64690 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 215 / Monday, November 8, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

National Environmental Policy Act 

Certification 

The Administrator of RUS has 

determined that this rule will not 

significantly affect the quality of the 

human environment as defined by the 

National Environmental Policy Act of 

1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.). Therefore, 

this action does not require an 

environmental impact statement or 

assessment. 

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance 

The program described by this rule is 

listed in the Catalog of Federal Domestic 

Assistance Programs under No. 10.850, 

Rural Electrification Loans and Loan 

Guarantees. This catalog is available on 

a subscription basis from the 

Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 

Washington, DC 20402–9325, telephone 

number (202) 512–1800. 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The policies contained in this rule do 

not have any substantial direct effect on 

states, on the relationship between the 

national government and the states, or 

on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. Nor does this rule 

impose substantial direct compliance 

costs on state and local governments. 

Therefore, consultation with states is 

not required. 

Background: On July 18, 1995, RUS 

published a final rule (60 FR 36882) 

establishing new RUS policies and 

requirements for mortgages used to 

secure direct and guaranteed loans 

made to electric distribution borrowers. 

The final rule became effective on 

August 17, 1995. On December 29, 1995, 

RUS published a final rule (60 FR 

67396) to establish new RUS policies 

and requirements for loan contracts 

ordinarily required for loans made to 

electric distribution borrowers; this rule 

became effective on January 29, 1995. 

These new policies and requirements 

reduced RUS oversight of borrowers’

operational decisions, allowing RUS to 

tailor its operational control to a 

borrower’s individual lending 

circumstances and credit risks. 

The ‘‘new’’ forms of mortgages and 

loan contracts (Current Documents) 

used by RUS for distribution loans and 

loan guarantees made after January 29, 

1996 reflect these policies and 

requirements. Distribution borrowers 

(Legacy Borrowers) with loans and loan 

guarantees made prior to January 29, 

1996 under the ‘‘old’’ forms of 

mortgages and loan contracts (Legacy 

Documents) have been encouraged to 

execute the Current Documents, and to 

date approximately 88% of Legacy 

Borrowers have replaced their Legacy 

Documents with Current Documents, 

either by obtaining a new loan or loan 

guarantee from RUS or by substituting 

New Documents for Legacy Documents. 

The December 29, 1995 rulemaking 

also established Subpart M. The 

purpose of Subpart M was to cut back 

the broad reach of certain operational 

controls contained in the Legacy 

Documents through waivers and 

exemptions, thereby bringing the 

operational controls applicable to 

Legacy Borrowers more in line with 

those applicable to distribution 

borrowers under the Current 

Documents. 

RUS believes that maintaining two 

sources of operational controls (i.e. the 

Current Documents, and the Legacy 

Documents supplemented by Subpart 

M) creates a confusing dual system that 

is no longer necessary to provide RUS 

with an appropriate level of operational 

control over its distribution loans and 

loan guarantees. As stated above, the 

vast majority of RUS electric borrowers 

have transitioned to the Current 

Documents, and all future loans and 

loan guarantees to Legacy Borrowers 

will be made using the Current 

Documents. Legacy Borrowers who do 

not anticipate new RUS loans may, by 

request, execute the Current Documents 

for their existing loans, and are 

encouraged to do so. For those Legacy 

Borrowers who chose to retain the 

Legacy Documents, RUS will conduct 

operational control decision making on 

a case-by-case basis, taking into 

consideration the unique characteristics 

of each Legacy Borrower and, in most 

cases, applying that level of operational 

controls contemplated in the Current 

Documents. For these reasons, RUS 

proposes to eliminate the provisions of, 

and reserve, Subpart M.

List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 1717

Administrative practice and 

procedure, Electric power, Electric 

power rates, Intergovernmental 

relations, Investments, Loan programsenergy, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Rural areas.

For the reasons set forth in the 

preamble, chapter XVII of title 7 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations, is 

proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 1717—POST-LOAN POLICIES 

AND PROCEDURES COMMON TO 

INSURED AND GUARANTEED 

ELECTRIC LOANS 

1. The authority citation for part 1717 

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 901 et seq., 1921 et 

seq., 6941 et seq.

Subpart M—Operational Controls 

2. Subpart M is removed and 

reserved.

Dated: October 29, 2004. 

Curtis M. Anderson, 

Acting Administrator, Rural Utilities Service.

[FR Doc. 04–24789 Filed 11–5–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410–15–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Part 73

[Docket No. PRM–73–12] 

Committee To Bridge the Gap, Receipt 

of Petition for Rulemaking

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission.

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; notice 

of receipt. 

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is publishing for 

public comment a notice of receipt of a 

petition for rulemaking, dated July 23, 

2004, which was filed with the 

Commission by Daniel Hirsch, 

President, Committee to Bridge the Gap 

(CBG). The petition was docketed by the 

NRC on September 29, 2004, and has 

been assigned Docket No. PRM–73–12. 

The petitioner requests that the NRC 

amend its regulations to upgrade the 

‘‘design basis threat’’ regulations ((DBT), 

or the magnitude of threat that the 

facility’s security systems must be 

capable of defeating) and associated 

requirements for protection of domestic 

reactors from nuclear terrorism to a 

level that encompasses, with a sufficient 

margin of safety, the terrorist 

capabilities evidenced by the attacks of 

September 11, 2001.

DATES: Submit comments by January 24, 

2005. Comments received after this date 

will be considered if it is practical to do 

so, but the Commission is able to assure 

consideration only for comments 

received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any one of the following methods. 

Please include the following number 

PRM–73–12 in the subject line of your 

comments. Comments on petitions 

submitted in writing or in electronic 

form will be made available for public 

inspection. Because your comments will 

not be edited to remove any identifying 

or contact information, the NRC 

cautions you against including any 

information in your submission that you 

do not want to be publicly disclosed. 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 215 / Monday, November 8, 2004 / Proposed Rules 64691

Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, ATTN: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. 

E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If 

you do not receive a reply e-mail 

confirming that we have received your 

comments, contact us directly at (301) 

415–1966. You may also submit 

comments via the NRC’s rulemaking 

Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.

Address questions about our rulemaking 

Web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415–

5905; e-mail cag@nrc.gov. Comments 

can also be submitted via the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal http://

www.regulations.gov.

Hand deliver comments to: 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. 

Federal workdays. (Telephone (301) 

415–1966). 

Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission at (301) 

415–1101. 

Publicly available documents related 

to this petition may be viewed 

electronically on the public computers 

located at the NRC’s Public Document 

Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint 

North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland. The PDR reproduction 

contractor will copy documents for a 

fee. Selected documents, including 

comments, may be viewed and 

downloaded electronically via the NRC 

rulemaking Web site at http://

ruleforum.llnl.gov.

Publicly available documents created 

or received at the NRC after November 

1, 1999, are available electronically at 

the NRC’s Electronic Reading Room at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

adams.html. From this site, the public 

can gain entry into the NRC’s 

Agencywide Document Access and 

Management System (ADAMS), which 

provides text and image files of NRC’s 

public documents. If you do not have 

access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the documents 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC 

Public Document Room (PDR) Reference 

staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737 

or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rules and 

Directives Branch, Division of 

Administrative Services, Office of 

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, telephone: 301–415–7163 or toll 

free: 800–368–5642.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The petitioner states that CBG has 

been active in attempting to increase 

protection at nuclear facilities against 

the risk of nuclear terrorism for a 

quarter of a century. The NRC’s current 

DBT regulations for nuclear power 

plants were issued in the 1974–1976 

period (February 24, 1977; 42 FR 

10836), with only one substantive 

modification in the ensuring thirty 

years, the truck bomb rule (August 1, 

1994; 59 FR 38889). The petitioner 

states that DBT regulations established 

in the mid-seventies do not require 

nuclear plant security be designed to 

protect against: 

(a) More than one insider;

(b) More than several external 

attackers; 

(c) Attackers capable of operating as 

more than one team (i.e., capable of 

employing ‘‘effective team maneuvering 

tactics’’); and 

(d) A group or individual using 

weapons of greater sophistication than 

hand-held automatic weapons. 

The petitioner states that the original 

DBT regulations essentially required the 

attacks to be on foot, by not requiring 

protection from truck bombs, or attacks 

by boat or air. 

The petitioner asserts that despite the 

facts that the original September 11, 

2001, plot considered attacking U.S. 

nuclear plants, that the terrorist risk has 

increased since September 11, 2001, and 

that U.S. authorities warn that Al 

Quaeda is planning even more 

spectacular and deadly attacks in the 

U.S., nearly three years after the 

September 11, 2001, attacks, U.S. 

nuclear reactor facilities remain 

unprotected against air attacks or 

against ground attacks involving the 

September 11, 2001, number of 

attackers. The petitioner believes 

something must be done promptly to 

protect these facilities—and the 

American public. Increased threats, 

however, can be countered by measures 

that can be implemented for modest cost 

but which will provide substantial 

protection against events with such 

potentially catastrophic consequences. 

The Petitioner’s Request 

NRC Security Requirements for 

Protection of Nuclear Power Plants 

From Terrorist Attack 

The petitioner requests that 10 CFR 

73.1(a) be revised to encompass 

attacking forces equal to those of the 

terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, 

plus a margin of safety, in numbers, 

teams, capabilities, planning, 

willingness to die, and other 

characteristics. The terrorist attack on 

September 11, 2001, involved 19 

attackers in 4 teams. The DBT 

regulations should be changed to 

include at least 19 attackers, plus a 

margin of safety above that level. 

The NRC should also take into 

consideration the inclusion of multiple 

coordinated teams. The petitioner 

believes that the attackers should be 

presumed to use a full range of potential 

weapons of which a group such as Al 

Qaeda would be capable, to include 

shaped charges, shoulder-fired rockets, 

mortars, anti-tank weapons, large 

quantities of explosives, etc. The 

explosives, weapons, and equipment 

need not be limited to hand-carried 

items, as stated in the current 

regulations (10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)(i)(D)). 

The attackers should be presumed to be 

ruthless, highly motivated, willing and 

even intent on dying, very creative, 

thorough, and capable of extended 

planning and preparation. The DBT 

regulations should include a minimum 

of three insiders, in addition to the 19 

external attackers, rather than the 

current 1 insider as stated at 10 CFR 

73.1(a)(1)(i)(B) and (ii). The insiders 

should be presumed to play both a 

passive role (e.g., supplying 

information) and active capacity (e.g., 

directly participating in a coordinated 

attack or separate sabotage actions), a 

land vehicle should not be limited to a 

four-wheel drive car or truck, as is now 

the case at 10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and 

(iii), but include the full range of trucks 

and other vehicles that a group like Al 

Qaeda might employ for such an attack. 

The petitioner states that the DBT 

regulations should include attacks by 

foot or by land vehicle (e.g., vehicle 

bombs), as well as by boat and by air. 

The DBT regulations addressing air 

attack should include a fully loaded 

jumbo jet of maximum size in 

commercial service and full fuel tanks, 

and more maneuverable smaller planes 

and helicopters. The petitioner states 

that the NRC should consider explosives 

potentially present in the aircraft as well 

as the mass of the plane and the effect 

of its fuel when igniting. The DBT 

regulations should protect both against 

direct impact of the aircraft on sensitive 

facilities at the nuclear plant and against 

use of the aircraft or helicopter for 

dropping explosives on those facilities. 

The petitioner also states that the NRC 

should consider the coordination of an 

air attack with assistance from insiders 

at the plant and/or external attackers 

(i.e., damage to systems from the air 

attack coupled with failure of backup 

systems due to coordinated action on 

the ground). 

64692 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 215 / Monday, November 8, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

Mandate Security Plans, Systems, 

Inspections, and Force-on-Force 

Exercises Protect Against the Amended 

DBT 

The petitioner states that the security 

plans and physical systems 

implementing those plans, inspections 

and force-on-force Operational 

Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) 

program exercises must be upgraded to 

conform to the proposed DBT 

regulations. The petitioner believes they 

must demonstrate high confidence to be 

able to repel a September 11, 2001, level 

assault. 

Require Prompt Construction of Shields 

From Air Attack at Standoff Distances 

From Key Support Structures at Nuclear 

Plants ‘‘Beamhenge’’

The petitioner states that nuclear 

power plants were not designed to 

withstand the attack by a fully loaded 

jumbo jet nor the intentional use of 

airplanes for terrorist purposes. 

The petitioner proposes the 

construction of shields composed of Ibeams with steel or other cabling and 

netting between them at standoff 

distances around the key structures at 

nuclear plants. Airplanes or jets 

attempting to attack sensitive structures 

would instead crash into the 

surrounding Beamhenge shield, leaving 

intact the reactor, spent fuel pool, and 

support facilities, thus protecting the 

public from damage that could result in 

substantial radioactivity releases. The 

Beamhenge concept may also provide 

some measure of protection against such 

weapons as shoulder-launched rockets, 

causing them to detonate before 

reaching their intended target. 

The petitioner states that I-beams are 

relatively inexpensive, and their 

installation can be done quickly and 

with modest expenditures. The 

petitioner estimates that Beamhenge 

shields could be constructed for a 

fraction of one percent of the original 

construction cost of the nuclear plant. 

The petitioner believes that with such a 

low price and relative ease of 

deployment, the burden is on the 

Commission to justify why 

implementation of the Beamhenge 

approach should not be mandated 

immediately. This petitioner requests 

that the shields against air attack be 

required to be promptly constructed at 

the nation’s nuclear plants, on a time 

urgent basis. 

Conclusion 

The petitioner states that the 

Commission’s DBT regulations 

remained essentially unchanged, with 

one exception, for nearly thirty years, 

despite dramatic increases in terrorist 

incidents, casualties, and capabilities. 

The petitioners seek a revision of the 

threat basis to include attack from the 

air by airplanes and jets, and attacking 

forces by land, water, or air—at least 

equal to the nineteen terrorists involved 

in the September 11, 2001, attacks in 

numbers, capacity, ruthlessness, 

dedication, skills, planning, and 

willingness to die and create large 

numbers of casualties. Additionally, the 

petitioners propose that the security 

requirements in part 73 be upgraded to 

provide high confidence in the ability of 

the security system to protect against 

the proposed upgraded September 11, 

2001-equivalent DBT. In particular, the 

petitioners propose requiring, under a 

time-urgent schedule, construction at 

reactor sites of shields consisting of Ibeams and cabling (Beamhenge) at 

stand-off distances from buildings and 

other assets important to safety at 

reactor sites so that airplanes or jets 

attempting to attack sensitive structures 

would instead crash into the 

surrounding Beamhenge shield, leaving 

intact the reactor, spent fuel pool, and 

support facilities, thus protecting the 

public from damage that could result in 

substantial radioactivity releases.

Dated in Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day 

of November, 2004.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Annette Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 04–24803 Filed 11–5–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2003–CE–65–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Glaser-Dirks 

Flugzeugbau GmbH Model DG–800B 

Sailplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM); 

Reopening of the comment period. 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to revise 

an earlier proposed airworthiness 

directive (AD) that applies to all GlaserDirks Flugzeugbau GmbH (DG 

Flugzeugbau) Model DG–800B 

sailplanes equipped with a SOLO 2625 

engine or a Mid-West AE 50T engine. 

The earlier NPRM would have required 

you to modify the coolant pump and 

fuel pump electrical circuits, replace the 

non-resettable circuit breaker with a 

resettable circuit breaker, and (for a 

version of the Mikuni carburetor) secure 

the choke butterfly valve axis. The 

earlier NPRM resulted from mandatory 

continuing airworthiness information 

(MCAI) issued by the airworthiness 

authority for Germany. This proposed 

AD is the result of further analysis by 

FAA of the service information and 

FAA determining that important actions 

were omitted in the NPRM and should 

be incorporated. Since these required 

actions impose an additional burden 

over that proposed in the NPRM, we are 

reopening the comment period to allow 

the public the chance to comment on 

these additional actions.

DATES: We must receive any comments 

on this proposed AD by December 13, 

2004.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following to 

submit comments on this proposed AD: 

• By mail: FAA, Central Region, 

Office of the Regional Counsel, 

Attention: Rules Docket No. 2003–CE–

65–AD, 901 Locust, Room 506, Kansas 

City, Missouri 64106. 

• By fax: (816) 329–3771. 

• By e-mail: 9–ACE–7–

Docket@faa.gov. Comments sent 

electronically must contain ‘‘Docket No. 

2003–CE–65–AD’’ in the subject line. If 

you send comments electronically as 

attached electronic files, the files must 

be formatted in Microsoft Word 97 for 

Windows or ASCII. 

You may get the service information 

identified in this proposed AD from DG 

Flugzeugbau, Postbox 41 20, D–76625 

Bruchsal, Federal Republic of Germany; 

telephone: 011–49 7257–890; facsimile: 

011–49 7257–8922. 

You may view the AD docket at FAA, 

Central Region, Office of the Regional 

Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 

2003–CE–65–AD, 901 Locust, Room 

506, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Office 

hours are 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Greg 

Davison, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, 

Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, 

Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; 

telephone: (816) 329–4130; facsimile: 

(816) 329–4090.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

How do I comment on this proposed 

AD? We invite you to submit any 

written relevant data, views, or 

arguments regarding this proposal. Send 

your comments to an address listed 

under ADDRESSES. Include ‘‘AD Docket 

No. 2003–CE–65–AD’’ in the subject