J-A12023-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

__________________ 

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

**Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

IN RE: LIEN ASSERTED AGAINST 

MATTHEW HEFFRAN 

APPEAL OF: MATTHEW HEFFRAN 

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

: 

: 

: 

: No. 2140 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 30, 2013, 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County, 

Civil Division, at No. 1389-2012. 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, FITZGERALD* and PLATT**, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 03, 2014 

Appellant, Matthew Heffran, appeals from the judgment entered on 

October 30, 2013, in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas. After review, 

we vacate the judgment entered on the verdict, reverse the order granting a 

directed verdict for Appellee and dismissing Appellant’s counterclaims, and 

remand for a new trial. 

 The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this matter as follows: 

This case arose out of a motor vehicle accident on July 26, 

2007 in which the Appellant, Matthew Heffran, was injured. As a 

result of his work-related injuries, Appellant received workers 

compensation benefits from Eastern Alliance Insurance Group 

(hereinafter “EAIG”). On April 1, 2011, Appellant and EAIG 

agreed to a compromise and release of the workers’ 

compensation benefits. 

According to the parties’ April 1, 2011 Compromise and 

Release Agreement, EAIG’s total subrogation lien, at that time, 

was $32,741.96. This amount consisted of $13,288.41 in wage 
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loss payments and $19,453.55 in medical payments. In addition, 

the Compromise and Release Agreement contained a clause 

where EAIG agreed to waive $17,000 of its subrogation lien on 

any third party claim that Appellant chose to pursue. 

On May 17, 2012, Appellant settled a related third party 

action against Charles Bolte in the amount of $100,000. As a 

result, EAIG asserted a workers compensation subrogation lien 

against Appellant. Suffice it to say, the parties had significant 

disagreement over the exact amount of the subrogation lien 

owed by the Appellant to EAIG. Appellant thereafter filed a 

Petition with this Court on July 9, 2012 requesting that the 

disputed funds be paid into the Court for adjudication. 

By Order dated August 28, 2012, this Court directed 

Appellant’s counsel to pay into court the sum of $27,923.01 

which was the alleged disputed amount. On September 10, 

2012, EAIG filed a Petition seeking, inter alia, reimbursement of 

its subrogation lien in the alleged amount of $60,629.59. On 

October 1, 2012, Appellant filed an Answer to EAIG’s Petition 

with a Counter-Claim. On March 13, 2013, this Court entered an 

Order denying EAIG’ s Petition.

EAIG thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 

April 26, 2013. On May 28, 2013, this Court granted in part and 

denied in part EAIG’s Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court 

granted the Motion with regards to the fact that EAIG was 

entitled to a workers’ compensation subrogation lien against 

Appellant. The Motion was denied, however, regarding the 

specific amount of the lien, which remained a genuine issue of 

material fact. 

A Jury Trial was held in this matter on June 18, 2013. At 

the trial, Appellant and EAIG introduced testimony and evidence 

of the third party settlement amount of $100,000 as well as 

Appellant’s reasonable attorney fees in the amount of 

$33,333.34 in procuring that settlement. Further, evidence was 

presented of indemnity and medical payments totaling 

$60,629.59 and the previously agreed upon credit of $17,000 

towards the subrogation lien. 
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After both Appellant and EAIG had rested their cases, but 

before closing arguments, this Court determined that no genuine 

issue of material fact remained in dispute between the parties. 

On EAIG’s sole claim for relief, we determined that the amount 

of subrogation lien owed by Appellant to EAIG was $23,319.72 

which was the amount determined to be owed by Appellant’s 

expert witness,[1] James Haggerty, Esquire. This Court also 

determined that Appellant had failed to meet his burden of clear 

and convincing evidence for the fraud claims of his Counterclaim as a matter of fact and law. EAIG’s motion for directed 

verdict was therefore granted that same day. 

Appellant filed a Motion for Post-Trial Relief on June 27, 

2013, alleging that this Court erred by finding that fraud had not 

been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Motion also 

alleged that this Court was in error when it found there to be no 

issues of material fact for determination by the jury. This Court 

denied the Appellant’s Motion on July 10, 2013.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/13, at 1-3. 

 On July 16, 2013, Appellant filed an appeal to this Court. Procedurally, 

the appeal was premature, as judgment had not been entered on the 

verdict. See Johnston the Florist v. TEDCO Construction Corp., 657 

A.2d 511, 514 (Pa. Super. 1995) (an appeal lies from the entry of judgment 

and not an order denying a post-trial motion). Ultimately, judgment was 

 

1

 While the trial court refers to Attorney Haggerty as an expert witness at 

page three of its opinion, the trial court goes on to state that it never 

formally qualified Attorney Haggerty as an expert at page six. Indeed, the 

record confirms that Attorney Haggerty was not formally qualified as an 

expert. However, this does not alter our ultimate conclusion. Despite the 

trial court’s reliance on Attorney Haggerty’s testimony, had Attorney 

Haggerty not testified at all, there would still be the record documents and 

demands for payments in excess of the amount that was due. Petitioner’s 

Exhibits 1-10, N.T., 6/18/13, at 141. 
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entered on October 30, 2013. This procedural anomaly does not hamper our 

appellate review, and we shall proceed with our discussion.2

 Id. 

On appeal, Appellant raises the following three issues for this Court’s 

consideration: 

Whether the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County erred in 

determining that Appellant had not shown fraud by clear and 

convincing evidence? 

Whether the Appellant had additional claims, outside of fraud, 

which it had proven sufficiently? 

Whether the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County erred in 

determining that no genuine issue of material fact remained on 

the issues of bad faith, fraud, bad intent, deception, 

misrepresentation, purpose, malice, outrageousness, 

wantonness, oppressiveness and reckless indifference? 

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (full capitalization omitted). 

As all of Appellant’s issues are interrelated and essentially seek the 

same relief, we shall address them concurrently. As noted above, Appellant 

claims the trial court erred in determining that Appellant had not shown 

fraud by clear and convincing evidence and asserts that there was a 

sufficient basis for the issue of punitive damages to be presented to the jury. 

 

2

 This court has held that quashing a premature appeal is an unnecessary 

expenditure of judicial resources where the decision on appeal is otherwise 

final and the only barrier to this Court’s appellate review is the entry of 

judgment. Johnston the Florist, 657 A.2d at 514. This is true because 

one of the parties would inevitably praecipe for the entry of judgment, and a 

subsequent appeal would follow. Id. 
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Our standard of review when considering motions for a directed verdict 

and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) are identical. This 

Court will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a directed verdict or JNOV 

only when we conclude that there was an abuse of discretion or an error of 

law that controlled the outcome of the case. International Diamond 

Importers, Ltd. v. Singularity Clark, L.P., 40 A.3d 1261, 1267 (Pa. 

Super. 2012). 

Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the 

same as that for a trial court. 

There are two bases upon which a JNOV can be 

entered: one, the movant is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law and/or two, the evidence is such that 

no two reasonable minds could disagree that the 

outcome should have been rendered in favor of the 

movant. With the first, the court reviews the record 

and concludes that, even with all factual inferences 

decided adversely to the movant, the law 

nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor. Whereas 

with the second, the court reviews the evidentiary 

record and concludes that the evidence was such 

that a verdict for the movant was beyond 

peradventure. 

International Diamond Importers, Ltd., 40 A.3d at 1267 (quoting Janis 

v. AMP, Inc., 856 A.2d 140, 143-144 (Pa. Super. 2004))(internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). Additionally, it is well settled that while the 

existence of fraud is a jury question, evidence of fraud must be clear and 

convincing, and whether the evidence of fraud justifies its submission to the 

jury is a question of law for the court. Greenwood v. Kadoich, 357 A.2d 
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604, 606 (Pa. Super. 1976). In reviewing questions of law, our standard of 

review is de novo and our scope of review, to the extent necessary to 

resolve this question of law, is plenary. Swords v. Harleysville Insurance 

Companies, 883 A.2d 562, 567 (Pa. 2005). Finally, punitive damages are 

appropriate only in cases of outrageous behavior, where the defendant’s 

egregious conduct shows either an evil motive or reckless indifference to the 

rights of others. J.J. DeLuca Co., Inc. v. Toll Naval Associates, 56 A.3d 

402, 415 (Pa. Super. 2012). Punitive damages are appropriate when the 

defendant’s actions are of such an outrageous nature as to demonstrate 

intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. Id. at 415-416. 

Here, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion for a directed verdict 

and dismissed Appellant’s counterclaim for fraud among other claims for 

relief. The trial court concluded that Appellee’s demand for payment from 

Appellant, wherein Appellee demanded from Appellant the full $60,629.59, 

which was the total paid out, without subtracting attorney’s fees and the 

agreed-upon waiver of an additional $17,000.00, was a “mistake.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 9/12/13, at 5. The trial court then cited to the testimony of 

Attorney James Haggerty, who Appellant called as an expert witness. The 

trial court supported its conclusion that there was no proof of fraud or 

outrageousness on Appellee’s part based on Attorney Haggerty’s testimony. 

Id. The trial court stated that Attorney Haggerty testified Appellant’s 
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demand of the full $60,629.59 was merely a mistake. Id. We are 

constrained to disagree. 

The trial court is correct that Attorney Haggerty testified Appellee was 

owed $23,319.72. Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/13, at 3. However, that was 

not the amount Appellee demanded and Attorney Haggerty never testified 

that $23,319.72 was the amount demanded. Additionally, contrary to the 

trial court’s conclusion, the record reveals that Attorney Haggerty never 

stated that Appellee’s demand for the full $60,629.59 was a “mistake.” 

Rather, Attorney Haggerty testified that the email in which Appellee averred 

that the total paid out on the claim was $27,000.00, as opposed to the 

actual total of $60,629.59, was a mistake. N.T., 6/18/13, at 80. Attorney 

Haggerty explained that if Appellee had only paid out $27,000.00, when that 

number is reduced by $9,000.00 reflecting the one-third for attorney’s fees, 

and then reduced again by the $17,000.00 that Appellee’s agreed to waive, 

the amount of Appellee’s lien would only have been $1,000.00, and that 

would be the mistake. Id. (emphasis added). Attorney Haggerty then 

commended Appellant for not taking advantage of Appellee’s error and 

claiming that he owed only $1,000.00. Id. 

Thus, there is no support for the trial court’s conclusion that Appellee’s 

demand for $60,629.59, without subtracting attorney’s fees or the agreedupon $17,000.00, was a mistake. Rather, Appellee’s intent regarding its 
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repeated claim that it was owed the full $60,629.59 remains at issue. For 

this reason, we conclude that reasonable minds could disagree on the 

outcome of the case and that a verdict for Appellee was not a certainty. 

International Diamond Importers, Ltd., 40 A.3d at 1267. 

Moreover, because Appellee’s intent is at issue, Appellant’s 

counterclaims should not have been dismissed. As noted above, there is no 

evidence that Appellee’s demand for the full amount of $60,629.59 was a 

mistake; Appellee, sought to recover from Appellant an amount to which it 

knew it was not entitled. N.T., 6/1/8/13, at 162-163. We conclude that this 

satisfies the threshold requirement of clear and convincing evidence, and 

Appellant’s fraud claim should have been considered by the jury. 

Additionally, Appellant’s remaining claims, which were summarily dismissed 

by the trial court, and the decision as to whether Appellee’s conduct was 

outrageous, permitting an award of punitive damages, should also have 

been considered by the jury. Greenwood, 357 A.2d at 606; J.J. DeLuca 

Co., Inc., 56 A.3d at 415.3

 

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court erred 

in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that 

Appellant failed to support its allegation of fraud by clear and convincing 

 

3

 Additionally, and for these same reasons, there is no indication in the 

record before us that Appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law 

on Appellant’s counterclaims. International Diamond Importers, Ltd., 

40 A.3d at 1267. 
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evidence. Appellee’s claims should have been decided by the jury. 

Moreover, Appellant’s counterclaims and the issue of punitive damages 

should also have been decided by the jury. Therefore, we vacate the 

judgment entered on the verdict and reverse the order granting a directed 

verdict for Appellee and dismissing Appellant’s counterclaims, and we 

remand for further proceedings. 

Judgment vacated. Order reversed. Case remanded for a new trial. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

PLATT, J., files a Dissenting Memorandum. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/3/2014