[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 215 (Monday, November 8, 2004)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 64690-64692]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-24803]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 73

[Docket No. PRM-73-12]


Committee To Bridge the Gap, Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; notice of receipt.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is publishing for 
public comment a notice of receipt of a petition for rulemaking, dated 
July 23, 2004, which was filed with the Commission by Daniel Hirsch, 
President, Committee to Bridge the Gap (CBG). The petition was docketed 
by the NRC on September 29, 2004, and has been assigned Docket No. PRM-
73-12. The petitioner requests that the NRC amend its regulations to 
upgrade the ``design basis threat'' regulations ((DBT), or the 
magnitude of threat that the facility's security systems must be 
capable of defeating) and associated requirements for protection of 
domestic reactors from nuclear terrorism to a level that encompasses, 
with a sufficient margin of safety, the terrorist capabilities 
evidenced by the attacks of September 11, 2001.

DATES: Submit comments by January 24, 2005. Comments received after 
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received 
on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. 
Please include the following number PRM-73-12 in the subject line of 
your comments. Comments on petitions submitted in writing or in 
electronic form will be made available for public inspection. Because 
your comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact 
information, the NRC cautions you against including any information in 
your submission that you do not want to be publicly disclosed.

[[Page 64691]]

    Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
    E-mail comments to: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#752630362c351b07165b121a03"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="421107011b022c30216c252d34">[email protected]</span></a>. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us 
directly at (301) 415-1966. You may also submit comments via the NRC's 
rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Address questions 
about our rulemaking Web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415-5905; e-mail 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ccafadab8ca2beafe2aba3ba"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="6f0c0e082f011d0c41080019">[email protected]</span></a>. Comments can also be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking 
Portal http://www.regulations.gov.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. (Telephone 
(301) 415-1966).
    Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
(301) 415-1101.
    Publicly available documents related to this petition may be viewed 
electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 
Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The PDR reproduction contractor will copy 
documents for a fee. Selected documents, including comments, may be 
viewed and downloaded electronically via the NRC rulemaking Web site at 
http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
    Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after 
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic 
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this 
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document 
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image 
files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or 
if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, 
contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by e-mail to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#54243026143a26377a333b22"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="32425640725c40511c555d44">[email protected]</span></a>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-7163 or toll free: 800-368-5642.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The petitioner states that CBG has been active in attempting to 
increase protection at nuclear facilities against the risk of nuclear 
terrorism for a quarter of a century. The NRC's current DBT regulations 
for nuclear power plants were issued in the 1974-1976 period (February 
24, 1977; 42 FR 10836), with only one substantive modification in the 
ensuring thirty years, the truck bomb rule (August 1, 1994; 59 FR 
38889). The petitioner states that DBT regulations established in the 
mid-seventies do not require nuclear plant security be designed to 
protect against:
    (a) More than one insider;
    (b) More than several external attackers;
    (c) Attackers capable of operating as more than one team (i.e., 
capable of employing ``effective team maneuvering tactics''); and
    (d) A group or individual using weapons of greater sophistication 
than hand-held automatic weapons.
    The petitioner states that the original DBT regulations essentially 
required the attacks to be on foot, by not requiring protection from 
truck bombs, or attacks by boat or air.
    The petitioner asserts that despite the facts that the original 
September 11, 2001, plot considered attacking U.S. nuclear plants, that 
the terrorist risk has increased since September 11, 2001, and that 
U.S. authorities warn that Al Quaeda is planning even more spectacular 
and deadly attacks in the U.S., nearly three years after the September 
11, 2001, attacks, U.S. nuclear reactor facilities remain unprotected 
against air attacks or against ground attacks involving the September 
11, 2001, number of attackers. The petitioner believes something must 
be done promptly to protect these facilities--and the American public. 
Increased threats, however, can be countered by measures that can be 
implemented for modest cost but which will provide substantial 
protection against events with such potentially catastrophic 
consequences.

The Petitioner's Request

NRC Security Requirements for Protection of Nuclear Power Plants From 
Terrorist Attack

    The petitioner requests that 10 CFR 73.1(a) be revised to encompass 
attacking forces equal to those of the terrorist attack on September 
11, 2001, plus a margin of safety, in numbers, teams, capabilities, 
planning, willingness to die, and other characteristics. The terrorist 
attack on September 11, 2001, involved 19 attackers in 4 teams. The DBT 
regulations should be changed to include at least 19 attackers, plus a 
margin of safety above that level.
    The NRC should also take into consideration the inclusion of 
multiple coordinated teams. The petitioner believes that the attackers 
should be presumed to use a full range of potential weapons of which a 
group such as Al Qaeda would be capable, to include shaped charges, 
shoulder-fired rockets, mortars, anti-tank weapons, large quantities of 
explosives, etc. The explosives, weapons, and equipment need not be 
limited to hand-carried items, as stated in the current regulations (10 
CFR 73.1(a)(1)(i)(D)). The attackers should be presumed to be ruthless, 
highly motivated, willing and even intent on dying, very creative, 
thorough, and capable of extended planning and preparation. The DBT 
regulations should include a minimum of three insiders, in addition to 
the 19 external attackers, rather than the current 1 insider as stated 
at 10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)(i)(B) and (ii). The insiders should be presumed to 
play both a passive role (e.g., supplying information) and active 
capacity (e.g., directly participating in a coordinated attack or 
separate sabotage actions), a land vehicle should not be limited to a 
four-wheel drive car or truck, as is now the case at 10 CFR 
73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and (iii), but include the full range of trucks and 
other vehicles that a group like Al Qaeda might employ for such an 
attack.
    The petitioner states that the DBT regulations should include 
attacks by foot or by land vehicle (e.g., vehicle bombs), as well as by 
boat and by air. The DBT regulations addressing air attack should 
include a fully loaded jumbo jet of maximum size in commercial service 
and full fuel tanks, and more maneuverable smaller planes and 
helicopters. The petitioner states that the NRC should consider 
explosives potentially present in the aircraft as well as the mass of 
the plane and the effect of its fuel when igniting. The DBT regulations 
should protect both against direct impact of the aircraft on sensitive 
facilities at the nuclear plant and against use of the aircraft or 
helicopter for dropping explosives on those facilities. The petitioner 
also states that the NRC should consider the coordination of an air 
attack with assistance from insiders at the plant and/or external 
attackers (i.e., damage to systems from the air attack coupled with 
failure of backup systems due to coordinated action on the ground).

[[Page 64692]]

Mandate Security Plans, Systems, Inspections, and Force-on-Force 
Exercises Protect Against the Amended DBT

    The petitioner states that the security plans and physical systems 
implementing those plans, inspections and force-on-force Operational 
Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) program exercises must be 
upgraded to conform to the proposed DBT regulations. The petitioner 
believes they must demonstrate high confidence to be able to repel a 
September 11, 2001, level assault.

Require Prompt Construction of Shields From Air Attack at Standoff 
Distances From Key Support Structures at Nuclear Plants ``Beamhenge''

    The petitioner states that nuclear power plants were not designed 
to withstand the attack by a fully loaded jumbo jet nor the intentional 
use of airplanes for terrorist purposes.
    The petitioner proposes the construction of shields composed of I-
beams with steel or other cabling and netting between them at standoff 
distances around the key structures at nuclear plants. Airplanes or 
jets attempting to attack sensitive structures would instead crash into 
the surrounding Beamhenge shield, leaving intact the reactor, spent 
fuel pool, and support facilities, thus protecting the public from 
damage that could result in substantial radioactivity releases. The 
Beamhenge concept may also provide some measure of protection against 
such weapons as shoulder-launched rockets, causing them to detonate 
before reaching their intended target.
    The petitioner states that I-beams are relatively inexpensive, and 
their installation can be done quickly and with modest expenditures. 
The petitioner estimates that Beamhenge shields could be constructed 
for a fraction of one percent of the original construction cost of the 
nuclear plant. The petitioner believes that with such a low price and 
relative ease of deployment, the burden is on the Commission to justify 
why implementation of the Beamhenge approach should not be mandated 
immediately. This petitioner requests that the shields against air 
attack be required to be promptly constructed at the nation's nuclear 
plants, on a time urgent basis.

Conclusion

    The petitioner states that the Commission's DBT regulations 
remained essentially unchanged, with one exception, for nearly thirty 
years, despite dramatic increases in terrorist incidents, casualties, 
and capabilities. The petitioners seek a revision of the threat basis 
to include attack from the air by airplanes and jets, and attacking 
forces by land, water, or air--at least equal to the nineteen 
terrorists involved in the September 11, 2001, attacks in numbers, 
capacity, ruthlessness, dedication, skills, planning, and willingness 
to die and create large numbers of casualties. Additionally, the 
petitioners propose that the security requirements in part 73 be 
upgraded to provide high confidence in the ability of the security 
system to protect against the proposed upgraded September 11, 2001-
equivalent DBT. In particular, the petitioners propose requiring, under 
a time-urgent schedule, construction at reactor sites of shields 
consisting of I-beams and cabling (Beamhenge) at stand-off distances 
from buildings and other assets important to safety at reactor sites so 
that airplanes or jets attempting to attack sensitive structures would 
instead crash into the surrounding Beamhenge shield, leaving intact the 
reactor, spent fuel pool, and support facilities, thus protecting the 
public from damage that could result in substantial radioactivity 
releases.

    Dated in Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of November, 2004.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 04-24803 Filed 11-5-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>