-.-- LEAR THE WAY 

By Major General Daniel W. Christman 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

0ur Army is entering a period of seif-examination and reflection. The continuing change 

and violence in the world emphasize the fact that 

the missions for our Army are as critical as ever. 

Many old planning assumptions are no longer valid, 

however. We must now prepare our Army for the future, a task that is not as straightforward as it may 

seem. In the past we prepared to meet our most 

likely challenger. Today we must prepare for the unknown. TO serve our nation effectively, we must be 

prepared to meet any threat--not just the most iikely known threat, but any threat. That is a monumental challengMow does an Army develop leaders, 

write doctrine, field weapons, and conduct training 

for the unknown? 

In April, your Engineer Center hosted the 1992 

Senior Engineer Leaders' Training Conference, or 

SELTC. The theme of this vear's conference was 

"Shaping the Force for the 21st Century" a timely 

topic! In the course of the SELTC, several key 

Army leaders gave their vision of the future Army 

and addressed some of the steps toward that 

vision. General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff 

of the Army, gave the keynote address which set 

the tone for the rest of the conference. His remarks 

are included in this issue of ENGINEER, beginning 

on page 24. General Edwin Burba, commander of 

the Army's Forces Command (FORSCOM), and 

General Frederick Franks, commander of Training 

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), provided insights into how their organizations will help shape 

the Army of the future. Lieutenant General Henry 

Hatch, our Chief of Engineers, gave the closing 

presentation. He made some very thought-provoking observations on how our Corps must continue 

to adapt to meet the needs of the Army and the nation. He emphasized that, as our Army gets smaller 

and increases its emphasis on power projection, 

we must be able to tailor engineer forces to accomplish whatever missions we are assigned. 

These tailored forces will often include both Active 

and Reserve Component forces. General Hatch 

concluded with a definition of "decisive victory" that 

is especially applicable to the engineer force: the 

return to sustainable peace. 

Finally, some specifics on near-term efforts to 

prepare the Army for the future. On doctrine, the 

Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth 

continues to work on the revision of FM 100-5, 

Operations. A first draft of this manual will be published in late August or early September. A 

TRADOC working group, composed of some of 

TFlADOC's visionaries, is laying the groundwork for 

a series of six "battle labs" that will address evolving battle dynamics. One lab will address each of 

the following: early entry operations, battlespace 

(ranae of combat actions) in mounted o~erations. 

battispace in dismounteb operations, depth and 

simultaneity of operations, command and control 

and tempo~of operations, and logistics. The labs 

will look at how these dynamics will affect future 

Army operations. They will be linked to a Chief of 

Staff of the Army initiative known as the "Louisiana 

Maneuvers," which will integrate and build upon 

numerous exercises and simulations Army-wide. 

The Louisiana Maneuvers will serve as a vehicle to 

assess doctrine and organizations, refine concepts, 

develop leaders, and train the force. More about 

the Louisiana Maneuvers will appear in future issues of ENGINEER. 

As you look at the table of contents of this issue 

of ENGINEER, you cannot help but be struck by 

the diversity of tasks expected of us as engineers. 

This diversity is one reason why in the future, as in 

the past, engineers will "lead the way" in Army 

operations. We must work together to shape our 

Army so that it may best serve our nation. 

Essayons! 
d@
 July 1992 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 

COMMANDERICOMMANDANT 

Major General Daniel W. Christman 

MANAGING EDITOR 

Catherine Eubanks 

FEATURESEDITOR 

Phillip R. Howell, Jr. 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 

Jennifer C. Bolyard 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

GORDON R. SULLIVAN 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

@@-

MILTON H. HAMILTON 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army 

02108 

Cover: Students are given an orientation 

ride on a MK ii Bridge Erection Boat 

during float bridge training at Fort Leonard 

Wood. (Photo by Phil Howell) 

Volume 22 PB 5-92-3 

FEATURES 

2 Desert Storm Countermine Improvisations 

by Willam Schneck 

8 Light Division Engineer Command and Control 

by Major Bill Allen and Major Wayne Whiteman 

14 	Float Bridge Training 

by Phil Howell 

20 	The "I Wonder" Years 

by Captain David A. Kramer 

24 	Remarks at the Senior Engineer Leader Training 

Conference 

by General Gordon R. Sullivan 

32 	Minimizing Time-On-Target 

by Captain James Dawklns 

36 	Maintaining Mobility With A Treadway Road 

by Major Thomas J. Kelly 

40 	 Building An Unbeatable Defense 

by Second Lieutenant Steven McGugan 

48 	Practical Leadership - The 20180 Rule 

by Colonel Herb Harback 

DEPARTMENTS 

Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 


13 Book Review 51 Engineer Solution 


23, Personal Viewpoint 56 Engineer Update 


35 Engineer Problem 59 Past in Review 


45 Lessons Learned 61 Bridge the Gap 


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Desert Storm 


Countermine llmgrovisations 


By William Schneck 

American combat engineers 

have a long tradition of improvising methods to accomplish 

their mission. Their remarkable 

ingenuity is second to none. And 

they proved themselves once 

again during the Gulf War, when 

standard countermine measures 

were found lacking. 

Just before the ground phase of 

Operation Desert Storm, it became 

painfully obvious that the lack of 

modern counterrnine equipment 

hampered the ability of American 

and other coalition forces to successfully complete an opposed 

breach. The Iraqis were reported to 

possess a wide variety of advanced The MI-mounted Vehlcle Magnetic Signature Duplicator (VEMASID), imland mines from a large number of provlsed by the 1st infantry Divislon to counter the threat of seismi~magnetlccountries, particularly Italy and fused AT mines. (Photo by Colonel Greenwait) 

the Soviet Union.' 

American combat engineers 

were told to expect mines that 

were far more sophisticated than 

any of the conventional mines 

then available in their own inventories. The arrival of the armored 

combat earth mover (ACE), the 

battalion countermine set, and the 

combat engineer vehicle (CEV) 

mine rake significantly improved 

the breaching capabilities of our Selsmlc-magnetic-fused mlnes required the use of non-metalllc probes, like 

forces. However, it did nothing to the BRDEC-manufactured fiberglass probe (top) and a cut-down wooden tent 

help the breaching abilities of stake. (Photo by William Schneck) 
r. ' 

i'i?;v:, "* , .y %' , D . :;.,,., i~ 

-. 

Small, commercially avallable alr blowers were effective for exposlng mlnes 

burled In desert soll. 

light units like the 82nd Airborne direct response to the types of 

and the 10lst Airborne. mines reported to be in the Iraqi 

The light units were assigned inventory The majority of Iraqi 

critical missions along the antitank (AT) and antipersonnel 

western flank of the Desert Storm (AP) mines were believed to be 

attack. They were charged with low-metallic-content, blast-overisolating the Iraqis in the Kuwait pressure-protected blast mines 

theater of operations. As a result which could be fitted with inof this situation, a variety of improvised countermine devices 

were developed by engineers supporting these units. Many of the 

devices worked well and should be 

included in every engineer's '%ag 

of tricks." 

; 

tegral antihandling devices. 

These mines are difficult to 

detect with the ANPSS-11 mine 

detector, and are resistant to the 

mine clearing line charge 

(MICLIC). 

Another Iraqi AT mine was the 

seismic-magnetic-fused, fullwidth attack mine. This mine is 

The Threat very resistant to clearance by a 

MICLIC. The mine's shape or platost of the improvised ter-charge kill mechanism is typidevices were developed in cally fatal to the crew of any 

vehicle that activates one. The 

seismic-magnetic fuse also functions as an integral antihandling 

device. 

The Iraqis were reported to possess off-route AT mines that can 

penetrate the side of a tank up to 

100 meters away Some fuse types 

used with this mine cannot be 

defeated by MICLIC or the battalion countermine set. This mine 

must be visually detected and 

neutralized by .50caliber machine 

gun fire or other means. 

The Iraqi stock of tripwireactivated AP mines was reported 

to be large. This mine has a lethal 

radius of up to 30 meters for 

bounding mines and up to 200 

meters for directional mines. The 

tripwires on these mines are very 

difficult to detect visually 

The Iraqis were also believed to 

have the capability of scattering 

mines into coalition areas of 

operation by a variety of means. 

This capability could have seriously disrupted the movement of follow-on units and supplies. , 

A more detailed assessment of 

Iraqi mine warfare capabilities is 

in the Mine Recognition and Warfare Handbook (available from the 

Engineer School, DSN 581-6225), 

or the Sawwer . . Countermine Guide 

(available from the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC), DSN 

654-2446). 

Improvised Equipment 

The devices developed for 

Desert Storm were based 

on similar items improvised 

during World War 11, Korea and 

Vietnam. Improvisations were 

also drawn from items under 

standard development programs 

during that period. 

The information presented 

here is not intended to cover all 

improvisations. Rather, it will illustrate some improvised countermine devices and techniques 

that may prove useful. While 

Engineer 3 
. ,#-.-' ... 

An improvised "mini-MICLIC," consisting of three 50-foot strands of det cord, a 

fragmentation grenade, blastlng cap, and time fuse. (Photo by William Schneck) 

these ideas have direct mission tent stakes.' 

applications, it is more impor- Both the 20th Engineer Brigade 

tant that they provide "food for and the 1st Infantry Division purthought." Hopefully, this will as- chased small, commercial air 

sist in developing similar-or blowers to supplement the 

different-improvisations when ANIPSS-11 mine detector. The 

faced with difficult situations on blower is effective for uncovering 

the battlefield. Before any im- mines hidden by loose vegetation 

provised device is used in com- or soil. It also proved faster and 

bat, however, I strongly recom- more reliable than a metal detecmend that it be tested as tor for clearing footpaths in a dry 

thoroughly as possible to deter- environment. The noise and dust 

mine its safety and reliability. signatures of these blowers are an 

obvious disadvantage, making 

them useful only in areas not 

Detection covered by enemy observation and - 3 

Bismounted: The bayonet 

tire: 

Soldiers of the French 6th Enhas served as a mine gineer Regiment (Foreign Legion), 

probe in previous wars. However, veterans of combat in Chad, 

the suspected presence of seis- recommended dragging an 

mic-magnetic-fused AT mines entrenching tool over the ground 

made the use of the bayonet haz- in a sweeping motion. This action 

ardous. A limited number of removes the loose soil covering 

units had fiberglass probes from shallow mines without activating 

squad sapper sets which were them. This method is much faster 

prepared by BRDEC in response than probing. Before using this 

to a request from the 20th En- technique, the area should be 

gineer Brigade (Airborne). The checked for tripwires. If magnetic5th Special Forces Group (Air- fused mines are thought to be 

borne) cut down wooden paint present, this technique should not 

paddles to use as probes. Other be used because steel in the 

units improvised non-metallic entrenching tool may activate 

probes by whittling down wooden these mines.4 

Viiual detection has generally 

proven to be the most reliable 

method of mine detection. In Vietnam, for instance, about one-third 

of the mines and booby traps were 

located visuallF5 During Desert 

Storm, visual detection again 

proved to be the most effective 

method of detection. Wind and 

rain had eroded the desert soil 

around many of the mines, 

making them relatively easy to 

spot. 

Mounted: Personnel from the 

1st Cavalry Division reported that 

they were able to locate buried 

mines at close range (up to 100 

feet) using the thermal sights on 

their M-1A1 tanks.6 Extensive research on thermal mine detection 

has been conducted at BRDE~. 

Findings indicate that sightine 

occur when the temperature difference between the mine and the 

ground exceeds the thermal 

sight's sensitivity threshold. This 

difference in temperature is the 

result of the different heat absorption and retention rates of mines 

and the soil in which they are 

located. 

Because of this phenomenon, 

thermal sighting can only be conducted at certain times of the 

day--depending on weather and 

soil conditions. Unfortunately, 

there is no universal timetable or 

formula for determining these 

times. Soldiers must conduct tests 

in the breaching operations region 

to help identify likely times during 

the day when thermal detection is 

feasible. Because these time 

periods are limited, thermal detection should be considered a supplement to other means of detection, such as mine rollers and the 

ANIPSS-11. It is not a primary 

means of detection. 

Breaching 

Dismounted: To clear tripwire-fused mines; several 

methods of projecting a grapnel 

into a minefield were tried. The 
most effective grapnel was 

manufactured on site by 

the 27th Engineer Battalion (Airborne). Based 

on a design by Steve Bennett, formerly of BRDEC, 

the grapnel was machined 

from 1-112 inch-diameter 

7075-T651 aluminum rod. 

The grapnel had a range 

of about 80 meters when 

fired from an M-16, using 

a blank round, reloaded 

with the same amount of 

propellant as the standard 

5.56. The grapnel deployed 

military-standard nylon 

cord, commonly called 550 

cord or parachute cord. 

The grapnel was then 

retrieved, clearing tripwires and leaving a visible 

mark on the ground. (See 

"The Bullet Trap" in the he Barren .so caliber sniper rifle, used by the Marines to clear mines. 

April 92 issue of Engineer 

Professional Bulletin.) 

Another approach was 

used by the 37th Engineer 

Battalion (Airborne). They 

successfully used a crossbow to launch a small grap 

nel into minefields. The 

grapnel was improvised 

from a three-pronged fiihing hook taped to the end of 

a crossbow bolt.7 

Several units improvised 

"mini-MICLICs" by taking 

three 50-foot strands of det 

cord and taping them in a 

bundle. One end is wrapped 

around an M67 fragmentation grenade and taped into 

place. The other end is 

primed with a blasting cap 

and time fuse. The det cord 

must be coiled to ensure 

proper deployment, The Modern, sophisticated mines like these Valmara 69 bounding APs, and VS-22 AT 

cord is deployed by simply necessitated some rapid lmprovlsatlons by engineers during the Gulf War. (Photo 

throwing the grenade into by Tom Reeder) 

the minefield (Do not pull 

the pin on the grenade). detonate simple pressure-fused ground. The grenade, which is 

When this device is activated, it AP mines and displace or expose detonated by the det cord wrap, 

will cut slack or taut tripwires and blast-resistant AP mines along a leaves a shallow crater that can be 

surface-laid or shallow-buried narrow footpath. The detonation located during periods of limited 

command firing wires. It will also leaves an obvious scar on the visibility to mark the end of the 
breached lane.' A longer length of 

det cord can be deployed up to 50 

meters by the rifle-launched 

grapnel.9 

Bravo Company of the 27th Engineer Battalion used small arms 

fire to clear DP-ICM and cluster 

bomb duds (BLU-61s and BLU97s) at A1 Bussayyah, Iraq. This 

technique normally required five 

or six shots from the prone position at a distance of about 25 

meters to achieve results. All submunitions hit by M-16 fire were 

destroyed. Unfortunately, this left 

the soldier uncomfortably close to 

the dud when it detonated. Nevertheless, this technique may be 

useful in some situations. The 

Marine Corps also used their .50 

caliber Barrett sniper rifles to 

clear a large number of mines in 

their sector.1° 

The 307th Engineer Battalion 

(Airborne) found that blowing AT 

mines in place left unacceptably 

large craters along the breached 

lane that would be used by 

wheeled vehicles. To counter this 

problem, they developed a technique for blowing the mines out of 

the way with block explosive. 

Placed the right distance from the 

mine, the block explosive would 

throw the mine out of the breached 

lane without activating it. The op 

timum amount of explosive and 

separation between the charge 

and the mine must be determined 

experimentally for each type of AT 

mine. 

Furthermore, this technique 

may not be effective against oddshaped mines like the British bar 

mine. It will also cause mines with 

seismic-magnetic fuses and antihandling devices to detonate. As a 

safeguard, some engineer equipment should be available to make 

the breached lane passable. 

This technique may also be useful for clearing dud submunitions 

from areas such as airfields. Experience at As Salman and A1 Bussayyah, Iraq, showed that if the 

neutralizing charge was placed 

alongside the submunition and 

letonated, the submunition was 

thrown clear most of the time. If 

the charge was placed adjacent to 

the fuse of the submunition and 

detonated, however, the submunition would be detonated. 

Mounted: M1 tanks faced the 

danger of seismic-magnetic 

fused AT mines passing between 

the blades of a fitted mine plow 

and detonating under the 

vehicle. The 1st Infantry Division, with the assistance of 

Bennett, came up with an improvised Vehicle. Magnetic Signature Duplicator (VEMASID) 

to counter this threat. It was 

successfully tested against an 

electronically fused AT mine. 

The device was fabricated from 

1,450 feet of #6 or #7 gauge wire 

coiled (about 80 turns) on a 5-foot 

by 4-foot tray Power for the coil 

was drawn from the slave recep 

tacle through a 200-amp fuse. The 

plane of the coil should be roughly 

parallel to the ground and overhang the leading edge of the 

vehicle. This device would probably be destroyed by the detonation 

of an AT mine, so it issacrificial in 

nature. But that's much better 

than losing the vehicle and its 

11 crew. 

The armored vehicle launched 

MICLIC (AVLM) wss improvised 

by the 1st Infantry Division to 

replace the trailers that usually 

carry the MICLIC. The trailers 

were found to be unsatisfactory 

because of their poor cross-country 

performance. The AVLM was 

made by downloading the bridge 

from the chassis of an armored 

vehicle launched bridge (AVLB). 

Two MICLIC systems were then 

mounted on an improvised frame 

above the vehicle's engine compartment. This greatly improved 

the mobility of the MICLICS.'~ 

Proofing the MICLIC scar was a 

significant problem for engineers 

supporting the 82nd Airborne 

Division and the French 6th 

Division. The battalion countermine set is incompatible with the 

M551 Sheridans of the 82nd. The 

French also did not have equip 

ment suitable for proofing. 

To address this problem, the 

27th Engineer Battalion fabricated an improvised mine-proofing roller. It had a central axle 

supported on both ends by fixed 

rollers. Eight articulated rollers 

were attached to the central axle. 

Four were pushed ahead of the 

axle and four trailed behind it. The 

articulation gave superb ground 

conformance. 

The roller was hooked up to the 

towing shackles of a heavily 

sandbagged 5-ton dump truck by 

two small I-beams and pushed 

ahead of the vehicle. Steel plates 

were added to raise the footprint of 

each roller above 500 pounds. 

The mine-proofing roller device 

was intended for proofing a 

breached lane. It was never used 

in combat because the 27th did not 

encounter any minefields that 

needed to be breached. This device 

probably would have been 

destroyed by the detonation of a 

single AT mine.13 Similar devices 

were fabricated during the Vietnam War. l4 

A dozer armor kit was designed 

by Captain Jordan, of the 20th Engineer Brigade, and fabricated by 

the 46th Engineer Battalion 

(Combat)(Heavy). Using 1-112- 

inch-thick mild steel, a cage was 

built around the vehicle to defeat 

rocket propelled grenade (RPG) 

attacks. The blade was angled for 

dozing mines out of the way15 

The ability of the Iraqis to scatter mines deep in our sector represented a serious threat to supply 

lines. To counter this, the 27th Engineer Battalion fabricated a scatterable mine clearing system 

similar to one currently in 

development at BRDEC. The open 

grid chain mat literally scoops up 

surface-laid mines and ordnance 

at speeds up to 15 mph.16 

The XWI Airborne Corps considered artillery and aerial 
bombing for breaching minefields. 

While this technique was used in 

World War I1 by the Germans, 

they found that it required large 

quantities of ammunition to clear 

mines equipyd with simple pressure fuses. 

Most of the mines in the Iraqi 

inventory had blast overpressure-protected fuses that are 

highly resistant to clearance by 

explosive line charges and fuelair explosives. The amount of 

ammunition required to breach 

the minefields found during 

Desert Storm would have been 

astronomical. Such a method 

would also have yielded a low 

confidence in the effectiveness of 

the breach. Trial testing at the 

National Training Center confirmed the drawbacks of this 

technique. 

Survivability 

ounted. The 27th Engineer Battalion amored 

their 2 ii2-ton dump truck squad 

vehicles by sandwiching a layer 

of sandbags between 314-inch 

plywood and bracing them with 

U-shaped pickets. In testing, the 

bags stopped NATO 7.62mm. 

The floor of the vehicle had two 

layers of sandb7~ as protection 

from mine blast. 

Marking: A variety of techniques were used by units for 

marking breached lanes: VS-17 

visual recognition panels, traffic 

cones, chemlights, and others. 

Such methods were effective, but 

need to be standardized within a 

theater of operations. This is 

necessary to prevent confusion 

when units are shifted from one 

breach site to another in a different sector. 

To mark approaches to 

breached lanes, the 1st Infantry 

Division effectively employed 

markers made from Cfoot by 8-

foot plywood with chemlights inserted in the board. To mark the 

breached lane itself, chemlights 

were placed in clear, one-liter 

bottles filled with water. 

The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment found that if diesel fuel were 

distributed on the ground, it left 

an obvious visual mark.lg In 

World War Two, this technique 

was used by the British 7th Armored Division at the Second Battle of El lamei in.'^ 

Conclusion 

ay its very nature, an imDrovised device is less 

reliable than a manufactured 

system. Nevertheless, it can 

provide an important capability 

where none existed before. In 

the foreseeable future, tight 

budgets will greatly restrict the 

modernization of countermine 

capabilities, particularly for 

our light forces. However, maneuver commanders will still 

look to their engineers to lead 

the way in breaching operations. These techniques may 

give the engineers the edge 

they need to continue clearing 

the way. 

Mr. Schneck is a civilian project 

engineer for the Low Intensity 

Conflict Team, Countermine Systems Directorate, Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center. During the Gulf 

War, he was deployed to Southwest Asia with the 20th Engineer 

Brigade (Airborne) as an expert in 

countermine warfare. During 

Desert Shield /Desert Storm, he 

trained 19 U.S. engineer battalions in mine warfare techniques and Iraqi mines. Previous 

military assignments include 

company commander with the 

229th Engineer Battalion (Light), 

and platoon leader with the 

27th Engineer Battalion (Airborne). He is a graduate of the 

Engineer and Infantry Officers 

Advanced Courses, and holds a 

bachelor's degree in mechanical 

engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology. 

Endnotes 

l~ineRecognition and Waifare 

Handbook, U.S. Army Engineer 

School, Fort Leonard Wood, MO, 

November 1990. 

2~apper Countermine Guide, 

BRDEC Pamphlet 350-4, Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering 

Center, Fort Belvoir, VA,30November 

1990,p. 100. 

Ibid, p. 102. 

4"~fter Action Report Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm," William C. Schneck, Belvoir Research, 

Development and Engineering Center, 

12 November 1991, p. 11. 

%it Cong Boobytraps, Mines, and 

Mine Warfare Techniques, TC 5-31, 

December 1969, p. 5-2. 

60~CIT, "After Action Report: 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm," p. 5. 

71bid, p. 11. 

'OP CIT, Net Cong Boobytraps, 

Mines, and Mine Warfare Techniques, 

p. 6-7. 

'western Europe, World War 11, 

Landmine and Countennine Warfare, 

Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Washington, D.C., July 1973, p. 

205, 

'"OP CIT, "After Action Report: 

Operations Desert Shield.and Desert 

Storm," pp. 13-15. 

''Did, p. B-4. 

121bid,p. 9. 

131bid, pp. 7 and B-3. 

14vi~m, Lessons Learned, 1965-

1968, Landmine and Countennine 

Waflkre, Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Washington, D.C., 

June 1972, p. 280. 

150p CIT, "After Action Report: 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm," p. B-1. 

161bid, pp. B-3 and B-4. 

I7~orth Africa, 1940-1943, 

Landmine and Countermine Warfare, 

Engineer Agency for Resourced Inventories, Washington, - D.C., June 1972, D.

261. 

"OP CIT, "After Action Report: 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm," p. B-1. 

191bid,p. 16. 

'O~orth Afica, 1940-1943,Appendices, Landmine and Countermine 

Warfare, Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Washington, D.C., 

June 1972, p. 0-21. 
By Major Bill Allen and Major Wayne Whiteman 

Command and control of engineer assets in support of light infantry divisions is a challenge. 

The engineer restructure initiative (ERI) command 

and control (c2)structure recognizes this challenge 

for heavy divisions and provides extensive assets to 

support multiple maneuver echelons. The light infantry division, on the other hand, has only its organic division engineer battalion (Figure 1). This 

battalion has a sm'all staff, limited in both personnel and equipment. 

Because of this austere arrangement, the battalion does not function at its maximum efficiency 

if it employs a separate engineer tactical operations center (TOC) in the traditional sense. Instead, the division engineer staff must integrate 

into existing tactical nodes and take advantage of 

their supporting structure. 

This article describes an initiative which the 

41st Engineer Battalion has implemented in support of the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum. 

It is an attempt to overcome the problems asDivisional Engineer @ Asset Comparison 

P

10th Mountaln Dlvlslon 	 ERI 

lnl!,m 

ADE Sectlon ADE Secflon 

sociated with limited light division engineer command and control assets. 

Basic Organizational Framework 

he ultimate measure of command and control effectiveness is whether the force 

functions more effectively and more quickly than 

the enemy." (FM 100-5, Operations) Experienced engineer leaders must be immediately available to 

supported maneuver commanders to achieve this 

objective. Likewise, these leaders need supporting 

staffs to enhance their efficiency, The single 

division engineer battalion is not robust enough to 

provide support to multiple command posts and 

echelons in the division, in addition to operating its 

own separate TOC. 

The 10th Mountain Division initiative allows the 

battalion commander to shift his focus toward directing engineer effort from a divisional-rather than a 

battalion-perspective. Assets of the battalion staff 

sections are consolidated and reorganized to create operations cells that 

function as part of the division and 

brigade tactical nodes (Figure 2). 

In the division forward area, assistant brigade engineers integrate into 

the brigade TOCs. Personnel from the 

5 3Sectlan 	 OpermlonWlanr secllon assistant division engineer (ADE) and 52 Sectlon TAC Senlon 

51 Sealon Admln19trallonlL0gI8tIc Secflon battalion S-2, 5-3,and communications 

54 Section sections form three cells with the 

3 Asslslanl Brigade Engineers Asdlanl Brlgade Englneer Secflon division main command post (DMAIN): 

OperstlanslPlans Sectlon an engineer close operations cell, an enTAC Sectlon 

Adrnlnlstratlon/Logl~tIcsSection 	 gineer operations cell, and an engineer 

plans cell. (from Coordlnatlng Dran FM 571-100) (Editor's Note: DIVEN TAC is the 

approved ten for the engineer close 

operations cell. This ten, along with Figure 1 
DIVEN REAR and DIVEN MAIN, appear in FM 5-71-100, Division Engineer Operations, scheduled for distribution later this year. These terms 

have been added to the authors'own 

for clarification). 

The battalion executive officer serves as the rear engineer and is supported by elements of the battalion 

S-1, S-4, and battalion motor officer 

(BMO) sections. They form an engineer rear operations (DIVEN 

REAR) cell in the division rear command post (DREAR). The engineer administrative and logistics operations 

center (ALOC) is effectively collocated 

with the DREAR. 

An engineer base is established 

with the headquarters company maintenance, medical, food service, and 

equipment support operations. It 

provides a central sustainment and 

operational base for divisional engineers and engineer augmentation 

units working in the division area. 

Division Forward Area 

Habitually associated divisional 

engineer companies support 

each infantry brigade. An assistant 

brigade engineer (ABE) from the company operates an engineer.cell in the 

brigade TOC Wigure 3). The company 

establishes a TOC near the brigade 

support area, which focuses on sustaining engineers operating in the brigade 

area. The company commander is free 

to position himself wherever he can 

best advise the maneuver brigade commander and control engineers operating in the brigade area. 

Divisional engineer platoon leaden 

serve as battalion task force engineers while assigned to a specific 

task force. There are only two engineer platoons in the light division 

engineer company, so all battalion 

task forces may not have a task force 

engineer. The ABE cell serves as the 

central engineer information and control node for all engineer effort in the 

brigade. 

The engineer close operations cell 

(DNEN TAC) in the DTAC is 

manned continuously by the ADE, 

LNO or a battalion S-3 NCO to keep 

Light Englneer c2Laydown 

X X X X X X 

(DNEN MAIN) 

AsE = Asslstam brlgsda snglnsw 


ECOPS - Englneer claps oprmlom cell (DNEN TAC) 


EOPS I Englneer pers st lorn cell 


EPC = EwJlneer plans cell (DIVEN hWIN) 


EROP = Englneer rear operatlons cell (DIVEN REAR) 

Flgure 2 

Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE) Cell 

Prlnclpal members 

- Company commander(s3 required) 


.Aoslstsnt brlgads englneer (OIC) 


- NCO assistant 

Prlmaryfunctlono: 

-Track current brlgade englneer opermlons 

- Pas8 lnformatlon between all engineers In brlgade area and the EOPS 

- lntegrste englneere Into plans for future operatlons; conduct englneer plannlng and 

write englneer annexes 

- Mslntsln an englneer data base 

-Serve as a central CDntect polnt for all unlte In the brlgade srea to request englnesr 

Inmrmstlon or assistance 

Secondary f~ncllons: 

-Alternate company CP 


.Coordinate englneer lntelllgence 


-Track war stopper sustalnrnem Issues 


LOCBtlon: 

.In brlgade maln TOC 

Flgure 3 

Engineer 9 
Engineer Close Operatlons Cell 

(DIVEN TAC) 

Prlnclpal members: 

- Dlvislon englneer (as required) 

- ADElBmtallon 5-3 (as requlred) 

- AOE LNO (OIC) 

- 5-3 NCO 

Primary functlons: 

-Take control of the engineer battle from the engineer Operatlons cell 

- Integrate engineers Into close operations 

- Malntaln an englneer data base 

- Serve as a central polnt to request englneer lnformatlon or assistance 

- Relay Information to the engineer operatlons cell 

Secondary functlons: 

-Track close and deep battle 

- Antlclpate englneer changes 

Location: 

- In DTAC 

Figure 4 

Division Main Command Post 

DMAIN Secudty Perlrnetet 

r----r-----
 I Engineer 

I operatlonst A' c2 ' Cell 

Englneel (DIVEN 

DMAlN Securlty Perlrneler 

Figure 5 

it ready to assume control of close engineer operations. When the DTAC is in control of the battle, 

the DMAIN engineer cells augment this engineer 

cell to control the close engineer battle (Figure 4). 

Two engineer cells operate within the DMAIN 

perimeter: the engineer operations cell and the engineer plans cell. The battalion S-3 and ADE provide 24-hour field grade engineer officer coverage 

for both engineer cells in the DMAIN area. The 

division engineer is free to position himself 

wherever he can best advise the division commander and control all engineer effort in the 

division area (Figure 5). 

I0 Engineer 

The engineer operations 

cell controls all engineer effort in the division area of 

operation, with G-3 oversight. Two battle captains 

and two battle NCOs, 

staffed from the battalion 

ADE and S-3sections, provide 24-hour coverage for 

controlling the current engineer battle. This cell 

directs effort and tasks engineer units through 

brigade engineers in the 

forward brigade areas and 

through the rear operations cell for units operating in the division rear. 

The operations cell also 

coordinates corps engineer 

augmentation. In addition, 

it provides an engineer 

command and control element for an engineer task 

force or a special operation 

(Figure 6). 

The engineer operations 

cell receives current operations reports from brigade 

engineers and the engineer 

rear operations cell. Corps 

augmentation units normal. 

ly report to a brigade engineer or the rear engineer, 

depending on where the 

units are located on the 

battlefield. 

Critical information is 

disseminated to engineer 

cells in the division tactical 

and rear command posts, 

as well as the engineer 

plans cell (DIVEN MAIN). 

Personnel from the engineer operations cell 

present situational updates at each of the division 

briefings and submit required reports to higher engineer headquarters. 

An engineer plans cell (DIVEN MAIN) at the 

DMAIN serves as an area for the development 

of future operations. It is located "outside of 

the wire," but within the security perimeter of 

the division command post. The battalion S-2, 

communications, and NBC sections operate from 

this location. It sends couriers to the brigade 

and division tactical operations centers as 

required. 
Each non-divisional battalion and 

separate engineer company working 

in the division area provides a 

liaison who operates from the engineer plans cell (DIVEN MAIN). 

This cell serves as a meeting place 

for engineer coordination and planning. The division engineer conducts 

daily updates and planning meetings 

at this location (Figure 7). 

This command and control structure normally allows continuous field 

grade coverage in the vicinity of the 

DMAIN. The ADE and battalion S-3 

are able to oversee both operations 

and planning. They also serve, with 

the division battle staff, as part of 

the operational planning group in 

conjunction with the G-3 plans cell. 

If required, one of these two majors 

can be released to command a 

separate engineer task force in support of the division. 

Division Rear Area 

An engineer rear operations cell 

in the DREAR CP monitors 

sustainment for engineers working 

within the whole division area. coordinates missions in the rear area, 

and manages all engineers operating 

in the division rear area. The divisional engineer battalion executive officer is the rear engineer who advises 

the assistant division commander for 

support. The battalion S-1 section, 

the battalion maintenance officer, 

and an 5-4 representative support 

him. The battalion's administration 

and logistics operations center 

(ALOC) is collocated with the 

DREAR (Figure 8, page 12). 

The engineer rear operations cell 

Engineer Operations Cell 

Prlnclpal members: 

- Dlvlslon englneer (as requlred) 

- ADVeattallon 5-3 

- Assistant 53s 

- Selected S3/ADE enllsted staff 

Prlmary functlons: 

.Command organlc and anached englneer assets 

- Control all englneer assets within the dlvlslon 

- Synchronize and wordlnate current englneer operatlons 

- Malmaln englneer data base 

- Request englneer augmentation 


-Troubleshoot logistic support to dlvlslonal englneers 


- Obteln mlssfon loglstlcs for augmenting englneerlng

- Serve as a central contact polnt for englneer lnformatlon and requests 

Secondary function: 

- Provlde englneer Input to future dlvlslon plans 

Figure 6 

Engineer Plans Cell (DIVEN MAIN) 

Prlnclpal memebera: 

- Olvlsion englneer (as requlred) 

- ADE/Sattallon S-3(as requlred) 

- BattallonS-2(OK) 


-Selected S-US-3enllsted staff 


.Battallon Commo Sectlan 


- LNOS 

Prlmary luncllons: 

- Integrate englneers Into plans for future operatlons 

- Prepare englneer estlrnates. OPOROS and annexes 

-Coordinate ISP wllh G-2 

- Monltar and dlssemlnate NBC lnformatlon 

- Sewe as englneer meetlng and coordfnatbn locatlon 

Secondary functlons: 

-Augment englneers operatlons cell 

-Augment englneer task force headquarters 

-Control or manltar speclal englneer operatlons or problems 

LOcatlOn: 

- Vlclnlty DMAIN 

Figure 7 

DMAIN become combat-ineffective, 

(DIVEN REAR) develops requirements for support An engineer base is usually separate from the 

and coordinates priorities of effort through the en- DREAR CP. The engineer base executes sustaingineer operations cell. Within these priorities, the ment functions for engineer units in the division 

rear engineer directs engineer effort in the rear area. Non-divisional engineers operating in the 

area. division can collocate here to maximize efficient 

The DnTEN REAR continuously monitors and sustainment support. This also facilitates encoordinates with other division rear elements to gineer integration into the division's rear area 

protect critical assets, maintain mobility, and assist security structure. The divisional HHC comwith area damage control. This cell monitors friend- mander is in charge of the engineer base unless a 

ly and enemy obstacles, tracks engineer logistical larger engineer headquarters is available for an 

problems, and coordinates sustainment for the extended period of time. Elements of the 

divisional engineer battalion. It also serves as the divisional battalion S-1 and S-4 augment the 

alternate engineer operation cell, should the HHC (Figure 9, page 13). 
Engineer Rear Operations Cell 

(DIVEN REAR) 

Prlnclpal members: 

- Batallon executhre offlcer 

- Banallon S-1 

- Battallon maintenance offlcer 

- S-1 staff 

- S4 NCO 

Prlmaryfunctlons: 

- lmegrae englneers Into rear operatlons

- Coordlnate and assign missions to engineers operating in the dlvlslon rear area 

- Plan englneer loglstlcal requirements 

- Monitor sustatnment of all englneers In the dlvlslon area for all classes of supply

- Coordinate sustalnment for dlvlslonal englneers

- Coordlnate solutlons to maintenance and loglstlcal war stoppers

- Malntaln englneer data 

- Serve as a central contact polnt for englneer Information and requests 

-Assist with area damage control 

Secondary functions: 

- SeNe as aRernate englneer operatlons cell 

- Provide sustalnment support 

Locallon: 

-In DREAR 

Flgure 8 

Discussion 

Tmplementation of the 

J ?light engineer command 

and control initiative has 

revealed several advantages: 

Better staffing of engineer operations. Consolidated assets from 

the division engineer 

battalion staff sections 

are organized to provide 

responsive cells at critical points on the battlefield. 

Increased parallel planning. Collocation of the 

battalion and division 

staffs allow for better information flow. For example, the battalion S-2 

can fully integrate with 

the division G-2, participate in the IPB 

process, and have access to timely intelligence information. 

Training Exercises 

The 41st Engineer - Battalion has conducted

J several training events to test this new command and control initiative and refine its structure. Early in the development of the initiative, 

battalion-level communications exercises were 

used to resolve personnel and equipment issues. 

Later, the system was fielded as part of several 

battalion- and division-level command post 

exercises. 

To date, the most successful application of this 

command and control arrangement was during the 

conduct of the battalion's external evaluation. The 

326th Engineer Battalion (AASLT) conducted an 

EXEVAL of the 41st in October 1991, and the 

results were favorable. The Fort Campbell 

evaluators offered constructive comments which 

have aided the development of this command and 

Streamlined engineer reporting and control. 

Communications and information no longer need 

to be channeled through an engineer battalion 

TOC to the division engineer section. This 

precludes the duplication of reports and plans. 

Engineerpersonnel and vehicles available for 

coordination and support. The consolidation of 

divisional engineer elements provides staff 

robustness and frees vehicles to conduct reconnaissance, coordination, and courier missions. 

Increased security. Protection of engineer command and control is enhanced by integrating engineer elements into the security of the division 

command post, and by establishing a consolidated engineer base. 

Improved engineer information accessibility. 

The engineer cells in brigade TOCs, the 

DTAC, DMAIN, and DREAR serve as nodes, 

providing ready access to engineer information 

and resources throughout the division area. 

control method. The major disadvantage of this structure is the 

Recently, the 10th Mountain Division attended a increased of the division command posts. workshop seminar for the Battle Command Train- Some flexibility is also lost by allocating engineer 

ing Program (BCTP), at Fort Leavenworth. The bat- command and control assets to the different nodes 

talion commander, ADE, and S-3 attended this of the division command post structure. The 

seminar under the new command and control destruction of a divisional command node would 

structure. mean the loss of the associated engineer cell. 

12Engineer 
Engineer Base Cell 

Prlnclpal members: 

- HHC commander (OlC) 

- HHC XO/Equlpment platoon leader 

- HHC 1SG 

- HHC staff 

- Battallon maintenance 

- Battallon mess team 

- Banallon 54 

- Banallon 54 staff 

Prlmaty functions: 

- Sustaln the bsnallon 

- Coordlnate area sesudly 

Location: 

- New dfvlslon support area or major engineer project 

Figure 9 

Conclusion 

Rteorganizing light engineer command and conrol assets to direct effort from a divisional 

perspective provides more efficient and responsive 

support. The division engineer controls effort 

centrally, but executes operations in a decentralized manner through his various cells. 

Engineer elements operating in the division forward area are controlled by-and report directly 

tethe operations cell in the DMAIN. Engineer 

units working in the division rear receive direction 

through the engineer rear operations cell (DIVEN 

REAR) in the DREAR. Direct links between these 

cells and the division and brigade command posts 

provide the maneuver commander with a more 

responsive engineer force and access to timely 

information. Y 

Major Allen is the erecutiue officer of the 41st Engineer 

Battalion. Hep~viously served as assistant division engineer for the 10th Mountain Division. Other assignments 

include group engineer for the 10th Special Forces Group, 

S~3of the 23rd Engineer Battalion, and company commander for the 23rd. He is a graduate of Command and 

General Staff College, and holds a master's degree in aalministration from Central Michigan University. He 

earned his bachelor's degree from the Uniuersity of 

Florida. 

Major Whiteman is 5-3 of the 41st Engineer Battalion. 

Other assignments include assistant professor of civil and 

mechanical engineering at West Point, company commander for the 2nd Engineer Battalion, and S-4 for the 

76th Engineer Battalion. He is a gmduate of Command 

and General Staff College, and holds a master's degree in 

civil engineering fim Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a West Point gmduate. 

Book Review 

~L-V~..~Courage, by Lord Mom, Garden City Park, 

NewYork Avery Publishing Group, Ino., 1987,202p 

World War I was unlike anv wnflid that came before it or has 

happened since. It was a meeLg of 19th century ideas and attiNdes toward war and its waging, and emerging 2Cth century 

technoloav. Thin union omduced a battlefield of destruction whioh 

fleeted &ely individual who came in contact with it. Lord 

Moran, a medical &cer with England's Fit Battalion of the 

Royal Fusiliers, kept dieries that contained his obsemtions on 

how that war &Ged the men charwd with its execution. both officersand enlisted During World WL11, as Wurston ~hu'&U's 

personal physician, he observed othor facets of warfnre at bath 

the level of the soldier and the statesman. First published in 

1944, his bmk, TheAnatomy of Courage has been republished as 

part of Avery's Art of Command Series. 

Lord Mom's purpoae was "to find how courage was born and 

how it was sustained in a modern army of a free people." Thin 

waa important becauae. 'Yhe soldier is alone in his war with terror and we have to rewgnize the first signs of defeat that we may 

wme in time to his rescue." 

Using his diaries, Moran tells many stories that illustrate the 

discwerv of fear. how wuraae - is smnt. . . and the care and manamment of fear. Later he discusses discipline and lesdership. The 

stories r.eIleu Mom's keen insight and sensitivity to the shatterina effen that the trenches had on his battalion. In chis he did 

not write as an impersonal third party; his own fears and beliefa 

are offeered as well. 

For Moran muram - was a moral aualitv. . . It was willwwer. the 

hed resolve not to quit. In the trenches, Moran said, a man'o 

willpower wan his capital, and he was always spending. Moran 

believed that leaders were obligated to watch "the expnditure of 

every penny lest their men went bankrupt. When their capital 

was done, they were f~shed." 

He also believed it was dhle to add to the amount, and used 

examples of fighter and bomber pilots during World War Il to 

demonstrate the need for both physical and mental re4. He noted. 

howwer, that a man who spent t& much time away from combat 

wss likely never to return.For such soldiers, life became more important than their commitment to fellow soldiers or their country. 

Writing with an obvious pride in his countrymen, Mom comoared the omfessional soldier and the oitizen soldier. . esoeciallv . with resped to discipline. He saw the change in the nature of armies in the two wars, and the succass and failurn of discipline 

in both. For Moran. a man's oersonal diaoioline was as imwrtant 

as that imped by wmmanders. 

Mom beliwed that a soldier's commitment to his regiment and 

the leadership of his oflicers were imponant suppons in<he sustainment of couraae and the fibt against fear. He defined leadership as 

the capacity to frame pl~& thatwould rum4 and the faculty if 

persuading others to any them out in the face of death. Sumsss, or 

the expedation of sums waa uudal,it justified the tmr, 

sacrifiw, and pain of battle. In some instances, success was due 

more to a commander's knowledge of what his men muld do, rather 

than what they were supped to do. In this respect. 'the art of-- 

mand is the art of dealing with human nature." 

In our doctrine tadav. leaders are oblimted to know war and 

its affect on soldiers. 0Lide of actual battle, we can understand 

the human dimension of war only by reading about past wnflicts. 

Without this understandina, leaders cannot how to effectively 

train soldiers for the demands of wmbat. 'Ihus; Moranns bmkwill 

he useful to leaders training their soldiers for battle. In this 

re&. the wdtinaa of Frederick the Great are still valid. 'Vnleen 

ev& &a is trair;ed beforahand in peacetime for that which he 

will have to ammplish in war, one has nothing but wple who 

bear the name of abusineas without knowing how topkctics it." 

DI:Larry D. Roberts, Command Historian, US.Army 

Engineer Centm 

Engineer 13 
14 Engineer 
Article and photos by Phil Howell 

There's a small lake, tucked 

into a remote corner of 

Fort Leonard Wood, that wears 

two faces. In the early morning, 

it looks like the kind of manmade pond you'd find on the best 

golf courses. A serene place, with 

pristine water, manicured shores, 

and a beautiful valley setting 

that would be the envy of any 

land developer. Songbirds search 

the waterline for insects, squirrels chatter in the nearby trees, 

and all is at peace with the 

world. 

Photo opposlte page: Com bat englneers (128) and bridge crewmen 

(12C)lift an aluminum balk Into the 

roadway of an M4T6 float bridge. 

Bulldlng the bridge Is part of the 

5-day Float Bridging Course at Fort 

Leonard Wood. 

Then all hell breaks loose. 

Five boats, painted military 

drab and weighing 4 tons each, are 

launched onto the water. Almost 

immediately, the calm is shattered 

by the roar of dual, 200 horse 

power diesel engines firing up in 

each craft. Pulling away from the 

dock for their test runs, they turn 

the smooth surface of the lake into 

a scene from hurricane news 

footage, sending waves crashing 

onto theshore. 

Helmeted troops hustle along 

the water's edge, guiding heavy 

trucks as they backslowly into the 

lake. Stopping about 10 feet out in 

shallow water, the trucks whine 

and creak as their motorized carriages tilt back to unload their 

cargo onto the lake surface. Each 

truck carries what looks, at first, 

like a giant, camouflaged loaf of 

'men they arrive 

at their unit, we 

want our students 

to be an immediate 

asset to the 

bridge-building 

effort." 
Students, assisted by an instructor, unloada ribbon bridge bay Into "LakeTA25OWfroma bridge 

transporter truck. 

bread. But after being dropped in 

the water and released from its 

cable, the loaf-like some monster 

Transformer toy-unfolds into 

what appears to be a floating slice 

of interstate highway. 

Untypical training, maybe. But 

a typical day in the Float Bridging 

Course at Fort Leonard Wood, the 

Army's only entry-level float 

bridge training facility for both 

Active and Reserve Component 

forces. 

Located at Training Area 250, 

the course is run by 12 instructors and 22 support personnel 

from Bravo Company, 589th Engineer Battalion. Over 3,000 soldiers a year are trained at the 

site in the fundamentals of the 

ribbon bridge, the M4T6 float 

bridge, the M4T6 fixed bridge, 

and bridge transporters. 

Soldiers attending the course 

include initial entry trainees with 

a 12B (Combat Engineer) or 12C 

Bridge Crewman) MOS, BNCOC 

(Basic NCO Course) students, 

EOBC (Engineer Officer Basic 

Course) students, Reserve and 

National Guard personnel, permanent party soldiers, and foreign 

military personnel. 

Located next to Missouri's Big 

Piney River, the T.4250 site covers 

38 acres, and was completed in 

June 1986, with the construction 

of the new man-made lake. Ribbon 

bridge training takes place on the 

lake; M4T6 float bridge construction is done on the Big Piney, and 

M4T6 fixed bridge training is conducted on earth-and-concretesites 

designed specifically for the fixed 

bridging. 

The course runs for five days, 

and is divided into the following 

blocks for initial entry trainees 

and other students needing the 

full familiarization course: 

Ribbon bridge -30.5 hours 

M4T6 float -7.5 hours 

M4T6 fixed -7 hours 

Driver's training -8 hours 

Training times vary for other 

groups, depending on the needs 

expressed by their parent units. 

While the M4T6 is no longer actively used in engineer units, and 

bridge stocks are kept in storage 

for possible wartime needs, the 

course teaches students the fundamentals of its construction. 

'The ribbon bridge replaced the 

old MAB (mobile assault bridge) 

and the M4T6 float as our primary 

assault bridges," said Sergeant 

First Class William Simmons, 

chief instructor for the course. 9ut 

since the M4T6 may be called into 

service as a follow-on bridge for 

supplytrains, westill need to teach 

soldiers how to put it up." 

16 Engineer 
The M4T6 is a jigsaw puzzle of a bridge. A giant erector set, with too many interlocking pieces that fit too 

close together. Sometimes, 

when parts are not exactly 

aligned, a sledge-hammer 

has to be used to nudge 

reluctant aluminum beams 

into position. On average, it 

takes a student class 3 and 

one-halfhours to erect about 

40 feet of M4T6 over the Big 

Piney River (a full bridge is 

not constructed to avoid 

blocking river craft). 

In a &-world bridging 

scenario, when M4T6 floats 

were still being used in daily 

operations, it would take 

about 3 and threequarter 

hours for a bridge unit to put 

up a Class 70-75 bridge 

having 53 feet of useable 

load space. And it would take 

the following assets--in addition to bridge prt.s-tn do it: 

60 men 

3 separate assembly 

sites 

Air compressor 

Crane (20-ton minimum) 

2 bridge erection boats 

7 bridge trucks 

In contrast, soldiem using 

ribbon bridging can construct 

a Class 70-75 float bridge 

with 88 feet of load space in 

20 minutes. Required assets 

include: 

B 16 men 

2 bridge erection boats 

6 ribbon bays 

8 bridge transporter trucks 

Speed and ease of construction 

don't limit the capabilities of the 

bridge, either. The ribbon bridge 

can transport anything from MI 

tanks tojeeps across water. 

Staff Sergeant Joannes Kan, left, a course instructor,teaches proper hand signals to 

a student during recovery operatlons for ribbon bridge bays. 

To prove that, and as a follow-on 

to the 5-day course, students participate in a 24-hour combined 

arms training exexise (CATEX). 

During the exercise, the* requid to construct a ribbon bridge 

during both day and night conditions. They must then successfully 

transport tanks, armored personnel 

carriers, heavy trucks, and other 

vehicles across ''Lake TA250." 

While the water isn't clear 

enough to see to the bottom, Sergeant First Class Joe Hawk, the 

TA250 site chief, assured me that 

they, "haven't lost any vehicles 

yet." In fact, the site has an excellent safety record, with no deaths, 

serious injuries, or lost vehicles 

since it opened. 

Instructors for the course are 

dedicated, a fact made obvious by 

the way they interact with the students. There is no harassment and 
------ ----- 

no impatience. Questions and mistakes are dealt with in the same 

manner: thorough explanation 

and demonstration of the proper 

. . 

technique. 

But there is also no nonsense. 

Putting up an assault float bridge 

is serious business. Both for what 

it means to the combined arms 

mission, and in terms of potential 

danger to the engineer soldiers. 

The instructors know their job. 

And they've all been where their 

students are going. 

'When they arrive at their unit, 

we want our students to be an immediate asset to the bridge-building effort," said Simmons, a 19-

year veteran of bridging. 'We want 

to give them a solid foundation of 

knowledge in the equipment 

they'll be using, so they can have 

confidence in what they're doing." 

"...at the end of the 

five days, the results 

of the quality 

at the 

site were obvious." 

Training at TA250 is normally 

conducted at skill level 10. Soldiers receive more extensive, onthe-job training once they arrive 

in their units. 

'We have the mast knowledgeable instructors in the Army," said 

Simmons. And the Army seems to 

think so, too. TA250 instructors 

were recently chosen to travel to 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Maryland, to test the Army's improved float bridge. 

Once the bridge is fielded, those 

same instructors will be the ones 

to teach other bridging engineers 

how to use it. 

'We've got quality people," said 

Sergeant First Class Willie Gee, 

~raioCompany's Bridge Branch 

Chief. 'Thev've ----" - been there. ~ ..-..~ Thev ---~

know the difficulties, the hazards. 

Most importantly, they know the 

right way tobuild a bridge. And we 

do a good job of instilling that 

knowledge in the students that 

come through the course." 

Standing back and watching 

assault bridging operations is 

kind of like watching tennis 

players compete at Wimbledonit looks easy when you're not the 

one running after the ball. 

But when you're working with 

Uslng a bridge erectlon boat, an instructor maneuvers a ribbon bridge bay Into position for connectlon to another bay. 

Students assist by placlng connecting Ilnes, and locking down connectors. 

18Engineer 
tons of steel and aluminum, unstable bank 

conditions, bad weather, 

fast/deeplcold water, impatient maneuver commanders-and then throw 

in a little extra tension 

from a fast-paced tactical 

training exercise or even 

combat-and it's a whole 

different ball game. The 

idea at TA250 is to give 

the students the knowledge they need to build 

good float bridges, and 

move men and materials 

over them. They'll learn to 

wrestle all those other alligators later. 

At the beginning of the 

five-day course I attended, students were 

nervous, unsure, or-perhaps worse-overconfident. The conversion of 

under- or over-confident 

students into knowledgeable, apprentice bridge 

builders is not an easy 

task, but one that the instructors seem to genuinely enjoy. 

Through initial driver's 

training on the bridge 

transporter trucks, familiarization with the 

bridge erection boats, and 

then instruction on the 

bridges themselves, you 

could see student attitudes becoming more 

even, more wrinkle-free. 

Leery students took on a Uslng a boat hook, a student pushes off a rlbbon bridge bay from shore during a bay 

new confidence and pride connection class. 

in their raoidlv exoand- A " A 


ing abilities with the 

equipment and techniques. during the course. duty assignments include editorAa one young bridge crewman in-chief of Special Warfare mag- Those that may have thought said to me, 'You know, I know I'm azine and public affairs officer for bridging was "easy" were not an expert on this stuff. But the John F. Kennedy Special Warbrought down (gently) a notch or thanks to the people here, I know fare Center: company commander 

two. for the 1st Special Operations I'm going to get there." w Command, radio and teleuision But at the end of the five days, broadcasting officer for the 4th the results of the quality instruc- Mt: Howell is the features editor Psychological Operations Group, tion at the site were obvious. for Engineer Professional Bulletin. and public affairs officer for the 

Without exception, the students An Anny Reseroe major, he also 5th Infantry Division. He is a 

were on sure footing when it came serves as a senior writer-instruc- graduate of Eastern New Maico 

to knowing what they were taught tor for the Engineer School. Active Universiw. 
The "1 Wonder"Years 


By Captain David A. Kramer 

There was a time not long ago 

when almost all West Point, 

ROTC, and OCS cadets who performed well in their pre-commissioning training were brought on 

active duty if they so desired. It 

seemed like such a logical process: 

the cadet wants an active duty 

career; the cadet does well in 

school, and the cadet demonstrates 

leadership potential-therefore, 

the cadet gets an active duty 

career. 

This logic held true as recently as 

two years ago when roughly 60 percent of cadets who applied for active 

duty were selected. This past year, 

however, saw a drastic reduction in 

that number. Only 2,194 cadets 

were selected out of 4,867 who asked 

for active duty-a selection rate of 

about 45 percent. Of the 262 engineer officers fortunate enough to 

he selected, only 166 were actually 

brought on active duty last year. 

The remaining 96 officers had to 

wait until this fiscalyear toreport to 

the Engineer Officer Basic Course. 

Fiscal Year 91 marked the Army's 

transition into a new era; one that I 

like to call the '7 Wonder" years. 

Uncertainty about the Army's 

strength level and structure is the 

only thing today's officers can be certain of. Reduced active duty accessions is just one of many changes 

affecting the way company grade officers look at-and plan for-their 

Army canxrs. 

The reality of a force drawdown, i along with the Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERI), has placed new 

demands on young lieutenants. 

They must quickly come to grips 

with operational assignments, institutional and self development, 

and branch qualification in order to 

lay the groundwork for successfully 

managing their careers. 

The new engineer force is already 

emerging. Fewer, smaller, CONUSbased units will be performing 

broadened missions with decreased 

resources. As a result, tour lengths 

will be carefully controlled, fewer 

key positions will be locked in, and 

there will be an increased reliance 

on officers proficient in several concentration and functional areas. 

In order to he successful, officers 

must be actively involved in the assignment process to get the right job 

at the right time. This should not be 

translated as "ticket punching," but 

as personal career management. 

Lieutenants who chart a logical 

career course from the outset will be 

successful during the intensely wmpetitive company grade years. This 

will enable them to move on to 

greater opportunities later in their 

career. 

Exercises like COBRA GOLD 

In central Thailand provide opportunities for platoon 

leaders to do combat construction work wlth englneers 

from other armies. 

.-, 


20 Engineer 
Development vs. 


Qualification 


Rtegardless of an officer's fuure career path, be it wmmand, staff or functional area, 

there are several assignments that 

form the foundation for success as a 

combat arms officer. These important, career-making johs may be 

classified either as branch dwelopment (operational assignments 

which aid in the professional 

growth of an officer), or branch 

qualification (assignments which 

must be satisfactorily completed at 

each career level in order to be considered for retention or promotion). 

The debate over which assignments aredevelopmental and which 

are qualifying will not end soon. Engineers, however, continue to maintain that an officer is branch 

qualified upon suc+ssful completion of EOBC, EOAC, and company 

command. Beyond the basic branch 

qualification at company grade 

level, there are presently no further 

qualification requirements within 

the engineers. Rather, an officer 

rises sequentially through positions 

of increasing responsibility, commensurate with the officer's quality 

of performance. However, the PO% 

sibility of establishing field grade 

qualificationstandards in the future 

is a topic of discussion within the 

Department of the Army. 

Lieutenant Time 

As a lieutenant, the engineer 

officer must become technically and tactically proficient. The 

lieutenant's goal should be to get 

leadership experience. It is important to spend as much time as psible with engineer units as a 

platoon leader and executive officer. 

The officer will gain first-hand 

knowledge of the complex combined 

arms battlefield and better understand his rule in providing support 

to the maneuver commander. 

More importantly, the officer will 

get practical experience in leading 

and training soldiers. 

While generally performing duties with 

combat and topographic engineers, it's 

beneficial for lieutenants to serve with other typesof units. With 

a variety of assignments, the officer can 

attain the broad base 

of experience engineer 

leaders require. 

Over the next few 

years the opportunities for platoon leader assignments will 

swing toward the 

divisional side with 

the activation of eight 

new ERI heavy divisional battalions. The 

60 additional engineer platoons will be 

ofiet by a reduction of 

about 75 platoons 

from corps battalions, 

12 from light battalions, and 27 from 

combat heavy battalions. Airborne, air 

assault. bridee. -. and 

topographic platoon 

A light engineer platoon leader communicates with 

helicopter suppon during a landing zone operation 

on the island of Oahu. 

opportunities remain essentially unchanged. 

When the drop in the number of 

platoons is considered in light of the 

lieutenant population reduction, the 

actual opportunity for platoon 

leader assignments increases by 

about 25 percent. Lieutenants will 

be able to spend more time in 

leadership positions that prepare 

them for all future assignments. 

Retention Time 

Manner of performance during 

,ian officer's fvst three years 

will be critical at the Lieutenant 

Retention Bod. Previously known 

as the CWRABoard, it's objective is 

to size the year grou~s so that the 

promotion opportunity to captain is 

about 95 percent. Without a retention board, year groups would have 

to undergo a reduction in force (RIF) 

as captains-prior to consideration 

for promotion to major. These bod 

will be held for year groups 89 and 

90, but will not be required after FY 

93 because adjusted accessions over 

the next two years will sustain the 

pmjected foree. 

Emphasis will continue to be 

placed on the Voluntary Early 

ReleaselRetirement Program 

(VERRP) as a tool to downsize the 

force. In FY90,445 lieutenants and 

36 captains were approved for 

separation. Of those oEoers, 37 percent were from the United States 

Military Academy, 56 percent from 

the Reserve Officer Training Corps, 

and 7 percent from Officer Candidate School. Of the 824 requests 

considered by this year's board, 65 

were engineers (41 USMA, 21 

ROTC, and 3 OCS) and all were approved. While this board serves the 
Army's purpose well, it is also the 

best time for an off~cer to make the 

decision to leave active duty. 

Captain Time 

Attendance at the Officer Advanced Course will prepare 

lieutenants and captains for that 

all-important company command 

assignment. As the final step for 

branch qualification, all engineer 

officers should actively seek command and perform well-regardless of the type of unit. 

The performance of an off~cer 

while in command is viewed as the 

most critical factor in demonstrating potential for future positions of 

additional responsibility. It is, 

therefore, directly related to promotion and retention. 

Like platoon leader positions, the 

opportunity to command a unit is expected to increase about 11percent 

over the next five years. Because of 

the addition of 20 ERI heavy 

divisional companies and several 

combat support equipment companies, the loss of 57 corps and combat heavy companies isnot nearly as 

drastic as the approximately 28 percent reduction in personnel competing for the assignments. 

The Functional Area 

Puzzle 

Buring the fifth year of active 

service. all officers reauest 

designation of a functional area. 

Depending on Army requirements, 

some engineer officers may singletrack in the engineer branch. The 

three areas of concentration, 21B, 

21C, and 21D, permit adequate assignment flexibility to accommodate single-tracking. 

For years, engineer captains were 

told that single-tracking was the 

path to success. The branch goal 

was to have 60 percent of any year 

group single-track and, in fact, last 

year over 60 percent of Year Group 

85 requested and were designated 

single track 21. 

This year, however, saw the 

philosophy regarding functional 

area designation take a major turn. 

A trend has been established to 

reduce the number of single-track 

engineers. This will result in the 

branch asking that at least 60 percent of each year group be dualtracked by M 95. 

As previously stated, the smaller 

Army of the future will place greater 

emphasis on joint and functional 

area experience with fewer pure 

21C and 21D positions. Although 

reduced, the opportunities in 

topographic, DEH, and district engineer positions will continue to provide single-tracked officers the 

diversity of assignments necessary 

for career development. 

In general, however, engineer officers should look toward the functional areas to provide the broadening opportunities for them to meet 

the Army's career development goals. 

By his fifth year, every engineer cap 

tain must assess hi previous academic and engineer experience and 

consider his future utility to the 

Army in order to correctly solve the 

functionalareapuzzle. 

Retention Time 


Revisited 


ust when most engineer officers start feeling comfortable--when thefie completed cornmand and crossed the functional 

area threshold-the potential for 

elimination rears its ugly head 

again. The Army must meet its 

mandated end strength, and to do it 

without a smart strategy would be 

disastrous. That strategy is being 

developed and the unpleasant task 

of executing it lies ahead. 

In addition to the selective early 

retirement of many field grade officers, it is inevitable that the 

population of Year Groups 81 

through 86 must be reduced further. 

Whether the reduction occurs with a 

RIF prior to the major's selection 

board, or as a result of low selection 

rates on the board, the outcome is 

the same. These year groups must 

be sized correctly in order to maintain a healthy career progression 

pyramid. While emphasis is being 

placed on maximizing voluntary 

separations, involuntary cuts will 

still be made at all levels--and not 

just for company grade officers. 

The Bottom Line 

ngineer lieutenants and cap 

tains can be enthusiastic 

about the future if they've sought 

tough assignments, demonstrated 

excellent performance in those assignments, and actively participated in personal career management. Post-company grade lie has 

no specified tracks to follow, only 

different career development assignments. The opportunities for 

field grade positions with troops 

and other equally demanding and 

rewarding jobs should increase over 

the next five years at rates similar 

to those for platoon leaders and 

company commanders. 

Schools, promotions, and command selection for all branchqualified officers is based on performance in each job assignment,not on 

rigid qualification gates in predetermined paths. Despite the uncertainty 

that pervades tows Army, quality 

officers will still be able to progress 

through varied assignments, have 

successful careers, get promoted, and 

be contributing members of the force. 

The bottom line for success will continue to be performance. y 

Captain Kmer is currently assigned to 

the Kuwaii Pmjects Office, rkcnsatlantic 

Diuiswn, U.S. Any Corps of Engineers. 

Hepreviously served as officer specialties 

coordinator for the Engineer School's 

Engineer Personnel Pmpomcy Office. 

He has aLso served as a company commander in the 31st Enp'wr Bettalion, 

civil engineer and pmject manager for 

the US.Any Engineer District in Buf 

fab, New York, and as platoon leader 

with the 79th Enmr Battalion. He is 

a gmduete of the Engineer Officers Advanced Course, the Combined Anns and 

Services Staff Sehwl, and holds a de 

gm in civil engineering fmm PennsyI. 

vania State Unwersity. 

22 Engineer 
Personul Viewpoint 


Engineers Fight As Infantry! 


By Captain Peter G. Laky 

ngineers rarely appreciate 

- Athe importance of their infantry training. Field Manual 5-

100 states that combat engineers 

have a secondary mission to fight 

as infantry. It paints in dramatic 

terms the risks to the maneuver 

commander of jeopardizing his 

engineers, and concludes that engineers usually will employ infantry tactics only as required to 

complete combat engineer missions. My experience in the Gulf 

War, however, taught me that 

our secondary mission is not so 

remote. Because of the speeds at 

which we maneuver and move 

logistics about the non-linear 

AirLand Battlefield, combat engineer units are more likely than 

ever before to receive infantry 

missions. 

I believe we need to reassess the 

importance of close combat skills 

in engineer doctrine and unit 

training programs. To test proficiency,I recommend that combat 

engineer companies and Engineer 

Restructure Initiative battalions 

be trained and observed on at least 

one infantry mission during each 

combat training center rotation. 

Based on my experience, I believe 

it's time to re-evaluate the combat 

engineers' role as infantry in combined arms operations. 

L)t.st.rl Orgunizatior~. The 

5th Engineer Battalion supported 

the 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry 

Division (mechanized) during 

Desert ShieldiStorm. My company spent months integrating 

into an infantry battalion task 

force, conducting combined arms 

breach training and live fire training. Prior to combat, the brigade 

organization was changed to four 

engineer companies (three 

wheeled, one mechanized) to support three maneuver task forces. 

My company was designated as a 

brigade asset. 

After the war started, however, 

we were given infantry missions,in 

turn, to dig in on-line with infantry 

in a defensive battle pcsition, to 

pmvide a reaction security force to 

brigade and division trains, and to 

conduct mounted and dismounted 

security patrols for the brigade tactical command prrjt VAC) during 

an attack into the Euphrates River 

Valley and Basra. 

Mission. I - Perim~ler 

Defense. The first mission arose 

from a threat to division aviation 

elements when the 24th Infantry 

Division deployed from central 

Saudi assembly areas to the Iraqi 

border. Due to a shortage of heavy 

equipment transporters, the 24th 

Aviation Brigade preceded the 

mechanized brigades. Iraqis suddenly began mortaring Saudi border stations during the deployment, which led to the first 

shootingcontactbetweenU.S. and 

Iraqi forces. 

Concern6d for the security of 

aviation assets, the division commander deployed that part of an 

infantry task force movable with 

organic trucks and my entire 

wheeled engineer company. We 

i quickly established a defensive 

perimeter around the helicopter 

i 	 companies. A platoon from our engineer company was formally 

reorganized as infantry and attached to the infantry task force. 

They dug in with M60 machine 

guns, M67 rocket launchers, borrowed SAWS, M203 rocket launchers, and a mortar fire plan. Using 

a plan straight out of the Engineer 

Officer Basic Course primer, the 

platoon leader tied in his fire plan 

with infantry dismounts on the 

left and dismounted TOW launchers on the right. He then con. 

ducted observation post drills and 

patrols while the enemy remained 

across the border. 

Mission 2- Tactical Re~ponse 

Force. The second mission was 

done in conjunction with a route 

marking mission for the brigade 

and division trains. We were to 

protect the forward support battalion and other support elements 

from levels I and I1threats, enemy 

squads, platoons and companies, 

until mechanized infantry could 

provide additional support if required. Maneuver forces had been 

instructed not to hold up the advance for anything less than a full 

enemy platoon. My platoons spent 

many days and nights rehearsing 

mounted and dismounted movement to contact and the rapid 

preparation of a dismounted 

blocking position. 

During the attack into Iraq, one 

of my platwns cleared a bunker 

complex at night. The NCOs in 

this platoon later reported that 

their infantry training was inadequate to prepare the squads for 

the harrowing experience of 

maneuvering in darkness through 

a honeycomb of bunkers and holes. 

They were well armed with AT-45, 

bunker busters, grenades, and 

(continued on 34) 
Remarks By Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, 

Army Chief of Staff 

To the Senior Engineer Leader Training Conference 


Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 


April 23, 1992 


I	t is a dist~nct pleas~re war0 to meet the 

to be here a1 Fort demanos of the future. 

Leonard Wood today-the 

home of the United States 

Corps of Engineers-and 

to address your annual 

conference. I'm especially 

impressed by the title of 

your conference. It shows 

me that you have internalized the fact that training 

is what binds this Total 

Army together. And training-focusing on being 

trained and readyis 

what will see us through 

the challenging times 

ahead. Your agenda clearly reflects the fact that you 

are focusing on training 

and warfighting. This is 

precisely the right target. 

Yours is the fourth in a 

series of branch conferences that I have addressed over the past 

month or so. In each 

case, I have laid out 

some challenges to the 

leaders of the branch. 

Today, I'll be talking to 

you about moving forAnd how we will work 

together to achieve the 

vision and deliver 

decisive victory when we 

are called by the 

American people. 

Iwill start by telling you 

a little about the challenges Iface as chief of staff. 

These challenges focus on 

ensuring the Army as a 

whole can deliver decisive 

victory into the 21st century. Then I have some 

points for you as combined arms leaders and 

those of you in the district 

engineer community. We 

will shift focus, but the 

theme is the Sam* 

decisive victory. I will wrap 

up by looking at what I call 

the essence of the Army. 

My Challenges As 

CSA 

I	am sure it is clear to 

everyone here that the 

24 Engineer 
the nextdecade, we can expect that the strategic environment will be dynamic, 

uncertain and unstable. 

No one here could have 

predicted the events of the 

past several years: the fall 

of the Berlin Wail, Operations Just Cause and 

Desert ShieldIDesert 

Storm, the dissolution of 

the Soviet Union, the 

withdrawal of all Army tactical nuclear weapons. 

What's next? I don't know. 

We can't predict. 

This environment causes 

us to place a premium on 

balance--the ability to 

respond to the unexpected. 

theunpredictable. we want 

to be positioned like the racquet ball player-in the 

middle of the court, on the bails of his feet, ready for 

the next play. We must balance the competing 

demands for continuity and change. On one hand, 

we must maintain sufficient continuity to keep the 

momentum of the great, battle-testedArmy we have 

today. On the other hand is the need to change the 

Army to fit the new world. As we balance continuity 

and change, we must remember the first rule of wing 

walking-never let go with both hands at the same 

time. 

Today, we are building toward a vision of America's 

future Army. in an unstable world, this vision is our 

beacon. It is our common expectation of what the 

Army of the 21st century will be. Our vision is: a 

Total Force, trained and ready to fight; serving 

America at home and abroad, and a strategic force 

capable of decisive victory. There is a lot of substance in that vision statement. Listen carefully to 

these points: 

Total Force: Balanced blend of Active, Army 

Reserve, Army National Guard, and civilianseach with unique strengths. 

Trained and ready to fight Our reason for 

being. We have the fundamental choice to trade 

force structure for readiness. What we keep will 

be trained and ready. 

Serving America: Defined in many diverse 

ways over our 217 years; today there are 11,000 

soldiers serving America in over 55 countries, 

not counting forward-deployed forces. Many of 

those are engineers performing peace-time 

engagement missions to foster peace. But, in 

the event that peaceful efforts fail, we ultimately 

exist to fight and win America's wars. 

Strategic: Based mainly here in the United 

States, but deployable worldwide. The Army signifies America's ultimate commitment. 

m Decisive victory: America's Army, as part of 

the joint team, can accomplish national objectives quickly, with minimum loss of life on [both] 

sides, and with minimum expenditure of national 

wealth and resources. This is the new standard. 

America does not want protracted, attrition warfare. In Just Cause and Desert Storm, we 

demonstrated that we can fight at a level our opponents can't handle. Everyone in this room has 

a role to play in ensuring we remain capable of 

decisive victory. And that includes, incidentally, 

the district engineer community. Consider the 

case of the Middle East-Africa Project Office 

(MEAPO) during Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm-the first and only people on the 

ground at the start of the crisis; a massive contracting effort that followed; representing a very 

important and visible role in contingency 

operations. 

The Army's strategy to achieve our vision has four 

elements--maintain the edge, reshape the force, provide resources, and strengthen the Total Force. Iam 

sure you are familiar with these. The key to maintaining our wariighting edge is keeping the six 

Engineer 25 
imperatives in balance. This is where you warfighters 

come in. I'll talk more about this in a minute. 

These are some of the means that will allow us to 

direct and control change as we reshape the Army. 

Training is the most important piece of the equation. 

We must continue to stay on the playing field, balancing our resources to ensure that our soldiers are 

prepared to fight and win. As General Franks 

(TRADOC commander) will mention to you tomorrow, 

we are rapidly moving forward on updating our 

doctrine in FM 100-5to reflect the entire range of effort-from mobilization, to deployment, to fighting and 

winning in joint and combined warfare. 

Louisiana Maneuvers is an umbrella concept for a 

series of netted simulations that will move us into the 

21st century as a power proiection Army. You are all 

familiar with the ~otal ~rm~ huality concept. Part of 

our efforts to remain a high-performing organization 

relates to our efforts to improve and streamline our 

operations. The Corps of Engineers has been a 

leader in employing many of the principles embodied 

in this concept. 

In the future, our Active and Resetve Components 

will be working together even more closely. We have 

learned a great deal over the past year and a half 

about how we can strengthen the Total Force. 

FORSCOM's Bold Shift initiatives, which General 

Burba (FORSCOM commander) will outline to you 

this afternoon, will help to enhance the integration 

and readiness of RC units. The first operational readiness exercises (ORES) have been conducted. This 

summer annual training is restructured to focus on 

26 Engineer 

we are making. My missage during the recent 

Congressional hearings was that we must maintain 

the steady pace of the restructuring. 

This is how I view the Army. Again, balance is the 

key. You here at the Engineer School and those of 

you in engineer districts are in the institution pillar. 

Those of you from units are in the center. Our soldiers--how they are developed and the values they 

share--comprise the third pillar of our Army. I have 

discussed the challenges we face at the Department 

of the Army level. I want to shift focus now to your 

challenges as America's combat leaders. There are a 

number of similarities between your battlefields and 

mine. Both are complex, dynamic and unpredictable. 

Both require a clear vision. Both demand that we 

focus on a few key tasks 

Your Challenge As Combined Arms 


Leaders 


Ibelieve this is the challenge you face--whether 

you are working here in the school, in an engineer 

district, or are out in a unit. You must contribute to 

decisive victory by improving the integration of combined arms on the modern battlefield. We can't maintain the edge and deliver decisive victory by resting 

on our laurels. We must improve. 0ur.soldiers and 

our nation expect us to remain the best This challenge is your link to the Army's vision statement. As 

engineers, you deliver decisive victory on the battlefield as one of the basic elements of the warfighting team. 
What's the problem? Several factors diminish our 

ability to synchronize combined arms. The complexity 

of the battlefield has increased, while the commander's tools to command and control that battlefield have not improved proportionately. Also, we 

Americans tend to be process-oriented, not objectiveoriented. We often get hung up on how to do something, rather than where we are headed. 

In the wake of our successes in Panama and the 

desert, some might ask: why change anything? 

Don't fix something that is not broken. My answer is 

that we must improve in part because of our great 

successes. Potential adversaries around the world 

watched and learned from our victories of the past 

several years. Our warfighting edge is only relative to 

a specific enemy at a specific time. Each situation is 

unique. It would be foolhardy to extrapolate from our 

past successes to future conflicts. We must improve 

because others are improving. 

Furthermore, the dynamic world situation ensures 

that for America's Army, the battlefield factors of 

METT-T are less predictable today than at any time 

over the past 40 years. For America's Army, there are 

no longer established GDP plans. This uncertain 

world requires increased flexibility on the battlefield. 

Finally, we must continue to look critically at our 

abilities and aim to improve. I believe that one of the 

single most important innovations of the past 20 

yearsand one of the keys to our edge today-is the 

after-action review. The AAR provides us an honest 

appraisal of our performance and directs our efforts 

to correct shortcomings. In a very broad sense, what 

I am doing here today is holding an AAR on our 

abilitv ~~~ ~, to inteorate com- ~ ~-2 -~~ -~~..

bined arms. There is room 

for improvement. 

Part of the problem with 

integrating combined arms 

is that the modern battlefield is chanaino. We 

three dimensions-space, 

speed and time. Today, 

the cube is expanding 

rapidly. Thanks to advanced technology, combat operations today take 

place in larger areas 

(greater width, depth and 

altitude), more rapidly and 

more continuously than 

ever before in the history 

of warfare. The.com. 

mander must control his 

sector of zone in all three 

of these dimensions. Enemy and friendly actions 

(both maneuver and fires) take place on the ground 

and in the air, and across the electro-magnetic 

spectrum at an astonishing rate. The overall effect of 

this expanding battlefield is greatly increased complexity for the commander. 

The commander has command and control tools 

that are designed to help him cope with this complex 

battlefield. The purpose of these tools is to assist the 

commander in focusing combined arms combat 

power at the decisive place and time--while both the 

place and time are constantly changing. This is a tall 

order to fill. 

General Hal Moore--when commanding 1st 

Squadron, 7th Cavalry at la Drang in 1965--summarized the commander's task in the form of three 

questions: What is happening? What is not happening? How can I influence the action? This is never 

easy-given the friction and fog of war-but today it 

is even more difficult. 

The problem we face today is that our command 

and control tools have not kept up with the increasing complexity of the battlefield. When I visited 

General Franks in the Gulf, he showed me the Blackhawk he used as a mobile command post during the 

war. What I saw inside was not unlike command 

posts I have seen since entering the Army 30 years 

ago-a map mounted on plywood and covered with 

plexiglass: acetate overlays attached with green 

tape; grease pencils in a can; a bottle of alcohol and 

a rag; a clipboard; a styrofoam cup with cold coffee. 

The only items that were new were the kevlar 

helmets and the commercial bottled water. 
Our command and control tools are lagging behind 

the expansion of the battlefield. 

The evidence for this observation comes from our 

combat training centers (CTCs). Here are several 

trends: 

Plans tend to be overly complex. 

m The intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

(IPB) is done well initially, but then lags behind 

as events unfold--and becomes increasingly irrelevant. 

m Combat assets often are not synchronized for 

overwhelming effect. This applies across diiferent types of forces (armored, light, special 

operations) within the same command, as well 

as across all the battlefield operating systems 

(BOS). Of particular concern, we must continue 

to completely integrate the engineer into the 

planning process, and on the ground where the 

breaches are conducted and the obstacles 

emplaced. 

Our ability to maintain the momentum we requir+mobilificis a product of engineer effort 

at the breach and along the MSRs. Our ability to 

prevent the enemy from integrating his combat 

power-countemobili~omes from the integration of maneuver, fires, and obstacles to 

support the commander's scheme of maneuver. 

Even the most elegant obstacle plans fail to 

achieve their objective when they are not firmly 

integrated into the maneuver commander's 

mindset. 

Finally, our ability to 

protect our combat assets--survivabiliQdepends on your 

ability to control and 

prioriiize limited assets to protect those 

systems and control 

nodes most vital to 

the fight. When engineer effort isn't 

synchronized, it represents piecemeal commitment of combat 

power-that is, violation of the principle of 

mass. This is evident 

at all levels above 

platoon-where every 

leader is a combined 

arms integrator. 

The CTCs report that 

we are becomina oredictable in our concepts of operations and schemes of maneuver 

and fires. The indirect approach that robs the 

enemy of the initiative is not frequently seen. 

Engineers are central to solving some of these 

problems. You are the key to ensuring that combat power is applied at the right place and the 

right time. But we have to be faster and much 

more agile. We have to synchronize to overwhelm the enemy. 

It is important to put these comments in perspective. We are the best army on the face of this planet. 

No one can touch us today. Our edge is decisive. 

When the National Training Center opened years 

ago, units trained there at the high school level of 

training. Today we are in graduate school at the 

CTCs. But remember: our challenge is to maintain 

that edge. And that means improving. That is the challenge i give you today. 

How can we improve? I have organized my 

thoughts around three themes: expectations, 

priorities, and mental agility. I will spend a few 

minutes on each. 

My first point is that we must develop shared expectations within units. This is important both in our 

combat plans and in execution. It takes time to build 

shared expectations. Therefore, much of what i offer 

here is work for home station. When plans and actions within the unit are readily understood and even 

anticipated, the result will be increased ability to deal 

with the unexpected on the battlefield. Operations 

within the unit must become second nature so that 

28 Engineer 
we can focus more on the variables over which we 

have little control (the weather, the terrain, the 

enemy). 

The first key to common expectations in plans and 

orders is a clear, concise commander's intent. This is 

the vision of what the end state of the operation is to 

be, and why the operation is being conducted. The 

sooner this intent is known by all, the sooner the unit 

begins to move toward a common goal. 

The commander's intent must be based on a common understanding of the enemy. This is not only the 

business of the S-2. The commander must visualize 

what the enemy can do before he can visualize how 

to defeat him. 

A clear commander's intent empowers subordinates to take independent actions toward the unit's 

objective. This is especially important when, in the 

course of the battle, fleeting opportunities occur that 

can be seized with decisive effect if subordinates 

demonstrate appropriate initiative. Our subordinates 

are capable of such action if they understand what is 

appropriate. The commander's intent tells them. 

The intent also serves to focus all the elements of 

the unit on the same end. All elements are 

synchronized to contribute to the unit's objective. 

There is a unity of effort. 

The second way to build shared expectations in 

plans and orders is to keep them simple. We can 

defeat ourselves before the battle even begins if our 

plans are complex, requiring multiple intricate steps 

and flawless timing. Simple plans are relatively easy 

to communicate and more readily understood when 

received. 

Third, we can promote 

Common expectations during execution build upon 

effective plans and orders. Beyond that, the key to execution is to master the basics. The building blocks 

for battlefield success are effective small units 

crews, squads, platoons. Drills, playbooks, and SOPS 

are developed and honed to a razor's edge at home 

station using the crawl-walk-run methodology. Basic 

skills such as boresighting, constructing fighting positions, and target acquisition must be mastered before 

battles can be won. This focus on small unit basics is 

the science of warfighting. 

A second requirement for more effective battlefield 

execution is to have cohesive teams among small 

units and staffs. Such teams know each other so 

well, that when the unexpected occurs, their 

response is clearly understood-and nearly automatic. Cohesive teams also provide the internal support 

built on trust and confidence that see small units 

through the toughest battlefield challenges. 

To take this logic one step further, a unit is essentially a team made up of smaller teamsa 'Yearn of 

teams." By this I mean that we are first grouped by 

basic function (tankers, engineers, medics), then put 

together in multi-functional units (company teams, task 

forces, brigades) of increasing size. The unit 

commander's job is to get all these teams working 

together in harmony. He must know whose team he is 

on-and who is on his team. He can't build an effective 

unit if he doesn't know. 

Engineers are on the maneuver commander's 

team throughout an operation. If engineer planning is 

too important to be left to engineers, then it is equally 

true that maneuver cannot be left solely to 
infantrymen and tankers. Engineer planning and 

operations and maneuver must fit together hand-inglove. This is the responsibility of commanders and 

staffs, and even the schools. And engineers must 

remain flexible--despite the Engineer Restructure lnitiative and the habitual associations it fosters, the 

fact is that engineers will always be used to weight 

the effort where they are needed, and they must be 

able to work with teams that are not fixed. 

The same is true of the district engineer, who is a 

member of many teams--the Corps of Engineers, the 

communities and geographical areas they serve, and 

possibly the CINC's team if they have presence in an 

overseas area of concern during response to a crisis. 

There are new dimensions of responsibility for those 

of you in districts that were not effectively tapped 

prior to Desert Storm, but will be in the future. 

The second point I want to make about improving 

battlefield integration is that we must do a better job 

of setting priorities. If any single lesson comes 

through over and over again from the CTCs, it is that 

units that fail to focus their resources-fail. We must 

learn that perfect is the enemy of good. This applies 

especially during the planning phase when long orders with a dozen annexes and too-long rehearsals 

eat up preparation time of subordinates and ensure 

that critical tasks are not accomplished. 

Priorities are also key to execution. We often fail to 

follow up on priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), 

or fail to integrate engineer intelligence into the R&S 

plan. Sometimes we disperse our fires rather than 

mass. Too often we fail to hit the enemy with the 

majority of our power at the critical point. 

Commanders get paid to determine the critical 

tasks, then ensure these are accomplished. What 

must be done well? It might be the wargaming 

process of the estimates process. It might be the 

recon and rehearsal of a particularly key element of 

the plan, perhaps the commitment of the reserve. It 

might be the firing of a FASCAM target group on a 

high-speed avenue of approach. It might be the completion and overwatch of the key obstacle. 

Whatever the critical tasks, the commander energizes his unit by identifying them, focusing on them, 

and then positioning himself when he can influence 

the action. 

My last point on how to improve combined arms integration is that we must develop mental agility. 

Since the physical tools of command and control 

have now developed as fast as the battlefield has expanded, we must compensate by being better 

capable of dealing with the unexpected. Our best tool 

for doing this is the commander himself. Not some 

high performance machine. 

I believe it is part of the American character to look 

for the technological answer to complex problems. 

This approach leads us to focusing on the process 

rather than the objective. We tend to become more 

concerned with how the task is accomplished, rather 

than how the task contributes to the overall objective. 

We have all fallen victim to the 100-slide quarterly 

training brief and the Bhour rock drill. 

Procedures have a place, but the down side is 

that they tend to become dogmatic and out-ofdate. Procedures are generic and do not account 

for the specifics of a particular situation. It is all 

too easv to fall into the 

I 	 trap of believing that 

the mission will be accomplished if only we 

can issue the most 

detailed order, conduct 

the most complete rehearsal, and complete 

properly the decision 

support template (DST). 

Orders, rehearsals, and 

DSTs are only toolsthey are necessary but 

not sufficient to win. We 

must stay focused on 

the obiective. If we qet 

- hung ;p on the 

process, we will often 

miss the imaginative approach that can prove 

decisive. 

Developing mental 

agility can be trained. 
should be confronted with 

unanticipated turns of 

events-both positive 

and negative--that cause 

them to react. 

An aspect of mental 

agility is recognizing 

when a plan has outlived 

its utility and requires 

major modification. This 

usually occurs not long 

after contact is made with 

the enemy. Commanders 

must beware of being so 

fixated on their plansometimes because of 

pride of authowhip-that 

they fail to recognize 

when it is time to change. 

Here, the executive officer (sewing as secondin-command) and subordinate commanders can play 

an important role in giving the commander 

feedback. 

Let me give you an example of what I mean. 

Several months ago, the 10lst Airborne conducted 

an air assault exercise. Apaches were first on the objective and recognized that enemy locations differed 

from the intelligence template. They relayed this real 

time intelligence to the task force commander who 

was already enroute with the assault ships. He adjusted his assault plan and issued new orders. The 

assault was precise and effective. That is mental 

agility. 

Another case in point is Patton's ability to 

counterattack against the Bulge in 1944. He was 

agile enough to turn the Third Army 90 degrees and 

hit the German advance in the flank. 

This Is really art, not science. Building such instincts takes years of preparation and practice. The 

key is that we develop in ourselves and our subordinates the ability to recognize acceptable risks and 

take them. We can do this by rewarding innovation in 

our schools, in garrison, and in the field. The time to 

start is now. 

As you progress through your conference, I ask 

you to think about many of the themes i have mentioned this morning, and some of the issues that will 

be important to the Corps of Engineers in the coming 

years. Ask yourself how you can best integrate your 

essential capabilities into the fight, to include the 

capabilities of your combat, topographic, and heay 

units--as well as your district offices and project offices. Discuss the modernization efforts, roles and 

missions that support our overall vision for the Army. 

Ask yourself how you can better assist in our efforts to integrate the RC and to train them to the 

readiness level required in the next war. Ask yourself how you can improve your methods of training 

to make them more realistic-and more economical. 

Demo effects simulators are an excellent example 

of that concept, and the potential is there for more 

such ideas. As engineers, you are an important part 

of the combined arms team-in peace and in warand a key element of the formula to achieve 

decisive victory. 

Those are my points on improving the integration 

of combined arms. I hope I have given you some 

food for thought. 

Summary 

These are challenging times for all of us. Just as 

the international environment is changing fast, 

so too is the modern battlefield changing. When challenges arise, soldiers look to their leaders. This is a 

time for leadership. 

When we opened the NTC a decade ago, we 

didn't know where it would lead us. Today, we are a 

much better Army, but there is still room for 

improvement. 

We must remain fixed on one standard--protect 

and defend the Constitution and the Republic. Provide decisive victory when the nation calls. m 

Engineer 31 
By Captain James Dawkins 

When attacking maneuver forces are waiting for 

supporting engineers to clear 

obstacles, "time on target" be- Tall 

comes critical. The less time you 

spend preparing demolition charges on the target site, the less 

your soldiers are exposed to 

enemy fire, and the faster the attacking force can move through 

the breach. 

Priming charges in a rear safe 

area is one way to reduce time on 

the target site. This is especially 

true if the breach is to be conducted under chemical attack conditions. Since charges should not 

be transported with caps in them, 

detonating cord can be used in- Det cord prlmlng of bangalore 

stead. FM 5-25, Explosives and 

Demolitions, pages 2-23 and 2-24, wraps may pinch the ban- Save time by connecting the 

and its replacement, FM 5-250, galore tube without detonat- primed charges to the line main 

pages 2-13 and 2-14, outline the ing it. or ring main. Det cord clips work 

use of detonating cord with both well in normal conditions, 

C-4 and TNT Abangalore torpedo Det cord wrap start at provided you have them. Howmay also be primed with det cord. the edge of the bevel, ever, trying to clip in while wearThe inset shows the proper use working toward the center of ing a chemical mask and gloves 

of detonating cord in priming a the tube. This ensures that is difficult at best. Additionally, 

bangalore torpedo, ~h~ following the booster is covered by the the traditional girth hitch with 

cautions should be noted: cord. an extra turn is difficult and time 

n Use eight wraps only - more rn When counting wraps of det consuming--even without chemical gear. 

wraps may cut the bangalore cord on the bangalore, count Several knots have been 

without detonating it; fewer on the side opposite the knot. developed to connect branch 

32 Engineer 
lines to the line main or ring 

main. These knots are easily attached-even in full chemical 

gear. The first of these is the 

cherry knot: 

(1) Make three bights in a 

piece of det cord. There should be 

approximately 36-48 inches of det 

cord for this knot. 

(2) Tightly wrap the free end 

of the det cord four times around 

all three bights. Pull the third 

bight down tightly on the free end 

of the last wrap. Ensure the standing end adjusts the outer bight. 

(3) Fold the lower bight forward over the wraps and tape it in 

place. Adjust bights before taping. 

(4) Place the line main between the two bights of the cherry 

knot. Insert the lower bight into 

the upper bight, capturing the line 

main. Close the cherry knot by 

pulling down on the standing end, 

while holding onto the lower bight. 

The next technique is the 

Gregory knot. It's similar to the 

cherry knot, but requires no 

tape: 

(1) Make four bights in a piece 

of det cord. Loops formed by the 

bights should be 4 to 6 inches in 

diameter. Squeeze the two bottom 

loops to form tight bights. 

(2) Make four to six wraps with 

the running end toward the bottom. Feed the running end 

through both of the bottom loops. 

(3) Hold the wraps and pull 

each of the top loops to secure the 

knot. 

(4) Place det cord between both 

loops, place the moving loop over 

the stationary loop. Grasp the stationary loop or wraps and pull the 

standing end to complete the 

connection. 

The last technique for connecting branch lines to line mains or 

ring mains is the Scanman knot. 

This knot is effective and requires 

less det cord than either the cherry or Gregory knots: 

(I) Tie knot as shown. 

Engineer 33 
(2) Tighten the knot but not 

the loop. 

(3) Thread the running end 

over the det cord and through the 

loop. Pull the standing end and 

tighten the loop. The free end 

should cross the det cord, which is 

held securely by the loop. The knot 

should have a minimum 6-inch 

tail after being secured. 

Connections should be at 90-

degree angles to prevent an 

angle cutoff failure. 

Take care when using det cord 

in arctic conditions. At low 

temperatures, the det cord's covering becomes stiff and may crack 

when bent. 

Time will always be critical for 

engineers supporting maneuver 

forces. However, safety should not 

be sacrificed for speed. 

The techniques outlined in this 

article will decrease the time required to set up and tie in charges. 

The key is for units to train hard to 

ensure successful, safe missions. 

w 

Captain Dawkins is a demolitions instructor for the Engineer School. He 

previously served us commander of 

Headquarters Company, JTF-Brwo, 

Honduras. He is a gmduate of the Engineer Officer Advanced Course and 

Combined Ans and Services Staff 

School. A graduate of Wlchita State 

University, he is also a certified 

blaster in Missouri. 

ultiple hi 

ts shki 

unch Reek 

ng overhe . -

We were 

dismount 

and to dee ..,. 

ismounte 

to flush 

rers and

.. 

to pmvid 

ed securi 

I* all ta .I 1. 

ad offerec 

(Personal Viewpointcontinued) 

automatic weapons. But they lacked confidence in such infantry 

skills as fire and support, and 

keeping track of cleared areas and 

friendly units, problems often associated with urban terrain. Although the mission was successful, the NCOs knew they were 

lucky that the enemy h I 

little resistance. 

Mission 3 - SecurZtj . mad Post. Our las~II~~PLL~L~ 

mission came when the 24th Infantry Division began to destroy 

Iraqi forces along Highway 8. We 

task such 

lex at nigl 

believe a -. 

Leasons Learned. Aftsr the 

oease fire, I Ion how fm 

tunate we had been. Fortunate that 

the Iraqis we met generally put up 

little resistance.Fortunate that we 

had a foundation of inEvltry skillsto 

draw upn to ammplish our missions. For example, pmammbioning and basic officer training ad* 

quately p~pd platmn leaders for 

simple infantry &ioq such as 

the perimeter defense. The NCO 

schools had tau& my -ts the 

fundamentals of squad fue and 

maneuver But neither leaders nor 

soldiers were prepared for a oompli-

-

i 

11 for arti 

lat our in 

f most en , . 

cated 

comp 

ful, I 

P hard k 

st a more 

restricte 

:.. At. m. 

had just finished marking the 

route to Highway 8when the intel 

ligence net reported that an Iraq 

asclearing a bunker 

ht. Although successre were inadequately 

Iraqi equipmeni not destioyed by 

the colonel. Although we executed 

our incoming artillery battle drill, 

the potent trailers escaped any 

direct hits, and the Iraqi infantry 

had little stomach left for fighting. 

Republican Guards force was 

careening headlong toward our 

brigade. I put the company into a 

security laager on the road and 

Captain Laky is pursuing a 

masters degree in nuclear engineering at Universiw of Missouri-

~~a~ H~ eomanded ~~l~ cornpany, 5th Engineer Battalion, 

during tk Gulf War. 

p~* to partiCrpate in clcee comht in the middle of the combined 

arms fight. For example, had the 

enemy fought more mivek I 

began coordinating a 1 would have had poor communicamission with the S-3. tion with armor and infantry units 

Dawn bmke to the dwenmg roar on my flank, and virtually no ability 

of Mi Uery fire.And I wiU 

mke fantry skills are typicolumns ot movlng Iraqi ultantq lgineer companies in 

When the brigade commander, 

Colonel John LeMoyne, drove psst, 

he paused and in his own words, 

was "thrilled to discover an engineer company available to me." 

Colonel LeMoyne ordered us to 

move in immediately behind the 

TAC. 1 

and B 

TAC I, 

and arnuery on me nlgnway mat 

'Be didn't get fmt " 

Our 14 lumbering dump trucks, 

dragging bolster trailers loaded 

with thousands of pounds of explosives, fell into Colonel 

LeMoyne's fiery caravan. At halts 

we d d and patmlled the 

area Iraqi soldiers from 

bunk culverts. On the 

move we mew UD the few Diems of 

mySHpmY

My maneuver commanders did 

not hesitate to use engineers in an 

infantry role. They assessed our 

firepower and engineer mission, 

and decided we could best influence the battle as infantry. 

They expected us to have the infantry skills required to exploit 

the capabilities of our firepower. I 

contend that our engineer doctrine 

should reflect those expectations. 

'Ib "fight as infantry" is not an 

unlikely mission for future engineers. Thus, thecombat training 

centers should re-evaluate the 

combat engineers' role as infantry 

before we leal wons in a 

conflict againr h tenacious 

foe, in more d terrain, 

than we faced in cne uulf. 
You have been tasked to re-grade an existing road section to protect a pipeline and provide 

drainage. 

The new grades form a new point of vertical intersection (PVI) at station 16 + 00, with an 

elevation of 1011 .OO feet. The new centerline passes over a 6-inch, high pressure, natural gas 

line at station 15 + 20. The top of the pipeline is at elevation 1017.00. 

G = 8.6% 

%

G = 4.0% 

PVI 16+00 

I ELEV 101 1.00 

You are to determine: 

1. The length of the vertical curve required to clear the pipeline, with 4 feet of minimum 


cover at the road centerline. 


2. The low point on the curve, where a culvert may be located. 

3. The centerline grades for surveyors to use for staking purposes. 

Hints for success: 

a Draw a sketch of the vertical cutve. 

m Locate the position of the pipeline In relation to the grade line. 

References: 

TM 5-330 and various civilian surveying or route location publications. 

Note: FM 5-430, scheduled for publication in the 2nd quarter of FY 1993, will replace 

TM 5-330 and include additional design information. 

ENGINEER Solution on page 51. I 

Enginee 
Maintaining Mobility With A 


Treadway Road 


By Major Thomas J. Kelly 

utting a bridge across 

a river is no guarantee 

that supported forces 

will be able to continue 

a successful offense. 

The 44th Engineer Combat Battalion (Corps) confronted just such 

a situation in Korea during Team 

Spirit 91. Two brigades of armor 

and mechanized infantry of the 

2nd Infantry Division had just 

crossed a river, and had the opposing forces on the run. 

But division units were getting 

short on food, fuel, and '%bullets." 

The 2nd Engineer Battalion had 

built a ribbon bridge acroas the 

river, and the division's supply 

trains began moving toward the 

crossing site. The first HEMMT 

(heavy-expanded mobility tactical 

truck), loaded with badly needed 

supplies for the brigades, rolled 

onto the farmer's field that 

separated the MSR (main supply 

route) from the crossing site. 

Less than halfway across, the 

truck became hopelessly mired in 

mud over its axles. It was obvious 

that nothing with wheels could get 

to the bridge site. An approach 

road was needed-and fast--or 

opposing forces would regroup and 

"destroy" the division's two 

brigades on the other side of the 

river. 

The Korean terrain poses special 

challenp for ming operations. 

The couneide is extremely mountainous with highly compartmentalized mobility corridom. Many rivers 

and streams restrict or impede 

movement, and most suitable crossing sites have poor am and 

egress mutes. Farmland covers 

mcst useable rural terrain. And 

since rice is the primary crop, most 

of the farming areas have been 

designed to trap and hold water. 

This make movement for wheeled 

vehicles diicult or impossible. 

36Engineer 
The crwing site was separated 

from the MSR by about 300 meters 

of farm field. TOreach the site, the 

2nd Engineer Battalion had driven 

their ribbon bridge trucks along a 

tractor path. This was done with 

great difftculty, and the trucks 

heavily rutted the path a m the 

field. This,combined with a steady 

rain, made the field impassable to 

further wheeled -c. 

The 44th'~ major challenge was 

to quickly upgrade the access road 

across the field, and the battalion 

started bringing in fill material 

from the river banks. The material 

found in mwt Korean riverbeds 

makes excellent road base material. However, the haul capabilities of the unit's 5-ton dump 

trucks were limited, and scoop 

loaders and dump trucks were 

needed elsewhere in the division 

area. The S-3 estimated it would 

take a week to upgrade the mad, 

but the tactical situation allowed 

only three days to get the job done. 

The battalion commander 

learned of a large quantity of lumber in the division support area, 

and directed the battalion staff to 

develop a plan for a corduroy road. 

The battalion 5-4 immediately inventoried the available lumber, 

and the staff assembled to determine a suitable road design. 

Based on the materials and time 

available, we immediately recognized that the treadway road 

design on page 2-20 of FM 5-34 

was an ideal solution. The treadway road required much less 

material and work effort than a 

corduroy road. And since most of 

the lumber sizes required were 

available in the division's lumber 

storage yard, only minor modifications would have to be made to the 

FM 5-34 design. Additionally, almost no extra lumber would have 

to be cut. The staff recommended 

the treadway solution to the battalion commander, and he told the 

unit to go with it. 

The S-4 took charge of moving 

materials to the crossing site, 

Plan 

4" X 10" x 12-16' 

Cross Section 

- A 

-.% =.-, 

FM 5-34 plan for "plank tread road." The 44th modified these specifications for 

their own mission. 

which was located about three 

hours from the division storage 

area. Working through the night, 

he coordinated movement of the 

battalion's cargo HEMM% and 

forklifts to the division lumber 

storage yard. The cargo HEMMTs 

were well suited for delivering the 

materials. They could be easily 

loaded by forklift with palletized 

lumber, and had their own cranes 

for off-loading. This proved to be 

invaluable at the crossing site because of the limited maneuvering 

space and lack of other materialhandling equipment. 

The S-4 configured each 

HEMMT load so that it carried 

all required materials for 25 

meters of treadway road. This 

enabled our one on-site company 

to begin building complete sections of road as soon as the first 

truck reached the site. It also 

speeded up construction, since 

loaded trucks could be driven out 

to the end of already completed 

treadway road, and unloaded for 

further construction. 

Charlie Company, the on-site 

unit, had only one line platoon 

and support platoon available. Because a treadway road is a laborintensive project, more men were 

required. An additional 30 Korean 

laborers from the 30th Korean 

Service Corps (KSC) augmented 

the company. This host nation 

support proved critical to the successful and timely completion of 

the road. The 30th KSC has been 

OPCON to the 44th since shortly 

after the end of the Korean War, so 

it was easy to integrate them into 

the construction project. 

To start the road, Charlie Company cut a shallow slot in the 

ground to form the road base. 

About 130 meters of gravel madway was laid down at the end of 

the treadway road closest to the 

MSR. Throughout the operation, 

the 44th continued to improve this 

section of the road. At the crossing 

Engineer 37 
site, a dozer was put to work building about 20 meters of graveled 

road from the river to the treadway road. 

The plans in FM 5-34 were invaluable for rapidly and concisely 

communicating the road design to 

the officers and NCOs in the construction unit. In its operations 

order, the battalion specified the 

section of FM 5-34 where the 

design was located, a list of modifications, and a list of materials 

being delivered to the site. Charlie 

Company then had the option of 

further modifying the design as 

necessary, and the S-4 sought out 

the additional materials. 

The unit used the same sleeper 

materials specified in FM 5-34. 

However, 3-inch by 12-inch lumber was used for the flooring instead of 3-inch by 10-inch because 

large quantities of that size were 

available in the division storage 

yard. We also did not use curbs. 

We found that the modified 

design enabled the road to carry 

all of the division's wheeled traffic. 

This included fully loaded ribbon stockpile of spare lumber and 

bridge trucks, fuel tankers, and nails to repair broken treadway 

cargo HEMMB. boards. However, no boards broke 

The platoon leaders and NCOs or failed due to wear. Several facof Charlie Company developed tors contributed to this. 

several changes to the original First, only wheeled traffic was 

design. The FM 5-34 design does allowed on the road. A separate 

not specify nail size, but the com- shallow slot had been cut parallel 

pany found that at least 60d nails to the treadway road, allowing 

were needed. Smaller nails did not tracked vehicles to drive to the 

adequately fasten the treadways bridge. MPs at each end of the 

to the sleepers. As vehicles went road enforced this division of trafover the road, the flooring popped fic. Secondly, the unit required a 

off the sleepers. ground-guide for each vehicle. 

The company also kept the gap This requirement ensured that 

between the treadways to 3 feet or vehicle speed was regulated to 

less, enabling CUCVs and minimize vehicle impact loads. 

HMMVs to easily traverse the However, had the road been in 

road. They also increased the service for a longer period of time, 

treadway width to 48 inches. This repair of broken or damaged 

allowed all of the wide vehicles to boards would have been a sigeasily negotiate the road. As a nificant maintenance requireresult of these last two changes, ment. The only real maintenance 

all vehicles were able to travel the requirement resulted from nails 

road-ven at night-without inadvertently dropping off the edge. 

, that worked loose along the treadway. A team of Charlie Company 

The battalion experienced very soldiers had to regularly walk the 

limited maintenance problems length of the road and hammer in 

with the road. We established a loose nails. 

Supply vehicles 

move over a completed section dthe 

treadway road. 

While the road was 

under construction, 

each HEMMT traveling to the end of the 

road was configured 

with all the materials 

required to build 25 

meters of treadway. 
A Charlie Company 

soldier nails a 

Elnch by 12-Inch 

floorlng plank. To 

make it easier for 

vehicles to travel 

the road, each 

treadway was 

widened to 48 

Inch- modification to plans 

found in FM 534. 

The road turned out to be a 

ready-made obstacle during the 

retrograde--an added bonus for 

the 44th'~ efforts. After the last 

division forces had re-crossed the 

river, the battalion pulled up 

about three-quarters of the road. 

The muddy gap that remained 

was impassable to the opposing 

force's wheeled vehicles, so the 

crossing site they "captured" was 

useless as a supply route. 

Picking up the road, however, 

was a real logistics effort for us. 

The crossing site was congested 

and we had great difficulty in getting enough men and trucks to 

pick up and haul the lumber away. 

The project was completed in 36 

hours with more than 150 meters 

of treadway road and about 150 

meters of graveled mad constructed. The officers and NCOs of 

the battalion gained valuable experience in innovative engineering. 

The construction of the graveled 

portion of the road was a major 

training opportunity for Charlie 

Company. The dump truck drivers 

were all new 12B combat engineers. They learned how to rig 

and then use their dump trucks to 

spread fill material--something 

they had never done before. 

The company had also been augmented with a dozer from the 2nd 

Engineer Battalion and a 621B 

scraper from the 82nd Engineer 

Company (CSE). The 12B NCOs 

learned how to use that equipment 

and supervise an earthmoving 

operation. 

Another major benefit of the 

operation was exercising battalion 

staff planning procedures. The 

backward planning process was 

used to synchronize the planning, 

logistics, and construction of the 

road with the requirements of the 

maneuver commander. Additionally, the staff wargamed the whole 

operation, enabling us to anticipate problems and keep the 

battalion responsive to the needs 

of the on-site company 

The maneuver commanders 

also benefited from the experience. They were surprised and 

impressed by the resourcefulness 

and skills of their supporting engineers. They suffered no loss of 

mobility during the offensive, and 

the unexpected benefit of turning 

the road into a retrograde obstacle 

proved a significant tactical 

benefit to the division. Overall, the 

treadway road project helped reinforce the importance and value of 

engineers as vital members of the 

combined arms team. Y 

Major Kelly is aprincipal investigator 

of construction robotics applications 

for the Anny at the Construction Engineering Research Laboratory in 

Champaign, Illinois. He previously 

served as executive ofFcer for the 44th 

Engineer Combat Battalion (Corps). 

Other assignments include battalion 

S-3, engineer group 42, group and 

bataclion assistant 53, battalion 8-4, 

company commander, company executive officer, and platoon lwdel: He is a 

gmduate of West Point, and holds a 

master's degree in robotics from Carnegie Mellon University. He is a 

graduate of Command and General 

Staff College, and is a registered 

professiona2 engineer in Krginia. 

Engineer 39 
By Second Lieutenant Steven McGdgan 

"...how to fully 

integrate obstacles 

and maintain close 

coordination with 

the supported 

infantry 

commander..." 

uring a company rotation 

to the Joint Readiness 

Training Center (JRTC) at Fort 

Chaffee, Arkansas, my platoon 

was charged with building defensive positions for the opposing 

forces (OPFOR). 

It was a valuable experience. In 

particular, learning how to fully 

integrate obstacles and maintain 

close coordination with the supported infantry commander were 

highlights of the assignment. 

This article is intended to share 

some of those experiences with 

other engineer platoon members. 

Coordination 

n order to make each defensive position as successful as 

possible, the engineer platoon 

leader must fully understand all 

of the maneuver commander's 

operational concepts and intentions. Well before each defensive 

operation at the JRTC, the infantry commander and the 

platoon leader would get 

together and go over the plan. 

This was necessary because the 

engineers normally moved onto 

the defense site one or two days 

prior to the infantry unit. The 

platoon leader and the commander then jointly developed 

the defensive plan using maps, 

sketches and even aerial 

photographs. Several aspects of 

the defense had to be covered: 

Qpe of Defense. Knowing the 

type of defense to be fought ensures that the engineer leader's 

use of the terrain meets the infantry commander's needs. For example, if a full, 360-degree 

perimeter cannot be established, 

the engineer wants to know where 

the infantry commander is willing 

to accept increased risk. 

Sub-UnitLocations. Friendly 

infantry movements around the 

defensive site must be known to 

the engineers. This is critical to 

maintaining security and ensuring that counter-reconnaissance 

conducted by the engineers is effective. 

Crew-Served Weapons. 

Finally, the platoon leader must 

be clear on where the infantry commander wants his 

40 Engineer 
crew-served weapons. Both 

leaders want to ensure that the 

weapons cover main routes or 

key pieces of terrain. Since the 

objectives at JRTC were normally defended by 30 to 40 men, and 

the attackers often struck with a 

battalion-sized force, this was a 

critical factor in the defense's 

survival. 

Once the engineer and infantry 

leaders are on the same sheet of 

music in these three areas, the engineer needs to turn his attention 

to counter-reconnaissance and 

deception. These actions do not 

have to occur in a particular order, 

but do have to be conducted concurrently with site preparation. 

Counter-Reconnaissance 

we the 

found that the better 

counter-reconnaissance, the greater the chances of 

surviving an attack. Successful 

counter-reconnaissance ensured 

that attacking forces were denied 

positive identification of concentrated defenses. 

The engineers accomplished this 

by using combat patrols of three to 

five men. The size of the patrol is 

important. During the initial 

building phase, the highest threat 

the engineer leader faces is observation by long range surveillance 

detachments (LRSD). These units 

normally move in small teams and 

do not want to make contact. If the 

engineer leader puts out patrols 

that are smaller than three men, 

chances are good that the LRSD 

can take them out and continue 

their surveillance mission. A threeto five-man patrol would usually 

make the LRSD back off. Counterreconnaissance patrols larger than 

five men limit the manpower 

needed to build defenses and provide local security. 

After the platoon leader decides 

on the size of his patrols, he must 

determine when and where they 

should move. The best time to send 

them out is after stand-to in the 

morning and just before stand-to 

at night. This clears the area and 

keeps the attackers unsure about 

activities at the defensive site. 

These patrols should move in a 

fan method that covers 360 

degrees of the perimeter, and 

should be conducted at a range of 

no more than 1to 2 kilometers. At 

JRTC, we found this method to be 

the best means of countering attacking unit reconnaissance. 

A critical follow-up to the 

patrols was the establishment of 

listening post/observation posts 

(LPIOPs). The number and location of these depended on the terrain, but as long as they could 

report to the platoon leader and 

they could see and/or hear enemy 

activity, they proved successful. In 

fact, the patrols and LPsIOPs were 

so successful that the LRSD commander, at the conclusion of the 

exercise, stated that his scouts 

were never able to ohserve construction of our defenses. 

Deception 

Running effective deception 

activities proved just as 

Engineer 41 
important as counter-reconnaissance. The deception plan called 

for showing movement in a location that was easily observed by 

the attacking forces. While the 

enemy concentrated effort and 

firepower on a false position, the 

real location of the platoon's 

defensive construction remained 

hidden. 

Our deception called for moving 

unneeded supplies to the "target" 

area. Boxes, miscellaneous equipment, and some soldier activity 

created the illusion that the 

OPFOR was establishing a position there. This compelled the attacking forces to dedicate valuable 

resources to neutralizing the site. 

Deception does not have to be 

visual. Noises that mimic position 

construction will also draw the attention of attacking forces. At the 

very least, attackers will dedicate 

men and time to investigating the 

Figure 1 

source of the noise. 

Smart Basics 

knother point driven home t the JRTC was that the 

smart implementation of basic 

fundamentals goes a long way 

toward building a successful 

defense. Fint, a lot of time went 

into walking the terrain, "sighting in" fighting positions, and 

gauging fields of fire. After fighting positions are finalized in accordance with the infantry 

commander's wishes, the engineer platoon leader ensures 

that they provide the soldiers 

maximum coverage from indirect 

fire. He also makes sure that 

this overhead cover does not 

limit the soldiers' ability to provide fire support to all four sides 

of the perimeter. 

Finally, smart construction allows the defender to minimize 

time spent on camouflage, and 

devote more time to the obstacle 

plan. For example, make overhead 

cover 18 inches high and, when 

possible, try to lower the plywood 

base below ground level so that it 

covers the silhouette. 

Wire 

actical and protective wire 

was critical to the success 

of the JRTC defensive positions. 

First, always place protective 

wire so that it prevents the 

enemy from throwing grenades 

into the defense. The platoon 

leader should then use tactical 

wire to create turning and channeling obstacles. 

Wire is high on an infantry 

soldiers "hate" list. At JRTC, it 
x-x T.cr,Ul* I \ 

N 

x x x T~wlo~oo 

comm.nd 

did not take large amounts of it 

to slow or even stop them. We 

also found that triple standard 

concertina (TSC) could be 

modified to a double row design. 

Although this design doesn't appear in current field manuals, 

we found it to be an adequate 

obstacle. Construction is basically the same as for TSC, but 

with the two rows of concertina 

stacked on top of each other. 

While perhaps not the best 

choice for actual combat, the 

idea could be useful in situations where there is a shortage 

of wire and time. 

We also learned the value of tactical wire as a channelizing and 

turning obstacle. The wire was 

placed at such angles that it 

turned advancing soldiers into the 

direct line of fire for crew-served 

weapons. All "dead" areas were 

laced with tactical wire, and 

Figure 2 

covered asmuch as possible by the 

defensive position's individual 

weapons. Tanglefwt was also used 

in these dead areas. Close coordination with the infantry commander on the placement of 

obstacles and crew-served positions helped to ensure the success 

of this tactic. 

Defensive Positions 

To illustrate how some of 

these lessons were ~ut to 

use, let's look at the three positions built during our JRTC 

rotation. For each defensive 

position, fighting positions 

were dug the first day on the 

site. This allowed soldiers time 

to emplace wire obstacles the 

following day 

In the first defense (Figure I),a 

reverse slope technique was used. 

The slope of the hill was wired in 

such a way as to direct the infantry into the fire of M60 

machine guns. The use of 

tanglefoot behind large trees 

helped to exclude their use as 

hiding places by the attacking infantry 

The double-dashed lines in the 

illustration show the approximate 

routes for counter-reconnaissance. 

While the routes for this site did 

not go out that far, the patrols 

werestill successful. Note that the 

infantry commander accepted 

some risk on his eastern flank. 

This risk was discussed with the 

commander prior to construction 

of the site. 

In the second defense (Figure 2), 

the engineers were given the eastern flank of a village to defend. 

The infantry commander deemed 

this flank the most likely avenue 

of approach because the creek bed 

Engineer 43 
x-x T.n,*.l*,,L 

/ 

was covered with woods. The 

engineers' main effort was to this 

woodline. While the rear of the 

defensive line seems to be open, 

the ability of the engineers to turn 

around in their fighting positions 

and fire to the rear was deemed 

sufficient coverage. 

Note that the tactical wire is in 

a "W-pattern in front of the 

protective wire. In addition, it was 

built so that the 'V of the wire 

pattern was placed in front of the 

M60 machine guns, or other positions designated to fire at a rapid 

rate. In the east, the use of 

tanglefoot across the road prevented a crawling approach by the 

enemy, and created easier targets 

for machine gun fire. 

In the last defense (Figure 3), 

the engineers had to defend 

another reverse slope--but this 

time a sheer rock cliff was to the 

north. Notice how counter-reconFigure 3 

naissance was conducted in two 

directions, in conjunction with the 

placement of three LPIOPs. This 

was more than ample to ward off 

LRSD patrols and allow secure 

site operations. 

The other side of the narrows 

was also brought into use as part 

of a deception plan. U-shaped 

pickets, barbed wire, and concertina wire were carried to this hill. 

The deception worked so well that 

the attacking forces devoted a 

companysized force to secure it. 

Wire was used again to deny the 

enemy the ability to move laterally The crew-served weapons had 

excellent fields of fire because of 

the upward slope the attackers 

faced. 

During the unit's stay at JRTC, 

each defense benefited from lessons learned from the preceding 

one. Solid defensive positions 

depended on: 

Close coordination between the 

maneuver commander and his 

supporting engineer leader. 

Smart engineering of each 

site, making maximum use of 

time, tactical techniques, and 

materials. 

Maintaining priorities, with a 

balance of effort to both 

security and construction. 

Following these basic guidelines 

will allow engineer leaders to successfully defend against even a 

vastly larger attacking force. Y 

Second Lieutenant McGugan is the 

light equipment platoon leader for 

Bravo Company, 27th Engineer 

Battalion (Combat) (Airborne). He 

previously served as a 12B platoon 

leader in Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm. He is a graduate of the Engineer Officer's Basic Course, and 

hold a bachelor's degree from North 

Carolina State Universily. 

44 Engineer 
Engineer Mobilization, Administrative and 


Logistics Techniques 


The following administrative and logistics lessons apply to Army engineer units mobilizing and 

deploying for training or combat. Mobilization training and security lessons will appear in a future 

issue of ENGINEER. 

These lessons apply primarily to Army Reserve 

and National Guard (NG) engineer personnel and 

units, but they also pertain to Active Army engineer 

forces. They are based on observations made during 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. For 

more information, write to Commandant, U.S. 

Amy Engineer School, ATSE-ESA, Fort Leonard 

Wood, MO 65473-6630. Or, call (314) 563-5304, 

DSN 676-5304. 

ISSUE: More than 70 percent of today's Army 

engineer force is madexp of Reserve Component 

(RC) units and soldiers. It is critical that they can 

mobilize quickly to go any where, any time in support of Army missions around the world, either for 

peacetime training or wartime operations. 

Most of the Army RC personnel called to active 

duty for Operations Desert ShieldIStorm were proficient in the administrative and logistics tasks 

needed to get them into the theater of operations. 

Those that were not, however, were delayed at 

mobilization stations and bumped out of deployment sequence. Some units were delayed as much 

as three weeks in deploying out of the country 

DISCIJSSION: Mobilization is primarily an administrative and logistics process, with available 

training time concentrated in common task areas 

such as weapons firing, NBC proficiency, and physical fitness. FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, Volume 

111, Reserve Component Unit Commanders Handbook (RCUCH), dated 1 March 1991, describes actions that will ensure personal and unit mobilization readiness. Ask yourself two questions: 'Tf I (or 

my unit) is called to active duty today, could I (or 

my unit) mobilize, deploy, and be ready to support 

Army missions worldwide? If not, what am I doing 

to get ready?" 

A total of 39 engineer RC units were mobilized 

during Operations Desert ShieldIStorm. Several 

hundred engineer individual ready reservists and 

individual mobilization augmentees also were mobilized to support those operations. The following administrative and logistics requirements were identified as critical in getting units and personnel into 

the theater. 

Administrative Readiness 

+ Review Military Personnel Records Jackets 

(DA Form 201). Ensure that emergency data CDD 

Form 93) and insurance selection forms for all personnel reflect the correct marital and beneficiary 

status. Soldiers who fail to change records after a 

divorce or remarriage may have future benefits go 

to ex-spouses or unauthorized family members. 

+ Pre-enroll yourself and your family members 

in the Department of the Defense Eligibility Enrollment System (DEERS). This system provides access to active duty medical care and other agencies, 

and enables you and your family members to 

receive active duty identification cards (DD Form 

1173). Family members may be denied active duty 

medical care when DEERS authorizations are 

delayed. 

+ Review financial records (DA Form 3716). Ensure that you and your soldiers are enrolled in 

Sure-Pay (direct deposit, check to bank). If not enrolled, family members may not receive funds because checks will be mailed to soldiers being 

deployed. Allotment checks may arrive late, causing financial hardships to family members. 

Engineer 45 
+ Make available, in a safe place, legal records 

and documents that allow others to execute actions 

when you and your soldiers are away. These 

records and documents include wills and testaments; powers of attorney; insurance policies; 

divorce decrees; custody court orders; birth, wedding, and death certificates; property titles and 

deeds; and tax information. Actions or benefits to 

authorized persons may be denied or delayed when 

soldiers are deployed if no legal documentation is 

available. For example, a spouse will be unable to 

transfer an automobile title that is in the soldier's 

name unless a power of attorney has been 

identified. 

+ Ensure family care plans (DA Form 5305-R) 

for single or dual-service parents are clearly articulated, verified, and up-to-date. Soldiers will become 

non-deployable if providers refuse or fail to follow 

family care plan agreements. 

+ Ensure medical and dental records for you 

and everyone in your unit are current and complete. Soldiers must have on-hand, current physical 

examinations, immunizations, NBC protective 

mask inserts, and panographic dental x-rays. 

- Identify and process for discharge soldiers 

who lack "over age 40" physical examinations, are 

continually overweight, fail Army physical fitness 

tests (APFT), or have physical profiles that prevent 

deployment. Many units lost key leaders when they 

became non-deployable due to medical problems 

that had gone unreported for years. 

- Find resources for soldiers to obtain regular 

dental checkups. Poor dental health, the most frequent medical problem RC soldiers encounter, will 

result in processing delays and pulled teeth. 

+ Maintain up-to-date mobilization files in accordance with FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3. 

Avoid notification problems due to incorrect 

telephone numbers and addresses by checking alert 

rosters and strip maps during monthly drills. Ensure that personnel identified for early active duty 

call-up and advance parties have the expertise 

needed to expedite the mobilization process. Administrative and supply personnel are key players 

for early call-up. 

+ Maintain your unit at or above the 100 percent authorized personnel level. Units selected for 

future activation will have strong recruiting and 

retention programs. Ensure that your unit manning reports (UMR) reflect the correct military occupational specialty qualification (MOSQ) status of 

personnel, and that personnel are slotted where 

they actually work. Use excess personnel to crosslevel and replace non-deployable soldiers. 

+ Implement family support programs that create a sense of community for widely dispersed RC 

engineer families. Units may form rear detachments using non-deployable personnel or personnel 

fmm higher headquarters at local armories and 

reserve centers. Such detachments are a critical 

link between family members and deployed soldiers. They provide access to mail and telephones, 

and information on active duty benefits, medical 

and dental care procedures, and the Red Cross. 

They may also serve as public media contacts, control rumors, and coordinate farewell and return 

activities. 

+ Develop a strong employer support program 

at the unit level, and implement it during all unit 

training deployments. Such programs help ensure 

rehiring rights when soldiers return and enhance 

the morale of soldiers and their families. 

+ Identify and use class A agents and purchasing officers to assist in mobilizing your unit at 

home station. The local acquisition of needed rations, repair parts, and construction materials by 

these personnel is very important as units prepare 

for deployment. In theater, they will perform 

similar tasks to obtain supplies from host nation 

sources. 

+ Acquire sufficient automation support, including lap-top computers, facsimile machines, and 

copiers. This equipment is essential for units to 

process accurate information on a timely basis, and 

should be included on unit property authorization 

documents. Currently, most units have their automation equipment as installation property, which 

cannot be taken to mobilization stations. 

Logistics Readiness 

Soldiers. Inspect individual soldiers periodically to ensure that they have adequate quantities of serviceable clothing, including battle dress 

uniforms (BDU), combat boots with extra laces, underwear, socks, and towels. Some soldiers arrived 

at mobilization stations with worn out or missing 

boots and BDUs. Some were unable to obtain replacements until they arrived in theater because 

their mobilization station had shortages in common 

clothing sizes. 

Maintenance. Establish effective equipment 

maintenance programs to ensure mobilization 

readiness: 

- Schedule and conduct preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS) and required 

services during each drill by unit soldiers, not just 

by full-time maintenance support personnel. Well 
maintained tactical and engineer vehicles, trailers, 

weapons, hand tools, mine detectors, NBC, food service and communications equipment are critical to 

unit combat readiness. Develop and maintain a 

sense of equipment "ownership" in your unit. 

- Identify Class IX repair parts required for 

mobilization and deployment and make them readily available to your unit. Some National Guard 

maintenance units may not release required engineer repair parts purchased with state funds instead of federal funds. 

- Take extra prescribed load list (PLL) and 

authorized stockage list (ASL) repair parts to alleviate shortages in theater. Critical repair parts 

commonly needed in contingency theaters include 

heavy equipment cutting edges, and vehicle filters 

and seals. 

Move?t~snt. Be flexible in planning unit movements, and prepare to meet many deployment 

options: 

- Plan for military and civilian deployments via 

road, rail, air, and sea. 

- Practice and document equipment loading procedures when preparing for annual training and 

overseas deployments. Ensure load cards accurately reflect vehicle and container load plans. 

- Spread loads among cargo containers rather 

than loading containers with like or similar items. 

This will enable your unit to start work quickly in 

theater even if some cargo containers are late or 

lost in transit. 

- Provide personnel for port and supercargo 

operations. This will reduce in-transit damage to 

equipment. 

- Load extra blocking, bracing, and tie-down 

materiel to alleviate follow-on shortages at 

mobilization stations. 

- Update your Computerized Movement Planning and Status System (COMPASS) data bases periodically. These data bases are used to provide 

automated unit equipment lists to movement planners at mobilization stations and must be 

accurate. 

Szrpply. Carry manual backup supply accounting systems in your hip pocket. Supply accountability may be hindered because current Active and 

Reserve Component automated data processing 

(ADP) hardware and software are incompatible. Inspect mobilization supply areas frequently to ensure that supplies on hand are adequate for an immediate mobilization at all times. 

Class I. Contract home station food service 

operations because unit food service equipment normally will be shipped out. 

Class II. Load extra tentage, generators, engineer power tools, chemlights, fluorescent tape, 

batteries, office supplies, and CTA-50. These items 

are critical, and extra on-hand supplies will offset 

shortages in theater. 

Class III. Ensure you have enough fuel on hand 

at all times to get to the mobilization station. 

Class N. Stockpile and ship enough construction materials to support your unit's mission and 

life support requirements in theater. Fabricate 

your own picket pounders. 

Class V Standardize your weapons ammunition 

basic load fill quantities with other, similar engineer units. Locate where your unit will receive 

its basic load and plan pickup procedures at the 

mobilization station, the port, and in theater. 

Class VI. Load sports and other activity equipment to enhance the morale of personnel. Pack adequate feminine sundry stocks. 

Class VII. Ensure major equipment items are on 

hand and ready for shipment. Be aware that any 

major equipment shortages you have prior to 

mobilization probably will remain short throughout 

the operation, even after cross-leveling. 

Class VZII. Load adequate stocks of medical 

supplies. 

Class IX. See Maintenance section. 

Facilities. Units without a rear detachment 

should establish procedures to turn over unit 

facilities and installation property smoothly, possibly with assistance from higher headquarters. 

- Ensure that secure facility communications systems are available during the mobilization process. 

Facsimile equipment and secure telephones are 

essential. 

- Use protective structures, access control 

points, and guard details to secure your facilities 

during mobilization. 

COIZ~CX~CSIOVS: All RC engineer personnel 

can learn valuable lessons from the recent mobilization and deployment to Operations Desert 

ShieldIStorm. The bottom line is: To be proficient 

in the mobilization process and to prepare for future contingencies, units must practice, check, and 

update their mobilization procedures. And, they 

must integrate these procedures into training whenever possible. By honing your unit's mobilization 

process, you can prevent many problems from occurring after your unit arrives at a mobilization station and in theater. 

Vernon Lowrey is chief, Analysis Division, Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, at the 

U.S. Army Engineer School. 
By Colonel Herb Harback 

guess it's bothered me for some time but I 

never could put my finger on it. I felt it each 

time I spent too much effort on a particular 

decision or project, and missed doing something 

else I wanted to do. I felt it when I had to wait 

while others added their "finishing touches" to 

what I considered a completed effort. I felt it 

when seemingly endless minutes ticked by while 

my boss "fine tuned" a totally tuned issue. All I 

could think was "why?"And my inner thoughts 

were saying "come on, enough already!" 

I'm now convinced that one does not have to 

dot every "i," cross every "t," or proof every word 

when it comes to daily events. Decisions can be 

made without Herculean data collection efforts. 

Decisions can have blemishes. The costs are too 

high for an absolutely fail-proof, 100 percent ontarget, type of decision-making process every 

time. The "get me ALL the facts before I decide" 

way of doin business is just not practical 

leadership. lg 

Focus on Net Gain 

Dractical leadership requires a decisionmaking style in which the end result is 

greater than the effort expended. I call it "20180 

leadership." It simply means that for about 20 

percent of your energy and resources, you should 

expect an 80 percent completion rate. And often 

48 Engineer 
that is close enough to get the job done. To get 

that last 20 percent of accuracy, refinement and 

perfedion-in other words, to get within a zero 

defect, total confidence level-you would have to 

commit enormous additional effort and expenditure of resources. The last 20 percent may cost 

up to four times more effort than did the first 80 

percent. 

I am totally convinced that the 20180 rule is a 

critical part of being a successful leader. As a battalion commander, I would make it a point to 

seek out the officer or NCO who, at the expense 

of other pressing missions, would feverishly 

work on one issuejust to get that action perfed. I would then load that leader up with multiple demands until he finally realized that he had 

to finish that one action in order to get me off 

his back on the others. The teaching point was 

that he could accomplish far more in the same 

amount of time by making decisions at the 20180 

mark. 

What I am saying is that pinpoint accuracy is 

not a normal decision prerequisite; rather, one 

strives to get within a standard and then move 

on.' There is abundant truth to the adage that 

"an 80 percent solution is far better than a 100 

percent idea." Sure, if time permits, one goes 

back and fine tunes-but do not count on it. Do 

it to standard with 20 percent of your effort the 

first time around. The object is to get within an 

acceptable band of excel~ence,~ not to get to an 

absolute certainty mark. 

A realistic goal in the corporate world is to be 

better than the competition. In the military, it is 

to have the edge over your enemy-to accomplish the mission and then move on. In other 

words, don't overdo it. If you do, you'll miss 

other waiting missions. The 20180 rule tells you 

how to increase the number of successful 

decisions within a given amount of time. 

Now, 20180 does not mean accepting a halfright, half-wrong (in other words, half-baked) 

solution. Rather, it is a mindset of not spending 

a lifetime on one action at the expense of others. 

If you do encounter the "must be 100 percent perfect," zero-defect mission, I rewmmend that you 

examine it with a critical eye. In most cases, 

relooking and redefining the issue into more 

basic terms will get you back within the 20180 

boundaries for a forward moving decision. 

Likewise, 20180 does not mean a lack of attention to detail. It is not a free ticket for sloppiness, shortcuts, or excuses for failure. The concentration of effort within a shorter amount of 

time should encourage a greater, not lesser, 

amount of attention to detail. 

20180 should be taken in the spirit of its intent, rather than its exact percentages. That 

number combination is based on my experiences 

and observations over the last twenty years. But 

the numbers are secondary to the goal of obtaining the greatest number of acceptable results 

within a given time. Could 15/85, 30170 or 50150 

be more accurate ratios? 

Perhaps, but if such a question is an issue, 

then I would say that the point has been missed. 

In fact, one could make a case that this question 

illustrates how quickly we can become bogged 

down on side issues. 

There is a pint where you stop, make it happen, and then move on. A point beyond which 

the price paid in a leader's efforts, time and 

resources becomes too high. General Edwin H. 

Burba, Jr., past commander of the 7th Infantry 

Division (Light), and now commander of Forces 

Command, is clear in his opinion that a leader 

should not get so caught up in a decision that he 

finds himself frozen on that one issue. The 

leader should gather sufficient assets within his 

control to accomplish his task and then move 

on.4 General Burba is talking the 20180 rule. 

Don't seek perfection; rather, put sufficient effort 

into the mission to get it done and keep the organization moving ahead. The return on additional effort is going to be far more expensive than 

the potential perfection. 

The Economics of It All 

The Law Of Diminishing - Returns. The

corporate world understands incremental 

value. It is an expectation that the return on an 

investment will be greater than the wsts involved. It is also an idea defined in economics as 

the "Law of Diminishing ~eturns."~ It is the key 

to understanding practical leadership. 

This can be illustrated by using a wet towel as 

an example. The first wring of the towel easily 

yields water, the second wring provides less, and 

so on. With each new try, the energy needed to 

squeeze the towel increases, while the amount of 

water quickly lessens. Soon it becomes unprofitable to continuethe cost is greater than 

the gain. The application of that law in decision 

making can be seen as you "fine tune" an issue 

over time. You will spend an inordinate amount 

of effort for those last drops of perfection. 

Time Value. Time is a precious resource 

which increasingly reveals its value as we use it 

up.6 The 20180 rule recognizes the importance of 

time as the leader's most critical resource. The 

more he fine tunes an issue or tries to gather 

Engineer 49 
additional information, the more time he consumes. Decision making must take place within 

the limits of the time available. The more time 

you use trying to wring out that wet towel, the 

less time there is for working other missions. 

Diminishing returns, coupled with the consumption of time, underscore the need for practical 

leadership in decision making. 

Opportunity Costs. A follow-on economic 

principle which comes to bear in practical leadership is that of "opportunity costs."7 There is a 

cost to every decision and that cost is felt in the 

opportunities you miss because you are focused 

on something else. It is directly connected to the 

20180 rule. If you do more than is needed, you 

will exceed the 20 percent effort and begin to experience diminishing returns. You will increase 

your overall costs because there are more and 

more opportunities you cannot undertake as long 

as you are wrapped around the decision-making 

axle. 

As you carefully torque yourself trying to perfect a decision, you consume additional time, 

money and effort which cannot be recovered. Opportunities to do other things, to make other 

decisions, to use your resources in other ways, 

disappear. Time marches on. While you may 

have made a completely correct decision, you 

may have lost in the long run because of the inappropriate amount of effort focused on that one 

action. Economically speaking, the 20180 rule is 

the key to practical leadership. 

Other costs, too, lurk in the shadows if you insist on '%edging your bet" and holding out for additional information before making a decision. 

First, you will quickly deplete your resources of 

time, initiative and momentum. Additionally, you 

will start to lose your overall focus during your 

scramble for all possible details on one issue. Because of that, any concurrent actions will come 

into risk. The probability of making uninformed 

new decisions will increase. The overriding fear 

of failure is sometimes shown in these decisionmaking delays.8 

When Exception is the Rule 

ne of the essential things in following 

through with the 20180 rule of leadership 

is that one needs to know when-and when notto use it. Yes, there are decisions and follow-on 

actions which require exacting precision and will 

override the costs I have mentioned. Precision, 

which demands extraordinary levels of attention, 

is an expensive proposition. But, space shuttle 

50 Engineer 

flights, surgery, and safety-to mention but a 

few-are worth the extra effort. 

If I was an astronaut, the 20180 rule would 

not be the best approach. It would not be a wmforting feeling for me as I sat on top of a NASA 

rocket in its countdown phase. Nor would I feel 

comfortable getting ready for open heart surgery 

based on the 20180 rule. Likewise, strategic, longrange decisions made by leaders which impact 

on national and world stability demand near failsafe considerations. However, despite these exceptions, the vast majority of decisions will fall 

within the 20180 rule. 

Bottom Line 

ombining the economic principles of opportunity costs, time value and diminishing 

returns with basic leadership traits provides us 

with a simple formula for successful decision 

making. Called the "20180 rule," the process encapsulates practical leadership. It focuses on 

meeting less-than-absolute standards of performance while maintaining realistic momentum. It 

is a handy rule of thumb which emphasizes the 

idea of "in-stride" net gains in decision making. 

In short, it is practical leadership! Y 

Colonel Harback is commander and district engineer of the Louisville District, Corps of Engineers. 

He previously serued as commander of the 14th Engineer Battalion (Corps). Fort Ord. He has served 

in various command and staffpositions, including 

executive officer, Bayonet Combat Support Brigade, 

7th Infantry Division (Light); deputy commander, 

7th Engineer Brigade, VII Corps; S-3, 7th Engineer 

Brigade, and aide-de-camp to the commanding 

general, U.S. Army Western Command. He is a 

graduate of the Army War College. 

Endnotes: 

'~akin~ Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders, Perry 

M. Smith, p. 108. 

'~rnall Unit Leadership: A Common Sense Approach, 

Dandridge M.Malone, pp. 126-129. 

3~ieldManual 25-100, Training the Force, U.S. Depart 

ment of the Army, pp.1-5. 

4~ieldManual 22-103, Leadership and Command at 

Senior Levels, U.S. Department of the Army, p. 82. 

5~conomics,Paul A. Samuelson, pp. 21-26. 

6~bid,p. 761. 

'Wh0.i is Economics?, Jim Eggert, pp 8-10. 

'why Leaders Can't Lead: The Unconscious Conspiracy Continiues, Warren Bennis, p. 22. 
-

En! olution 

1. Determine the length of the vertical curve required to clear the pipeline, with 4 feet of 


minimum cover at the road centerline. 


a. The first part of the problem requires a vertical curve to be designed through a known 

point. The pipeline is located at STA 15+20, so you must find the grade line elevation (GLE) for 

that station. Or, you can find the change of elevation in 80 feet on a 8.6 percent grade: 

-

8.6 x 80 = 6.88 feet change

100 

GLE = PVI Elev t 6.88 = 1011.00 + 6.88 = 1017.88 (STA15+20) 

The elevation at the top of the pipeline is 1017.00, and the required centerline elevation Is 

1017 + 4 feet of minimum cover, or 1021.00. Therefore. the minimum offset (OFF) between the ' minimum final grade and the GLE is: 

OFF = 1021 - 1017.88 = 3.12 feet. 

Thls figure becomes the known polnt. 

b. When the known point Is at a location other than the PVI, use the following equation to 

determine the length of the curve: 

1 Where: 

A = horizontal distance, in feet, from the PVi to the known point 

AG = absolute decimal value of GI - Gn or AG = IG1 - G 2 1 

OFF = offset between the elevation of the known point and the GLE of the known point 

Solve for A: 

A= PVI - 15 t 20 = 16 t 00 - 15 + 20 = 80feet 

Soive for AG: 

AG = ]GI - G2 1 = 1-0.086 -0.040 1 = 0.126 

Soive for OFF: 

OFF = 1021.00 - 1017.88 = 3.12 
c. Enter the GLE values into the table. 

d. Next, determine the offset ( 8 ) from the grade line elevation up to the road centerline 

elevation using the equation: 

Where: 


d = distance from the point of vertical curvature (PVC) or PVT to the station. 


Remember: When d values are identical, the offsets are the same on both sides of the curve. 

Afler you have solved the AG12L portion of the equation, that value (1.26) remains constant. 

0 13 + 50 = 1.26(0.0)" 0 


0 14 + 00 = 1.26 (0~5)' = 0.32 


e 14 + 50 = 1.26 (1.0)' = 1.26 


8 15 + 00 = 1.26 (1.5)~ = 2.84 


8 15 + 20 = 1.26 (1.7' = 3.64 


0 15 + 50 = 1.26 (2.0)' = 5.04 


0 16 + 00 = 1.26 (~.5)~ = 
7.88


8 16 + 50 = = 5.04 


e is + 91 = 1.26(1.58)~= 3.15 


8 17 + 00 = = 2.84 


8 17 + 50 = = 1.26 


8 16 + 00 = = 0.32 


0 16 + 50= = 0.00 

Now, determine L: 

= 2 X [80 t 49.521 + 4 41980.95 + 613.15 


= 259.04 + 4(50.93) 


= 462.76 


The minimum length of the cufve = 462.76 feet. 


Answer: Using the round-up rule to the next even 100 feet, the length of the curve 


L = 500 feet. 


2. Determine the low point. 

When tangent grades are unequal and have opposite signs, the low point always occurs on 

the flatter of the two grades. Therefore, the low point will fall between the PVI and the point of 

vertical tangency (Pmon the side with the 4.0 percent grade. 

Use x = -L(G)

AG 


Where: 


X = distance to the low point from the PVT, and 


G = flatter of the two grades, then 


PVT = PVI + U2 = 1600 + 50012 = 1850 or STA18 + 50 

Low point = PVT - x = 1850 - 159 = 1691 or STA 16 + 91 

Answer: The low point of the curve is at Station 16 + 91 
I 3. To stake the centerline, the surveyors will need the stationing and centerline elevations. 

a. The first step is to set up a table, as shown below. Enter the known Information, and solve 

for each station's GLE and offset ( 0 ). 

I1 1 STA 1 OLE I meto / Road Elevation I 

PVC 	 13 + 50 


14 + 00 


1 14 + 50 15tOO 


Plpellne 15 t 20 1017.88 


15 + 50 


PVI 16 + 00 1011.00 


16 + 50 


Low Polnt 	 16 + 91 

17 + 00 1 

! 

17 + 50 


18 + 00 


PVT 18 t 50 


b. Determine the GLE for each station using the equation: I 

GLE = PVIElev t IG 1 d I 

13 + 50 GLE = 1011.00 t 8.6 (2.5) = 1032.50 

14 + 00GLE = 1011.00 t 8.6 (2.0) = 1028.20 

14 t SO GLE = 1011.00 t 8.6 (1.5) = 1023.90 

15 + 00 GLE = 1011.00 t 8.6 (1.0) = 1019.60 

15 t 20 GLE = 1011.00 + 8.6 (0.8) = 1017.88 

15 t 50 GLE = 1011.00 t 8.6 (0.5) = 1015.30 

16 t 00GLE = GIVEN = 1011,OO 

16 t 5OGLE = 1011.00 + 4.0(0.5) = 1013.00 

16 t 91 GLE = 1011.00 + 4.0 (.91) = 1014.64 

17 t 00 GLE = 1011.00 t 4.0 (1.0) = 1015.00 

17 t 50GLE = 1011.00 + 4.0(1.5) = 1017.00 

18 t 00GLE = 1011.00 + 4.0(2.0) = 1019.00 

18 + 50 GLE = 1011.00 t 4.0 (2.5) = 1021.00 
Engineer Solution 


e. Enter the offset values into the table. Add the offset value to the GLE. The resulting sums 

are the final centerline road elevations. 

ASTA GLE Road Elevatlon I I I I 

PVC 1 13 + 50 1 1032.50 0 1032.50 

Pipeline 

PVI 

LOW Point 

Answer: - There are 4.52 feet of cover over the pipeline at STA 15 + 20. 

- The low point is at STA 16 + 91. 


-The final centerline elevations are shown in the table above. 


This Engineer Problem/Solution was submitted by the Roads and Airfield Branch, Combat 

Construction Division, Department of Instruction, U.S.Army Engineer School. 
ENGINEER UPDATE 


I I 

Comrnerdal numbers are (314) 563-XXXX and Defense System 


Nehvoh (DSN) numbers are 676-XXXX unless otherwise noted. 


Directorate of Training and Demolitions Effects Simulator (DES). To provide realism in demoliDoctrine (DOTD) tions training, a locally fabricated device, number DVC-D 05-46, was approved for Army-wide use in April 1991. The DES is a folded, weatherresistant cardboard trainer that simulates the M5A1 demolition charge. 

The trainer is filled with a mixture of 50 percent chalk and 50 percent 

sand. When detonated with a blasting cap or detonation cord, it produces 

a flash, bang, and smoke signature. For a complete information package. 

call CPT Bart Ives, -7805. Local Training Aids Support Centers (TASCs) 

will produce them upon request. 

Demolitions Effects Slrnulator (DES) 

FY93 Self-Development Tests (SDV for MOS 628.The MOS-specific 

portion of the FY 93 SDT for MOS 628 soldiers has been revised. Questions related to basic task information that do not require extracts will 

replace questions based on material provided in extracts from doctrinal 

manuals. The new questions have had two reviews by NCOs and draft test 

administrators. Validation confirmed that soldiers should not require references to answer the new questions. To maximize their opportunity for high 

test scores, 628 NCOs are encouraged to begin their study programs as 

soon as they receive the FY 93 SDT Notice. POC is Jim Evans. -7510. 

Leadership Videodisc Program Available. A user-friendly practical 

exercise is available to students preparing for leadership positions. Titled 

"Task Force Engineer in Defensive Operations I and 11," the interactive 

videodisc (IVD) allows students to act in battalion task force engineer and 

combat engineer platoon leader positions. The program, IVD 5-1, is available to Active and Rese~e Component units through local TASCs and 

state adjutant general offices. POC is Suzanne Rosen, -7645. 

Directorate of Combat VOLCANO Liaht Aaaroved for Develoament. The VOLCANO, a 

Developments (DCD) multiple de~iver~mine 'system, is slimming bown to meet the needs' of 

light units. The mounting system will be modified to provide light forces 

an effective force multiplier in light intensity conflicts. The current 
VOLCANO mine system consists of four racks, each with 40 mine 

canisters, and a dispenser control unit. Two variations will be available for 

VOLCANO Light: A single rack to be mounted on an M998 high mobility 

multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) will be issued as a weapon. A 

portable model with a single canister equipped with a built-in firing device 

will be issued as a Class V item (like a claymore). The estimated fielding 

date is 1997. POC is SFC Thomas Adams, -7327. 

TRADOC Project Office Update. In a June 10 letter from the Under 

Secretary of Defense, the Armored Systems Modernization (ASM) program 

was redirected. This effectively deferred the Combat Mobility Vehicle (CMV) 

fielding and limited its design impact, The letter stated 'The Army should 

continue to consider commonality for future vehicles at the component level 

as a design parameter. However, other vehicles (CMV) have been deferred 

to the extent that this should no longer be a fundamental design driver." 

Both of the engineers' MI-based mobility systems, the Breacher and 

the Heavy Assault Bridge (HAB), remain on schedule. The Breacher program passed Milestone I on 13 May, and was granted approval to 

develop 106 vehicles. Current plans call for a contract award by 1 October 92, with fielding commencing in FY 99. The HAB special in-process 

review on 25 June validated the program acquisition strategy. The current 

schedule calls for fielding 106 HAEs beginning in FY 98. POC is MAJ 

Koch or Al Lee, -7326. 

ENGINEER Readership Survey. Randomly selected units from ENGlNEER Professional Bulletin's mailing list will soon receive readership 

surveys. Those receiving surveys are urged to complete and return them 

within two weeks of receipt. This is your opportunity to assess the bulletin 

and tell the staff what you would like to read in future issues. Comments 

and suggestions are welcome. POC is Peggy McAvenia, -5305. 

Unexploded Ordnance. The issue of unexploded ordnance (UXO) 

found in the Gulf War has attracted national media attention. The authors 

of a Lessons Learned article that appeared in the February 1992 issue of 

ENGINEER (p. 28-30) stand by their comments. The article was written to 

advise soldiers of the dangers inherent with unexploded munitions, and 

the techniques recommended in it are recognized methods of minimizing 

those dangers in training and on the battlefield. The first sentence of the 

photo caption on page 29, however, is incorrect. The munitions are 

unidentified munitions found by combat engineers from the 18th Corps 

(Airborne). POC is Vern Lowrey, -5304. 

Training Needs Identified. The combat training centers (CTC) have 

identified two areas where engineer officers require additional training. 

The first, terrain analysis, is critical in the combined arms arena. The 

CTCs report that engineers' skills in terrain analysis are weak, and that 

engineers need more practice and experience in determining terrain 

Directorate of Evaluation 

and standardization (DOES) 

Department Of InStruCtiOIl 

(DO,) 
Engineer Personnel 

P~~~~~~~~~ office (EPPO) 

News and Notes 

impacts on tactical operations. As the terrain experts, engineers must 

help their commanders visualize the terrain and be able to explain how it 

will affect the mission. Terrain walk exercises, tactical exercises without 

troops, and officer professional development classes can be used to 

strengthen these skills. 

The CTCs also report that engineers working at the main command 

post often do not develop threat templates for their planning. Developed 

with the help of the intelligence staff, the templates are used to identify 

places most likely to contain threat activity. Engineers and intelligence 

staff use the templates to set up and focus their reconnaissance and 

surveillance (R&S) plans, and to determine breaching asset and personnel requirements. Units are encouraged to use the method taught at the 

Engineers Officers Advanced Course to develop proficiency in preparing 

threat templates. POC is CPT Bob O'Brien. 3-5519. 

Advanced Civil Schooling. Each year the Engineer Branch at 

PERSCOM selects officers to attend civilian graduate schools on a fulltime basis. Those selected normally attend school for 18 months to obtain advanced degrees that will enable them to fill positions validated 

under the Army Educational Requirements System (AERS). Graduates 

are required to serve in an AERS position for a minimum of three years. 

Most of these positions are in the fields of civil, construction, environmental, structural, or topographic engineering. To satisfy Corps of Engineer 

position requirements, EPPO and PERSCOM are working together to 

identify acceptable universities (in terms of programs of instruction, tuition, etc.) for engineer officers to attend. Program requirements are in AR 

621 -1, Chapter 3, dated 15 October 85. POC at Engineer Branch is CPT 

Chamberlain, DSN 221-7504. POC at EPPO is CPT Brad Eaton, -5362. 

FM 25-101 Improvements Requested. Combined Arms CommandTraining (CAC-TNG), Fort Leavenworth, is requesting suggestions on 

how to improve training management doctrine in FM 25-101, Bame 

Focused Training. Suggestions for text changes and additions should include the specific pagelparagraph and specific recommendation. Submit 

comments by December 1992 to: Deputy Commanding General for Training, Combined Arms Command, Attn: ATZL-ClT. Fort Leavenworth, KS 

66027. POC is CPT Bill Hedges, (91 3) 684-391 9, DSN 552-3919. 

Prime Power Production Specialist Course. Looking for a career that 

will give you hands-on engineering experience with electrical power generation and distribution systems? The Army's prime power program offers this 

opportunity, plus travel throughout the world. The MOS is open to soldiers 

who are in grade E-5 and below, agree to serve three years after completing 

training, have GTIST and EL scores of 110 or higher, and pass the basic 

math and science proficiency test. The next course begins 1 February 1993, 

with students reporting on 19 January. Applications are due at PERSCOM 

by 30 September 1992. POC is Ms Martineau, (703) 704-1505/1507. 

58 Engineer 
Past in Review 

Army Engineering: 


A Key to National Greatness 

By Dr. Martin Reuss 

when Army engineers first 

became involved in public 

works construction in the early 

19th century, they immediately 

thought of themselves as "nation 

builders"-as engineers making 

a valuable, necessary contribution to national greatness. Instead of simply constructing a 

network of roads and waterways, 

the Corps wanted to construct 

projects that would last for the 

ages. 

Critics accused them of overengineering, of constructing grand 

works when something less ambitious and costly (even if less safe 

and durable) would suffice. This 

predilection to turn public works 

projects into what some perceived 

as engineering monuments contributed to charges in the early 

19th century that Army engineers 

were a new aristocracy at variance 

with democratic virtues. 

Similar charges have been 

heard recently, although now they 

are based as much on environmental as on financial concerns. The 

truth is that the Corps' cost estimates have alwavs leaned A drawing of the C&O Canal at Georgetown in the late 1850s. 

toward the conservative side, emphasizing safety and durability It advised building it all the way to and general interests of the 

is true, however, that Army en- Pittsburgh. The estimated cost community." 

gineers believe their projects con- was about $22 million, an enor- According to those engineers, 

tribute to national greatness and mous sum for that time. They jus- any revenues derived from the 

are something more than just tified the figure by noting, 'When canal (a matter of considerable inone more link in America's in- a nation undertakes a work of terest to the canal company) were 

frastructure. great public utility, the revenue is "...of merely secondary importance 

An instructive example is the not the essential object to take in for the nation." The Army enChesapeake and Ohio Canal along consideration: its views are of a gineers designed a canal that 

the Potomac River. Army en- more elevated order-they are would testify to the glory of the 

gineers surveyed the route for the all, and, it may be said, exclusive- nation, even though it saddled the 

C&O Canal in the late 1820s and ly, directed toward the great canal company with enormous 

Engineer 59 
the new nation, 

promoting both political stability and commercial development. 

In this, engineer officers revealed the 

French bias of their 

West Point training, 

for state owned and 

constructed roads and 

canals in France had 

contributed much to 

that country's military security and 

economic progress. 

What these industrious, educated, 

and dedicated Army 

officers could not have 

appreciated was that 

they were establishing 

a sense of administrative responsibility 

Mules were used to pull boats through the the C&OCanal.Thls photo probably v jstaken that remains with the 

around 1900. 

debt. Just the first part of the 

canal, stretching 184 miles from 

Washington, D.C. to Cumberland, 

Maryland, would cost nearly $9 

million according to Army 

estimates. 

Outraged investors and politicians called for another survey, this time by a group of engineers led by two who had 

worked on the Erie Canal. These 

gentlemen craftsmen, much admired but ignorant of formal engineering theory, determined 

that the canal to Cumberland 

could be built for less than half 

the Army's estimate. They cut 

the width from 60 to 40 feet, left 

the bed of the canal unlined, and 

estimated excavation costs to be 

about 5 cents per cubic yard, 

compared to the Army's estimate 

of 14 cents per cubic yard. Congress, investors, and state and 

local officials were delighted, 

and construction got underway. 

But when the canal to Cumberland was finally completed in 

1850, the cost was more than $2 

million higher than the Army's estimate. Chastised directors of the 

canal company harkened back to 

the beginning of the project and 

explained, "A body of men, however upright and intelligent, are 

easily satisfied of what they greatly wish to believe. The elaborate, 

well digested, and disinterested 

estimates of a corps of the ablest 

engineers in America guided by 

the matured experiences of one 

who had distinguished himself at 

the [French] Polytechnic school 

[BG Simon Bernard] ...were thus 

cast aside and condemned." 

Disregarding the question of 

who the best engineers were, we 

see a kernel of truth in the charges of overengineering. 'We were 

planning a work for the nation," 

wrote Army engineer officers in 

their 1826 report on the C&O 

Canal, and "it did not belong to us 

to curtail the cost in order to 

derive from the capital a greater 

interest...to the detriment of 

durability and conveyancy." The 

Corps of Engineers thought in 

terms of grand works of improvement that would knit together 

Corps to this day They 

elevated the construction of roads and canals from an 

engineering and financial exerc-nough to satisfy the ambitions of most civilian engineersto an enterprise that both 

symbolized and contributed to national grandeur and strength. 

In today's environment, with 

conflicting and numerous demands on limited funds, Army engineers are far more sensitive to 

financial constraints. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the value, 

indeed the necessity, of a transportation network for national greatness remains part of the culture of 

the Corps of Engineers. When 

Army engineers claim they have a 

role to play in repairing and 

replacing America's infrastructure, they use as evidence nearly 

two centuries of experience in 

building a nation and, in so doing, 

contributing to its strength and 

unity. 

Dz Martin Reuss is a Senior Historian in the Office of History, 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of , Engineers, at Fort Beluoir 
By Command Sergeant Major Richard N. Wilson 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

"safe training is a predictable result of performing to established tactical and technical 

standards. Leaders at all levels ensure that safety requirements are integral, not add-on considerations, to 

all aspects of planning, executing, and evaluating 

training. Safe training results from the systematic 

management of inherently dangerous training risk." 

(FM 25-100, Training the Force) 

R0th FM 25-1 00 and FM 25-1 01 (Baffle Focused 

Training) emphasize the need to integrate (not 

add on) safety into training and to perform to standards. The same message appears in FM 100-5, 

Operations, which stresses force protection. One of 

the four elements of combat power, force protection 

has two components: protection from enemy actions, 

and the protection of personnel and equipment from 

loss or damage. Safety is part of the second component and must be integrated into ail activities, in 

peace and in war. 

Over the history of the U.S. Army, accidents account for 20 percent of the casualties and 40 percent 

of materiel losses. In the most recent conflicts 

(Grenada, Panama, and Desert ShieldIStorm), losses 

from accidents (excluding fratricides) have approached 50 percent. We must work to improve that 

statistic! 

As engineer soldiers, safety is especially important because we are constantly on the move: going 

to and from field training exercises, construction 

sites and ranges; and participating in sports activities and other functions. Because engineers are 

constantly called on to do more with less, we sometimes try to do too much, both on and off duty. 

While our intentions may be good, we fail to recognize the danger in which we place ourselves and 

our soldiers. 

Many accidents can be reduced or prevented if all 

levels of leadership understand and implement effective risk management. Risk management is a tool 

leaders use to integrate safety into training. We cannot stop training or fail to perform a mission in combat simply by using safety as an excuse. Nor can we 

afford to unnecessarily jeopardize the lives of our soldiers or the loss of critical equipment, which could affect mission accomplishment. However, studies show 

that by using risk management techniques, units can 

improve training safety by 50 percent. 

The Army has not adopted any one format as a 

standard for the risk assessment portion of risk 

management, even though many are available. The 

exact format used will be dictated by local policy. 

Regardless of the format, the basic process remains 

the same: Identify risks, assess risks, develop controls and make decisions, implement controls, and 

supervise. 

No matter how we assess risks and establish 

safety programs, the enforcement of standards is critical. Enforcement is a primary leadership responsibility-mery soldier is responsible for enforcing the 

standards. ironically, most organizations have established excellent standing operating procedures 

(SOPS), but they often fail to ensure that the standards are enforced. 

Any time that we fail to enforce an existing standard, we set a new standard and we set our soldiers 

up for failure. The majority of all accidents can be 

traced back to the violation or non-enforcement of a 

known, well established standard. When soldiers are 

not trained to standards and standards are not enforced, the effectiveness of that unit is diminished and 

the risk to soldiers is greatly increased. Statistics 

show that 80 percent of all accidents are caused by 

human error, and supervision is key to preventing 

human error. 

As FM 25-100 states, we as leaders must train to 

and enforce all standards at all times. That is how 

we can really "protect the force." Our commandant 

puts it another way: ',Train Combat Hard. Train Combat Realism, Train Combat Safe." Make that your 

motto! 

Engineer 61 
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