IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs April 19, 2016 

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. WILLIAM SETH BOWMAN

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Putnam County

No. 2015-CR-0083 David Alan Patterson, Judge

No. M2015-02086-CCA-R3-CD – July 14, 2016

The appellant, William Seth Bowman, pled guilty in the Putnam County Criminal Court 

to aggravated assault and received a six-year sentence with the manner of service to be 

determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the 

appellant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the 

trial court erred by not granting his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the 

record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT 

WILLIAMS and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

Benjamin D. Marsee, Cookville, Tennessee, for the appellant, William Seth Bowman. 

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Meredith DeVault, Senior 

Counsel; Bryant C. Dunaway, District Attorney General; and Victor Hugo Gernt, III, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

In July 2015, the appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony. 

Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a six-year sentence as a Range II, multiple 

offender, and the trial court was to determine the manner of service of the sentence after a 

sentencing hearing. In return for the plea, the State dismissed the following charges: 

unlawful possession of a weapon, failure to surrender a firearm, violating an order of 
- 2 -

protection, driving on a suspended license, reckless driving, resisting arrest, unlawful 

alteration of a registration tag, and violating the financial responsibility law.

At the sentencing hearing, Deputy Patrick Short of the Putnam County Sheriff’s 

Department testified that on November 17, 2014, he and other deputies went to the 

appellant’s home to serve a capias for the appellant’s arrest. The officers heard several 

people talking in the garage and knocked on the door, and the people in the garage let 

them in. Deputy Short went into the kitchen and told the occupants of the house why the 

officers were there, and the occupants claimed they did not know if the appellant was 

home. At that point, Deputy Short “heard a male subject enter an unknown room, 

hollering that he had a gun and he was going to shoot it out” with the officers if they did 

not leave his residence. Deputy Short ordered the male to come out of the room and 

show his hands. The appellant came out of a bedroom and “had a gun down to his side.” 

The appellant again stated that he was “going to shoot it out” with the officers.

Deputy Short testified that he felt threatened, that he and the other deputies “had 

[the appellant] at gunpoint,” and that he thought a shootout was going to occur. The 

appellant stepped back into the bedroom, so the officers “evacuated” the residence and 

set up a perimeter outside the home. The sheriff arrived, spoke with the appellant, and 

went into the house. The appellant then came out with the sheriff. The sheriff had the 

appellant’s gun wrapped in a white t-shirt, and the gun was loaded. Deputy Short stated 

that in his opinion, the appellant should serve his sentence in confinement.

The appellant testified in his own behalf and apologized for his actions. He said 

that at the time of the incident, he and his wife had been having “problems,” that he had 

been living in the home alone for about six months, and that he “started using 

[methamphetamine] again.” He said that he had been “clean from methamphetamine” for 

ten years prior to his wife’s leaving him and taking their children but that he was not in 

his “right mind” on November 17, 2014. He said he had no excuse for his actions.

Regarding the capias Deputy Short was trying to serve on November 17, 2014, the 

appellant testified that a police officer had stopped him for “wrong tags or something like 

that,” that he and the officer got into an argument, and that the officer arrested him. The 

appellant missed a court appearance, so the capias was issued. The appellant stated that 

at the time of the sentencing hearing, he had been incarcerated for six months, was no 

longer using drugs, and was requesting split confinement with six months in jail. He 

acknowledged that he had two prior felony convictions but said that he had not been in 

trouble with the law for more than twenty years. He acknowledged that he was a Range 

II offender. 
- 3 -

The State introduced the appellant’s presentence report into evidence. According 

to the report, the then thirty-nine-year-old appellant dropped out of high school, did not 

obtain his GED, and was divorced with two daughters. In the report, the appellant 

described his mental health as “good” but his physical health as “poor” due to a previous 

car accident that resulted in three surgeries, including a knee replacement. The appellant 

stated in the report that he had a “disability case” pending and that he used 

methamphetamine ten years ago but stopped taking the drug on his own because “it’s the 

devil.” The appellant said that he had never been in a treatment program for alcohol or 

drug abuse and that he was employed by Middle Tennessee Curb for five years but had to 

quit working due to problems with his legs. The report showed that the appellant had 

prior felony convictions of burglary and evading arrest in 1996. The report also showed 

misdemeanor convictions of criminal impersonation in 1997, assault in 2000 and 2001, 

and multiple traffic offenses. According to the report, the appellant violated probation in 

1996 and 1997. It also showed that in 2014, he violated a conditional release agreement 

and was ordered to pay a fifty-dollar fine; serve ten days in jail, suspended; and perform 

forty hours of community service.

The trial court found that confinement was necessary to protect society by 

restraining a defendant who had a long history of criminal conduct but took into 

consideration that “it is an old history.” The court then addressed the circumstances of 

the offense, noting that the appellant did not dispute Deputy Short’s testimony. The court 

stated that Deputy Short “was placed in an extreme zone of danger by a person who was 

under the influence of methamphetamine” and found that confinement was necessary to 

avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense and was particularly suited to provide an 

effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses. The court noted that the 

appellant’s probation had been revoked twice previously; therefore, measures less 

restrictive than confinement had been applied frequently and unsuccessfully. The court 

stated that it did not believe the appellant “will do anything other than violate the 

probation” and that split confinement was inappropriate. The court ordered that the 

appellant serve his six-year sentence in confinement.

II. Analysis

The appellant contends that the trial court erred by not granting his request for 

alternative sentencing. Appellate review of the length, range, or manner of service of a 

sentence imposed by the trial court are to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion 

standard with a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 

(Tenn. 2012); see State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012) (applying the 

standard to alternative sentencing). In sentencing a defendant, the trial court shall 

consider the following factors: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the 

sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of sentencing and 
- 4 -

arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal 

conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on enhancement 

and mitigating factors; (6) any statistical information provided by the administrative 

office of the courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; (7) any 

statement by the appellant in his own behalf; and (8) the potential for rehabilitation or 

treatment. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -210; see also State v. Ashby, 823 

S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991). The burden is on the appellant to demonstrate the 

impropriety of his sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n 

Cmts.

An appellant is eligible for alternative sentencing if the sentence actually imposed 

is ten years or less. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a). The appellant’s sentence 

meets this requirement. Moreover, an appellant who is an especially mitigated or 

standard offender convicted of a Class C, D, or E felony should be considered a favorable 

candidate for alternative sentencing absent evidence to the contrary. See Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-35-102(6). As a Range II, multiple offender, the appellant is not considered a

favorable candidate for alternative sentencing. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-

103(1) sets forth the following sentencing considerations which are utilized in 

determining the appropriateness of alternative sentencing:

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by 

restraining a defendant who has a long history of criminal 

conduct;

(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the 

seriousness of the offense or confinement is particularly 

suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to 

commit similar offenses; or

(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have 

frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the 

defendant.

See also State v. Zeolia, 928 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Additionally,

“[t]he potential or lack of potential for the rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant 

should be considered in determining the sentence alternative or length of a term to be 

imposed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(5). A defendant with a long history of criminal 

conduct and “evincing failure of past efforts at rehabilitation” is presumed unsuitable for 

alternative sentencing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(5).
- 5 -

The appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for 

alternative sentencing because the court placed “undue emphasis” on his two prior 

probation revocations. In denying the appellant’s request for split confinement, the court 

stated that it was denying alternative sentencing based upon considerations (A), (B), and 

(C): that confinement was necessary to protect society by restraining the defendant who 

had a long history of criminal conduct, that confinement was necessary to avoid 

depreciating the seriousness of the offense, and that measures less restrictive than 

confinement had frequently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant. As noted by 

the State, the appellant’s presentence report reflects that the appellant not only violated 

probation in 1996 and 1997 but violated a conditional release agreement in 2014. 

Furthermore, the trial court’s statement that the appellant would do nothing “other than 

violate the probation” demonstrates that the court considered the appellant to have a poor 

potential for rehabilitation. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by ordering that the appellant serve his six-year sentence in confinement. 

III. Conclusion

Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

_________________________________ 

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE