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******************************************************WEINSTEIN AND WISSER, P.C. v. FREDERICK B. CORNELIUS (AC 35656)
Beach, Sheldon and Peters, Js. Argued February 19—officially released June 24, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Tanzer, J. [judgment]; Schuman, J. [motions to open, to dismiss and to reargue].)
Frederick B. Cornelius, self-represented, the appellant (defendant). Kerry M. Wisser, for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion BEACH, J. The defendant, Frederick B. Cornelius, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff, Weinstein & Wisser, P.C. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. InAugust, 2007, theplaintifffiledacomplaintalleging that the parties entered into an agreement whereby the plaintiff was to provide the defendant with legal representation in regard to an action taken by the Department of Banking. The plaintiff further alleged thattheplaintiffrepresentedthedefendantinthematter from December, 2003, until May, 2006, and billed the defendant accordingly. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant made only sporadicpayments, and breached the agreement by refusing to pay a remaining balance of $24,509.66. In September, 2007, the plaintiff filed a motionfordefault, seekingthatthe courtenteradefault against the defendant for his failure to enter an appearance in the matter. The court granted the motion. In November, 2007, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment after default. The court granted the motion and renderedjudgmentinfavoroftheplaintiffintheamount of $24,509.66, plus $362.40 in costs. There the matter stood for approximately five years. On January 23, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant because of insufficient service of process. The defendant attached an affidavit to his motion in which he averred that he had not resided at 127 Sunset Farm Road, West Hartford, the address at which service had been made, at any time on or before the date of purportedservice ofprocess. Theplaintifffiledamemorandum of law in opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss and attached an affidavit by a state marshal who attested that, on August 8, 2008, he had made service upon the defendant by leaving a copy of the writofsummonsandcomplaintatthe defendant’susual place ofabode. He furtheraverredthatwhenhe arrived at the address on the summons, 637 Park Road, West Hartford, the building was unoccupied and being renovated; the marshal was informed that the defendant
was residing with his parents at 127 Sunset Farm Road in West Hartford. The marshal stated that when he arrived at 127 Sunset Farm Road, he was told by an older gentleman, who the marshal believed was the defendant’s father, that the defendant was not there at the time, but that the defendant did reside there. Also attached to the plaintiff’s motion was an affidavit of a legal assistant in the plaintiff’s office, who averred that several court documents had been mailed to the defendant at 127 Sunset Farm Road during the course ofthe action, thatnopiece ofmail addressedto the defendant at 127 Sunset Farm Road had been returned as undeliv-erable, and that it was not until after judgment liens hadbeenfiledin 2012 ontwo ofthe defendant’sproperties that mail was returned as nondeliverable.
At the same time as he filed the motion to dismiss, the defendant also filed a motion to open the default judgment ‘‘on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over [the defendant] due to insufficiency ofservice ofprocess (Practice Book § 10-31 [a] [5]) for the reasons articulated in his motion to dismiss.’’ The court deniedthe motionto openbecause the defendant had not shown that a good defense existed at the time judgment was rendered. The defendant filed a motion for articulation, which the court granted. It explained that it had considered his motion as a standard motion to open brought pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212 (a) and Practice Book § 17-43 (a). Under the two-prong standard used in deciding such motions,1 the court foundthatthe defendant didnotmake anyinitial showing, underthe firstprong, that agood defense existedat the time thejudgmentwas rendered. It laterarticulated that, because the first prong was not satisfied, there
was no need to address the second prong of the test, that is, whether the defense had not been raised by
reason ofmistake, accident, or otherreasonable cause. The court denied the motion to dismiss, on the ground that the case would have to be opened before it could consider the motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.
I
As a preliminary matter, the plaintiff claims that the appeal is moot. It argues that an opening ofthe default judgment is a precondition to consideration of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, but the defendant appealed from only the denial ofhis motion to dismiss and did not appeal from the denial of his motion to open. The plaintiff contends that the court’s denial of the motion to open remains in effect and unchallenged, and, asaresult, nopracticalreliefcanbegrantedbythis court. The defendant argues that reliefcan be afforded because the judgment of default is void for want of personal jurisdiction and there is no need formally to open voidjudgments. He contends that his ‘‘mistake is not in neglecting to appeal the failure to open ajudgment that doesn’t exist, rather it was his improper procedural methodology at the trial level. In addition to the properly requested

. . . motion to dismiss, the defendant mistakenly simultaneously requested the courttoopenajudgmentthatdoesn’texist. Whatshould have been an innocuous error allowed the trial court to misconstrue and confuse the basis of his argument resulting in an erroneous decision.

. . . The issue is not whether the decision to deny the motion to open was proper, the issue is

. . . whether the motion to dismiss was properly denied.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
Because ‘‘[m]ootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for[it] to resolve

. . . ordinarily, we would be required to address that issue first, before considering the merits of [an] appeal. This is so because [i]t is a well-settled general rule that the existence ofan actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical reliefcan follow.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) ArgentMortgage Co., LLCv. Huertas, 288 Conn. 568, 575, 953 A.2d 868 (2008). In this case, however, as in Argent Mortgage Co., LLC, the issue of mootness is ‘‘inextricably intertwined’’; id.; with the issue raised by the defendant on appeal, namely, whetherthe trial court improperly denied his motionto dismiss despite his claimthatthe court lackedpersonal jurisdiction over him due to defective service of process— ‘‘[i]n otherwords, our determination ofwhether the defendant can be granted any practical relief depends on whether the trial court had personaljurisdiction overthe defendantwhen itrendered [its default judgment].’’ Id., 575–76.
In the circumstances ofthe present case, the motion to open and the motion to dismiss were, as in Argent Mortgage, Co., LLC, inextricably intertwined. The defendant stated in his motion to open that it should be granted ‘‘for reasons articulated in his motion to dismiss.’’ The motions asserted the same grounds and sought very similar relief. In order to avoid a mootness challenge, the defendantproperlyshouldhave appealed fromthedenialofthemotionto open. Butintheunusual circumstances of this case, where the two grounds of decision are by no means independent—and the court in fact denied the motion to dismiss ‘‘in view of [its] decision on [the motionto open’’—itwould doubtlessly exaltformoversubstanceto avoidconsideringthemerits ofthe appeal because the defendant appealed from the wrong ruling.
II
The defendant argues that the court erred in treating his motion to open as ‘‘a standard motion to [open]’’ and in analyzing his claim solely under § 52-212 (a) and Practice Book § 17-43 (a). He argues that he relied not
on § 52-212 (a) or Practice Book § 17-43 (a), but rather
on a common-law jurisdictional argument. We beginbynoting that ‘‘[t]o open ajudgmentpursuant to Practice Book § 17-43 (a) and General Statutes § 52-212 (a), the movant must make atwo part showing that (1) a good defense existed at the time an adverse judgment was rendered; and (2) the defense was not at that time raised by reason of mistake, accident or other reasonable cause.

. . . The party moving to open a defaultjudgment must not only allege, but also make
a showing sufficient to satisfy the two-pronged test [governing the opening ofdefaultjudgments].

. . . Thenegligence of a party or his counsel is insufficient for purposes of § 52-212 to set aside a default judgment.

. . . Finally, because the movant must satisfy both prongs of this analysis, failure to meet either prong is fatal to its motion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Nelsonv. The Contracting Group, LLC, 127 Conn. App. 45, 49, 14 A.3d 1009 (2011).
The court acknowledged in its articulation that the defendant had attempted to raise ajurisdictional argument, butstatedthatitnonetheless appliedthe straightforwardstandardexpressedin § 52-212 (a) andPractice Book § 17-43 (a). The defendant’s motion to dismiss, however, did raise a jurisdictional claim. See Grenier

v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 536, 51 A.3d 367 (2012) (interpretation of pleadings question of law requiring plenary review). ‘‘Although

. . . § 52-212 [opening ajudgment upon default]

. . . normally limit[s] the authority [of the trial court] to open judgments to a four month period, [this statute does] not preclude the opening of a default judgment that is rendered withoutjurisdiction over a defendant.

. . . As a matter of law, in the absence ofjurisdiction
over the parties, a judgment is void ab initio and is subject to both direct and collateral attack.

. . . A trial court’s authorityto open suchjudgments doesnot arise from

. . . § 52-212 (a) or Practice Book [§ 17-43] but from its inherent power to open ajudgment rendered without jurisdiction.

. . . In other words, a court always has the inherent authority to open a default judgment, irrespective of the four month rule and the valid defense and good cause requirement in Practice Book § 17-43 and General Statutes § 52-212 (a), if the judgment was rendered withoutjurisdiction ofthe parties or ofthe subject matter.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Devore Associates, LLC

v. Sorkin, 132 Conn. App. 244, 250–51, 31 A.3d 420 (2011). Accordingly, because the defendant’s motion to open raised a jurisdictional claim, the court erred in analyzing it solelyunder § 52-212 (a) and Practice Book § 17-43 (a).
III
The defendant argues that an evidentiary hearing regarding personal jurisdiction was required because he submitted an affidavit disputing the factual question ofwhetherservicewasmadeathisusualplaceofabode. The plaintiff argues that because the defendant raised the issue oflack ofpersonaljurisdiction postjudgment, he must make a preliminary showing that service of process was insufficient and that he has not waived such a claim or consented to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. The plaintiff contends that without such a preliminary requirement, a defendant who knows of
an action and/or judgment against him can delay the assertionofadefense ofpersonaljurisdiction‘‘foryears after the judgment’s entry to a time when it suits hispurpose [andthat] isintolerabletothejudicialprocess.’’ The plaintiff asserts that the defendant’s affidavit did not make such a preliminary showing because the defendant only averred that he did not reside at 127 Sunset Farm Road; he did not state that his parents resided at that address, where he resided at the time of service, and that he did not have actual knowledge of the proceedings or judgment. The plaintiff argues that, because the defendant presented no facts to contest effective service ofprocess, waiver or consent, an evidentiaryhearing onthe issue ofpersonaljurisdiction
was not warranted. ‘‘A motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded and invokes any record that accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that contain undisputed facts.

. . . see also Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 346–47, 766 A.2d 400 (2001) ([w]here

. . . the motion [to dismiss] is accompanied by supporting affidavits containingundisputedfacts, the courtmaylooktotheir content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations ofthe complaint)

. . . . When issues offact
are necessaryto the determination ofacourt’sjurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses.

. . . Put another way, the due process requirement of a hearing is required only when issues of facts are disputed.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weihing v. Dodsworth, 100 Conn. App. 29, 37–38, 917 A.2d 53 (2007).2
Inthe present case, there were disputedfacts regarding the defendant’s place of residence. The plaintiff submitted an affidavit from a marshal, who attested to hearsay evidence that the defendant resided at 127 Sunset Farm Road in West Hartford, and submitted an affidavit from a legal assistant stating that during the duration of the action several court documents had been sent to 127 Sunset Farm Road, and none had beenreturnedasundeliverable. Thedefendant, asnoted previously, averred that he did not live at 127 Sunset Farm Road. The affidavits present a factual dispute regarding the defendant’s place ofabode at the time of service. Accordingly, the case must be remanded for
an evidentiary hearing to comport with due process. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the otherjudges concurred.

1 ‘‘To open ajudgment pursuant to Practice Book § 17-43 (a) and General Statutes § 52-212 (a), the movant must make a two part showing that (1) a good defense existed at the time an adverse judgment was rendered; and (2) the defense was not at that time raised by reason of mistake, accident

or other reasonable cause.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nelson v. The Contracting Group, LLC, 127 Conn. App. 45, 49, 14 A.3d 1009 (2011).

2 We see no reason to set forth different evidentiary procedures by which to decide motions to dismiss filed in an open, pending case and motions to open filed later.