1 The trial court also entered an or der allowing plain tiff ’s m ot ion to voluntarily

dism iss count II o f pl

ai ntif f’ s compl ai nt agai nst Dr. Ahm

ed Elb orno without prejudi ce. We n ot e that t her e is no sher iff

's ce rt ifi cat ion in t he r eco rd which indicat es t hat Dr . E lbor no w as se rve d wit h a su m m on s a n d c om pl ai n t. Fou rth Di vi si on Septembe r 20, 2007

No. 1-05- 3953

KA THRYN LONG, ) Appe al fro m the ) Ci rcu i t Cou rt of Pl ai n ti f f -A pp el l an t, ) Co o k C o un t y.

) v. ) ) No. 04 L 13549 AHMED ELBOR

NO, Indi vi dually and as ) Agent of Ru sh Oa k P ar k Ho spit al, a nd ) Ru sh Oa k P ar k H o sp it al, I nd ivid ua lly, ) Ho no r ab le ) Abis hi C. Cu nnig ha m, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) Judge Presidin g. PR ESI DI NG JU STI CENEVI LL

E de l i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Pla int iff, Kat hryn Lo ng ( Lo ng) , filed a ne gligence act ion ag ainst t he defen dants, Dr. Ahm

ed Elbo rno (Dr . El

bor no) 1 and Rush

Oak Park H ospi t al (Ru sh). Rus h fil ed a mot ion t o d ismi ss t he
co mplaintpu

rsua n t to Su pr eme Cou

rt Ru l e 1 03( b) , an d the tri al cou rt gran ted the moti on b as ed

upon Long’s f ail ure to exerci se reasonab le dil ige nce i n serv in g Rush wi th her sum

mons and com pla in t. 177 I ll. 2d 10 3(b ). On

appe al, L ong p re se

n ts the fol lowi ng i ssues f

or review: (1) whether R

us h’ s m oti on to dis mi ss Long’ s c o mpla in t wa s u n ti mel y ; (2 ) w h eth er Ru sh wai v ed i ts r i gh t to f i l e a moti on to dismiss base d up on t he pr ovisio ns in Sup re me Co ur t Rule 1 03( b) (177 Il l . 2d 103 (b));(3) whether1-05-3953

- 2 -

Lo ng acted with reasona

ble di li gence i n serv in g Rush wi

th her compl

ai nt and sum

mo ns; and (4) whether t he t rial co ur t abus ed it s discr et ion whe n it granted R ush’s mot ion t o d ismi ss. Fo r t he
re as on s th

at f oll ow, we af f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e tr i al cou rt. BACK GROUND On Decem ber 3, 2004, Long fi

le d a two- coun t com

pl ai n t aga inst D r. Ahmed E lbor no a nd Rus h and alle ged that on Decemb er 3, 2002, t he def endan ts neglige ntly performe d a

v er teb rop l asty pro ce dureo n Lo ng . Ac co r din g t o t he t wo - yea rst at ut e o f limit at io ns f o rph ysic ian s o rho sp it als codi f i ed i n s ection 13- 212 of

the C ode of

Ci vi l Procedu re (Co de) , t he t ime for filing su ch a la ws uit
ex pi res two y ears af ter the c aus e of

action ac crues . 735 IL CS 5/1 3-212(We st 2004 ). Lo ng ap pe nd ed t o he rco mpla in t a se cti on 2-6 22(a)( 2) af f i dav i t. 735 IL CS 5/2 -622(a

)(2). (West 2004). In the aff

ida vi t, Bradley Lichtma n, Long’s atto rney, averred that he was un ab l e to o bt ain the phy

si ci an’s consul tation required b y

se ction 2 -62 2(a

)(1 ) b ec au se

(1) the sta tute of lim itat ions wo uld impair t he act ion, and (2) b eca use the c onsu

l tation could not b e obtai

ne d be f ore t he ex pi ra ti on of th e statu te of l i m i tations. 735 ILCS 5/2-62 2(a)(1 ),(a)(2) (We st 2004 ). On March 3, 20 05, Lon

g f i l ed an af f i da vi t an d the w ri tten rep ort f rom a p hy si ci an req ui red by se cti on 2
- 622(a)(1) of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-62 2(a)(1 ) (We st 2004 ). On March 30, 2005, Lich

tman f ai le d to appear for a case managemen t co nf erence, and the t rial

cour t dismi

ss ed the case f

or wa nt of p ros ec uti on. Ho weve r, t he t rial co ur t vaca t ed t he dismissal whe n Licht man fil ed a mot ion and expl ai ned that hi s f

ai lure to appearon

Mar ch 30 , 2 005 , o n behalf of Lo ng wa s du e t o a “do cke t ing error.” On

July 6, 2005, the sherif

f served Long’s compl

ain t and su mmons o n N eal Levi n, an1-05-3953

- 3 -

authorized

person to r ecei

ve serv ic e for Rush , at Rush' s hospi tal l ocated at 520 Sout h Mapl e, Oak Park, Ill in ois. On Au gust 10 , 2005, R

ush f i l ed i ts appe ara

nce a nd a dem and f or a j ury tria l
. On August 19, 2005, Rush f

il ed a m ot ion to dismi

ss an d ma in taine d that t he com

pla in t served o nt he ho sp it al d id

not have the af

fi davi t and heal th professi

onal ’s report fil

ed by Long on March 3, 2005, attached to i t , a nd t hat Lo ng failed t o e xer cise r eas ona ble diligence in o bt aining ser vice o n t he ho sp it al, t he r eb y vio lat ing Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 1 03 ( b)
. 17 7 I ll. 2d 1 03( b). At t he same tim e, Rush
serv ed subp oena s f

or deposi tions an d record s on f

i ve of L ong' s heal

th ca re prov i ders
. On Oc t o ber 11 , 2 00 5, Lo ng file d he r r es po nse and at t ac hed t he a ffida vit o f h er att orney (Li ch tma n). Li ch tma n a verred that he

pers onal l y f i l ed th e com

plai nt on D ecem

ber 3, 2 004, and al thoughhe ackn

owledged that he di

d not personall

y pl ace the sum

mons and com pla in t for servi ce, he bel ie ved that the support st aff at his fi rm, Evi ns & Sklare, would have the sher iff ser ve t he defend ant s. L ichtman fu rt her aver re d t hat , w hile examini ng Lo ng’s c ase fil

e o n Mar ch 3, 200 5, he noti ce d that the sum

mons an d c om pl ai nt h ad not been ser ved a nd, upo n making t his disco ver y, he
once agai n di rected t he Evi

ns &Skl ar e s up po rt st aff t o ha ve t he she r iff se rve t he de fen da nt s in Lo ng's cas e. Lichtma

n averred that bet wee n Mar ch 3, 200 5, and J une 1 5, 200 5, he dir ect ed t he E vins & Sk lar e s up po rt st aff

to ob tai n se rvi ce on th e def en da n ts on m ul ti ple oc ca si ons ; h owe ve r, he di d n ot
r ec all the specifi

c dates that such di

rections were m

ade. Li ch tman f urth er a ve rre d that i t wa s n ot un t il June 15 , 20 05 , t ha t E vins & S kla r e’ s c ler k h ad t he cle rk o f t he cir cu it co ur t fil e st amp t he summons and, on J une 17, 2005, t he sum mons and the com

pla in t were deli

vered t o t he C o o k C o unt y she riff to be serv

ed on the def

endan ts. Lich tman a verred that, although serv ic e of proce ss matters we re han dle d by the fi rm’s support staff, serv i ce m atte rs w er e o ver see n by the a t t or ney assigne d t o t he1-05-3953

- 4 -

case. Fi nal ly , Lic htman averred that f rom D ecem

ber 3, 200 4, un

til Jun e 17, 2 005, the f

ail ure to pla ce t he sum mons and com pla in t with the sh

erif f f or service on defen dants was i

nadvertent an d no t i nten tion al
. On Oc to be r 17, 20 05, R

ush f il ed a repl y i n f urther support of i

ts motion to dism

is s. On Novem ber 7, 200 5, aft er hear ingthe arguments of the part ies, the tri al cou rt gran ted Ru sh ’s moti on to dis mi ss wi th prejudi ce. The trial

court ’s order als o stat ed that “pur sua nt t o Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 304(a ), t his ma t t er is fina l an d a pp ea lab le a s t he r e is no jus t rea son for delay in g enf orcemen t o r appeal or both.” See 2 10 Il

l . 2d R. 3 04(a). AN AL YSIS Standard of Revi

ew In this case, the trial

court dis mi ssed Long’ s compl

ai nt pursuan t t o Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 103(b). 177 Ill. 2d 103 (b) . An appella te court applie s an ab

use of discretion standard of review when
re viewing a

t rial co ur t ’s o rd er dismissing a com plai nt purs uan t to Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 103 (b). Segal
v. Sacco , 136 Ill . 2d 282, 286 (1990). Accordin gly , we must deter mi

ne wh et her the t ri al

court abused its di scretion wh

en i t entered the or der that gran t ed Ru sh’ s mo t ion t o d ismi ss Lo ng's
com plai nt. Segal , 136 Il

l . 2d at 28 6. I.

Tim eli ness Fi rs t, we a ddr ess L ong ’s ar gument t hat t he trial court abused

its di scretion wh

en i t permi tt ed Rush to fi le its m ot ion to dismi

ss on Augus

t 19, 2005. Long reli

es upon two supreme court rules in supp ort of her posi

tion . Supreme Court

Ru le 1 01 ( d) pr o vid es t ha t a d efe nd an t is r eq uir ed t o file an1-05-3953

- 5 -

answer or o therwis e appear

wit hin 30 d ays aft er being se rve d wit h a su mmons and compl ai nt. 166 I ll. 2d R. 10 1( d)
. Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 181 (a ) p ro vides t hat a pa rt y may app ear by

f i l i ng a m oti on wit hin the 30 day

per iod of b eing s erved wi th a s um mons a nd c omp l ai

nt. 210 Il l .2d R. 1 81(a). Acco rd ingto Long, Rush fi led i ts a ppearance on A

ugu st 1 0, 2 005 , an

d i ts m oti on to d

i sm i ss on August 19, 2005, and they were both untim

el y, an d therefore, the trial

court abused i

ts discret io n wh en i t fa i l ed to f i nd th at Rush’ s m

otion to dis m i ss was u nti mel y . In the motion to dism

iss, Rush maintains t hat Lo ng’s a ffi davit and he al

th prof ess i onal ’sreport were n ot att ach ed

to t he complai

nt when the hospital was served on Jul y 6, 2005. In Long’s respo nse to the moti on to d

i sm i ss , sh e doesnot addre ss Ru sh 's arg um en t or tak e the p osi ti on t hat t he co mplaint served on R ush includ ed a n affidavit and he alth p rofe ssi onal ’sreport. Our re

vi ew of the re cord reveal ed th at a ttach ed to L ong’ s res

ponse to th e m oti on to dis mi ss wasLong’s M arch 3, 2005, notice of fi li ng, wi th an af f i dav i t and a heal th prof ess i onal ’sreport app ended to the noti ce. How ev er, t he record rev eal ed tha t no c erti f i ca te of servi cewa s a

ttac he d to the n

oti ceof fi li ng indi cat ing that Lo ng’s aff ida vi t and heal th professi

onal ’s report were served on Rush. Beca

use Long f

ai le d to addre ss

or denyRu sh’ s c o nt en t io n t ha t Lo ng ’s affid av it and health pro fessional’s repor t weren ot ap

pen de d to t he summons and c omp laint t hat Rush r ece ived fro m the s her iff , a nd bec aus e t he no t ice wit h t he affid av it an d r ep o r t ap pe nd ed t o it did no t co nt ain a c er t ifica t e o f se rvic e in dic at ing t ha t t he affid av it and reportwere served

on Ru sh, w e c on cl

ude th at R ush di d n ot re ce i v e L ong’ s af

f i da v i t an d h ea l th pro fessional’s r ep o r t wh en t he ho sp it al w as se rve d w it h Lo ng ’s co mpla in t o r wh en Lo ng filed t he noti ce wi th the clerk of the c i rcui t court. In o rd er t o de t er mine if Rus h' s an swe r and m ot ion to dismi

ss were fi led tim ely , we must1-05-3953

- 6 -

review Supreme Court

Rul es 101(d) and 181(a) and section 2-622 of the Code of Ci vi l Procedure. Supreme Court Rule 101(d) pro vides, in pertinen t par t, as foll

ows: “[ T] he sum

mons shal l requi re each def

endan t t o file hi s an swe r o r ot herwise fi le hi s appearanc e wi

thin 30 day s af

ter se rvic e. ” 1 66 I ll. 2d 101(d ). Supreme Court Rule 181(a) pro vides, in pertinen t par t, as foll

ows: “The defend ant may make his o r he r appe ara nc e b y f i l i ng a m oti on wit hin th e 30-day pe

riod, in whi ch i nstance a n answer or another appr opri ate

mo t io n sh all be filed wit hin t he t ime t he co ur t dir ec t s in t he order dispo sing o f t he mo t io n. I f t he de fen da nt 's a pp ea r an ce is
ma d e in some other m

ann er, neverthel

ess h is or her answer

o r appr opri ate

mot ion sha ll be

fi le d on o r be for e t he last day o n which he or sh e was

requi red to appe ar.” 21 0 Il

l . 2d R. 1 81(a). Secti on 2-622(a)(2) of

the Code of

Ci vi l Procedure provi

des, i n perti nen t part, as fol

l ows: “The a defen dant shal l b e excu se d f

rom a nsweri ng or otherwise pleading un t il 3 0 d ays after being served with the certificate required byparagraph 1. ” (Emphasi s added.) 735 ILCS 5/2- 622(a)( 2) (West 2004)
. The certif ic ate required by

section 2-622(a)(1) is

an af fi davi t by the pl

ai ntif f contai ni ng a written report from

a heal th professi

onal who reviewed the f

acts of the case an

d hasi ndi cated th at there is
a m eri torious caus e f or fi l i ng th e ac tion . 735 IL CS 5/2 -622(a )(1) (W est 200 4).1-05-3953

- 7 -

Lo ng maint ain s t ha t Su pr eme Cou rt R ul es 10 1( d) an d 1 81 (a) a rei n di re ct c on f l i ct wi th se cti on 2-622 (a )( 2) of t he Co de. We disag re e. We find no co nflic t be t we en Su pr eme Court Rul es 101(d) and 181(a) and secti on 2-622(a)(2) o f the C ode. 166 Ill . 2d 101(d); 210 Ill . 2d R. 181(a); 735 ILCS 5/2-622(a)(2) (We st 2004 ). Both Su prem e Court Rules 101 (d ) a nd 18 1( a) give a d ef en da nt 30 da ys to answer or otherwise pl ead ( file a m ot ion) af ter bein g served wi

th a sum mons and com pla in t. 166 I ll. 2d 101 (d); 210 Il

l . 2d R. 1 81(a);735 IL CS 5/2 -622(a )(2) ( West 2004). Section 2-622(a)(2) provides that the 30- da y pe riod do es no t co mmence unt il the d efenda nt is ser ved w ith an a ffi davit and a reviewing heal

th pr ofessional’sreport. 735 ILCS 5/2-622(a)(2) (West 2004). I f the pl ai ntif f h as be en un ab le t o o bt ain a wr itt en r epo rt and files an a ffi davit pur sua nt to section 2-622(a)(1), which Lo ng did i

n thi s case, se cti

on 2 -62 2(a

)(2 ) toll s th

e 3 0-day l i m i tati ons pe riod to a

ns wer or ot herwise ple ad pr es cr ibe d b y Su pr eme Cou rt R ul es 10 1( d) an

d R ul e1 81 (a) u n ti l th e def en da n t i s s er v ed wi th
an aff ida vi t and report . 735 ILCS 5/2-622(a)(2) ( West 2004). We f in d that Supreme Court Rules 101(d) and 181(a) do not co nf li ct with section 2-622(a)(2) of t he Code b ec au se the l i m i tations pe riod in the rules simp ly do es no t co mmenc e u nt il t he de fen da nt is served wi th an af fi davi t and report as required by section 2-622(a)(2) of the Code . 735 IL CS 5/2 -622(a )(2) (W est 200 4). Ac co r di ng ly,
we fi nd Long’s argument that t here is a co nfli ct bet wee n Su pr eme Co ur t Rules 101 (d ) a nd181 (a ) a nd
se cti on 2-622( a)(2) of the Code d evoid of m erit because t he 30 -d ay lim itat ions pe r io d in Su pr eme CourtRules 1 01( d) and 181(a) does not comme nce, pursuan

t t o section 2-622(a)(2) of the Code,
un t il the de fendant rece ives the plai ntiff ’s aff idavi t and healt h pro fessional’s report. See 166 Ill . 2d 101(d ); 21 0 Ill . 2d R. 1 81(a). In t he ev en t se ct io n 2
- 62 2( a) ( 2) did no t t o ll the 30-day l

im itations period codif

ie d in Rul es1-05-3953

- 8 -

101(d) and 181(a), we would st ill re ach th e s am e res ul t re ga rdi n g th e f i l i n g of Ru sh ’s moti on to dism iss. Th e tri

al cou rt h asdi screti

on to a l l ow a tard y f i l i ng of a m oti on to dis m i ss. In r e M. K. , 284 I ll. App. 3d 449, 455 (199 6). We fi nd that t here was no abuse of dis cr et io n be ca us e R us h d id n o t file
a tardy appe aran ce or m otion to dis m i ss. Accordin

gly , because the l

im itations period i n Rul es 101(d) and 181 (a ) d oe s no t co mmence unt il the d efenda nt is ser ved w ith a co py of t he af f i da v i t an d r ep ort, whi ch Rush did no t re ceive in t his case , a nd bec aus e t he appearance an d motion to dism

is s were f il ed t imel y, the

tri al cou rt di d n ot abuse i ts di scre tion wh en i t gran ted Rus h’ s m otion to dis m i ss. In re M.K ., 284 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 455. II.

Wai ver Ne xt, Long

argue s tha

t Rush wai ve d i ts right to obj ect to Long ’sf ail ure to ex er cis e r ea so na ble di lig en ce in s er vin g h er co mp lain t by it s a ct ive pa r t icip at io n indi sc o ve ry. Long argues that Rush’s ef f ortsto obtain h

er medi cal records thro ugh the i ssuan ce of sub poenas on Augus

t 19, 2005,
am oun ted to acti v e p ar ti ci pa ti on i n i ts d ef ense ag ai n st Long’ s c as e th

at w as suf f i ci en t to co n sti

tute
a wai ver of a ny obj ection pur sua

nt to Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 103 (b). Rus h re spo nds t hat t her e wa s no waiver beca use it d id no t par t icipat e in defend ing ag ai n st th e l i ti ga ti on on i ts meri ts b ef oref i l i n g i ts
m otion to dis m i ss p ursuan t to Rule 103(b). Ge ne r ally, a pa

rty m us t i nterpo se a timel

y obj ection to hi s oppo nent's f ail ure t o exercise
r ea so na ble dil

igen ce in servin g a summ

ons and complai

nt before defendi

ng a suit on its m

erits. Krey kes E lec t r ic I nc . v. Ma lk & Ha rr is , 297 Il l . Ap p. 3d 93 6, 944 ( 1998)
. A

de f en da nt' s p arti ci pa ti on i n th e def ense of h i s c as e m

ay con sti tutea wai ver of a Rul e 103 (b) ob

j ection. Canno n v. D ini , 2261-05-3953

- 9 -

I ll. App. 3d 82, 85 (1992), citin g Lovel l v . Hastings ,11 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 22 1, 223 ( 1973)
. Howev er, t he wai ver ru le in Lo ve ll

onl y appl i eswhere i t i s ob vi oustha t the de f en da nt' s p arti ci pa ti on a nd uti l iza ti on of av aila ble pr et r ial d isc o ve ry p roced ures w ere i n a ntici pation of a def en se on the m eri ts. Daily v. Hartley, 77 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 69 7, 704 ( 1979)
. We rej ec t Lon

g’ s w ai ve r ar gum en t be ca us e L ong has p res en

ted no a uthor i ty f

or t he prop osi ti on that a party that issues

subpoenas

to obtain m

edi cal records on the sam

e day that it fi le s a mo t ion to di smiss has w aived it s Ru le 103 (b) objec t ion bec aus e it is a ct ively part icipat ing in the defense of the a ct ion o n t he merit s. Alt hou gh t he wa iver r ule wa s discu ssed in Krey kes , Ca nn on , Lo ve ll and Da ily , t his c o ur t o nly su st ain ed a R ule 10 3( b) wa ive ro bje ct io n in Lo ve ll
. Lo ve ll , 11 I ll. Ap p. 3d a t 223. In Lo ve ll , f

i ve month s af ter s erv i ceof t he co mplaint and summons , t he de fendant answered int er r o ga t o r ies , wa s d ep o se d b y t he pl ain t iff's at t o rne y, an d took the di sc ove ry depos i ti on of the p l ai ntif f s. Lo ve ll , 11 I ll. A

pp . 3d at 2 23 . Tw o da

y s af ter th e dep osi

ti on , the def

en da n t f i l ed i ts
m oti on to di sm i ss f orf ail ure to ex ercise d

ue di l i gen ce i n obtai ni ng s ervi ce of

proces s. Lo ve ll , 11 I ll. App. 3d at 223. We note that 43 days (from Jul y 6, 2005 (sum

mons and com pl ai nt se rv ed ) , un t il August 19 , 20 05 (m

oti on to dism i ss f i l ed )) af ter b ei n g s er v ed wi th th e s um mon s a n d c om pl ai n t, Rush si m ul tan eou sl y f i l ed i ts motion to dism

is s and s ubpoenas for Long's

me dic al records. We fi

nd that t he Lo we ll

defendan t's acts o f answering i

nterro gato ries, of

submitt ing t o a dep os itio n, a nd t aking
a de pos i ti on i n di ca te acti v e p ar ti ci pa ti on i n th e def ense of th e acti on on th e meri

ts, and t he aforem entione d acts aredis

tingui shab le from Rush’ s act in

the presen

t case, wher e i

t issued subpoenas

for Long's

me dic al records. Accordingl

y, we ho ld tha t Ru sh ’s i ss ua nc e of su bp oen ason t he sam e day that i t fi l ed i ts Supre me Court Ru l e 1 03 (b ) m

oti on to dismiss do es no t co nst itu t e ac t ive1-05-3953

2 While we ar e mind ful o f t he fac t t ha t Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 1 03 ( b) ha s be en ame nd ed , it would not chan

ge the resul

t in this case. See Of

fi ci al Reports Advance

Sheet No. 13, ( June 20, 20 07 ) R. 10 3( b) , eff. Ju ly 1, 20 07 ( "I f t he pla int iff fails t o ex er cis e r ea so na ble dilig en ce t o o bt ain servi ce on a def

endan t prior to the expi

ration of the appl

ic abl e statut e of l

im itations , the action as t o t ha t de fen da nt may be dis miss ed wit ho ut pr eju dic e. I f t he failu r e t o ex er cis e r ea so na ble di l i ge nc e to obtai

n s erv i ceon a de f en da nt oc cu rs af ter th e e xp i rati on of the appl i ca bl e s tatute of - 10 - pa rtici pa ti on in the d efense of t he action on the m erits suf fi ci ent to justif

y a wai ver of it s Ru le 103 (b) obj ection. Ca

nn on , 22 6 Ill. App. 3d at 85; Da ily , 77 Ill . App. 3d at 704. III. Su pr eme Co ur t Rule 1 03( b) Lo ng al so argues tha

t i t wa s a n a bu se of di screti on for the trial

court to fi

nd that she f

ai le d to exercise

re aso nable diligence in obt aining ser vice o f her su mmons and compl ai nt on Rush wh

en it gran ted Rus h’ s m otion to dis m i ss p ursuan t to Suprem

e Court Ru le 1 03 ( b)
. 13 4 I ll. 2d R. 1 03(b ). Su pr eme Cou

rt Ru l e 1 03( b)prov i de s f ordis miss als fo rfailing t o ex er cis e r ea so na ble dil ige nce wh en se rv i n g a de f en da n t wi th a s um mon s a n d c om pl ai n t: “If t he plai ntif f f ails to exercise

r ea so na ble dilig en ce t o o bt ain servi ce pr ior t o t he exp irat ion o f the ap plic ab le stat ute o f l im itations, t he ac ti on

as a w h ol e or as to an y unse rved de f en da n t may be dis mi ssed wi t ho ut pr eju dic e. I f t he failu r e t o ex er cis e r ea so na ble dil ige ncet o o bt ain se rvic e o cc ur s a ft er t he ex pir at io n o f t he ap plic ab le sta tute o f li mitat ions , the dism

is sal shal l b e wi th prejudi ce. In ei ther
case t he dismissal may be made o n t he ap plicat ion o f any defend ant or on the court's own m otion .” 134Il l . 2d R. 1 03(b ). 21-05-3953

lim itat ions, t he dismissal shall be wit h pr ejudice as t o t hat defend ant only and s hall not bar any cl ai m ag ai n st a n y oth er pa rty b as ed on v i ca rious l i ab i l i ty f or th at d i sm i ss ed de f en da n t' s c on du ct. The di sm i ssa l may be made on the a ppl i cation of an y party or on the court's own m otion . In co nsider ing t he exe rc ise o f rea so nable diligence , t he co ur t shall review t he t ot ality o f the cir cu mst an ce s, inc lud ing bo t h la ck o f r ea so na ble dilig en ce in a ny p r ev io us ca se vo lun t ar ily dis miss ed o rdis miss ed fo rwa nt o f pr o se cu t io n, an d t he ex er cis e o f r ea so na ble dilig en ce in obtai ni ng s ervi ce i

n a ny cas e ref i l ed un der s ection 13- 217 of

the C ode of

Ci vi l Procedu re"). - 11 - In Krey kes , 297 Ill . App. 3d at 94 0, t his c o ur t dis cu ss ed Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 103 (b) and t he tria l court’s broad di scre tion i n ru l i ng on a m otion to dis m i ss b rough t pursua nt to Rul e 103 (b): “We note t hat 'the rules o f our s upr

em e c ourt a

re n ot as pir at io na l. "They

have the force of l

aw, and the presumption must be that t hey

wil l b e obey ed and en forced as wri

tt en.”" Billerbeck v. Caterpil la rTractor C o. , 29 2 I ll. App. 3d 3 50, 353 *** (1 997 ), quo t ing Brig ht v. Dicke , 166 Il

l . 2d 204 , 210 (1 995). As a rul e, the trial court hasbroaddis cret ion i

n granti ng or deny

in g a m ot ion b rought under Ru le 103(b) ( Mar ks v. Rue ben H. Do nnelley, Inc
. , 26 0 I ll. App. 3d 1042, 1047 *** (1994)), and this c ourt wil l n ot dis turb the trial

co ur t 's
ru ling absen t an abuse of

that bro ad d iscre t ion ( St ash v. Do ll , 22 3 I ll. App. 3d 66 2, 66 3 * ** ( 19 92 ) )
. T he rule ‘" ha s a n e ss en t ial p ur po se in pr omo t ingthe expedi

tious han dli ng of s uits b y gi vi ng trial court s wide di screti on t o d ismi ss whe n ser vice is no t effect ed w ith r eas ona ble dil ige nce.”' Segal

v. Sacco , 136 Il

l . 2d 282 , 285-8 6 (199 0) (Ry an , J., dis senti ng), quoting Karp iel v. La S alle Nat ional Ba nk , 11 9 I ll. App.1-05-3953

- 12 - 2d 157, 161 *** (1970). Furt herm ore, Rule 103(b) i s not roo ted in a subjec t ivet est of t he plaint iff 's inte nt bu t, ra

th er , u po n an o bject ive
eval ua ti on of r eas ona ble diligence in o bt ain in g service of process. Marks , 2 60 Ill . App. 3d at 1047***, citin g Parker v. Uni

versal Pac kag ingCorp. , 2 00 I ll. App. 3d 8 82, 886 *** (1 990 ). We also n ote that t he bu r de n r es t s w it h t he pla int iff t o de mo nst r at e r ea so na ble dil ige ncein eff ectuating serv

ic e, and that the defen

dant is not required to es t ab lish t ha t it was prej udiced b y pl ai ntif f 's del ay . Bill erbeck , 292 I ll. App. 3d at352 *** ; Tisc her v. Jordan , 269 Ill . App. 3d 301, 307 ***(199 5);***." Krey

kes , 297 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 940. In the prese

nt ca se, L ong cites Seg al v. Sacco , 13 6 I l l . 2d

28 2 ( 19 90 ) i

n su pp ort of i ts arg um en t tha t i t exerc i se d re as ona

bl e di l i ge nc e i

n e f f ec tua ti ng servi ceon

Rus h. The

supr em e court in Segal iden tifi ed the following seven

factors a court mus

t consider wh en deter m i n i n g w h eth er to gr ant a Ru le 103 (b) mot ion: "(1) the l en gth of tim e used to o btain

servi ce of process; (2) the acti

vi ties of plai ntif f; (3) plai ntif f' s kno wledg e o f defend ant 's loc at ion; ( 4) t he ea se w ith w hich defend ant 's wh erea b outs co uld ha ve be en as ce r t ain ed; (5) ac tua l kn owl edgeon th

e p art of the de f en da nt of pe nd en cy of the action***; (6) specia l c ircum stances wh

ic h would a ff ect pla in tif f' s ef forts; and (7) actual service on def

endant." Segal , 136 Ill . 2d at 287. Based upon o ur review of Ill

in ois cases, the fi

rst Segal f ac to r to determ

i ne the exerc i se of
r ea so na ble dil i gen

ce -- the l ength of tim e us ed to obtai

n s ervi ce of

proces s -- f

avors Ru sh . We n

ote that the alle ged

i nj ury occurred o n Decem

ber 3, 2002; the com

pla in t was fi le d on Decem

ber 3, 2004;1-05-3953

- 13 -

and the sum

mons and com pla in t were served on Jul

y 6, 2005, seven

months after the ex pi rati on of t he statute of

l i m i tations. A

t ime per iod exce eding s even mo nt hs bet wee n t he fili ng o f the co mplaint
on Dec ember 3 , 2 004 , a nd se rvice o f the co mplaintan d sum mons on July 6, 200 5, sup po rt s a finding of a l ack of reasonab le

dil ige nce b y Long. See Tisc

her v. Jordan , 269 Ill . App. 3d 301, 30 8(199 5), citing Schusterm

an v . Nort hwestern Me dic al Facu lty Fo unda t ion , 195 Il l . Ap p. 3d 63 2, 639 ( 1990)
. The second Segal

fact or , t he ac t ivities o f the pla int iff, als o fails t o su pp o r t Lo ng ’s cla im o f r ea so na ble dil ige nce. Long argues t hat , a fte r filing the c omp laint o n Dec ember 3 , 2 004 , bu t befo re effect uat ing servi ce, she was

act ive ly se ek in g to obtain the heal th professi

onal ’s report required by

section 2- 622(a)(1) of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2 -622(a) (2) (West 200 4) . Lo ng’s d iff icult y and delay in obt aining
a se ct io n 2
- 62 2( a) ( 1) r ep o r t did not excuse he r from h er dut y to effect uat e se rvice o n Rus h aft er fil ing the c omp l ai

nt on D ecem

ber 3, 200 4. Le

wi s v . Di l l on , 352 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 51 2, 519 ( 2004)
. Lo ng ac kno wledg es t hat aft er t he co mplaint w as filed o n Dec ember 3 , 2 004 , Licht man and t he Evi ns & Sk l are s upport st aff fail ed t o ha ve t he su mmons issue d by t he cler k o f the ci rcui t court un t il June 15, 2005, a period exceeding si x m onths. Lo ng also ack now ledge s t hat t he de lay in i ssu ing t he su mmo ns r es ult ed in

the su m mons an d c om pl ai nt n ot be i ng pl ac ed wi th th e she ri f f f orse rvic e u nt il June 17, 2005. Long argue s that t his de lay w as ina dv er t en t an d n o t int en t io na l. Ho we ve r , de lay,
ev en when in advertent and un

in tentional , provides n

o support for Long’s posi tion bec ause t h e r ea so na ble dil i gen

ce re qui rem en t in Supreme Court

Rule 1 03( b) is no t base d up on a subj ective test of plai ntif f' s i ntent but ratherupon t he objectiv e test of reasonab le

dil ige nce i n ef fectuatin g servi ce. Tisc her , 26 9 Ill. App. 3d at 307 ; Le wis , 352 Ill . App. 3d at 518. Licht man, o n be ha lf

of Long, had a

nondel egabl e duty to deli

ver t he s ummo ns t o t he s her iff1-05-3953

- 14 -

and to en su reth at a prom pt and proper r

eturn wasmade. Kole

v. Brubaker , 325 Ill . App. 3d 944, 953 (2001). The absen

ce of an y c redib le expl anati on regardin

g eff ort s m ade t o o bt ain ser vice du ring t his per iod sup po rt s t he t rial co ur t ’s findingthat t here was a la ck of di li gence i n ef fectuatin g servi ce. See Ko le , 325 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 951. Our revi ewof

th e rec ord , i

n cl udi n g a ttorn ey Li ch tm an ’s af f i da v i t,
r ev ea ls that Long’s activ

ities between

Decem ber 3, 2004, and Jun

e 15, 2005, suppo rt the t rial court ’s finding tha t Lo ng wa s no t re aso nably dili gent in effect uat ing ser vice o n Rus h. The thi rd Segal f ac tor f orde t er mining if

t her e has been r eas ona ble diligence in effect uat ing
ser vice is Lo ng’s k now ledge of Ru sh’s lo cat ion. Segal , 136 Ill. 2d at 287 . T he fo ur t h Segal f ac tor f ordeter mi

ni ng reasonable di

li gence is the ease with wh

ic h Rush ’s wh

ereabouts could be a scertain ed. Segal , 13 6 I ll. 2d a t 287 . We not e t hat t he she riff's cer t ifi cat e indicat es t hat Rus h was ser ved o n t he sher iff 's first at t empt t o s er ve t he su mmons and co mplaint . However , we need not address t hese f actors beca use Lo ng has co nced ed in he r br i ef th at R ush h as pr ev ai l ed as to th e th i rd an d f our th factors of the Segal

test. The fif t h Segal fac t o rfo rde t er mining if t he r e h as be en r ea so na ble dilig en ce in effect uat ing servi ce is whet her t he def

endan t had actual knowl edge

of the pen

di ng a cti on. Long argues that Ru sh knew of the pe nd i ng ac ti on prior to service b ecause, on Augus t 19, 2005, Rush h

ad subpoenas

is sued f orthe records of fi

ve of Long’s heal

th care providers. Rus

h respo nd s t ha t it did no t learn o f the pend ingact ion u nt il i

t was ser ved w ith the c om pl ai n t, w h i ch di d n ot h av e th e af f i da v i t an d h ea l th pro fessional’s report appended to it as requi redby section 2-622(a)(1) of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2- 622(a)(1) (West 2004). Rush ex pla in s, however, that after bei

ng served o n Ju ly 6, 200 5, wit h t he
com pl ai n t, without the required af f i dav i t a nd he al

th professi

onal ’s report appended, the hospital1-05-3953

- 15 -

exam in ed the c i rcui t court file a nd o bt ain ed a c o py o f Lo ng ’s se ct io n 2
- 62 2( a) ( 1) affid av it an d r ep ort, which Long fi

led on March 3, 2005, and which i dentif ied Long’s h

ealth care providers. Long’s argumen

t t hat Rush kn

ew of the pen

din g action prior t o servi ce becaus e Rush i ssued subpoenas

f or th e re cords of

f i v e of Lon g’ s h ea l th ca repr ov i dersi s n

ot s uppor ted b y an y f ac ts in the record. Th

e heal th ca re prov i ders whose records Ru sh s o ug ht t o su bp o en a w er e e ac h id en t ified in t he heal th professi

onal ’s report t hat was f

il ed by Long on March 3, 20 05 with the circui t co urt . Rush
co uld have ex am

i ne d the courtfi le and obta ined Long’s 2-6 22(a )(1 ) affi davit and health pro fessional’s reportto obtain the

ide ntities of Long’ s heal

th care providers i

n order to comm

ence dis co ve ry. Moreov er, even

if Rush h ad not ice o f the pend ing act ion p rio r t o be ingserved, we f in d that t hi s f

act alone f ai l s to o vercome Long’s s even -month del

ay in eff ectuating serv

ic e. We f in d that Long has f ail ed to pres en

t facts wh i ch estab l i sh that Ru sh

had actua

l knowl edge

of the pen

di ng a cti on. The sixth Segal

fact or for det er mini

ng wh eth er th ere h as b een re as on ab l e d

i l i gen ce to ef f ec tua te ser vice is t he exist ence of a ny spec ial circumst ance s affect ing t he plai ntif f ’sef f orts. Segal , 136 Ill . 2d at 287. Lo ng arguesthat t he sole special ci rcumstance i

n th i s c as e is th

at h er f ai l ur e to pla ce the compl

ai nt for servi

ce for over a si

x-m onth period af

ter hav in g fi le d it wasinadver t ent and not i nten tion al . Supreme Court

Rul e 1 03(

b)i s n ot b as ed up on a s ub j ec ti v e te st o f pl ai n ti f f ' s i n ten t, b ut, r at he r , up o n t he o bje ct ive t es t o f r ea so na ble dilig en ce in eff ectuating serv

ic e. Canno n v. D ini , 226 I ll. App. 3d a t 85. The re for e, we p lace minim al weight on w het her Lo ng intend ed t o d elay ser ving Ru sh, but, i

n ste ad , look to Lo ng ’s effo r t s t o ex er cis e r ea so na ble dilig en ce in dec iding whet her any special ci rcumstance s miti gat e aga i nst her d elay i n e f f ectuati ng s ervi ce. Le wis , 352 Ill . App. 3d at 516. The weight t o be given t o a “spe cial circu msta nce” in relat ion to the other s ix Segal f actors1-05-3953

- 16 -

whi ch mus t be considered depends upon the parti cul ar f acts i n e ach cas e. Marks v. Rueb en H. Donnel le y, In c. , 260 Il l . Ap p. 3d 10 42, 104 9 (199 4). Lo ng fai ls to present any

authority to support her argum ent that ina

dvertent de la y in effect uat ingservi

ce by her atto rney

or her att orney’ s support st aff is a special circu msta nce s ufficient to outweigh th

e other Segal

fac t o r s T he t r ial c o ur t ’s pr ev io us dis miss al o f thi s cas e on March 30, 2006 , f or wa nt of pros ecution i

s a ci rcu m sta nc e that f urth er e sta bl i sh esLon g’ s l ac k of rea son abl e dil ige nce. Th ere f

ore, wef i nd tha t no s pe ci al ci rcu m sta nc esex i ste d that a f

f ec ted Lon g ’s ef f ortsto tim el y serv e Rus h. Le wis , 352 Il

l . Ap p.3d a t 518. The seve nt h Segal

factor for deter mi

ni ng whether there has been reaso nab le di l i gen ce to ef f ec tua te serv i ce is wh ethe r Rush w as a

ctual l y serv ed. Segal , 13 6 I ll. 2d a t 287 . We have found that Rush was serve d with the c omplai nt, but wa s n

ot s er v ed wi th an affidavit and t he hea lth p ro fessio nal's
repor t. Af ter t he com

pla in t was place d

wit h the sh

erif f f or serv i ce on Jun e 17, 2 005, the rec ord in dic ates that N eal Lev

in, a perso n authorized to receive se rvice f or Rush , was served on J uly 6, 2005, at Rush hospi

tal, approxi

ma tely three weeks af

ter the com pl ai nt waspl ac ed f orser vice. The sheriff ’s certificate indicates t hat Rush was served on the first atte m pt. W e f i nd tha t servi ceon

Rush
was not di ffic ult t o o bt ain beca use Lo ng plac ed t he su mmons and co mplaint fo r se rvice w ith t he she riff o n Ju ne 1 7, 20 05 , a nd, Ru sh w as su cc es sfu lly ser ved by t he s her iff o n t he fir st a

ttem pt. The ref ore, we f i nd th at thi s f actor also f

avors Rus h.

CONCLUSION In concl usi on, we hol

d tha t the tri al courtdid not abuse its discret ion when i t g rant ed Rush’s1-05-3953

- 17 -

m oti on to dis mi ss Long’ s compl

ai nt because

Long f ai le d to exerci se reasonab le dil ige nce in obt aining servi ce on Rush . Accordin

gly , the decis ion of

the trial court is aff irm ed. Af fi rmed. CA MPB ELL , J., an

d QUIN N, J., c oncu

r.