Declassified Key Judgments of the National 

Intelligence Estimate ìTrends in Global Terrorism: 

Implications for the United Statesî dated April 2006 

Key Judgments 

United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of 

al-Qa’ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qa’ida will continue to 

pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist 

organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which includes alQa’ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells—is 

spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts. 

• Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body 

of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, 

although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and 

geographic dispersion. 

• If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad will become 

more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide. 

• Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majority 

nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time, such 

progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the 

vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa’ida, 

could erode support for the jihadists. 

We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global 

strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with antiAmerican agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose 

and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups. 

• We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in 

importance to US counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the 

Homeland. 

• The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests. 

Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate 

recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and 

2005 London bombings. 
We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and 

operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the 

struggle elsewhere. 

• The Iraq conflict has become the ìcause celebreî for jihadists, breeding a deep 

resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for 

the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, 

and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry 

on the fight. 

We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its 

vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate. 

• Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1) 

Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western 

domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the 

Iraq ìjihad;î (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and 

political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US 

sentiment among most Muslimsóall of which jihadists exploit. 

Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged that, if fully exposed 

and exploited, could begin to slow the spread of the movement. They include 

dependence on the continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of the 

jihadistsí radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation, and 

criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens. 

• The jihadistsí greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solutionóan 

ultra-conservative interpretation of shariía-based governance spanning the 

Muslim worldóis unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the 

religious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadistsí propaganda 

would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade. 

• Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious interpretations by a few 

notable Muslim clerics signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of a 

constructive alternative to jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This also 

could lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim 

communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize on 

passive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as the 

most powerful weapon in the war on terror. 

• Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated 

multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist 

leaders. 

If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years, 

political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and 
groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless, 

attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunities 

for jihadists to exploit. 

Al-Qa’ida, now merged with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network, is exploiting the 

situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role. 

• The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and 

al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into 

smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the 

mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements. 

We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less 

serious threat to US interests than does al-Qaíida. 

• Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks against 

Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a global 

threat. 

• The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qaíida in Iraq might 

lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations. 

Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar alSunnah, and several North African groups, unless countered, are likely to expand their 

reach and become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their 

traditional areas of operation. 

• We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland than does alQaíida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our allies and to US interests 

abroad. The focus of their attacks is likely to ebb and flow between local regime 

targets and regional or global ones. 

We judge that most jihadist groupsóboth well-known and newly formedówill use 

improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on soft targets to 

implement their asymmetric warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct 

sustained terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in Iraq are a 

potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics. 

• CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist groups. 

While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state sponsors of 

terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent territory or resources from being 

exploited by terrorists. 

Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical 

ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt 

terrorist methods to attack US interests. The radicalization process is occurring more 
quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of 

surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to 

pinpoint. 

• We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to 

communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial 

support.