J-S52033-14

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*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

BRYAN M. HILL

Appellant No. 671 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 4, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0006321-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 31, 2014

Appellant, Bryan M. Hill, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench 

trial conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”)—highest 

rate of alcohol.1 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows:

[O]n June 1, 2013, at approximately 12:05 a.m. [Officer 

Alonso] heard a police dispatch call about a hit-and-run 

accident in the vicinity of S. Newtown Street Rd. (Rt 252) 

and Media Line Road in Newtown Township, Delaware 

County, Pennsylvania. The hit-and-run accident allegedly 

involved a motor vehicle that struck a utility pole. There 

was no description of the vehicle broadcast over the police 

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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(c). 
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radio only that it was last seen heading north on S. 

Newtown Street Road towards Newtown Township. 

Just after hearing the radio call, Officer [Alonso] was on 

West Chester Pike near the intersection with S. Newtown 

Street Rd. (Rt 252) when he observed a vehicle traveling 

on Route 252 with heavy front-end damage. The frontend damage to the vehicle was so significant that it would 

not have passed inspection. At the intersection, Officer 

[Alonso] observed that the vehicle was a Dodge Caravan 

with heavy front-end damage indented in a “V” pattern. 

The intersection where [Officer Alonso] made the 

observation about the front-end damage was well lit. 

[Officer Alonso] turned onto Route 252 and made a U-turn 

into a position behind the damaged Caravan. Officer 

[Alonso] had arrived on Route 252 behind the vehicle 

within one minute of receiving the radio call. 

Officer [Alonso] activated his lights and siren as the Dodge 

Caravan entered the intersection. The vehicle did not 

stop. Another [p]atrolman, Officer [Vandergrift], also 

responded to the area. Officer [Vandergrift] pulled up next 

to the vehicle with his siren and lights activated. At this 

point, both police vehicles had their lights and sirens 

activated but the driver still did not pull over. The Caravan 

did not stop until Officer [Vandergrift] put his police vehicle 

in such a position as to block the Caravan’s path. The 

driver was not compliant until Officer [Vandergrift] 

impeded his travel. Ultimately, the vehicle was pulled 

over. 

Officer [Vandergrift] approached the vehicle from the front 

and Officer [Alonso] approached the rear of the vehicle. 

Both [o]fficers told the driver, later identified as 

[Appellant], to shut off his vehicle and get out of the 

vehicle. The [o]fficers had to tell [Appellant] more than 

once to turn his vehicle off. [Appellant] would not follow 

the [o]fficers’ orders. [Appellant] was not compliant prior 

to being removed from his vehicle [and placed] in 

handcuffs. 

[After the officers removed Appellant from his vehicle], the 

[o]fficers turned him around to face his car. [Appellant] 
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said “what’s going on?” The [o]fficers told him “you have 

just been in an accident” and they placed him in 

[handcuffs]. Officer [Alonso] smelled the odor of an 

alcoholic beverage. He asked [Appellant] if he had been 

drinking and [Appellant] answered “yes.” Officer [Alonso] 

asked [Appellant] to recite the alphabet and he was unable 

to do so. The [o]fficer[s] observed that [Appellant] was 

not steady on his feet and[,] therefore, did not ask him to 

perform any other field sobriety tests. [Appellant] was 

placed under arrest for [driving under the influence of 

alcohol]. He was read the implied consent form at the 

scene of the vehicle stop. The [o]fficers asked [Appellant] 

if he would submit to blood testing and he said yes. [The 

officers] transported [Appellant] to Riddle Memorial 

Hospital where his blood was drawn and placed into an 

evidence locker. 

(Trial Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed February 14, 

2014, at 1-2) (numbering omitted). Appellant was arrested and charged 

with DUI—highest rate, because his blood alcohol content registered greater 

than 0.16. This offense was Appellant’s third DUI offense. On January 27, 

2014, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion to suppress physical 

evidence and statements. The court held a suppression hearing on January 

30, 2014. On February 14, 2014, the court denied Appellant’s motion. 

Appellant’s bench trial commenced on February 28, 2014, and the 

court found Appellant guilty of DUI—highest rate of alcohol. On March 4, 

2014, the court sentenced Appellant to one (1) to three (3) years’ 

imprisonment, followed by a consecutive term of two (2) years’ probation. 

The court also deemed Appellant RRRI eligible at nine (9) months’ 

imprisonment and ordered Appellant to complete a safe driving course and 

pay a fine. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 5, 2014. On 
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March 7, 2014, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant 

timely complied on March 14, 2014. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] WHEN IT DENIED 

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 

AND STATEMENTS AS THERE WAS NO REASONABLE 

SUSPICION TO STOP APPELLANT’S VEHICLE? 

DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] WHEN IT DENIED 

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 

AND STATEMENTS AS THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE 

TO ARREST APPELLANT? 

DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] WHEN IT DENIED 

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AS 

APPELLANT WAS UNDER ARREST AND NOT GIVEN 

MIRANDA[2] WARNINGS? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 3). 

We examine Appellant’s issues subject to the following principles: 

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial 

court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from 

those facts are correct. 

[W]e may consider only the evidence of the 

prosecution and so much of the evidence for the 

defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the record 

supports the findings of the suppression court, we 

are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the 

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2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
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court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based 

upon the facts. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26-27 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en 

banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, “[i]t is 

within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” 

Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa.Super. 2006)). 

In his first issue, Appellant argues the police officers did not have 

reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop of Appellant’s motor vehicle. 

Appellant asserts Officer Alonso unlawfully stopped Appellant’s vehicle based 

solely on an anonymous 911 call, which indicated only the location of the 

accident and the direction the suspect vehicle was traveling. Appellant 

alleges the anonymous call did not provide the officer with reasonable 

suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle, especially when the call did not provide 

a description of the suspect vehicle. Appellant concludes this Court must 

grant the motion to suppress and remand in accordance with that decision. 

We disagree. 

Section 6308 of the Motor Vehicle Code provides:

§ 6308. Investigation by police officers

* * *

(b) Authority of police officer.―Whenever a police 

officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking 

vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a 
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violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may 

stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of 

checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial 

responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine 

number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other 

information as the officer may reasonably believe to be 

necessary to enforce the provisions of this title. 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (emphasis added). 

Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion[,] either of 

criminal activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code

under the authority of Section 6308(b)[,] must serve a 

stated investigatory purpose. In effect, the language of 

Section 6308(b)—“to secure such other information as the 

officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce 

the provisions of this title”—is conceptually equivalent with 

the underlying purpose of a Terry[3]stop. ... Mere 

reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when 

the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory 

purpose relevant to the suspected violation. 

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal 

denied, 611 Pa. 650, 25 A.3d 327 (2011) (internal citations omitted). 

[T]o determine whether the police officer had reasonable 

suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be 

considered. In making this determination, we must give 

due weight...to the specific reasonable inferences [the 

police officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of 

his experience. Also, the totality of the circumstances test 

does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those 

facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a 

combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may 

warrant further investigation by the police officer. 

Commonwealth v. Fulton, 921 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 594 Pa. 686, 934 A.2d 72 (2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

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3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
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Hughes, 908 A.2d 924, 927 (Pa.Super. 2006)) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). If an objective view of the facts indicates an 

officer had specific, articulable facts that a traffic violation occurred, the law 

deems the stop reasonable. Commonwealth v. Chase, 599 Pa. 80, 92, 

960 A.2d 108, 114 (2008). 

Instantly, the Commonwealth presented the following evidence at 

Appellant’s suppression hearing: Officer Alonso received a police radio call 

reporting an accident in the area he was patrolling; the report indicated that 

a vehicle struck a utility pole and left the scene; approximately one (1) 

minute after Officer Alonso received the radio call, he observed Appellant’s 

motor vehicle at an intersection only one and one-half (11⁄2) miles away from 

the reported accident scene; Appellant’s vehicle had heavy front-end 

damage in a “V” pattern, and Officer Alonso believed the pattern matched 

the damage that would occur if the vehicle had struck a utility pole; Officer 

Alonso did not believe the vehicle was safe to operate and did not believe 

the vehicle would pass inspection due to the significant front-end damage. 

Officer Alonso testified that the condition of Appellant’s vehicle violated 

Pennsylvania motor vehicle inspection standards. (N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 1/30/14, at 36). Officer Alonso, therefore, stopped Appellant’s 

vehicle for investigatory purposes after learning of the recent motor vehicle 

accident and observing damage on Appellant’s vehicle consistent with the 

accident. Based on the totality of the above circumstances, Officer Alonso 
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had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6308(b); Fulton, supra. Accordingly, the record supports the court’s denial 

of Appellant’s motion to suppress on this basis. See Williams, supra. 

In his second and third issues combined, Appellant argues that the 

officers did not have probable cause to arrest him and failed to give 

Appellant proper Miranda warnings prior to his arrest. Appellant maintains 

he was not free to leave the scene when the officers stopped his vehicle, 

pulled him out, threw him against the vehicle, and immediately placed him 

in handcuffs. Appellant contends the officers noticed signs of intoxication 

and ordered Appellant to perform a field sobriety test only after they had 

placed Appellant in handcuffs. Appellant asserts the officers did not have 

any confirmation that Appellant had been involved in the accident, and they 

placed Appellant under arrest based solely on the unreliable information 

from the anonymous 911 call and the damage to Appellant’s vehicle. 

Appellant claims the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Appellant, given 

the totality of these circumstances. 

Appellant also argues the officers failed to advise him of his Miranda

rights before they conducted a custodial interrogation. Appellant contends 

Officer Alonso read no Miranda warnings before he asked Appellant whether 

he had been drinking. Appellant claims Officer Alonso obtained Appellant’s 

answer during an unlawful interrogation. Appellant concludes this Court 

must grant the motion to suppress and remand in accordance with that 
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decision. We disagree. 

Contacts between the police and citizenry fall within three general 

classifications: 

The first [level of interaction] is a “mere encounter” (or 

request for information) which need not be supported by 

any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to 

stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative 

detention” must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it 

subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but 

does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute 

the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally an arrest or 

“custodial detention” must be supported by probable 

cause. 

Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 305 (Pa.Super 2011), 

appeal denied, 616 Pa. 651, 49 A.3d 442 (2012) (quoting Commonwealth 

v. Bryant, 866 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 

668, 876 A.2d 392 (2005)). 

“Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances 

within the police officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably 

trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of 

reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the 

person to be arrested.” Williams, supra at 27 (quoting Commonwealth 

v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 

722, 920 A.2d 831 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted). “Probable cause 

justifying a warrantless arrest is determined by the totality of the 

circumstances.” Williams, supra at 27 (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “The question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was 
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correct or more likely true than false. Rather, we require only a

probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.” 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 604 Pa. 198, 203, 985 A.2d 928, 931 

(2009) (emphasis in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“The key difference between an investigative and a custodial detention 

is that the latter ‘involves such coercive conditions as to constitute the 

functional equivalent of an arrest.’” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 

A.2d 879, 887 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 587 

Pa. 511, 519, 901 A.2d 983, 987 (2006)). 

The court considers the totality of the circumstances to 

determine if an [interaction] is investigatory or custodial, 

but the following factors are specifically considered: the 

basis for the detention; the duration; the location; whether 

the suspect was transported against his will, how far, and 

why; whether restraints were used; the show, threat or 

use of force; and the methods of investigation used to 

confirm or dispel suspicions.

Commonwealth v. Teeter, 961 A.2d 890, 899 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). Nevertheless, our Supreme Court “has declined to hold that every 

time an individual is placed in handcuffs that such individual has been 

arrested.” Commonwealth v. Guillespie, 745 A.2d 654, 660 (Pa.Super. 

2000) (citing Commonwealth v. Carter, 537 Pa. 233, 247 n. 2, 643 A.2d 

61, 67 n. 2 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1005, 115 S.Ct. 1217, 131 

L.Ed.2d 198 (1995)). “[F]or their safety, police officers may handcuff 

individuals during an investigative detention.” Commonwealth v. Rosas, 

875 A.2d 341, 348 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 691, 897 A.2d 
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455 (2006) (finding suspect was not under arrest when trooper ordered 

suspect from vehicle and placed him in handcuffs). Moreover, “when an 

officer detains a vehicle for violation of a traffic law, it is inherently 

reasonable that [the officer] be concerned with safety and, as a result, may 

order the occupants of the vehicle to alight from the car.” Id.

Additionally, in evaluating whether an officer should have provided 

Miranda warnings during an interaction, “a court must consider the totality 

of the circumstances...[and] keep in mind that not every statement made by 

an individual during a police encounter amounts to an interrogation. 

Volunteered or spontaneous utterances by an individual are admissible even 

without Miranda warnings.” Williams, supra at 30 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Gaul, 590 Pa. 175, 180, 912 A.2d 252, 255 (2006), 

cert. denied, 552 U.S. 939, 128 S.Ct. 43, 169 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007)). 

Motorists have statutory obligations to stop and provide officers with 

information about an accident when the accident results in damage to any 

motor vehicles or other property. Williams, supra at 31 (citing 75 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3743, 3744). Thus, a motorist is not in custody for Miranda

purposes during the time he is obligated to remain and provide the required 

information about an accident. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 

519 Pa. 116, 546 A.2d 26 (1988)). 

Instantly, a police dispatch informed Officer Alonso that a vehicle 

recently had hit a utility pole and left the scene of the accident. Officer 
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Alonso independently observed Appellant’s vehicle in the general area of the 

accident only one (1) minute after he received the radio call. Officer Alonso 

testified that Appellant’s vehicle caught his attention because the damage on 

the front end of the vehicle consisted of a significant intrusion in a “V” 

pattern. (N.T. Suppression Hearing, 1/30/14, at 13). Appellant refused to 

stop when police activated their lights and sirens and continued to drive at a 

low rate of speed. The officers forced Appellant to stop his vehicle by 

blocking the roadway with Officer Vandergrift’s patrol car. Additionally, 

Appellant refused to obey the officers’ orders to exit Appellant’s vehicle. 

Officer Alonso testified that, based on Appellant’s failure to comply, Officer 

Alonso was unsure of Appellant’s mental state or potential reasons for 

“running.” (Id. at 39-40). Based on Appellant’s failure to comply with 

multiple police orders and the officers’ reasonable concern for safety, the 

officers removed Appellant from his vehicle and placed him in handcuffs to 

conduct an investigatory detention. See Rosas, supra; Guillespie, supra

(placing individual in handcuffs does not always constitute arrest). 

After the officers removed Appellant from his vehicle, Officer Alonso 

smelled an odor of alcohol coming from Appellant. Officer Alonso asked 

Appellant if he had been drinking, and Appellant responded “yes.” Appellant 

failed a field sobriety test, and the officers decided not to ask Appellant to 

perform any other tests when they observed Appellant was unsteady on his 

feet. See Williams, supra (finding police may utilize experience and 
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personal observations to render opinions as to whether suspects are 

intoxicated). Based on the damage to Appellant’s vehicle, the officers’ 

observations of Appellant, and their knowledge of the recent hit-and-run 

accident, the officers had probable cause to arrest Appellant for driving 

under the influence of alcohol. See id.; Thompson, supra. 

Furthermore, prior to this arrest, Appellant was not in custody for 

purposes of Miranda. The officers initially attempted to detain Appellant to 

gain more information about the damage to his car, which was consistent 

with the police dispatch’s description of the accident. See Williams, supra. 

Additionally, Appellant had a statutory obligation to stop and provide the 

officers with information about the damage to his vehicle and if it was 

related to the reported accident. See id. Thus, Appellant was subject to 

only an investigatory detention under these circumstances, when he 

answered Officer Alonso’s question about whether Appellant had been 

drinking. See id. Therefore, Appellant’s statement did not require Miranda

warnings. Id. Accordingly, the record supports the court’s denial of 

Appellant’s motion to suppress. See id. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/31/2014