#25498-rev & rem-JKM 

2010 S.D. 87

IN THE SUPREME COURT 

OF THE 

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

NICHOLAS RONDELL, Defendant and Appellant. 

 

* * * * 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT 

OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 

ROBERTS COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

HONORABLE JON S. FLEMMER 

Judge 

* * * * 

MARTY J. JACKLEY 

Attorney General 

CRAIG M. EICHSTADT 

Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for plaintiff 

Pierre, South Dakota and appellee. 

ADAM G. BRIDGE 

Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate 

 Public Defender’s Office Attorney for defendant 

Agency Village, South Dakota and appellant. 

* * * * 

CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS 

ON OCTOBER 4, 2010 

 

 OPINION FILED 11/17/10 
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MEIERHENRY, Justice 

[¶1.] Nicholas Rondell appeals an adverse ruling on a suppression motion. 

Rondell was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Rondell 

claimed that the traffic stop was an unconstitutional search and seizure and moved 

to suppress evidence resulting from the stop. After the trial court denied Rondell’s 

motion, he entered into a plea agreement with the State. The State and Rondell 

agreed that Rondell would enter a “conditional guilty plea” to preserve his right to 

appeal the court’s adverse suppression motion ruling. The trial court accepted the 

conditional guilty plea – also with the understanding that the agreement 

contemplated that Rondell was preserving his right to appeal. On appeal, but 

without filing a notice of review, the State raises the issue whether Rondell waived 

his right to appeal. The State claims that South Dakota law does not provide for a 

conditional guilty plea and that a benefit of the bargain plea under North Carolina 

v. Alford waives all non-jurisdictional defects, including allegations of an 

unconstitutional traffic stop.1 Generally we do not consider issues that have not 

been raised to the trial court or noticed for review. Hall v. State ex rel. S.D. Dep’t of 

Transp., 2006 S.D. 24, ¶ 12, 712 N.W.2d 22, 26. Nevertheless, the unique plea 

 

1. In North Carolina v. Alford, the United States Supreme Court held that a 

plea can be entered by a defendant who maintains his innocence or is unable 

or unwilling to admit that he committed a crime. 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 

160, 167, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 171 (1970). This Court recognized in State v. 

Engelmann that an Alford plea “allows a defendant the opportunity to avoid 

the risk of trial and obtain the benefit of a favorable plea bargain ‘even if he 

is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the 

crime.’” 541 N.W.2d 96, 101 (S.D. 1995) (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 37, 91 

S.Ct. at 167). 

 

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agreement between Rondell and the State involving a conditional guilty plea 

prompts us to question the trial court’s jurisdiction. We therefore address the 

question whether a trial court has authority to accept a conditional plea. 

Facts 

[¶2.] Rondell was arrested for: driving under the influence of alcohol, third 

offense, a violation of SDCL 32-23-1; driving with a revoked license, a violation of 

SDCL 32-23-4; possession of an open container, a violation of SDCL 35-1-9.1; and 

underage consumption, a violation of SDCL 35-9-2. Before trial, Rondell filed a 

motion to suppress evidence gathered the night he was arrested. Rondell argued to 

the trial court that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make a lawful 

traffic stop. The trial court denied Rondell’s motion, finding that reasonable 

suspicion justified the stop. After his suppression motion was denied, Rondell 

changed his not guilty plea to a conditional guilty plea. In exchange for Rondell’s 

plea, the state’s attorney dismissed the charges for underage consumption, open 

container, and driving with a revoked license. 

[¶3.] The State, Rondell, and the trial court understood that the plea was 

entered as a conditional plea. The following exchange took place at the plea 

hearing: 

Rondell’s Attorney: I’ll outline [the plea agreement] for the Court. Mr. 

Rondell’s agreed to withdraw his earlier not guilty 

plea, enter a conditional guilty plea to the charge 

of DUI, Third Offense. Thereby preserving his 

right to appeal [ ] [the] [d]enial of the motion to 

suppress but saving the State the burden of trial. 

In [ ] exchange I believe the State will not proceed 

on the misdemeanor charges and will not oppose 

Mr. Rondell’s request for a sentence to run 
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concurrent to a sentence that he’s looking at in 

Brown County[.] 

 

Trial Court: Is that the extent of the agreement [Rondell’s 

attorney]? 

Rondell’s Attorney: Yes, Your Honor. 

Trial Court: And, [state’s attorney], is that the State’s 

understanding of the agreement? 

State’s Attorney: Yes, Your Honor. 

Trial Court: And, Mr. Rondell, is that your understanding of the 

agreement that you’ve made with the [s]tate’s 

[a]ttorney? 

Rondell: Yes, Your Honor. 

Trial Court: And I guess by a conditional plea, [Rondell’s 

attorney], you’re referring to an Alfred [sic] plea 

basically where the Defendant is not admitting the 

offense but wishes to accept the benefit of the offer 

made by the State?2

Rondell’s Attorney: Yes, Your Honor. 

. . . 

Trial Court: And just so that we’re clear, the agreement calls for 

[Rondell] to enter an Alfred [sic] plea of guilty to 

the charge and the recommendation being made to 

the Court is to allow any sentence imposed here to 

the penitentiary to be allowed to run concurrently 

or at the same time as any sentence you receive on 

another charge in Brown County[.] 

. . . 

Trial Court: And just so that we’re clear for the record, you wish 

to enter what’s called an Alfred [sic] plea in that 

2. Although the trial court refers to this as an Alford (or Alfred) plea, the record 

demonstrates that Rondell, the State, and the trial court understood that the 

plea was a conditional plea, not an unconditional Alford plea.
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you are not necessarily admitting that you 

committed the offense but you wish to accept or 

enter a plea of guilty in order to receive the benefit 

of the agreement that the State is offering in this 

case? 

Rondell: Yes, Your Honor. 

. . . 

Trial Court: [T]hat also because there was the issue on the 

suppression hearing, here, I should advise you that 

you do have the right to appeal your decision here 

but that appeal would have to be filed within 30 

days of when the written judgment of conviction is 

filed[.] 

Analysis 

[¶4.] The only pleas permitted in South Dakota are set forth in SDCL 23A7-2 (Rule 11(a)) as follows: 

Pleas permitted to defendant - Requirements for plea of guilty or 

nolo contendere. 

 A defendant may plead: 

(1) Not guilty; 

(2) Not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity; 

(3) Guilty; 

(4) Nolo contendere; or 

(5) Guilty but mentally ill. 

 Except as otherwise specifically provided, a plea of guilty 

or nolo contendere can only be entered by a defendant himself in 

open court. If a defendant refuses to plead, or if the court 

refuses to accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court 

shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court may not enter a 

judgment unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for 

any plea except a plea of nolo contendere. 

This statute does not provide for conditional pleas. 

[¶5.] As support for his argument that South Dakota could permit 

conditional pleas, Rondell points to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2). 
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Federal Rule 11(a)(2) permits conditional pleas under certain circumstances. The 

Federal Rule provides: “With the consent of the court and the government, a 

defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in 

writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a 

specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal may then withdraw 

the plea.” Id. 

[¶6.] Rondell recognizes that South Dakota has not adopted a similar rule, 

but asserts that “there is nothing in South Dakota’s Rules of Criminal Procedure 

that prohibits a conditional plea or the preservation of appeal rights following a 

guilty plea.” Conversely, the State argues that without a rule, the trial court lacks 

jurisdiction to accept a conditional guilty plea.3

[¶7.] The Rhode Island Supreme Court faced a similar question in State v. 

Keohane, 814 A.2d 327 (R.I. 2003). The Keohane court addressed whether a 

defendant’s conditional plea agreement, which was not authorized by statute, could 

preserve for appeal a trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. Id. 

at 328-29. The Keohane court held that Rhode Island statutes did not give the trial 

court the “authority to accept a conditional plea of guilty . . . preserving the right of 

the defendant to obtain review of the adverse determination of any specified pretrial 

motion.” Id. at 329. The Keohane court further stated that “[t]he defendant’s guilty 

plea acted as an effective waiver of his right of appeal; thus, the appeal [wa]s not 

properly before [the] Court.” Id. As a result, the Keohane court refused to recognize 

3. The State points out that a defendant wishing to preserve appeal rights can 

enter a not guilty plea but stipulate to the facts. That allows the trial court 

to adjudicate the case and the defendant to appeal adverse rulings. 
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“a right to a conditional plea subject to appeal” because such a right did not exist by 

statute. Id.

[¶8.] Like Rhode Island, South Dakota does not provide for a conditional 

guilty plea by statute or court rule. As such, we decline to recognize a conditional 

plea’s validity. Consequently, there was no authority for Rondell and the State to 

agree to a conditional guilty plea or for the trial court to accept the conditional plea. 

Cf. State v. Olson, 334 N.W.2d 49, 50 (S.D. 1983) (“This [C]ourt’s jurisdiction to 

entertain appeals is limited by statute . . . and it is left to the [L]egislature to 

expand the right to appeal.”); State v. Texley, 275 N.W.2d 872, 874 (S.D. 1979); State 

v. Nuwi Nini, 262 N.W.2d 758, 760 (S.D. 1978) (“The right to appeal is statutory 

and therefore does not exist in the absence of a statute permitting it.”). 

[¶9.] The State takes a rather precarious position on appeal. Initially, the 

State agreed, as part of the plea agreement, that Rondell would enter a conditional 

guilty plea. Now, the State asks this Court to hold that Rondell’s conditional plea 

be considered an unconditional guilty plea waiving all non-jurisdictional appeal 

rights. We have said that when a party “induce[s] or provoke[s] the court or the 

opposite party to commit” an error, the doctrine of “invited error” applies and that 

party “will not be heard to complain on appeal” about such error. Veith v. O’Brien, 

2007 S.D. 88, ¶ 27, 739 N.W.2d 15, 24, (quoting Taylor Realty Co. v. Haberling, 365 

N.W.2d 870, 873 (S.D. 1985) (additional citation omitted)). In this case, the State 

contributed to the error by affirmatively approving, rather than objecting to, 

Rondell’s conditional plea.
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[¶10.] This case presents an unusual situation where Rondell, the State, and 

the trial court agreed on a conditional plea, which had no legal basis in statute or 

court rule. Therefore we conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to 

accept Rondell’s conditional plea. As a result, we hold that Rondell’s conditional 

guilty plea is void. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

[¶11.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, ZINTER, and 

SEVERSON, Justices, concur.