United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

June 1998 B-2 BOMBER

Additional Costs to

Correct Deficiencies

and Make

Improvements

GAO/NSIAD-98-152

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278432 

June 16, 1998

Congressional Committees

The conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1994 requires us to report to the congressional defense

committees at regular intervals on the total acquisition costs of the B-2A

bomber through the completion of the production program. The last

production aircraft was delivered in November 1997, and all aircraft are

scheduled to be updated to the latest defined (block 30) configuration by

July 2000.1

 This report discusses deficiencies that must be corrected to

achieve Air Force objectives for the B-2A, additional costs to correct the

deficiencies, and the B-2A modification schedule.2

Background The Air Force began development of the B-2A in 1981 and reported on

June 30, 1997, after 16 years, that the development and the initial

operational test and evaluation had been completed. The Air Force reports

of the initial operational tests were completed in November 1997.

In 1986, the Air Force estimated that B-2A development could be

completed for $14.5 billion, including a 4-year, 3,600-hour flight test

program scheduled at that time to end in 1993. The flight test program

ended June 30, 1997, and the estimated cost of the development program

had grown to over $24 billion and the flight test program to about 

5,000 flight test hours over 8 years. The development and testing programs

were extended because of Air Force changes in the B-2 requirements and

various technical problems.

Major changes and problems contributing to the delays included

(1) making the B-2A’s primary mission conventional rather than nuclear;

(2) redesigning the aircraft to satisfy an added requirement to penetrate

adversary air space at low altitudes; (3) difficulty in manufacturing test

aircraft, resulting in late delivery of partially complete test aircraft;

(4) difficulties achieving acceptable radar cross-section readings on test

aircraft, which resulted in significant redesigning and retesting of certain

components; and (5) correction of deficiencies in the aft deck structure

because of the unanticipated effects of engine exhaust.

1

The B-2A’s final configuration is defined as a block 30 aircraft. The Air Force accepted B-2s in two

other configurations, a block 10 training aircraft and block 20 interim capability aircraft, which all will

be upgraded to the block 30 configuration.

2

A list of related GAO reports is included at the end of this report.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

Even though numerous problems hindered the scheduled completion of

B-2A development, production began with no flight testing having been

completed. This resulted in substantial overlap of development and

production. Test and production aircraft were delivered that did not fully

meet the Air Force requirements, and a 5-year post-delivery modification

program was initiated to update all aircraft to the block 30 configuration.

Since production began in 1986, the planned number of B-2As was reduced

from 133 to 21 aircraft and both the total development and the average

unit procurement costs increased. Table 1 shows the change in estimated

total and unit cost from 1986 to 1998.

Table 1: Comparison of B-2A Program

Total and Unit Costs Between 1986

and 1998 1986 (133 aircraft) 1998 (21 aircraft)

Millions of then-year dollars

Acquisition element Total cost Unit cost Total cost Unit cost

Development $14,500 $24,700

Procurement $43,700 $329 $19,600 $933

Total $58,200 $438 $44,300 $2,110

The last two of the 21 B-2As were delivered to the Air Force in the 

block 30 configuration. The major effort remaining in the B-2A acquisition

program is modification of the other 19 B-2As to the block 30

configuration, scheduled for completion in July 2000. Through April 1998,

six B-2As have been delivered in, or modified to, the block 30

configuration and were operational at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri.

Ultimately, the Air Force plans to have 21 B-2As, of which 16 will be

available for missions (2 squadrons of 8 aircraft), and 5 will be in various

maintenance and repair cycles.

Results in Brief The Air Force evaluated the B-2A capability to meet several broad

objectives—strike rapidly, sustain operations, deploy to forward locations,

survive in hostile environments, and deliver weapons accurately. The

November 1997 operational test reports concluded that B-2As, in the

block 30 configuration, are operationally effective, but with several

important deficiencies that limit the aircraft’s ability to fully meet those

objectives as planned.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

The test reports identify four deficiencies:

• Incomplete development of the automated ground mission planning

system, which is needed to rapidly plan and carry out B-2A strike

missions.

• Unsatisfactory performance of the defensive avionics system, which is

used to provide enemy threat information to the crews and increase their

survivability in certain situations.

• Inadequate reliability and maintainability of low observable materials and

structures, reducing the ability to sustain the defined pace of operations

while maintaining a high degree of survivability for conventional B-2A

missions.

• Lack of environmental shelters to maintain low observable materials and

to protect the aircraft from certain weather conditions during deployment.

The fiscal year 1999 B-2A cost estimate identifies the cost to complete the

B-2A program for the block 30 configuration at $44.3 billion then-year

dollars. Included in this figure is funding to correct or improve some, but

not all, of the deficiencies listed above. For example, the estimate does not

include the additional costs that would be incurred if defensive avionics

were to be required to achieve the originally planned capability, which

Department of Defense (DOD) officials said is no longer required at this

time. However, it does include funding for software upgrades to improve

the system performance, which meets current operational objectives.

Further, it does not include the cost to improve low observable materials,

which are needed to sustain the pace of B-2A operations, and to provide

for a sufficient number of deployment shelters to accommodate repairs to

B-2As. The estimate also excludes costs to buy spare parts that are being

identified to support the B-2A’s nuclear mission.

Modifications of B-2As to the block 30 configuration have not been

accomplished on schedule. Four modified aircraft were delivered as of

April 1998—three later than scheduled and one ahead of schedule.

According to the Air Force, the contractor has had difficulty hiring enough

personnel to achieve the schedule.

Deficiencies Must Be

Corrected to Achieve

Air Force Objectives

To test the operational performance of the B-2A, the Air Force measured

B-2A performance against five broad operational objectives that were

derived from documented Air Force operational requirements and

concepts related to nuclear and conventional missions. Figure 1 identifies

these operational objectives and the key elements of each that were

included in the operational testing.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

Figure 1: Key Elements of the Broad

Operational Objectives Included in

Operational Tests

Reliability, Maintainability, and 

Deployment

 Unscheduled maintenance

 Maintenance man-hours

 Deployability to other locations

Survivability

 Susceptibility to

 threat systems

 Survivability from 

 threat systems

 Track time

 Effects of tactics 

Rapid Strike

 Mission planning

 Accurate radar

 Terrain-following

 Crew workload

 Crew awareness 

 Aircraft performance

 Targeting

 Weapon release 

Sustainment

 Sortie generation

 Mission capable

 Mission planning

 capacity

 Effect of extreme

 environment

Launch Weapons

 Weapons accuracy:

 Precision

 Conventional

 Nuclear

Although test results indicate that B-2As generally met operational

objectives, four deficiencies were identified during testing that will limit

or, under some circumstances, change the planned concepts for using the

B-2As and slow its operational pace. These relate to mission planning,

defensive avionics, low observable materials, and deployment.

As the B-2A matures, numerous minor problems identified in the test

reports are scheduled to be corrected or improved based on their relative

priorities. These include corrections of minor software and hardware

deficiencies, improvements to make crew operations easier or faster,

improvements of selected radar modes, and relocation of certain buttons

or displays. The corrections and improvements involve flight operation as

well as maintenance and support of the aircraft.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

Mission Planning System

Still in Development

Ground mission planning, which is still in development, is important to the

successful employment of the B-2A because very precise mission routes

must be planned to maximize the benefits of the aircraft’s low observable

features. Mission planning for the B-2A, done with the automated Air

Force Mission Support System (AFMSS), currently takes more time than

planned. This will limit the Air Force’s ability to rapidly strike targets and

sustain operations.

The goal of the AFMSS development program is to produce a mission

planning system that can provide specific B-2A mission plans in 8 hours.

Testing as of June 30, 1997, concluded that the system frequently

malfunctioned, was not flexible or user friendly, and was complex and

time consuming to use. Air Force operators at Whiteman Air Force Base

told us that the developmental version of AFMSS had so many failures that

they estimated it would take 60 hours to plan a conventional mission and

192 hours to plan a nuclear mission.

AFMSS is an acquisition program separate from the B-2A and is being

developed to support all Air Force combat aircraft. Interface of AFMSS with

the B-2A began in 1994. According to the operational test report, AFMSS is a

complex system made up of separate subsystems developed by different

contractors. The Air Force has received various developmental versions of

AFMSS subsystems, and additional upgrades to software and hardware are

planned in fiscal years 1998 and 1999. The Air Force expects these

upgrades to support preparation of mission plans in 8 hours by the third

quarter of fiscal year 1999.

Defensive Avionics Do Not

Work as Planned

The Air Force spent over $740 million to develop the defensive system for

the B-2A; however, test reports concluded that this system is

unsatisfactory. The lack of an effective defensive avionics system could

affect the B-2A’s survivability in selected situations because it is supposed

to provide B-2A crews with information on the location of threats, both

known and unknown that they may encounter during a mission. Limited

funds and time are available to correct all the deficiencies in the defensive

system. The Air Force plans some software upgrades that are intended to

provide the defensive system with a limited but useful capability.

Air Force officials said the cost of making the defensive system meet

originally planned capability is unaffordable at this time. Air Force

officials told us that all the functions originally planned for the system are

not required to successfully carry out the planned B-2A missions. The

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

operational test report further stated that, although the defensive system is

rated unsatisfactory, the system’s deficiencies do not prevent planning and

executing B-2A missions. The test report indicated that the B-2A’s low

observability to adversary threat systems permits use of other effective

tactics that could ensure its effective employment.

The defensive system is supposed to provide the crew information on

enemy threat systems to enhance B-2A survivability. Known threat

locations are included in computer files prior to the mission. The system is

to correlate these with the actual threats as the B-2A flies its mission, but

it is also to identify and locate unknown threats that pop-up during a

mission. However, this system does not work as planned, limiting the

utility of information provided the crew during critical portions of

expected B-2 missions. For example, test reports indicate that the

defensive system provided inaccurate or cluttered information to the crew

and had unacceptably high workloads for the operators.

The number and significance of problems with the defensive system were

not identified until near the end of the flight test program, leaving Air

Force program managers little time to correct problems. Flight testing,

where most of the problems were discovered, did not begin for the

defensive system until February 1993, almost 4 years after the flight test

program started in July 1989 and almost 2 years after other avionics began

flight testing in June 1991. According to Air Force officials and an

independent review team, several issues contributed to the deficiencies

and their discovery late in the developmental and test processes. These

reasons included (1) development and testing began late, (2) successful

early laboratory tests could not be repeated in flight tests, (3) test results

from flight tests were not completely analyzed before tests were

continued, (4) the contract provided incentives to move ahead with

development rather than correct problems, (5) there was too much

confidence that upgrades to computer software would solve the problems,

and (6) there were inadequate engineering controls to prevent the

overoptimistic view and approach to this development effort.

The Air Force’s cost estimate does not include the cost of correcting all

deficiencies but does cover some improvements in the defensive system.

The Air Force plans to develop software changes that are scheduled to be

available for use by 2000, if tests demonstrate the changes are effective in

providing a useful capability. Air Force officials indicated some changes

have been tested by operational crews with good success. These software

changes are intended to provide capabilities that are useful but less than

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

were expected in the original defensive system design. The Air Force

believes these changes will meet their requirements. To achieve the

original design would require more costly upgrades, including new

computer processors. Expensive hardware upgrades are not included in

current Air Force plans to enhance the B-2A.

Historically, defensive avionics have experienced significant problems

during development. The B-1B bomber had serious deficiencies with its

defensive avionics and the Air Force is still working to provide an effective

defensive capability for the B-1B. Other defensive avionics programs, like

the Air Force’s ALQ-135 jammer and the Navy’s Airborne Self-Protection

Jammer, also experienced costly development problems.

Inadequate Reliability and

Maintainability of Low

Observable Materials

Low observable materials and features on the B-2A frequently fail,

requiring high amounts of maintenance. They also have time-consuming

and environmentally controlled repair processes and long cure times for

the materials repaired. This reduces the time aircraft are available for

operational use, which keeps mission capable rates below the Air Force

requirement. These problems increase the amount of time it takes to

prepare a B-2A for its next combat flight, potentially reducing the number

of sorties that could be flown in a given period of time.

During operational testing, low observable materials and features

accounted for 40 percent of unscheduled maintenance and 31 percent of

the maintenance hours to repair the aircraft. Aircraft operating at

Whiteman Air Force Base experienced results similar to those in the

operational test. During a visit to Whiteman Air Force Base, we observed a

block 20 B-2A aircraft after a 10-hour flight. The aircraft had damaged

tape, caulk, paint, and heat tiles, all low observable materials. In addition,

we observed hydraulic fluid leaks beneath the aircraft that further

damaged tape and caulk. The Air Force is incorporating some new low

observable tape materials into the block 30 aircraft, which should reduce

some maintenance; however, according to Air Force officials, this

improvement will not be adequate to achieve the operational pace

currently planned for the aircraft.

In addition to the frequent failure of these materials, the processes to

repair them are time consuming and require an environmentally controlled

repair facility. Cure times on some of the low observable tapes and caulks,

items that most frequently fail, can be as long as 72 hours, but most

materials require 24 or more hours.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

The poor durability and extensive maintenance required of low observable

materials is an important factor keeping the B-2As from achieving desired

mission capable rates—the Air Force measure of an aircraft fleet’s

availability to perform its assigned missions. At maturity, the Air Force

goal for a mission capable rate is 77 percent. On average, the mission

capable rate in calendar year 1997, when including the effects of low

observable features, was 36 percent, less than half the goal.

The Air Force has prepared a comprehensive plan to develop, test, and

install new and improved low observable materials, and to improve repair

processes, reduce cure times, and develop new diagnostic tools that

should allow the B-2A to meet operational requirements. The plan extends

through 2005 and shows that funds required for research and

development, procurement, and operations and maintenance could total

about $190 million, of which $144 million is not in the current cost

estimate.

Lack of Environmental

Shelters for Deployment

The operational test report states that the block 30 B-2A aircraft must be

sheltered to protect it from weather and provide a suitable environment in

which to maintain low observables. The Air Force is studying options for

providing shelters, including the purchase of portable shelters and use of

existing facilities.

The Air Force plans to buy a portable deployment shelter as a test article

to determine if the portable shelters will be adequate to protect and

maintain the B-2A’s low observable features. If the Air Force buys the

shelters, at a minimum it will require 17—1 training shelter and 1

operational shelter for each of the 16 primary mission aircraft.

Air Force officials stated they are dedicated to buying the deployment

shelters but have not determined how many shelters are needed to support

B-2A deployments or the shelter configuration. In addition, they said

funding sources have not been identified, but the shelters will likely cost a

total of between $15 and $25 million, depending upon the quantity

purchased.

Air Force officials said they have begun to practice deploying the B-2A and

it is likely additional requirements will be identified when this happens.

The Air Force completed one exercise, deploying two B-2As to Guam, in

March 1998, and plans two more in 1998. Air Force officials advised us that

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

the B-2As performed well in the March 1998 deployment, but an official

report has not been issued on the results as of April 1998.

Additional Funds Will

Be Required to

Complete the

Program

The fiscal year 1999 B-2A cost estimate indicates it will cost $44.3 billion

then-year dollars to complete development, procurement, and

modification. However, the Air Force will incur additional costs if it plans

to correct the deficiencies identified during testing and achieve the full

operational capability originally planned for the B-2A. At this time, there is

no comprehensive plan that identifies the efforts required to achieve the

full B-2A capability, the likely cost of these efforts, or a funding plan.

Further, the Air Force has not yet determined all requirements needed to

achieve some capabilities.

Most B-2A Funds Have

Been Appropriated

The fiscal year 1999 B-2A cost estimate indicates the cost to complete

development, procurement, and modification of the B-2A program is

$44.3 billion then-year dollars. Through fiscal year 1998, the Air Force has

been appropriated $43.3 billion, or 98 percent.

Air Force estimates show the funding required from fiscal years 1999 to

2003 to complete development is $446.7 million and to complete

procurement and modifications from fiscal years 1999 to 2005 is

$599.4 million. Table 2 shows the major elements of costs for which

funding is to be requested in fiscal years 1999 and beyond.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

Table 2:Planned Use of Funds for the

B-2A Program from Fiscal Years 1999

Through 2005

Then-year dollars in millions

Development

Northrop Grumman $332.9

Armament 0.2

Mission planning 23.9

Government test 65.3

Other government test 5.9

Direct release 18.5

Total development $446.7

Procurement

Air vehicle $91.4

Equipment/data/training 34.5

Interim contractor support 103.1

Spares 119.6

Retrofit 92.6

Program management 30.0

Other government costs 32.0

Software support 96.2

Total procurement $599.4

Total estimated cost $1,046.1

Additional Costs Will Be

Required

As discussed above, testing identified four deficiencies that will require

additional costs if the Air Force plans to fully correct all deficiencies. In

addition to the cost increases needed for defensive avionics, low

observable materials, and support needed for deployment, the Air Force

will also incur costs to procure spares to support the nuclear mission of

the B-2A. Table 3 shows estimated costs to fix deficiencies that are not in

the current cost estimate as well as areas of other potential cost increases

not yet fully defined by the Air Force.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

Table 3: Estimated Cost to Correct

Deficiencies and Improve B-2A

Capabilities Deficiency

Estimated costs not in

estimate Comments

Defensive avionics $0a New computer processors

needed to provide full

capability would be costly

but are currently not

planned for acquisition.

Low observable features $144 million The Air Force said it plans

to use $54 million of the

fiscal year 1998 funds

added by Congress to help

fund some of the $144

million in improvements

planned for low observable

materials.

Deployment and shelters $15 to $25 million The Air Force is now

beginning to practice B-2A

deployments to identify

support equipment

shortfalls, which could

result in additional costs.

Spares Not yet determined by Air

Force

The Air Force must still

identify and acquire spare

parts to support the nuclear

mission. Costs estimates

and funding plans are not

expected to be available

until June 1998 or later.

a$34 million is included in the cost estimate to provide a limited capability. No additional costs are

planned.

Block 30 Modification

Schedule Issues

The Air Force program to upgrade 19 B-2A aircraft to the block 30

configuration is falling behind schedule and further delays are possible. In

addition, modified aircraft have been delivered with significant numbers of

deficiencies.

Air Force officials said Northrop Grumman has not been able to hire

adequate numbers of workers; therefore, modifications have been delayed.

Both the Air Force and Northrop Grumman were trying to complete

modifications based on schedules that were 3 to 6 months ahead of the

contract schedule. Because of delays and problems, these accelerated

schedules have been discarded. As of April 1998, Northrop Grumman had

delivered three modified aircraft later than, and one modified aircraft

earlier than, the contract schedule. The Air Force is assessing schedule

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

performance and studying the funding implications of a schedule slip. At

this time, the Air Force believes adequate funds are available to complete

the modifications.

The Air Force is also assessing a planned schedule change that could

significantly delay the modification program for one aircraft. This change

would be to accommodate the need to provide an aircraft for flight testing

planned upgrades. Until the assessment is complete, Air Force officials

said it is not possible to determine if there will be a cost impact on the

modification program.

All four block 30 aircraft delivered from the modification line have a

significant number of deficiencies. Air Force officials stated that some of

these deficiencies are not operationally critical and will be corrected

during regular scheduled maintenance activities. They said a team will be

located at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, to correct some of the

deficiencies, and others will be corrected during normal aircraft

maintenance cycles to maintain the aircraft in active operational service.

The four aircraft have from 30 to 46 deficiencies each and, to ensure

corrections are made, the Air Force has withheld contractor payments

totaling $24.5 million for two of the delivered aircraft.

Conclusions and

Recommendations

DOD should determine the nature and cost of those efforts that remain to

be accomplished to bring the B-2A into compliance with operational

requirements established by the Air Force. This report identifies various

deficiencies that are unresolved and indicates the Air Force is still

identifying other requirements that may require further effort and funding.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Air Force to identify remaining efforts to achieve full operational

capability, the costs to complete these efforts, and the fiscal year funding

requirements not currently in the fiscal year 1999 President’s Budget for

the B-2A program. We further recommend that this information be

provided to Congress with the fiscal year 2000 President’s Budget in the

form of a comprehensive plan to complete the B-2A program.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with the

recommendations. DOD stated the B-2A is projected to meet full

operational capability by the third quarter of fiscal year 1999 as a “baseline

program” within currently programmed funding. DOD, therefore, states no

additional reporting is required on baseline requirements. DOD defines the

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

baseline program as being a block 30 aircraft. The DOD position assumes all

operational problems discussed in this report will be resolved without

additional cost, but, until these deficiencies have been proven to be

corrected, some cost uncertainty remains. In addition, as this report points

out, the Air Force has accepted the block 30 aircraft with less performance

in some areas than originally planned in the baseline program.

DOD agreed there is a need to identify to Congress future efforts and

funding requirements to upgrade current B-2As. DOD said it is developing a

long-range plan for upgrades to the bomber force and that funding

requirements will be included in the normal budgeting process. This action

is consistent with our recommendations. DOD’s comments are presented in

their entirety in appendix I. DOD provided additional technical comments,

which have been incorporated in this report, as appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

To identify deficiencies with the operational performance of the B-2A, we

reviewed key test reports and summaries prepared by the B-2A Combined

Test Force, which conducted the developmental test and evaluations, and

the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Command, which

conducted the initial operational test and evaluations. We also reviewed

assessments of the B-2A operational testing prepared by the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, Operational Test and Evaluation, and we reviewed

various program management and engineering reports that summarized

performance and testing efforts being conducted on the B-2A program. We

interviewed Air Force engineers, test managers, and program management

officials to determine the nature and extent of problems that were

identified. We also discussed deficiencies identified during testing and

current operational experience and performance of operational B-2As with

Air Force officials at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri.

To identify cost issues and plans to correct deficiencies, we reviewed the

available planning documents that identified corrective plans and funding

requirements for selected deficiencies. We reviewed the B-2A’s program

office annual cost and budgetary estimates, financial and management

reports, contract cost reports, program schedules and plans, and other

documents. We also interviewed Air Force officials in the B-2A program

and at Air Combat Command to determine cost and funding plans to

correct deficiencies and complete efforts necessary to provide fully

operational B-2A aircraft.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

To identify the status of the block 30 modification schedule, we reviewed

the contract and planning schedules for the block 30 modification process,

delivery documents identifying the delivery date and number of

deficiencies on the delivered aircraft, and reports showing planned and

actual manning at the contractor’s modification facility. We also discussed

with Air Force managers of the modification process, the reasons for

delayed deliveries, changing schedules, and the plans to correct remaining

deficiencies.

We performed our review from September 1997 to May 1998 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the

Air Force, the Director of Office of Management and Budget, and other

interested parties. We will make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix II.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
B-278432 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

18

Appendix II 

Major Contributors to

This Report

20

Related GAO Products 24

Tables Table 1: Comparison of B-2A Program Total and Unit Costs

Between 1986 and 1998

2

Table 2: Planned Use of Funds for the B-2A Program from Fiscal

Years 1999 Through 2005

10

Table 3: Estimated Cost to Correct Deficiencies and Improve

B-2A Capabilities

11

Figure Figure 1: Key Elements of the Broad Operational Objectives

Included in Operational Tests

4

Abbreviations

AFMSS Air Force Mission Support System

DOD Department of Defense

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 12.

Now on p. 12.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

David E. Cooper

Robert D. Murphy

Chicago Field Office Michael J. Hazard

Marvin E. Bonner

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
Related GAO Products

B-2 Bomber: Cost and Operational Issues (GAO/NSIAD-97-181, Aug. 14, 1997).

B-2 Bomber: Status of Efforts to Acquire 21 Operational Aircraft

(GAO/NSIAD-97-11, Oct. 22, 1996).

B-2 Bomber: Status of Cost, Development, and Production (GAO/NSIAD-95-164,

Aug. 4, 1995).

B-2 Bomber: Cost to Complete 20 Aircraft Is Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-94-217,

Sept. 8, 1994).

(707282) Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-152 B-2 Bomber
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100