Winter 2006 cov1

Inside this edition: 

The future of mine warfare - page 4 

Secrets of keeping your ship from running aground - page 31

SNA photo contest winners - page 42

Groundings!

What every Sailor should know

Vol. 31 No. 1

Winter 2006
cov2 Surface Warfare

2. MESSAGE FROM COMMANDER 

3. DIRECTOR’S CORNER 

FEATURE STORIES 

4. Littoral Combat Ship Will Counter Mine Threat 

The U.S. has plans to accelerate the mine countermeasures timeline and to remove the man from the minefield. Both of

these objectives can be achieved with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

6. Mainstream Mine Warfare...Starting Now! 

With the advent of the 21st Century and its Global War on Terror, Mine Warfare is now front and center as a major and critically

needed capability for all our Sailors and Marines, not just the few specialists stationed in Ingleside.

8. Surface Warfare Enterprise is Launched 

This winter, the Surface Warfare community launched an exciting and necessary journey, called the Surface Warfare

Enterprise (SWE). SWE aligns Surface Warfare’s leadership to meet tomorrow’s demands while at the same time effectively

dealing with today’s needs.

12. USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) - New Ship Bears Proud Name 

The U.S. Navy welcomed USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) to the fleet on Nov. 12, 2005. The Aegis destroyer is the fifth ship

named for Commodore William Bainbridge, a naval hero of the War of 1812. Another ship of that name, USS Bainbridge

(DD 246), earned a place in history with a heroic rescue in 1922.

14. Experiment Proved Power of Partnership 

Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Mike Mullen, has spoken about the combined advantages of “a 1000-ship Navy,” - a fleet-in-being

made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world. The U.S. Navy has always worked closely with allied

navies. That was especially true with USS Claude V. Ricketts (DDG 5), which had an allied crew.

16. Yard Patrol Craft: a different kind of sea duty 

The flotilla of Yard Patrol craft (YPs) is a familiar sight on the waters near the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Md. The

craft provide hands-on underway training for Midshipmen in navigation, shiphandling, and seamanship. YPs also provide interesting

duty for several Surface Warriors assigned as crew to the 21 boats.

ON THE COVER: A Sailor from USS Harry S. Truman’s Weapons Department 

fires an M-14 rifle with a MK-87 line throwing adapter. This photograph earned top honors in the Surface Navy 

Association’s 2005 CAPT Komorowski Photography Contest. (PH3 Ricardo Reyes/USN)

Winter 2006 cov1

Inside this edition: 

SNA photo contest winners

How to survive if captured

Secrets of advancement

The future of mine warfare

Groundings!

What every Sailor should know

Vol. 31 No. 1

Winter 2006

Surface Warfare (USPS 104-170)(ISSN 0145-1073) is published quarterly by the Department of the Navy, Director, Surface Warfare (OPNAV N761M), 2511 Jefferson Davis HWY, Suite 4300, 4th Floor, 

Arlington VA 22202. Periodicals postage paid at Arlington, VA, and at additional mailing offices. The Secretary of the Navy has determined this publication is necessary in the transaction of business required 

by law or the Department of the Navy. Funds for printing this publication have been approved by the Navy Publications and Printing Committee. 

Postmaster: Send address changes to Surface Warfare, OPNAV N761M, 2000 Navy Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-2000.
Winter 2006

Tactics

20. Forging Tactics for the 21st Century Surface Warrior: Surface Warfare Development Group

Today’s potential adversaries are constantly adapting their systems and tactics to counter and overcome our combat

capabilities at sea. Therefore, learning and applying current Surface Warfare tactics is critical in a combat readiness

environment that revolves around electronic classrooms, simulators, synthetic training, and inport exercises. Knowing and

employing the right tactics has never been more essential for success in combat at sea.

Safety

26. Groundings - What Every Sailor Ought to Know 

A collection of stories, case studies, and history that highlight the need for ongoing vigilance at sea.

32. BOOK REVIEW 

34. LESSONS FROM HISTORY

40. Changes of Command 

41. SHIP IN THE SPOTLIGHT 

42. VIEWS FROM THE FLEET 

44. CAPTAIN’S TRIVIA 

ON THE BACK:

A Sailor mans a .50 caliber 

machine gun mount on 

the Khawr Al Arnaya Oil 

Terminal. The terminal, 

located off the coast of 

Iraq, is one of two major 

platforms that export the 

majority of the country’s 

oil. (PH3 Randall Damm/

USN)

RADM Barry McCullough, USN

Director, Surface Warfare Division

Military Editor

LT Thomas Chaffe, USN

Managing Editor

JO1(SW/AW) Athena Blain, USN

Administration and Distribution

YN2 (SW/AW) Fredrica Johnson, USN

Staff Journalist

J02 Heather Canterbury, USN

Editorial: 

Address editorial inquiries to:

Surface Warfare Magazine

OPNAV N76IM

2000 Navy Pentagon

Washington, DC 20350-2000

Phone: (703) 604-1911

FAX: (703) 604-1917

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E-mail: surfwarmag@navy.mil

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Allen Wayne, Ltd.

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Master stock number: 

708-050-00000-8 (SW)
Operational Risk Management 

(ORM) needs to be an integral part 

in the daily lives of all Surface Force 

Sailors. ORM should be present in 

every step of the decision making 

process to ensure that risk is 

managed effectively and the safety of 

our Sailors remains at the forefront. 

Recent events and feedback 

from the fleet indicate there are 

some common misperceptions 

of what ORM really is. ORM is 

not another safety program. It is 

a decision making process that 

enables Sailors to identify potential 

hazards and implement appropriate 

control measures to reduce the risks 

associated with those hazards. 

All decisions inherently 

involve some level of risk. The 

purpose of ORM is to increase 

overall mission effectiveness and 

safety by identifying, assessing, 

and managing risk. Through 

proper ORM, we can increase the 

probability of a successful mission. 

It is imperative that we only accept 

risk when the mission benefits 

outweigh the potential risks, and 

that we should never accept a 

risk that is unnecessary. We can 

never completely eliminate risk, 

but we must control it so that the 

mission can be accomplished with 

a minimum amount of loss. We 

should constantly strive to fully 

anticipate any risks prior to action 

and continually manage these risks 

throughout the evolution. Ensure that 

risk decisions are made at the proper 

level in the chain of command. Stress 

that if at any time the risk associated 

with the mission exceeds your 

Sailors’ authority to accept it, he or 

she should pass the decision up the 

chain of command.

Mishaps are frequently the result 

of poor planning, poor preparation, 

not adhering to procedures, or lack of 

supervisory oversight. The safety of 

your ship and crew is paramount to 

mission accomplishment. 

Apply risk management in the 

planning, preparation, execution, and 

supervision of all evolutions:

Plan: Ensure you have an 

understanding of both the severity 

of the hazards and the probability 

of mishaps prior to and during 

any mission. Use the command 

ORM instructors to assist you in 

developing and evaluating your risk 

management plan.

Preparation: Once the hazards 

have been identified, take the 

necessary steps to mitigate the risk 

and prevent mishaps from occurring. 

ORM should be a constant and 

fluid process. Whether immediate 

decisions need to be made, or you 

are planning ahead, ORM should 

be an intuitive part of your decision 

making process.

Execution: Established procedures 

exist for a reason. Properly follow 

them and avoid cutting corners 

in an effort to save time. Simply 

following instructions can greatly 

reduce the severity and frequency 

of mishaps. Forceful backup is 

the key. As conditions change 

during an evolution, time critical 

risk management comes into play. 

Continually re-evaluate the situation 

mentally or verbally. What’s 

changed? What new hazards exist? 

What risk do those hazards pose?

Supervision: Supervision allows 

for the identification of risks and 

hazards as the evolution progresses. 

If at any point the risks or hazards 

become too great, stop the evolution. 

Ensure safety observers follow the 

same guidance.

The ORM culture that you 

establish in your actions will 

permeate throughout the command. 

With this in mind, we must 

consistently demonstrate well 

grounded risk assessment skills, both 

on and off duty. 

— VADM T. T. Etnyre,

 Commander, Naval Surface Forces

Message from Commander, Naval Surface Forces

Surface Warfare
Every year we try to convince 

ourselves that this year will be the 

best ever. This time around we just 

might be right.

Programs exist to bring superior 

combat capabilities to the fight. 

The U.S. Navy will continue to 

prosecute the Global War on 

Terror, engage with our partners, 

support humanitarian efforts, and 

be prepared to win a major conflict 

anywhere in the world. Our job here 

at the Surface Warfare Directorate 

is to work with the fleet to identify 

requirements in order to deliver 

capability balanced with affordability. 

Two brand new ship programs are 

coming to life: the Littoral Combat 

Ship (LCS) and the DD(X) multimission destroyer, and we are moving 

ahead with the new CG(X) cruiser.

LCS was just an idea three years 

ago. It is now a steel and aluminum 

ship taking shape in Wisconsin. By 

the end of this year, the first LCS 

will be in the water. The keel was 

recently laid for the second LCS, 

being built to an entirely different 

design in Alabama. These are the 

first of new class of ship and a new 

type of combatant, a modular and 

reconfigurable focused mission 

warship, capable of dealing with 

current and evolving threats. Not 

only will LCS possess the right 

warfighting qualities for the job, we’ll 

build a lot of them, and quantity 

counts when establishing presence 

and assuring access. 

We will have remarkable combat 

capability to address asymmetric 

threats that might attempt to deny 

access in the littoral. With the mission 

packages we can place aboard, and 

as part of a netted and distributed 

force, LCS will have unparalleled 

ability to conduct anti-submarine 

warfare, mine warfare, and antisurface warfare in the difficult and 

dangerous littoral environment.

The multi-mission DD(X) 

is funded, and we are issuing 

contracts to start detailed design 

of this 14,000-ton ship this year. 

CNO recently unveiled the Navy’s 

313 ship force structure plan 

that includes seven DD(X)s. This 

transformational warship will 

have more combat power than any 

destroyer ever built. DD(X) will have 

awesome precision strike capability 

with the Tactical Tomahawk 

missile and a pair of Advanced 

Gun Systems (AGS), able to fire the 

Long Range Land Attack Projectile 

at targets more than 80 miles away 

with GPS accuracy. It will also have 

significant ASW capabilities, as well 

as a superb radar and increased 

missile and air defense capabilities.

Congress has also authorized 

us to begin work on the CG(X) 

Multimission cruiser. Leveraging 

technology gained from investing in 

DD(X), this new cruiser will project 

air and missile defense over joint 

forces ensuring dominance of the 

joint battlespace. 

Our CNO, ADM Mike Mullen, 

said, “The new 313-Ship Navy will 

require a different ship mix from 

today’s force in terms of capability 

and capacity in order to combat the 

increasing array of asymmetric and 

conventional threats.”

“We will build only what we 

need,” CNO said, but “we will not 

assume any unacceptable risks.”

This commitment is backed by an 

increase in funding, and that funding 

is “fenced,” so it won’t be diverted. 

CNO says, “Recapitalization will 

require a disciplined commitment.”

While we are building new 

ships, we are also committed to 

modernizing our current fleet of 

Aegis cruisers and destroyers. 

This, too, has been funded, and 

will enable us to provide relevant 

combat capability as we transition 

to the newer ships that will take us 

into the future.

The news is good and the future 

is bright. This is a great year to be a 

Surface Warrior.

— RADM Barry McCullough

 Director, Surface Warfare

Winter 2006 

Capability AND Affordability

The right ships with the right capabilities
The goal of mine warfare has 

remained unchanged for the past 14 

years, said Darlene Costello, a naval 

warfare specialist in the Office of 

the Undersecretary of Defense for 

acquisition, technology and logistics.

“The U.S. has tried to accelerate 

the mine countermeasures (MCM) 

timeline, and to remove the man from 

the minefield. Both of these objectives 

can be achieved with the Littoral 

Combat Ship (LCS),” Costello said.

Speaking at an industry day held 

by the Mine Warfare Association 

(MINWARA) on Oct. 20 at Ft. Meyer, 

Costello said the U.S. needs effective 

MCM capability from the deepwater 

area to the beach. 

LCS will focus independently on 

three primary threats in the littoral 

or coastal regions of the world: mine 

warfare (MIW), anti-submarine 

warfare (ASW), and anti-surface 

warfare (ASuW).

The “focused-mission” LCS 

has attributes that are optimal for 

near-shore missions. The shallowdraft LCS is fast, modular, and 

reconfigurable. Most important, 

LCS employs offboard systems - 

helicopters and unmanned vehicles 

- as its “main battery.” 

Employing open architecture, 

LCS and its mission packages will 

have the flexibility to provide rapid 

insertion of new technology. The 

Navy has two different ship designs 

in various stages of construction. 

A team led by Lockheed Martin 

is building the first at Marinette 

Marine in Marinette, Wis. The 

second, under contract to General 

Dynamics, is being built by Austal 

USA in Mobile, Ala.

The MIW mission package is the 

first being procured by the Navy 

for LCS.

“The Navy is trying to shorten 

the acquisition cycle for LCS,” said 

Roger Smith, deputy Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy for Littoral 

and Mine Warfare (LMW). “We have 

rapidly compressed the acquisition 

time frame.”

The LCS seaframe procurement 

is led by Program Executive Office, 

Ships (PEO Ships), while PEO LMW 

is procuring the mission modules. 

PEO Aviation is involved because of 

the helicopters and unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs) being used on LCS.

“We’re working with Fleet Forces 

Command, Mine Warfare Command, 

and THIRD Fleet to determine how 

we’re going to use this ship,” said 

RDML Mark Buzby, Deputy Director 

for Surface Warfare in the Office of 

the Chief of Naval Operations.

“LCS will provide flexible options 

for joint combat commanders. 

Instead of wishing for the right 

Littoral Combat Ship 

will Counter Mine Threat 

By Mr. Edward Lundquist, N76 public affairs

Open Architecture : Standardization of the Navy’s computer hardware, making it 

transferable to any platform and able to accommodate a variety of software applications.

 MN1 Richard Rosser, left, and MN2 Kelly Freeman, right, begin wheeling the 25,000-pound Mark-65 quick 

strike mines to the next workstation in the assembly building at Mobile Mine Assembly Unit Eight (MOMAU-8). 

MOMAU-8 is homeported on board the U.S. Naval Magazine on the island of Guam. (PH2 Nathanael Miller/USN)

 Surface Warfare

(o p’n är k tek h r) e e
kind of ship, LCS will be capable 

of focusing its efforts where they 

are needed by changing modules,” 

Buzby said. “Our challenge is to 

build the right modules, and stage 

them at the right locations.”

LCS will have “core capabilities” 

inherent in the seaframe, but the 

real combat power will reside in the 

mission packages, which will rely 

heavily on unmanned systems.

After the first LCS is delivered 

at Marinette, Wis., it will transit the 

St. Lawrence Seaway and conduct 

a shakedown at Norfolk, Va., before 

continuing to Panama City, Fla., to 

begin exercises with the mine warfare 

mission package. The crew will practice 

launching and recovering unmanned 

vehicles, boats and aircraft.

The ship will deploy for 

operations by late 2007 or early 

2008. While deployed, the ship 

will conduct a reconfiguration by 

swapping mission modules.

Eventually, Buzby said, two or three 

LCSs will operate as part of a Carrier 

Strike Group (CSG) or Expeditionary 

Strike Group (ESG), with a mix of 

mission packages depended on the 

operational requirement. Squadrons 

of four to six LCS will also deploy to 

critical locations.

“LCS will be affordable, so there 

will be a lot of them,” Buzby said.

Current minesweeping ships are 

slow and cannot get to a mine area 

quickly. LCS, on the other hand, 

can sprint at speeds approaching 

50 knots.

“We’ll have a 50-knot mine 

warfare capability, but we won’t be 

sweeping mines at 50 knots. We can 

get there quickly. The real strength of 

LCS is its offboard systems,” Buzby 

said. “This keeps our Sailors out of 

harm’s way and puts the vehicles in 

the area of interest.” 

MAJ GEN Gordon Nash, the 

Director of Expeditionary Warfare 

Division on the Navy staff, pointed 

out how the U.S. is bringing Mine 

Warfare into the forefront with USS 

Freedom, the name given to LCS-1. 

MAJ GEN Nash pointed to the 

strong development of new off-board 

systems will help LCS to operate out 

of the minefield. 

MAJ GEN Nash said it was 

encouraging that “three of our MCM 

programs having passed Milestone 

C and entered into low-rate initial 

production this year.” 

MAJ GEN Nash was referring to 

the Airborne Laser Mine Detection 

System (ALMDS) and AQS-20 MineHunting Sonar, both of which deploy 

from the MH-60S helicopter; and 

RMS Remote Minehunting System 

which deploys from surface vessels.

According to RADM Charles 

Hamilton, the Program Executive 

Officer for ships, LCS must be able to 

change modules in one to four days. 

“Everything we’ve seen so far 

indicates that we can do this in less 

than one day,” Hamilton said.

In addition to the operational 

flexibility, modularity makes sense 

from a modernization standpoint, 

too. “We can modernize the 

capability without fundamentally 

gutting the ship,” Hamilton said.

“LCS will be good,” predicted 

retired RADM John Pearson, 

president of MINWARA. “It may 

even be great.” 

Program Executive Office : an organization reporting to the Asssitant Secretary of 

the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. These offices are responsible for research, development, 

acquisition, systems integration, construction, and lifetime support of a particular asset.

 MN3 Phillip Sweet prepares to 

operate the mine neutralization 

vehicle (MNV) aboard the 

Avenger-class mine warfare ship 

USS Dextrous (MCM 13). (JO2 

Elton Shaw/USN)

Winter 2006 

(pro gram ig zek y tiv of is) e
Surface Warfare

With the advent of the 21st

Century and its Global War on 

Terror, Mine Warfare (MIW) has 

become front and center as a major 

and critically needed capability 

for all our Sailors and Marines, not 

just the few specialists stationed in 

Ingleside, Texas! 

To begin to address the critical 

littoral threats of this century, 

our Navy has designated that the 

first Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), 

the Flight 0, will initially employ 

MIW mission modules, now being 

produced by industry for our Navy.

To make these Flight 0 ships 

effective in our new essential mission 

Mainstream Mine Warfare... Starting Now!

By RADM (ret.) Charles Horne, USN

 MNSN Romeo Rocha of Lubbock, Texas, carefully 

removes the protective covering of an underwater 

surveillance camera of a Mine Neutralization Vehicle 

(MNV) for cleaning and maintenance aboard the mine 

countermeasure ship USS Avenger (MCM 1). MNVs 

are used by MCM ships to locate and destroy enemy 

mines. (PH3 Johansen Laurel/USN) 

 Mineman Steven Hill lowers the AN/SLQ-48 Mine 

Neutralization Vehicle in the Arabian Gulf by using 

a vehicle handling system (VHS) aboard the mine 

countermeasure ship USS Dextrous (MCM 13). 

The AN/SLQ-48 system uses a remote-controlled 

submersible vehicle to identify and neutralize 

underwater mines. (PH2 Michael Sandberg/USN)
Winter 2006 

 Since the Korean War, mines have damaged 15 U.S. Navy ships. (Compare that with only five ships impacted by missiles, torpedoes, airplanes, and small boat.) As such, 

our great Surface Warfare Community needs to lead the way in embracing Mine Warfare as its core competency, starting now!

area - assured access - our Navy 

needs to begin now to get all Sailors and 

Marines directly involved with MIW. 

They need to learn all about it so 

that they can embrace the oncoming 

LCSs and make them the big success 

our Navy is counting on so heavily!

MIW critically needs to become a 

core competency of all our Carrier 

Strike Group and Expeditionary Strike 

Group Sailors starting now!

MIW needs to be taught and 

studied at all our great schools 

throughout our Navy. It needs to 

be a major training qualification 

and expertise for all the officers and 

Sailors of each of our great ships and 

submarines. They must know and 

understand MIW like they do AntiSubmarine Warfare, and with this 

great new and critical knowledge, 

make MIW a major strength of our 

21st Century Navy. The Navy needs 

to mainstream MIW starting now to 

enable us to go anywhere, anytime.

(RADM Horne retired in 1984. 

From 1979 to 1984, he served as 

Commander, Mine Warfare Command.) 
The Surface Warfare community 

launched an exciting and necessary 

journey in November 2005 called 

the Surface Warfare Enterprise 

(SWE). SWE aligns Surface 

Warfare’s leadership to meet 

tomorrow’s demands while at the 

same time effectively dealing with 

today’s needs. It is a Process Value 

Management (PVM) approach that 

will ensure we have the technologies, 

systems, platforms, and people to 

meet future challenges.

The Surface Navy can no longer 

operate in “stovepipes,” accepting 

situations in which one component is 

unaware of decisions or expenditures 

another component is making––

unintentionally creating a situation 

that could dramatically affect our 

understanding of operational 

requirements and our ability to 

provide critical capabilities to satisfy 

those needs. Encompassing all 

Surface Warfare stakeholders and 

partners, the SWE enables multiple 

organizations to function as a single 

enterprise to deliver, on time, and 

sustain, within budgets, our product: 

warships ready for tasking.

Process Value Management 

(PVM) is a proven methodology for 

achieving operational excellence for 

the entire business enterprise. PVM 

links and extends processes across 

the enterprise and throughout the 

supply chain, achieving short-term 

operating results, as well as longterm systemic process enhancements. 

The teams map processes, install 

metrics with targets, identify and 

remove barriers, manage tasks and 

priorities, link actions to results and 

establish lessons learned to assess 

Surface Warfare Enterprise 

IT2 Quemeka Hill conducts maintenance on a central processing unit (CPU) in Computer Repair aboard the 

amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD 3).” (PHAN Kenny Swartout/USN)

Surface Warfare
what is working and what must 

change. We have used PVM in the 

Ship Maintenance (SHIPMAIN) 

program, helping to make many 

process improvements and save 

millions of dollars. We will now do 

the same across the entire Surface 

Warfare Enterprise.

The fact that we are transforming 

our organizational processes does not 

mean that the Surface community 

hasn’t been doing a good job in 

designing, engineering, acquiring, 

crewing, and preparing ships for 

their operational taskings. The 

warships we have at sea today are 

without peer. But if we hope to 

maximize the return on the nation’s 

investment in our Navy, we need to 

embrace opportunities to optimize 

resources and leverage manpower 

knowledge, skills, and abilities 

throughout Surface Warfare. The 

biggest challenge will be changing 

the way we think and the way 

we behave.

We must strive to generate the 

right operational readiness at the 

right cost for each dollar we invest 

in surface technologies, systems, and 

ships. To do so, we must fully align 

numerous organizational activities 

and put in place the cost control 

processes to maximize productivity 

(readiness divided by cost) across 

the entire enterprise. The key process 

goals for the SWE are thus alignment 

and cost control –– both aimed at 

delivering trained, highly effective, 

 is launched By VADM Terry Etnyre, 

Commander, Naval Surface Forces

Figure 1 illustrates the SW Enterprise, with three 

principal actors that work together to ensure 

ready warships. CNSF determines the integrated 

requirements; the various OPNAV “N-Codes” 

(N75, N76) make the hard decisions regarding 

the resources to be allocated for programs 

that will satisfy the integrated needs; and the 

Systems Commands and other activities serve 

as Providers that produce optimized output: 

maximum warship readiness at the right cost.

Winter 2006
10 Surface Warfare

and technologically relevant Surface 

Forces that are certified across a full 

spectrum of warfare missions, and to 

provide warships ready for tasking 

more effectively and efficiently than 

we ever have before.

The Surface Warfare Enterprise’s 

functions are to:

• Align and integrate all Surface 

Warfare stakeholders to produce 

ships and crews ready for 

operational mission(s) or tasking 

more effectively. 

• Institute interdependent and 

disciplined cost-control processes to 

produce warfighting capability 

more efficiently.

• Engender stakeholder collaboration 

through a Board of Directors

comprising senior leaders with 

equity in Surface Warfare.

In the SWE business model, 

CNSF functions as the Chief 

Executive Officer (CEO), VADM 

Paul Sullivan, Commander, Naval 

Sea Systems Command, serves as 

the Chief Operating Officer (COO), 

and RADM Mike Nowakowski, 

Commander, Naval Surface Force, 

U.S. Atlantic Fleet, is the Chief 

Financial Officer (CFO). A total 

of twenty flag officers comprise 

the Board of Directors who will 

meet and communicate regularly 

to formalize cross-organizational 

relationships that directly impact the 

product of surface warships ready 

for tasking; understand the complex 

SWE business model to find and 

drive process efficiencies; define 

right readiness requirements; and 

define common, linked metrics to 

support risk-based decision making 

across the enterprise.

There are three cross-functional 

teams: Sustainment and 

Modernization, Personnel Readiness, 

and Strategic Financial Management. 

Here’s some detail on what each 

team will strive to accomplish:

Sustainment and Modernization 

Team. This team focuses on 

enterprise-wide, end-to-end material, 

maintenance, and modernization 

processes, specifically:

• Requirements definition

• Technical standards development, 

including acquisition, installation, 

and sustainment

• Disposal and/or replacement of all 

surface systems

The team’s goal is to achieve 

efficient repeatable processes that 

enable continuous improvement and 

enhanced efficiencies with regard to 

all sustainment and modernization 

processes. The Sustainment and 

Modernization Team will eventually 

absorb our SHIPMAIN program. 

Personnel Readiness Team.

Personnel Readiness addresses 

integrating manpower initiatives 

FR Edroy Francis inserts a hot torch into the fre box of boiler number two aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5), as MM2 Jose Ferandezdelgado stands 

by to assist.” (PH3 Casey James/USN)
Winter 2006 11

with the Surface Force Total Force 

Strategy. This team is assessing our 

processes of personnel assignment 

to authorized billets, entry-level 

personnel, and unit-level and 

sustainment training. This includes 

officers, enlisted, and civilians, both 

shipboard assignments and shore 

assignments. We expect to identify 

efficiencies in individual training to 

deliver personnel who report to the 

ship ready to assume the watch.

Strategic Financial Management 

Team. This team’s challenge is to 

change the SW Enterprise from a 

consumption mindset to an output 

mindset, focusing on improving 

productivity to re-capitalize the fleet 

assets and help build tomorrow’s 

fleet. Among the team’s tasks are to:

• Analyze key cost drivers and excess 

resources and target them for 

reduction 

• Define and implement linked 

hierarchical cost management 

measurements for the SWE 

• Develop a collaborative enterprise 

financial planning and analysis 

organization that supports effective 

cost management 

• Develop training programs to 

support the financial management 

objectives

The benefits to the Navy from the 

Surface Warfare Enterprise are many: 

a coherent and prioritized “demand 

signal” for required resources 

and capabilities; investment of 

the right resources in the right 

capability to meet near- and far-term 

requirements; less “churn” in annual 

program, planning, budgeting, and 

execution; and a long-term view 

throughout the Future Years Defense 

Plan and the out-years to identify 

and perhaps free-up resources to pay 

for future acquisitions. It is a process 

that will transform the “business 

practices” of Surface Warfare officers, 

enlisted and civilians for the better, 

enabling us to provide “warships 

ready for tasking” more effectively 

and more efficiently. 

 Figure 2 is the SW Enterprise “org chart,” showing the Board of Directors and three “Process-based Teams,” each guided by a Flag-Officer Lead: Sustainment and 

Modernization; Personnel Readiness; and Strategic Financial Management Team. As an enterprise organization, the Board of Directors and Process Teams interface to 

confront resource and requirements barriers, developing streamlined process driven solutions to deliver and sustain war-ready ships. 
The U.S. Navy welcomed USS 

Bainbridge (DDG 96) to the fleet on 

Nov. 12, 2005. The Aegis destroyer is 

the fifth ship named for Commodore 

William Bainbridge, a naval hero 

of the War of 1812. Another ship of 

that name, USS Bainbridge (DD 246), 

earned a place in naval history with a 

heroic rescue in 1922.

The destroyer, under the command 

of LCDR Walter A. Edwards, was 

underway on its first deployment in 

the Sea of Mamora off eastern Turkey 

on Dec. 16, 1922, when smoke and 

flames were sighted coming from a 

French ship about five miles astern. 

Edwards turned Bainbridge around 

and came alongside to assist the 

5,500-ton French military transport 

Vinh-Long, underway from Bizerte 

to Constantinople carrying French 

officers and their families, along with 

large quantities of ammunition.

Bainbridge put boats in the water 

while the troopship’s crew contained 

the fire. Shortly after arriving, the 

fire touched off a magazine and an 

explosion rocked Vinh-Long and the 

fire spread quickly. Some passengers 

panicked and jumped overboard, 

and Bainbridge’s boat began picking 

up people in the water. A large 

number of passengers ran to the bow 

to escape the flames, so Edwards 

brought his ship up to the bow so he 

could take passengers aboard. Twice 

Bainbridge was blown from side 

of the transport. Edwards rammed 

Bainbridge’s bow into the side of 

Vinh-Long to remain close enough 

as the French ship’s ammunition 

detonated. A line was rigged so 

people could slide down to the 

American warship.

By Edward Lundquist, N76 public affairs

 The guided-missile destroyer USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) shown conducting a missile exercise (MISSILEX). 

Some new features of the Flight IIA-class critical to littoral war fighting effectiveness include the incorporation of 

embarked helicopters (SH-60), an organic mine-hunting capability, and the introduction of area theater ballistic 

missile defense capabilities to protect near coastal airfields, and seaports essential to the flow of forces into 

theater in time of conflict. (USN)

12 Surface Warfare

USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) New Ship Bears 

Proud Name
As Bainbridge’s crew helped 

evacuate the French passengers and 

crew, the flames reached the after 

magazines and a second explosion 

rocked the old transport, toppling 

her mainmast. The fire intensified. 

Bainbridge continued to bring people 

aboard while the destroyer’s boats 

rescued people in the water. The last 

man to leave the transport was the 

ship’s Captain. Despite the flames 

and danger from further explosions, 

the 1,190-ton destroyer rescued 485 

survivors of the 495 people on board 

Vinh-Long (the destroyers normal 

complement was 149). Several 

French soldiers died shortly after 

being rescued, so Edwards departed 

immediately for Constantinople to 

provide prompt medical treatment 

for the injured.

For the heroic actions of his ship 

and crew, LCDR Edwards was 

awarded the Congressional Medal 

of Honor. 

The U.S. Navy’s first nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate was USS Bainbridge (DLGN 25), later redesignated as a 

cruiser (CGN-25). The keel was laid for the 7,800-ton combatant in 1959. Bainbridge was launched in 1961 at Bethlehem 

Steel’s Quincy Shipyard in Massachusetts, with Mrs. Robert L. Goodale, great-great granddaughter of Commodore 

William Bainbridge as sponsor and ADM Arleigh Burke as the principal speaker. This Bainbridge was commissioned 60 

years after the very first destroyer, USS Bainbridge (DD 1), joined the fleet, and served from 1962 until 1996.

Along with USS Enterprise (CVN 65) and USS Long Beach (CGN 9), these three ships constituted Task Force ONE, 

the world’s first nuclear task force. They circumnavigated the globe without refueling as part of Operation Sea Orbit.

 Mrs. Robert Goodale of Cambridge, 

Mass., christens USS Bainbridge (DLGN 

25) April 15, 1961 at Bethlehem Steel 

Company’s Quincy Shipyard. (USN)

 A Sailor stands by the ASROC 

Missile, one of the Navy’s newest 

and most potent answers to the 

submarine threat back in 1962. 

(USN)

Winter 2006 13
Chief of Naval Operations, ADM 

Mike Mullen, has spoken about the 

combined advantages of “a 1,000-

ship Navy,” – a fleet-in-being made 

up of the best capabilities of all 

freedom-loving navies of the world.

Mullen challenged Navy men and 

women to imagine the possibilities 

of increased interoperability 

through more standardized training, 

procedures, and command and 

control protocols.

“This 1,000-ship Navy would 

integrate the capabilities of the 

maritime services to create a fully 

interoperable force – an international 

city at sea,” he said.

The U.S. Navy has always worked 

closely with allied navies. That was 

especially true with the USS Claude 

V. Ricketts (DDG 5), which had an 

allied crew.

Claude V. Ricketts was a test 

ship for the “Mixed-Manning 

Demonstration,” where half of 

the destroyer’s complement was 

comprised of officers and men from 

other NATO nations.

(Note: Originally built as USS

Biddle (DDG 5) and commissioned in 

1962, the ship was renamed Claude V. 

Ricketts in June of 1964, shortly after 

the death of ADM Ricketts, the ship’s 

namesake, who was serving as the 

Vice Chief of Naval Operations. DDG 

5 was decommissioned in 1989.)

The 18-month demonstration 

helped validate the concept of 

having mixed-manning on a 

modern warship as part of a 

“Multilateral Force” (MLF) under 

NATO command. In addition to 10 

officers and 164 Sailors from the 

U.S. Navy, Claude V. Ricketts had 

officers and men from West Germany, 

Italy, Greece, United Kingdom, the 

Netherlands, and Turkey (see 

table). Both the Commanding 

Officer and Executive Officer were 

American. The entire crew used 

English as the common language. 

The experiment started in June of 

1964 and completed at the end of 

1965. The policy was for no nation 

to provide more than 40 percent of 

a given department. 

The crew received specialized 

training in their respective countries 

and at U.S. Navy service schools. 

Officers reported first, followed 

Experiment Proved Power of Partnerships

Guided-missile destroyer sailed with multi-national crew

By Edward Lundquist, N76 public affairs

 German, U.S., and Italian Sailors (left to right) “take a turn” on a line as USS Claude V. Ricketts is moored.

(Toby Marquez/USN)

14 Surface Warfare
by the enlisted complements from 

the various countries. The nonU.S. personal had several weeks 

of turnover before relieving their 

American counterparts.

Claude V. Ricketts conducted 

routine operations, and deployed 

to the Mediterranean during 1965. 

The ship called at ports in Italy, 

Greece, England, the Netherlands, 

and Germany.

A typical watch on the bridge was 

be led by an Italian OOD, a Dutch 

JOOD, a German helmsman, and a 

British boatswain’s mate.

The ship’s library featured 

books from all seven nations. The 

menu featured a greater variety 

of international cuisine compared 

to other U.S. ships. The crew 

was not berthed by nationality, 

but by the divisions in which the 

Sailors worked. One press report 

speculated that Claude V. Ricketts

would be able to field the U.S. 

Navy’s best soccer team.

Disciplinary matters were handled 

by the Commanding Officer in 

conjunction with the senior officer on 

board of the respective nation.

The crew was paid in U.S. dollars 

at augmented rates of pay established 

by their own navies.

The proposed MLF was to consist 

of 25 ships under multi-national 

command, configured as merchant 

ships but armed with eight Polaris

ballistic missiles. The MLF concept 

was created to give NATO nations a 

more meaningful involvement in the 

nuclear affairs of the alliance.

“The objective was to demonstrate 

that a complex ship, a modern 

guided-missile destroyer, could be 

smoothly and effectively handled 

by men of different nations,” said 

Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze, 

upon the demonstration’s conclusion. 

“This objective has been singularly 

achieved.” 

 A part of the shipboard life in every Navy is the Commanding Officer’s personnel inspection. On board USS Claude V. Ricketts, the colorful array of uniforms makes 

this inspection an impressive ceremony. (Toby Marquez/USN)

Officers Men

West Germany 2 47

Italy 2 30

Greece 2 24

British 2 24

Netherlands 1 17

Turkey 1 10

United States 10 164

Source: Department of Defense

Winter 2006 15
The flotilla of Yard Patrol craft (YPs) 

is a familiar sight on the waters near 

the United States Naval Academy at 

Annapolis, Md. The crafts provide 

hands-on underway training for midshipmen in navigation, shiphandling 

and seamanship. YPs also provide interesting duty for several Surface Warriors assigned as crew to the 21 boats.

Each boat has a crew of four. 

Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist 

(ESWS) qualified senior boatswain’s 

mates and quartermasters serve as 

craftmasters, and ESWS qualified Enginemen serve as the chief engineers 

on each boat. There are also two undesignated seamen on each crew. 

YP 689

“After being on two destroyers, I 

basically have my own command,” 

says QMC Randi Dreis of Cleveland, 

Ohio. “I’ve done everything I can do 

in my rate. Having my own boat is 

amazing. I’ve got a great crew. You 

couldn’t ask for a better deal.”

While Dreis says there are challenges to maintaining craft with 

wooden hulls, “These are good 

boats. They may be a little top heavy, 

and a bit on the wet side, but they’ll 

plow through the seas.” 

Dreis likes the opportunity he 

has to get his Coast Guard certification. “Through Navy Knowledge 

On-Line (NKO), I get credit for my 

training and experience.”

Being underway is demanding, 

says EN2 Jason Walter, from Buffalo, N.Y., because he’s the sole qualified engineer on board. He maintains and operates the craft’s two 

GM 12V71 diesel engines and two 

GM 3L71 diesel generators. “If the 

boat has engineering problems out 

on the water, you’re the only person 

qualified to do anything about it. 

It’s all up to you.”

Thankfully, Walter says, the plant 

is simple and the engines are reliable. The job is demanding, however, 

because the engineer is responsible 

Yard Patrol Craft

A different kind of sea duty

16 Surface Warfare
for all systems, such as potable water, 

the electrical distribution system, the 

steering gear, and keeping up with 

the logs and admin. If there is a fire 

in the main spaces, the engineer is 

the only individual allowed to deal 

with it.

“My job is to make sure he (pointing to Chief Dreis) doesn’t have one.”

SN Keshab Bhatta is one of the 

deckhands on the 689 boat. This is his 

first tour. He performs a variety of 

tasks from handling lines and fenders 

to painting the wooden hull and preserving deck tackle. He is from Nepal 

and joined the Navy for a better life.

YP 700

EN2 Aaron Richter likes having a 

big job. “When I reported for duty, 

my wife asked me what my new job 

was.” He said, “You’re not going to 

believe this, but I’m the Chief Engineer.” In reply, Richter’s wife said 

she thought he was going to be a mechanic. “So did I.”

BMC Rickie Regan, a native of 

Lumberton, N.C., likes driving YPs, 

although he admits it took a while to 

grow on him. As he arrives from the 

Naval Station at the Academy across 

the Severn River, Regan speaks into 

the 1MC. “Moored. Shift Colors.” He 

By Mr. Edward Lundquist, N76 public affairs

Winter 2006 17
18 Surface Warfare

then runs around to the flag halyards 

and hauls down the ensign. He credits the strong training program for 

bringing crewmembers up to speed, 

because he says, “I was straight raw.”

“Fake down that line on the fantail,” Regan yells from the bridge 

wing of YP 700. He smiles when 

I ask him if he’s trying to turn his 

deck seamen into Boatswain’s 

Mates. “No,” he laughs, “but they 

think I am.”

OSCM Gilbert Ortiz from Douglass, Ariz., schedules the YPs. “They 

meet all the commitments. We do 

whatever we need to do to get 

underway,” he says.

“The Small Craft Repair Facility 

here is our maintenance activity,” Ortiz says. “They do our major repairs.”

“This is shore duty,” Ortiz says. 

“But we spend a lot of time underway, including most of the summer.” 

The YPs travel to ports such as Philadelphia for the Army-Navy game, or 

on summer cruise to Baltimore, Williamsburg, or New York City.

The 108-foot wooden boats were 

built by Peterson Builders of Sturgeon Bay, Wis., and Marinette Marine of Marinette, Wis. The bridge 

is equipped with radar, GPS, and a 

chart table. One of the YPs (YP 686) 

is used for oceanographic purposes, 

operated by the Naval Research 

Laboratory.

BMC Ralph Romano from Kent 

Island, Md., grew up within sight 

of the YPs cruising on the Chesapeake, yet never thought about 

sailing on them. Today he not only 

cruises his home waters, he helps 

train the new craftmasters. 

“Craftmasters have 90 days to 

qualify after reporting aboard,” 

Romano says. Candidates get underway on the various boats with 

the different craftmasters as often as 

possible.” Candidates must past a 

written test, then a practical underway evaluation, followed by an oral 

board, demonstrating knowledge of 

their boats, navigation and the rules 

of the road. The Commanding OfSN Keshab Bhatta is one of the deckhands on the 689 boat. This is his first tour. He performs a variety of tasks from handling line and fenders to painting the wooden 

hull and preserving deck tackle. He is from Nepal and joined the Navy for a better life. (Edward Lundquist/USN)
Winter 2006 19

ficer of the Naval Station convenes 

the qualification board.

YP 694

Midshipmen come aboard YP 694 

for their classroom on the Chesapeake. With them is LTJG Mark Leskoff, the instructor for Seamanship 

and Navigation 204. 

The students have different labs 

throughout the year, complimenting 

classroom training.

Naval Science 100 is taught to first 

year “Plebes,” where they learn nautical terms, positions and duties of 

the bridge team, and standard commands. The NS 204 lab includes an 

emphasis on navigation and piloting.

Leskoff was a SK2 before earning 

his commission through the Enlisted 

Commissioning Program and getting qualified aboard USS Ponce

(LPD 15). “Today we’re working on 

man overboard drills,” says Leskoff. 

“This is their last big underway lab 

of the semester.”

Besides the regular classes, the 

midshipmen have extracurricular 

opportunities to work with the YPs. 

Each company has a YP Team that 

competes for the honor of “Color 

Company,” flying a streamer on 

their company guidon as the best 

shiphandlers at the Academy. The 

Power Squadron is an extracurricular student activity with its own 

“commodore,” and is organized like 

a yacht club.

BM1 Ron Spencer watches the 

wind gust to 26 and 30 knots as 

the midshipmen get his YP 694 

underway. “This is a crucial part 

of the Academy’s training,” says 

Spencer, from Canton, Pa. Along 

with Leskoff, they conduct man 

overboard drills, throwing a life 

ring into the choppy water on this 

brisk November afternoon.

“I’ve learned more about what the 

midshipmen go through in my year 

with YPs than I ever knew in my 12 

years in the fleet,” Spencer says.

 MIDN 3/C Lydia Von Gohren, a sophomore from Leonardtown, Md., takes a turn at the helm of a YP. 

(Edward Lundquist/USN)
“Understanding ‘How’ to fight 

your ship entails knowing your 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

(TTP),” says CAPT Stanley V. 

DeGeus, Commander of the Surface 

Warfare Development Group 

(SWDG), “and knowing your 

enemies’ tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. Winning in combat 

is the only option. There are no 

alternatives.” 

Today’s potential adversaries are 

constantly adapting their systems 

and tactics to counter and overcome 

our combat capabilities at sea. 

Therefore, learning and applying 

current Surface Warfare tactics 

is critical in a combat readiness 

environment that revolves around 

electronic classrooms, simulators, 

synthetic training and inport 

exercises. Knowing and employing 

the right tactics has never been more 

essential for success in combat at sea.

ASSUMING THE WATCH

As the Combat Systems Officer 

(CSO) entered Combat Information 

Center (CIC), as he had done 

frequently to relieve as Tactical 

Action Officer (TAO) during this 

challenging port and starboard watch 

rotation, he sensed tonight would 

be a little more interesting. Trailing 

behind him was the newly reported 

Chief Engineer (CHENG), a TAO 

in the making and welcoming sign 

of relief to finally shift the watch to 

three sections. “Welcome to the fight 

and congratulations on your first 

under instruction watch,” said the 

Operations Officer (OPS).

They were not particularly happy 

with the ship’s position so close to 

the enemy coast, but that was the 

assigned patrol area. Hostilities have 

been escalating for weeks. Tomorrow 

morning, the Mine Countermeasure 

(MCM) forces would be heading 

between the islands near the enemy 

coast, to prepare a swept channel for 

the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 

arriving to launch a vertical assault. 

Among the small islands bordering 

the coast in which the ship patrolled, 

intelligence had warned of enemy 

submarines, large numbers of active 

and unlocated small attack craft and 

the possibility of several operational 

Coastal Defense Cruise Missile 

(CDCM) sites.

There’s a lot to consider, CHENG 

thought as he assumed the watch 

and sat down in the TAO’s chair. 

Let’s consider the possibilities, he 

thought to himself. Better make sure 

the watchstanders are aware of the 

current situation.

“SWC, TAO. Are you watching for 

small boats inbound?”

“Yes sir,” the Surface Warfare 

Coordinator answered. “MT 22 is in 

the Surface Mode.”

CHENG creased his brow in 

confusion for a moment. MT 21 was 

waiting in air ready. With MT 22 in 

surface mode, how do we defend the 

ship aft against an air threat? Then 

he remembered reading SWDG’s 

TACMEMO 3-20.3-05 on CIWS 1B 

employment against surface craft. 

Thinking about the small boat 

threat waiting for them tonight, 

CHENG remembered the FAC/FIAC 

exercises he had heard about before 

leaving for deployment. One of the 

Forging Tactics for the 21st Century Surface Warrior: 

Surface Warfare Development Group 

By CDR Len Remias

Undersea Warfare Director, Surface Warfare Development Group

“This ship is built to fight. 

You had better know how.”

- ADM Arleigh Burke

 OSSN Orlando McCray monitors the Surface Search Radar for other vessels, from the Combat Information 

Center aboard the guided missile cruiser USS Monterey (CG 61). (PH3 Craig Spiering/USN) 

Tactics

20 Surface Warfare
major problems facing the ships had 

been detecting the small craft on 

radar. Being this close to land and 

with the small islands in the straights 

around them, the problem for radars 

would be compounded.

“RSC, TAO; what’s our SPY 

(radar) setup?”

“TAO, RSC; SPY setup as 

follows...” 

The Radar System Controller 

rattled off the settings and 

parameters as CHENG 

mentally bounced them off 

recommendations that he had 

read about in a SWDG TACBUL, 

TB SUW-03-05, documenting 

Aegis setup for FAC detection. 

Everything sounded right to 

him, but he would pull up the 

information from SWDG’s SIPR 

website (www.swdg.navy.smil.mil) 

in a few minutes to verify.

“TAO, aye,” he answered. Tapping 

his fingers on the console he realized 

he had not addressed the ASW 

threat yet. He walked through Sonar 

before coming to CIC and saw the 

sonar technicians reviewing SWDG’s 

‘Surface Ship ASW Best Practices 

Message,’ but what about the bridge, 

he wondered?

“Bridge, TAO; Have your lookouts 

keep a sharp eye out for submarine 

periscopes.”

“Aye sir,” the Officer of the Deck 

immediately answered. “All lookouts 

have been briefed and I was just 

quizzing the Conning Officer on 

how to perform some of the torpedo 

evasion maneuvers. Kiss and Cross, 

he’s on it, sir.”

“Make sure he knows the Weave 

11A,” CHENG exclaimed, again 

remembering more vital tactics 

SWDG had published. “Weave 11A 

provides the best chance of survival 

and is the one I’ll be ordering if we 

have hydrophone effects.”

“Yes sir. We’ll be ready,” the OOD, 

answers. “What maneuvers will the 

other ships employ?”

“SWDG is testing maneuvers for 

all ship classes. I remember reading 

about this in their post-exercise 

‘Warfighter Quicklook’ messages.”

QMSN Dave Strick plots the ship’s postion before USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) moors in Seattle. 

(PHAN John Ciccarelli/USN)

Tactics

Winter 2006 21
“Sir, we were just looking at the 

schedule for tomorrow and were 

wondering about how long it was 

going to take for the mine sweeps to 

clear the Gators a Q-route? It takes 

them a while to clear a channel, 

doesn’t it?”

“I got to do a MIREM (Mine 

Warfare Readiness Effectiveness 

Measuring) event with SWDG on 

my last ship,” CHENG answers. “It 

may not take as long as you think if 

you reduce the swept channel lane 

width. After you get off watch, you 

can hit SWDG’s interactive tactical 

discussion area of their website. Click 

on ‘Ask a Tactical Question’ and 

you’re there.”

“Thanks, sir.”

CHENG leaned back in his 

seat at the front table and took a 

deep breath.

“Lot to think about tactically, isn’t 

there?” CSO smiled, the qualified 

watchstander sitting next to him. “But 

your ASW questions to the bridge got 

me thinking. How would you attack a 

submarine right now? Say we needed 

to launch a torpedo at them, how 

would you maneuver?”

“Well, let me check the threat 

axis,” CHENG said reaching for the 

battle orders, but CSO interrupts him.

“Trick question CHENG, 

remember, we have Digital Fire 

Control Interface (DFCI) and the Mk 

54 torpedo onboard.”

“Oh, that’s right,” CHENG 

nodded. He remembered reading 

more of SWDG’s TACMEMO and 

resources from the website. He used 

his time wisely at Department Head 

School to learn tactics and read about 

innovative technologies. The DFCI 

and Mk 54 would enable them to 

shoot at any bearing. They wouldn’t 

need to maneuver the ship at all to 

launch a torpedo at a sub.

 OS2 Jabari Ettinoffe, assigned to the guided missile cruiser USS Thomas S. Gates (CG 51), tracks surface contacts from a SPA-25F Radar Repeater in the Combat 

Information Center during UNITAS 46-05. (PH2 Michael Sandberg/USN) 

 Commanding Officer, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 

76), CAPT James Symonds, oversees an underway 

replenishment on the navigation bridge. 

(PHAN Kathleen Gorby/USN)

Tactics

22 Surface Warfare
“You’re ready for the watch. 

You’re familiar with the tactics 

SWDG has developed to fight the 

ship and should have no problem 

qualifying TAO.” 

“Attention in CIC, this is CHENG, 

I have the watch Under Instruction.”

SURFREM AND COMBAT 

READINESS

A new and innovative SURFREM 

(Surface Readiness Effectiveness 

Measuring) initiative modeled 

after SWDG’s successful SHAREM 

(Ship ASW Readiness Effectiveness 

Measuring) and MIREM (Mine 

Readiness Effectiveness Measuring) 

programs will enhance combat 

readiness. SURFREM will identify 

future technical and tactical 

challenges to enable cutting 

edge Surface Warfare tactics

development. Through disciplined 

at sea measurements, analysis and 

feedback (a science) and improved 

training and tactics development 

(an art), SURFREM provides a 

warfighter’s assessment in various 

missions. It breaks the paradigm of 

a one dimensional maritime warfare 

problem into a multi-dimensional 

and multi-mission view of emerging 

threats. 

“Anything that will add value to 

the Fleet Collaborative Team (FCT) 

and Sea Trial process, I applaud,” says 

VADM Barry Costello, Commander 

Third Fleet and Operational Agent 

for Sea Shield. SURFREM will align 

with the Navy Warfare Training 

System (NWTS) to enhance training 

and readiness. 

“The emphasis in training has 

been on the mechanical training (who 

is on the system and how does it 

work) versus the operational tactical 

training (how and why we employ a 

system and to counter what threat). 

Tactics puts the combat in front of 

readiness and the enhanced in front 

of training. Training gets Sailors 

ready for the fight and tactics lets 

them win,” says DeGeus.

TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT, 

EXPERIMENTATION AND 

INNOVATION

SWDG bridges Sea Trial

experimentation and technology 

for the fleet. Technological 

innovation and experimentation to 

enhance warfighting must involve 

tactics development with verification 

and validation, as opposed to trial 

and error. “To know tactics, you 

must know technology,” cites CAPT 

(ret) Wayne Hughes, author of 

Fleet Tactics. 

As a Warfare Center of Excellence 

(WCOE), Surface Warfare tactics is an 

enterprise that SWDG takes seriously. 

SWDG is the authority on surface 

ship platform, systems, sensors, and 

weapons capabilities. 

“As the fleet lead for three Sea 

Shield (SUW and AD) and Sea 

Strike (NSFS) Fleet Collaborative 

Teams (FCT) and a vital member 

of the ASW and MIW FCTs, 

SWDG and SURFREM provides 

the tactics, systems, and analysis 

to inform the Navy’s investment 

strategy,” said DeGeus.

The SWO top ten covers a variety 

of basic Surface Warfare tactics to 

serve as the cornerstone of every 

SWO’s knowledge base. (See 

accompanying list.) The top ten 

uses the concept of immediate and 

controlling actions from engineering 

casualty control procedures and 

 Commanding Officer, USS Curtis Wilber (DDG 54), CDR John T. Lauer III, gives the Commander, Russian 

Pacific Fleet, ADM Federov, a tour of the Combat Information Center. (PH2 John Beeman/USN) 

CNO’s 2006 guidance 

includes tasking to 

rapidly prototype 

ASW technologies 

that will hold at risk 

adversary submarines, 

substantially degrade 

adversary weapons 

effectiveness and 

compress the ASW 

detect-to-engage 

sequence.

Tactics

Winter 2006 23
can be used for qualifications and 

training. Accessed via the SWDG 

SIPRNET website, top ten uses 

hyperlinks to navigate between 

pages, references, and a playbook 

with videos to make learning tactics 

entertaining and fun.

• Anti-ship Torpedo Defense 

• Hostile Submarine w/in Vital 

Area or Torpedo Danger Area 

• FAC/FIAC in the Vital Area

• Over the Horizon Threat 

• Inbound Anti-ship Cruise Missile

• Bogey in the Vital Area 

• Entering a Mine Danger Area

• Sighting a Mine-Like Object

• CBR Attack

• Setting FPCON Delta

Other SWDG innovations include 

the interactive tactical discussion 

- ‘Ask a Tactical Question’ - from 

the SWDG website, a ‘Red versus 

Blue’ tactical decision tool being 

developed in collaboration with 

ONI, and installation of the 3-

D tactical simulator, called ‘Kill 

Chain’ that should bring several 

capabilities for training, tactical 

development and evaluation, 

mission effectiveness evaluation, 

and a technology demonstrator. 

SWDG –21 is the force behind 

Surface Fleet performance and 

tactical excellence in order to conduct 

current and future operations 

across the spectrum from peacetime 

to armed conflict. The trireme, 

an ancient Greek warship, was 

comparable to the modern day LCS 

(Littoral Combat Ship). Built with 

speed and maneuverability, it had an 

offensive punch from a bronze-clad 

ram mounted on the prow (bow). 

Success at sea depended on great 

skill and a variety of ramming tactics 

to effectively defeat an adversary. 

21st Century Surface Warriors like 

the TAO in our hypothetical scenario 

don’t have the luxury to learn tactics 

on the fly or through long protracted 

wars like the Athenian Navy. If 

winning in combat is the only 

option, then understanding your 

ship, your enemy, your strengths 

and vulnerabilities is to know the 

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.

 SN Margarette Fajardo keeps a watchful eye out as portside lookout by searching for surface contacts through a telescopic alidade from the bridge during a general 

quarters drill aboard the guided missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62). Sailors train to defend the ship and control battle damage during such drills. 

(PHAN Adam York/USN) 

Tactics

24 Surface Warfare
Tactically minded junior officers 

will come with time. With the everchanging role of the U.S. Navy in 

today’s world, the roles of those 

in it must also adjust, not just 

technologically, but tactically. As 

a member of one of the last, sixmonth-long classes to go through 

SWOS, I truly felt sorry for the new 

Ensigns who missed that experience 

and are now subjects of the 

“Division Officer At Sea” program. 

Nevertheless, I have come to 

appreciate some of the finer aspects 

– and downfalls - of both programs, 

and the most glaringly obvious short 

fall of each is arguably their lack of 

instruction in tactics.

Filling the void of what one 

is taught to know and what one 

has gained through experience is 

difficult, especially where tactics are 

concerned. Even more challenging 

is promoting tactical awareness in a 

fluid environment that continually is 

responding to innovative and neverbefore-seen threat platforms. It is in 

these types of evolving arenas that 

“trial by error” and “best practices” 

becomes the order of the day, not 

through defiance of promulgated 

tactics, but out of necessity for 

lack thereof. Combined, these 

issues further stress the need for 

tactical development and tactical 

advancements across the board, and 

easier access to those finds. “How 

do we know what to do when...?” 

“What happens if...?” These are 

the prime questions we have used 

in the past to enhance our practices 

and procedures and ones we will 

continue to use in the future to 

further develop our tactics and 

techniques. But to what end?

Institutions such as the Surface 

Warfare Development Group 

(SWDG), the Naval Strike and Air 

Warfare Center (NSAWC), and 

Submarine Development Squadron 

Twelve (DEVRON-12) are all Warfare 

Centers of Excellence in developing, 

producing, and teaching the most 

current tactics available to the 

fleet. Yet for the common JO, these 

organizations have little impact 

except when one is studying for a 

qualification board; or so I thought. 

Today, these authorities on tactics 

are attempting to make an even 

bigger impact. In the Surface Warfare 

realm, exercises and training events 

like MIREM and SHAREM, and the 

up-and-coming SURFREM are how 

SWDG is moving forward in filling 

that tactical void.

MIREM – Mine Readiness 

Effectiveness Measurement – for 

example, is a vital endeavor that 

only gains the limelight in the event 

of tragedy. But what do JOs really 

know about MIREM? I would wager 

very little. Here’s a quick test to 

prove my point: 

1. How will your role as a 

Division Officer, Department Head, 

or watchstander be affected by a 

MIREM exercise?

2. What MIW capability do you 

have on your ships and how can it be 

effectively utilized?

3. How are swept channels and 

“Q-routes” designed and what is the 

vulnerability of my ship to sea mines?

Well, how did you do? In the 

end, the onus is really on the 

individual officer - junior or senior, 

at sea or ashore - to keep current 

with the tactical developments 

available to our fleet. Yet, perhaps 

just as importantly, it is also up to 

SWDG, NSAWC, DEVRON 12, and 

the like to keep those tactics that 

are useful and validated, whether 

it be involving systems, sensors, 

weapons or capabilities, up-to-date 

and readily accessible. And, truly, 

what could be more accessible than 

the World Wide Web? For more 

information on Surface Warfare 

tactics, links to the various exercises 

and organizations listed above, 

or even a head start in finding the 

answers to your tactical questions go 

to www.swdg.navy.smil.mil. 

F i l l ing the tac t ics vo id...

By LT Jennifer Tyll

Winter 2006 25

Junior officers who stand bridge watch can keep current with the tactical developments available to our fleet by 

logging on to www.swdg.navy.smil.mil. (PH3 Ricardo Reyes/USN)
Even the most sophisticated 

warship can find herself someplace 

she doesn’t want to be: aground.

The consequences of grounding 

run from a minor delay in meeting 

an operational commitment to total 

destruction. The U.S. Navy’s most 

serious grounding occurred in 1923 

at Honda Point, Calif., when seven 

destroyers, operating at night in 

fog, followed one another onto the 

rocky coast (see related story). Some 

of those ships had the latest radio 

navigation systems. But even today, 

with automated bridge systems and 

electronic navigation, warships and 

commercial vessels can make a series 

of errors that can lead to grounding. 

The common thread in all of these 

incidents is that these groundings 

could have been prevented.

CAPT Brian Boyce, USN (ret.), 

instructor in navigation for Marine 

Safety International (MSI), in 

Norfolk, Va., offers some lessons on 

grounding that some learned the 

hard way. Many of the mistakes that 

resulted in groundings are common 

threads in multiple incidents.

A guided missile frigate was 

entering Ponce, Puerto Rico, in 

1996. The CO deferred to the pilot’s 

advice, but the ship found herself 

outside the channel. The navigation 

team’s plot held the ship outside the 

channel and warned the CO and the 

conning officer. The pilot disagreed 

with the warnings from the navigator 

and CIC and did not follow their 

recommendations to get back into 

the channel until it was too late. The 

subsequent investigation found that 

the pilot was fatigued. But the report 

also noted that the ship was able to 

determine that it was outside 

the channel – despite the sharp 

disagreement of the pilot - and did 

not take timely appropriate action.

Lessons learned: Complacency, 

and expecting things to go well, and 

being unprepared for when they 

don’t, is one common thread. There 

is a failure to recognize that an error 

chain is developing. The failure to 

react to early clues and slow or stop 

the ship is another common thread.

A recently commissioned DDG 

was completing a port visit in 1996 

at St. Maarten in the Netherlands 

Antilles following Combat Systems 

Qualification Testing (CSQT) 

Type Training in the Puerto Rican 

Operation Area. The navigation 

brief was held early on a Sunday 

morning, and was not conducted 

professionally. Last-minute changes 

to the watch bill resulted in key 

members of the navigation detail 

who had not attended the brief. 

Groundings!

New Technology helps, but you have to know 

 USS Delphy (DD 261) capsized and broken in two at Honda Point, California, shortly after she ran aground in a fog 

during the night of September 8, 1923. USS Nicholas (DD 311), wrecked at the same time, is in the background. 

(Naval Historical Center)

By Mr. Edward Lundquist, N76 public affairs

26 Surface Warfare

SAFETY
The charts used were not up to 

date. Throughout the process, CIC 

was not engaged and did not offer 

recommendations. Although it 

appeared that the ship had a safe 

track planned for departure from

the anchorage, once underway, 

they found their desired course 

was blocked by an inbound cruise 

ship. The CO improvised a new 

departure plan, but failed to involve 

the key team members (Conn, Nav, 

CIC) on the new plan. 

No one had the same vision as 

to what the new plan was. As they 

drove south to cross the bow of the 

inbound cruise ship, the conning 

 how to use it

Since antiquity, mapmakers 

have struggled with the problem of 

representing a bumpy, ellipsoid (the 

earth) on a flat, rectangular surface 

(the map). To do this requires some 

compromise in the relative position 

of individual points to each other. 

Historically, mapmakers have picked 

a point of interest to them to be the 

center of their depiction, and placed 

various features in their relative 

position to that point. For instance, 

an early English mapmaker might 

have chosen to place England at the 

center of his chart. More than just 

having personal appeal, this makes 

sense in terms of accuracy, since 

the farther one is from the reference 

point, generally, the less accurate the 

depiction.

This was fine for giving a general 

depiction of landmasses and water 

bodies. By laying a coordinate system 

(longitude and latitude, for example) 

over the geographical features, you 

could provide a frame of reference 

that could be shared by other users. 

But maps based on different central 

points could differ radically in the 

coordinate position of a location 

away from those centers.

In the modern world of 

interoperability and precision 

positioning, this problem is greatly 

amplified. The solution is to reference 

each chart and map to a “datum.” 

A datum is a mathematical model 

of the shape of the earth used as a 

basic reference to calculate position 

coordinates, heights, and distances, 

as well as to make maps and charts. 

The datum defines the point from 

which all positions are referenced. 

For example, the WGS 84 point of 

origin is the center of the earth’s 

mass, as measured by the 1984 World 

Geodetic Survey (hence WGS 84). 

The North American Datum, NAD 

27, is referenced to a ranch in Kansas, 

considered to be the approximate 

center of the continental United

 States. For the Tokyo datum, all 

points are referenced to the center of 

Tokyo.

There are literally hundreds of 

datums in use. The DOD standard 

datum is WGS 84, and this is the one 

to which GPS defaults, but there is 

no “world standard datum.” GPS 

gives positions based on WGS 84, so 

a position plotted on a chart using 

a different datum could differ by 

as much as a half mile with respect 

to ports, and up to two miles with 

respect to isolated islands! Several 

ships have run aground due to a poor 

understanding of datums!

This problem becomes more 

critical when the subject is targeting. 

During the military action in 

Lebanon in 1983, Marine Corps 

spotters ashore were directing the 

naval gunfire from a battleship. 

Unfortunately, the ship was using 

WGS 72 coordinates, while the 

Marines were using European Datum 

coordinates. The target was missed 

and shells landed uncomfortably 

close to friendly forces. Fortunately, 

there were no casualties!

Until a world standard datum is 

adopted, the solution to this problem 

must reside in training. And while 

algorithms exist for translating 

from one datum to another, this is 

no substitute for understanding. 

GPS is a wonderful innovation for 

navigation, providing instantaneous, 

real-time fixes at an accuracy that 

far exceeds conventional methods. 

But navigators must be aware of its 

limitations and understand how to 

compensate when using charts based 

on other datums.

By Mr. Robert Freeman, 

Office of the Navigator of the Navy

A standard point of reference: Datums 

Winter 2006 27

SAFETY
officer was preparing to come right 

to pass the inbound ship starboard 

to starboard when the navigator 

recommended coming left to avoid 

shoal water (a reef) off the starboard 

bow. Once in extremis, the ship failed 

to take immediate action. After a 

short (but very costly) delay, the 

ship decided to come left, but they 

turned too little too late. Ten minutes 

after getting underway from her 

anchorage, the DDG ran aground 

on Proselyte Reef. Proximate causes 

were lack of situational awareness 

with respect to the well-charted 

reef, failure to use the whole team, 

and poor planning. This was 

compounded by the late departure 

and need for hurry to make their next 

event. It took $10 million and nine 

months to repair the ship. 

Lessons learned: The ship’s team 

did not react to very significant error 

chain clues. They also did not have 

a slow-and-stop abort plan in their 

tool bag. 

An FFG grounded off Alexandria, 

Egypt, in 1999. Although the Port 

Directory was specific in directing 

where to meet the pilot, the ship 

did not follow the stipulation and 

proceeded into port prematurely. 

 Wrecked destroyers on Honda Point, California, soon after the night of September 8, 1923, when they went ashore in a fog. In the foreground is USS Delphy (DD 261), 

which has broken in two, with her forward section capsized to port. At left, behind the rocky outcropping, is the stern of USS Chauncey (DD 296). USS Young (DD 312) is 

capsized to starboard, astern of Chauncey. In the distance is USS Woodbury (DD 309), heeled to port with her bow near a small rock island, with USS Fuller (DD 297) 

beyond her. (Naval Historical Center)

28 Surface Warfare

SAFETY
It was late in the day and they 

were probably anxious to get into 

port. Once in the narrow channel, 

the FFG encountered an outbound 

Navy CG. This forced the FFG to 

turn to seaward and head back out. 

After the CG cleared, the FFG again 

attempted to enter the channel but 

were directed by the port authority to 

return to sea. This time, the conning 

officer miscalculated his position 

and against the navigator’s strong 

recommendation, he turned the 

ship into danger and the FFG ran 

aground. 

Lessons learned: Poor planning, 

lack of teamwork, fatigue and 

confusion caused this incident.

A U.S. Navy LST taking part in 

a UNITAS 2000, was preparing for 

 USS Missouri (BB 63) ran aground on Thimble Shoals, Va., with tugs alongside and astern attempting to pull 

her off, during one of four unsuccessful attempts to free her after she ran onto the shoal on 17 January 1950. She 

was freed by the fifth attempt on 1 February, following dredging to open up a path between her position and the 

main shipping channel. (Naval Historical Center)

The Navy’s greatest navigational 

tragedy took place in September 

1923 at an isolated California coastal 

headland known as Honda Point. 

Officially called Point Pedernales, 

Honda Point was not far from the 

busy Santa Barbara Channel.

Thirteen destroyers of Destroyer 

Squadron (DESRON) 11 departed 

San Francisco for a two-day cruise to 

San Diego. The squadron comprised 

the five ships of Destroyer Division 

(DESDIV) 33, led by USS Delphy

(DD 261), followed by USS S.P. 

Lee (DD 310), USS Young (DD 312), 

USS Woodbury (DD 309), and USS 

Nicholas (DD 311); six ships from 

DESDIV 31, with USS Farragut (DD 

300) followed by USS Fuller (DD 

297), USS Percival (DD 298), USS 

Somers (DD 301), USS Chauncy

(DD 296) and USS Kennedy (DD 

306); and three ships from DESDIV 

32, USS Paul Hamilton (DD 307), 

USS Stoddert (DD 302) and USS 

Thompson (DD 305).

The ships formed a column on the 

squadron leader Delphy. The flagship 

broadcast an erroneous report — 

based on an improperly interpreted 

radio compass bearing — showing 

the squadrons position about nine 

miles off Point Arguello. From that 

position the ships plotted a dead 

reckoning course. An hour later, the 

destroyers turned east to enter what 

they believed was the Santa Barbara 

Channel, though it could not be 

seen because of thick fog. Unusually 

strong current complicated the 

navigational situation. When Delphy

turned, the other ships followed, but 

they were not where they thought 

they were, and seven of them ran 

aground along the rocky coast.

There were eight hundred 

officers and men on those ships, 

but only twenty-three lives were 

lost. All seven vessels: the Delphy, 

S.P. Lee, Young, Woodbury, 

Nicholas, Fuller, and Chauncey

were declared total wrecks.

The ships were employing a new 

radio compass system. The system 

was working, but the bearings 

received were misinterpreted. 

The official investigation said the 

groundings were attributable to 

“bad errors in judgment and faulty 

navigation.” In an endorsement to 

the record of the court of inquiry, the 

Chief of the Bureau of Engineering 

said: “The Bureau desires to 

emphasize the fact that such devices 

as radio compasses, sonic depth 

finders, etc., are reliable only to 

the extent that they are operated 

properly, and recommends that 

the attention of the forces afloat 

be directed to the necessity for 

continuous training in their use.”

Destroyers end up on the rocks: 

One mistake follows another

Winter 2006 29

SAFETY
SAFETY

a pre-dawn amphibious landing 

exercise when she ran aground 

on the rocky bottom. The 522-foot 

ship, carrying 240 Marines and 

their equipment, was operating in 

darkness and fog. It was getting 

ready to deliver eight vehicles to the 

beach, when it hit a reef, opening up 

a 40-foot long hole as it scraped the 

rocky bottom. No one was injured, 

but the ship was declared a loss, 

stripped, used as a gunnery target 

and sunk. The ship was using the 

Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) for 

navigational fixes, but was plotting 

them on Chilean charts. 

Lessons learned: GPS uses a 

point at the Earth’s center as a 

datum, but the Chilean charts used 

a point on a promontory of land (see 

related story). The difference was 

disastrous.

An amphibious transport 

grounded in the Suez Canal in 2000. 

The LPD was anchored in Great 

Bitter Lake and was preparing to 

depart for northbound transit of the 

Suez Canal. The ship had a safe plan 

but when the pilot boarded, the plan 

was changed to one that would save 

some time and distance. The original 

plan had the advantage of operating 

inside the well-marked channel; 

the new plan was well outside the 

channel and relied on reference to 

a small number of buoys marking 

the general anchorage area. Except 

for buoys, the area is featureless. As 

the ship transited north, they lost 

situational awareness and when 

attempting to enter the main channel 

grounded outside of it. 

Lessons learned: The basic cause 

here was failure to craft a safe plan 

when the pilot asked for a change or 

failure to adhere to the old plan.

“Quite often when we review the 

circumstances of a grounding it is 

apparent that one or more members 

of the team recognized that the 

ship was standing into danger,” 

says retired CAPT Jim Barber, 

author of Naval Shiphandler’s Guide, 

published by the Naval Institute 

Press. “Yet through timidity, failure 

to communicate clearly, or because 

their warning was ignored, the ship 

went aground. Any discrepancy 

between navigation teams must be 

immediately addressed and resolved 

without the ship proceeding further 

into possible danger.”

No one source of information 

is infallible, and no individual is 

immune to error, Barber says. “Thus 

for critical matters such as navigation 

 USS Worden (DD 352) sinking after she went aground in Constantine Harbor, during the occupation of 

Amchitka, Aleutian Islands, Alaska, on January 12, 1943. Note the oil spreading around the ship. 

(Naval Historical Center)

30 Surface Warfare
SAFETY

in restricted waters we rely on 

multiple teams and multiple sensors. 

Three teams, the conning party, the 

Navigator and his assistants, and 

CIC must be mutually supportive. 

All use the same planned track, and 

if circumstances require deviation 

from the plan it is vital that everyone 

understand the new plan.”

According to Boyce, ships 

rarely ground in familiar waters. 

“Unfamiliar waters require very 

careful planning and a very 

disciplined approach to execution. 

All the available tools for knowing 

where the ship is relative to danger 

have to be used and the team has 

to be proficient in how to use them. 

The ship must have a full toolbox of 

abort and fail-safe maneuvers and 

be prepared to stop or slow when 

the ‘risk meter’ goes into the red. A 

non-complacent attitude of ‘chronic 

unease’ is absolutely necessary and 

communications among all the key 

team members must be effective.”

Ships have access to new and 

better technology, but they also need 

the best available training on how to 

use it, says Boyce. 

Barber agrees. “GPS is so 

convenient and usually so accurate 

that there is a strong temptation to 

rely upon it to the virtual exclusion 

of other sensors. This is a mistake. 

We need to habitually compare 

GPS results with all other sensors, 

particularly including fathometer, 

radar, and visual.”

Retired RDML Dave Ramsey says 

that responsibility for collisions must 

often be placed above the shipboard 

level. “Senior leadership needs to 

take an interest in what’s happening. 

We need to get the right technology 

on our ships, and we need to make 

sure our people know how to use it. 

For example, there’s no standard fleet 

course that teaches Automated Radar 

Plotting Aides. We still have Navy 

people who don’t know how to

use it.”

“In the commercial world the 

causes of groundings show similar 

error chains,” says MSI’s Ed Lynch. 

“Complacency or fatigue on the part 

of the pilot and the bridge team not 

taking charge early enough. The 

bridge team does not give the pilot 

the assistance requested or he does 

not ask for their assistance or ignores 

the info provided.”

Planning and anticipation are 

important. Says Barber, “We must 

think through in advance how to 

react to potential problems. What 

if we have an engine or rudder 

malfunction? In what direction 

is deep water? Where are the 

shoals and narrow places in the 

channel? Current? Ship traffic? 

Danger bearings? The ship control 

party must be prepared to react 

appropriately to any emergency.” 

In unfamiliar waters a written plan 

and a carefully considered track are 

particularly important, Barber says. 

“Any requirement to deviate from the 

plan is a red flag and needs prudent 

evaluation. Saving a few minutes at 

the price of a riskier transit is almost 

never justified.” 

Winter 2006 31

Top Ten Tips to keep your ship from running aground By RDML(ret.) David Ramsey

1. Verify the accuracy of the charts. This means the datum, the age of the survey on 

which the chart is based, updates entered, and any questionable obstacles.

2. Use all of the navigational aids available. USS Frank Knox (DD 742) was 

transiting from Vietnam to Japan with overcast skies, steaming only on DR with 

no reference to the ocean currents charts, which showed a general set towards 

Pratas, and an inattentive, untrained watch team.

3. Know where your ship is. With the advent of DGPS, ECDIS, ARPA, AIS, accurate 

fathometers, and a host of other aids, there are plenty of tools available for the 

serious watch stander to use.

4. Ensure the watch team is organized to provide careful management of the 

functions all ships perform at sea: navigation, ship control, sensor monitoring, 

communications, and engineering. Know what information can be expected and 

know how to interpret it.

5. Train the watch standers as a team. With today’s integrated bridge systems, 

cross-training is required.

6. The Bridge is a work space - keep it so. Professional, quiet, dark at night, no 

distractions.

7. Pay attention to reports, regardless of the source. 

8. Be alert. This includes a rested watch team that has respect for each other.

9. Know how to use the equipment on the bridge: radar, radios, ECDIS, ARPA, autopilot, light panels, alarms, and know the layout of the bridge (fight to have the 

location of the components on the bridge user-friendly).

10. Navigation is fun! Make it so!
32 Surface Warfare

Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. 

Fleet, 18th Edition

By Norman Polmar

Price - $89.95

U.S. Naval Institute 

(www.usni.org)

Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 

published by the U.S. Naval Institute, 

is an essential 672-page reference 

book (with more than 900 pictures 

and drawings) for any military, 

naval, or maritime library. More than 

an authoritative manual to consult 

when a question arises, this book is 

very enjoyable to browse or study. 

The book covers not only vessels 

and aircraft, but weapons, sensors 

and people, as well. In fact, there is 

a great deal of information about 

how the Navy and Marine Corps 

are organized, and how the sea 

services relate to the other services, 

the Combat Commanders, and the 

Department of Defense. It takes a 

rather complex organization and 

explains it clearly and simply.

This book lists and all U.S. 

warships, auxiliaries or craft in naval 

service, including those ships of the 

Military Sealift Command, the U.S. 

Coast Guard, the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration, 

the U.S. Army, the Environmental 

Protection Agency, the U.S. 

Geological Survey, and the National 

Science Foundation. 

The appendices are useful, too. 

Polmar offers a listing of force 

levels by year and by ship type. 

He provides Navy shipbuilding 

programs from the end of World 

War II to the present, so you can see 

what ships were ordered by year. 

The list of foreign ship transfers 

covers 2000-2005, showing what 

ships were transferred, to whom, the 

date, and the type of transfer (e.g. - 

sale, lease, grant aid, or gift). There’s 

also a list of Navy and Coast Guard 

ships preserved as museums and 

memorials.

This edition explains new ship 

programs like the Littoral Combat 

Ship (LCS) and DD(X) destroyer, 

the Coast Guard’s Integrated 

Deepwater System, and the services 

Maritime Security Cutters, and new 

aircraft such as the P-8 Multimission 

Maritime Aircraft and the F-35 Joint 

Strike Fighter. There’s even a new 

chapter that covers unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs). 

The Naval Institute Guide to Combat 

Fleets of the World 2005-2006

Their Ships, Aircraft and Systems

By Eric Wertheim

The Naval Institute Guide to 

Combat Fleets of the World covers the 

waterfront. It is an authoritative 

and thorough compendium about 

warships, aircraft, and auxiliaries 

that serve in navies and coast 

guards worldwide. With 1,104 pages 

and more than 4,000 photos and 

illustrations, it’s even bigger than 

Jane’s Fighting Ships (but costs less.) If 

the seven-pound book is too heavy to 

handle, save both money and weight 

and get the CD version instead.

If you are interested in aircraft 

carriers, you can read about the 

Three For The Bridge

By Edward Lundquist, N76 public affairs

Here are three recent must-have new editions of the most 

valuable publications you can have on your bridge.

Book Review
Winter 2006 33

navies that you would expect to 

have aircraft carriers, like the U.S., 

Russia, U.K., India, France, Italy 

and India. But there are also a few 

fleets that you might not – Thailand 

and Brazil - that also operate flat 

tops. Submarine devotees will find 

nuclear boats in navies such as the 

U.S., Russia and U.K. Small diesel 

boats can be found in the listings 

for Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, 

or Turkey, or mini-subs operated 

by Croatia or North Korea. The 

book is filled with unique or highly 

specialized auxiliaries, from oilers 

and tankers to repair and ammo 

ships, from towing and salvage ships 

to converted merchantmen carrying 

prepositioning supplies. If you seek 

an obscure vessel, like a ship to tend 

harbor nets, you’ll find that Turkey 

still operates net layers. Poland has 

a deperming ship. Myanmar has 

a presidential yacht. Brunei has 

two new very capable frigates, and 

the Swiss Army operates a fleet of 

patrol boats on Lake Geneva. For 

ultra-modern, turn to new Aegis

combatants being built by Spain 

and Norway.

Weyers Warships of the World 

2005-2007

Compiled by Werner Globke

Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Bonn, 

Germany

The 2005-2007 edition of Weyers 

Warships of the World is a compact 

and up-to-date handbook for ship 

identification. Weyers is not an 

alternative to Ships and Aircraft of the 

U.S. Fleet or Combat Fleets of the World. 

Those are huge volumes, with ship 

details provided on a grand scale. 

The big advantage with Weyers is the 

small size.

Weyers is not lacking in details. But 

you won’t find pages of expository 

descriptions of ships and systems. 

Consequently, Weyers is easier to 

carry around in the pilothouse. It is a 

handbook, where Jane’s and Combat 

Fleets are not. There are hundreds 

of highly detailed drawings and 

practical photographs (virtually all in 

color in this edition).

No other naval reference book is 

so handy for use on a small ship’s 

bridge. It’s not small enough to tuck 

in your pocket unless you have really 

big pockets, but you’ll certainly want 

a copy on your ship.

Book Review

SWO

USS Cowpens (CG 63)

USS Curts (FFG 38)

USS Mason (DDG 87)

USS McClusky (FFG 41)

USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60)

USS Scout (MCM 8)

USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)

ESWS

USS Cowpens (CG 63)

USS Curts (FFG 38)

USS James E. Williams (DDG 95)

USS Mason (DDG 87)

USS McClusky (FFG 41)

USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60)

USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58)

USS San Jacinto (CG 56)

USS Scout (MCM 8)

USS Stout (DDG 55)

USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)

Any ship that qualifies to fly the 

Officer or Enlisted Surface Warfare 

pennants can email surfwarmag@

navy.mil, and gain recognition for its 

achievement in our Spring edition. 

The following is a list of ships that qualified to fly the Officer or Enlisted Surface 

Warfare pennants between November 1, 2005 and February 1, 2005.
Lessons From History

All too often, we see on television, 

or read in the paper, about suicide 

attacks. While the most common 

sites are Iraq and Afghanistan, 

such attacks have also occurred in 

locations as diverse as Bali, Beirut, 

and Saudi Arabia. More recent 

examples include the Underground 

in London, the Pentagon and World 

Trade Center in the U.S., and the 

guided-missile destroyer, 

USS Cole (DDG 67).

Such attacks may seem new, as 

hallmarks of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

but it is a form of combat our fellow 

Surface Warriors knew all too well 

over 60 years ago. Suicide attacks 

characterized the final stages of 

the Pacific Theater of World War II. 

The challenges faced by the “Little 

Beavers” of DESRON 23 during that 

war were typical. With the exception 

of the USS Spence (DD 512), lost to 

weather in December 1944, all of the 

DESRON 23 ships battled against 

suicide attacks by kamikazes.

Who were these kamikazes? The 

literal translation - “Divine Wind” 

– is derived from the legendary 

typhoon that saved Japan from a 

13th Century Mongol invasion. The 

Kamikaze Corps quickly attracted 

more volunteers than there were 

planes available. The war effort 

needed the best pilots for instructors 

and special missions, so the Kamikaze

missions were entrusted to the 

youngest and least experienced. 

They were fighting for the Emperor 

and were willing to die for Japan, 

especially in what they perceived as 

such a glorious death. The Japanese 

planned to use 4,500 aircraft for the 

great suicide offensive. This did not 

include a number of ouka bombs, 

which were glider bombs released 

from beneath a larger aircraft and 

piloted by humans into Allied ships. 

The Allies renamed these bombs, 

“baka,” which is Japanese for “fool.”

The following is an account of 

the “Little Beavers” who fought the 

kamikaze:

USS Claxton (DD 571) patrolled 

Leyte Gulf to support the forces 

ashore in November 1944. Claxton

suffered five dead, 23 wounded, and 

sustained serious damage when a 

Japanese suicide plane crashed and 

exploded in the water close aboard 

her starboard side. Although her 

aft berthing spaces were flooded, 

her crew fought the damage as she 

rescued 187 survivors of USS Abner 

Read (DD-526), also a kamikaze

Destroyers Were 

U.S. Navy Knows 

 Destroyer USS Newcomb (DD 586) showing 

damaged received from a Kamikaze hit off Okinawa 

April 6, 1945. (USN)

34 Surface Warfare
Lessons From History

victim. She was repaired, and later, in 

1945, served off Okinawa as a radar 

picket and fighter-director. On June 

6, her guns drove off a flight of 12 

kamikazes.

On Dec. 21, 1944, USS Converse

(DD 509) was escorting the first resupply convoy to Mindoro, when 

she came under attack by Japanese 

suicide planes. Converse drove 

the enemy off with her guns, then 

rescued 266 survivors of USS LST 

749. She arrived off Okinawa in 

May and performed dangerous and 

demanding radar picket duty, often 

firing to drive off kamikazes, but not 

receiving damage.

Also on Dec. 21, 1944, the USS 

Foote (DD 511) was guarding a 

convoy to Mindoro when she was 

attacked several times by kamikazes. 

The destroyer shot down at least one 

of them, while rescuing survivors 

from two LSTs, USS LST 460 and 

USS LST 749, that had been hit. 

Later, Foote reported for picket duty 

off Okinawa where she fought off 

numerous enemy air attacks. She was 

credited with knocking down at least 

one plane, and two of her Sailors 

were wounded from the effects of a 

near miss on May 24.

USS Stanly (DD 478) was off 

Okinawa in April 1945. On April 

12, she rushed to assist another 

destroyer, USS Cassin Young (DD 

793), that had been struck by a 

kamikaze while on radar picket station 

north of the island. Soon thereafter, 

enemy planes also located Stanly, 

forcing her to maneuver radically 

to avoid being hit. Friendly fighters 

arrived and splashed some of the 

enemy. Out of the confusion of an 

American and Japanese dogfight, a 

baka bomb emerged, plunging toward 

Stanly at nearly 500 knots. The 

baka struck Stanly on her starboard 

bow five feet above the waterline, 

passing through to the port side and 

exploding close by. Another baka flew 

so close overhead that it pulled the 

ensign off the mast, as it descended 

into the water and disintegrated. Not 

long after that close call, Stanly was 

ordered to close the transports at the 

Hagushi anchorage. While headed 

there, Stanly experienced her third 

near-fatal encounter of the day when 

a zeke – a Mitsubishi A6M5 Type 0 

carrier fighter – tried to bomb and 

crash her in a single pass. The bomb 

 Kamikaze Targets

 About Suicide Attacks By CAPT (ret.) Robert Riche, USN 

 The Destroyer Minelayer USS Arron Ward

(DM 34) showing damage received from multiple 

Kamikaze hits on May 3, 1945. This picture was taken 

two days later. Notice the mine on deck at the left. 

(USN)

Winter 2006 35
fell short and the plane overshot. 

Miraculously, her total casualties 

for all the day’s action amounted to 

only three wounded Sailors. Late that 

night, she entered “Busted Ship Bay” 

at Kerama Retto for repairs.

USS Thatcher (DD 514) was also at 

Kerama Retto in May 1945, assigned 

to radar picket duty to detect and 

intercept enemy aircraft before they 

could enter the transport anchorages. 

On May 20, she detected large 

numbers of approaching Japanese 

aircraft. Thatcher maneuvered to 

bring all batteries to bear on the 

attacking planes while she, and many 

of the ships at anchor, opened fire. 

A low-flying Oscar – a Nakajima 

Ki.43 army fighter – passed down 

Thatcher’s port side as she increased 

her speed to 25 knots while firing 

her 20- and 40-millimeter guns. The 

kamikaze climbed steeply, flipped 

over and struck the destroyer just 

behind her bridge. Power and 

steering control on the bridge 

were lost, both radars and the gyro 

system were knocked out, external 

communications were lost, and 

Thatcher was left with a six- by ninefoot hole between her keel and the 

bilge strake. A destroyer, USS Boyd

(DD 544), and a high-speed transport, 

USS Pavlic (APD 70), came alongside 

to remove the wounded and help 

extinguish fires. Thatcher had 14 

killed and 53 wounded. She was drydocked at Kerama Retto for repairs. 

Ready for sea on July 13, she got 

underway to ride out a typhoon. A 

few days later, she was attacked by a 

kamikaze, but because his aim was not 

accurate, he bounced off the port side 

above the water line, exploding and 

burning alongside. Fortunately for 

Thatcher, the damage was slight, and 

only two men were wounded.

USS Aulick (DD 569) anchored 

off Hagushi beach on May 16 to join 

the anti-aircraft and radar picket 

screen around the transports. She 

remained in the vicinity of Okinawa 

through the end of World War II. Her 

duties included conducting air-sea 

rescue on the direct air lane between 

Okinawa and Tokyo, and she saved 

nine crewmen from a downed B-29. 

Lessons From History

 USS Lindsey (DM 32) at Kerama Retto with her 

bow blown off, April 14, 1945. She had been hit by 

a Kamikaze aircraft on April 12, 1945, off Okinawa. 

(USN)

36 Surface Warfare
Arriving at Hagushi anchorage on 

the same day as Aulick, USS Charles 

Ausburne (DD 570), was assigned 

antisubmarine patrol duties. Twice, 

she drove off enemy air attacks while 

protecting landings at Aguni Shima. 

On June 23, she was assigned to 

radar picket duty, which she survived 

without damage. She patrolled off 

Okinawa through the remainder 

of the war. USS Dyson (DD 672), 

was also at Okinawa in May 1945, 

performing patrol, radar picket, local 

escort, and air-sea rescue duties. Like 

her sister ships Aulick and Charles 

Ausburne, Dyson was able to escape 

damage from kamikaze attack.

USS Braine (DD-630) also took 

part in the Okinawa operations as 

a radar picket ship, but she was 

not as fortunate. On May 27, 1945, 

she was hit in quick succession by 

two kamikazes. The first hit came 

up forward, seriously damaging 

the bridge. The second hit came 

amidships, blowing number two 

funnel overboard and demolishing 

the amidships superstructure. Braine

retired to Kerama Retto, Ryukyu 

Islands, for emergency repairs. She 

departed on June 19 and arrived in 

the United States on July 19, 1945. 

In the Okinawa campaign alone, 

34 Allied vessels had been sunk, 

mostly by kamikazes, and 368 others 

were damaged. Kamikaze attacks 

and conventional air strikes had 

killed 4,320 Sailors and wounded an 

additional 7,312. 

Despite this terrible toll on our 

ships and Sailors, kamikazes were 

ultimately a desperate failure. 

The courage, resolve, and dogged 

persistence of the Little Beavers and 

all of our armed forces prevailed. 

Their success provides our currentday surface warriors a legacy we 

respect and emulate.

(CAPT Riche retired in 2004 after 29 

years of service. From 2000-2002, he was 

Commander, Destroyer Squadron 23.)

Lessons From History

Winter 2006 37

 Destroyer USS Leutze (DD 481) showing damage 

to the stern from a Kamikaze hit off Okinawa on 

April 6, 1945. This photo was taken while alongside 

the light repair ship USS Egeria (ARL 8) for repairs. 

The destroyer USS Bennett (DD 473) is in the 

background. (USN)

 In Lingayan Gulf, P.I. on Jan. 5, 1945, RADM Theodore Chandler’s flagship, the heavy cruiser USS Louisville (CA 28), is struck in the face of turret two. The Japanese 

D3A1 VAL then flew up into the front of the bridge. One in a series of eight photos cropped from 35mm motion picture film. (USN)
 It is often said that a surface ship 

is most vulnerable while moored 

to a pier, when its main radar and 

weapon system are shut down 

and the crew is focused on inport 

activities. The Cole attack has made 

us aware of the situation in which a 

small boat laden with explosives can 

ram itself into the side of a moored 

or anchored ship. Fortunately, we 

have not experienced the situation 

in which a suicide bomber on foot 

crosses the brow and detonates a 

bomb on a ship’s quarterdeck. Surely, 

the vigilance of our watchstanders 

has successfully deterred potential 

post-Cole terrorist attacks. Perhaps 

the recent rocket attacks against 

surface ships moored in Aqaba, 

Jordan were conducted because 

the terrorists realized they could 

not penetrate our defenses with a 

waterborne or pierside suicide attack.

Surface ship Anti-Terrorism Force 

Protection (ATFP) watchstanders 

have the ability to deter and defeat 

a pierside suicide attack originating 

from the water or pier. Discussions 

with training team personnel on the 

waterfront indicate five actions that 

the crew of a surface ship can take to 

deter or, if necessary, defend against 

a suicide attack:

1. Maintain the Mindset of a 

Sentry. An energetic watchstander 

thoroughly executing the 

watchstation’s duties will give the 

impression of a hard target and 

deter potential threats. Each ATFP 

watchstander understands that their 

actions might either dissuade or 

encourage threats. Shipboard ATFP 

leadership and senior watchstanders 

also play a role in ensuring proper 

watchstanding is taking place at all 

time. All Navy personnel learn the 

General Orders of a Sentry at basic 

training or from their commissioning 

source. Reviewing them before 

assuming the watch will put you in 

the proper mindset.

2. Maintain and Be Familiar with 

ATFP Equipment. Remember that 

your ATFP equipment can save the 

lives of you and your shipmates. 

Also remember that it will operate 

properly only if it is maintained 

properly and you are trained to use 

it correctly. Make sure preventative 

maintenance is completed within 

periodicity. During watch turnover, 

ensure that your equipment is in 

good working order. Take every 

Lessons From History

38 Surface Warfare

 A symbol of freedom flaps in the wind, contrasted by a soot-covered building. Patriotism was widespread 

throughout New York city, as well as the country, as rescue workers labored to save lives. The World Trade Center 

was destroyed during a Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attack. (PH2 Jim Watson/USN)

Deterring and Defeating 

 Modern Day Kamikazes

By LCDR Adan Cruz, USN
opportunity to train with your 

equipment. If you will carry a small 

arm, ensure you maximize the 

use of available range time. If you 

are a coxswain, get familiar with 

your small boats. Using your ATFP 

equipment should be second nature. 

You need enough training so that 

when an incident occurs, you will 

instinctively take the right actions. 

Let your chain of command know if 

there is additional equipment needed 

to help you accomplish your mission.

3. Take an “outside looking in” 

approach to ATFP. Instead of looking 

at your ATFP defenses from the 

ship’s perspective (inside looking 

out), look at it from a potential 

terrorist perspective (outside looking 

in.) The questions you must ask 

yourself are, “What do potential 

intruders see when they look at my 

ship?” and “Do they see something 

that will make them think that this 

target is too difficult to conduct a 

successful attack” or will they see 

a weakness that they feel they can 

exploit. Use of a shipboard “Red 

Cell” may expose vulnerabilities 

of which you were not previously 

aware. 

4. Train the ATFP watchstanders 

as a team. ATFP shipboard 

leadership must take a holistic view 

of the ship’s ATFP watch. Tailored 

training for individual watchstanders 

is beneficial, but training should also 

be focused toward the watchteam 

in its entirety. View your watchteam 

as a weapons system. Each 

watchstander supports the efforts 

of another. The goal is to achieve a 

unity of effort of all watchstanders in 

keeping the ship safe.

5. Follow Standard Procedures. 

During the Unit Level Training 

Phase, ships train often to become 

proficient with their Pre-Planned 

Responses (PPR). PPR execution 

must be second nature to every ATFP 

watchstander. If you are following 

the PPRs and other standard 

procedures correctly, very rarely 

should instances arise where there 

is a question about the correct initial 

actions. From a shipboard leadership 

perspective, if you are consistently 

waiving a certain section of your 

Inport Security Plan (ISP) or not 

conducting Random Antiterrorism 

Measures (RAM) because of the 

inconvenience, your commitment 

to ATFP and ship safety comes 

into question. The RAM and ISP 

measures have been instituted to 

present a comprehensive defense. 

Anything less than 100 percent 

compliance will degrade your ATFP 

readiness posture.

The surface navy prevailed over 

the kamikaze threat in the Pacific in 

WWII and is now prevailing over the 

modern day kamikaze threat, known 

as the suicide bomber. The best ATFP 

weapon the surface navy has is the 

professionalism and vigilance of its 

sailors. This professionalism and 

vigilance has kept and will continue 

to keep us safe in the future. 

(LCDR Cruz is the ATFP-MIO 

AEL Action Officer in OPNAV N76.) 

Winter 2006 39

Lessons From History

Shipmates, as I travel around and talk to Sailors, one 

of the hot topics is the new Command Senior Chief 

(CSC) program which was announced in NAVADMIN 

319/05. Since the first assignments are Surface Force 

billets, there is a lot of focus and excitement within 

our community. In this article I will answer some of 

the questions that I and my counterpart, Force Jim 

Monroe from SURFLANT, have received.

How did this program come about?

The CSC program is the result of a successful pilot 

conducted on three Mine Countermeasure ships that 

was started because we wanted to increase the value 

added of the Senior Enlisted Leader in the MCM class 

ships. Smaller ships with smaller crews pose unique 

challenges to the growth of our Senior Leaders. We 

started with MCMs and are now expanding it to our 

Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). 

Who is eligible to apply?

All senior chief petty officers, regardless of rating, are 

eligible to apply, including those who are frocked. 

Applications are due to NPC by 1 February 2006, and 

these CSCs will be selected during a selection board 

held in Millington later in the month of February. 

How many Senior Chiefs do you think will apply? 

Can you give us a ballpark figure on how many will 

be selected this first year? 

When we started the MCM pilot we had 97 applicants 

for three billets – all within two weeks. So we expect 

a greater number now that the program has been 

detailed in a NAVADMIN and we have added LCS 2 

(Gold) to the opportunities. Quotas will be set at the 

beginning of the official board, but I expect no more 

than 10 during this first year due to the number of 3M 

billets which will come open during the next 12-15 months. 

What type of background will make someone 

competitive? 

These billets are multi-coded for responsibilities. In 

both types of billets (MCM and LCS), these leaders 

will be the Senior Enlisted Leader for the crew. 

Therefore documented experience in the people 

programs a CMC normally deals with will be 

beneficial and competitively speaking, essential. The 

CSCs will also be the 3M Coordinators for these ships. 

And on LCS, the CSC will stand Officer of the Deck 

(Underway). The selection board will select those who 

have demonstrated leadership ability and potential for 

success in these challenging billets.

What kind of schools will the selected CSCs attend?

Those selected will attend the Senior Enlisted 

Academy in Newport, Rhode Island (if not already 

a graduate), the 2-wk CMC/COB course, also in 

Newport, the 3M Coordinator training, and if selected 

for LCS, they will attend the requisite training pipeline 

for that PCU assignment and Officer of the Deck 

(underway) training. 

Will their ratings change? What NEC will be given?

No, members will maintain their current ratings 

and compete within their communities for selection 

to MCPO. The NEC for CSCs has been designated 

as 9579, the same as for Chiefs of the Boat in the 

submarine community. CSCs will not be detailed 

to submarines, however, as those billets have an 

added Code requirement. Additionally, CSCs will 

receive Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP) and be 

authorized to wear the CSC badge on their uniforms 

once they report to their initial command and assume 

the duties. 

Will all LCS ships have CSCs? 

Not at first. USS Freedom (LCS 1) Blue and Gold crews 

will have Command Master Chiefs (CMCs) as well 

as the Blue crew of LCS 2. LCS 1 and LCS 2 are two 

different hulls, built by two separate shipbuilders 

and the challenges of precommissioning a new hull 

led us to put CMCs on these first crews. Once the 

precommissioning CMC transfers from these first 

three billets, they will revert to CSC billets. So the 

SCPO selected from this board who is later detailed to 

LCS 2 (Gold) will be the first LCS CSC. 

Do you expect this program to grow to other 

communities?

I do. As some of our commands are leveraging 

technology and crew assignments are getting smaller, 

there are other possible billets where CSCs could be 

the right fit. Some of these billets may be sea billets, 

and some may even be ashore, or in squadrons. The 

respective Force and Fleet Master Chiefs, in concert 

with their commanders, will continue to look for 

ways to improve the right fit and ultimately make 

recommendations for possible CSC expansion. 

In closing, I would like to reiterate that this leadership 

initiative is an opportunity to profoundly influence the 

career paths of our best and our brightest Senior Chief 

Petty Officers and build leaders for our future naval 

forces. The CSC program will allow us to capitalize 

on the talented and energetic leaders who are ready 

and eager to accept the challenges of these billets. 

The Command Senior Chief program will also feed 

our Command Master Chief program, as once they 

are successful as a CSC they will gain the tools to be a 

successful CMC – and potentially build the Force and 

Fleet Master Chiefs, and the MCPONs of tomorrow. 

Ask the FORCM By FORCM(SW/AW) Karen O’Connor
USS Avenger (MCM 1)

LCDR J.A. Bennett relieved

LCDR P.E. Sobek

January 2006

USS Boxer (LHD 4)

CAPT B.W. Nichols relieved

CAPT T.J. Culora

December 2005

USS Bulkeley (DDG 84)

CDR D.P. Cashman relieved

CDR B.G. McGrath

February 2006

USS Champion (MCM 4)

LCDR B.R. Nicholson relieved

LCDR M.B. Riley

December 2005

USS Cleveland (LPD 7)

CAPT F.R. McCullough relieved

CAPT M.B. Chase

January 2006

USS Cole (DDG 67)

CDR B.W. Roberson relieved

CDR B.A. Solo

December 2005

COMDESRON ONE

CAPT A. Collins relieved

CAPT L.S. Little

January 2006

COMPHIBRON EIGHT

CAPT R. Bougher relieved

CAPT E. Barfield

December 2, 2005

USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54)

CDR B.P. O’Donnell relieved

CDR J.T. Lauer III

December 2005

USS Dextrous (MCM 13)

LCDR J.W. Pederson relieved

LCDR J.A. Bennett

January 2006

USS Elrod (FFG 55)

CDR T.S. Sanford relieved

CDR D.D. Schweizer

February 2006

USS Stephen W. Groves (FFG 29)

CDR J.C. Kreitz relieved

CDR B.J. Harrison

February 2006

USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44)

CDR T.P. Brasek relieved

CDR T.M. Negus

January 2006

USS James E. Williams (DDG 96)

CDR I.M. Hall relieved

CDR P.W. Vance

February 2006

USS Mason (DDG 87)

CDR J.V. Fuller relieved

CDR E.H. Black

January 2006

USS Rushmore (LSD 47)

CDR C.S. O’Connor relieved

CDR R.N. Fox

February 2006

USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58)

CDR J.M. Weeks relieved

CDR B.M. Gately

November 2005

USS Stephen W. Groves (FFG 29)

CDR J.C. Kreitz relieved

CDR B.J. Harrison

February 2006

USS Typhoon (PC 5)

LT C.M. Williams relieved

LCDR B.L. Stallings

February 2006

USS Vicksburg (CG 69)

CAPT C.C. Swicker relieved

CAPT T.K. Shannon

February 2006

USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)

CDR E.M. Ross relieved

CDR C.E. Pringle

February 17, 2006

Changes of Command

40 Surface Warfare

If your command has an upcoming change of command scheduled, please submit your information 

to surfwarmag@navy.mil.
How expert are you at identifying surface combat from foreign navies? Can 

you tell whether a ship on the horizon is an ally or an enemy? It’s time to test 

your ship identification skills. How about all of you manning the “big eyes” 

take a look at the ship pictured below and let us know what type of vessel it is, 

its name and what nation operates it. 

Send your entry to SURFWARMAG@navy.mil with Ship Shape in the 

subject line. Be sure to include your rate, name, ship or unit of assignment, and 

current mailing address. The first individual to provide the correct information 

will receive recognition in the next issue of Surface Warfare.

The winner for this issue is CTT2(SW) Sandor Mate stationed aboard USS 

Stout (DDG 55). He was the first to correctly identify the ship as the Peruvian 

frigate BAP Carvajal (FM 51).

 This ship, took part in UNITAS 47-06 as a part 

of the multi-national force conducting exercises 

that enhance enhances friendly, mutual cooperation 

and understanding between participating navies by 

enhancing interoperability in naval operations among 

the nations of the Western Hemisphere. 

Peruvian frigate BAP Carvajal (FM 51).

Winter 2006 41
42 Surface Warfare

CAPT Raymond Anthony Komorowski, USN

1925-2002

Prior to his active duty retirement, CAPT Raymond Anthony Komorowski spent an illustrious career, including 

command tours aboard USS Hartley (DE 1029), USS Manley (DD 940), and USS Boston (CA 69). His final assignment 

prior to retirement was as Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface) from 1973 to 1975. 

At the DCNO’s behest, CAPT Komorowski established Surface Warfare magazine in 1975, where he continued as 

editor and advisor until 1990. Concurrently, he became a founder and national Vice President of the Surface Navy 

Association, an office he held for eight years.

It is in his memory that the Surface Navy Association conducts its annual CAPT Komorowski Photography Contest. 

Here are several of this year’s top finishers. 

SECOND PLACE 

 While waiting for word from USS Fort McHenry’s (LSD 43) Gun crew Liaison Officer (GLO) for the go-ahead, Gunner’s Mate 2nd Class (the gunner) and Gunner’s Mate 

Seaman Omar Bonilla man the starboard MK-38 25mm machine gun in preparation to shoot the “Killer Tomato” simulation target. (JO2 David Ham/USN)
Winter 2006 43

HONORABLE MENTION 

 An aging hemp mooring line and cargo pulley lay half in the shadows in the forward hold 

aboard the Sloop-of-War USS Constellation, the last sail-powered warship built by the Navy. 

Constellation now rests in Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, serving as a public maritime museum. 

(PHAN Kristopher Wilson/USN) 

HONORABLE MENTION 

 Sailors aboard the Fast Combat Support Ship, USS Camden (AOE 2) prepare for a refueling at 

sea with the Italian Frigate Libecco (R5 72). (PH3(AW/SW) Crystal Vigil)

HONORABLE MENTION 

 OS2(SW) Houge determines distance between the USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20) 

and USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189) during a replenishment at sea. 

(YN2(SW/AW) Marie Goodwin)

HONORABLE MENTION 

 USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) sits moored to a buoy in Villefranche, France while on transit to 

homeport after GWOT Surge 2005. (IS1(SW) Pierre Peterson/USN)

THIRD PLACE

 Sailors perform fire fighting drills during a General Quarters (GQ) drill inside 

the hangar bay aboard USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75). This photograph also 

earned third place honors in the Surface Navy Association’s 2005 CAPT Komorowski 

Photography Contest. (PH3 Ricardo Reyes/USN)
44 Surface Warfare

Congratulations to this issue’s 

Salty Dog, IC2(SW) Juan Camacho, 

stationed aboard USS McFaul

(DDG 74). Camacho was the 

first person to correctly identify 

that there were 16 Medals of Honor 

given to Navy personnel for their 

actions in the Vietnam Conflict. 

Camacho also correctly stated that 

the Navy first recognized a distinction

 between First, Second, and Third-class 

Petty Officers in 1885. 

This issue’s challenges are presented below. 

The first person to correctly answer all ten questions 

will receive recognition in the next issue. As soon as 

we have received a winner, the correct answers will be 

posted on our website. Good luck!

COMMAND ORGANIZATION

1. Who is responsible to the CDO for the fire party?

2. Who is responsible for the testing of all spaces that may have been overrun by gases? (Hint: this person is 

also the only one who can certify a space as “safe to enter.”

COMBAT SYSTEMS

3. Explain the difference between two-dimensional and three-dimensional RADAR.

4. What is the difference between active and passive SONAR?

5. What is the gyrocompass used for?

DECK

6. Explain the meaning of the following line-handling commands: 

 a) hold, b) check, c) ease, d) slack, e) take-in, f) cast-off, g) avast, h) heave around

7. Aboard ship, what are the measuring standards for a line and wire rope?

C4I

8. What is meant by the term “gingerbread?”

HERITAGE

9. What was the first ship named after an enlisted man?

GENERAL MILITARY KNOWLEDGE

10. How many gun salutes are allowed for a Vice Admiral and at how many intervals? 

--Send your replies to SURFWARMA@navy.mil with “CAPTAIN’S TRIVIA” in the subject line.

4 Surface Warfare