POLICY ISSUE 

NOTATION VOTE 

July 6, 2007 SECY-07-0114

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: Luis A. Reyes 

Executive Director for Operations 

SUBJECT: STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISIONS TO THE ADVERSARY 

CHARACTERISTICS SCREENING PROCESS 

PURPOSE: 

To obtain Commission approval of the staff’s recommended approach for improving the 

Adversary Characteristics Screening Process (ACSP). This paper does not address any new 

resource implications. 

BACKGROUND: 

On December 12, 2006, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff briefed the 

Commission on the current threat environment. Following the briefing, the Commission directed 

the staff to reconsider the sequence of actions in the ACSP and provide recommendations. 

The NRC staff analyzes terrorist and criminal tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) 

occurring both domestically and worldwide throughout the year to ensure the continued 

adequacy of the NRC’s Design Basis Threats (DBTs). The NRC staff analyzes these TTPs 

relative to the DBT attributes using the ACSP. The ACSP was utilized in determining the initial 

adversary characteristics used in the supplemented DBT Order issued on April 29, 2003. 

CONTACT: Jim Whitney, NSIR/DSO/ILTAB 

 (301) 415-5253 
The Commissioners -2- 

Since the promulgation of the ACSP and its initial use of drafting the supplemented DBT, staff 

has used it for the Annual Threat Environment Review (formerly Semiannual). The results of 

the analysis are provided annually to the Commission unless circumstances dictate earlier. 

The ACSP is intended to enhance the transparency, predictability, and consistency of NRC’s 

identification and application for adversary characteristics. The staff uses the screening process 

to identify adversary characteristics and assign a level of significance to them in order to 

determine their potential applicability to the regulatory base. The screening process currently 

comprises four steps – with the Commission being informed of the staffs’ efforts throughout the 

process, and being asked for a vote during the Disposition and Communication Plan (step 4): 

Step 1 - The process begins with routine staff review of intelligence reporting consisting 

of raw and finished reporting coming from the Intelligence and Law Enforcement 

Communities, open source reporting, and staff participation in a number of interagency 

groups focused on terrorism related topics. This reporting is evaluated against specific 

initial criteria (is the attribute absent from the DBT; is the attribute possessed by a 

terrorist/criminal group; is the attribute possessed outside of a foreign military entity; is 

the attribute an increased capability; is it man-portable). The staff also performs specific 

fact-finding to support the understanding of specific adversary characteristics. 

Step 2 – If a new potential adversary characteristic passes the first round of screening, 

then additional weighting factors are considered (what groups possess it; what location 

is the attribute used; what target type is the attribute used against; what is the social 

stability of the country where the group is using the attribute; what is the tactical use of 

the attribute; what is the frequency of use; what is the motive of the group using the 

attribute; what is the availability of the attribute). 

Step 3 – Based on the results of Step 2, staff may interact at the working level with other 

government agencies within the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities. In this 

informal interaction staff attempts to obtain additional data and insights regarding the 

characteristic. This interaction will support or refute the staff’s working analysis of the 

characteristic. 

Step 4 – Based upon the results of Steps 2 and 3, the staff determines whether the 

characteristic should be pursued further in a disposition process, which involves 

preparation of a Disposition and Communication Plan. This plan describes next steps 

such as engaging stakeholders as appropriate, conducting research and engineering 

analyses, determining resource impacts and producing a schedule for the process. This 

Disposition and Communication Plan is then submitted to the Commission for approval 

before any further action is taken regarding the characteristic. 

DISCUSSION: 

SRM M061212A – “Subject: Staff Requirements – Briefing on Threat Environment Assessment, 

0930 AM, Tuesday, December 12, 2006,” states that the staff should reconsider the sequence 

of actions. The staff evaluated the viability of simply reversing the sequence of impact 

assessment and the interagency coordination and determined this would not be efficient. 

Assuming that the staff performs an in-house technical analysis and impact assessment prior to 

interagency coordination, then a future analysis by the licensees will be needed due to the 
The Commissioners -3- 

limitations of the NRC in-house analysis. These limitations include not having all the sitespecific details in order to perform a more accurate technical and resource analysis. 

Based upon Commission direction, the staff identified three options for consideration: 

Option 1 – Add an NRC technical and resource analysis step into the screening 

process before Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Homeland Security 

Communities input. 

PRO: 

Adding a step in the ACSP by conducting an NRC in-house review and technical and resource 

analysis of the characteristic provides the Commission with more information for its 

deliberations and pre-decisional thinking without involving stakeholders at this preliminary stage 

of information gathering. 

CON: 

Providing the in-house NRC analysis without engaging the Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and 

Homeland Security Communities first could potentially prove inefficient regarding NRC staff time 

and resources by deferring staff access to outside agency expert opinion and analysis to the 

NRC. This increases the possibility that the staff’s assessment could incorporate flawed 

assumptions regarding threat characteristics. The staff focuses its interactions with other 

agencies to include a discussion of what actions, if any, these agencies are taking to modify the 

strategies for protection of their equities in the homeland. These interactions have obviated the 

need for further staff analysis in a number of cases, and could do so for future studies. 

Option 2 – Add an NRC technical and resource analysis step into the screening 

process after Intelligence, law Enforcement, and Homeland Security 

Communities input. 

PRO: 

Conducting another step in the ACSP by conducting an NRC in-house review of the technical 

and resource analysis provides the Commission with more information for its deliberations and 

pre-decisional thinking before involving non-Federal stakeholders at this preliminary stage of 

information gathering. Conducting NRC technical and resource analyses after the Intelligence, 

Law Enforcement, and Homeland Security Communities input step provides NRC staff and the 

Commission with the greatest amount of information available, and potentially screens out the 

adversary characteristic before reaching this stage, as stated in Option 1. It may also refine the 

inputs used in the staff’s analysis, thereby making it more effective and reducing the likelihood 

of subsequent rework. 

CON: 

Pre-decisional thinking shared outside the Agency could potentially inhibit the independence of 

the Commission’s decision-making process. 
The Commissioners -4- 

Option 3 – Do not change the ACSP – keep it as it currently stands. 

This option keeps the process the same and the Commission would not receive an NRC inhouse analysis of the technical and resource analysis until the Disposition and Communication 

Plan at the end of the process. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

The staff recommends Option 2 – add an NRC technical and resource analysis step after 

Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities’ input. The staff believes this option will give 

the Commission the greatest amount of information; provide the staff the most amount of 

information available at the Federal level for the staff to conduct its technical and resource 

analysis; and not involve non-Federal stakeholders in the Commission’s predecisional 

deliberations at this early stage in the process. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this package and has no legal objection. 

 /RA/ 

Luis A. Reyes 

Executive Director 

 for Operations 
The Commissioners -4- 

Option 3 – Do not change the ACSP – keep it as it currently stands. 

This option keeps the process the same and the Commission would not receive an NRC inhouse analysis of the technical and resource analysis until the Disposition and Communication 

Plan at the end of the process. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

The staff recommends Option 2 – add an NRC technical and resource analysis step after 

Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities’ input. The staff believes this option will give 

the Commission the greatest amount of information; provide the staff the most amount of 

information available at the Federal level for the staff to conduct its technical and resource 

analysis; and not involve non-Federal stakeholders in the Commission’s predecisional 

deliberations at this early stage in the process. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this package and has no legal objection. 

 /RA/ 

Luis A. Reyes 

Executive Director 

 for Operations 

ADAMS ACCESSION NO.: ML072620339 WITS 200700098

OFFICE ILTAB ILTAB DSO/DDSP DSO OGC 

NAME JWhitney RWarren RWay DDorman JGoldberg 

DATE 06/29/07 06/15/07 06/15/07 06/15/07 06/19/07 

OFFICE NSIR DEDR DEDR OEDO 

NAME RZimmerman WKane BMallett LAReyes 

DATE 06/29/07 09/24/07 12/18/07 12/19/07 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY