Growing Global Migration

and Its Implications for

the United States

NIE 2001-02D

March 2001
Growing Global Migration

and Its Implications for

the United States

This Estimate was approved for publication by the

National Foreign Intelligence Board under the

authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.

NIE 2001-02D

March 2001
Preface

1

NIE 2001-02D

March 2001

Growing Global Migration

and Its Implications for

the United States

I am pleased to share with you this unclassified version of a new National

Intelligence Estimate on the growing global movement of people and its

implications for the United States. It is a follow-on study to our special

publication, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts, published in December 2000.1 Global Trends 2015

examined the broad features of the changing security environment and

identified key global drivers and their likely impact over the next 15

years—including demography and natural resources, technology, globalization and governance, likely conflicts and prospects for cooperation, and

the role of the United States. It is intended to help senior US leaders recognize and deal with longer term problems and uncertainties—and to

inform the broader debate on these important issues.

Migration will move higher on the policy agendas of many countries—

including the United States—as new waves of legal and illegal migrants,

asylum-seekers, and refugees flee poverty, conflict, and persecution in their

native lands. The latest US census underscored this trend in the United

States, and it is undoubtedly taking place elsewhere, as well. Rising

migration will provide challenges and opportunities to both sending and

receiving countries. Sending countries will benefit from emigrant remittances, for example, but they will lose some of their more industrious people, while returning immigrants can play both constructive and disruptive

political roles. In the richer receiving countries, migration will alleviate

demographic and labor force shortfalls, but it also will add to social and

cultural tensions.

This National Intelligence Estimate focuses on:

• The causes and likely social, economic, political, and security consequences of global migration of all types on key sending and receiving

regions and countries.

1 Other papers in the series include The Global Infectious Disease Threat (published in January

2000), and projects underway: Global Trends 2015: Future Technologies, Global Trends 2015:

Future of Military Power, Global Trends 2015: Geopolitics of Energy, Global Trends 2015:

Democratization, and Global Trends 2015: Terrorism. These papers will be published in the course

of the next year.
2

• The willingness and ability of governments to control migration.

• The scale of direct migration pressures on the United States; the impact

of other countries’ migration policies on such pressures; and the extent to

which some countries may try to use migration as leverage in bilateral

relations.

• The broader implications for the United States of migration trends and

the migration policies of other countries.

The Estimate was produced under the auspices of Dr. David F. Gordon,

National Intelligence Officer for Economics and Global Issues. It was

drafted principally by Deputy NIO, George C. Fidas. The Estimate especially benefited from a contribution by Dr. Demetrios Papademetriou, CoDirector of the International Migration Policy Program at the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, and a related conference at Carnegie,

as well as from critiques by experts at the American Enterprise Institute,

RAND Corporation, and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Comments and

inquiries may be directed to Dr. Gordon at (703) 482-4128 or by e-mail at

davidfg@nic.odci.gov. This and other papers in this series can be found at

http://www.odci.gov/nic/nic_homepage/nic/publications/index.htm.

John C. Gannon

Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Key Judgments

3

Growing Global Migration

and Its Implications for

the United States

During the next 15 years, globalization, demographic imbalances between

OECD and developing countries, and interstate and civil conflicts will fuel

increasing international migration, much of it illegal. Migration will have

positive and negative consequences for sending and receiving countries

alike. Other countries’ responses to migration issues will affect migration

pressures on the United States and a broad range of US economic and security interests.

Growing Migration

Today, more than 140 million people live outside their countries of birth

and migrants comprise more than 15 percent of the population in over 50

countries. These numbers will grow as demographic “push” and “pull” factors intensify:

• Some 45 million people in developing countries will enter the job market

each year through 2015; many will fail to find work and some will emigrate, whether legally or illegally.

• Illegal migration—facilitated increasingly by alien-smuggling syndicates

and corrupt government officials—will grow dramatically, matching or

exceeding other forms of migration into many countries in Europe and in

the more developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

• Violent conflicts, economic crises, and natural disasters in developing

countries will often trigger mass migrations.

• By contrast, Europe and Japan face rapidly aging populations and shrinking labor forces, threatening the solvency of pension systems and constraining economic growth in the absence of greater migration or other

compensatory measures such as pension reform and increases in

productivity.
4

• A wide range of constraints—many of them resulting from recent globalization and democratization trends—will limit most countries’ willingness and ability to control migration flows across their borders.

Migration’s Mixed Impact

For sending countries, emigration will relieve pressures from their unemployed youth, generate substantial remittances, and often provide them

with leverage on receiving countries. Returning immigrants often will be

agents of economic modernization and political liberalization. But emigration also will result in the loss of skilled personnel—especially in SubSaharan Africa, South and East Asia, and Russia—while ethnic diasporas

will sometimes be agents of extremism or separatism, as in the Balkans.

For most receiving countries, immigration will provide demographic and

economic vitality for those with aging populations—even as it raises complex political and social integration challenges.

• Migration will ameliorate labor force and military manpower shortfalls

and expand tax and consumer bases in developed countries.

• Immigrants’ initial strain on social, educational, and health services and

their differing languages, cultures, and religious practices will evoke discrimination and hamper their further assimilation.

• The negative impact of large illegal or mass migration will be greatest in

less developed receiving countries, straining local infrastructures, contributing to the spread of infectious diseases, and sometimes upsetting

ethnic balances and contributing to conflict or violent regime change.

Key Regional Trends

Americas. Legal and illegal migration to the United States and within the

region will continue to rise. Despite declining population growth and

strong economic prospects in Mexico, persistent poverty and large wage

differentials will further fuel large-scale emigration to the United States.

Central America will remain the second-largest source of illegal migrants

and its large alien-smuggling infrastructure also will make it a gateway for

other US-bound immigrants, especially from South America and Asia.

Political instability or economic decay in Cuba or Haiti could again lead to

mass migration to the United States. Growing illegal migration within

Latin America also will become a more contentious issue among

governments.
5

In Russia and other Eurasian states, weak immigration control regimes,

fitful economic development, ethnic conflicts, and discrimination against

minorities will sustain migration pressures that already have produced

more than 10 million—mostly Russian—migrants since the Soviet Union’s

breakup. Migration into Russia will partially compensate for but not offset

labor force shortfalls and declining population. It also will add to welfare

costs and may generate friction with other FSU states and with China over

illegal immigration into the Russian Far East.

The Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa are the principal sources and

places of refuge to some 7 million refugees—including Palestinians,

Afghans, and Rwandan Hutus—who will remain a source of instability and

political polarization throughout these regions. The status of Palestinian

refugees will continue to confound efforts toward a peace settlement.

Intraregional migration will play a key role in the economies of more

developed states, but these regions also will be a major source of migration

to developed countries.

In the European Union, countries will attempt to reconcile protection of

national borders and cultural identity with the need to relieve growing

demographic and labor market imbalances. Most EU countries are unlikely

to opt for large numbers of new immigrants, while legal constraints against

discrimination and laws favoring family reunification also preclude a “fortress” approach. Instead, most are likely to opt for “targeted migration” in

an effort to meet labor shortages in selected sectors while not unduly burdening national health and welfare systems or provoking a political backlash.

In Asia, populous countries such as China and India will be the source of

growing regional and global migration flows. The advanced countries in

the region—with the exception of Australia and New Zealand—will

strongly resist integrating migrants socially and politically. Japan, which

faces the greatest demographic imbalances, nonetheless will attempt to

retain its current, highly cautious approach to immigration. Japan’s premium on ethnic homogeneity, few legal constraints against discrimination,

high population density, and geographic insularity will reinforce this

approach absent a sustained economic recovery. Should a recovery take

hold, however, labor shortfalls may become so acute that Japan may shift

eventually to a more open, targeted migration approach.
6

Hesitant Japanese and EU Responses Portend Problems. Because temporary workers are likely to find ways to remain indefinitely, shifting to the

“targeted migration” course may not significantly curtail social and political tensions. Nor would it substantially expand European and Japanese

labor forces or tax bases or provide relief for shrinking military recruitment

pools, since temporary workers are excluded from military service and

many illegal workers evade taxes.

Implications of Global Migration Pressures for the United States. Foreign born residents now comprise nearly 11 percent of the US population,

up from 6 percent in 1980, and immigration will continue to climb during

the next 15 years. It will be driven by the attraction of the strong US economy and political and economic difficulties in many developing and former

Communist countries. Most experts believe that migration will continue to

contribute significantly to noninflationary economic growth and demographic balance, despite some initially higher welfare costs and some

downward pressure on wages in relevant sectors. Difficult issues will nonetheless arise:

• Manmade humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters, especially in

Latin America, will challenge US immigration control efforts.

• The United States will remain vulnerable to attempts by some foreign

governments to use the threat of mass migration as leverage in bilateral

relations or to relieve domestic pressures.

• Attempts by other countries to prevent or sharply limit immigration will

tend to channel migration pressures toward the United States.

• Transnational terrorist, narcotrafficking, and organized crime groups will

seek to blend into and recruit among coethnic immigrant communities

and exploit gaps in migration control efforts to ply their trades.

On a broader level, the reluctance of key US economic partners and allies

to substantially liberalize migration policies will place them at a competitive disadvantage with the United States in strategically important sectors

such as information technology. According to the OECD, differing demographic trends are a major factor in Europe’s and Japan’s weaker economic

outlook in comparison with the United States during the next five years.
7

• Restrictive migration policies, by limiting economic growth in Europe

and Japan, may undermine efforts to overcome the imbalances among the

advanced economies.

• Such policies also may skew the “guns versus butter” debate in these

countries toward maintaining social expenditures at the expense of

defense spending, weakening burden-sharing and the alliance system.

Contents

Page

9

Preface 1

Key Judgments 3

Discussion 11

The Demographics of International Migration 11

Enduring Push and Pull Factors Driving Migration 13

The Impact of Migration 18

The EU and Japan: Responding to the Migration Dilemma 27

Implications for the United States 28

Annex

Regional Migration Profiles 33

The Americas 33

Russia and the Other FSU States 33

Middle East and North Africa 34

Sub-Saharan Africa 37

Asia/Pacific 37

European Union 38
10

FIGURE 1

GRAPHIC # 379009

(39p X 54p)

0

5

10

15

20 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

“Palestinian,” 3.93

Afghanistan, 2.56

Sierra Leone, 0.46 Iraq, 0.57

Somalia, 0.43

Sudan, 0.42

Serbia and

Montenegro, 0.39

Angola, 0.34

Croatia, 0.34

Eritrea, 0.32

Burundi, 0.31

Bosnia and

Herzegovina, 0.30

Other, 3.07

The Americas, 0.74

(US: 0.64)

Africa, 3.15

(Guinea: 0.45)

Middle East, 5.85

(Iran: 1.84)

Europe, 1.91

(Germany: 0.29)

South and

Central Asia, 1.78

(Pakistan: 1.22)

East Asia and Pacific, 0.66

(China: 0.37)

Million (filing claims during 1991-99)

Canada

France

Germany

UK

US

1991 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

Million

Refugees and Asylum-Seekers 

Worldwide in Need of Protection

Asylum-Seekers in Selected Countries

Figure 1

Refugees and Asylum-Seekers by Host Region and Origin

Refugees and

Asylum-Seekers,

by Host Region, 1999

Million

Refugees and

Asylum-Seekers,

by Origin, 1999

Million

(data in parentheses

indicate country drawing 

largest number)

Source: US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survery 2000.

DI Design Center/MPG 379009AI 4-01
Discussion

11

Growing Global Migration

and Its Implications for

the United States

Globalization, population growth, and demographic imbalances between OECD and developing countries, and interstate and civil

conflicts are fueling increased international

migration, much of it illegal. During the next

15 years, migrants will seek to move to a growing number of countries in both the industrialized and the developing world:

• To the United States and Canada primarily

from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia.

• To Europe primarily from North Africa, the

Middle East, Asia, and the post-Communist

states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

• From the less to the more developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East,

Latin America, Asia and the Pacific, and the

former Communist world.

This large-scale movement of people in search

of a better life will benefit most sending countries and those receiving countries that manage

it effectively. At the same time, migration flows

will exacerbate social and political fissures in

many countries. As a major country of immigration, the United States will be significantly

affected by growing global migration and the

difficulties other countries will face in coping

with it.

The Demographics of

International Migration

More than 140 million people—nearly 1 in 40

of the world’s population—are migrants,

including legal immigrants and temporary

workers, other visa-holders, illegal immigrants,

asylum-seekers, and refugees. Legal immigrants admitted as temporary workers or to promote family reunification comprise the largest

portion, but illegal immigrants—including asylum-seekers and visa-overstayers—are increasing dramatically.

Immigrants currently account for about 65 percent of the population growth in most OECD

countries, compared to 45 percent during the

1990-95 period. This share is likely to grow

through 2015, as continued migration and the

initially higher fertility rates of immigrant populations outpace those of native-born populations, most of which have fallen below

replacement levels.

Immigration to the United States has been on a

steep upward climb for the past two decades,

with the current foreign-born population more

than doubling to nearly 30 million or almost

11 percent of the US population. Immigrants

from the Americas and Asia account for about

one-half and one-third, respectively, of the
12

FIGURE 2

GRAPHIC # 379010

(39p X 50p)

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

USa

Germany

Japan

UK

Canadaa

France

Australiaa

Netherlands

Switzerland

Belgium

Sweden

Luxembourg

Percent of

population that

is foreign born

9.3b

9.0

1.2

3.6

17.4

Thousand

Figure 2

Legal Immigration in Selected OECD Countries, 1997

aIncludes naturalized citizens. The European countries do not

include estimates of illegal aliens.

Sources: OECD, US Bureau of the Census, Urban Institute.

DI Design Center/MPG 379010AI 4-01

6.3

21.1

9.2

19.0

8.9

6.0

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1960 70 80 90 2000 10 20

Million

Foreign-Born Population

in the US, 1960-2020

Estimated

34.9

bData for 2000: 11 percent.

Sources: US Bureau of the Census, Urban Institute.
13

total. Immigration from EU countries has

declined from 30 percent in the 1960s to 15

percent in the last two decades and may drop

even further.

Surging Illegal Migration

Most forms of international migration are on

the rise, but illegal migration is growing the

most rapidly. As emigration pressures intensify

in sending countries, many receiving countries

are tightening admissions requirements for

legal migrants and asylum-seekers, while lacking the ability and, in some cases, the willingness to stop many, if not most, of those entering

or staying on illegally.

• Indicators suggest that illegal migrants now

comprise one-third to one-half of new

entrants to most developed countries, including the United States—up from about 20 percent a decade ago. In some of the recent

immigrant-receiving countries in Southern

Europe and the more developed countries in

South America and Sub-Saharan Africa, illegal immigrants probably comprise up to half

or more of both entrants and stock.

• Despite stepped-up border security measures,

the United States will remain hard-pressed to

staunch the flow of illegal immigrants. More

than 1.5 million aliens are arrested on the

US-Mexico border annually—many of them

repeatedly—and there were some 250,000

apprehensions of aliens from other key

source countries in 1999 alone. Up to

800,000 initially manage to enter the United

States and some 300,000 to 500,000 stay on

indefinitely. Data from the 2000 US census

suggest that the stock of illegal immigrants

may total 9-11 million—nearly double earlier

estimates.

Sharply lower approval rates for asylum-seekers, especially in the EU where some 400,000

sought asylum in 2000, prompt more to attempt

the illegal migration route. Moreover, most of

the 60 to 90 percent that are rejected go underground.

Large numbers of illegal immigrants emerge

from hiding to apply for the periodic amnesties

that receiving countries are increasingly offering to deal with the deluge of illegal immigrants.

• Nearly 1 million have surfaced in southern

European countries during the last five years

to accept such amnesties. In the United

States, nearly 3 million emerged to accept a

1986 amnesty and a more limited one in

1997.

Enduring Push and Pull Factors

Driving Migration

Both the push factors from migrant-sending

countries and the pull factors from those receiving migrants look set to persist and some will

intensify—even as many governments attempt

to limit most forms of immigration. Despite

such attempts, states will become less able to

control migration flows across their borders.

Push Factors Driving Migration

Pressures to emigrate from developing countries will remain intense, fueled by continued

poverty, lack of jobs, population growth, political upheavals, and/or conflicts in much of the

developing world. At the same time, globalization will increase access to information about

lifestyles and opportunities in industrialized
14

countries abroad, while ongoing democratization will further loosen state restrictions on

emigration.

Some 45 million new working age people in

developing countries will enter the job market

annually during the next 15 years; many will

fail to find work and some will emigrate.

• Mexico, for example, will need to substantially increase its 700,000 annual new job

creation rate to accommodate new labor force

entrants totaling nearly 1 million annually.

• North African countries must create more

than 500,000 new jobs to absorb new

entrants.

• The new states in the Caucasus also will need

to create large numbers of new jobs to keep

their young people from migrating in large

numbers to Russia and elsewhere in Europe,

where their job prospects are better.

During the short- to medium-term, even rising

wages in those developing countries experiencing economic growth will not be sufficient to

substantially attenuate migration pressures,

given continuing wage differentials with industrialized countries. A recent ILO-sponsored

study noted that in the mid-1990s:

• Mexican migrants earned nine times as much

in the United States as in their last job in

Mexico.

• Polish construction workers earned over three

times as much in Germany as in Poland.

• Indonesian laborers in Malaysia earned

nearly eight times as much as in Indonesia.

FIGURE 3

GRAPHIC #379025

(19p X 41p)

Figure 3

Top Ten Sources of Legal and 

Illegal Migration to the US

Mexico, 18.4

China, 5.2

India, 4.8

Cuba, 4.2

Dominican

Republic, 3.4

El Salvador, 2.3

Jamaica, 2.2

Mexico, 54.0

El Salvador, 5.6

Guatemala, 3.3

Canada, 2.4

Haiti, 2.1

Philippines, 1.9

Honduras, 1.8

Poland, 1.4

Sources of Legal Immigration, 1997

Percent

Sources of Illegal Immigrants in the US, 1996

Percent

Source: US Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1997, 1998.

DI Design Center/MPG 379025AI 4-01

Philippines, 6.2

Vietnam, 4.8

Russia 2.1

Nicaragua, 1.4

The Bahamas, 1.4

Other, 46.4

Other, 24.7
15

Mass migrations will also continue to be triggered by civil conflicts and related economic

uncertainty, such as in Colombia; deterioration

of ecosystems and renewable resources so

severe that it makes life unsustainable, such as

in the Sahel region of Africa and parts of Central Asia; and the flight from various forms of

natural and manmade humanitarian disasters,

such as Hurricane Mitch in Central America

and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia,

respectively.

FIGURE 4

GRAPHIC # 379011

(39p X 41p)

0 5 10 15 20

Figure 4

Alien Smuggling Into the United States

Honduras

El Salvador

Guatemala

Dominican Republic

Cuba

Canada

China

Jamaica

Colombia

Haiti

Nicaragua

0 5 10 15 20

Thousand

1999

1997

From 1997 to 1999, the number of 

smuggled aliens apprehended as they 

were entering the US increased by 80 

percent to 247,000.

Source countries, excluding Mexico, with the highest number 

of apprehensions by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

DI Design Center/MPG 379011AI 4-01

Sources: General Accounting Office, US Immigration and Naturalization Service.
16

Alien Smuggling on the Rise

Alien smuggling is now a $10 billion to

$12 billion-a-year growth industry for

migrant-smuggling groups that entails the

transport of more than 50 percent of illegal immigrants globally, often with the

help of corrupt government officials,

according to International Labor Organization (ILO) and other estimates. Smugglers charge as little as $500 for short

trips across single borders, such as

between Morocco and Spain, to as much

as $70,000 for complex journeys from

Asia to Western Europe and North America. Although apprehension rates at major

entry points into many developed countries have increased several fold in recent

years, police and immigration officials in

several countries believe that the majority

manage to gain entry.

• Trafficking in women and children for

purposes of labor and sexual exploitation also is increasing dramatically, with

some 700,000 trafficked globally in

1997, including some 50,000 to the

United States, according to an US Intelligence Community–sponsored study.

Alien smuggling will have a corrosive

effect on the political institutions of many

countries as many of their law enforcement officials succumb to bribery and contribute to a public perception that their

governments are losing their capacity to

control their countries’ borders and

ensure public order.

Pull Factors Driving Migration

With their own populations aging, labor forces

shrinking, and globalization eroding their ability to police their borders, the OECD countries—particularly Japan and an

increasingly integrating EU—will face daunting demographic, economic, and political

dilemmas over immigration.

Demographic and Economic Factors. The

old-age dependency ratios of OECD countries—which reflect the ratio of the working

age population to those aged 65 or older—will

decline dramatically, according to US Census

Bureau projections: from nearly 7 to 1 in 2000

FIGURE 5

GRAPHIC #

379012

(19p X 30p)

Thousand

Figure 5

Illegal Migration Into the EU, 1993-99

Sources: International Center for Migration

Policy Development; The Economist estimates.

DI Design Center/MPG 379012AI 4-01

0

100

200

300

400

500

1993 94 95 96 97 98 99
17

to nearly 5 to 1 by 2015. In the EU and Japan

combined, the ratio will fall from 5 to 1 in 2000

to 3 to 1 in 2015.

Thus, OECD countries will face pressures to

rely on immigrants to fill a major portion of

their labor market shortfalls, in addition to

exploiting technology for greater productivity

and the skills of women and older citizens.

Aging populations will require substantially

more spending for pensions and health care,

ensuring that already large unfunded public

pension deficits will require more public

borrowing in the absence of robust economic

growth and an expanding tax base.

Political Factors. A wide range of political and

legal constraints will limit the extent to which

most OECD countries will be able or willing to

adopt harsh measures against illegal or other

would-be immigrants.

• The reduction of controls over cross-border

economic transactions will limit the ability of

states to shape migration flows. Within the

EU in particular, the Schengen Agreement

generally allows for unhindered travel across

internal EU borders after initial entry into a

Schengen member country.

• Attempts to expel short-term or illegal

migrants, while appealing to antimigrant elements in the local population, would incur

opposition from the local business community and human rights groups, as well as risk

damaging relations with governments of the

sending countries.

FIGURE 6

GRAPHIC # 379013

(39p X 26p)

On 9 December 1999, the US Coast 

Guard took custody of the antiquated 

fi shing boat, the Wing Fung Ling, 

which carried 230 Chinese aliens 

and eight crewmembers, about 200 

miles off Guatemala’s Pacifi c coast.

Some 30,000 to 40,000 Chinese

aliens entered the US illegally in 

1999.

Figure 6

The Wing Fung Ling Incident

DI Design Center/MPG 379013ID 4-01
18

• Once established in receiving countries,

immigrant communities will serve as magnets for additional members of their national

or ethnic groups. The priority that immigration laws give to family reunification will

reinforce this process and make it difficult for

governments to shift to alternative migration

streams from other countries and regions.

• The increasing ease of travel, communication, and access to ethnic media, moreover,

will enable those who do emigrate to maintain strong ties with their countries of origin,

generating further flows.

The Impact of Migration

Migration will have both positive and negative

consequences for sending and receiving states

alike, but on balance the benefits will outweigh

the costs for most countries.

Impact On Sending Countries

On the positive side, emigration will help

relieve some social and political pressures from

the large, unemployed and restless youth

cohorts of poor sending countries. Moreover,

FIGURE 7

GRAPHIC # 379014

(39p X 30p)

Figure 7

Global Trafficking in Women and Children in 1997, by Source

Source: US Government.

DI Design Center/MPG 379014AI 4-01

Total = 700,000

FSU/Eastern Europe, 25

Southeast Asia/

Other, 22 East Asia, 32

North America

Latin America

Africa

Middle East

South Asia, 21

Bangladesh, 8

Nepal, 6 Russia, 8

Ukraine, 5

Thailand, 11

Burma, 3

Percent
19

FIGURE 8

GRAPHIC # 755452

FOLDOUT

Source: US Government.

Illegal

migrants

Trafficking Flows

Women and

children

Boundary representation is

not necessarily authoritative.

I N D I A N

O C E A N

N O R T H

A T L A N T I C

O C E A N

S O U T H

A T L A N T I C

O C E A N

ARCTIC OCEAN ARCTIC OCEAN

N O R T H

P A C I F I C 

O C E A N N O R T H

P A C I F I C 

O C E A N

S O U T H

P A C I F I C 

O C E A N

S O U T H

P A C I F I C 

O C E A N

Figure 8

Illegal Migration Flows and Trafficking in Women and Children

DI Cartography Center/MPG 755452AI 3-01

21

immigrant remittances and returning immigrants will provide important balance of payments help, direct investments, and useful skills

in their home countries.

• Among key sending countries, Mexico’s population growth from 1990 to 1995 was 20

percent smaller than it would have been without the net emigration of 1.6 million people.

• The total value of registered immigrant

remittances grew from nearly $15 billion in

1980 to almost $50 billion in 1999,

according to a World Bank study, and much

higher if transfers through informal channels

were included.

• Remittances exceed the value of foreign

investment in many countries and have a multiplier effect on the broader economy. Mexican immigrant remittances from the United

States to Mexico now total some $7 billion

annually and those from the Moroccan

diaspora to Morocco some $2 billion.

FIGURE 9

GRAPHIC # 379015

(39p X 34p)

DI Design Center/MPG 379015AI 4-01

Figure 9

Regional Population by Age Group: 2000 and 2015

Source: US Bureau of the Census.

Billion

0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5

North America

Sub-Saharan Africa

Latin America and

the Caribbean

Russia and Eurasia

Western Europe

Middle East and

North Africa

South Asia

East and Southeast

Asia, Oceania

Young 

(ages 0-14)

Working 

(15-64)

Old

(65+)

2015

2000
22

Immigrant populations can often act as

liberalizing and modernizing forces in their

native lands, particularly at times of political

transition.

• Returning expatriates from North America

and the EU played a key role in the establishment and consolidation of democratic rule in

southern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.

• Since the Cold War’s end, returning expatriates have played a similar role in several

former Communist countries, most recently

in Serbia, where the diaspora generally supported the opposition movement that ousted

Slobodan Milosevic from power.

• Democratization and economic development

in several Asian and Latin American

countries similarly has been spearheaded by

Western-educated leaders and elites.

For their part, most sending country governments will be reluctant to discourage emigration because of its many economic and political

benefits, ranging from foreign remittances to

influence in countries where they have growing

diasporas. Such governments will also increasingly attempt to harness the political influence

of these diasporas by encouraging them to

lobby for their native country’s interests.

• A growing number are offering dual citizenship to their diasporas in an effort to retain

and strengthen ties with them.

• Ethnic politics and lobbying will loom

increasingly large in the EU, as members’

large immigrant communities become enfranchised and gain political and economic

influence.

On the negative side, emigration will drain

some sending countries of an increasing portion of their small, highly educated elites.

There are at least 1.5 million skilled expatriates

from developing countries employed in

Western Europe, the United States, Australia,

and Japan. More than 500,000 students from

Note: Widely disparate wages are a principal

driver of intraregional and global migration.

Source: Peter Stalker. Workers Without

Frontiers. International Labor

Organization. 2000.

Table 1

(U) Hourly Labor Costs in

Manufacturing in Selected

Countries, 1985-95

US $

Country 1985 1995

United States 13.01 17.20

Canada 10.94 16.03

Australia 8.20 14.40

Europe

France 5.72 19.34

Germany 9.60 31.88

Italy 7.63 16.48

United Kingdom 6.27 13.77

Spain 4.66 12.70

Switzerland 9.66 29.28

Poland NA 2.09

Russia NA 0.60

Asia

Japan 6.34 23.66

China 0.19 0.25

South Korea 1.23 7.40

Philippines 0.64 0.71

Indonesia 0.22 0.30

India 0.35 0.25
23

developing, Communist, and former Communist countries are studying overseas, roughly

two-thirds of whom do not return.

• Although East Asia and South Asia are the

principal sources for such professionals

and students, Africa has been hardest hit

proportionately, losing some 200,000 professionals and some 30,000 Ph.D.’s during the

Globalization Fueling Migration

Globalization—expanded international

trade, finance, investment, and information

flows—is likely to accentuate economic insecurity and migration pressures in many

developing countries during the short- to

mid-term. Sudden economic emergencies—

such as the debt and energy crises of the

1970s and 1980s and the currency crises of

the 1990s—resulted both in stepped-up

migration to OECD countries and in largescale expulsions of immigrants from the

more advanced developing countries.

• The Mexican peso crisis of 1995, for example, contributed to a surge in illegal immigration to the United States.

• In Asia, the 1997-98 financial crisis

prompted Malaysia, Thailand, and South

Korea, to expel substantial numbers of foreign workers.

At the same time, globalization will continue

to increase demand for high-tech and other

professionals for whom developed countries

will continue to compete in order to fuel their

information technology and other strategic

sectors. The EU will face a shortage of several hundred thousand high-tech workers

annually. Germany, alone, will need some

300,000 additional high-tech workers by

2005, according to the President of Siemens

Corporation.

High-tech workers and entrepreneurs will be

increasingly prepared to emigrate from

countries such as India, those in East Asia,

and Russia, provided that immigration laws

in industrialized countries become sufficiently flexible to permit their entry.

• Australia, Canada, the Nordic countries,

and the UK are opening up to high-tech

immigration, albeit oftentimes in the face

of political and labor union resistance.

• Japan and continental Europe are more

resistant; the German Government only

recently succeeded in securing parliamentary approval for the admission of 20,000

high-tech workers annually after a lively

debate.

last decade, according to the 1999 UN

Human Development Report.

• The emigration of over 1.5 million generally

well-educated Russian Jews to Israel, the EU,

and North America over the last decade will

continue to be a drag on Russia’s economic

recovery, while the trickle of Russian
24

scientists and engineers emigrating to countries such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea will

enable these countries to speed up their

WMD efforts if it turns into a more substantial flow.

Although diasporas often pick up both democratic political attitudes and technical skills

while abroad, some also have a nationalist bent

that inclines them to support and finance ultranationalist causes, including armed conflict.

• In recent years, some Balkan and East African diasporas have stoked ethnic and nationalist passions that have prolonged conflict

and made political resolution more difficult.

Impact on Receiving Countries

On the positive side, migration will offer a

source of demographic and economic dynamism for aging developed countries that will

replenish their youth cohorts and expand their

shrinking labor and military recruitment pools.

It also will expand their tax and consumer

bases that are key to maintaining fiscal balance,

the social contract, and economic growth.

• Immigrants in 10 EU countries earn at least

$461 billion annually and pay $153 billion in

taxes, compared to $92 billion they receive in

welfare, according to a European economic

institute.

FIGURE 10

GRAPHIC # 379016

(39p X 31p)

0 1 2 34 567

Short-distance

migration

Long-distance

migration

Long-distance

high skill

Migration propensity

Average real income per capita

Thousand US $

The “migration hump” refers to the 

tendency of economic development 

to increase emigration initially. It 

disrupts traditional economic 

relationships and noncompetitive 

sectors and also provides prospective 

emigrants with the economic means 

to emigrate.

Figure 10

The “Migration Hump”

DI Design Center/MPG 379016AI 4-01

Source: Peter Stalker. Workers Without Frontiers. International Labor Organization. 2000.
25

• During the last seven years, the number of

self-employed immigrants in these countries

has increased at two-and-a-half times the rate

of those that are native born.

• A recent British Ministry of Defense study

projects a substantial military recruitment

pool shortfall during the next 30 years if

present demographic trends persist.

On the negative side, immigration and refugee

flows sometimes will change the balance of

ethnic and political power within and among

nations, especially in developing countries.

Large-scale flows of migrants and refugees—

some recent, some decades old, and some yet to

take place—will provoke political instability

and conflict.

• The recent military interventions in Fiji and

Cote d’Ivoire; ethnic conflicts in the former

Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, eastern

Indonesia, and Democratic Republic of the

Congo; and the Arab-Israeli dispute have

resulted in part from large-scale migration

and refugee flows.

Migration will continue to pose particularly

complex policy, management, and control

challenges for OECD countries that many will

be hard pressed to address. Immigrants will

oftentimes strain social, educational, and health

services in host countries, as well as challenge

their political tolerance and cultural security,

thereby accentuating social and political

tensions.

• Unemployment among EU immigrants from

outside of the EU is double that of immigrants from other EU countries, according to

a European research institute.

• Such immigrants also will be increasingly

difficult and probably less willing to assimilate, owing to wide-ranging language, cultural, and religious differences in relation to

their host societies, and the ease of access to

their countries and cultures of origin.

FIGURE 11

GRAPHIC # 379018

(19p X 34p)

Figure 11

Annual Working-Age Migration Required

To Maintain 2015 Old-Age Dependency

Ratios for the EU, Japan, and Russia

at 2000 Levels

Million

Source: US Bureau of the Census.

DI Design Center/MPG 379018AI 4-01

Russia

Japan

EU

(0)

Without this number of working-age 

immigrants, the number of working-age 

people supporting the elderly will decrease 

from an average of 5-to-1 in 2000, to 3-to-1 in 

2015 in the EU and Japan. It will remain 

nearly constant at 5-to-1 in Russia owing to 

shorter lifespans.

Estimated working-age

net migration in 2000

Number of foreign workers age

15-64 required to support age 65+

population in 2015

0 1 2 34 5
26

FIGURE 12

GRAPHIC # 379026

(39p X 49p)

0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5

0 30 60 90 120 150

China

India

Taiwan

South Korea

Canada

Germany

Japan

Turkey

Mexico

Brazil

India

China, Hong Kong, Taiwan

Philippines

Canada

UK

Thousand

Thousand

Nationality of Non-US Citizens Earning Ph.D.’s in the US, 1997a

Working Immigrants Entering the US Between

1994 and March 1999 With a Bachelor’s Degree or More

Figure 12

Developing Country “Brain Drain” to the United States

a

Percent of Ph.D. recipients reporting postdoctoral location as the US in 1997:

China, 95; India, 91.

Sources: Institute of International Education and National Opinion Research Center,

University of Chicago, Urban Institute, and US Bureau of the Census.

DI Design Center/MPG 379026AI 4-01

Developed

countries

Developing country 

students are the largest 

group of foreigners who 

earn Ph.D.’s in the US.

Most study science and 

engineering and stay in

the US after receiving

their degrees.

Developing

countries
27

• Illegal immigrants often are willing to work

long hours for lower pay, putting pressure on

host countries’ social and labor standards,

even as immigrants meet the labor needs of

these economies.

The EU and Japan: Responding

to the Migration Dilemma

Balancing the demographic and economic

imperatives to replenish aging labor markets

and pro-immigrant pressures from the business

community against longstanding cultural

traditions and the largely anti-immigrant sentiments of electorates and labor unions will pose

daunting choices for Japan and many EU countries.

In the EU, concerns about cultural identity will

weigh heavily on migration policies, but EU

FIGURE 13

GRAPHIC # 379020

(39p X 33p)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Italy France Germany Canada Japan US UK

1995

Projected

2030

By comparison,

total G-7 public

spending on

defense, education,

and R&D was

8.1 percent of

GDP in 1995.

Aging population will require much 

more public spending for pensions 

and health care.

Percent of GDP

Figure 13

Public Spending on Pensions and Health Benefits,

1995 and 2030

Source: Peter G. Peterson. Gray Down. Random House. 1999.

DI Design Center/MPG 379020AI 4-01
28

members are unlikely to adopt a “fortress”

approach entailing highly restrictive immigration and integration policies owing to legal constraints against discrimination, labor

imbalances, and their reluctance and inability

to prevent family reunification and illegal

migration respectively. Instead, most EU

countries are likely to move toward a targeted

migration approach that would attempt to

attenuate labor shortages in selected sectors

such as high tech and services with modest

increases in overall migration, while not unduly

burdening national health and welfare systems.

Japan will attempt to retain its highly cautious

approach to immigration. Although Japan faces

the greatest need for workers, it places a premium on ethnic and cultural homogeneity, has

few of the constraints against discrimination,

and is highly conscious of its already high population density. Further, Japan’s geographic

insularity better enables it to limit illegal immigration. Should Japan’s economy return to sustained growth, however, labor shortfalls may

become so acute that Japan may shift eventually to a more open, targeted migration

approach.

Implications for the United States

The rise in global migration will have both

direct and indirect implications for the United

States and for US national security. The attraction of a strong US economy and persistent

political and economic difficulties in many

places around the world will ensure that the

United States continues to draw large migration

flows. Moreover, how well other countries handle their own migration issues will affect subsequent migration pressures on the United States

and will also have broader implications for

important US economic and security interests.

• Immigration will enable the United States to

maintain a more balanced demographic profile than most EU states and Japan. Despite

some initially higher social welfare costs and

some downward pressure on wages, most

experts believe that migration facilitates

sustained, noninflationary growth. In the

1990s, nearly 40 percent of new US jobs—

including those for software engineers—were

filled by immigrants. According to the

OECD, differing demographic trends are the

main source of a rosier economic growth outlook for the United States during the next five

years in comparison with the EU and Japan.

• Nonetheless, difficult issues will arise. Persistent poverty in Mexico and Central America—along with natural disasters and

conflicts in Latin America more generally—

will strain immigration control efforts; foreign governments such as in Cuba or Haiti

will sometimes threaten to allow mass migration; and terrorists and narcotraffickers will

look for ways to evade US immigration

controls.

Forced or Large-Scale Migration

Civil conflicts and humanitarian or natural

disasters, especially in neighboring countries,

could generate sudden and large-scale migration flows into the United States. US immigration control efforts will be especially hardpressed to staunch such flows.

• The civil conflict and economic uncertainty

in Colombia that have displaced some 1 million people already have produced a near
29

doubling of visa applications that sometimes

total 50,000 monthly. Illegal migration also

will rise if the conflict and related economic

problems intensify. Economic uncertainty in

Ecuador, likewise, has contributed to a substantial increase in US-bound illegal immigrants in the last two years.

• If Mexico experiences another economic

crisis, a further surge in migration to the

United States would be likely.

• Almost any scenario involving a change of

government in Cuba would have the potential

to generate a substantial migration component—at least during its early phases.

• A dramatic deterioration of the political,

human rights, and economic situation in Haiti

could lead to a repeat of the immigration

crises of the first half of the 1990s.

Hesitant EU and Japanese Responses

Portend Problems

In Europe and Japan the “targeted migration” option would ameliorate but would not

resolve demographic and labor force imbalances or substantially curb immigrationrelated social and political tensions. Both

EU members and Japan would also have to

look to other politically controversial measures such as pension reform, additional

social safety net cuts, and more substantial

economic restructuring and improvements in

productivity to sustain fiscal balance and

promote economic growth.

• Japan and EU members already spend

twice as much on pensions as a share of

GDP than does the United States. Yet pension reforms, such as supplementing public

pay-as-you go pension programs with privately funded schemes, are only now being

considered while politically controversial

pension cuts and increased age requirements generally are being deferred.

• Improvements in productivity to compensate for declining labor forces also may

prove inadequate. The EU and Japan are

investing in information technology at half

the US rate.

• Because temporary workers in the EU and

Japan are likely to find ways to remain

indefinitely, moreover, this course would

not substantially curtail social and political tension in the absence of better social

and political integration of immigrant populations. It would also fail to provide relief

to their demographically driven military

manpower dilemma, since temporary

workers and noncitizens in general are

excluded from military service.
30

• Central America, the Caribbean, and much of

the Andean region are highly prone to major

natural disasters. The devastation in Central

America caused by Hurricane Mitch in

October 1998 caused an outflow of tens of

thousands of people from the four affected

countries to the United States within four

months.

Emigration as a Political Tool

The United States will remain vulnerable to

explicit or implicit threats by foreign governments to use illegal and especially mass emigration as leverage in bilateral relations or to

reduce political pressures arising from domestic policy failures.

• Although a 1994-95 agreement granting up to

20,000 visas to Cubans annually has largely

staunched the flow of illegal migration, fully

500,000 Cubans apply for visas annually, and

Castro could again exploit this widespread

desire by Cubans to emigrate as in 1980 and

1994.

• Pent-up migration pressures could rise even

higher in Haiti, where the Aristide government could encourage mass migration should

economic conditions deteriorate further and

tensions with the United States grow over

such issues as human rights.

• China is capable of facilitating the efforts of

substantial numbers of potential emigrants,

many of whose ultimate destination would be

the United States to which some 30,000 to

40,000 already attempt to emigrate illegally

each year.

Spillover From Other Regions

To a lesser extent, the United States also will

remain vulnerable to at least some added

migration pressures as a result of decisions by

other immigrant-receiving countries to shut

down or severely limit immigration. While

legal and political constraints would prevent

most OECD countries from taking draconian

measures to stop or expel immigrants, many

developing countries without such constraints

have and may again take such actions in

response to economic and other crises.

• Attempts by Asian countries and the more

developed South American countries to prevent or sharply limit immigration from poorer

neighbors will tend to channel migration

pressures toward the United States.

Migration’s Impact on Broader US Interests

The impact of other countries’ likely migration

policies on broader US interests will be mixed.

The hesitancy of key US partners substantially

to liberalize their immigration policies—especially if combined with continuing reluctance

to undertake major reforms of their pension and

social welfare systems—will place them at a

competitive economic disadvantage with the

United States. On the other hand, their hesitancy to undertake immigration and economic

reforms will lead to wage-induced inflationary

pressures and excessive borrowing to shore up

budget deficits, raising interest rates and constraining economic growth. This, in turn, will

undermine efforts to promote a sound world

economy.
31

To the extent that key US allies and economic

partners opt for maintaining greater social and

cultural cohesion at the expense of immigration

and more extensive economic and fiscal reform,

these nations will turn inward, exacerbating

internal tensions and skewing the “guns versus

butter” debate toward greater social expenditures.

• Sudden or large-scale migration flows into

US allies and economic partners would most

likely strengthen extremist parties and could

increase anti-immigrant violence.

• Reduced defense spending and shrinking military manpower pools may limit the willingness and ability of some US allies to share the

defense burden.

• The same internal pressures would also constrain resources for foreign assistance and a

wide range of international activities of interest to the United States.

FIGURE 14

GRAPHIC # 755872

(39p X 33p)

C a r i b b e a n S e a

G u l f

o f

M e x i c o

N o r t h

A t l a n t i c

O c e a n

N o r t h

P a c i f i c

O c e a n

Hudson Bay

Labrador Sea

Mexico

U n i t e d S t a t e s

The Bahamas

Belize

Honduras

Nicaragua

Guatemala

C a n a d a

Costa Rica

Panama Colombia

Venezuela

Trinidad and Tobago

Cuba

Island of Newfoundland

Puerto Rico

(U.S.)

Guadeloupe

(France)

British

Virgin Is.

(U.K.)

Virgin Is.

(U.S.) Martinique

(France)

Barbados

Grenada

Jamaica

Haiti Dominican

Republic

El Salvador

St. Pierre

and Miquelon

(FRANCE)

Caracas

Santo

Domingo

Panama

Calgary St. John's

Quebec

Vancouver

Halifax

Winnipeg

Montreal

Seattle

Boston

Portland

Toronto Minneapolis

New York Detroit Milwaukee

Philadelphia

Chicago

Columbus Indianapolis

Salt Lake City

San Francisco

St. Louis

Denver

Atlanta

Los Angeles

San Diego Phoenix

Tijuana

Dallas

Jacksonville

Mexicali

El Paso Ciudad

Juarez Houston

New

Orleans

Miami Monterrey

Matamoros

Mazatlan

Merida Leon

Guadalajara

Veracruz

Puebla

Oaxaca Acapulco

Happy ValleyGoose Bay

San

Antonio

Ottawa

Nassau

Havana

Port-auMexico Kingston Prince

Belmopan

Tegucigalpa Guatemala

Managua

San Salvador

Washington, D.C.

Cleveland

Baltimore

Cancun

San Jose

Edmonton

Port-auPrince

St. Pierre

and Miquelon

(FRANCE)

Caracas

Santo

Domingo

Panama

Calgary St. John's

Quebec

Vancouver

Halifax

Winnipeg

Montreal

Seattle

Boston

Portland

Toronto Minneapolis

New York Detroit Milwaukee

Philadelphia

Chicago

Columbus Indianapolis

Salt Lake City

San Francisco

St. Louis

Denver

Atlanta

Los Angeles

San Diego Phoenix

Tijuana

Dallas

Jacksonville

Mexicali

El Paso Ciudad

Juarez Houston

New

Orleans

Miami Monterrey

Matamoros

Mazatlan

Merida Leon

Guadalajara

Veracruz

Puebla

Oaxaca Acapulco

Happy ValleyGoose Bay

San

Antonio

Ottawa

Nassau

Havana

Mexico Kingston

Belmopan

Tegucigalpa Guatemala

Managua

San Salvador

Washington, D.C.

Cleveland

Baltimore

Cancun

San Jose

Edmonton

Figure 14

Estimated Annual Illicit Chinese Migration to the United States

DI Cartography Center/MPG 755872AI 4-01

12,000

4,000

4,000

1,000

2,000

2,000

(from Guam)

8,000

0

0 600 Kilometers

600 Miles

Via air

Via land

Via sea

Arrows on the map add up to 33,000. An 

interagency assessment estimates that 

the flow in 1999 was 30,000 to 40,000.

Source: US Government.
32

Other migration flows will directly or indirectly

challenge US military forces, border defenses,

and law enforcement capabilities.

• Authoritarian regimes will remain capable

of ethnic cleansing and other forms of

repression and economic mismanagement,

leading to large and sudden population outflows that will create pressures for US diplomatic and possibly military involvement.

• As illegal migration increases, there will be

increased demands on border control and

other law enforcement agencies.

• Transnational terrorists, narcotics traffickers,

and organized crime groups will seek to

blend into and recruit among coethnic and

other immigrant communities and exploit

gaps in migration control efforts to ply their

trades.

• Increased migration and variances in transit

patterns will further exacerbate the threat

from the spread of infectious diseases.

FIGURE 15

GRAPHIC # 379021

(39p X 32p)

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

Migrants by fiscal year

1996 97 98 99a

Reaching

US shores

Interdicted

by US Coast

Guard

The number of Cubans trying to reach 

the US through alien smuggling has 

increased steadily since Havana and 

Washington signed bilateral migration 

accords in 1994 and 1998 committing 

the Cuban Government to curb illegal 

migration in return for 20,000 visas 

annually for Cubans waiting to 

emigrate to the US.

Figure 15

Cuban Migration: Fewer Rafters, Increased Smuggling

aOctober 1998 through April 1999 only.

Sources: US Coast Guard, and Immigration and Naturalization Service.

DI Design Center/MPG 379021AI 4-01
Annex

33

Regional Migration Profiles

The Americas

Migration pressures on the United States and

within the region will continue to rise during

the next 15 years. Differential rates of population growth, recurring political and economic

crises and natural disasters, as well as personal

insecurity caused by widespread poverty and

increasing crime will propel more Latin Americans to attempt to emigrate.

Most countries will be unable to control the

flow of people into the United States.

• Although declining population growth and

strong economic prospects in Mexico will

gradually diminish migration pressures, disparities in living standards, US demand for

labor, and family ties will sustain Mexico’s

rank as the single largest source of legal and

illegal immigration to the United States.

• Economic and demographic pressures in

Central America and fitful migration management and control efforts ensure that the

region also will remain a large source and

transit point for illegal immigrants attempting

to enter the United States.

• While Cuba generally has honored its obligation in the 1994-95 immigration accord with

the United States to prevent illegal departures

in return for a set legal quota of up to 20,000

annually, Castro could contemplate violating

the accord during periods of increased

tension.

• The long US-Canadian border will make it a

major transit point for illegal, mainly Asian,

immigrants bound for the United States,

although close US-Canadian cooperation will

limit such entries.

Illegal migration also will become a more contentious issue among Latin American governments.

The growth of alien-smuggling networks

throughout the Americas will further complicate migration management and control efforts.

It will exacerbate problems along US borders—

as indicated by the near doubling of arrests of

smuggled aliens in recent years—and elsewhere in the region and also will act as a corrupting influence on law enforcement officials.

Russia and the Other FSU States

Migration pressures have become more intense

since the demise of the Soviet Union and

resulting change in inter-ethnic balances and

loosening of immigration controls. Migration

flows into Russia will compensate somewhat

for but will not offset Russia’s labor force

shortfalls and declining population. They also

will add to social welfare costs and have the

potential to generate further friction within

Russia, with other FSU states, and possibly

with China in the Russian Far East. Continuing
34

poor economic conditions and political instability also may lead to a more substantial exodus of FSU populations to EU and other

developed states.

Well over 10 million people already have

moved across the international boundaries

between FSU states, often under duress. These

include some 6 million ethnic Russians and

non-Russian economic immigrants entering

Russia from other FSU states and some 3.3 million non-Russians leaving Russia for such

states. Over 3 million, often well-educated

ethnic Germans and Russian Jews, have left the

FSU for Germany, Israel, and elsewhere.

Although intra-FSU migration has peaked,

migration strains and flows will persist, arising

from a number of sources:

• Continued pressures on Russians in many

states to emigrate or assimilate.

• A large-scale internal migration of Russians

from Siberia and the Far East to European

Russia.

• The illegal migration of ethnic Chinese into

the Russian Far East, currently estimated to

total nearly 500,000, which sets the stage for

increased tensions.

• The integration of refugees escaping ethnic

and religious conflicts in the Caucasus and

Central Asia.

• An ecologically driven movement of people

thus far numbering 700,000 escaping natural

and manmade humanitarian disasters.

• A substantial movement of illegal immigrants

into and out of the FSU totaling several hundred thousand annually, often with the help of

alien-smugglers, women-traffickers, and corrupt government officials.

Migration’s Mixed Impacts. The return to Russia of large numbers of ethnic Russians from

the other former republics, together with the

growing number of migrant workers from even

more impoverished FSU states, has increased

public disenchantment and added to the Russian Government’s many woes by contributing

to competition for scarce jobs and public

resources. But over the longer term, Russia’s

aging and declining population will make it a

net beneficiary of migration from within the

FSU—which the Putin government looks set to

encourage. The poorer FSU states in the Caucasus with younger and growing populations

already are experiencing both the positive

results of emigration, such as remittances, and

negative ones, such as loss of skilled people, to

Russia and elsewhere.

Middle East and North Africa

North Africa and the Middle East are both

sending and receiving subregions. As a whole,

the region is second only to Sub-Saharan

Africa as a generator of refugees, who will

remain a source of political instability and illegal migration.

North Africa is the principal source for the

EU’s Muslims, and its poor opportunity structure and continuing population growth ensure

that it will remain so. Despite the relaxation of

some EU exclusionary laws and $6 billion in

aid to North African countries since 1996 as
35

part of an initiative aimed at socioeconomic

development and weakening migration pressures, these pressures will persist.

The Persian Gulf States. Intraregional migration, primarily in the form of contract laborers

initially from Egypt—and more recently from

the South Asian region—plays an instrumental

role in the economies of the oil-producing Gulf

states where they comprise nearly half the population. These contract laborers have virtually

no access to social welfare and political participation or to permanent residence or citizenship.

Israel. In Israel, friction among European, nonEuropean, and more recent Russian-Jewish

immigrant populations will persist. The 1 million Russian Jews are a new source of economic dynamism; they also are inclined to

caution in the peace process. Immigration to

Israel will remain a neuralgic issue for Palestinians and Arab states in the region, who see it as

fueling perceived Israeli territorial ambitions.

Similarly, the prospect of Palestinian refugees

returning to the region and the high fertility of

Source: Russian State Statistical Committee.

Table 2

Migration in the Former Soviet Union, 1989-99

Net Migration,

1989-99

Net Migration of Russians,

1989-98

Thousands Percentage of 1989

population

Thousands Percentage of 1989

Russian population

Russia 3,282 2.2 2,910.2 11.5

Ukraine 77 0.1 -295.4 -2.6

Belarus 109 1.1 -18.0 -1.3

Moldova -215 -5.0 -50.8 -9.0

Latvia -141 -5.3 -92.5 -10.2

Lithuania -19 -0.5 -45.1 -13.1

Estonia -86 -5.5 -58.3 -12.3

Armenia -2 0.0 -32.1 -62.2

Azerbaijan -466 -6.6 -188.8 -48.1

Georgia -251 -4.6 -153.0 -44.8

Kazakhstan -2,196 -13.6 -1,031.9 -16.6

Kyrgyzstan -290 -6.8 -215.0 -23.5

Tajikistan -273 -5.4 -220.0 -56.6

Turkmenistan 536 15.2 -84.4 -25.3

Uzbekistan -853 -4.3 -425.0 -25.7
36

Palestinians generally will increase Israeli concerns. The prospect of changed ethnic balances

will remain a difficult issue in negotiating a

settlement.

Surging Refugee Populations. The large refugee populations in the northern tier states of

Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, along with the

longstanding Palestinian refugees scattered

throughout the region, now total some 7 million. They will remain a source of instability

and friction within and between states, while

also providing recruits for terrorist groups in

the region.

FIGURE 16

GRAPHIC # 379022

(39p X 37p)

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

North Africa

Middle East

Sub-Saharan Africa

2000

2005

2010

2015

The steady rise in working-age 

populations and the poor prospects

for employment in most of Africa and 

the Middle East will increase 

migration pressures.

Figure 16

Working-Age Population in North Africa, Middle East,

and Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-15

Million

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Source: US Bureau of the Census.

DI Design Center/MPG 379022AI 4-01
37

Sub-Saharan Africa

Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa is primarily

intraregional and consists of a growing number

of economic, primarily illegal, migrants and of

refugees escaping the many civil conflicts and

wars in the region. International migration to

other regions, mainly the EU but also to North

America, is likely to grow commensurate with

Africa’s youth bulge, poor economic prospects,

and continuing ethnic and cross-border conflicts.

Refugees. There are several million refugees in

Sub-Saharan Africa—concentrated in the western, central, and eastern regions—where they

will further exacerbate ethnic and political

polarization and provide recruits for the many

conflicts in the region. They also will remain a

strain on already meager host government

capacities to sustain local populations.

Economic Migrants. Sub-Saharan Africa has

long witnessed movements of migrant workers,

particularly to Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa.

The estimated 3 to 6 million foreign immigrants in Cote d’Ivoire, totaling one quarter to

one-half of its population, are creating an

anti-migrant backlash that contributed to the

short-lived military coup in December 1999

and persistent political instability since then.

The issue of ethnic origin and citizenship also

is a destabilizing component in the politics of

neighboring countries.

South Africa is home to some 3-8 million illegal immigrants from throughout Sub-Saharan

Africa, a flow that is likely to continue and add

to social and economic pressures—as well as to

the spread of HIV/AIDS. South Africa also will

be challenged to limit growing elite emigration

to developed countries.

Asia/Pacific

Asian countries’ vast populations and varying

economic and demographic conditions ensure

the region will confront intense intraregional

migration pressures and also will contribute

substantially to global migration. Populous

countries, such as the Philippines, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, and

China, account for the growing migrant flows

within the region, which totaled at least 6.5

million in 1997, mainly to the fast growing

economies of Hong Kong, Taiwan, South

Korea, and Singapore. Thailand, Burma, and

Malaysia are both sending and receiving countries. With China estimated to have more than

100 million underemployed urban workers and

Indonesia facing growing civil and secessionist

conflict, the potential for continued emigration—and potentially unsettling regional and

global ramifications—remains substantial.

Increasingly, Australia and New Zealand are

becoming destinations for large numbers of

legal and illegal Asian immigrants in response

to an earlier loosening of immigration laws and

growing public tolerance for Asian immigrants.

More so than in other regions, Asian migration

is a regulated “industry” that both sending and

receiving country governments attempt to

manage to their advantage. Many countries

have imposed tight residency requirements and

severe penalties on employers of illegal workers. Nonetheless, in Asia, too, illegal migration

is on the rise and may soon approach levels in

the EU and North America. Continued migration and minimal integration of immigrants will
38

remain a source of tension and conflict

throughout Southeast Asia in particular.

Japan’s Conundrum. Japan has the world’s

most pressing need for immigrants to address

impending labor force shortfalls. It would need

over 600,000 working age immigrants annually

just to maintain its working age population at

2000 levels and some 3.2 million annually to

maintain its old-age dependency ratio at 2000

levels, according to UN projections. The precipitous aging of Japan’s population will generate severe fiscal strains; the OECD estimates

that Japan’s pension expenditures will nearly

double from 1995 to 2020, compared to a

growth of 25 percent for the United States.

Such growth in social expenditures also will

constrain defense spending and force

modernization.

Japan continues to resist greater immigration,

with basically no net immigration in 2000.

Although it cautiously increased its immigrant

population during the robust economic growth

and severe labor shortages of the late 1980s,

Japan has among the lowest number of

foreign-born among OECD countries at about 1

percent of the population. Japan’s immigration

regime makes naturalization almost impossible.

Even work and study permits are difficult to

secure and discourage prolonged stays, thereby

encouraging a small but growing flow of illegal

immigrants totaling some 270,000, according

to ILO estimates.

Japan has turned to several alternative methods

to defer a decision in favor of more open immigration or integration of current immigrants.

Japanese efforts have focused on enticing the

more than 2 million overseas Japanese, particularly in Latin America, to return; broadening

opportunities for women somewhat; and

“exporting” labor through foreign direct investment. These measures have produced only

modest labor “gains.”

European Union

With most EU members officially “closed” to

most forms of legal immigration, illegal migration and the overstaying of asylum-seekers and

visa-holders will loom increasingly large and

a

 Number of workers by country of origin (thousands,

latest year available, estimates of undocumented

workers in parentheses).

Source: Peter Stalker. Workers Without Frontiers.

International Labor Organization. 2000.

Table 3

Legal and Illegal Foreign Workers in Asian

Labor-Importing Countries, 1998

Importing Country Total Foreign

Workersa

(thousands)

Indonesia Philippines Thailand China Other Asia

Malaysia 2,500 755 (1,000) 100 (400) 79 (33) NA 305

Thailand 1,260 NA 5 NA 60 944

Singapore 450 100 60 60 46 NA

Japan 1,354 NA 84 (43) 18 (39) 234 (38) 680 (88)

Hong Kong (China) NA 50 120 18 NA 39

Taiwan 297 9 84 138 21 NA

South Korea 210 15 23 (15) 9 (6) 28 (49) 56 (20)
39

FIGURE 17

GRAPHIC#

379023

(19p X 48p)

threaten to overwhelm the EU’s emerging common immigration regime and member state

regimes.

• Illegal immigration has grown ninefold in

less than a decade—to some 500,000 in 1999,

compared to less than 50,000 in 1993,

according to one estimate by the International

Center for Migration Policy Development.

Asylum-seekers totaled nearly 400,000 in

2000.

China’s Migration Challenge

With an estimated 500,000 or more Chinese emigrating annually, as many as half

of them illegally, and 100 million underemployed urban workers, China will

remain a major uncertainty in the global

migration picture.

Social, political, and economic developments in China have the potential to create a spontaneous mass migration

emergency that could spiral out of control.

• Such an emergency could result from a

sudden economic crisis caused by a failure of the banking system; continued free

market reforms leading to massive

unemployment and underemployment

and a rapid influx to urban areas; or a

crisis of legitimacy for the regime leading to widespread unrest.

China also could encourage migration to

relieve socioeconomic and political pressures.

Figure 17

Legal and Illegal Foreigners in

Japan by Country of Origin

South

Korea, 42

China, Taiwan,

and Hong Kong, 18

Brazil, 15

Philippines, 7

US, 3

Peru, 3

Other, 12

South

Korea, 26

China, 20

Philippines, 12

Thailand, 11

Iran, 5

Malaysia, 4

Peru, 4

Pakistan, 3

Indonesia, 2

Bangladesh, 2

Other, 11

Legal Foreign Population, 1997

Percent

Total: 1.48 million

Illegal Foreign Workers, 1997a

Percent

Total: 251,697

aNumbers represent workers against whom

deportation procedures were intiated.

Source: Demetrios G. Papademetriou, and Kimberley 

A., Hamilton. Reinventing Japan: Immigration’s Role 

in Shaping Japan’s Future. Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace. 2000.

DI Design Center/MPG 379023AI 4-01
40

FIGURE 18

GRAPHIC# 379027

(39p X 43p)

0 50 100 150 200

Figure 18

Net Legal Migration Into EU Countries, 1999

0 50 100 150 200

Thousand

Germany

UK

Italy

France

Netherlands

Greece

Portugal

Ireland

Austria

Sweden

Belgium

Denmark

Finland

Luxembourg

Spain (no data)

Source: Business Week.

DI Design Center/MPG 379027AI 4-01
41

FIGURE 19

GRAPHIC# 379024

(39p X 49p)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

As percent of GDP, 1997

As percent of total social

protection benefits

Pension Spending, 1997

Italy

France

Germany

EU 15

Sweden

UK

Spain

Ireland

2000 2015

People Over Age 64 as a Percent of Total Age 15 to 64

Figure 19

Aging Trends and Pension Spending in the EU

Sources: US Bureau of the Census, and The Economist.

DI Design CenterMPG 379024AI 4-01
42

The EU will remain vulnerable geographically

to mass migrations sparked by pervasive conflict and economic hardship in nearby regions.

Such factors already have produced nearly a

million refugees and asylum-seekers from the

Balkans within EU borders and this flow likely

will persist. Continuing economic pressures

and political upheaval in parts of the FSU and

North Africa also will produce a steady flow.

Difficult Choices Ahead. Most EU states will

face politically painful dilemmas requiring

them to choose among substantially more liberal immigration and integration policies or

alternative economic and social policy

remedies for their looming labor and fiscal

shortfalls. A failure to permit substantially

increased migration is likely to lead to growing

labor and tax base shortfalls. It also threatens to

undermine social safety nets and constrain

defense spending and force modernization in

the absence of other compensatory measures

such as substantial pension reform and

improvements in productivity.

The EU’s looming demographic and labor

force imbalances are beginning to generate a

reappraisal of its restrictive immigration

policies among the business community in

particular. Segments of the media and political

parties also support an expanded temporary

worker and limited permanent immigrant programs. Most recently, the European Commission called for expanded immigration to ensure

future growth and ensure the social contract.

The beginnings of this trend are visible in the

move by the German Government to loosen

citizenship requirements and initiate a limited

visa program for high-tech workers; the Swiss

Government’s success in defeating a referendum to limit immigrants to 18 percent of the

population; and the British Government’s

loosening of requirements for some immigrant

categories.