In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425

SEAWAY BANK & TRUST COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

J&A SERIES I, LLC, SERIES C, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:17-cv-07213 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge.

ARGUED DECEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED JUNE 18, 2020

Before ROVNER, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. J&A Series I, LLC, Series C (“J&A

Series”), J&A Investment Group, LLC (“J&A Investment”), and

Adam Ackerman (collectively “J&A Parties”) appeal from the

district court’s dismissal of the petition they filed under 735

ILCS 5/2-1401. We affirm.
2 Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425

I.

In October of 2012, Seaway Bank & Trust Co. (“Seaway”)

filed an action in the Circuit Court of Cook County against the

J&A Parties and others to collect on two loans issued by its

predecessor in interest. The debts were guaranteed by

Ackerman and secured by a mortgage on a Chicago property.

In August of 2013, the court entered a judgment of foreclosure.

By early 2014, the court had approved the sale of the mortgaged property and entered a deficiency judgment against

Ackerman in the amount of $116,381.

In January of 2017, the Illinois Department of Financial and

Professional Regulation, Division of Banking, closed Seaway.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) was

appointed as receiver and set a claims bar date of May 3, 2017.

Although the FDIC published notice of the bar date, the J&A

Parties filed no timely claims with the FDIC. Instead, several

months after the bar date, on September 8, 2017, the J&A

Parties filed a Petition to Quash Service (“Petition”) against the

FDIC in the state-court lawsuit that Seaway had filed in 2012.

The Petition, which was filed pursuant to section 2-1401 of the

Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, asserted that Seaway’s 2012

service of process had been defective in several ways.1 The J&A

1

 The J&A Parties asserted that: (1) the summonses did not name J&A

Investment or Ackerman; (2) the summonses spelled J&A Series’ name with

an Arabic numeral “1" instead of a Roman numeral “I;” (3) service of

process on J&A Series should have been made upon the Illinois Secretary

of State instead of the registered agent because the limited liability company

had been dissolved; and (4) the affidavit of service did not contain the full

name of J&A Series. These purported defects are not relevant to the

(continued...)
Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425 3

Parties requested that: (1) the state court quash service of

process as to the J&A Parties; (2) vacate as void all orders that

had been entered against them; (3) find that lack of personal

jurisdiction over the J&A Parties was apparent on the face of

the record; and (4) award any further relief that the court

deemed just. Although they did not expressly seek return of

the property, they argued below that, once the relief sought in

the Petition was granted, they were entitled to restitution in the

form of the return of the title and possession of the property

from the current title holder.2

 The FDIC, which had been

named as a party in the Petition, removed the proceeding to

the District Court in the Northern District of Illinois. See 12

U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) (providing for removal from a state court

to the appropriate federal district court of any action, suit, or

proceeding filed against the FDIC); 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (providing

for removal of civil actions). 

The FDIC then sent to each of the J&A Parties a “Notice to

Discovered Claimant to Present Proof of Claim” (“Notice”).

Contemporaneously, the FDIC moved in the district court to

stay the proceedings in order to allow the J&A Parties to

exhaust the mandatory claims process required by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of

1989 (“FIRREA”). See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d), subsections (3)

through (13) (setting forth the authority of the FDIC as receiver

to determine claims and the procedures for doing so). The

1

 (...continued)

resolution of this appeal. 

2

 After the foreclosure, the property was sold to a third party.
4 Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425

Notices advised the recipients that, because the claims bar date

had passed, they were required to submit a proof of claim, and

also prove to the FDIC’s satisfaction that the late-filed claim

exception applied. The court granted the stay but the J&A

Parties did not submit any claims to the FDIC by the November 2018 submission deadline set in the Notices.3

The FDIC then moved to dismiss the proceeding on the

ground that the J&A Parties failed to exhaust the mandatory

FIRREA claims process, and therefore the district court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D). The J&A Parties opposed the

motion, arguing that it was unripe for adjudication and that it

sought improper relief. Specifically, the J&A Parties asserted

that FIRREA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision applied only to

claims seeking payment from a failed bank, and that the J&A

Parties’ Petition did not seek payment. Rather, it sought to

quash service and vacate void orders from the original litigation. Only if the court granted that non-monetary relief, the

J&A Parties argued, could they then pursue restitution in the

form of “possessory relief,” or the return of their property.

They would seek monetary relief only if the property could not

be restored to them, they contended. In essence, the J&A

Parties contended that the FDIC’s motion was not ripe for

adjudication because they were not yet seeking the return of

the property or monetary relief, but also that they were

automatically entitled to the return of their property or

monetary relief should their Petition be granted. 

3

 The three Notices were sent in late August and early September 2018, and

listed submission deadline dates in late November 2018.
Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425 5

In reply, the FDIC pointed out that section 1821(d)(13)(D)

is not limited to claims for monetary relief, but bars courts

from reviewing “any claim or any action seeking a determination of rights with respect to the assets of any depository

institution for which the FDIC-R has been appointed receiver,”

as well as “any claim relating to any act or omission of such

institution or the Corporation as receiver.” All such claims, the

FDIC argued, are first subject to the mandatory administrative

claims process. The district court granted the FDIC’s motion,

finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

section 2-1401 Petition because the J&A Parties had failed to

exhaust administrative remedies. The J&A Parties appeal.

II.

On appeal, the J&A Parties challenge the district court’s

conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the section 2-1401

Petition. We review de novo the district court’s order dismissing

the J&A Parties’ Petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Miller v. F.D.I.C., 738 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 2013). We may

affirm a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any

ground supported by the record. Kowalski v. Boliker, 893 F.3d

987, 994 (7th Cir. 2018). FIRREA, which was enacted in

response to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, facilitates

the expeditious and efficient resolution of claims against failed

banks. Miller, 738 F.3d at 840. 

To achieve this purpose, FIRREA allows, and

in certain situations requires, the FDIC to

take over failed banks and empowers it as

receiver to allow or disallow claims asserted

against them. ... To ensure that claims are
6 Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425

resolved quickly and efficiently, FIRREA

establishes strict administrative prerequisites

and deadlines that claimants must follow to

lodge their claims and challenge any denials.

... FIRREA bars claimants from taking claims

directly to court without first going through

an administrative determination.

Miller, 738 F.3d at 840 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

The J&A Parties contend that they were not properly served

with process in the underlying foreclosure action in the Circuit

Court of Cook County. As a result, they continue, the Circuit

Court lacked personal jurisdiction over them, and so all orders

entered in that action are void. The Petition asked only that the

court quash service, void the orders, and declare that the lack

of personal jurisdiction was apparent from the face of the

record. The J&A Parties assert that, because the Petition did not

seek financial restitution and asserted no claim for monetary

relief from the FDIC, the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of

section 1821(d)(13)(D) were not implicated, and the Petition

should not have been dismissed.

In the district court, the FDIC argued for dismissal under

either subsection (i) or (ii) of 1821(d)(13)(D). The district court

focused largely on subsection (i) because of the J&A Parties’

argument that they were not seeking monetary relief. The

FDIC now asks us to focus on subsection (ii). Section

1821(d)(13)(D) provides, in its entirety:

Limitation on judicial review
Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425 7

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction over–

(i) any claim or action for payment from, or

any action seeking a determination of rights

with respect to, the assets of any depository

institution for which the Corporation has

been appointed receiver, including assets

which the Corporation may acquire from

itself as such receiver; or

(ii) any claim relating to any act or omission

of such institution or the Corporation as

receiver.

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D).4 To the extent that subsection (i) is

limited to claims for payment (an issue we need not address

here), subsection (ii) is not so constrained. Under the facts

presented here, we find subsection (ii) to be the better fit for

addressing the relief sought in the Petition. 

Under subsection (ii), “[c]ourts lack authority to review

FIRREA claims ‘relating to any act or omission’ of a failed bank

or of the FDIC as receiver of a failed bank unless they are first

subjected to FIRREA's administrative claims process.” Farnik

v. F.D.I.C., 707 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 2013). That is precisely the

nature of the J&A Parties’ claim here. Under Illinois law, “a

plaintiff has a nondelegable duty to (1) assure the clerk issued

4

 The “[e]xcept as otherwise provided” clause refers back to section

1821(d)(6). That section allows claimants to seek judicial review of their

claims after first exhausting the administrative process. Miller, 738 F.3d at

844–45; Westberg v. F.D.I.C., 741 F.3d 1301, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
8 Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425

the summons, (2) deliver the summons to the process server

for service, and (3) see the process server made a prompt and

proper return.” Smith v. Menold Constr., Inc., 811 N.E.2d 357,

362 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). See also John Isfan Constr., Inc. v.

Longwood Towers, LLC, 52 N.E.3d 510, 517–18 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

(when a limited liability company has been dissolved, “a

plaintiff is required to serve process upon the Secretary of

State, and it must also serve copies at the company's last

registered office as well as the address that the plaintiff

believes is most likely to result in actual notice. 805 ILCS

180/1–50(c)”). The J&A Parties asserted in their Petition that

Seaway, the failed bank for which FDIC serves as receiver,

failed to fulfill its duties with respect to service of process in

the foreclosure action. See note 1, supra. That failure, in turn,

resulted in the entry of void orders, they contend, orders that

wrongfully deprived them of their property. Because the J&A

Parties’ claims relate to an act or omission of the failed bank,

they were required to exhaust the FIRREA administrative

claims process. Because they did not do so within the time

permitted, the court lacked authority to consider their claims.

In response to this direct application of the statute, the J&A

Parties contend that subsection (ii) is not implicated because it

applies only to “claims” and they assert that their Petition does

not present a “claim.”5

 They relatedly argue that a “claim” in

5

 The J&A Parties concede that section 2-1401 petitions “are essentially

complaints inviting responsive pleadings.” People v. Vincent, 871 N.E.2d 17,

23 (Ill. 2007). Section 2–1401 authorizes a trial court to vacate or modify a

final order or judgment in civil and criminal proceedings. People v. Daniels,

83 N.E.3d 4, 7 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). “A proceeding under section 2–1401

(continued...)
Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425 9

the context of the statute must be limited to demands for

monetary relief, an assertion contradicted by the broad

language of the statute, as we have already noted. And they

revive their argument that dismissal was premature because

their ultimate claim for restitution in the form of possessory

relief will not ripen unless and until a court quashes service

and declares the orders in the underlying litigation void.

The statute does not define the word “claim,” but several

courts have addressed the meaning of that term. As used in

FIRREA, the word “claim” is “a term-of-art that refers only to

claims that are resolvable through the FIRREA administrative

process.” Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 106 (4th Cir. 2017)

(quoting American Nat’l Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 642 F.3d 1137, 1142

(D.C. Cir. 2011)). See also Hudson United Bank v. Chase

Manhattan Bank of Conn., N.A., 43 F.3d 843, 848–49 (3d Cir.

1994) (“Logic dictates that the claims barred by paragraph

(13)(D) must coincide with those that may be filed under the

administrative procedures of paragraph (5).”). Moreover,

claims under subsection (ii) are not limited to monetary relief

but may include declaratory or other relief. See Westberg, 741

F.3d at 1305 n.1. See also Willner, 849 F.3d at 107 (collecting

cases). 

The J&A Parties contend that their claims seeking to quash

service and vacate as void all orders entered against them are

not resolvable in the FIRREA administrative process because

5

 (...continued)

constitutes an independent and separate action from the original action[.]”

Warren County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. Walters, 32 N.E.3d 1099,

1105 (Ill. 2015). 
10 Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425

only an Illinois court may void the orders. But the J&A Parties

make clear that their ultimate goal is not simply to void state

court orders; rather, they argue that once service is quashed

and the orders voided, they are automatically entitled to

restitution. In opposing the motion to dismiss filed by the FDIC

below, the J&A Parties insisted that they were entitled to

restitution in the form of possessory relief once the court

granted the Petition:

Restitution is the right of an aggrieved party.

Ordering restitution is the obligation of a court

responsible for an erroneous judgment. As

such, if this Court should gran Petitioners’

petition to quash and vacate the void orders

against them, then it must order restitution.

... Here, the subject property must be restored to Petitioners to achieve a return to the

status quo ante.

R.16, at 6–7 (emphasis in original). In fact, they sought a

declaration that the lack of personal jurisdiction was apparent

from the face of the record because section 2-1401(e) protects

bona fide third-party purchasers of real property from challenges to their rights under section 2-1401(f) unless the lack of

jurisdiction was apparent on the face of the record. See 735

ILCS 5/2-1401(e)-(f). This makes clear the nature of the relief

that the J&A Parties were seeking. The J&A Parties further

argued that they would not be entitled to monetary relief

unless the property could not be restored to them, at which

point the proceeds from the sale of the property would be the

appropriate relief. All of this demonstrates that the goal of the

Petition was not simply to quash service or void orders in the
Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425 11

abstract; the J&A Parties wanted their property back in the

form of possession or financial compensation. Critically, they

contended that they were entitled to that relief because of an

“act or omission” of the failed bank for which the FDIC serves

as receiver. Farnik, 707 F.3d at 722.

Moreover, contrary to their assertion, the relief that the J&A

Parties seek is within the power of the FDIC to provide

through the mandatory administrative claims process and

therefore meets the definition of a claim. The FDIC notes that

it could have allowed an unsecured claim, for example, in the

amount of the value of the property. The FDIC could also have

entered into an agreed order to vacate the original judgment.

If the J&A Parties had timely made this claim for the return of

the property and the FDIC had disallowed it or offered

inadequate relief, the J&A Parties would have been entitled

under the statute to bring the matter to the district court for de

novo review. Farnik, 707 F.3d at 721; 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A).

By attempting to bypass the mandatory claims process

altogether, the J&A Parties waived any argument that the FDIC

could not provide adequate relief. Willner, 849 F.3d at 109 (by

not timely submitting a claim to the FIRREA claims process,

claimants waived their argument about how the FDIC would

have resolved it); Westberg, 741 F.3d at 1308 n.3 (claimants may

not circumvent FIRREA’s exhaustion requirement by declining

to pursue the remedies available to them and later arguing that

such remedies are ineffective). 

In their quest for restitution, the J&A Parties sought to

avoid the mandatory administrative claims process through

artful pleading. See Farnik, 707 F.3d at 722–23 (in applying

section 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii), the court focuses “on the substance
12 Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425

of a claim rather than its form”). But “[l]itigants cannot avoid

FIRREA’s administrative requirements through strategic

pleading.” Benson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 1207,

1209 (9th Cir. 2012). Because the FDIC, through the administrative claims process, had the power to remedy the wrong that

the J&A Parties claim to have suffered, the district court

correctly concluded that it was without jurisdiction to entertain

the Petition. 

Before we conclude, we must address one final issue. After

stating in its briefs that the district court had jurisdiction to

resolve this matter, the J&A Parties asserted for the first time

at oral argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction over

the matter under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and that remand

to the state court was appropriate. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust

Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Because the Rooker-Feldman bar is

jurisdictional, this objection may not be waived. Lennon v. City

of Carmel, Ind., 865 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 2017). 

Recall that the FDIC removed the case to the district court

under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B), which allows removal to

federal court of any suit (with an exception that does not apply

here) filed against the FDIC. Section 1819(b)(2)(A) provides

(with the same inapplicable exception) that “all suits of a civil

nature at common law or in equity to which the [FDIC], in any

capacity, is a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of

the United States.” See also F.D.I.C. v. RLI Ins. Co., 784 F.3d

1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that the “district court had

subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit under 12 U.S.C.

§ 1819(b)(2)(A), which provides that civil suits to which FDIC

is a party arise under the laws of the United States”);
Nos. 19-2268 & 19-2425 13

Buczkowski v. F.D.I.C., 415 F.3d 594, 595 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting

that, with certain exceptions, all suits against the FDIC in any

of its capacities “shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the

United States” and hence may be removed under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(b)). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall

have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). The

district court was thus well within its authority to determine

whether exhaustion under FIRREA’s administrative claims

process was required. Having concluded that it was, and

having determined that the J&A Parties failed timely to

exhaust their claims, dismissal for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction under section 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) was appropriate.

Remand to the state court would have been improper because

section 1821(d)(13)(D) provides that, in the absence of exhaustion of that process, “no court shall have jurisdiction over” a

claim. Miller, 738 F.3d at 844–45. That includes state courts. Cf.

Mains v. Citibank, NA, 852 F.3d 669, 678–79 (7th Cir. 2017)

(finding a claim barred by both Rooker-Feldman and section

1821(d)(13)(D)).

AFFIRMED.