[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13366

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

DR. EDWARD L. JONES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DR. ANDREW HUGINE, JR., 

individually and officially as President of Alabama A&M University, 

BRIAN RUBLE, 

individually and officially, 

CURTIS MARTIN, 

individually and officially, 

DR. DANIEL WIMS, 

individually and officially, 

ALABAMA A&M UNIVERSITY, et al.,

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Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cv-00326-MHH

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and NEWSOM and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Dr. Edward Jones appeals the denial of his motion for relief 

from the judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, filed nearly five years after 

the district court dismissed his lawsuit challenging the termination 

of his employment at Alabama A&M University. In the lawsuit, 

Jones complained that the University and several of its employees

violated his federal civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Alabama law.

We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In February 2016, Jones sued the university; its former president Dr. Andrew Hugine; its former Dean of College Education, 

Humanities and Behavioral Sciences, Dr. Curtis Martin; its former

Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. Daniel Wims; 

and a university police investigator, Brian Ruble. The complaint 

alleged that, as early as 2013, Jones, the Director of the Office of 

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Teacher Education and Certification, warned the university about 

various red flags that later came to the attention of institutional 

regulators. It alleged that, to “keep [Jones’s] mouth shut,” university administrators began a “retaliatory smear campaign” against 

him, which escalated around 2015, when he refused to participate 

in a committee that he believed was designed to cover up the university’s problems.

The complaint further alleged that Wims, on October 13, 

2015, placed Jones on administrative leave and, on January 14, 

2016, recommended terminating Jones. It alleged that after Jones

notified the university of his intent to appeal, Ruble and university 

police officers executed search warrants of Jones’s home and personal property based on a false allegation that he had stolen university property. The complaint alleged that the unlawful searches of 

his “personal electronic data and records” yielded the evidence on 

which the university relied to terminate him. It also alleged that 

the university falsely accused him of professional incompetence, 

committing theft, and engaging in immoral conduct.

In March 2016, Jones moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to bar the university from terminating him without proper notice and a hearing. In his affidavit, 

Jones averred that he did not “have any information about the basis 

for the charges” against him. But he attached an “Intent to Terminate” letter, dated January 14, 2016, which stated, “The cause for 

termination is gross professional misconduct. You are charged with 

both using University resources to view obscene materials and the 

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production and/or creation of obscene materials. The behaviors 

which are the basis of these charges occurred on university property during duty hours.” Jones also attached his termination letter, 

dated March 10, 2016, which stated that he was terminated immediately because “[t]here is convincing evidence that you have engaged in sexual conduct below minimum standards of professional 

integrity and misused University computing/electronic assets in 

gross violation of well-established University policy.”

The university defendants opposed the motion for injunctive relief and moved to dismiss the complaint. In an attached affidavit, Ruble averred that the university property manager reported 

several missing computers to the police, including a laptop computer issued to Jones. On February 12, 2016, after obtaining and 

executing a warrant to search Jones’s home for stolen property, Ruble retrieved a university-issued laptop and other items with the 

assistance of the Huntsville Police Department. A computer forensics expert reviewed the laptop and determined that three pornographic videos had been downloaded to it. According to Ruble, the 

videos depicted Jones masturbating on university property and receiving fellatio from two young males, who appeared to be about 

20 years old, in a university classroom.

In May 2016, after a hearing, the district court denied injunctive relief because Jones failed to establish a substantial likelihood 

of success on the merits and because he had an adequate remedy 

at law. The district court granted the university defendants’ motion 

to stay discovery until it ruled on their motion to dismiss.

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In July 2016, Jones sought reconsideration of the denial of 

injunctive relief. He submitted a new affidavit averring that on the 

same day that Wims placed him on administrative leave in October 

2015 due to “serious concerns raised by the Alabama State Department of Education [] as to the sufficiency of [] administrative processes,” the university’s Chief Information Officer and a locksmith 

went to his office to retrieve his computer and to change the locks.

Jones stated that, on March 10, 2016, he was arrested at his home 

for theft of university property and terminated. Jones stated that he 

was not terminated because of performance or his alleged theft of 

property, but because of his sexual orientation.

In February 2017, the district court held a hearing on Jones’s 

motion for reconsideration of injunctive relief. Jones stated that he 

had the opportunity to attend a grievance hearing at the university,

but he did not attend because he “repeatedly asked for the information, the equipment, [and] the documentation that [the university] had,” including information related to his criminal trial and 

the search of his home. Jones stated that he wanted his forensic 

specialist to review the items to determine whether the obscene 

material was located on university property, or if the material had 

been transferred over from personal devices like jump drives and 

cell phones that were seized from his office and home. 

The university defendants responded that Jones and his previous counsel had viewed the obscene material that was evidence 

against him in university counsel’s office with Ruble present. They 

argued that because Jones was aware of the evidence against him, 

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he could have participated in the grievance hearing. They argued 

that Jones was challenging his inability to conduct discovery before 

the grievance hearing, but the grievance procedure was not a lawsuit. They also argued that Jones’s “voluminous document request” made it clear to them “that he was not only seeking discovery as to the particular electronic documents that were relied on in 

terms of his termination, but also discovery as to the box of documents related to the theft of monies” that formed the basis of the 

state criminal charge against him. And they asserted that it was the 

core acts of Jones’s sexual misconduct on campus that was adequate grounds for his immediate termination, and the existence of 

recordings of that misconduct on university devices only added another layer to his misconduct. 

During the evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed 

Jones’s Fourth Amendment claim. It ruled that the validity of the 

warrant to search his home was an evidentiary matter at issue in 

his ongoing state criminal case, so it was not a cause of action

against the university defendants. The district court told Jones’s 

counsel that it needed to avoid further delays in resolving the pending motion to dismiss:

I want you to understand [] the challenge that 

the court faces, we have been working on trying to 

see if we could identify any claims in this case that 

could go forward for months now. Dr. Jones has 

changed attorneys a number of times. I have scheduled hearings at which no one has appeared. I’m still 

working from the original complaint in this action 

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and counsel for the plaintiff is saying that the court 

should be aware of this, the court should be aware of 

that, but the court is trying to resolve a motion to dismiss the complaint that is before the court.

[Jones’s] counsel has had abundant time in 

which to amend the complaint, if [his] counsel chose 

to, and at some point the court needs not to have a 

moving target so that the court can resolve the pending motion.

On February 16, 2017, the district court denied Jones’s motion for reconsideration of its denial of injunctive relief and dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim and several other claims with 

prejudice. The district court ordered the university to give Jones 

another opportunity to engage in the grievance process. Specifically, it ordered Jones to submit any information that he wanted 

the university to consider, and it ordered the university to provide 

a written response to Jones’s supplemental information explaining 

whether the information changed its decision or required further 

proceedings. The district court ordered that Jones, after receiving 

the university’s written response, either file an amended complaint 

to proceed with the action or file a notice voluntarily dismissing it.

Because the district court anticipated receiving either an amended 

complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal, it denied the motion 

to dismiss as moot. On March 10, 2017, the district court granted 

Jones’s request for an extension and reiterated its instructions 

about filing an amended complaint.

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Jones did not file an amended complaint, nor did he dismiss 

the lawsuit. Instead, he filed a discovery request for the electronic 

devices that allegedly contained the obscene material. He also requested information about other university employees who had 

been terminated for theft of property, sexual misconduct, or moral 

turpitude. 

On April 27, 2017, the district court held a telephone conference with Jones and the university defendants and provided Jones 

an opportunity to explain why he disregarded its orders. The district court explained that, regardless of whether the obscene material was downloaded or stored on university property, the university had an adequate reason to terminate Jones because he engaged

in sexual conduct in a classroom on campus, which Jones had not 

disputed. 

The next day, the district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to follow its orders, Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The district court denied Jones’s motion for reconsideration, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Jones 

did not appeal either the February or April 2017 dismissal orders.

Almost five years later, in February 2022, Jones moved to 

vacate the February 2017 order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and, alternatively, 60(d)(3), insofar as the order dismissed his Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful search. Jones asserted that in October 2017, he brought an employment discrimination and retaliation lawsuit against the university and had been 

able to obtain discovery, including a “box of documents” that contained an investigative file on him. He contended that the 

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documents related to the university’s decision to terminate him 

and its post-termination investigation of him. Specifically, he argued that the file established that counsel for the university defendants deliberately lied to the district court at the February 2017 hearing when counsel represented that the file “related to theft of monies that were otherwise state funds that were collected by 

Dr. Jones.” Jones argued that this false statement “trick[ed] the 

Court into believing the investigative file was not relevant to prevent dismissal of [his] Fourth Amendment Claim” and provided 

cause for the district court to vacate its February 2017 order under 

Rule 60(b)(6) or Rule 60(d)(3). In the same motion, he moved for 

leave to file an amended complaint adding defendants and to consolidate this lawsuit with his employment discrimination lawsuit. 

The district court denied the motion to vacate the judgment. 

It recognized that it erred by dismissing with prejudice Jones’s 

Fourth Amendment claim, instead of staying the claim until the 

state criminal proceeding resolved the lawfulness of the search, because a claim for damages for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation is unavailable in the state proceeding. Deakins v. Monaghan, 

484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988). But it explained that, even if it had not 

dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim in February 2017, it would 

have later dismissed the claim in its April 2017 order dismissing the

lawsuit for failure to comply with its orders. 

The district court ruled that Jones’s evidence fell short of establishing that university counsel committed fraud on the court under Rule 60(d)(3). It explained that its sua sponte decision to dismiss 

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the Fourth Amendment claim had not been procured by fraud, the 

theft investigation was legitimate, and nothing established that the 

university had tampered with the administration of justice. Itstated 

that, even if it found that the university defendants or their counsel 

misled the district court about the contents of the “box of documents,” it still would not grant relief under Rule 60(d)(3) in the light 

of Jones’s own lack of transparency during the litigation, which included his refusal to participate in the grievance process when ordered to do so and his first affidavit stating that he did not “have 

any information about the basis for the charges” when he already 

received two lettersinforming him that he was charged with “using 

University resources to view obscene materials and the production 

and/or creation of obscene materials . . . on University property 

and during duty hours” and that he was terminated for sexual misconduct and misuse of university assets.

The district court also ruled that Jones could not use a Rule 

60(b)(6) motion as a substitute for an appeal. It explained that “[o]n 

another record, [its error in dismissing with prejudice the Fourth 

Amendment claim] might suffice to permit relief under Rule 

60(b)(6), but here, Dr. Jones [could not] escape the fact that his litigation strategy ultimately is to blame for the dismissal of his claims 

in this action.” 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the denial of a motion under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and (d)(3) for abuse of discretion. Aldana 

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v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 741 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 

2014); Booker v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 281, 285 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. DISCUSSION

Jones argues that substantial justice required the district 

court to grant his motion under Rule 60(b)(6). We disagree. A district court “may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or 

proceeding for . . . any other reason” not covered by the rest of 

Rule 60(b) “that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Because 

this is “an extraordinary remedy,” Jones must establish “a justification for relief so compelling that the district court was required to 

grant [his] motion.” Rice v. Ford Motor Co., 88 F.3d 914, 919 (11th

Cir. 1996). Our review of the ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion “is fairly 

circumscribed and deferential; this appeal does not bring up the underlying judgment for review.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that, 

in the light of the entire record, this case did not present the kind 

of equitable factors that warrant Rule 60(b) relief. See Seven Elves, 

Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981) (listing the factors 

that should inform the consideration of a Rule 60(b) motion). The 

district court considered the policy favoring the finality of judgments and that Jones’s motion effectively was a belated appeal of 

its decision to dismiss his Fourth Amendment claim. Id. It ruled

that, even assuming counsel for the university defendants misled it 

regarding the contents of the “box of documents,” the equities did 

not weigh in favor of reviving Jones’s claim in the light of his own 

conduct contributing to the dismissal of the lawsuit. Id. Indeed, the

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record reflects various problems that Jones’s litigation strategy 

caused the district court and the efforts the district court made to 

resolve these problems in a manner that was fair to him, including

holding several hearings and telephone conferences and warning 

Jones before dismissing the lawsuit.

Jones argues that the district court failed to consider the merits of his re-framed Fourth Amendment claim. But the district court 

considered the evidence he submitted and ruled that he still “ha[d] 

not demonstrated that [the university] launched a bogus investigation into alleged theft by Dr. Jones as a ploy to investigate Dr. 

Jones’s sexual misconduct” and found that the theft investigation 

was legitimate. We are not persuaded that the district court failed

to consider the appropriate factors in denying Jones relief under 

Rule 60(b)(6), or that exceptional circumstances are present in this 

case that required the district court to grant him relief. See id.; Rice, 

88 F.3d at 919. Insofar as Jones now challenges that the April 2017 

order dismissing his lawsuit was reversible error too because he did 

not display willful contempt and lesser sanctions would have been 

appropriate, he cannot use his Rule 60(b) motion as a substitute for 

a timely appeal of that order. See Rice, 88 F.3d at 919.

Jones also argues that the district court “completely disregarded” the issue whether he offered sufficient evidence to establish fraud on the court under Rule 60(d)(3), but we disagree. A litigant may bring an independent action for relief under Rule 60(d), 

formerly the savings clause of Rule 60(b), which allows a district 

court to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” Fed. R. Civ. 

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P. 60(d)(3). To obtain this relief, the movant must establish “fraud 

on the court” by clear and convincing evidence of egregious misconduct. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Gore, 761 F.2d 1549, 1551 (11th Cir. 

1985). The movant also must establish that the adverse party obtained the verdict through fraud and employed an “unconscionable 

plan or scheme” to improperly influence the decision of the district 

court. Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978).

The record contradicts Jones’s argument that the district 

court failed to consider whether he had established fraud on the 

court. The district court considered his arguments about the investigative file and found that he “ha[d] not established that dismissal 

of his Fourth Amendment claims was procured by fraud.” The district court explained that, even if it found that the investigative file 

was part of the same “box of documents” referenced by opposing 

counsel during the February 2017 hearing, and even if it found that 

opposing counsel had misled the district court about his knowledge 

of the contents of that box, those findings would not entitle Jones 

to relief under Rule 60(d)(3) because the presumedly “misleading” 

statement did not influence its decision to dismiss the claim under 

Rule 12(b)(6) or to dismiss the lawsuit for failure to comply with its 

orders. Jones could not use opposing counsel’s statement as a basis 

to relitigate his Fourth Amendment claim. See Travelers, 761 F.2d at 

1552.

Jones incorrectly argues that the district court violated the 

principle of party presentation when it relied on his “negligence” 

as a reason for finding that relief was unwarranted. See United States 

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v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020). But the university 

defendants argued in their response to Jones’s motion that he 

lacked exceptional circumstances due to his own conduct. And 

even if they had not raised his conduct as a reason to his deny relief, 

the district court still was tasked with considering whether Jones 

“had a fair opportunity to present his claim” and “any other factors 

relevant to the justice of the judgment.” Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at 402. 

The district court did not abandon its role as a “neutral arbiter of 

matters” to construct its own theories for denying relief. See 

Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1579. And because we conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jones’s motion for relief from the judgment, we deny his motion to supplement the record with affidavits that were not presented to the district court. See Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 212 (11th Cir. 1997) 

(en banc).

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the denial of Jones’s motion for relief from the 

judgment, DENY his motion to supplement the record, and 

GRANT his motion to withdraw his previous motion to file his reply brief with partial redactions.

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