U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

66–464 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

CUBA’S LINK TO DRUG TRAFFICKING

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 17, 1999

Serial No. 106–143

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian

CARLA J. MARTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman

BOB BARR, Georgia

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

DOUG OSE, California

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

SHARON PINKERTON, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

GIL MACKLIN, Professional Staff Member

MASON ALINGER, Professional Staff Member

LISA WANDLER, Clerk

CHERRI BRANSON, Minority Counsel

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C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on November 17, 1999 ...................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Beers, Rand, Assistant Secretary, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State; William E. Ledwith, Chief

of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Agency; and Rear Admiral Edward J. Barrett, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force East .. 24

Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana .................................................................................................................. 6

Gilman, Hon. Benjamin A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York ................................................................................................... 15

Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:

Barrett, Rear Admiral Edward J., Director, Joint Interagency Task Force

East, prepared statement of ......................................................................... 40

Beers, Rand, Assistant Secretary, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, prepared statement of ............... 28

Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana:

Investigative results .................................................................................. 67

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 12

Gilman, Hon. Benjamin A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York:

Article dated November 11, 1999 ............................................................. 61

Letter dated November 10, 1999 .............................................................. 55

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 17

Ledwith, William E., Chief of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Agency, prepared statement of .......................................................... 34

Ose, Hon. Doug, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, articles dated November 1, and June 28, 1999 ................................... 89

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CUBA’S LINK TO DRUG TRAFFICKING

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,

AND HUMAN RESOURCES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Mica, Barr, Gilman, Shays, RosLehtinen, Ose, Mink, Cummings, Kucinich, Turner, and

Schakowsky.

Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, staff director and chief counsel;

Gil Macklin and Mason Alinger, professional staff members, Charley Diaz, congressional fellow; Lisa Wandler, clerk; John Mackey,

investigative counsel, HIRC; Kevin Long, professional staff member, HGRC; Cherri Branson, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority staff assistant.

Mr. MICA. Good morning. I would like to call this meeting of the

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources Subcommittee to order.

I welcome our members. I will start off this morning with an

opening statement, and then I will yield to other members. We

have several panels this morning we will hear from, so we want to

get started.

This morning, our subcommittee will conduct an oversight and

investigative hearing on the subject of Cuba’s involvement in illegal narcotics trafficking. This past week the United States Department of State and the Clinton administration determined that

Cuba would not be added to the majors list. Each November, the

majors list which is developed is the first step in the annual certification process established by the International Narcotics Control

Act of 1986, and this list determines which countries are involved

both in producing and transiting of illegal narcotics.

This decision was made despite the United States Drug Czar’s

statement that drug overflights of Cuba increased by almost 50

percent last year. I think we have a copy of his statement. It says

the intelligence and law enforcement communities report detected

drug overflights of Cuba increased by almost 50 percent. That is a

letter sent to Chairman Burton on May 27th.

In addition, last year 7.2 metric tons of cocaine seized by the Colombian National Police in Cartagena were shown to be bound for

Cuba with the final destination possibly being the United States.

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Also, according to the State Department’s own 1999 International

Narcotics Control Strategy Report, there are indications in that report, and let me quote from it, that ‘‘drug trafficking, particularly

transshipment via mules transiting Cuban airports and drugs

dropped from planes over waters off of Cuba’s northeast coast is on

the rise,’’ and that is also from the State Department’s report.

Today, our subcommittee will hear from a variety of witnesses,

including the chairman of our full committee, Mr. Burton, and Mr.

Gilman, a member of our subcommittee who also chairs the House

International Relations Committee. Both chairmen have carefully

reviewed Cuba’s role in international narcotics trafficking. They

have also had their key staffers do extensive work in reviewing

what is going on with illegal narcotics trafficking from and to

Cuba.

Additionally, we will hear from administration officials involved

in assessing Cuba’s illegal drug activities and from several other

witnesses knowledgeable about alleged Cuban narcotics and criminal connections.

Last year, more than 15,700 Americans, most of them young,

died from drug-induced deaths. Few wars have so devastated our

population as the toll we now see taken by illegal narcotics.

Any country and its officials involved either directly or indirectly

in dealing with this poison must be and will be held accountable.

Both our Federal law and simple justice require no less of an action

on our part.

I have personally flown above the Caribbean waters in United

States surveillance aircraft and witnessed how drug traffickers use

Cuban waters as a refuge in a deadly cat and mouse game.

I will be interested to learn today from this hearing if Cuban officials support these criminal ventures. We have a number of questions that must be answered. Does Castro and his regime turn

their backs or partner with drug traffickers as huge quantities of

deadly drugs transit to our shores? As heroin and cocaine pour out

of Colombia we know traffickers use island nations such as Cuba,

Haiti, Jamaica and others as steppingstones to reach the streets of

our American communities.

Several months ago, Fidel Castro called for American assistance

and cooperation to stem the Caribbean drug trade. Today’s hearing

should help us determine whether Cuba and its leaders are a

friend or foe in a battlefield that stretches across the Western

hemisphere.

Finally, in addition to Cuba, I am very deeply troubled by reports

of drug transiting and official corruption in Haiti and among Haitian officials who may be dealing with illegal narcotics trafficking.

This is particularly troubling after the United States has spent billions of taxpayer dollars in a nation building and judicial institution reform effort in that country.

It is bad enough to have our adversaries demean us, let alone

have those who we have taken under our wings now betray us.

We have a very serious Federal obligation to stop illegal narcotics, both at their source and to interdict those drugs prior to the

drugs reaching our shores.

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With thousands of our American citizens dead, in prisons or with

their lives and families destroyed, we must pursue each and every

one of the violators and bring this mounting problem under control.

This hearing can hopefully help us achieve that goal and help us

obtain answers to very serious and troubling questions concerning

Cuba’s role in international narcotics trafficking.

With those comments, I am pleased to recognize the gentlelady

from Hawaii, our ranking member, Mrs. Mink.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in welcoming our distinguished panelists and look forward to their comments on this issue.

I think it is important from our perspective on the minority side

to be perfectly clear on what exactly we are examining today. We

need to be clear about what the majors list is and is not. The majors list is the annual list of major drug producing or drug trafficking countries which is used as the basis of certification. The majors

list is a compilation of countries which have been responsible for

the presence of illicit narcotics on American streets through either

major drug producing or drug transit activities.

The majors list is not a way to express official approval or disapproval of a country, its policies or practices. Exclusion from the

majors list does not mean that the country does not raise some concerns nor does exclusion mean the United States can or should abdicate its role of monitoring drug activity in, around and through

that country.

Inclusion on the majors list is a statement that the available information indicates that a country has met the statutory definition

regarding the amount of drugs that are grown, harvested or transported through a country and are headed for the United States. If

a country meets the statutory criteria, it must be placed on the majors list. The State Department, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the

Office of National Drug Control Policy, the agencies that advise the

President on the composition of the majors list, have all determined

that Cuba does not meet the statutory criteria.

Even if Cuba did meet the statutory requirement, what could the

United States do? Countries that are placed on the majors list are

denied 50 percent of their current U.S. assistance, except humanitarian or counternarcotics aid, until a certification decision is

made. Because Cuba does not receive any U.S. assistance, a majors

list designation could have no practical effect.

I am very much interested in what the witnesses and the panels

will be contributing to our understanding of this issue, and I would

hope that at the end of these hearings we will have a better understanding of the administration’s decision and the basis upon which

it was made.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady.

Now, I would like to recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Ms.

Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and

thank you for the witnesses and panelists who will be appearing

before us.

Today, I assume that we will be hearing from Clinton administration witnesses—I have read some of their statements—who will

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state that there is no evidence that Castro is involved with drug

trafficking, that he has made strong statements against drugs and

that he fights corruption. And because this administration has a

political agenda which is to establish and normalize relations with

Castro and also to undermine our U.S. embargo, in order to do this,

we have got to say that up is down and down is up.

Cuba is a totalitarian police state, we all know that, and do we

really honestly think that someone could be involved with drugs in

Cuba and Castro not know this is going on? He not only knows, but

is part of this illegal operation. He allows the fast boats of the drug

traffickers to go into Cuban waters, and these boats go into Cuban

waters to avoid and evade our United States agents who are fighting a strong battle against drugs. There has been continuous video

footage, as shot by Miami television stations, showing these fast

boats going into Cuba waters.

The only time that Castro brings up drug charges against other

officials in Cuba is when the dictator is not given his share of the

cut, or when a military official becomes too popular. Then some

trumped-up drug charges will be brought up against those officials.

Castro is clearly part of the problem. He is not the solution. But,

after all, this administration sent United States Chamber of Commerce officials to Cuba to talk to those hordes of nonexistent small

businessmen in Cuba, to talk to the Cuban Chamber of Commerce,

as if there is such a thing, as if there are small businesses in Cuba

and a Cuban Chamber of Commerce. And if you are naive enough

to believe that, then I guess you could believe that Castro is not

involved in drug trafficking. It fits the pattern very well.

And Castro, by the way, also says that he has no political prisoners. Castro says he is not a dictator. And, of course, the jails are

full of political opposition leaders, and it is actually illegal in Cuba

to have any other political party except the Communist party to operate in Cuba. There is no freedom of expression, and I suppose

that we should believe Castro when he says that all is well in Cuba

as well.

As we know, there is a Federal indictment, a draft indictment

since 1993 that implicated and could have indicted Raul Castro in

cocaine smuggling, and nothing has been done about that evidence

since that time. The transit of drugs in Cuban airspace and in waters is well known. As we know, Castro shot down small planes of

Brothers to the Rescue and killed three innocent U.S. citizens and

one U.S. resident who were in international airspace on a humanitarian mission. Yet we are to believe that Castro’s air force is unable to control their airspace when it comes to drug trafficking.

That is ridiculous.

Castro certainly had no resource problem when it comes to murdering U.S. citizens on a humanitarian mission. Yet we are to believe that he is unable to stop drug trafficking in his airspace now.

Now, we have even more evidence of Castro’s complicity with the

drug trade, tons and tons of pure cocaine headed to Cuba. Oh, but

Castro did not know—I forgot—he does not know what is going on

in Cuba. He wants to cooperate with the United States on drug

trade.

And this is not just naive. It is dangerous. It endangers our

young people for us to believe that Castro is a willing partner in

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stamping out drugs. In treating Castro as a cooperative agent, this

could mean that the United States will look the other way when

faced with even more clear evidence of Castro’s involvement in trafficking, which would mean then more drugs coming to the United

States. It is not naive. It is dangerous for us to assume this position.

Will we actually be sharing information with Castro? The answer

today is no. But tomorrow, when we are willing to look the other

way and say that up is down and down is up, I fear the worst. And

this tyrant who tells us that all is well in Cuba, who will sign any

document saying that he is for freedom and human rights and democracy and yet will accomplish nothing, he has never lived up to

any international agreement he has signed with any country. Why

would we think that he is now going to be a willing partner in

fighting drug trafficking in the United States? Do we not have

enough drugs in our country that we really need to say that Castro

is going to be our partner? I think it is ludicrous, it is a shame,

and it is dangerous.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady, and I now will recognize the

gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Schakowsky.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just briefly, let me say that this is a narrowly crafted hearing,

I hope, that deals with the possible role in illegal narcotics trafficking, and the involvement of Cuba. Not a general hearing about

Cuba and its politics, and its relationship to the United States. I

trust that the information that we will be hearing will not be relying simply on statements by the Cuban Government, but will be a

reflection of investigations on the part of our intelligence operations, and we should evaluate them based on our confidence in the

kinds of work that they are able to do and in the reports now from

our distinguished colleagues who will be making presentations.

So I look forward to all of the testimony. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Gentleman from California, Mr. Ose. No statement.

Gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner. No statement.

Gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

thank you for holding this hearing.

In July of this year, a member of my staff traveled to visit the

Coast Guard’s Seventh District which covers southern Florida and

the Caribbean, and she had an opportunity to interact with members of the Coast Guard Cutter Cushing. The members of the Coast

Guard are our first line of defense against the inflow of drugs via

the Caribbean. These men and women are hardworking, underpaid,

and an indispensable component of our counternarcotics efforts.

Upon my staff member’s return, one of the issues she expressed

to me was the frustration members of the Coast Guard had when

chasing drug traffickers. The traffickers will ‘‘cross the line’’ from

international waters into Cuban territory because they know that

the U.S. Coast Guard can’t get them.

Mr. Chairman, the flow of illegal drugs through the Caribbean

region cannot be stopped without cooperation from the Government

of Cuba. Currently, there is no bilateral agreement between the

United States and Cuba. Although our two countries continue to

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exchange drug-related law enforcement information on a case-bycase basis, I strongly believe that increasing our cooperation will

assist in our fight against illegal drug trafficking.

As such, I am a cosponsor of H.R. 2365, sponsored by Representative Charlie Rangel of New York, which authorizes the Director

of the Office of National Drug Control Policy to enter into negotiations with representatives of the Government of Cuba to provide

for increased cooperation between Cuba and the United States on

drug interdiction efforts. The Government of Cuba is a party to the

1988 U.N. convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and

psychotropic substances. It has expressed its desire to expand cooperation with the United States on drug interdiction efforts. At

the very least, we should discuss this issue.

Representatives Ben Gilman and Dan Burton have introduced

H.R. 2422, which provides for the determination that Cuba is a

major drug transit country and would subject the country to annual certification procedures. On November 10, 1999, the President

issued a memorandum that included the list of major drug producing or transit countries. Cuba was not on the list. The memo stated

that the United States will continue to keep trafficking in the area

under close observation and will add Cuba to the majors list if the

evidence warrants it. I emphasize—if the evidence warrants.

At this time, according to the State Department and the President, evidence does not warrant such a determination. At a news

conference on November 4th, General McCaffrey, who we all respect greatly, stated that there was little reason to believe that the

Cuban Government was complicit in allowing Colombian cocaine

and heroin to move to the United States through Cuban territory,

airspace or seas. Moreover, including Cuba on the majors list would

have no practical significance since Cuba neither receives United

States aid nor has any bilateral agreement with the United States.

Again, I strongly believe that we should increase our cooperation

with Cuba on drug interdiction. However, I will give full consideration to all testimony provided today.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

We are going to go ahead and proceed with our first panel at this

time. Our first panel consists of two individuals well-known to the

committee and the Congress, Chairman Ben Gilman, who is chairman of the House International Relations Committee, and Chairman Dan Burton. Of course, Mr. Burton is the chairman of our full

House Government Reform Committee.

I see Mr. Kevin Long, who is also one of our professional staffers,

who has worked with the chairman and with our subcommittee on

this issue. And also I see behind Mr. Gilman Mr. John Mackey,

who has spent a credible amount of time, a number of years, reviewing drug policy and drug trafficking.

So I welcome the two distinguished chairs and staff.

What we will do at this time, if we may, is recognize Chairman

Burton, chairman of our full committee, first.

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STATEMENT OF HON. DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Chairman Mica; and I want

to congratulate you and your committee for holding this hearing on

Fidel Castro’s what I believe to be long-standing participation in

international drug trafficking.

Unfortunately for the American people, President Clinton has

chosen to ignore the facts and proceed down the trail of normalization with the murderous drug-running Castro dictatorship. Just

last week, President Clinton refused to put Cuba on the majors list

of drug transiting countries that substantially impact the United

States. This is a decision that is clearly rooted, in my opinion, in

politics rather than determined by the facts.

The stained foreign policy legacy of this administration has never

been more evident. Clearly, the Clinton administration has turned

its back to American children in order to normalize relations with

a brutal dictator who is flooding American streets and schoolyards

with deadly drugs, all the while lining his pockets and his administration in Cuba with illicit drug money. The Clinton legacy will be

an entire generation of Americans subjected to dramatically increased drug use, as well as record numbers of drug addicts and

overdose deaths.

This has already happened in places like Baltimore where 1 in

17 citizens is addicted to heroin according to the DEA, 1 out of 17.

In August our Government Reform colleague, Mr. Cummings, who

just left—I wish he was still here—told us of the devastating impact this had on his district in Baltimore. Other places like Chairman Mica’s District in Orlando where over 50 people have died of

heroin overdoses this year, and many of them teenagers, have suffered needlessly while the administration has been asleep at the

switch.

All one needs is common sense to see that Fidel Castro’s regime

has resorted to drug trafficking to fund his sagging economy. It is

clear to those who have followed Cuba as closely as I have that his

brutal dictatorship is in dire straits since the collapse of the Soviet

Union and the subsidies that it provided to Cuba. Further, the

Helms-Burton embargo has Castro’s dictatorship strapped for hard

currency. And this begs the question, where has Castro turned to

subsidize this loss of money? In my opinion, he has turned to drug

trafficking and quite possibly money laundering to prop up his

Communist regime.

There is an abundance of evidence that Castro’s regime is involved in drug trafficking. My staff has conducted nearly a yearlong investigation into one particular shipment of drugs seized by

the Colombian National Police last December. This investigation

has shown the Cuban Government was the primary principal behind this shipment of drugs, destined for Havana before it was

seized. We believe this shipment may have been heading for the

United States through Mexico after it got to Cuba. And some of my

colleagues have asked, are they a major drug transiting country?

This 7.2 ton shipment worth $1,500 million belonging to the Cuban

Government was seized in six containers and was to be transported

to Cuba by a Cuban Government-owned shipping company and was

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to be opened only in the presence of Cuban Government Customs

agents.

Fidel Castro has alleged that two Spanish businessmen who

were minority partners in the joint venture were responsible for

this shipment. Castro also said that since these two were from

Spain, the shipment must have been going to Spain.

A perfect setup by a notorious lying dictator. In reality, the

Cuban—and I hope my colleagues understand—in reality, the

Cuban Ministry of Interior, which is the equivalent of our CIA, the

Cuban intelligence service, assigned two agents to run this company under the Cuban Ministry of Light Industry. It was an operation that proceeded only under the strict control of the Ministry

of the Interior, including the order of materials in this particular

shipment. The two Interior agents were very upset that this shipment was twice delayed in Colombia, and they even phoned one of

the Spanish businessmen to ask when it would be delivered. After

the seizure in Colombia, when the Cuban authorities could have

detained the other Spaniard, they sent him back to Spain with a

gift for his sick wife without detaining or questioning him about

the seizure.

Surprisingly, our government has taken Castro’s word on the

destination of this shipment without question. And the White

House just the other day once again said it was destined to Spain,

and we hope to refute that in our statement here. This is the

uncorroborated evidence the DEA will speak of here today. The bottom line is the White House chose to take Castro’s story without

a shred of evidence and base their assumptions and Cuba’s exclusion from the majors list on Castro’s word, on a Communist dictator’s word and nothing else.

In a letter to Chairman Gilman and myself, the State Department spoke for the DEA saying this shipment was headed for

Spain, and we have a copy of the letter up there. The DEA had not

cleared that letter, and in a letter the DEA sent back to State, they

said there was no corroborated evidence that this shipment was

headed for Spain. And I had the head of the DEA and others from

the DEA in my office and we grilled them very thoroughly about

whether or not this shipment was headed for Spain, and they said

there was no indication whatsoever that it was headed for Spain

and that the officer who had made some comments to State Department was misquoted. And we have gone into that in some detail.

There is also the letter from the DEA to the State Department

pointing out thoroughly that there was no indication that this shipment was headed to Spain. The DEA then confirmed to me that it

was investigating whether or not there was a Mexican connection,

and we have that letter up there as well.

We all know DEA statistics show that 60 percent of all hard

drugs in the United States enter through Mexico. Today, the DEA

will reconfirm it has no evidence this shipment was destined for

Spain despite President Clinton’s assertion to the contrary in a November letter to Chairman Gilman, and just last week one of his

assistant press secretaries made the same statement, which is totally false.

My investigators interviewed one of the accused businessmen, a

Mr. Jose Herrera in Spain, just recently. I sent two of my invesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:25 Dec 18, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66464.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
9

tigators over there. They found him informative and even willing

to submit to a polygraph test to be administered by the Drug Enforcement Agency. Before the interview, the DEA said they were

unable to get in contact with Mr. Herrera but wanted to interview

him and polygraph him. And my question to the DEA is, if my staff

could find him and interview him, why in the world had the DEA

not already done it? And I hope that some of my colleagues—and

if you don’t ask them, I will when we come to the questioning—

said they couldn’t find this guy and they couldn’t question him, and

couldn’t polygraph him. He told our investigators he would be

polygraphed by the DEA and he would be willing to swear under

oath that he had nothing to do with the drugs going into Cuba and

that it was all done by the Cuban Government and Castro himself.

Since the interview, the DEA has not polygraphed Mr. Herrera

and has not even made contact with him. Why? Is it because the

Clinton administration is afraid this man is telling the truth and

Fidel Castro is involved with drug trafficking? This interview produced hundreds of potential leads for the DEA to followup on, and

yet they haven’t even talked to him. My staff has received assurances from the DEA that they are in fact doing that, and I hope

Mr. Ledwith will confirm this is the case when he answers my

questions later on, along with other members of the committee.

This is not the only case that can be made that the Castro regime is neck deep in drug trafficking. It has been reported that

since the early 1990’s the U.S. attorney in Miami has had, as my

colleague Ms. Ros-Lehtinen has said, a draft indictment for drug

trafficking ready to go against Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother, who is

very high in the administration down there.

Under pressure from Janet Reno and the Department of Justice

in Washington, the indictment has been put on the shelf since its

drafting. This Justice Department has chosen not to pursue it.

Once again, we ask why? Is it because the Clinton administration

is so tilted toward normalizing relations with Cuba that it does not

want to deal with the allegation of drug trafficking by Castro’s

Cuba? Unfortunately, this seems like the logical conclusion.

Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me for a minute, I would like

to show a DEA surveillance video to all my colleagues, which shows

a drug trafficker bragging about faking an emergency landing in

Cuba to drop off a load of dope, then getting the royal treatment

from the Cuban Government. He was even given a false repair document for his plane, which permitted him to enter the United

States after he left Cuba. Now, get that, he landed in Cuba saying

he had plane trouble, he dropped off a load of narcotics, he was

treated royally, and given false documents saying that the plane

was repaired because there were plane troubles, and then he flew

to the United States with impunity. This is a fact. Listen to what

the man has to say.

[Video played.]

Mr. BURTON. I know that the sound quality was very bad, but

for the members who may have any doubts, we will be happy to

have you to listen to that more closely in a confined area so that

you can hear the words very clearly. But the fact is, the man landed in Cuba, dropped off the drugs, said he had plane trouble, they

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gave him phony documents saying the plane was repaired, and he

flew on to the United States.

I was provided with this tape only after threatening the DEA

with a subpoena. They wouldn’t give it to us voluntarily. And, once

again, I want the DEA to explain why they are so reluctant to let

the Congress of the United States know about things like this, but

they did give it to us after we threatened them with a subpoena.

Well, that seems pretty convincing to me but not to the Clinton

administration, which has repeatedly claimed there is no evidence

of Cuban Government involvement in drug trafficking. My good

friend Bob Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat, has said, ‘‘in a

country where every human rights activist, political dissident, and

journalist is followed, that narcotic traffickers can meet without the

Cuban Secret Police knowing is a tale from Alice in Wonderland,’’

and I agree with him.

Castro knows, through his block captain system and his secret

police, everything that is going on in Cuba. If somebody complains

about politics in Cuba, someone in the block knows about it, and

those people become political prisoners and go to jail. So it’s inconceivable that drugs can be coming in and out of Cuba with him

knowing about it or being involved. It is impossible to believe anyone could move that much cocaine through Cuba without his

knowledge or at least his willingness to turn a blind eye to the

movement in exchange for some of the profit.

The Clinton administration has argued that Cuba does not have

the capacity to respond to drug plane overflights or boats entering

its territorial waters. That claim is absolutely hollow and ridiculous. Castro has shown his ability to lethally respond to innocent

civilians in the past. As Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen has mentioned, Castro scrambled his MiGs in 1996 to shoot down two unarmed civilian planes in international airspace. American fighter

planes were left on the ground and their engines were shut down

while Americans were being murdered by Castro’s warplanes, and

that put the administration in a very uncomfortable position. The

President ultimately was forced to sign the Helms-Burton embargo

as a response, which he did not want to do. He had told me personally, and told others, that he was going to veto it a number of

times. It wasn’t until those innocent Americans were shut down

that he felt the political pressure and did sign the bill.

Castro has also sent his navy to murder nearly 100 innocent

women and children in one incident when it rammed the 13th of

March tugboat and then used fire hoses to flood the deck and sink

the boat and drown those women and kids. These were innocent

refugees merely fleeing the oppression of his brutal dictatorship. So

if he can find those women and kids on a boat, don’t tell me he

can’t find drugs coming in and out of his territorial waters. He

knows everything that is going on down there.

What this shows is that Castro has the capacity to respond to

boats and planes if he so chooses. Apparently, Castro feels more

threatened by innocent women and children telling the world the

truth about his dictatorship than he does by allowing drug traffickers to use Cuba as a syringe for injecting drugs into American

streets and schoolyards.

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My good friend Senator Robert Torricelli, chairman of the Democrat Senatorial Committee, recently said, ‘‘the regular use of Cuban

airspace and the tracking of drugs through Cuba make it clear

Cuba belongs on the majors list. Any decision not to place Cuba on

the list would be for purely political reasons.’’

This is one of the Democrat leaders in the U.S. Senate.

I also agree, it is purely political. The Clinton administration is

now in the ironic position of defending Fidel Castro’s illicit activities. What the Clinton administration does not realize or chooses

to ignore is that by not placing Cuba on the majors list it has, in

effect, become an accomplice to Castro’s activities. President Clinton is now complicit with every ounce of cocaine which goes

through Cuba and ends up on the streets of Chicago, Indianapolis,

Baltimore and New York.

President Clinton’s decision will impact an entire generation of

American children. Even worse is that President Clinton made this

decision based on his desire to normalize relations with Fidel Castro, shameless even to many of his fellow Democrats, like Senator

Torricelli and Representative Menendez. The Clinton administration needs to be held accountable for this inaction.

And I would like to end by saying what some people have said,

why should they be put on the majors list because we can’t really

do anything to them? The reason they need to be put on the majors

list is because they are working with Colombia. The FARC guerrillas down there are in league with Castro. The Marxist FARC guerrillas down there who are working with the drug cartel and bringing billions of dollars worth of drugs in this country through many

avenues, are working with Fidel Castro, and so there is a cabal

down there involving Fidel Castro and the FARC guerrillas and

others.

And one of the things that really concerns me and should concern

every Member of Congress and every American is that General

McCaffrey has said that there is a major problem in Colombia right

now that works with Castro. And the administration was supposed

to get, according to McCaffrey, $1 billion in assistance down there

to help fight the FARC guerrillas and help the Colombia National

Police win that war. Chairman Gilman and myself and Speaker

Hastert had to fight for 2 years to get three Blackhawk helicopters

and three Hueys down there, and McCaffrey has now seen the

light. The President of Colombia has said that they need $3 billion

to fight this drug war, and the administration has put absolutely

nothing, zero, in their budget to deal with this.

Now, the reason I bring this up—and I am closing, Mr. Chairman—is that they are running those drugs through Cuba. We did

not put them on the majors list, and we are not doing anything

about the FARC guerrillas and the drug cartel in Colombia that is

working in concert with Fidel Castro. So this administration is

asleep at the switch. I am very sorry about that. And at least we

have made the American people, through this hearing today, a little bit more aware of the situation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I thank the chairman for his testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Mr. Gilman, we do have a vote on, but I think you

have about 8 minutes.

Mr. GILMAN. I will try to be brief.

Mr. MICA. We will have another bell warning but you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank our

committee for coming together on this important issue. I am

pleased to appear with my colleague, Chairman Dan Burton, to address this important issue of Cuba’s links to the illicit narcotics

trade; and I want to thank your committee, Mr. Mica, for your continued diligent attention to our Nation’s drug policy; and I thank

our committee staff for their dedicated efforts in fighting drug trafficking.

Last week brought to an end an extraordinary series of events

on this important issue. It is a subject which should be of major

concern to our entire Nation. All of our communities have been ravaged by illicit drugs transiting here from other nations, through

places like Cuba.

On November 10, 1999, the President notified me by letter, as

chairman of our International Relations Committee, of his annual

determinations on the major drug source and major transit nation

list, as required by law. The President, in failing to include Cuba

on this majors list, stated, while there have been some reports that

trafficking syndicates use Cuban land territory for moving drugs,

we have yet to receive any confirmation that this traffic carries significant quantities of cocaine or heroin to the United States, close

quote.

The President’s list of November 1999 of major transit nations

included the nearby Caribbean nations of Haiti, of the Dominican

Republic, and Jamaica. The Bahamas were also included on the

President’s major transiting list.

The State Department International Narcotics Bureau, which

has the lead on preparing the recommendations for the majors list,

was apparently ignored by the President making this determination. The long overdue inclusion of Cuba as a major drug transit

nation, which significantly impacts our own Nation, is once again

subject to political considerations.

Incredibly, an official of the State Department tried to explain

away the President’s failure to include Cuba’s involvement in the

71⁄2 metric ton cocaine seizure—71⁄2 tons—we used to worry about

a few grams or a few pounds—71⁄2 tons of cocaine seized in northern Colombia last December by stating that since these multi-tons

of cocaine never reached this island nation and didn’t reach it only

because it was seized in Colombia by the police.

After weeks of ‘‘lawyer time’’ and extraordinary legal gymnastics

on whether the term ‘‘through’’ means drugs over the skies and in

the territorial waters of Cuba, we are once again witnessing a failure of Presidential leadership in the fight against illicit drugs.

Regrettably, our administration has become a cheerleader for the

Communist dictatorial regime in Havana. It has not been objective.

It has swallowed the Cuban Government’s spin, hook, line and

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sinker on illicit drugs. It has long been our understanding that the

DEA had no evidence to support the conclusion that Spain was the

ultimate destination of this 71⁄2 ton drug shipment in question.

What is amazing about this Spain destination idea is that it is

the same propaganda and misinformation that the Castro regime

in Havana has been promoting since last December. Once that

shipment of 71⁄2 tons was determined by Colombian police to be

headed for Cuba, could we have expected Castro to say it was

headed for the United States? Obviously never. He is a master of

disinformation and propaganda, especially when it comes to drugs.

The head of the Spanish National Police informed our committee

staff 2 weeks ago in Colombia that Cuba is the only destination

that they have been able to determine for this massive shipment

of Colombian cocaine, not Spain, as both Mr. Castro and Mr. Clinton allege.

A few things DEA has made clear to our committee, and it might

be worth noting these factors for the record, concerning Cuba’s

rightful inclusion on the majors list are as follows—and I will be

brief.

First, the DEA says a massive shipment of 71⁄2 metric tons of cocaine, such as this one in December, does not represent the first

time Cuba was used to transit large quantities of drugs. This route

would have been tried and tested many times before such a large

quantity of drugs were able to be passed through Cuba.

Second, the DEA also makes it clear that any organization moving such a large quantity of illicit drugs is targeting both the

United States and Europe, two of the major cocaine markets in the

world. A recent DEA case in point involved a major drug trafficking

organization that was moving large quantities of cocaine to Europe,

as well as Florida and Texas.

Until we get a thorough investigation of this 71⁄2 ton cocaine

shipment’s ultimate destination, and not distortions and propaganda from the administration along with Castro’s government, we

should give the benefit of doubt to the communities and children

of America and include Cuba on the majors list.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman follows:]

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Mr. MICA. I thank the Chairs of our two full committees for their

testimony.

We do have a vote that is under way right now. Why don’t we

recess the hearing until about 7 minutes after the vote? Then we

will reconvene. If everybody could come back, we will be able to ask

questions and proceed with this panel and then the second panel.

So this hearing stands in recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. MICA. I would like to call the subcommittee to order.

We will go ahead and seat our second panel and proceed since

we do have three witnesses on this panel, and we will have an opportunity, I guess, for some exchange between members, both Mr.

Burton and Mr. Gilman, during our regular questioning so we can

expedite these proceedings.

Our second panel today consists of Mr. Rand Beers, who is the

Assistant Secretary of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs with the Department of State. Another one of our witnesses is Mr. William E. Ledwith, the Chief of International Operations of the Drug Enforcement Agency. The third witness is Admiral Ed Barrett, he is the Director of the Joint Interagency Task

Force East.

I would like to welcome all three panelists. I think some of you

have been with us before, and we do swear in our witnesses, other

than Members of Congress, and we will do that in just a minute.

Also, if you have lengthy statements or information that you would

like to make part of the record, we will be glad to do that upon request.

With those opening comments, if you all would please stand,

raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. MICA. Witnesses answered in the affirmative.

I would like to welcome back again Mr. Beers, who is the Assistant Secretary of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs with the Department of State.

Welcome, sir, and you are recognized.

STATEMENTS OF RAND BEERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; WILLIAM E. LEDWITH,

CHIEF OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY; AND REAR ADMIRAL EDWARD J. BARRETT,

DIRECTOR, JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE EAST

Mr. BEERS. Thank you, sir, Mr. Chairman and other members of

the committee, Chairman Burton, Chairman Gilman. It’s a pleasure be here. Thank you very much for inviting me to testify today

on the issue of Cuba’s links to drug trafficking. I welcome this opportunity to discuss our assessments of Cuba’s potential as a drug

transit country and the administration’s decision to continue to

identify Cuba as a narcotics trafficking country of concern.

I assure you that we have closely scrutinized the situation in

Cuba over the past year. We reached the decision to keep it as a

country of concern rather than include it on the majors drug transit list of countries that the President sent to Congress on November 10 after a careful and exhaustive review of all available inforVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:25 Dec 18, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66464.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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mation. Much of this year’s decision is based on law enforcement

sensitive and intelligence information that, for security reasons, I

cannot discuss at this open hearing.

Mr. Chairman, along with my colleagues from DEA and JIATFEast, I would like to address your questions, and I’d be happy to

take questions after that.

Cuba has never been on the majors list since Congress enacted

this legislation in 1987. The international narcotics control community, however, has long been concerned about Cuba’s potential role

as a drug transit country, if for no other reason than that the potential is high because Cuba’s geography places it on a direct line

between the drug export centers in Colombia and many of the importation gateways in the southeast United States. The information

available to us, however, indicates that Cuba has not emerged as

a major drug transit country where narcotics trafficking would

have a significant effect on the United States despite our concerns.

The December 1998 seizure of 7.2 metric tons of cocaine from

several containers in Cartagena, Colombia, caused us to re-examine

carefully our assessment of Cuba’s potential role in the drug trade.

Information at that time indicated that the containers were to be

rerouted through Jamaica to Havana.

If we knew that such a shipment was ultimately destined for the

United States, that information would have influenced our decision

concerning Cuba’s role as a transit country.

The information we acquired about this case, however, has not

borne this out. While we cannot state with absolute certainty

where the shipment was ultimately destined, the preponderance of

information indicates that it was destined for Spain. This is the

conclusion of an all-source interagency assessment we have requested from the intelligence and law enforcement communities

about all aspects of this case. They have not changed this conclusion, even after reviewing the deposition of a suspect in this case

recently provided by congressional staff investigators in Spain. Furthermore, our information reveals no high-level Government of

Cuba complicity in this foiled smuggling operation.

We have not limited our examination of Cuba’s role in the drug

trade to this one case, however. The State Department has requested and received a series of reports about smuggling operations

in this region. The reporting shows the following.

We are unaware of significant quantities of drugs transiting

Cuba’s land mass. The drugs that do arrive in Cuba appear to be

mostly for a growing indigenous and tourist market.

We have tracked a relatively small number of suspect drug-laden

aircraft over Cuba in 1999, a total of nine through September.

None of them delivered drug shipments directly to the United

States. Most, we believe, were dropped off—dropping off their loads

in international waters to be recovered by go-fast boats. We based

this assessment mostly on the airplane flight profiles, not because

we could always confirm how many—how large a drug shipment

was on board.

We have detected an even smaller number of drug smuggling

boats, five go-fasts, using Cuba’s territorial waters in 1999. All the

boats probably originated in Jamaica, and there is no information

that they intended to be put ashore in Cuba.

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This is a much lower level of activity than we saw in 1998 when,

for instance, some 27 suspect smuggling flights crossed Cuba in the

same January to September timeframe.

We are concerned about these operations but do not believe that

they currently reflect the level and nature of activity that warrants

putting Cuba on the list of major drug transit countries. Most of

the incidents are suspected, not confirmed, drug operations. Unlike

the case in all other transit countries, traffickers appear not to be

using Cuba proper in any way to facilitate the smuggling of drug

shipments to the United States. Less than 9 tons of cocaine are estimated to have entered Cuba’s airspace and territorial seas in this

regard from January through September 1999, 60 percent less of

the estimated 15 tons that entered Cuba’s airspace and territorial

seas during the same period in 1998. Moreover, the 1999 estimate

is a fraction of what has arrived in every other transit corridor during the same period.

In short, the administration concluded that Cuba did not meet

the legislative mandated standard for a major drug transit country

that is defined in section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Let me turn next to the steps by the Cuban Government to assess this threat.

The Government of Cuba has limited, and we believe diminishing, resources to address the overflight and maritime smuggling

threats. We have seen no evidence that the government regularly

tries to intercept drug smuggling flights, and we are not encouraging or supporting them to do so. That said, we believe it is in our

interest to work more closely with Cuba in maritime interdiction

operations, including operations that disrupt the retrieval of airdropped drugs.

Cuba’s principal drug interdiction organization, the Border

Guard, appears committed to supporting maritime drug interdiction efforts when it has enough resources and information to operate effectively. For instance, the Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard have exchanged dozens of telexes this year in an attempt to identify suspect smuggling operations and make seizures.

Such exchanges resulted in at least two seizures we are aware of

by the Government of Cuba earlier this year, the seizure of a 3,300

pound marijuana suspect vessel and the arrest of three smugglers

in January; the seizure of 1,200 pounds of marijuana from a go-fast

boat in March.

Our counternarcotics objective is to facilitate drug interdiction efforts around Cuba and to prevent the island from becoming a major

drug transit center to the United States. As members of this committee are aware, we are currently exploring some modest steps to

achieve these goals.

For instance, we have proposed to the Government of Cuba that

we upgrade the current telex link between the United States Coast

Guard District Headquarters in Miami and the Cuban Border

Guard to a voice link to facilitate more timely exchanges of information. We have also proposed adding extra frequencies for safety

and security purposes over which Coast Guard and Cuban Border

Guard boats can communicate when conducting coincidental counternarcotics and search and rescue operations in the region. The

Cubans have responded favorably to these proposals, and we are

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currently examining next best steps in light of the international

and domestic laws that govern how exchanged information can be

used.

In every respect, our counternarcotics decisions regarding Cuba

are intended to comply with domestic and international laws and

our broad drug objectives in the region.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beers follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you. And we will recognize now Mr. William E.

Ledwith, who is Chief of International Operations with the Drug

Enforcement Agency. You are welcome and you are recognized, sir.

Mr. LEDWITH. Good morning, sir. Chairman Mica, Chairman

Burton, Chairman Gilman, and members of the subcommittee,

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. And as

always, thank you for your continued support of drug law enforcement.

The subcommittee today is hearing testimony in Cuba’s link to

drug trafficking. DEA’s mission is to protect American citizens from

drug traffickers by enforcing the drug laws of the United States.

A major means of accomplishing this mission is DEA’s ability to

target the command and control of the most significant international drug trafficking organizations operating in the world

today. Several of these organizations smuggle their poison into the

United States through the Caribbean. A portion of this smuggling

transits Cuban waters or airspace by virtue of its geographic proximity between the source zone countries and the United States.

The subcommittee is interested in DEA’s knowledge of any steps

taken by the Cuban Government to counter the drug trafficking

threat. This is difficult to assess because DEA has no office in Cuba

and no established liaison with Cuban law enforcement authorities.

Cuba has counternarcotics agreements with several other nations,

but no such treaties with the United States. Cuba does work occasionally on a case-by-case basis with United States law enforcement and interdiction agencies.

As a law enforcement agency, the DEA does not make recommendations whether to certify or not to certify countries for cooperation in counterdrug efforts. We do, however, annually provide

to the Attorney General factual summaries and our objective assessment of a country’s law enforcement capability to combat international drug trafficking.

As to the nature and extent of the drug threat from Cuba, Cuba

lies in a direct air and maritime path from South America to Florida. As Cuba expands its foreign trade relations, its territory will

become more vulnerable to exploitation by international criminals

seeking to establish new bases of operations for illegal activities,

including drug trafficking. Understanding these changes in trafficking trends is vital in order to take effective measures to stem

the flow of drugs.

While Cuba’s performance in interdicting narcotics has been

mixed, the Cuban Government has recently strengthened agreements with several governments, including the United Kingdom,

Italy, the Bahamas, and France, as well as the United Nations

International Drug Control Program, the UNDCP. Although Cuban

authorities, on occasion, have arrested individual drug traffickers,

historically the Cuban Government was not aggressive in responding to incursions by these traffickers into their territorial waters

and airspace. Cuba has argued that it lacks ‘‘naval means,’’ and

other resources to patrol all of its airspace and territorial waters

while at the same time it does not routinely permit United States

interdiction assets to enter its territory.

It is important to understand that much of our information regarding drug arrests and seizures by Cuban authorities has been

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gleaned through international media sources as well as other law

enforcement agencies, which is a result of not having a presence of

the DEA in Cuba. Therefore, we have no formal contacts with

Cuban authorities and we cannot independently corroborate much

of the reporting on alleged Cuban involvement in drug trafficking.

The most recent case related to Cuba is the Colombian National

Police seizure of some 7.2 metric tons of cocaine in Cartagena, Colombia, on December 3, 1998. Allow me to clarify for the subcommittee the limited extent of the information currently available

to the DEA in this case. This seizure is part of a very active investigation being aggressively conducted by the Colombian National

Police, the Spanish National Police, and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Currently, DEA has no information to suggest that the shipment

of 7.2 metric tons of cocaine was destined for the United States.

Limited and as yet uncorroborated information indicates that the

cocaine was bound for Spain. This information includes previous

bills of lading for the containers, previous movements of the merchant vessel, Cuban police examination of containers in Havana

that contained false walls, and the Cuban authorities’ seizure of

$107,000 equivalent in United States and Spanish currency in one

of the containers.

At this stage of the investigation, DEA has no evidence regarding

the final destination of the cocaine-laden containers beyond Cuba.

Our best assessment of all available information currently indicates that Spain was the most likely destination for the cocaine

shipment after it reached Cuba.

We are certain that the shipment was intended for Cuba as an

intermediary stop. At this time, DEA has no evidence indicating

that high-ranking officials in the Cuban Government were

complicit in this shipment. The drugs were well enough concealed

that Cuban officials might not have become aware of their presence

had the shipment not been seized in Cartagena.

In conclusion, DEA will continue to evaluate the challenge of

drug law enforcement posed by the constantly changing dynamics

of the international drug trade in the Caribbean. A striking feature

of the trade is the drug trafficker’s ability and resourcefulness to

respond and adapt to law enforcement operations. However, DEA

continues to develop and implement flexible responses to this

threat as evidenced by our most recent success in Operation Millennium and Columbus.

Operation Millennium targeted the heads of a major Colombian

drug trafficking network, resulting in 42 indictments, 32 arrests, of

which 31 defendants are currently awaiting extradition from Colombia to the United States in the seizure of over 13 metric tons

of cocaine. In Operation Columbus, law enforcement agencies in 15

Caribbean countries, in concert with DEA, combined to disrupt

drug trafficking in their region, resulting in over 1,200 arrests.

These operations underscored DEA’s ability to coordinate sophisticated international drug enforcement operations, resulting in the

arrests of some of the most powerful narcotics traffickers operating

in the Colombian or Caribbean Islands today. In similar fashion,

DEA continues to aggressively pursue all investigative leads arising out of bilateral investigations in Colombia and Spain regarding

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the subject seizure of 7.2 metric tons of cocaine that occurred in

Cartagena.

As always, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear

before you. I appreciate the interest that you and the subcommittee

have continuously showed in DEA and drug law enforcement. I will

gladly answer any questions that you may have, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ledwith follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you. We will hold our questions until we have

heard from our final witness, Admiral Ed Barrett, Director of the

Joint Interagency Task Force East.

You are welcomed and you are recognized, sir.

Admiral BARRETT. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members.

JIATF East was created in 1994 as a result of PDD 14, which

ordered a review of the Nation’s command, control, and intelligence

centers involved in international counterdrug operations. Our organization of approximately 300 people includes representatives from

all five military services including the U.S. Coast Guard, several

law enforcement agencies such as Customs, DEA, and FBI, and

agencies from the intel community including CIA, DIA, and NSA.

We are working hard to internationalize the drug fight and also

have several foreign liaison officers that work with us in Key West

from the U.K., the Netherlands, France, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. We work directly for General

Wilhelm, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command.

In April 1999, JIATF South from Panama was merged with

JIATF East in Key West, and we assumed responsibility for

counterdrug planning and operations for the entire Southern Command area of responsibility, which include both the source zone

and the transit zone. To date, in calendar year 1999, JIATF East

has directly supported the seizure of over 45 metric tons of cocaine

and over 3 metric tons of marijuana with a street value totaling

$681 million.

I have been asked to comment and provide information on trafficking information. If you would look at the posters to your right,

please, this data is from the Interagency Counterdrug Performance

Assessment Working Group data base, and I am talking here, first

of all, about just noncommercial air. We have seen a dramatic drop

in noncommercial air flights over Cuban airspace in the last year.

It was a major problem in 1997 and 1998, as you can see from the

statistics.

Next slide, please.

This basically shows the historical tracks that we followed from

1997 and 1998. There were many tracks over Cuba which dropped

cocaine north of Cuba right between the 12-mile territorial limit in

the international waters and then on up into the Bahamas.

Next slide, please.

This shows the change to 1999 and it is through November 15th

of this year. Basically, I think there were two things that happened

here. We had excellent end-game success north of Cuba, great cooperation between DEA of Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos

(OBAT), the Coast Guard in the Seventh District, and Customs in

Florida. Working together, we had several seizures there north of

the Cuban territorial waters. The second issue is that the drug

traffickers will take the course of least resistance, and that is currently Haiti.

Next slide, please.

I will shift now to noncommercial maritime——

Mr. MICA. Could you go back just a second? I want to make sure

that everyone sees that. Could the gentleman point out just for the

benefit of our panel, the subcommittee, Cuba. And then you just

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testified that the bulk of these flights are detected through Haiti;

is that correct?

Admiral BARRETT. That’s correct, sir.

Sir, the flights are going to Haiti, dropping drugs in Haiti or

landing in Haiti, and then returning to South America.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Admiral BARRETT. I want to talk now about noncommercial maritime, or go-fasts. We saw a marked increase in go-fast tracks in

1999, particularly originating in the Jamaica area and going up

through the Windward Passage to the Bahamas.

Next slide, please.

I did not have the information for 1997, but this gives you an

idea of where we had go-fast detections in 1998. There were a few

along the southern coast of Cuba and one along the northern coast.

Next slide, please.

Basically, after we analyzed the increase in go-fast tracks in the

Windward, the majority of those were marijuana shipments from

Jamaica up into the Bahamas. About 80 percent of the total go-fast

tracks were actually marijuana. We had seizures of two cocaine gofasts in the Windward, and, as was previously mentioned, there

were two marijuana seizures that we are aware of from the Cuban

Border Guards, and there were several loads of marijuana that

were dumped because of law enforcement assets in the Windward.

In summary, at JIATF East we have seen little indication that

cocaine traffickers are using Cuba as a transshipment point. What

we have seen is noncommercial air and maritime suspect tracks

flying over Cuba or skirting the territorial waters en route to the

Bahamas and the southeast United States.

That concludes my statement, sir. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Barrett follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Admiral, you just testified that you seized a total of 45 metric

tons of cocaine. Is that in fiscal year 1999 or is that a full year?

Admiral BARRETT. Calendar year 1999, sir.

Mr. MICA. So far?

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir, that’s correct.

Mr. MICA. So the shipment which was seized in Cartagena,

bound for Cuba, would be about 20 percent?

Admiral BARRETT. I think that occurred in 1998, sir.

Mr. MICA. I am just saying in sheer volume, 7.2 metric tons is

almost 20 percent of what you seized in 1 year; is that correct?

Admiral BARRETT. Seven tons is a very large shipment.

Mr. MICA. And I heard our DEA representative, Mr. Ledwith,

also testify—did you say that the Cuban authorities detected another container in Cuba with some drug residue and money or

something like that? I didn’t catch all of your testimony.

Mr. LEDWITH. Sir, you are correct. Subsequent examination, as

told to us through the Colombian intermediaries—we are unable to

deal directly with the Cubans—indicated that they subsequently

examined containers in Cuba after the seizure was made in

Cartagena, discovered false compartments with Spanish money and

a total of approximately $107,000 United States equivalent, as well

as some cocaine residue. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MICA. And that container was different from the one that

was seized in Cartagena?

Mr. LEDWITH. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MICA. But not linked with the same firm or linked to the

same firm?

Mr. LEDWITH. Linked to the same firm, but different from the

container seized in Cartagena. That container remained in

Cartagena.

Mr. MICA. What is particularly disturbing about the 7.2 metric

tons, which is 71⁄2 tons as we know it, is that it doesn’t appear—

first of all, like a one-time or experimental shipment. The quantity

is huge when you consider the Admiral said in an entire fiscal year

they have gotten 25 tons. That’s 25 percent of it, and you are telling me that the Cubans are saying there were other containers

that may have held significant amounts of cocaine.

Is that correct?

Mr. LEDWITH. Sir, what I am saying is there were other containers found and examined subsequently, according to Cuban officials,

that had hidden compartments in them. And one, in fact——

Mr. MICA. No cocaine, just traces?

Mr. LEDWITH. No, sir, no cocaine.

Mr. MICA. Well, again, 20 percent and we double that, you are

looking at some significant traffic.

I don’t know what you would consider major. The administration

doesn’t consider it major trafficking—whether it is going to Spain,

and we are not able to tell what its final destination was.

Mr. Ledwith, you also testified that this is an open, active case

with DEA and, I think you testified, with the Spanish National Police; is that correct?

Mr. LEDWITH. That’s correct, sir.

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Mr. MICA. Our staff, who were there recently, informed me—and

correct me if I am wrong, staff—but the Spanish National Police

considered this case closed? We have had two staffers talking with

them as recently as the last week, so that doesn’t seem to jibe.

The other thing that disturbs me is DEA says that there have

been occasional—well, actually the Department of State says there

is—Cuba does work occasionally with our law enforcement officials

and yet DEA has testified that they lack any good consistent contact with DEA or specific information on this case or other trafficking. Are you saying that—Mr. Ledwith, that again you don’t have

the sources or resources there that are reliable in Cuba?

Mr. LEDWITH. Sir, our ability to work interactively with the

Cuban authorities is exceptionally limited. What I was remarking

on, is there have been historically some occasions where we have

been able to make contact in an official capacity. Usually we would

travel to Havana, and exchange documents at the airport.

I am really referring to our ability to interact with them in the

capacity in which we interact with other police agencies from other

countries, or our ability to independently conduct investigations or

at the very least corroborate facts and circumstances by our presence in that area. We do not have that ability in Cuba.

Mr. MICA. Mrs. Mink.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you very much.

Secretary Beers, this authority given the President to examine

the recommendations by State and DEA and others with respect to

the dangers of drug trafficking to the United States was, by law,

enacted in 1986. And I am curious, since I have not really had an

opportunity to examine the history of this law with respect to what

other administrations might have done with respect to Cuba; I only

know from my staff’s notes that Cuba has never been listed on the

majors list.

Mr. BEERS. That’s correct, ma’am.

Mrs. MINK. If so, then I need to know, when was the first list

published by the administration? Was it the year following?

Mr. BEERS. 1987, ma’am.

Mrs. MINK. Now, since 1987 to the present time, do you have any

historical records as to trafficking in and out of Cuba, headed for

the United States, of any major drugs?

Mr. BEERS. There is one case which DEA could comment on that

appears to be related to that which occurred—Bill, you can speak

to that issue——

Mrs. MINK. Was that 1989? You are speaking about the 1989 incident, or is it earlier?

Mr. LEDWITH. Yes, ma’am, referring to an incident that occurred

in 1987–1988, in particular.

Mrs. MINK. Could you elaborate?

Mr. LEDWITH. This is particularly in reference to the videotape

that was shown earlier. It is an investigation in which—is that not

the case that you are referring to, ma’am?

Mrs. MINK. I just wanted to know what the history has been in

terms of the examination by either State Department or DEA or

other agencies with respect to the drug trafficking from Cuba to

the United States.

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Mr. BEERS. Other than this case, which is the only one that I am

personally aware of, the other area that has been looked at historically is drug flights over Cuba. If you go back historically and look

at that, based on the information available to me, 1999 is a relatively low period in the overall trend. The peak years were 1991

and 1992 and are double—more than double even 1998 figures in

terms of suspect overflights of Cuba by drug trafficking aircraft.

It has been an issue, it has been a concern, but it has never been

a basis for making a determination that Cuba was a drug transit

country. That is what I was referring to when I was talking about

the unique nature of this transit situation, which we all agree is

happening and is in a period now when the numbers went up in

late 1997 to a peak in 1998 and have gone back down in 1999 to

date. But even that period was lower than the peak period that I

have information about, which was 1992. It has not been used as

a basis for making this determination, and it was not again this

year.

Mrs. MINK. The basis that any administration, the current one

or previous administrations, has used in order to decide whether to

place a country on the majors list is the amount of traffic to the

United States; is that correct?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, ma’am, that’s correct.

Mrs. MINK. Is that determination based upon surveillance of

boats and air traffic, or is it based upon actual interdiction of drugs

after they have been landed and have begun to move within the

United States; or is it both?

Mr. BEERS. It is based on a series of pieces of information that

are brought to the State Department by the various sources of information which we have. DEA is one of the primary providers of

information, but not the only. The Intelligence Community is also

asked to provide information.

We look at seizures. We look at trafficking patterns. We look at

information that don’t necessarily result in seizures but would indicate trafficking patterns. We try to do the best that we can with

estimates in terms of flows, put that all together and come to a

judgment as to whether or not this significantly affects the United

States. So it is all of those things together.

In the case of Cuba this year, the examination was exhaustive.

It has been an issue and an important issue that members and individuals within the administration have been most interested in.

This is probably the most exhaustive review of the Cuban data that

has ever been done, to the best of my knowledge.

Mrs. MINK. One final question, Admiral Barrett. In your last

paragraph, you say, ‘‘In summary there is little indication to suggest that cocaine traffickers use Cuba as a transshipment point for

markets.’’

Is there any evidence at all with respect to other drug trafficking

emanating from Cuba as a transmission point to markets in the

United States? Or was your comment only limited to cocaine?

Admiral BARRETT. Ma’am, I don’t have any other information. I

was trying to specify that I am not aware over the last couple of

years of any air drops of cocaine that have been made to the land

mass of Cuba or aircraft that have landed in Cuba, from the statistics that I was showing.

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Mrs. MINK. What about marijuana?

Admiral BARRETT. The marijuana that we see is coming primarily from Jamaica up toward the Bahamas. They are using the

territorial waters of Cuba in the Windward Pass to avoid law enforcement assets.

Mrs. MINK. Now, just for the purposes of the record, exactly what

is this Joint Interagency Task Force of which you are Director? Is

that all of the military services, Coast Guard and everybody that

you are speaking for today?

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, ma’am. I am basically General Wilhelm’s,

the Commander in Chief of Southern Command’s, tactical commander for counterdrugs. So we basically have the ability in our

organization to track air and maritime targets from the source zone

in South America toward the United States.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I would now like to recognize the

gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ledwith, I have some questions for you regarding a south

Florida cocaine kingpin, Jorge Cabrera, who has worked with both

the Medellin and Cali cartels for a period of over 15 years. In one

of the many newspaper accounts of Mr. Cabrera, it says that he

was sentenced—that’s from that newspaper blowup over there

sentenced in U.S. District Court in Miami to 19 years in prison and fined $1.5

million after being convicted along with several accomplices in the transportation

of 6,000 pounds of cocaine into the United States. He was arrested by undercover

detectives who confiscated the drugs, $50,000 in cash, several boxes of illegal Cuban

cigars, and photos of Cabrera with Cuban President, Fidel Castro.

Mr. Cabrera has reportedly stated that he has given DEA and

the U.S. Justice Department investigators evidence of Cuban Government compacts with the drug trade. I have a series of questions

related to that and you may answer them as you wish.

I wanted to ask, what has the DEA done to followup on this? He

stated that the notorious Colombian Cali cartel drug kingpin Carlos Pescone was escorted aboard Mr. Cabrera’s boat in Havana

with no objection from the Cuban regime and was brought to the

United States. Do you think that the Cuban interior ministry was

aware of this, and was our State Department interested in this information?

Mr. Cabrera’s attorney, Stephen Bronis, in an October 7 letter to

Attorney General Janet Reno, has accused our government of subverting the investigation that focuses on Cuba and drug trafficking.

I would like your comment on the background of this particular

investigation. He states in his letter—and you may discuss the

credibility of it—he says that Cabrera described in detail his trips

to Colombia—and Mr. Pescone, related to that, to Colombia and

Cuba—in the planning of freighter loads of cocaine using Cuba as

the point of discharge. Related to this case of Mr. Cabrera, he had

repeatedly talked about how the Cuban coast guard would look the

other way.

Are you familiar with this case and if you would care to comment

on Cabrera’s assertion about the Cuban involvement in drugs?

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Mr. LEDWITH. Ma’am, I am not personally familiar with that investigation on a basis to be able to discuss it in great detail with

you at this moment. I would be happy to respond in writing.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I would like that response in writing.

Mr. LEDWITH. I would be happy to do so, ma’am.

I would say that we look at—and within DEA we are apolitical,

and we look at every single indication that we possibly can. I can

assure you that these allegations would be given serious consideration within DEA.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Beers, if you would comment on this

case?

Mr. BEERS. I am not in a position to comment in detail, but we

would also seek to get to the bottom or support the DEA or the law

enforcement investigative body providing any kind of information

suggesting the involvement of senior government officials or any

government officials of any government anywhere in the world. We

are interested in that also.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If I could ask Rear Admiral Barrett about

the go-fast. In my opening statement, I had stated that there were

various Miami television stations that had filmed the go-fast boats

of the drug traffickers entering into Cuban waters that would not

allow us to go into those waters to escape intersection. What opinions do you have about this? Have you seen such footage, and do

you think that is something that you would care to followup on and

investigate?

Admiral BARRETT. Ma’am, we have had mixed response from the

Cuban Border Guard. As Mr. Beers said earlier, the Coast Guard

in Miami has a telex to the Cuban Border Guard.

I do not have any direct links to the Cuban Border Guard. As

an operational commander, the best way for us to track suspect

targets and to have an endgame is to work op center to op center.

I can’t do that with Cuba. So basically, we pass the information to

the Coast Guard in Miami and they pass it to the Cuban Border

Guard via telex.

We have had mixed results from the Cuban Border Guard. Along

the northern border, we have seen very little response; along the

southeast border, we have seen fairly good response. I think about

75 percent of the go-fast tracks that were identified to the Cuban

Border Guard were responded to. They didn’t seize them. Generally

what would happen is, they would get underway and the go-fast

would run back into international waters. We have never seen a response from the Cuban Government on the air tracks flying over

Cuba.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Beers, I had a question related to your

statement. You said, ‘‘We have seen no evidence that the Cuban

Government regularly tries to intercept drug smuggling flights and

we are not encouraging them or supporting them to do so.’’

Our intention to establish this cooperative link with Castro, it

would be for them to intercept drug smuggling flights?

Mr. BEERS. No, ma’am, to intercept the drops. It is to deal with

the interdiction in the maritime arena. That would be the focus of

our effort.

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And the reason for that is because we believe

that he is not part of the air drops? He does not have any knowledge in his government, in his regime—— Mr. BEERS. No, ma’am. We have very special circumstances that

restrict the degree to which we are in a position to directly assist

any government in the aerial intercept of aircraft. Cuba does not

meet those specifications. Only two countries, Peru and Colombia,

meet the requirements of the law that allow us to cooperate directly to interdict aircraft in the air.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Now, what kind of information would we be

sharing with Castro related to any kind of smuggling operation

around Cuba?

Mr. BEERS. The intention, as I have said before, would be to

focus that information on maritime intercepts by the Cuban forces

in conjunction with the Coast Guard, information that the Coast

Guard Seventh District headquarters would provide to them. I am

not in a position at this point in time to tell you specifically what

kinds of information would actually be shared with them because

those final decisions have not been made yet.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Are you aware of any international agreement that Castro has complied with that he has signed in his 41

years of ruling over Cuba?

Mr. BEERS. I am not a Cuba expert. I am not in a position to

make that judgment.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. I recognize Mr. Gilman at this time. He has another

obligation.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will try to be brief.

Mr. Beers, did INL recommend that Mexico be on the majors

list?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, as a matter of fact, it is the administration—individuals who participate in the process are part of the administration as a whole. And I, sir, with all due respect, am not in a position to confirm what INL’s position was, or was not, on any of the

countries with respect to the majors list.

Mr. GILMAN. The newspaper, the Post, I believe, said on November 11 that ‘‘The U.S. officials speaking in background said the

State Department felt Cuba should be on the list, but the White

House disagreed.’’ [The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. BEERS. Sir, I am not in a position to confirm or deny that

statement. And I was not the U.S. official.

Mr. GILMAN. How do you resolve, Mr. Beers, the fact that Cuba

was left off the majors list this year with General McCaffrey’s

statement that ‘‘The intelligence and law enforcement communities

reported that detected drug overflights of Cuba, although still not

as numerous as in other parts of the Caribbean, increased by almost 50 percent last year?’’ Mr. BEERS. Sir, General McCaffrey could only have been referring to 1998 information compared to 1997 information. But it

was——

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Beers, it was a major increase over the last

year, was it not?

Mr. BEERS. The 1999 information, which we have now, does not

represent an increase. They represent a decrease.

Mr. GILMAN. Over last year?

Mr. BEERS. Calendar year 1999 information, based on the information available to me, indicates that there were 14 incidents, 9

of which were air, over this past calendar year.

Mr. GILMAN. So General McCaffrey is wrong; is that right?

Mr. BEERS. As I said, sir, I believe General McCaffrey’s comparison was the data in 1998 to the data in 1997, not the data in 1999

to the data in 1998.

Mr. GILMAN. As far as you are concerned, there has been no increase in air traffic over Cuba in the last year?

Mr. BEERS. Not this year, sir, no.

Mr. GILMAN. Chief Ledwith, would you explain the DEA’s position on a theory that this 7.2 metric ton cocaine shipment was

headed for Spain when the Spanish officials tell us that it was destined for Cuba?

Mr. LEDWITH. As I mentioned earlier, sir, we have

uncorroborated information at this point that would indicate that

it was headed to Spain. As I mentioned in my original

testimony——

Mr. GILMAN. Have you spoken or have your people spoken to the

head of the Spanish police with regard to this?

Mr. LEDWITH. I know we have interaction from our office in

Spain, with the Spanish police on several levels. I do not know if

they have spoken to the head of the Spanish police. I can’t say with

certainty.

Mr. GILMAN. It’s been long reported there is a draft U.S. drug

trafficking indictment hanging over Raul Castro. Could you shed

some light on this issue and where it stands?

Mr. LEDWITH. I would not be able to comment on that, sir. I really don’t know.

Mr. GILMAN. Admiral Barrett, according to Drug Czar McCaffrey,

as I stated before, the intelligence and law enforcement communities report that detected drug overflights in Cuba, although not

as numerous as in other parts of the Caribbean, increased by almost 50 percent in the last year or two. Do you agree with that

assessment?

Admiral BARRETT. No, sir. The statistics, as I showed in my

tracking information, say there was a major increase between 1997

and 1998, but in 1999 there has been a significant drop-off.

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Mr. GILMAN. Can you describe the volume of the drug trafficking

that transits between northeast Cuba and Haiti? Do you think that

the Cuban and Haitian Governments aggressively target the drug

trafficking between those two countries?

Admiral BARRETT. Sir, the information that I have is that Haiti

is a major problem area for transshipment. I have no information

that there are any drugs going from Haiti to Cuba or from Cuba

to Haiti. My information is that once it gets into Haiti, it comes

up into the Bahamas or to the southeast United States.

Mr. GILMAN. Admiral, one other question. Can you explain the

tactics, the strategy they are using of drug air drops into or near

the Cuban waters? Just how prevalent is that method of delivery

today?

Admiral BARRETT. Sir, that was a major problem in 1997 and

1998. As I said earlier, there was a coordinated effort by our organization working with DEA and OBAT with their assets, the Coast

Guard in the Seventh District out of Miami, and Customs in Florida to put additional assets in the area north of Cuban territories.

Every time we had an air track headed toward Cuba, we would put

air assets out to monitor what boats, particularly go-fasts, there

were sitting either in international waters or in the territorial waters of Cuba waiting for the drop. We were successful with several

seizures in that area, and I think that is one reason that we have

seen a drop-off with the flights over Cuba.

Mr. GILMAN. Admiral, was there any substantial number of air

drops in and around those waters?

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir. For 1997 and 1998, it was a total of

60 overflights of Cuba and drops either north of Cuba or the flights

would continue up to the Bahamas.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request

that the Washington Times article of November 11 with a headline

of ‘‘Havana Left Off U.S. Drug Majors List and White House Sees

No Clear Evidence of Trafficking on the Island’’ be made part of

the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to go

out of order.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. MICA. The gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Schakowsky, is recognized.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Rather dramatic,

and I would say inflammatory accusations were leveled at the

President by the chairman of this full committee, that President

Clinton is now complicit with every ounce of cocaine which goes to

Cuba and ends up on the streets of Chicago, Indianapolis, Baltimore, and New York.

What I wanted to get at was what exactly is the difference, how

the United States in terms of our drug enforcement investigations

of tracking differs between a country of concern versus one of the

majors?

Mr. LEDWITH. To DEA, it doesn’t—there is no difference. Any

country that is involved in drug trafficking that affects the United

States, be it on the majors list or listed as a country of concern or

not listed at all, would get the same degree of interest and scrutiny

from DEA. We are not particularly interested in the majors versus

the nonmajors. If they are shipping drugs to the United States, we

are interested.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So essentially—correct me if I’m wrong—the

difference is in terms of the amount of aid that we might give to

a country, which is irrelevant in this case because we don’t give

any aid, what are the differences that might—do you look at that

activity less than you would?

Again, let me try to pin that down if there is anything more specific.

Mr. LEDWITH. To DEA, it is not an issue. We are not overly concerned with majors list or the countries of concern or countries that

are not listed. Our interest is specifically in any country that is facilitating drugs entering the United States. It may be of political

interest or of interest to other agencies within the U.S. Government, certainly appropriately so, but to DEA it is not an issue.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Presented—I am not quite sure, so I could certainly be corrected—as some kind of incontrovertible evidence of

drug trafficking was a video of an individual that—it sounded to

me was a pilot involved in drug trafficking. Now, this was presented as absolute fact. I wonder what we know about that individual and why we should accept as absolute truth the words of someone that, I thought anyway, was someone involved in drug trafficking who might have a reason to give self-serving testimony.

Mr. LEDWITH. The person involved in that tape is a drug trafficker. He was significantly involved in drug trafficking in the

United States, who made those claims. The person was provided

with the opportunity to take a polygraph test; it was permitted to

do so, and there was no deception indicated as a result of that test.

We do not regard this as absolute proof of anything. A polygraph

test is not admissible in court. However, it is one of many indicators that would cause us to examine that person’s allegations more

closely.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Are you saying that the statements he made

on the tape were true?

Mr. LEDWITH. I am not a polygraph expert, but the results of the

polygraph examination indicated that he believed that those statements were true.

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Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. How did you then followup with the information? How did the DEA then followup with that information?

Mr. LEDWITH. DEA conducted an investigation. These people

were ultimately sentenced and went to prison in the United States.

I am not prepared at this moment to discuss the intricate details

of that particular allegation, I am not that familiar with it. I would

be happy to respond to you, but I can assure you that we would

have further attempted to investigate those claims.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. The concern here today, of course, is really

only the involvement with Cuba. That’s the portion that I would be

interested in. Is there any comment that you could make on that?

Mr. LEDWITH. I do not think there is any country in which drug

traffickers with their interruptive potential and influence could not

cause certain things to happen. I would never, as a matter of policy, rule out any allegation that a drug trafficker makes. We pay

attention to all of them because in many cases they have proved

to be accurate.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Let me ask one final question. There was also

a concern that the United States failed to followup on Mr. Herrera

the White House chose to take Castro’s story without a shred of

evidence, and then there was a Mr. Herrera that did testify to this

investigating committee, but the DEA said they were unable to get

in contact with Mr. Herrera but wanted to interview him and polygraph him. Why is it that he seemed to be fairly readily—I am sure

there was a lot of investigative work—readily available to the staff

of the committee and not available to the DEA?

Mr. LEDWITH. It would not be accurate to represent that we

could not find this gentleman, No. 1. We were able to find this gentleman if we chose to, and we knew where this person was. It is

accurate to say that we did not interview this person and it is accurate to say that we did not provide this person with the polygraph

examination. There are certain investigative strategies in a criminal investigation and this investigation remains open and ongoing

in parallel areas. I can only discuss at this point that we were unable to do that at that time.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

I would now like to recognize Chairman Burton.

Mr. BURTON. It is pretty significant that a country that is involved in drug trafficking is not put on the majors list, and since

there was a witness in Spain that had evidence that would bear

directly on a possible decision of this type made by the President

of the United States, why in the world wouldn’t you have gotten

to him right away? We did.

Mr. LEDWITH. Sir, I am unable to comment appropriately in this

forum, but there are reasons.

Mr. BURTON. I would be very happy if you would come to my office and tell me why. We are cleared for Top Secret. I had Mr.

Toms in my office, and we went into this in great detail, a lot of

this stuff. And for you guys to come up here and say, well, there

is some reason why you haven’t talked to this fellow over in Spain

when we sent our investigators over there and we did talk to him,

and he said he would take a polygraph and come back here and

testify, and you guys didn’t go talk to him. And the President then

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says there is not enough evidence to put Cuba on the majors list

when there is a person there who can testify very clearly about it,

who supposedly was involved and swears he wasn’t. This doesn’t

make sense. Why didn’t you do it? I don’t understand why you

didn’t go over there quickly and find out.

Mr. LEDWITH. Sir, this is part a continuing criminal investigation. It is not concluded, and we will eventually be able to do that.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just say one more thing. You say they found

Spanish money in containers that had drug residue?

Mr. LEDWITH. No. I think there were separate occasions.

Mr. BURTON. Where was that found?

Mr. LEDWITH. In Cuba, yes.

Mr. BURTON. Who was it found by in Cuba?

Mr. LEDWITH. The Cuban authorities.

Mr. BURTON. The Cuban authorities? Oh, my gosh, Fidel Castro’s

people went and found Spanish money when they said previously

there were no drugs whatsoever. Then all of a sudden they come

back when the heat is turned up, and you open up a canister and,

lo and behold, the Cuban people tell the world there is Spanish

money in there and there is drug residue. So obviously you did not

know it was going to Spain.

You don’t think that might be a plant by Castro? I mean, come

on.

Let me go into other things here. Mr. Cabrera in a letter that

was written in 1996 to the Attorney General of the United States

says, ‘‘In his debriefings, Mr. Cabrera was careful not to embellish

the facts.’’ I want to read this to you.

He described in detail his trips to Colombia and Cuba and the planning of freighter loads of cocaine using Cuba as a point of discharge. Mr. Cabrera informed the

investigators that on each of the cocaine importations the freighter would meet his

organization’s vessel at a predetermined global plotting system coordinate within 4

miles of the Cuban coast.

He described how the Cuban Government welcomed the presence of Carlos

Pescone and other Colombian drug cartel leaders to Cuba on a regular basis. When

Mr. Cabrera would arrive in Havana, he was embraced by Cuban officials and he

has described his meetings with them, including his association with Manuel Pinero

LoSada, a/k/a Barbaroka, Alfredo Guevara, and Fidel Castro. During his meetings

with Castro, he even made reference to Cabrera’s and Castro’s mutual friends from

the Cali drug cartel.

It’s not a major drug shipping transit point for drugs. They were

sending shiploads in there and he was meeting with Fidel Castro.

Let me just talk to you about something else. ‘‘Gonzalo Bassols

Suarez’’—he is one of the Cuban officials—‘‘remains in Cuba’s diplomatic service. Despite his 1992 U.S. indictment on drug smuggling charges, he is in the government. As minister counselor of

Cuba’s embassy in Bogota, he aided an arms-for-drugs smuggling

ring involving the Colombian M–19 guerrillas and Cuban officials.’’

He is still in power down there.

‘‘Nelson Blanco, general of the revolutionary armies, implicated

in the 1993 draft U.S. Federal indictment that named Cuban Minister of Defense and First Vice President Raul Castro and other

senior Cuban officials in cocaine smuggling.’’ He is still in power

down there. He is still making decisions. Obviously, he has cleaned

up his act. He is a nice guy; he is not involved in drug trafficking

anymore.

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Raul Castro, Fidel Castro’s brother, indicted or should be indicted in Miami. He is still there.

‘‘Alberto Colome Ibarra, Minister of the Interior and corps general of the revolutionary armed forces, named in a draft U.S. Federal racketeering indictment in 1993 for conspiring with our Cuban

officials to ship cocaine from Colombia through Cuba to the United

States.’’

I have a four-page list of these people. For this government and

this President who appointed you, I think, to say that this is not

a major transshipping point for drugs is just unbelievable. I can’t

believe that the agencies of our government would come here and

tell us that that’s not the case, and tell us there are cases pending

and that’s why you haven’t talked to this guy in Spain who was

willing to swear under oath and take a lie detector test that he was

not involved; and that Castro’s government—two of the people in

Castro’s government from the minister of the interior, their equivalent of the CIA, were in charge and they looked at every single

thing that came into that company.

And they even called him and said, hey, where is that shipload

of stuff supposed to be coming in from Colombia. Fifty-one percent

of the company was owned by the Castro government. They controlled it. They had the minister of the interior running it; they

knew about the 7.2 tons of cocaine coming in.

So what do they do? They get caught red-handed. They deny it

completely, deny that there was anything that ever came into

Cuba. And then they tell you that the Cuban police found a secret

compartment that showed a little drugs in there and some Spanish

currency which is floating all over Havana. And, oh, my gosh, you

deduct that it’s going to Spain.

I tell you, you know, when you come and testify before our committee and you tell us this stuff, it just drives me up the wall. The

reason that I believe this is happening, is because the President of

the United States wants to normalize relations with Castro. He is

working with as many business people as he can possibly find,

sending them down there to try to open the door to Fidel’s dictatorship, and he didn’t want this on the majors list because it would

be a blowup and might cause a little problem as far as the normalization process.

When we passed the Helms-Burton law, the President was fighting for normalization with Cuba. Until Castro shot down those

planes, he was going to get it done. But because of the political hell

fire that came into being because of those people being shot down

and killed, he ended up signing the Helms-Burton law; and he

didn’t want to do it, but he did it for political reasons. Now he

doesn’t want this thing to explode in his face, so the 7.2 tons of cocaine obviously was going to Spain.

How in the hell do you know that? You don’t have any idea that’s

the case. As a matter of fact, there are all kinds of companies that

Castro and his government have dealt with in Mexico that could

be the conduit for that. That ought to be what you are checking

into, instead of saying it all went to Spain. And at the same time

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you are not even talking to the people who are involved in the company over there, who was willing to take a lie detector test, but you

say it is still under investigation.

I yield back the balance of my time. This isn’t the end of this.

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Mr. MICA. Mr. Cummings, you are up. The chairman has yielded

back the balance of his time. I would recognize you at this time.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I want to thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As I have been listening to all of this, Mr. Ledwith, as a criminal

lawyer for about 17 years, I had an opportunity to meet a lot of

DEA agents. They were some of the finest human beings that I

have ever met, putting their lives on the line every day, every day

trying to make life better for people all over the country.

I was just wondering, when you say that you have got an ongoing

investigation and there are certain strategies that you use, I take

it that is something very important to you. I guess the end result

is that you catch the criminals and that there are certain things

that you just can’t talk about in open—a place like this.

Mr. LEDWITH. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But just as significant, there are certain people

that you don’t want to talk to at a certain point because it may

cause the very things that you are trying to accomplish to be defeated.

Mr. LEDWITH. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But you said something that really—I guess just

has been hanging on my mind, and that is that it really doesn’t

make any difference to you whether they are on the majors list or

not. Why is that?

Mr. LEDWITH. Well, sir, I have spent the last 31 years of my life

enforcing the laws of the United States. I don’t do it by political

affiliation nor does the Drug Enforcement Agency. It doesn’t make

a bit of difference to me if the drugs were going to Spain or the

United States in that sense, in a political sense. It makes a difference to me that we were able to successfully conclude an investigation.

We do not align ourselves politically. We do not target people politically. And I would be both personally and professionally insulted

if I was asked to do an investigation based on any kind of political

perceptions. I would not do it. I would resign first.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Admiral, let me ask you something. You were

the one that showed the maps, right, the charts?

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir; the air tracks and the maritime

tracks, yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. One of the tracks had a lot of different colors, the

lines. I don’t know which one it was, but what did that mean? Did

your man disappear?

Admiral BARRETT. Let me go up and see if I can——

Mr. CUMMINGS. What did those lines—when the different colors—I wanted to ask the question at that time, but it just was inappropriate. The one on——

Admiral BARRETT. Back one.

Mr. CUMMINGS. We have got the expert back.

Admiral BARRETT. Sir, there are different periods of time, just so

you can see. It will show some of the contrast. They also would

be—some are known tracks and others are possible tracks. As part

of our data base, if we have only one piece of intelligence that an

aircraft is going to leave and go to a destination and we have no

corroborating evidence, then that is a possible track. We collect

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that. We handle that a little differently, but we use that as part

of the historical track information.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Maybe Mr. Ledwith can help me with this, too.

When we find out that, say—you also said noncommercial flights

are going by. Exactly what does that help you with, and what do

you do about it? Are you following what I am saying?

Is there something that Cuba could have been doing to help us?

I know about radar and all of that kind of thing, but I am just trying to figure out what could they be doing to help us address this

problem? Listening to you all, I am not sure whether they are really involved in the drug trafficking themselves, but I am just wondering if there are things that they could be doing to assist you

more than what they may be doing now.

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir. When I say ‘‘a noncommercial air

track,’’ it is basically a light aircraft that is generally equipped

with extra fuel tanks to be able to make a trip from the north

shore of—the north coast of Colombia, the La Guajira Peninsula,

to overfly Cuba and drop their drugs and turn around and return

to South America. And basically what we do, every time we get one

of those tracks on our radar, we pass the information to the Coast

Guard in the Seventh District and they alert the Cuban authorities.

So what I think we could do is if Cuba would respond, and as

Mr. Beers said, they do not have a shoot-down policy, and we cannot give them specific radar information, but we can tell them a

track is on the way, which we do regularly. And basically, if they

responded, I think it would be a deterrent against the traffickers

to not overfly Cuba.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Is there something other than shooting down

that would be an appropriate response?

Admiral BARRETT. Well, we basically have a lot of problems right

now with the air tracks that return to South America overflying

Venezuela. Venezuela does not have a shoot-down policy. They do

not allow us to overfly their sovereign air space now, but they do

frequently respond with fighter jets that try to force the traffickers

to land so they could make an arrest.

Mr. CUMMINGS. One other question. I guess just the mere fact

that if you had a shoot-down policy, that in and of itself would be

a deterrent, you would hope?

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir, very definitely. When we had successes on the air bridge between Peru and Colombia, where coca

base was being delivered to the processing labs in southern Colombia, the Peruvian Air Force shot down approximately 3 percent of

the flights and it stopped the air traffic.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Have we had any of those kinds of discussions,

any at all, Mr. Beers?

Mr. BEERS. With the Cubans, no, sir. The law says that the

United States and U.S. Government officials are not permitted to

in any way assist or abet that kind of activity except in certain exceptional circumstances which require that the country in question

have a national security emergency and that the United States and

the country in question discuss the procedures which are undertaken before the country actually begins to fire on the plane; that

is, to determine whether or not it is a drug trafficking aircraft,

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whether or not it is prepared to land after being spoken to on the

radio, after being signaled to, cockpit-to-cockpit, with normal international procedures, and only at that point and only with the decision of a higher-level official not in the cockpit.

Those are the kinds of procedures that we have asked, or are required to ask, of countries before we could knowingly transfer data

to them that would aid them in any way in shooting down those

aircraft.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I would like to recognize now the gentleman from California, Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Beers, if I may, I’m a little bit confused. What was

the number of overflights of Cuba in the period from January 1,

1997 to September 30, 1997?

Mr. BEERS. The number that I have is approximately 20 plus.

And I believe Admiral Barrett has a more accurate figure than I

have in his presentation.

Admiral BARRETT. The bar chart, it’s the first chart. Sir, I think

the differences, these are calendar year figures. And I think Mr.

Beers was talking fiscal year, but basically those are the figures

from the interagency data base.

Mr. OSE. Here’s the question I have: In the material we have it

appears that for the period January 1, 1999 to September 30, 1999,

according to Mr. Beers’ testimony, there were nine such overflights.

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. In the period from January 1, 1998 to September 30,

1998, there were 27 such overflights. What I’m trying to get to is

the period from January 1, 1997 to September 30, 1997, the number of overflights. And what I’m confused about is that, Admiral,

I heard you mention the number 60 as being the overflights both

to Cuba and to the Bahamas.

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir. I was adding 1997 and 1998 from my

chart. When Chairman Gilman asked me were there a lot of flights

prior to 1999, I combined those years. And that’s where I got the

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Mr. OSE. The 1997 number is 21, the 1998 number is 39, and you

have 10, Mr. Beers has 9.

Mr. BEERS. His goes to a later date this year than mine. And I’m

prepared to stipulate that his numbers are the best numbers we

have, sir.

Mr. OSE. All right. What I’m trying to do is reconcile General

McCaffrey’s observation that the overflights have increased by 50

percent with the representation that the overflights have reduced

by 50 percent.

Mr. BEERS. Sir, the only explanation I can come up with is that

the data speaks for itself and he meant to compare 1998 and 1997

and not 1999 and 1998, because we don’t have anything that would

come out anywhere close to that 50 percent figure increase in calendar year 1999.

Mr. OSE. I have a letter here dated May 27, 1999 from General

McCaffrey to Chairman Burton. I want to quote, ‘‘the intelligence

and law enforcement communities report that detected drug overflights of Cuba, although still not as numerous as in other parts

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of the Caribbean, increased by almost 50 percent last year.’’ So that

would have been 1998.

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. So that would have been a comparison presumably from

1997 for the period through September 30.

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir, that’s correct.

Mr. OSE. That would essentially establish the general accuracy

of these numbers, if I do some quick math.

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir. But, again, my figures are for calendar year. So when Mr. Beers was talking up through the end of

the fiscal year, I’ve added 3 more months into mine. Mine are calendar year figures.

Mr. OSE. I was unclear on that, I appreciate that. And we had

a major effort, as I said, with the domestic law enforcement agencies, DEA, Coast Guard and Customs, to get successful endgames

against those air drops north of Cuba, and that happened late last

year, early this year. And we think that’s one of the reasons for the

dropoff.

Mr. Ledwith, your comments about the end source for the 7.2

metric tons; you keep using the word ‘‘uncorroborated’’ information

on which the DEA bases its opinions. And I’m trying to make sure

I understand what uncorroborated means. And the reason I ask

that is I read the deposition of Mr. Herrera, and I’m just trying to

understand why do you use the word ‘‘uncorroborated?’’ Mr. LEDWITH. Sir, in general we would use that word to indicate

that we were not able to factually verify the information ourselves,

that it is third-party reporting or it is reporting of Cuban origin.

And we do not place the ultimate test of faith in any reporting that

we have not done ourselves or have been able to factually corroborate ourselves. I would refer to it as uncorroborated at that point.

Mr. OSE. So if I understand correctly, you’re surmising that the

end destination of the container was Spain, but you’re giving us a

heads up that that information comes from Cuban sources?

Mr. LEDWITH. Partly from Cuban sources, partly from the Colombian National Police. The Colombian National Police, and I have

the greatest faith in their reporting, seized documents at the time

of the container seizure in Cartagena, that would also be part of

the documents that we referred to. Some of the other information

that we became aware of is as a result of Colombian National Police interaction with the Cuban police, because we do not have the

capability to interact directly with them.

Mr. OSE. Is the information you’re getting from the Colombian

police coming from the Colombians or from the Cubans? In other

words, are the Colombians serving as a conduit or is it generated

from their own sources?

Mr. LEDWITH. It is my understanding, sir, that there’s two different levels of information involved here; one is that which was

seized by the Colombian National Police in Cartagena, Colombia at

the time of the seizure. Those would be the documents indicating

that this container was to be shipped on the vessel Capitan Ortegal

to Jamaica with further routing to Cuba.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I see the red light is on. I can’t believe

my 5 minutes are up, but before I yield back, I want to enter into

the record two articles, one dated June 28, 1999 from the Miami

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Herald and the other dated November 1, 1999 from the Washington Times, highlighting our efforts to track this down.

Then I can’t help but have two questions which I appreciate any

input on, and that is if—according to the tracking information that

you’ve got on these flights, they have largely been redirected toward Haiti and that the dilemma I have is it is my understanding

we’re engaged in a bunch of nation building down in Haiti. And I

can’t understand why it is that drug traffickers are flying to a

country that we have a military presence in and we can’t do a

damn thing about it.

The second item is if, in fact, this container was headed to Spain,

as the uncorroborated evidence indicates, according to the definition on the certification process, that might bring into jeopardy

whether or not Spain in fact should be identified as a number on

the majors list.

So I just—I don’t have time to explore those, but I appreciate the

chairman’s time.

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Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. Without objection the two articles he referred to will be made a part of the record.

And I will now recognize the vice chairman of our subcommittee,

the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I too must express some degree of surprise, and mystification

over why Cuba has never been on the majors list. Mr. Beers, I

know you’re very familiar with the language in the statute, I’m

going to read it here for purposes of just laying the basis for my

mystification, ‘‘the term major drug transit country means a country, A, that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting

the United States; or, B, through which are transported such drugs

or substances.’’ It seems as if you’re saying, reading in between the lines of your

earlier discussion with, I forget which one of the other members of

our committee it was, regarding General McCaffrey’s statement

that, and Mr. Ose from California just referred to this, that there

had been a 50 percent increase in transshipment flights or flights

over Cuba.

You seem to indicate that may not be that significant this year,

because the way you read the statistics that would mean that it’s,

according to this they’ve dropped off, and therefore, that would be

a reason not to have Cuba on the list. Would that not be a strong

reason to have included Cuba in previous years, if now that provides the basis for not including them this year?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, what I was trying to say was that we have chosen as looking at the information.

Mr. BARR. Who is we?

Mr. BEERS. This is the U.S. Government position.

Mr. BARR. The State Department position.

Mr. BEERS. The U.S. Government, sir.

Mr. BARR. I want the State Department—— Mr. BEERS. Sir, I’m not in a position to speak about what individual or individual agency views were in a decision made by the

President of the United States.

Mr. BARR. Does the State Department not have a view on whether or not Cuba should be included on the majors list?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, the Secretary of State’s view that she communicates to the President on this is her view.

Mr. BARR. Does the State Department have a view? The State

Department being that agency of our U.S. Government funded by

taxpayer money? I’m trying to help you here. I’m not being antagonistic to you. I think you agree, even though you’re not saying so.

Does not the State Department have a position on whether or not

a country should be included or not included on the majors list? I’m

not asking you to say what it is.

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARR. They do have a position.

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. That is true. The Secretary of State is required to provide that recommendation to the President.

Mr. BARR. I’m very happy to know the State Department has a

position.

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.

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Mr. BARR. Is it the position of the State Department that a country that has a significant number of flights allowed through or over

its territory or in its territorial waters of drugs transshipped either

to or affecting the United States should be included on the list?

Mr. BEERS. The administration’s position, sir, with respect to

the——

Mr. BARR. The State Department position. I’m not asking for a

specific country, for heaven’s sake. There has to be some criteria

that the State Department uses in rendering its decision that you

already told me it uses to make recommendations to the President.

Is part of the criteria that the State Department uses as a general matter of fact that there is evidence that there is a significant

number of flights over or transshipments through the territorial

waters or the territory of a country of mind altering drugs that are

destined to or affect the United States?

Mr. BEERS. That is one of the things that we look at, yes, sir,

as do other agencies.

Mr. BARR. OK. Looking then at this chart, one could perhaps

make an argument, we might not agree with it, one might make

an argument that in 1998 Cuba would be included, and then the

fact that there has been significant dropoff to 1999 might provide

at least a colorable argument that one could make, without a major

grin, that it should not be included in the current year. But

wouldn’t it seem, if you took off of this chart the name of the country, that there probably would be a reasonable basis for including

a country with that significant a number of flights, suspected

flights, given its proximity to the United States, given its proximity

to a number of other countries that are included in the list, that

probably would make that country eligible for inclusion in the list?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, you can make that argument. The administration

has chosen not to. We know the administration—— Mr. BARR. The President.

Mr. BEERS. No administration—— Mr. BARR. The President has chosen, has made that decision.

Mr. BEERS. The President, yes, sir. And no President has chosen

to make that argument. The statistics which I have go back to

1991. The largest years were 1991 and 1992 and the administration that preceded this administration, and as I said, no administration has chosen to make this the sole criteria for putting a country, Cuba, on the majors list. This is a unique case.

Mr. BARR. I think it is a unique case, and that’s what bothers

us, that there seems to be very good reason to have it on the list,

yet it is not. The President has again chosen to include some countries that, unlike Cuba, mount very, very strenuous efforts to assist

us and take very strong measures against drug trafficking, and yet

they’re included on the list, and yet we have Cuba that does not

make those efforts that is not included.

It seems to us unique and that’s why we’re probing, because we

think that there is a reason, simply politics or—— Mr. BEERS. Why would that have prevailed since the beginning

of this log-in, sir?

Mr. BARR. That is a mystification. But what we’re focusing on is

recent years. I mean we’re not here to talk—at least I’m not here

to talk about what Lyndon Johnson might have done or George

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Bush or somebody else. That’s not really the concern of this Congress. It may be to some Members on the other side, and it may

be to you, I don’t know, but our concern, those of us who are here

today and who have spoken on this, are concerned with what seems

to be very significant evidence that raises a very high likelihood

that Cuba ought to be and satisfies the criteria, even more so than

some of the other countries on the list, for inclusion.

Does the 71⁄2 tons of cocaine destined for Cuba concern you?

Mr. BEERS. The 71⁄2 tons of cocaine destined for anywhere would

concern me. That is a very significant shipment. We all would

agree with that.

Mr. BARR. And I know there’s been some discussion here already

today about whether or not the evidence indicates that it was destined for Spain or the United States. It’s my understanding that

there has been no firm conclusion on that, is that true? Is that accurate?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir, that is an accurate view. The preponderance

of information continues to suggest that it was going toward Spain,

but that is information, not evidence, and there is no firm conclusion.

Mr. BARR. So the administration has not ruled out that it was

destined for the United States? You’ve not been able to rule that

out?

Mr. BEERS. No, sir, but the other piece of information that’s lacking here is we do not have other information about other shipments

that went through the territory of Cuba that were destined for the

United States this past year, or the year before that or the year

before that or the year before that.

Mr. BARR. I think Mr. Burton’s concern was that perhaps some

of these leads are not being followed up, I think. I can’t speak for

him, but I think his concern is that there may be some effort to

exclude certain possibilities that you might find out if too many

questions perhaps were asked, and I know the other witnesses

have expressed an unwillingness to go into that here in an open

hearing. But I do hope that we can have some meetings that will

shed some more light on that.

Mr. BEERS. Sir, we’re trying to do everything we can, but as you

also know, the State Department is not a law enforcement, investigative agency.

Mr. BARR. Looking back also at the 71⁄2 tons of cocaine, such as

the one in December 1998, is it—the language that we’re talking

about earlier in the statute, and I know the President’s letter in

May, true to form, uses some very specific words. He says ‘‘we have

yet to receive any confirmation that this traffic carries significant

quantities of cocaine or heroin to the United States,’’ which is not

precisely the language of the definition of a major country. It is not

a criteria to include a country on the majors list that the drugs be

specifically targeted to the United States, is that not correct?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, it is correct that the language of the law does

not say that. We are going by legal opinion that was developed

within our legal community within the government that has caused

us to use the United States as the final destination as the determining element.

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Mr. BARR. Let’s say hypothetically we have a country and we can

establish that two shipments come through that country of equal

amounts and say, just hypothetically, 71⁄2 tons each, and both of

those are at the point of embarkation from the source country destined for the United States, but somebody makes a decision somewhere in the trafficking line that instead of sending all 15 tons to

the United States, they’re only going to send 71⁄2 and they’re going

to send 71⁄2 to one of our allied countries in Europe, which is a

major concern to DEA. Would the fact that that 71⁄2 did not actually wind up being targeted directly to the United States lessen the

concern that you might have over that shipment?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, the fact that 71⁄2 metric tons were coming to the

United States out of the two shipments of 71⁄2 each would be a significant concern to the United States and we would look very seriously at that.

Mr. BARR. You’re not saying that you look at these numbers,

these shipments, these drug transactions in a vacuum; is it not a

concern when we have major shipments going to those of our allied

countries as well? I mean that does happen.

Mr. BEERS. I’m sorry, sir, I thought you were talking about in

the context of the majors list. No, sir, we, like DEA, would agree

that drug trafficking anywhere in the world is a serious problem

and a serious problem that directly or indirectly affects the United

States and all the citizens of the world. And the State Department’s effort to deal with trafficking is not limited to the focus on

drugs that come to the United States. We have programs with

countries that don’t necessarily make major contributions to drug

flows to the United States.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. I have a couple of followup

questions, first of all for Admiral Barrett. You obtain your surveillance information from various agencies, you said Coast Guard,

Navy, various—— Admiral BARRETT. No, sir.

Mr. MICA. Where do you obtain that from?

Admiral BARRETT. We receive our track information from a system of radars that feed into my organization in Key West. We

do——

Mr. MICA. Do you use any of the information obtained by Coast

Guard and other aircraft and other flights?

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir. But normally speaking, those aircraft

are working for me. We are——

Mr. MICA. So this information on flights is strictly radar based,

currently and historically?

Admiral BARRETT. It will be initially radar based and then we actually launch aircraft to identify the suspect aircraft.

Mr. MICA. Well, who launches the aircraft?

Admiral BARRETT. I do, sir.

Mr. MICA. What aircraft?

Admiral BARRETT. Navy aircraft, Coast Guard aircraft.

Mr. MICA. Well, I’m a little bit curious as to the number of

flights, because May 1st, we stopped all of the flights out of Howard Air Force Base; is that correct?

Admiral BARRETT. That’s correct, sir.

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Mr. MICA. And our staff was down there for some months after

and there was a big gap in those—the capability of launching any

aircraft from anywhere to go after drug traffickers; isn’t that correct?

Admiral BARRETT. Sir, we have moved our assets to forward operating locations.

Mr. MICA. But, sir, there was indeed a gap from May 1—we had

staff down there, I sent them down immediately, we had no capability out of Manta, almost no flights for some time, and limited out

of Aruba. And then I was told in fact—is this not the case—that

out of Aruba that we were getting bumped for commercial traffic,

our flights?

Admiral BARRETT. I’m not aware of that, sir.

Mr. MICA. That’s what I was told. But weren’t there—from May

1st there was a dramatic decrease in the number of flights that

took off for a number of months; is that correct?

Admiral BARRETT. No, sir, that’s not correct.

Mr. MICA. Well, we’re getting different information.

Admiral BARRETT. Sir, there was an extensive number and different type of aircraft that worked out of Howard. We did not have

as many aircraft in Aruba and in Curacao. But I have assets also

working out of Guantanamo Bay.

Mr. MICA. For several months there were none coming out of

Manta—— Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir, but Manta only covers the Eastern

Pacific. It had no influence on the Central—— Mr. MICA. And there was a greatly diminished number from this

information that we got from May, June, and July out of Aruba

than had previously come out of Howard; is that correct?

Admiral BARRETT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MICA. OK. Well, whether we had more flights or not, your

other testimony provided to the subcommittee today is that there

is an increase in go-fast; is that correct?

Admiral BARRETT. That is correct.

Mr. MICA. A dramatic increase. Not only go-fast, and if I were

a drug trafficker, it wouldn’t take me much time to figure out that

there may be pressure from the air and surveillance, even if it’s

limited, but to move this stuff by another means. And you also testified today, this is almost 20 percent in one shipment, that’s correct, of what you seized in 1999, 20 percent of the total?

Admiral BARRETT. Sir, I need to clarify a point. When I indicated

that JITF East, my organization, had been directly involved in the

seizure of over 45 metric tons, there are other agencies that also

seized drugs in the transit zone that we may not have been directly

involved in. So the historical——

Mr. MICA. But it’s a significant amount, and then——

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir, very definitely.

Mr. MICA. And then Mr. Ledwith testified that the Cubans told

him that they found containers with residue in it, that’s right, Mr.

Ledwith?

Mr. LEDWITH. Correct.

Mr. MICA. I don’t want to get into money, because now I’m finding out that’s in another one. So it appears that there’s significant

increase in Cuban involvement in drug trafficking. What concerns

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me is Mr. Beers has testified today that this is the most exhaustive

review ever conducted, yet Mr. Ledwith tells us that in fact the investigation isn’t complete. We cannot confirm or deny if the United

States was the final source.

We met with the CIA today in closed door session, they don’t

have a clue. They do not have a clue. I’ve read more in the newspaper close to the comic section than they could tell me in a closed

door briefing of what’s going on. If it’s an exhaustive review, I

would be very concerned.

Mr. BEERS. Of availability information, sir, excuse me.

Mr. MICA. Of available information. And they can tell you they

don’t have much available. Then I’m told by our staff that the

Spanish police, national police has closed the investigation and Mr.

Ledwith testifies that there’s an ongoing investigation of—the

Spanish National Police are part of it. Quite frankly I am concerned.

I did not become convinced before today that there was this involvement with the Cuba at this level. It has raised many more

questions. I’m concerned about the volume. This is an incredible

amount of narcotics. And I’m told now that there’s even more and

we don’t know much about what’s going on. And it does concern

me.

So I have taken a new turn as far as my knowledge and I have

to say I was very skeptical before the hearing. But now I’m even

more concerned.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that we

have just a few minutes remaining on the clock. Mr. Ledwith, we

know that there will be confirmation hearings before the DEA Administrator probably coming up in early next year. And I know we

have at least one more—from what you hear from this subcommittee many of us have a lot of questions related to whether our agencies have done everything that we should and must do regarding

this investigation of the over 7 metric tons headed from Colombia

to Cuba.

And we definitely would like to encourage the Administrator to

wrap up the investigation as quickly as possible and any loose

threads should be closed up and all of those questions should be

asked and people should be properly investigated and followup.

And we hope that those confirmation hearings, of course, go well

for the Administrator, and many of us will be checking with Senator Helms and Senator Hatch to make sure that our agencies are

doing everything to wrap up that investigation and do a thorough

job, and I know that DEA will do its job.

Mr. LEDWITH. Yes, ma’am. Investigations have a pace of their

own and at times there are integral parts of an investigation that

we have to work with, where we have to wait for certain things to

happen. I mean in any investigation and it is impossible to establish timeframes for investigations in progress. But we will do everything in our power to complete this as soon as possible.

I would not wish to hold it to any kind of timetable with which

we could not comply and bring the idea before the committee that

we were uncooperative or unwilling. It is merely a case that these

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things have a life of their own occasionally and we need to work

within those parameters.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let’s hope there’s more followup on this case

than there was in the Cabrera case.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Captain, could you flip to

the air tracks, please. I want to first look at this one. I presume

this reflects the 21 and 39 flights that were tracked for 1997 and

1998.

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. And if you can see—I mean you have some bisecting

virtually the center of Cuba, you have some over on the island of

Hispaniola, some headed out to the east and some headed into central Mexico. Captain, would you go to the next page, now, please.

Here we have the tracking for calendar year 1999 through November 15th, and what we see is a substantial reorientation of the

tracks, if I’m reading the map correctly, a substantial reorientation

of the tracks to Haiti, which is on the western end of Hispaniola.

Mr. BEERS. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. OSE. Now the question arises in my mind if this tracking

pattern contributes to the empirical evidence on which Haiti would

be put on to the majors list—captain, flip back to the previous

page—why is it that a similar tracking pattern over Cuba doesn’t?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, that’s not the only information on which Haiti

and the Dominican Republic were looked at with respect to this decision. There are also go-fast boats which have landed cargo in

Haiti and the Dominican Republic which comes on to the United

States. And we have—if you will look at that, you will notice that

those planes are landing in Haiti, they’re not necessarily going on

from Haiti. And so what we have used to look at that is all available information and based on all available information, which is

that there are a variety of ways in which drugs come into and go

out of Haiti, that’s the basis for putting Haiti on the list, sir.

Mr. OSE. So if I understand correctly, a country in which we

have a military presence engaged in nation building to reinstall the

democratically elected government has under this scenario fewer

tracks and yet then say Cuba and yet—captain, flip to the next

page—here on the western end of Hispaniola, which is Haiti as opposed to the eastern end, which is the Dominican Republic, which

I see, I think there’s one track in the very southwestern corner.

I mean there’s some inconsistency here in my opinion as to the

empirical evidence you’re using, whether it be go-fast boats, overflight patterns or what have you, to in one case have Haiti on the

list, because of the overflight patterns of the go-fast boats, and then

have the Dominican Republic on the list where the empirical evidence doesn’t have any overflight pattern for instance.

Mr. BEERS. Sir, we don’t use the overflight patterns as a sole criteria to put people on the list. That’s what I’ve been trying to say.

Mr. OSE. I’m in agreement with you. I’m saying up here that the

overflight pattern is empirical evidence that something is going on,

and it ought to be raised in priority in terms of how you put a

country on or off the majors list. There is a direct connection as we

can hear from the testimony in terms of the dumping of cargo in

international waters for pickup by go-fast boats between planes flyVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:25 Dec 18, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66464.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ing over a country and the subsequent delivery of material into the

water.

I’m just amazed at the difference in the empirical evidence between Haiti on the west end and the Dominican Republic on the

east end as it relates to overflight patterns only and the empirical

evidence as it related to Cuba in previous years.

Mr. BEERS. Sir, the trafficking patterns that have caused both

Haiti and the Dominican Republic to essentially be put on the majors list for the past several years is that the flow comes into the

territory of both of those countries and goes out of the territory of

both of those countries we believe to the United States. It is the

land nexus that is the basis for the decision. If those countries were

like Cuba, if those countries had only overflight in maritime transit

around but did not touch, then we would be in a position which

would be similar to Cuba. Neither of them are.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, we need to go, so I yield back.

Mr. MICA. Unfortunately, we do have a vote, with a little bit of

time left. Without objection, the record will be left open for 3

weeks. We will be submitting additional questions to the witnesses.

Being no further business to come before this subcommittee, this

meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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