[Cite as Aho v. RTI Internatl. Metals, Inc., 2017-Ohio-2803.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO 

WALTER AHO, : O P I N I O N 

 Appellant, : 

 CASE NOS. 2016-T-0080

 - vs - : 2016-T-0082 

RTI INTERNATIONAL METALS, INC., : 

et al., 

: 

 Appellee. 

Civil appeals from the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. 

Case Nos. 2015 CV 01488 and 2016 CV 00131. 

Judgment: Reversed and remanded. 

Irene K. Makridis, 155 South Park Avenue, Suite 160, Warren, OH 44481 (For 

Appellant). 

C. Scott Lanz and Adam V. Buente, Manchester Newman & Bennett, The Commerce 

Building, Atrium Level Two, 201 East Commerce Street, Youngstown, OH 44503-1641 

(For Appellee). 

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Walter D. Aho, appeals the judgment of the Trumbull County 

Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor of appellee, RTI 

International Metals, Inc. (“RTI”). For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is 

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. 
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{¶2} Mr. Aho suffered a knee injury while climbing the stairs at work on the 

premises of his employer, RTI. The Industrial Commission allowed Mr. Aho to 

participate in the worker’s compensation fund, first on a claim for a “strain/sprain right 

knee” and subsequently on a claim for a “medial meniscus tear of the right knee,” for 

which Mr. Aho underwent surgery and physical therapy. RTI appealed the allowance of 

both claims to the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, and the cases were 

consolidated. 

{¶3} RTI took Mr. Aho’s deposition. RTI moved for summary judgment, arguing 

there was no causal connection between Mr. Aho’s injury and his employment. Mr. Aho 

took the deposition of his surgeon, Dr. Thomas Jones, but it was not filed until after Mr. 

Aho responded to the motion for summary judgment and after the trial court granted 

summary judgment in favor of RTI. The trial court found Mr. Aho’s injury did not arise 

out of his employment with RTI and reversed the Industrial Commission’s decisions. 

{¶4} Mr. Aho filed a timely notice of appeal and assigns one error for our 

review: 

{¶5} “The trial court committed error in granting appellee’s motion for summary 

judgment based upon the conclusion that appellant was not injured in the course of and 

out [of] his employment with appellee.” 

{¶6} Mr. Aho argues the trial court erred in determining on summary judgment 

that he did not suffer a compensable workplace injury as defined by R.C. 4123.01. 

Summary Judgment Standard 

{¶7} “While summary judgment is a beneficial procedure aiding in the swift 

administration of justice, it must also ‘be used cautiously and with the utmost care so 
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that litigant’s right to a trial * * * is not usurped in the presence of conflicting facts and 

inferences.’” Fifth Third Mtge Co. v. Perry, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 12CA13, 2013-Ohio3308, ¶35, quoting Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co., 13 Ohio App.3d 7, 14-15 (6th 

Dist.1983). “[T]he trial court may not weigh the evidence or select among reasonable 

inferences. * * * Rather, all doubts and questions must be resolved in the non-moving 

party’s favor.” McCarthy v. Lordstown, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0050, 2015-

Ohio-955, ¶7 (citations omitted). 

{¶8} Summary judgment is, therefore, only proper when 

(1) [n]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be 

litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds 

can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most 

strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary 

judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. 

Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977), citing Civ.R. 56(C). 

{¶9} “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial 

court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the 

trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material 

element of the nonmoving party’s claim.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 

(1996), citing Civ.R. 56(C) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986). 

If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment 

must be denied. Id. If the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party then 

has the burden to provide evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

at 293, citing Civ.R. 56(E). 

{¶10} “Civ.R. 56(C) provides the exclusive list of documentary evidence to 

support a summary judgment motion: affidavits, deposition, answers to interrogatories, 
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written admissions, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations. 

No other evidence may be considered.” Drawl v. Cornicelli, 124 Ohio App.3d 562, 569 

(11th Dist.1997) (emphasis sic), citing Civ.R. 56(C); see also Rilley v. Brimfield Twp., 

11th Dist. Portage No. 2009-P-0036, 2010-Ohio-5181, ¶61. “Other documentary 

evidence may be admitted; however, the appropriate method to introduce this evidence 

is by way of an affidavit that complies with Civ.R. 56(E).” Id., citing Martin v. Cent. Ohio 

Trans. Auth., 70 Ohio App.3d 83, 89 (10th Dist.1990). 

{¶11} On appeal, we review a trial court’s entry of summary judgment de novo, 

i.e., “independently and without deference to the trial court’s determination.” Brown v. 

Cty. Commrs. of Scioto Cty., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711 (4th Dist.1993) (citation omitted); 

Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996); see also Conley-Slowinski 

v. Superior Spinning & Stamping Co., 128 Ohio App.3d 360, 363 (6th Dist.1998) 

(holding the de novo standard applies to common pleas rulings from an appeal of an 

Industrial Commission’s decision).

Review of the Record 

{¶12} On appeal, Mr. Aho asserts, “[t]he record in this case contains ample facts 

that show that appellant injured his right knee at the appellee’s titanium melt shop on 

February 10, 2015, [and] that appellant was injured while doing his regular work for 

appellee.” RTI responds that Mr. Aho is relying on evidence not properly before the trial 

court at the time summary judgment was entered and that the injury is not compensable 

merely because it happened at the workplace. 
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{¶13} On June 6, 2016, RTI filed its motion for summary judgment, arguing no 

genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Mr. Aho’s injury is compensable. RTI relied 

on Mr. Aho’s deposition, which was properly filed that same day. 

{¶14} On June 24, 2016, Mr. Aho filed his memorandum contra to the motion for 

summary judgment, arguing genuine issues of fact exist regarding the compensability of 

his injury. Mr. Aho attached the following to his memorandum contra: (a) the intake 

report by the nurse at WorkMed, RTI’s own medical provider, where Mr. Aho was 

immediately taken for treatment; (b) the physician’s report dictated by Dr. Stephen 

Dubos at WorkMed; and (c) the physician’s report submitted by Dr. Dubos to the Ohio 

Bureau of Worker’s Compensation. 

{¶15} On July 15, 2016, RTI filed a reply to Mr. Aho’s memorandum contra, in 

which it argued Mr. Aho did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact because 

the medical records attached to his memorandum contra contained hearsay and were 

not properly authenticated. Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(E), RTI asserted, the trial court could 

not consider these documents. 

{¶16} On July 20, 2016, Mr. Aho filed a response to RTI’s reply, in which he 

argued the medical records could be considered by the trial court because they were 

included as exhibits to the deposition of Dr. Thomas Jones. Mr. Aho stated the 

deposition of Dr. Jones was taken on June 15, 2016; “Defense counsel attended Dr. 

Jones deposition, reviewed these exhibits and fully cross-examined Dr. Jones”; but the 

transcript would not be completed until July 22, 2016. Mr. Aho asserted RTI’s reply 

would be rendered moot upon proper filing of the exhibits with the deposition. Mr. Aho 

also requested “that the Court delay ruling on Defendant Employer’s motion for 
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summary judgment until Plaintiff’s formal filing of transcript of the deposition of Dr. 

Thomas Jones.” 

{¶17} On July 22, 2016, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of RTI 

in an entry that had been signed on July 20, 2016, the same day Mr. Aho’s response 

was filed with the request for delay. 

{¶18} On July 25, 2016, Dr. Jones’ deposition was properly filed. On that same 

day, RTI also filed a sur-reply to Mr. Aho’s response, in which it stated the following: 

The transcript of Dr. Jones will demonstrate that Defendant 

objected to the use of these exhibits during Plaintiff’s counsel’s 

examination of Dr. Jones for the same reason that Defendant 

objects to the use of these documents as evidence in connection 

with Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment – namely, that the 

documents are hearsay and not admissible. The documents are 

not medical records that were prepared or authored by Dr. Jones 

and properly authenticated by Dr. Jones in his deposition, but are 

instead medical records from a completely different medical facility 

and doctor, Austintown Work-Med and Dr. Dubos. The records 

have not been properly authenticated, and the information 

contained within the records is hearsay. 

{¶19} We agree with RTI that the trial court could not consider the documents 

attached to Mr. Aho’s memorandum contra. Regardless of whether the documents 

contain hearsay, they were not properly authenticated or incorporated by way of an 

affidavit that complies with Civ.R. 56(E). Additionally, the deposition of Dr. Jones had 

not yet been filed. Mr. Aho, in his memorandum contra, requested the trial court to 

delay its ruling but did not move for an extension of time to respond to the summary 

judgment motion, as provided for in Civ.R. 56(F). The trial court’s decision not to delay 

its ruling has not been assigned as error on appeal. As a result, we can only consider 

the pleadings and the transcript of Mr. Aho’s deposition in determining whether 

summary judgment should have been denied. 
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Compensable Workplace Injury 

{¶20} “‘Injury’ includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means 

or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the 

injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). Therefore, “[a]n injury sustained by 

an employee is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act only if it was 

‘received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.’” 

Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St.2d 302, 303 (1980), quoting R.C. 4123.01(C) (citations 

omitted); see also Fisher v. Mayfield, 49 Ohio St.3d 275, 277 (1990) (recognizing both 

elements must be met). Here, there is no dispute that the injury occurred in the course 

of Mr. Aho’s employment. The dispute in this case centers on whether Mr. Aho’s injury 

arose out of his employment. 

{¶21} The test for “arising out of” employment is not whether there was any fault 

or neglect on the part of the employer or its employees. Lord v. Daugherty, 66 Ohio 

St.2d 441, 444 (1981), citing Indus. Comm. v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1 (1921); Indus. 

Comm. v. Gintert, 128 Ohio St. 129 (1934); Fox v. Schiele, 162 Ohio St. 569 (1955). 

The test is, rather, “whether a ‘causal connection’ existed between an employee’s injury 

and his employment either through the activities, the conditions or the environment of 

the employment.” Bralley, supra, at 303, citing Weigandt, Gintert, and Schiele, supra. 

Whether a “causal connection” exists “depends on the totality of the facts and 

circumstances surrounding the accident, including, (1) the proximity of the scene of the 

accident to the place of employment, (2) the degree of control the employer had over 

the scene of the accident, and (3) the benefit the employer received from the injured 

employee’s presence at the scene of the accident.” Lord, supra, at syllabus (emphasis 
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added). An injury may be compensable “irrespective of the presence or absence of a 

special hazard thereon which is distinctive in nature or quantitatively greater than 

hazards encountered by the public at large.” Griffin v. Hydra-Matic Div., Gen. Motors 

Corp., 39 Ohio St.3d 79 (1988), syllabus. 

{¶22} Because worker’s compensation cases are very fact specific, “no one test 

or analysis can be said to apply to each and every factual possibility. Nor can only one 

factor be considered controlling. Rather, a flexible and analytically sound approach to 

these cases is preferable. Otherwise, the application of hard and fast rules can lead to 

unsound and unfair results.” Fisher, supra, at 280. Additionally, worker’s compensation 

statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee and in favor of awarding 

benefits. Id. at 278 (citation omitted). 

{¶23} “An injury caused by an unexplained slip or fall presents a unique case 

under the workers’ compensation laws.” Waller v. Mayfield, 37 Ohio St.3d 118, 122 

(1988). 

‘All risks causing injury to a claimant can be brought within three 

categories: risks distinctly associated with the employment, risks 

personal to the claimant, and “neutral” risks—i.e., risks having no 

particular employment or personal character. Harms from the first 

are universally compensable. Those from the second are 

universally noncompensable. It is within the third category that 

most controversy in modern compensation law occurs.’ 

Id., quoting 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, Section 7.00, at 3-12 

(1985). 

{¶24} Thus, under circumstances “where it may be shown that the unexplained 

fall results from a neutral origin,” and idiopathic causes have been eliminated, an 

inference arises that the fall is traceable “to some ordinary risk, albeit unidentified, to 
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which the employee was exposed on the employment premises.” Id. at 124. The 

claimant carries the ultimate burden to eliminate idiopathic causes (i.e., unique to the 

claimant) for an unexplained fall. Id. at 125. Nevertheless, in the summary judgment 

exercise, the moving party must initially demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact in that regard. Stewart v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 89 Ohio App.3d 35, 42 (4th 

Dist.1993). 

Trial Court’s Ruling 

{¶25} Here, the trial court stated the following in its entry granting summary 

judgment: 

It is unfortunate that Aho sustained this injury. However, the fact 

that the injury was sustained at work performing a normal activity of 

daily life does not mean it is a compensable injury under workers’ 

compensation. There was no direct benefit to the employer of Aho 

traversing the stairs consummate with his injury. This activity, 

much like that in Dailey, was a normal movement. 

{¶26} In Dailey v. Autozone, Inc., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 99-T-0146, 2000 WL 

1459708 (Sept. 29, 2000), the claimant, a cashier, was either walking or turning slightly 

to hand off a paper receipt when he first experienced a pain in his back. Id. at *3. The 

only evidence before the trial court on the issue of whether the claimant’s injury “arose 

out of” his employment came from the claimant’s treating physician who was of the 

opinion that the injury was not compensable as a worker’s compensation injury. Id. 

The claimant’s request to participate in the worker’s compensation fund was denied by 

the Industrial Commission. Id. at *1. This court held the claimant’s workplace injury 

was not compensable because it “was a normal movement that could easily have 

occurred at home, or any other place other than work. It was not specifically associated 

with his work nor could it be considered a hazard of working at AutoZone.” Id. at *3. 
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{¶27} We do not find this case to be determinative of Mr. Aho’s claim. First, 

unlike Dailey, Mr. Aho’s claims were allowed by the Industrial Commission. Second, 

unlike Dailey, we do not have an opinion from Mr. Aho’s treating physician that his injury 

is not compensable. Third, although climbing stairs is a normal movement that Mr. Aho 

would engage in other than at work, similar to Dailey, climbing this particular unlit 

staircase is only associated with Mr. Aho performing a necessary function of his job 

duties, unlike Dailey. Mr. Aho testified in his deposition that the injury to his knee 

occurred when he was climbing a staircase at work. RTI emphasizes that Mr. Aho did 

not slip, fall, or trip when he was climbing the staircase. Mr. Aho did repeatedly testify, 

however, to the following: it “felt like my foot didn’t hit the stair tread correctly”; his “foot 

felt awkward on that stair tread”; “I don’t know how my foot hit the stair tread. Something 

wasn’t right”; his “foot hit the stair tread, and it felt awkward”; “I almost fell down. But 

thank God there was a steel railing on both sides”; and “when I felt and heard the loud 

pop in my right knee, I grabbed onto the railing with the travel card in my hand, and 

that’s how I got the rest of the way up the steps.” He additionally testified that the lights 

were out in the stairwell, and the emergency light was not working. He stated: “I don’t 

know if there was something on the step that made my foot not hit it right, or if it just 

popped and happened. I don’t know. Because the lights were out. It was a very dark 

area.” And he stated: “All I know is that the lights were out, and there may have been 

something on the step.” 

{¶28} Further, “other courts have eschewed the reasoning of Dailey where an 

activity, event, or condition of employment is a precipitating or contributing factor in the 

claimant’s injury.” Luettke v. Autoneum N. Am., Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-14-1236, 
 11

2015-Ohio-3210, *12 (adopting the trial court’s decision in Appendix A as its own), citing 

Bahr v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92620, 2009-Ohio-6641 

(claimant twisted her knee and tore her ACL while turning to walk away after engaging 

in an employment-related physical activity); and Emmert v. Mabe, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. 

C-070315, 2008-Ohio-1844, ¶10 (claimant-housekeeper tore the meniscus in her knee 

when bending over to pick up trash: “That she could have sustained the injury at home 

or elsewhere was immaterial in light of the uncontroverted evidence that the 

performance of her job duties had directly led to her injuries.”). 

{¶29} Additionally, RTI did not argue in its motion for summary judgment that Mr. 

Aho’s unexplained injury was idiopathic, thus Mr. Aho did not have a burden to 

demonstrate a factual issue in that regard to survive summary judgment. Because Mr. 

Aho could not identify the origin of his knee injury, other than his foot hit the stair tread 

“awkwardly,” an inference arises that it is traceable to some ordinary, yet unidentified, 

risk, to which Mr. Aho was exposed on RTI’s premises. This is further bolstered by Mr. 

Aho’s testimony that the stairwell was unlit at the time of his injury. 

{¶30} Finally, we do not agree with the trial court that RTI did not receive a direct 

benefit from Mr. Aho climbing that staircase, and counsel for appellees conceded this 

fact at oral argument. Mr. Aho testified that it was necessary for him to climb those 

stairs to take a “travel card” from the floor to the furnace operator on the “pulpit,” which 

is one of his job duties at RTI. He explained why he was climbing the stairs at the time 

of his injury: 

Well, we were out on the floor working the furnaces. And I was the 

bolt man that day, so my job is to tear the furnaces down and put 

them back together. And then when I get a furnace done, I’m to 

take the travel card to the furnace operator on the pulpit. There is 
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approximately 13 steps that I have to go up and hand him the travel 

card. * * * On the second or third step, I felt a loud, I felt a hard 

and loud pop, a very painful pop in my right knee. It’s like I heard 

and felt it at the same time, or I felt and heard it all at the split 

second, just like bam. I hobbled the rest of the way up the steps. I 

handed [a co-worker] the travel card. 

{¶31} RTI did not meet its initial summary judgment burden to demonstrate the 

absence of any genuine issues of material fact. It did not establish that reasonable 

minds could only reach the conclusion that Mr. Aho’s injury did not arise out of his 

employment. In other words, considering the record at the time summary judgment was 

entered, whether Mr. Aho’s knee injury arose out of his employment cannot be decided 

in favor of RTI as a matter of law. The trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment 

in favor of RTI was in error. 

{¶32} Mr. Aho’s assignment of error is with merit. 

{¶33} The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is reversed. 

This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., 

concur.