FUNDING DEFENSE:

CHALLENGES OF BUYING MILITARY

CAPABILITY

IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Daniel W. Henk

Martin Revayi Rupiya

September 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-069-9

ii
FOREWORD

The American military, particularly the Army, plays a

modest but significant role in helping the nations of

Sub-Saharan Africa build regional security systems. Some

of the most important U.S. efforts focus on assisting

Africans as they improve their civil-military relations,

strategic planning methods, and defense budgeting

procedures. All of these are interlinked: stable

civil-military relations and coherent strategic planning

depend on a transparent budgeting process that builds

consensus among military and civilian leaders, and ties the

allocation of resources to strategic objectives, military

missions, and threats. 

In this monograph, Martin Rupiya, Director of the

University of Zimbabwe’s Centre for Defence Studies, and

Daniel Henk of the Air War College provide one of the first

comprehensive studies of defense budgeting practices in

Africa. They assess both the problems with these practices,

and fruitful avenues of reform. By doing so, they provide a

solid roadmap both for African leaders and for Americans

concerned with the development of greater security in the

region.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

monograph as a contribution to the analysis of the Army

role in regional security.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHORS

DANIEL W. HENK serves at the Air War College in the

Department of Leadership and Ethics. He was raised in

central Africa by missionary parents. Dr. Henk served in

the U.S. Army for 29 years, retiring in 1999 at the rank of

colonel. His military service included staff and leadership

positions at tactical, theater, and national levels. During his

military career, he held multiple Africa-related

assignments, including service as U.S. Defense Attaché in

Zimbabwe with diplomatic accreditation as Army Attaché

to Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania. He taught at the U.S.

Military Academy, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special

Warfare Center, at the Army War College where he served

as Director of African Studies, and at the Africa Center for

Strategic Studies where he was Chair of the Department of

Security Studies. Dr. Henk is a graduate of the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army

War College. He received his Ph.D. in Anthropology from

the University of Florida, performing his doctoral research

in a mining community in the Democratic Republic of

Congo. He has conducted research throughout Africa on

security issues, and lectures frequently to government,

academic and professional organizations on issues related

to Africa and U.S. foreign policy towards Africa. He

co-authored the 1997 SSI study The United States and the

Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis

Response Initiative and Beyond.

MARTIN REVAYI RUPIYA is a Senior Lecturer in War and

Strategic Studies, Department of History, University of

Zimbabwe. He also is the Founding Director of the

University’s Centre for Defence Studies. Born and raised in

Zimbabwe, Dr. Rupiya pursued a military career for 17

years, retiring from the Zimbabwe National Army in 1989 at

the rank of lieutenant colonel. Dr. Rupiya was educated at

King’s College (London) and the University of Zimbabwe,

v
where his doctoral dissertation addressed the history of the

Rhodesian armed forces between 1926 and 1963. In

addition to his duties as University Lecturer, he holds a

variety of senior administrative and committee

appointments at the University of Zimbabwe. He edits a

professional journal, a quarterly review, and an occasional

paper series for the Centre for Defense Studies and is widely

published. Dr. Rupiya also is very active in scholarly and

outreach activity on security and conflict resolution issues.

He is a visiting lecturer at the Africa University (Mutare,

Zimbabwe) and at the University of Witwatersrand (South

Africa). He is a research fellow with the Department of

Peace Studies, University of Bradford (United Kingdom)

and the Centre for Defense Studies in London. He sits on

the steering committee of the (Danish) DANIDA Project on

the Network of Centers for Defense Management and

Security in Southern Africa. His role as director has

resulted in his invitation to serve with the new,

Geneva-based Non-State Actors organization. 

vi
SUMMARY

The interests of the United States would be well-served

in the emergence of a stable, secure and prosperous Africa, a

fact acknowledged in the rhetoric of the current and

previous Administrations. Since the end of the Cold War,

the United States has been increasingly active in efforts to

promote political and economic reform in African countries,

including programs to democratize African security sectors. 

While the military (and other security force) establishments

in Africa have many problems—and pose challenges to

ongoing democratization efforts—few challenges are as

potentially significant for good or ill as that of defense sector

funding. The ability of African countries to provide the

secure environment necessary for social and economic

development requires the creation of the right kind of

security establishments, legitimized by democratic

processes, and empowered with adequate resources. It is

very much in the U.S. interest to assist African societies in

reform both of the security sector and of security sector

financing.

The official data about African defense expenditure is

scanty at best, often deliberately concealed and rarely

provides the full story. At the same time, African leaders

face increasing pressure from external partners and, in

some cases, from their own populations, to reduce military

forces and military spending. However, with a few egregious

exceptions, African countries spend surprisingly little on

defense—possibly less than is prudent. Military

establishments typically are under-funded for basic

military requirements, and spend an overwhelming and

crippling proportion of their budgets on salaries and

personnel allowances. They tend to be oriented against

domestic rather than external threats, and tend to serve

regimes in power rather than societies at large. (Though

vii
with over 50 separate countries on the continent, it is

dangerous to generalize too broadly.)

What generally is missing in African countries is a

transparent process, based upon broad national concensus,

for defining security, formulating coherent national

security strategy, allocating resources based on that

strategy, then effectively overseeing implementation.

African countries generally have not established national

consensus on the nature of security they desire and the ways

and means to achieve that security. This commonly results

in defense establishments very poorly suited to any

conceivable threat, unaccountable to the society at large

and riddled with graft. Decisions on defense funding tend to

come out of a small elite of government insiders, or from

jockeying by major institutions (including the military) for a

share of the national resources. Neither system results in a

good return on the investment in defense.

That said, many African countries now are engaged in

some process of government—including security sector—

reform. These efforts are being assisted by a variety of

external partners. There is widespread acknowledgement

that reforms will not be quick and certainly will not be easy,

but the potential results are well worth the effort. Part of

the solution lies in the improvement of institutions and

techniques for more efficient planning and more effective

oversight of defense expenditure. But a more fundamental

issue is the democratization of the whole process of deciding

national priorities and allocating resources based on a true

national consensus.

The United States is one actor in this critical drama, and

the Department of Defense (DoD) is playing a key role. DoD

activities include the long-standing Intenational Military

Education and Training (IMET) program that trains foreign

military personnel in a variety of skills, the Africa Crisis

Response Initiative (ACRI), essentially a bilateral,

tactical-level peace operations training program, various

initiatives by the U.S. European and U.S. Central

viii
Commands and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies

(ACSS). The ACSS provides an exceptional forum in which

senior African leaders—including those from civil society—

can analyze and debate key issues that bear on defense

sector reform. Though a relatively new program, ACSS has

won wide acceptance and high praise from Africans. This

clearly is one program that should be encouraged and

enhanced.

A number of other innovative, relatively low-cost

programs also could contribute substantial value to reform

of defense funding in Africa. These could include targeted

employment of contractors with unique expertise and an

internship program in the United States for small numbers

of African officials involved in defense budgeting.

The United States has a considerable long-term stake in

the success of ongoing reform efforts in Africa—including

those pertaining to the funding of security. Modest current

U.S. investments could yield a substantial future payoff.

ix
FUNDING DEFENSE:

CHALLENGES OF BUYING MILITARY

CAPABILITY

IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Introduction.

U.S. security interests in Sub-Saharan Africa do not

require the commitment of military forces in large-scale

conventional operations, and are unlikely to do so in the

foreseeable future. But the United States does have

interests on the continent, including the resolution of

ongoing conflict and development of secure, stable, and

prosperous societies committed to working as partners with

Washington on common problems.

1

 These interests can be

promoted by assisting African leaders in the revision and

reform of their security environment. A key to this

end—and an integral part of Africa’s movement toward

stable governments with popular support—is the reform of

civil-military relations. African militaries have often

preyed on the citizens of their countries, and typically are

much more interested in securing regimes than societies at

large. Since the late 1960s, military intervention in politics

has been common and effective civilian control of the

military rare, features that work against transparent,

accountable, effective governance. Africans themselves,

along with their external partners, are engaged in a variety

of efforts to promote governmental reform, including reform

of security sectors. It is very much in the interest of the

United States to support such efforts.

Healthy civil-military relations are not easy for any

society to achieve or maintain. The relations between a

national security sector and a larger public are complex and

culturally peculiar, reflecting unique historical

antecedents. Even when models of civil-military relations

are good in one society, they cannot be easily exported to

1
others. They always require more than mere restraint on

the part of the armed forces. They tend to be improved by

coherent and reasonably transparent processes for the

development of budgeting that links military funding to

missions, that generates public support for defense

expenditures, and that leaves the military confident that it

is receiving adequate resources. But in Africa, open,

coherent procedures for developing defense budgets have

been rare. One of the most valuable things that the United

States can do to help shape the African security

environment is to assist the region’s political and military

leaders in their efforts to reform defense spending.

Because budgeting for security sectors in Africa has long

been an informal and closed process, it is poorly understood. 

Both African leaders and Americans seeking to assist them

must overcome this lack of understanding. The authors

address that problem by summarizing some of the

challenges faced by African policymakers in determining

financial allocations for their security organizations,

particularly the uniformed military. The authors consider

general patterns in the ways in which policy decisions on

security force financing are made and implemented in

Africa. The monograph is not intended as an economic

treatise; rather, it is about relationships, choices, and the

ramifications of those choices.

The authors focus on the armed forces—the military

establishment—of the African state. However, given the

fact that African political decisionmakers may not always

view the armed forces as their most important and relevant

security agency, the authors expand the analysis to include

(at least in passing) other important state security organs,

such as the police and intelligence services.

Patterns in the ways African leaders conceptualize

“security” and decide on the security force capabilities they

need are of interest. Of equal concern is the way in which

leaders choose between what traditionally has been

regarded as “security” and other national priorities in

2
allocating resources, and the degree to which these choices

are informed by the wider society. Patterns in the allocation

process (including oversight of spending) also are

considered. A final question has to do with the result—the

output—of security force funding in African contexts. The

authors identify particular problems and challenges and

offer some suggestions for attenuating them.

Before exploring these issues in more depth, two

cautions are offered. First, the act of generalizing about a

continent as large and diverse as Africa is fraught with

danger. What is true for Sierra Leone cannot be assumed to

be true of South Africa; Ethiopia is vastly different than

Zambia. Second, despite appearances to the contrary in the

professional literature, “countries” are abstractions and

cannot decide anything. Sentient beings, not “countries,”

make policy decisions. In some African countries, the group

that makes such decisions on behalf of the country is very

small. While the authors will use the common convention,

describing choices that “countries” make in Africa, lingering

closely behind the discussion is the question: who really

speaks for the “country”?

At the outset, it should be acknowledged that there is no

rich body of literature on African defense economics.

Individual African scholars and some African organizations

are beginning to address this subject, notably in South

Africa. However, African researchers face daunting

obstacles, ranging from egregious lack of access to official

documents and officials in many instances, to the possibility

of repercussions from authorities. Even in African countries

that receive generally high marks for democratic

commitment, officials tend to treat data about defense

issues as privileged information and its disclosure as

treasonous.

2

 One intention of the authors is to stimulate

debate about the subject and about access to data. A

longer-term objective is to assist African societies in their

efforts to make the processes of funding security more

efficient, productive and transparent.

3
This kind of analysis begs several much more important

background questions. At the center of these larger

questions is the definition of “security.” For the purposes of

this monograph, the authors define it as the protection of

what the political decisionmakers consider to be important

and valuable. The primary questions here are: “What do

you value, and what will you do to protect it?” Or, put a

different way, the question is “What is security, and how

much of it is enough?” Here, it is important to identify who

in a society has the prerogative of defining what is

important and valuable. For instance, if the society is ruled

by a small, unrepresentative elite, maintaining the political

power of a regime may be the most important value. In a

society with more democratic structures, protecting the

economy and safeguarding economic development

programs may receive greater emphasis. Again, if key

security decisions exclusively are made by a threatened

regime, no degree of “security”—however coercive to the

society at large—may be “enough.” This leads to the issue of

society’s other priorities, and begs several additional

questions: Besides security, what are the society’s basic

interests? How are they funded in comparison to “security”? 

Whose voices are heard in this decision? 

The issue of “threat” is related to “security.” The

question here is: What threatens the things that society

values? Here, too, are a number of subsidiary questions.

Who determines the nature and extent of “threat,” and what

process is used in this assessment? What proportion of the

society’s resources are the policymakers willing to devote to

attenuate the threat? Or alternatively, how much risk are

they prepared to accept?

In recent years, the definition of “security” has

broadened in Africa and elsewhere.

3

 For instance, it now is

common to hear policymakers speak of “economic security,”

or “environmental security.”

4

 Since 1993, the international

conversation has featured increasing use of the term

“human security,” stimulated in great degree by that year’s

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human

4
Development report.

5

 The following year’s report defined

the concept in greater detail, giving it a very broad charter.

6

It is readily evident that a society’s security forces are not

suited to all of the tasks specified in these new definitions of

“security” and often are inadequate to provide all of the

security desired by members of the society. If security is

attained, it must include the contributions of public and

private sector actors other than simply the security organs

of the state.

The questions about financing security in Africa, as

elsewhere, are tied to the broader questions of security

strategy. Before considering how African countries allocate

resources to their security forces, it is very appropriate to

ask whether they undergo some process of developing such

strategy. A standard approach would begin with

identification and prioritization of interests and an

assessment of threats to those interests. This would then

lead to development of policies that marshal the various

instruments of state power—diplomatic, economic,

informational, and security force/military —to protect and

promote the interests, carefully balancing desired ends with

feasible ways and available means. The latter point is

especially important: strategy that is not grounded in fiscal

reality is meaningless. Budgeting is a necessary component

of strategic planning.

Funding Security: African Realities.

According to the best available data, in 1996, the 48

countries of sub-Saharan Africa collectively spent over $10

billion on their military establishments. For the modal

country in the region, this amounted to about 2 percent of

gross domestic product (GDP), a reduction from the late

1980s, when the modal country in the region spend more

like about 4 percent of its GDP on its armed forces.

7

 This

compares to a world-wide average for the mid 1990s of about

5 percent of GDP devoted to defense.

8

 Given the significant

security challenges to African states,

9

 levels of defense

5
spending for most African countries are surprisingly low,

both in relative and absolute terms. In fact, given the

expense of maintaining professional military

establishments anywhere in the world, it may be

appropriate to question what military capability a typical

African country could expect to purchase with an annual

defense budget of $200 million or less.

10

 That said, a very

modest defense budget in Africa could be large enough to

significantly reduce a state’s ability to fund other critical

national priorities.

These data are by no means the whole story. Much of the

real budgetary data from African countries is shrouded in

secrecy and obscurity and should be viewed with a healthy

dose of skepticism.

11

 National leaders in countries like

Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, or

Zimbabwe can divert significant resources to security forces

in ways that are entirely shielded from public scrutiny and

accountability.

12

 Funds that contribute directly to the

security forces requirements—such as construction of

facilities—can be obscured in budgets of otherwise

unrelated ministries. For that matter, funds allocated in

military budgets can be diverted to nondefense uses,

including graft. Some African military establishments are

so austerely funded that personnel are obliged to rely on

petty commerce or farming (often performed by “dependents” of military members) to make ends meet—so, in a

sense, depending on the informal economy to “fund” defense

needs like salaries. Some African countries operate on

“cash budgets” in which ministries of the state are allocated

funding on a month-by-month basis, based upon revenues

available (which cannot be accurately anticipated).

13

 In

short, no one really knows what many African countries

spend on defense, including senior officials of the countries

themselves. Calculating the amounts spent on the

nonmilitary services—particularly the intelligence

services—is even more problematic.

That said, it is possible to make “order of magnitude”

assessments of spending. If Malawi and Zimbabwe can be

6
cited as valid examples, in the mid 1990s, African countries

tended to spend 4-6 percent of GDP on the security

services—the military, police, and intelligence services—

designed to provide external and internal security. While

not large in absolute terms, security budgets are a

significant proportion of public sector economic resources in

African states. Hence, while it still is appropriate to ask

how much “security” these outlays purchase, it is

appropriate to ask if policymakers explored nonmilitary

options for protecting security interests. It also is useful to

ask if the voice of the average African citizen was heard in

making the funding choices. It is even more appropriate to

ask what the citizen received for his or her country’s

security forces expenditure. 

One of the most significant differences between African

countries and the established democracies in the West is the

degree to which African national policymakers consider

their most serious security threats to be internal rather

than external to the country’s borders.

14

 Internal stability

cannot be taken for granted by most African leaders, a fact

that has significant ramifications for choices about resource

allocation and roles and missions of the security forces. An

obvious corollary to the problem of internal stability is that

the capability to assure internal security—be it found in

intelligence, police, or military communities—may be far

more important to political decisionmakers than that

dedicated to security from external threats. Another

corollary is that the cost of purchasing capabilities for

internal security may be significantly different than that for

external security.

Whether the topic is internal and external security,

military capability, or another interest of the state, most

African countries lack the resources for near-term

realization of any of their most significant priorities. This

imposes excruciating choices on national policymakers

under the best of circumstances. But it also has significant

implications for internal security. Access to the very limited

resources of the state—including, particularly, public sector

7
employment—can take on such importance that

competitors (and those already in power) are tempted to

resort to any methods to attain and maintain a privileged

position. Losing that position can result in destitution or

worse. This is true for military as well as civilian

government employees.

Since the late 1980s, external donors increasingly have

pressured African governments to reduce funding for the

security sector—particularly for the armed forces. This has

been expressed in the insistence on the so-called “three Ds”:

democratize, demobilize, and downsize. An objective of this

pressure has been to increase the resources available for

other priorities of African national development. While wellmeaning, and sometimes very appropriate, this pressure is

not always wise. African development depends to a large

degree on an ability to attract capital (and prevent capital

flight). This, in turn, requires security from crime,

insurgent groups, and environmental threats. Ironically, to

provide the security necessary to attract investment—and

promote sustainable economic development—African

countries may need to invest more, not less, in the security

sector. (Significantly, because of an egregious crime threat,

South Africa now spends more on its national police than on

its military establishment.

15

) And there certainly is room

for more efficient utilization in Africa of resources already

devoted to security.

In the case of defense spending, lack of materiel

resources almost inevitably means that African military

establishments are under-funded for basic military

requirements such as pay and allowances, personnel

services (e.g., billeting and medical treatment), training,

and acquisition of necessary materiel. A significant

deficiency in military funding has obvious implications for

military readiness and military capability in general. This

is recognized even in the African popular press.

16

 Nor are

the richer countries exempt from these problems. An audit

of the Nigerian military conducted in 2000 found over 75

percent of its Army equipment to be inoperative, and all of

8
its Air Force fighter jets were grounded. Military training

virtually had ceased. And this is a country with a

sophisticated military establishment.

17

Severe under-funding for salaries and benefits

encourages military personnel to abuse their access to

government resources. For example, in some military

establishments, senior officers are provided official vehicles

that they use for very personal transportation needs. (One

author was informed of a mid-level officer in a southern

African country who had engaged his army’s engineers to

build a very nice house for him in an upper-class

neighborhood—at government expense. This apparently

was not an isolated instance in the country in question.)

Other military personnel supplement their income by

taking on second jobs—sometimes using military resources. 

In the worst instances, in countries like Democratic

Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique,

security force personnel “shake down” hapless citizens on

the street or in “security sweeps.”

18

 The state in these cases

partially has delegated its role of funding defense to the

informal economy. It is very important to note here,

however, that a number of African armies exhibit a notable

discipline and professional demeanor despite great

austerity in resources.

Discussion of military spending in Africa frequently

results in accusations of corruption and graft. In some

cases, these accusations are well-founded. However,

suspicions of corruption taint even those transactions that

are not corrupt. Part of this is due to a general lack of

transparency in use of government funds: insistence on

secrecy for secrecy’s sake.

An Unfortunate Legacy.

The lack of resources touches a very key problem related

to defense spending in Africa. In their present form, some

military establishments are far too large or far too small for

any viable role in their current security environment. Many

9
are not well-configured for the kind of conflict—or other

roles—national leaders conceivably might want them to

play.

19

 Virtually all African countries inherited their

security establishments from pre-independence regimes or

insurgent organizations, neither of which provided a

security establishment well-suited to the new environment. 

Few African countries have had the option of building a

national army “from scratch,” and few African countries

have had the option of abolishing their military

establishments. 

This lack of resources also contributes to another

characteristic of many African governments: a reluctance to

engage in long-range strategic planning. The effects go well

beyond the security sector, of course, but they have a very

negative impact on organizations that require multi-year

planning for even the most basic efficiencies in acquisition

and maintenance of sophisticated materiel and training of

personnel. There is a very pronounced tendency to rely on

“muddling through somehow.” One clear result is

considerable waste and inefficiency; another is difficulty

achieving the synergy of men and materiel that military

operations require.

Security establishments are an important economic/

political constituency in many African states. Their

members depend for their livelihood on this form of state

employment in countries that have limited economic

opportunity. They cannot be taken for granted in the

distribution of state benefits. Their access to the means of

violence gives them a clout well out of proportion to their

actual numbers. This limits the options of senior

policymakers in making any fundamental change in the

nature of the security agencies or in their size and missions.

That said, there are many highly professional African

military leaders who desperately want to improve their

country’s capabilities and have a clear idea of the need. The

commander of the army of a large African country explained

to one author in the early 1990s that he would have been

10
extremely happy to cut his 40,000-man army in half if he

could find the means to deploy the smaller force rapidly to

his country’s borders. In the long term, despite the outlay

for new military materiel, this would have saved his country

an enormous amount of money. However, his country had

no short-term ability to acquire the needed mobility, and

could not accept the risk of the unguarded frontiers. Though

the commander did not mention it, his country’s economy

could not easily absorb the 20,000 former soldiers released

in such a downsizing. Unless very carefully handled, such

an act could have been destabilizing for the country and

certainly would have been a political liability for the ruling

party.

The general lack of resources also bears on African

options for acquisition of materiel. Defense industries in

Africa—save for those of South Africa and Egypt—are very

small. African countries generally have acquired their

military materiel from a variety of external sources, some as

a legacy from an earlier colonial regime, some from various

Cold War patrons, some as donations of surplus equipment

from the developed world. Much of this equipment is old,

much is of it is poorly suited to contemporary roles and

missions. Often, equipment from different sources proves

incompatible in the field. Spare parts are unavailable or too

expensive. Yet replacing the equipment often is beyond the

funding capacity of the state. The result is continued

piecemeal replacement from different sources, perpetuating

the problem. Another result is graveyards of unusable

equipment around many African military bases.

Where Does the Money (and other Resources) Come

From?

While virtually all African countries struggle to obtain

the resources to maintain their security forces, the sources

of those resources vary considerably. In general, some

proportion of the funding for security services derives from

11
the normal revenues raised by the state and extracted from

citizens and businesses as taxes.

International financial institutions generally do not now

provide loans for purchase of African military capability,

although some governments (particularly in the former

“East Bloc”) seem willing to provide credit on favorable

terms for purchases of military materiel. That said, any

form of economic assistance to an African country

potentially could compensate for state resources diverted to

the security sector.

In several cases, African governments enjoy access to

foreign exchange revenues from lucrative extractive

industries (as in Nigeria or Angola). These provide

substantial options not available to other countries,

allowing the Angolan government, for example, to purchase

significant quantities of sophisticated military materiel

from overseas sources.

20

The ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

has featured another source of funding for at least some of

the intervening armies since 1998. Uganda may have

supported its Congo adventure by trafficking in Congolese

gold and diamonds,

21

 while Zimbabwean entrepreneurs

connected to senior officials may have obtained lucrative

access to Congolese minerals in exchange for Zimbabwe’s

backing of the Kabila regime.

22

 These examples point to a

troubling issue: the prospect that African leaders in the

future may be tempted to commit military forces to regional

conflicts in the expectation of significant financial reward.

However, it is worth noting that neither Uganda nor

Zimbabwe have been able to fully finance the human and

materiel costs of their Congo intervention with Congolese

resources.

23

 Significantly, in neither case were the citizens

of the countries consulted about the political or financial

implications of the interventions.

Another source of funding for some African military

establishments is the United Nations (U.N.). Several

African countries have participated for decades in

12
international peacekeeping operations conducted by the

U.N., notably Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria,

Tunisia, and Senegal. Many other African countries have

participated in one or more U.N. peacekeeping operations in

the 1990s. Both the individual soldier and the participating

government are well-remunerated for participation in U.N.

peacekeeping. This includes a monthly payment of over

U.S.$1,000 per soldier to the contributing government, and

other allowances paid directly to the soldier on site.

24

 One

knowledgeable observer calls attention to the economic

benefit enjoyed by the Ghanaian military because of the

consistent, high level of Ghana’s participation in U.N.

operations.

25

 However, African states do not necessarily

return the U.N. peacekeeping reimbursements to the

defense budget, a fact which has generated civil-military

friction in some countries.

26

During the Cold War era, a number of African countries

received quantities of military materiel as grant aid, or

purchased through very long-term “soft loans.” In the wake

of the Cold War, few patrons now are willing to provide

African countries much in the way of military grant aid,

though there are a few exceptions. In the 1990s, the United

States provided light observer aircraft and C-130 transport

aircraft to several countries. It also provided quantities of

nonlethal excess defense materiel to individual countries

and to the West African peacekeeping force in Liberia

(ECOMOG).

27

 Still, since 1990, neither the United States

nor any other external patron has donated enough military

materiel to substantially enhance the military capability of

any Sub-Saharan African country.

In contrast to military materiel, African countries have

continued to receive external support for the training of

military personnel.

28

 While this support certainly falls short

of the overall need, significant numbers of African military

personnel—mainly of officer rank—are invited to training

courses offered by countries outside of Africa. Several

countries—particularly France, the United Kingdom, and

the People’s Republic of China—maintain cadres of military

13
trainers in Africa.

29

 Denmark has provided funding and

military personnel for peacekeep- ing training—and

extensive support in development of a peacekeeping

training institute in Zimbabwe.

30

 This form of external

support provides African militaries with a much greater

capability to train officers than would be available through

national resources alone.

Finally, it is important to note that resources to sustain

military establishments in Africa also are derived from the

informal economy. Salary costs are defrayed in some

instances by allowing the use of government resources—

such as vehicles—for personal business, or by turning a

blind eye to graft. In other cases, it simply is assumed that

military personnel will rely on outside entrepreneurial

activity—or family farms—to make ends meet.

31

Deficiencies in military medical care often require service

personnel to seek assistance outside official channels. In

many cases, military personnel in the final stages of AIDs

simply are sent home to die.

Deciding on the Desired Capability.

How do African countries decide what to spend on their

security services? This is related to the question: What are

the key determining factors behind the spending decisions?

Because of Africa’s political diversity, there are no universal

answers to these questions.

32

 South Africa, for example, has

a sophisticated methodology similar in many respects to the

Western democracies.

33

 Nigeria seems to be experimenting

with the development of security strategy much like that of

the United States. The Democratic Republic of Congo, by

contrast, appears to have little or no coherent system for

calculating and embarking on defense expenditures other

than the ad-hoc decisions of a small group around the Head

of State. For the majority of African states, it does not

appear that the decisions on levels of defense spending—

however made—are tied to any solid analysis of the kinds of

capabilities desired of the armed forces.

14
Again, however, there are exceptions. Angola and

Eritrea stood out in the late 1990s for the large proportion of

national resources devoted to defense (15.1 percent and 22.8

percent of GDP, respectively, for 1996).

34

 In both cases, the

national leadership clearly had a strong sense of threat and

a clear picture of the military capability it required to

attenuate that threat. What was not clear in either case is

that the national leadership had carefully balanced the

need for security against other competing priorities for state

resources. Nor, in the case of Angola, does it appear that the

citizenry was in any way consulted in national choices about

defense spending.

What generally is missing in African countries is a

transparent process, based upon broad national consensus,

for defining security, formulating national security

strategy, and then allocating resources to this strategy. In

other words, African societies by and large have not

established national consensus on the nature of security

they desire and ways and means to achieve that security;

nor have they been able to formulate and translate a clear

vision into viable policy in regard to security allocations. To

be sure, the attentive publics in African countries tend to be

smaller than in the Western democracies, and most African

states lack a large, educated middle class. Engaging the

common citizen in a debate about security priorities may

seem fruitlessly difficult even in countries striving to

implement democratic reform. But the national leadership

of most African countries tends to be reluctant to engage

even their communities of intellectuals—interested

individuals in academe, the professions and commerce—in

such debate. (It is important to note here that South Africa

is a notable exception to this generalization.

35

)

The authors’ interviews of African civil servants from a

wide range of African countries indicate that decisions on

funding priorities tend to be made by one of three processes.

In the first case, a small elite of senior government insiders

determines the national priorities and makes the

fundamental decisions about resource allocation. Perhaps

15
an extreme of this form was that of the highly personalized,

patronage-based Mobutu regime in Zaire,

36

 although the

successor governments seem to preserve much the same

decisionmaking style. This methodology of resource

allocation is by no means restricted to the Congo. It can be

found in much less authoritarian states, and can take some

innovative forms. For instance, parliamentary committees

charged with oversight of national financing can be stacked

with party insiders who loyally do the bidding of senior

government policymakers.

In the second case, allocations result from consensus

among the senior leaders of the large bureaucracies of the

state. In this case, the military establishment is one of the

“senior partners” which jockeys for its “fair share” of the

resources. In these cases, the previous year’s budget tends

to be the base line, and institutional pressures inhibit

significant departure from previous practice, whether or not

the security environment has significantly changed.

Neither this nor the first process lends itself to a careful

definition of desired military capabilities nor to a logical

allocation of appropriate resources.

A final case includes only a handful of African countries.

Here, the national budgeting process is relatively

transparent. There is genuine debate about national

priorities and resource allocations. The funding for security

is subjected to somewhat the same scrutiny as funding for

other national priorities. Preeminent in this category is

South Africa. However, Botswana, Namibia, Ghana, and

(recently) Nigeria seem also to be reasonably close to this

categorization.

37

However the national policymakers go about the process

of deciding what to spend on security, it is worth returning

to the issue of the desired output. Here, the question

remains: What is the expenditure intended to do? In many

cases in Africa, the answer is not self-evident; assuring

security sector capabilities may not be a primary purpose of

the allocation. Rather, the decisions are rooted in the

16
economic, political or even personal agenda of the senior

national decisionmakers.

On What Is the Money Generally Spent?

Whatever method is used to calculate defense

allocations, certain types of expenses are characteristic of

military establishments. Different countries have

somewhat different ways of describing the categories of this

expenditure, but generally reflect some combination of the

following:

• Personnel costs, to include recruiting and maintenance

of military and civilian personnel.

• Operations, training and maintenance costs, to include

the routine peacetime expenses of keeping a large

organization running and prepared to perform contingency

roles.

• Infrastructure costs, to include construction and repair

of bases, firing ranges, and headquarters.

• Procurement/capital costs, involving the acquisition of

military materiel and the various programs involved in this

activity.

• Contingency costs, involving the additional expenses

when forces are deployed in consonance with military

missions.

Before attempting to account for ways in which African

states allocate defense funds, it is important to recall the

difficulty in Africa of obtaining explicit, reliable funding

data. With some exceptions, African governments (or

military establishments) rarely publish breakdowns of

defense expenditures, making it very difficult to establish

an empirical baseline for Africa, and there almost certainly

is wide variation in detail. In addition, the use of cash

budgeting in some African countries and the allocation of

“off budget” funding to the security sector in others make

17
formal budgets suspect. However, several general

comments can be made.

In most African militaries, an overwhelming proportion

of the budget goes to salaries and personnel allowances.

38

(In one 1998 West African example available to the authors,

74 percent was allocated to salaries and about 5 percent was

allocated to operations, maintenance, and training. In

recent years, Zimbabwe has spent some 68 percent of its

defense budget on personnel salaries and allowances. This

seems a common pattern.) Typically, very small portions of

the military budget are allocated to infrastructure and

capital costs. The funds available for contingency

operations must generally be taken from other resources

available to the state.

The results of these allocations are military establishments which have difficulty funding unit training and

which are chronically short of ammunition, fuel, other basic

supplies, and spare parts. Infrastructure deteriorates

without the resources to maintain it. Work spaces and

living quarters are decayed and badly overcrowded.

39

Ironically, despite the high proportion of defense resources

that typically go to military pay and allowances, personnel

reimbursements often do not provide an adequate standard

of living, particularly for junior officers and enlisted

personnel. Inadequate pay—or delayed pay—for military

personnel is a prime motivator of unrest in the military and

the basic source of a number of coups d’etat in Africa.

40

Overseeing Military Spending.

Allocation of defense resources is one thing; overseeing

their use is quite another. Here again, African countries

reflect considerable difference in approach. Different levels

of oversight are important. One level would require the

ability to hold senior policymakers accountable for policy

choices that resulted in significant defense expenditure. At

another level, the ability to deter mid-level officials from

fraudulent or wasteful use of resources is important.

18
In a few countries like South Africa, legislatures have

the mandate, interest, and expertise to monitor use of

defense resources and to call defense officials to account.

Several countries, such as Kenya, Senegal, and South

Africa, have robust civilian management in the defense

ministries that insists on a relatively high degree of

accountability for use of defense funds. Some African

countries, among them Nigeria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe,

have an independent press that has endeavored to call

attention to defense spending, even challenging

presidential policy decisions.

In general, however, senior African policymakers are not

consistently challenged on major decisions of resource

allocation for security force use. Senior leaders hide behind

a claim of “state secrets,” especially for paramilitary or

intelligence agencies with coercive internal security roles.

Mechanisms for preventing waste, fraud, and abuse in

security force spending are relatively weak, both in the

defense ministries and in the countries generally. Spending

can be an important form of patronage for authoritarian

leaders, who generally shun public scrutiny. Oversight

mechanisms autonomous from the executive branch also

would limit the options for use of military force. For

instance, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe probably could not

have deployed his country’s forces to the Democratic

Republic of Congo in late 1997 had he been held accountable

for the economic ramifications to Zimbabwe of that

deployment. Nigeria’s government probably could not have

sustained its participation in ECOMOG operations in

Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s had Nigeria’s

citizenry been consulted about that involvement.

With some exceptions, African countries lack effective

financial management information systems to monitor

spending. However, even with structures that should

provide some accountability, senior policymakers often

have the authority to override them. It is noteworthy that

Zimbabwe’s Comptroller and Auditor-General repeatedly

have called attention to irregularities in Zimbabwe’s

19
defense spending, with little indication of government

interest in investigating wrongdoing or correcting the

abuse.

Weakness in defense resource accountability is

particularly pronounced in the realm of materiel

procurement. The problem is manifest at various levels.

The most basic deficiency is the lack of the kind of planning

that includes a realistic assessment of the security

environment and a serious effort to match ends, ways, and

means to logical procurement decisions.

In many parts of the world, senior policymakers can be

prone to squander national resources on expensive weapons

not out of military necessity but for their symbolic value,

and African countries are no exception. This probably was

the case in abortive Zimbabwean negotiations to purchase

sophisticated Soviet Mig-29 fighters in the late 1980s, or

Ethiopian and Eritrean acquisition of similar aircraft in the

late 1990s. Uganda’s purchase of a large quantity of 1950s

era tanks in the late 1990s may have been similarly

motivated. South Africa’s purchase of submarines and

Swedish jet fighters in 1999—at enormous public

expense—bore little discernible relevance to the external

threat, a fact debated in the national press.

41

Except for South Africa and Egypt, defense industries in

Africa are very small scale. However, they do exist. A

number of African countries produce munitions and

assemble light weapons with parts from abroad. But even in

cases where military materiel could be locally procured,

African governments have been slow to take advantage of

this opportunity. A notorious recent example was Ugandan

purchase of military uniforms from the People’s Republic of

China, despite a significant textile industry in Uganda.

Only the key insiders involved in this purchase know if the

Chinese uniforms cost less than locally-made equivalents.

Competitive bidding for military materiel, while it does

occur in Africa, is relatively infrequent and rarely

transparent. Because of their constrained resources,

20
African countries are prone to seek donations or

particularly favorable terms for weapons, even if the

resulting product is of marginal use. (This has made the

surplus weaponry and unscrupulous arms merchants of

Eastern Europe particularly attractive.) Perhaps more

worrisome is a tendency in some African countries to keep

military procurement “off-budget.” This lack of transparency makes it difficult hold procurement officials—and

senior policymakers—accountable for procurement

decisions.

Because of the limited oversight of procurement

processes, officials in many African countries have found

significant opportunity for graft. One notorious example

was the Zimbabwean purchase of a large quantity of

Spanish Santana light utility vehicles in the early 1990s,

despite the fact that similar vehicles at better prices were

available in the region. Soon after this purchase, the

Santana Corporation folded. With no available spare parts,

most of the vehicles now in Zimbabwe are inoperable.

Ironically, Zimbabwe has a relatively sophisticated

procurement establishment. 

Defense Spending and Military Capability.

As noted earlier, African countries generally struggle to

find the resources to fund any of their national priorities,

including security.

42

 Few African countries have a

transparent, coherent process for developing national

security strategy. Given these problems, it is very

appropriate to ask if the resources devoted by African

countries to “defense” result in a desired outcome. The

ultimate “output” of effective security strategy, good policy

planning, and adequate budgeting would be some measure

of security. But an intermediate output would be a defense

establishment of the right size, appropriately equipped,

well-led, sufficiently trained, and disciplined to fulfill the

expectations of the society.

21
A simple question is relevant to defense spending

anywhere in the world: What capability is being purchased? 

And this begs the question for policymakers: What do you

want your armed forces to be able to do? These questions get

at the heart of roles and missions for the military. They are

not idle questions. They have profound implications for

allocation of very scarce resources.

With the partial exception of the South African National

Defense Force, no military establishment in sub-Saharan

Africa could conduct the kind of multi-division, joint force

power projection that is characteristic of the larger Western

nations. Yet it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which

that capability would be necessary. Clearly, there are viable

military roles that African militaries do play well.

43

Individual African countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea,

Nigeria, and Zimbabwe have fielded impressively

sophisticated forces that have demonstrated an ability to

perform well in conventional military operations. Countries

like Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal have been cited

for excellence in international peacekeeping operations.

Botswana has used its military very successfully in

environmental security operations. The South African Air

Force performed heroically in rescue operations during the

flooding in Mozambique in March 2000. 

Several sub-Saharan African countries stand out for the

competence and professionalism of their armed forces.

Among these are Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, Botswana, and

South Africa, each of which devotes a relatively modest

portion of its GDP to defense spending (1.8 percent, .07

percent, 2.0 percent, 3.1 percent and 1.7 percent,

respectively, in 1995). The level of funding devoted to a

military establishment in Africa is not in itself a

particularly good indicator of general professionalism or

proficiency. A variety of historical and social factors seem to

bear upon the role and relevance of the defense establishment in each country.

44

22
It is abundantly clear, however, that many African

military establishments do not provide a good return on the

nation’s defense investment. As an extreme example,

Zaire’s former dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, purchased

security for his regime by maintaining a large, poorlyequipped and ill-trained military. However, that military

provided little benefit to the society as a whole: it preyed

upon Zaire’s long-suffering populace and provided no

security from external aggression. The army of Mobutu’s

successors displays many of the same characteristics. In

greater or lesser degree, the same holds true for a number of

African countries.

Perhaps the most common thread linking the more

professional African armed forces is the presence of a

well-resourced professional military education system for

officers, at least up to Staff College level. (Some countries,

like Botswana, have compensated for lack of in-country

schools by concerted efforts to send officers abroad for such

training.) Judging by the output, investment in

professional military education seems to provide a good

return on defense spending by African countries.

45

Ideas for the Future.

A variety of institutions in Africa and abroad are active

in encouraging security sector reform. These have included

institutions like the South African Institute for Security

Studies and Centre for Defense Management (University of

Witwatersrand) which provide training programs, publish

materials, and organize conferences and exchanges.

They also include such non-African organizations as the

(U.S.) Overseas Development Council, involved in a very

promising study of ways in which foreign donors can better

assist reform. (An ongoing project sponsored by the United

Kingdom’s Department for International Development has

offered considerable insight into requirements for security

sector reform in the developing world.

46

)

23
Issues of defense funding in Africa ultimately boil down

to issues of legitimacy and governance. At its heart are

three basic questions: First, what is “security” for a given

society and who has the prerogative to define it? Second,

how does the need for “security” relate to the society’s other

priorities, and who has the right to decide that? Third, how

are the allocation and expenditure of resources overseen to

assure that the society obtains the right amount of security,

no more or less, without waste or abuse? These are profound

questions that confront all societies, and the answers

almost inevitably are complex and ambiguous.

African countries face two particularly challenging

problems relating to these decisions: poverty, and weak or

absent democratic institutions. Both problems have obvious

implications for internal security. Resources are

constrained for any national priority—including security.

At the same time, African states generally have not

achieved the mechanisms for establishing a sound

consensus on the nature and degree of security desired by

the populace. This significantly undermines the legitimacy

of the state—and its security sector—in the eyes of the

general population. So the remaining question is not so

much, “How much should we spend?” Rather, it is “What,

exactly, are we trying to buy?”

Although hardly original to this monograph, it

nonetheless is worth observing that an increase in economic

strength and economic opportunity in African countries is

critically important to attenuating significant internal

security threats. At the same time, it is difficult to envision

achieving a national consensus on security, threats, and

national priorities in the absence of the kinds of

consultation typical of democratic government. So in the

absence of economic improvement and further democratic

transition, security reform continues to be problematical.

That said, a variety of measures exist that could improve

the coherence and value of defense spending in Africa. An

obvious one would be to better distribute the responsibility

24
for the armed forces among institutions of government, to

prevent the accumulation of too many prerogatives in too

few hands. Many African countries feature at least some

responsibility on the part of the national legislature for

allocation (or oversight) of defense spending. However,

parliaments often do not have the expertise, or the

independence from the executive branch, to perform this

role adequately. Clearly, assistance to parliaments in

performing such roles is appropriate.

47

It is important to establish a dialogue among security

force officials, civil society, and those responsible in national

governments for the allocation and oversight of resources.

This will enable the civilian public servants to better

understand the valid concerns of professionals regarding

security force needs.

48

 It particularly is important that

parliamentarians acquire expertise in oversight and

monitoring of defense funding.

However, distribution of responsibility for overseeing

security force spending also might be a fruitful area for

African innovation. It is conceivable that an African

solution to this problem could take the form of independent

regulatory commissions of professionals (somewhat like the

U.S. Food and Drug Administration) separate from the

executive and legislative branches of government, but

responsible in some ways to each.

One of the most useful measures would be the institution

of a process that created and maintained a national security

strategy. This process would identify and prioritize national

interests, assess threats to the national interests, and select

appropriate policies to attenuate threats and advance

interests. It is, of course, more preferable that this occurs

prior to an identification of roles and missions for the

security services. One result of this process may be to

determine that some resources now devoted to the military

might be better spent on law enforcement agencies, or vice

versa. Another result could be a much better determination

of the appropriate roles for national intelligence agencies.

25
Several African countries are engaged in efforts to develop

national security strategies.

Efforts to increase the legitimacy and relevance of the

security sector in the eyes of the general public would be a

wise investment. For the armed forces themselves, this

could involve use of military assets for such roles as medical

treatment of civilians, construction of infrastructure in

remote areas, and rapid-response disaster assistance.

49

 But

there is no substitute for maintenance of a well-trained,

well-disciplined professional military establishment,

oriented against discernible security threats, whose

personnel have a strong commitment to human rights and

ethical use of national resources. This is recognized by

Africans inside and outside the security sector.

50

Another important measure would be efforts to make the

defense funding, defense allocation, and procurement

processes open and transparent. Preferably, this would be

accompanied by a very public debate on the roles and

missions of the security services. It also would help to assure

that the decisions about defense spending follow the same

processes—subject to the same rules and oversight—as the

funding of other sectors. This would be much facilitated by

government efforts to encourage and court the independent

press. It also would be helped by a full public sector

commitment to anti-corruption efforts.

The transparency and competence of security force

expenditures would be enhanced by adoption of sound

business management techniques within organizations or

ministries charged with allocation and oversight. This

would include stringent fiscal discipline and accountability. 

The effort also would be much enhanced by multi-year

planning and budgeting on the part of security forces. In the

long run, such measures would enable African military

establishments to overcome some of the problems inherent

in lack of resources. The skills involved, however, are not

easily acquired. Education of qualified personnel—military

26
and civilian—is very important. Giving qualified personnel

the autonomy to perform these functions is essential.

If African military establishments are employed in

“nontraditional” roles—such as regional humanitarian

assistance or support to internal anticrime police

operations—the additional resource requirements should

be subject to coherent planning and budgeting processes.

Employment in nontraditional roles poses problems to any

military establishment, and can significantly undermine

the capacity to perform the primary function.

51

African military establishments have made

considerable efforts to find educational opportunities for

their personnel. Here again, they have been impeded by

limited resources and are subject to the whims of donors.

But a commitment to education is a wise investment of

limited resources. In the long run, it can result in much

enhanced military capability and professionalism, as

evident in such military establishments as those of

Botswana, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal. African efforts to

obtain such education for their military professionals

should be commended and assisted.

However, the need for the education of military

professionals is matched by the need to provide education on

security issues to civilian public servants in all branches of

government. There is a significant need for institutions like

the (U.S.) John F. Kennedy School of Government that could

provide graduate-level training for mid-level African civil

and military leaders, preferably in mixed groups from all

over the continent and preferably focused on African issues

and solutions.

Finally, it may be very productive for African countries

to continue—and enhance—efforts to seek subregional

answers to pressing security problems. This certainly may

reduce the sources of regional insecurity. But it may also

provide options that somewhat mitigate the lack of

resources in individual African countries.

52

 For instance,

the East African Community has worked on plans to

27
integrate the military officer training of Kenya, Tanzania,

and Uganda, allowing each country to specialize in different

levels of training for the whole community. The Southern

African Development Community has established a

regional peacekeeping training facility in Zimbabwe.

Conceivably, the same sort of rationalization could be

applied to military forces of individual countries—one

specializing in a certain capability, a second in another. The

same could be applied to procurement of some military

materiel. 

The important thesis to this whole discussion is that

defense spending in Africa should be viewed as the tail of a

very long chain. An African society will not realize the value

of resources devoted to defense unless it first features the

kind of democratic consultation that allows the entire

society to define its interests and priorities—including

security. This process should occur before establishing the

roles and missions of the security services based upon what

the society can afford. Then, it is important to establish

mechanisms that assure the security services are

accountable for performing their designated roles and for

wisely using resources allocated to them. Finally, the

allocation itself should be sufficient to allow the security

forces to perform their designated roles.

Conclusion: The Role of the U.S. Department

of Defense.

A primary focus of American security policy in Africa is

to assist local partners in their efforts to build stable,

accountable governments and effective security

institutions. Although the U.S. military may be called to

participate in humanitarian relief, peace operations, or

noncombatant evacuation operations in Africa, its main

current role is to assist with professionalization and reform. 

The longest-standing effort in this vein is the International

Military Education and Training (IMET) program that

provides U.S. military training (mainly in U.S. military

28
schools) to African military students. (In Fiscal Year 2000,

the United States allocated $3.9 million for IMET

programs, involving some 1,364 personnel from 35

countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

53

) Much of the IMET

training involves relatively junior officers who apply their

skills at the tactical level. A relative handful of senior

African officers attend U.S. senior service colleges where

strategic planning and defense budgeting form a

substantial part of the curriculum. A few African officers

also attend courses such as those offered by the U.S. Naval

Postgraduate School that emphasize civil-military

relations, defense budgeting and military justice. 

Another significant U.S. professionalization program

also is targeted at the tactical level in African armies. The

African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) provides military

forces up to brigade size with skills necessary for peace

operations. (As of July 2001, nine African countries had

agreed to participate in ACRI, and the United States had

active programs with five of these.

54

) Rules of engagement,

relations with civilians, and professional conduct in general

form an important part of this training.

If the United States is going to make a significant,

long-term impact on reform of the security sector in African

countries, it must devote substantial attention to the

capabilities and professional inclinations of policymakers

(both civilian and military) at the strategic level. This

attention should include a focus on civil-military relations,

strategic planning and security sector budgeting.

To assist African states in efforts to improve the

accountability and effectiveness of defense budgeting, DoD

should undertake several related activities. The first and

most important is to continue support for and development

of the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS).

Founded on the DoD Regional Center concept (under which

four other institutes now operate), the Africa Center

complements other U.S., African, and multinational

programs on the continent.

55

 ACSS seeks to enhance the

29
professional skills of Africa’s civilian and military leaders.

Its programs support democratic governance in Africa by

offering senior African civilian and military leaders

rigorous academic and practical programs in civil-military

relations, national security strategy, and defense

economics. 

ACSS participants include military officers, government

officials, and nongovernmental civilian leaders. The Center

promotes informed and productive inquiry on the military’s

role in a democracy. It encourages its participants to assess

the importance of civilian control and military

professionalism in democracies and examine civil-military

relations in formulating and executing national security

strategy. It also endeavors to promote an understanding of

the military’s role shaped and shared by African societies,

their governments, and their military establishments.

U.S. attention to Africa often vacillates and the future of

ACSS is not assured. However, U.S. national interests in

Africa are likely to grow in the future, and relatively small

investments in programs like ACSS can have a large payoff. 

DoD should sustain its support and continue to explore

ways to further develop the Center and augment its

effectiveness.

With ACSS in the lead, DoD should help publish an

international journal designed to help African defense

professionals exchange ideas on strategy development,

defense budgeting, and building healthy civil-military

relations. European nations involved in African security

could be partners in this endeavor. Along the same lines,

DoD should sponsor an annual workshop for Africans

involved in defense budgeting to provide a forum for

communication and exchange. Finally, DoD should take the

lead in an interagency effort to establish a system of

internships in Washington for Africans involved in defense

budgeting. These interns could serve on congressional

staffs, in the Congressional Budget Office, in the Office of

30
Management and Budget, and in the Pentagon’s budget

offices. Such hands-on experience could be invaluable.

Whatever programs the U.S Government sponsors, they

will not be a panacea for the shortcomings of security sector

financing in Africa. But there are low cost ways of giving the

region some essential tools it needs to continue reform and

the movement toward greater security and stability. Over

the long term, these could play an important role in

promoting the security interests both of the United States

and of its African partners.

ENDNOTES

1. Dan Henk, “U.S. National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa,”

Parameters, Winter 1997-1998, pp. 92-107.

2. See Kenneth Good, “Enduring Elite Democracy in Botswana,”

Democratization, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 30-65.

3. See Dan Henk, “Security in Africa: New Definitions?” Paper

presented at the African Studies Association 43rd Annual Meeting,

Nashville, TN, November 2000.

4. See particularly Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde,

Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London: Lynne Rienner

Publishers, 1998.

5. Human Development Report, 1993, United Nations Development

Program, available from http://www.undp.org/hdro/93.htm.

6. Human Development Report, 1994, United Nations Development

Program, available from http://www.undp.org/hdro/94.htm.

7. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data

provided on request, March 8, 2000, http://www.sipri.se.

8. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Economics of Defense,

Cambridge: The Univesity Press, 1995, p. 1.

9. See, for example, Hussein Solomon, “From Marginalized to

Dominant Discourse: Reflections on the Evolution of New Security

Thinking,” in H. Solomon and M. van Aardt, eds., Caring Security in

Africa, ISS Monograph Series, No. 20, February 1998, pp. 3-14; and

Steven Metz, Refining American Strategy in Africa; Carlisle Barracks,

31
PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 2000,

pp. 7-28.

10. It is worth noting that the U.S. defense budget for Fiscal Year

2000 was $278 billion, about 2.7 percent of GDP. As a percentage of

GDP, the FY 2000 U.S. defense outlays are similar to those of most

African countries.

11. For a discussion of the reliability of published data, see M.

Brzoska, “World Military Expenditure,” in The Handbook of Defense

Economics, K. Hartley and T. Sandler, eds., Amsterdam: Elsevier,

1995, pp. 45-67; and Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in the Third

World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 84-122.

12. See, for example, “Tracking Angola’s oil money,” The Economist,

January 15, 2000, p. 48.

13. Interview, May 4, 2000, with Dr. Peter Batchelor, eminent South

African defense economist, currently serving as Project Director, Small

Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.

14. Ball, p. 40.

15. Batchelor.

16. “African Armies Can’t Stand Fire,” The Monitor (Kampala,

Uganda), September 1, 1999, p. 2; Batchelor notes that part of the South

African press in 1999 and 2000 has supported large-scale military

purchases and has been concerned about the reported deterioration of

their country’s defense capabilities.

17. Douglas Farah, “U.S. to Help Nigeria Revamp its Armed

Forces,” Washington Post, April 29, 2000, p. A14.

18. Based upon the personal experiences of the authors. In the

Mobutu era, the Zairian security forces particularly were notorious for

this proclivity, leading one author to entitle a descriptive chapter “The

State as Bandit.” Michael G. Schatzberg, The Dialectics of Oppression

in Zaire, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988, pp. 52-70.

19. See Rocklyn Williams, “How primary is the primary function?:

Configuring the SANDF for African realities,” African Security Review,

Vol. 8, No. 6, 1999, pp. 70-83; and Nadir A. L. Mohammed, “Trends,

Determinants and the Economic Effects of Military Expenditure in

Sub-Saharan Africa,” in E. Hutchful and A. Bathily, eds., The Military

and Militarism in Africa, CODESRIA Book Series, 1998, pp. 47-104.

32
20. “War and Money: The business of conflict,” The Economist,

March 4, 2000, 46; “Tracking Angola’s oil money,” The Economist,

January 15, 2000, p. 48.

21. Ian Fisher, “Uganda’s Help to Congolese Rebels Raises

Questions about Motives,” New York Times, December 21, 1998.

22. “Zimbabwe army in Congo diamond deal,” BBC News,

September 23, 1999, available at: http:/news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/

world/africa/newsid_4550004555882.stm; “Zimbabwe accused of

‘economic colonialism’,” BBC News, October 1, 1999, available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_462000/462

951.stm; “DRC Slams Door on SA Trade, Favours Zim,” The Zimbabwe

Independent (Harare, Zimbabwe), October 23, 1998, available at:

http://www.africanews.org/central/congo-kinshasa/stories/1998102

3_feat6.html.

23. “Zimbabwe losses add up in Congo,” BBC News, November 25,

1999, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/

newsid_536000/536454.stm.

24. U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/45/258 dated May 3, 1991.

This resolution specifies a monthly U.S.$988 as the basic pay and

allowance for soldiers of all ranks with additional allowances of U.S.$65

for usage factor of personal gear and U.S.$5 for personal weaponry.

These funds are paid directly to the contributing government.

Additional supplementary payments also are authorized if the

contingent consists of specialists such as logisticians. On-site daily

allowances paid to the troops consist of U.S.$1.28 plus recreational

leave and welfare supplements. See also Dan Henk, Peace Operations:

Views from Southern and Eastern Africa, Occasional Paper, Carlisle

Barracks: U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, June

1996, p. 23.

25. Interview, April 4, 2000, with Lieutenant Colonel Anthony D.

Marley, U.S. Army (retired). Marley, a highly experienced Department

of Defense Africanist, served as U.S. military attaché in West Africa in

the 1990s.

26. Interview, May 5 2000, with Lieutenant Colonel Eric

Bonnemaison, French Marines, French liaison officer to the Africa

Center for Strategic Studies. Bonnemaison’s extensive experience in

Africa and service in the French Ministry of Defense provide unique

insights into African civil-military relations.

33
27. See Dan Henk, Uncharted Paths, Uncertain Vision: U.S.

Military Involvements in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Wake of the Cold

War, Occasional Paper, No. 18, Colorado Springs, CO: Institute for

National Security Studies, March 1998, pp. 40-42.

28. Ibid., p. 54.

29. For a discussion of the British military assistance program in

southern Africa, see Greg Mills, “BMATT and military integration in

southern Africa,” South African Defense Review, No. 2, 1992.

30. Jakkie Cilliers, “Building Security in Southern Africa,” ISS

Monograph, No. 43, November 1999, pp. 47-49.

31. Interview, March 15, 2000, with Dr. Constance J. Freeman,

Chair of the Department of Defense Economics, Africa Center for

Strategic Studies (ACSS).

32. Mohammed, pp. 60-68, draws on a review of existing literature

to offer a catalog of political, economic and military determinants of

African defense spending.

33. See Rocklyn Williams, “How primary is the primary function?:

Configuring the SANDF for African realities,” African Security Review,

Vol 8, No. 6, 1999. See also South African White Paper on Defense, May

1996; South African Defense Review, April 1998.

34. SIPRI data.

35. Batchelor.

36. See, for example, Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise

and Decline of the Zairian State, Madison, WI: The University of

Wisconsin Press, 1985, pp. 164-184.

37. Batchelor.

38. For illustrative detail, see Ball, p. 58.

39. See, for example, Parliament of Zimbabwe, Third Report of the

Departmental Committee on Security Ministries, presented to the 3rd

Session of the 4th Parliament on Tuesday, March 24, 1998, Lieutenant

Colonel (retired) Shumba, Chairman.

40. Bonnemaison. Bonnemaison notes that the coup d’etat in Cote

d’Ivoire in early 2000 had its source in unhappiness by junior Ivoirian

military personnel over their perception that allowances supposedly

34
paid for their peacekeeping role in the Central African Republic were

being withheld or diverted.

41. Batchelor.

42. Metz, pp. 13-22.

43. See, for example, Dan Henk,Peace Operations, No. 6, pp. 17-19.

44. See Sunday Obogonye Ochoche, “The Military and National

Security in Africa,” in E. Hutchful and A. Bathily.

45. It is worth noting the essential role that the military education

system played in the United States in the era between World War I and

World War II, when the country allowed its military capability to

atrophy alarmingly. The high quality leadership that emerged in the

early days of World War II is directly attributable to the continuing

emphasis on officer education in the inter-war years.

46. DFID Discussion Paper No. 1, “Security Sector Reform and

Management of Defense Expenditure: A Conceptual Framework,”

London, February 15-17, 2000, http://www.dfid.gnet.gov.uk.

47. Eboe Hutchful, “Demilitarizing the political process in Africa:

Some basic issues,” African Security Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1997,pp. 2-16.

48. Eboe Hutchful, “Militarism and the Problems of Democratic

Transition, in M. Ottaway, ed., Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road

Ahead, London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 43-64.

49. For a related discussion, see C. William Fox, “Military Medical

Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army

War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 24, 1997. It is noteworthy

that a major activity of the U.S. Central Command in Africa now

features an annual exercise (“Golden Spear”) with 11 countries of

eastern/central Africa around the theme of national/regional planning

for natural disasters.

50. “Naval Boss Stresses for Policing Economic Zone,” (Lagos) Post

Express, May 3, 2000, available at http:/africanews...ries/20000503/

20000503_feat24.html.

51. Rocklyn Williams, pp. 80-81.

52. For a discussion of possibilities—as well as a warning of

dangers—see Gavin Cawthra, “Toward a Holistic Approach to Security

Management at Regional Security Level,” African Security Review, Vol.

35
6, No. 5, 1997, pp. 58-61. For a more generalized discussion, see Sandler

and Hartley, p. 337.

53. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Foreign Military Training

Report to Congress, January 2001, Vol. 1.

54. The countries with active programs in 2001 were Benin, Kenya,

Mali, Malawi, and Senegal. Activities with Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ivory

Coast and Uganda were on hold.

55.Information from the ACSS website at http://www.africacenter. 

org/english/e1000_center.htm.

36
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Authors

Dr. Daniel W. Henk

Dr. Martin Revayi Rupiya

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams