COMMISSION BRIEFING SLIDES/EXHIBITS

BRIEFING ON DIGITAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL

JULY 18, 2007
I

Digital I&C- Industry Per

July 18, 2O

Amir Shahkarami

Sr. VP Engineering,& Technical Seh

Exelon Corporation.

N U C l E A R

I N S T IR T U ( T

I
Topics

* Objective

* Communication

* Project Plan

~*C••onclusions

2
Objective

* Safety-focused application of digital technology

Design certification

- Current operating plants

- New plants

S facilities

Stable, - predictable and timely licensing process

aguiance

Enrc aTety availability and reliability

3
Communication

* NEI Digital I&C and Human Factors

Working Group

- Reports to industry Chief Nuclear Officers

-Participate on the Digital I&C Steering Committee

- Coordinate with NEI New Plant Working Group

aj-r•vendor participation

ntfecrated, focused attention to ensure safetyf tabe se and predictable licensing process

4
Project Plan

* Disciplined Framework

- Issue scope and definition

- Deliverables

- Milestones

-Accountability

tegr~ate d approaches to resolution

jdiidne~n~ta'I tool for management oversight

5
Conclusions

* Progress has been made

* Project plan provides a framework going

forward

- Integrate lessons learned and other improvements

* ~tntairin focused management attention

kui?1A, th e lonrer term

1

6
ELECTRIC POWER

RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Digital Instrumentation &

Control - EPRI Role

July 18, 2007

Chuck. Welty

Technical Executive

Electric Power Research Institute
Acronyms

EPRI

I&C

R&D

MCR

PRA

HFE

ANT

SER

PLC

ASIC

FPGA

CCF

- Electric Power Research Institute

- instrumentation and control

- research and development

- main control room

- probabilistic risk assessment

- human factors engineering

- advanced nuclear technology

- safety evaluation report

- programmable logic controller

- application specific integrated circuit

- field programmable gate array

- common-cause failure

n.lrhrsvLECTRIC POWER

c. All rights reserved. 2 II S*ARCHI4NSTITUTE © 2007 Electric Power Research Institute, In
EPRI Digital I&C R&D

*Substantial past/ongoing activities.on digital I&C,

MCR, risk and human factors

° Guided by extensive utility advisory structure

- Expertise - I&C, PRA, HFE and ANT

° Several products with SERs

* Basis for industry technical positions

*Areas of information exchange and interaction

with NRC

EPRI has substantial, expertise and proven capabilities •....... ......... • I

'RESCTRIC POWER er2ii RI MARCH INSTITUTE

© 2007 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc, All rights reserved. 3
EPRI R&D on Digital I&C

* Licensing digital upgrades

* Verification & validation

* Electromagnetic interference

° Commercial devices - PLCs,

ASICs, FPGAs, wireless, etc.

" Control room/human factors

" Defense-in-depth and diversity

" Applying risk methods

1

1

1

1

992-2004

992-1998

992-

993-

2001-

2002-

2002-

ELECTRIC POWER

© 2007 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. RESEARC INTTT
Current EPRI Support

" Defense-in-depth and ,diversity

-Use design and diversity for CCF protection

" Risk-informed methods

Existing methods provide insights to focus

design and review efforts

• Human factors

- Bases for minimum inventory of interfaces,

computerized procedures, graded HFE design

approach

* Ongoing evaluation of operating experience

© 2007 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc..All rights reserved. 5 RESEARCH NI s U
Future EPRI Activities

* Interaction with NRC Research has not been as

extensive as it could be - we want to help

improve this

* Interim Staff Guidance documents are only a

start - our advisors expect us to continue to work

with NRC to resolve the issues completely

2007 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. RESEARCH INSTITUTE
invensys. IProcess Systems

Digital Modernization Hurdles

and Solutions

7- 18-07

Ken Brown

Vice President Invensys

1
NkREG(1 -

nvensyso

Process Systems C-2

About Invensys

Invensys'PLC- 30,000 employees, in 60

countries

-I nvensys. Process Systems (IPS)

Comprised of Foxboro, Triconex,

Wonderware, Simsci-Esscor, Avantis,

Validation Technologies

• IPS is presently providing input to the

industry -working groups and the NRC

2
,nvensys® Process Systems

,ýNkREG~j

4, 0

Digital Instrumentation and Control

Issues in the Nuclear Industry

e Diversity, Defense in Depth - D3

* Risk Informed Digital I&C

" -Operator Training

* Cyber Security

* Lessons Learned from other Industries

3
NcFt,• 1 REGjj,

nvensys r t

Process Systems Co.

Diversity, Defense in Depth

" IPS - install a highly available, highly

reliable Triple Modular Redundant (TMR)

controller for Reactor Protection and

ESFAS with a diverse digital controller I/A

series

" Use technology to solve this issue- not

challenge the license base or operation

position

4
inver

Process Sy

r,,\P REGQ•

isys®•

fstems 0

Diversity, Defense. in Depth

" Invensys and our customers need a

workable and understandable position on

issues of concern - causing. confusion and

delays

" Common Cause Failure - extensive

diagnostics and a highly developed

platform substantially reduce this risk

5
t' 1REG&4

invensAys..

Process Systems C

Risk Informed Digital I&C

" Consultative teaming relationship

" TMR technology - deployed on safety,

mission critical, and life critical systems

* This technology currently supports High

Probabilistic Reliability Analysis numbers

* Need to evaluate and take credit for

.methodologies used in other countries and

industries

6
NtREGI/ -,

!nvensys ,5o

Process Systems 00

Operator Training

° TMR, Fault Tolerant, High Diagnostic

systems allow for minimal training for

Operations

* Can be used on Important To Safety and

Safety Related applications minimizing

training

7
invensys® Process Systems ~"p' SIV0

Cyber Security

* Invensys is committed to industry leading

cyber security initiatives

* Utilize Wurldtech Securities Achilles

Level 1 assessment test

Security benchmark

as Cyber

8
* Nft RE04/4

'4,o

Invensys®• •

Process Systems

Lessons Learned from other

Industries

e Triconex is by far the most trusted safety system in the continuous process industries

9 Make obsolescence "Obsolete

* Provide Digital Commercial Off The Shelf

Technology (COTS) Solutions under a I OCFR

Appendix B program

* IPS safety platform meets safety criteria for

Hydro Carbon Industry and Rail Signaling

Industry

9
ý,pkREGU4

invensys®

Process Systems

Conclusion

* We are pleased with the progress being

made by the recent working groups

* Facilitate technology transfer from other

Mission Critical / High Reliability industries

* Staff should continue to develop

consultative relationships with key

technology providers

10
_\v,ýV REG&j4

nvensys 

°

Process Systems -

Conclusion

* IPS encourages the staff to engage I&C

design early in COL phase for new builds

* IPS is committed to the industry, to help resolve I&C issues, on existing and new

plant designs to accelerate the

renaissance of nuclear power

11
API 000

Digital Instrumentation and

Control

July 18, 2007

Cynthia McGinnis

Westinghouse Electric Company

*GWestinghouse APIOOO

1
AP1000 Design

Certification Finality

* Functional Design

* Applicable codes and

standards-

* Basic architecture

* Diversity/Defense-in- Depth

* Minimum Inventory

" Diverse Actuation

Functions

* Design Acceptance

Criteria

2
APIO00 I&C Design and

Licensing Efforts

* Plant Simplicity Drives I&C Safety

System Simplicity

-One-time component actuation

* Common Q Platform

*"Simple" digital I&C

implementation

" Technical Reports

* Existing requirements and

Guidance remain applicable

3
Fundamentals the Same as

Operating Plants

* Functional Basis Simplistic and

Transparent

* Architecture Basis

- Divisional Independence

- Safety/Non-Safety Separation

Isolation

* Communications and Architecture driven from operating plant design and

experience

* Analog to Digital Implementation does

not impact Fundamental Philosophy

4
AP1000 I&C Evolutions •ooo

* Diverse Actuation Functions

Functionality resolved in Design

Certification

Separate sensors/actuators from,

those used by the Safety'System

New Plant (clean sheet) flexibilities

" Priority for safety system actuation

* Cyber Security Issues

API000 Technical Report

Consistent with NEI-04-04

5
APIOOO Licensing Efforts

* Design Certification resolved many I&C

issues for the APIOOO Design

* Technical Reports/DCD Revision 16 to

resolve I&C DAC

* NRC interactions to establish sufficient

information for reasonable assurance

* Simplistic digital I&C application results

in acceptable use of existing regulatory

requirements and guidance

6
AP1 000 Licensing Efforts

" Development of Cyber Security Plan

TR is developed and submitted

Continued work with Industry and

Staff to resolve the issues/concerns

- Consistent with NEI-04-04

" Westinghouse-proposed schedule for

resolution by Spring 2008

7
Conclusions/Comments

9 Design Certification resolved many I&C issues

for API 000

* Existing NRC regulatory requirements and

guidance sufficient to evaluate AP1000 I&C

safety. system

" Licensing basis for I&C in the design

certification rule

" Propose to resolve I&C DAC in DCD

amendment currently under NRC staff review

* Result in elimination of the DAC from the

AP1000 Design Certification Rule upon

successful NRC reasonable assurance

conclusion

e Operating plant upgrade issues different

8
U

DIGITAL I&C

Grid Operations

July 1 8 th 2007

Tom Bowe

PJM Interconnection

bowet@pjm .,c,om
pAPjm PJM's MISSION

* Maintain the safety, adequacy,

reliability and security of the bulk

power system

" Create and operate a robust,

competitive, and non-discriminatory

electric power market

• Ensure that no Member or group

of Members has undue influence

RTO = Regional Transmission Operator

2
PJM's Area of Operations

V I

1 '7 •

PJM RTO (Post-intearatlons)

Generating Units

Generation Capacity

Peak Load

Annual Energy

Transmission Miles

Area (Square Miles)

Customers

Population Served

States (+ D.C.)

1,400

170,807 MW

144,000 MW

648,000 GWh

55,000

186,000

21 Million

50+ Million

13 states + D.C.

I

r w -~

f

/

/

PJrM 66m flde. t;J v ©2003 PJM3
Generation Svstem Operator

4
I Transmission System Operations

@2003 5 PJM
*pJ m Back-Up Capability

* We Must Maintain Situational Awareness

& a Wide Area View

- Y2K

- September 11 th 2001

-August 14th 2003

* PJM exists on its data streams

- Multiple and Diverse Communication Paths

* Digital I&C Provides for Greater Visibility

and Flexibility

* Creative Training

6
9pj *,lj m1 Cyber Security

9 Starts with Defining - "What is Critical?"

9 If everything is critical than nothing is a 0

" Must also define the "Electronic Perimeter"

- Defense in Depth

- Network Segmentation

" Conduct Independent Vulnerability

Assessments

" NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection

Standards (CIP 002-009) and/or ISO 17799

7
44pjmII PJM's Advanced Control Center Concepts

" Visualization with a focus on human factors

and role vs. function based displays

" The evolution of intelligent event processing

and intelligent agents

" Improvements in control through advanced

algorithms, improved visualization, advanced

look ahead, modeling of heuristics.

" Synchronized control centers for rapid

recovery

8
COMPUTING SUBSYSTEMS

(Safety and Reliability Challenges)

July 18, 2007

Homayoon Dezfuli, Ph.D.,

Manager, System Safety

Office of Safety. and Mission Assurance

NASA Headquarters
Role of Computing Subsystems -I

Perform safety-critical and mission-critical

functions

- Power management

- Telemetry

Data and information handling

Communication

Hardware'automation and control

* Have contributed to several spacecraft

accidents

- Software data specification errors

- Software design specification errors

2
'd

What is NASA Doing? U

* Improving system engineering (SE)

processes to better handle

hardware/software, software/human and

software/software interfaces and design

trade studies

" Improving software assurance processes

" Exploring the applicability of risk

assessment techniques to risk-inform the SE

and software assurance processes

3
01

Challenges for Risk-informing

Software Safety

" Need: Ability to predict (or bound) with a

given level of. confidence the likelihood of

mission failure due to latent software

defects to support

- Risk management decisions (e.g., designing SW

testing regimes for risk significant

configurations)

Risk acceptability decisions (e.g., showing that a

probabilistic safety criterion is being met)

" Based on results to-date, it appears that a

combination of techniques is needed to

satisfy this need

4
.• I . I

Exploratory Ideas

Risk management decisions

- Application of scenario-based accident modeling

techniques to identify system-critical configurations, flight

mode changes, and flight transients

- Risk-informed testing regimes

* Risk acceptability decisions

- Assignment of initial reliability levels (ranges) based on

* attributes such as design complexity, and SW quality V&V

process considerations (risk classification of software

elements)

- Adjustment of reliability levels based on V&V and riskinformed test process findings (updating of initial reliability

levels)

* Continue focused research

- Beneficial to work with NRC

15
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Protecting People and the Environment

Briefing on Digital Instrumentation

and Controls

Update on New Reactors

Update on Digital Research Platform

July 18, 2007

Luis Reyes

Executive Director for Operations
Acronyms

ABWR

ACRS

APWR

BWR

COL

D3

DC

DOE

EIS

EPR

EPR

EPU

ESP

ESBWR

FPGA

FPL

FY

GDC

I&C

INPO

IT

LLTF

Advanced Boiling Water Reactor

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor

Boiling Water Reactor

Combined License

Diversity and Defense-in-Depth

Design Certification

Department of Energy

Environmental Impact Statement

Evolutionary Power Reactor

Evolutionary Power Reactor

Extended Power Uprate

Early Site Permit

Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor

Field-Programmable Gate Array

Florida Power & Light Company

Fiscal Year

General Design Criteria

Instrumentation and Control

Institute for Nuclear Power Operations

Information Technology

Lessons Learned Task Force

NFPA

NMSS

NRC

NRO

NRR

NSIR

NUREG

OGC

PRA

PWR

RAI

RES

RG

RIS

SRM

SRP

SWP

TVA

TXU

SER

SGI

TWG

National Fire Protection Association

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of New Reactors

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

technical report (Nuclear Regulatory Commission)

Office of General Counsel

Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Pressurized Water Reactor

Request for Additional Information

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Regulatory Guide

Regulatory Issue Summary

Staff Requirements Memorandum

Standard Review Plan

Strategic Workforce Planning

Tennessee Valley Authority

Texas Utilities Energy Corporation

Safety Evaluation Report

Safeguards Information

Task Working Group

2
Agenda

Introduction

Readiness for New Reactors

Digital I&C Research Platform

Digital I&C Steering Committee

Diversity and Defense-in-Depth

Highly-Integrated Control Room

Digital Risk Assessment

L. Reyes

W. Borchardt

R. Croteau

J. Grobe

M. Mayfield

M. Cunningham

M. Cunningham

3
~U.S.NRC

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Protecting People and the Environment

Readiness for New

Reactors

William Borchardt

Office of New Reactors
New Reactor Licensing Applications

An estimated schedule by Fiscal Year U Y I I I I

2005 12006 2007 2008 12009 2010 1 2011 2012 12013 12014 I U 4

APIOOO Fqrogram R~view - U I -, I w I

LU~arb~>

Dei-n I Prnrjrpq-,; Fnprnv - H:;rricz INM

FI 'Fer

-~

* Schedules depicted for

future activities represent

nominal assumed review

durations based on submittal

time frames in letters of intent

from prospective applicants.

Actual schedules will be

determined when applications

are docketed.

~EU , W~k....LL~.g.LiLi~ -

S.-

I Hearina> I + - 4,.I--.

ESBWR Rrogram R~view

I- .U

iiI~Ir

ndGUý2SP~ Heaij

IH-earibd:-

-n- I H~~rinn

I Hearinuj

Legend:

.r OM - .

Hearin ost SEREIS

Hearing (other hear ng activities

occur during ESPIC )L safety

ande vironmental eviews)

I

II

EPR Program Revi w F

- ~ .. -

Hear[oq,ý*,'>

rJea

HeaEl! r7

---- I-.-

4 4 4- 4-I t"

I

I

ABWR Poogram Reiew UI LLLW4 I 1- 4 4 I I .- 1-

I

USAPWF Program Review

I I

U nspeci~ied M H~a~ Hearia I 625/0

7FHearing 6/25/07
New Reactor Infrastructure

e Approved Rulemakings: Part 52

and Limited Work Authorizations

* Finalized Regulatory Guide 1.206

"Combined License Applications

for Nuclear Power Plants"

6
New Reactor Infrastructure

* Completed final wave of staff

transfers from NRR

• Populating Licensing Program

Plan

* Developed Combined License

application acceptance review

guidance

7
Pre-application Activities

" Pre-Combined License interactions

and site visits, and application

readiness assessment visits

" Public outreach

* Design Centered Working Group

meetings

* International interactions

" Orders imposing safeguards

information protection requirements

8
UNITED 

US.N 

STATES NUCLEAR 

NRC

REGULATORY COMMISSION

Protecting People and the Environment

Research Platform

Rick Croteau

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Test Facility

" Develop a defined set of concepts

- Input from interested stakeholders

Investigating other similar facilities

" Conduct a public workshop

- September 6 & 7 - technical issues - September 11 - non-technical issues

i Prepare Commission paper

- Results of workshop - Recommendations on path forward

10.
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Protecting People and the Environment

Digital Instrumentation

and Controls Steering

Committee

Jack Grobe

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Background

• November 8, 2006, Commission

briefing

* December 6, 2006, Staff

Requirements Memorandum

• January 12, 2007, memorandum

established the Digital I&C

Steering Committee

12
Key Challenges

* Assuring predictability through

refined Regulatory Guidance

* Anticipating future needs

- Evolving technology

- Industry priorities

* Improving stakeholder interactions

* Expanding domestic and

international interactions

13
Digital l&C

Future Workload

* Operating reactor modifications

" Design Certification

* Combined License

" Fuel-cycle facilities

14
Steering Committee

[NRC Line Organizations

4" - " Industry Contacts

rnteractiort with NRC Line Organtzations

Public Interaction with Industry Contacts

15
Structure of Project Plan

" Defined problem statements under

each Task Working Group

( Developrn Interim. Staff Guidance .(near-'term)

" Interactive effort with industry

* Revise Regulatory Guides and

industry standards (long-term)

16
Stakeholder Interactions

• Conducted 30ipublic meetings with

the industry since November 2006

-5 Public Steering Committee

meetings

-25 Public Task Working Group meetings

* ACRS interactions

* Expanded domestic and

international interactions

17
~U.S.NRC

i UNITED STDATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Protecting People and the Environment

Diversity and

Defense-i'n-Depth

Michael Mayfield

Office of New Reactors
Diversity and Defense-in-Depth

• Common-cause failures are

credible

* Current guidance has been

successfully used

* Staff is working to improve

existing guidance

19
Diversity and Defense-in-Depth

* Seven key issues being addressed:

- Adequate diversity

- Operator action

- Component vs. system level

actuation

- Effects of common-cause failures

-Common cause failure applicability

- Echelons of defense

- Single failure

20
Diversity and Defense-in-Depth

* Development of Interim Staff Guidance is well underway

-Acceptable diversity and

defense-in-depth criteria

-Criteria on remaining issues

under internal review

21
Diversity and Defense-in-Depth

• Path forward

- Issuance of Interim Staff

Guidance

-Continued interaction with

industry

-Update Regulatory Guides and

Standard Review Plan

22
S~U.S.NRC.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Protecting People and the Environment

Highly Integrated Control

Room -- Com unications and

Risk Assessment

Mark Cunningham

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Highly-Integrated Control

Room Communications

" Communications issues

- Between safety divisions

- Between safety, and nonsafety

equipment

" Staff is working to improve

guidance

24
Highly-Integrated Control

Room--Communications

• Four key technical areas

- Inter-divisional communications

- Command prioritization

- Multi-divisional control/display

stations

- Network configuration

25
Highly-Integrated Control

Room--,Co mmunications

• Improved guidance on schedule

- Inter-divisional communications

- Command prioritization

26
Highly-Integrated Control Roo m--Commun ications

* Continuing interactions

- Multi-divisional workstations

* Non-safety workstations for

safety indication and control

- Network configuration

27
Highly-Integrated Control

Room--Communications

• Path forward

-Issuance of Interim Staff

Guidance

-Continued public interaction with

industry

-Update Regulatory Guides and

Standard Review Plan

28
Digital Risk Assessment

* Expanding Use

-Risk insights in design

certifications

- Risk-informing regulatory

practices

* Staff is working to develop

guidance

29
Digital Risk Assessment

* Risk insights

- Information sources

* Industry white papers

*NRC research

* Operating experience

* Path forward

-'Continued public interactions

with industry

- Develop Interim Staff Guidance

30
Digital Risk Assessment

* Risk-informing regulatory

practices

- State of technology

-Path Forward

- Continued public interactions

with industry

- Develop guidance

31
Summary

* Steering committee is fu

effectively

* Project plan is in place

" Interim Staff Guidance is

developed

" Stakeholder interactions

" Strong industry support

" Staff is on'schedule to c

near-term deliverables

nctioning

being

)mplete

32