NEW WORLD COMING:

AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

MAJOR THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS

The Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment

for the First Quarter of the 21st Century 

The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

September 15, 1999
Preface

In 1947, President Harry Truman signed into law the National Security Act, the landmark U

national security legislation of the latter half of the 20th century. The 1947 legislation has ser

us well. It has undergirded our diplomatic efforts, provided the basis to establish our military ca

bilities, and focused our intelligence assets. 

But the world has changed dramatically in the last fifty years, and particularly in the 

decade. Institutions designed in another age may or may not be appropriate for the future. It is 

mandate of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century to examine prec

ly that question. It has undertaken to do so in three phases: the first to describe the world emerg

in the first quarter of the next century, the second to design a national security strategy appro

ate to that world, and the third to propose necessary changes to the national security structur

order to implement that strategy effectively. This paper, together with its supporting research 

analysis, fulfills the first of these phases. As co-chairs of the Commission, we are pleased 

present it to the American people.

Gary Hart

Warren B. Rudman
Gary Hart

Co-Chair

Anne Armstrong

Commissioner

John Dancy

Commissioner

Leslie H. Gelb

Commissioner

Lee H. Hamilton

Commissioner

Donald B. Rice

Commissioner

Harry D. Train

Commissioner

Warren B. Rudman

Co-Chair

Norman R. Augustine

Commissioner

John R. Galvin

Commissioner

Newt Gingrich

Commissioner

Lionel H. Olmer

Commissioner

James Schlesinger

Commissioner

Andrew Young

Commissioner

U.S. COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21st CENTURY
MAJOR THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS 

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 

This paper consists of four parts: a contextual introduction; an articulation of

twelve basic assumptions and observations;

fourteen key conclusions about the global environment of the next quarter century; and a

statement of their essential meaning for

American national security strategy in the 21st

century. The U.S. Commission on National

Security/21st Century will build upon this

foundation to recommend a new strategy for

the advancement of American interests and

values. It will then propose, as necessary, new

structures and processes for U.S. foreign and

security policies in order to implement that

strategy. 

Introduction

In the next century, the spread of knowledge, the development of new technologies,

and an increasing recognition of common

global problems will present vast opportunities

for economic growth, regional integration, and

global political cooperation. The size of the

world’s middle class may increase many times

over, lifting literally tens of millions of people

from the depredations of poverty and disease.

Authoritarian regimes will increasingly

founder as they try to insulate their populations

from a world brimming with free-flowing

information, new economic opportunities, and

spreading political freedoms. We may thus see

the rise of many new democracies and the

strengthening of several older ones. However

fragile this process may be, it holds the hope of

less conflict in the world than exists today.

Realizing these possibilities, however, will

require concerted action on the part of the

United States and other mature democracies

around the world. Active American engagement cannot prevent all problems, but wise

policies can mitigate many of them. The United

States and governments of kindred spirit must

work harder to prevent conflicts as well 

respond to them after the fact. Otherwise, 

promise of the next century may never 

realized, for greater global connectedness 

lead to an increased possibility of misfortun

well as benefit. 

The future is one of rising stakes. W

humanity has an unprecedented opportunity 

succor its poor, heal its sick, compose its 

agreements, and find new purpose in comm

global goals, failure at these tasks co

produce calamity on a worldwide scale. Tha

to the continuing integration of global finan

networks, economic downturns that were o

normally episodic and local may become m

systemic and fully global in their harm

effects. Isolated epidemics could metasta

into global pandemics. The explosion in sc

tific discoveries now under way bears 

potential of near miraculous benefit 

humanity; misused, in the hands of despots, 

new science could become a tool of genoc

on an unprecedented scale. During the next 

years, dilemmas arising from advances 

biotechnology increasingly will force so

cultures to reexamine the very foundation

their ethical structures. As society changes, 

concept of national security will expand 

our political values will be tested. In ev

sphere, our moral imaginations will be ex

cised anew.

For all that will be novel in the n

century, some things will not change. Histor

principles will still apply. There will still 

great powers, and their interaction in pursui

their own self-interests will still matter. As e

much will depend on the sagacity and g

character of leadership. Misunderstandin

misjudgments, and mistakes will still occur, 

so will acts of bravery borne on the insigh

exceptional men and women. 
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 

2 NEW WORLD COMING

Today, and in the world we see emerging,

American leadership will be of paramount

importance. The American moment in world

history will not last forever; nothing wrought

by man does. But for the time being, a heavy

responsibility rests on both its power and its

values. It is a rare moment and a special opportunity in history when the acknowledged

dominant global power seeks neither territory

nor political empire. Every effort must be made

to ensure that this responsibility is discharged

wisely. It is to this end that our study is ultimately directed.
MAJOR THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS 

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 

Our View of the Future

As we look to the future, we believe

that:

1. An economically strong United States is

likely to remain a primary political,

military, and cultural force through 2025,

and will thus have a significant role in

shaping the international environment. 

2. The stability and direction of American

society and politics will help shape U.S.

foreign policy goals and capacities, and

hence the way the United States may affect

the global future.

3. Science and technology will continue to

advance and become more widely available

and utilized around the world, but their

benefits will be less evenly distributed.

4. World energy supplies will remain largely

based on fossil fuels.

5. While much of the world will experience

economic growth, disparities in income

will increase and widespread poverty will

persist.

6. The international aspects of business and

commerce (trade, transportation, telecommunications, investment and finance,

manufacturing, and professional services)

will continue to expand.

7. Non-governmental organizations (refugee

aid organizations, religious and ethnic

advocacy groups, environmental and other

single-issue lobbies, international professional associations, and others) wi

continue to grow in importance

numbers, and in their international role

8. Though it will raise important issues o

sovereignty, the United States will fin

it in its national interest to work wit

and strengthen a variety of internation

al organizations.

9. The United States will remain the prin

cipal military power in the world. 

10. Weapons of mass destruction (nuclea

chemical, and biological) and weapon

of mass disruption (informatio

warfare) will continue to proliferate t

a wider range of state and non-stat

actors. Maintenance of a robust nuclea

deterrent therefore remains essential a

well as investment in new forms o

defense against these threats. 

11. We should expect conflicts in whic

adversaries, because of cultural affin

ties different from our own, will reso

to forms and levels of violenc

shocking to our sensibilities.

12. As the United States confronts a variet

of complex threats, it will often b

dependent on allies; but it will fin

reliable alliances more difficult t

establish and sustain.
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 

4 NEW WORLD COMING

Conclusions

On the basis of the foregoing beliefs, and

our understanding of the broad context of the

international security environment that will

emerge over the next quarter century, we

conclude that:

1. America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland,

and our military superiority will not

entirely protect us.

The United States will be both absolutely and

relatively stronger than any other state or combination of states. Although a global competitor

to the United States is unlikely to arise over the

next 25 years, emerging powers—either singly

or in coalition—will increasingly constrain

U.S. options regionally and limit its strategic

influence. As a result, we will remain limited

in our ability to impose our will, and we will be

vulnerable to an increasing range of threats

against American forces and citizens overseas

as well as at home. American influence will

increasingly be both embraced and resented

abroad, as U.S. cultural, economic, and political power persists and perhaps spreads. States,

terrorists, and other disaffected groups will

acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass

disruption, and some will use them. Americans

will likely die on American soil, possibly in

large numbers.

2. Rapid advances in information and

biotechnologies will create new vulnerabilities for U.S. security.

Governments or groups hostile to the United

States and its interests will gain access to

advanced technologies. They will seek to

counter U.S. military advantages through the

possession of these technologies and their

actual use in non-traditional attacks. Moreover,

as our society becomes increasingly dependent

on knowledge-based technology for produc

goods and providing services, new vulnerab

ties to such attacks will arise. 

3. New technologies will divide the world 

well as draw it together.

In the next century people around the world 

both developed and developing countries 

be able to communicate with each other alm

instantaneously. New technologies w

increase productivity and create a transnatio

cyberclass of people. We will see much gre

mobility and emigration among educated el

from less to more developed societies. We 

be increasingly deluged by information, 

have less time to process and interpret it. 

will learn to cure illnesses, prolong and enr

life, and routinely clone it, but at the same ti

advances in bio-technology will create m

dilemmas. An anti-technology backlash 

possible, and even likely, as the adoption 

emerging technologies creates new mo

cultural, and economic divisions.

4. The national security of all advan

states will be increasingly affected by 

vulnerabilities of the evolving glo

economic infrastructure. 

The economic future will be more difficul

predict and to manage. The emergence 

strengthening of significant global econo

actors will cause realignments of econo

power. Global changes in the next quar

century will produce opportunities 

vulnerabilities. Overall global econo

growth will continue, albeit unevenly. At 

same time, economic integration and fragm

tation will co-exist. Serious and unexpec

economic downturns, major disparities 

wealth, volatile capital flows, increasing v

nerabilities in global electronic infrastructu

labor and social disruptions, and pressures 
MAJOR THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS 

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 

increased protectionism will also occur. Many

countries will be simultaneously more wealthy

and more insecure. Some societies will find it

difficult to develop the human capital and

social cohesion necessary to employ new technologies productively. Their frustrations will be

endemic and sometimes dangerous. For most

advanced states, major threats to national

security will broaden beyond the purely

military.

5. Energy will continue to have major 

strategic significance.

Although energy distribution and consumption

patterns will shift, we are unlikely to see

dramatic changes in energy technology on a

world scale in the next quarter century.

Demand for fossil fuel will increase as major

developing economies grow, increasing most

rapidly in Asia. American dependence on

foreign sources of energy will also grow over

the next two decades. In the absence of events

that alter significantly the price of oil, the stability of the world oil market will continue to

depend on an uninterrupted supply of oil from

the Persian Gulf, and the location of all key

fossil fuel deposits will retain geopolitical significance.

6. All borders will be more porous; some will

bend and some will break.

New technologies will continue to stretch and

strain all existing borders—physical and social.

Citizens will communicate with and form allegiances to individuals or movements anywhere

in the world. Traditional bonds between states

and their citizens can no longer be taken for

granted, even in the United States. Many countries will have difficulties keeping dangers out

of their territories, but their governments will

still be committed to upholding the integrity of

their borders. Global connectivity will allow

"big ideas" to spread quickly around the glo

Some ideas may be religious in nature, so

populist, some devoted to democracy 

human rights. Whatever their content, the st

will be set for mass action to have social imp

beyond the borders and control of exis

political structures.

7. The sovereignty of states will come un

pressure, but will endure.

The international system will wrestle const

ly over the next quarter century to establish 

proper balance between fealty to the state 

the one hand, and the impetus to build effec

transnational institutions on the other. T

struggle will be played out in the debate o

international institutions to regulate finan

markets, international policing and pea

making agencies, as well as several ot

shared global problems. Nevertheless, glo

forces, especially economic ones, will conti

to batter the concept of national sovereig

The state, as we know it, will also face c

lenges to its sovereignty under the mandate 

evolving international law and by disaffec

groups, including terrorists and crimin

Nonetheless, the principle of national sov

eignty will endure, albeit in changed forms

8. Fragmentation or failure of states 

occur, with destabilizing effects on nei

boring states. 

Global and regional dynamics will norm

bind states together, but events in major co

tries will still drive whether the world 

peaceful or violent. States will differ in t

ability to seize technological and econo

opportunities, establish the social and polit

infrastructure necessary for economic grow

build political institutions responsive to 

aspirations of their citizens, and find the le

ership necessary to guide them through an 
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 

6 NEW WORLD COMING

of uncertainty and risk. Some important states

may not be able to manage these challenges

and could fragment or fail. The result will be an

increase in the rise of suppressed nationalisms,

ethnic or religious violence, humanitarian disasters, major catalytic regional crises, and the

spread of dangerous weapons.

9. Foreign crises will be replete with atrocities and the deliberate terrorizing of

civilian populations.

Interstate wars will occur over the next 25

years, but most violence will erupt from conflicts internal to current territorial states. As the

desire for self-determination spreads, and many

governments fail to adapt to new economic and

social realities, minorities will be less likely to

tolerate bad or prejudicial government. In consequence, the number of new states,

international protectorates, and zones of

autonomy will increase, and many will be born

in violence. The major powers will struggle to

devise an accountable and effective institutional response to such crises.

10. Space will become a critical and competitive military environment.

The U.S. use of space for military purposes will

expand, but other countries will also learn to

exploit space for both commercial and military

purposes. Many other countries will learn to

launch satellites to communicate and spy.

Weapons will likely be put in space. Space will

also become permanently manned.

11. The essence of war will not change. 

Despite the proliferation of highly sophisticated and remote means of attack, the essence of

war will remain the same. There will be casualties, carnage, and death; it will not be like a

video game. What will change will be 

kinds of actors and the weapons available 

them. While some societies will attempt 

limit violence and damage, others will seek 

maximize them, particularly against those s

eties with a lower tolerance for casualties.

12. U.S. intelligence will face more challe

ing adversaries, and even excell

intelligence will not prevent all surpris

Micro-sensors and electronic communicati

will continue to expand intelligence collec

capabilities around the world. As a result of 

proliferation of other technologies, howe

many countries and disaffected groups 

develop techniques of denial and deception 

an attempt to thwart U.S. intelligence effort

despite U.S. technological superiority. In 

event, the United States will continue 

confront strategic shocks, as intellige

analysis and human judgments will fail 

detect all dangers in an ever-changing worl

13. The United States will be called upon f

quently to intervene militarily in a tim

uncertain alliances and with the prosp

of fewer forward-deployed forces. 

Political changes abroad, economic consid

tions, and the increased vulnerability of U

bases around the world will increase pressu

on the United States to reduce substantially 

forward military presence in Europe and A

In dealing with security crises, the 21st cent

will be characterized more by episodic "pos

of the willing" than the traditional World W

II-style alliance systems. The United States 

increasingly find itself wishing to form co

tions but increasingly unable to find partn

willing and able to carry out combined mili

operations.
MAJOR THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS 

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 

14. The emerging security environment in the

next quarter century will require different

military and other national capabilities.

The United States must act together with its

allies to shape the future of the international

environment, using all the instruments of

American diplomatic, economic, and military

power. The type of conflict in which this

country will generally engage in the first

quarter of the 21st century will require sustainable military capabilities characterized by

stealth, speed, range, unprecedented

accuracy, lethality, strategic mobil

superior intelligence, and the overall will 

ability to prevail. It is essential to main

U.S. technological superiority, despite 

unavoidable tension between acquisition 

advanced capabilities and the maintenance 

current capabilities. The mix and effect

ness of overall American capabilities need 

be rethought and adjusted, and substan

changes in non-military national capabili

will also be needed. Discriminating and h

choices will be required. 
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 

8 NEW WORLD COMING

Seeking an American National

Security Strategy

In many respects, the world ahead seems

amenable to basic American interests and

values. A world pried open by the information

revolution is a world less hospitable to tyranny

and more friendly to human liberty. A more

prosperous world is, on balance, a world more

conducive to democracy and less tolerant of

fatalism and the dour dogmas that often attend

it. A less socially rigid, freer, and self-regulating

world also accords with our deepest political

beliefs and our central political metaphors—the

checks and balances of our Constitution, the

“invisible hand” of the market, our social creed

of E Pluribus Unum, and the concept of federalism itself.

Nevertheless, a world amenable to our

interests and values will not come into being by

itself. Much of the world will resent and oppose

us, if not for the simple fact of our preeminence,

then for the fact that others often perceive the

United States as exercising its power with arrogance and self-absorption. There will also be

much apprehension and confusion as the world

changes. National leaderships will have their

hands full, and some will make mistakes.

As a result, for many years to come

Americans will become increasingly less

secure, and much less secure than they now

believe themselves to be. That is because many

of the threats emerging in our future will differ

significantly from those of the past, not only in

their physical but also in their psychological

effects. While conventional conflicts will still be

possible, the most serious threat to our security

may consist of unannounced attacks on

American cities by sub-national groups using

genetically engineered pathogens. Another may

be a well-planned cyber-attack on the air tra

control system on the East Coast of the Un

States, as some 200 commercial aircraft are try

to land safely in a morning’s rain and fog. O

threats may inhere in assaults against an incr

ingly integrated and complex, but hig

vulnerable, international economic infrastruc

whose operation lies beyond the control of 

single body. Threats may also loom from 

unraveling of the fabric of national identity its

and the consequent failure or collapse of sev

major countries. 

Taken together, the evidence suggests 

threats to American security will be more diff

harder to anticipate, and more difficult to neut

ize than ever before. Deterrence will not work 

it once did; in many cases it may not work at 

There will be a blurring of boundaries: betw

homeland defense and foreign policy; betw

sovereign states and a plethora of protector

and autonomous zones; between the pull 

national loyalties on individual citizens and 

pull of loyalties both more local and more glo

in nature.

While the likelihood of major confl

between powerful states will decrease, con

itself will likely increase. The world that lie

store for us over the next 25 years will surely c

lenge our received wisdom about how to pro

American interests and advance American val

In such an environment the United States nee

sure understanding of its objectives, an

coherent strategy to deal with both the dang

and the opportunities ahead. It is from the Pha

Report—both this document and the research 

analytical study from which it is drawn—that 

Commission will seek to develop that understa

ing, and build that strategy, in Phase II. We 

unveil that strategy in April 2000.