Filed 5/30/24 P. v. Geronimo CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ABRAHAM GERONIMO,

Defendant and Appellant.

B330022

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BA443976-01)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.

Neil Rosenbaum, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

——————————
2

Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216

(Delgadillo), we review this appeal of an order denying 

defendant’s petition for resentencing brought under Penal Code1

section 1172.6. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On August 23, 2016, the People charged defendant 

Abraham Geronimo by amended information with one count of 

attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder in 

violation of sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a) and one count of 

assault with a firearm in violation of section 245, 

subdivision (a)(2). As to the attempted murder count, it was 

alleged that a principal personally and intentionally used and 

discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury pursuant to 

section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d) and (e)(1). It was also 

alleged both offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal 

street gang. (§ 186.22(b)(1)(C).)

A jury found Geronimo guilty of both charges and found the 

enhancement allegations true. The trial court sentenced 

Geronimo to 25 years to life with the possibility of parole.

For context only, we recite the facts of the case from our 

opinion affirming Geronimo’s conviction. Geronimo and Julio R. 

were spraying paint over rival gang graffiti on a garage door near 

the victim’s house. The victim went outside to move his car and 

Julio told him, “Don’t mess with me.” (People v. Geronimo (Dec. 

12, 2017, B277467) [nonpub. opn.].) Geronimo seemed to be 

acting as a “lookout,” i.e., “looking” and “keeping an eye out.” 

Before the shooting, Geronimo crossed the street and stayed in 

the area. Julio R. fired a handgun at the victim three times and 

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

wounded him in the leg. Both men then fled to Geronimo’s 

house. (People v. Geronimo, supra, B277467.)

On August 15, 2022, Geronimo filed a petition for 

resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. He also requested and 

was granted appointment of counsel. The People filed a response 

to the petition to which they attached the instructions given to 

the jury at trial. Geronimo filed a reply brief. On April 24, 2023, 

after reviewing the briefs of the parties, the trial court denied the 

petition, finding that the jury was not instructed the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine or any theory of imputed malice 

and therefore Geronimo was not entitled to relief as a matter of 

law.

In denying the petition, the trial court stated, “The court 

has read and considered the original petition, obviously, and then 

I had looked at the People’s response to the petition and then the 

defense reply to the response. [¶] . . . [¶] So the court has taken a 

look at a couple of things in the case. The court did not do any 

fact-finding in this case. It just looked at the conviction record. 

[¶] And the defendant was convicted of attempted murder. There 

was no natural and probable consequence that was given to the 

jury. Also, there was no theory that could be imputed onto the 

defendant, based on the instructions. [¶] As such, the court is 

going to find the defense has failed to make a prima facie case, 

and it will find the defendant is legally ineligible for relief 

pursuant to [section] 1172.6.” Geronimo timely appealed.

On August 21, 2023, we appointed counsel to represent 

Geronimo on appeal. On January 18, 2024, counsel filed a noissue brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo. Counsel advised us 

appellant was told he may file his own supplemental brief within 
4

30 days. Counsel sent Geronimo transcripts of the record on 

appeal as well as a copy of the brief.

On January 19, 2024, this court sent Geronimo notice that 

a brief raising no issues had been filed on his behalf. We advised 

him he had 30 days within which to submit a supplemental brief 

or letter stating any issues he believes we should consider. We 

also advised him that if he did not file a supplemental brief, the

appeal may be dismissed as abandoned.

On April 15, 2024, we received Geronimo’s supplemental 

brief, in which he concedes the jury was not instructed on the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine. He contends, 

however, he was convicted under a theory where malice was 

imputed to him based solely on his participation in the tagging of 

the apartment building.

DISCUSSION

Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) eliminated the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for 

liability for murder (and later, attempted murder). It also limited 

the scope of the felony murder rule. (People v. Lewis (2021) 

11 Cal.5th 952, 957) (Lewis).) Petitions for resentencing carry 

out the intent of Senate Bill No. 1437, which was “to ensure that 

murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual 

killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major 

participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless 

indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); 

Lewis, at p. 967.) Petitions under section 1172.6 address 

convictions where a defendant was not the shooter but was held 

vicariously liable on one of several theories of liability identified 

in the statute. If the record establishes ineligibility for 

resentencing as a matter of law, the petition has been properly 
5

denied. (Lewis, at pp. 970–972.) However, the petition and 

record must establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible 

for relief. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1,14 [a 

“petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law if the 

record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no factfinding, 

weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations, that . . . the 

petitioner was the actual killer.”].) (Ibid.) When a trial court 

denies a section 1172.6 petition based on the failure to make a 

prima facie case for relief, our review is de novo. (Ibid.)

After appointment of counsel, the trial court assesses when 

a prima facie case for relief has been made. The prima facie 

inquiry is limited. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In 

assessing whether a defendant has made a prima facie case for 

relief pursuant to section 1172.6, ruling on a resentencing 

petition, the trial court is entitled to review the record of 

conviction, which includes the jury summations, jury 

instructions, verdict forms, and prior appellate opinions. (Lewis,

at p. 971–972.) However, Lewis cautions that although appellate 

opinions are generally considered to be part of the record of 

conviction, the prima facie bar was intentionally set very low, the 

probative value of an appellate opinion is case-specific; a trial 

court should not engage in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of 

evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972.)

Here, the jury was instructed on aiding and abetting only

(CALCRIM No. 401). The instruction reads: “To prove that the 

defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that 

crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The perpetrator 

committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that the 

perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or during 

the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and 
6

abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The 

defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the 

perpetrator’s commission of the crime. [¶] Someone aids and 

abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful 

purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, 

aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s 

commission of that crime. [¶] If all of these requirements are 

proved, the defendant does not need to actually have been 

present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an aider 

and abettor. [¶] If you conclude that defendant was present at the 

scene of the crime or fails to prevent the crime, you may consider 

that fact in determining whether the defendant was an aider and 

abettor. However, the fact that a person is present at the scene 

of a crime or failed to prevent the crime does not, by itself, make 

him or her an aider and abettor.”

The jury was also instructed on attempted murder

(CALCRIM No. 600): “To prove that the defendant is guilty of 

attempted murder, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The 

defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step toward 

killing another person; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant intended to 

kill that person. [¶] A direct step requires more than merely 

planning or preparing to commit murder or obtaining or 

arranging for something needed to commit murder. A direct step 

is one that goes beyond planning or preparation and shows that a 

person is putting his or her plan into action. A direct step 

indicates a definite and unambiguous intend to kill. It is a direct 

movement toward the commission of the crime after preparations 

are made. It is an immediate step that puts the plan in motion so 

that the plan would have been completed if some circumstance 

outside the plan had not interrupted the attempt.”
7

As confirmed by our review of the record of conviction, the 

jury was not instructed on the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine or any other theory of imputed malice. 

Nonetheless, Geronimo argues that the prosecutor’s focus on 

Julio R.’s actions confused the jury into thinking it could find 

Geronimo guilty by imputing Julio R.’s mental state to him.

We disagree. The instructions make clear that Geronimo 

himself had to have the intent to kill. They do not direct or 

permit the jury to impute Julio R.’s mental state to Geronimo just 

because he was present at the scene, as Geronimo contends. As a 

“general rule,” courts presume that juries can and will dutifully 

follow the instructions they are given. (People v. Washington 

(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 26.) Because Geronimo was convicted 

under a theory of direct aiding and abetting, he is ineligible for 

relief under resentencing relief.

We decline to independently review the record. (People v. 

Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)

DISPOSITION

The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J. VIRAMONTES, J.