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72–523 2001

S. HRG. 106–1063

ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 10, 2000

Serial No. J–106–64

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

JON KYL, Arizona

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York

MANUS COONEY, Chief Counsel and Staff Director

BRUCE A. COHEN, Minority Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION

SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan, Chairman

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa

JON KYL, Arizona

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York

LEE LIBERMAN OTIS, Chief Counsel

MELODY BARNES, Minority Chief Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Page

Abraham, Hon. Spencer a U.S. Senator from the State of Michigan .................. 1

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne a U.S. Senator from the State of California .................. 4

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont, prepared

statement .............................................................................................................. 15

WITNESSES

Callister, Rayn H., Immigration Inspector, Immigration and Naturalization

Service, and Steward, Local 40, American Federation of Government Employees, prepared statement ................................................................................ 37

Dean, Diana, Customs Inspector, U.S. Customs Service ...................................... 16

Gorton, Hon. Slade, a U.S. Senator from the State of Washington, prepared

statement .............................................................................................................. 8

Kelley, Colleen M., prepared statement ................................................................ 88

Lindemann, Robert E., Senior Border Patrol Agent, Detroit Sector, and Union

Steward, National Border Patrol Council, American Federation of Government Employees, prepared statement ................................................................ 34

Pearson, Michael A., Executive Assistant Commissioner for Field Operations,

Immigration and Naturalization Service, prepared statement ........................ 22

Smith, Ora A., Immigration Inspector, Special Operations, Immigration and

Naturalization Service, prepared statment and attachments .......................... 40

Winwood, Charles W., Acting Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service,

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 17

(1)

ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2000

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m., in room

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Spencer Abraham

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Also present: Senator Feinstein.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SPENCER ABRAHAM, A U.S.

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Senator ABRAHAM. We welcome you all here today. Sorry about

the delay in getting the hearing going. As I think everybody knows,

there were two votes called right at 2 p.m. So we are still expecting

Senator Gorton to return, and when he does, we will let Senator

Murray and Senator Gorton introduce Inspector Dean.

But in the interim, what I thought I would do is begin the hearing with an opening statement. Senator Feinstein will have one as

well, and we will work in the two Senators as it becomes possible

to do so.

Well, there is Senator Gorton. We welcome him.

Today, we will address the issue of enhancing border security.

On December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested after attempting to enter Port Angeles, WA. He was found with nitroglycerin

and other potential bomb-making material. He was successfully apprehended, but he will not be the last one to try.

This committee is committed to providing our Federal agencies

with the support they need to stop terrorists. We have seen in action the critical role that border security personnel play in protecting Americans. Recent high-profile alien and drug smuggling

cases have also served as a further reminder of our border security

system’s important functions. These incidents have also focused renewed attention on the critical importance of maintaining adequate

personnel resources at our borders to allow these functions to be

performed, and performed effectively.

I hope today’s hearing will shed light on four areas, in particular:

First, what happened in Washington State in the days prior to the

New Year and how Federal agencies responded to those events;

second, what steps INS and Customs took and how did the two

agencies coordinate their activities.

Third, what other factors enhanced our ability to respond? In

particular, how did cooperation between Canada and the United

2

States, the world’s strongest bilateral relationship, work during

these incidents, and how does it work more broadly to protect

Americans from potential dangers? And, finally, fourth, what additional resources are necessary to help deter and defend against terrorists, drug smugglers, and others seeking to do harm across our

borders?

I believe recent events show what works to deter and defend

against unlawful activity at the border. As we will hear today,

skilled, trained personnel are our best line of defense. At Port Angeles, it was trained Customs personnel who made the difference.

In addition, we needed the intelligence capabilities that allowed us

to follow up in the Ressam case, and intelligence also alerted the

U.S. Government as to where other threats existed.

Recent events also show that our agencies responded quite admirably to the immediate need for greater vigilance. In reaction to intelligence reports and the arrest in Washington State, INS and

Customs added shifts and transferred a significant number of additional personnel to ports of entry at the northern border. This

heightened readiness enhanced our ability to detect and deter unlawful activity.

Finally, however, these events also demonstrated that we have

unmet needs. In particular, it appears that the heightened readiness achieved in the last week of December was accompanied only

by rather heroic efforts on the part of the key branches of Customs

and INS. But as we will hear today, it appears that our current

level of readiness cannot be maintained on a permanent basis with

existing resources.

The need for additional inspectors and investigative personnel at

ports of entry has been a recurring theme in the oversight and legislative activities of this subcommittee. The Border Improvement

and Immigration Act, S. 745, which I introduced with 27 Senate cosponsors, would provide a net increase of over 900 INS inspectors

at ports of entry, 375 on the northern border and 535 in the Southwest. In addition, the bill would provide for increased intelligence

officers and significantly enhanced tools to combat terrorism, drug

smuggling, and illegal immigration. A similar set of resources is

also provided for the Customs Service in the bill, including

antinarcotics equipment and over 900 additional Customs inspectors.

We have other important unmet needs in closely related areas.

Three years ago, Senator Kyl and I included, through an amendment in the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, a provision that mandated a net increase of 1,000

new Border Patrol agents a year in each of the following years

through fiscal year 2001.

Unfortunately, in only one of those years, fiscal year 1999, did

the President’s budget ask for the funds necessary to hire the required agents. Moreover, although Congress appropriated the

money over the 3-year period, the targeted level was not achieved

because we fell short of our recruitment efforts by a net of 594

agents. We have actually had hearings to look at that issue and try

to find ways to make sure that we have the ability to meet the

level of agent recruitment that we are trying to target.

3

We must improve on this record. Unfortunately, the President’s

new budget falls short of the 1,000 new Border Patrol agents mandated by a total of 570 agents. The 430 new agents the President

proposes for fiscal year 2001 doesn’t even make up for the 594

agents that we have fallen short in recruitment efforts over the last

3 years. So we want to look at that issue both on the budget side

as well as here in the committee to try to figure out how we can

not only provide the resources but recruit the quality people we

need.

The Border Patrol is significantly understaffed at the northern

border. Overall, there are fewer than 300 Border Patrol agents responsible for the nearly 4,000-mile-long border the United States

shares with Canada.

Inadequate staffing is also a problem for both INS and Customs

inspectors. In a May 18, 1999, letter I urged Customs Commissioner Kelly and INS Commissioner Meissner to provide additional

INS and Customs personnel to ports of entry in Michigan, where

our shortages are clearly felt. That would not only help with security, but would help relieve significant traffic problems at our various ports of entry.

So these are some of the issues that we want to focus on, but in

particular today I think we want to make it clear that this committee recognizes the key role that personnel play to help pursue

cross-border criminal activities, especially such things as the smuggling of people across borders or terrorist activities.

We are very excited about the panel today and the chance to

hear from people who have been on the front line. We will hear

from Michael Pearson and Charles Winwood, who respectively head

field operations for INS and Customs, and we welcome you.

But in addition to a view from headquarters, we also wanted to

hear from people on the front line. That is why we have here today

Diana Dean, the Customs agent who first interviewed Ahmed

Ressam in Port Angeles. It was her quick thinking and resourcefulness that may be most responsible for having prevented potential

tragedy.

On our second panel—I will get into more details when we bring

it up here, but we will be hearing from Robert Lindemann, who is

a Border Patrol agent with the Detroit Sector; Ryan Callister, an

INS inspector from Idaho; and Ora Smith, an INS inspector in

Michigan, all of whom can describe the vital personnel resources

America needs to maintain a strong deterrent.

The best way to defend our borders against drug smugglers,

would-be terrorists and criminals is through solid intelligence, a

strong Border Patrol, a sound inspections regime, and a sufficient

number of investigators. In my view, it is essential that we allocate

the resources to make this happen and thereby guard against unlawful entry and against those who are seeking to do harm on

American soil. Recent events show how effective this combination

can be and how important it is to make sure we invest now to

make sure our efforts are adequate to the task.

At this point, we will hear from Senator Feinstein, and then we

will go to Senators Gorton and Murray to introduce one of our witnesses.

Senator Feinstein, thank you for being here.

4

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator Murray was good enough to introduce me to Inspector Dean,

and I want to give you my warmest congratulations, and also hope

you will relay that to your colleagues, Mark Johnson, Carmon

Clem, and Mike Chapman, for the stop that you made. It was certainly very fine work.

Mr. Chairman, one of the things that I think has happened is,

as we have increased the enforcement presence on the southwest

border, we have seen a shift of illegal entry from the southwest to

the northern border. Northern Border Patrol agents have recently

reported Mexicans flying to Canada and attempting to slip illegally

into the United States from the north.

Given the fact that international terrorists have focused on Canada rather than Mexico, the northern border situation is in some

ways even more serious than that in the Southwest. Holes in

United States-Canada border enforcement have permitted international terrorists to enter quite easily. Indeed, since 1995, there

have been 13 known cases of terrorists crossing to the United

States from Canada, and those are just the ones we know about.

As the Canadian Security Intelligence Service concluded in a

1997 report, most of the world’s terrorist groups have established

themselves in Canada, seeking safe haven, setting up operational

bases, and attempting to gain access to the United States. These

groups follow a familiar pattern of behavior of making fraudulent

use of false or valid travel documentation and arranging the illegal

transit of members to the United States and other countries.

Indeed, Canada’s generous immigration policies have meant that

terrorist groups can more easily establish and maintain cells there.

In 1998, the CSIS stated that it had active investigations into 50

terrorist groups and 350 individuals. These include virtually every

terrorist group in the world, including Hezbollah, Hamas, radical

Islamic groups from Algeria and Iran, the Tamil Tigers of Sri

Lanka, the IRA, Sikh separatists, the Kurdish Worker’s Party, Palestinian Force 17, and the Iranian Intelligence Service.

But since 1992, Canada has only deported 11 people as terrorists,

and before that none. Indeed, starting in 1997, Canada stopped extraditing people to Algeria because of the violence there. Some commentators have argued that these numbers are the result of lax

Canadian procedures and poor cooperation between police and immigration authorities.

These individuals point to Ahmed Ressam as a perfect example.

Ressam, an Algerian native, arrived in Canada in 1994 with a

French passport under another name. He was later actually arrested and deported. Then he went underground and obtained a

Canadian passport using only a Roman Catholic baptism certificate, a common practice in Quebec. He remained at liberty in Canada, free to enter the United States illegally.

Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, a Palestinian who claimed Jordanian

nationality, is another example. He applied for refugee status after

arriving in Canada in 1993, which permitted him to remain in the

country, despite two criminal convictions there. As an asylum apVerDate 31-AUG-2001 15:51 Sep 09, 2001 Jkt 072523 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\C523.XXX pfrm04 PsN: C523
5

plicant, Mezer was also entitled to free legal counsel, welfare payments, and full access to the healthcare system.

Moreover, because Canada lacks something like the U.S. expedited removal system which allows quick deportation of those with

manifestly unfounded claims, an applicant such as Mezer could expect to stay in Canada, at government expense, for a year or even

longer. This would give him enough time to try to sneak into the

United States, which, as he later admitted, was exactly why he

went to Canada in the first place.

Indeed, Mezer tried to enter the United States illegally three

times. The third time, he was picked up by the Border Patrol 25

miles inside the U.S. States border in Bellingham, WA. INS attempted to remove him, but a judge released him on bond, in part

because the judge erroneously believed that the State Department

had checked its records but found no evidence that Mezer had any

association with terrorism.

Mezer then went on to move to Brooklyn, to set in motion his

plan to bomb a busy New York subway station. Mere hours before

Mezer and another man, Lafi Khalil, intended to carry out their attack, police raided the terrorist apartment and shot and wounded

them. Before he was convicted in July 1998, Mezer testified that

the goal of his suicide attack was to kill as many Jews as possible.

While Ressam and Mezer were ultimately apprehended, it seems

astonishing that they were really actually caught at all. Our northern border, excluding Alaska, extends almost 4,000 miles. But last

year, this border had only 300 agents, about 1 agent for every 13

miles of border. In comparison, the southwest border, 2,000 miles

long, had 8,000 agents, 4 agents for every mile.

Don’t mistake me. I am not criticizing that. I support it and I am

all for it.

And the sector-by-sector breakdown of Border Patrol agents is

even more dispiriting. Last year, in the Detroit Sector, for instance,

about 20 agents covered 4 States, and in western Washington there

were 4 agents for 102 miles of border.

Moreover, even if a possible terrorist is apprehended, there is no

guarantee that the person won’t just be released with a deportation

hearing notice, which, of course, means that he or she will just disappear, free to carry out a planned attack.

The Department of Justice Inspector General, for example, found

a few years ago that immigration authorities almost never checked

to see if illegal aliens they caught in the Blaine Sector in Washington State were suspected terrorists. Blaine is the most heavily

traveled crossing between Canada and the United States west of

Detroit. In addition, the Inspector General determined that INS

and the Department of State did terrorism checks on only about 10

percent of the 150,000 asylum applications filed by asylum officers

each year.

So even if an alien is caught along the northern border, the person will often not be detained or repatriated. The INS simply lacks

the money. Last year, for instance, there was testimony that no

INS detention facility existed in the Detroit metro area. Agents discovering an illegal alien had to rely on local jails to detain the alien

and then pay for that privilege. Indeed, distances are so great and

the Border Patrol so sparse that an agent could travel 200 miles

6

to pick up an alien from another law enforcement agency and then

just process and release the person.

What we need is more cooperation with Canada. As the former

Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, Phillip Wilcox, has stated, ‘‘The most effective way of minimizing penetration of our land borders is close cooperation with the Canadian

and Mexican governments. Since Mexico has not been a focus of

international terrorism, the bulk of my experience was working

closely with Canadian law enforcement and counterterrorism officials.’’ We also need, as you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, more cooperation between INS, Customs, domestic law enforcement, and

our defense and intelligence communities. I am pleased, for instance, to see that in cities such as Detroit, INS special investigation agents have been assigned to FBI-led joint terrorism task

forces. We need to do much more along these lines.

To counter terrorism at the northern border, we also need a

strategy that focuses not just on deterrence but on physical checks

on streets, at farm, on ranches, and in jails. Shows of force such

as Operation Gatekeeper or Operation Hold-the-Line may be effective in deterring illegal immigration from Mexico, but are not going

to dissuade terrorists seeking to come in from Canada.

These terrorists are more sophisticated than the average illegal

alien. They will plan their move across the border carefully. They

will come laden with high-quality forged identification documents

or genuine documents under an assumed name.

In terms of sheer numbers, terrorism doesn’t yet kill many people. Terrorists murder fewer than 2 dozen Americans each year. In

comparison, gun shots kill about two dozen American children

every 2 days. However, speaking as the ranking member on our

committee’s Terrorism Subcommittee, the growth potential is enormous, and if we are going to carry out our number one responsibility, which is to protect the national security of this country, we

cannot ignore this area.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the important

subject of enhancing the security of our borders. I am especially delighted to see Inspector Diana Dean here today. Inspector Dean played a vital role in detecting and

arresting Ahmed Ressam, an alleged terrorist with ties to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, who was smuggling a huge cache of bombing materials and equipment

in his car trunk. She helped prevent what could have been one the most serious

terrorist attacks of recent years, one that might have otherwise resulted in terrible

damage and suffering.

I join my distinguished friends in applauding the efforts of Inspector Dean and

her colleagues Mark Johnson, Carmon Clem, and Mike Chapman in stopping that

man. And I congratulate them on winning Exceptional Service Awards for their outstanding performance.

The topic of border security is of preeminent importance, not only to my own state

of California, which shares a border with Mexico, but to other states in the south

and north. And, while I firmly believe that our immigration authorities must do

much more on the problem of alien and drug smuggling and illegal alien entry on

our southwest border, I also recognize that these problems plague our northern border as well. Indeed, strategies to protect the integrity of our northern and southwest

borders are inextricably linked. As the enforcement presence has increased on the

southwest border, we have seen a shift in illegal entries from the southwest to the

7

northern border. Indeed, northern Border Patrol agents have recently reported

Mexicans flying to Canada and attempting to slip illegally into the U.S. from the

north.

Moreover, given the fact that international terrorists have focused on Canada

rather than Mexico, the northern border situation is in some ways even more serious than that in the southwest; holes in U.S.-Canada border enforcement have permitted international terrorists to enter quite easily. Indeed, since 1995, there have

been 13 known cases of terrorists crossing into the U.S. from Canada since 1995.

And those are just the ones we know about.

As the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) concluded in a 1997 report: ‘‘Most of the world’s terrorist groups have established themselves in Canada, seeking safe haven, setting up operational bases, and attempting to gain access to the

USA. * * * [These groups] follow a familiar pattern of behaviour of * * * making

fraudulent use of false or valid travel documentation [and] arranging the illegal

transit of members to the United States and other countries.’’ Indeed, Canada’s generous immigration policies have meant that terrorist groups

can more easily establish and maintain cells there. In 1998, the CSIS stated that

is had active investigations into 50 terrorist groups and 350 individuals. These include virtually every terrorist group in the world—including Hezbollah, Hamas, radical Islamic groups from Algeria and Iran, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, the IRA,

Sikh separatists, the Kurdish Worker’s Party, Palestinian Force 17, and the Iranian

intelligence service.

But, since 1992, Canada has only deported 11 people as terrorists. And before

that, none. Indeed, starting in 1997, Canada stopped extraditing people to Algeria

because of the violence there. Some commentators have argued that these numbers

are the result of lax Canadian procedures and poor cooperation between police and

immigration authorities.

These individuals point to Ahmed Ressam as a perfect example. Ressam, an Algerian native, arrived in Canada in 1994 with a French passport under another name.

He was later ordered arrested and deported. But he then went underground and obtained a Canadian passport using only a Roman Catholic baptism certificate, a common practice in Quebec. He remained at liberty in Canada, free to enter the United

States illegally.

Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, a Palestinian who claimed Jordanian nationality, is yet

another example. He applied for refugee status after arriving in Canada in 1993,

which permitted him to remain in that country despite two criminal convictions

there. As an asylum applicant, Mezer was also entitled to free legal counsel, welfare

payments, and full access to the health care system. Moreover, because Canada

lacks something like the U.S. Expedited Removal System, which allows quick deportation of those with manifestly unfounded claims, an applicant such as Mezer could

expect to stay in Canada at government expense for a year or even longer. This

would give him enough time to try to sneak into the U.S.—which, as he later admitted, was exactly why he went to Canada in the first place.

Indeed, Mezer tried to enter the U.S. illegally three times. The third time, he was

picked up by the Border Patrol 25 miles inside the U.S. border in Bellingham,

Washington. INS attempted to remove him but a judge released him on bond, in

part because the judge erroneously believed that the State Department had checked

its records but found no evidence that Mezer had any association with terrorism.

Mezer then went on to move to Brooklyn, to set in motion his plan to bomb a busy

New York subway station. Mere hours before Mezer and another man, Lafi Khalil,

intended to carry out their attack, police raided the terrorists apartment and shot

and wounded them. Before he was convicted in July 1998, Mezer testified that the

goal of his suicide attack was to kill as many Jews as possible.

While Ressam and Mezer were ultimately apprehended, it seems astonishing that

they were caught at all. Our northern border (excluding Alaska) extends almost

4,000 miles. But last year, this border only has about 300 agent—about one agent

for every thirteen miles of border. In comparison, the southwest border is 2,000

miles and had 8,000 agents—four agents for every mile. And the sector-by-sector

breakdown of Border Patrol agents on our northern border is even more dispiriting.

Last year, in the Detroit sector, for instance, about twenty agents covered four

states, and in western Washington State, there were about four agents for 102 miles

of border.

We know that 8,000 agents have been too few to stem the tide of illegal alien

smuggling, drug smuggling, and illegal alien entry in southwestern states such as

California. Three hundred agents for 4,000 miles border in the north is also not

enough.

Moreover, even if a possible terrorist is apprehended on our northern border,

there is no guarantee that the person will not just be released with a deportation

8

hearing notice—which, of course, means that he or she will just disappear, free to

carry out a planned attack. The Department of Justice Inspector General, for example, found a few years ago that immigration authorities almost never checked to see

if illegal aliens they caught in the Blaine Sector in Washington State were suspected terrorists. Blaine is the most heavily traveled crossing between Canada and

the U.S., west of Detroit. In addition, the Inspector General determined that INS

and the Department of State did terrorism checks on only about ten percent of the

150,000 asylum applications filed by asylum officers each year.

And even if an alien is caught along the northern border, the person will often

not be detained or repatriated. The INS simply lacks the money. Last year, for instance, there was testimony that no INS detention facility existed in the Detroit

Metro area. Agents discovering an illegal alien had to rely on local jails to detain

the alien and then pay for that ‘‘privilege.’’ Indeed, distances are so great along the

northern border and the Border Patrol so sparse, that an agent could travel 200

miles to pick up an alien from another law enforcement agency and then just process and release the person.

What we need is more cooperation with Canada. As the former Coordinator for

Counterterrorism at the Department of State, Phillip Wilcox, has stated, ‘‘The most

effective way of minimizing penetration of our land borders is close cooperation with

the Canadian and Mexican Governments. Since Mexico has not been a focus of

international terrorism, the bulk of my experience was working closely with Canadian law enforcement and counterterrorism officials.’’

We also need more cooperation between INS, Customs, domestic law enforcement,

and our defense and intelligence communities. I am pleased, for instance, to see

that—in cities such as Detroit—INS special investigations agents have been assigned to FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces. We need to do more along these

lines.

To counter terrorism at the northern border, we also need a strategy that focuses

not just on deterrence but on physical checks on streets, at farms and ranches, and

in jails. Shows of force such as Operation Gatekeeper or Operation Hold-the-Line

may be effective in deterring illegal immigration from Mexico but are simply not

going to dissuade terrorists seeking to come in from Canada. Terrorists are more

sophisticated than the average illegal alien. They will plan their move across the

border carefully, and come laden with high-quality forged identification documents

or genuine documents under an assumed name.

As Ranking Member on the Technology, Terrorism, and Governmental Information Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I know that terrorism is a

huge problem today and becoming even bigger. Terrorism can result in the death

of hundreds or even thousands of innocent men, women, and children. It also leaves

economic and property damage and widespread fear and disruption in its wake.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding a hearing on this important subject and

look forward to working with you and the other members of this Subcommittee to

give this matter the attention it demands.

Senator ABRAHAM. Senator Feinstein, thank you very much.

To introduce our first witness, Inspector Dean, I am going to

turn to the two Senators from Washington, Senator Gorton and

Senator Murray.

Senator Gorton, thank you for being here.

STATEMENT OF HON. SLADE GORTON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

Senator GORTON. Mr. Chairman, I begin by thanking the subcommittee for holding this hearing and for allowing me to participate. I can think of few issues more important than ensuring the

security of our borders.

Everyone here is aware of the alarming incident last December

in which a man attempting to cross the border into the United

States via ferry at Port Angeles, WA, was found to be carrying significant amounts of bomb-making materials in the trunk of his

rented car. We cannot say for sure exactly what that man, Ahmed

Ressam, intended to do with those explosive materials, though it

9

is becoming more clear that he is part of a much larger conspiracy

of international terrorism.

What we know for sure is that through the professional expertise

of the woman who will be speaking with you today, a likely disaster was averted. It is not an overstatement to say that our Nation owes a debt of gratitude to Inspector Diana Dean and the

other Customs Service employees in Port Angeles for apprehending

Mr. Ressam before he and his co-conspirators could perpetrate

whatever acts of terror they had planned against the United

States. And I know I share those sentiments with my colleague,

Senator Murray, and with the entire Washington congressional delegation.

For a number of years, I have expressed my concern with the insufficient personnel levels at our northern border, as have many of

my colleagues in the Senate, including members of this committee.

It is unfortunate that it has taken an incident as alarming as the

case of Ahmed Ressam to draw attention to a problem that many

of us have been pointing to for all too long.

Nevertheless, the situation provides us with a unique opportunity to improve border security that we cannot afford to let pass.

Make no mistake, this will not be the last attempt made by those

outside our borders intent on carrying out acts of terrorism against

the United States. It is vitally important that we continue to authorize and appropriate funds for additional border personnel, for

which there is strong bipartisan support, not only for the southwest

border but for our northern border as well. It is equally important

that the administration follow through and actually hire the additional personnel, which the administration failed to do last year.

As my colleagues from northern border States can attest, our

calls for additional personnel are often answered with an explanation of the seemingly never-ending need for more support at our

southern border. To make matters worse, not only is the northern

border unable to get much-needed new personnel, but the relatively

few agents we do have are often detailed to the Southwest for extended periods, further exacerbating the understaffing problem.

As a consequence, you can imagine my shock at reading an article in the January 4, 2000, edition of the Wall Street Journal detailing the sheer boredom some Border Patrol agents in the San

Diego area are suffering. According to this article, efforts to reduce

illegal immigration along the U.S.-Mexico border have been so successful that Border Patrol agents are lacking sufficient work to

keep them busy.

In an effort to alleviate this boredom, agents are engaged in one

of two alternative activities. They are spending time during working days doing community service—one agent profiled in the article

spends 4 days a week at a local elementary school helping students

learn to read—or they are leaving the Border Patrol altogether in

search of more challenging professional opportunities.

Now, I have no quarrel with the apparent success of the INS in

its efforts to curb illegal immigration along the southern border.

Nor do I have any complaint with Border Patrol agents performing

community service, though I question the amount they should be

doing on the taxpayers’ time.

10

What I do have a problem with is the fact that understaffing at

our northern border is jeopardizing the security of our Nation, not

to mention our border personnel themselves, while in at least some

sectors of the southern border there are so many agents that there

is not enough work to keep them all busy.

I would like to take a moment to address the question of what

impact, if any, an automated entry/exit control system would have

made in the Port Angeles incident. I have joined with a number of

my colleagues, most notably the chairman, in seeking a repeal of

section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. We believe that while the intent of section

110 is commendable, the sheer volume of traffic crossing the northern border every day makes such verification unfeasible.

Many communities that depend on the steady commerce between

Canada and the United States would be devastated by the long

border delays that would be the inevitable result if section 110

were to be implemented. No doubt, proponents of section 110 will

use the apprehension of Ahmed Ressam and his alleged associates

as an argument for retention of section 110. I believe this would

be unfortunate, as the existence of an automated entry/exit control

would not have kept Ressam out. It was by reason of the experience and instinct of Inspector Dean that Ressam was detained and

ultimately apprehended. What we need is more Inspector Deans,

not more congestion.

With the chairman’s indulgence, I make one final comment about

Customs border staffing, and that relates to the current HouseSenate conference on the Customs Authorization Act. There is a

difference between the House and Senate versions of this bill on

the pay of Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers.

The House bill contains a provision that would reduce the pay of

those public servants at the very time we are authorizing an increase in personnel on border staffing. Customs agents in Washington State could see a reduction in income of almost $5,000 a

year under the House provision. I have previously stated my opposition to that House provision and I restate it today as this committee examines this very important issue.

I thank you for holding the hearing. I am delighted to have the

opportunity to meet Inspector Dean. I am sorry to report I have a

markup at exactly this time in the Energy Committee of bills in

that committee, and so if the chairman will indulge me, I will take

my leave.

Senator ABRAHAM. Senator Gorton, thank you for being here.

[The prepared statement of Senator Gorton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SLADE GORTON

Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking the Subcommittee for holding

this hearing, and for allowing me to participate. I can think of few issues more important than ensuring the security of our borders.

By now, everyone here is aware of the alarming incident that occurred last December, in which a man attempting to cross the border into the United States via

ferry at Port Angeles, Washington was found to be carrying significant amounts of

bomb-making materials in the trunk of his rented car. We cannot say for sure exactly what that man, Ahmed Ressam, intended to do with those clandestine materials, though it is becoming clear that he is part of a much larger conspiracy of

international terrorism. What we do know for sure is that through the professional

11

expertise of the woman who will be speaking with you today, disaster was very likely averted.

I don’t think it would be an overstatement to say that our nation truly owes a

debt of gratitude to Inspector Diana Dean, and the other Customs Service employees

in Port Angeles, for apprehending Mr. Ressam before he and his conspirators could

perpetrate whatever acts of terror they had planned against America.

For a number of years I have been expressing my concern with the insufficient

personnel levels at the Northern border, as have many of my colleagues in the Senate, including some members of this Committee. It is unfortunate that it has taken

an incident as alarming as the developing case involving Ahmed Ressam to draw

attention to a problem that many of us have been pointing to for so long. Nevertheless, the situation provides us with a unique opportunity to improve border security

that we cannot afford to let pass. Make no mistake about it, this will not be the

last attempt made by those outside our borders intent on carrying out acts of terrorism against the United States.

It is vitally important that we continue to authorize and appropriate funds for additional border personnel, for which there is strong bipartisan support, not only for

the Southwest border, but for the Northern border as well. Equally important is

that the Administration follow through and actually hire the additional personnel,

which the current Administration failed to do last year.

As my colleagues from Northern border states can attest, our calls for additional

personnel are often answered with an explanation of the seemingly never-ending

need for more support at the Southern border. To make matters worse, not only is

the Northern border unable to get much-needed new personnel, but the relatively

few agents we do have are often detailed to the Southwest for extended periods, further exacerbating the problem with under-staffing. Therefore, you can imagine my

shock upon reading an article in the January 4, 2000 edition of the Wall Street

Journal detailing the sheer boredom some Border Patrol agents in the San Diego

area are suffering. According to this article, efforts to reduce illegal immigration

along the U.S.–Mexico border have been so successful Border Patrol agents are lacking sufficient work to keep them busy. In an effort to alleviate this boredom, agents

are doing one of two things. They are spending time during working hours doing

community service—one agent profiled in the article spends four days a week at a

local elementary school helping students learn to read—or they are leaving the Border Patrol altogether in search of more challenging professional opportunities. Now,

I certainly have no quarrel with the apparent success of the INS in its efforts to

curb illegal immigration along the Southern Border. Nor do I have any complaint

with Border Patrol agents performing community service—though I question whether they should be doing it on the taxpayers’ time. What I do have a problem with

is the fact that under-staffing at our Northern border is jeopardizing the security

of our nation, not to mention border personnel, while in at least some sectors of the

Southern border, there are so many agents that there is not enough work to keep

all of them busy.

I would like to take a moment to address the question of what impact, if any, an

automated entry-exit control system would have made in the Port Angeles incident.

I have joined with a number of my colleagues in seeking a repeal of Section 110

of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibilities Act of 1996. It is

our belief that, while the intent of Section 110 is commendable, the sheer volume

of traffic crossing the Northern border every day makes such verification unfeasible.

Many communities that depend on the steady commerce between Canada and the

U.S. would be devastated by the long border delays that would be the inevitable result if Section 110 were to be implemented. No doubt, proponents of Section 110 will

use the apprehension of Ahmed Ressam and his alleged associates as an argument

for retention of Section 110. I believe this would be unfortunate, as the existence

of an automated entry-exit control would not have kept Ressam out. It was through

the experience and instinct of Inspector Dean that Ressam was detained and, ultimately, apprehended. What we need is more Inspector Dean’s, not more congestion.

With the Chairman’s indulgence, I would like to make one final comment regarding Customs border staffing, and that relates to the current House-Senate Conference on the Customs Authorization Act. There is a difference between the House

and Senate versions of this bill pertaining to the pay of Customs Inspectors and Canine Enforcement Officers. The House bill contains a provision that would reduce

the pay of these public servants at the very same time we are authorizing an increase in personnel and border staffing. Customs agents in Washington state could

see a reduction in income of almost $5000 annually under the House provision. I

have previously stated my opposition to the House provision, and I restate it today

as this Committee examines this very important issue.

12

Let me again thank the Subcommittee for holding this hearing. I look forward to

working with my colleagues to ensure we take the steps necessary to enhance the

integrity of our borders.

13


Insert offset folio 27 here 72523A.001
14

Senator ABRAHAM. We will turn to Senator Murray, and we

thank you for being here before and waiting this long. I know you

have other assignments, but we appreciate your being here to introduce Inspector Dean.

Senator Murray.

STATEMENT OF HON. PATTY MURRAY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

Senator MURRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Feinstein, for holding this extremely important hearing today,

and thank you both for your statements that I concur with.

It is really my pleasure today to introduce to you my constituent

and a real hero, Diana Dean. Diana has been an inspector for the

Customs Service for 19 years. She moved from Hawaii to Seattle— that was a good choice—in the mid-1980’s. In 1996, she became a

full-time Customs inspector and was stationed at Port Angeles,

WA.

We really all were very fortunate that she was stationed in Port

Angeles, and last month her experience and her training caused

her to question an individual who was getting off the ferry entering

my home State from British Columbia. The person she stopped,

Ahmed Ressam, was carrying 100 pounds of bomb-making supplies.

For her service, she received an Exceptional Service Award, along

with Inspectors Carmon Clem, Mike Chapman, and Mark Johnson,

who assisted her.

Let me just add that I feel like I have a good idea of what

Diana’s job is like and she has a good idea of what my job is like

because shortly after this incident I traveled to Port Angeles and

had a chance to sit down with Diana and other inspectors and talk

about what they were facing everyday. Shortly after that, she flew

back with me to Washington, DC, on that long flight, got here, and

we had a snow storm. She flew back home and had to fly here

today. So she understands my job now and I understand hers.

I am delighted that she is with us today, and I want to also recognize her daughter, Adrianna, who is with us and has waited patiently and flown out here twice as well. She must be extremely

proud of Diana as well.

Let me tell you when I was in Port Angeles, I saw that the

northern border really does need our attention. I also visited Blaine

and talked with the Customs and border agents there as well. And,

Mr. Chairman, your statement is exactly right, and you and I both

know, being on the northern border, that we have $1 million a day

of economic activity going back and forth across our border. It is

important that we allow it to move safely, quickly, and efficiently.

But we also want to make sure that we have agents like Inspector Dean who are there, who are trained, who are the best people

so that those people like Ressam are caught at the border and detained, and we have our work cut out for us.

So I am delighted that you are having this hearing, and I am

proud to be here with Diana today. I want her to know that everyone at home is extremely proud of her and her colleagues and the

work they do everyday. I have never before the last month had people come up to me and say, will you tell the Customs inspectors

thank you for the job they do.

15

Diana made us all proud and I am pleased to have her before the

subcommittee. It is my honor to present to you Inspector Diana

Dean.

Senator ABRAHAM. Senator Murray, thank you very much. We

appreciate it.

Before we turn to Inspector Dean to make her comments, let me

just also mention the panel which we have here includes also Mr.

Charles ‘‘Chuck’’ Winwood, who is the Assistant Commissioner of

Field Operations with the U.S. Customs Service. We look forward

to hearing from you next.

And then finally we have Mr. Michael Pearson, who is the Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and I believe from Traverse

City, MI, somewhere in your past. We are proud of that and welcome you both here.

We will start with Inspector Dean.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, may I enter a statement into

the record, please?

Senator ABRAHAM. Sure, we will be glad to do that and make

that part of the record. If other members want to submit statements, of course, we will accept those as well.

[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

First, I would like to thank Senators Abraham and Kennedy for holding this hearing on an issue that is so important to the residents of my state of Vermont. I would

also like to thank the witnesses who have come here today from the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the National Border Patrol

Council, all of which play such a crucial role in maintaining the security of our nation.

This hearing is particularly appropriate at this time, considering the significant

public attention garnered by the border arrests that occurred over the holiday season in Vermont and Washington state. Last December 19, border guards in Beecher

Falls, Vermont, arrested a Canadian woman, Lucia Garofalo, who was bringing an

illegal Algerian immigrant across the border. She has been charged with seven felony counts of alien smuggling and misuses of identification documents.

Ms. Garofalo’s arrest followed on the heels of the arrest of Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian who was apprehended in Washington state while trying to enter the United

States from Canada with 100 pounds of bomb-making supplies. Federal prosecutors

in Burlington, Vermont, are investigating potential links between Ms. Garofalo and

Mr. Ressam. I am heartened by the outstanding work of law enforcement officials

in Vermont and throughout the United States in this matter—their excellent service

allowed our country to avert what could have been a terrible tragedy. I am also appreciative of the assistance that Canada has provided to assist American investigators.

I strongly support providing additional resources—in the form of additional officers, support personnel, and equipment—to assist federal and local law enforcement

officers who patrol our northern border. Our southern border has received the vast

portion of our attention over the last decade, but the events of the last two months

demonstrate that we need to be more attentive to the concerns raised by our border

with Canada. That is why I am a cosponsor of S. 745, the Border Improvement and

Immigration Act, which would provide additional resources to the INS, Border Patrol, and Customs Service.

Although recent events have confirmed the need to ensure that our northern border is effectively patrolled, it is important that our reaction to these events be a

measured one. It is worth noting that although December yielded an important and

high-profile case along our northern border, it was in some ways an ordinary month

for the Border Patrol. As the Burlington (Vt.) Free Press reported last month, the

number of illegal and criminal aliens apprehended along our border in Canada during that month was typical. Despite this fact, some have recently renewed their calls

to implement draconian border inspection procedures that would cripple traffic and

trade at our borders with Canada. Such a step would be extremely harmful to the

16

entire American economy, and especially to our northern states. It would also be

disproportionate to the threats we face. We should not lose sight of the fact that

our law enforcement officers were able to stop the alleged terrorists who apparently

sought to harm our citizens. If our officers need additional help, we should provide

it. That, and not closing our borders, is the appropriate way to battle this threat.

Senator ABRAHAM. Inspector Dean, we have all come here today,

in part, to hear from you and we want to, on behalf of the subcommittee, thank you for your service. Obviously, when we hold

hearings here, we often focus in on problems and we too often, as

I have said in this role before, act as if nothing is going right. That

is sort of the nature of congressional hearings; they tend to oversee

problems.

Today, it is good to have a hearing where we are going to be talking about something that did go right, where we, in fact, were successful, thanks to your efforts in apprehending a terrorist, or somebody who at least, we believe, was planning to engage in those

kinds of activities.

So we welcome you here today and we will turn to you at this

time.

PANEL CONSISTING OF DIANA DEAN, CUSTOMS INSPECTOR,

U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, PORT ANGELES, WA; CHARLES W.

WINWOOD, ACTING DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS

SERVICE, WASHINGTON, DC; AND MICHAEL A. PEARSON, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR FIELD OPERATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

WASHINGTON, DC

STATEMENT OF DIANA DEAN

Ms. DEAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here to testify today. My

name is Diana Dean. I am a U.S. Customs inspector with 19 years’

experience. I am currently assigned to Port Angeles, WA, and have

been there since 1991. Prior to my assignment at Port Angeles, I

worked as an inspector in both Seattle and Hawaii.

On December 14, 1999, at 6:00 p.m., Ahmed Ressam attempted

to enter the United States from Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, in a rented vehicle aboard the ferry motor vessel Coho at the

Port Angeles, WA, port of entry. As the primary interviewing officer, I noticed during routine questioning that Ressam was acting

in a nervous and strange manner while answering routine questions. I decided to perform a more thorough secondary examination.

Ressam was told to exit the vehicle he was driving in order to

open the trunk for examination. After several requests, Ressam reluctantly exited the vehicle and opened the trunk. Preliminary examination by additional inspectors present and myself revealed

that the vehicle’s spare tire compartment contained several bags of

an unknown substance.

Based upon this discovery, an immediate pat-down of Ressam

was conducted, during which Ressam managed to slip out of his

jacket and flee on foot. The other inspectors present gave chase in

a foot chase that ensued over a five-block area, resulting in

Ressam’s capture. During the foot chase, Ressam attempted to

strong-arm the driver of a vehicle passing by. After a brief scuffle,

the subject was cuffed and escorted back to the port.

17

Further examination of Ressam’s vehicle resulted in the discovery of 4 timing devices, a total of 118 pounds of urea crystals,

14 pounds of sulfate powder, and 48 ounces of nitroglycerin. The

fact is U.S. Customs inspectors do things like this every hour of the

day, every day of the week, and every week of the year at all 301

ports of entry in our Nation. Sometimes, we interdict dangerous

drugs, sometimes guns, contaminated food, defective parts. The list

goes on.

I want to again thank the committee for the opportunity to be

here today.

Senator ABRAHAM. Inspector Dean, thank you.

Mr. Winwood, thank you for being here as well. We will turn to

you at this time.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES W. WINWOOD

Mr. WINWOOD. Thank you, Chairman Abraham and members of

the subcommittee, Senator Feinstein, for this opportunity to testify.

Inspector Dean’s words are a far better testament to the dedication shown by the men and women of the Customs Service in defending our Nation’s borders than I could ever offer today. I would

simply like to take this opportunity to sketch a broader picture of

our mission and the challenges and the needs that we face in the

future.

We are extremely proud of the professionalism displayed by our

inspectors at Port Angeles. The prevention of terrorist threats at

our borders is a cornerstone of Customs responsibilities. Yet, it is

only one part, albeit a vitally important one, of a vast mission that

ranges from processing nearly $1 trillion in trade a year to seizing

illegal drugs hidden amongst the highest volume of arriving passengers and conveyances in the world.

We also combat money laundering, forced child labor, child pornography, and criminal exploitation of the Internet. We enforce

more than 600 laws for a variety of Federal agencies at the Nation’s borders, in addition to our own. On a typical day, Customs

officers process 1.3 million passengers and nearly 350,000 vehicles

at ports and border crossings. They seize nearly 4,000 pounds of

narcotics and over $1 million in ill-gotten cash.

Customs enforcement actions protect our domestic industries

from unfair foreign competition. They keep tainted and spoiled

products from making their way to consumers, defend against intellectual property rights violations, and deter the corrosive effects

of economic fraud. And as you heard today, they help safeguard

America from the threat of terrorist attack. It is a difficult job for

the Customs Service to sift all of these threats from the vast majority of legitimate trade and travelers passing through our borders.

In response to the threat raised by the arrest at Port Angeles

last December, Commissioner Raymond Kelly ordered the Customs

Service into an immediate heightened state of alert. Our 301 ports

and border locations were instructed to provide prompt staffing assessments to ensure our sites were adequately manned. Where

shortfalls existed, inspectors and special agents were relocated.

Where extra shifts were needed, overtime was added. Where gaps

still remained, other officers were put back on the front line.

18

Our special agents were detailed to interagency counterterrorism

task forces nationwide to provide investigative expertise and coordination of real-time intelligence and dissemination to our ports

and border personnel. In all, our measures added to an equivalent

of over 900 extra inspectors along our frontiers during the busy

holidays.

I cannot stress enough the commitment of the men and women

of Customs in making this possible. Our people made extraordinary

sacrifices, worked longer, harder hours under heavy volumes of

travel in extreme weather conditions, using time they would otherwise have spent with family and friends at home. Their efforts

were deeply appreciated. Despite longer lines at border crossings,

greater scrutiny, and more intense questioning, we received the

strong support of the American public.

Our efforts did not end there. On December 30, Commissioner

Kelly implemented a two-officer minimum staffing requirement for

all northern and southwest border crossings 24 hours a day, 7 days

a week. While this may seem like a small number at first glance,

let me make it clear that many of our border crossings, especially

along our northern border, are situated in extremely remote locations where travelers are few and hours of operation are limited.

A number of these locations are served by remote video inspection systems, with which frequent travelers can pass through border areas quickly without time-consuming inspections. While these

sites are often the least traveled, they are also the most vulnerable,

and to staff them around the clock, as the Commissioner ordered,

was truly a dramatic step and a necessary one.

On January 11, the Commissioner authorized a scaled-back state

of alert. This was done in consultation with other Federal inspection agencies and our intelligence community. Ports and border

crossings were returned to their regular operating hours. Staff detailed temporarily to undermanned checkpoints returned home.

The only exceptions were the one-man ports and the video inspection locations.

One important result of these operations has been the publication of a new alert plan, again authorized by Commissioner Kelly,

for any future threats of this nature. The plan outlines four alert

levels, each of which carries sufficient detail to ensure appropriate

response to the threat at hand.

We also affirmed once again the indispensable role of cooperation

with our partner border enforcement agencies, particularly the INS

and the Border Patrol. I say ‘‘once again’’ because since September

1998, our agencies have engaged in an unprecedented project

known as the Border Coordination Initiative, or BCI.

At its heart, BCI involves open lines of communication, joint operations, and shared management strategies. In the year-and-a-half

that it has been in place, BCI has yielded record levels of drug seizures and reduced processing times for travelers at our ports of

entry. It is an outstanding example of what can happen when Government agencies work together to improve service to the American

public. This spirit of cooperation carried over to our work to secure

U.S. borders after the Port Angeles incident. Immediately following

the arrest, Customs and INS exchanged operational plans for 24-

hour-a-day staffing at all of our facilities.

19

I must also acknowledge our outstanding working relationship

with Canadian authorities. After the seizure and arrest, our usual

high level of interaction with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

and Canadian Customs became even more intense. We exchanged

data on subjects who may have been involved in suspicious activity

and made an extra effort to share our findings.

A special U.S. embassy law enforcement team in Ottawa, comprised of Customs, the FBI, and representatives of the intelligence

community in Ottawa worked tirelessly to support our inspectors

and agents stationed at land borders and pre-clearance stations at

the seven major Canadian airports.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that when America was faced with a terrorist threat last December, U.S. Customs and its fellow law enforcement agencies along the border stepped up to the challenge.

I like to think in some way the peaceful holiday celebrations that

ensued were at least partly the result of our efforts. That said, we

are under no illusion about the possibility of another attempt occurring again at some other place, at some other time.

We have arrived at an important crossroads. A spiraling volume

of trade has put immense pressure on our resources. At the same

time, an unrelenting illegal drug trade continues its daily assault

on our front lines. Add to this now the specter of international terrorism doorstep. Sifting the threats will become all the more difficult, all the more daunting. How we respond to these challenges

now will impact greatly on our mission to facilitate and enforce in

years to come.

Fortunately, the Customs Service has taken several important

steps to make sure we continue to deliver for the American people.

We have developed and are in the process of refining a resource allocation model, a tool developed to provide an agency-wide assessment of our most critical staffing needs and ideas on how to apply

our resources. It is the first such model of its kind in the Federal

Government to be deployed across the board, throughout every department and location.

Mr. Chairman, these requirements I have with me today are the

requirements and documents for the resource allocation model

which we would be happy to walk through at a later date with you.

I would stress again that this is simply a tool for management and

decisionmaking and not the final determinant of how we deploy our

personnel.

Lastly, Customs is leading a critical study of border infrastructure needs throughout the country, in consultation with the General Services Administration and other Federal inspection agencies.

This project, mandated by Congress, is intended to assess every

physical aspect of port operations, from facilities and equipment to

staffing and technology. Security and training needs will also be

considered. We hope for the support of Congress on this and other

important initiatives designed to prepare U.S. Customs for the

challenging era of trade and enforcement ahead.

In closing, I again want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the

members of this subcommittee for the opportunity to testify and to

spotlight the dedicated professionals of the Customs Service.

Senator ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Winwood.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Winwood follows:]

20

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES W. WINWOOD

Chairman Abraham and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify. Inspector Dean’s words are a far better testament to the dedication

shown by the men and women of the Customs Service in defending our nation’s borders than I could ever offer today. I would simply like to take this opportunity to

sketch a broader picture of the mission of the U.S. Customs Service, our challenges,

and our needs in the years ahead.

To be sure, we are extremely proud of the professionalism displayed by our Inspectors at Port Angeles. The prevention of terrorist threats at our borders is a cornerstone of Customs’ responsibilities. Yet it is only one part—albeit a vitally important one—of a vast mission that ranges from processing nearly 1 trillion dollars in

trade a year to seizing illegal drugs hidden amongst the highest volume of arriving

passengers and conveyances in the world.

We also combat money-laundering; forced child labor; child pornography; and

criminal exploitation of the Internet. We enforce more than 600 laws for a variety

of federal agencies at the nation’s borders, in addition to our own.

On a typical day, Customs officers process 1.3 million passengers and nearly

350,000 vehicles at ports and border crossings around the country. They seize nearly

4,000 pounds of narcotics and over a million dollars in ill-gotten cash.

Customs enforcement actions protect domestic industries from unfair foreign competition. They keep tainted and spoiled products from making their way to consumers. They defend intellectual property rights and deter the corrosive effects of

economic fraud. And, as you heard today, they safeguard Americans from the threat

of terrorist attack.

It is the difficult job of the Customs Service to sift all of these threats from the

vast majority of legitimate trade and travelers passing through our borders. And it

is my job as the Acting Deputy Commissioner to help make certain we do this without imposing any undue burden upon international business and the travelling public we serve.

In response to the threat raised by the arrest at Port Angeles last December,

Commissioner Raymond Kelly ordered the Customs Service into an immediate

heightened state of alert. Directors in the Office of Field Operations, who manage

our 301 ports and border locations, were instructed to provide prompt staffing assessments to ensure our sites were adequately manned.

Where shortfalls existed, inspectors and special agents were relocated. Where

extra shifts were needed, overtime was added. Where gaps still remained, officers

whose normal duties did not include basic inspection work found themselves on temporary detail, back out on the front line, interacting with travelers. Our special

agents were detailed to interagency counter-terrorism task forces nationwide, to provide investigative expertise and coordination of real-time intelligence dissemination

to our port and border personnel.

In all, our measures added up to the equivalent of over 900 extra inspectors along

our frontiers for the busy holiday season. I cannot stress enough the commitment

of the men and women of Customs in making this possible. Our people made extraordinary sacrifices, worked longer, harder hours, under heavy volumes of travel,

in extreme weather conditions, using time they otherwise would have spent with

family and friends at home.

Their efforts were deeply appreciated, not just by Customs management, but by

the American people. Despite longer lines at border crossings, greater scrutiny, and

more intensive questioning, we received the strong support of the travelling public.

We clearly sensed an awareness among those we processed of the threat at hand,

and Customs role in making the holiday season as safe and secure as possible.

Our efforts did not end there. On December 30, Commissioner Kelly implemented

a 2 officer minimum staffing requirement for all northern and southwest border

crossings, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. While this may seem like a small number

at first glance, let me make it clear that many of our border crossings, especially

those along our northern border, are situated in extremely remote locations, where

travelers are few and hours of operation are limited. A number of these locations

are served by remote video inspection systems, with which frequent travelers can

pass through border areas quickly without time consuming inspections. While these

sites are often the least traveled, they are also the most vulnerable. To staff them

around the clock, as the Commissioner ordered, was truly a dramatic step, and a

necessary one.

On January 11, the Commissioner authorized a scaled back state of alert. This

was done in consultation with other federal inspection agencies and our intelligence

community. Ports and border crossings were returned to their regular operating

hours. Staff detailed temporarily to undermanned checkpoints were allowed to reVerDate 31-AUG-2001 15:51 Sep 09, 2001 Jkt 072523 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\C523.XXX pfrm04 PsN: C523
21

turn home. The only exceptions to this order were ten northern border posts and

all remote video inspection system sites, which remain subject to the staffing requirements put into effect immediately after the Port Angeles seizure.

That is the status at which we remain today. One important result of these operations has been the articulation of a new alert plan, again authorized by Commissioner Kelly, for any future threats of this nature. The plan outlines four alert levels, each of which carries sufficient detail to ensure appropriate response to the

threat at hand.

We also affirmed once again the indispensable role of cooperation with our partner border enforcement agencies, particularly the INS and the Border Patrol. I say

‘‘once again’’ because since September 1998 our agencies have engaged in an unprecedented project known as the Border Coordination Initiative, or BCI, along our

Southwest Border. At its heart, BCI involves open lines of communication, joint operations, and shared management strategies. In the year and a half that it has been

in place, BCI has yielded record levels of drug seizures and reduced processing

times for travelers at our ports of entry. It is an outstanding example of what can

happen when government agencies work together to improve service to the American public.

This spirit of cooperation carried over to our work to secure U.S. borders after the

Port Angeles incident. Immediately following the arrest, Customs and INS exchanged operational plans for 24-hour a day staffing at all our facilities. Though implemented at the national level, it was thanks to the skill and dedication of our employees in the field that these plans came together. Our people worked together diligently to ensure that the two officer minimum staffing requirement was met at

every location in the country.

I must also acknowledge our outstanding working relationship with Canadian authorities. After the seizure and arrest, our usual high level of interaction with the

Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canada Customs became even more intensive.

We exchanged mountains of data on subjects who may have been involved in suspicious activity and made an extra effort to share our findings. A special U.S. Embassy law enforcement team in Ottawa comprised of Customs, the FBI and representatives of the intelligence community in Ottawa worked tirelessly to support

our Inspectors and Special Agents stationed at land borders, air preclearance stations, and seven major Canadian airports.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that when America was faced with a terrorist threat last

December, U.S. Customs and its fellow law enforcement agencies along the border

stepped up to the challenge. I like to think that in some way, the peaceful holiday

celebrations that ensued were at least partly the result of our efforts. That said, we

are under no illusions about the possibility of another attempt occurring again at

some other place, some other time, along the thousands of miles of border that we

defend.

We have arrived at an important crossroads. A spiraling volume of trade has put

immense pressure on our resources, at the same time an unrelenting illegal drug

trade continues its daily assault on our front lines. Add to this now the specter of

international terrorism at our doorstep. Sifting the threats will become all the more

difficult—finding that deadly needle in the haystack all the more daunting.

How we respond to these challenges now will impact greatly on our mission to

facilitate and enforce in years to come. Fortunately, the Customs Service has taken

several important steps to make sure we continue to deliver for the American people. We have developed and are in the process of refining a Resource Allocation

Model, a tool developed to provide an agency-wide assessment of our most critical

staffing needs and ideas on how to apply our resources optimally. It is the first such

model of its kind in the federal government to be deployed across the board,

throughout every department and location.

At your request, Mr. Chairman, I am submitting a summary of the model. These

are the requirements and documentation for the Resource Allocation Model which

we would be happy to walk you through at a later date. I would stress again that

this is simply a tool for management in decision-making, and not the final determinant of how we deploy our personnel.

Lastly, Customs is leading a critical study of Border Infrastructure needs throughout the country in consultation with the General Services Administration and other

federal inspection agencies. This project, mandated by the Congress, is intended to

assess every physical aspect of port operations, from facilities and equipment to

staffing and technology. Security and training needs will also be considered.

We hope for the support of the Congress on this and other important initiatives

designed to prepare the U.S. Customs for the challenging era of trade and enforcement ahead. In closing, I again want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members

22

of this subcommittee for the opportunity to testify and spotlight the dedicated professionals of the Customs Service.

Senator ABRAHAM. We will turn now to Mr. Pearson. Thanks for

being with us today.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. PEARSON

Mr. PEARSON. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I

too appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today to share

with you the crucial role that the Immigration and Naturalization

Service plays in controlling our Nation’s borders, including addressing terrorist threats.

I would like to begin by assuring you that the INS’ commitment

to border security remains unwavering. As you know, the INS is

the agency responsible for controlling the entry of aliens into the

United States and detaining and removing those who have entered

contrary to our laws, including aliens involved in terrorism.

We work diligently with our partners from other local, State,

Federal, and international law enforcement, and intelligence agencies to accomplish this goal, which I will highlight in my testimony

today. With the recent failed attempts at entry by suspected terrorists along the northern border of the United States, it has never

been more apparent that the INS and other law enforcement agencies must continue to work together as a close-knit team.

International terrorists who seek to enter the United States must

do so either by applying for admission at a port of entry or by attempting illegal entry. The INS role in counterterrorism is strongly

represented by our active participation in several interagency task

forces. In today’s world, INS efforts to ensure the security of the

United States neither begins nor ends at our immediate borders.

INS has adopted a strategy called Global Reach that addresses

this overall threat. INS officers are stationed worldwide, working

with local government authorities to prevent illegal immigration

and alien smuggling in source countries abroad. Currently, the INS

has over 5,000 immigration inspectors at our ports of entry nationwide, and over 8,000 Border Patrol agents patrolling our borders

between the ports of entry.

Our strategic plan for border enforcement, announced in 1994, is

to first control the most heavily-trafficked corridors along the

southwest border. The INS greatly appreciates the congressional

support for this strategy through its continued appropriations for

the Border Patrol.

In order to enforce our laws more effectively and secure our borders, immigration inspectors have instant access to a broad range

of information through the use of several informational databases.

This information is used to identify and process individuals who

may be inadmissible or removal from the United States or subject

to other enforcement actions by another agency.

The INS is working with the Customs Service and other Federal

agencies to identify how these systems are best applied to border

security and facilitation uses. Our close cooperation with our Federal partners, particularly Customs, is embodied by the Border Coordination Initiative, as was outlined by Mr. Winwood.

In achieving our mission on the northern border, we work closely

with the Canadian government. Canada and the United States

23

have a partnership that works. We share the longest undefended

border in the world. The INS staffs 105 ports of entry, 8 Border Patrol sectors, and 44 Border Patrol stations along the nearly 4,000-

mile border with Canada, not including Alaska.

The INS, with the cooperation of Customs, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Revenue Canada, and the Royal Canadian

Mounted Police, is keeping a close watch on our shared border.

Canada is a close ally in the fight against illegal immigration. In

combatting illegal immigration, and terrorism in particular, the

challenge for United States and Canadian officials is the rapid and

timely exchange of information on such individuals who pose a

common threat. Our officers at the border, in the interior, and

overseas work closely together and continuously to prevent illegal

immigration to both countries.

In closing, I would like to emphasize that inherent in our border

enforcement strategy is the flexibility to respond to emerging conditions and changing tactics. I look forward to working with the subcommittee to ensure that INS can continue to meet today’s demands and tomorrow’s challenges.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to answer any

questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pearson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. PEARSON

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee.

I appreciate this opportunity to share with you the crucial role that the Immigration

and Naturalization Service (INS) plays in protecting the United States (U.S.) from

terrorist threats. I would like to begin by assuring you that the INS commitment

to border security remains unwaivering.

As you know, the INS is the agency responsible for controlling the entry of aliens

into the U.S., and detaining and removing aliens who have entered contrary to our

laws, including aliens involved in terrorism. This is accomplished at over 300 air,

land, and sea Ports-of-Entry (POE’s) by Immigration Inspectors and between the

ports by the Border Patrol. The INS also prevents the entry of inadmissible aliens

at our 14 overseas preflight inspection sites and through international enforcement

operations.

We work diligently with our partners from other local, state, Federal, and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies to identify individuals who may

pose a threat to the U.S. and prevent their entry or, detain and remove them. With

the recent failed attempts at entry by suspected terrorists along the northern border

of the U.S., it has never been more apparent that the INS and other law enforcement agencies must continue to work together as a close-knit team.

I will describe our border management strategies, our close cooperation with Canada, and the INS response to the recent northern border terrorist threats.

BORDER MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

International terrorists who seek to enter the U.S. must do so by either applying

for admission at a POE or by attempting illegal entry. Consequently, Immigration

Inspectors and Border Patrol Agents form the Nation’s first line of defense on the

border against international terrorism. The INS’ role in counter-terrorism is also

strongly represented by our active participation in the Federal Bureau of Investigations’ (FBI) International Terrorism Operations Section, the Central Intelligence

Agency’s Counter Terrorism Center, and on 16 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF).

In today’s world, the INS’ efforts to ensure the security of the U.S. neither begins

nor ends at our immediate borders. Threats from terrorists, alien smugglers, and

organized criminals are serious international problems affecting democratic societies

everywhere. INS has adopted a strategy to better address this global threat; we call

the approach Global Reach. This approach supports the Administration’s International Crime Control Strategy. It focuses on addressing the threat at all points

on the globe, with INS officers deployed at source and transit locations working with

local government authorities, training international air carriers to recognize frauduVerDate 31-AUG-2001 15:51 Sep 09, 2001 Jkt 072523 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\C523.XXX pfrm04 PsN: C523
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lent documents, gathering information to better understand and dismantle smuggling operations, and interdicting undocumented aliens before they reach our shores.

INS is also working closely with other democratic governments on various initiatives, some of which I will discuss later.

Currently, there are over 5,000 Immigration Inspectors staffing our POEs and

over 8,000 Border Patrol Agents patrolling more than 8,000 miles of border. Of the

Immigration Inspector positions, over 500 are located on the northern border. The

remaining positions are deployed to the southern land border (1,485) and to air/sea

ports (3,044) throughout the country. This equates roughly to the inspections workload on each land border, with approximately 26 percent of our border workload and

26 percent of our staff on the northern border. There are 7,705 Border Patrol Agents

stationed along the southwest border and over 460 located at the northern or coastal

borders. This also reflects the approximate workloads on the northern and southern

border; the northern border represents less than one percent of our apprehensions

and has approximately four percent of the agents.

Our strategic plan for border enforcement is to first control the southwest border.

In order to gain control of the border, since 1994, the INS has strategically deployed

both personnel and equipment along the U.S.-Mexico border. Since that time, the

number of Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Inspectors deployed to the southwest border has doubled, lighting has been installed, fences built, and sensors put

into place. This strategy has proven highly successful in gaining control of the most

heavily trafficked portions of the southwest border.

INSPECTIONS

In fiscal year 1999, Immigration Inspectors encountered over 525 million applicants for entry into the U.S.: 115 million at the northern land border, 319 million

at the southern land border, and 91 million at air and seaports. While the total

number of applicants for entry has risen approximately 9 percent over the last five

fiscal years, the amount of document fraud encountered in the course of those inspections has risen 20 percent. Enforcement actions such as vehicle seizures have

risen 100 percent while alien smuggling apprehensions at the POE’s have risen

117.5 percent. The increased resources have clearly produced impressive gains in

enforcement results.

In order to enforce our laws more effectively and secure our borders, Immigration

Inspectors have instant access to a broad range of information through the use of

the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS). This information is used to identify and process individuals who may be inadmissible or removable from the U.S.

or subject to other enforcement actions by another agency. In the past five years,

the annual number of IBIS lookout system intercepts increased 200 percent from

a little more than 50,000 to over 150,000.

The INS also makes a major contribution to the Federal enforcement inventory

of lookout records and related information, in IBIS, through our National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS). NAILS is the repository for lookout

information generated by the Department of State’s (DOS) Bureau of Intelligence

and Research (INR). INR maintains a classified database containing records on individuals who have been identified through analysis of all source information as probably or definitely involved in terrorist activities. Because these records relate to the

admissibility or inadmissibility of an alien, INS is the lead agency for responding

to matches at POEs throughout the U.S. When Immigration Inspectors at POEs encounter the subject of a terrorist lookout, the INS coordinates with INR and others

to determine what actions to take against that individual. With the consent of the

proprietor of the derogatory data, the INS may use classified/sanitized information

in a proceeding against the alien for inadmissibility. During fiscal year 1999, 88 confirmed hits against the INR database of suspected or known terrorists were made

nationwide.

The INS believes that there is value in the use of technologies like Dedicated

Commuter Lanes (DCL), the Remote Video Inspection System (RVIS) and the Outlying Area Reporting System (OARS). These systems allow INS to improve border

enforcement while facilitating the entry of low-risk travelers. The INS is working

with the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) to identify how these systems are best applied to border security and facilitation uses.

BORDER PATROL

Nearly six years ago INS implemented its multi-phase, multi-year strategy to prevent the illegal entry of people and contraband while facilitating the flow of legal

immigration across the border. In the area of border management, we have achieved

more in the past five years than had been accomplished in any comparable period.

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Nowhere else is the success of our strategic approach to enforcement more evident

than along the southwest border.

Before 1994, there was no comprehensive unified plan for controlling the 2,000-

mile border with Mexico. The number of immigration enforcement personnel was insufficient to get the job done, and those we did have did not have the logistical support necessary to accomplish their mission. As a result, illegal immigrants and drug

smugglers came across the border with the expectation that they would easily evade

apprehension.

In February 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno announced the implementation

of a multi-year strategy to strengthen enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws

and to disrupt illegal entry via traditional smuggling corridors along the nation’s southwest border. The strategy specifically called for ‘‘prevention through deter- rence’’, that is, elevating the risk of apprehension to a level so high that prospective

illegal entrants consider it futile to attempt to enter the U.S. illegally. The Border

Patrol developed an operational plan to implement the Attorney General’s strategic

plan. The INS greatly appreciates Congressional support for this strategy through

its continued increased appropriations for the Border Patrol.

The INS has achieved considerable success in restoring integrity and safety to the

southwest border by implementing the strategy through well planned operations,

such as Operation Gatekeeper in California and western Arizona, Operation Safeguard in central and eastern Arizona, and Operation Rio Grande in New Mexico and

Texas. It has been almost six years since the INS began this effort, and the strategy

is having a significant impact. Border Patrol apprehensions in the San Diego Sector,

once the nation’s busiest illegal border crossing, are at a 24-year low. Crime rates

in many border communities have fallen dramatically. At the same time, the fees

charged by alien smugglers along the southwest border have risen to record levels,

a sign that the border is increasingly more difficult to breach.

BORDER COORDINATION INITIATIVE

In August 1998, the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury announced the Border Coordination Initiative (BCI). The BCI is a strategic plan for

increased cooperation on the southwest border by INS and the USCS to enhance the

interdiction of drugs, illegal aliens, and other contraband. The goal of the BCI is

to create a comprehensive, integrated border management system at and between

the POEs that effectively achieves the mission of each agency.

The interagency approach of the BCI has boosted our enforcement efforts along

the border by drawing from the varied skills and expertise within both organizations. This approach is not limited to INS and USCS. One of our goals this year

is to formally involve other Federal agencies including: Coast Guard, Agriculture,

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the High Intensity

Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) task force along with state and local law enforcement agencies in the BCI. This year, we have tasked our field managers with formalizing that involvement through joint planning, effective coordination, and joint

implementation of this year’s BCI Action Plans.

Although the initial focus of the BCI has been the southwest border, the INS and

the USCS are considering expansion to the northern border. In late September, the

Port Management component of the BCI was presented to INS and USCS field managers in the Detroit area.

Cooperation, as exemplified by the BCI, is the key to effective border management. The BCI has proven itself to be an effective and broad-based mechanism to

date for coordinating the law enforcement activities of agencies operating along the

southwest border of the U.S.

COOPERATION WITH CANADA

Canada and the U.S. have a partnership that works. We share the longest

undefended border in the world. The INS staffs 105 ports-of-entry, 8 Border Patrol

Sectors and 44 Border Patrol stations along the 3,987 miles of border with Canada

(excluding Alaska). The INS, with the cooperation of USCS, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Revenue Canada (RC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), is keeping a close watch on our shared border.

The two-way movement of illegal aliens across our border is a concern that both

countries are addressing through long-standing cooperative relationships. Neither

Canada nor the U.S. views the border as an impermeable barrier, but rather a border that supports trade and travel while protecting the social and economic wellbeing of both countries.

Although Canada and the U.S. have differences in their immigration laws, both

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cerned. The two countries have a long and cherished tradition of embracing immigrants and openness of expression. For both the U.S. and Canada, one of the challenges for democracy is in striking the right balance between facilitation and enforcement while guarding against becoming a refuge for terrorists from abroad. Canada has become the U.S.’ closest ally in the fight against illegal immigration. The

U.S. recognizes that illegal immigration issues cannot be dealt with in isolation, as

does Canada.

In combating illegal immigration, and terrorism in particular, the challenge for

U.S. and Canadian officials is the rapid and timely exchange of information on such

individuals who pose a common threat. Exchanges of information follow established

formal protocols, strengthened by the personal liaison between our officials at the

border. Our officers at the border, in the interior, and overseas, work together closely and continuously to prevent illegal immigration to both countries.

BORDER VISION

Our current border strategy is designed to address ever-changing crossing patterns. We anticipate that the success in our efforts at controlling the southern land

border may result in the shifting of crossing to the northern border. Illegal entry

apprehension figures from the Canadian border are still small when compared to

the southwest border. Our challenge is to work with our Canadian partners to ensure the Canadian border does not become a viable alternative gateway for illegal

entry to the U.S.

In November 1997, Attorney General Janet Reno and Minister of Citizenship and

Immigration Canada (CIC) Lucienne Robillard agreed to build on our already successful cooperation by encouraging immigration officials to formalize their partnership in a Border Vision exercise. They directed the immigration services of Canada

and the U.S. to expand joint cooperation on migration issues (overseas, border and

interior) to protect the region against illegal immigration and the movement of terrorists and criminals. This exercise complements the joint 1995 U.S./Canada Accord

on Our Shared Border.

INS and CIC officials, working closely with their respective State Departments,

are finding ways to combine resources to protect their citizens against the threats

associated with illegal immigration and the movement of terrorists, drug traffickers

and other criminals. Both countries have taken concrete steps to systematically and

regularly share information on known or suspected terrorists to ensure early detection. In May 1997, the U.S. signed an agreement with Canada to share a list of

names of known and suspected terrorists. The program was implemented in April

1998. Clearly, such joint activities illustrate the exceptional level of cooperation between the U.S. and Canada.

The spirit of cooperation on sharing information between Canada and the U.S.

took a major step forward with the signing of the Statement of Mutual Understanding (SMU) on Information Sharing on June 24, 1999. The SMU allows for the

exchange of information on a variety of immigration-related activities between the

two countries.

In addition to the SMU, INS and CIC are exploring the potential for cooperation

on issues such as: name search technology for foreign languages, sharing passportreader technology, the mapping of major smuggling routes to the U.S. and Canada,

and joint interdiction exercises to dismantle smuggling syndicates and established

smuggling routes.

Additionally, the INS and the Department of State (DOS), working with Canadian

authorities, have made significant progress in establishing better coordination between the two countries on visa and entry policies and operations. A comparative

paper on visa exemption policy has been drafted. INS and DOS have reached an

understanding with CIC on the consultative mechanisms on visa and entry policy,

specifically with regard to the sharing of information from visa and immigration

records for the purpose of enhancing border security. The U.S. and Canada have

also prepared comparative papers on visa issuance policies.

Improving coordination between Canada and the U.S. includes an analysis of

criminal offenses of aliens refused admission at certain U.S./Canadian border ports.

Canada and the U.S. have also discussed a pilot program to identify those criminal

aliens who have been deported by both countries, to be accomplished through the

sharing of fingerprint data. We are also exploring the creation of a joint U.S./Canada interdiction and intelligence exercise on illegal aliens transiting the U.S. in

order to attempt entry into Canada.

27

THE U.S./CANADA ACCORD

The U.S./Canada Accord on Our Shared Border brings together four agencies, RC,

CIC, USCS and INS to focus on joint land border issues such as enhancing the security, enforcement and service at low-volume, remote POEs along the northern border

with the use of alternative inspection systems such as RVIS, OARS, and the DCL’s

at selected ports.

Alternative inspection locations are selected only after a careful risk analysis,

which includes consideration of prior enforcement actions and compliance, the general location, surrounding communities, traffic volume and various intelligence regarding actual or potential threats. Previously, citizens at these locations were restricted from crossing by the limited hours of operation. In addition, many remote

locations had little, if any, security and surveillance capability. The use of technology such as remote video interviewing capability, automated inspection, and license plate readers, significantly increases the security of the border. RVIS also provides better lighting, surveillance capabilities and a 24-hour law enforcement presence where previously none had existed. RVIS is currently deployed to nine northern border sites.

Programs under the private boat initiative, including the Outlying Area Reporting

System (OARS), enhance the service provided to the boating and snowmobile communities along the northern border. OARS is a two-way video telephones that enables travelers to receive a primary inspection at selected marinas, docks, and remote areas where there are no inspection facilities.

These initiatives demonstrate the close bilateral cooperation of our two countries.

They also demonstrate the way in which cross-border cooperation can work towards

the common objective of protecting the security of both our nations.

TERRORIST THREAT AT THE NORTHERN BORDER

In December 1999, the INS expanded the security level nationwide in response

to intelligence that indicated there would be an increase of entry attempts by terrorists. INS offices coordinated their planning process at the local level with the other

INS enforcement programs, Federal inspection agencies, and state and local law enforcement entities.

To enhance security, the POE’s: Increased overtime to provide for additional coverage on each shift, moved or detailed inspectors between POE’s within the same

District, and canceled some annual leave, coordinated scheduling with U.S. Customs

Service, identified additional enforcement personnel to augment staff coverage at

POE’s and increased joint enforcement activities such as pre-primary roving, block

blitzes, and 100 percent trunk searches with Customs.

During the days surrounding January 1, 2000, the Border Patrol increased its enforcement posture all across the northern border. The Border Patrol: Detailed

agents from non-northern border Sectors, canceled some annual leave, used overtime and six-day workweeks to expand enforcement coverage, coordinated with local

law enforcement agencies to secure their support in the event additional assistance

was required, increased the frequency of contact with Canadian law enforcement

agencies, and enhanced presence in and around POE’s.

LIAISON WITH COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMUNITY

The INS currently dedicates six full time positions to other federal agencies at the

Headquarters level. At the field level, the INS participates in the FBI’s JTTF. The

agents provide expertise on INS subject matters ranging from the arrest of suspected terrorists for violation of INS statutes to the coordination of potential threat

alerts and lookouts with various INS components.

Recently, the FBI received threat information regarding the possible entry of alleged extremists along the northern border of the United States in the wake recent

arrests. Through national level coordination, the INS rapidly disseminated critical

information to allow targeted ports of entry to reinforce their resources.

The national level representation of INS at FBI Headquarters allows the FBI and

INS to coordinate cooperative arrests in cities where the INS is not represented on

the JTTF. On December 30, 1999, the INS supported the FBI during the course of

its investigations by interviewing numerous individuals. As a result, six subjects

were taken into custody for violation of United States Immigration laws.

During the past thirty days, the FBI and INS have jointly arrested fifteen additional suspects nationwide related to counter-terrorism efforts. Twelve of the fifteen

arrests were for INS criminal and administrative violations.

The INS’ participation and coordination has also resulted in other effective and

significant counter-terrorism operations such as: In March 1999, Operation Eastern

28

Approach conducted by the Los Angeles JTTF resulted in the arrest of 29 suspects

for terrorism and immigration violations and the first conviction of an individual for

violation of the statute prohibiting material support of a terrorist organization, the

MEK or Mujaheddin-e-Khalq, and Other JTTF operations during the past year include the FBI–INS coordinated removal of Hani El-Sayegh to Saudi Arabia. El

Sayegh is suspected of being a conspirator in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi

Arabia, resulting in the deaths of nineteen U.S. armed forces personnel.

CONCLUSION

As you see, our commitment to border security does not start or end with the inspection of persons at a port-of-entry. Our strong working relationships with other

Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, international law enforcement

agencies and other governments allows the INS to safeguard our nation’s borders,

taking a global approach. This is especially apparent along the northern border because of our close relation with Canada.

In closing, I would like to emphasize that inherent in our border enforcement

strategy is the flexibility to respond to emerging conditions and changing tactics. I

look forward to working with the Subcommittee to ensure that INS can continue to

meet today’s demands and tomorrow’s challenges.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and I would be happy to answer any questions that you

and Members of the Subcommittee may have.

Senator ABRAHAM. By previous agreement with respect to the

testimony of Inspector Dean, because of the ongoing nature of the

circumstances in the case there, we will defer any questioning

today. So let me just focus on Mr. Winwood and Mr. Pearson.

Mr. Pearson, you talked a little bit about the relationship between the United States and Canada. Obviously, in the wake of the

Ressam case, there have been some concerns about whether or not

there is a well-coordinated effort. And I guess, Mr. Winwood, I

would kind of like to throw it to both of you. Maybe in our case,

Mr. Pearson, amplify a little bit on your views as to how effective

the coordination is, and in the case of Mr. Winwood on the Customs side as well. So could you maybe expand a little bit?

Mr. PEARSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to. I think we

have a good, close coordination nationally, and also with each of

our sectors and at the ports of entry in our districts with working

with Canada, both with the Canadian immigration system but also

with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We exchange information

on terrorists, we exchange intelligence information. We work together on areas that are being covered.

In the State of Washington, for example, earlier this week at our

Border Vision Conference with Canada, we were working with the

Canadians about the way we have divided much of the southwest

border and are doing on the northern border with zones, working

such that as we are covering particular zones in the Spokane Sector, those areas that we are not focusing on or don’t have the immediate resources to cover, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are

covering the opposite side.

In fact, in Spokane, they have set up zones that are exactly parallel to ours so we can exchange that information. We are exchanging information on terrorists, on threats. Much of the information

we get and people we have stopped at ports of entry or between

ports of entry have been because the Canadians have provided information on who is coming.

Senator ABRAHAM. Mr. Winwood.

Mr. WINWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I would echo those statements. I

think Mr. Pearson has covered the cooperation we have at the border. The other example I would cite was when this heightened alert

29

occurred, the establishment of a collaborative task force in Ottawa,

with intelligence units on both sides of the border. We have Customs officers assigned in Canada both for pre-clearance and at the

embassy in Ottawa, the attache’s office, that has immediate access

to law enforcement information.

There was a tremendous amount of information exchanged,

shared, analyzed between the two governments not only during

this heightened alert but during other circumstances. So I would

say that the cooperation is outstanding. It is coordinated. People

work well together and there is an exchange and flow of information to help each other because we do have a shared concern particularly on our northern border.

Senator ABRAHAM. The concerns that have been expressed about

the Canadians’ policies with respect to immigration, and so on, that

Senator Feinstein mentioned and others, and the media, and so on,

obviously poses a concern. But is it your testimony here today,

though, that with respect to the monitoring of those kinds of terrorist activities, but in particular as to the possibility of people

using Canada as a base to come to the United States, that we are

receiving the fullest possible assistance that we can from the Canadian government?

Mr. PEARSON. I think that certainly we don’t have a system that

is going to catch everything. I wouldn’t want to mislead you by saying that with full cooperation we know everything there is to know

about who is in Canada and who is attempting to get to the United

States, just as we don’t know everything about who is in the

United States and what they may be attempting to do here.

Senator ABRAHAM. Sure. My question was more is it your perspective that the Canadian government is cooperating as fully as

they possibly can in working with us at this point, or are there

things we should be asking for that we have not.

Mr. PEARSON. The answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, is,

yes, I believe they are. I think we have a very good relationship

with them. They have been very open.

Senator ABRAHAM. And on the Customs side?

Mr. WINWOOD. Yes, sir, I would have to echo that, also. Particularly in these circumstances, the data and information was open,

the information was flowing back and forth. There was nothing

kept back from either side, very open and very cooperative.

Senator ABRAHAM. Now, let me shift gears a little bit. When the

incidents that Inspector Dean was part of took place, you have already chronicled the flexibility that was used to bring people to the

Port Angeles area, to the border in that area, but obviously that

strained conditions elsewhere.

Can you give us perhaps a little sense of what kind of limits and

what constraints we have, and more or less what was left, shall we

say, more vulnerable perhaps because of that shifting of resources?

Mr. WINWOOD. Well, in our case, Mr. Chairman, we hope we

didn’t leave anything vulnerable. What we did was we did move

some personnel from other locations, but at each location where we

removed personnel we asked our officers to work extra hours. We

covered normal processing at our southern border and our airports

and seaports, where people volunteered to go to the northern border during this heightened time.

30

Now, the strain, of course, was on the officers. They had to leave

home, they were on temporary detail, they were in strange areas.

They knew their job, they were well-trained, but it was away from

home. So the strain on us was moving people and keeping them

away from their home port on these temporary details.

Our goal, though, with our operational plans and our alert levels

is that we have contingency plans that allow us to then back up

and put other officers on the line or to take other procedures and

to increase the amount of hours and overtime that we use to cover

the places where we pull people from.

Mr. PEARSON. And we did the same thing. Our personnel really

stepped up, understood why leave had to be canceled and understood why they had to work additional duties over Christmas and

New Year’s and stuff like that. We did have intelligence information on which routes our intelligence community thought that the

threats might be coming, so we did focus on more attention on

those routes, drawing from other areas. But I wouldn’t say that we

left any area vulnerable.

Senator ABRAHAM. Well, let me ask it a little differently. And I

am glad to hear it, obviously; I am sure all of the audience is as

well. But let me just ask how many such threats at one time would

we be able to address, given the personnel levels that we have

today, and for how extensive a time frame would that be possible?

Mr. PEARSON. That would be a very difficult question to answer

because we certainly look at the extent of the threat, what we are

looking for for the kinds of numbers. We have 305 Border Patrol

agents on the northern border. We recognize that for where we

want to get in the border strategy that that is not enough. That

comes in Phase IV, as we have discussed before.

Should the threat level be high enough, we can take from other

parts of the country, to include the southwest border. We have not

done that yet because of the successes we have had on the northern

border, and I would say the same applies at the ports of entry.

Senator ABRAHAM. I recognize the hypothetical nature of the

question makes it difficult to address, but I guess the concern that

I have is that while, when we were able to focus all of our energies

in one area, we could maintain adequate vigilance to cover that

area and be able to kind of make due elsewhere because of people

working extraordinary hours and being taken off their leaves, and

so on, it just seems to me that you probably couldn’t be doing more

than a few of those kinds of intense efforts at the same time without basically breaking the system, which leads to something I will

be asking about later.

I don’t want to answer these for you, but I obviously am interested in, practically speaking, what can be done in the face of, say,

a multi-tiered threat.

Mr. WINWOOD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will tell you that the actions we took obviously put a strain on the organization both in

time and cost. There are only so many hours a day that dedicated

officers like Diana and others can work. When you have people

working 16 hours a day, double shifts, in very trying conditions, it

takes its toll.

I will also tell you, as I mentioned in my testimony, that the tremendous growth in travel and trade that is affecting this country,

31

which is good—it is good for the economy—there has never been a

perfect match with resources to address the increase.

So is it a strain? Yes. Is it the most optimal way to work? I

would say no. I guess this is the time to thank you for the efforts

you have done with the bills that you have proposed recognizing

the need to at least match the growth of work that we face on a

day-to-day basis. If we could at least do that, we would have the

opportunity to make the proper adjustments for these types of crises that will arise. If you have the right base and match the growth

accordingly, then the strain for instances such as this isn’t quite as

bad. But it is not the ideal way to operate for long-term or multiple

crises.

Senator ABRAHAM. Well, that is kind of where I was headed because it seems to me that we do need to give you the support you

need. I said at the outset and, of course, have been talking about

that a couple of years now. It just seems as a practical matter that

if you were trying to be highly strategic about it and you were trying to figure out a way to penetrate our net here, you would take

advantage of a situation where there was a particularly disproportionate number of agents, and so on, aimed in one particular area,

that would give you probably an incentive, if you were trying to

smuggle somebody into this country, to do it where the lines were

shorter.

That goes to really what I guess I wanted to finish this panel

with, and that is just to ask you what sorts of things we, the Congress, should be doing in terms of providing support to make it possible not to meet every crisis, but to meet just the challenges we

have today.

The number in terms of the northern border which has been

mentioned here several times, whether it is the Detroit region

where we have got 30 inspectors covering 4 States, hundreds of

miles of border, or 400 for the entire 4,000-mile border, are ones

that cause us to be particularly shocked. I mean, I think anybody

recognizes that 1 agent per 13 miles, or whatever the ration is, is

inadequate.

We obviously want to hear what your needs are, so let me just

throw it open and let each of you on behalf of your agencies give

us a sense of what you are looking at and what you think would

be the kind of force level that would give you the ability to defend

the borders the way you want to.

Mr. WINWOOD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would say one thing. A

sound bite I heard when this incident occurred which I think

echoes what you just said was that it is probably true that Ressam

did not pick the ferry and arriving at Port Angeles because he

wanted a nice ferry boat ride. It is a very vulnerable port, it is

small, it is isolated, and obviously it is a target of opportunity for

people who would like to take advantage of our borders.

I think the best way I could answer it, Mr. Chairman, is when

you have the opportunity with our commissioner establishing

through PricewaterhouseCoopers one of the first ever total, acrossthe-board resource allocation models that takes into account the information associated with growth, et cetera—I think the best way

to do that is, when you and your staff have the opportunity, to

32

show you what we are trying to do which gives us an indication

of what the staffing to meet the needs of the future should be.

It is more of a documented, well-designed methodology versus

throwing out numbers. So rather than throw out numbers, I would

say let’s take a look at the resource allocation model when it is finally finished—there are a few more modifications to be made to

it—demonstrate it to you and see where that takes us because I

think it will show where we need to have the proper increases to

meet the tremendous growth of work and challenges that face anybody that is attempting to secure the borders for the American

public.

Senator ABRAHAM. Well, whenever anybody appears with a notebook as thick as that, I mean we are always very interested, and

we will have you testify as to its contents at a later point. But I

suspect that not all 100 members of the Senate are going to be interested in the documents there. But I think it is important—I

mean, we will be happy to obviously meet with you—but to get a

sense of what the needs are in perhaps a more succinct way.

Mr. WINWOOD. Mr. Chairman, please, I will not put you through

this. I can’t go through this, but what this model does—— Senator ABRAHAM. I guess the question is after I have gone

through the first 972 pages, is there on the last page sort of—— Mr. WINWOOD. Right, that is what the model does. The model

gives the numbers. That is it. This is just how the model is put together. I wouldn’t put you through this.

Senator ABRAHAM. You have referenced it enough. I am sufficiently intimidated now.

Let’s move to Mr. Pearson. What do you need over there? You

don’t have a notebook, so you must have a number.

Mr. PEARSON. Well, actually, Mr. Chairman, I do, but it is in

notes here. Let me first thank you for all the support you and the

subcommittee have given over the years. The INS has grown tremendously since 1994. And it is not just the INS, but the support

that you have given for the inspection stations.

The simple answer is continue with that support. Recognize that,

as Mr. Winwood talked about and I mentioned, that the Border Coordination Initiative is something that works. We recognize that at

the ports of entry, we are a team. So I would ask that with the

President’s budget for 2001, please support it both on the Customs

side and the INS side, so we can get some more inspectors out

there and we can get more personnel to help guard our borders, as

well as the use of technology.

Senator ABRAHAM. We will support it. I think our plan is probably to provide more support than is outlined in it. And I recognize

obviously when the President is putting a budget together, he has

to make priority decisions, but I have to confess that at least my

understanding is that the numbers, as I indicated in my remarks,

that are supported there or that are proposed are not at the 1,000

new per-year agent level that I know the Congress supports.

I have always said we have one of the more unusual subcommittees, in that most of my fellow subcommittee chairs have agencies

come to them and ask for more money than Congress is prepared

to provide. I sort of find myself in the reverse role of trying to urge

more requests because I think this committee is prepared to proVerDate 31-AUG-2001 15:51 Sep 09, 2001 Jkt 072523 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\C523.XXX pfrm04 PsN: C523
33

vide whatever reasonable requests are made here in terms of addressing some of these problems. So we will obviously be talking

more about it.

With respect to inspectors, my understanding is that the administration is proposing 115 new land border inspectors. Is that right?

Mr. PEARSON. That is correct.

Senator ABRAHAM. But I believe 87 of those will go to new ports

of entry that are being created in Texas. I think that is the allocation, which means only 28 will go to existing land border ports.

That is where I think we are going to have some disagreement here

probably not in the subcommittee but in the Congress.

Now, that doesn’t mean we can’t come to an agreement ultimately, but every indication we have had is that 28 for the rest of

the country is not enough and that we are going to have to plusup that amount. I know from the agency’s point of view our support

in that respect may not be on your immediate agenda, but probably

something we can work together to achieve.

But I would say that Congress, I think, is interested in providing

that support, and I think I can speak for most of the subcommittee

that there is that type of backing here. And I think we are a little

bit frustrated sometimes when the proposals are lower than what

seem to be at least the needs, but we can save that discussion for

a later date.

I just would conclude by saying that Inspector Dean’s presence

here today means a lot to us, and I know that those of you here

in Washington appreciate the people on your front lines. They don’t

always get the attention in the favorable way that we want, but

I think as Senator Feinstein said, and Senator Gorton, and I tried

to allude as well to the fact that it is real people on the front lines

that are the ones who make the difference.

We can have all the high-tech equipment, and so on, and that

can make a difference, too, but I think at the end of the day you

have to have talented, trained people running that equipment. And

you have to have people who have, through their own personal experiences, the expertise to make a discerning difference between

someone who might pose a threat and someone who doesn’t.

And ultimately you have to have well-trained, but also I think

well-compensated people, people who have an incentive to do their

jobs well. And that is another part of our goal here to try to not

just talk in terms of increasing numbers, but making sure that the

job itself is sufficiently reimbursed, remunerated, and supported so

that the people who can do the job want to stay in this work.

One of the things that we learned at an earlier hearing—and it

was somewhat, I guess, not surprising in a sense, but somewhat

disappointing—was that a lot of the very best people on the front

lines are basically being recruited away by either other Federal law

enforcement agencies or the private sector because the pay and

compensation and benefits are inadequate to really cause the jobs

that we have here in the Border Patrol and Customs, and so on,

to be sufficiently appealing.

And we don’t want that to happen. We want you to stay doing

that job because you have proven that you are our best line of defense, Inspector. So we are going to continue to push for improvement in those kinds of conditions so that we, in fact, can meet the

34

goal of recruitment that we want and the retention of people, because a lot of our problem has been that even though we are recruiting new people, we are losing folks that cause the net number

to not be as high as we want.

So I thank you all and we will ask the next panel to come up.

But Inspector Dean, particularly, thank you for what you have

done for your country. We are grateful.

Ms. DEAN. Thank you.

Senator ABRAHAM. Again, I want to thank our first panel and

now welcome our second panel. We are joined by, again, three of

our front-line folks who work on our borders.

First, we have Mr. Robert Lindemann, who has been here with

us before. It is good to have you back, Agent Lindemann. He is a

senior patrol agent in the Detroit Sector and a 15-year veteran, a

union steward for the National Border Patrol Council.

We also have INS Inspector Ryan Callister, from the Eastport,

ID, port of entry office, and shop steward, I guess, of Local 40,

American Federation of Government Employees.

Then we also have and welcome INS Inspector Ora Smith, who

is also from my home State of Michigan, where he is the president

of Local 46 of the American Federation of Government Employees.

Let me say that, as I acknowledged to Inspector Dean, we really

appreciate the work that you and your colleagues do. The people

of Michigan certainly appreciate our team at home, and I am sure

that the folks in Idaho do you as well, Inspector Callister. We kind

of take some of this for granted. In fact, because of the very nature

of the work, too often the only contact citizens have with people in

the Border Patrol or the inspections, and so on, come when they

are traveling across the border and there is a traffic jam or congestion and they get frustrated.

But when a story like the one at Port Angeles happens, then I

suspect it causes people to rethink their impatience and appreciate

the fact that the job that you have to do is a pretty challenging one

that requires the skills that you all bring.

So I want to just say that up front and now turn to you, Agent

Lindemann, for opening comments.

PANEL CONSISTING OF ROBERT E. LINDEMANN, SENIOR BORDER PATROL AGENT, DETROIT SECTOR, AND UNION STEWARD, NATIONAL BORDER PATROL COUNCIL, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, DETROIT, MI; RYAN

H. CALLISTER, IMMIGRATION INSPECTOR, IMMIGRATION

AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AND STEWARD, LOCAL 40,

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,

EASTPORT, ID; AND ORA A. SMITH, IMMIGRATION INSPECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AND PRESIDENT, LOCAL 46, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, DETROIT,

MI

STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. LINDEMANN

Mr. LINDEMANN. First off, I would like to thank you again for

having me in front of your committee. First, I would like to discuss

an ongoing problem that continues to plague the northern border

35

and Southeast, directly affecting our ability to provide adequate

border security. There seems to be a lack of commitment from the

INS to provide these areas with the necessary officers, support personnel, equipment, and funding to secure the border and combat an

escalating alien and drug-smuggling problem.

Woefully inadequate staffing levels, antiquated technology, and

insufficient funding have greatly reduced our ability to control illegal immigration and drug-smuggling in these areas. Current staffing and funding for these critical areas is only a fraction of what

is needed.

Routine repairs to patrol vehicles are often neglected, patrol

boats sit idle, and illegal aliens that should be detained or deported

are released. This severe deficiency in border enforcement readiness was highlighted last December after several Algerian terrorists were captured trying to enter the United States and the INS

attempted to provide around-the-clock border security on the 4,000-

mile northern border with fewer than 300 agents. As you can well

imagine, it was impossible to provide adequate security with such

a small workforce.

For years, experts have identified the northern border and

Southeast as likely and preferred avenues for criminals to enter

the United States because of the vast territory and lack of law enforcement personnel. Although this is common knowledge, it appears to have been ignored by the INS in determining staffing allocations. It is heartening to see that some members of Congress are

trying to correct these deficiencies and place much-needed resources in these critical areas to avert future potential threats to

our national security.

Senate bill 745, introduced by Senator Abraham, would require

funding for much-needed increases in manpower and resources for

the Border Patrol, INS, and Customs Service. The National Border

Patrol Council supports this initiative and commends you, Senator,

for your tireless commitment to strengthen our borders. Your leadership, as well as Senator Kennedy’s and that of other members of

this subcommittee, has been invaluable.

We ask Congress to ensure that any legislation that adds manpower to the Border Patrol on the northern border and Southeast

specify that such personnel be voluntarily transferred from the

ranks of experienced officers, for three reasons.

First, the complexity of work on the northern border and Southeast is generally greater than that on the southwest border, requiring agents that already have field experience.

Second, the northern border and Southeast do not have the resources to properly train new agents.

Third, and by no means least importantly, placing new hires in

highly desirable locations on the northern border and Southeast

that current officers have been waiting years to transfer to would

have a devastating effect on morale, exacerbating an already high

attrition rate.

In addition to the equipment and manpower specified in Senate

bill 745, there needs to be specific language directing additional resources to the Border Patrol, particularly on the northern border

and Southeast. Sad experience has shown that the INS will not do

the right thing unless it is ordered to do so.

36

In addition to the equipment specified in Senate bill 745, consideration should also be given to funding long-range patrol boats for

the Border Patrol. Additional funding should be provided for upgrading communications equipment and intrusion sensors for the

northern border and Southeast. The systems employed throughout

these areas are antiquated and inadequate by any standards.

We commend Senator Abraham and this subcommittee for the vision to provide funding for 40 intelligence analysts to be deployed

in drug-trafficking areas. This would be the first time that the Border Patrol would have a trained staff of intelligence personnel to

gather and disseminate the raw intelligence gathered from the

field.

In closing, the longer it takes to increase officers and support

personnel, modernize and augment technology, and provide adequate detention and removal funding on the northern border and

Southeast, the more attractive these areas will be for aliens and

drug smugglers.

Again, thank you for having me and I will answer any questions

you have, sir.

Senator ABRAHAM. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lindemann follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. LINDEMANN

Good afternoon. My name is Robert E. Lindemann. I am the Vice President of the

National Border Patrol Council, Local 2499. I am a Senior Border Patrol Agent with

over 15 years of experience, and am currently assigned to the Detroit Border Patrol

Sector.

Thank you for the invitation to appear before this Subcommittee regarding the

important issue of border security.

First, I would like to discuss an ongoing problem that continues to plague the

northern border and Southeast, directly affecting our ability to provide adequate

border security. There seems to be a lack of commitment from the I&NS to provide

these areas with the necessary officers, support personnel, equipment and funding

to secure the border and combat escalating alien and drug smuggling. Woefully inadequate staffing levels, antiquated technology, and insufficient funding have greatly reduced our ability to control illegal immigration and drug smuggling along these

areas.

While manpower, equipment and funding for these areas should have increased

at the same time the southwestern border was augmented, it actually decreased.

Small increases were undertaken only after inquiry and prodding by concerned

members of this Subcommittee.

Current staffing and funding for these critical areas is only a fraction of what is

needed. Routine repairs to patrol vehicles are often neglected, patrol boats sit idle,

and illegal aliens that should be detained and deported are released.

This severe deficiency in border enforcement readiness was highlighted last December after several Algerian terrorists were captured trying to enter the United

States and the I&NS attempted to provide around-the-clock border security on the

4,000 mile northern border with fewer than 300 agents. As you can well imagine,

it was impossible to provide adequate security with such a small workforce.

For years, experts have identified the northern border and Southeast as likely and

preferred avenues for criminals to enter the United States because of the vast territory and lack of law enforcement personnel. Although this is common knowledge,

it appears to have been ignored by the I&NS in determining staffing allocations.

It is heartening to see that some members of Congress are trying to correct these

deficiencies and place much-needed resources in these critical areas to avert future

potential threats to our national security.

S. 745, introduced by Senator Abraham, would require funding for much-needed

increases in manpower and resources for the Border Patrol, I&NS, and Customs

Service. The National Border Patrol Council supports this initiative and commends

you, Senator Abraham, for your tireless commitment to strengthen our borders.

Your leadership, as well as Senator Kennedy’s and that of other members of this

37

Subcommittee, has been invaluable on this and other immigration enforcement

issues, and is greatly appreciated.

We ask Congress to ensure that any legislation that adds manpower to the Border

Patrol on the northern border and Southeast specify that such personnel be voluntarily transferred from the ranks of experienced officers for three reasons. First, the

complexity of the work on the northern border and Southeast is generally greater

than that on the southwestern border, requiring agents that already have field experience. Second, the northern border and Southeast do not have the resources to

property train new agents. Third, and by no means least importantly, placing newhires in highly desirable locations on the northern border and Southeast that current officers have been waiting years to transfer to would have a devastating effect

on morale, exacerbating on already high attrition rate.

In addition to the equipment and manpower specified in S. 745, there needs to

be specific language directing additional resources to the Border Patrol, particularly

on the northern border and Southeast. Sad experience has shown that the I&NS

will not do the right thing unless it is ordered to do so.

One of the most frustrating aspects of my job is encountering illegal aliens that

have to be released because there is no money to detain and remove them. This

problem also needs to be addressed.

In addition to the equipment specified in S. 745, consideration should also be

given to funding long-range patrol boats for the Border Patrol. These boats should

be large enough to be suitable for cold weather and/or rough water operations as

well as search rescue applications, and outfitted with LORUS night vision scopes.

Additionally, funding should be provided for upgrading field communications

equipment and intrusion sensors for the northern border and Southeast. The systems employed throughout these areas are antiquated and inadequate by any standards.

We commend Senator Abraham and this Subcommittee for the vision to provide

funding for 40 intelligence analysts to be deployed in drug trafficking areas. This

would be the first time that the Border Patrol would have a trained staff of intelligence personnel to gather and disseminate the raw intelligence gathered from the

field.

In closing, the longer it takes to increase officers and support personnel, modernize and augment technology, and provide adequate detention and removal funding on the northern border and Southeast, the more attractive these areas will be

for alien and drug smugglers.

Thank you all for your time, and I will be happy to answer any questions.

Senator ABRAHAM. Inspector Callister.

STATEMENT OF RYAN H. CALLISTER

Mr. CALLISTER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for this

opportunity to express my perspective on the security of the northern border of the United States of America and of the role of the

immigration inspector in this vital issue.

My name is Ryan Callister. I am a steward for Local 40, American Federation of Government Employees, and an inspector for the

last 3 years at Eastport, ID. The Eastport, ID, port of entry is

staffed 24 hours a day with four Immigration and Naturalization

Service employees and eight U. S. Customs Service employees. At

times, the four INS employees work long hours on overtime and

the schedule is augmented with part-time and detailed inspectors.

The constant lack of sufficient staff on the entire northern border

has a deleterious effect on border security. There are simply not

enough inspectors to do the job. INS management at the ports of

entry are constantly juggling shift coverage. Some 24-hour ports of

entry have even had to eliminate the Immigration midnight shift.

This has resulted in overburdening Customs, and has caused friction between the two agencies.

A major contributing factor in the lack of staffing is that Immigration inspectors have not been designated as Federal law enforcement officers by the Department of Justice or by Congress. This

38

negatively impacts recruitment and retention of Immigration inspectors. Inspections is no longer a favored path within INS. As

soon as inspectors finish their 18-week basic training course, they

are looking for better jobs in the INS or other agencies which provide greater pay, benefits, and law enforcement coverage.

Currently, there is an approximately 15-percent turnover annually in the inspections program nationwide. This necessitates that

the agency rely more on part-time help and 60-hour-plus work

weeks for those inspectors who remain. There is not even benefit

parity with our brothers and sisters in the Customs Service.

Inspectors have been empowered by the Attorney General to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right

to be or remain in the United States, to arrest any alien who, in

his presence or view, is entering the United States in violation of

any law or regulation pertaining to the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the authority to carry a firearm. Inspectors have

even recently been issued bullet-proof vests. As the saying goes, if

it looks like a duck, talks like a duck, and walks like a duck, then

it is a duck. The Inspections Branch is past due for law enforcement coverage.

In the last 10 years, the southern border has been augmented

with many new positions, while the northern border has not. It is

equally important for the northern border to be adequately staffed.

People do not build walls around three sides of their home and expect to keep out unwanted individuals. This is what has happened

with respect to America’s undermanned northern border.

It is not a coincidence that the Ahmed Ressam incident occurred

in Port Angeles, WA, in December. Anyone, including terrorists,

can read about the 3,987 miles of virtually unguarded border between Canada and the United States.

It is interesting to note that with the Ressam case, INS had encountered him at a pre-inspection station in Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, prior to his boarding the ferry for Port Angeles.

However, INS had only one inspector working because the three

other inspectors on duty that day were needed for inspections elsewhere. That one inspector had to single-handedly inspect every vehicle and driver boarding the ship.

The inspector felt Ressam’s story was suspicious and did take a

closer look at him. He checked Ressam’s documents, which were

valid, although issued under false pretenses. He also did a cursory

inspection of his luggage and rental car. Had he had more time and

help, the explosives might have been found. The ship was sailing

and the inspector had to leave to conduct another inspection 40

miles away.

A simple analogy is that America is like a house located on a

flood plain. Congress has done the basic job of providing Immigration and Customs with enough sand bags to protect the front door

when the river rises. But until there are enough sand bags to go

around the house, you should not be surprised when the river rises

that water comes through the back door.

Within the last few weeks, Immigration Inspections has been informed that their budget on the northern border in Washington

State, Idaho, Montana, Vermont, and elsewhere has been reduced

from the insufficient levels of fiscal year 1999 to an even greater

39

inadequacy for the year 2000. These reductions are exacerbated by

the fact that the budget was not enacted until December, 3 months

into the new fiscal year.

In addition, massive amounts of overtime were spent in December 1999 and early January because of the World Trade Organization in Seattle, the advent of the millennium, and the heightened

security alert due to the suspected terrorist interceptions in

Vermont and Washington State.

Recently deceased General Leonard F. Chapman, ex-commissioner of INS, once said 5-ton trucks are not built to carry 10-ton

loads. If Congress is serious about strengthening America’s efforts

to stem terrorism and the smuggling of aliens and illicit drugs on

its northern border, then it must hire and fund an ample number

of full-time inspectors to do the job. Senator Abraham’s legislation,

S. 745, is an important step in that direction.

In addition, Congress must pass legislation that designates Immigration and Customs inspectors as law enforcement officers, and

make the pay and benefits for these employees comparable with

Federal and State law enforcement personnel.

I again thank the subcommittee, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ABRAHAM. Thanks, Inspector. We appreciate it.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Callister follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RYAN H. CALLISTER

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for

this opportunity to express my perspective on the security of the Northern Border

of the United States of America and the role of the Immigration Inspector in this

vital issue. My name is Ryan H. Callister. I am a Steward for Local 40, American

Federation of Government Employees, and an Immigration Inspector stationed for

the last three years at Eastport, Idaho.

The Eastport, Idaho Port of Entry is staffed twenty four hours a day with four

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) employees and eight United States

Customs Service (USCS) employees. At time, the four INS employees work long

hour on overtime and the schedule is augmented with part-time and detailed Inspectors. The constant lack of sufficient staff on the entire Northern Border has a

deleterious effect on border security. There are simply not enough Inspectors to accomplish the job. INS Management at the ports of entry are constantly ‘‘juggling’’ shift coverage. Some twenty four hour Ports have even had to eliminate the Immigration midnight shift. This has resulted in overburdening Customs and has caused

friction between the two agencies.

A major contributing factor in the lack of staffing is that Immigration Inspectors

have no been designated as Federal Law Enforcement Officers by the Department

of Justice or by Congress. This negatively impacts recruitment and retention of Immigration Inspectors. Inspections is no longer a favored path within INS. As soon

as Inspectors finish their eighteen week basic training course, they are looking for

better jobs in the INS or other agencies which provide greater pay, benefits, and

Law Enforcement coverage. Currently there is approximately a 15 percent turnover

annually in the Inspection’s program nationwide. This necessitates that the agency

rely more on part-time help and sixty hours plus work weeks for those Inspectors

who remain. There is no even benefit parity with our brothers and sisters in the

Customs Service.

Inspectors have been empowered by the Attorney General to interrogate any alien

or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or remain in the United

States, to arrest any alien who in his presence or view is entering the United States

in violation to any law or regulation pertaining to the Immigration and Nationality

Act, and the authority to carry a firearm. Inspectors have been recently been issued

bullet proof vests. As the saying goes, ‘‘if it looks like a duck, talks like a duck, and

walks like a duck, then it is a duck.’’ the Inspector’s Branch is past due for Law

Enforcement coverage.

In the last ten years, the Southern Border has been augmented with many new

positions while the Northern Border has not. It is equally important for the Northern Border to be adequately staffed. People do not build walls around three sides

40

of their home and expect to keep out unwanted individuals. This is what has happened with respect to America’s undermanned Northern Border. It is not a coincidence that the Ahmed Ressam incident occurred in Port Angeles, WA in December.

Anyone including Terrorists can read about the 3,987 miles of virtually unguarded

border between Canada and the United States.

It is interesting to note that with the Ressam case, INS has encountered him at

a pre-inspection station in Victoria, BC Canada prior to his boarding the ferry for

Port Angeles. However, INS has only one Inspector working because the three other

Inspectors on duty that day were needed for inspections elsewhere. That one Inspector had to single handedly inspect every vehicle and driver boarding the ship. The

Inspector felt Ressam’s story was suspicious and took a closer look at him. He

checked Ressam’s documents, which were valid although issued under false pretenses. He also did a cursory inspection of his language and rental care. Had he

had more time and help, the explosives might have been found; the ship was sailing

and the Inspector had to leave to conduct another inspection forty miles away.

A simple analogy is that America is like a house located on a flood plan. Congress

has done the basic job of providing Immigration and Customs with enough sandbags

to protect the front door when the river arises. But until there are enough sandbags

to go around the house, you should not be surprised when the river rises that water

comes through the back door.

Within the last few weeks Immigration Inspections have been informed that their

budget on the Northern Border in Washington State, Idaho, Montana, and elsewhere has been reduced from the insufficient levels of fiscal year 1999 to an even

greater inadequacy for the year 2000. These reductions are exacerbated by the fact

that the budget was not enacted until December—three months into the new fiscal

year. In addition, massive amounts of overtime were spent in December 1999 and

early January because of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle, the advent of the millennium, and the heigtened security alert due to the suspected terrorist interceptions in Vermont and Washington States. Recently deceased General

Leonard F. Chapman, ex-Commissioner of INS, once said, ‘‘Five ton trucks are not

build to carry ten ton loads.’’

If Congress is serious about strengthening America’s effort to stem terrorism and

the smuggling of aliens and illicit drugs on its Northern Border, then it must hire

and fund an ample number of full-time Inspectors to do the job. Senator Abraham’s

legislation, S. 745, is an important step in that direction. In addition, Congress must

pass legislation that designates Immigration and Customs Inspectors as Law Enforcement Officers and make the pay and benefits for these employees comparable

with Federal and State law Enforcement Personnel.

I thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to present this testimony and I

would be happy to answer any questions that you might have to the best of my

abilities.

Senator ABRAHAM. Mr. Smith, good to have you here.

STATEMENT OF ORA A. SMITH

Mr. SMITH. Senator Abraham, members of the committee, it is an

honor to speak to you today in support of Senate bill 745. For

years, the news media, INS, and Congress has systematically practiced institutionalized neglect of our northern border. We are heartened by your introduction of S. 745, the Border Improvement and

Immigration Act of 1999. It gives us something we have not had

for years—hope.

Increasing numbers of Eastern European illegals are entering

the United States through our northern border. Many legally enter

Canada before illegally crossing into the United States. These Eastern Europeans are not unskilled, menial laborers. They are taking

American skilled trades workers’ jobs. These illegals walk our

streets unnoticed because they generally have no physically distinguishing ethnic characteristics.

Mainland Chinese are showing up at northern border ports in

record numbers. Since November, there have been over 40 undocumented Chinese and 1 Chinese individual with a genuine Japanese

passport apprehended at Detroit Metro Airport. Smugglers of illeVerDate 31-AUG-2001 15:51 Sep 09, 2001 Jkt 072523 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\C523.XXX pfrm04 PsN: C523
41

gal drugs and other contraband have also discovered the porosity

of our northern border. Just ask our brothers and sisters who are

border inspectors for Customs, Agriculture, and the Fish and Wildlife Service.

The recent arrest of Ahmed Ressam is a prime example of why

northern border Federal inspection programs must be strengthened. Today’s terrorists do not dress as Mexican peasants and

swim across the Rio Grande. They have the financial resources to

buy the highest-quality counterfeit documents or, as in the case of

Ahmed Ressam and the Chinese at Detroit, to fraudulently get real

documents. Only a trained inspector can detect an illegal who has

a genuine document.

The Detroit border ports have seen an estimated 300- to 400-percent growth in traffic over the past 10 years. The staffing shortage

at Detroit has become critical. On January 12, 2000, Detroit began

ordering inspectors to work 8-hour overtime shifts instead of 4-hour

overtime shifts. Less than 50 full- and part-time inspectors work

the auto line at the Detroit Bridge and Tunnel. The INS’ own staffing model shows a requirement for 102 full-time inspectors. The

INS solution to this problem has been to order more and longer

overtime shifts. The situation at our Port Huron and Sault Ste.

Marie, MI, ports is only marginally better.

Staffing is also a problem at Detroit Metro Airport, the 11th

busiest international airport in the world. Metro inspectors average

45 to 50,000 inspections each per year, while inspectors at other

airports average only 20 to 30,000. Seven new international flights,

bringing an additional 1,400 to 2,000 passengers per day, will begin

arriving at Metro within the next 4 months. There is no planned

increase of inspectors.

In December 2001, a new terminal designed to accommodate

4,000 arriving international passengers per hour is scheduled to

open. The INS has known about this new terminal for 2 years, but

we have seen no efforts to recruit more inspectors.

Staff shortages at our airports are further exacerbated by an unrealistic congressional requirement to complete the primary inspection of an arriving flight in 45 minutes or less. Like the inspector

who first encountered Ahmed Ressam, many of our best and most

capable inspectors just don’t have the time to do a proper inspection. Inadequate staffing, facilities, and equipment have made incomplete and/or poor inspections the rule at many busy ports.

Many inspectors have simply quit questioning applicants or have

tailored their questions to elicit safe answers. Many inspectors no

longer make any attempt to determine the citizenship of persons

crossing our international border. Recently, my counterpart in the

Customs union stated that Customs inspectors at the Detroit truck

docks, the busiest on the northern border, no longer bother to check

for immigration violations because there are not any immigration

inspectors to process them.

Finally, I would like to thank Senator Abraham for including

language in Senate bill 745 to adopt a sensible approach to the implementation of departure controls required by section 110 of the

1996 Immigration Act. The implementation of section 110 would do

absolutely nothing to combat terrorism, alien smuggling, or address

any other border security issues. We need more staff, better equipVerDate 31-AUG-2001 15:51 Sep 09, 2001 Jkt 072523 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\C523.XXX pfrm04 PsN: C523
42

ment, better training, and better facilities, not more ill-conceived

missions of questionable value.

The premature implementation of section 110 would serve only

to destroy whatever tiny shreds of pride, professionalism, and esprit that are somehow surviving our current mistreatment by INS.

I believe that if section 110 were implemented today, four to six of

our Detroit inspectors would simply quit their jobs rather than face

even more 16-hour shifts.

I urge each and every member of this committee and the entire

Congress in the strongest possible terms to get behind Senate bill

745 and make it a reality. If you want northern border security,

it is time for you to make the commitment of giving us the recognition, pay, and grade of law enforcement officers, state-of-the-art

equipment, proper training, and adequate facilities and manpower.

Senator Abraham, members of the committee, if you make this

commitment to the front-line employees, without hesitation or reservation I promise you we will make it happen.

Once again, thank you for the privilege of bringing my message

to you. I will do my best to answer any questions you may have,

and I would also request, Senator, that I be allowed to submit some

supporting documentation into the record.

Senator ABRAHAM. Without objection, we will be glad to include

in the record the additional documents, if any of you have anything

to add to your opening statements. I also would like to submit the

prepared statement of Colleen M. Kelly, National President, National Treasury Employees Union.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith along with additional

items referred to above follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ORA A. SMITH

Senator Abraham, members of the committee, it is an honor to speak to you today

in support of S. 745. For years, the news media, I&NS, and Congress have systematically practiced institutionalized neglect of our northern border. We are heartened

by your introduction of S. 745, the Border Improvement and Immigration Act of

1999. It gives us something we have not had for years. HOPE!

Since the end of the cold war, an increasing number of Eastern European illegals

are entering the United States through our northern border. Many legally enter

Canada before illegally crossing into the United States. These Eastern Europeans

are not unskilled menial laborers. They are taking American skilled trades workers’

jobs. These illegals walk our streets unnoticed because they generally have no physically distinguishing ethnics characteristics.

Mainland Chinese are showing up at northern border airports and seaports in

record number. Since November, there have been over 40 undocumented Chinese,

and one Chinese individual with a genuine Japanese passport, apprehended at

Detriot Metro Airport.

Smugglers of illegal drugs and other contraband have also discovered the porosity

of our northern border. Just ask our brothers and sisters who are border inspector

for Customs, Agriculture, and Fish and Wildlife.

The recent arrest of Ahmed Ressam is a prime example of why northern border

Federal Inspection Programs must be strengthened. Today’s terrorists do not dress

as Mexican peasants and swim across the Rio Grande. They have the financial resources to buy the highest quality counterfeit documents, or, as in the case of

Ahmed Ressam and the Chinese at Detroit, to fraudulently get real travel documents. Only a trained Inspector can detect an illegal who has a genuine document.

The Detroit border ports, have seen an estimated 300 to 400 percent growth in

traffic over the past 10 years. The staffing shortage in Detroit has become so critical

that on January 12, 2000, Detroit began ordering Inspectors to work eight hour

overtime shifts instead of four hour overtime shifts.

Less than 50 full and part-time Inspectors work the auto line at the Detroit

bridge and tunnel. The I&N’s own staffing model shows a requirement for 102 fullVerDate 31-AUG-2001 15:51 Sep 09, 2001 Jkt 072523 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\C523.XXX pfrm04 PsN: C523
43

time Inspectors. The I&NS solution to this problem has been to order more and

longer overtime shifts. The situation at our Port Huron and Sault Ste. Marie, MI

ports is only marginally better.

Staffing is also a problem at Detroit Metro Airport, the 11th busiest international

airport in the world. Metro Inspectors average 45,000 to 50,000 inspections each per

year, while Inspectors at other airports average only 20,000 to 30,000. Seven new

international flights bringing an additional 1,400 to 2,000 additional passengers per

day will begin arriving at Metro within the next four months. There is no planned

increase of Inspectors.

In December 2001, a new terminal designed to accommodate 4,000 arriving international passengers per hour is scheduled to open. Although the I&NS has known

of this new terminal for more than two years, we have seen no efforts to recruit

more Inspectors.

Staff shortages at our airports are further exacerbated by an unrealistic Congressional requirement to complete the primary inspection of an arriving flight in 45

minutes or less. Often, this requirement is mathematically impossible, and can only

be achieved if the Inspectors perform improper and/or incomplete inspections.

Like the Inspector who first encountered Ahmed Ressam, many of our best and

most capable inspectors just don’t have the time to do a proper inspection. Inadequate staffing, facilities, and equipment have made incomplete and/or poor inspections the rule at many busy ports. Many Inspectors have simply quit questioning

applicants, or tailored their questions to elicit ‘‘safe answers’’. Many Inspectors no

longer make any attempt to determine the citizenship of persons crossing our International border.

Recently, my counterpart in the Custom Union state that Customs Inspectors at

the Detroit Truck Docks (the busiest on the northern border), no longer bother to

check for immigration violations because there are not any Immigration Inspectors

to process them.

Finally, I would like to thank Senator Abraham for including language in S. 745

to adopt a sensible approach to the implementation of departure controls required

by Sec. 110 of the 1996 Immigration Act. The implementation of Sec. 110 would do

absolutely nothing to combat alien smuggling. We need more staff, better equipment, better training, and better facilities, not more ill conceived missions of questionable value.

The premature implementation of Section 110 would serve only to destroy whatever tiny shreds of pride, professionalism, and espirit that are somehow surviving

our current mistreatment by the I&NS. I believe that if Section 110 were implemented today, 4–6 of our Detroit Inspectors would simply quit their jobs rather than

face even more 16 hour shifts.

I urge each and every member of this committee, and the entire Congress, in the

strongest possible terms to get behind S. 745 and make it a reality. If you want

northern border security, it is time for you to make the commitment of giving us

the recognition, pay, and grade of Law Enforcement Officers; state of the art equipment; proper training; and adequate facilities and manpower.

Senator Abraham, members of the committee, if you make this commitment to the

front line employees, without hesitation or reservation, I promise you, ‘‘we will make

it happen.’’ Once again, thank you for the privilege of bringing my message to you.

I will do my best to answer any questions you may have.

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[The prepared statement of Colleen M. Kelley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COLLEEN M. KELLEY

Chairman Abraham and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to submit the views of the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) on

the issue of border security. NTEU represents over 150,000 federal employees.

About 8,000 of these workers are inspectors and canine enforcement officers (CEOs)

of the U.S. Customs Service. They are stationed at 301 ports of entry around the

United States and in Canada and the Caribbean.

Customs inspectors and CEOs make up our nation’s first line of defense in the

war on drugs. In addition to this primary mission, they are responsible for stopping

sophisticated and dangerous narcotics smuggling, international money-launderers,

arms smugglers, child-pornographers, fugitives from justice and, the subjects of this

hearing, suspected international terrorists.

We are pleased and proud that you invited Inspector Diana Dean to testify today

about her role in safeguarding American lives by apprehending Ahmed Ressam at

the Canadian border in Port Angeles, Washington. Inspector Dean is a member of

NTEU, and one of the brave officers who risks her life daily in the performance of

her duty. No one knows what tragedy would have befallen American communities

in mid-December 1999 had Ahmed Ressam been cleared to enter the United States

with over 100 pounds of bomb making supplies in the trunk of his car. In addition

to Diana Dean, Customs inspectors, Mark Johnson, Carmon Clem and Mike Chapman are owed a debt of gratitude from us for their quick and clear thinking and

their responsiveness.

What many people do not know is that these inspectors, the first line of defense

against terrorism, are not considered to be federal law enforcement officers under

current statute and regulation. This is a long-standing injustice that must be corrected. H.R. 1228 and S. 718 would extend law enforcement officer status to Customs and INS inspectors and give them the benefit of twenty-year retirement that

they so obviously deserve.

It has become increasingly more difficult for the Customs Service to recruit the

best and the brightest to the ranks of Customs inspectional personnel. Once new

Customs’ recruits learn that they are not provided the benefits of law enforcement

officers in other agencies and the private sector, they take their newly trained skills

elsewhere. This is a preventable situation that can be cured by designating Customs

inspectors and CEOs as law enforcement officers.

Customs inspectors work side-by-side with Customs agents, FBI agents, and local

police to carry out anti-terrorist contingency plans. Around the country, they take

the lead in boarding ships and suspicious flights searching for stowaways and illegal

narcotics and contraband. A Customs inspector’s training includes criminal law, arrest authority and arrest procedures, seizure and search authority techniques, selfdefense tactics, frisk and pat down procedures, hand cuffing, and take down procedures, anti-terrorism, and firearms use.

All inspectors are issued firearms to protect themselves, their fellow inspectors

and the public. Commissioner Kelly’s recent decision to allow Customs inspectors to

carry their weapons 24 hours a day was a necessary response to the constant threat

of violence faced by inspectors in the performance of their duties at all ports. Currently inspectors and CEOs are required to qualify on a firing range three times

a year.

All of the training and experience mentioned above was used in the apprehension

of Ahmed Ressam. Inspector Dean used her experience and skills in interrogation

to become highly suspicious of Mr. Ressam’s responses to routine questioning. Inspector Mark Johnson was required to pat down Mr. Ressam in the secondary area.

After he escaped detention, Inspector Johnson chased him and ‘‘took him down.’’ He

hand cuffed Ressam and placed him under arrest. This is not a rare occurrence at

a port of entry. This is a job requirement. These Customs inspectors and their fellow

inspectors and CEOs around the country should be granted law enforcement officer

status under Title 5, section 8336(c)(1).

In the immediate wake of Ahmed Ressam’s arrest in December, Customs Commission Raymond Kelly declared the agency to be in a heightened state of alert. This

declaration forced a look at the working conditions and security assessment on the

Northern Border. The picture was not pretty. In many areas of the 4,000-mile border, travelers were being cleared to enter the United States by a remote video inspection system (RVIS). This system requires travelers to look into a camera

manned by a Customs inspector positioned, in some cases, over 100 miles away. The

effectiveness of this method of clearance is obviously flawed. There is no way of requiring a traveler to drive his or her vehicle to an open entry port for a more thorVerDate 31-AUG-2001 15:51 Sep 09, 2001 Jkt 072523 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\C523.XXX pfrm04 PsN: C523
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ough inspection, and what criminal would comply with that request from an inspector on a monitor. RVIS has been suspended since the heightened state of alert. It

is our hope that the Customs Service will permanently abandon the RVIS program

to concentrate on more effective ways of protecting our borders.

The heightened state of alert confirmed what NTEU has been emphasizing for

years. The Customs Service is poorly funded and sorely lacks the adequate resources, staffing and technology to keep pace with the burgeoning trade and travel

across America’s borders. After Ressam’s capture, the issue of inadequate staffing

levels was not just a matter of travelers tolerating long lines at border crossings,

we were forced to examine staffing levels from the perspective of the safety of

human lives from terrorist attack.

The heightened state of alert required inspectors to relocate to the Northern Border from inland airports and all over the United States. There was immediate expanded shift coverage where Customs had been operating at below minimum staffing levels. The ‘‘one-man’’ ports of entry were recognized to be too dangerous and

risky, so two inspectors were assigned to all locations.

Inspectors worked extra shifts, some clocking 16-hour days all week. Most worked

double shifts at least twice a week. All rank and file inspectors as well as non-uniformed Customs employees and their families made sacrifices. Approved vacation

and holiday leave was canceled; the days were long and stressful. The weather conditions were horrendous and the atmosphere was one of danger and apprehension.

These were extreme conditions under which to work. The Customs employees, who

gladly gave what was required of them to their agency during this time, must be

appreciated and recognized for it. Through their hard work, we greeted the new century without tragedy.

The Customs Service is now operating in a scaled back state of alert, but the

problems have not disappeared. Additional resources have not been budgeted to hire

more Customs inspectors on the Northern Border, and the woefully inadequate

staffing levels will remain unless there is a push from Congress to recognize this

dangerous and unacceptable situation and appropriate more funds for Customs.

We welcome Senator Abraham’s proposal, S. 745, that would authorize more staffing and resources for Customs, and we pledge to support this bill and any others

that recognize that adequately funding the Customs Service and supporting the employees who perform its mission should be a legislative priority.

In August the Senate passed its version of H.R. 1833, the Customs Authorization

Act, that would authorize, but not appropriate, additional resources and staffing for

Customs all around the country. We commend the Senate for its interest in this

issue, and for supporting the dedicated men and women of the Customs Service by

refusing to include in its bill attacks on their night pay that were included in the

House’s version of H.R. 1833.

Thank you.

Senator ABRAHAM. Of course, we from Michigan have a pretty

good feel for the challenges that are confronted there. I suspect it

is a little different in Idaho just because of the nature of the geography.

Let me just ask, first of all, a question similar to the one I did

in the last panel, which is what has been the level of cooperation

with the Canadian officials or your counterparts in the other law

enforcement agencies in terms of trying to maintain border security? Is it your sense that they are working as effectively as we

heard in the last panel and that they are doing the things that we

need them to do to help make sure that the border is safe?

Mr. LINDEMANN. Yes, sir. On my level, on a field agent level, Ontario Provincial Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and

the various other police departments, Windsor P.D., go well above

and beyond the call of duty in providing us with whatever information we need, and that is something we don’t experience at all on

the southern border.

Mr. CALLISTER. I agree. We have very good rapport with the Canadians. It can involve other things other than terrorists, such as

drug smuggling or whatever, but we do work together well.

90

Mr. SMITH. I believe we have excellent coordination with Canada.

Our intelligence officer is in contact with the Canadian police departments at all levels on a daily basis. Many of our look-outs are

generated through his contacts with the Canadian law enforcement

officials.

Senator ABRAHAM. Let me just ask you, Inspector Smith, the

President’s budget, as I mentioned, proposes—although it proposes

the addition of about 117 or so new inspectors, it turns out that

about 87 of them end up going to new ports of entry. Is it your

judgment that 28 new inspectors for the entire country will meet

the shortage problem that we confront right now?

Mr. SMITH. Senator, I believe we need at least 70 just in the Detroit district alone. So 28 is far short of our requirements.

Senator ABRAHAM. Inspector Callister.

Mr. CALLISTER. Well, I look forward to going back to 12-hour

days when I get back to my port. There are three inspectors there

to work 24 hours, so we definitely need probably double that, at

least.

Senator ABRAHAM. Well, let me just throw out something else

that we have talked about before, but I want to kind of for the

record address it—probably you, Mr. Lindemann, would be the

best—but the absence of detention space and what challenges that

presents to us in the Detroit region.

Mr. LINDEMANN. In a nutshell, it devastates morale. In the last

8 days, we have had money; miraculously, it came through. But for

the preceding year, we had little or no detention money. We could

not detain anybody. We were having people we were arresting on

outstanding warrants of deportation. We attempted to reinstate

those. No money. It has had a devastating effect on any type of border control.

We have been constantly arresting smuggled loads of Chinese up

in the Port Huron area on a regular basis, as well as INS investigators. We don’t detain any of them. We arrest them, process

them, and let them go. There is no deterrent. Now, it is my understanding it is getting so bad at the ports of entry that the Chinese

are foregoing the process of a smuggler and turning themselves in.

I believe that occurred on the southern border at one of the southern ports of entry. They are just saying, well, if they are not going

to detain us or deport us, why take a chance of crossing across the

river and possibly drown?

Senator ABRAHAM. They basically allow themselves to be——

Mr. LINDEMANN. I will just go to the port of entry and turn myself in. That is clearly not an enforcement strategy.

Senator ABRAHAM. That sort of beats asylum-seeking, too, doesn’t

it?

Mr. LINDEMANN. Exactly. I mean, if that is the point, why not

just pack us up and send us to the southern border?

Senator ABRAHAM. Unbelievable. If there is any documentation of

that that can be provided, we would appreciate it.

Mr. LINDEMANN. As far as releasing aliens from custody?

Senator ABRAHAM. Or that it is becoming a pattern that is increasing in terms of people turning themselves in.

Mr. LINDEMANN. Yes, sir.

91

Senator ABRAHAM. Anything that would support that anecdotal

evidence would be helpful to us.

Mr. LINDEMANN. I do have that with me, as a matter of fact.

Senator ABRAHAM. Great, thank you.

Let me, in light of the time, and we got started a little bit late,

just throw out one last question and allow you to kind of address

in any way you want. Is there anything else that you would like

to address with respect to the impact of inadequate staffing in

terms of what those problems—I mean, you know, when we talk

about the issues of terrorism across the border, and so on, obviously there is an enormous range of issues that can be brought up

in terms of U.S.-Canadian relations, in terms of various kinds of

technologies, and so on.

But can you perhaps each address in a very specific sense what

the risk in terms of the terrorist risk is if we continue as inadequately staffed as you have each characterized the current situation? We will start with you, Inspector Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I think it is only a matter of time before terrorists

that have more nefarious intentions than Ahmed Ressam did simply walk across our border. I think we are deluding ourselves if we

say that it will not happen.

Senator ABRAHAM. If we don’t staff up to the levels that are

needed?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator ABRAHAM. Inspector Callister.

Mr. CALLISTER. I mentioned earlier that we are working 12-hour

shifts. What does that do to the body? I don’t feel that I am adequately prepared to handle certain situations that might arise, and

I am sure everybody else agrees with me. Safety is a big issue. So

if we have the terrorists coming through, they could come through

our port, they could walk around our geographical area. But we do

definitely need additional staff, sir.

Senator ABRAHAM. Mr. Lindemann.

Mr. LINDEMANN. Not to be another doomsayer, but we are in the

same boat. In Port Huron, they cover several miles of area which

is experiencing out-of-control smuggling. They have three agents to

cover that, with one supervisor. That leaves several hours out of

every day when there is no one available. So I mean I don’t know

how to answer that any more than that.

Senator ABRAHAM. I think the point we are trying to make here

in the hearing is that there is a clear connection between the levels

of staffing and the potential risk that we confront.

We have kind of run out of patience, I guess, around here a little

bit about this issue. I mean, when these events happened in Port

Angeles over the holidays and I was watching them, I was, or

course, immediately reminded of the last hearing we had—I think,

Mr. Lindemann, you were down here for it—and the fact that we

have heard continuously from the people on the front lines that

they don’t have anything close to the level of agents that they need,

or inspectors, on the northern border.

That is why I have been writing regularly to the heads of the

agencies to ask for more of an allocation, recognizing that we don’t

want to leave some other part of the country vulnerable, but at the

same time assuming that we were at least going to succeed in inVerDate 31-AUG-2001 15:51 Sep 09, 2001 Jkt 072523 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\C523.XXX pfrm04 PsN: C523
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creasing on a net basis by 1,000 agents per year and at least in

terms of Border Patrol getting some of the manpower we required.

That is why we introduced the legislation you have all spoken

about here today, S. 745.

As I suggested before, the thing that amazes me is that this is

a situation where Congress is prepared to provide the support that

the agencies need. Most other subcommittees have agency heads

and representatives in here begging for more support and essentially being told that they will have to live with what they have got

or with slight increases.

Here, there is a strong bipartisan consensus to provide the support that is needed, and yet we can’t seem to get the job done. I

mean, we are prepared to appropriate enough money to hire 1,000

new Border Patrol agents. I think if we pass our legislation, we

would have the ability to have the resources for the inspectors.

Again, maybe this is a function of Government. I don’t know.

Maybe Government just can’t operate. But if this was the private

sector, I don’t think it would be that challenging in terms of if a

company needed to add more sales personnel or needed to add

more accountants or whatever. They would be able to do that. I

can’t imagine the government in the State of Michigan, if it needed

certain increases in personnel, failing to be able to fill the positions.

We recognize there are some things that make it harder. That is

why we have also tried to address the issues of pay and benefits

because it is not easy to keep people in positions, as been mentioned here, for a variety of reasons. But we are going to do our

best.

I just want to finish this round by thanking you all for being

here. I am going to do my very best to convey your sentiments—

and I know the sentiments you are conveying represent those of

the people beyond you in the services—to our colleagues. Hopefully,

we can, as a result of that, build even greater momentum to pass

the legislation, but also to get the cooperation of the administration.

It is very difficult to guard the borders if we have got only a few

hundred agents for the thousands of miles we have in the north.

It is very hard in an area like Michigan, which has the largest

amount of—there is more trade over the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, just one bridge between the United States and Canada—there

is more trade over that bridge, just that one facility, than all American trade with Japan combined. And right behind it are the tunnel

in Detroit and the Blue Water Bridge in Port Huron in terms of

ports of entry and in terms of economic activity. To have 30 agents

representing the whole region is just simply not enough. So we will

keep working on it.

We appreciate your testimony because it is probably the one

thing which we can effectively use more than any other to try to

get the message across, and we will do our best to convey it. Thank

you for being here.

The hearing will now be adjourned.

93

[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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