In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-23-00208-CV 

 

IN RE: THE COMMITMENT OF KAMERON DEDAN PEARSON, APPELLANT 

On Appeal from the 181st District Court 

Randall County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 81562B, Honorable Titiana Frausto, Presiding 

November 28, 2023 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

Kameron Dedan Pearson appeals his civil commitment under the Texas Civil 

Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVP Act”).1 His sole issue on appeal 

concerns the trial court’s refusal to include a requested instruction in the jury charge. We 

affirm.

1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.153.
2

BACKGROUND

In 2010, when Pearson was a juvenile, he was adjudicated as a delinquent and 

placed on probation for two years after the trial court found that he had committed the 

offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. His probation was revoked in 2011 based 

on the commission of three counts of sexual assault of a child, to which he pleaded guilty.

2

 

Pearson was placed on deferred adjudication and committed to the Texas Youth 

Commission. In 2014, Pearson was convicted of the offense of possession of child 

pornography and sentenced to eighteen years’ confinement in the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice. His deferred adjudication for the 2011 offenses was revoked and he 

was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment for each count, with the sentences to run 

concurrently.

In June of 2022, the State filed a petition to civilly commit Pearson as a sexually 

violent predator, alleging that he is a repeat sexually violent offender who suffers from a 

behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual 

violence. A jury trial was held. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Pearson 

is a sexually violent predator. Pearson timely filed this appeal.

ANALYSIS

During the charge conference, Pearson requested a separate instruction reading: 

“All persons are presumed not to be a sexually violent predator. No person may be 

determined to be a sexually violent predator unless the State proves each element in its 

2 The juvenile court certified Pearson to be tried as an adult.
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cause of action beyond a reasonable doubt.” The trial court denied the request. In his 

sole issue on appeal, Pearson asserts that the trial court’s refusal to include the requested 

instruction was reversible error.

We review a trial court’s decision to refuse a particular instruction in the charge for 

an abuse of discretion. Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012). A trial court 

may refuse to give a requested instruction or definition that is not necessary to enable the 

jury to render a verdict, even if the instruction or definition is a correct statement of the 

law. In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2015, pet. denied). “The omission of an instruction is reversible error only if the omission 

probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.” Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192 

S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).

Pearson’s requested instruction was modeled on an instruction concerning the 

presumption of innocence applicable in criminal cases. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 

478, 483–86, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1978); Bennett v. State, 396 S.W.2d 875, 

875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (“The presumption of innocence is the most valuable of 

defendant’s rights, and a charge upon such subject is essential in every criminal case.”). 

However, a civil commitment under the SVP Act is a civil matter, not a criminal trial. In re 

Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 653 (Tex. 2005). The instruction requested by 

Pearson is not mandated by statute or by caselaw. Nothing in the SVP Act creates a 

presumption for either the State or the respondent in such proceedings.

The SVP Act requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person 

is a sexually violent predator. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(a); In re 
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Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 639–41. Here, the charge of the court correctly 

instructed the jury that the burden of proof rested upon the State and never shifted to 

Pearson. The charge further provided that the State had the burden of proving Pearson 

is a sexually violent predator “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It instructed jurors that, if they 

had a reasonable doubt as to whether Pearson is a sexually violent predator, they “will 

say by [their] verdict that [Pearson] is not a sexually violent predator.” We conclude that 

the jury charge adequately presented the issue of the burden of proof to the jury and that 

no separate instruction was necessary. See In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 

at 554 (no abuse of discretion in refusing separate jury instruction on “serious difficulty 

controlling behavior” where requested instruction was not statutory law and was not 

necessary to enable jury to render verdict).

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that 

Pearson was presumed not to be a sexually violent predator. Accordingly, we overrule 

Pearson’s sole issue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker

 Justice