NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MELISSA T., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, P.T., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0352 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300JD201800046

The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Robert D. Rosanelli

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Autumn Spritzer

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 2-5-2019
MELISSA T. v. DCS, P.T.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Melissa T. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to P.T. (Child), arguing she was deprived of 

due process when the court proceeded in her absence after she failed to 

appear at a pretrial conference. We find no due process violation and 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In June 2018, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) removed 

one-month-old Child from Mother’s care after receiving a report that 

Mother and Child’s father (Father) were using methamphetamine and 

engaging in domestic violence in Child’s presence.

1 DCS immediately filed 

two petitions: the first alleged Child was dependent as to Mother, and the 

second requested Mother’s parental rights be terminated upon the grounds 

of neglect, substance abuse, domestic violence, and a prior termination in 

the preceding two years for the same cause.

2 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) 

§ 8-533(B)(2), (3), (10).

3 The juvenile court scheduled a pretrial conference 

for August 2018. Mother received, signed, and returned the Form 3: Notice 

to Parent in a Termination Action, which correctly identified the date and 

time of the hearing and advised Mother that she would waive her right to 

 

1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the 

juvenile court’s order [terminating parental rights].” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. 

v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (citing Manuel M. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008)).

2 DCS also alleged Child was dependent as to Father and petitioned 

for termination of his parental rights on the same grounds. Father’s rights 

were terminated in August 2018, and he did not appeal.

3 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current 

version of rules and statutes.
MELISSA T. v. DCS, P.T.

Decision of the Court

3

contest the contents of the petitions if she did not attend certain hearings, 

including a pretrial conference, without good cause.

¶3 When Mother did not appear at the August 2018 pretrial 

conference, counsel advised the juvenile court that Mother had relocated to 

Phoenix and was unable to attend in person because she was working and 

did not have reliable transportation. Although Mother’s counsel had 

provided her with the court’s telephone number and requested she be 

permitted to appear telephonically, Mother did not call.

¶4 The juvenile court determined Mother had notice of the 

August 2018 pretrial conference and lacked good cause for her failure to 

appear. The court then accepted Mother’s non-appearance as an admission 

to the allegations of the petitions, adjudicated Child dependent, and 

proceeded with the termination hearing. See A.R.S. §§ 8-537(C), -844(F); 

Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 64(C); Marianne N. v. DCS, 243 Ariz. 53, 56, ¶ 16 (2017). 

After receiving testimony, the court found DCS proved all three statutory 

grounds for severance by clear and convincing evidence and that severance 

was in Child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence, and 

entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother timely 

appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-

120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile 

Court 103(A).

DISCUSSION

¶5 Mother argues the juvenile court deprived her of due process 

when it found she did not have good cause for failing to appear at the 

pretrial conference and then accelerated the termination adjudication 

hearing to the time scheduled for the pretrial proceeding.

4 We will reverse 

the court’s determination regarding good cause only if it was “manifestly 

unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable 

reasons.” Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 96, 101, ¶ 15 (App. 

2007) (quoting Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, 83, ¶ 19 

(App. 2005)). Whether a party is afforded due process presents a question 

 

4 Mother also argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it 

denied her counsel’s oral motion to allow Mother to participate in the 

pretrial conference telephonically. The record reflects, however, that the 

court never denied Mother’s request; rather, Mother simply failed to call 

the court at any point during the hearing.
MELISSA T. v. DCS, P.T.

Decision of the Court

4

of law we review de novo. Jeff D. v. DCS, 239 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 6 (App. 2016) 

(citing Herman v. City of Tucson, 197 Ariz. 430, 432, ¶ 5 (App. 1999)).

¶6 To demonstrate good cause for failing to appear at a pretrial 

conference, a parent must “show evidence of a legitimate reason or excuse 

for her failure to appear — which the court, in its discretion, may accept or 

reject.” Trisha A. v. DCS, 245 Ariz. 24, 34, ¶ 28 (App. 2018). Mother argues 

she should not have been required to personally appear for the pretrial 

conference because she did not have reliable transportation, had recently 

begun a new job, and had “little or no income.” Nonetheless, the juvenile 

court could reasonably determine that Mother’s unavailability was of her 

own volition. See, e.g., Bob H. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 225 Ariz. 279, 282, 

¶¶ 11-13 (App. 2010) (concluding a parent’s “excuse that she was required 

to arrange her own transportation is insufficient to establish good cause for 

failure to appear”). Moreover, Mother made no effort prior to the pretrial 

conference to obtain permission to appear telephonically, to request that 

her presence be waived, or to seek assistance with transportation. 

Unexplained neglect is not excusable. See Richas v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 

512, 515 (1982). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.

¶7 The juvenile court has discretion to accelerate the termination 

adjudication hearing after a parent fails to appear at a pretrial conference 

without good cause. See A.R.S. §§ 8-535(E)(3), -537(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 

64(C); Marianne N., 243 Ariz. at 57-58, ¶¶ 22-25. Mother argues the court 

abused its discretion in doing so here because it resulted in a deprivation of 

due process. We disagree.

¶8 Although the right to the custody and control of one’s child is 

fundamental, it is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 

Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12 (2000). In the absence of good cause, a parent who 

fails to appear at a pretrial conference after being advised of the 

consequences for her non-appearance waives her right to be present and 

personally participate and testify in the hearing. See Brenda D. v. DCS, 243 

Ariz. 437, 440, ¶ 2 (2018); see also Trisha A., 245 Ariz. at 34, ¶ 30 (noting a 

parent who fails to appear without good cause waives certain rights); 

Manuel M., 218 Ariz. at 211, ¶¶ 19-20 (recognizing that although a parent 

has procedural due process rights in a termination adjudication hearing, 

the parent can waive those rights through non-appearance after being 

“specifically informed he or she could lose by failing to appear”) (citing 

Monica C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 89, 93, ¶ 20 (App. 2005), and 

A.J. Bayless Mkts., Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 134 Ariz. 243, 245 (App. 1982)). The 

absent parent’s due process rights are satisfied, however, through the 

effective participation of counsel. See Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
MELISSA T. v. DCS, P.T.

Decision of the Court

5

217 Ariz. 299, 307, ¶¶ 25, 28 (App. 2007) (“[W]here the parent fails to appear 

but is still represented by counsel, the court may proceed in that parent’s 

absence because his or her rights will be protected by the presence and 

participation of counsel.”); see also Brenda D., 243 Ariz. at 440, ¶ 3 (holding 

the absent parent retains her right to counsel, who may then “fully 

participate in the hearing”).

¶9 The record reflects Mother’s counsel was present at, and 

effectively participated in, the accelerated termination adjudication

hearing. Counsel cross-examined DCS’s witnesses and was given the 

opportunity to comment on the admissibility of evidence and present 

information and argument to the juvenile court. Thus, Mother participated 

in the hearing through counsel and has not shown any due process 

violation.

CONCLUSION

¶10 Mother does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the juvenile court’s findings and orders. Accordingly, the order 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child is affirmed.