I 4

~~ 

tUSimNRC

UNITE STATE NUCLAR EGLULATRY COMMLSSION

Protecting People and the Environ men~t

ACNW&M MEETING WITH

THE U. S. NUCLEAR

REGULATORY COMMISSION

November 14, 2007
OVERVIEW

Michael T. Ryan
Accomplishments

* 17 Letter Reports

* 4 Working Group Meetings

* Issued:

-Low-Level Waste NUREG

- Igneous Activity White Paper

-Reprocessing White Paper

3
Accomplishments (cont'd)

* In development

-White Paper on Seismic issues

(Yucca Mountain)

-White Paper on Decommissioning

4
ACNW&M Charter

* Expanded Charter to include

Materials Safety

* The Committee will continue

study:

- In-situ Leach Mining

- Enrichment Facilities

- Transportation

- Storage and Disposal Facili

- Waste Determinations

to

ities

5
ACNW&M Charter (cont'd)

-Health Effects

- Decommissioning

- Materials Safety

-Application of Risk-Informed,

Performance-Based Regulations

6
2007/2008 Action Plan

* Joint ACRS/ACNW&M

Subcommittees

* Review of Regulatory Guides and

SRP Chapters

7
Future Activities

* Working Group Meetings

-Low Activity Radioactive Waste

-Modeling Landscape Evolution

for Performance Assessment

-Low Dose Radiation Effects

8
ACNW&M LETTERS
0. UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE ACNWR-0256

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 - 0001

January 4, 2007

The Honorable Dale Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Klein:

SUBJECT: PROPOSED REVISION 1 TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.112, "CALCULATION

OF RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN GASEOUS AND LIQUID

EFFLUENTS FROM LIGHT-WATER-COOLED NUCLEAR POWER

REACTORS"

.During its 1740 meeting, on November 13-16, 2006, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste

(ACNW) heard a presentation from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (NRC) staff on a

proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.112, "Calculation of Releases. of Radioactive

Materials in Gaseous and Liquid Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors."

This Regulatory Guide describes an acceptable method for calculating the annual radioactive

liquid and gaseous source terms used in evaluating the adequacy of radioactive effluent control

systems for nuclear reactors. The Regulatory Guide references NUREG-0016 (BWR-GALE)

and NUREG-0017. (PWR-GALE)1 as acceptable approaches for calculating average annual

expected releases of radioactive material in gaseous and liquid effluents from a reactor. The

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research requested that the Committee review Revision 1 to

Regulatory Guide 1.112 for consideration in support of new reactor licensing activities.

OBSERVATIONS

1. The staff reported its priorities and tentative schedule to make changes as follows:

a. Make currently proposed administrative changes (March 2007)

b. Technical update of the GALE Computer Codes (Late 2007)

c. Update Regulatory Guide 1.112 and issue for public comments (2008)

d. Publish Revised Regulatory Guide. (six months after the draft comment period is

complete)

The Committee notes that updates to the technical basis documents that support this

Regulatory Guide are planned to occur later in the process rather than at the beginning.

1

The BWR and PWR GALE Codes are computerized mathematical models for calculating the

releases of radioactive material in gaseous and liquid effluents (i.e., the gaseous and liquid source terms)

to determine conformance with the requirements of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.
-2-

2. It was reported that many of the assumptions and parameters in the GALE codes are

represented by fixed values basedon design approaches and operating experience for

reactors prior to 1980. The Committee is concerned with the relevance of these values

to new applications.

3. The staff reported that its short term focus will be to (a) make changes to the Regulatory

Guide for consistency with ANSI standard 18.1-1999 because applicants are likely to

refer to this standard in their applications and (b) update the Regulatory Guide to be

consistent with the current terminology and other requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. The

Committee believes that making the changes to the Regulatory Guide before the GALE

code and its basis are updated is not efficient or technically defensible.

RECOMMENDATION

Staff priorities should be to evaluate and update the technical aspects- of the GALE codes and

their associated documentation first. The Regulatory Guide should then be revised to reflect

these updates. The emphasis should be assuring that the GALE codes and Regulatory Guide

are based on up-to-date approaches for estimating radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent

source terms.

Sincerely,

iRA

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman

References:

1. Memorandum dated September 25, 2006, from Jimi T. Yerokun, Chief, RiskApplications and Special Project Branch, RES to Michael R. Snodderly, Chief for

Technical Support Branch, ACRS, Subject: Additional Information - Regulatory Guide

1.112, "Calculation of Releases of Radioactive Materials in Gaseous and Liquid

Effluents from Light-water-cooled Nuclear Power Reactors" (DG-1 160).

2. NUREG-0016, "Calculation of Releases of Radioactive. Materials in Gaseous and Liquid

Effluents from Boiling Water Reactors (BWR-GALE Code)," Revision 1, issued 1979.

3. NUREG-0017, "Calculation of Releases of Radioactive Materials in Gaseous and Liquid

Effluents from Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR-GALE Code)," Revision 1, issued

1985.

4. ANS/ANSI 18.1-1999, "Radioactive Source Term for Normal Operation of Light Water

Reactors."
SLEUNITED STATES

V, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE AND MATERIALS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

ACNWS-0266

August 1, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: CHAPTERS 11.2 THROUGH 11.5 OF NUREG-0800, "STANDARD REVIEW

PLAN (SRP) FOR THE REVIEW OF SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTS FOR

NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS"

Dear Chairman Klein:

At the request of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, the Advisory

Committee on Nuclear Waste and Materials (the Committee) reviewed the revisions to

Chapters 11.2 through 11.5 of NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan (SRP) for the

Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants." The staff of the Office of

New Reactors (NRO), Health Physics Branch, provided presentations on the revised

SRP Chapters to the Committee at recent Committee meetings including the following:

" SRP Chapter 11.2, Liquid Waste Management System, at the 17 5th Meeting

(December 2006)

a SRP Chapter 11.3, Gaseous Waste Management System, and Chapter 11.4, Solid

Waste Management Systems, at the 17 81h Meeting (April 2007)

" SRP Chapter 11.5, Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring Instrumentation

and Sampling Systems, at the 17 9th Meeting (May 2007)

These SRP chapters were revised by March 2007 and posted on the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission's (NRC) website to be available to potential applicants for new nuclear

power reactors 6 months in advance of when the new license applications are expected

to be transmitted to the NRC. The revisions did not receive stakeholder review before

posting on the website, although some industry feedback has been received after the

posting.

The revisions to these SPR chapters include the following:

" Adding 10 CFR Part 20.1406, Minimization of Contamination, as an acceptance

criteria

" Adding supplemental guidance on meeting 10 CFR Part 20.1301(e) and 40 CFR Part

190, Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations
2

" Updates to address modernization of equipment used (e.g., mobile radioactive waste

treatment systems) and updated regulatory documentation employed in licensing,

reactors (e.g., the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual)

" Updates to regulations that have been issued after the. last revision (e.g., Department

of Transportation shipping requirements in 10 CFR Parts 171 to 180)

RECOMMENDATION

As soon as practical, the technical bases referenced in the SRP sections should be

updated, including computer codes, methodologies, and parameter values cited in

referenced regulatory guides, supporting NUREGs, and other documents.

OBSERVATIONS

Although these SRP chapters have been recently reissued, some of their fundamental

technical bases have not been updated. Underlying dose analysis methodologies used

in the regulatory guides supporting these SRP chapters and the supporting

documentation is outdated. Dose methodologies first published in 1959 are still used

(International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 2). Newer

dosimetry methods in ICRP Publication 60 and Publication 64 that have updated

dosimetric models and methods are not used. The dose methodologies that underpin

SRP chapters use guidance that spans over 40 years, proscribe the calculation of very

different dose quantities and result in different calculated doses. The NRO health

physics staff suggested an approach that addresses the weaknesses in dose

methodologies that updates them in a multi-step fashion. They suggested that the first

step could update critical parameters such as dose conversion factors. The second step

could update other important parameters such as shielding and biological accumulation

factors. The third step could systematically review all dose methodologies used and

comprehensively update all of them to ensure that a risk-informed approach is

employed.

Some regulatory guides referenced in the SRP chapters are new and under

development (e.g., Draft Regulatory Guide 4012 for implementing 10 CFR Part 20.1406)

or being revised (e.g., Regulatory Guide 1.21, "Measuring, Evaluating, and Reporting

Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of Radioactive Materials in Liquid and

Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants"), and were not

available when the SRP chapters were revised.

Some of the regulatory guides have never been finalized (e.g., Regulatory Guide 4.8,

"Environmental Technical Specifications for Nuclear Power Plants," issued for comment

in December 1975). Other regulatory guides are up to 30 years old (e.g., Regulatory

Guide 1.109, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor

Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I,"

October 1977) or are not scheduledfor revision (e.g., Regulatory Guide 1.33, "Quality

Assurance Program Requirements (Operation)," Revision 2, February 1978) in the near

future.
3

Supporting analysis cited in some of the regulatory guides is outdated (e.g., NUREG1301, "Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Guidance: Standard Radiological Effluent

Controls for Pressurized Water Reactors," April 1991 and NUREG-1 302, "Offsite Dose

Calculation Manual Guidance: Standard Radiological Effluent Controls for Boiling Water

Reactors," April 1991, use the 1979 Branch Technical Position on Radiological

Assessment). Therefore, the supporting methodologies cited in the regulatory .guides

may not be representative of expected performance from the new reactor designs, and

may not take into account modern fuel characteristics and performance, and

improvements to reactor coolant water quality since the analysis was conducted.

The Committee reported earlier on one of the technical bases in need of .updating, the

Gaseous and Liquid Effluent (GALE) code, in its letter report dated January 4, 2007, on

Regulatory Guide 1.112, "Calculation of Releases of Radioactive Materials in Gaseous

and Liquid Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors."

The Committee plans to continue its evaluation of regulatory guides and technical bases

documents regarding radiation protection, radioactive waste management, protection of

the environment, and other areas consistent with the Committee's Charter and Action

Plan.

Sincerely,

IRA/

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman
ICRP's RECOMMENDATIONS

Michael T. Ryan

/ 1"
ICRP's Recommendations

" The Committee has reviewed

previous drafts of- the ICRP

recommendations

* The Committee continues to

closely follow ICRP's work

10
AC NW& M Conclusion

* The Committee concurs with the

NRC staff that "there may be no

compelling public health and

safety argument to change NRC

regulations"

* ICRP publication 103 is expected

soon

11
ACNW&M LETTERS
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Er ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE ACNWR-0258

Zo• WASHINGTON. DC 20555 - 0001

January 11, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, "THE DOSE-EFFECT

RELATIONSHIP AND ESTIMATING THE CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS OF LOW

DOSES OF IONIZING RADIATION"

Dear Chairman Klein:

In response to an SRM dated February 9, 2006, during its 174' meeting on November 13-16,

2006, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (the Committee) heard a presentation from

representatives of the French Academy of Sciences. The report was titled "The Dose-Effect

Relationship and Estimating the Carcinogenic Effects of Low Doses of Ionizing Radiation." This

report provided the Committee with excellent and detailed insights regarding the French

Academy's study of the current state of radiation biology related to low dose exposures; their

views regarding the linear no-threshold (LNT) theory of radiation injury; and the appropriate

context for uses of the LNT.

Observations

The Committee offers the following observations from the presentation and discussion of the

Academy's report:

1. The French Academy of Sciences report focuses on the radiobiological science and

does not try to interpret these results in a policy context. In contrast, the BEIR VII report

attempts to interpret the current state of knowledge into a policy context. The French

Academy of Sciences presenters pointed out that the LNT theory of radiation damage

can be appropriately used as a risk management tool but not as a risk assessment tool.

2. The presenters reported that collective dose is useful as a management tool for work

planning and assessing worker exposure (ALARA), but should not be used as a risk

assessment tool. Cancer risks for individuals or groups cannot be estimated using

collective dose, nor can potential future cancer risk be projected from estimates of dose.

The presenters stated that extrapolation of cancer risk using the LNT theory assumes

that a very low dose administered to many people has the same carcinogenic effect as

high doses administered to a small number of people. They further noted that this

assumption does not have a scientific foundation, as UNSCEAR and ICRP have pointed

out. The Committee has concurred with this view and reiterates it here.
-2-

3. The French Academy report, based on current data, raises doubts about the validity of

using the LNT theory to estimate carcinogenic risks at doses less than 10 rem (< 100

mSv) and is even more skeptical of such estimates at doses less than 1 rem (< 10 mSv).

However, an actual threshold in the probability of cancer as a function of dose cannot be

demonstrated with data available today.

4. In contrast to the French Academy report, the BEIR VII report states:

"The [National Academy of Sciences] Committee concludes that the current

scientific evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a linear, nothreshold dose-response relationship between exposure to ionizing radiation and

the development of cancer in humans."

The BEIR VII report does not conclude that the LNT theory is correct but the data

.appear to be consistent with the LNT theory..The report does not rule out the

possibility of a threshold.

5. A recent paper by several authors of the French Academy study compares their

report with the BEIR VII report and the recent ICRP Report on cancer risk from

low doses of radiation. One forward looking conclusion from this paper observes:

"The controversy related to the carcinogenic effect of low doses of

genotoxic agents started over a decade ago (Abelson 1994, Ames and

Gold 1997). However, the recent biological data have brought about new

arguments which, when confirmed, would be convincing. The

epidemiological studies have not yet been able to demonstrate a

detrimental effect of low dose irradiation. They should be pursued and a

meta-analysis of the available data should be carried out. The

controversy between the reports should not be ignored. Discussion could

clarify the problem and pave the way for new investigations and hopefully

a consensus on many points. A few years ago the general impression

was that it was important to obtain quantitative data regarding the effect

of low doses but that it would always be impossible to reach a reliable

conclusion. The perspectives have dramatically changed over the past

few years. It clearly appears that in a decade or so we shall have

conclusive data. In the meantime it would be proper to reconsider the

ways the detrimental effects of low doses are assessed since an

overestimation of the risks currently has a negative effect on the physical

and mental health of the population."

6. Radiobiology studies at the cellular, tissue, organ, and organism level are useful

because, through these studies, understanding of the fundamental mechanisms

of radiation injury and the response to such injury is being developed. Many

factors influence biological responses to radiation at the cellular, tissue, organ
-3-

and organism levels. These include dose, dose rate, duration of exposure, and

radiation quality. This information contributes to developing understanding of

radiation carcinogenesis. As the Committee noted in its letter (dated November

8, 2006) to the Commission on the current efforts on low-dose research:

"This body of DOE research is unearthing interesting radiobiology on the.

mechanisms for radiation injury, repair, and responses to radiation mainly

at the molecular and cellular level. However, much of the work is

evaluating effects at doses several times to orders of magnitude above

levels at which exposures to the public and to most workers are

regulated. Extrapolation to lower doses and reconciliation with

epidemiology studies have so far not been performed at a level of detail

that would be directly useful in policy making or in revising current or

developing new radiation protection standards at this time."

7. The French Academy presenters stated that effects at low doses should not be

extrapolated from effects at high doses because damage repair mechanisms at

the cellular level can be quite different. Further, extrapolating observations at the

cellular level to the tissue, organ, or organism level is also uncertain.

8. The French Academy report considered data from the Department of Energy

(DOE) low-dose study, while in a letter dated July 15, 2005 from Raymond

Orbach (Director, Office of Science, U.S. Department of Energy) to the National

Academies it was pointed out that some epidemiological studies and new

biological research were left out of the final deliberations of the BEIR VII

Committee. It is not apparent to the ACNW that these differences in the data

reviewed by either group would explicitly impact the ACNW's recommendations.

9. Exposure to a particular source cannot be evaluated in isolation. There are many

sources of ionizing radiation (see public health statement for ionizing radiation at

http:/lwww.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/phsl49.html). Radiation exposure for any

individual includes contributions from:

a. Terrestrial background

b. Cosmic radiation

c. Radon

d. Radioactive materials incorporated into the body

e. Medical exposures from diagnosis and therapy

f. Other man-made sources and human activities including air travel,

consumer products, and nuclear power
-4-

The Committee has learned that the National Council on Radiation Protection and

Measurements (NCRP) is undertaking a detailed study that will produce an update of

NRCP Report No. 93, Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the Population of the United

States, which was published in 1987. The scope of work includes all

sources of radiation exposure: background radiation, industrial sources, medical patient,

occupational, consumer products, and miscellaneous sources.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

1. Based on the Committee's review of the French Academy report and the BEIR

VII report, the Committee finds the current state of knowledge does not warrant

any change to current NRC radiation protection standards or limits.

2. The Committee affirms its earlier recommendations that the Committee and NRC

staff should remain informed of continuing developments in this area. In support

of this recommendation, the Committee plans a half-day Working Group session.

The focus of the Working Group would be to give summaries of the state of

knowledge of radiation biology with emphasis on implications for radiation risk

models and radiation protection practice.

3. The Committee also reaffirms its previous recommendations that collective dose

is only appropriate as a measure to be used in comparing alternatives and not as

a method of estimating absolute cancer risk.

Sincerely,

IRA/

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman

References:

1. Dose-effect relationships and estimation of the carcinogenic effects of low doses

of ionizing radiation, Academie des Sciences [Academy of Sciences] - Academie

nationale de Mddecine [National Academy of Medicine], Andre Aurengo1

(Rapporteur), Dietrich Averbeck, Andre Bonnin' (t), Bernard Le Guen, Roland

Masse 2, Roger Monier3 , Maurice Tubiana 13 (Chairman), Alain-Jacques Valleron3 ,

Florent de Vathaire. 1 Member of the Academie nationale de Medecine. 2

Correspondent Member of the Academie nationale de M6decine. 3 Member of

the Academie des Sciences

2. Health Risks From Exposure To Low Levels Of Ionizing Radiation: BEIR VII

PHASE 2, Committee to Assess Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of

Ionizing Radiation Board on Radiation Effects Research, Division on Earth and

Life Studies, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL

ACADEMIES, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, Washington, D.C.

www.nap.edu
-5-

3. September 30, 2005 Letter to The Honorable Nils J. Diaz Chairman U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 "COMMENTS ON

USNRC STAFF RECOMMENDATION OF THE USE OF COLLECTIVE DOSE"

4. OPINION The debate on the use of linear no threshold for assessing the effects

of low doses M Tubiana, A Aurengo, D Averbeck and R Masse J. Radiol. Prot. 26

(2006) 317-324

5. ICRP 2004 ICRP Draft report of Committee I/Task Group. Low dose

extrapolation of radiation related cancer risk

6. November 8, 2006 Letter to The Honorable Dale E. Klein, Chairman, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001 titled "DOE LOW

DOSE RADIATION RESEARCH WORKSHOP (Vl)"

7. July 15, 2005 letter to Dr. Ralph Cicerone, President National Academy of

Sciences, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001

8. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Program Area

Committee on Radiation Measurements and Dosimetry PAC 6, Subcommittee on

Radiation Expo-sure of the U.S. Population SC 6-2 (available at

http://www.ncrponline.org/Current Proa/SC 6-2.html)
'Ao UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ACNWR-0259

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 - 0001

February 28, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON "DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION," DATED JANUARY 12, 2007

Dear Chairman Klein:

The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste has consulted with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC) staff on the latest draft' of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) document, "Draft Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection," dated

January 12, 2007. The Committee understands that the staffs comments are in the concurrence

process before transmission to ICRP.

Although ICRP did not allow sufficient time for a comprehensive review of these draft recommendations, the Committee believes that the NRC staff has performed a thorough review2 and that its comments are

appropriate. Although the staff recognizes improvements in this draft compared to previous drafts, it

concludes that problems remain.

The following two issues are noteworthy:

(1) ICRP relied on unpublished reports and data as a basis for its recommendations. This is a poor

practice. The Committee believes that the staff should advise ICRP accordingly.

(2) The Committee supports the staff view that it is not necessary to develop a radiation exposure

standard for nonhuman species.

The Committee prepared this short letter to offer its independent review of, and agreement with, the staff

comments so that the Commission would have the benefit of the Committee views before the ICRP

comment deadline. Furthermore, the Committee concurs with the staff conclusion' that "there may be

no compelling public health and safety argument to change NRC regulations..." based on the current

draft of the ICRP recommendations'.

Sincerely,

IRA/

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman

References:

1. Draft Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, January 12, 2007 (http:l/www.icrp.org/docs/ICRPDraftRecommendations_12_January,2007.pdf).

2. Draft NRC staff comments (February 2007) on the January 12, 2007 Draft Recommendations of

the International Commission on Radiological Protection.
UNITED STATES

X ".1% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE& MATERIALS

WASHINGTON, DC 20666 -0001

ACNWR-0265

July 27, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: AGENCY EFFORTS REGARDING RADIATION PROTECTION

INFORMATION

Dear Chairman Klein:

On June 20, 2007, at the 1 8 0 1h meeting of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste

and Materials (the Committee), Mr. David McIntyre, from the Office of Public Affairs

(OPA), briefed the Committee on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

program regarding outreach on radiation. He described the NRC's efforts to inform the

public about the health effects of low-dose radiation exposure and to elicit the public's

perceptions of radiation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Public outreach information on the NRC Web site should be organized to better respond

to questions typically raised by the public. Activities to reorganize information for the

public should complement the current structure of the Web site.

The agency should develop and proactively disseminate non-Web-based materials

supporting agency actions to targeted audiences.

The agency should continue to use focus groups to evaluate the effectiveness of NRC

public outreach activities.

OBSERVATIONS

Mr. McIntyre reported that NRC outreach focuses on the agency's mission to protect

people and the environment. He also noted that every office has a public outreach

program, not only OPA. The Committee also leamed that the goal of OPA is to ensure

openness in the NRC's regulatory process by making clear, accurate information

available in a timely manner to the news media and the public about the NRC's policies,

decisions, programs, and activities. Representatives from OPA typically serve as the

points of contact for the press, persons from other media, and the public. The office

focuses on areas such as preparing responses to public inquiries; supporting agency

public meetings; and developing information for dissemination via the Web, videos,

brochures, and fact sheets.
2

Mr. McIntyre reported that both the agency and the office seek to become the public's

first choice as a source for information regarding radiation protection. In conclusion,

Mr. McIntyre presented examples of information currently available on the NRC Web site

and on other Web sites. He reported that OPA, with support from the Office of Federal

and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, has begun efforts to

revamp the Web site and to make radiation protection information readily available and

easily accessible.

The Committee reviewed the following related NRC publications:

* NUREG/BR-0308, "Effective Risk Communications," January 2004

* NUREG/BR-0322, "Radiation Protection and the NRC,, February 2006

* Fact Sheet, "Biological Effects of Radiation," December 2004

* Fact Sheet, "Radiation Monitoring at Nuclear Power Plants and the 'Tooth Fairy'

Issue," January 2005

* Fact Sheet, "Tritium, Radiation Protection Limits, and Drinking Water Standards,"

July 2006

* Backgrounder, "Radiation Protection and the 'Tooth Fairy' Issue," December

2004

* -the agency Web site at http://www.nrc..ov and various sub pages discussed

below

Currently, the header buttons on the home page are organized according to the

regulatory areas and the organization's structure. The agency should consider adding a

header button labeled Radiation Information that would link to a page that reflects a

focus on questions asked by members of the public. Educational materials could also

be organized under these key questions and issues.

The NRC's outreach program focuses on the use of Web-based tools. The staff

develops and uses written materials (pamphlets, brochures, fact sheets) in support of

specific agency actions. The agency has no system for the targeted distribution of

information related to radiation protection through school systems, libraries, or other

outlets readily accessible to members of the public.

The staff currently evaluates the effectiveness of the NRC's public outreach program by

discussing "lessons learned" at staff meetings held after public meetings. The program

offices usually conduct the meetings and then apply the "lessons learned." The agency

has attempted to assess national changes in attitudes using focus groups.

Sincerely,

IRAI

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMNMITTEE ON NUCLEA'R WASTE ANI) MATEIRIALS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

ACNWMR-0267

September 25, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington D.C. 20555-0001

SUBJECT: ENGAGEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL

PROTECTION (ICRP)

Dear Chairman Klein:

The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and Materials (the Committee) believes that the

staff is well prepared and engaged in contemporaneous activities associated with the

International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and other national and international

regulatory and recommending bodies. The staff is currently engaged through:

1. Direct review of and comment on ICRP draft documents;

2. Membership, by invitation, on the ICRP Committee 4: Application of the

Commission's Recommendations;

3. Membership on the Nuclear Energy Agency's Committee on Radiation Protection

and Public Health, which provides a forum to develop consensus views on ICRP

recommendations; and

4. Federal interagency coordination of views on ICRP recommendations through

the Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation Standards.

In addition to the participation of its staff, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),

through grants and contracts, provides financial support to the ICRP. These activities are

effective in keeping the NRC current with the emerging guidance being offered by the ICRP.

The Committee notes that publication of the new (2007) ICRP recommendations will provide the

NRC with the opportunity to work with other Federal agencies to move toward a consistent

radiation protection framework for the United States.
Chairman Dale E. Klein -2-

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommends that:

1 The Commission invite representatives of organizations such as the ICRP, Nuclear Energy

Agency, International Atomic Energy Agency, and National Council on Radiation Protection

& Measurements to meet with the Commission, staff, and key U.S. stakeholders. This

exchange should provide the Commission with important insights regarding radiation

protection issues and initiatives, and the programs that address them. This engagement

and follow-up will offer the opportunity for the Commission to take a leadership role and set

a course for radiation protection practice.

2. The current staff activities continue and, in addition, the staff institute a more formal

process in order to:

a. Identify emerging radiation protection issues with lead times longer than

3 to 5 years.

b. Assess the potential impact of emerging issues on current

NRC regulations.

c. Develop strategies for reacting to changes in national and ICRP

recommendations.

Sincerely,

/RAJ

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman
CURRENT ISSUES

LOW-LEVEL WASTE

Michael T. Ryan
Status of LLW Disposal

• Barnwell will likely close to out-ofCompact waste in June 2008

• Northwest and Rocky Mountain

Compacts are unchanged

* Energy Solutions will continue to

receive Class A LLW

* Storage of LLW will increase

13
ACNW&M LETTERS
P PUNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY.COMNMISSION

ADIVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE AND) MATERIALS AWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

ACNWMR-0268

October 1, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE (LLW) MINIMIZATION

STRATEGIES AND VIEWS ON COMMERCIAL LLW MANAGEMENT

Dear Chairman Klein:

In June 2008, the Barnwell disposal facility in South Carolina, one of only three licensed,

commercially operated, low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities in the

country, will likely stop accepting LLW from states outside the Atlantic Compact (South

Carolina, New Jersey, and Connecticut). LLW generators in 36 States will be affected

when the Barnwell facility closes to non-compact states. In anticipation of this change,

at thel 8 2 nd meeting of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and Materials, the

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) presented its plans for the management of commercial

LLW.

The NEI presentation covered the following topics:

1 Plans to store Class B and Class C LLW safely and securely at nuclear power

plant sites.

1 Operational changes at nuclear power plants to reduce Class B and Class C

LLW generation.

1 Plans to reduce waste, particularly Class B and Class C LLW.

The NEI representative reported on both the short-term and long-term (strategic) issues

that NEI is studying. The speaker noted that NEI recently formed the LLW Executive

Committee (Executive Committee) to consider what should be done in the long term to

improve the management of commercial LLW. The Executive Committee will focus on

the following questions:

1 Is central processing, packaging, and storage of LLW feasible?

2 Is access to Federal disposal an option?

3 Should a Federal title be established for some classes of LLW?
Chairman Dale E. Klein -2-

4 Should the industry and government encourage development of other LLW

commercial disposal sites?.

5 Should industry petition rulemaking to Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations

(10 CFR) Part 61, "Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive

Waste"?

6 Should there be improved U.S. alignment with International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) framework for waste classification?

7 Are changes to the LLW Policy Act and its amendments necessary?

The Executive Committee intends to issue a report in early 2008 with its views on these

issues.

OBSERVATIONS

Nuclear power plants are focused on interim LLW storage from the present through

2035. This is based on the predicted decommissioning schedules of the current fleet of

power reactors at the end of one 20-year license renewal. The nuclear power industry

reports that it is prepared to store Class B and Class C LLW for an extended period of

time in interim waste storage facilities collocated at the reactor sites. To achieve this

objective, the utilities have considered ways to reduce the volumes of Class B and Class

C LLW that they generate. NEI indicated that by volume, nuclear power plant wastes

are 86 percent, 11.9 percent, and 1.2 percent Class A, B, and C LLW, respectively. The

key radionuclides that are driving overall classification are nickel-63, cesium-1 37, and

strontium-90.

The types and kinds of commercial LLW being generated by other industries are less

certain, and this sector is likely to be less prepared to manage and store LLW for any

extended period of time.

The NEI representative reported that they are looking at the original technical bases

(waste volumes, radioactive material content, waste form, and waste packaging)

underlying the 10 CFR Part 61 regulation and are comparing these bases against LLW

produced today. NEI is further considering a petition under 10 CFR 61.58, "Alternative

Requirements for Waste Classification and Characteristics," to propose an alterative

LLW waste classification system. They would like the alternative classification to

maintain compliance with the protection criteria for the LLW disposal site as defined in

10 CFR 61.41, "Protection of the General Population from Releases of Radioactivity"; 10

CFR 61.42, "Protection of Individuals from Inadvertent Intrusion"; 10 CFR 61.43,

"Protection of Individuals During Operations"; and 10 CFR 61.44, "Stability of the

Disposal Site After Closure." Additionally, NEI is reexamining staff guidance found in the

Branch Technical Position on Waste Averaging. This review will consider alternative

averaging schemes that account for the characteristics of currently generated waste.
Chairman Dale E. Klein -3-

To ease the disposal burden on other LLW generators (hospitals, universities, research

institutions, etc.), non-Part 61 disposal options, such as Resources Conservation and

Recovery

Act (RCRA) Subtitle C and D sites, might be suitable for certain types of Class A LLW

and other low-activity radioactive wastes (LAW) without having significant impacts on

public health and safety and the environment.

Improved information is needed regarding types and kinds of LLW and LAW being

generated by other industries to make decisions concerning alternative disposal of these

wastes. This information could provide the technical basis for possible guidance or

rulemaking regarding disposal of LAW at RCRA sites. The Committee intends to

examine this issue in more detail over the next year and is developing a white paper on

this topic.

RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommends that the Commission initiate efforts in the near future to

address interim storage and ultimate disposal options for LLW. Both the regulatory and

institutional issues need to be addressed. It is important to integrate stakeholders into

this dialogue as early as possible since this is a topic of significant public interest.

The Committee intends to track developments related to the forthcoming Executive

Committee findings and compare those with the staffs 2006 LLW strategic planning

recommendations.

Sincerely,

IRA!

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman
IGNEOUS ACTIVITY AT

THE PROPOSED

YUCCA MOU.NTAIN

REPOSITORY

William J. Hinze
Recent Activities

• Working Group on Igneous Activity

* Published White Paper on Igneous

Activity- June 2007

* Monitored DOE expert elicitation

update on volcanism probability

and NRC staff's reports

15
Technical Basis for

Decisionmaking

* Review and analysis of views

-What could happen?

- How likely is it?

-What are the potential

consequences?

* Evaluation of hypothetical

extrusive and intrusive scenarios

16
Extrusive Scenario

* Inhalation of dispersed respirable

ash ejected from molten rock

erupting through the repository

• Maximum effect during first

thousand years after closure

• Current analysis indicates risk is

a small fraction of proposed

standard

17
Intrusive Scenario

* Waste from canisters destroyed

by intruding molten rock is carried

by ground water to nearby

aquifers

• Maximum effect not anticipated

for tens of thousands of years due

to slow groundwater movement

* Current analysis indicates risk is

a small fraction of proposed

standard

18
Evaluation of Scenarios

* Considers:

- Nature

- Likelihood

- Consequences

• White Paper presents range of

credible views

19
Nature of Possible

Igneous Event

Characteristics similar to most

recent volcano in region- Lathrop

Wells

-Small volume, single episode

eruptive event that disperses

ash over surrounding region

- General agreement

20
Likelihood of Igneous

Event

• Forecasting from previous events

* Volcanism is waning

* 1 chance in a billion to I chance

in ten million per year of an event

intersecting the repository

* Ongoing DOE expert elicitation

will update probability estimates

in 2008

21
Source Term Resulting From an Extrusive Event

* Number of waste packages

involved

" Quantity of radioactive material

released

* Fraction of material that is

respirable

* Wide range of views

22
Consequences of an

Extrusive Event

* Relatively mature models

* Evolving consideration of

-Range of waste particler size

-Fraction of waste in ash vs. lava

flows

- Preferential remobilization of

respirable ash by water and wind

23
Consequences of an

Intrusive Event

* Less well understood and no natural

analogs lead to differing views

* Range of views on

- Interaction of molten rock with

waste packages and repository

-Governing molten rock properties

- Number of waste canisters

affected and potential for

secondary vents from repository

24
Consequences of an..

Igneous Event

Continuing analysis will reduce

uncertainties, but credible

alternative views are likely to

remain with regard to.

-Source term in extrusive scenario

-Interaction of molten rock, waste packages, and the repositor in

the intrusive scenario

• Current analysis indicates risk is a

small fraction of proposed standard

25
ACNW&M LETTERS
•r•

"o UNITED STATES

- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 -0001

ACWNR-0264

June 6, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: IGNEOUS ACTIVITY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN: TECHNICAL BASIS FOR

DECISION MAKING

Dear Chairman Klein:

The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and Materials (the Committee) is pleased to

forward the attached report "Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain: Technical Basis for

Decision Making." This. report was prepared by the Committee at the request of the

Commission in SRM M06011 1 B, February 9, 2006, "to provide the Commission with an

analysis of the current state of the knowledge regarding igneous activity which the

Commission can use as a technical basis for its decisionmaking." The report presents a

review and analysis of the range of current technical views on the nature, likelihood, and

potential consequences of future igneous activity at the proposed repository. The

Committee appreciates the ongoing dialogue with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) staff regarding alternative igneous activity views presented in the

report.

The Committee considered the full range of current views on igneous activity when it

determined its general observations, presented in the Executive Summary of the report.

Briefly summarized, these observations are as follows:

1. The nature and consequences of an igneous event in the Yucca Mountain

vicinity lead to differing professional judgments and alternative views on the

expected impacts of igneous activity on the proposed high-level Waste

repository. As a result, evaluation of risk from an igneous event requires

quantitative consideration of credible alternative views.

2. Despite the broad range of conceptual models and parameters used there is

general agreement on many aspects of the nature of potential igneous events

and the range of probability of these events in the future.

3. The consequences of an igneous event on the repository are more controversial

and less well understood than other aspects of igneous activity, but

consequence models are evolving through consideration of magma physics.

The significance to risk of differences in these views is not well documented.
-2-

4. Limitations in fundamental information and knowledge of consequence

processes result in inherent uncertainties in evaluating igneous activity models.

Application of the principles of magma physics as illustrated in this report can

constrain uncertainties in consequence analyses that can minimize the need for

conservatisms in performance assessment.

5. Both the extrusive (volcanic) and intrusive igneous scenarios are credible at

Yucca Mountain. The extrusive scenario is likely to cause the larger relative risk

and the effect is greatest within the first thousand years after closure of the

repository. On the other hand, the maximum risk from the intrusive scenario

would not occur for several tens of thousands of years.

6. Preliminary performance assessment indicates that the consequences from

either scenario would be only a fraction of the dose standard.

7. Future igneous activity in the Yucca Mountain region will likely be similar to the

small-volume, single-episode basaltic Lathrop Wells volcano and would likely

occur within basins rather than on ridges. Certain styles of volcanism. are not

expected. For example, large-volume felsic volcanism which formed the rocks of

Yucca Mountain is not anticipated and conditions necessary for explosive

phreatic eruptions (maar volcanism, involving heating and expansion of ground

water) do not exist at Yucca Mountain.

8. General, but not total, agreement is that the igneous activity at Yucca Mountain

is waning, with the probability that future igneous activity intersecting the

repository in the range of 10' to 10/yr. . The ongoing expert elicitation of

volcanic experts in the DOE's Probabilistic Volcanic Hazard - Update which

incorporates the latest geophysical and drilling data will be the most up to date,

credible estimate of the range of igneous activity intersection with the proposed

repository. The results of the drilling have reduced uncertainty about the number

and age of buried basalts near Yucca Mountain.

9. Significant disagreement exists regarding the extent of flow of magma into drifts

of the repository during a possible intrusive igneous event and the number of

waste packages destroyed by invading magma. However, magma physics

indicates that flow of intruding magma into drifts would be limited and a

secondary (satellite) vent branching from a drift (including the "dogleg" scenario)

is unlikely to form at any time in the style of volcanism expected at Yucca

Mountain.

10. The current technical bases of several aspects of igneous activity appear to be

insufficiently developed or supported by available information and analyses.

These include the range of waste particle sizes in the ash, the effects of large

floods on the volume and distribution of contaminated ash in the vicinity of the

RMEI, the amount of waste incorporated into ash versus lava during early

eruptive phase of the extrusive scenario, and the importance of setbacks of the

repository from faults and fractured zones.
-3-

The NRC staff has committed to brief the Committee regarding their analysis of

alternative views on igneous activity issues and the related risk significance using the

newest version of the NRC Total-System Performance Assessment code. This

information together with the attached report will be the basis for the Committee's

evaluation of risk-significant topics pertinent to decisionmaking on igneous activity at

Yucca Mountain that will be reported to the Commission.

Sincerely,

IRA/

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman

Attachment:

As stated
TRANSPORTATION

Ruth F. Weiner
Transportation

* Met with staff and stakeholders

- Moderator Exclusion

- Burnup Credit

* commercial spent fuel

* Moderator exclusion and burnup

credit are related

27
Burnup Credit

* Burnup credit is not precluded by

regulation

* Full burnup credit would allow

fewer shipments of spent fuel

* NRC has approved one application

for actinide burnup credit and

partial credit for fission product

poisoning

28
Moderator Exclusion

* Moderator exclusion is regulated

by Part 71 and staff guidance

• NRC has not yet approved

shipments that rely on moderator

exclusion - applications are

expected

29
Moderator Exclusion

* 10 CFR 71.55

- (c) provides basis for moderator

exclusion

(e) and Interim Staff Guidance 19

provide for moderator exclusion

under accident conditions

30
Recommendations

.Use existing regulations for

moderator exclusion

* Risk-inform regulatory: guidance on

burnup credit and moderator

exclusion

31
ACNW&M LETTERS
"1 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE ACNWR-0260

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 - 0001

April 23, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: USE OF CREDIT FOR MODERATOR EXCLUSION IN THE LICENSING OF

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TRANSPORTATION PACKAGES

Dear Chairman Klein:

At the 17 6" meeting of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (the Committee or ACNW) on

February 13-15, 2007, staff from the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards,

Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation, briefed the Committee on taking credit for

moderator exclusion for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation packages. The staff of the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sought advice from the Committee on its intention to

begin background preparation for a rulemaking on moderator exclusion. At the Committee's

177t meeting on March 20-22, 2007, representatives from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI),

the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the Idaho'National Laboratory (INL), and H322

Consulting LLC briefed the Committee on this topic. The briefings addressed the advantages

and disadvantages of taking credit for moderator exclusion (with some discussion of burnup

credit) in preventing criticality during transportation. The meeting included a roundtable

discussion involving all presenters. The participants did not discuss safeguards and security

aspects of the transportation of SNF.

The NRC staff briefing highlighted the current regulatory framework for transportation of fissile

material, regulations for fissile material packages, current staff practice with respect to criticality

prevention and moderator exclusion, considerations if the practice is changed, and interim staff

guidance (ISG-19, "Moderator Exclusion under Hypothetical Accident Conditions and

Demonstrating Subcriticality of Spent Fuel under the Requirements of 10 CFR 71.55(e)").

The current rule (Title 10, Section 71.55, "General Requirements for Fissile Material Packages,"

of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71.55)) requires that fissile material being

transported be in a configuration such that criticality cannot occur even if water, a neutron

moderator, partly or completely fills the package. The requirements of 10 CFR 71.83,

"Assumptions as to Unknown Properties," provide a bounding case for determining the

assumptions for fissile content of SNF. If the inventory of germane radionuclides is known,

burnup credit can be granted. Prevention of criticality could be demonstrated by either

guaranteeing that water is excluded (moderator exclusion) or recognizing that the material does

not have its original fissile content and contains some fission poisons (burnup credit), or both.

Presenters from NEI and EPRI indicated that if burnup credit, including credit for fission

products, were considered for commercial SNF in criticality analyses, credit for moderator

exclusion might not be needed because the combination of less fissile material and poisoning

by fission products could be shown to prevent a criticality.
-2-

Industry participants reported that if burnup credit were granted for the current fleet of dualpurpose storage.and transportation casks, some of these casks could then be transported. This

would avoid the need to repackage them for transport.

In addition, the U.S. Department of Energy has an inventory of noncommercial SNF destined for

the proposed high-level waste repository. This noncommercial SNF exhibits such a wide range

of enrichment and burnup that it is difficult to adequately characterize it for burnup credit. The

INL representative presented the test sequence for the canister-in-canister transportation

package, showing that water would not infiltrate the inner canister and thereby strengthening

the proposal for moderator exclusion.

SNF could be shipped more efficiently than at present in transportation packages granted an

exception under 10 CFR 71.55(c). This exception would allow such shipments with the

following conditions:-

if the package incorporates special design features that ensure that no single

packaging error would permit leakage, and if appropriate measures are taken

before each shipment to ensure that the containment system does not leak.

ACNW Observations

The regulations in 10 CFR 71.55(b) require that fissile transportation packages be

subcritical even when optimally moderated (fully flooded), so that criticality is impossible

in the as-loaded condition. Credit for moderator exclusion is a demonstration of

subcriticality without moderator (no water in-leakage) inside a transportation package

containment system. Under 10 CFR 71.55(c), the NRC can approve an exception to

10 FR 71.55(b) if the applicant can show that water in-leakage can be completely

excluded from the transportation package, or if the amount of water that could enter is

not sufficient to cause criticality. To date, the NRC has not received a request for an

exception for an SNF transportation package design or for shipments that rely on

moderator exclusion for criticality safety, though industry participants seem willing to

make such requests.

As currently written, 10 CFR 71.55 is deterministic and not risk-informed. Exceptions to

10 CFR 71.55 may be risk-informed, but this does not affect the deterministic nature of

the regulation. The regulation as written concentrates on preventing a criticality during

transportation but considers alternate methods of reducing risks only as case-by-case

exceptions.

ISG-1 9 allows moderator exclusion for commercial SNF transportation during

hypothetical accident conditions (as described in 10 CFR 71.55(e)). However, ISG-1 9

does not give relief from 10 CFR 71.55(b) (i.e., subcriticality must still be ensured with

water inside the containment system with the fuel in the as-loaded configuration).

Moderator exclusion and burnup credit are not separate issues. Either or both would

allow a larger amount of SNF to be transported in a single package.
-3-

To date, the NRC staff has approved one application for a transportation package with

partial (actinide plus some fission products) burnup credit. The staff is now considering

a second application.

Current staff thinking suggests that rulemaking might be appropriate to codify moderator

exclusion for certain packages under certain conditions. In addition, rulemaking would

provide an opportunity for public input.

The staff expressed concern that if major vendors seek exceptions under

10 CFR 71.55(c), many SNF shipments will be made under an exception rather than an

affirmative rule. Routine use of the exception under 10 CFR 71.55(c) may call into

question the assumptions underlying the generic environmental impact statement for

transportation of radioactive -materials.

ACNW Recommendations

The Committee recommends that the staff use the existing rule at 10 CFR 71.55(c) to

evaluate submittals from applicants seeking to apply moderator exclusion provisions of

the rule. A decision about rulemaking should be deferred until more experience is

obtained using the existing provisions of the rule.

The Committee recommends that guidance be made risk-informed and include

consideration of both moderator exclusion and burnup credit.

Sincerely,

iRAI

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman

References

1. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of

Radioactive Material."

2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Moderator Exclusion under Hypothetical Accident

Conditions and Demonstrating Subcriticality of Spent Fuel under the Requirements of

10 CFR 71.55(e)," Interim Staff Guidance 19, Rev. 0, May 2003.
In-Situ Leach Uranium

Recovery Activities

Ruth F. Weiner
OBJECTIVES

* Advise the Commission on

Rulemaking

- Environmental protection issues

- Resolution of issues associated

with in-situ leach mining and

groundwater contamination

33
Proposed Rulemaking

Recommendations

* Rule should be risk informed and

provide:

- Location of the point of

compliance

- Groundwater monitoring

requirements

- Methods of demonstrating

compliance

- Financial surety

34
Proposed Rulemaking

Recommendations (Cont'd)

° Rule should provide:

-Measures to reduce the

likelihood of contaminant

release

- Groundwater remediation

- Establishing pre-mining

background or baseline

groundwater quality

35
Proposed Rulemaking

Recommendations -(Cont'd)

* Rule should consider:

-Groundwater use

- Onsite effluent disposal

- Decommissioning and license

termination requirements

36
Next Steps

• Review staff progress regarding

Rulemaking

• Evaluate NRC staff resolution of

public comments on the draft rule

37
ACNW&M LETTERS
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE R-0261

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 - 0001

May 9, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON GROUNDWATER PROTECTION AT IN SITU

LEACH URANIUM RECOVERY FACILITIES

Dear Chairman Klein:

During its 178th meeting on April 10-12, 2007, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (the

Committee) received a briefing by NRC staff from the Office of Federal and State Materials

Safety and Environmental Management Programs (FSME) on the status of a proposed

rulemaking on groundwater protection at in situ leach (ISL) uranium recovery facilities. The

FSME staff discussed the legislative and regulatory background of ISL, efforts to.eliminate dual

regulation, staff interactions with the U.S. Environmental Agency (EPA) and the National Mining

Association, staff rulemaking strategy, the path forward, and future interactions with the

Committee. The staff indicated that the technical basis for the rulemaking is under

development. The rulemaking will add a new criterion.addressing ISL uranium mining to the

existing regulations for conventional uranium mills and mill tailing facilities in 10 CFR Part 40,

Appendix A.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The FSME staff should proceed with developing the proposed rule, .including codification

of the appropriate standards specified by the EPA.

The rule should provide specific guidance on the three-dimensional location of the point

of compliance, groundwater monitoring requirements, methods of demonstrating

compliance, and financial surety considerations.

The rule should establish guidance on measures to reduce the likelihood of contaminant

excursions outside the mined zone (the exempted aquifer unit that contains the uranium

ore deposit) and the site property (the land that is under control of the licensee), and for

remediation outside the mined zone if excursion occurs.

The rule should be risk-informed and should consider groundwater use, onsite effluent

disposal, and decommissioning and license termination requirements.

The rule should provide requirements for establishing pre-mining background or

baseline groundwater quality.
-2-

DISCUSSION

The NRC staff is developing a rulemaking to codify regulations and standards to protect

groundwater at ISL uranium mining sites. The main concerns are multiplicity of regulations and

regulators, protection of uncontaminated groundwater outside the mined zone and restoration

of groundwater quality in the mined zone after the mining is terminated. The latter represents a

challenge in practice because groundwater restoration involves flushing of the mined zone to

remove contaminants, and the resulting asymptotic concentration of contaminants may exceed

the concentration desired in the mined ore body. Therefore, full restoration of the mined ore

body may not be achievable and an alternate concentration limit (ACL) may be appropriate.

Currently groundwater protection at licensed uranium recovery facilities is regulated pursuant to

the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) and the Atomic Energy Act, as

amended. The applicable EPA standards are provided in 40 CFR Part 192, "Health and

Environmental Protection Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings," and NRC

regulations in 10 CFR Part 40, Appendix A "Criteria Relating to the Operation of Uranium Mills

and the Disposition of Tailings or Wastes Produced by the Extraction or Concentration of

Source Material From Ores Processed Primarily for Their Source Material Content." These

regulations require groundwater restoration to pre-mining background levels, or to maximum

concentration limits (MCLs), or to alternate concentration limits (ACLs). They are generally

applied to uranium mill and mill tailings sites and do not explicitly address ISL facilities.

Guidance for licensing of ISL facilities is currently provided in NUREG-1 569, "Standard Review

Plan for In Situ Leach Uranium Extraction License Applications," which calls for restoration of

groundwater quality within the mined zone and any affected aquifers to pre-operational

(baseline) water quality conditions ("Primary Restoration Standards"), or pre-operational class

of use ("Secondary Restoration Standards"). If a constituent cannot technically or economically

be restored, an applicant must demonstrate that the resulting higher concentration would not

degrade adjacent groundwater resources unacceptably or threaten health and safety. In some

cases the affected state also regulates groundwater protection at ISL mines. There is a need to

codify standards for groundwater protection at ISL sites in NRC regulations.

Committee Activities Pertinent to ISL

In two Staff Requirements Memoranda "COMSECY-05-0064-Fiscal Year 2006 and 2007 Action

Plan for the ACNW" (ML060380593), dated February 7, 2006, and "Meeting with Advisory

Committee on Nuclear Waste" (ML070170041), dated January 16, 2007, the Commission

requested that the Committee advise the Commission as to:

1. The unique waste management, decommissioning, and environmental protection issues

related to the licensing of ISL uranium recovery facilities that may arise from a Part 41

rulemaking addressing uranium recovery, and

2. The potential resolution of issues associated with ISL mining and resulting groundwater

contamination.
-3-

The Commission also stated that the Committee's advice should be appropriately coordinated

with the NRC staff so that they are not in conflict with ongoing efforts of the staff. In support of

this direction, the Committee appreciates the interaction with the FSME staff on their

rulemaking plans and looks forward to commenting on the technical basis for the rule when it is

completed.

Sincerely,

IRA/

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman
ABBREVIATIONS

ACNW&M

ACRS

CFR

DOE

ICRP

LLW

NRC

NUREG

SRP

Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste

and Materials

Advisory Committee on Reactor

Safeguards

Code of Federal Regulations

Department of Energy, U.S.

International Commission on

Radiological Protection

Low-Level Waste

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S.

NRC Technical Report Designation

(Nuclear Regulatory Commission)

Standard Review Plan

38
REMAINING ACNW&M

LETTERS
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE ACNWR-0255

WASHINGTON, DC 20555- 0001

December 27, 2006

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON USING MONITORING TO BUILD MODEL

CONFIDENCE

Dear Chairman Klein:

In a Staff Requirements Memorandum (M0601 11 B) dated February 9, 2006, the Advisory

Committee on Nuplear Waste (Committee) was requested by the Commission to work with the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff "to identify and assess methods of monitoring for

compliance and to identify possible enhancements for increasing confidence in the validity of

associated analytical models." The Committee worked closely with staff from the Office of

Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) to organize and conduct a 2-day working group meeting

on "Monitoring to Build Model Confidence" during the ACNW 173rd meeting, September 18-21,

2006. This letter provides Committee recommendations, along with comments and

observations, based on the working group meeting.

The meeting included presentations by invited experts as well as members of the NRC staff,

panel discussions, and question-answer sessions involving the participants and Committee

members. Outside participants included representatives from the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, the U.S. Geological Survey, the American Nuclear Society, the Electric

Power Research Institute, the Department of Energy national laboratories, private consulting

firms, waste management companies, and universities. Professor George Hornberger of the

University of Virginia served as moderatorfor the panel discussions.

Recommendations

1. Staff should develop guidance on integrating monitoring and modeling programs to

increase confidence in the validity of the performance assessment predictive models

and their results, and to demonstrate compliance with regulatory limits at licensed sites.

The guidance should consider risk, facility and subsurface complexity, environmental

setting, and subsurface flow and transport regimes. The approach should be

risk-informed and performance-based.

2. Monitoring and modeling should be used together in a graded approach to demonstrate

compliance, including long-term compliance.

3. Licensees and applicants should be offered financial incentives to use integrated

monitoring and modeling approaches to demonstrate compliance with the regulations

(e.g., reductions in decommissioning costs or other obligations).
-2-

4. Licensees and applicants should be encouraged to develop monitoring programs that

are designed to include detection near the source and before contaminants reach a

point of compliance.

5. Monitoring and modeling should be linked through a dynamic and iterative process

beginning with initial site characterization.

6. Performance assessment models should be updated when new information that alters

the site conceptual model becomes available.

7. NRC staff should become involved in research designed to identify performance

indicators and approaches to their implementation into early warning systems, and in the

development and implementation of additional non-invasive monitoring technologies.

8. Post construction monitoring should not be used as a substitute for a robust

.performance assessment. NRC decisionmaking should be based on robust

performance assessment models using site-specific information such as monitoring

data, and other supporting information such as laboratory bench-scale testing.

Comments and Observations

There are currently no systematic incentives or requirements to coordinate and integrate

monitoring and modeling activities to build model confidence.

Many decommissioning sites have little to no existing soil and/or ground-water

contamination. Monitoring may be of limited utility at sites where the phenomena of

interest occur over time spans that exceed the duration of licensed activity and when.

extending the license is not warranted. In these cases, decommissioning decisions can

be made with relatively simple calculational tools. When significant subsurface

contamination exists and has reached ground water, a higher level of analysis is

required. This analysis would identify the need for and selection of remediation

strategies.

Mining of the monitoring data for temporal and spatial variations can provide important

confirmatory feedback that is useful to inform the site conceptual model, performance

assessment, choices of performance indicators, monitoring devices, and monitoring

locations. The results of the models can provide important confirmatory feedback with

regard to the monitoring locations and critical data to be collected, and models can also

be used as management tools for the site data.

Building confidence in performance assessment models through integration with

monitoring will yield increased capability and confidence in assessing the necessity for

and duration of institutional controls.

For some facilities, it is appropriate to consider systems that incorporate the monitoring

of precursors to engineered system failure (performance indicators) so corrective

measures can be taken to prevent contaminant release.
-3-

Natural analogues can provide information that is useful in selecting and assessing

long-term performance of engineered contaminant isolation systems.

Evaluation of engineered barrier performance should consider both the physical

(engineered barriers) and chemical (waste form) isolation of radionuclides depending

upon the specific source term. The service life of physical barriers may be limited (100's

of years).

There are chemical and physical constraints that limit the development of conceptual

models for ground water. There is a need for site characterization to support the

development of conceptual ground-water transport models and to establish

characterization goals based on existing limitations.

There are new cost-effective monitoring techniques and approaches that can be

pursued and implemented, including geoprobes, tracers, new coring techniques,

geophysical measurements, low-rate pumping, and gas-phase monitoring including soil

vapor extraction.

Experts supported the idea of phased monitoring, in which data collection is managed to

build confidence in modeling and then optimized to achieve further confidence in

modeling results.

Guidance is needed to assist licensees/applicants and NRC reviewers of radiological

environmental monitoring programs and assessments involving releases to ground

water. Guidance is needed for determining the level of analysis, and the monitoring and

modeling tools and approaches that can be used to build model confidence.

Historical emphasis for licensed facilities has not been on early site characterization

data to develop a conceptual site model to facilitate compliance assessment throughout

the facility lifetime. Contamination issues typically emerge during decommissioning

rather than during normal operations.

The Committee would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge RES staff for their help in

organizing and participation in this working group meeting, and the staff from the Office of

Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs for their presentations

and participation in the panel discussions. We look forward to continued interaction with the

staff on this important subject.

Sincerely,

IRA/

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE ACNWR-0257

4. WASHINGTON. DC 20555 - 0001

January 8, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON DECOMMISSIONING LESSONS

LEARNED

Dear Chairman Klein:

At its 174h meeting on November 14, 2006, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste

(the Committee) conducted a working group meeting (WGM) on Decommissioning

Lessons Learned. The meeting featured presentations from representatives of the

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the Fuel Cycle Facilities Forum, Argonne National

Laboratory, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Kansas Department of Health and

Environment, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Offices of Nuclear Regulatory

Research, Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, and

Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The meeting also included an invited expert panel, whose

members have participated in other WGMs on decommissioning issues. 1

The following recommendations are provided:

Recommendations

The staff should continue and expand its efforts to seek coherent

decommissioning requirements with states and the Environmental Protection

Agency. Differences in requirements contribute substantially to increased costs

and delays.

The staff should evaluate the potential impact of cumulative releases that, while

permitted and legal, can cause the derived concentration guideline levels

(DCGLs) for soil and groundwater to be exceeded when the facility is

decommissioned. Derivations of DCGLs should consider the interrelationships

between contaminated soil and future groundwater contamination.

The expert panel consisted of Eric Darois, Radiation Safety and Control; David Kocher,

SENES Oak Ridge and consultant to the ACNW, Tracey Ikenberry, Dade Moeller and

Associates; and Thomas Nauman, of Shaw, Stone and Webster.
-2-

The staff should continue its development of guidance related to

decommissioning lessons learned into the planning for new facilities.

Approaches to capturing unintended releases, providing access to potentially

contaminated system components, and providing secondary containment and

environmentally sound management of potentially contaminated liquids should

be included in guidance.

Observations

* Several other groups in addition to the NRC staff are capturing decommissioning

lessons learned. These groups include the NEI, the Electric Power Research

Institute, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Department of Energy.

" Allowed discharges to the atmosphere and surface waters during the facility

lifetime can result in DCGLs for remediation being exceeded. Early development

of DCGLs during the licensing process and potential modification of DCGLs

during the facility operating period may have merit.

* Multi-agency jurisdictions impact decommissioning costs and schedule.

Variations in the cleanup requirements adopted by different states and regulatory

agencies and the lack of a risk-informed waste classification system can lead to

increased decommissioning costs and schedule delays. Consistency in

requirements and approaches that are risk-informed would be very beneficial.

* In many decommissioning projects, waste disposal costs drive the ultimate cost

of decommissioning. The total cost includes the disposal cost as well as

substantial transportation costs resulting from the typically long distances from

decommissioning sites to disposal facilities. Additional disposal facilities that

provide cost-competition and are closer to decommissioning sites would lower

total decommissioning costs significantly.

* An additional contributor to increased decommissioning costs is the need to

remove unanticipated contaminated material from unknown legacy disposal or

releases.

* Effective environmental management of liquids that can become contaminated is

essential to minimization of decommissioning costs. Secondary containment of

process liquids and storm-water management are critical in this regard.

* Preliminary site characterization typically addresses licensing requirements only.

Baseline characterization of subsurface and hydro-geological factors is best

done when construction is complete since construction affects site subsurface

conditions. On-site backfilling of construction debris can affect subsurface hydrogeology as well.

* Accessibility of potentially contaminated system components is essential.

Embedded or buried piping should be avoided or designed and constructed in

such a way that access for inspection and needed maintenance is provided.
-3-

0 Decommissioning of facilities decades from now may be very different from the

current practices of decommissioning. Representatives of the expert panel urged

that the lessons learned process be continued in the future. Lessons learned

should be revisited to assess their continued applicability over time.

The Committee supports the capture and dissemination of information concerning

decommissioning lessons learned. The Committee is planning the development of a

white paper that integrates what it has learned about several key aspects of

decommissioning. The Committee looks forward to continued interactions with the staff

and other stakeholders as this initiative progresses.

Sincerely,

IRA/

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE ACNWR-0262

&• WASHINGTON, DC 20555 -0001

June 27, 2007

The HonorableDale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) LONG-TERM

RESEARCH: FISCAL YEAR 2009 ACTIVITIES

Dear Chairman Klein:

During the 179th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and Materials

(ACNW&M or the Committee), May 16-17, 2007, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

(RES) briefed the Committee on their draft plan (Reference 1), "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory LongTerm Research: FY 2009 Activities." RES will use the plan as a basis for the fiscal year (FY)

2009 research budget request, as well as for budget requests for subsequent years. The plan

is intended to be a living document, and recommendations are made based on this

understanding.

In preparing the plan, the staff solicited candidate research topics from NRC internal

stakeholders as reported in SECY 07-0068 (Reference 2). The Advisory Committee on Reactor

Safeguards (ACRS) has already been briefed and has written a letter (Reference 3) on

research topics associated with the reactor programs. This letter responds to the briefing that

the Committee received on activities associated with the nuclear waste and materials area.

RES plays an important role in the regulatory process by developing the technical bases for

new and existing regulations, facility licensing, regulatory guidance, and by investigating

emerging scientific and technical issues on public and worker health and safety. An additional

long-term research focus would support the potential licensing of the next generation of nuclear

facilities.

In this context, RES presented the following three general topical areas for long-term

consideration:

1. The aspects of the proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) that deal with

radioactive waste, effluents, and materials

2. Extended in-situ and real-time inspection and monitoring techniques

3. Advanced quantitative risk assessment methods, including the Advanced Offsite

Consequence Code

The ensuing text discusses each of these topics and makes reference to the recommendations

.pertaining to that topic. The Committee has also included some additional recommendations.
2

Topic 1: The GNEP and Fuel Recycle Facilities (Recommendation 1)

Reprocessing spent nuclear fuel produces a variety of effluent releases and waste

streams that may challenge the current regulatory scheme. Managing the radioactive

waste streams and effluents associated with recycled spent nuclear fuel may require

new technology and related regulatory initiatives. Licensing recycling facilities is likely to

require new or modified regulation based on technical principles that the NRC has not

yet considered intensively. Candidate research on recycle facilities should address

waste streams and effluents as well as focusing on the facilities.

Regulation of the waste generated by fuel recycling may suggest consideration of a

different waste classification system. An intermediate class for radioactive waste that is

between low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and high-level waste (HLW) is used in other

countries (Reference 4) where recycling of nuclear fuels occurs, as well as by the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The current two-tiered system (HLW and

LLW), with the provision of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) 61.58,

"Alternative Requirements for Waste Classification and Characteristics," that allows the

Commission to develop alternate schemes of waste classification, could be crafted to

regulate the radioactive materials in wastes generated by recycling.

Topic 2. In-Situ And Real-Time Inspection And Monitoring Techniques

(Recommendation 2)

Research is needed to develop and improve in-situ and real-time inspection and

monitoring techniques that focus on predicting behavior. The use of real-time sensor

technology and advanced performance assessment methods could benefit licensees by

establishing a basis for lower decommissioning costs, and reduced inspections. The

need to allocate -resources to deal with decommissioning at the end of life, together with

reduced decommissioning costs, couldobecome one of the major benefits of the

program.

Topic 3. Advanced Quantitative Risk Assessment Methods (Recommendation 3)

The Committee has previously commented (Reference 5) on the need for quantitative

risk assessment for fuel cycle facilities other than reactors. Integrated Safety

Assessments (ISAs) currently used to assess the safety of fuel fabrication facilities may

not be robust enough for reprocessing facilities, which are more complex and produce

larger quantities of, and a variety of different kinds of, waste streams. The staff should

ensure that codes used in ISAs are up-to-date and should continue to develop them

consonant with both their application to advanced systems and current computer

technology. The best risk tools available should be applied to the design features and

human actions that are important to facility operation and oversight.
3

In addition, the Committee believes that "long term" research planning should look further into

the future than FY2009 for perhaps 5 to 10 years. A long-term plan is expected to include

future technical needs (e.g., experimental and test facilities, computer models and codes, data)

and a forward-looking regulatory perspective (e.g., rules, regulatory guides, standard review

plans).

The Committee also observes the continuing need for research efforts to maintain up-to-date

information technology, including data management and retrieval related to RES activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Regarding recycled fuel, RES should consider issues of waste classification with respect

to the adequacy of the current two-tiered system (HLW and LLW) of waste classification

versus the three-tiered system (low, intermediate, high) used in other countries that

recycle fuel. Research should be undertaken on technology for management and

disposition of waste and effluents produced in the recycling of spent nuclear fuels.

2. RES should maintain and continue to develop real-time inspection and monitoring

techniques, and focus future efforts on "early-warning" monitoring systems as well as

monitoring for compliance.

3. RES should improve research-related data organization and retrieval, and investigate

advanced programming and artificial intelligence techniques for data management and

analysis.

4. The RES plan should take a longer range view of perhaps 5 to 10 years in the future.

RES's definitions of "short-term" and "long-term" research planning could be

misinterpreted. While the staff reported on plans that were specific through FY 2009, no

details were provided for activities beyond FY 2009.

The Committee supports RES long-term planning of research activities and believes it is

important that the plan be kept as a living document and be updated periodically to include new

information. RES has a successful history of leveraging limited resources by undertaking

cooperative programs with other Federal and state agencies. Investigation of cooperative

research should continue in the long term.

The Committee would like to remain informed of the plan's evolution and of any significant

updates.

Sincerely,

IRA/

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman
4

-References:

1. Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Report, Subject: "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission Long-Term Research: FY 2009 Activities," March 2007 (Official Use Only

- Sensitive Internal Information - Draft)

2. Memorandum to The Commissioners from Luis A. Reyes, Executive Director for

Operations, Subject: SECY-07-0068, "Candidate Agency Long-Term Research

Activities for Fiscal Year 2009," April 6, 2007. (Official Use Only Document - Sensitive

Internal Information - Limited to NRC Unless the Commission Determines Otherwise)

3. Report dated May 16, 2007, from William J. Shack, Chairman, ACRS to Dale E. Klein,

Chairman, NRC, Subject: Development of an Integrated Long-Term Regulatory

Research Plan

4. ACNW White Paper NUREG-1853, "History and Framework of Commercial Low-Level

Radioactive Waste Management in the United States," January 2007

5. Report dated January 14, 2002, from, George M. Hornberger, Chairman, ACNW to

Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, NRC, Subject: Risk-Informed Activities in the Office of

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE

WASHINGTON, DC 20555- 0001

* 4 ACNWR-0263

June 28, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Klein:

SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON 10 CFR 20.1406 MINIMIZATION OF

CONTAMINATION AND PROPOSED REGULATORY GUIDE 4012

At its 180' meeting on June 19, 2007, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and Materials

(the Committee) held a working group meeting on Draft Regulatory Guide DG-4012,

"Minimization of Contamination and Radioactive Waste Generation in Support of

Decommissioning," that would provide guidance for Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR) 20.1406, "Minimization of Contamination." This working group meeting was held in

response to SRM-M060111B, "Staff Requirements - Meeting with Advisory Committee on

Nuclear Waste," that charged the Committee with reviewing best practices in decommissioning

in order to look for ways to improve the design and construction of reactor and materials

facilities that would lead to less environmental impact and more efficient decommissioning.

During the working group meeting the Committee heard presentations from industry vendors on

the Westinghouse AP1000 and the General Electric Nuclear Economic Simplified Boiling Water

Reactor, and additionally from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) staff on the proposed guidance. Invited experts1 who have assisted the

Committee in the areas of revised guidance for decommissioning, prevention of legacy sites,

and decommissioning lessons learned also participated.

DISCUSSION

10 CFR 20.1406, "Minimization of Contamination," states that:

Applicants for licenses, other than renewals, after August 20, 1997, shall describe in the

application how facility design and procedures for operation will minimize, to the extent

practicable, contamination of the facility and the environment, facilitate eventual

decommissioning, and minimize, to the extent practicable, the generation of radioactive

waste.

This regulation applies to all license applications for new facilities submitted after 1997.

10 CFR 20.1406 is currently being revised. The staff feels that it is important to issue guidance

as soon as possible for use by applicants for new licenses for nuclear power reactors.

I Eric L. Datois, Radiation Safety and Control Services, Inc. and Eric W. Abelquist, Oak Ridge

Institute for Science and Education.
-2-

The staff is to be commended for its efforts in capturing decommissioning lessons learned in

the proposed guidance. The staffs approach to minimizing contamination stresses three major

components: prevention, detection, and correction. Over the past several months, both the

NRC and the NEI have been engaged in initiatives to capture and document decommissioning

lessons learned so that this information can be incorporated into designs for new reactors.

The Committee learned that vend23ors have incorporated features to prevent releases and

provide early detection of releases into their standard reactor designs. These features include

use of construction materials and techniques that provide improved barriers, secondary

containment of potential liquid releases, avoidance of underground piping, and incorporation of

leak detection systems. These features reflect the proactive approach being taken by these

vendors to incorporate decommissioning lessons learned into the design of new facilities.

The NEI representative urged that the guidance provide a clear statement of performance

objectives and sufficient information to identify the measures needed to comply with the

regulation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee offers the following recommendations:

1. The Committee recommends that the guidance in its present form apply only to new

reactor licensing. The Committee further recommends that the guidance in its present

form should not be applied to non-reactor licensees. The Committee recommends that

after 10 CFR 20.1406 is revised, the guidance should be revisited regarding its

applicability to reactor licensees and other licensees.

2. The Committee believes that since 10 CFR 20.1406 applies to all NRC licensees and all

Agreement State licensees, care should be taken.to organize the guidance so that what

is applicable to each type of licensee is clearly identified. A graded approach should be

developed to determine what parts of the guidance would apply to various categories of

licensees.

3. The guidance should clearly provide licensees with enough information to determine

what steps they need to take to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1406.

Additionally, guidance should be clear enough to avoid confusion or misinterpretation

during the license application review or inspection processes.
-3-

The Committee appreciates the opportunity to interact with the staff and looks forward to

continued interaction as the rulemaking and associated guidance go forward.

Sincerely,

IRA/

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman

Reference:

1. Memorandum dated May 1, 2007, from Jimi T. Yerokun, Chief, Risk Applications and

Special Projects Branch, Division of Risk Assessment and Special Projects, Office of

Nuclear Regulatory Research, to Cayetano Santos, Chief, Technical Support Branch,

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Subject: Draft Regulatory Guide DG-40,12,

"Minimization of Contamination and Radioactive Waste Generation in Support of

Decommissioning"
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE AND MATERIALS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

August 13, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: CONCERNING THE RESPONSE FROM THE EDO REGARDING THE

COMMITTEE'S LETTER ON PREVENTION OF LEGACY SITES

Dear Chairman Klein:

The Committee is responding to the Executive Director for Operations' (EDO) letter dated

June 14, 2007, which responds to the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and Materials'

(the Committee) letter dated October 17, 2006, concerning the development of rulemaking and

guidance for the prevention of legacy sites. The EDO's letter states that five of the six

recommendations made by the Committee in its October 2006 letter are being implemented by

the staff in the current. rulemaking and guidance efforts. The Committee commends the staff for

its continuing improvements in decommissioning rulemaking and guidance based on the

Committee's recommendations.

The EDO letter also states that the sixth recommendation, reducing the financial assurance

requirements for licensees who effectively implement the guidance and requirements for

preventing legacy sites, is inconsistent with NRC requirements, and that it is critical that all

licensees maintain the minimum financial assurance necessary to remediate their sites.

The Committee agrees with the staff that all licensees must maintain the minimum financial

assurance as required in the regulations. Unfortunately, the Committee did not frame its

recommendation clearly based on the staffs presentation of the material at the 17 2nd meeting of

the Committee.

The Committee's recommendation should have referenced the guidance for prevention of

legacy sites for those licensees required to prepare decommissioning cost estimates and to

establish financial assurance amounts based on those estimates. Often these financial

assurance requirements are set well above the minimum values based on the required

assessments. The Committee believes that the consolidated decommissioning guidance found

in NUREG-1 757, Volume 3, "Consolidated NMSS Decommissioning Guidance - Financial

Assurance, Recordkeeping, and Timeliness - Final Report," should discuss how

decommissioning financial requirements could be maintained at or near their threshold amounts

based on successful implementation of legacy site avoidance strategies. The Committee

believes that licensees with large amounts of radioactive material and complex operations could

perform actions during operations, such as initiating a spill cleanup immediately, installing leak

detection systems in critical areas, or reengineering systems to eliminate hard to monitor

features or components. Such guidance would allow licensees to consider reducing the amount

of financial assurance required for license termination versus improvements during the active

life of facility.
2

The Committee expects to be briefed by the staff again on the rulemaking and guidance for

prevention of legacy sites at the 18 3rd meeting of the Committee in October, and we will discuss

this issue with them again at that time.

Sincerely,

IRAI

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman

Reference: NUREG-1 757, Volume 3, "Consolidated NMSS Decommissioning Guidance -

Financial Assurance, Recordkeeping, and Timeliness - Final Report"
Pi o0 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAI WASTE AND NIATERIALS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

ACNWMR-0269

October 2, 2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Klein:

SUBJECT: NRC PLANS FOR-MONITORING DISPOSAL ACTIONS FOR WASTE

INCIDENTAL TO REPROCESSING AT U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

FACILITIES AT THE IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY AND SAVANNAH

RIVER SITES

In May 2007, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (the Committee) received and

reviewed draft copies of plans for monitoring actions to dispose of waste incidental to

reprocessing (WIR) at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) at the Idaho National Laboratory

(INL) Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) tank farm facility and the salt waste

disposal facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) (References 1 & 2). During its 181 ' meeting

on July 17-19, 2007, the Committee received a briefing by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC) staff members from the Office of Federal and State Materials Safety and Environmental

Management Programs on these plans. The staff has prepared the monitoring plans for both

sites in fulfillment of the NRC responsibilities under Section 3116 of the Ronald Reagan

National Defense Authorization Act of 2005 (NDAA)'.

The staff discussed the NRC's responsibilities under the NDAA, their general monitoring

approach (that includes technical reviews and onsite observations), coordination with the DOE

and the concerned states (Idaho and South Carolina), and specifics of the monitoring plans.

The staff reported that they had completed technical evaluation reports (TERs) for both facilities,

and that the monitoring plans address the key monitoring areas identified in these reports. The

staff also discussed the criteria for compliance with the performance objectives for waste

determinations provided in both the legislation and the TERs. They also indicated that they will

prepare periodic compliance monitoring reports that will assess and document whether there is

reasonable assurance that the DOE complies, and will continue to comply, with the performance

objectives of 10 CFR 61.40 through 61.44.

The monitoring plans for disposal actions for WIR at the SRS salt waste disposal facility and

INTEC tank farm are high quality, risk-informed, performance-based, and largely responsive to

previous Committee recommendations. The Committee commends the staff for developing

these plans in a complex technical and institutional environment.

1Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2005, Public Law 108-375,

118 Stat 2162, October 28, 2004
Chairman Klein -2-

RECOMMENDATIONS

When preparing periodic compliance monitoring reports, the NRC staff should evaluate the

adequacy of information produced by environmental monitoring programs performed by DOE

and the host States.

The Committee recommends that future versions of these and other plans for monitoring WIR

disposal actions seek environmental monitoring information from points beneath, beside, or

within the WIR disposal site to provide early warning of potential radionuclide release.

The Committee recommends that future versions of these and other plans seek performance

assessment results based on best-estimate and central tendency models and input parameters,

preferably including a probabilistic uncertainty analysis.

Monitoring plans should focus on the extent to which the residual radionuclide inventory in WIR

has been reduced considering other factors (e.g., cost, worker risk) involved in achieving this

reduction, and not on evaluating whether separation efficiency goals are met.

OBSERVATIONS

The monitoring activities are focused on the performance objectives in 10 CFR 61.40 through

61.44, and the uncertainty in the DOE's evaluation of whether the performance objectives will

continue to be met. Implementation of the plans uses the (1) results of monitoring activities

performed by DOE and the host States, (2) modeling activities performed by the DOE, and

(3) onsite observation of the DOE's experimental activities and waste disposal actions. The

NRC staff reported that the plans have been favorably received by the DOE, the host States,

and other stakeholder groups. The NRC staff expects these plans to be 'living documents' that

evolve as the DOE's waste disposal actions progress and lessons are learned. The Committee

believes that the monitoring plans embody many of the Committee's previous recommendations

on related subjects, such as performance assessment, review of the DOE's draft waste

determinations, and iterative monitoring and modeling of closed waste disposal sites

(References 3 & 4).

The NRC staff reported that existing environmental monitoring efforts performed by the DOE

and the host States will provide an adequate basis for the NRC's independent assessment of

whether there is reasonable assurance the DOE will continue to comply with the performance

objectives. The Committee accepts this judgment at present but notes that the validity of the

staff's conclusion could be affected by information obtained from future environmental

monitoring and the DOE's research programs concerning contaminant migration and the

performance of engineered barriers, as well as potential changes in the DOE's approaches to

the disposing of WIR.
Chairman Klein -3-

The Committee has previously recommended that monitoring be performed near the source to

provide early warning before releases occur (Reference 4). The Committee notes that existing

DOE/State environmental monitoring points are at least several meters from the waste.2

The Committee has previously recommended that performance assessments be based on best

estimates instead of conservative assumptions and models because the latter can obscure risksignificant features, events, and processes (References 3, 5-7). In their briefing, the NRC staff

noted that comparison of the DOE's conservative performance assessment results is not

consistent with environmental modeling.

The monitoring plan for the salt waste disposal facility at the SRS states:

"Predicted removal efficiencies of highly radioactive radionuclides by each of the

planned salt waste treatment processes are a key factor in determining the

radiological inventory disposed of in saltstone."

As previously observed by the Committee (Reference 3), removal efficiency is not a meaningful

measure of risk from radionuclides disposed of onsite. While removal efficiency may be useful

in evaluating the effectiveness of competing radionuclide separation technologies, it does not

provide insights into risks from material sent to a disposal facility unless it is combined with

information concerning the initial inventory of radionuclides being sent through the separation

process. The Committee reiterates its belief that the parameters relevant to risk are the

inventory and spatial distribution of radionuclides in wastes that will be disposed of or stabilized

onsite (e.g., saltstone) after radionuclide removal to the maximum extent practical, not the

fraction or amount of radionuclides removed.

In conclusion, the Committee appreciates the forthright and responsive discussions concerning

the NRC's draft monitoring plans for WIR disposal actions. We look forward to future

discussions on implementation of the monitoring plans regarding evaluation of whether there is

reasonable assurance that the DOE's WIR disposal actions will continue to meet the

performance objectives in 10 CFR 61.40 through 61.44, and generic technical topics related to

managing WIR.

Sincerely,

IRA/

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman

2The terms of the settlement of a recent lawsuit brought by the National Resources Defense

Council against the DOE call for monitoring beneath the SRS salt waste disposal vaults.
Chairman Klein -4-

References

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Plan for Monitoring Disposal Actions Taken by the

U.S. Department of Energy at the Idaho National Laboratory Idaho Nuclear Technology and

Engineering Center Tank Farm Facility in Accordance with the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, dated April 13, 2007. (Adams Accession No.

ML070650222)

2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Plan for Monitoring the U.S. Department of Energy

Salt Waste Disposal at the Savannah River Site in Accordance with the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, dated May 3, 2007. (Adams Accession No.

ML070730363)

3. Letter dated December 1, 2006, from Michael T. Ryan, Chairman, Advisory Committee on

Nuclear Waste, to Dale E. Klein, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Standard

Review Plan for Activities Related to U.S. Department of Energy Waste Determination."

(Adams Accession No. ML063380158)

4. Letter dated December 27, 2006, from Michael T. Ryan, Chairman, Advisory Committee on

Nuclear Waste, to Dale E. Klein, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 'Working

Group Meeting on Using Monitoring to Build Model Confidence." (Adams Accession No.

ML063620174)

5. Letter dated August 2, 2000, from B. John Garrick, Chairman, Advisory Committee on

Nuclear Waste, to Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory, "Branch Technical

Position on a Performance Assessment Methodology for Low-Level Radioactive Waste

Disposal Facilities." (Adams Accession No. ML003737348)

6. Letter dated January 17, 2002, from George M. Hornberger, Chairman, Advisory Committee

on Nuclear Waste, to Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

"Total System Performance Assessment and Conservatism." (Adams Accession No.

020240467)

7. Letter dated September 18, 2001, from George M. Hornberger, Chairman, Advisory

Committee on Nuclear Waste, to Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, "Total System Performance Assessment-Site Recommendation (TSPA-SR)."

(Adams Accession No. ML 012690661)
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 - 0001

ACNWMR-0270

October 11,2007

The Honorable Dale E. Klein

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Klein:

SUBJECT: REGULATION OF ADVANCED SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING

AND REFABRICATION FACILITIES

SUMMARY

Facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and fabricating new fuels (i.e., recycle) as

envisioned by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) would produce a range of products,

wastes, and effluents that are unfamiliar to the U.S. civilian sector. Examples of such unfamiliar

materials are cladding waste, a mixture of cesium and strontium, krypton-85 (

85Kr), technetium99 (

99

Tc), recycled uranium, and a mixture of transuranic elements. The potential existence of

these materials raises the need to develop regulations concerning their classification, form,

packaging, storage, and disposal or release.

As envisioned by DOE, future recycle facilities would be much more complex than existing

recycle facilities and would contain substantial inventories of (1) liquids that could be

flammable, corrosive, and highly radioactive and (2) zircaloy-clad SNF in storage pools that can

burn under certain conditions. Accidents involving these materials could lead to significant

offsite releases of radioactive material. The U;S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) needs

to consider these unique hazards when developing or revising regulations to license recycle

facilities.

Major Recommendations

The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and Materials (the Committee) makes the following

key recommendations concerning regulation of SNF recycle facilities:

Regulations for licensing recycle facilities should require the use of an approach based

on probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) for facilities processing large inventories of solid and

liquid radioactive materials and hazardous chemicals.

The NRC should consider using a two-step licensing process for SNF recycle facilities

until the NRC staff becomes familiar with the processes, equipment, and materials in the

recycle facilities.
-2-

The gap analysis and the technical basis document being prepared by the NRC staff

should include an analysis of the current civilian waste classification and disposal

system for the range of wastes that may be produced by SNF recycle facilities.

The remainder of this letter provides supporting observations and additional recommendations.

BACKGROUND

DOE is pursuing programs to develop and deploy SNF recycle1 technology. The current DOE

recycle program contemplates building a nuclear fuel recycle facility, an advanced power

(burner) reactor for irradiating transuranic elements, and a research facility to develop the

required recycle technology. The NRC may license the first two of these facilities. Congress

directed DOE to select a site for the nuclear fuel recycle facility by fiscal year (FY) 2007

[Congress, 2005] and to initiate construction of one or more such facilities by FY 2010.

Licensing SNF recycle facilities will require changes to the NRC's existing regulatory..

framework, which is now structured to license light-water reactors and facilities associated with

the once-through fuel cycle. The Commission directed [NRC, 2006 a,b] that the Committee

become knowledgeable about developments in fuel recycle and help in defining the issues most

important to the NRC concerning potential licensing of fuel recycle facilities.

In FY 2006, the Committee received initial briefings by Committee consultants, NRC staff, and

DOE staff on SNF recycle. Based on these briefings, the Committee decided to prepare a

white paper on this subject and chartered a group of experts2 to do so. The goal of the paper is

to summarize the technical, regulatory, and legal aspects of the history, status, and issues

concerning SNF recycle for the following two purposes:

(1) to provide the primary basis for the Committee's initial observations on important

regulatory issues that SNF recycle would raise and recommendations to address these

issues

(2) to capture the knowledge of experts and the history of SNF recycle and implications for

current SNF recycle programs in line with the Commission's knowledge management

goals

The Committee and NRC staff offices reviewed successive drafts of the paper. A revised draft

was posted on the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) site,

which is accessible to the public, and a list of expert reviewers (see Enclosure 1) was invited to

submit comments. The draft final version of the white paper in Enclosure 2 incorporated

For the purposes of this document, "SNF recycle" involves SNF reprocessing (separating or

potentially fractionating SNF into its constituent parts without producing a separated plutonium

stream); refabrcation (making the recovered uranium, transuranic elements, and possibly some

fission products into fresh fuel or targets); storage of spent fuel; management of solid, liquid, and

gaseous wastes; and incorporating radionuclides that cannot be readily destroyed by irradiation

into tailored waste forms for disposal appropriate to their hazard and longevity.

These experts included R.G. Wymer, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (retired); L.T. Tavlarides,

Syracuse University; H.J. Larson, NRC (retired); J.H. Flack (Committee staff); and A.G. Croff

(Committee).
-3-

comments on the public review draft, and final comments by the Committee and its staff. The

Committee also obtained information on fuel recycle from numerous other public briefings and

discussions, which are listed in Enclosure 3.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Primary Licensing Regulation for Recycle Facilities

The NRC could use several regulatory options to license SNF recycle facilities. All have

deficiencies that must be addressed to make them suitable for this purpose [Enclosure 2,

Section VIII; NRC, 2007b]. To address these deficiencies, the Commission directed the staff

[NRC, 2007a] to begin developing the regulatory framework to license SNF recycle facilities

using an option based on Title 10, Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material," of

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 70) by preparing the following:

a technical basis document to support rulemaking for 1.0 CFR Part 70 with revisions to

10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," as

appropriate to eliminate its applicability to licensing a SNF reprocessing plant

a gap analysis for all NRC regulations (10 CFR Chapter I) to identify changes in

regulatory requirements that would be necessary to license a reprocessing facility

The NRC has used 10 CFR Part 70 to license fuel fabrication facilities, and the regulation is

currently the basis for reviewing the license application for the mixed-oxide fuel refabrication

plant at the Savannah River Site. Experience and lessons learned from previous and ongoing

use of 10 CFR Part 70 to license fuel refabrication facilities are likely to be useful when deciding

how the regulation should be modified to license SNF recycle facilities. However, the

Committee observes that important aspects of 10 CFR Part 70 will need to be addressed for it

to be an efficient and effective regulation for licensing SNF recycle facilities. These aspects

include the following:

Use of an Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA): The regulations at 10 CFR Part 70 call for

the use of an ISA to evaluate the hazards in a facility processing nuclear materials. Use

of an ISA is an important step towards quantifying risk. However, the Committee

believes that the effort required to prepare an ISA adequate for complex SNF recycle

processes handling liquids containing substantial quantities of concentrated cesium,

strontium, and transuranic elements is likely to approach the effort that would be

required to evaluate risks using a PRA. The Committee and the Advisory Committee on

Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) continue to recommend [Committee, 2002, 2006] that a

regulation based on PRA is preferable to one based on ISA because the latter has

significant limitations in its treatment of dependent failures, human reliability,

uncertainties, and aggregation of event sequences.

Recommendation 1: The revision of 10 CFR Part 70 for application in licensing recycle

facilities should require use of PRA-based approaches for facilities processing large

inventories of solid and liquid radioactive materials and hazardous chemicals.
-4-

One-Step Construction and Operating License (Combined License): 10 CFR Part 70

allows for a one-step licensing process, which means that the design and process

details necessary to review the adequacy of a recycle facility would not be available until

relatively late in the licensing process. The Committee believes this approach is

appropriate for facilities containing well-established processes and equipment and

where there is prior licensing experience (e.g., reactors, fuel fabrication plants). SNF

recycle facilities could involve equipment, processes, and materials that may require

modification as a result of regulatory requirements that evolve as the license application

is being reviewed.

Recommendation 2: The NRC should consider using a two-step licensing process for

SNF recycle facilities until the NRC staff becomes familiar with the processes,

equipment, and materials.

Risk-Informing Changes to 10 CFR Part 70: The NRC uses 10 CFR Part 70 to license

many other nuclear material processing facilities that are much smaller, less costly, and

less complex than an anticipated SNF recycle facility. Licensing requirements

appropriate to SNF recycle facilities could be unduly burdensome and may need to be

tempered to be cost-effective for applicants with simpler designs and well-established

technology.

Recommendation 3: The revision of 10 CFR Part 70 to license SNF recycle facilities

could have unintended consequences for other types of facilities. The revision of

10 CFR Part 70 to accommodate SNF recycle facility licensing should be risk informed

by embodying a graded approach to licensing requirements. Decisions in applying the

graded approach should be based on the complexity of the facility and the size, form,

and potential hazard of the projected nuclear material inventory. Guidance that

supports the regulations could specify requirements for various facility types.

Basing 10 CFR Part 70 Changes on Performance: It is important that 10 CFR Part 70

be performance based. Performance-based criteria for granting a license are

expressed in terms of the requirements the applicant must meet but not the means by

which the applicant meets the requirement. This allows the applicant to select the most

efficient means to meet the requirements based on the specific circumstances of each

facility.

Recommendation 4: Revisions to 10 CFR Part 70 to accommodate SNF recycle

facilities should be performance based.

Specificity of Changes to 10 CFR Part 70: The NRC staff paper [NRC, 2007b]

presenting options for licensing SNF recycle facilities focused on the DOE Global

Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and the facilities currently being proposed by the

GNEP. The Committee believes the scope, functional requirements, size, and timing of

these facilities are still evolving and are likely to change in response to factors such as

technology development, budget considerations, stakeholder input, and broader U.S.

and international decisions on nuclear and energy po!icy.
-5-

Recommendation 5: Revisions to 10 CFR Part 70 should be sufficiently flexible so that

they apply to a broad range of recycle technologies, equipment, and facility design

concepts.

Impacts of SNF Recycle on Waste Management and Classification

Recycle of SNF could generate waste types that have not been produced in the U.S. civilian

sector in decades (e.g., high-level liquid waste, cladding waste) and some that have never been

produced anywhere (e.g., 85Kr waste, combined cesium/strontium waste). The number and

nature of these wastes are presently not known. They depend on future decisions such as the

number of streams into which the SNF is fractionated and the extent to which internal streams

are combined for purposes of waste management. To provide a basis for the discussion of the

waste management and classification system, the white paper (Enclosure 2) includes an

analysis of the types of wastes that might be generated if SNF recycle were to be implemented

using the UREX+la process under development by DOE.

The UREX+la process could result in the following products and wastes:

* uranium containing traces of radionuclides such as 99Tc and neptunium-237 (

237

Np) that

is expected to be reused

a mixture of transuranic elements that could be stored for a few decades and eventually

refabricated and fissioned in a reactor

separate waste forms destined for disposal containing hydrogen-3 (

3H), carbon-14 (14C), 85Kr, iodine-129 (1291), and, in the case of fuel that has been out of the reactor for less

than about 5 years, ruthenium-1 06 (

106Ru) and antimony-125 (125Sb)

a waste form destined for disposal containing the cladding from which most of the SNF

matrix has been removed, insoluble solids that remain after dissolving most of the SNF

matrix, and possibly most of the 99Tc

a waste form containing essentially all of the strontium-90 (9

"Sr) and cesium-135 and -

137 (

135'137Cs) destined for long-term (about 300 years) storage in an engineered surface

facility followed-by closure in place

a vitrified waste form destined for disposal containing essentially all of the fission

products not mentioned above plus traces of actinides

a wide variety of solid wastes (e.g., failed process and laboratory equipment, used

protective clothing) or wastes converted to solids (e.g., analytical solutions, ion

exchange material) destined for disposal and containing concentrations of transuranic

radionuclides greater than 100 nanocuries per gram (nCi/g)

Based on traditional interpretations of the definition of high-level waste (HLW) and waste

classification Tables 1 and 2 in 10 CFR Part 61.55, "Waste Classification," the following

classifications would apply:

Captured 15Kr would be Class A waste because it is not listed in the tables.
-6-

GC, C), and cladding waste with or without 99Tc are all likely to be greater-than-Class C (GTCC).

* The vitrified fission product waste would be HLW.

Cesium/strontium waste could be HLW, GTCC low-level waste (LLW), or Class C LLW

depending on the interpretation of the definition of HLW, the extent to which credit is

given for decay occurring during about 300 years of interim storage, and how risks

posed by long-lived 1

" 5Cs (not included in the tables) are taken into account.

The Committee believes these classifications raise questions such as the following:

Are the classifications appropriate given the risks posed by the wastes?

Do current efforts to define a disposal destination for GTCC wastes consider potential

SNF recycle wastes?

How should the unique features of a waste incidental to reprocessing determination for

cesium/strontium waste be addressed if this waste is determined to be HLW?

As described above, reprocessing SNF yields a variety of wastes having differing radionuclide

concentrations. Reprocessing plant operations [Vernaz, 2006] have improved to the point that

the volume of wastes (excluding uranium and plutonium) from a reprocessing plant that are

destined for disposal in a deep geologic repository is about the same as the volume of the SNF

fed to the plant. The combined radioactivity of the wastes from reprocessing SNF is essentially

the same as that of the original SNF.

Risk-informed, performance-based criteria will also need to be devised for (1) appropriate waste

forms for an inert gas (15Kr) and two very-long-lived and environmentally mobile radionuclides

(

14C and 129!) and (2) acceptable disposal destinations for each type of waste (e.g., near-surface

disposal, deep geologic disposal, intermediate-depth disposal). Finally, requirements for

engineered and institutional controls for long-term, near-surface storage of nuclear material

may be needed for facilities storing very radioactive transuranic product for times extending to

decades and cesium/strontium waste for a few hundred years followed by facility closure as a

cesium/strontium disposal site.

Recommendation 5: The gap analysis and the technical basis document being prepared by the

NRC staff should include an analysis of the current civilian waste classification and disposal

system for the range of wastes that may be produced by SNF recycle facilities.

Recommendation 6: The NRC should consider initiating a comprehensive study on the

durability of engineered and institutional controls for the purpose of establishing the basis for a

consistent risk-informed NRC policy on the extent to which credit can be taken for such

controls. Applications to be considered include radioactive material storage, near-surface

waste disposal, and control of decommissioned sites and facilities.
-7-

impacts of SNF Recycle on Regulation of Effluent Releases

Reprocessing SNF releases volatile radionuclides to gas streams inside the facility. A U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standard (40 CFR Part 190) effectively requires

capturing 99.5 percent of the 1291 and 85 percent of the 85

Kr originally present in the SNF. The

regulation does not provide specific limits on the amount of other volatile radionuclides that can

be released. Captured radionuclides would be converted to a suitable form,3 packaged, and

sent to a disposal facility. Reprocessing facilities in France capture about 99.5 percent of the

1291 and about 35 percent of the 14

C and release them to the sea. The 3

H, which is present in

low concentrations in process water, is also released to the sea.

The Committee notes the following:

EPA had planned to consider limits on the releases of 3H and 1

4C but never completed

this activity. These radionuclides could be significant contributors to the dose from

releases to the environment from recycle facilities.

The approach used by EPA to establish the existing release limits in 40 CFR Part 190

involved dividing the estimated cost of various options for removing a volatile

radionuclide by the collective dose (person-rem) to the affected population and

comparing the result to criteria such as limiting expenditures on effluent treatment to

$1000/person-rem. For the volatile radionuclides, calculation of the collectiye dose

involved multiplying a small dose to individuals by a large population that is exposed to

the dispersed radionuclides. Previous Committee letters [Committee, 2005] have stated

that this approach to estimating the absolute impacts of radionuclides is not technically

defensible, and the Committee reiterates that position here.

Capture of 1291 in the French and United Kingdom reprocessing plants is accomplished

by aqueous scrubbing of the off-gas. This approach is efficient in this situation because

the resulting solutions are intended to be released to the sea. However, water

scrubbing is not efficient if radionuclides need to be recovered for packaging and land

disposal, as is likely in the United States, because additional recovery processes would

be required. If 1291 is to be captured for land disposal, the currently preferred approach

uses a.solid sorbent containing silver in one of a number of forms. The Rokkasho

reprocessing plant, which is just beginning operations, uses such sorbents, but there is

little experience with silver-based sorbents in large, modern reprocessing plants or in

combination with other off-gas treatment systems that may be required in the United

States.

Recommendation 7: The NRC should hold interagency discussions with EPA on whether (1)

existing release limits for "'Kr and 1291 need to be reexamined to reflect current technology and

(2) release limits need to be established for 3H and 1

4

C. Additionally, methodologies based on

concepts other than collective dose should be used as a basis for revised release limits.

Potential waste forms for "

5Kr include pressurized gas cylinders, a solid zeolite waste form, and a

sputtered metal waste form.
-8-

Impacts of SNF Recycle on Other Regulations

Implementation of civilian SNF recycle would require modification of regulations other than the

primary regulation for licensing SNF recycle facilities. The Committee believes that

10 CFR Part 61 and 10 CFR Part 63, "Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic

Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada," should receive particular attention.

Regarding 10 CFR Part 61,'the Committee is aware that the NRC staff, pursuant to

Commission direction [NRC, 2005], is undertaking an analysis of whether depleted uranium

warrants inclusion in the waste classification tables in 10 CFR 61.55, "Waste Classification."

Wastes resulting from SNF recycle that might be considered for near-surface disposal may

contain other significant concentrations of radionuclides that are also not listed in the waste

classification tables, including 8

"Kr, 11 5Cs, and recycled uranium containing minor uranium

isotopes and trace amounts of some fission product and transuranic elements if the uranium

were to be declared waste.

Recommendation 8: The NRC staffs ongoing evaluation of whether a specific concentration

limit and classification should be developed for depleted uranium in the 10 CFR Part 61 waste

classification tables should consider including 85

Kr, "' 5Cs, and uranium recovered from a recycle

facility.

Implementation of SNF recycle could have major impacts on a deep geologic repository.

Depending on the outcome of decisions on disposal of GTCC waste, the repository might

receive a variety of wastes that could affect its design and operation. The Committee believes

that repository licensing regulations and associated guidance have not been devised with these

situations in mind.

Recommendation 9: The NRC staff should assess the possible impacts of SNF recycle and

associated wastes on a potential deep geologic repository. Accommodating SNF recycle may

change the licensing, requirements for a deep geologic repository.

Implications of SNF Recycle for NRC Infrastructure and Knowledge Needs

The NRC staff may need access to facilities and equipment for confirmatory research to

validate key assumptions and data used by an applicant to support an SNF recycle facility

license application. Of particular importance are hot cell facilities capable of handling significant

quantities of highly radioactive solid and liquid materials. In the United States, such facilities

exist almost exclusively at DOE sites. The number of appropriate hot cells is dwindling as is the

NRC's access to them. This is evidenced by the delays that lack of access to a key hot cell at

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) has caused the NRC in obtaining information concerning

the performance of high-burnup (greater than 45 GWd/MT) SNF.

Recommendation 10: The NRC should assess its future needs for hot cells and the potential

availability of hot cells for the purpose of deciding on a strategy to maintain the required level of

access for NRC confirmatory research. Options considered should include hot cells in the

United States and in other countries.

The Committee believes it is necessary for the NRC staff (and the Committee) to remain

abreast of DOE technical activities to provide the historical context (e.g., the alternatives that
-9-

were considered and rejected and the reasons for it) and technical insights to support.

development of: regulations and then review a license application. The Committee believes the

recent establishment of a memorandum of understanding between the NRC and DOE in this

regard is a positive step.

Recommendation 11: The Committee recommends that the NRC staff continue to keep

abreast of the DOE SNF recycle technology development program and that such involvement

extends to NRC observation of key experimental activities such as the GNEP Coupled End-toEnd Demonstration being conducted over the next few years.

Research Needs

To fulfill its role in developing regulations and reviewing a license application for SNF recycle

facilities, the NRC staff needs to independently assess the safety of the facilities. Such an

assessment requires sufficient understanding of key technical aspects of the processes and

materials in the plant. The Committee noted a number of research needs likely to be important

to the NRC's regulatory role. Enclosure 4 summarizes these needs.

Recommendation 12: The NRC should consider supporting research concerning radionuclide

separation factors, integrated modeling of SNF recycle facilities, data and methods supporting

cost-benefit analyses to assess effluent controls, chemical and radiolytic degradation of

solvents and ion exchange media, the durability of institutional controls and cement for 300

years or more, the performance of novel waste forms (e.g., for krypton, iodine, carbon, and

cesium/strontium), and the behavior of tritium in cladding under high-temperature oxidizing

conditions.

Timing and Urgency4

The Committee notes a number of time-consuming activities that should be completed before

receipt of a license application for SNF recycle facilities to provide the basis for preparation and

efficient review of the application. These activities include developing the licensing

requirements for recycle facilities, modifying supporting regulations (e.g., 10 CFR Parts 50, 51,

61, 63, 73, 74, and 75), preparing guidance documents underpinning the foregoing,

establishing release limits for volatile radionuclides such as 3

H and 14C, and reconsidering the

waste classification and disposal technology system. Establishing release limits for volatile

radionuclides could take a particularly long time because of the likely need to perform

engineering design, cost, and risk studies as a basis for the limits.

The Committee notes that DOE also needs to complete a number of time-consuming activities

before it can submit a license application for a recycle facility having the full capabilities

presently envisioned by DOE (i.e., using the UREX+1 a or other flowsheet). These activities

include completing the development and testing of a complex four-step reprocessing flowsheet,

testing equipment to implement the flowsheet, developing waste treatment processes and

disposal facilities for a number of novel waste streams, completing a generic environmental

impact statement for the recycle program, designing the facility, and preparing the license

application and other regulatory documents.

4 See discussion in Section IX.F of Enclosure 3.
-in

-10-

The Committee estimates that, in the foregoing scenario, the time required to accomplish both

the regulatory and DOE activities is likely to be at least several years, but this estimate has

substantial uncertainty. The Committee notes that DOE could decide to initially deploy SNF

recycle facilities that do not have the full capabilities presently envisioned by the department

and add additional modules over time to achieve the full capabilities. Such a facility is

significantly less complex than a facility having all the envisioned capabilities at the outset and

represents only a modest extension of existing technology. As a consequence, the time

required to develop and submit a license application could be significantly less than the time

needed to prepare an application for a fully capable facility, but the time required to undertake

the required regulatory development would not be significantly reduced.

Recommendation 13: The Committee recommends that the highest priority should be given to

modifying regulations concerning release limits for volatile radionuclides from SNF recycle

facilities and addressing the interrelated issues related to waste classification and disposal

destinations for novel wastes that could be produced by SNF recycle facilities.

Recommendation 14: The Committee recommends that the NRC staff monitor DOE plans for

implementing SNF recycle because DOE could develop a license application for a recycle

facility based on a modest extension of existing technology in a timeframe that could challenge

the ability of the NRC to establish a regulatory framework for recycle facilities.

Path Forward

The Committee appreciates the many informative briefings and discussions with staff members

from the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, the Office of Federal and State

Materials and Environmental Management Programs, and the Office of Nuclear Regulatory

Research. The Committee looks forward to future interactions with NRC staff on activities that

impinge on SNF recycle. Additionally, the Committee plans to continue modest efforts to keep

abreast of SNF recycle technology and plans.

Enclosures: As stated

Sincerely,

Michael T. Ryan

Chairman
REFERENCES

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(January 14).

Committee (2005). Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, Letter from Michael T. Ryan,

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Comments on USNRC Staff Recommendation of the Use of Collective Dose (September 30)

Committee (2006). Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, Letter from Michael T. Ryan,

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