FILED

April 8, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

GALE JOAN HOLLEN RITCHIE, )

) Houston Chancery

Plaintiff/Appellant, ) No. 4-342

)

VS. )

)

DAVID ANTHONY RITCHIE, ) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9708-CH-00425

Defendant/Appellee. )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF HOUSTON COUNTY

AT ERIN, TENNESSEE

HONORABLE ROBERT E. BURCH, JUDGE

Gregory D. Smith, BPR #013420 Timothy K. Barnes, BPR #012375

One Public Square, Suite 321 103 S. Third Street

Clarksville, TN 37040 Clarksville, TN 37040

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Mark A. Rassas, BPR #4334

Julia North

RASSAS & RASSAS

Glenn Bldg., Suite 104

P.O. Box 361

Clarksville, TN 37041

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

HENRY F. TODD

PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION

CONCUR:

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

WALTER W. BUSSART, JUDGE
-2-

GALE JOAN HOLLEN RITCHIE, )

) Houston Chancery

Plaintiff/Appellant, ) No. 4-342

)

VS. )

)

DAVID ANTHONY RITCHIE, ) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9708-CH-00425

Defendant/Appellee. )

O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from a divorce decree in which the only issue is which parent should

have principal custody of Luke, the minor child of the parties who was born July 13, 1993. The

divorce decree of the Trial Court granted principal custody to the father, and the mother appealed

to this Court. Her sole issue on appeal is:

The Trial Court erred in denying Plaintiff/Appellant

primary custody of the minor child of this marriage.

Background Facts

The father is a staff sergeant in the United States Army. The mother has a child from a

previous relationship. Said child has a learning disability. The parties were married March 1,

1991, separated in October 1995, and were divorced June 12, 1997. From the time of their

marriage until March 1997, the father was stationed at Fort Campbell near the residence of the

parties.

Proceedings in Trial Court

On November 3, 1995, the mother filed a complaint for divorce in which the only

grounds stated were, verbatim, as follows:

Perhaps the principal reason plaintiff wants a divorce

is the defendant’s mental and physical abuse of her thirteen

year-old son by a prior marriage who is handicapped by

attention deficit disorder and is hyperactive. Living in the

same house as his stepfather has caused this child serious

psychological damage. In addition to that child, plaintiff has

another child by the defendant and a live-in nanny. It would

be much easier for the defendant to leave the marital

residence than for plaintiff and her three dependents to do so.
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Defendant has threatened to sell the parties’ property,

both marital and individual, if a divorce is filed. Plaintiff

fears that he will do so unless restrained by an order of this

court.

The complaint prayed for:

1. Child support

2. Allocation of debts

3. Injunction against disposal of property

4. Possession of marital home

5. Absolute divorce

6. Child custody

7. Division of marital estate

On November 28, 1995, the Trial Court entered an agreed order granting the father

visitation with the minor child.

On November 14, 1996, the father filed an answer denying allegations of the

complaint and a counterclaim alleging inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable

differences and praying for an absolute divorce, division of marital estate and child custody

and support.

On November 27, 1996, the Trial Court entered a “Final Decree of divorce from Bed

and Board,” dismissing the mother’s complaint, granting the father a divorce “a mensa et

thoro” (from bed and board), custody of the child, with visitation by the mother, and child

support.

On January 16, 1997, the Trial Court entered the following agreed order:

COME NOW the parties, and by agreement, as

evidenced by the signatures of their respective counsel,

announce to this Honorable Court that, there being no hope of

reconciliation, and the Defendant’s permanent change of

station having been established as Fort Benning, Georgia, the

Bed and Board Divorce should be converted to an Absolute

Divorce.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the divorce a

mensa et thoro entered by this Court on the 4th day of March,
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1996, be converted to an Absolute Divorce, thereby restoring

both parties to all rights and privileges of unmarried persons.

On January 24, 1997, the Trial Court entered an order permitting the father to move

with the child to Ft. Benning, Ga., and providing visitation with the mother.

As stated above, the sole issue on appeal is custody.

The considerations for choosing which parent should receive custody are listed in

TCA § 36-6-106. However, an additional factor weighs heavily in the present case. The

evidence shows without contradiction that, at both Ft. Campbell and Ft. Benning, the Army

provides superlative health and child care facilities. Whatever the shortcomings of either

of the parents, the Army facilities provide the decisive factor in the present case.

The child’s best interest is the paramount consideration. Bah v. Bah, Tenn. App.

1983, 668 S.W.2d 663.

Trial Courts are vested with wide discretion in the determination of child custody.

Such decisions are entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be reversed absent a clear

showing of an improper and erroneous exercise of that discretion. Harwell v. Harwell,

Tenn. App. 1980, 612 S.W.2d 182; Abney v. Abney, 61 Tenn. App. 531, 456 S.W.2d 364

(1970); Marmino v. Marmino, 34 Tenn. App. 352, 238 S.W.2d 105 (1951.

No grounds are found for reversal of the judgment of the Trial Court which is 
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affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed against the appellant and her surety. The cause is

remanded to the Trial Court for necessary further proceedings.

 AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

___________________________________

HENRY F. TODD

PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION

CONCUR:

_____________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

_____________________________

WALTER W. BUSSART, JUDGE