Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2001 AIR FORCE

INVENTORY

Parts Shortages Are

Impacting Operations

and Maintenance

Effectiveness

GAO-01-587
Page i GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

Spare Parts Shortages Adversely Affect Mission Performance,

Economy and Efficiency of Operations, and Retention of

Military Personnel 7

Shortages of Specific Spare Parts Occurred for Multiple Reasons 11

Overall Initiatives Exist to Address Problems 16

Agency Comments 20

Scope and Methodology 21

Appendix I Management Weaknesses Have Contributed to

Spare Parts Shortages 24

Appendix II E-3, C-5, and F-100-220 Engine Parts and Part

Function 26

Appendix III Spare Parts Reviewed and Reasons for Shortage 27

Appendix IV Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations

and Logistics, Directorate of Supply, Spare Parts

Initiatives 29

Appendix V Comments From the Department of Defense 30

Related GAO Products 31

Contents
Page ii GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Tables

Table 1: Reported Rates for Aircraft That Were Mission Capable

and Not Mission Capable Due to Supply Problems 4

Table 2: Reported Mission-Capable Goals and Rates for the E-3 7

Table 3: Reported Goals and Rates at Which E-3 Aircraft Were Not

Mission Capable Due to Supply Problems 8

Table 4: Reported Mission-Capable Goals and Rates for the C-5

Aircraft 9

Table 5: Goals and Rates at Which the C-5 Aircraft Were Reported

Not Mission Capable Due to Supply Problems 9

Table 6: F-100-220 War Readiness Engine Goal and Reported

Usable Engines Available, by Quarter 10

Table 7: Reasons for Shortages of 75 Spare Parts for Selected

Engine and Aircraft 12

Figures

Figure 1: E-3, C-5, F-15, and F-16 Aircraft 6
Page 1 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

June 27, 2001

Congressional Committees

Having spare parts available when needed to perform required

maintenance is critical to the Department of Defense’s accomplishment of

its missions. Shortages of spare parts are a key indicator of whether the

billions of dollars annually spent on these parts are being used in an

effective, efficient, and economical manner. Since 1990, we have

designated the Department ‘s management of its inventory, including spare

parts, as high risk because its inventory is vulnerable to fraud, waste, and

abuse.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 requires us to

evaluate various aspects of the military services’ logistics support

capability, including the provision of spare parts.1

 Also, the Chairman,

House Committee on Appropriations, and the Chairman, Subcommittee on

Defense, House Committee on Appropriations, requested that we review

issues related to the quality and availability of spare parts for aircraft,

ships, vehicles, and weapon systems. In response to these requests, we

reviewed known spare parts shortages within the services. For this report,

our objectives were to determine (1) the impact of spare parts shortages

on three selected Air Force systems and (2) the reasons for the shortages.

Additionally, we identified the overall initiatives that the Air Force and the

Defense Logistics Agency have in place or planned to address the

shortages.

To address our objectives, we reviewed the Air Force’s E-3 early airborne

warning and control system aircraft; the C-5 transport aircraft; and the

F-100-220 engine, which is used in some F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft; we

also reviewed 75 parts that were in short supply for these systems. We

selected these systems because they are key to fulfilling Air Force

missions. The Air Force sets goals to have a certain number of each

aircraft available and capable of performing its missions at any given time.

It measures the impact of parts shortages on aircraft availability by

determining the percentage of aircraft that cannot meet mission

requirements because parts needed for repairs are unavailable. The Air

 1

 P.L. 106-65, sec. 364.

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Force and the Defense Logistics Agency are responsible for managing and

providing spare parts for the Air Force’s aircraft.

Spare parts shortages on the three systems we reviewed have adversely

affected the performance of assigned missions and the economy and

efficiency of maintenance activities. Specifically, the Air Force did not

meet its mission-capable goals for the E-3 or C-5 during fiscal years

1996-2000, nor did it meet its goal to have enough F-100-220 engines to

meet peacetime and wartime goals during that period. For example, in

fiscal year 2000 the E-3s were not mission capable for supply reasons

11.3 percent of the time. In other words, 3 or 4 of the total of 32 E-3

aircraft were not available during the year. In fiscal year 2000, the C-5s

were not mission capable for supply reasons 18.1 percent of the time, or

almost 23 of 126 C-5s were not mission capable. Also, maintenance

personnel have been required to use the inefficient practice of removing

parts from one aircraft for use on another. Maintenance personnel report

that this practice can require double the work since they also have to fix

the aircraft that parts are removed from. Lastly, the shortages may affect

personnel retention. We recently reported that one of the six factors cited

by military personnel as sources of dissatisfaction and reasons to leave the

military related to work circumstances such as the lack of parts and

materials to successfully complete daily job requirements.

The majority of reasons cited by item managers at the maintenance

facilities for spare parts shortages were most often related to more spares

being required than were anticipated by the inventory management system

and delays in the Air Force’s repair process as a result of the consolidation

of repair facilities. Other reasons included (1) difficulties with producing

or repairing parts, (2) reliability of spare parts, and (3) contracting issues.

For example, the anticipated quarterly demand for a machine bolt for the

F-100-220 engine was 828, but actual demand turned out to be over 12,000.

As a result, some F-100-220 engines were not mission capable because

they were waiting for more bolts to be obtained. In another case, a

contractor produced sufficient quantities of a visor seal assembly for the

C-5, but the parts failed to meet design tolerances. As a result of this

production problem, demands for this part could not be met.

The Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency have numerous overall

initiatives under way or planned that may alleviate shortages of the spare

parts for the three aircraft systems we reviewed. The initiatives generally

address the reasons we identified for the shortages. For example, the Air

Force Materiel Command is developing a model to better forecast the

repair facilities’ demands for parts needed in the repair process. In another

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

overall initiative, the Command is developing a pilot program to have

contractors bypass the supply system and fill the supply bins for

maintenance personnel directly. This is an attempt to expedite the delivery

of repair parts. To ensure that the initiatives are achieving the goals of

increasing efficiencies in the supply system, the Air Force has developed a

Supply Strategic Plan that contains specific goals and outcome-oriented

measures for the initiatives. While the initiatives are intended to improve

processes for providing spare parts, they would likely result in increased

costs and larger inventories of needed spare parts.

The Air Force’s plan is in keeping with our previous recommendations to

improve overall logistics planning. We are, therefore, not making

recommendations at this time. We will separately review the overall

approach and initiatives, once they are more fully developed, to determine

whether there are opportunities to enhance these efforts. The Department

of Defense generally concurred with this report.

In January 2001, we reported on Department of Defense management

challenges and noted that the Department has had serious weaknesses in

its management of logistics functions and, in particular, inventory

management.2

 We have identified inventory management as a high-risk

area since 1990.3

 In 1999, we reported on the Air Force’s specific problems

in managing spare parts and noted an increase in the percentage of some

of its aircraft that were not mission capable due to supply problems.4

 (See

appendix I for examples from our reports on management weaknesses

related to the Air Force.) Also, the Secretary of the Air Force reported that

the readiness of the Air Force has declined since 1996 and attributed this

overall decline, in part, to spare parts shortages.5

 Table 1 shows the

percentage of all aviation systems that were mission capable and the

percentage of aircraft that were not mission capable due to supply

problems from fiscal year 1996 through the first quarter of fiscal 2001.

 2 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO-01-244,

Jan. 2001).

3 High Risk Series: An Update (GAO-01-263, Jan. 2001).

4 Air Force Supply: Management Actions Create Spare Parts Shortages and Operational

Problems (GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-99-77, Apr. 29, 1999).

5 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, part VI: Statutory Reports, Secretary of

the Air Force.

Background
Page 4 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Table 1: Reported Rates for Aircraft That Were Mission Capable and Not Mission

Capable Due to Supply Problems

In percent

Fiscal year

Aircraft reported

as mission capable

Aircraft reported

 as not mission capable

due to supply problems

1996 78.5 11.0

1997 76.6 12.6

1998 74.3 13.9

1999 73.5 14.0

2000 72.9 14.3

2001 (1st quarter) 72.9 14.0

Source: The Air Force’s Multi-Echelon Requirements and Logistics Information Network.

As table 1 shows, the percentage of all Air Force systems reported as not

mission capable due to supply problems steadily increased from fiscal year

1996 through fiscal year 2000. The Air Force requested additional funding

to address concerns with spare parts shortages. The Air Force states in the

Department of Defense Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress6 for

July through September 2000 that funding Congress provided in earlier

years has begun to improve the availability of spares, citing a 58-percent

reduction in parts that have been ordered but not received since

December 1998. The Secretary also expressed cautious optimism that

recent congressional funding would improve the availability of spare parts

and aircraft mission-capable rates. In the most recent quarterly readiness

report (Oct. through Dec. 2000), the Air Force cautions that although as of

early December 2000 overall mission-capable rates had improved from

average fiscal year 2000 rates, this improvement had come at the cost of

the increased use of the practice of removing parts from one aircraft for

use on another, that is, cannibalization.7

Because of concerns that spare parts shortages were causing readiness

problems, the Air Force received in fiscal 1999 an additional $904 million

in obligation authority from the Department of Defense to buy more spare

 6 Department of Defense Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress is a review of

individual service and joint readiness on a quarterly basis and is submitted to Congress by

the Secretary of Defense no later that 45 days after the end of each quarter.

7

 We are separately reviewing this issue and will report the results later this year to the

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International

Relations, House Committee on Government Reform.
Page 5 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

parts. This amount consisted of $387 million to buy spare parts

attributable to the Kosovo operation, $135 million to buy engine-related

spare parts for the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, and $382 million to

overcome the accumulated shortfall of spare parts inventories. Also in

1999, the Department of Defense announced plans to provide $500 million

to the Defense Logistics Agency to purchase spare parts for all the services

over fiscal years 2001-2004. Of that $500 million, $213.8 million is to be for

parts to be used on Air Force aircraft. According to a Department of

Defense official, the Air Force was provided the first $50 million in fiscal

2001 to pass on to the Defense Logistics Agency to pay for Air Force parts

ordered in fiscal year 2000. The Air Force and the other military services

received additional funds in fiscal year 1999 that, unlike the funds cited

above, were placed largely in operations and maintenance accounts. In a

separate report issued earlier this year, we indicated current financial

information did not show the extent to which these funds were used for

spare parts.8

 However, the Department plans to annually develop detailed

financial management information on spare parts funding uses but does

not plan to provide it to Congress. We, therefore, recommended to the

Secretary of Defense that the information to be developed annually by the

Department and the services on the quantity and funding of spare parts be

routinely provided to Congress as an integral part of the Department’s

annual budget justification; the Department agreed to do so.

The aviation systems that we reviewed are vital to the Air Force achieving

its missions. The E-3 provides surveillance of the airspace and manages

the flight of all aircraft in an assigned battlefield area. The Air Force first

received E-3s in 1977, and an Air Force official told us that it is the oldest

aircraft in the Air Force in terms of operational hours flown. The C-5 is the

Air Force’s largest cargo aircraft, carrying cargo such as Army tanks, and

is one of the largest aircraft in the world. About 70 percent of the

oversized cargo required in the critical first 30 days of one major war

scenario would be the type of cargo the C-5 carries. The Air Force first

received operational C-5 aircraft in 1970, and according to Air Force

officials, one of the reasons for the lower than expected mission-capable

rates in recent years for the C-5 aircraft is its age. The F-100-220 engine

powers many of the Air Force’s F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft and,

according to an Air Force official, will become increasingly critical to

operations as some older engines are replaced with the F-100-220. For

 8 Defense Inventory: Information on the Use of Spare Parts Funding Should Be Provided to

Congress (GAO-01-472, Apr. 2001).
Page 6 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

each of these systems, we judgmentally selected for review 25 parts, a

total of 75, with the highest number of hours or incidents of unavailability

for given time periods.

Figure 1: E-3, C-5, F-15, and F-16 Aircraft

Source: www.af.mil\gallery.

Air Force spare parts are classified as either consumables or reparables.

Consumable items, which are mostly managed by the Defense Logistics

C-5 aircraft F-15 with F-100-220 engine

E-3 aircraft F-16 with F-100-220 engine
Page 7 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Agency, are those items that are discarded when they fail because they

cannot be cost-effectively repaired. The Defense Supply Center Richmond

is the lead center for managing aviation consumable spare parts.

Reparable items, managed by the Air Force Materiel Command, are items

that can be cost-effectively repaired. The Command’s mission is to

research, develop, test, acquire, deliver, and logistically support Air Force

weapon systems.

The shortages of spare parts for the three aircraft systems we reviewed

have not only affected readiness but also have created inefficiencies in

maintenance processes and procedures and may adversely affect the

retention of military personnel. Two aircraft we reviewed, the E-3 and C-5,

did not meet their mission-capable goals in fiscal years 1996-2000 and were

not mission capable due to supply problems from 7.3 percent to

18.1 percent during the same period. The number of usable spare

F-100-220 engines that the Air Force had on hand fell short of its goal by as

few as 6 and as many as 104 engines during the same period.

The Air Force did not achieve its mission-capable goals during fiscal years

1996-2000 for any of the three Air Force aircraft systems we reviewed, in

part, due to spare parts shortages. Table 2 shows the mission-capable

goals and actual rates for the E-3 aircraft for fiscal years 1996-2000, and

table 3 shows the rates at which the E-3 was not mission capable due to

supply problems during the same period.

Table 2: Reported Mission-Capable Goals and Rates for the E-3

In percent

Fiscal year

Missioncapable goal

Reported mission-

 capable rate Difference

1996 85 82.5 (2.5)

1997 85 79.2 (5.8)

1998 85 71.9 (13.1)

1999 85 73.5 (11.5)

2000 73 72.8 (0.2)

Source: The Air Force’s Multi-Echelon Requirements and Logistics Information Network.

The goal for the E-3 was lowered to 73 percent from March through

September 2000 based on an Air Force assessment of its ability to achieve

its mission-capable goal. The Air Force recognized that it had failed to

Spare Parts Shortages

Adversely Affect

Mission Performance,

Economy and

Efficiency of

Operations, and

Retention of Military

Personnel

Spare Parts Shortages

Contributed to Three

Systems’ Failure to Meet

Mission Performance

Goals
Page 8 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

achieve historical performance levels to the point that falling short of the

standard had become the norm. Citing constraints regarding spare parts,

maintenance personnel, and repair equipment, the Air Force lowered

mission-capable goals for the E-3 and other aircraft with the intent of

providing maintenance personnel with more achievable targets. The

mission-capable goal for the E-3 aircraft rose to 81 percent in fiscal year

2001, and it is planned to return to 85 percent in fiscal year 2002.

Table 3: Reported Goals and Rates at Which E-3 Aircraft Were Not Mission Capable

Due to Supply Problems

In percent

Total not mission capable due to supply problems

Fiscal year Goal Reported rate Difference

1996 6 or less 7.3 (1.3)

1997 6 or less 9.4 (3.4)

1998 6 or less 12.9 (6.9)

1999 6 or less 11.9 (5.9)

2000 12 or less 11.3 0.7

Source: The Air Force’s Multi-Echelon Requirements and Logistics Information Network.

The goal was 12 percent or less from March through September 2000 and

was raised based on an Air Force assessment of the aircraft’s ability to

achieve the not mission capable due to supply problems goal for the E-3

and other aircraft. The Air Force recognized that it had failed to achieve

historical performance levels to the point that falling short of the standard

had become the norm. Citing constraints regarding spare parts,

maintenance personnel, and repair equipment, the Air Force raised its goal

for not mission capable due to supply problems for the E-3 and other

aircraft with the intent of providing maintenance personnel with more

achievable targets. The not mission capable due to supply problems goal

changed to 8 percent in fiscal year 2001, and it is planned to return to

6 percent in fiscal year 2002.

The reported rate for total not mission capable due to supply problems in

fiscal year 2000, 11.3 percent, equated to about 3 or 4 E-3s of the total of 32

aircraft being not mission capable due to supply problems.

The C-5 also did not achieve its goals during fiscal years 1996-2000. Table 4

shows the C-5’s mission-capable goals and actual mission-capable rates for

those years, and table 5 shows the rates at which the C-5 was not mission
Page 9 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

capable due to supply problems as well as its goals during the same

period.

Table 4: Reported Mission-Capable Goals and Rates for the C-5 Aircraft

In percent

Mission capable rates

Fiscal year Goal Reported rate Difference

1996 75 64.2 (10.8)

1997 75 62.7 (12.3)

1998 75 61.2 (13.8)

1999 75 59.5 (15.5)

2000 75 60.8 (14.2)

Source: The Air Force’s Multi-Echelon Requirements and Logistics Information Network.

Table 5: Goals and Rates at Which the C-5 Aircraft Were Reported Not Mission

Capable Due to Supply Problems

In percent

Fiscal year Total not mission capable due to supply problems

Goal Reported rate Difference

1996 9 or less 15.6 (6.6)

1997 8.5 or less 15.2 (6.7)

1998 8.5 or less 16.8 (8.3)

1999 8.5 or less 17.3 (8.8)

2000 8.5 or less 18.1 (9.6)

Source: The Air Force’s Multi-Echelon Requirements and Logistics Information Network.

The reported rate for total not mission capable due to supply problems in

fiscal year 2000, 18.1 percent, equated to almost 23 C-5s of the fleet of 126

aircraft being not mission capable, at least in part, due to supply problems.

With regard to the F-100-220 engine, the Air Force never met its goal,

called the war readiness engine goal, during fiscal years 1996-2000 (see

table 6). The goal can change each fiscal year for the number of usable—

ready to be installed in an aircraft—spare engines the Air Force would like

to have on hand to meet wartime needs. In some cases, it has had F-15s or

F-16s grounded due to the lack of the engine. When the number of usable

spare engines is shown as a negative number, there are not enough

engines for all the aircraft required for peacetime operations; in other

words, aircraft that would otherwise be available to fly are grounded
Page 10 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

because they lack engines. During fiscal years 1996 through 2000, this

occurred in five different quarters.

Table 6: F-100-220 War Readiness Engine Goal and Reported Usable Engines

Available, by Quarter

Fiscal year

quarter

War readiness

engine goal

Usable

spare engines Difference

1996 –1 54 10 (44)

1996 –2 54 22 (34)

1996 –3 54 48 (6)

1996 –4 54 42 (12)

1997 –1 68 -5 (73)

1997 –2 68 11 (57)

1997 –3 68 17 (51)

1997 –4 68 14 (54)

1998 –1 90 -1 (91)

1998 –2 90 -13 (103)

1998 –3 90 3 (87)

1998 –4 90 17 (83)

1999 –1 90 40 (50)

1999 –2 90 41 (49)

1999 –3 90 -14 (104)

1999 –4 90 0 (90)

2000-1 84 -6 (90)

2000-2 84 16 (68)

2000-3 84 38 (46)

2000-4 84 44 (40)

Source: Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Department of the Air Force.

To compensate for a lack of spare parts, maintenance personnel

sometimes remove usable parts from aircraft for which spare parts are

unavailable to replace broken parts on others. Maintenance personnel at

Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base said that this practice is necessary to

attempt to maintain mission-capable rates when spare parts are not

available. As we have previously reported, the result of this practice is that

maintenance personnel spend a large amount of time cannibalizing parts

and performing double work.9

 According to a Naval Postgraduate School

thesis, there is also the potential for breaking the needed part or causing

 9 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-99-77, Apr. 29, 1999.

Spare Parts Shortages Can

Cause Inefficient Maintenance

Practices and May Hamper

Efforts to Retain Maintenance

Personnel
Page 11 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

collateral damage while removing the part. Additionally, a part removed

from another aircraft will likely not last as long as a part from the supply

system and will require maintenance sooner.

Additionally, our past work shows that spare parts shortages may affect

retention. In August 1999, we reported on the results of our December

1998 through March 1999 survey of about 1,000 Army, Navy, Air Force, and

Marine Corps active duty personnel that were selected based on their

work in jobs in which the Department of Defense believed were

experiencing retention problems. More than half of the respondents stated

that they were dissatisfied and intended to leave the military. The majority

of factors were associated with work circumstances such as the lack of

parts and materials needed to successfully complete daily job

requirements. Both officers and enlisted personnel ranked the availability

of needed equipment, parts, and materials among the top 2 of 44

quality-of-life factors that caused their dissatisfaction.10

Spare parts shortages on the three systems we reviewed occurred for

various reasons. In addition, an internal Department of Defense study

found similar reasons for spare parts shortages.

The 75 parts (25 for each system) we selected for review were recorded as

being the cause for the most hours of the systems being not mission

capable due to supply problems for a given time period. Specific parts

were in short supply for numerous and varied reasons. Because of the

interrelated nature of the supply system, some of the parts were

unavailable for more than one reason. Table 7 provides a summary of the

reasons for the shortages of the top 25 problem parts for each system for a

given month. (See appendix II for a more detailed list of the parts

discussed in this report.)

 10 Military Personnel: Perspectives of Surveyed Service Members in Critical Specialties

(GAO/NSIAD-99-197BR, Aug. 16, 1999).

Shortages of Specific

Spare Parts Occurred

for Multiple Reasons

Selected Systems Have

Experienced Parts Shortages

for Multiple Reasons
Page 12 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Table 7: Reasons for Shortages of 75 Spare Parts for Selected Engine and Aircraft

Reason F-100-220aE-3bC-5cTotal

Demands were not anticipated 10 11 5 26

Changes in location of repairs 7 7 8 22

Parts production problems 3 5 10 18

Component reliability 5 2 9 16

Contracting issues 4 3 3 10

Other 3 9 0 12

Total 32 37 35 104

Note: The totals exceed 25 because some parts were unavailable for multiple reasons.

a

The time period for the shortages was April 2000.

b

The time period for the shortages was March 2000.

C

The time period for the shortages was July 2000.

Source: Our analysis of Air Force Materiel Command data.

Greater demand than anticipated by repair activities for the spares we

reviewed was one of the most frequent reasons parts were not available.

According to agency officials, the Air Force and the Defense Logistics

Agency forecast the demand for parts using past data on usage of parts.11

According to current policy, if a part had no demands over the specified

period and no anticipated future demands, it may not be purchased for

stock. Twenty-six (about 35 percent) of the 75 parts we reviewed were

unavailable because of unanticipated demands for spare parts. For

example, there had been no demand for a tension regulator for the C-5

since 1993, and it was therefore not on hand when needed through the end

of July 2000. As of July 2000, C-5 aircraft had not been mission capable for

a total of 155 operational days (24-hour days) due to the lack of this part.

In another case, the demand calculated from past experience for a

machine bolt for the F-100-220 engine was far less than the demand by the

end of April 2000. In that case, the average quarterly demand for the bolt

was 828 but increased to over 12,000 in one quarter. The item manager did

not know the specific reasons for this increase in demand. At the end of

April 2000, in 96 cases the lack of this bolt rendered F-100-220 engines not

mission capable. Also, in the case of a metallic seal for the engine, demand

increased after responsibility for the repair of the seal was transferred

from a closing repair facility. Parts managers speculated that workers at

 11 When establishing initial spares for new weapon systems, the Air Force uses, in part,

engineering estimates to determine the quantities of spare parts to purchase.

Actual Demands Were Greater

Than Anticipated
Page 13 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

the new repair facility were replacing this item more often than at the

previous repair facility as a part of their routine maintenance efforts. As a

result of the lack of this seal, F-100-220 engines were not mission capable

in 11 cases by the end of April 2000.

Twenty-two (about 29 percent) of the parts reviewed were on back orders

because of difficulties related to the transfer of workload from two

maintenance facilities that were closing. As a result of the Base

Realignment and Closure Commission’s 1995 recommendations, the Air

Force consolidated its air logistics centers, or maintenance repair

facilities, from five to three locations and increased its use of contractor

repair capability. Air Force data indicated that back orders for critical

parts affected by the consolidation peaked at about 615,000 in December

1998 before falling to 374,000 by the end of fiscal 1999 and to just over

258,000 by December 2000, a 58-percent reduction. The Department of

Defense cited underestimated workloads in several key shops at the

remaining three air logistics centers as the primary reason for the increase

in back orders.

For one part we reviewed, a blade lock retainer for an F-100-220 engine, a

closing air logistics center had repaired the part on a special, as-needed

basis and did not record demands for repair. When responsibility for

repair of the part was transferred to the Oklahoma City Air Logistics

Center, the Center had no demand data for the part and had not ordered

replacement retainers, and no retainers were on hand to install on engines

as needed. As a result of the lack of this blade lock retainer, F-100-220

engines were not mission capable in 22 instances by the end of April 2000.

Also, the receiving air logistic centers did not have some of their repair

shops ready as planned when items were to be transferred. For example, a

hydraulic valve for the E-3 was unavailable because the receiving air

logistics center did not have a required test stand repaired and certified in

time to prevent this part from being available when needed. Because of the

lack of this part, by the end of March 2000, E-3 aircraft had accumulated a

total of about 8 operational days of time not mission capable.

Production problems were at least partially the cause of the unavailability

of 18 (24 percent) of the spare parts reviewed. Several examples follow.

• The sole-source contractor for a C-5 part could not deliver as many

aircraft turbines as the Air Force needed in the time specified in the

contract. As of July 2000, due to the lack of the turbine, C-5s had

accumulated about 335 days of not mission capable time.

Changes in Location of Repairs

Parts Production Problems
Page 14 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

• Although a contractor produced sufficient quantities of the visor seal

assembly for the C-5, the parts failed to meet design tolerances. As a

result, C-5s had accumulated the equivalent of 186 operational days of

not mission capable status by the end of July 2000.

• Most of the dual ignition exciters for the F-100-220 engine that a

contractor produced failed quality inspections, and the contractor

therefore could not provide a quantity sufficient to satisfy Air Force

demands. By the end of April 2000, the lack of dual ignition exciters

had caused F-100-220 engines to be not mission capable in 104 cases.

• A contractor agreed to increase production of an augmentor nozzle for

the F-100-220 engine to meet the demand created by the Kosovo air

campaign. The contractor scaled back production after the campaign

was over. According to an Air Force official, this was within the terms

of the contract, which called for an average number of parts per month.

However, overall demand for this part exceeded supply. By the end of

April 2000, the lack of the nozzle had caused F-100-220 engines to be

not mission capable in 63 cases.

• At an Air Force repair facility, spares of an augmentor fuel control for

the F-100-220 engine were mistakenly disposed of instead of being

turned in for repair, and the controls had to be bought on an

emergency basis to make repairs. Through April 2000, having to

purchase this item on an emergency buy resulted in 30 incidents of

F-100-220 engines being classified not mission capable.

Sixteen (about 21 percent) of the parts that we reviewed were unavailable

because the life of parts was shorter than the Air Force had predicted.

Thus, the parts in stock were exhausted before the Air Force could replace

them. For example, a skid detector for the C-5 aircraft experienced a

50-percent increase in failures, and all the spare parts were used before

the item could be ordered and restocked. Through July 2000, C-5 aircraft

were not mission capable for over 368 operational days due to the lack of

this part. Some reliability problems raised safety concerns and created

new, and higher, requirements for the part. For example, when a nozzle in

the augmentor duct on some F-100-220 engines began to fall off due to

cracks at the rivet head, the Air Force began to replace the duct routinely

as each aircraft came in for maintenance. By the end of April 2000, the lack

of this part had resulted in F-100-220 engines not being mission capable in

34 cases.

Component Reliability
Page 15 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Both the Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency have encountered a

variety of problems in contracting for spare parts needed for repairs. Ten

(about 13 percent) of the parts we reviewed were unavailable, at least in

part, because of contracting issues. These issues included lengthy price

negotiations, a contract requirement to have a minimum number of units

before beginning repairs, failure of a contractor to meet the delivery date,

and termination of a contract. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency

did not have a straight pin for the F-100-220 engine in stock because the

sole-source company wanted a price that the Agency was unwilling to pay.

This resulted in extended negotiations with the company before an award

could be made. By the end of April 2000, the lack of this part had caused

F-100-220 engines to be not mission capable in nine cases. In another case,

to obtain an acceptable price for a contract for the repair of a temperature

indicator for the E-3 aircraft, the Air Force was required to provide a

minimum of 10 regulators for repair. By the time 10 units were

accumulated and shipped, the demand for the part had exceeded the

supply. Through March 2000, E-3 aircraft were not mission capable over

19 operational days due to the lack of this part. Also, a contract for an axle

beam fitting for the C-5 aircraft had to be terminated because the

contractor requested too many delivery schedule extensions. As of July

2000, the equivalent of one C-5 aircraft was not mission capable for 124

operational days.

Twelve (16 percent) of the parts we reviewed were unavailable for reasons

other than those we have already cited. In one case, the Air Force used an

incorrect replacement rate for an engine core, and as a result, the repair of

parts was not timely. Through April 2000, F-100-220 engines were not

mission capable due to the lack of this part in 33 cases. Also, the limited

repair facility capacity for certain spare parts, such as electric generators,

created shortages of the parts. By the end of March 2000, E-3 aircraft had

been not mission capable for almost 10 operational days due to the lack of

this part. In another case, because maintenance facilities prioritize repairs

based on current Air Force requirements, a receiver transmitter was not

repaired in time to avoid a shortage because higher priority items had to

be repaired first. As a result, over 15 operational days of not mission

capable time had been accumulated on E-3s by the end of March 2000. In

another case, the required part, a vaneaxial fan, was on hand, but E-3

aircraft had accumulated over 15 operational days of not mission capable

time by the end of March 2000 because of the time it took to ship the part

overseas. In some cases, no spare parts had been purchased when an

aircraft was being modified or the technical data for the modification was

incomplete. At the end of March 2000, over 10 operational days of not

Contracting Issues

Other Reasons
Page 16 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

mission capable time had accumulated for E-3 aircraft due to the lack of a

control indicator that fell into this category.

An internal study conducted by the Department of Defense found similar

reasons for Air Force reparable spare parts shortages.12 The study

examined parts causing aircraft to be not mission capable and found that

there were two reasons for the shortages. The first reason was an

insufficient inventory of certain reparable parts. The second was that

although there were enough parts in the system, other constraints

prevented a repair facility from repairing the parts in a timely manner. The

study states that this may have happened for several reasons. The parts

may not have been returned from units to the repair facility, a repair

facility may have lacked capacity in certain key areas such as manpower

or testing equipment, the consumable parts required to fix the reparable

item may not have been available, or the item managers may not have

requested the repair facility to repair a part because of a lack of funding.13

The study contained a recommendation that the Air Force provide

$609 million for fiscal years 2002 to 2007 to improve the availability of

reparable spare parts. According to a Department of Defense official, the

Air Force plans to provide the funds.

The Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency have overall initiatives

under way or planned to improve the availability of spare parts. The

initiatives are intended to improve the efficiency of the supply system and

increase the requirements for spare parts. The initiatives generally address

the specific reasons for shortages identified by our review, with the

exception of changes in the location of repairs that is not a recurring

problem. The Air Force has developed a Supply Strategic Plan that

includes a management framework and specific goals and outcomeoriented measures for its initiatives. We have made various

recommendations to address this issue. The Air Force has actions under

way to respond to address these recommendations; therefore, we are not

 12 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Aviation Spare

Parts Inventory Funding for Readiness, Feb. 2001.

13 We also found in our 1997 study that even though military units had funds to purchase

spare parts, the supply group did not always have sufficient funds to buy new parts or pay

for the repair of broken parts that customers needed. See Air Force Supply: Management

Actions Create Spare Parts Shortages and Operational Problems (GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-99-77,

Apr. 29, 1999).

Department of Defense Internal

Study Found Similar Reasons

for Shortages

Overall Initiatives

Exist to Address

Problems
Page 17 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

making any additional recommendations at this time. We will be reviewing

the strategic plan’s initiatives, once they are more developed, to evaluate

their likely effectiveness and to assess whether additional initiatives are

needed.

The Air Force is regularly monitoring which spare parts are unavailable for

the longest period of time and undertakes ad hoc actions to resolve the

problems causing the shortage. In 1999, the Air Force developed the

Supply Strategic Plan to help create an integrated process for supply

planning, to facilitate the exchange of information throughout the supply

system, and to improve measures of effectiveness for the supply system.

The plan, which was updated in January 2001, establishes five goals for the

Air Force supply community to achieve by 2010.

Each goal has associated objectives to be achieved in the next 4 to 7 years

and tasks to be completed in the next 1 to 4 years.

Air Force Supply Strategic Plan

Supply Strategic Plan Goals

Manage assets effectively

Organize, train, and equip supply personnel

Support Department of Defense operations

Establish and implement fuel policy

Implement effective financial management
Page 18 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

In support of the Supply Strategic Plan, the Air Force Deputy Chief of

Staff, Installations and Logistics, Directorate of Supply,14 established in

1999 the Supply Foundation Project, which includes 10 objectives with

associated initiatives for each. The Directorate views the project as a

comprehensive means of improving the supply system. The first objective

is to improve spare parts management. The intent is to determine the

baseline for formulating a spare parts policy; to determine the overall

trend for spare parts, that is, are shortages increasing or decreasing; and to

develop and implement initiatives to reduce the shortages of spare parts.

Within the objective of improving spare parts management, the Directorate

has initiatives within the goal of managing assets under way or under

study.

For each of these initiatives, the Air Force has established short-term and

 14 The Air Force Directorate of Supply establishes and implements Air Force supply and

fuel policy. The Directorate also prepares, executes, and manages budget programs totaling

over $17 billion annually for Air Force aircraft, missiles, munitions, communications, and

vehicles.

Objectives to Support Supply

Strategic Plan

Initiatives for Managing Assets

Improve the process for determining requirements for spare

parts

Improve the process for funding the parts

Increase the stock of certain parts

Increase the parts contained in readiness spares packages

(deployment kits for maintaining aircraft)

Coordinate with the Defense Logistics Agency to ensure that

it buys the most critically needed parts from the Air Force

portion of the $500 million provided by the Department of

Defense for fiscal years 2001 to 2004

Reduce the time that customers wait for parts
Page 19 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

long-term milestones and accountability for implementation by assigning

program responsibility to specific offices and individuals. The measures

for success include achieving goals such as (1) increasing the issuance of

parts when requested, (2) increasing the stock of certain parts,

(3) improving total rates for aircraft not mission capable for supply

reasons, and (4) lowering cannibalization rates. (See appendix IV for a

complete listing of these Air Force initiatives.)

In addition to the initiatives contained in the Air Force Supply Strategic

Plan, the Air Force Materiel Command also has actions under way and

planned to separately address more specific aspects of spare parts

management and policies. According to Air Force officials, these actions

are being coordinated with the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff,

Installations and Logistics, Directorate of Supply. As part of its Constraints

Analysis Program, the Air Force Materiel Command identified six major

problems that had prevented it from providing timely support to the

warfighter. These problems were unavailability of consumable parts;

unreliability of parts; poor management of the suppliers of parts;

inadequate workload planning; ineffective inventory management; and

inefficient policies regarding which parts are repaired and, if repair is

needed, where the repairs should be made. The Command focused its

initial efforts on studying ways to resolve the problems with supplier

management, parts reliability, and unavailability of consumable parts.

Implementation plans are being developed for actions for each of these

problems while the remaining problems are being studied. The Command

is also developing (1) a model to forecast the repair facilities’ demands for

consumable spare parts and electronically transmit this data to the

Defense Logistics Agency and (2) a pilot program to have contractors

bypass the supply system and fill the supply bins for maintenance

personnel directly.

Among the efforts the Defense Logistics Agency has under way to improve

the availability of spare parts are its Aviation Investment Strategy and

Aging Aircraft Program.

The Defense Logistics Agency’s major initiative to resolve aircraft spare

parts shortages is its Aviation Investment Strategy. This fiscal year 2000

initiative focuses on replenishing consumable aviation repair parts with

identified availability problems that affect readiness. Of the $500 million

that the Defense Department budgeted for this purpose, $213.8 million was

the Air Force portion. As of December 2000, $95.3 million had been

targeted for Air Force spare parts and $22.3 million worth of parts had

been delivered.

Air Force Materiel Command

Initiatives

Defense Logistics Agency

Initiatives

Aviation Investment Strategy
Page 20 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

The goal of the Defense Logistics Agency’s Aging Aircraft Program is to

consistently meet the goals for spare parts availability for the Army, Navy,

and Air Force aviation weapon systems. The program’s focus will be to

(1) provide inventory control point personnel with complete, timely, and

accurate information on current and projected parts requirements;

(2) reduce customers’ wait times for parts for which sources or production

capabilities no longer exist; and (3) create an efficient and effective

program management structure and processes that will achieve the stated

program goals. The Agency plans to spend about $20 million during fiscal

years 2001-2007 on this program.

We recommended in November 1999 that the Secretary of the Air Force

develop a management framework for implementing best practice

initiatives based on the principles embodied in the Government

Performance and Results Act. The Department of Defense concurred with

our recommendation and stated that the Air Force is revising its Logistics

Support Plan to more clearly articulate the relationships, goals, objectives,

and metrics of logistics initiatives.15 As a part of the Supply Strategic Plan,

the Air Force included initiatives intended to improve the availability of

spare parts.

We also recommended in January 2001 that the Department develop an

overarching plan that integrates the individual service and defense agency

logistics reengineering plans to include an investment strategy for funding

reengineering initiatives and details on how the Department plans to

achieve its final logistics system end state.16

Since the Air Force and the Department of Defense are taking actions on

our previous recommendations to improve overall logistics planning, we

are not making new recommendations at this time.

The Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel

Readiness, in commenting on a draft of this report, indicated that the

Department of Defense generally concurred with the report. The

Department’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V.

 15 Defense Inventory: Improved Management Framework Needed to Guide Air Force Best

Practice Initiatives (GAO/NSIAD-00-2, Nov. 18, 1999).

16 GAO-01-244, Jan. 2001 and GAO-01-263, Jan. 2001.

Aging Aircraft Program

Air Force Has Responded to

Our Recommendations for

Better Planning

Agency Comments
Page 21 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

To determine the impact of the shortages of spare parts, we reviewed data

on the Air Force’s mission-capable goals and actual rates and goals and

actual rates for aircraft not mission capable due to supply problems for

selected months from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force,

Installations and Logistics Directorate. We did not independently verify

these data. From these data, we selected three systems for review that had

experienced difficulties in achieving mission-capable goals or in the case

of the F-100-220 engine readiness goals for the number of usable engines

on hand. We also reviewed data on cannibalizations provided by the Air

Combat Command, Hampton, Virginia; the Office of the Secretary of the

Air Force, Installations and Logistics Directorate, Washington, D.C.; and

Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base, Goldsboro, North Carolina. Using the

data, we discussed with maintenance personnel the impact of

cannibalizations on spare parts shortages. We also used data from studies

conducted by the Department of Defense regarding spare parts shortages

and their impacts. Lastly, we drew relevant information from our recently

issued reports.

To determine the reasons for these part shortages, we visited the air

logistics centers at Tinker Air Force Base (E-3), Oklahoma City,

Oklahoma; Warner-Robins Air Force Base (C-5), Robins, Georgia; Kelly Air

Force Base (F-100-220 aircraft engine), San Antonio, Texas; and the

Defense Supply Center Richmond, Richmond, Virginia. To identify specific

reasons, we discussed the specific parts shortages with those who manage

these items at these locations. We also reviewed our related work on Air

Force and Department of Defense inventory management practices to

identify systemic management problems that are contributing to spare

parts shortage.

To determine what overall actions are planned or under way to address

overall spare parts shortages for Air Force aircraft and the management

framework for implementing the overall initiatives, we visited the Air

Force headquarters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Logistics Directorate, and the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, located in the Washington, D.C. area;

the Defense Logistics Agency located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the

Defense Supply Center located in Richmond, Virginia; the Air Force

Materiel Command, Dayton, Ohio; and the air logistics centers at Tinker

Air Force Base, Oklahoma (E-3), Warner-Robins Air Force Base, Georgia

(C-5), and Kelly Air Force Base, Texas (F-100-220). We discussed with

officials at each of these locations Air Force initiatives regarding spare

parts, their progress and results to date, the planned completion dates for

some initiatives, and additional steps needed to address spare parts

shortages. We also compared the reasons for the shortages we found with

Scope and

Methodology
Page 22 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

the overall initiatives under way or planned to determine if there were any

areas that were not being addressed. We did not review these plans or the

specific initiatives.

Our review was performed from February 2000 to April 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the

Secretary of the Air Force; the Director, Office of Management and

Budget; and the Director, Defense Logistics Agency. We will also make

copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions

regarding this report. Key contributors to this report were Lawson Gist Jr.,

John Beauchamp, Willie Cheely Jr., and Nancy Ragsdale.

David R. Warren

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 23 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John Warner

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel Inouye

Chairman

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Bill Young

Chairman, Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bob Stump

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman

The Honorable John Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Management Weaknesses Have

Contributed to Spare Parts Shortages

Page 24 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Our high-risk reports over the past several years have noted that

Department of Defense inventory and financial management weaknesses

have contributed to parts not being available when needed.1

In January 2001, we reported on Department of Defense management

challenges and noted it has had serious weaknesses in its management of

logistics functions and, in particular, inventory management.2

 Although not

specifically identified with the systems we reviewed, these management

weaknesses directly or indirectly contribute to the shortages of spare parts

the Air Force is facing, as the following examples show.

• We reported in January 2001 that nearly half of the Department’s

inventory exceeded war reserve or current operating requirements and

that the Department had inventory on order that would not have been

ordered based on current requirements. 3

 Purchasing items that exceed

requirements use funds that could be used to purchase needed parts.

• We reported in April 1999 that because the Air Force had reduced the

supply activity group’s budget by $948 million between fiscal year 1997

and 1999 to reflect efficiency goals and because these goals were not

achieved, fewer items than projected were available for sale to

customers. As a result, military units had funds to purchase spare parts,

but the supply group did not always have sufficient funds to buy new

spare parts or pay for repair of broken parts that customers needed.4

• We also reported that because of poor management practices, over

$2 billion worth of spare parts in the Air Force’s “suspended inventory

category,” which cannot be issued because of questionable condition,

was not reviewed for years. 5

 As a result, the Air Force is vulnerable to

incurring unnecessary repair and storage costs and reducing its

readiness. Better management of these parts could increase the

number of spare parts available.

 1 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO-01-244,

Jan. 2001) and High Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-01-263, Jan. 2001).

2 GAO-01-244, Jan. 2001.

3 GAO-01-244, Jan. 2001.

4 Management Actions Create Spare Parts Shortages and Operational Problems

(GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-99-77, Apr. 29, 1999)

5 Defense Inventory: Inadequate Controls Over Air Force Suspended Stocks (NSIAD-98-29,

Dec. 22, 1997).

Appendix I: Management Weaknesses Have

Contributed to Spare Parts Shortages
Appendix I: Management Weaknesses Have

Contributed to Spare Parts Shortages

Page 25 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

In addition, the Department of Defense’s long-standing financial

management problems may also contribute to the Air Force’s spare parts

shortages. As we recently reported, existing weaknesses in inventory

accountability information can affect supply responsiveness.6 Lacking

reliable information, the Department of Defense has little assurance that

all items purchased are received and properly recorded. The weaknesses

increase the risk that responsible inventory item managers may request

funds to obtain additional, unnecessary items that may be on hand but not

reported.

 6 GAO-01-244, Jan. 2001.
Appendix II: E-3, C-5, and F-100-220 Engine

Parts and Part Function

Page 26 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Spare part Part function

C-5 tension regulator Cable tension regulator that tightens or loosens the tension on cables

F-100-220 machine bolt Retains augmentor nozzle on the augmentor duct

F-100-220 metallic seal Retains number one bearing in place on the inlet fan case

F-100-220 blade lock

 retainer

Retains third stage blades to the rotor

E-3 hydraulic valve Opens the inlet and outlet valve for the auxiliary power unit

C-5 aircraft turbine Provides air for heat and cooling plus aircraft pressure

C-5 visor seal assembly Keeps moisture out and ensures a secure fit

F-100-220 dual ignition

 exciter

Sends message to start engine and when afterburner is needed

F-100-220 augmentor

 nozzles

Provides aviation fuel to combustion chamber

F-100-220 augmentor fuel

 control

Supplies fuel into the segment, core, and duct systems

C-5 skid detector Sends wheel speed to main computer

F-100-220 augmentor duct Houses augmentor section of engine

F-100-220 engine core Compresses air in the engine

E-3 generator Provides electrical power to the aircraft

E-3 receiver transmitter Provides altitude data and trip signals to crew

E-3 vaneaxial fan Supplies air to the crew compartment

E-3 control indicator Provides means of controlling the frequency of the flight deck radio equipment

F-100-220 straight pin Secures the short links to the augmentor nozzle convergent segments, which opens and closes the

nozzle

E-3 temperature indicator Reads temperature of integrated drive generator

C-5 axle beam Bushing for the landing gear to control turning the aircraft

Source: Air Force.

Appendix II: E-3, C-5, and F-100-220 Engine

Parts and Part Function
Appendix III: Spare Parts Reviewed and

Reasons for Shortage

Page 27 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Spare part Reason for shortage

E-3 aircraft

Rotodome door actuator Parts production problem, contracting issue

Floating deck pulser Changes in location of repair

High voltage regulator Changes in location of repair

Low chain klystron power amplifier Component reliability

Door Actual demands were greater than anticipated and parts production problem

Aircraft door Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Landing gear door Actual demands were greater than anticipated and other—repair facility capacity/priority and

incomplete technical order

Waveguide coupler Parts production problem and component reliability

Central processing Other-repair facility capacity/priority and test equipment software problem

Nitrogen fill valve Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Temp indicator Parts production problems and contracting issues

Regulator, oxygen Changes in location of repairs, actual demands were greater than anticipated, and parts

production problems

Connecting link, rig Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Vaneaxial fan Other—shipping time

Receiver transmitter Actual demands were greater than anticipated and other—repair facility capacity/priority

Regulator, current Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Auxiliary power supply Changes in location of repairs

Gas turbine engine Other – shipping time

Control indicator Other—no spares purchased for modifications

Generator Changes in location of repairs and other—repair facility capacity/priority

Interface unit Contracting issues and other—incomplete technical data for modification

Voltage regulator Changes in location of repairs and actual demands exceeded anticipated

Circuit card assembly Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Regulator Actual demands were greater than anticipated and other—suitable substitute not linked to

master

Hydraulic valve Changes in location of repairs

Spare part Reason for shortage

C-5 aircraft

Hydraulic servo valve Component reliability

Skid detector Component reliability

Aircraft turbine Parts production problem

Cylinder assemblyaChanges in location of repairs

Manifold assemblya Changes in location of repairs and parts production problems

Track assembly Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Manifold assemblya Changes in location of repairs and parts production problems

Visor seal assembly Contracting issue and parts production problem

Direction slide Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Manifold assemblyaComponent reliability

Variable feel unit Changes in location of repairs

Tension regulator Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Temperature transmitter Actual demands were greater than anticipated and parts production problems

Test adapter Component reliability

Appendix III: Spare Parts Reviewed and

Reasons for Shortage
Appendix III: Spare Parts Reviewed and

Reasons for Shortage

Page 28 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Spare part Reason for shortage

Linear valveaComponent reliability and parts production problem

Cylinder assemblyaChanges in location of repairs

Electric actuator Changes in location of repairs and component reliability

Axle beam fitting Component reliability, contracting issue, and parts production problem

Manifold assemblya Changes in location of repairs and parts production problem

Hydraulic cartridge Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Linear valvea Component reliability and parts production problems

Cylinder assemblya Changes in location of repairs

Alarm-monitor Contracting issues

Linear valveaComponent reliability

Flush valve Parts production problem

F-100-220 engine

Ignition weight Parts production problem

Machine boltaActual demands were greater than anticipated

Machine boltaActual demands were greater than anticipated

Fan Contracting issue and parts production problem

Spare part Reason for shortage

Augmentor nozzleaContracting issue

Augmentor nozzleaContracting issue

Lower pressure turbine Actual demands were greater than anticipated and parts production problem

Divergent seal Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Static probe Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Jet engine fuel pump Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Augmentor duct Component reliability

Plate spacer Component reliability

220 core Component reliability and other—information system problem

Sleeve spacer Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Fuel controla Changes in location of repairs

220e core Component reliability and other—information system problem

Fuel controlaChanges in location of repairs

Blade lock retainer Changes in location of repairs and other—information system problem

Transmitter Component reliability

Tube assemblya Changes in location of repairs and demands were not anticipated

Bearing unit Actual demands were greater than anticipated

Tube assemblyaChanges in location of repairs and demands were not anticipated

Metallic seal Changes in location of repairs

Turbine rotor Changes in location of repairs

Straight pin Contracting issue

a

The spare parts with the same name have different stock numbers.

Source: Air Force.
Appendix IV: Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff,

Installations and Logistics, Directorate of

Supply, Spare Parts Initiatives

Page 29 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Initiative Objective

Estimated completion

date

Implement spares requirements review

board

Identify total spares requirement May 31, 2002

Use “total cost of goods” vs. “total cost of

goods sold” in budget estimates

Enhance cost recovery for Working Capital Fund Dec. 31, 2002

Change point-of-sale policy Enhance Working Capital Fund cost recovery Feb. 28, 2002

Use actual pipeline times instead of goals

in requirements computation

Increase spares availability Oct. 31, 2001

Enhance process for determining aircraft

goals

Increase safety levels of spare parts Dec. 31, 2001

Review retention policy Improve low/variable usage spares support by retaining more

parts longer

Oct. 11, 2002

Change consumable parts reorder point

policy

Improve mission capability by lowering the reorder point for

consumables

May 31, 2001

Change policy to reduce base-level

excess instances of “awaiting parts”

Make more serviceable assets available by reducing the

credit a base will receive for turning in excess parts

Sept. 28, 2001

Expand use of air logistics centers’

EXPRESS prioritization system

Improve repair and distribution decisions for spares by

including more parts in the EXPRESS prioritization system

Nov. 30, 2001

Align annual readiness spares packages

review cycle and budget cycle

Recognize readiness spares packages requirements in

budget

Oct. 31, 2002

Field fighter readiness spares packages

updates

Increase range/depth of fighter readiness spares packages

for aerospace expeditionary force operations

Nov. 9, 2001

Field strategic airlift and C-130 readiness

spares packages

Recompute strategic lift/C-130 readiness spares packages Nov. 9, 2001

Field high-priority contingency mission

support kits

Pre-position spares for split operations and “Rainbow Unit”

deployment

Reported as completed

Develop method to incorporate readiness

spares packages in resource-constrained

environment

Release squadron-level readiness spares packages

authorizations instead of entire model design series at once

Sept. 30, 2002

Influence Defense Logistics Agency

Aviation Investment Strategy

Increase Defense Logistics Agency critical item inventory July 31, 2003

Improve pipeline times Reduce customer wait time by more efficiently locating and

shipping parts

Oct. 31, 2001

Use e-business strategies Reduce costs and wait time using reverse auctions via

Internet to improve support

Jan 4, 2002

Complete paperless contracting for

spares

Achieve Department’s directive on electronic procurement Apr. 30, 2002

Implement purchasing and supply

management practices

Improve performance and reduce cost of supply June 11, 2003

Source: Air Force.

Appendix IV: Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff,

Installations and Logistics, Directorate of

Supply, Spare Parts Initiatives
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 30 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Appendix V: Comments From the

Department of Defense
Related GAO Products

Page 31 GAO-01-587 Air Force Inventory

Defense Inventory: Opportunities Exist to Expand the Use of Defense

Logistics Agency Best Practices (NSIAD-00-30, Jan. 26, 2000).

Air Force Depot Maintenance: Analysis of Its Financial Operations

(AIMD/NSIAD-00-38, Dec. 10, 1999).

Defense Inventory: Improvements Needed to Prevent Excess Purchases by

the Air Force (NSIAD-00-5, Nov. 1, 1999).

Air Force Depot Maintenance: Management Changes Would Improve

Implementation of Reform Initiatives (NSIAD-99-63, June 25, 1999).

Department of Defense: Status of Financial Management Weaknesses and

Actions Needed to Correct Continuing Challenges (T-AIMD/NSIAD-99-171,

May 4, 1999).

Defense Inventory: Status of Inventory and Purchases and Their

Relationship to Current Needs (NSIAD-99-60, Apr. 16, 1999).

Defense Inventory: DOD Could Improve Total Asset Visibility Initiative

With Results Act Framework (NSIAD-99-40, Apr. 12, 1999).

High Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, Jan 1999).

Air Force Supply: Management Analysis of Activity Group’s Financial

Reports, Prices, and Cash Management (AIMD/NSIAD-98-118, June 8,

1998).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Use of Public-Private Partnering

Arrangements (NSIAD-98-91, May 7, 1998).

Defense Inventory: Management of Surplus Usable Aircraft Parts Can Be

Improved (NSIAD-98-7, Oct. 2, 1997).

Related GAO Products

(709530)

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