U.S. Nuclear Office of Nuclear NUREG/BR-0117

Regulatory Material Safety No. 05-03

Commission and Safeguards October 2005

NMSS Quarterly Newsletter

Contents Page

1. Gas Centrifuge Licensing Activities .................. 1

2. Fuel Cycle Inspection Program Procedure

Revision Workshop ........................................... 2

3. Disconnected Microphone Clip Leads to

Interruption of Patient Treatment ....................... 3

4. Generic Communications Issued

(May 1, 2005 - August 31, 2005) ....................... 3

5. Significant Medical Events

(June 1 - August 31, 2005) ................................ 4

6. Understanding 10 CFR 35.3045(a)(3) Wrong

Treatment Site Reportable Medical Event.......... 5

7. Selected Federal Register Notices

(June 1, 2005 - August 31, 2005) ....................... 5

8. Significant Enforcement Actions ....................... 6

GAS CENTRIFUGE LICENSING

ACTIVITIES

Significant milestones

have been reached

recently in the area of gas

centrifuge (GC) uranium

enrichment facility

licensing. Three license

applications, two from

USEC Inc., and one from

Louisiana Energy

Services (LES), have

been received. These

license applications signal

a changeover from the

current uranium

enrichment technology

used in the United States

— the gaseous diffusion

process.

On June 15, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) issued the final Environmental

Impact Statement (EIS), NUREG-1790, and Safety

Evaluation Report (SER), NUREG-1827, for the

proposed National Enrichment Facility (NEF) to be

constructed and operated by LES. In the SER, the

staff concluded that LES demonstrated it has

adequate safety programs to construct and operate

the proposed facility. In the final EIS, the staff

analyzed the environmental impacts from the

proposed NEF, and determined that impacts

generally would be small to moderate. In preparing

the final EIS, the staff addressed nearly 4200

comments received from approximately 400

individuals on the draft EIS, which was issued on

September 17, 2004.

The proposed NEF, to be located in Lea County,

New Mexico, would produce Uranium-235 (235U)

enriched up to 5 weight percent by a gas centrifuge

process. If the license is approved, facility

construction would begin in 2006, and continue for

8 years through 2013. The proposed NEF would

begin initial production in 2008, and peak

production would be reached in 2013.

The final EIS and SER are the major NRC staff

reviews in the licensing process. Several

contentions related to the facility are still before the

NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. The

Commission expects to complete the licensing

hearing process in mid-2006.

USEC Inc. submitted an application for a Lead

Cascade Facility on February 12, 2003, and a

license for the facility was issued on February 24,

2004. The Lead Cascade is a test facility intended

to provide operational information on the machines

and auxiliary systems as they would be used in

commercial application. The Lead Cascade Facility

is located at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion

Plant (GDP) site in Piketon, OH, and is expected to

begin operation late this year.

Figure 1 .

Gas Centrifuge Process
2

USEC Inc. submitted a license application for the

American Centrifuge Plant (ACP) on August 23, 2004.

The ACP would be an expansion of the Lead Cascade

facility at the Portsmouth GDP site in Piketon, OH,

and is a proposed 3.5 million Seperative Work Units

(SWU)/year plant that would operate at up to 10

percent 235U enrichment. An SWU is a unit of

enrichment that measures the effort required to

separate isotopes of uranium. The application was

reviewed and accepted by NRC staff on October 7,

2004, and safety, security, and environmental reviews

are on going. Additionally, USEC Inc. has submitted

four revisions to the application. The SER is expected

to be issued in February 2006. NRC expects to issue

the draft EIS in September 2005 and the final EIS in

April 2006. The Commission has ordered mandatory

hearings for this application, and has directed

completion of the licensing review process within 30

months of the application.

For more information related to gas centrifuge

uranium enrichment facility licensing, visit our

website at http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cyclefac/gas-centrifuge.html.

(Contact: Brian W. Smith, Fuel Cycle, NMSS,

301-415-5331; e-mail: bws1@nrc.gov)

FUEL CYCLE INSPECTION PROGRAM

PROCEDURE REVISION WORKSHOP

Region II Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

(DFFI) conducted a procedure revision workshop

assisted by the Technical Support Group (TSG) of

the Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards

(FCSS) on August 4, 2005, in the Region II Atlanta

office. DFFI and FCSS held the workshop as part

of an initiative to revise fuel cycle inspection

procedures to consolidate inspection activities and

incorporate increased risk-informing to reflect

revisions to 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H. The

workshop began with an introduction and

welcoming remarks by Dr. William Travers, the

Region II Regional Administrator. Dr. Travers

discussed the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s (NRC) goal to better risk-inform

inspection procedures and the licensees’ associated

efforts to perform integrated safety analyses. The

meeting was facilitated by Chip Cameron, of NRC’s

Office of the General Counsel. The workshop

consisted of facilitated discussions of procedure

revisions, NRC-proposed enforcement policy

revisions, and fuel cycle industry views on

enforcement policy. The majority of the workshop

involved NRC staff presenting proposed revisions to

fuel cycle inspection procedures.

David Ayres, Chief of DFFI, Branch 1, presented

the basis for the decision to revise the fuel cycle

inspection procedures. NRC’s three main goals

were to emphasize a risk-informed focus for

inspection activities, consolidate and reduce

duplication among inspection procedures and

technical safety disciplines, and create a more

uniform procedure format and content. Inspection

procedure changes included modifying eight

procedures, drafting six new procedures and

eliminating 14 procedures whose requirements were

either incorporated into other procedures or

eliminated as duplicative. Significant procedure

changes include: (1) the replacement of the existing

criticality safety procedure with three new

procedures; (2) the consolidation of the chemical

safety inspection procedure suite (11 procedures)

into other procedures; and (3) creation of new

procedures to address issues related to the revised

10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H. NRC staff addressed

comments on the draft procedures received from the

public before the meeting and responded to

questions from the public during presentations on

individual inspection procedures.

NRC staff presented proposed policy changes

addressing Subpart H issues such as items relied on

for safety (IROFS). Staff noted that NRC

enforcement policy regarding fuel cycle facilities is

contained in the NUREG-1600, Supplement IV

which, although broad, does not address issues

related to Subpart H revisions, such as failure of

IROFS, management measure degradation, or

consideration of uncredited controls. The NRC staff

presentation: (1) reviewed new Subpart H

requirements and definitions; (2) discussed the

significance of controls that are credited for meeting

performance requirements but are not IROFS; (3)

presented examples of how uncredited safety

controls affect the risk significance of upset

conditions; and (4) discussed how IROFS and

uncredited controls might be considered during

enforcement proceedings. Staff emphasized that

proposed new criteria are consistent with Subpart H

and past practice, are risk-informed and provide

appropriate flexibility.

After completion of the enforcement policy

presentation, representatives of the Nuclear Energy

Institute (NEI) presented a high-level proposal for

enhancing NRC enforcement policy regarding

Subpart H changes. The NEI proposal emphasized

a graded approach for dispositioning issues such as

failure of IROFS, management measure

degradation, or procedural non-compliances, based

on whether the performance requirements of

Subpart H continued to be met. The NEI proposal
3

also discussed the importance of an adequate

problem identification, resolution, and correction

system for purposes of timely identification and

correction of event precursors before recurrent

failures result in the performance requirements not

being met.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the staff reviewed

comments received and discussed further steps to

complete the procedure revision initiative. Staff

expects written comments from the fuel cycle

industry by September 6, 2005. Staff agreed to

consider feedback such as proposed additional

procedure revisions and potential additional

workshops.

(Contact: Dennis Morey, Division of Fuel Cycle

Safety and Safeguards, 301-415-6107;

e-mail: dcm@nrc.gov)

DISCONNECTED MICROPHONE CLIP

LEADS to INTERRUPTION of PATIENT

TREATMENT

Recently, the shielding jaws of a Leksell gamma

stereotactic radiosurgery unit (Elekta Instrument

AB, Model 23004, Type B) failed to fully open

during a patient treatment. Two of five planned

treatment shots were successfully delivered when

the shielding jaws failed to fully open at the

beginning of the third shot. The unit’s sensors

prevented the unit from allowing the patient couch

to travel to a treatment position and caused the

shielding jaws to close. After an investigation, it

was discovered that the metal clip that held the

microphone to the patient couch assembly had fallen

into the jaw mechanism. The licensee believes the

metal clip may have been knocked out of its

position by inadvertent contact with the patient’s

shoulder during one of the previous couch

movements.

This licensee reported that the microphone clip had

become detached from the couch assembly in the

past, but previously had not caused any problems

with patient treatments. This licensee noted that this

microphone appeared to be smaller than earlier

microphones and did not fit tightly into the clip.

Licensees should be aware that the metal clip that

holds the microphone for this model of gamma

stereotactic radiosurgery unit can become dislodged,

and ensure that the metal clip and other small

objects are secured against falling into the unit.

(Contact: Cindy Flannery, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, 301-415-0223,

e-mail: cmf@nrc.gov)

GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS ISSUED

(May 1, 2005 - August 31, 2005)

Information Notices (IN)

IN 2005-12, “Excessively Large Criticality Safety

Limits Fail to Provide Double Contingency at

Fuel Cycle Facility,” was issued on May 17, 2005.

This IN was issued to all licensees authorized to

possess a critical mass of special nuclear material.

(Technical Contact: Dennis Morey, NMSS,

301-415-6107; e-mail: dcm@nrc.gov)

IN 2005-13, “Potential Non-conservative Error

in Modeling Geometric Regions in the

Keno-v.a Criticality Code,” was issued on May 17,

2005. This IN was issued to all licensees using the

Keno-V.a criticality code module in Standardized

Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation

(SCALE) software developed by Oak Ridge

National Laboratory (ORNL).

(Technical Contact: Lawrence Berg, NMSS,

301-415-6215; e-mail: ljb2@nrc.gov)

IN 2005-17, “Manual Brachytherapy Source

Jamming,” was issued on June 23, 2005. This IN

was issued to all medical licensees authorized to

possess a Mick applicator.

(Technical Contacts: Nima Ashkeboussi, NMSS,

(301) 415-7637; e-mail: naa@nrc.gov; John P.

Jankovich, NMSS, (301) 415-7904,

e-mail: jpj2@nrc.gov)

IN 2005-22, “Inadequate Criticality Safety

Analysis of Ventilation Systems at Fuel Cycle

Facilities,” was issued on July 29, 2005. This IN

was issued to all licensees authorized to possess a

critical mass of special nuclear material.

(Technical Contact: Dennis Morey, NMSS,

301-415-6107; e-mail: dcm@nrc.gov)

Regulatory Issue Summaries (RIS)

RIS 2005-10, “Performance-Based Approach for

Associated Equipment in 10 CFR 34.20,” was

issued on June 10, 2005. This RIS was issued to all

industrial radiography licensees and manufacturers

and distributors of industrial radiography

equipment.

(Technical Contacts: J. Bruce Carrico, NMSS 301-

415-7826; e-mail: jbc@nrc.gov; Thomas Young,

NMSS, 301-415-5795; e-mail: tfy@nrc.gov)
4

RIS 2005-11, “Requirements for Power Reactor

Licensees in Possession of Devices Subject to the

General License Requirements of 10 CFR 31.5,”

was issued on July 11, 2005. This RIS was issued

to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power

reactors and generally licensed device vendors.

(Technical Contacts: Stephen P. Klementowicz,

NRR, (301) 415-1084; e-mail: sxk@nrc.gov;

Anthony S. Kirkwood, NMSS, (301) 415-6140;

e-mail: ask@nrc.gov)

RIS 2005-12, “Transportation of Radioactive

Material Quantities of Concern NRC Threat

Advisory and Protective Measures System,” was

issued July 11, 2005. This RIS was issued to

licensees authorized to possess radioactive material

that equals or exceeds the threshold values in the

Additional Security Measures (ASM) for

transportation of Radioactive Material Quantities of

Concern (RAMQC) under their 10 CFR Part 30, 32,

50, 70, and 71 licenses and Agreement State

licensees similarly authorized to possess such

material in such quantities under their Agreement

State licenses.

(Technical Contact: Rocky Foster, NSIR/DNS,

(301) 415-7670; e-mail: rdf@nrc.gov)

RIS 2005-13, “NRC Incident Response and the

National Response Plan,” was issued on July 13,

2005. This RIS was issued to all licensees and

certificate holders.

(Technical Contact: Thomas A. Kevern, NSIR,

301-415-0224; e-mail: tak@nrc.gov)

RIS 2005-15, “Reporting Requirements for

Damaged Industrial Radiographic Equipment,”

was issued on August 3, 2005. This RIS was issued

to all material licensees possessing industrial

radiographic equipment, regulated under 10 CFR

Part 34.

(Technical Contacts: Angela R. McIntosh, NMSS,

(301) 415-5030; e-mail: arm@nrc.gov.; Michael M.

LaFranzo, R-III, (630) 829-9865; e-mail:

mml@nrc.gov)

RIS 2005-16, “ Management Directive 8.17,

Licensee Complaints Against NRC Employees”

was issued on August 10, 2005. This RIS was

issued to all licensees and certificate holders.

(Technical Contact: David K. Allsopp, NRR,

301-415-3073; e-mail: dka@nrc.gov)

RIS 2005-18, “Guidance for Establishing and

Maintaining a Safety Conscious Work

Environment,” was issued on August 25, 2005.

This RIS was issued to all licensees, applicants for

licenses, holders of certificates of compliance, and

their contractors subject to NRC authority.

(Technical Contact: Lisamarie L. Jarriel, OE, 301-

415-8529; email: llj@nrc.gov)

(General Contact: Angela R. McIntosh, NMSS,

301-415-5030; e-mail: arm@nrc.gov)

SIGNIFICANT MEDICAL EVENTS

(June 1 - August 31, 2005)

Event 1: Medical Event at St. Johns Mercy

Hospital Center (Correction)

Date and Place: March 9, 2005, St. Louis, Missouri

Nature and Probable Causes: The licensee reported

that a 5 month-old infant was prescribed 18.5

megabecquerels (MBq) [0.5 millicuries (mCi)] of

Technetium-99m (Tc-99m) myoview sulfur colloid,

but instead received 429.2 MBq (11.6 mCi) of Tc99m myoview sulfur colloid. Personnel did not

look at the label when measuring the dose to be

administered. The whole body dose to the infant

was calculated to be between 5.2 and 10

centisieverts (rem). The physician has informed the

infant’s parents.

Correction: In the July 2005 edition of the NMSS

Licensee Newsletter, it was incorrectly reported that

an infant was administered 429.2 MBq (11.6 mCi)

of Tc-99m “myoview sulfur colloid” instead of the

correct dosage of 18.5 MBq (0.5 mCi) Tc-99m

“myoview sulfur colloid.” In fact, the infant was

incorrectly administered 414.4 MBq (11.2 mCi) of

Tc-99m myoview, instead of the prescribed dosage

of 18.5 MBq (0.5 mCi) of Tc-99m sulfur colloid for

a gastric emptying study.

Furthermore, at the time this submission went to

press, the licensee was still determining corrective

actions. NRC has learned that corrective actions

included counseling the technologist, revising

procedures, and retraining staff.

Event 2: Possible Overexposure at Inland

Dredging Company

Date and Place: July 18, 2005, Dyersburg,

Tennesee
5

Nature and Probably Causes: Alabama Radiation

Control reported that a licensee illegally removed

and shipped a Ronan source holder (Model SA-1),

which contained a Cesium -137 source with an

activity of 7.4 gigabecquerel (200 millicurie), from

its dredge near Jackson, Alabama, to the Ronan

Engineering Company. The shutter was not locked

in the closed position, but the licensee stated that it

had closed the shutter and placed a bolt through the

mechanism to lock it closed. The licensee contends

that the shutter handle was broken during shipping.

It was reported that the licensee had painted over the

marking and labeling on the source holder so that

they were illegible. The licensee stated that it had

removed the paint from the identification placard on

the source head. The licensee has hired a consultant

to reconstruct the incident and try to determine any

possible exposures received. The gauge is currently

in the possession of Ronan Engineering Company.

Ronan performed a survey of the device and found

maximum exposure readings of 15 microsievert/

hour (1.5 millirem/hour) at 1 meter. During

shipping, the device went through five terminals and

appears to have been transferred to different trucks

in each terminal. An Alabama licensee authorized

to service industrial gauges has been contracted to

investigate the event. That company is traveling to

Ronan to obtain further information and has set up

interviews with personnel at the transport terminals.

Event 3: Medical Event at University of Texas

Southwestern Medical Center

Date and Place: August 15, 2005, Dallas, Texas

Nature and Probable Causes: The licensee reported

that a patient received 1,451 centigray (cGy) (rad),

instead of the intended 550 cGy (rad), during the

first of two fractions for vaginal cancer treatment.

The patient was scheduled to receive 1100 cGy (rad)

in two fractions during remote high-dose-rate

afterloader treatment using Iridium -192. The first

fraction was oriented interior 4.5 centimeters,

resulting in a dose of 164 percent greater than

intended. The second fraction was not administered

and the patient is not returning for further treatment.

(Contact: Angela McIntosh, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, 301-415-5030,

e-mail: arm@nrc.gov)

UNDERSTANDING 10 CFR 35.3045(a)(3)

WRONG TREATMENT SITE

REPORTABLE MEDICAL EVENT

Correction: In the July 2005 edition of the NMSS

licensee Newsletter, some of the international units

in the last paragraph of the article “Understanding

10 CFR 35.3045(a)(3) Wrong Treatment Site

Reportable Medical Event” were incorrect. The

paragraph should have read:

If the “wrong site” was not expected to receive any

dose during the correct administration, and it

received 0.5 sieverts (Sv) (50 rem), the medical

event needs to be reported. If the “wrong site” was

suppose to receive 0.1 Sv (10 rem) during the

correct administration but received 0.6 Sv (60 rem),

the medical event would be reportable. In this case

the “wrong site” received more than 0.5 Sv (50

rem), as well as receiving more than 50 percent of

what it should have. If the “wrong site” was

suppose to receive 0.1 Sv (10 rem) and it received

0.4 Sv (40 rem), the medical event would not be

reportable because the dose to the “wrong site” was

under 0.5 Sv (50 rem) even though the “wrong site”

received more than 50 percent of what it should

have. For permanent implants, NRC recognizes that

the sources may migrate after being implanted in the

correct site. This migration would not result in a

reportable event under 10 CFR 35.3045(a)(3).

(Contact: Donna-Beth Howe, PhD, Office of

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards,

301-415-7848; e-mail: dbh@nrc.gov)

SELECTED FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICES

(June 1, 2005 - August 31, 2005)

10 CFR Parts 25 and 95 [RIN 3150-AH52],

“Broadening Scope of Access Authorization and

Facility Security Clearance Regulations,” 70 FR

32224, June 2, 2005.

(Contact: Dr. Anthony N. Tse, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, 301-415-6233;

e-mail: ant@nrc.gov)

10 CFR Part 72 [RIN 3150-AH64], “List of

Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: HI-STORM

100 Revision 2,” 70 FR 32977, June 7, 2005.

(Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, 301-415-6219;

e-mail: jmm2@nrc.gov)

10 CFR Part 9 [RIN 3150-AH12], “Public

Records,” 70 FR 34303, June 14, 2005.

(Contact: Russell Nichols, Office of Information

Services, 301-415-7169; e-mail: FOIA@nrc.gov)
6

10 CFR Part 20 [Docket No. PRM-20-26], “James

Salsman, Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking,” 70

FR 34699, June 15, 2005.

(Contact: Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Office of

Administration, 301-415-7163 or Toll Free: 800-

368-5642; e-mail: mtl@nrc.gov)

10 CFR Part 72 [RIN 3150-AH70], “List of

Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: VSC-24

Revision 5,” 70 FR 37647, June 30, 2005.

(Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, 301-415-6219;

e-mail: jmm2@nrc.gov)

10 CFR Parts 71 and 73, “Governors’ Designees

Receiving Advance Notification of Transportation

of Nuclear Waste,” 70 FR 37873, June 30, 2005.

(Contact: Rosetta O. Virgilio, Office of State and

Tribal Programs, 301-415-2367; e-mail:

rov@nrc.gov)

10 CFR Part 110 [RIN 3150-AH44], “Export and

Import of Radioactive Materials: Security Policies,”

70 FR 37985, July 1, 2005.

(Contact: Suzanne Schuyler-Hayes, Office of

International Programs, 301-415-2333; e-mail:

ssh@nrc.gov)

10 CFR Parts 20, 32, and 150 [RIN: 3150-AH48],

“National Source Tracking of Sealed Sources,”

70 FR 43646, July 28, 2005.

(Contact: Merri Horn, Office of Nuclear Material

Safety and Safeguards, 301-415-8126; e-mail:

mlh1@nrc.gov)

10 CFR Part 51 [Docket No. PRM-51-9], “State of

Nevada; Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking,”

70 FR 47148, August 12, 2005.

(Contact: Michael T. Lesar, Office of

Administration, 301-415-7163 or toll-free: 1-800-

368-5642; email: mtl@nrc.gov)

10 CFR Part 51 [Docket No. PRM-51-8], “State of

Nevada; Denial of a Petition for Rulemaking,”

70 FR 48329, August 12, 2005.

(Contact: Keith I. McConnell, Office of the General

Counsel, 301-415-1743, e-mail: kim@nrc.gov; or E.

Neil Jensen, Office of the General Counsel,

301-415-1537, e- mail: enj@nrc.gov)

10 CFR Part 26 [RIN 3150-AF12], “Fitness for

Duty Programs,” 70 FR 50442, August 26, 2005.

(Contact: Rebecca L. Karas, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation, 301-415-3711: Timothy S.

McCune, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident

Response, 301-415-6474: or Dr. David R.

Desaulniers, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,

301-415-1043. All of the above contacts may also

be reached by e-mail to: FITNESSFORDUTY@

NRC.GOV)

10 CFR Chapter I “ Energy Policy Act of 2005

Requirements; Treatment of Accelerator- Produced

and Other Radioactive Material as Byproduct

Material; Waiver,” 70 FR 51581, August 31, 2005.

(Contact: Susan Chidakel, Office of the General

Counsel, 301-415-1535, e-mail : ssc@nrc.gov or

Merri Horn, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and

Safeguards, 301-415-8126, e- mail:

mlh1@nrc.gov)

(General Contact: Michael K. Williamson, Office

of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards,

301-415-6234; e-mail: mkw1@nrc.gov)

SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

The NRC’s enforcement program can be accessed

via the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s

(NRC’s) homepage [http://www.nrc.gov/] under

“What We Do.” Documents related to cases can be

accessed at [http://www.nrc.gov/], “Electronic

Reading Room,” “Documents in ADAMS.”

ADAMS is the Agency wide Document Access and

Management System. Help in using ADAMS is

available from the NRC Public Document Room,

telephone: 301-415-4737 or 1-800-397-4209.

Gauges

Harsco Cororation (EA-05-121)

On August 15, 2005, a Notice of Violation (NOV)

was issued for a Severity Level III violation

involving the licensee’s failure to appoint a new

Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) when the previous

RSO left the company. Three additional violations

that were not considered for escalated enforcement

were discussed in the NOV.

Craig Testing Laboratories, Inc. (EA-05-109)

On August 5, 2005, a Notice of Violation and

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount

of $3250 was issued for a Severity Level III

problem involving the: (1) failure to control and
7

maintain constant surveillance of a portable gauge;

(2) failure to lock the portable gauge and its

transportation case during transport; and (3) failure

to comply with the applicable requirements of the

Department of Transportation regulations.

Froehling and Robertson, Inc. (EA-05-132)

On July 12, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for

a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to

secure, control or maintain constant surveillance of a

portable nuclear gauge containing NRC licensed

material in an unrestricted area while it was not in

storage. Specifically, the gauge user left the gauge

unattended for approximately 10 minutes. During the

time period that the gauge was not in direct line of

sight with the operator, the gauge was damaged when

it was run over by a sheepsfoot roller. The damage to

the gauge did not result in removal of the source from

its shielded position, nor did it cause any leakage from

the source.

David Blackmore & Associates (EA-05-092)

On June 27, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued

for a Severity Level III violation involving the

failure to secure, control or maintain constant

surveillance of a portable nuclear gauge containing

NRC licensed material in an unrestricted area while

it was not in storage. Specifically, a portable gauge

was damaged when it was run over by a bulldozer

after an authorized gauge operator left it unattended

for approximately 10 minutes at a job site. The

damage to the gauge did not result in removal of the

source from its shielded position, nor did it cause

any leakage from the source.

Radiography

MISTRAS Holding Group D/B/A:

Conam Inspection and Engineer Services, Inc.

(EA-05-120)

On August 17, 2005, a Notice of Violation was

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving

the licensee’s failure to secure from unauthorized

removal, or limit access to NRC licensed material

in a radiographic exposure device at a temporary job

site (an unrestricted area), or to control and maintain

constant surveillance of this licensed material.

Specifically, the licensee left the locked

radiographic exposure device on a scaffold at a

temporary job site after completing daily work

activities.

High Mountain Inspection Service, Inc.

(EA-05-064)

On July 22, 2005, a Notice of Violation and

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount

of $6000 was issued for a Severity Level III

problem consisting of two violations that occurred

when the licensee performed radiography at a

temporary job site. Specifically, the radiographer

was not accompanied by at least one other qualified

radiographer, or individual who had at a minimum,

met the requirements of 10 CFR 34.43(c) in order to

be a radiographer’s assistant; and, in addition, the

licensee did not provide the second individual with

the radiation monitoring equipment required by 10

CFR 34.47(a). An additional violation of NRC

requirements was dispositioned as a Severity Level

IV violation.

(General Contact: Sally Merchant, Office of

Enforcement, 301-415-2747; e-mail: slm2@nrc.gov)

NOTE TO READERS: In an effort to keep the

NMSS Quarterly Newsletter relevant, useful and

informative, feedback regarding the content of the

newsletter is welcomed. Readers desiring to contribute

articles, self-explanatory diagrams, suggestions for

future articles, bulletins, web-site postings, and other

items of interest to the NMSS Quarterly Newsletter

readership, should contact Michael K. Williamson,

from the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and

Safeguards, Rulemaking and Guidance Branch. Mr.

Williamson may be contacted at (301)415-6234 or

mkw1@nrc.gov. In addition, to ensure proper delivery

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Please send written correspondence and requests to:

Michael K. Williamson, Editor

NMSS Licensee Newsletter

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Two White Flint North, Mail Stop: T8F-3

Washington D.C. 20555-0001
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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