POLICY ISSUE 

(Information) 

March 27, 2008 SECY-08-0041 

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: Luis A. Reyes 

Executive Director for Operations 

SUBJECT: FISCAL YEAR 2007 RESULTS OF THE INDUSTRY TRENDS 

PROGRAM FOR OPERATING POWER REACTORS AND STATUS OF 

THE ONGOING DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM 

PURPOSE: 

The purpose of this paper is to inform the Commission of the results of the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) Industry Trends Program (ITP) for fiscal year (FY) 2007 and the 

status of ongoing program development. 

BACKGROUND: 

The NRC staff implemented the ITP in 2001. The NRC uses industry-level indicators to monitor 

for adverse trends. After assessing adverse trends for safety significance, the NRC responds 

as necessary to any identified safety issues, including adjusting the inspection and licensing 

programs if necessary. One important output of this program is the annual agency performance 

measures reported to Congress on the number of statistically significant adverse industry trends 

in safety performance. This outcome measure is part of the NRC Performance and 

Accountability Report (PAR). In addition, the NRC annually reviews the results of the ITP and 

any actions taken or planned during the Agency Action Review Meeting and reports the findings 

of this review to the Commission. This paper is the seventh annual report to the Commission on 

the ITP. 

CONTACT: A. Masciantonio, NRR/DIRS 

 301-415-1290
The Commissioners 2 

NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0313, “Industry Trends Program,” contains ITP details, 

including definitions of indicators monitored and program descriptions. 

DISCUSSION: 

Using the ITP, the staff monitors industry safety performance to identify and address adverse 

industry trends. The indicators are comprehensive and based on the best available data. An 

adverse trend exists if the slope of the regression line fitted to the long-term indicator data is a 

positive value. 

In addition to the long-term indicators, the ITP also uses precursor events identified by the 

accident sequence precursor (ASP) program to assess industry performance. The occurrence 

rate of precursors is analyzed to determine if an adverse trend exists. 

The ITP uses the ASP results as one of the agency’s monitored indicators. The NRC provides 

the results of the ITP in the PAR and performance budget documents. 

The ITP monitors industry-level performance. The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) provides 

oversight of individual plant conditions and events. 

RESULTS OF FY 2007 TREND ANALYSES 

Based on the ITP indicators and the ASP program results, the staff did not identify any 

statistically significant adverse trends in industry safety performance through the end of 

FY 2007. The graphs in Enclosure 1 show the long-term ITP indicator trends and the ASP 

precursor data. 

The ASP program considers an event with a conditional core damage probability (CCDP) or 

increase in core damage probability (ΔCDP) greater than or equal to 1×10-6 to be a precursor. 

The graph depicting the occurrence rate of total precursors by fiscal year, on page 8 of 

Enclosure 1, shows the occurrence rate for all precursors by FY during the period 

FY 2001 - FY 2006. A review of the data for that period reveals that (1) the mean occurrence 

rate of all precursors does not exhibit a trend that is statistically significant for the period 

FY 2001 - FY 2006, and (2) the analysis detected a statistically significant decreasing trend for 

precursors with a CCDP or ΔCDP greater than or equal to 1×10-4 during this same period. The 

staff chose FY 2001 as the starting point for trend analyses to provide a data period with a 

consistent ASP program scope and to align it with the first full year of the ROP. ASP program 

changes in FY 2001 (e.g., inclusion of significance determination process findings and external 

initiated events) significantly increased the number of precursors identified compared to those 

identified in previous years. The data period for trending analyses ends in FY 2006 (the last full 

year of completed ASP analyses) but will become a rolling 10-year period in the future. 

The ASP program also provides the basis for the FY 2006 performance goal measure of “zero 

events per year identified as a significant precursor of a nuclear accident”—one measure 

associated with the safety goal established in the NRC’s Strategic Plan. A significant precursor 

is an event that has a probability of at least 1 in 1,000 (greater than or equal to 1×10-3) of 

leading to a reactor accident. A review of the data reveals that the mean occurrence rate of 
The Commissioners 3 

significant precursors does not exhibit a statistically significant trend for the period 

FY 2001 - FY 2007. The staff identified no significant precursors in FY 2007. 

The staff reported the results of the ASP program to the Commission in SECY-07-0176, “Status 

of the Accident Sequence Precursor Program and the Development of Standardized Plant 

Analysis Risk Models,” dated October 3, 2007.

In addition to the long-term trend monitoring, the staff uses a statistical approach based on 

prediction limits to identify potential short-term, year-to-year emergent issues before they 

become long-term trends. Enclosure 2 shows the short-term trends and the prediction limits for 

each of the ITP indicators. Short-term trending of the FY 2007 data did not identify any issues 

that warranted additional analysis or significant adjustments to the nuclear reactor safety 

inspection or licensing programs. However, in the ROP self-assessment Commission paper for 

calendar year 2007, the staff noted a possible declining trend in industry performance as 

evidenced by an increase in the number of sites in Column 3 and 4 of the ROP Action Matrix. 

The staff plans to further assess ITP and ROP data as well as engage with internal and external 

stakeholders to better understand this information. 

ITP DEVELOPMENT

Current ITP performance indicators have both strengths and weaknesses. Strengths include 

the availability of historical results, continuity and consistency in yearly evaluations, and broad 

coverage of the cornerstones of safety. However, weaknesses in the initiating events and 

mitigating systems cornerstones of safety include (1) overlapping coverage, (2) limited risk 

coverage, and (3) difficulties in interpreting the risk significance of important adverse trends. 

As a first step in enhancing the ITP to address these weaknesses, the staff chose the initiating 

event cornerstone of safety as the area of focus. Work focused on the development of 

performance indicators that did not overlap in coverage, significantly increased the risk 

coverage, and provided a mechanism for determining the risk significance of changes in 

performance, at both the individual initiating event level and at the integrated cornerstone of 

safety level. 

In FY 2007, the staff completed the development of the Baseline Risk Index for Initiating Events 

(BRIIE), an indicator that monitors 9 risk-significant initiating events for boiling-water reactors 

and 10 events for pressurized-water reactors (the additional event category is steam generator 

tube rupture). The indicator weights each initiating event according to its relative contribution to 

industry core damage frequency. The staff reported the status of BRIIE development in 

SECY-07-0063, “Fiscal Year 2006 Results of the Industry Trends Program for Operating 

Reactors and Status of the Ongoing Development of the Program,” dated April 3, 2007. In its 

staff requirements memorandum (SRM), “Briefing on Results of the Agency Action Review 

Meeting (AARM)—Reactors,” dated June 14, 2007, the Commission directed that “the staff 

should provide to the Commission for approval a paper that describes the Baseline Risk Index 

for Initiating Events and plans for its use as a new industry-wide indicator. As part of this paper, 

the staff should discuss its communication plan.” 

The Commission paper describing the BRIIE and the related communication plan appeared as 

SECY-07-0184, “Industry Trends Program for Operating Power Reactors—Baseline Risk Index 

for Initiating Events,” dated October 22, 2007. In this paper, the staff requested Commission 
The Commissioners 4 

approval to implement the BRIIE as a new performance indicator for the ITP. In its SRM of 

December 21, 2007, related to SECY-07-0184, the Commission approved the staff’s 

recommendation to implement the BRIIE. However, the Commission directed the staff to 

develop a public communication strategy to explain the meaning of the BRIIE, its underlying 

concept, and its intended use before making the information publicly available and before 

beginning the practice of reporting the BRIIE results to Congress. The Commission also 

directed that, when making the BRIIE publicly available, the staff should provide supporting data 

where appropriate and update the NRC public Web site on industry trends to discuss the BRIIE. 

The staff is currently implementing these directives. With assistance from the Office of Public 

Affairs and the Center for Communications in the Office of the Executive Director for 

Operations, the staff has drafted a clear, plain-English, reader-friendly description of the BRIIE 

for the NRC public Web site. The staff has also drafted revisions to the NRC IMC 0313 that 

incorporate the BRIIE. These initiatives will be completed by May 2008. 

NUREG/CR-6932 (INL/EXT-06-11950), “Baseline Risk Index for Initiating Events (BRIIE),” 

issued June 2007, provides historical results and the technical basis for the BRIIE. The staff will 

provide initial results for BRIIE in the Commission ITP paper issued in early 2009. 

COMMITMENTS: 

In SECY-07-0063, the staff committed to incorporate the BRIIE concept into NRC IMC 0313 and 

to formally report BRIIE results as an ITP indicator in this Commission paper; however, both of 

these activities were delayed in response to Commission direction as described above. The 

staff had previously also committed in SECY-06-0076, “FY 2005 Results of the Industry Trends 

Program for Operating Power Reactors and Status of the Ongoing Development of the 

Program,” dated March 31, 2006, to revise IMC 0313 to include a process to ensure that the 

count of significant events includes revised and updated significant events data. The staff 

delayed this change to IMC 0313 in order to include the BRIIE at the same time; however, the 

staff used the new process in FY 2007. The next revision to IMC 0313 will address both the 

new process and the BRIIE concept. 

RESOURCES: 

In FY 2008, approximately 0.5 full-time equivalent staff (FTE) and $450,000 are needed for 

ongoing ITP implementation. The budget currently includes these resources. For FY 2009, 

approximately 0.5 FTE and $475,000 for contractor support are needed and are included in the 

FY 2009 budget request as part of the ROP in Planned Activity 122148. The NRC Office of 

Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) completed work in direct support of the BRIIE in FY 2007. 

RES provides indirect support to the ITP in the areas of operating experience data and models 

developed and budgeted under other RES programs such as the simplified plant analysis risk 

program, the ASP program, and the reactor operating experience data collection and analysis 

program. The resources budgeted in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and RES are 

adequate for ongoing ITP implementation. 
The Commissioners 5 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this paper and concurs. The Office of the 

General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. 

 /RA/ 

 

Luis A. Reyes 

 Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosures: 

1. Fiscal Year 2007 Long-Term Industry 

 Trends Results 

2. Fiscal Year 2007 Short-Term Industry 

 Trends Results 
The Commissioners 5 

 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this paper and concurs. The Office of the 

General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. 

 /RA/ 

 

Luis A. Reyes 

 Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosures: 

1. Fiscal Year 2007 Long-Term Industry 

 Trends Results 

2. Fiscal Year 2007 Short-Term Industry 

 Trends Results 

 

 

EDATS: SECY-2008-0155/200100034 

ADAMS Accession Number: ML080510574 *Concurred by e-mail 

OFFICE IPAB/DIRS IPAB/DIRS Tech Editor* IOEB/DIRS* PMDA/NRR* 

NAME AMasciantonio JAndersen HChang MJRoss-Lee TDietz 

DATE 02/21/08 03/06/08 02/25/08 03/03/08 02/28/08 

OFFICE DIRS/NRR OCFO* OGC (NLO)* RES* NRR 

NAME FBrown LBarnett EWilliamson BSheron 

(BBeasley for) 

JDyer 

(JWiggins for) 

DATE 03/10/08 03/05/08 03/03/08 03/05/08 03/20/08 

OFFICE EDO 

NAME LReyes 

DATE 03/27/08 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
 

 ENCLOSURE 1

FISCAL YEAR 2007 LONG-TERM INDUSTRY TRENDS RESULTS 

No statistically significant adverse trends were observed in the Industry Trends Program 

performance indicator data from the most recent 10 years (fiscal year (FY) 1998 to FY 2007) as 

indicated by the following graphs. 

Automatic Scrams While Critical

0.48

0.64

0.52

0.57

0.44

0.75

0.56

0.47

0.32

0.48

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Scrams per Plant

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend
 

 

2

Safety System Actuations

0.31 0.29 0.29

0.19 0.18

0.42

0.24

0.38

0.22

0.25

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Actuations per Plant

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend

Significant Events

0.04

0.03

0.04

0.07

0.05

0.07

0.04

0.05

0.03

0.02

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Events per Plant

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend
 

 

3

Safety System Failures

2.76

1.68

1.40

0.83 0.87

0.96

0.78

0.99

0.59 0.65

0

1

2

3

4

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Failures per Plant

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend

Forced Outage Rate (%)

10.73

5.20

4.24

3.00

1.70

3.04

1.88

2.44

1.47 1.43

0

5

10

15

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Forced Outage Rate (%)

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend
 

 

4

Equipment Forced Outages/1000 Commercial Critical Hours

0.18

0.16

0.13

0.11

0.12

0.16

0.15

0.13

0.10

0.11

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Equipment Forced Outages/

1000 Comm. Crit. Hours

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend

Collective Radiation Exposure

140

128

115

123

111

125

100

117

93

110

0

100

200

300

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Average Exposure per Plant

(Person-REM)

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend
 

 

5

Unplanned Power Changes

1.51

1.39

1.21

1.07

1.15

1.00 0.97

0.91 0.90

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend

Reactor Coolant System Activity

1.53

0.76

0.52 0.51

0.41 0.42 0.39

0.58

0.43

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Maximum Percentage of Technical 

Specification Limits

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend
 

 

6

Reactor Coolant System Leakage

5.76

7.94

5.86

5.16

4.82 4.64 4.45

4.08

4.35

0

4

8

12

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Maximum Percentage of Technical 

Specification Limits

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend

Drill/Exercise Performance

96.57

95.94

95.44 95.28

95.73 95.64

95.85

96.09 96.15

92

94

96

98

100

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Percentage Timely and Accurate

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend
 

 

7

ERO Drill Participation

96.34 96.30

97.10

97.74 97.87

98.20

97.96

97.58

92

94

96

98

100

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Note: Complete Fiscal Year 1999 Data not Available

Percentage of Key Personnel

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend

Alert and Notification System Reliability

98.05 98.02

98.53

98.79

98.92

99.24

99.34

99.48 99.45

97

98

99

100

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Percentage of Tests Successful

Industry Average

Industry Average Trend

 
 

 

8

Accident Sequence Precursors 

Total precursors—occurrence rate, by fiscal year. Data for FY 1988 – FY 2000 are shown for historical 

perspective. No trend line is shown because no statistically significant trend (p-value = 0.20) is detected for the 

FY 2001 – FY 2006 period. 

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

0.35

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Fiscal Year

Occurrence Rate

Historical Precursors (FY 88-00)

FY 01-06 Precursors
 ENCLOSURE 2

FISCAL YEAR 2007 SHORT-TERM INDUSTRY TRENDS RESULTS

The annual industry trend analysis compares the data for the most recent year with established 

short-term “prediction limits.” The prediction limits are 95th percentiles of predictive distributions 

for the data. The predictive distributions are statistical probability distributions that describe 

expected future performance. They are derived from performance during “baseline” periods for 

each performance indicator (PI). Baseline periods are periods for each PI during which the data 

can be regarded as fairly constant and indicative of “current” performance. There is no 

requirement for favorable trends to continue, and any adverse trends would need to be 

reversed. Therefore, for each PI, a series of trend analyses was performed to identify, if 

possible, a baseline period in which no statistically significant trend exists. In the Industry 

Trends Program (ITP) methodology, the minimum baseline period is at least 4 years, ending in 

the year with the most recent data (initially fiscal year (FY) 2002). If the most recent 4-year 

period satisfies the criteria, then the most recent 5-year period is considered. Successively 

longer periods are selected, as long as the statistical models fit and the test for trends shows 

little evidence. In the current methodology, whenever a new baseline period is sought, the 

period selected is the one that shows the least evidence of a trend. The results of the 

evaluation of the FY 2007 ITP PIs using the established prediction limits are provided below 

followed by plots of each PI with its FY 2007 data and associated prediction limit. 

No PI exceeded its associated prediction limit in FY 2007 as shown in the following graphs. 

Automatic Scrams While Critical

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

1.25

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Scrams per Plant

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (0.680)

Baseline Industry Average (0.533), 1997-2002

Figure 1 Automatic scrams while critical
 2 

 

Figure 2 Safety system actuations 

Significant Events

0.00

0.03

0.06

0.09

0.12

0.15

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Events per Plant

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (0.107)

Baseline Industry Average (0.0524), 2000-2004

Figure 3 Significant events

Safety System Actuations

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Actuations per Plant

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (0.379)

Baseline Industry Average (0.274), 1998-2005

 

(See Endnote 1) 
 3 

 

Figure 4 Safety system failures 

Forced Outage Rate

0

3

6

9

12

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Forced Outage Rate (%)

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (4.28)

Baseline Industry Average (2.40), 2001-2004

Figure 5 Forced outage rate 

Safety System Failures

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Failures per Plant

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (1.05)

Baseline Industry Average (0.862), 2001-2004
 4 

 

Equipment Forced Outages/1000 Commercial Critical Hours

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Equipment Forced Outage Rate

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (0.181)

Baseline Industry Average (0.142), 1998-2004

Figure 6 Equipment forced outages per 1000 commercial critical hours 

Collective Radiation Exposure

0

50

100

150

200

250

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Average Exposure per Plant (Person-REM) 

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (139)

Baseline Industry Average (119), 1999-2002

Figure 7 Collective radiation exposure 
 5 

 

Unplanned Power Changes

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (1.29)

Baseline Industry Average (1.10), 2001-2004

Figure 8 Unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours 

Reactor Coolant System Activity

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Maximum Percentage of Tech. Spec. Limits

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (0.646)

Baseline Industry Average (0.462), 2001-2004

Figure 9 Reactor coolant system activity 
 6 

 

Drill/Exercise Performance 92

94

96

98

100

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Percentage Timely and Accurate

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (95.2)

Baseline Industry Average (95.6), 2000-2004

Figure 11 Drill/exercise performance 

Reactor Coolant System Leakage

0

2

4

6

8

10

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Maximum Percentage of Tech. Spec. Limits

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (6.32)

Baseline Industry Average (5.14), 2000-2004

Figure 10 Reactor coolant system leakage 

(See Endnote 1) 
 7 

 

ERO Drill Participation

94

96

98

100

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Percentage of Key Personnel

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (96.8)

Baseline Industry Average (97.3), 2001-2004

Figure 12 ERO drill participation 

Alert and Notification System Reliability

97

98

99

100

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fiscal Year

Percentage of Tests Successful

Industry Average

Prediction Limit (98.9)

Baseline Industry Average (98.3), 2001-2004

Figure 13 Alert and notification system reliability 
 8 

 

NOTE 1: The 2003 blackout event in the safety system actuations graph (Figure 2) and the 

2000 Indian Point 2 steam generator tube rupture event in the reactor coolant system leakage 

graph (Figure 10) were not included in the short-term data for the purpose of determining 

prediction limits. They were excluded from the development of the prediction limit models 

because they are considered outlier events that overly influenced the statistical analysis of the 

industrywide data. Removing these events resulted in less restrictive prediction limits.