United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation,

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,

House of Representatives

For Release

on Delivery

Expected at

2:00 p.m. EDT

Wednesday

September 11, 1996

AVIATION SECURITY

Urgent Issues Need to Be

Addressed

Statement of Keith O. Fultz,

Assistant Comptroller General,

Resources, Community, and Economic

Development Division

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Protecting civil aviation from a terrorist attack is an urgent national issue.

We appreciate the opportunity to testify before this Committee on the

serious vulnerabilities that exist within the nation’s air transportation

system and ways to address them. Experts on terrorism within the

government intelligence agencies believe that the threat to civil aviation is

increasing. The threat from concealed explosive devices remains a high

concern. The 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103, which killed 270

people, and the more recent, but as yet unexplained, explosion of TWA

flight 800 have shaken the public’s confidence in the safety and security of

air travel.

At your request, we are testifying on the steps that need to be taken to

protect the flying public from the activities of terrorists. Our testimony is

based on several issued GAO reports and testimonies including a number of

unclassified recommendations from our August 1996 classified report.

Today, we will discuss (1) the threat to aviation from attacks by terrorists,

(2) the aviation security system and vulnerabilities that exist within it,

(3) the availability and limitations of explosives detection technology and

other methods to address the threat, and (4) the efforts under way to

improve aviation security. We also will discuss the September 9, 1996,

recommendations from the Presidential Commission on Aviation Security

and Terrorism headed by Vice President Al Gore (the Gore Commission).

The following is our summary:

• The threat of terrorism against the United States has increased. Aviation is

and will remain an attractive target for terrorists.

• The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has mandated additional

security procedures as the threat has increased. Currently, aviation

security relies on a mix of procedures and technology. However, the

domestic and international aviation system has serious vulnerabilities. For

example, conventional X-ray screening of checked baggage has

performance limitations and offers little protection against a moderately

sophisticated explosive device.

• Explosives detection devices that could improve security are

commercially available for checked and carry-on baggage, but all of the

devices have some limitations. Some of these devices are being tested

domestically and are already in use at overseas locations. The Gore

Commission has recommended that the federal government purchase

some of this equipment for use in airports. Other devices are under

Page 1 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
development and may be available in a few years for screening baggage

and passengers, but technologies for screening cargo and mail at airports

are not as far along. Other security methods that could be expanded

upon—and that have been recommended by the Gore

Commission—include matching passengers with their bags and identifying

passengers for additional security screening (profiling). A mix of

technology and procedures will likely be needed to improve security.

• To improve aviation security, the Congress, the

administration—specifically FAA and the intelligence community, among

others—and the aviation industry need to agree and take action on what

needs to be done to meet the threat of terrorism and who will pay for it.

Several initiatives are under way to address this issue; they include two

presidential commissions and an FAA working group. We have made

recommendations to strengthen these initiatives. The Gore Commission’s

report provides opportunities for agreement on steps that could be taken

in the short term; however, the issue of how to finance security over the

long term still needs to be addressed. Given the urgent need to improve

aviation security and FAA’s problems in addressing long-standing safety

and security concerns, once steps are agreed upon, it will be important for

the Congress to monitor their implementation. Therefore, we believe that

the Congress should establish goals and performance measures and

require periodic reports from FAA and other federal agencies on the

progress and effectiveness of efforts to improve aviation security.

The Threat of

Terrorists’ Attacks on

U.S. Civil Aviation Has

Increased

We have previously reported about the challenges of protecting the U.S.

civil aviation system from terrorists’ attacks, the potential extent of

terrorists’ motivation and capabilities, and the attractiveness of aviation as

a target for terrorists.1

 Until the early 1990s, the threat of terrorism was

considered far greater overseas than in the United States. However, the

threat of international terrorism within the United States has increased.

Events such as the World Trade Center bombing have revealed that the

terrorists’ threat in the United States is more serious and extensive than

previously believed.

Terrorists’ activities are continually evolving and present unique

challenges to FAA and law enforcement agencies. We reported in March

1

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Challenges

(GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994), Aviation Security: Development of New Security Technology Has

Not Met Expectations (GAO/RCED-94-142, May 19, 1994), Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and

Roles of Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996),

and Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237,

Aug. 1, 1996).

Page 2 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
1996 that the bombing of Philippine Airlines flight 434 in December 1994

illustrated the potential extent of terrorists’ motivation and capabilities as

well as the attractiveness of aviation as a target for terrorists. According to

information that was accidentally uncovered in January 1995, this

bombing was a rehearsal for multiple attacks on specific U.S. flights in

Asia.

Aviation Security

System and Its

Vulnerabilities

Even though FAA has increased security procedures as the threat has

increased, the domestic and international aviation system continues to

have numerous vulnerabilities. According to information provided by the

intelligence community, FAA makes judgments about the threat and

decides which procedures would best address the threat. The airlines and

airports are responsible for implementing the procedures and paying for

them. For example, the airlines are responsible for screening passengers

and property, and the airports are responsible for the security of the

airport environment. FAA and the aviation community rely on a

multifaceted approach that includes information from various intelligence

and law enforcement agencies, contingency plans to meet a variety of

threat levels, and the use of screening equipment, such as conventional

X-ray devices and metal detectors.

For flights within the United States, basic security measures include the

use of walk-through metal detectors for passengers and X-ray screening of

carry-on baggage—measures that were primarily designed to avert

hijackings during the 1970s and 1980s, as opposed to the more current

threat of attacks by terrorists that involve explosive devices. These

measures are augmented by additional procedures that are based on an

assessment of risk. Among these procedures are passenger profiling and

passenger-bag matching.2

Because the threat of terrorism had previously been considered greater

overseas, FAA mandated more stringent security measures for international

flights. Currently, for all international flights, FAA requires U.S. carriers, at

a minimum, to implement the International Civil Aviation Organization’s

standards that include the inspection of carry-on bags and passenger-bag

matching.3 FAA also requires additional, more stringent

2

Passenger profiling is a method of identifying potentially threatening passengers who are then

subjected to additional security measures. Passenger-bag matching is a procedure used by air carriers

to ensure that a passenger who checks a bag also boards the flight; if the passenger does not board, the

bag is removed.

3

The International Civil Aviation Organization is a United Nations organization that develops standards

and recommends practices for aviation safety and security.

Page 3 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
measures—including interviewing passengers that meet certain criteria,

screening every checked bag, and screening carry-on baggage—at all

airports in Europe and the Middle East and many airports elsewhere.

In the aftermath of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103, a Presidential

Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism was established to

examine the nation’s aviation security system. This commission reported

that the system was seriously flawed and failed to provide the flying public

with adequate protection. FAA’s security reviews, audits prepared by the

Department of Transportation’s Office of the Inspector General, and work

we have conducted show that the system continues to be flawed.

Providing effective security is a complex problem because of the size of

the U.S. aviation system, the differences among airlines and airports, and

the unpredictable nature of terrorism. In our previous reports and

testimonies on aviation security, we highlighted a number of

vulnerabilities in the overall security system, such as checked and carry-on

baggage, mail, and cargo. We also raised concerns about unauthorized

individuals gaining access to critical parts of an airport and the potential

use of sophisticated weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles, against

commercial aircraft. According to FAA officials, more recent concerns

include smuggling bombs aboard aircraft in carry-on bags and on

passengers themselves.

Specific information on the vulnerabilities of the nation’s aviation security

system is classified and cannot be detailed here, but we can provide you

with unclassified information. Nearly every major aspect of the

system—ranging from the screening of passengers, checked and carry-on

baggage, mail, and cargo as well as access to secured areas within airports

and aircraft—has weaknesses that terrorists could exploit. FAA believes

that the greatest threat to aviation is explosives placed in checked

baggage. For those bags that are screened, we reported in March 1996 that

conventional X-ray screening systems (comprising the machine and

operator who interprets the image on the X-ray screen) have performance

limitations and offer little protection against a moderately sophisticated

explosive device. In our August 1996 classified report, we provided details

on the detection rates of current systems as measured by numerous FAA

tests that have been conducted over the last several years.

In 1993, the Department of Transportation’s Office of the Inspector

General also reported weaknesses in security measures dealing with

(1) access to restricted airport areas by unauthorized persons and

Page 4 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
(2) carry-on baggage. A follow-on review in 1996 indicated that these

weaknesses continue to persist and have not significantly improved.

Explosives Detection

Technology Has

Limitations in Meeting

the Increased Threat

New explosives detection technology will play an important part in

improving security, but it is not a panacea. In response to the Aviation

Security Improvement Act of 1990, FAA accelerated its efforts to develop

explosives detection technology. A number of devices are now

commercially available to address some vulnerabilities. Since fiscal year

1991, FAA has invested over $150 million in developing technologies

specifically designed to detect concealed explosives. (See table 1.) FAA

relies primarily on contracts and grants with private companies and

research institutions to develop these technologies and engages in some

limited in-house research. The act specifically directed FAA to develop and

deploy explosives detection systems by November 1993. However, this

goal has not been met.

Table 1: FAA’s Expenditures for

Developing Explosives Detection

Technology, by Fiscal Year

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Expenditure

1991 $22.4

1992 27.1

1993 26.7

1994 24.2

1995 23.6

1996a 29.3

Total $153.3

aThe 1996 funding level is an estimate as of June 1996.

Source: FAA.

Since fiscal year 1991, these expenditures have funded approximately 85

projects for developing new explosives detection technology. Currently,

FAA has 40 active development projects. Of these, 19 projects are

developing explosives detection prototype systems. The remaining 21

projects are conducting basic research or developing components for use

in explosives detection systems.

In September 1993, FAA published a certification standard that explosives

detection systems for checked bags must meet before they are deployed.

Page 5 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
The standard is classified and sets certain minimum performance criteria.4

To minimize human error, the standard also requires that the devices

automatically sound an alarm when explosives are suspected; this feature

is in contrast to currently used conventional X-ray devices, whereby the

operator has to look at the X-ray screen for each bag to determine whether

it contains a threat. In 1994, we reported that FAA had made little progress

in meeting the law’s requirement for deploying explosives detection

systems because of technical problems, such as slow baggage processing.

As of today, one system has passed FAA’s certification standard and is

being operationally tested by U.S. airlines at two U.S. airports and one

foreign location.

Explosives detection devices can substantially improve the airlines’ ability

to detect concealed explosives before they are brought aboard aircraft.

While most of these technologies are still in development, a number of

devices are now commercially available. However, none of the

commercially available devices are without limitations. On the basis of our

analysis, we have three overall observations on detection technologies.

• First, these devices vary in their ability to detect the types, quantities, and

shapes of explosives.

• Second, explosives detection devices typically produce a number of false

alarms that must be resolved either by human intervention or technical

means. These false alarms occur because the devices use various

technologies to identify characteristics, such as shapes, densities, and

other properties, to indicate a potential explosive. Given the huge volume

of passengers, bags, and cargo processed by the average major U.S.

airport, even relatively modest false alarm rates could cause several

hundreds, even thousands, of items per day to need additional scrutiny.

• Third, and most important, these devices ultimately depend upon human

beings to resolve alarms. This activity can range from closer inspection of

a computer image and a judgment call to a hand search of the item in

question. The ultimate detection of explosives depends on extra steps

being taken by security personnel—or their arriving at the correct

judgment—to determine whether an explosive is present. Because many of

the devices’ alarms signify only the potential for explosives being present,

the true detection of explosives requires human intervention. The higher

the false alarm rate, the greater is the system’s need to rely on human

judgment. As we noted in our previous reports, this reliance could be a

4

The certification standard sets minimum performance criteria for (1) the explosive substances to be

detected; (2) the probability of detection, by explosive; (3) the quantity of explosive; and (4) the

number of bags processed per hour. In addition, the standard specifies the maximum allowable false

alarm rate, by explosive.

Page 6 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
weak link in the explosives detection process. In addition, relying on

human judgments has implications for the selection and training of

operators for new equipment.

Despite the limitations of the currently available technology, some

countries have already deployed some explosives detection equipment

because of differences in their perception of the threat and their

approaches to counter the threat. The Gore Commission recommends that

$161 million in federal funds be used to deploy some of these devices. It

has also recommended that decisions about deploying equipment be based

on vulnerability assessments of the nation’s 450 largest airports.

Devices Are Available to

Address Some of the

System’s Vulnerabilities,

and FAA Has Developed

Some Cost Estimates

A number of explosives detection devices are currently available or under

development to determine whether explosives are present in checked and

carry-on baggage or on passengers, but they are costly. FAA is still

developing systems to screen cargo and mail at airports.

Checked Bags Four explosives detection devices with automatic alarms are commercially

available for checked bags, but only one has met FAA’s certification

standard—the CTX-5000. FAA’s preliminary estimates are that the one-time

acquisition and installation costs of the certified system for the 75 busiest

airports in the United States could range from $400 million to $2.2 billion,

depending on the number of machines installed. These estimates do not

include operating costs. The four devices rely on three different

technologies.

• The CTX-5000 is a computerized tomography device, which is based on

advances made in the medical field. It has the best overall detection ability

but is relatively slow in processing bags and has the highest price. To meet

FAA’s standard for processing bags, two devices are required, which would

cost approximately $2 million for a screening station. This system was

certified by FAA in December 1994.

• Two other advanced X-ray devices have lower detection capability but are

faster at processing baggage and cheaper—costing approximately $350,000

to $400,000 each.

• The last device uses electromagnetic radiation. It offers chemical-specific

detection capabilities but only for some of the explosives specified in FAA’s

standard. The current price is about $340,000 each.

Page 7 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
FAA is funding the development of next-generation devices based on

computerized tomography, which is currently used in the CTX-5000. These

devices are being designed to meet FAA’s standard for detecting explosives

at faster processing speeds; the target price is about $500,000 each, and

they could be available by early 1998. Advanced X-ray devices with

improved capabilities are also being developed.

Carry-on Items Explosives detection devices are commercially available for screening

carry-on bags, electronics, and other items but not yet for screening

bottles or containers that could hold liquid explosives. Devices for liquids,

however, may be commercially available within a few years.

Carry-on bags and electronics. At least five manufacturers sell devices that

can detect the residue or vapor from explosives on the exterior of carry-on

bags and on electronic items, such as computers or radios. These devices,

also known as “sniffers,” are commonly referred to as “trace” detectors

and range in price from about $30,000 to $170,000 each. They have very

specific detection capabilities as well as low false alarm rates. One

drawback to trace devices, among others, is nuisance alarms. The alarms

on these devices could be activated by persons who have legitimate

reasons for handling explosive substances, such as military personnel.

An electromagnetic device is also available that offers a high probability of

chemical-specific detection but only for some explosives. The price is

about $65,000.

Detecting liquid explosives. FAA is developing two different

electromagnetic systems for screening bottles and other containers. A

development issue is processing speed. These devices may be available

within 2 years. The cost is projected to be between $25,000 and $125,000

each.

Passengers Although a number of commercially available trace devices could be used

on passengers if deemed necessary, passengers might find their physical

intrusiveness unacceptable. In June 1996, the National Research Council,

for example, reported that there may be a number of health, legal,

operational, privacy, and convenience concerns about

passenger-screening devices. FAA and other federal agencies are

developing devices that passengers may find more acceptable. FAA

Page 8 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
estimates that the cost to provide about 3,000 of these devices to screen

passengers would be about $1.9 billion.

• A number of trace devices in development will detect residue or vapor

from explosives on passengers’ hands. Two devices screen either

documents or tokens that have been handled by passengers. These devices

should be available in 1997 or 1998 and sell for approximately $65,000 to

$85,000 each.

• Another five devices under development use walk-through screening

portals similar to current metal detectors. Three will use trace technology

to detect particles and vapor from explosives on passengers’ clothing or in

the air surrounding their bodies. Projected selling prices range from

approximately $170,000 to $300,000. One of these devices will be tested at

an airport in the latter part of 1996, and another device may undergo

airport testing next year.

• Two other walk-through portals based on electromagnetic technology are

in development. Rather than detecting particles or vapor, these devices

will show images of items concealed under passengers’ clothing. Prices

are projected to be approximately $100,000 to $200,000.

Cargo and Mail Screening cargo and mail at airports is difficult because individual

packages or pieces of mail are usually batched into larger shipments that

are more difficult to screen. If cargo and mail shipments were broken

down into smaller packages, some available technologies could be used.

For example, the electromagnetic device available for checked baggage

will be tested for screening cargo and mail at a U.S. airport. Although not

yet commercially available, two different systems for detecting explosives

in large containers are being developed by FAA and other federal agencies.

Each system draws vapor and particle samples and uses trace technology

to analyze them. One system is scheduled for testing in 1997.

In addition, FAA is considering, for further development, three

nuclear-based technologies originally planned for checked-bag screening

for use on cargo and mail. These technologies use large, heavy

apparatuses to generate gamma rays or neutrons to penetrate larger items.

However, they require shielding for safety reasons. These technologies are

not as far along and are still in the laboratory development stage rather

than the prototype development stage. If fully developed, these devices

could cost as much as $2 million to $5 million each.

Page 9 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
Blast-Resistant Containers To reduce the effects of an in-flight explosion, FAA is conducting research

on blast-resistant containers, which might reduce the number of expensive

explosives detection systems needed. FAA’s tests have demonstrated that it

is feasible to contain the effects—blast and fragments—of an internal

explosion. However, because of their size, blast-resistant containers can

be used only on wide-body aircraft that typically fly international routes.

FAA is working with a joint industry-government consortium to address

concerns about the cost, weight, and durability of the new containers and

is planning to blast test several prototype containers later this year. Also

this year, FAA will place about 20 of these containers into airline operations

to assess, among other things, their durability and effect on airline

operations.

Other Methods to Improve

Aviation Security

In addition to technology-based security, FAA has other methods that it

uses, and can expand upon, to augment domestic aviation security or use

in combination with technology to reduce the workload required by

detection devices. The Gore Commission has recommended expanded use

of bomb-sniffing dogs, profiling passengers to identify those needing

additional attention, and matching passengers with their bags.

Dogs are considered a unique type of trace detector because they can be

trained to respond in specific ways to the smell of explosives. Dogs are

currently being used at a number of U.S. airports. The Gore Commission

has recommended that 114 additional teams of dogs and their handlers be

deployed at a cost of about $9 million.

On July 25, 1996, the President announced additional measures for

international and domestic flights that include, among other things,

stricter controls over checked baggage and cargo as well as additional

inspections of aircraft. Two procedures that are routinely used on many

international flights are passenger profiling and passenger-bag matching.

FAA officials have said that profiling can reduce the number of passengers

and bags that require additional security measures by as much as

80 percent. The Gore Commission has recommended several initiatives to

promote an automated profiling system. In addition, to determine the best

way to implement systemwide matching of passengers with their bags, the

Gore Commission has recommended testing techniques at selected

airports.

Profiling and bag matching are unable to address certain types of threats.

However, in the absence of sufficient or effective technology, these

Page 10 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
procedures are a valuable part of the overall security system. FAA has

estimated that incorporating bag matching in everyday security measures

could cost up to $2 billion in start-up costs and lost revenue. The direct

costs to airlines include, among other things, equipment, staffing, and

training. The airlines’ revenues and operations could be affected

differently because the airlines currently have different capabilities to

implement bag matching, different route structures, and different periods

of time allotted between connecting flights.

Initiatives to Address

Vulnerabilities Should

Be Coordinated

Addressing the vulnerabilities in the nation’s aviation security system is an

urgent national issue. Although the Gore Commission made

recommendations on September 9, no agreement currently exists among

all the key players, namely, the Congress, the administration—specifically

FAA and the intelligence community, among others—and the aviation

industry, on the steps necessary to improve security in the short and long

term to meet the threat. In addition, who will be responsible in the long

term for paying for new security initiatives has not been addressed. While

FAA has increased security at domestic airports on a temporary basis, FAA

and Department of Transportation officials believe that more permanent

changes are needed. Furthermore, the cost of these changes will be

significant, may require changes in how airlines and airports operate, and

will likely have an impact on the flying public. To achieve these permanent

changes, three initiatives that are under way may assist in developing a

consensus among all interested parties on the appropriate direction and

response to meet the ever-increasing threat.

On July 17, 1996, FAA established a joint government-industry working

group under its Aviation Security Advisory Committee. The committee,

composed of representatives from FAA, the National Security Council, the

Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the

Departments of Defense and State, the Office of Management and Budget,

and the aviation community, will (1) review the threat to aviation,

(2) examine vulnerabilities, (3) develop options for improving security,

(4) identify and analyze funding options, and (5) identify the legislative,

executive, and regulatory actions needed. The goal is to provide the FAA

Administrator with a final report by October 16, 1996. Any national policy

issues would then be referred to the President by the FAA Administrator

through the Secretary of Transportation.

In recognition of the increased threat of terrorism in general, the President

established a Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection on July 15,

Page 11 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
1996. Moreover, with respect to the specific threat against civil aviation, in

the aftermath of the TWA flight 800 crash, the President established a

commission headed by the Vice President on July 25, 1996, to review

aviation safety, security, and the pace of modernization of the air traffic

control system. The Gore Commission is working with the National

Transportation Safety Board, the Departments of Transportation and

Justice, aviation industry advisory groups, and concerned

nongovernmental organizations. In our August 1, 1996, testimony before

the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, we

emphasized the importance of informing the American public of and

involving them in this effort. Furthermore, we recommended that the

following steps be taken immediately:

• Conduct a comprehensive review of the safety and security of all major

domestic and international airports and airlines to identify the strengths

and weaknesses of their procedures to protect the traveling public.

• Identify vulnerabilities in the system.

• Establish priorities to address the system’s identified vulnerabilities.

• Develop a short-term approach with immediate actions to correct

significant security weaknesses.

• Develop a long-term and comprehensive national strategy that combines

new technology, procedures, and better training for security personnel.

The Gore Commission was charged with reporting its initial findings on

aviation security in 45 days, including plans (1) to deploy new technology

to detect the most sophisticated explosives and (2) to pay for that

technology. We are pleased that the Gore Commission’s September 9,

1996, report contains many recommendations similar to those we made.

The commission recommended a budget amendment for fiscal year 1997

of about $430 million to implement some of the 20 recommendations made

in the report. However, the commission stated that it did not settle the

issue of how security costs will be financed in the long run. The

commission will continue to review aviation safety, security, and air traffic

control modernization over the next several months and is scheduled to

issue its final report by February 1, 1997. Given the urgent need to improve

aviation security and FAA’s less-than-effective history of addressing

long-standing safety and security concerns, it will be important for the

Congress to oversee the implementation of new security measures once

they are agreed upon. Therefore, we believe that Congress should

establish goals and performance measures and require periodic reports

from FAA and other responsible federal agencies on the progress and

effectiveness of efforts to improve aviation security.

Page 12 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
To sustain the Gore Commission’s momentum and its development of

long-term actions to improve aviation security, we concluded in our

classified August 1996 report that the Commission should be supported by

staff composed of the best available government and industry experts on

terrorism and civil aviation security. We recommended the following:

• In view of the short time frame for the Gore Commission and the expertise

within FAA’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee’s working group, both

groups should be melded together. The Vice President should make the

necessary arrangements for detailing the working group to the Gore

Commission.

• The Vice President should not restrict the purview of the working group’s

proposed solutions to those within FAA’s jurisdiction but should also

include proposed solutions within the intelligence and law enforcement

communities’ purview that relate to aviation security.

• Because aviation security is an urgent issue, the President should report to

the Congress, during the current congressional session, recommendations

on statutory changes that may be required, including who should pay for

additional security measures, whether aviation security should be

considered a national security issue, and whether changes are needed in

the requirement for FAA certification of explosives detection technology

before mandating its deployment.

In addition, we also stated that the Congress may wish to enact legislation

during the current legislative session addressing such matters as who

should pay for additional security, whether aviation security is a national

security issue, and whether the requirement for FAA certification for

explosive detection devices should be changed.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the threat of terrorism has been an

international issue for some time and continues to be, as illustrated by

events such as the bombing in Saudi Arabia of U.S. barracks. But other

incidents, such as the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York

and the federal building in Oklahoma City—have made terrorism a

domestic as well as an international issue. Public concern about aviation

safety, in particular, has already been heightened as a result of the ValuJet

crash, and the recent TWA flight 800 crash—regardless of the cause—has

increased that concern. If further incidents occur, public fear and anxiety

will escalate, and the economic well-being of the aviation industry will

suffer because of reductions in travel and the shipment of goods.

Page 13 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
Given the persistence of long-standing vulnerabilities and the increased

threat to civil aviation, we believe corrective actions need to be

undertaken immediately. These actions need a unified effort from the

highest levels of the government to address this national issue. With three

separate initiatives under way, the Vice President could be the focal point

to build a consensus on the actions that need to be taken to address a

number of these long-standing vulnerabilities. The Gore Commission’s

September 9, 1996, report to the President provides opportunities for

agreement on steps to improve security that could be taken in the short

term.

(341502) Page 14 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251
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