alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Waverly BREEDLOVE, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-4759.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted April 25, 2002.

Decided May 6, 2002.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, William S. Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, John W. Stone, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, James Waverly Breedlove, Jr., pled guilty to bank robbery. The agreement provided that “the Government will make no recommendation to the Court as to what sentence the defendant should receive within the sentencing guideline range.” At sentencing, the court determined Breedlove’s guideline range to be 151 to 188 months. Contrary to the terms of the plea agreement, the Assistant United States Attorney argued in favor of a sentence at the higher end of the range. The court thereafter imposed a 180-month sentence.

Breedlove argues, and the Government concedes, that this constitutes a breach of the plea agreement. Due to the Government’s breach—albeit inadvertent—of the plea agreement Breedlove failed to receive the benefit of his bargain. *See Santobello v. New York,*404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). We therefore vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing before a different district court judge. *See United States v. Peglera,*33 F.3d 412, 415 (4th Cir.1994); *United States v. Brown,*500 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir.1974). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*VACATED AND REMANDED.*
#### In the Matter of James W. West, Appellant, against Alfred J. Bohlinger, as Superintendent of Insurance, Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Albany County Special Term, which dismissed on the merits appellant’s petition for a review under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act of respondent’s denial of appellant’s application for a license as an insurance agent under section 115 of the Insurance Law. The .determination sought to be reviewed was made after a nonstatutory hearing. Respondent, as Superintendent of Insurance, may refuse to issue any insurance agent’s license if, in his judgment, the applicant is not trustworthy and competent "to act as such agent (Insurance Law, § 114, subd. 4). In addition to the written examination required by subdivision 2 of the section cited, the Superintendent may, it has been held by implication, conduct a nonstatutory hearing *(Matter of West*v. Bohlinger, 281 App. Div. 925). At the hearing to which appellant was cited to appear he was charged with improper conduct in connection with the preparation of annual statements and vouchers submitted to the State Insurance Department by an insurance company of which he was president; and also that he gave false testimony concerning a trip he made to North Carolina, allegedly in the interest of the company of which he was president, at an expense of more than $1,100. The Special Term held that the charges were substantial and that the determination of respondent was not arbitrary and capricious. Order unanimously affirmed, with $10 Costs. Present — Poster, P. J., Bergan, Coon, Halpern and Imrie, JJ. [See 283 App. Div. 749.]
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 18

- 00563

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF G .V.S

. , et al., C hildren

From the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2017

- PA

- 01818 Honorable Karen H. Pozza, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ANGELINI
, JUSTICE BARNARD , AND JUSTICE MARTINEZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

SIGNED December 19, 2018.

_____________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
§ 550.1406 Use of accrued compensatory time off. ( a ) An employee must request permission from his or her supervisor to schedule the use of his or her accrued compensatory time off in accordance with agency-established policies and procedures.
( b ) Compensatory time off may be used when the employee is granted time off from his or her scheduled tour of duty established for leave purposes. An employee must use earned compensatory time off under this subpart in increments of one-tenth of an hour (6 minutes) or one-quarter of an hour (15 minutes). Agencies must charge compensatory time off in the chronological order in which it was earned, with compensatory time off earned first being charged first.
[70 FR 3856, Jan. 27, 2005, as amended at 72 FR 19098, Apr. 17, 2007]
Merrimack,

June, 1897.

#### Whittaker *v.*Ordway.

Board iurnisked by the maker of a promissory note to the payee will operate as a payment, if such was the agreement of the parties.

Payment of a note by the maker prior to its transfer is a good defense to an action against him by an indorsee who took it after it became due, for full consideration, and without notice of payment.

Writ oe Entry. Pacts found by a referee. May 2, 1882, Jonas Poster loaned the defendant $500 upon his promissory note of that date, payable to Poster’s order on demand, with interest annually, and secured by a mortgage of the real estate described in the writ. On the same day, after the note-had been delivered to Poster, he and the defendant agreed that if Poster, who was then about seventy years of age, should become disabled or be thrown out of employment, he should make his home with the defendant and board out the amount of the note. September 3, 1884, Poster being out of employment went-to the defendant’s in pursuance of the agreement, and remained there the most of the time until June 24, 1891, both parties understanding that the board furnished in the meautime was in fulfillment of the agreement. The board at a reasonable price more than paid the note.

At some time after June 22, 1891, Poster sold and transferred the note and mortgage to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration,—the plaintiff’having no knowledge of Poster’s agreement with the defendant, nor of the defendant’s claim that the note had been paid.

Each party moved for j udgment in his favor.

*Willis*6r,. *Buxton*and *Albin, Martin £ Hoioe,*for the plaintiff

■ *Arthur W. Silsby*and *William L. Foster,*for the defendant.

Chase, J.

The question whether Poster’s agreement to> *c<*board out the amount of the note ” upon the happening of the contingency named could have been enforced, need not be considered, for the agreement has been fully executed. As both he- and the defendant understood that the board was furnished and accepted in payment of the note, it was payment. *Jameson*v. *Carpenter,*68 N. H. 62. Payment by the maker of a note prior to its transfer is a good defence to an action against him by an indorsee who took it after it became due, although he paid a full consideration for it and had no notice of the payment. *Odiorne*v. *183Howard, 10 N. H. 343; Hill v. Huntress, 43 N. H. 480; Hardy v. Waddell, 58 N. H. 460; Leavitt v. Peabody, 62 N. H. 185, 189.

•Judqment for the defendant.

All concurred.
### §20923. Megan Nicole Kanka and Alexandra Nicole Zapp Community Notification Program

#### (a) Establishment of Program

There is established the Megan Nicole Kanka and Alexandra Nicole Zapp Community Notification Program (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Program").

#### (b) Program notification

Except as provided in subsection (c), immediately after a sex offender registers or updates a registration, an appropriate official in the jurisdiction shall provide the information in the registry (other than information exempted from disclosure by the Attorney General) about that offender to the following:

(1) The Attorney General, who shall include that information in the National Sex Offender Registry or other appropriate databases.

(2) Appropriate law enforcement agencies (including probation agencies, if appropriate), and each school and public housing agency, in each area in which the individual resides, is an employee or is a student.

(3) Each jurisdiction where the sex offender resides, is an employee, or is a student, and each jurisdiction from or to which a change of residence, employment, or student status occurs.

(4) Any agency responsible for conducting employment-related background checks under section 40102 of this title.

(5) Social service entities responsible for protecting minors in the child welfare system.

(6) Volunteer organizations in which contact with minors or other vulnerable individuals might occur.

(7) Any organization, company, or individual who requests such notification pursuant to procedures established by the jurisdiction.

#### (c) Frequency

Notwithstanding subsection (b), an organization or individual described in subsection (b)(6) or (b)(7) may opt to receive the notification described in that subsection no less frequently than once every five business days.

(Pub. L. 109–248, title I, §121, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 597.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 16921 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 179

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand the depreciation 

benefits available to small businesses, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 7, 2003

Mr. HERGER (for himself, Mr. WELLER, Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut, Mr. 

CRANE, Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky, Mr. FOLEY, and Mr. MANZULLO) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways 

and Means 

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand 

the depreciation benefits available to small businesses, 

and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Small Business Ex5 pensing Improvement Act of 2003’’. 

6 SEC. 2. MODIFICATIONS TO EXPENSING UNDER SECTION 

7 179. 

8 (a) INCREASE OF AMOUNT WHICH MAY BE EX9 PENSED.—
2

•HR 179 IH 

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (1) of section 

2 179(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relat3 ing to dollar limitation) is amended to read as fol4 lows: 

5 ‘‘(1) DOLLAR LIMITATION.—The aggregate cost 

6 which may be taken into account under subsection 

7 (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed $75,000.’’

8 (2) INCREASE IN PHASEOUT THRESHOLD.—

9 Paragraph (2) of section 179(b) of such Code is 

10 amended by striking ‘‘$200,000’’ and inserting 

11 ‘‘$325,000’’. 

12 (3) INFLATION ADJUSTMENT OF DOLLAR

13 AMOUNTS.—Subsection (b) of section 179 of such 

14 Code is amended by adding at the end the following 

15 new paragraph: 

16 ‘‘(5) INFLATION ADJUSTMENT.—In the case of 

17 any taxable year beginning in a calendar year after 

18 2003, each dollar amount contained in paragraph 

19 (1) or (2) shall be increased by an amount equal 

20 to—

21 ‘‘(A) such dollar amount, multiplied by 

22 ‘‘(B) the cost-of-living adjustment deter23 mined under section 1(f)(3) for the calendar 

24 year in which the taxable year begins by sub-
3

•HR 179 IH 

1 stituting ‘calendar year 2002’ for ‘calendar year 

2 1992’ in subparagraph (B) thereof. 

3 If any amount, as adjusted under the preceding sen4 tence, is not a multiple of $1,000 ($10,000 in the 

5 case of the dollar amount contained in paragraph 

6 (2)), such amount shall be rounded to the nearest 

7 multiple of $1,000 or $10,000, as the case may be.’’

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

9 this section shall apply to property placed in service in 

10 taxable years beginning after December 31, 2002.

Æ
Exhibit 32.2

                             CERTIFICATION

              Certification of Chief Financial Officer

                    Pursuant to Section 906 of the
          Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Invicta Group, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB/A for the quarter ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Richard David Scott, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at
the dates and for the periods presented in this Report.



Date:  August 22, 2007	By: /s/ Richard David Scott
			Richard David Scott
			Chief Financial Officer
#### Willis S. Paine, Receiver, etc., Respondent, *v.*J. Wyman Jones et al.

The mistake which will warrant a court of equity in reforming a written contract must be one made by both parties to the agreement, so that the intention of neither is expressed therein; or it must be the mistake of one party and fraud in the other in taking advantage of it, and thus obtaining a contract with the knowledge that the party dealing with him is in error in regard to its terms.

Where it appears that the contract, as executed, is just the one, one of the parties intended to make and the one he understood the other intended to make the court has no power to reform it.

(Argued October 3, 1878;

decided November 12, 1878.)

This was an action to foreclose a mortgage. The mortgage with the bond accompanying were assigned to the bank, of which plaintiff was receiver, by defendant Wright. In the assignment was contained a covenant on the part of the assignor guaranteeing the payment of the bond and mortgage. Judgment was asked and rendered against Wright for any deficiency. He defended upon the ground that said covenant was put into the assignment by mistake, without any previous agreement to that effect between the parties, and that there was no intent to make it. He asked to have the assignment reformed by striking out the guaranty. The court reiterated the principles above stated, and *held,*that the evidence authorized the .finding of the trial court that the assignee of said defendant, without fraud, obtained j ust the contract which it, from the first, intended to ask and have, and which it demanded, and that, therefore, defendant failed to show fraud or mistake authorizing the reformation of the contract.

*Samuel Jones*for appellant.

*594
      *Rastus S. Ransom*for respondent.

Folger, J.,

reads for affirmance.

All concur, except Miller and Earl, JJ., absent. Judgment affirmed.
§ 731.101 Purpose. ( a ) The purpose of this part is to establish criteria and procedures for making determinations of suitability and for taking suitability actions regarding employment in covered positions (as defined in paragraph (b) of this section) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 3301, E.O. 10577 (3 CFR, 1954-1958 Comp., p. 218), as amended, and 5 CFR 1.1, 2.1(a) and 5.2. Section 3301 of title 5, United States Code, directs consideration of “age, health, character, knowledge, and ability for the employment sought.” E.O. 10577 (codified in relevant part at 5 CFR 1.1, 2.1(a) and 5.2) directs OPM to examine “suitability” for competitive Federal employment. This part concerns only determinations of “suitability,” that is, those determinations based on a person's character or conduct that may have an impact on the integrity or efficiency of the service. Determinations made and actions taken under this part are distinct from objections to eligibles or pass overs of preference eligibles, and OPM's and agencies' decisions on such requests, made under 5 U.S.C. 3318 and 5 CFR 332.406, as well as determinations of eligibility for assignment to, or retention in, sensitive national security positions made under E.O. 10450 (3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 936), E.O. 12968, or similar authorities.
( b ) *Definitions.* In this part: *Applicant* means a person who is being considered or has been considered for employment.
*Appointee* means a person who has entered on duty and is in the first year of a subject-to-investigation appointment (as defined in § 731.104).
*Core Duty* means a continuing responsibility that is of particular importance to the relevant covered position or the achievement of an agency's mission.
*Covered position* means a position in the competitive service, a position in the excepted service where the incumbent can be noncompetitively converted to the competitive service, and a career appointment to a position in the Senior Executive Service.
*Days* means calendar days unless otherwise specified in this part.
*Employee* means a person who has completed the first year of a subject-to-investigation appointment.
*Material* means, in reference to a statement, one that is capable of influencing, affects, or has a natural tendency to affect, an official decision even if OPM or an agency does not rely upon it.
*Suitability action* means an outcome described in § 731.203 and may be taken only by OPM or an agency with delegated authority under the procedures in subparts C and D of this part.
*Suitability determination* means a decision by OPM or an agency with delegated authority that a person is suitable or is not suitable for employment in covered positions in the Federal Government or a specific Federal agency.
[73 FR 20154, Apr. 15, 2008, as amended at 73 FR 66492, Nov. 10, 2008]
### §60303. Applications

#### (a) In general

The Attorney General shall establish a process through which a State may apply for a grant under this chapter.

#### (b) Application

#### (1) In general

A State desiring a grant under this chapter shall submit an application to the Attorney General at such time, in such manner, and containing such information as the Attorney General may reasonably require.

#### (2) Contents

Each application submitted under paragraph (1) shall contain—

(A) a certification by an appropriate officer of the State that the State authorizes capital punishment under its laws and conducts, or will conduct, prosecutions in which capital punishment is sought;

(B) a description of the communities to be served by the grant, including the nature of existing capital defender services and capital prosecution programs within such communities;

(C) a long-term statewide strategy and detailed implementation plan that—

(i) reflects consultation with the judiciary, the organized bar, and State and local prosecutor and defender organizations; and

(ii) establishes as a priority improvement in the quality of trial-level representation of indigents charged with capital crimes and trial-level prosecution of capital crimes;

(D) in the case of a State that employs a statutory procedure described in section 60301(e)(1)(C) of this title, a certification by an appropriate officer of the State that the State is in substantial compliance with the requirements of the applicable State statute; and

(E) assurances that Federal funds received under this chapter shall be—

(i) used to supplement and not supplant non-Federal funds that would otherwise be available for activities funded under this chapter; and

(ii) allocated in accordance with section 60306(b) of this title.

(Pub. L. 108–405, title IV, §423, Oct. 30, 2004, 118 Stat. 2288.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 14163b of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Ralph Mohr, Claimant, and Ronald Armstrong, an Infant, Respondent, against Board of Education of Central School District No. 3, Town of Hempstead, Nassau County, et al., Appellants.

No opinion. Nolan, P. J., Johnston, Sneed, Wenzel and MaeCrate, JJ., concur.
| **Exhibit 32.2** |
|------------------|

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

| In    connection with the Quarterly Report of China Media Group Corporation a Texas corporation    (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the three months period ending June 30, 2011,    as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the    "Report"), Con Unerkov, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies to the    best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of    the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
    (1)
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the    Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
    (2)
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the    financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
    A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to    China Media Group Corporation, and will be retained by China Media Group Corporation and    furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
    /s/ Con Unerkov
--------------------------
Con    Unerkov
Chief    Financial Officer
August    22, 2011 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
### §150109. Duty to maintain corporate and tax-exempt status

(a) Corporate Status.—The corporation shall maintain its status as a corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia.

(b) Tax-Exempt Status.—The corporation shall maintain its status as an organization exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 1 et seq.).

(Pub. L. 105–225, Aug. 12, 1998, 112 Stat. 1387.)

| Revised Section | Source (U.S. Code) | Source (Statutes at Large) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 150109(a) | 36:2308(f). | Apr. 10, 1984, Pub. L. 98–257, §§8(f), 15 (1st sentence), 98 Stat. 128, 129. |
| 150109(b) | 36:2314 (1st sentence). | |

Section