 22, 2017) (unpublished memorandum at 1-3). This Court affirmed 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Id. at 11.
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On January 22, 2018, Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal 

with our Supreme Court. On February 8, 2018, Appellant discontinued his 

appeal.

On February 15, 2018, Appellant filed, pro se, the instant PCRA petition. 

On February 21, 2018, the PCRA court appointed counsel, who then filed an 

amended PCRA petition. The Commonwealth filed a response on July 16, 

2018. The PCRA court held hearings on August 21, 2018, and October 25, 

2018. On October 25, 2018, the PCRA court entered an order denying relief. 

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the PCRA court erred by finding that trial counsel did 

not provide ineffective assistance by failing to file a suppression 

motion to challenge the police’s warrantless entry into the hotel 

room where Appellant/Defendant and his codefendants were 

found and arrested?

II. Whether the PCRA court erred by refusing to continue the 

proceedings to allow counsel to investigate a witness who 

Appellant/Defendant has reason to believe had recently returned 

to the area and had information pertaining to the suppression 

issue, to wit, the owner of the motel where the 

Appellant/Defendant was found and arrested following a 

warrantless entry into his motel room?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we 

consider the record “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the 

PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 
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2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(en banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of 

record supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is 

free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. 

Super. 2012). We grant great deference to the PCRA court’s findings that are 

supported in the record and will not disturb them unless they have no support 

in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. 

Super. 2014).

Appellant first argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

by failing to file a suppression motion. Appellant’s Brief at 11-14. Appellant 

contends that counsel should have filed the suppression motion to challenge 

the warrantless entry by police into the hotel room where Appellant was 

discovered and arrested. Id. at 11. Appellant asserts that none of the 

exceptions to the warrant requirement were present. Id. at 12. However, 

Appellant concedes that, if the police were in a common area when they 

knocked on Appellant’s door, there is merit to the Commonwealth’s claim that 

the police entry was constitutional. Specifically, Appellant states the 

following:

Admittedly, there is an unresolved wrinkle within the 

suppression issue presented in this case. The troopers testified 

that the [common] kitchenette area was not secured by a 

locked door (N.T. Dolney Suppression Hearing, 01/19/17, p. 77 

(herein after “Dolney”)), while Appellate [sic] testified that he 

was given a key to access that area and believed it to be 

part of the area he rented, (PCRA II at 29-30). “The crucial 

distinction between protected and unprotected areas ... is whether 
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an unrelated person had unfettered access to the area. If even 

one unrelated person has an unfettered right to access an area, 

the area is not protected ....” Commonwealth v. Reed, 851 A.2d 

958, 962 (Pa. Super. 2004).

In other words, if the troopers’ version is credited, their 

entry into the first room is constitutional. However, if 

Appellant’s version is credited, their entry into the first 

room is unconstitutional and all evidence obtained after 

that point should have been suppressed. Notably, the 

Commonwealth has the burden to establish that the search was 

constitutional. See, Pa.R.Crim.Pro. 581(H). The Commonwealth 

put on no evidence regarding the layout of the Valley Lodge; 

therefore, the decision to deny Appellant relief as to this issue is 

based solely upon a negative assessment of [Appellant’s] 

credibility.

Appellant’s Brief at 12-13 (emphases added).

Appellant essentially admits that, if the area in front of the door to the 

room that he occupied was a common area, the state troopers had a 

constitutional right to be in the space. Conversely, Appellant posits that, if 

the area was not a common space, the police entry into that area was 

unconstitutional, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 

suppress.

Appellant’s issue challenges the effective assistance of his trial counsel. 

Our Supreme Court has long stated that, in order to succeed on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that (1) the 

underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s performance lacked a 

reasonable basis; and (3) the ineffectiveness of counsel caused the appellant 

prejudice. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001).
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We observe that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not selfproving. Commonwealth v. Wharton, 811 A.2d 978, 986 (Pa. 2002). In 

addition, we note that where an appellant is not entitled to relief with regard 

to the underlying claim upon which his ineffectiveness issue is premised, he 

is not entitled to relief with regard to his ineffectiveness challenge. 

Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2011). Thus, 

trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless 

claim. Commonwealth v. Loner, 836 A.2d 125, 132 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en 

banc).

Moreover, with regard to the second prong, we have reiterated that trial 

counsel’s approach must be “so unreasonable that no competent lawyer would 

have chosen it.” Commonwealth v. Ervin, 766 A.2d 859, 862-863 (Pa. 

Super. 2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Miller, 431 A.2d 233 (Pa. 1981)).

Our Supreme Court has discussed “reasonableness” as follows:

Our inquiry ceases and counsel’s assistance is deemed 

constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the 

particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis 

designed to effectuate his client’s interests. The test is not 

whether other alternatives were more reasonable, employing a 

hindsight evaluation of the record. Although weigh the 

alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of 

effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel’s 

decision had any reasonable basis.

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987) (quoting 

Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 235 A.2d 349 (Pa. 

1967)) (emphasis in original).
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In addition, we are mindful that prejudice requires proof that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of the 

proceeding would have been different. Pierce, 786 A.2d at 213. “A failure 

to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim 

of ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa. 

2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Sneed, 899 A.2d 1067 (Pa. 2006)). Thus, 

when it is clear that a petitioner has failed to meet the prejudice prong of an 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the claim may be disposed of on that 

basis alone, without a determination of whether the first two prongs have been 

met. Commonwealth v. Baker, 880 A.2d 654, 656 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Further, it is presumed that the petitioner’s counsel was effective unless 

the petitioner proves otherwise. Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 

1167, 1177 (Pa. 1999). Moreover, we are bound by the PCRA court’s 

credibility determinations where there is support for them in the record. 

Commonwealth v. Battle, 883 A.2d 641, 648 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79 (Pa. 1998)).

We note that questions of the admission and exclusion of evidence are 

within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal 

absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Freidl, 834 A.2d 638, 641 

(Pa. Super. 2003). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as 

factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 
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their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa. 

Super. 2006).

We are aware that when presented with a challenge to the admission of 

evidence, Pa.R.Crim.P. 581, which addresses the suppression of evidence, 

provides in relevant part as follows:

(H) The Commonwealth shall have the burden . . . of 

establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in 

violation of the defendant’s rights.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect 

individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby 

ensuring the “right of each individual to be let alone.” 

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236, 36 L. Ed. 2d 

854, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973); Commonwealth v. Blair, 394 Pa. 

Super. 207, 575 A.2d 593, 596 (Pa. Super. 1990).

Commonwealth v. By, 812 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2002).

Our Supreme Court has long held that a defendant seeking suppression 

of seized evidence has the initial burden of establishing standing and a 

legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or the items seized. 

Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 718 A.2d 265, 267 (Pa. 1998). “There is no 

question that under Pennsylvania law, a defendant charged with a possessory 

offense has automatic standing to challenge a search.” Commonwealth v. 

Perea, 791 A.2d 427, 429 (Pa. Super. 2002). “However, in order to prevail, 

the defendant, as a preliminary matter, must show that he had a privacy 

interest in the area searched.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 
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457 (Pa. 1983)). “[A] defendant cannot prevail upon a suppression motion 

unless he demonstrates that the challenged police conduct violated his own, 

personal privacy interests.” Commonwealth v. Hunter, 963 A.2d 545, 553 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680 (Pa. 

2005)).

An expectation of privacy is present when the individual, by his 

conduct, exhibits an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and 

that the subjective expectation is one that society is prepared to 

recognize as reasonable. The constitutional legitimacy of an 

expectation of privacy is not dependent on the subjective intent 

of the individual asserting the right but on whether the 

expectation is reasonable in light of all the surrounding 

circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 620 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa. 1993) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). As our Supreme Court has noted, “a 

guest in a motel or hotel room has a legitimate expectation of privacy during 

the period of time it is rented.” Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 620 A.2d 

1115, 1118 (Pa. 1993).

However, as this Court has explained regarding common areas, a tenant 

does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the common hallway and 

stairs of a multiunit apartment building. Commonwealth v. Reed, 851 A.2d 

958, 962 (Pa. Super. 2004). The holding in Reed was based upon the fact 

that a tenant does not have the right to exclude residents or other authorized 

individuals from accessing the shared areas in an apartment building. The 

Reed Court held: “The crucial distinction between protected and unprotected 

areas ... is whether an unrelated person has unfettered access to the area. If 
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even one unrelated person has access to an area, the area is not protected in 

Pennsylvania from government searches and seizures.” Id. (footnotes 

omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Murphy, 795 A.2d 997, 1004 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (finding no expectation of privacy in an apartment building’s 

common storage room to which numerous residents, employees, and the 

utility company all had keys).

At the conclusion of the PCRA hearing, the court offered the following 

thoughts with respect to this claim of ineffective assistance lacking merit:

[Appellant] testified he was asleep, and the first thing he 

remembered was the police yelling at him and shining flashlights 

at him to get up and get out, that it was the police. But then he 

wants to backtrack and testify as to events that occurred while he 

was asleep. There’s no credibility there once again. Even looking 

at the drawing [of the motel], I don’t find [Appellant’s] testimony 

credible as to the entry of the first door. The [c]ourt would note 

that to get in to the office of this [establishment], you have to go 

through the first door, and the office accesses this [same 

common] area prior to going in to room two that’s marked there. 

Room two has a separate door, with the bed and bathroom in it 

that’s separate from the [common] area with the kitchenette, 

table, and couch. Whoever’s going in and out of that office, has 

to get in to that [common] area. Of course [Appellant] would 

have received a key if that door is locked, as would anyone that’s 

going in to that [common] area.

The [c]ourt does not find that [Appellant’s] testimony of the 

information in the drawing would have changed the outcome of 

the suppression motion that was addressed by President Judge 

Hudock in the companion case of Commonwealth versus Dolney,[1]

where Judge Hudock denied [Dolney’s] Motion To Suppress the 

Evidence, which [Appellant] in this case, is claiming his trial 

counsel was ineffective in [not] raising it. [Dolney’s motion] was 

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1 Jerome Dolney was also discovered in the motel room with Appellant and 

was charged with various crimes.
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decided subsequent ... to this case, by Judge Hudock. The 

additional facts provided by [Appellant] do not persuade the 

[c]ourt that the error – or that Judge Hudock’s decision was in 

error. ...

So that issue [of ineffective assistance], [Appellant] has 

failed to meet his burden.

N.T., 10/25/18, at 80-81. We are constrained to agree with the PCRA court.

Our review of the record reflects that, at the PCRA hearing held on 

October 25, 2018, the transcript from the suppression hearing held in the 

matter of Commonwealth v. Jerome Dolney, CP-60-CR-0000124-2016, on 

January 19, 2017, was made part of the record. N.T., 10/25/18, at 9-11. At 

the suppression hearing, both state troopers, who were present for the arrest 

of Appellant, testified regarding the circumstances surrounding their discovery 

of Appellant in a motel room. N.T., 1/19/17, at 49-70, 72-80.

Trooper Mark Evans testified that he and Trooper Anthony Bickhart were 

dispatched to the Valley Lodge Motel in Shamokin Dam, Pennsylvania, to 

investigate a stolen vehicle and “the subjects [who] were wanted in connection 

with a theft [at a Walmart store].” N.T., 1/19/17, at 50. Upon arriving at the 

motel parking lot, the officers discovered the vehicle in question, the interior 

of which contained items matching the list of products stolen from the Walmart 

store. Id. at 51-52. The officers then entered the motel in an effort to find 

the people associated with the vehicle. Id. at 52. The officers proceeded to 

the front desk, which was unoccupied. Id. However, there was a note on the 

front desk asking the “Occupants of Room 2” to “leave the key at the desk.” 
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Id. Because room two was close to the front desk, the two officers 

approached the door to the room, and Trooper Bickhart knocked on the door. 

Id. When Trooper Bickhart knocked on the door, the door opened. Id. at 52-

53. The officers then noticed two people on a bed, one of whom resembled a 

picture of the perpetrators of the theft, which Trooper Evans had in his 

possession. Id. at 53. The officers then asked the two occupants to “come 

out into the common area.” Id.

Likewise, Trooper Bickhart testified that when he knocked on the door 

to room two, “[t]he door wasn’t even secured. It just opened.” N.T., 1/19/17, 

at 73. The officer further stated that when the male on the bed appeared to 

match the person in the photograph, the officers “requested that the 

occupants of the room step out into a communal area.” Id. at 74. When 

asked to describe the common area, Trooper Bickhart offered the following:

Well, initially when you walk in the front door [of the motel], I 

believe you go up -- you have a choice to go up or down. You're 

kind of on a level surface when you first walk in. At the top of the 

steps, I’m going to say that's where the [front] desk was with the 

note on it. And then we went through to the right, I believe it was 

kind of a double door archway. There was more like a living room 

area, couch, chairs, and just a large -- larger communal area.

Id. at 76-77. Trooper Bickhart further observed that the common area is 

“open clearly to the public when they first walk in.” Id. at 77.

In light of the above testimony offered at Dolney’s suppression hearing, 

and incorporated into the record at Appellant’s PCRA hearing, we conclude 

that the troopers were in a communal area when they approached the door to 
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the motel room occupied by Appellant and knocked. Accordingly, Appellant 

did not have a privacy interest in this common space, and the police were not 

prevented from entering that area lawfully. Thus, there is no merit to the 

underlying claim that would support Appellant’s allegation that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion based upon the police 

activity. Hence, Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

Appellant next argues that the PCRA court erred in refusing to grant a 

continuance in the PCRA proceedings. Appellant’s Brief at 15-17. Appellant 

claims that the PCRA court should have granted a continuance in order “to 

allow [PCRA] counsel to investigate the whereabouts and potential testimony 

of a witness that Appellant had reason to believe had recently returned to the 

country.” Id. at 15. Appellant claims that the owner of the motel recently 

returned to the United States and could offer “dispositive testimony” regarding 

the suppression claim. Id. Appellant asserts that the “denial of this 

opportunity constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id.

The decision of whether to grant or deny a request for a 

continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. 

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 546 Pa. 370, 387, 685 A.2d 96, 

104 (1996). In this context, our Supreme Court has defined 

“abuse of discretion” as follows:

An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of 

judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is 

overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised 

is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or 

the record, discretion is abused.
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Id. The refusal to grant a continuance constitutes reversible error 

only if “prejudice or a palpable and manifest abuse of discretion is 

demonstrated.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 12 (Pa. 

Super. 2002).

Commonwealth v. Pries, 861 A.2d 951, 953 (Pa. Super. 2004). “As we 

have consistently stated, an abuse of discretion is not merely an error (sic) 

judgment.” Commonwealth v. Prysock, 972 A.2d 539, 541 (Pa. Super. 

2009).

Our review of the record reflects that at the second PCRA hearing, which 

was held on October 25, 2018, PCRA counsel alerted the court that counsel 

had recently become aware of a potential witness. The following transpired 

when PCRA counsel initially suggested that the record be left open in order to 

investigate the additional witness:

THE COURT: Do you need additional time to prepare?

[APPELLANT]: I do.

[PCRA COUNSEL]: Well, we would – I believe it’s appropriate to 

leave the record open ... . [Appellant] also did recently, as in 

this morning, let me know of another potential witness as to 

the suppression issue. But I didn’t want to delay things any 

further as far as getting [Appellant’s] testimony on record today.

THE COURT: Well, if he’s just letting you know about a new 

witness, I’m not leaving it open for that. We’re – otherwise, we 

will continue this . . . forever.

[PCRA COUNSEL]: We had no way of communicating beforehand 

as far as that witness goes. It’s a witness who we understand 

recently returned to the country. And again, I can’t even – I can’t 

even verify that because I just learned about it this morning, 

Judge.

N.T., 10/25/18, at 62-63 (emphases added).
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At the conclusion of the PCRA hearing, the following transpired, in which 

PCRA counsel again suggested that the matter be continued in order to 

investigate the potential witness:

[PCRA COUNSEL]: As discussed earlier, I would ask that the 

record be kept open that I could investigate the witness that 

[Appellant] was only able to inform me about today due to 

communication difficulties we have had with the state prison 

system.

THE COURT: How many times have you ... . How many times have 

you spoke [sic] with [Appellant] about this case prior to this 

proceeding, including the last time we were in court, [PCRA 

counsel]?

[PCRA COUNSEL]: I visited [Appellant] at SCI Benner in June. At 

that time, we – I remember specifically talking to him about the 

hotel owner. He informed me, at that point, [the hotel owner] 

was out of the country. And that was kind of a dead end at that 

point. I believe there was a letter exchanged prior to the first 

hearing. And then that’s about when the difficulties with the state 

prison system started with the mail. It’s not just been [Appellant], 

Your Honor. I’ve had other clients in state prison.

THE COURT: Oh, no. I’m not questioning the communication 

issues at the state prison. But you were here on August 21st. So 

you had the ability, and I am assuming, did talk face-to-face with 

[Appellant].

[PCRA COUNSEL]: Absolutely.

THE COURT: Because that was continued. And [Appellant] didn’t 

mention that other witness to you at that point?

[PCRA COUNSEL]: I don’t know that he was aware of it at that 

point.

THE COURT: Okay.

[PCRA COUNSEL]: What [Appellant] is telling me is he’s hearing 

about this guy being back in the area from conversations he had 

in jail after his hearing.
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THE COURT: But he would have been aware of the witness at the 

time of the trial. If he wasn’t aware of the witness in August of 

this year, long after the trial, how could [Defense Counsel] be 

ineffective for not having a witness here? Would you agree with 

me?

[PCRA COUNSEL]: I’m sorry, Your Honor. I’m not – I don’t know 

if that witness was discussed with [Defense Counsel]. I didn’t 

know to ask [Defense Counsel] about it until this morning.

THE COURT: Okay. I’m not continuing it. This is the second day 

of these proceedings. I’m making a decision today.

N.T., 10/25/18, at 75-77.

We conclude that Appellant has failed to establish an abuse of discretion 

by the PCRA court in declining to grant his motion for continuance. Appellant

has failed to demonstrate that in reaching a conclusion, the PCRA court has 

overridden or misapplied the law. Further, Appellant has not established that 

the judgment exercised by the PCRA court was manifestly unreasonable, or 

the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Accordingly, Appellant has 

not shown that the PCRA court’s decision refusing to continue this matter 

constituted an abuse of discretion. Consequently, Appellant’s claim lacks 

merit.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/14/2019