Dismissed in Part and Reversed and Re ndered in Part and Opinion filed February 14 , 202 3
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 21

- 00178

- CV NO. 14

- 21

- 0017 9- CV NO. 14

- 21

- 00180

- CV
SHAWN DEANE GRUSS, AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF MAURITA J. GALLAGHER; AND NUCLEAR SO URCES AND SERVICES, INC. , Appellant s V. GARY W. GALLAGHER, DANIELLE KEOGH, BRENT R. CALDWELL, AND DIVERSIFIED MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC , INDIVIDU ALLY AND AS TRUSTEES OF NSSI ACQUISITION TRUST; DANIEL WEBSTER KEOGH; NSSI ACQUISITI ON TRUST ; AND NSSIDMS HOUSTON, LLC , Appellee s
On Appeal from the Proba te Court No . 3 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . 442,656 , 442,656

- 401 , and 442,656

- 402



### O P I N I O N In three consolidated appeals from identical interlocutory judgments2 rende red in three trial court case s, we c onclude we have appellate jur isdiction over paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgments under section 51.014(a)(4) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code . We reverse the second sentence of p aragraph 6 and paragraph 7 of the j ud gments , declare the se pa rt s of the j udgments void for failure
to fix the amount of secur ity to be given , and order the m dissolved. After

c oncluding that the trial court erred in granting a motion to dissolve temporary injunction in the first senten ce of para graph 6 of the j udgments , we reverse this
sentence a nd render judgment denying th e motion to dissolve. After determining that we lack appellate jurisdiction over paragraphs 3

- 5 of the j udgments , we dismiss the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh issues f or l ack of jurisdiction

. Because judicial efficiency does not militate against requiring the appellant s to file a separate original proceeding , we do not treat the appellant s’ b rief as a petition for writ of mandamus. I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND App el lant Nuclear Sources and Services, Inc. (the “ Company ”) is a closely held corporation found ed by Robert Gallagher, the husband of Maur ita Gallagher. The Company p ro cesses nuclear and other toxic waste chemicals. Before his death Robert owned 100% of the st oc k of the Company . Robert died on Oc t ober 8 , 2014, and the assets of his estate , including the Company stock, passed under the terms of his will to his survi ving spou se Maurita. Maurita died on August 25, 2015, and the stock of the Company became an asset of Maurita ’ s estate. Robert ’ s d a ughter , Shawn Gr uss, qualified as Independent Executor of the Es tate of Maurita Gallagher. Shawn a sked her brother Gary W. Ga lla gher (“ Gar y”) , son of Robert and a beneficiary of Maur ita ’ s Estate , to ass ist Shawn in hand li ng the C ompany. On August 16, 2016, Shawn as Independent Executor of the Es tate of3 Maurita Gallagher (the “ Executor ” ) and Gary as Member of th e Board of Tr u stees of NSS I Acquisition Trust ( “ Acqu isiti on Trust ” ), an entity cr eated for the purpose of buying 1 00% of t he outstanding common stock of the Company (the “ S ha res ” ) , signed a Stock Purchase Agreement (the “ Agreement ” ) effect ive as of May 1, 2016. T h e A g reement pro vided terms and conditions for Acquisition Trust to purchase the S hares from the Executo r
. T he Agreement was signed in the offices of Brent R. Caldw ell , a lawyer who repre sented the Executor when the Agreement was drafted and signed. Caldwell was also a member of the Company ’ s Board of Directors and a trustee of Acqui sition Trust.
The Agreemen t pr ovided t hat the aggregate pur chase pri ce for the Shares was $2,405, 882.50 (the “ Pu r chase Price ” )

. It is undisputed that to date, A cquisition Trust has not paid the Executo r any part o f t he Purchase Price. Var i ous disp utes

arose relating to the Co mpany , i n cluding a dispu te be tween the Executo r and Acquisition Trust as to the meaning of the A greement ’ s la nguage and as to whether the I n dependent Executor or Acquisition Trust owns the Shares.
The First Case In c ause number 442,656 in Harris County Proba t e C ourt Number 3 , 1 Plaintiffs Sandra Bentley, Timothy Meyers, and Christina Meyers , beneficiaries of the Estate (the “Bentley Parties”), each individually and derivatively on behalf of the C ompany filed claims against the Executor , Gary , Daniel We bster Ke o u g h (Gary’s son

- in

- law) , Danielle Keough (Gary’s daughter) , C aldwell , Diversified Management Services, LLC (“Diversified”), A cquisition Trust , and NSSIDMS Hou ston, LLC (“NSSIDMS”). I n this c ase (the “ First Case ” ) , t he Bentley Parties
assert ed the followin g c l aims: (1) a declaratory judgment action against all

1 Th is cause number w as assigned w hen the Executor f iled an application to proba te the will of Maurit a Gall a gher

.4 defendants seeking declarations that (a) the Agreement is void and unenforceable; (b) any purported sale of the Shares by the Execu tor without court approval is

v oid; and (c) the B usiness Services Agr e e m e nt, and Gary and Daniel’s Executive Employment Agreements are void as a matter of law; (2) breach

- of

- fiduciary

- duty claims against Gary, Daniel, Caldwell, and Gruss; (3) waste of corporat e asset claims against Gary , Daniel, and Cald well; (4) an action t o r escind certain
t ransactions against Gary, Daniel, and Caldwell; (5) fraud claims against Gary, Acquisition Trust, and Diversified, (6) conversion claims against all defendants, (7) purpor ted unjust enrichment claim s against all defendants, ( 8) a reques t f o r a constructive trust against Diversified and NSSIDMS, (9) a request for appointment of a receiver for the Company, and (10) a request for the appointment of an auditor

. The Executor set tled t he Bentley Parties ’ c laims against her , and the Bentley Par t i e s assi gned their claims against the other defendants to the Execu tor

. In the First C ase, the Executor also asserted a cross claim against Caldwell, Gary, and Danielle as trustees of Acquis ition Trust , seeking a decla ration that the Estate

o f Maurita J. G a l l ag her (the “ Estate ” ) is the lawful own er of the S hares. O n August 13, 2019, the trial court signed a temporary injunction in the First Case enjoining G ary , Daniel , Dani elle , Diversified, Acqu isition Trust, and NSSIDMS from (1) holding themse lves ou t as s t ockholders, officers, or directors of the Company, (2) taking any position contrary to the Company’s current Board of Director s , (3) taking any action in furtherance of a sale of the Company’s stock
or assets , (4) making any withdrawals or a uthorizi n g an y transfer of any funds from any bank or bro k erage account of the Company, Diversified, or NSSIDMS , (5) taking any action as a shareholder of Acquisition Trust, and (6 ) engaging in any self

- deal ing transactions or transactions with interested parties u nder s ection 21.418 of the Texas Business Organizations Co de. In th is injunction , the trial court order ed the Company to suspend performance of all contracts with any of t he5 e njoined p arties and ord er ed the e njoined p arties not to take any action against t he C o m pany to enforce any purported contractual obligation of the Company without the trial court’s permission. The Second Case In Cause No. 442 , 656

- 401 (the “Second Ca se”) , the Executor sued Div ersified as Trustee of Acquisition Trust seeking (1) t h e fo llo w i ng declaratory relief: (a) a declaration as to the rights of ownership in the Shares , (b) a declaration that the Estate owns the S hares, and (c) a declaration th at the Estate is entitled t o reasonable attor ney’s fees; and (2) the following injunc t ive rel i e f: (a) an injunction that Diversified not assert any position contrary to the Company’s Board of Directors; (b) an injunction that Diversified not make any withd rawals or authorize any tra nsfers from any ba nk or brokerage account maintained by th e Com pan y or Diversified (to the extent the Company’s funds are in such accounts); (c) an injunction that Diversified not engage in any transactions that constitute self

dealing or that otherwise r epresent transacti ons with interested parties under sectio n 21. 418 o f the Texas Business Organizations Co de ; and (d) an injunction that Diversified not take any action in furtherance of a sale or potential sale of the Company to any buyer. In the Second C ase o n August 13, 2019 , the trial court signed a temporary inju ncti o n whose body contains the same text as the August 13 , 2019 temporary injunction in the First Case

. In th is s econd August 13 , 2019 temporary injunction , the trial court enjoins Gary, Da niel, Dani elle, Acquisition Trust , and NSSIDMS even though none of th em i s a party in the Second Case. The Thir d Case In Cause No. 442 , 656

- 402 (the “Third Case”) , the Company sued Gary, Daniel, Caldwell, and Diversified asserting the fo llowing claims: (1) breach

- of

fiduciary

- duty claims against Gary, Daniel, and C a ldwell; (2 ) m oney - had

- and

-6 received claims against Gary, Daniel, and Diversified; (3) Theft Liability Act claims against Gary, Daniel, and Diversified; (4) conversion claims ag ainst Gary, Daniel, and Div ersified; (5) a negligence claim against Caldwell; a n d (6) a d e c l a ratory

- judgment action against all defendants seeking declarations that (a) Gary and Daniel’s Executive Emp loyment Agreements are each void as a matter of law; (b) the Business Services Agre ement between the Company and Diversified is void as a matter o f l aw; and (c) the website “nssienvironmental.com” belongs to the Company. The trial court did not issue any temporar y injunction in the Thi rd Case

. A l though the Company sought declaratory relief, the Company did not seek a declaratory judgment as to the ow n e rship of the Shares or as to the effect of the Agreement on the tra nsfer of ownership of the C ompany’s stock from the Estate to Acquisition Trust. The Trial Court ’s Sepa rate T rial Order The Ex ecutor filed an opposed motion to consolidate t he three c as e s , alon g with two cases regarding the Estate of Robert Gallagher, into a single case. T he C ompany joined the motio n. In an order entitled “Order on Shawn Deane Gruss’s First Ame nded Motion to Consolidate Joined by [the Company],” the trial co u rt
state d th a t this motion came on to be heard, and then procee ded to not rule on consolidation

. Instead , the trial court s tate d that “by agreement between counsel, two (2) issues shall be tried to the bench.” The trial court order ed that “the cause of

a c tion pled in [ t he First Case, the Second Case, and the Third Case] for a d eclaratory judgment as to the e ffect of the [ A gree ment ] on the transfer of ownership of the [ S h ares] f rom the [Es tate] to [ Acquisition Trust ] shall be tried to the bench on [ a speci f ied date]. ” T h e trial court also ordered that the claims in one of the cases regard ing the Estate of Robert Gallagher “shall also be tried t o the7 bench if same is nece ssary.” 2 Although the trial court state d in this order that the re

was a claim in the Thi r d Case for de c l aratory relief regarding the Agreement , there

never has been any claim for such relief in the Third Ca se. Although the trial court suggested that it was ruling on the Executor ’ s motion to consolidate, the court

ne ve r ruled on this motion, a n d the Firs t C a s e, Second Case, and Third Case remain unconsolidated

. Instead of granting consolidation, the trial court effectively determined t hat a declara tory

- judgment claim alle gedly pending in the three cases should be tr ied together in a bench trial separate f rom t he trial of the remaining claims in each of the respective cases. So the substance of the order is a separ ate trial order rather than a con so lidation o rder.
A Bench Trial and A Judgment
The trial court conducted a two

- day bench trial on th e claims fo r d e c laratory relief allegedly pending in the three separate cases. After trial the court signed a judgment that was entered by the clerk in each of the three cas es. In the judgments, the trial court stat ed in pertine nt part:

• “ The ca uses of acti o n tried to th e bench related only to [ the Executor ’s] request for a declaratory judgment as to the effect of the [Agreement] on the transfer of ownership of the [ Shares ] fro m the Estate to [Acquisition Trust] in [ the First Cas e, the Second Ca se, and the T hird Case ] .”

• T h e trial court order ed “that pursuan t to the terms of the [ A gre ement] , the Closing commenced on August 16, 2016 (“Closing”), but has not been completed; accordingly, [Acquisition Trust] has sixty (60) days from th e date of this O rder to pay t he Purchas e P r i ce of . . . ($2,405,882.50) to the Estate for the [ Shares ] as set forth in the [ A greement ] between the [ Estate ] and [A cquisition Trust] entered into August 16, 2016 dated effective May 1, 2016 ( “ Purc hase Price ” ) to finalize the Closing. ”

• Th e trial cou rt o r der ed “that upon timely delivery of the purchase price the

2 A pparently tryin g t h e claims in th is c as e was no t necessary beca u se the r ecord reflects tha t the trial court d id not try these clai ms alo ng with the decla ratory

- judgment cla i ms ment ioned.8 stock shall remain in the possession, ownership and control of [Acquisition Trust]; however, if the trustees of Acquisition Trust fail to pay the Purchas e Pric e to the Estate by no l ater t han six t y ( 60) days from the date of this Order, the [A greement ] is null and void and ownership of the [ Shares ] will vest with the Estate, which shall be declared the lawful owner of the [ Shares ]

. ”

• The trial court also or der ed “that in the event [ Ac q uisiti on T rus t ] pays the Purchase Price to the Estate within sixty (6 0) days of this Order then all other terms of the [Agree ment] shall remain in place, including b ut not limited to, [ the Executor ’s] right within sixty (60) da ys aft er receipt of the Purc h ase Pr ice to o b tain a current Adjusted Valuation (i.e., “ Fairness Opi nion ” ). ”

• The trial court order ed that its “ Temporary Injunction, dated August 13, 2019, is DISSOLVED. ” 3

• The trial court further order ed “that the current book s a nd records of [the Compan y ] shal l be ma d e available to [Acquisition Trust] immediately and the parties shall cooperate to provide [Acquisition Trust] access to [the Company] at a mutuall y agreed date and time but no later than [within] two (2) weeks of the date of this judgment .”

• T he tri al c our t order ed “that no expenditures or distributions shall b e made by [the Company] other than in the ordinary course of business without prior approval of the Court. ” The trial court did not rule on the parties ’ reque sts for attorney’s fees but s tated in
t he j u dgment that the parties could submit applications for attorney’s fees as to the claims tried in the bench trial within 90 days of the date of the judgment. The Executor and the Company ( collectively the “ Gruss Par ties ” ) timely perfected a n inter loc u tor y appeal from the identical judgment s that the trial cour t rendered in each of the three cases (collectively the “ Judgments ” )

. In each judgment, the trial court ordered all remaining claims in each of the three case s to be tried to the bench on a specified d ate , b ut before that date, the trial court granted the Executor ’s mot ion to abate each of the three cases pending the disposition of

3 Pres umably the trial c ourt meant to dissolve the t emp orar y injunction it issued on tha t date in the Fi rs t Case and the temporary i njunctio n it issued on t h at date in the Seco n d Case

.9 the interloc utory a ppeal in eac h case by the Executor and the Company. The trial court set a sup ersedeas amount for the Ju dgment s , and counsel for the Executor and the Co mpany ma de a cash depo sit in lieu of supersedeas bond in this amount

. The trial court also issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I I. I SSUES AND A NALYSIS
A. Does th is court have appe l late ju ris di ct ion to review the Judgments?
T he Gruss Par ties assert i n their second issue that the trial court erred in dissolving the August 13, 2019 tem porary inju nctions. In their third issue, the Gruss Parties contend that the trial court erred in is su ing a new tempora ry in

junction in the J udgments. In their fourth, fifth, sixth, a nd seventh issues the Gruss Parties challenge the merits of the relief the trial court granted in the Judgments regarding the A greement and Acqui sition T rust ’ s ability to pa y the Purc h as e Price and t o own the Shares. In their first issue the Gruss Pa r ties assert that this co urt has appellate jurisdi ction to co n sider all issues presented in their appellate brief. The Gruss Parties brief various base s on whi ch they assert this

c ourt has a pp el late jurisd iction. Appellees Gary W. Gallagher, Daniel Webste r Keogh, Danielle Keogh, Diversified Management Services, LLC , NSSI Acquisition Trust , and NSSIDMS Hou ston, LLC (collectively the “ Gallagher Parties ” ) have filed an appellate brief. 4 The Galla gh er Parti e s assert t hat this court has appellate jurisdiction , although th ey do not br ief this point or specify the basis on which they think this court has jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal. We are ob ligated to review sua sponte issu e s affecting ou r appell a te jurisdi cti on. Se e M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape , 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004 ). Thus, we first a ddress whether and to what exten t

4 Caldwell represents himself on ap peal and has not fi l ed a brief.10 this court has appe ll ate jurisd iction in th ese app eals.
1. Are the J udgments final judgments app ealable under sect io n 51.012 of the Civ il Practice and Remedies Cod e? In civil cases in which the judgment or amount in controversy exceeds $250, exclusive of interest and costs, a person may take an appeal to the court of appeals from a final judgment of a district or coun ty court. S ee Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012 (West, Westlaw through 2021 R.S .)

. Under the general rule for determining finality, a n order issued without a conventional trial on the merits is final for purposes of appeal if it ( 1) actua lly dispos es of all c laims and all parties before the court or (2) s tates with unmistakable clari t y that it is a final judgment. See Lehmann v

. Har

– Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 192, 200 (Tex. 2001)

. In each of the J udgments , the trial court did not ac tually dispose of al l claims and all pa rti es before the court , nor did the trial court state with unmista kable clarity that the judgment is a final judgment. 5 See id

. The tr ial cou rt did not grant a severance to make any of the Judgments final. U nder the g eneral rule for de te rmining f inality,

e ach of the judgments is interlocu tory and not appealable under sect ion 51.01 2 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Cod e. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51. 012 ; Lehmann , 39 S.W.3d at 192, 200

. The Gruss Parties a nd the Gallagher Par ties agr e e that this is so

. 2. Are the Judgments fin al order s under section 32.001(c) of the Estates Code ? An exception to the general rule for determinin g finality applies in probate cases because orders resolving certain discrete matters in probate cas es may be final for purposes of appeal even though these or ders do not dispose of all pending parties and claims. See Tex. Est. Code § 32

. 001 (c) (West, Westlaw through 2021

5 Indeed, the trial court acknowledged that the Judgments were not final since i t abated all remaining c laims pending this appeal.11 R.S.) (“A final order issued by a probate court is appealabl e to the court of
ap pea ls”); Lehman n , 39 S.W.3 d at 195 ; Crowson v. Wakeham , 897 S.W.2 d 779, 781

– 83 (Tex. 1995); Clark v . Clark , 638 S.W.3d 829, 835 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.)

. To determine whether the prob ate order is fin a l on this ba sis, we fi rst consider wh ether there is a s tatute specifically declaring this type of order to be the end of a particular phase of proceedings under the Est ates Code. See De Ayala v. Mackie , 193 S.W.3d 575, 578

– 79 (Tex. 2006); Crowson , 897 S.W

. 2d at 781 –83 . If there is such a s ta t ute, then that statute controls; if not, the order is final i f, in the order, the probate court disposed of all parties and all iss ues in a particular phase of the probate proceedings of which the order logically may b e considered a part. Se e De Ayala , 19 3 S.W.3d at 578

– 79; Crowson , 897 S.W.2d at 781

– 83; Clark , 638 S.W.3d at 835 . Probate proceedings are an exceptio n to the “one final judgment” rule

. Lehman , 39 S.W.3d at 192. N ot every interlocutory order in a probate case, however, is appealable. See De Ay a la , 193 S.W.3d at 578. There is no statute specifically declaring orders like the J ud gments to be the end o f a particul a r phase of proceedings under the Estates Co de. Thus, to determine whether the Judgments are final and appealable under the probate

ex c eption to the general rule for determining finality, we must determine (1) if there i s a particular phase of t he p robate pro ceedings of which the J udgments logically may be considered a part, and (2) if, in the J udgments , the probate court dis posed of al l partie s and all issues in this phase. See id . at 578

– 79; Crowson , 897 S.W.2d at 781

– 83; Clark , 638 S.W.3d at 83 6. To make this determination, we examine the live ple adings contained i n the record.
I n each judgment, the tria l court granted cer tain decl ar a tory relief, and did not dispose of the remaining claims. The adjudicated claims for declaratory relief

are n o t t h emsel ves a particular phase of the probate proceedings ; rather, the y are12 some of the c laims asserted in the cases below. In none of the Jud gm e nts did the trial court dispose of all parties and all issues in a particular phase o f the probate proceeding s. Se e De Ayala , 193 S.W.3d at 578

– 79 (holding t hat an or der refusing
to remove an executor did not dispose of all parties and all issues in a p ar t icular phase of the probate proceeding s ); C rowson , 897 S.W.2d at 781

– 83 (holding that interlocutory summary j u dgm e nt that Cr owson was not t he com m on law wi fe of the d ece dent was interlocutory, even th ou gh it adjudic ated all of Cr owson ’s he irship claims, be cause t he judgment did not adjudicate all of the other parties ’ he irship claims); In re Estate of Pustka , No. 14 -18- 00 166 -CV , 20 18 WL 2926202 , at * 2–3 (Tex. App.

— Hous ton [14th Dist.] Jun. 12, 20 18 , no pet. ) (holding that the trial court’s partial -summary-j udgment order logically should be considered as part of the phase of the probate proceeding in which appellan t req uested to be appointed guardian and sought the remov al of the current guardi an and tha t order ruling on the former request but not th e latt er was int erlocutory) (mem . op.) ; A safi v. Rauscher , No. 14

- 09

- 00800

- CV, 2009 WL 4346067 , at *1

– 2 (Tex. App.

— Hou s ton [14th Dist .] Dec. 3, 2009, pet. denied) (ho lding th at the pr obate court ’s partial

- summ ary - judgment ord e rs were interloc utory and did not di sp o se of a ll parties and all issues in a particular phase of the probate proceeding s be c ause t he

o rders related t o cl aims and i ssues that remained pe nding be for e th e pro bate court ) (m em
. op.) . N one o f the J udgments is a final order under the probate except io n to the general rule for determining finality

. See De Ayala , 193 S.W.3d at 578

– 79 ; Cr owson , 897 S.W.2d at 781

– 83 ; In re Estate of Pustka , 2018 WL 2926202 , at *2– 3 ; A safi v. Rauscher , 2009 WL 43460 67 , at *1 –2.
The Gruss Parties cite Estate of Wright f or the proposition that a probate
court ’s “ order is appea lable if it finally ad judicates some substantial right .” 67 6 S.W.2d 16 1, 163 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.)

. The Supreme13 C ourt of Texas has determ ined that th e “s ubstantial right ” le gal s tandard is no lo nger the correct le gal standard for determining the appe a lability of a probate

c ourt order in this c ontext

. See De Ayala , 193 S.W. 3 d a t 578

– 79 ; C lark , 638 S.W.3d at 83 5. T he Grus s Par ties also cite Christensen v. Hark ins , a case tha t i s also not on point because it did not apply the current legal standar d. See 740 S.W.2d 69, 72

– 74 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1987, n o writ ) (op. on mot. ). Th e G r uss Partie s cite Chase Manha ttan Bank v. Bo wles

. See 52 S.W.3d 871 , 8 78 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2001, no pe t .). B ut the court in that case a pplied a legal standard based on the “ substantial right ” test rather than the cur ren t lega l sta ndard based on the “ part i cul a r phase of th e probate proceeding s.” See id

. T he Gr uss Par ties rely on Estate of Durrill , a ca se in which the Th irteenth Court of A pp eals stated the current legal standard, cited E state of Wright for the “ substantial right ” legal standard , and conclud e d t h at the probat e court ’s judgment was appealable because the judgment

me t “ the tests in Cr owson and in Lehman that ‘ [a] j udgment that finally disposes of

a ll remaining parties and c laims, based on the record in the cas e , is fin al. ’” 570 S.W.3d 945, 956 –5 7 (Tex. App.

— Corpus C hristi 2 019, no pet.). The Estate of Du rrill case is not on p oint. See id . The G ru s s Parties cite Gord on v. Gord on , in which the court o f appeals recited the cor r ect legal sta ndard and concluded the

co urt had appellate jurisdiction, w i thout identifying the particu lar phase of the probate proce e dings involved in the case. See No. 11

- 14 -00 086

- CV, 2016 WL 127 4076, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Eastland Ma r. 31, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) . I n its summary judgment, the probate court in Gordon held th a t the clause at issue was testamentary , that Patrick and Beverly did no t by the joint will revoke the tr ust , and that the t rust assets were not a part of Pat rick ’ s estate

. See id

. Th u s, the Gordon court appears to have concluded that the particular phase o f the probate proceed ing s was the determination as to whethe r the trust assets were assets of Patrick ’s estate and that the trial court ’ s summary judgment dispose d of all parties14 and all issues in t hat particular phase

. See id

. Th e fac ts of Gordon are mat e rial ly differen t from the fac ts in toda y’ s case. See id

. Un der the applicab le legal standard from th e S upreme Court of Tex as , we conclude that we do not hav e appella te jurisdiction u nder section 32.001(c) and t he probate exception to the general rule for determining finality

. See Tex. Est. Code § 32

. 001 (c); De Aya la , 193 S.W.3d at 578

– 79 ; C rowson , 897 S. W. 2 d at 781

– 83 ; In

re Estate of Pustka , 2018 WL 2926202 , at * 2–3 ; A safi v. Rausch er , 2009 WL 43 46067 , at *1 –2.

3. Are parts of t he Judgments s ubject to an interlocutory appeal beca use they grant a temporary i njunction? B ecause the J udgments are interlocuto ry , the y are not appea lable unless explicitly made so by statute. Stary v. DeBord , 967 S.W.2d 3 52, 352

– 53 (Tex. 1998)

. The Gruss Parties assert that in pa r ts of the Judgments t he t rial court granted

a tempor ary i n ju nction , and th us this court ha s interlocuto r y appel late jurisd iction under section 51.014(a)(4) o f the Civil Practice and R emedies Code

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2021 R.S.) . T his
statute provides that “a person may appeal from an interlocutory or d er of a . . . statutory probate court . . . that . . . g rants or refus es a tempor ary injunction

. ” See id

. But, a n appellant may not use an appeal under th i s statute as a vehicl e for obtaining an interlocutory appeal of other rulings not subject to an interlo c utory app eal that are made in the order in which the trial court gra nt ed or refuse d a temporary injunction

. See Clark , 638 S.W.3d at 83 7. To the ext ent the trial co urt grant ed a temporary injunction as well as non

- injunctive re lief that is not subject to

a n interlocutory appeal , this statute provides for an interlocutory appeal onl y from the part of the order in which the trial court granted the temporary injunction. See Ale xander Dubose Je fferson & T o wnsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co. , 540 S.W.3 d 57 7 , 587

– 88 (Tex. 2018); Clark , 638 S.W.3d at 83 7

. This court base s its15 determin a tion as to whether the trial court granted or refused a temporary injunctio n in an order on th e substance, cha racter, and function of the order, not on its form or title. S ee D e l Valle ISD v. Lopez , 845 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Te x. 1992 ); Clar k , 638 S.W.3d at 8 38.
The Gruss Parties argue that Paragraphs 3-7 of the Judgments require the parties to take ce rtain actions and therefore the substance of these paragraphs is a temporary in junc t ion. See C lark , 638 S.W.3d at 838. In paragr a phs 3, 4 , and 5, the trial court interprets th e A greement and allows the partie s to take actions if they wis h, but the court do es not command o r prohi bit any conduct. See id

. The trial court d oes not requir e Ac q uisition Trust to either pay or not pay the P urc hase Price. See id

. In th e fi rst senten ce of paragraph 6, the trial cour t dissolves temporary injunct ions b ut does not c ommand or prohi bi t any conduct. 6 See id

. Under the plain text o f the Judgments and cons i dering the Judgments ’ substance, character, a nd function, we conclude tha t p aragraphs 3 through 5 and the first
sentence of paragr aph 6 of the Judgments do not grant a temporary injunc t ion and

are no t subject to an interlocutory appeal under this par t of s ection 51.014(a)(4) of the Civil Practice and Re medies Code

. See Tex. Civ

. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4); Clark , 638 S.W.3d at 838. However, i n the second sente nce of paragraph 6 of the Judgm e nts, the trial court order s that the curr ent b ooks and r ecords of the Company shall be made available to Acquisitio n Trust immedia tely and t h at the parties cooperate to
pr ovide Acquisi tio n Trust access to the Com pany at a mu t ually agre ed date and time but no l ater t han two weeks after the date of the Judgments . I n this se nt ence, the trial court command s t he part ies , including the C om pany, to engage in certain

6 I n the next subsection , we dis cuss the appe alabi l it y of this sentence und er another part of
se ction 51,014(a) (4) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code

.16 co nduc t

. See Clark , 638 S.W.3d at 838. In paragraph 7 , the trial court orders that no expenditures or distributio ns s hall be made by the Company other tha n in the ordinary course of business without p rior approval of the trial c ourt. I n this
paragra p h the trial court prohi b i t s the Compan y fr om engaging in certain conduc t

. See id

. The Gallagher Parties assert that the se parts of the Judgments are not a new i njunction because they represent no change fr om an a greed temporary injunction i ssued in the Fir st Case on June 24, 2019. 7 In the prior agreed in junction, the trial
court enjoin s the Execu tor and any agents, servants, employees, and

r epresentatives , as we l l as all those acting in concert with her fro m (1) m aking any withdrawals or aut horizing any transfers from any bank or brokerage account maintained by the Comp any or Diversified , except as is necess a ry in the ordinary

course of business to pay trade paya b les to disinterested and independent vendors and payroll expenses of disinterest ed employees, except that the Executor may be paid a $ 600 per week salary from the Company ; (2) e ngaging in any transac t ion
t hat constitutes self

- dealing or that otherwise rep r esents transactions with interested parties u nder Tex as Bus iness Org anizations C ode section 21.418; and (3) t aking any action in furtherance of a sale or potentia l sale of the Company to any buyer, e x cept as may be approved by the trial c ourt, with the ex c eption of exchange of due diligence materials with Republic Services . Th is prior injunction d oes n ot order that the Company ’s curr ent b ooks and records be made available to any party. Though the firs t provision of the prior injunction regarding withdrawal s and transfers from any bank or brokerage acc ount maintained by the Comp any has

s ome si milarity to paragraph 7 of the Injunctions, there are material differences . In additi on, in the prior in junction , the trial court enjoined only the Executor and any

7 The trial court did not issue th is prior inj unction in the Second Cas e or in the T hird Case.17 age n ts, servants, employees, and r epresentatives , as well as all those acting in

conc ert with her. In paragraph 7 of the Judgments, the trial court enjoins the C ompany. We conclude that the second sente n ce of p aragraph 6 and paragraph 7 of the Judgments are d i fferent from the prior injunction in the Fir st Case and do not
serve to maintain or carry for ward the prior injunction. 8 Instead, u nder the plain
text o f the Judgments and considering the J udgment s’ substance, char acter, and function, we conclude that the second sentence of p aragraph 6 and paragraph 7 of the Judgments gran t a new t emporar y inju nct ion and are subject to an inte rlocutory appeal unde r section 51.0 14(a)(4) of t he Civil Practic e and Remed i es Cod e as an interlocutory or der that g rants a tempor ary injunction , whereas the other parts of the Judgments are not subject to an interlocutory appeal under this part of section 51.0 14(a)(4)

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem

. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4) ; Q west Co mmunica tions Corp. v. AT & T Corp. , 24 S.W.3d 3 34, 337 –38 (Tex. 2000) ; Clark , 638 S.W.3d at 838.

4. I s the first sentenc e of pa ragraph 6 of the Judg m ents s ubject to an interlocutory a ppeal because in it the t r ial court gra nt s a motion to dissolve a tempor a ry i njunction? T he Gruss Parties also rel y on th e pa rt o f section 51.014(a)(4) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code in which the Legislature prov ides that “a person may appeal from an interlocutory order o f a . . . stat utory probate court . . . that .

. . grants . . . a motion to dissolve a temporary inj unct i on as provided by Chapter 65. ” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4). Af ter t he bench trial , Acquisition Trust m ov ed to dissolv e the tria l c ourt ’ s temp orary injunction dated Au gu st 1 3, 2019. Under the plain text o f the Judgments and consider i ng the Judgments ’ substance, character, and function, we conclude that i n the first

8 To the extent that this pri o r i njunction has not been dissolved o r set asi de, th e injunction continues to be in effect in the Fi rst Case.18 sentenc e of paragraph 6 the trial c ourt ef fectively grant ed this mo t ion to d issol ve these temporar y injunctions. T h us, this court has juris diction over the Gruss Parties ’ i nterlocuto ry appeal fro m the first sentence of paragra ph 6 of the Judgments under this part of section 51.014(a)(4) of the Civ il Practice and Reme dies C ode

. See id .; Murphy v. McDani el , 20 S.W.3d 87 3 , 877 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2000, no pet.).

5. Does the tria l c ourt ’s grant ing of a temporary injunction in part of the Judg ments or its grant ing o f a motion to dissol ve a temporary injun ction in another pa rt of t he Judg ments mean that all parts of the Judgme n ts are subject to an in terlocu tory appeal under section 5 1.014(a)(4) of the Civil Practice and Remedi es Code ? T he Gruss Part ies assert that bec ause they may p ursue an interlocutory
ap peal of the part s o f the J udgmen t s in which the trial court gra nte d a te m porary inju nction and the part of the Judgments in which the trial court granted a motion to dissol ve a temp orary injunction, they may appeal e very part of the Judgments under section 51.014(a)(4) of th e Civi l Practi ce and Remedies Code

. See Tex. Civ. Pra c . & Rem. Code Ann. § 51 .014(a)(4)

. The cases the Gruss P a rties cite f or this proposition apply subsec tion (a)(6) of section 51.014 of the Civi l Practice and Remedies Code , rathe r than sub sec tion (a)(4). See Tex . Civ

. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014( a)(6) ( West, Westlaw thr ough 2021 R.S.) ; Dallas Symphony Ass’n, Inc. v. Reyes , 571 S.W.3d 753, 760 (Tex. 201 9) ; Delta Airl ines , Inc. v. No rris , 949 S. W.2d 422 , 429 (Tex. App.

— Wac o 199 7 , writ denied)

. The language of

s ubsect ion (a)(6) is materi ally differen t from that of su bs ectio n (a)(4). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Co d e Ann. § 51.014(a)( 6) (stating that “[a] per son may appeal from an interlocutory orde r of a district court, county court at law, statutory probate cour t, or co unty court that

. . . denies a motion f o r summary judgm en t that is based in whole or in part upo n a claim against or defense by a member of t he19 electronic or print media, acting in s u ch capacity, or a person whose

com munication appears in or is pub li shed by the electronic or print media, arisin g under the free s peech or free press clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Article I, Section 8, of the Texas Co n stitution , or Chapter 73 ” ) (emphas is added). Thus, th e cases the Gr uss Pa rties cite are not on point. In

a dditio n , under bindin g precedent, an appeal unde r section 51.01 4 (a)(4) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Co de of the parts of an order or judgment in which the trial c ourt grants or refuses a temporary injunction o r grants or denies a motion to dissolve a tempo ra ry injunction does not give this court i nterlocutory ap p ellate ju risdiction over other parts of the order or judgmen t. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & R em. C ode Ann. § 51.0 14(a)(4) ; Alex ander Dubose Jefferson & Townse n d LLP , 540 S.W.3d at 587 (stating that p ortion s of an order can be injunctive in nature and appealable, while other provisions of the same order can be interlocutory and unreviewable becaus e they do not resembl e injunctive r elief ); Clark , 638 S.W.3d at 83 7 (holdi ng that “[ t]o the extent the trial cour t grants a temporary injunction as well as non - injunctive relief that is not appealable, [ section 51.0 14(a)(4)] provides for an interlocutory a p peal only from the part of the ord er granting the temporary injun c tion ”). Thus, we reject the Gruss Partie s’ arg u ment that the appealability of the trial court ’ s grantin g of a temporary injunction and dissolving of a prior temporary injuncti on makes every ruling in the Judg me nts subject to an interlocutory appeal u nder s ection 51.014(a)(4)

. See Alexander Dubos e Jeff e rson & Townsend LLP , 540 S.W.3d at 587– 88; Clark , 638 S. W .3d at 83 7.
6. D oes this court have appellat e jurisdiction over the nonappealable pa r ts of the Judg ments based on State v. Cook United, Inc. ? In the e v en t tha t this court determines that it h as a pp e llate jurisdiction over paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Ju dgme n ts , the Gr u ss Part ies assert that this court has20 jurisdiction over paragraphs 3

- 5 of t he Jud gments based o n “ pendent ” in terlocut ory appellate jurisd ict i on unde r State v. Cook United, Inc. , 464 S.W.2 d 105 , 106 (Tex. 1971). 9 The Gruss Partie s cite Cook Unit e d for the proposition that an order of the trial court not subject to interlocutory a ppeal may be attacke d in an interl ocutory appeal from the trial c ourt ’ s temporary injunction in so far as the q u estions raised as to the order affect the validity of the temporary inju nction. 10 See S tate v. Cook Un ited, Inc. , 464 S.W.2d 105 , 106 (Tex. 197 1 ). T he Gr u ss Parties assert th at b ecause th e trial court based it s ru ling s in parag raphs 6 and 7 on the tr ial co u rt ’s interpretation of the Agreement and determination of the parties’ rights in paragraphs 3

- 5, the issues they raise a s to paragra phs 3

- 5 af f

e ct the validity of paragraphs 6 a nd 7 , and therefore, this court has “pe ndent ” int erlocut ory appellate ju risd ic t ion to address their issues as to paragra phs 3

- 5

. In Cook United , in an interlocutory appeal from a t e mporary injunction , the defendant s asser t ed two point s o f err or in th e cour t of civil appeals : ( 1) that th e trial court erre d in over ruling their p leas i n abatement , and ( 2) that the trial court erred in failing to state its reasons in the temporary

- injun ction order. See id . The
court of civil a ppeals s us ta ined bot h points and r eve rsed the trial court ’ s

9 The Gruss Parties also rely on a 2000 u npublishe d opinion of th is court , Santo s Ltd . v . Gibson , N o. 14

- 00

- 00151

- CV, 2000 W L 15 88095 (Tex. App.

— Hou s ton [14th Dist.] Oct

. 26, 2000 , n o pet.) (not designated for publicati on). But, because it is an u npublished opinion issued before January 1, 2003 , this opini o n has no prece dent ial value. See Tex

. R. App. P

. 47.7 (b) & 2008 cmt. ; St e arns v. Martens , 476 S.W

. 3d 541, 548 n.5 (Tex

. App.

— Housto n [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet

. ) ; Office of Att ’y Gen ’l v. Long , 40 1 S.W.3d 911, 915, n.2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 201 3 , no pet.).
10 F eder al appella t e court s apply p en d ent interlocut ory appell a te j urisd iction in r a re c ircumstances. See No b le Capital F und Management, L.L.C. v. U.S. C apital Global Investment Managem ent, L.L.C. , 31 F.4th 333, 336

– 37 (5th Cir. 2022). The Gruss Part ies have n ot cited and
re sea rch h as n ot rev e aled any Texas precedent in w hich a court exp r e ss l y addresses whether t o apply this doct rine . Inste ad, the Gruss Parti es effectively assert that th e Cook United opinion applies p endent inter locut ory appell ate jurisd ictio n , though the cour t in th at case does not
e x pres sly mention that doct rine. See Co o k U n ite d, Inc. , 464 S.W.2 d at 106

– 07

.21 temp o r ary - i nj unct ion or der. See id

. The Suprem e Cour t of T e xas stated that the
tr ial co urt ’ s o rder overruling t he plea in abatement was an interlo cutory o rder from which no appeal is provided

. Se e id

. The high court stated that th is order “ may be attacked in th e appeal from the temporary injunction on ly in s o far as the questions raised affect the validity of the i njunction order. ” Id . The Cook United court sai d nothing further regarding the respo n dents ’ c hallenges to the plea in a batement order. S ee id . at 106

– 0 7. The court did not address whether the se cha l lenges affected the validity of the in jun ction o rder or w h ether the court had interlocutory appellate jurisdiction o ver these challenges. S ee i d

. The s upreme court proceed ed
to address the challenge to the te m po rary - inju nct ion order, conclude d that this

c h allenge lacked merit, reversed the court of civil appeals ’ s judgment , and affirmed the trial court ’ s temp orary - injunct ion order. See id . T o t h e extent the
sentenc e quoted above is a legal rule, the high cour t did no t explain or apply thi s rule. See id . Th e only authority that the c ourt cited in support of this s e ntence is Texas State Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp , 343 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1961).
In Car p , in an interlocut ory appeal from a te mporary inj u nction , the defen dant asserted : ( 1) that the tr i al court erred in over ruling its plea to the jurisdict ion and its motion for se verance , and ( 2) that the trial court erred in granting the te m porary i njunct ion. See id . at 243

. The Supreme Court of T e xas

no t ed that the trial co urt ’ s order s overrul ing the motion for severance and plea to the jur isdiction we re in t erlocutory, and tha t n o statute provid ed fo r an appeal there from. See id

. The high c ourt sta ted that the se orders “ can not be attacked in an appeal fr o m anoth er interlo cutory order which is a ppealab l e except in so far as the questions rais ed might affect t h e validity of the latter order. ” Id

. The C a rp court sai d nothing further regarding t he p et it ioner ’ s chal lenges to the order s overruling22 the motion fo r severa nce and pl ea to the jurisdiction

. See id

. at 243

– 47. The court did not address wh ether these chall e nges affected the validity of the in junctio n

o rder or whether the court had interlo c utory ap pellate juri sdiction o ver these challenges. S ee id . The s u preme c ourt proce ed ed to address the cha llenge t o the tempo rary - inju nct ion order, conclu de d that this cha l lenge had merit, reversed the court of civi l appeals ’s judgment , and di ssolved the t rial cou rt ’s temp ora ry injunct ion order. See id

. T o the extent t he sent ence quote d above from Carp is a legal r u le, the high court did not explain or ap ply thi s rule. Se e id . The only authority that the c ourt cite d in support of this sentence are these t wo cases : Zanes

v. M ercantile Bank & Trust Co. , 49 S.W.2d 922 (Te x
. Civ. App.

— Dalla s 1932, writ ref ’ d) and Witt v

. Witt , 205 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.

— Fo rt Worth 1947, no writ). S ee Carp , 343 S.W.2d at 243

. In Zane s the Supr eme Court of T e xas did not say that in terlocutor y o rders not subj ect to interlocutory appeal may be atta cked in an appeal from an appeala ble int e rlocutory order if the questions raised about the former a ffect or might affect the va lidity of the l atter. See Zanes v. Mercantile Bank & T r ust Co. , 4 9 S.W.2d 9 22 (Tex. Civ. App.

— Dallas 1932, writ ref ’d)

. I nstead, the high court ruled that in

an interlo c utory appeal from the trial c ourt ’ s orde r granting a temp o rary injunction and appointing a receiver , it was proper for the h igh court to refu s e to addre ss appella nts ’ challenge s to the trial court ’ s order on a p lea of misjoin der and a plea in abate ment

. S e e id . at 929. Although the appell ants a rgued that the cou r t should consider these challenges because the pleas related to appellee ’ s right t o a tempora ry inj unct ion , the high court stated that no statute pr o vided f or an inte rlocutory appeal from a n order o n a plea of misjoinder or on a plea in abatement and that the co urt should not rev iew these ruling s o n an interlocutory

a

ppeal from a n order appoint ing a receive r and granting a temporary inj unction23 “ unless a reaso nable nece ssity should exist ther efor

. ” I d

. The Supreme Court of Texas conclude d that to adjudicate the a ppeal f r o m the temporary

- in junction an d receivershi p order, it was not neces s a ry to addr ess the ch allenges to th e orders on the pleas of misjoi n der and abatement

. See id . Thus , Zanes d o es n ot s upport the proposi tion stated by the Ca rp court; instead, Zanes says that interlocutor y orders
not su bject to interlocutory appeal may be at t acked in an ap peal f rom an appeala ble interlocutory order only if the que stions rai sed about the former ar e reason a bly necessary to adjudic ate the appeal of t he latter. See id

. In Witte v. Witte , appella nt sou ght to appeal from the parts of the tri al cour t ’s order that grante d a temporary injunct ion, as well as the part s that o verru led a ple a to the jurisdicti on and a plea in abate ment

. See Witt v. Witt , 20 5 S.W.2d 612 , 615 ( Tex. Civ. App.

— Fort Worth 1947, no writ). T he court of civil appeal s cited Za nes for the f ollowing pro positio n : “ We know of no rule of law which would auth o rize th e tacking of interlocuto ry orders from wh i ch no appeal lies to those in the same case from w h ich an appeal will lie, and thus authorize the app ellate court to review orde rs from whic h no appeal lies. ” I d . The Witte co urt dismissed the appeal to the
exten t appellant sought to appeal from t he parts of the order that did not grant a tempo rary inju nc t i on. See id

. Thus , Witte do es n ot support the prop osi tion stated by the C arp court

. See i d

. Likewise, the Supr eme Court of T exas has cited its opin ion in Z a nes for the propo sition that the high co u rt c oul d not address the petitioners ’ challenge to an orde r overruling their plea in abatement because that o rder was a

non - appealable interlocutory order , even though i t accompanied an appealable temporary

- injunct i on orde r. See Has tings Oil Co. v. Texas C o

. , 234 S.W.2d 389 , 398 (Tex. 1950). Thus, the Cook United line of cases is based on Zanes , which at most sta nd s for the proposition that interlocut o r y orders not subjec t to interlocu tory appeal may24 be attacked in a n appea l from an appealable interlocutor y order o nly if th e questions raised about the f ormer are re asonably necessary to adjudic ate the appeal of t he latter. See id

. As shown below, we nee d not address the Gruss Parties ’ ch allenges to paragraphs 3- 5 to re verse p aragraphs 6 and 7 of the Judgment s
. W e

co n cl ude tha t no reasonable n e cessity exists to addre s s the Gruss Parties ’ challenges to paragraphs 3-5

. S ee Zanes , 49 S.W.2d at 9 2 9. Thus, the Gruss P arties ’ argume nt as to “pendent ” interlocut or y appell ate jurisd iction do es no t show th at this c ourt has i nterlo c utory appellate jurisd iction to review paragra p hs 3

- 5 of the Judgments.
As discussed above, this court has juris diction ove r the Gruss Parties ’ interlocutory appeal fro m paragraph s 6 and 7 of the J udgments u nder section 51.014(a)( 4) of th e Civil Practice and Reme dies Code

. None of the bases for appell a te jurisdiction asserted by the Gru ss Parties provides this court with inter l ocutory appellate ju risdiction ove r paragraphs 3

- 5 of the Judgmen ts. We

c onclude th at this court lacks app ellate j u risdiction over these paragra p hs, and
t heref ore we dismiss the f ourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh issues for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 11
B. Should th is cou rt dismiss the appeal in cause number 14

- 21

- 00 1 80

- CV f

or the re asons stated by the Gal lagher Pa r ties? The Gallag her Parties assert th at this cou rt s hould dismi s s the appeal in cause number 14

- 21 -0 0180

- CV because no party in the Third Ca se sought a declara tory judgment a s to the effect of the Agreemen t on the tra nsfer of ownership of the Co mpany’s s t ock from the Estate to Acquisition Tru st. Though it is true that

no party sought this rel ief in the T hird Case, the trial court signed an o rd er in

11 In their firs t issue, the Gruss Part ies assert that this c our t has appellate jurisdiction to consider al l issues presen ted in th eir ap pellate brief. Thi s issue assign s no e rror b y th e trial court

. In any event, w e c o ncl u de that this cou rt ha s appellate jurisdiction to review p aragraph s 6 and 7 of the Judgments, but not the remainder of the Judgments.25 which the trial c ourt order ed th at “the cause of action ple d in [the Fi rst Case, the Second Case, and t he Th i rd Case ] for a declaratory judgment as to the e ffect of the [ A gr e ement ] on the transfer of ownership of the [ Sh ares] f rom the [Estate] to [ Acqu isition Trust ] shall be tried to the bench on [ a specified date ]” (emphasis added)

. The reporter ’s record r eflec t s th at the trial court held this bench tri al in all three cases, and the clerk ’s record ref lects that the trial court rendered judgment in each of t he three cases. We conclude tha t the Gallagher Parties hav e not shown that they are entit led to a dism issa l of cause number 14

- 21

- 00180

- CV on the basis that they assert

. C. Should th is cou rt strike the Company as an appellant?
A lthou gh the Compan y timely perfected appeal, t he Gallagher Parties contend that , the C om pany is not a proper appellant in these appeals . T he Gallagher Parties ask this court to strike the Company as a n appellant. In support of this reque st , th e Gallagher Parties assert that the trial court did not impose any new injunction or modify any existing injunction affecting any conduct or claim b y the Company that might be subject to review at this time

. We co n cl uded in s ection II.A.3. above that the second sentence of p aragraph 6 and paragraph 7 of the Judgments do impose a new injunction . This new injunction affec ts the C ompan y ’s conduct b ecause the trial court o rder s that (1) the Company ’ s curr ent b ooks and

r ecords be made available to Acquisit io n Trust , (2) the partie s cooperate to pr ovide Acquisi tio n Trust access to the Com pany , and (3) no expenditures or distributio ns be made by the Company ot her tha n in the ordinary course of business without prior approv al of the trial c ourt. The Company timely appealed from this new temporary injunction , and this court has appellate jurisdiction to review th is relief under section 51.0 14(a)(4) of t he Civil P ractic e and Remedies Cod e. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem

. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4) ; Q west C omm unica tions Corp. , 24 S.W.3d26 at 337

– 38 ; Clark , 638 S.W.3d at 838. The G allagher Parties also assert that no claim by the Company was tried and that the trial concerne d a declaration of the rights of the parties to the Agreement, bu t the Comp any is not a party to the A greement

. We have alread y determi ned that this court lacks appellate jurisdiction ove r paragraphs 3

- 5 of the Judgmen ts , in which the trial court ad dressed the rights of the parties to the Agreement. We conclude that the C om pany is a proper appellant in the se appeals , and therefor e we deny the Gallagher Parties ’ request t hat we strike the Company as an appellant.
D. Should this court de clare the parts of the Judgment granting a temp orary in ju nction void? As discu ssed abov e , the second sentence of paragraph 6 and par agraph 7 of the Judgments grant a temporary injunct ion and are subject t o an int erlocutory appeal under se ction 51.014(a)(4) of the C i vil Practice and Remedies Code

. Se e Tex. Civ. Prac. & R em. Code Ann. § 51.014 (a)(4 ). The Texas Rul e s of Civil Procedur e requi re that an order granting a temporary injunction fix the amount of security to be given by the applican t. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 68 4

. Th is procedural requirem ent is mandator y, and a n o rder granting a t emp orary in junction that do es not meet t his requirement is subject to being declared void a nd dissolved. See Q west Comm unica tions Corp. , 24 S.W.3d at 337 ; Mc C urry v. Smith , No. 14

- 10

- 00722

- CV, 2011 WL 82488 2 , at *1 (Tex. App.

— Ho uston [ 1 4th Dist.] Mar. 10, 2 01 1 , no pe t.) (mem . op .). At no pl ace in t he Judgments does the trial court fix the
amount of security to be given as to either of the se temporary in junctio ns. T hu s,

w e reverse the s eco nd sentence of p aragraph 6 and paragraph 7 of the Judgments , declare t hese pa rt s of the Judgments void, and order them dissolved. We sustain the third issue to t he extent the Gruss Parties challenge the second sentence of27 p arag r aph 6 or paragraph 7 of t he Judgments

. To the extent the Gruss Partie s challe n ge any other party o f the Judg ments, we dismis s the third issue for lack of
ap pellate jurisdict ion. E. Did the trial court err in granting the motion to dissol ve the prior tempo r ary injunctions?
In the ir sec ond issue, the Gruss Parties assert that the tr i al co urt er re d in
gr ant in g the m otion to disso lve the t empor ary inj unctions i ssued on August 13, 2019 , in the First Case and in the Second Case

. Deciding whe ther to dissolve a
te mpor ary injunction is a m atter that falls within the broad discretion of the t rial
court

. See De Los Salmones v. Anchor Develo p ment Group, LL C , N o. 14

- 20

- 00720

- CV, 2022 WL 1218541, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2022, n o pet.) (mem. op.). Th is interlocutory appeal is fr om an order grant ing a motion to dissolve th e t e mporary injunction s ; th is appeal is not from the tempor ary injuncti ons issued by the tr ial court on August 13, 2019

. Thus, we d o not have jurisdiction to consider the propri ety o f the trial court’s decision to grant th e temporary injunc tion s. See id .; Cell ula r Marketing, In c. v. Housto n C ellu lar Telephone Co. , 784 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, n o writ). We presume that the temporar y injunction s w ere no t im p rovidently granted and that the re cord s upport ed the trial court’s action in g ran t ing the tempor ary i njunction s
. Se e De Los Salmones , 2022 WL 1218541, at *3; C ellular Marketing, Inc. , 784 S.W.2d at 735. Our review of the trial cou rt’s order dissolving the temporary injunction s is limited t o the narrow question of whether that a ctio n by the trial cour t con stitute s a cle ar abuse of discretion. See De Los Salmones , 2022 WL 1218541, at *3

. The purpose of a moti on to dissolve a temporar y injunction is not t o gi v e a party the opportunity to relit igate the propriety of t he temporary

- in junc t ion order. Id. at *4. T he trial c ourt has the authority to dissolve a temporary i njunction upon a28 showin g of changed circumstances

. Id . Changed circumstanc es are conditions tha t alter the status quo exi sting after the tem porary injunction wa s granted that mak e the injunction u nn ecessar y or i mpro per. Id . Changed circumstances may include a n agreement of the part ies, newly revealed fac ts, or a change in the la w that make the tempo r a ry injunction unnecessar y or improper. Id

. The movant bears t he burden to
pre s ent new evidence esta bl ishing change d ci rcumstances. Id

. I f the movant fails to
pres ent new evidence showin g fundamental error or changed circumstances , th en the trial court ab u s ed its discretion in gra nting the motion to dissolve

. Id

. ; Mu rp hy , 20 S.W.3d a t 8 7 8

– 79 & n.4

. The onl y changed cir cumsta nce s asserted by the Gallag her Parties are the
tr ia l court’s ruling s on the merits of two declaratory judgment claims and granting declar a tory relief in the J udgments. The only legitimate purpose of a temp or ary in

j unction is t o preserve th e status quo pendin g tr ial, and the most expeditious relie f from an u nfavorable preliminary order dissolving an injunction is a prompt tri al on the merits

. See Murphy , 20 S.W.3d at 87 7

. An interlocutory a ppeal should not b e used t o obtain an a dvance ruling on the issue s
. See id.
T he Gruss Parties argue that the trial cou rt’s ruling s on the merits of the declaratory judgment claims are not change d circum s tanc es authorizing dissolutio n of the trial cour t’s otherwise prop er ly granted te mpora r y injunction. See id . at 8 7 8

– 7 9. Cha nged circumstances may include an agreement of the parties, newly revealed facts, or a change in the law that make the temporary in j unct ion unnecessary or imprope r. See id. Here, th e c hange d circu ms tances alleg e d by the Gallagher Parties w ere not ne wly revealed facts or a change in the law; rathe r, the “change” was merely an interlocutory judicial determin ation of t he merits of the decl aratory judgment claims. In the J u dgme nt s the trial court did not ad dr ess the

r emai ning c laims in the three cases, and th e tr ial court did not order any severance29 of any claims. We conclude that the trial co urt’s interlocutory ruling s on the merits of the d e clar atory

- judgment claims are n ot changed cir cumstances author iz ing dissolut i on of the trial cou rt’s temporar y inju ncti ons. See id

. The motion to dissolve was not based on fundamental error

. Th us , the trial court clearly abused its discretion in gran t ing the motion to dissol ve the August 13, 2019 t e m porary inju nctions

. See id

. I n t he Thi rd Case, ther e was no “ T emporary Injunction, dated August 13, 2019

. ” Therefore, the trial court clearly abused its di scretion in grant ing the motion to dissolve tempor a ry injunction in the Third Case

. W e sustain the Gruss Parties ’ second issu e , reve r se thi s part of the Judgments , and render j udgment denying th e motion to dis solve , and reinstating the temporary injunctions.

F
. Should this court treat the Gr us s Parties ’ a p pella te brief as a petition for writ of mandam us ?
I n the alte rnative, if this co u rt determines, as i t has, that the court l a cks appellate juris diction to consider on e or more of the issues in the Grus s Parties ’ brief, then the Gruss Part ies ask this cou r t to treat these parts of the ir appellate brief a s a mandamus p etition and grant t h e Gruss Parties man damu s relief. Se e CMH H o mes v. Perez , 340 S.W.3d 4 44, 452

- 54 (Tex. 2011)

. In the CMH Homes case, the supreme court instructed the cour t of appeals to con s i der the appeal as a petition for mandamus beca us e (1) the appe llant specifically r equested the court of appeals to tr eat its appeal as a m andamus petit ion, (2) the appellant preserved this issue in the high court, and (3) judicial effi ciency militated ag a i nst requiring the appellant to file a separate o riginal procee ding since doing so would waste the
par ties’ time and j udicial resources by requiring the appellant to file a separate document with the ti tle “petition for writ of mandamus ” listed on the cov e r
. See id

. at 453

– 54.30 In the section of the ir b rief in which they ask this court to treat parts of t he ir appellate brief as a mandamus pe tition , t h e G russ Parties state in a conclusory

ma nner that “ th e requirements for mandamus relief are satisfied. ” Th ey then asser t that “[f] or the reasons stated in s ections II

– VI, the trial court ab u sed its discretion in signing the J udgment .” But, in sec ti ons II –V I o f their br ief, the Gruss Part ies present vario us arguments as to why the trial court reversibly erred an d why th is court should reverse the Judgmen ts o n ap peal . T o est ablish their entitl e men t to mandamus re lief as to the Ju dgments , the Gru ss P arties must show, among other things, that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by sig ni ng the J udgments. Se e In re Akin Gum p Straus s Hauer & Feld, LLP , 252 S.W.3d 480, 488 (Tex. App.

— Housto n [14 th Dist.] 200 8, orig. proc eeding)

. Yet, in the referenced secti ons II –VI , th e Gruss Parti es do not argue that the trial court cle arly abused its discretion or that they a re enti tled to mandamus relief. In th e se s ection s , the Gruss Part ie s do not ci t e m and a mus case s. In t he section of their brief in which they ask this court to tre at parts of the ir appellate brief as a mandamus petit ion , the Gruss Parties do not brief an a r gument that the tr ial c o urt clearly abused its d i scretion in

s igning the Judgm ent s. Th e Gruss Part i es ’ appellate brief does not contain any argument or analysis i n s upport of the proposition that the trial court cle arly abused its discretion by signing th e Judgme nts

. Se e Tex. R. App. P. 52.3 (h) (s tating that “[t]he p etition must con tai n a c lear and conc is e argume nt for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the appendix or record”); In re A kin Gum p , 25 2 S.W .3d at 495. E ven co nstruing the Gruss Par ties ’ opening brief liberally , we cann ot conc l ude that the G russ Parties adequately briefed an argument that they a re enti tled to mandamus relief based on the trial court ’s cl ear abuse of discretion in signing the Judgment s
. See City of H ouston v. G. L ., 56 0 S.W.3d 744, 751 (Te x. App.

— Houston [14th Di s t.] 2018, no p et.); In re A kin Gu mp , 25 2 S.W.3d at 495. Th us , if we were to treat the Gr uss Parties ’ a ppellat e31 brief as a petition for writ of mandamu s , the Gruss Parties wo uld not hav e sh own their entitle ment to mandamus relief d ue to this b riefing waiver

. See In re Ak in Gum p , L LP, 25 2 S .W.3d at 495. In this context, judicial efficien cy does not militate against requiring the appel lant s to file a separate original proceeding

. See G. L ., 56 0 S.W.3d at 75 1. T her e fore, we do not treat the Gruss Parties ’ appellat e brief as a petition for writ of mandamus. See C MH Homes , 340 SW.3d at 453

– 54; G. L ., 56 0 S.W.3d at 751

. I II. C ONCLUSION Under the plain text o f the Judgment s an d conside ring the Ju dgm e nts ’ substan ce, char a cter, and fu nction, the second sentence of p aragraph 6 and
pa r agraph 7 of t he Ju dgments grant a new temporary injunct ion and are sub ject t o an interlocutory appeal under section 51

. 014(a)(4) of t h e Civil Practic e an d Remedies Code

. In the Judgments th e trial c ourt do es no t fix the amount of

secur ity to be given as t o either of these t emporary in junctions

. Thu s, w e reverse the second se ntence of p aragraph 6 and paragraph 7 of the Jud gments , declare these pa rt s of the Judgments void, and order them disso lved. Un d er the plain text o f the J udgments and considering the Ju d gments ’ substance , character, and function, in the first sentence of paragraph 6 of the Judgments the trial c ourt effectively grant ed a motion to d issolve the August 13, 2019 temporary i njunctions

. Thus, this court has juris di ction ov e r the Gruss Parties ’ inter locuto ry appe al fro m th is part of the Judgments under section 51.014(a)(4) of the Civil Practice and Reme dies Code . T he trial co urt’s interloc utory ruling s on the merits of the decla ratory

- judgment claims are n ot chan ge d circumst ances authorizing di s solution of the trial court ’s temporary injunctions , and t he motion to dissolve was not based on fundamental error

. Therefore, the trial court clearly abused its discret i on in granting the motion to32 dissol ve the August 13, 2019 t e m porary inju nctions

. W e r e verse th e first senten ce

o f para graph 6 of the Judgments a nd render judgment deny ing t h e motion t o dissol v e and reinstating the temp orary injunctions. The Gallag her Parties have not shown that the appeal in cause number 14

- 21

- 00180

- CV s houl d be dismissed b ecause no party in the Third Ca se sought a declara tory judgment a s to the effect of th e Agreemen t on the tra nsfer of ownership of the Co mpany’s st ock from the Estate to Acquisition Tru st. T he Gallagher Parties have n ot shown that the Compan y should be str i cken as an appellant. T his cour t lacks interlocut o ry appellate jurisdiction over parag raphs 3

- 5 of the Judgments , and theref ore we dismiss the f our th, fifth, sixth, and seventh issues for lack of appellate ju risdiction

. Concluding t h at judi c ial efficiency doe s not

m ilitat e against requi ring the appellant to file a separate original proceedi ng , we d o not treat the Gruss Parties ’ appellat e brief as a p etition for writ of ma ndamus.

/s/ R a ndy Wi l s on Just ic e
P a n e l cons ist s of Just ic es Wis e, P ois sant , and W i l s o n.