IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2024 ND 120

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

Regina Deanne Goodale, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20230373

Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial 

District, the Honorable Todd L. Cresap, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.

Rozanna C. Larson, State’s Attorney, Minot, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.
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State v. Goodale

No. 20230373

Jensen, Chief Justice.

Regina Goodale appeals from a judgment entered following a jury verdict 

finding her guilty of accomplice to murder—extreme indifference for the 

murder of her husband. On appeal, Goodale asserts the jury instructions were 

improper, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict of guilty, 

the district court erred in permitting the State to join her and Mathew 

Anderson’s cases for trial, and the court imposed an illegal sentence under 

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-03-01. We affirm.

I

In June 2022, the State charged Goodale with accomplice to murder—

extreme indifference, a class AA felony, in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-

01(1)(b). The State moved to join Anderson’s and Goodale’s cases under 

N.D.R.Crim.P. 8 and 13. Anderson was alleged to be the individual who killed 

the victim. Goodale did not respond and the district court permitted the 

joinder.

During the trial, the State provided testimony from several witnesses, 

including acquaintances of Goodale, the investigating officer, and her codefendant, Whitney Racine. At the close of the State’s case, Goodale moved the 

district court for a judgment of acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29. The court 

denied the motion and Goodale rested her case without presenting any 

additional evidence.

The jury instruction which defined accomplice to murder—extreme 

indifference read as follows:

A person may be convicted of an offense based upon the conduct of 

another person when she acts with the kind of culpability required 

for the offense she caused the other to engage in the conduct, or 

with intent that an offense be committed, she commands, induces, 

provides, or aids the other to commit it.
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A person acts with the kind of culpability required for murder 

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 

of human life is guilty of the offense of accomplice to murder, if she 

causes another to engage in conduct, with the intent that an 

offense be committed, she intentionally commands, induces, 

procures, or aides another to commit it, is guilty, of being an 

accomplice to the commission of the offense of murder under 

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 

human life.

The jury instructions also required the State to prove the following 

essential elements:

1. On or about February 24, 2022, in Ward County, North Dakota, 

the Defendant, Regina Deanne Goodale, intentionally commanded, 

induced, procured or aided another to commit an offense; and

2. She willfully caused another to engage in conduct constituting 

the offense of murder under circumstances manifesting extreme 

indifference to the value of human life.

The jury found Goodale guilty of accomplice to murder—extreme 

indifference. Goodale now appeals.

II

Goodale asserts the district court erred in providing the essential

elements required for accomplice to murder—extreme indifference by

improperly merging subsections (a) and (b) of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-03-01(1), the 

statute defining an accomplice. The accomplice statute, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-03-

01(1), reads as follows:

1. A person may be convicted of an offense based upon the conduct 

of another person when:

a. Acting with the kind of culpability required for the offense, 

he causes the other to engage in such conduct;

b. With intent that an offense be committed, he commands, 

induces, procures, or aids the other to commit it, or, having 
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a statutory duty to prevent its commission, he fails to make 

proper effort to do so; or . . .

(Emphasis added.)

We have previously recognized the following regarding jury instructions:

Jury instructions must correctly and adequately inform the jury of 

the applicable law and must not mislead or confuse the jury. We 

review jury instructions as a whole and, if the instructions, as a 

whole, correctly advise the jury on the law, they are sufficient 

although part of the instructions, standing alone, may be 

insufficient or erroneous.

State v. Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 18, 575 N.W.2d 658 (internal citations 

omitted). “An attorney’s failure to object at trial to instructions, when given 

the opportunity, operates as a waiver of the right to complain on appeal of 

instructions that either were or were not given.” Id. at ¶ 10 (quoting State v. 

McNair, 491 N.W.2d 397, 399 (N.D. 1992)).

Prior to the closing arguments the parties and the district court reviewed

individually each of the proposed final jury instructions, including accomplice 

to murder—extreme indifference. Following that review the final instructions 

were prepared and the parties again met with the court to approve the final 

instructions. After reviewing the final jury instructions, the court inquired 

whether the instructions were acceptable to which her counsel responded, 

“Yes.” Goodale was provided with an opportunity to object to the instructions 

and, by answering in the affirmative that the instructions were acceptable, 

waived her right to complain on appeal that the instruction regarding 

accomplice to murder—extreme indifference incorrectly instructed the jury.

III

Goodale asserts there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s

verdict of guilty because the State failed to prove causation between the actions 

of Goodale and the victim’s death. This Court applies the following standard of 

review for issues of sufficiency of the evidence:
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When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence,

we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. 

The conviction rests on insufficient evidence if no rational 

factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. In considering a sufficiency of the evidence 

claim, we do not weigh conflicting evidence, or judge the credibility 

of witnesses.

State v. Geiger, 2023 ND 222, ¶ 10, 997 N.W.2d 845 (cleaned up).

The State charged Goodale with violating N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01(1)(b), 

accomplice to murder—extreme indifference. The accomplice statute does not 

require a defendant to intend a murder be committed, only that he intends an

offense. Olson v. State, 2019 ND 135, ¶¶ 17-18, 927 N.W.2d 444. A person can 

be charged with accomplice to extreme indifference murder based on their

conduct surrounding an assault under circumstances manifesting extreme 

indifference, which ultimately results in death, even if the victim’s death was 

unintentional. Id. at ¶ 18.

During the trial, testimony was given indicating Goodale was making 

statements of her wanting Anderson to beat up the victim. Racine testified on 

the night of the murder she contacted the victim to come to her house so 

Anderson could assault him. She stated she was apprehensive about doing this 

when Anderson “put his hands on [her] shoulders and said you can do this, it’s 

for [Goodale].” Before sending the message to the victim, Racine contacted 

Goodale to ask if this was what she wanted, to which she replied yes.

The State provided testimony of an investigating officer who stated 

Goodale was witnessed in Anderson’s pickup truck the night of the incident, 

and one individual even indicated Goodale admitted to her she was present at 

the murder scene. The officer further testified when he interviewed the other 

individual present in the car at the time of the murder she heard Anderson 

say, “this is for [Goodale]. [Goodale] wanted you dead tonight.”

In addition to testimony, the State provided messages sent by Anderson

which indicated on the night of the murder he was acting on the request of

Goodale. These messages included: “[Goodale] set me up . . . what part of that 
5

are you not understandi[n]g”; “That bitch [Goodale] set me and [Racine] up”;

and “I think bec[au]se everyone was right she did Set me up she got exactly 

what she wanted out of m[e] im such a fool i thought she actually loved me i 

introduced her To all the right people and she set me up played me like a 

fiddle[.]”

After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict with

the benefit of all inferences reasonably to be drawn in its favor, there was 

sufficient evidence presented for a rational fact finder to find Goodale guilty of 

accomplice to murder—extreme indifference for the murder in violation of 

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01(1)(b).

IV

Goodale asserts the district court erred in permitting the joinder of her

and Anderson’s cases.

Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 8(b) a “complaint may charge two or more 

defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 

transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting one or 

more offenses.” The purpose of Rule 8 is to provide judicial convenience and 

economy. State v. Wamre, 1999 ND 164, ¶ 30, 599 N.W.2d 268.

Under Rule 14, an aggrieved defendant may seek relief from 

prejudicial joinder, but has the burden of demonstrating 

substantial prejudice from a consolidated trial. Joint trials of 

persons charged together with committing the same offense are 

the rule rather than the exception. Bare allegations that a 

defendant would stand a better chance of acquittal in a separate 

trial or that there may be some “spillover effect” from evidence 

against a codefendant is insufficient to compel severance.

Id. (cleaned up); see N.D.R.Crim.P. 14; see also State v. Bingaman, 2002 ND 

202, ¶ 13, 655 N.W.2d 51 (holding in order to show obvious error, a defendant 

must demonstrate severe or compelling prejudice by showing his defense was 

irreconcilable with that of the codefendant or the jury was unable to 

compartmentalize the evidence).
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In July 2022, the State moved to join Anderson’s and Goodale’s cases 

under N.D.R.Crim.P. 8 and 13. Goodale did not respond and the district court 

permitted the joinder, finding Anderson and Goodale were alleged to have 

participated in the same act, transaction, and common scheme and could be 

joined in a single indictment.

Goodale, as above, does not dispute this issue was not adequately 

preserved for appeal but asserts joining the parties constituted an obvious 

error. She states the joinder of cases permitted the admission of messages from 

Anderson as a party opponent while preventing Goodale from cross-examining 

him. However, we conclude no obvious error exists as it relates to the joinder 

motion, supported by the lack of objection relating to these messages being 

admitted into evidence by Goodale’s attorney. The district court did not err in 

permitting the joinder of the defendants.

V

Lastly, Goodale asserts the district court erred in sentencing her under 

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-09.1 since the crime of accomplice is not specifically 

included in the statute.

In response, the State contends Goodale cannot directly appeal a 

sentence, citing the rulings in State v. Walker, 2010 ND 214, ¶ 22, 790 N.W.2d 

484 and State v. Nace, 371 N.W.2d. 129, 131 (N.D. 1985), arguing these cases 

indicate a defendant must first make a N.D.R.Crim.P. 35 motion to correct an 

illegal sentence to the district court. These cases, however, do not indicate 

Goodale would be prevented from appealing her sentence as part of her direct 

appeal of her judgment. Instead, our conclusion in Walker indicates, 

“defendants may not appeal a sentence alone under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-06(5).” 

Walker, at ¶ 21.

In her appeal, Goodale raises a number of issues relating to the district 

court’s judgment, and is not making a delayed appeal based solely on the 

sentence imposed. As such, our conclusion in State v. Thomas would be more 

closely related to Goodale’s appeal. 2020 ND 30, 938 N.W.2d 897. In Thomas, 

we determined “an objection is unnecessary to preserve a claim of illegal 
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sentence imposed in a criminal judgment from which an appeal may be 

immediately taken.” Id. at ¶ 16. Goodale is then permitted to appeal her 

sentence to this Court on direct appeal.

We conclude the sentence does not need correcting. Goodale was charged

as an accomplice under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-03-01(1)(b), whereby one may be 

convicted of an offense based upon the conduct of another when, with the intent 

that an offense be committed, they aid the other to commit it. Olson, 2019 ND 

135, ¶ 17. We have repeatedly held an accomplice is to be treated as a principal 

actor in the crime. See Walker, 2010 ND 214, ¶ 15 (holding an accomplice who 

obtains the money in a robbery but does not participate in the physical attack 

perpetrated by a principal actor can still be held accountable as a principal for 

robbery); State v. Anderson, 172 N.W.2d 597, 602 (N.D. 1969) (holding 

accomplices who accompany a principal and aid the principal in climbing to the 

roof of the building to commit a burglary can also be held accountable as a 

principal for said burglary).

As N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01(1)(b), murder—extreme indifference is a crime 

contemplated by N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-09.1 as an offense, which is not eligible for 

release until eighty–five percent of the sentence imposed has been served, an 

accomplice to this offense would be subject to the same release terms. The 

district court did not err in sentencing Goodale under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-09.1.

VI

We conclude the district court erred in using “and” instead of “or” in the 

jury instructions for an accomplice; however, in the given case, this error is 

harmless as it increased the burden to the State and did not prejudice Goodale. 

We further conclude sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to convict 

Goodale of accomplice to murder—extreme indifference and the court did not 

err in permitting the joinder of the defendants or in sentencing Goodale under 

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-09.1. We affirm the judgment of conviction.
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Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte

Douglas A. Bahr