* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

NO. 97-40492

Summary Calendar

JAVIER REYNOSA,

Plaintiff-Appellant

VERSUS

E. WOOD; PHILIPPA A. LANG; M. DODSON;

ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION COMMITTEE; W. BOOTH,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(C-96-CV-460)

December 18, 1997

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

As this Court finds no error in the dismissal of Appellant’s

civil rights complaint, and in lieu of a separate opinion, this

Court adopts en toto the order of dismissal in this case of the

United States District Court for the Southe rn District of Texas,

Corpus Christi Division, C.A. No. 96-460, United States Magistrate2

Judge B. Janice Ellington, sitting by consent, to wit:

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The plaintiff brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

various constitutional violations. The Court held a S pears hearing

in this case on February 3, 1997. S pears v. McCotter

, 766 F.2d 179

(5th Cir. 1985). At the hearing, all witnesses were sworn, all

records used by the witnesses were authenticated and had adequate

indicia of reliability, the inmate had an opportunity t o examine

the records, and the inmate had the opportunity to cross examine

witnesses. Wilson v. Barrientos

, 926 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1991).

A. Due process

Plaint iff contends that, on April 13, 1996, Defendant Woods

charged Plaintiff with “possession of a weapon intended to be used

to injure another person”. Plaintiff alleges that he only had a

rolled up newspaper, not a weapon. Plaintiff asserts that

Defendant Lang failed to present pictures to support t he claim.

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the administrative segregation

committee, Captain Dodson and Assistant Warden Boothe refused him

the right to be heard and relied on an incomplete offense report.

Plaintiff asserts that the “fal se allegations by the

Defendants has caused the Plaintiff loss of line class, 90 days on

level 3, parole date drastically change d, and paper gown

restrictions for 72 hours”. Plaintiff also contends that he lost

30 days of good-time credit.3

Due process protections do not attach to ordinary prison

disciplinary cases. Sandin v. Conner

, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct.

2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995)(no due process protections for

disciplinary hearings which do not lengthen the inmate’s sentence

or exceed its expected parameters). Where Plaintiff lost

privileges (other than good time credits), his due process claim is

dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.

Regarding Plaintiff’s assertion that the reduction in line

class will affect his parole date, “[t]he loss of the opportunity

to earn good-time credits, which might lead to earlier parole, is

a collateral consequence of [an inmate’s] custodial status. Yet,

such speculative, collateral consequences of prison administrative

decisions do not create constitutionally protected liberty

interests.” Luken v. Scott

, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995), cert.

denied

, 116 S. Ct. 1690 (1996); See Meacham v. Fano

, 427 U.S. 215,

229 n. 8, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2540 n. 8, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976)(noting

that possible effect o n parole decision does not create liberty

interest in confinement in particular prison).

As to any claim for r estoration of good-time credits,

resolution of the factual and legal assertions of that claim would

automatically entitle Plaintiff to accelerated release and,

consequently, that claim must be pursued through a petition for

writ of habeas corpus. Cook v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice

Transitional Planning Dept.

, 37 F.3d 166 (5th Cir. 1994); Keenan v.4

Bennett

, 613 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980)(loss of “good time” credit

treated as claim under § 2254). The Court cannot consider any

claim for restoration of good time credits in this action because

Plaintiff has not exhausted his state habeas remedies. Rose v.

Lundy

, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S. Ct. 1198; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). So that

Plaintiff is not prevented from proceeding with his claim for loss

of good-time credits pursuant to a state writ of habeas corpus, the

claim is dismissed without prejudice.

B. Conspiracy

Plaintiff asserts “that Officer Wood and Sgt. Lang conspired

to fabricate false disciplinary charges against him”.

To allege a claim of conspiracy to deprive a plaintiff of his

constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must

allege, (1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons; (2) for the

purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of

persons of the equal protection of the laws; and (3) an act in

furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which causes injury to a person

or property, or deprivation of any right or privilige of a citizen

of the United States. Hilliard v. Ferguson , 30 F.3d 649 (5th Cir.

1994). Moreover, where all of the defendants are members of the

same collective entity, the conspiracy does not involve two or more

people. Hilliard

, 30 F.3d at 653; see also Moody v. Jefferson

Parish Sch. Bd.

, 803 F. Supp. 1158, 1166 (E.D. La. 1992)(School

Board, Principal, V ice-Principal, and various teachers are all5

employed by the Jefferson Parish School Board and, thus, are a

single entity), aff’d, 2 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 1993); Hankins v.

Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.

, 698 F. Supp. 1323, 1330 (N.D. Tex.

1988)(hig h school and its officials constitute a single entity);

Chambliss v. Foote

, 421 F. Supp. 12, 15 (E.D. La. 1976)(“the

university and its officials are considered as constituting a

single legal entity which cannot conspire with itself”), aff’d

, 562

F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1977), c ert. denied

, 439 U.S. 839, 99 S. Ct.

127, 58 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1978).

Here Plaintiff produces no facts, other than his personal

belief, that there is a conspiracy. His claim is too vague to go

forward. Furthermore, all of the defendants are members of the

same collective entity, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed as frivolous.

C. Intentional infliction of emotional distress

Plaintiff opines that the various unconstitutional acts of the

Defendants have caused him to suffer emotional distress. At the

Spears hearing, Plaintiff admitted that he did not see a

psychologist or lose any sleep because of the emotional distress.

A federal district court has supplementa l jurisdiction over

state law claims which are so related to the claim in the action

within the Court’s original jurisdiction that they form part of the

same case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, the doctrine

of supplemental jurisd iction is one of discretion. United Mine6

Wo rkers v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218

(1966). In exercising this discretion, the district court should

consider judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity.

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill

, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S. Ct. 614,

619, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1988). “In the unusual case in which all

federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction

over the remaining state law claims.” Id . at 350 n. 7, 108 S. Ct.

at 61 9 n. 7. Accordingly, as the Court declines to exercise

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim, such claim is dismissed without prejudice.

AFFIRMED.