IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-30516

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

PAUL W. MILLER,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:10-CR-102-1

Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

A jury convicted Paul W. Miller of two counts of sexual exploitation of a

minor and one count of possession of child pornography. The district court

sentenced him to 70 years in prison and fined him $15,000. Miller appeals his

conviction and fine. We AFFIRM.

Miller contends the district court improperly barred him from crossexamining the two young victims about their juvenile criminal records and

probation statuses. The Confrontation Clause secures the defendant’s right of

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 12, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 12-30516

cross-examination, particularly in order to expose a witness’s motivation for

testifying. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986). Nonetheless,

the district court retains “wide latitude” to reasonably limit cross-examination

due to concerns about “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, . . . or

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id. at 679. Alleged

violations of the Confrontation Clause are reviewed de novo, subject to 

harmless-error analysis. United States v. Jimenez, 464 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir.

2006).

Miller offers only vague speculation about the possible impeachment value

of the proposed cross-examination. He relies on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308

(1974), for the proposition that cross-examination about juvenile probation was

warranted. Miller’s case is distinguishable from Davis. There, crossexamination about the witness’s probation could have exposed an incentive to

deflect suspicion away from himself and toward Davis. See id. at 311-19. The

victims in this case were not on probation at the time of the crime, nor were they

suspects with an incentive to shift blame onto Miller. Moreover, nothing in the

record or pleadings suggests that the federal prosecutor could have influenced

any state juvenile-court proceedings and thereby provided an inducement for the

victims to testify in the federal trial. See United States v. Thorn, 917 F.2d 170,

176 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming preclusion of impeachment with state indictments

because the defendant offered no evidence that the Government could influence

the state proceedings). In addition, the impeachment value of the proposed

cross-examination was minimal because other witnesses corroborated the

victims’ material testimony. See Kopycinski v. Scott, 64 F.3d 223, 226-27 (5th

Cir. 1995) (concerning withheld evidence and noting that strong corroboration

can make testimony unimpeachable). Miller’s speculative cross-examination of

the young witnesses about their juvenile conduct would have been marginally

relevant, at best. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. 

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Regardless, any error in limiting cross-examination was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt. See id. at 684. The victims’ testimonies were not

indispensable in light of other evidence that was corroborative on points

material to Miller’s conviction. The only evidence contrary to the victims’

testimony was Miller’s uncorroborated denial of wrongdoing. Under the totality

of circumstances, the Government’s case against Miller was very strong. See id.

(identifying factors relevant to harmless error review). 

Miller also asserts that it was plain error to impose a $15,000 fine where

the presentence report noted that he would likely be unable to pay a fine within

the Guideline range. The applicable fine under the Guidelines was $25,000 to

$250,000. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3). The fine was below the Guideline range, and

Miller offers no evidence or argument that he will be unable to earn money

toward payment of the fine while he works in prison for the rest of his life. He

has not shown that the imposition of the fine was a plain error. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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