Present: All the Justices 

LESLIE G. CARR, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 000475 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 January 12, 2001 

ROBERT C. KIDD, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

William F. Rutherford, Judge 

 This appeal arises from a judgment entered in a suit to 

determine the riparian rights of neighboring landowners. The 

primary issue is whether the trial court erred in confirming the 

report of a commissioner in chancery, which recommended an 

apportionment of riparian rights based on an approximated 

historic shoreline existing prior to manmade development of the 

perimeter of the parties' properties. 

 The suit initially involved a riparian rights dispute 

between Robert C. Kidd and Marjorie B. Kidd (collectively, the 

Kidds), and their immediate neighbors to the northwest, Mark S. 

Crowley and Lori Crowley (collectively, the Crowleys). The lots 

owned by the Kidds and Mark Crowley1 respectively are situated 

along a cove of Tanner's Creek, a tributary of the Lafayette 

River in the City of Norfolk. The Kidds sought to build a pier 

out into the cove from their lot, to which the Crowleys 

 1

Mark Crowley is the sole owner of the Crowley lot. His 

wife Lori was named as a party at the request of Mr. Crowley 
objected. The Kidds commissioned a riparian surveyor, Robert L. 

Taliaferro, to perform a riparian survey of their lot (the 

Taliaferro survey) to help resolve the dispute. The Taliaferro 

survey indicated that the Kidds were within their riparian 

rights to build the proposed pier, and that the existing pier 

used by the Crowleys encroached on the Kidds' riparian rights. 

 Thereafter, the Kidds filed a bill of complaint against the 

Crowleys requesting a determination of the parties' respective 

riparian rights and asserting a cause of action against the 

Crowleys for trespass based on the location of the existing 

pier.2 After the suit was filed, the Crowleys commissioned their 

own riparian surveyor, Robert M. Kennedy, to perform a survey 

(the Kennedy survey) of the Crowley and Kidd lots. The 

delineation of riparian rights in the Kennedy survey was nearly 

identical to that in the Taliaferro survey.3

 In light of the similarity between the two surveys, the 

Kidds and the Crowleys reached a tentative settlement that would 

have required the Crowleys to remove the existing pier but would 

have ensured that each party had sufficient riparian rights to 

 

based on her interest in the property by reason of her marriage 

to Mr. Crowley. 

2

The Kidds later filed an amended bill of complaint naming 

additional parties with a potential interest in the disputed 

riparian rights. These additional parties are not involved in 

this appeal. 

2
construct a pier. The Crowleys' neighbors to the northeast, 

Leslie G. Carr and Janice N. Kohl (collectively, the Carrs), 

learned of the impending settlement and intervened in the suit 

on the ground that the proposed settlement interfered with the 

Carrs' riparian rights. The Carrs further alleged that the 

Kennedy survey incorrectly drew riparian lines across a portion 

of the Carrs' property, thereby converting a substantial portion 

of allegedly non-riparian property into a riparian zone 

belonging to Mr. Crowley. 

 Following the Carrs' intervention, the trial court referred 

the matter to a commissioner in chancery, Philip R. Trapani, Jr. 

At a hearing before the commissioner, the Kidds and the Crowleys 

stipulated to the results of the Kennedy survey. The Carrs 

argued that the Kennedy survey was incorrect, and they requested 

a different allocation of the parties' riparian rights. 

 After the hearing, the commissioner filed a report in which 

he recommended that the parties' riparian rights be allocated 

based on the Kennedy survey. The trial court confirmed the 

commissioner's report and entered a final order allocating the 

parties' riparian rights in accordance with the Kennedy survey. 

 The record shows that the lots currently owned by the 

parties were part of a residential subdivision that originally 

 3

Attached to this opinion is a diagram adapted from the 

Kennedy survey depicting the properties and their respective 

3
was platted and recorded in 1903. The lots now owned by the 

Carrs (the Carr property) were purchased by their original owner 

in 1904 from the subdivision developer.4 The source deed for the 

Carr property makes reference to the original subdivision plat 

of 1903 (original subdivision plat). The lot now owned by Mr. 

Crowley (the Crowley property) was purchased by its original 

owner from the developer in 1910. The source deed for the 

Crowley property references a revised subdivision plat recorded 

in 1908 (revised subdivision plat). The source deed for the 

Crowley property is also the source deed for the lot now owned 

by the Kidds (the Kidd property), which was part of a larger lot 

originally purchased from the developer in 1910 by one of the 

Kidds' predecessors in title.5

 In 1939, a concrete bulkhead was constructed along the 

northwestern edge of the Carr property. In addition to the 

bulkhead, an area of "riprap"6 was placed along the northeastern 

edge and corner of the Carr property. Samples of sand and 

potash taken from the Kidd property were admitted into evidence 

 

riparian allocations. 

4

The Carr property consists of two adjacent lots. For ease 

of reference, we will refer to the two lots collectively as "the 

Carr property." 

5

The larger lot had been subdivided before the Kidds 

purchased their property in 1994. 

6

The Kidds' expert testified that "riprap" is "[g]enerally 

stone and concrete and debris of that nature . . . use[d] as 

backfill and to prevent any more erosion." 

4
at the commissioner's hearing as proof that "fill material" had 

been placed behind the bulkhead on the Carr property. 

 The parties stipulated that the applicable rule for 

apportioning riparian rights is the rule set forth in Groner v. 

Foster, 94 Va. 650, 27 S.E. 493 (1897). There, the Court 

stated: 

 A just rule of division is to measure the length of the 

shore and ascertain the portion thereof to which each 

riparian proprietor is entitled; next measure the length of 

the line of navigability, and give to each proprietor the 

same proportion of it that he is entitled to of the shore 

line; and then draw straight lines from the points of 

division so marked for each proprietor on the line of 

navigability to the extremities of his lines on the shore. 

Each proprietor will be entitled to the portion of the line 

of navigability thus apportioned to him, and also to the 

portion of the flats, or land under the water, within the 

lines so drawn from the extremities of his portion of the 

said line to the extremities of his part of the shore. 

Id. at 652-53, 27 S.E. at 494. Our decision in Groner further 

indicates that the "shore line" for purposes of applying the 

above rule is what today is referred to as the mean low water 

(MLW) line. 94 Va. at 656-58, 27 S.E. at 496. 

 The parties agreed on the proper methodology for measuring 

a current MLW line for the purpose of apportioning riparian 

rights under Groner, and they did not dispute that the Kennedy 

survey shows the correct current MLW line. The parties also did 

not dispute that the Kennedy survey shows the correct "edge of 

water" line in 1939, as taken from a 1939 harbor chart prepared 

by the United States Army Corps of Engineers Water Department, 

5
and that this line is nearly identical to the current MLW line. 

The parties disagreed, however, whether the current MLW line, or 

a historic MLW line existing about the time the lots originally 

were platted and recorded, should be used in making the 

calculation under Groner. 

 The parties further disagreed on the proper location of a 

historic MLW line. The Kidds and the Crowleys argued that the 

correct MLW line for making the Groner apportionment is a 

historic MLW line "unaffected by man," namely, a MLW line that 

existed prior to any manmade development affecting the perimeter 

of the properties. In determining this historic MLW line in 

their separate surveys, both Kennedy and Taliaferro relied on 

the revised subdivision plat. Although a MLW line is not 

expressly designated on the revised subdivision plat or the 

original subdivision plat, Taliaferro and Kennedy both concluded 

that the MLW line of 1908 could be approximated from the 

information appearing on the revised subdivision plat. 

Taliaferro testified that this MLW line was an unmarked dotted 

line on the revised subdivision plat that roughly follows the 

"straight-line"7 rear lot boundary lines of the properties, and 

that he used this dotted line in making his calculation under 

the Groner rule. Kennedy did not use this dotted line in making 

6
his calculation pursuant to Groner but instead used the 

"straight-line" rear lot boundary lines of the properties, as 

shown on the revised subdivision plat, which closely resembled 

the historic MLW line identified by Taliaferro. Kennedy used 

these rear lot boundary lines based on his determination that 

they were precise and clearly determined, and were "basically a 

mathematical tie line" along the actual MLW line of 1908. 

 The approximate MLW line of 1908, as determined by both the 

Kennedy and the Taliaferro surveys, is located substantially 

inland of the current MLW line. An apportionment of the 

parties' riparian rights under the current MLW line would yield 

different results from an apportionment under the approximate 

MLW line of 1908. This disparity would result because the 

property dimensions set forth in the source deeds and 

subdivision plats do not extend to the current MLW line, with 

the exception of the northeastern corner of the Carr property. 

Thus, based on the dimensions indicated in the deeds and the 

subdivision plats alone, there is currently an additional 

portion of land between the rear property line of all the 

parties' lots as originally platted and deeded and the current 

MLW line. 

 7

We use the term "straight-line" to describe the fixed lines 

as designated by the original subdivision surveyor and shown on 

the revised subdivision plat and the Kennedy survey. 

7
 The parties agreed that if the Groner rule were applied 

using the current MLW line, the pie-shaped configuration of the 

Crowley property would result in its side lot lines converging 

before reaching the current MLW line. Also, using this method, 

the side lot lines extending from the Kidd property would nearly 

converge. Therefore, use of the current MLW line in applying 

the Groner rule would leave the Crowleys with no riparian rights 

and the Kidds with substantially reduced rights. 

 By contrast, the Kennedy survey depicts that in 1908 no 

additional portion of land existed between the approximate MLW 

line of 1908 and the back line of the parties' properties as 

platted and deeded. Since that approximate MLW line was farther 

inland than the current MLW line, all the parties would have 

substantial riparian rights if the calculation under Groner were 

made using the MLW line of 1908. 

 The Kidds and the Crowleys produced testimony from their 

expert witnesses that the additional portion of land shown on 

their surveys exists today because manmade development of the 

perimeter of the parties' properties has moved the MLW line 

seaward since the lots originally were platted and recorded. 

The Kidds and the Crowleys argued that this movement was caused 

by the placement of the concrete bulkhead and "riprap" on the 

Carr property, as well as the placement of fill materials along 

the perimeter of all three properties. 

8
 The Carrs disagreed with this argument and asserted before 

the commissioner that the Kidds and the Crowleys improperly 

relied on the "straight-line" rear lot boundary lines of the 

revised subdivision plat to approximate the MLW line of 1908. 

John F. Hill, Jr., a surveyor who qualified as an expert 

witness, testified that the MLW line of the parties' properties 

is essentially the same today as when the lots originally were 

platted and recorded. Based on this testimony, the Carrs 

contended that the current MLW line is the proper line for 

purposes of making the calculation under Groner. 

 Hill based his opinion on a comparison of a "proposed" 1903 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers harbor chart, a 1939 harbor chart 

prepared by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Water Department, 

and the original subdivision plat. While Hill conceded in his 

testimony that there had been some movement of the MLW line over 

the years, he contended that this movement was only "partially 

caused by development." Hill did not prepare a survey that 

supported his opinion. 

 The Carrs also argued that the language in their source 

deed extended their side lot lines to a MLW line that was 

virtually the same in 1904 as it is currently. They relied on 

the language of their source deed stating that the property was 

conveyed "with all riparian rights on that branch of Tanner's 

Creek bounding them on the North and West." Thus, the Carrs 

9
argued that the courses and distances set forth in the deed 

descriptions merely approximated the true rear boundary of their 

property, which is the MLW line of Tanner's Creek. The Carrs 

contended that by comparison, the source deed for the Kidd and 

the Crowley properties did not contain express grants of 

riparian rights or indicate that the properties were bounded by 

Tanner's Creek.

 In his report, the commissioner concluded that a historic 

MLW line "unaffected by man" is the appropriate MLW line for 

making the Groner apportionment. The commissioner determined 

that the "straight-line" rear lot boundary lines shown on the 

revised subdivision plat, and depicted on the Kennedy survey, 

best approximated such a MLW line, and that the Kennedy survey's 

apportionment of riparian rights under the approximated MLW line 

of 1908 should be adopted. In reaching these conclusions, the 

commissioner found that Kennedy used a more appropriate 

methodology that was based on known points, which are fixed and 

are capable of recertification at any time. 

 The commissioner was not persuaded by Hill's methodology, 

observing that testimony from Kennedy and Taliaferro established 

that the 1903 proposed harbor chart used by Hill was prepared to 

show navigable water, not land boundaries. Further, Hill 

conceded on cross-examination that his analysis of the case 

relied on whether he had accurately located the Carr house on 

10
the 1903 proposed harbor chart. The commissioner noted, first, 

that Taliaferro testified that the structure identified by Hill 

was not the Carrs' house but an upstream structure, and second, 

that Kennedy testified that the house simply was shown on the 

plat as a general reference point. Moreover, while the 

commissioner found that Taliaferro and Kennedy had very candid 

demeanors, the commissioner stated that he was left with the 

impression that Hill did not believe his own testimony but 

merely was crafting the best argument for his clients, the 

Carrs. 

 The commissioner concluded that there was no merit in the 

Carrs' argument that the Kidds and Mr. Crowley lacked riparian 

rights based on the language of the parties' deeds. The 

commissioner noted that the 1904 source deed for the Carr 

property describes the property by referring to the lot lines of 

the original subdivision plat, and refers to the Carr property's 

dimensions as 150 feet wide by 125 feet deep, fronting on 

Luxembourg Avenue to the west. 

 The commissioner observed that the language of this source 

deed states that the Carr property includes "all riparian 

rights" extending into Tanner's Creek from the southwest corner 

of the property by a line of North 16 degrees West "as shown by 

a dotted line of the plat above referred to." The commissioner 

concluded that this deed language designates this riparian line 

11
to run from the platted pin placed 125 feet from Luxembourg 

Avenue at the southwest corner of the Carr property. The 

commissioner stated that this conclusion is evident from the 

original subdivision plat, which shows dotted lines extending 

out from the corners of the three properties of the parties, and 

described these dotted lines as "strikingly similar in 

orientation to the riparian lines on the Kennedy survey." 

 The commissioner noted that although the current deeds for 

the Kidd and the Crowley properties have quitclaim provisions 

regarding the properties' respective riparian rights, no 

riparian rights have been severed by deed from these properties. 

The commissioner finally concluded that an apportionment based 

on the Kennedy survey better meets "plain principles of justice" 

because such an apportionment gives all the property owners in 

this case rights to the shore and the flats directly in front of 

their properties. The trial court entered a final order 

apportioning the parties' riparian rights in accordance with the 

commissioner's recommendations. 

 We consider the Carrs' assignments of error on appeal under 

an established standard of review. A trial court's order 

approving a commissioner's report will be affirmed unless it is 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Chesapeake 

Builders, Inc. v. Lee, 254 Va. 294, 299, 492 S.E.2d 141, 144 

(1997); Firebaugh v. Hanback, 247 Va. 519, 525, 443 S.E.2d 134, 

12
137 (1994). We accord "great weight" to the factual findings of 

the commissioner that have been confirmed by the trial court 

and, thus, it is not our role to assess either the credibility 

of the witnesses or the probative value to be given to their 

testimony. Cooper v. Cooper, 249 Va. 511, 518, 457 S.E.2d 88, 

92 (1995). 

 On appeal, the Carrs first argue that the commissioner's 

use of the approximate MLW line of 1908, rather than the current 

MLW line, violated the Groner rule. They contend that the 

commissioner improperly assumed that the historic MLW line had 

changed because the Carrs' predecessors in title had placed fill 

materials and a bulkhead on the property. 

 The Carrs also assert that since their bulkhead lawfully 

was constructed in 1939 inland of the then existing MLW line, 

the commissioner erred in making his calculations under the 

Groner rule based on the approximate MLW line of 1908. They 

contend that the Kennedy survey adopted by the commissioner is 

further contrary to the Groner rule because the survey allocates 

within Mr. Crowley's riparian zone 639 square feet of the Carrs' 

"dry" land. We disagree with the Carrs' arguments. 

 In addressing these arguments, we first observe that the 

law governing the allocation of riparian rights is clear. A 

riparian owner has a right to the water frontage that belongs by 

nature to his land. This right includes, among other things, 

13
the right to the soil under the water between his land and the 

navigable line of the watercourse. The riparian owner may erect 

on this soil wharves, piers, or bulkheads for his own use, or 

for public use, subject to such rules as the General Assembly 

may impose for the public's protection. Langley v. Meredith, 

237 Va. 55, 62, 376 S.E.2d 519, 523 (1989); Cordovana v. Vipond, 

198 Va. 353, 357, 94 S.E.2d 295, 298 (1956); Groner, 94 Va. at 

651, 27 S.E. at 494. The enjoyment of this right is limited by 

statute such that exercise of the right shall not result in an 

obstruction of navigation or in injury to another's private 

rights. See Code § 62.1-164. 

 In conformance with these principles, a riparian owner is 

entitled to have the extent of his rights on the line of 

navigability of the water course determined and marked, along 

with his proper share of the flats, or land under the water, and 

those boundaries defined. Langley, 237 Va. at 62, 376 S.E.2d at 

523; Groner, 94 Va. at 651-52, 27 S.E. at 494. The prime object 

of this apportionment "should be to give each proprietor of the 

shore, and as directly in his front as practicable, a parcel of 

land under the water of a width at its outer end upon the line 

of navigability proportioned to that which it has at the inner 

or shore end." Langley, 237 Va. at 62, 376 S.E.2d at 523 

(quoting Groner, 94 Va. at 652, 27 S.E. at 494). 

14
 Frequent incidences of shore curvature prevent 

apportionment of riparian rights under a fixed rule extending 

out to the line of navigability the divisional lines between the 

owners' properties in the same direction that these lines reach 

the shore. Langley, 237 Va. at 62, 376 S.E.2d at 523; Groner, 

94 Va. at 652, 27 S.E. at 494. If the shore line or the line of 

navigability curves, or the divisional property lines approach 

the shore at different angles, projection of these lines in the 

same direction out to the line of navigability would necessarily 

and unjustly cause an encroachment on the riparian rights of the 

several adjoining waterfront owners, and deprive one or more of 

those owners of all access to the navigable part of the 

watercourse. Langley, 237 Va. at 62-63, 376 S.E.2d at 523; 

Groner, 94 Va. at 652, 27 S.E. at 494. To account for these 

potential problems, we articulated the rule in Groner, which we 

set forth above. 

 As these principles governing riparian rights make clear, a 

riparian owner's rights are limited by the water frontage 

belonging by nature to his land. Langley, 237 Va. at 62, 376 

S.E.2d at 523; Cordovana, 198 Va. at 357, 94 S.E.2d at 298; 

Groner, 94 Va. at 651, 27 S.E. at 494. Thus, a riparian owner 

gains the benefit of any accretion8 of his property from gradual 

 8

"Accretion" is a broad term referring generally to any 

change in land that is caused by the force of water and that 

15
and imperceptible changes caused by natural forces. Steelman v. 

Field, 142 Va. 383, 387, 128 S.E. 558, 559 (1925). However, a 

riparian owner may not, by means of lawful development of his 

land, enlarge his riparian rights and advance the division line 

between his riparian zone and the riparian zone of other 

property owners, or otherwise restrict the riparian rights of 

such other property owners. Lambert's Point Co. v. Norfolk and 

W. Ry. Co., 113 Va. 270, 274, 74 S.E. 156, 158 (1912); see

Shepheard v. Boggs, 198 Va. 299, 305, 94 S.E.2d 300, 304 (1956). 

 This rule articulated in Lambert's Point is particularly 

instructive here. The parties in that case sought an 

apportionment of riparian rights under circumstances in which 

the shoreline of their adjoining properties was irregular and 

curved. 113 Va. at 271, 74 S.E. at 157. On the waterfront of a 

portion of its land, one party lawfully had "filled in" land and 

built wharves, and sought to have its riparian rights determined 

in accordance with the altered shoreline resulting from the 

"filled in" land. 113 Va. at 273-74, 74 S.E. at 158. The 

commissioner in chancery to whom the suit was referred 

apportioned the parties' riparian rights by determining the MLW 

line "as if the filling in had not been done." 113 Va. at 274, 

74 S.E. at 158. 

 

involves an addition to land. Lynda Lee Butler & Margit 

Livingston, Virginia Tidal and Coastal Law § 3.4, at 62-63 

16
 We approved the methodology of the commissioner and his 

conclusion that an owner's riparian rights cannot be increased 

by that owner's lawful development of its shoreline. Id. We 

quoted with approval the commissioner's explanation that under a 

contrary view, "it would lie in the power of one riparian owner, 

by its own voluntary act, which could not be prevented by the 

adjoining owner, to increase its riparian rights, and encroach 

upon the riparian rights of the other adjoining owner to any 

extent." Id. Thus, when a property's perimeter has been 

developed, thereby altering the property's shoreline, an 

apportionment of riparian rights under the Groner rule requires 

that those rights be determined as if the perimeter 

improvements, including the placement of fill materials, had not 

been made. Id.

 In the present case, the commissioner accepted the 

testimony of Kennedy and Taliaferro that the Carrs' shoreline 

had been altered due to the manmade development of the perimeter 

of the property. Both experts testified that there were fill 

materials behind the bulkhead and the riprap on the Carrs' 

property. Taliaferro stated that these fill materials created 

"an enormous increase in land" behind the bulkhead on the Carr 

property, and he identified the fill materials as including 

 

(1988). 

17
heavy grain sands, rock, stone, and fly ash, which are materials 

"not natural to that area." 

 In addition, the bulkhead on the Carr property was 

constructed about 38 feet seaward of the 125-foot southern lot 

line terminus designated in the Carrs' source deed. Taliaferro 

concluded that the portion of the Carr property extending to the 

water beyond its 125-foot southern side lot line consisted 

entirely of fill materials. 

 Kennedy also testified that the difference between the 

current shoreline of all the parties' properties and their 

shoreline shown on the revised subdivision plat of 1908 is 

largely the result of manmade development. In addition, Hill, 

the Carrs' expert, conceded on cross-examination that the Carrs' 

shoreline had moved to some degree partly based on the manmade 

development of the property. Based on this evidence of manmade 

development, we conclude that the commissioner properly 

disregarded the current MLW line for purposes of making his 

apportionment under the Groner rule. 

 We next conclude that the evidence supports the 

commissioner's use of the approximate MLW line of 1908, as 

reflected by the "straight-line" rear lot boundary lines shown 

on the Kennedy survey. This methodology is supported by the 

expert testimony of Kennedy and Taliaferro. The approach also 

is consistent with Code § 28.2-1202 which provides, in material 

18
part, that the boundaries of tracts of land lying on the bays, 

rivers, creeks, and shores within the jurisdiction of the 

Commonwealth, and the rights and privileges of the owners of 

such lands, generally extend to the mean low-water mark "but no 

farther." Id.

 Kennedy testified that he approximated the MLW line of 1908 

after examining both the original and the revised subdivision 

plats. He stated that he identified this approximate MLW line 

based on his 16-year expertise in preparing hydrographic and 

riparian surveys, and that he followed proper surveying 

procedures for determining riparian rights, including 

disregarding changes in property boundaries caused by manmade 

development. Taliaferro confirmed that Kennedy used proper 

surveying procedures, and identified an approximate MLW line of 

1908 that closely resembled the course of the historic MLW line 

identified by Kennedy. 

 We find no merit in the Carrs' assertion that the method of 

locating this historic MLW line violated the requirement of 

Swanenburg v. Bland, 240 Va. 408, 413, 397 S.E.2d 859, 862 

(1990), that a surveyor's conclusion regarding the location of a 

property line rest on a factual basis. In Swanenburg, we 

reversed a judgment that was based on a surveyor's opinion 

regarding the location of a MLW line because his testimony was 

not supported by any probative evidence. Id. In contrast, the 

19
historic MLW line adopted by the commissioner in the present 

case was supported by evidence that this MLW line could be 

approximated based on the shoreline as shown on the original and 

revised subdivision plats. 

 We next consider the Carrs' contention that the trial court 

erred in adopting the commissioner's conclusion that the 

southern lot line of their property did not extend to "existing 

mean low water." The Carrs' objection to the commissioner's 

conclusion is based on their assertion that they own a 

triangular-shaped piece of about 639 square feet of land that 

they would lose to Mr. Crowley under the commissioner's 

recommended allocation of riparian rights. The Carrs note that 

their property was conveyed pursuant to the original 1904 

subdivision plat, and that their deed description did not 

provide for a rear property line but stated only that Tanner's 

Creek bounded the rear of the property. They contend that this 

natural boundary description takes precedence over measurements 

in the deed, such as the description of the property as "running 

between [125-foot] parallel lines." 

 We conclude that the commissioner's finding is not plainly 

wrong and is supported by evidence in the record, including the 

testimony of Leslie Carr. Carr admitted on cross-examination 

that the survey he obtained when he purchased the property 

showed that the disputed triangle of land lying to the southwest 

20
of his bulkhead was outside his platted lot lines. Moreover, 

the Kennedy survey adopted by the commissioner placed that 

triangle of land within the riparian zone for the Crowley 

property based on Kennedy's location of the approximate MLW line 

of 1908 along the rear lot lines fixed in the revised 

subdivision plat. Thus, the commissioner properly accepted the 

conclusion of Kennedy and Taliaferro that the Carr property did 

not include the disputed triangle of land. 

 The Carrs next argue that the trial court erred in 

affirming the commissioner's determination that the language of 

the source deed for the Kidd and Crowley properties did not 

"estop" the Kidds and the Crowleys from asserting riparian 

rights. The Carrs note that the source deed for both properties 

did not contain an express grant of riparian rights and did not 

state that the rear boundary lines of those properties was 

Tanner's Creek. The Carrs also contend that the commissioner 

failed to address adequately the issues raised by the quitclaim 

provisions in the deeds of the Kidd and the Crowley properties. 

We disagree with the Carrs' arguments. 

 Although the source deed for the Kidd and Crowley 

properties did not contain an express grant of riparian rights, 

the deed describes the boundaries of those lots in part by 

reference to the revised subdivision plat, which depicts the 

properties as having a rear waterfront boundary. Moreover, the 

21
source deed for the Kidd and Crowley properties did not have a 

quitclaim provision. The record before us shows that a 

quitclaim provision appeared in the chain of title for the Kidd 

property in 1993, and in the chain of title for the Crowley 

property in 1985. 

 A riparian owner has the right to water frontage belonging 

by nature to his land, unless that right has been clearly and 

manifestly retained by the grantor in language appearing on the 

face of the deed. Irby v. Roberts, 256 Va. 324, 330, 504 S.E.2d 

841, 844 (1998); Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 

913, 140 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1965). Here, the chain of title to 

both the Kidd and the Crowley properties shows no such retention 

or severance of riparian rights. Thus, the commissioner 

properly concluded that the language of the Kidd and the Crowley 

deeds did not preclude them from asserting riparian rights in 

their waterfront properties.9

 For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 

judgment. 

Affirmed.

 9

We have considered the remaining arguments advanced by the 

Carrs in support of their assignments of error and conclude that 

those arguments have no merit. 

22
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