UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4854

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KWAME ESSEL DJANSON, a/k/a Quarmey Gyanson Essel, a/k/a 

Samuel Kofi Essel,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:13-cr-00177-LO-1)

Submitted: June 27, 2014 Decided: July 11, 2014

Before KING, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Caroline S.

Platt, Appellate Attorney, Brooke Sealy Rupert, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. 

Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Dina S. Finkel, Special 

Assistant United States Attorney, Gene Rossi, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Kwame Essel Djanson appeals his conviction for 

unlawful procurement of naturalization, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1425(a) (2012),* and the district court’s order revoking his 

naturalization. Finding no error, we affirm.

Djanson first claims that the indictment failed to 

state an offense, and the district court therefore erred in 

denying his timely motion to dismiss. He argues that “an 

indictment for an offense which includes a ‘contrary to law’ 

element — without stating which law the defendant’s conduct 

violated — is inadequate because it does not set forth the 

elements of the offense with sufficient specificity.” 

(Appellant’s Br. at 26-27). 

In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss an 

indictment, we review the district court’s factual findings for 

clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. 

Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 2005). “When a criminal 

defendant challenges the sufficiency of an indictment prior to 

the verdict, we apply a heightened scrutiny.” United States v. 

Kingrea, 573 F.3d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 2009). A federal 

 * Djanson does not appeal his remaining convictions for 

making a false statement in connection with the purchase of a 

firearm and making a false statement in an application for a 

passport.
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indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged, 

fairly inform the defendant of the charge, and enable the 

defendant to plead double jeopardy as a defense to future 

prosecutions for the same offense. United States v. Resendiz–

Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1).

After reviewing the statutory language and the 

language contained in the indictment, we conclude that the 

indictment properly set forth the elements of the offense 

charged, fairly informed Djanson of the charge, and informed him 

of the material false statements that he was charged with 

making. Although the phrase “contrary to law” is not defined in 

§ 1425(a), it has been interpreted to mean a violation of the 

laws governing naturalization. See United States v. Puerta, 982 

F.2d 1297, 1300-01 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The statute does not define 

the phrase ‘contrary to law.’ Presumably the ‘law’ referred to 

is the law governing naturalization.”); see also Fedorenko v. 

United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981) (recognizing that “there 

must be strict compliance with all of the congressionally 

imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship” and 

that “[f]ailure to comply with any of these conditions renders 

the certificate of citizenship ‘illegally procured,’ and 

naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be set aside”).

Because knowingly making material false statements to procure 

naturalization is always contrary to the law, we find Djanson’s 
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argument without merit and we uphold the district court’s denial 

of the motion to dismiss.

Djanson next alleges that the district court erred in 

failing to give his proposed jury instruction on the § 1425(a) 

charge and contends that the court failed to properly instruct 

the jury on the “contrary to law” element of the offense. We 

review de novo a claim that a jury instruction failed to 

correctly state the applicable law. See United States v. 

Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 351 (4th Cir. 2012). “A trial court 

has ‘considerable discretion in choosing the specific wording of 

[its] instructions,’ and we will not reverse unless an 

instructional error ‘is determined to have been prejudicial, 

based on a review of the record as a whole.’” United States v. 

Whitfield, 695 F.3d 288, 305 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Figg v. 

Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 640 (4th Cir. 2002)), cert. denied, 133 

S. Ct. 1461 (2013). In conducting our review, we do “not view a 

single instruction in isolation; rather we consider whether 

taken as a whole and in the context of the entire charge, the 

instructions accurately and fairly state the controlling law.” 

United States v. Rahman, 83 F.3d 89, 92 (4th Cir. 1996).

We have thoroughly reviewed Djanson’s proposed 

instruction and the instructions given by the district court in 

the context of its entire charge to the jury. As discussed 

above, we conclude that the Government was not required to 
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specify an underlying predicate offense in order to charge 

Djanson with a § 1425(a) violation. Moreover, to the extent 

that Djanson contends that the instructions never set forth the 

element that his statements must be “contrary to law,” we 

conclude that the entire charge, taken as a whole, accurately 

and fairly stated the controlling law. See id. Because Djanson

has failed to show that the “contrary to law” element was not 

substantially covered by the district court’s jury charge or 

that the failure to further define “contrary to law” seriously 

impaired his ability to conduct his defense, see United 

States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, __ 

S. Ct. __, 2014 WL 1747984 (U.S. June 9, 2014) (No. 13-9948), we 

conclude that no error occurred. See United States v. Latchin, 

554 F.3d 709, 715 (7th Cir. 2009) (considering jury instructions 

on § 1425(a) charge).

Djanson next argues that there was insufficient 

evidence to support his conviction. We review a district 

court’s decision to deny a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a 

judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 

209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). A defendant challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden. United 

States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). The 

verdict of a jury must be sustained “if, viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, the verdict is 
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supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Smith, 451 F.3d at 216 

(citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “evidence that a 

reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and 

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he jury, not the reviewing court, 

weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any 

conflicts in the evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reversal for 

insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the 

prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

In attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, Djanson

argues that “no witness specified which law [his] procurement of 

naturalization was ‘contrary to’ such that it violated 

§ 1425(a).” (Appellant’s Br. at 34). As explained above, we 

conclude that this argument is without merit. Moreover, our 

review of the record convinces us that substantial evidence 

clearly supported the jury’s verdict in this case. 

Finally, Djanson contends that the district court 

erred in entering an order of denaturalization. Pursuant to 8 

U.S.C. § 1451(e) (2012), 

When a person shall be convicted under section 1425 of 

Title 18 of knowingly procuring naturalization in 

violation of law, the court in which such conviction 
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is had shall thereupon revoke, set aside, and declare 

void the final order admitting such person to 

citizenship, and shall declare the certificate of 

naturalization of such person to be canceled. 

Jurisdiction is conferred on the courts having 

jurisdiction of the trial of such offense to make such 

adjudication.

He argues that his judgment of conviction does not become final 

until after he has exhausted his rights to appeal, and alleges 

“the district [sic] erred when it concluded that it could not 

wait to issue the denaturalization order until this appeal, and 

any potential resulting petition for certiorari, have been 

resolved.” (Appellant’s Br. at 36).

We conclude that Djanson’s argument is contrary to the 

plain language of the statute. Upon a § 1425(a) conviction, the 

statute provides that the trial court “shall thereupon revoke, 

set aside and declare void” the order admitting a defendant to 

citizenship and “shall” cancel the certificate of 

naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e). Moreover, the cases to 

consider this statutory provision have found that revocation of 

naturalization is automatic, ministerial, and involves no 

exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Latchin, 554 F.3d at 716 

(“Under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e), a conviction for knowingly procuring 

naturalization in violation of the law results in automatic 

denaturalization.”); Bridges v. United States, 199 F.2d 845, 846 

(9th Cir. 1952) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he is not 

‘convicted’ until all appellate remedies have been exhausted and 
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finding that the revocation is “meant to be a part of the 

criminal proceedings and not a separate proceeding. This is 

indicated by the language of the subsection itself which states 

that when a person is convicted of obtaining citizenship by 

fraud, his citizenship shall ‘thereupon’ be revoked in the same 

court where he was convicted.”), reversed on other grounds by

346 U.S. 209 (1953). We therefore uphold the district court’s 

denaturalization order. 

Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment and the 

district court’s order revoking naturalization. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately expressed in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED