IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matterofthe Detention of 

### ) No. 78496-0-I D.C. 

### ) DIVISION ONE STATE OFWASHINGTON, 

### )

Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION v. D.C., Appellant. 

### ) FILED: July 29, 2019 SCHINDLER, J.

— D.C. seeks reversal ofthe 90-day order ofcommitmentfor involuntarytreatment. D.C. contends his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficient evidence supportsfinding he was gravely disabled under RCW 71 .05.020(22). Because the record does notsupport his argument, we affirm. Initial Detention On April 9, 2018, a King County designated mental health professional filed a petition for initial detention of D.C. The petition alleged that as the result ofa mental disorder, D.C. was gravely disabled. Psychiatrist Dr. Manal Khan filed a declaration in support ofthe petition. Dr. Khan states D.C. “was broughtto the UWMC [(University of Washington Medical Center)] [Emergency Department] after being found down at [the University ofWashington] Bookstore covered in feces, urine, vomit and bed bugs.” D.C.No. 78496-0-1/2

had a “concerning

. . . elevated white blood cell count” and a bowel obstruction. Dr. Khan described D.C. as follows: On presentation, patient is agitated, disorganized, impulsive, and responding to internal stimuli. His mentation is clearly altered (patient is neither oriented nor can track conversation). He has been intermittently and unpredictively agitated and non-adherentwith treatments! interventions. This has necessitated four point restraints. Petition for 14-Day InvoluntaryTreatment On April 10, 2018, the UWMC and Dr. Janice Edwards filed a petition fora 14- day involuntarytreatment orderalleging D.C. was gravely disabled. Dr. Edwards asserts: In the hospital [D.C.] continues to be confused and disorganized. He has no self[-]care plan and insists the he needs to stay in the hospital for surgery (which is notthe case). He says that he is not sure that he will take psychiatric medications because the hospital is giving him some “fake” medications. He has no realistic self-care plan.
[T]here are no less restrictive alternatives to detention in the best interest of [D.C.] orothers because: he is not compliantwith treatment.~1~ On April 11, 2018, a superior court commissioner entered an ordercommitting D.C. for involuntarytreatmentfor 14 days. The findings offact state, “[A]fter consultation with counsel, [D.C.] voluntarily

. . . agreed to the entry ofan orderfor

. more restrictive involuntary mental health treatment.” D.C. was transferred to Cascade Behavioral Health Hospital for involuntarytreatment. Petition for 90-Day InvoluntaryTreatment On April 20, 2018, Cascade Behavioral Health Hospital designated professional and licensed clinical social worker Hyemin Song filed a petition foran additional 90-day

1 Some boldface omitted.
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orderfor involuntarytreatment. The petition alleges D.C. is “gravely disabled.” The petition states D.C. suffers from schizophrenia “evidenced by disorientation, confusion, delusions, disorganized thoughts, tangential speech, and poorjudgment.” D.C’s symptoms are “ongoing” even in a stabilized environment, he “has not engaged in discussing his treatment needs in a meaningful manner,” and he “does not have safe and reasonable discharge options atthis time.” The petition states thatwere D.C. to leave the hospital prematurely, D.C. “would be at riskto harm himselfdue to an inability to take care for basic health and safety needs.” Appointment ofGuardian ad [item On April 24, 2018, D.C’s attorneyfiled a motion to continue the trial on the petition fora 90-day involuntary commitment orderto seekthe appointment ofa guardian ad item (GAL) for D.C. The court granted the motion. The same day, the court entered an order appointing Elizabeth Walter as the GALfor D.C. under King County Local Mental Proceeding Rule (LMPR) 1 72 A GAL is appointed “forthe benefit ofand to protectthe rights and best interests” of D.C. In re Quesnell, 83Wn.2d 224, 235, 517 P.2d 568 (1973). The orderstates the GAL shall be “permitted reasonable access” to D.C. “forthe purpose of interviewing [him]” and to all

2 LMPR 1.7 states: (a) Appointmentofa Guardian ad Litem. Upon representation by the respondent’s counsel on the record thata Guardian ad Litem is needed in a case, the Court may appoint a Guardian ad Litem on behalfofthe respondentwithout requiring the respondentto appear in court. The requestforthe appointment ofa GAL shall be on the record with petitioner’s counsel present. In the eventthe petitionerobjects to the appointmentofa Guardian ad Litem in the respondent’s absence or if respondent’s counsel requests, the Court may require the respondentto appearto allowthe Courtto conduct an inquirywith the respondentto determine that a Guardian ad Litem should be appointed. (b) Discharge ofa Guardian ad Litem. Upon representation bythe respondent’s counsel on the record thatthe Guardian ad Litem has concluded that his or herservices are no longer necessary and that respondent’s counsel has been able to communicate with the respondent, the Court may discharge the Guardian ad Litem. (Boldface omitted.)
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hospital records pertaining to his “current hospital stay.” See ROW70.02.230(2)(x)3 (‘Information and records related to mental health services

. . may be disclosed

. . . [tjo the person’s counsel orguardian ad item, without modification, at anytime in orderto prepare for involuntary commitment.”). Trial on Petition fora 90-Day Involuntary Commitment Order On April 30, 2018, the court entered an orderscheduling a bench trial on the petition fora 90-day involuntary commitment orderfor May 10. Atthe beginning ofthe May 10 trial, the prosecutortold the courtthis is an “uncontested hearing” on grave disability. Counsel for D.C. told the courtthe GAL “asked thatthis be a short hearing.” The GALwaived her presence and D.C’s presence to attend the trial and the court confirmed. A person may be involuntarilycommitted fortreatment ofa mental disorder if, as a result ofsuch disorder, he is gravelydisabled. In re Det. of LaBelle, 107Wn.2d 196, 201-02, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). ROW71.05.020(22)(a)4 defines “gravely disabled” as “a condition in which a person, as a result ofa mental disorder,

. . [i]s in dangerofserious physical harm resulting from a failure to providefor his or heressential human needs of health orsafety.” The State has the burden ofproving a person is gravely disabled by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Labelle, 107 Wn.2d at 209. [T]he State must present recent, tangible evidence offailure or inabilityto provide forsuch essential human needs as food, clothing, shelter, and

~We note the legislature amended RCW 70.02.230 several times since April 2018. LAws OF 2018, ch. 201, § 8002; LAWS OF2019, ch. 381, § 19; LAWS OF2019, ch. 317, §2; LAWS OF2019, ch. 325, § 5020. Because the amendments do notchange the language quoted here, we cite the currentstatute.

~We note the legislature amended ROW71.05.020 several times since April 2018. LAWS OF 2018,ch.201,~3001;LAwsoF2018,ch.291,~1; LAwsoF2018,ch.305,~1; LAwsoF2019,ch.325,~ 3001; LAWS OF2019, ch. 444, § 16; LAWS OF2019, ch. 446, §2. Because the amendments do not change the definition of“gravely disabled,” we cite the current statute. 4No. 78496-0-115

medical treatmentwhich presents a high probability ofserious physical harm within the nearfuture unless adequate treatment is afforded. Labelle, 107Wn.2d at204-05. “[T]he failure or inabilityto provide forthese essential needs must be shown to arise as a result ofmental disorderand not because ofother factors.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 205. The State called clinical social worker Song as the onlywitness attrial. Song testified thatshe interviewed and evaluated D.C. and metwith D.C. “multiple times, including today, this morning.” Song testified that D.C. ‘has a mental disorderand working diagnosis atthis time is schizophrenia,” and his resulting cognitive and behavioral functions make him “gravely disabled.” Song addressed D.C.’s schizophrenia: He is responding to auditory hallucination, responding to internal stimuli, and preoccupied. He tendsto be very isolated and withdrawn

. . . . He only comes out ofthe room when

. . . it’s alerted to him and reminded him for meal times. He’s often very restless and anxious and requiring assurance from the staff, and most ofthe time that it doesn’twork and then he requires a calming medication that are needed. He is not really in tune to whatthe basic needs that he needs to keep up with in the reality setting because he is too preoccupied. Song testified thatduring her interviews with D.C., “[h]e presents as internally preoccupied responding to hallucination. He’s attimes restless and anxious and that he has slurred speech.” Song testified that in heropinion, D.C. was at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to his inabilityto provide for his needs and safety. When Song asked D.C. that morning what he planned to do if released from the hospital, D.C. replied he would like to go to the Downtown Emergency Service Center (DESC) but could not say how hewould do so orwhat he would do in case ofan emergency, other than “‘walkto the emergency room.’

“ When Song suggested helping D.C. get benefits

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and he stay in the hospital, he became “extremely agitated” and “incoherent and then delusional.” Song testified that in heropinion, D.C. was gravely disabled: Due to [DC’s] internal preoccupation and disorganization, he’s not able to effectively communicate with the other providers and the staff, even at Cascade, which is his structured environment. Outside ofthis structured environment, I would be concerned about him not being able to communicate his basic needs. I’m afraid that he’s going to be in the same situation after decompensation where he shows up completely incoherent, incontinent of his bladder and bowel, and that he would ultimately be at risk at having infections orother medical needs that he had atthe time of admission. He’s a safety risk in that he’s not in his own behaviorcontrol even though he has been able to maintain his behaviors in a hospital. But withoutthe consistent structure to provide the medications and the treatment, I would be concerned about his safety outside ofthe setting. In reaching heropinion, Song said she also considered medical chart notes and consulted with the treatmentteam. The State introduced entries from the Cascade Behavioral Health Hospital medical chartas business records. D.C.’s attorney stipulated to the admission ofthe medical records. Song referred to the observations in the medical records that supported her opinion. An April 14, 2018 psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Long states, “Upon admission, [D.C.] remained disorganized, psychotic, agitated, with a loud speech. He believed that I was somebodyfrom Olympia and he was very paranoid and guarded; did notwantto speakwith me.” Song testified that Dr. Long noted D.C. “as suspicious.” Song also referred to the most recent May 9, 2018 “psychiatric progress note” thatdescribes D.C.’s behaviors and increasing his antipsychotic medication for “persistent psychosis.” The chart note states D.C. “respond[s] to internal stimuli,” “denies all psychotic symptoms,” and when trying to elicit his thought process, he starts to “express very disorganized and delusional nonsensical thoughts.” The final medical entry Song refers

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to is a May 7, 2018 “[n]ursing progress note” detailing observations of D.C. That note describes D.C. “talking to self, laughing to self, [and] making nonsensical statements.” D.C.’s attorney did not cross-examine Song. The Statewaived closing argument and D.C.’s attorneywaived closing argument. The court ruled Song’s testimony established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that D.C. was gravely disabled. The court entered an orderfor 90 days of involuntarytreatment. The court also entered written “Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Pursuantto LMPR 1.11 .“~ Appeal of 90-Day Involuntary Commitment Order D.C. seeks reversal ofthe 90-day commitment orderon the grounds that (1) his attorney provided ineffective assistance ofcounsel and (2) insufficient evidence supportsfinding he was gravely disabled. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel An individual subjectto a civil commitment proceeding under chapter71 .05 ROW has the statutory rightto effective assistance ofcounsel as analyzed underthe ineffective assistance ofcounsel standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In re Det. ofT.A.H.-L., 123 Wn. App. 172, 178-79, 181, 97 P.3d 767 (2004); see ROW71 .05.300 (statutory rightto counsel in 90- day commitment proceedings).

~ LMPR 1.11(b) states: The Court shall entersupplemental written findings and conclusions in a case that is appealed to the courts ofappeal. The findings and conclusions may be entered afterthe notice ofappeal is filed. The prosecution must submit such proposed findings and conclusions, togetherwith a copy ofthe taped report of proceedings, to the appropriate Judge or Commissioner, and opposing counsel of record within 21 days after receiving the respondent’s notice ofappeal.
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Ineffective assistance ofcounsel claims present mixed questions of lawand fact. Statev. Lopez, 190 Wn.2d 104, 116, 410 P.3d 1117 (201 8). “We review atrial court’s factual findings made in the course ofdeciding an ineffective assistance issue for substantial evidence.” Lopez, 190 Wn.2d at 116. The legal conclusions based on findings offactfor ineffective assistance ofcounsel claims are reviewed de novo. Lopez, 190Wn.2d at 117. Strickland uses a two-pronged testforevaluating whethera defendant had constitutionallysufficient representation. State v. Estes, 188 Wn.2d 450, 457, 395 P.3d 1045 (2017). Under Strickland, D.C. must establish both (1) deficient performance and (2) resulting prejudice. Estes, 1 88 Wn.2d at 457~58.6 Performance is deficient if itfalls” ‘below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration ofall the circumstances.’

“ Estes, 188 Wn.2d at458 (quoting Statev. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995)). Prejudice exists ifthere is a reasonable probabilitythat”’butforcounsel’s deficient performance, the outcome ofthe proceedings would have been different.’” Estes, 188 Wn.2d at458 (quoting Statev. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009)). To prove prejudice, D.C. must show more than a “conceivable effect on the outcome” to prevail. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. “Atthe same time, a ‘reasonable probability’ is lowerthan a preponderance standard.” Estes, 188 Wn.2d at458. “Rather, it is a probability sufficientto undermine confidence in the outcome.” Estes, 188 Wn.2d at 458.

6 D.C. cites to the rule in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 5. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984), stating there are specific limited circumstances where the court does not apply Strickland and presumes prejudicefrom deficient performance. Butthe Supreme Court has applied the presumption-of prejudice exception to Strickland in veryfewcases, most involving conflict of interests. Freeman v. Graves, 317 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2003). The Cronic exception to proving prejudice under Strickland is not applicable here. 8No. 78496-0-1/9

“Washington courts also indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was reasonable.” Estes, 1 88 Wn.2d at458. To rebutthe presumption of reasonableness, a defendant must establish an absence ofany legitimate trial tactic thatwould explain counsel’s performance. In re Pers. Restraint of Lui, 188 Wn.2d 525, 539, 397 P.3d 90 (2017). “Performance is not deficient ifcounsel’s conduct can be characterized as legitimate trial strategy ortactics.” Estes, 1 88 Wn.2d at458. An attorney’s decision on whetherand when to objectto trial testimony are classic examples oftrial tactics. In re Pers. Restraintof Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 714, 101 P.3d 1(2004). When a defendant bases his ineffective assistance ofcounsel claim
on trial counsel’s failure to object, the defendant mustshowthe trial courtwould have sustained the objection and the resultwould have been different. Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 714. D.C. contends his attorney provided ineffective assistance ofcounsel by stipulating to the admittance of medical records under ROW 5.45.020. The decision to admit orexclude business recordswill be reversed only if itwas a manifestabuse of discretion. State v. Ziegler, 114 Wn.2d 533, 538, 789 P.2d 79 (1990). As provided in ROW 5.45.020, hearsay evidence contained in business records is competent evidence: A record ofan act, condition orevent, shall in so far as relevant, be competent evidence ifthe custodian or otherqualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if itwas made in the regularcourse ofbusiness, at or nearthe time ofthe act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion ofthe court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as tojustify its admission. Business records are presumptively reliable ifthey are made in the regularcourse of business and with no apparent motive to falsify. Ziegler, 114 Wn.2d at 537-38. Hospital records qualify as business records—” ‘A practicing physician’s records, made in the

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regularcourse ofbusiness, properly identified and otherwise relevant, constitute competent evidence ofa condition therein recorded.’

“ Ziegler, 114Wn.2d at 538-39 (quoting Statev. Sellers, 39Wn. App. 799, 806, 695 P.2d 1014 (1985)). Hospital records containing entries made by a variety of medical personnel may be testified to even ifthose authors are not presentfor cross-examination. Ziegler, 114 Wn.2d at 538. As the Ziegler court states: “As applied to hospital records, compliancewith the [Uniform Business Records as EvidenceAct, chapter 5.45 ROW,] obviates the necessity, expense, inconvenience, and sometimes impossibilityofcalling as witnesses the attendants, nurses, physicians, X raytechnicians, laboratory and other hospital employees who collaborated to make the hospital record ofthe patient. It is not necessaryto examine the person who actually created the record so long as it is produced by one who has the custody ofthe record as a regular part of his work or has supervision of its creation.” Ziegler, 114 Wn.2d at 538 (quoting Cantrill v. Am. Mail Line, Ltd., 42 Wn.2d 590, 608, 257 P.2d 179 (1953)). Indeed, even a provision in the civil commitmentstatute explicitly anticipates this issue and provides:

The record makershall not be required to testify in orderto introduce medical or psychological records ofthe detained person so long as the requirements of ROW 5.45.020 are met exceptthat portions ofthe record which contain opinions as tothe detained person’s mental state must be deleted from such records unless the person making such conclusions is available for cross-examination. ROW71 .05.360(9).~ Because the record establishes Song is the custodian ofthe medical records and relies on them in forming heropinion, the records are admissible.

~We note the legislature amended ROW 71.05.360 in 2019. LAWS OF 2019, ch. 446, § 13. The amendments do not change subsection (9). 10No. 78496-0-Ill 1

D.C. relies on In re Welfare ofJ.M., 130 Wn. App. 912, 125 P.3d 245 (2005), to argue the business record exception does not apply.8 J.M. is distinguishable. In J.M., the court held thatthe failure ofcounsel to objectto the admission and testimony of witnesses who were not experts about psychological evaluations that contained opinions ofwitnesseswho did nottestifywas deficient performance. J.M., 130 Wn. App. at 916-25. Here, unlike in J.M., the undisputed record shows Song referred onlyto objective facts and observations contained in the medical recordsthat supported Song’s expert opinion that D.C. was gravelydisabled. D.C. cannot show his counsel was deficientforstipulating to admissible medical records underthe business records exception. D.C. also asserts his attorney provided ineffective assistance ofcounsel by not cross-examining Song, not calling witnesses, and not giving an opening orclosing statement. “Generallythe decision whetherto call a particularwitness is a matterfor differences ofopinion and therefore presumed to be a matter of legitimate trial tactics.” Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 742. D.C. also does not identify any particularwitness he claims his attorney should have called totestify. Statev. Davis, 174 Wn. App. 623, 639, 300 P.3d 465 (2013). Likewise, an attorney’s decision to forgo an opening or closing statement is a matteroftactics. Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 715; State v. Jones, 33 Wn. App. 865, 872, 658 P.2d 1262 (1983).

8 D.C. also cites In re Dependency ofG.A.R., 137 Wn. App. 1, 8-9, 150 P.3d 643 (2007), which follows J.M. and holds defense counsel was ineffective forfailing to objectto evidence, including reports written by experts who did nottestify. 11No. 78496-0-1/12

The extent ofcross-examination is a matterofjudgment and strategy” as well. State v. Johnston, 143 Wn. App. 1, 20, 177 P.3d 1127 (2007). “Moreover, in orderto establish prejudice forthefailure to effectively cross-examine a witness, the defendant must showthatthe testimonythatwould have been elicited on cross-examination could have overcome the evidence againstthe defendant.” Johnston, 143 Wn. App. at20. The undisputed record shows the GALwaived her presence and the presence of D.C. and decided to proceed with an uncontested “short hearing” that required the State to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence D.C. was gravely disabled. D.C. cannotshowthat his counsel was deficient on any ofthese otherallegations of ineffective assistance ofcounsel because theywere legitimate trial tactics. Sufficiency ofthe Evidence D.C. contendsthe findings offact based on Song’s testimony and the medical records do not establish D.C. was gravely disabled under RCW 71 .05.020(22) and the 90-day commitmentwas warranted. The burden ofproofata 90-day involuntary commitmenttrial is “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.” LaBelle, 1 07 Wn.2d at 209. Accordingly, “the ultimate fact in issue must be shown byevidence to be ‘highly probable.’

“ LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 209 (quoting In re Pawling, 101 Wn.2d 392, 399, 679 P.2d 916 (1984)). When the trial court has weighed the evidence, this court limits its reviewto determining whethersubstantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings and, ifso, whetherthe findings in turn supportthe trial court’s conclusions of law and thejudgment. LaBelle, 107Wn.2d at 209; In re Det. ofW.C.C., 193 Wn. App. 783, 793, 372 P.3d 179 (2016). “Substantial evidence is ‘evidence in sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person ofthe

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truth ofthe declared premise.’

“ In re Det. ofA.S., 91 Wn. App. 146, 162, 955 P.2d 836 (1998) (quoting Holland v. Boeing Co., 90Wn.2d 384, 390-91, 583 P.2d 621 (1978)). ‘The party challenging afinding offact bears the burden ofdemonstrating thefinding is not supported by substantial evidence.” AS., 91 Wn. App. at 162. The court defers to the trial court as to the credibility ofthe witnesses and the weight ofthe evidence. In re VulnerableAdult Petition for Knight, 178 Wn. App. 929, 937, 317 P.3d 1068 (2014). “An appellate courtwill uphold challenged findings offact and treatthefindings as verities
on appeal ifthefindings are supported by substantial evidence.” In re Estate ofJones, 152 Wn.2d 1,8,93 P.3d 147 (2004). The supplemental findings and conclusions state, in pertinent part, “[D.C.] currentlysuffers from a mental impairment and has been diagnosed as suffering with schizophrenia.

. . . [D.C.]’s mental impairment has had a substantial adverse effect upon his cognitive and volitional functions.” The courtfound that as a result of his mental impairment, D.C. was gravelydisabled and at “substantial risk of harm due to his inabilityto provide for his own essential needs of health and/orsafety.” The findings also state D.C. exhibits active symptoms of his mental impairment including but not limited to presenting with an inabilityto communicate effectively, including the inabilityto communicate his own needs, being incoherent, confused, disorganized, agitated, experiencing and expressing delusional thought process, experiencing hallucinations, and exhibiting preoccupation. The courtfound thatwithoutfurthertreatment, [D.C.] will continue in the condition that brought him into hospital and that a less restrictive treatment alternative is not appropriate nor in {D.C.]’s best interest because he is not stabilized, exhibits active symptoms of his mental impairment, and [D.C.] continues to be too disorganized and too symptomaticto complywith a less restrictive treatment orderatthis time.

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The court concluded the State “established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that [D.C.] suffers from a mental impairmentthat has had a substantial adverse effect on his cognitive and volitional functions; and as a result ofthis mental impairment [D.C.] is gravely disabled pursuantto” RCW71 .05.020(22).~ D.C. argues that because this was the firsttime he was hospitalized for his mental health and was stable after his initial treatment, the court lacked evidence that he was gravely disabled. D.C. contends he devised a safe and reasonable discharge plan in that he wanted to take a busto DESC forservices and his most recent hospital record indicated hewas eating, adequate with his hygiene, and compliantwith his care plan, which proved he was not at risk of harm forfailing to providefor his essential human needs. The record does not support his argument. Song provided overwhelming evidence that supplemented herexpert opinion that D.C. was gravely disabled. Song testified that because of D.C’s schizophrenia, he suffers from ongoing disorganization, incoherence, and extreme agitation despite being in the stable hospital environment. Song furthertestified that D.C. was not aware of his basic needs due to being “too preoccupied” and having “poor insight.” Song was also concerned that D.C. was not able to state a reasonable self-care plan because in addition to D.C. not being able to articulate how he would arrange transportation to DESC, he also could not describe how hewould ensure his personal safety in case of
an emergency. Song concluded that if D.C. did not receive furthertreatment, he would likelyend up back in the hospital in the same condition that brought him there—being unable to communicate and care for his basic needs and in poor physical health. The

~ Boldface in original.
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trial court ultimatelyfound the testimony ofSong credible” and incorporated her testimony by reference in its supplemental findings offact and conclusions of law. Substantial evidence supports the findings offact and thefindings supportthe conclusion that D.C. demonstrated grave disability. We affirm.



# , I. A~

WE CONCUR:

15