Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Technology and

Procurement Policy, Committee on Government

Reform, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m., EDT

Thursday, June 28, 2001 DOD COMPETITIVE

SOURCING

A-76 Program Has Been

Augmented by Broader

Reinvention Options

Statement of Barry W. Holman

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-01-907T
Page 1 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee

I am pleased to be here today to present our observations of how the

Department of Defense (DOD) uses the Office of Management and

Budget’s (OMB) Circular A-76, which establishes federal policy for the

performance of recurring commercial activities. OMB issued the Circular

in 1966 and supplemented it in 1979 with a handbook of procedures for

conducting cost comparison studies to determine whether commercial

activities should be performed by the government or by the private sector.

DOD refers to A-76 cost comparison studies as competitive sourcing. OMB

updated the handbook in 1983, 1996, and 1999.

My comments today are based on work we have carried out in recent

years tracking DOD’s progress in implementing the A-76 program with the

goal of saving billions of dollars that could be applied to other priority

needs (see list of related GAO products at the end of this statement). In

response to the questions you asked us to address, my testimony will

(1) review the evolution of the A-76 program in DOD up to the present,

(2) address the extent to which savings are being realized through the A-76

process, (3) identify some key issues we have raised about DOD’s A-76

program as useful lessons for other agencies, and (4) provide an update of

the commercial activities panel chaired by Comptroller General David

Walker under Section 832 of the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2001.

DOD has been the leader among federal agencies in the use of the A-76

process in recent years and at one point planned to study over 200,000

positions using the process over several years. However, the number of

positions planned for study has changed over time, and the Department

recently augmented its A-76 program with what it terms strategic

sourcing—a broader array of reinvention and reengineering options that

may not necessarily involve A-76 competitions. DOD has already

reprogrammed over $11 billion in anticipated savings from A-76 and

strategic sourcing into its modernization accounts.

DOD has achieved savings through the A-76 process primarily by reducing

the number of in-house positions. Yet we have repeatedly found that it is

extremely difficult to measure the precise amount of net savings because

available data have been limited and inconsistent. Although DOD has

begun efforts to improve the estimated and actual costs of activities under

study, its savings estimates have not taken fully into account up-front

costs associated with the A-76 and strategic sourcing processes, which

Summary
Page 2 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

must be offset before net savings begin to accrue. Considering that DOD

has already reduced operating budgets on the assumption of these savings,

it is crucial that its estimates be as accurate as possible.

Issues we have raised concerning DOD’s A-76 program that may be useful

lessons learned for other agencies that use the A-76 process include the

following: (1) studies have generally taken longer than initially expected,

(2) studies have generally required higher costs and resources than

initially projected, (3) finding and selecting functions to compete can be

difficult, and (4) making premature budget cuts on the assumption of

projected savings can be risky.

Both government groups and the private sector have expressed concerns

about the fairness, adequacy, costs, and timelines of the A-76 process. As

required by the Congress, a panel of government and private sector

experts was created earlier this year to study the policies and procedures

governing the transfer of commercial activities from government

personnel to contractors, including the A-76 process, and to report its

findings and recommendations by May 2002.

Under A-76, commercial activities may be converted to or from contractor

performance either by direct conversion or by cost comparison. Under

direct conversion, specific conditions allow commercial activities to be

moved from government or contract performance without a cost

comparison study (for example, for activities involving 10 or fewer

civilians).1

 Generally, however, commercial functions are to be converted

to or from contract performance by cost comparison, whereby the

estimated cost of government performance of a commercial activity is

compared to the cost of contractor performance in accordance with the

principles and procedures set forth in Circular A-76 and the supplemental

handbook. As part of this process, the government identifies the work to

be performed (described in the performance work statement), prepares an

in-house cost estimate based on its most efficient organization, and

compares it with the winning offer from the private sector.

 1

 For functions performed by DOD employees, a number of additional requirements,

reports, and certifications are addressed in chapter 146 of title 10 U.S. Code and in

recurring provisions in DOD’s annual appropriation acts.

Background
Page 3 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

According to A-76 guidance, an activity currently performed in house is

converted to performance by the private sector if the private offer is either

10 percent lower than the direct personnel costs of the in-house cost

estimate or $10 million less (over the performance period) than the inhouse cost estimate. OMB established this minimum cost differential to

ensure that the government would not convert performance for marginal

savings.

The handbook also provides an administrative appeals process. An eligible

appellant2

 must submit an appeal to the agency in writing within 20 days of

the date that all supporting documentation is made publicly available.

Appeals are supposed to be adjudicated within 30 days after they are

received. Under current law, private sector offerors who believe that the

agency has not complied with applicable procedures have additional

avenues of appeal. Specifically, they may file a bid protest with the

General Accounting Office or file an action in a court of competent

jurisdiction.3

Circular A-76 requires agencies to maintain annual inventories of

commercial activities performed in house. A similar requirement was

included in the 1998 Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act,

which directs agencies to develop annual inventories of their positions

that are not inherently governmental.4

 The fiscal year 2000 inventory

identified approximately 850,000 full-time equivalent commercial-type

positions, of which approximately 450,000 were in DOD.5

 2

 An eligible appellant is defined as: (a) federal employees (or their representatives) and

existing federal contractors affected by a tentative decision to waive a cost comparison,

(b) federal employees (or their representatives) and contractors who have submitted

formal bids or offers who would be affected by a tentative decision, or (c) agencies that

have submitted formal offers to compete for the right to provide services through an interservice support agreement.

3

 Federal employees do not have standing to file a protest with GAO and have generally

been denied standing to sue in court.

4

 Section 5 of P.L. 105-270, codified at 31 U.S.C. 501 note (1998) defines an inherently

governmental function as a “function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to

require performance by Federal Government employees.”

5

 Guidance implementing the FAIR Act permitted agencies to exempt many commercial

activities from competitive sourcing consideration on the basis of legislative restrictions,

national security considerations, and other factors. Accordingly, DOD’s fiscal year 2000

inventory of positions it considers to be potentially subject to competitions was reduced to

approximately 260,000.
Page 4 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

OMB has recently indicated that it intends to expand its emphasis on A-76

governmentwide. In a March 9, 2001, memorandum to the heads and acting

heads of departments and agencies, the OMB Deputy Director directed

agencies to take action in fiscal year 2002 to directly convert or complete

public/private competitions of not less than 5 percent of the full-time

equivalent positions listed in their FAIR Act inventories.

In 1999, DOD began to augment its A-76 program with what it terms

strategic sourcing.6

 Strategic sourcing may encompass consolidation,

restructuring or reengineering activities, privatization, joint ventures with

the private sector, or the termination of obsolete services. Strategic

sourcing can involve functions or activities, regardless of whether they are

considered inherently governmental, military essential, or commercial. I

should add that these actions are recognized in the introduction to the

A-76 handbook as being part of a larger body of options, in addition to

A-76, that agencies must consider as they contemplate reinventing

government operations.

Strategic sourcing initially does not involve A-76 competitions between the

public and the private sectors, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense

and service officials have stressed that strategic sourcing may provide

smarter decisions because it determines whether an activity should be

performed before deciding who should perform it. However, these officials

also emphasized that strategic sourcing is not intended to take the place of

A-76 studies and that positions examined under the broader umbrella of

strategic sourcing may be subsequently considered for study under A-76.

DOD has been the leader among federal agencies in emphasizing A-76

studies. DOD’s use of A-76 waned from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s,

then grew substantially in 1995 before falling again in1999 to the present.

DOD is currently emphasizing a combination of A-76 and strategic

sourcing.

Available information indicates that A-76 studies in civilian agencies have

been minimal, compared with those carried out in DOD. Unfortunately, no

central database exists to provide information on the actual number of

 6

 While strategic sourcing includes A-76 studies, the Department has commonly used the

term to refer to all reinvention efforts other than A-76. For purposes of this testimony, our

reference to strategic sourcing will not include A-76 studies.

DOD’s A-76 Program

Has Evolved Over

Time
Page 5 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

studies undertaken. From the late 1970s through the mid-1990s, DOD

activities studied approximately 90,000 positions under A-76. However,

program controversy and administrative and legislative constraints caused

a drop in program emphasis from the late 1980s through 1995.

In August 1995, the Deputy Secretary of Defense gave renewed emphasis

to the A-76 program when he directed the services to make outsourcing of

support activities a priority in an effort to reduce operating costs and free

up funds to meet other priority needs. The effort was subsequently

incorporated as a major initiative under the then-Secretary’s Defense

Reform Initiative, and the program became known as competitive

sourcing—in recognition of the fact that either the public or the private

sector could win competitions.

The number of positions planned for study and the time frames for

accomplishing those studies have changed over time in response to

difficulties in identifying activities to be studied. In 1997, DOD’s plans

called for about 171,000 positions to be studied by the end of fiscal year

2003. In February 1999, we reported that DOD had increased this number

to 229,000 but then found it reduced the number of positions to be studied

in the initial years of the program. In August 2000, DOD decreased the

total number of positions to be studied under A-76 to about 203,000, added

about 42,000 Navy positions for consideration under strategic sourcing,

and extended the program to fiscal year 2005. The introduction of strategic

sourcing came about as the Navy—which was having difficulty identifying

sufficient numbers of positions for study—sought and obtained approval

to use this broader approach to help meet its A-76 study goals. In March

2001, DOD officials announced that they had again reduced the number of

positions to be studied under A-76 to about 160,000 but increased the

number of strategic sourcing positions to 120,000. DOD’s latest targets

include strategic sourcing study goals for each of the military services.

Tables 1 and 2 show the number of positions Defense components planned

to study under A-76 and strategic sourcing as of March 2001.
Page 6 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

Table 1: Positions to Be Studied Under A-76 Process

Component

Positions

announced for

fiscal years 1997-

2000

Positions planned

for fiscal years

2001-2007 Total

Army 37,871 20,916 58,787

Navy 32,573 9,366 41,939

Air Force 24,306 5,206 29,512

Marine Corps 4,625 0 4,625

Defense agencies 11,533 13,187 24,720

Total 110,908 48,675 159,583

Source: DOD data.

Table 2: Positions to Be Studied Under Strategic Sourcing

Component

Positions

projected for fiscal

years 1997-2000

Positions planned

for fiscal years

2001-2007 Total

Army 8,444 9,163 17,607

Navy 41,733 5,652 47,385

Air Force 38,964 2,134 41,098

Marine Corps 8,864 5,079 13,943

Defense agencies 0 0 0

Total 98,005 22,028 120,033

Source: DOD data.

DOD’s data shown above show fewer positions planned to be studied

under both A-76 and strategic sourcing in the out-years compared to those

projected before 2001. To what extent these numbers will change on the

basis of recent program direction from OMB for an expanded A-76

program emphasis is yet to be determined.

As these numbers changed, so did savings targets. In 1999, for example,

DOD projected that its A-76 program would produce $6 billion in

cumulative savings from fiscal year 1997 to 2003 and $2.3 billion in net

savings each year thereafter. In 2000, DOD projected savings of about

$9.2 billion in 1997-2005, with recurring annual net savings of almost

$2.8 billion thereafter. Additional savings were to come from strategic

sourcing, which was expected to produce nearly $2.5 billion in cumulative

savings by 2005 and recurring annual savings of $0.7 billion thereafter.

Together, A-76 and strategic sourcing are expected to produce estimated

cumulative savings of almost $11.7 billion, with about $3.5 billion in
Page 7 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

recurring annual net savings. More recent savings estimates have not yet

been made available.

Most importantly, these projected savings have become more than

ambitious goals, when it developed its fiscal year 2000 budget, DOD

reprogrammed about $11.2 billion of these anticipated savings into its

modernization accounts, spread over future years’ planning period.

Our work has consistently shown that while savings are being achieved by

DOD’s A-76 program, it is difficult to determine precisely the magnitude of

net savings. Furthermore, savings may be limited in the short term

because up-front investment costs associated with conducting and

implementing the studies must be absorbed before long-term savings begin

to accrue. Several of our reports in recent years have highlighted these

issues.

We reported in March 2001 that A-76 competitions had reduced estimated

costs of Defense activities primarily by reducing the number of positions

needed to perform those activities under study.7

 This is true regardless of

whether the government’s in-house organization or the private sector wins

the competition. Both government and private sector officials with

experience in such studies have stated that, in order to be successful in an

A-76 competition, they must seek to reduce the number of positions

required to perform the function being studied.8

 Related actions may

include restructuring and reclassifying positions and using multiskill and

multirole employees to complete required tasks.

In December 2000, we reported on compliance with a congressional

requirement9

 that DOD report specific information of all instances since

1995 in which DOD missions or functions were reviewed under OMB

 7 DOD Competitive Sourcing: Effects of A-76 Studies on Federal Employees’ Employment,

Pay, and Benefits Vary (GAO-01-388, Mar. 16, 2001).

8

 We completed a more recent analysis of 22 cases in which the government’s most efficient

organization won the A-76 competitions and found that the in-house organizations had

reduced authorized personnel levels an average of 46 percent—between 13 and 69 percent.

The actual number of personnel performing a function tends to be less, so these figures

may overstate the savings.

9

 DOD Appropriations Act, fiscal year 2000, P.L. 106-79, sec. 8109.

Savings Are Being

Realized, but

Precision of Savings

Estimates Is Limited
Page 8 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

Circular A-76.10 For the 286 studies for which it had complete information,

the Department’s July 2000 report to the Congress largely complied with

the reporting requirement. We noted that DOD had reported cost

reductions of about 39 percent, yielding an estimated $290 million savings

in fiscal year 1999. We also agreed that individual A-76 studies were

producing savings but stressed that savings are difficult to quantify

precisely for a number of reasons:

• Because of an initial lack of DOD guidance on calculating costs, baseline

costs were sometimes calculated on the basis of average salaries and

authorized personnel levels rather than on actual numbers.

• DOD’s savings estimates did not take into consideration the costs of

conducting the studies and implementing the results, which of course

must be offset before net savings begin to accrue.

• There were significant limitations in the database DOD used to calculate

savings.

• Savings become more difficult to assess over time as workload

requirements change, affecting program costs and the baseline from which

savings were initially calculated.

Our August 2000 report assessed the extent to which there were cost

savings from nine A-76 studies conducted by DOD activities.11 The data

showed that DOD realized savings from seven of the cases, but less than

the $290 million that Defense components had initially projected. Each of

the cases presented unique circumstances that limited our ability to

precisely calculate savings—some suggested lower savings. Others

suggested higher savings than initially identified. In two cases, DOD

components had included cost reductions unrelated to the A-76 studies as

part of their projected savings. Additionally, baseline cost estimates used

to project savings were usually calculated using an average cost of salary

and benefits for the number of authorized positions, rather than the actual

costs of the positions. The latter calculation would have been more

precise. In four of the nine cases, actual personnel levels were less than

authorized. While most baseline cost estimates were based largely on

personnel costs, up to 15 percent of the costs associated with the

government’s most efficient organizations’ plans or the contractors’ offers

 10 DOD Competitive Sourcing: Results of A-76 Studies Over the Past 5 Years (GAO-01-20,

Dec. 7, 2000).

11 DOD Competitive Sourcing: Savings Are Occurring, but Actions Are Needed to Improve

Accuracy of Savings Estimates (GAO/NSIAD-00-107, Aug. 8, 2000).
Page 9 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

were not personnel costs. Because these types of costs were not included

in the baseline, a comparison of the baseline with the government’s most

efficient organization or contractor costs may have resulted in

understating cost savings. On the other hand, savings estimates did not

reflect study and implementation costs, which reduced savings in the short

term.

DOD has begun efforts to revise its information systems to better track the

estimated and actual costs of activities studied but not to revise previous

savings estimates. DOD is also emphasizing the development of

standardized baseline cost data to determine initial savings estimates. In

practice, however, many of the cost elements that are used in A-76 studies

will continue to be estimated because DOD lacks a cost accounting system

to measure actual costs. Further, reported savings from A-76 studies will

continue to have some element of uncertainty and imprecision and will be

difficult to track in the out-years because workload requirements change,

affecting program costs and the baseline from which savings are

calculated. Given that the Department has reduced operating budgets on

the basis of projected savings from A-76 studies, it is important that it have

as much and as accurate information as possible on savings, including

information on adjustments for up-front investment costs and other

changes that may occur over time.

In monitoring DOD’s progress in implementing the A-76 program, we have

reported on a number of issues that should be considered when expanding

emphasis on the A-76 process, either in DOD or at other government

agencies. These issues include (1) the time required to complete studies,

(2) the costs and other resources needed to conduct and implement

studies, (3) the difficulties involved in selecting functions to compete, and

(4) the timing of budget reductions in anticipation of projected savings.

This last issue is a fundamental issue that is directly affected by the first

three.

Individual A-76 studies have taken longer than initially projected. In

launching its A-76 program, some DOD components made overly

optimistic assumptions about the amount of time needed to complete the

competitions. For example, the Army projected that it would take

13-21 months to complete studies, depending on their size. The Navy

initially projected completing its studies in 12 months. The numbers were

subsequently adjusted upward, and the most recent available data indicate

Some Issues We Have

Raised About DOD’s

A-76 Program

Studies Have Taken Longer

to Complete Than

Expected
Page 10 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

that studies take about 24 months for single-function and 27 months for

multifunction studies.

Once DOD components found that the studies were taking longer than

initially projected, they realized that a greater investment of resources

would be needed than originally planned to conduct the studies. In August

2000, we reported that DOD had increased its study cost estimates

considerably since the previous year and had given greater recognition to

the costs of implementing the results of A-76 studies. But we expressed

concern that the Department was, in some instances, still likely

underestimating those costs.12

The 2001 President’s budget showed a wide range of projected study costs,

from about $1,300 per position studied in the Army to about $3,700 in the

Navy. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force provide their subcomponents

$2,000 per position studied. Yet various officials believe these figures

underestimate the costs of performing the studies. Officials at one Army

major command estimated that their study costs would be at least $7,000

per position. One Navy command estimated its costs at between $8,500

and $9,500 per position. Our own assessment of a sample of completed A76 studies within the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and Defense agencies

showed that study costs ranged from an average of $364 to $9,000 per

position.13

In addition to study costs, significant costs can be incurred in

implementing the results of the competitions. Transition costs include the

separation costs for civilian Defense employees who lose their jobs as a

result of competitions won by the private sector or when in-house

organizations require a smaller civilian workforce. Such separation costs

include the costs of voluntary early retirement, voluntary separation

incentives, and involuntary separations through reduction-in-force

procedures. The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2001 included for the

first time all Defense components’ estimated costs of implementing A-76

competitions and showed a total of about $1 billion in transition costs

resulting from A-76 studies for fiscal years 1997-2005.

 12 DOD Competitive Sourcing: Some Progress, but Continuing Challenges Remain in

Meeting Program Goals (GAO/NSIAD-00-106, Aug. 8, 2000).

13 DOD Competitive Sourcing (GAO/NSIAD-00-107, Aug. 8, 2000).

Costs and Resources to

Conduct and Implement

Studies Were

Underestimated
Page 11 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

Selecting and grouping functions and positions to compete can be difficult.

Because most services faced growing difficulties in or resistance to finding

enough study candidates to meet their A-76 study goals, DOD approved

strategic sourcing as a way to complement its A-76 program. The Navy, for

instance, had planned to announce 15,000 positions for study under A-76 in

fiscal year 1998 but announced only 8,980 (about 60 percent). The

following year it planned to announce 20,000 positions but announced

10,807 (about 54 percent).

Although DOD’s FAIR Act inventory in 2000 identified commercial

functions involving about 450,000 civilian positions, including about

260,000 associated with functions considered potentially eligible for

competition, DOD does not expect to study all these functions. It remains

to be seen to what extent the Department will significantly increase the

number of functions it studies under A-76 in the near future. Department

officials told us that the process identified few new functions and

associated positions that could be studied under A-76 and that the

increases in positions identified did not automatically translate into

potentially large numbers of additional studies. The number of positions

that will actually be studied for possible competition may be limited by a

number of factors, including the following:

• Some activities are widely dispersed geographically. Having positions

associated with commercial activities that are scattered over many

locations may prevent some of them from being grouped for competition.

• Some work categorized as commercial may not be separated from

inherently governmental or exempted work. In some cases, commercial

activities classified as subject to competition are in activities that also

contain work that is inherently governmental or exempt from competition,

and the commercial workload may not always be separable from the

workload performed by the exempted positions.

• Resources to conduct A-76 studies are limited. Officials of several military

service commands have told us that they already have aggressive

competition programs under way and that they lack sufficient resources

and staff to conduct more competition studies in the near future.

Even before it developed its FAIR Act inventory, DOD had already

established goals for positions that the services and the Defense agencies

should study and the savings to be achieved. For the most part, the

services and Defense agencies delegated to their components

responsibility for determining which functions to study. DOD then fell

behind in its initial timetable for initiating and completing A-76 studies.

Service officials told us that they had already identified as many

Selecting and Grouping

Functions to Compete Can

Be Difficult
Page 12 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

competition opportunities as they could to meet savings goals under the

A-76 program, and they believed that their capacity to conduct studies

beyond those already underway or planned over the next few years was

limited.

Difficulties encountered in identifying A-76 study candidates, and in

launching and completing the studies in the time frames initially projected,

along with greater than expected costs associated with completing the

studies, have led to concerns among various service officials about their

ability to meet previously established savings targets. Some Defense

officials have also voiced uncertainties over cost estimates and savings

associated with strategic sourcing and the lack of a rigorous basis for

projecting savings from this effort.14

Data included in the President’s fiscal year 2001 budget submission

indicated that the Navy estimated that study costs and savings generated

by strategic sourcing efforts would be virtually the same as those

generated by A-76 studies for each position studied. Office of the Secretary

of Defense officials have noted there is a wide variation in the types of

initiatives that make up strategic sourcing and, consequently, that there

can be wide variation in the resultant savings. These uncertainties led us

to previously recommend that DOD periodically determine whether

savings are being realized in line with the reductions in operating accounts

that are based on projected savings.

Increasing emphasis on A-76 has served to underscore concerns expressed

by both government employees and industry about the process. Federal

managers and others have been concerned about organizational

turbulence that typically follows the announcement of A-76 studies.

Government workers have been concerned about the impact of

competition on their jobs, their opportunity for input into the competitive

process, and the lack of parity with industry offerors to appeal A-76

decisions. Industry representatives have complained about the fairness of

the process and the lack of a “level playing field” between the government

and the private sector in accounting for costs. It appears that everyone

involved is concerned about the time required to complete the studies.

 14 DOD Competitive Sourcing (GAO/NSIAD-00-106, Aug. 8, 2000).

Concern About Premature

Budget Reductions Based

on Anticipated Savings

Commercial Activities

Panel Convened to

Study Policies and

Procedures
Page 13 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

Amid these concerns over the A-76 process, the Congress enacted section

832 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. The

legislation required the Comptroller General to convene a panel of experts

to study the policies and procedures governing the transfer of commercial

activities for the federal government from government personnel to a

federal contractor. The Panel, which Comptroller General David Walker

has elected to chair, includes senior officials from DOD, private industry,

federal labor organizations, and OMB. Among other issues, the Panel will

be reviewing the A-76 process and implementation of the FAIR Act.

The Panel had its first meeting on May 8, 2001, and its first public hearing

on June 11. At the hearing, over 40 individuals representing a wide

spectrum of perspectives presented their views. The Panel currently plans

to hold two additional hearings, on August 8 in Indianapolis, Indiana, and

on August 15 in San Antonio, Texas. The hearing in San Antonio will

specifically address OMB Circular A-76, focusing on what works and what

does not in the use of that process. The hearing in Indianapolis will

explore various alternatives to the use of A-76 in making sourcing

decisions at the federal, state, and local levels. The Panel is required to

report its findings and recommendations to the Congress by May 1, 2002.

This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions

you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.

Contacts and Acknowledgment

For further contacts regarding this statement, please contact Barry W.

Holman at (202) 512-8412 or Marilyn Wasleski at (202) 512-8436.

Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Debra

McKinney, Stefano Petrucci, Thaddeus Rytel, Nancy Lively, Bill Woods,

John Brosnan, and Stephanie May.
Page 14 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

DOD Competitive Sourcing: Effects of A-76 Studies on Federal

Employees’ Employment, Pay, and Benefits Vary (GAO-01-388, Mar. 16,

2001).

DOD Competitive Sourcing: Results of A-76 Studies Over the Past

5 Years (GAO-01-20, Dec. 7, 2000).

DOD Competitive Sourcing: More Consistency Needed in Identifying

Commercial Activities (GAO/NSIAD-00-198, Aug. 11, 2000).

DOD Competitive Sourcing: Savings Are Occurring, but Actions Are

Needed to Improve Accuracy of Savings Estimates (GAO/NSIAD-00-107,

Aug. 8, 2000).

DOD Competitive Sourcing: Some Progress, but Continuing Challenges

Remain in Meeting Program Goals (GAO/NSIAD-00-106, Aug. 8, 2000).

Competitive Contracting: The Understandability of FAIR Act Inventories

Was Limited (GAO/GGD-00-68, Apr. 14, 2000).

DOD Competitive Sourcing: Potential Impact on Emergency Response

Operations at Chemical Storage Facilities Is Minimal

(GAO/NSIAD-00-88, Mar. 28, 2000).

DOD Competitive Sourcing: Plan Needed to Mitigate Risks in Army

Logistics Modernization Program (GAO/NSIAD-00-19, Oct. 04, 1999).

DOD Competitive Sourcing: Air Force Reserve Command A-76

Competitions (GAO/NSIAD-99-235R, Sept. 13, 1999).

DOD Competitive Sourcing: Lessons Learned System Could Enhance

A-76 Study Process (GAO/NSIAD-99-152, July 21, 1999).

Defense Reform Initiative: Organization, Status, and Challenges

(GAO/NSIAD-99-87, Apr. 21, 1999).

Quadrennial Defense Review: Status of Efforts to Implement Personnel

Reductions in the Army Materiel Command (GAO/NSIAD-99-123, Mar. 31,

1999).

Defense Reform Initiative: Progress, Opportunities, and Challenges

(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-95, Mar. 2, 1999).

Related GAO Products
Page 15 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

Force Structure: A-76 Not Applicable to Air Force 38th Engineering

Installation Wing Plan (GAO/NSIAD-99-73, Feb. 26, 1999).

Future Years Defense Program: How Savings From Reform Initiatives

Affect DOD’s 1999-2003 Program (GAO/NSIAD-99-66, Feb. 25, 1999).

DOD Competitive Sourcing: Results of Recent Competitions

(GAO/NSIAD-99-44, Feb. 23, 1999).

DOD Competitive Sourcing: Questions About Goals, Pace, and Risks of

Key Reform Initiative (GAO/NSIAD-99-46, Feb. 22, 1999).

OMB Circular A-76: Oversight and Implementation Issues

(GAO/T-GGD-98-146, June 4, 1998).

Quadrennial Defense Review: Some Personnel Cuts and Associated

Savings May Not Be Achieved (GAO/NSIAD-98-100, Apr. 30, 1998).

Competitive Contracting: Information Related to the Redrafts of the

Freedom From Government Competition Act (GAO/GGD/NSIAD-98-167R,

Apr. 27, 1998).

Defense Outsourcing: Impact on Navy Sea-Shore Rotations

(GAO/NSIAD-98-107, Apr. 21, 1998).

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Facing DOD in Implementing

Defense Reform Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115, Mar. 18, 1998).

Defense Management: Challenges Facing DOD in Implementing Defense

Reform Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-98-122, Mar. 13, 1998).

Base Operations: DOD’s Use of Single Contracts for Multiple Support

Services (GAO/NSIAD-98-82, Feb. 27, 1998).

Defense Outsourcing: Better Data Needed to Support Overhead Rates for

A-76 Studies (GAO/NSIAD-98-62, Feb. 27, 1998).

Outsourcing DOD Logistics: Savings Achievable But Defense Science

Board’s Projections Are Overstated (GAO/NSIAD-98-48, Dec. 8, 1997).

Financial Management: Outsourcing of Finance and Accounting

Functions (GAO/AIMD/NSIAD-98-43, Oct. 17, 1997).
Page 16 GAO-01-907T DOD Competitive Sourcing

Base Operations: Contracting for Firefighters and Security Guards

(GAO/NSIAD-97-200BR, Sept. 12, 1997).

Terms Related to Privatization Activities and Processes

(GAO/GGD-97-121, July 1997).

Defense Outsourcing: Challenges Facing DOD as It Attempts to Save

Billions in Infrastructure Costs (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-110, Mar. 12, 1997).

Base Operations: Challenges Confronting DOD as It Renews Emphasis

on Outsourcing (GAO/NSIAD-97-86, Mar. 11, 1997).

Public-Private Mix: Effectiveness and Performance of GSA’s In-House

and Contracted Services (GAO/GGD-95-204, Sept. 29, 1995).

Government Contractors: An Overview of the Federal Contracting-Out

Program (GAO/T-GGD-95-131, Mar. 29, 1995).

Government Contractors: Are Service Contractors Performing Inherently

Governmental Functions (GAO/GGD-92-11, Nov. 18, 1991).

OMB Circular A-76: Legislation Has Curbed Many Cost Studies in

Military Services (GAO/GGD-91-100, July 30, 1991).

OMB Circular A-76: DOD’s Reported Savings Figures Are Incomplete

and Inaccurate (GAO/GGD-90-58, Mar. 15, 1990).

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