United States Commission

on

National Security/21st Century

April 15, 2001

National Security Study Group

assisted by

Booz·Allen & Hamilton
Foreword

The Charter of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

(USCNS/21) requires the Commission to recommend the redesign of structures and

processes of the U.S. national security system, as necessary, based on its assessment of

the prospective threat environment and a U.S. national strategy to deal with that

environment. The Charter also calls for the submission of an implementation “roadmap”

to complete these improvements. Accordingly, in this Addendum on Implementation, the

Commission provides those plans with respect to implementing its recommendations on

Homeland Security, the National Security Council, the Department of State, National

Security Education Act, Civil Service Personnel, Foreign Service Personnel, and Military

Personnel.

These plans demonstrate actions the Executive Branch can take to implement the

Commission's recommendations. They identify where responsibilities lie, suggest

timelines and sequencing for implementation, and discuss the coordination and

consultation that must occur between the Executive and Legislative Branches to bring the

Commission’s recommendation into being. In addition, the plans address the impact of

the recommendations on affected agencies' personnel levels, where applicable, and

identify issues that, unless addressed, are likely to impede implementation.

The implementation plans within this Addendum identify whether legislation,

Executive Orders, or internal departmental actions are required to bring USCNS/21

recommendations into being. Where legislation or Executive Orders are required, the

plans identify their key elements and provide draft language. The firm of Booz Allen &

Hamilton assisted the USCNS/21 in developing the implementation plans contained in

this Addendum.

The Commission calls for bold and significant change in many areas, and it

realizes that implementing change is difficult and can take time. It is impossible to

specify in full detail in advance exactly how to bring about positive change in large

organizations that deal with complex issues. Nevertheless, a start must be made, and this

Addendum is instrumental to that purpose.

Charles G. Boyd, General, USAF (Retired)

Executive Director
i

PREFACE

ROAD MAP FOR NATIONAL SECURITY:

ADDENDUM ON IMPLEMENTATION

1. Introduction

This Addendum includes implementation plans for a number of key recommendations

made by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21) in its final report,

Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change. Specifically, the implementation

plans address the Commission's recommendations on Homeland Security, the functioning and

roles of the National Security Council, the organization of the U.S. Department of State, and

improving recruitment and retention in the Foreign Service, the Civil Service, and among

military personnel. Table 1 lists the specific USCNS/21 recommendations addressed in this

Addendum.

The implementation plans serve as blueprints for initiating the changes in processes and

organizations recommended by the Commission. Each implementation plan details specific

actions for achieving the objectives defined by the Commission, identifies responsibility for

those actions, and a timeline within which these actions should be completed. Depending on the

content of the recommendation, the plans address the implications of implementing the

recommendations on an agency's personnel. The implementation plans also describe challenges

specific to particular recommendations and offer ideas for addressing them. Finally, the plans

include draft language for legislation, if legislation is required to implement the

recommendation, and for Executive Orders, if required.

In developing the implementation plans, the Commission was mindful of the linkages

among the changes it was recommending. The reorganization of the Department of State, for

example, reflects the Commission's concept for improved interagency coordination of national

security policy that is the centerpiece of the recommendations on the functioning and roles of the

National Security Council (NSC). This emphasis on interagency coordination is also evident in

the Commission's recommendations on Civil Service personnel, which include establishing a

National Security Service Corps for top performers who would rotate from department to

department, obtaining broader experience than would otherwise be available to them. The

implementation plans recognize the linkages among the USCNS/21 recommendations and

highlight required actions to align related implementation plans. For example, the National

Security Council implementation plan lays out the actions for developing a top-down strategic

planning process. The strategic plan called for in this recommendation is then linked to the

process for improving strategic planning at the Department of State, another recommendation

made by the Commission.

2. Homeland Security

The USCNS/21 recommendations on Homeland Security focus on developing a

comprehensive strategy to improve U.S. ability to prevent and defend against homeland security

threats and creating a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA), by building upon the

functions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and bringing the Coast

Guard, Customs Service, the Border Patrol under the new agency's control. In addition, the

Commission calls for producing National Intelligence Estimates on homeland security threats;
ii

establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within the Office of the

Secretary of Defense; assigning the National Guard homeland security as a primary mission; and

establishing a Congressional body to provide oversight for homeland security.

Legislation is required to implement the centerpiece of the Commission's

recommendations—the creation of the NHSA—as well as creating an Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Homeland Security. A bill establishing the NHSA along the lines suggested by the

Commission was introduced in the House of Representatives (HR 1158). The implementation

plan outlines additional actions prior to and following the drafting of legislation, such as creating

an interagency task force, chaired by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to develop

policy and procedures for the NHSA and performing an analysis of the positions of the many

stakeholders in the establishment of the new agency, including the various agencies and

organizations that stand to lose some of their responsibilities to it.

The Commission's recommendation on developing a comprehensive national security

strategy can be implemented by Presidential action, either through the issuance of a National

Security Presidential Directive, an Executive Order, or a prominent Presidential speech. The key

element in preparing such a strategy will be to identify and assemble representatives of those

agencies that will likely play a central role in implementing the strategy to obtain their early

input.

Assigning the National Guard a primary mission of homeland security, on the other hand,

will require both Executive and Congressional action. The President could direct the Secretary

of Defense to make homeland security a National Guard primary mission of equal status with

warfighting missions. Congressional action would be required, however, to provide the

necessary resources to equip the Guard to execute this mission. The implementation plan details

a course of action for assigning this mission to the National Guard, including the steps necessary

to conduct a comprehensive assessment of threats, requirements, and capabilities for both

conventional warfighting and homeland security missions.

3. The National Security Council

The Commission's recommendations pertaining to the National Security Council (NSC)

focus on establishing a top-down strategic planning process, coordinated by the National

Security Advisor; preparing integrated "national security" budgets for those crosscutting national

security issues identified in the planning process; emphasizing the coordinating role of the NSC

Staff; making the Secretary of Treasury a statutory member of the NSC; and abolishing the

National Economic Council (NEC), folding its functions into the NSC and the Domestic Policy

Council (DPC).

The majority of these recommendations can be implemented by Presidential directive.

Initiating a top-down strategic planning process can be initiated by a National Security

Presidential Directive tasking the National Security Advisor to coordinate the process. The

implementation plan provides a blueprint for assembling this strategic guidance, drawing on the

direction of the NSC Principals, the involvement of the NSC Deputies, and the support of the

NSC staff. The Commission’s vision for this strategic guidance is a brief document that would

direct the development of the various Departments' budget submissions. As such, the

implementation plan suggests a timeline for developing the guidance that fits within the budget

preparation process.
iii

Similarly, developing a "national security budget" for critical, crosscutting national

security goals, such as homeland security, counter-terrorism, and nonproliferation, can be

initiated by a direct Presidential tasking to the National Security Advisor and the Director of

OMB. The Commission does not envision this budget as a full national security budget, but an

expanded cross-functional budget compiling 15-20 crosscutting issues that would supplement the

President's budget request to Congress. The implementation plan details steps for developing

this budget, including the role of the National Security Advisor, the NSC staff, and OMB in

preparing specific budget guidance for the departments participating in the preparation of the

cross-functional budget.

The abolishment of the NEC and the consolidation of its functions in the NSC and the

DPC can also be accomplished by Presidential directive. The implementation plan lays out the

steps to be taken to ensure the appropriate treatment of economic issues within the National

Security Council, including the appointment of a Deputy National Security Advisor as the

President's chief economic advisor.

The recommendation for making the Secretary of Treasury a statutory member of the

National Security Council requires legislation. The implementation plan provides draft

legislative language as well as steps for ensuring coordination of Treasury Department actions

with other national security activities.

4. Department of State

The USCNS/21 recommendations on the Department of State focus on the reorganization

of the Department by aligning functional bureaus under regional Under Secretaries and a Global

Under Secretary; the abolishment of U.S. AID and consolidation of its functions into the State

Department; the strengthening of strategic planning functions within the Department; and the

establishment of a panel to ensure that the selection process for U.S. Ambassadors yields

candidates with appropriate management and leadership skills. The Commission also

recommended that Congress appropriate funds to the State Department in a single Foreign

Operations budget.

The centerpiece of the Commission's recommendations, the reorganization of the

Department of State and the abolishment of U.S. AID, will require legislation. The

implementation plan lays out a course of action for developing a legislative proposal, including

the development of a reorganization plan that would aid in identifying the elements of the

legislative proposal. At a minimum, the legislation for reorganizing the Department of State and

consolidating U.S. AID functions within it would require repealing eight statutory positions,

including two Under Secretaries, four Assistant Secretaries, and all Special Coordinators;

increasing the number of Under Secretaries allowed in the Department to seven; increasing the

number of Assistant Secretaries to 25; and repealing the establishment of U.S. AID as an

independent agency, specifying that its functions be transferred to the State Department.

Other Commission recommendations, such as strengthening internal strategic planning

efforts and establishing the Office of Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget, can be

implemented by internal, departmental action. The implementation plan lays out a blueprint for

strengthening the current strategic planning process and for linking it to the strategic planning

guidance prepared by the National Security Council, as recommended by the Commission.
iv

5. National Security Education Act

To reverse the declining interest in government service, and mindful of the anticipated

bow wave of retirements among the upper ranks of government, the USCNS/21 recommends a

broad plan of action to attract a new generation of talent to careers in the Civil Service, Foreign

Service, and in the military. Central to its goal of bolstering the government's human resources

is the Commission's recommendation to expand the incentives for government service provided

by the National Security Education Act (NSEA) of 1991.

The NSEA funds undergraduate scholarships, graduate fellowships, and grants to

universities to develop a cadre of individuals skilled in foreign languages and area studies to staff

U.S. national security agencies. Scholarship and fellowship recipients are required to enter

government service at the end of their education. The Commission proposes broadening the

scope of the scholarship and fellowship program by increasing the length of scholarships from a

maximum of two years to a maximum of four years; eliminating certain requirements for the

scholarships and fellowships, such as the requirement that scholarships be used for study abroad

and that they include study of a foreign language; and by enabling individuals who have already

completed their studies to obtain partial or full repayment (based on length of service) of their

student loans if they enter government service. The Commission also proposes amending the

NSEA by establishing a professional development program for the fellowship and scholarship

recipients while in school, so as to prepare them for their government careers.

Implementation of this recommendation requires amending the NSEA. The

implementation plan recommends steps to achieve the desired changes to the underlying

legislation, drawing on the role of National Security Education Board, chaired by the Secretary

of Defense and the support of the Administration as a whole.

6. Foreign Service

The USCNS/21 recommends the overhaul of the Foreign Service, to include revamping

the examination process; improving the level of on-going professional education; making

leadership a core value of the Department; and changing the name of the Foreign Service to the

U.S. Diplomatic Service. The latter recommendation is the only one requiring legislation. The

remaining recommendations can be implemented by departmental action.

The Foreign Service implementation plan provides a detailed road map for each of these

recommendations. To revamp the examination process, for example, the plan recommends steps

for shortening the examination process, including assessing the success of the Alternative

Examination Process (AEP), and eliminating the "blindfolding" policy for the oral part of the

exam. The plan also lays out specific actions for reducing the excessive lag time from

examination to hiring, which is currently so long that a number of good candidates are lost to

other employers. Among the specific actions suggested by the implementation plan is

conducting a best practice analysis to adapt innovative hiring strategies for use in the Foreign

Service.

The implementation plan also recommends a process for improving the level of

professional education in the Foreign Service. The plan presents actionable steps to undertake an

analysis of training needs and to develop a curriculum that matches the training requirements of

the Department.
v

7. Civil Service

The USCNS/21 recommends improving civil service personnel recruiting and retention

by streamlining the hiring process; enhancing professional education opportunities; and creating

a National Security Service Corps to foster a cadre of national security policy experts.

The Civil Service implementation plan provides a road map for the Commission's

recommendations and sub-recommendations that highlight specific areas for improvement.

These include streamlining the security clearance process; exercising available options to

enhance recruiting and retention; increasing professional education opportunities; attracting

quality personnel by reforming the hiring process and offering market-based compensation;

modifying government personnel regulations to lift pay cap restrictions; expanding the Cyber

Corps while identifying outsourcing opportunities for information technology support functions;

and creating an interagency coordinating group to develop new personnel provisions. These

recommendations can be implemented by effectively applying current government personnel

authorities. The implementation plan also describes actions required to create a National

Security Service Corps designed to broaden the experience base of upper level Civil Service

personnel to produce integrated solutions to U.S. national security policy problems.

8. Military Personnel

The USCNS/21 made two broad recommendations aimed at addressing the recruitment

and retention problems currently faced by the military services. The first focuses on enhancing

the Montgomery GI Bill and strengthening other legislation providing medical, transition, and

home ownership benefits for veterans. The second addresses the need to decentralize military

personnel legislation governing enlistment and commissioning terms, career management,

retirement, and compensation, so as to facilitate the ability of Service Secretaries to reach

retention and recruitment goals.

In the context of these broad recommendations, the Commission offers specific initiatives

designed to accomplish the overall goals. For example, to decentralize military personnel

legislation and give added flexibility to Service Secretaries in the area of recruitment and

retention, the Commission recommends revising the Defense Officers Personnel Management

Act of 1980, the 1999 National Defense Authorization Act, Title 37 of the U.S. Code governing

compensation, and the 1974 Aviation Career Incentive Act.

The implementation plan for the Commission's recommendations on military personnel

provides actionable steps for achieving these goals. It identifies, where appropriate, current

Legislative or Executive Branch initiatives to enhance recruitment and retention and

recommends means to build upon them. For example, one of the specific initiatives

recommended by the Commission is to correct the pay compression for senior noncommissioned

officers. The implementation plan lays out an approach for achieving this objective that builds

upon the Defense Department's ongoing Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation

(QRMC), so as to avoid creating additional task forces that might work at cross purposes with

each other.
vi

HOMELAND SECURITY

1. The President should develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten America's ability to prevent and protect against all forms of

attack on the U.S. homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail.

2. The President should propose, and Congress should agree to create a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with

responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. The

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should be a key building block in this effort.

3. The President should propose to Congress the transfer the Customs Service, the Border patrol, and the Coast Guard to the National

Homeland Security Agency, while preserving them as distinct entities.

4. The President should ensure that the National Intelligence Council: include homeland security and asymmetric threats as an area of

analysis; assign that portfolio to a National Intelligence Officer; and produce National Intelligence Estimates on these threats.

5. The President should propose to Congress the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly to the Secretary.

6. The Secretary of Defense, at the President’s direction, should make homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard

homeland, and the Guard should be organized, properly trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission.

7. Congress should establish a special body to deal with homeland security issues, as has been done with intelligence oversight.

Members should be chosen for their expertise in foreign policy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and appropriations. This body

should also include members of all relevant Congressional committees, as well as ex-officio members from the leadership of both

houses of Congress.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

14. The President should personally guide a top-down strategic planning process and delegate authority to the National Security

Advisor to coordinate that process.

15. The President should prepare and present to the Congress an overall national security budget to serve the critical goals that emerge

from the National Security Council strategic planning process. Separately, the President should continue to submit budgets of the

individual national security departments and agencies for Congressional review and appropriation.

16. The National Security Council should be responsible for advising the President and for coordinating the multiplicity of national

security activities, broadly defined to include economic and domestic law enforcement activities as well as the traditional national

security agenda. The NSC advisor and staff should resist the temptation to assume a central policymaking and operational role.

17. The President should propose to the Congress that the Secretary of Treasury be made a statutory member of the National Security

Council.

18. The President should abolish the National Economic Council, distributing its domestic economic policy responsibilities to the

Domestic Policy Council and its international economic responsibilities to the National Security Council.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

19. The President should propose to the Congress a plan to reorganize the State Department, creating five Under Secretaries, with

responsibility for overseeing the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter-America, and Near East/South Asia, and redefining the

responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. These new Under Secretaries would operate in conjunction with the existing

Under Secretary for Management.

20. The President should propose to the Congress that the U.S. Agency for International Development be consolidated into the State

Department.

21. The Secretary of State should give greater emphasis to strategic planning in the State Department and link it directly to the

allocation of resources through the establishment of a Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office.

22. The President should ask Congress to appropriate funds to the State Department in a single integrated Foreign Operations budget,

which would include all the foreign assistance programs and activities as well as all the expenses for personnel and operations.

23. The President should ensure that Ambassadors have the requisite area knowledge as well as leadership and management skills to

function effectively. He should therefore appoint an independent, bipartisan advisory panel to the Secretary of State to vet

ambassadorial appointees, career and non-career alike.

NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION ACT

39. Congress should significantly expand the National Security Education Act (NSEA) to include broad support for social sciences,

humanities, and foreign languages in exchange for military and civilian service to the nation.

FOREIGN SERVICE

41. The President should order the overhauling of the Foreign Service system by revamping the examination process, dramatically

improving the level of on-going professional education, and making leadership a core value of the State Department.

CIVIL SERVICE

42. The President should order the elimination of recruitment hurdles for the Civil Service, ensure a faster and easier hiring process,

and see to it that strengthened professional education and retention programs are worthy of full funding by Congress.

43. The Executive Branch should establish a National Security Service Corps (NSSC) to enhance civilian career paths, and to provide

a corps of policy experts with broad-based experience throughout the Executive Branch.

MILITARY PERSONNEL

44. Congress should significantly enhance the Montgomery GI Bill, as well as strengthen recently passed and pending legislation

supporting benefits—including transition, medical, and homeownership—for qualified veterans.

45. Congress and the Defense Department should cooperate to decentralize military personnel legislation dictating the terms of

enlistment/commissioning, career management, retirement, and compensation.

Table 1. USCNS/21 Recommendations
Road Map for National Security

Addendum on Implementation

Homeland Security Implementation Plan

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
1

Executive Summary

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21) stated throughout

its reports that homeland security (HLS) was perhaps the most significant threat facing the

nation. As the Commission noted in its initial report, the nation "will become increasingly

vulnerable to attacks on our homeland."1

The Commission recommended a three-layered HLS strategy: prevention, protection, and

response. In satisfying the requirements posed by each layer, the USCNS/21 noted the need for

an overarching strategy; strategic integration at the NSC; a new, specialized organization;

improved intelligence analysis, coordination, and dissemination; better oversight and integration

within the Department of Defense (DoD); re-prioritizing National Guard missions; and different

ways for providing Congressional oversight. These improvements are necessary to ensure

greater operational integration and cohesiveness in areas ranging from border security through

emergency management. These recommendations are listed in the following table.

USCNS/21ST CENTURY RECOMMENDATIONS2

1. The President should develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten America's ability to

prevent and protect against all forms of attack on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if

prevention and protection fail.

2. The President should propose, and Congress should agree to create, a National Homeland

Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various

U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. The Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA) should be a key building block in this effort.

3. The President should propose to Congress the transfer of the Customs Service, the Border

Patrol, and the Coast Guard to the National Homeland Security Agency, while preserving them

as distinct entities.

4. The President should ensure that the National Intelligence Council: include homeland security

and asymmetric threats as an area of analysis; assign that portfolio to a National Intelligence

Officer; and produce National Intelligence Estimates on these threats.

5. The President should propose to Congress the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Homeland Security within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly

to the Secretary.

6. The Secretary of Defense, at the President’s direction, should make homeland security a

primary mission of the National Guard, and the Guard should be organized, properly trained, and

adequately equipped to undertake that mission.

7. Congress should establish a special body to deal with homeland security issues, as has been

done with intelligence oversight. Members should be chosen for their expertise in foreign policy,

defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and appropriations. This body should also include

members of all relevant Congressional committees as well as ex-officio members from the

leadership of both Houses of Congress.

Table 1. Summary of Recommendations

 

1 USCNS/21. New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, p.4.

2 Recommendations addressed in this implementation plan are extracted from Road Map for National Security: Imperative for

Change, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21)'s Phase III report, posted on January 31, 2001

at www.nssg.gov, and published on March 15, 2001. All references are based on the published version. (Hereafter cited as

Road Map.)
2

The following sections examine ways in which these recommendations might be

implemented. They are not designed to present definitive answers; rather they provide a

framework for thinking about the best ways to put the Commission's findings into practice.

The implementation plans that accompany each recommendation take into account

actions that might be required by the Administration and Congress. They do so by providing a

notional, step-by-step blueprint of suggested actions, and discuss the nature of the coordination

and consultation that must occur between the Executive and Legislative branches. The plans

also note personnel implications for each recommendation and major considerations that impact

recommendations and, unless addressed, are likely to render implementation less effective.

These include those that involve bureaucratic considerations, cultural impediments that

accompany all transformations, and lessons derived from earlier events.

Although there are certainly other methods for implementing these important HLS

recommendations, the blueprints described here represent steps that are bureaucratically feasible,

given impetus from the leaders of the organizations involved and appropriate incentives. They

serve as a basis for developing more detailed concepts and, if this is done, will act as a

foundation for change.
3

Implementation Plan: Homeland Security

I. READER'S GUIDE

A. Background

The charter that created the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

(USCNS/21) directed the Commission to include implementation concepts for its

recommendations as part of its final report.3 At the outset of its work in 1998, the Commission

identified HLS as a primary security concern for 21st century decision makers. It addressed the

HLS threat in its initial report, New World Coming: American National Security in the 21st

Century, and elaborated on strategies to deal with this threat in its second report, Seeking a

National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom.4 The

Commission's final report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, provides 50

specific recommendations for changing national security structures, organizations, and processes

to better enable the United States to implement a new national strategy. This implementation

plan addresses seven of those recommendations as they apply to Homeland Security (HLS).

B. Scope of Implementation Plan

HLS was a primary USCNS/21 concern from the outset of its deliberations. The

Commission's first two reports noted the increasing danger of attacks on the American homeland

and the damage such assaults could do. In its final report, Road Map for National Security;

Imperative for Change, the Commission included seven major recommendations for improving

the Nation's capabilities and capacities to cope with threats to the American homeland.5 These

include developing a comprehensive HLS strategy; creating a National Homeland Security

Agency (NHSA); transferring the Customs Service, Border Patrol, and Coast Guard to that

agency; improving intelligence support for HLS; establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense

(ASD) for HLS; assigning the National Guard (NG) a more prominent role in HLS; and

improving Congressional oversight of HLS activities. Each recommendation is addressed in turn

in the following sections.

C. Implementation Plan Layout

Section II of this implementation plan highlights issues and requirements raised by

Commission recommendations and provide options that, if adopted, will facilitate

implementation of those recommendations. The plan will identify general responsibilities for

actions, and will provide reasonable timelines and arrange actions in sequence. Throughout the

plan, tables will be used to simplify presentation and format will remain the same for each

recommendation to facilitate comparisons. Each of the seven USCNS/21 HLS recommendations

will be addressed in separate sections of this plan; however, the format of each section will

remain the same. The narrative descriptions will note whether recommendations must be

addressed simultaneously or sequentially.

 

3 USCNS/21 Charter, July 1998 is contained in Appendix 2 of Road Map.

4 All USCNS/21 reports are available at the Commission's website www.nssg.gov.

5 Road Map also contains a synopsis of the findings contained in earlier Commission reports.
4

Section III describes issues, challenges, and opportunities raised by the recommendations

and presents potential courses of action to address them.

Section IV describes means by which the recommendations can be implemented,

including legislative and executive actions.

Section V describes implications for the personnel affected by these recommendations,

including personnel transfers, reclassification, and training.

Section VI contains the appendices. Appendix A includes a matrix summarizing the

information in this implementation plan. Appendix B contains draft Executive Orders and draft

legislative language to implement the recommendations addressed in this plan. Appendix C

includes two process maps depicting how to create a comprehensive HLS strategy, and a HLS

budget.
5

II. IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINTS

A. Crafting a Comprehensive Homeland Security Strategy

1. Background. In the course of their deliberations, the Commission proposed a threelayered strategy that weaves together prevention, defense, and response. However, the

Commission determined that a clear and comprehensive national homeland security (HLS)

strategy that addresses these layers does not exist, not is it tied into a larger national security

strategy.6 Although several departments and agencies have modest internal strategies and

operational concepts, and some Members of Congress have taken an active interest in HLS

issues, no overarching HLS strategy exists to give form to the three layers proposed by the

Commission or to establish priorities.

Preparing a comprehensive, overarching HLS strategy will increase awareness of threats,

assign priorities for dealing with them, identify crucial elements of the approach, provide

guidance for allocating resources, fix responsibilities, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and

improve Legislative/Executive Branch cooperation. A comprehensive strategy would contain

overall goals and objectives for prevention, defense, and response; identification of roles and

responsibilities of government activities; priorities; and conceptual approaches to implementing

the strategy. It should also contain information that will be useful to departments and other

activities for developing programs and budgets.

In further defining HLS strategy requirements, the Commission included the protection of

the lives, welfare, and property of American citizens. It also determined that an effective

strategy must ensure the integrity of the Nation's critical infrastructure—including

communications, transportation, and financial networks—as well as essential public services

such as power generation, sanitation, and health care. The USCNS/21 noted that, in many cases,

critical interrelationships exist between elements of the infrastructure, and an attack on one—

physical or cyber—could result in a cascade of adverse effects. And, Commissioners noted that

effectively preventing, defending, or responding to threats to the homeland will require publicprivate partnerships, as well as complementary relationships between federal and state/local

governments.

As noted earlier, the Commission found that the best approach to HLS is a layered

strategy that "focuses first on prevention, second on protection, and third on response."7 Because

such a strategy will involve a number of agencies and departments, the Commission

 

6 This determination is predicated upon staff research, testimony before the Commission, interviews with functional area and

regional experts, and the application of expert professional judgement.

7 Road Map, p. 10.

Recommendation 1: The President should develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten

America's ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attack on the homeland, and to

respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail.
6

recommended that the President oversee its development and establish HLS as a key

Administration priority.8

2. Recommended Blueprint

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Appoint an interagency policy

group, designate a chair, and

provide initial guidance

President Within 180 days of taking office

2. Develop and coordinate draft

strategies within the interagency

Policy group chair Within 60 days of receiving

charter

3. Present strategy for approval

to the National Security Council

(NSC)9

Policy group chair Within 120 days of receiving

charter

4. Approve strategy and provide

implementation instructions

President Within 30 days of approving

strategy

5. Prepare HLS implementation

plans

Lead Agencies Within 120 days of approval of

the strategy

6. Direct periodic exercises and

reviews

President/NSC As appropriate

Table 2. Illustrative Work Plan Comprehensive National HLS Strategy

Implementation of this recommendation requires a Presidential directive. One option is

for the President to direct the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA),

and/or the Director of the National Homeland Security Agency (see Recommendation 2)10, or

some other senior government official (such as the Vice President) to coordinate the

development of a comprehensive strategy in the interagency and, as appropriate, with the civil

sector.11 Using this approach, a strategy could be prepared within 12 months (or less), and

development could be accomplished concurrently with the implementation of other HLS

recommendations.

A central question in terms of organization is whether a relatively small policy

coordination committees (PCC) called for in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1

or whether a larger task force should be constituted. The challenges, risks, and equities involved

 

8 It is worth keeping in mind that the process by which the strategy is prepared is nearly as important as the strategy itself.

The preparation process facilitates exchanges of information that improve the abilities of participants to deal with HLS

requirements and it helps establish networks of personal relationships that will improve response time in crises.

9 Traditionally, the Executive Branch does not coordinate documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) with

Congress. In this case, in order to improve actions following the approval of the strategy, it seems advisable for the

Executive Branch to consult with appropriate members of the Legislative Branch during strategy preparation.

10 The Commission's second recommendation provides for a National Homeland Security Agency to be built on the foundation

provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and augmented with three existing border control

organizations, inter alia, as well as additional organization focused on critical infrastructure protection. If this

recommendation is adopted, then it would be reasonable to have the APNSA and the Director of the new agency jointly

oversee the interagency process by which the overarching HLS strategy is prepared. Such an arrangement would do much

to highlight the Director's position as the central HLS official. If recommendation 2 is not adopted, then the strategy should

be developed under the guidance of the APNSA.

11 Many homeland security experts believe that a public-private partnership between government agencies and commercial

enterprises, which own and operate most of the critical infrastructure, is essential to eliminate seams that will otherwise

present attractive targets.
7

seem to argue for a larger group that includes all organizations that will be affected if a HLS

agency is constituted as called for in Recommendations 2 and 3.

Once developed and approved by the President, the HLS strategy provides the overall

guidelines for department and agency strategies and plans and for interagency cooperation.12

Like the National Security Strategy (NSS), unclassified portions of the HLS strategy (which

would become part of the NSS) would be shared with Congress and the American public to

improve inter-branch cooperation and increase public awareness. The HLS strategy should be

linked to the national security planning guidance, described in Recommendation 14 by the

Commission and addressed in the National Security Council Implementation Plan.

Table 2 summarizes actions in the strategy development chain. Initially, the President

establishes a PCC using an authoritative document such as an Executive Order or a National

Security Presidential Directive (NSPD). Although membership is likely to vary, a list of

potential PCC members includes: the APNSA and members of the National Security Council

staff with HLS responsibilities; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB);

the Director of the Domestic Policy Council; Under Secretaries (or Justice Department

equivalents) from State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Health and Human Services (and its Centers

for Disease Control), Commerce, Energy, Agriculture, and Transportation; and senior officials

from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Institute for Information Infrastructure

Protection (I3P), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Intelligence

Community. Special advisors to the working groups should include state officials and leaders of

the business community.

Because of the broad spectrum of interests and vulnerabilities, the PCC will necessarily

be large. To facilitate actual development and vetting of the strategy, one activity (e.g., the NSC

staff or the National Homeland Security Agency) would collect input from the members and

prepare a draft for circulation to the PCC. Smaller sub-PCC working groups could be constituted

to focus on specific areas or functions. This approach is similar to that used by past

administrations to prepare the NSS. Once vetted in the interagency (and with the private sector

as appropriate), the draft strategy would be presented to the President for approval.

The approved overarching strategy serves as the basis for preparation of implementation

plans and department/agency strategies.13 A number of these will be prepared by individual

activities, but some integrated planning will be required. A promising approach to integrated

HLS planning is the process currently used by FEMA to prepare the annexes to the Federal

Response Plan (FRP). In this process, FEMA identifies functional requirements (e.g., fire

fighting, power generation, and providing emergency medical care) and specific departments or

 

12 One useful model is the relationship between the NSS and the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Defense Planning

Guidance (DPG). In this example, the NSS forms the basis for the Joint Staff to develop the NMS and for the Office of the

Secretary of Defense to develop the DPG. The NMS and DPG are framework documents that establish strategic priorities

and inform operational planning and programming and budgeting decisions.

13 The previous Administration’s Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-63 is an example of an overarching directive that

provides a policy framework and agenda; identifies goals and objectives; establishes offices to implement and oversee

implementation; and lays out specific issues for consideration during implementation. It also prescribes an interagency

planning framework for developing and implementing additional plans as directed by the PDD. The task force may find this

document to be a useful model and should review PDD-63 to ensure that appropriate recommendations on critical

infrastructure protection are incorporated into the new strategy. However, care should be taken not to rely on classified

PDDs in lieu of clear strategic direction.
8

agencies agree to take responsibility for preparing each annex. Other departments and agencies

sign on to support the efforts of the lead agencies, most often those with vested interests in the

functional area or those who will be required to render support if an emergency arises. The

annexes become part of the FRP, and the preparation process ensures that all involved are aware

of their responsibilities.14

Once approved by the office designated by the President as having overall HLS

responsibility, the strategy and implementation plans should be exercised periodically through

gaming and simulation. Based on these exercises, appropriate revisions can be made to both the

HLS strategy and its implementation plans. The Department of Defense conducts routine

interagency plans exercises, as does FEMA. The approaches used by these entities could serve

as the model for exercising HLS plans.

3. Process Implications. Organization of the PCC should be based on the

Administration's interagency process (i.e., National Security Presidential Directive-1). For a

detailed business process map, please refer to Appendix C.

4. Personnel Implications. Although not necessary, a small permanent staff to assist

the working groups and to maintain continuity could be formed, drawing upon the interagency

for membership. If the NHSA is chartered, a staff director and some key members could be

drawn from this agency since it will play a central role in implementing the strategy.

5. Issues. Taken in conjunction with Recommendation 2 (establishing a National

Homeland Security Agency) and Recommendation 3 (transferring organizations to the new

agency), development of a comprehensive strategy presents unique opportunities. First, it allows

the Executive Branch to design an organization that is structured and resourced to carry out the

HLS strategy, rather than attempting to adapt existing structures that may have little experience

in HLS matters. Second, it emphasizes the Administration's high-priority commitment to HLS as

a complete function, instead of discreet activities that are only occasionally synchronized—

usually under circumstances requiring an immediate response when it is too late to prevent or

defend against threats. Developing a comprehensive strategy before hand offers a better chance

of preventing attacks on the homeland by creating a synergy between key elements of the

government. Such a strategy will also enable the Administration to orchestrate a more effective

defense against attacks should prevention fail and a more effective response should that be

necessary. Having a comprehensive strategy in place may, in itself, have deterrent value,

although as is the case with most deterrents, that value will be difficult to quantify.

There are few impediments to creating a HLS strategy. The most significant will be

found in bureaucratic resistance to changing the status quo. A comprehensive strategy is likely

to include provisions that reorder priorities and/or change resource allocation agreements. Many

are likely to see such changes as threats, or a zero sum game in which some gain at the expense

of others. Under such circumstances, bureaucracies tend to employ tactics that can delay or

derail needed improvements, including strategies and plans. To the extent that senior

government officials accept HLS as a primary concern, this resistance can be minimized and

managed. However, gaining buy-in from the bureaucracy will require top-down leadership from

senior officials and meaningful incentives for change. Unless this is forthcoming, some officials,

 

14 Noteworthy in the FRP model is that the American Red Cross, a non governmental agency, participates in the planning

process. This example could serve to include other non government entities in HLS planning.
9

concerned about the risks of change or the loss of stature, are likely to employ tactics of

malicious compliance. There is a danger that those who wish us harm could equate confusion

over developing and/or implementing a strategy with weakness and seek to exploit it.

Issue Approach

Bureaucratic resistance based on perceptions of

risk and/or loss of stature.

Reaffirmation of HLS as an Administration

high-priority issue and top-down leadership

coupled with meaningful incentives.

Table 3. Impediments to Strategy Development

6. Implementation Means. Presidential directive (e.g., NSPD; Executive Order; verbal

instructions); draft language is attached. (It is noteworthy that the House of Representatives will

consider legislation this year (HR 525) that would, if enacted, require the Administration to

develop a comprehensive HLS strategy.)

B. Creating a National Homeland Security Agency and Enhancing its Capabilities

1. Background. Recommendations 2 and 3 are closely linked to Recommendation 1

(development of a comprehensive HLS strategy) and to each other.15 (See the accompanying

organization chart for a depiction of the agency after implementation of Recommendation 2 and

Recommendation 3.)

In its discussion of the three-layered strategy, the Commission noted the complexity of

HLS requirements and the widely dispersed location of the capabilities to satisfy those

requirements within the government.16 It concluded that there is a critical need to be able to

oversee the implementation of strategy and policy, and that capability should reside in one

organization, with one person "responsible and accountable to the President."17 Although the

NSC might be able to coordinate HLS strategy and policy making, it is neither designed nor

staffed to supervise implementation and increasing its size and capabilities to do so is counter to

 

15 In fact, Recommendation 2 will be less effective unless Recommendation 3 is adopted also, and Recommendation 3 cannot

be implemented unless Recommendation 2 is adopted because there will be no overarching agency to which activities can be

transferred.

16 The three layers are: prevent attacks on the homeland; defend against attack when prevention is not possible; and respond to

attacks if they occur to control damage and speed the return to normalcy.

17 Road Map, p.14.

Recommendation 2: The President should propose, and Congress should create, a National

Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and

integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. The Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should be a key building block in this effort.

Recommendation 3: The President should propose to Congress the transfer of the Customs

Service, the Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard to the National Homeland Security

Agency, while preserving them as distinct entities.
10

other Commission recommendations.18 Under these circumstances, the Commission

recommended that a new organization—the National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA)—be

created. The NHSA, as envisioned by the Commission, will be based on FEMA, but will

substantially expand FEMA's responsibilities and capabilities. Its director will be confirmed by

the Senate, will be a member of the President's cabinet, and will be a statutory advisor to the

NSC.19 Commissioners envisioned that this new organization would be empowered by Congress

to serve as the "focal point for all natural and manmade crisis and emergency planning

scenarios."20

The USCNS/21 also noted that the United States' borders are porous. There are literally

hundreds of ports of entry—both land and sea—through which terrorists and weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) can infiltrate the American homeland. Although there are agencies charged

with responsibility for the nation's borders, to be effective against 21st Century threats, their

activities must be better integrated. The Commission noted in its final report that the three

organizations with primary responsibility for patrolling and policing borders are apportioned

across three cabinet-level departments. This dispersion constitutes an obstacle to better

integration and closer coordination.

Currently, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is an arm of the Department of Transportation;

the Customs Service is part of the Department of the Treasury; and the Border Patrol is a

subordinate agency of the Immigration and Naturalization Service within the Department of

Justice. The dispersal of these organizations among different departments makes communication

and the ability to leverage their capabilities cumbersome in a strategic environment where it must

be expeditious. There are also indications that these organizations are often viewed as ancillary

to department core competencies. Thus, they receive less attention and fewer resources at a time

when their proficiency is critical.

To improve U.S. ability to protect and police its geographic borders the USCNS/21

recommended transferring the USCG, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol to the NHSA

once it is established. The organizations would remain intact following the transfer. However,

moving them to the agency charged with homeland security as its primary mission would

improve the synergy between them and reinvigorate their individual capabilities and capacities

by ensuring that adequate resources were available. Because some functions could be

consolidated as a result of the transfer (e.g., some aspects of training and aircraft, ship, and

vehicle maintenance) and procurement standardized for some items (e.g., sensors, information

technology, command and control communications, and data bases), substantial efficiencies are

likely to result from the transfer. Conversely, because each organization performs functions that

are not necessarily part and parcel of HLS, provisions must be made for continued performance

of those activities under the original organizations.21

Ultimately, the transfer will ensure more effective border control and better support for

legitimate commercial activities, while simplifying oversight and budgetary matters. The NHSA

 

18 See the Commission's Road Map Recommendation 16, p. 51.

19 Currently, there are two statutory NSC advisors: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of

Central Intelligence.

20 Road Map, p. 14.

21 For example, the USCG is responsible for boating safety and the Customs Service is responsible for collecting revenues and

developing customs policy. The Departments of Transportation and Treasury should retain these functions.
11

should conduct a threat-requirements-capabilities study following transfer to identify areas that

require recapitalization and take the appropriate programmatic and budgetary actions.

In addition to the three large organizations, five smaller organizations are dispersed

among several government activities and should be consolidated into the NHSA. Four of these

organizations should be placed under the direction of the Directorate for Critical Infrastructure

Protection (CIP) (see Figure 1). These include:

• the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), committees designed to

improve information exchanges between the public and private sectors in order to

improve information security;

• the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), a Commerce Department entity

that is responsible for raising awareness of cyber threats;

• the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P), which coordinates and

supports cyber security research and development; and

• the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), a joint entity housed in the FBI

that gathers information and provides warnings of cyber attacks.

The fifth organization, the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), is currently a

subordinate element of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It should also be transferred to the

NHSA and tasked with training first responders at the state and local levels to deal with the

consequences of attacks using weapons of mass destruction. It should also be responsible for

identifying requirements and capabilities, and, in doing so, for providing state and local

authorities with the appropriate equipment necessary for consequence management. The

Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response would oversee its activities.
12

Figure 1. The National Homeland Security Agency

Once the Customs Service, the Border Patrol and the Coast Guard and the other activities

are incorporated into the NHSA, the agency will become the overarching structure for homeland

security functions. As described in Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, the

staff directorates will oversee planning, coordinating, and the activities of subordinate

organizations (and those who may come under NHSA control in times of emergency).22

Accordingly, the Directorate of Prevention will oversee border security; the Directorate for CIP

would have responsibility for reducing cyber threats; and the Emergency Preparedness and

Response Directorate will oversee preparedness and response activities to include training and

operations. Although not shown in the diagram, NHSA will have a science and technology

office to advise agency officials with respect to research and development.

The National Crisis Action Center (NCAC), a subordinate activity of the Directorate for

Emergency Preparedness and Response, will become the focal point for response during

homeland security events and is critically important during emergencies. The center will be

responsible for monitoring emergencies and coordinating support for state and local governments

and the private sector. A full-time interagency staff will man the NCAC. The center must be

able to communicate and coordinate with the ISACs, the National Military Command Center,

Joint Task Force Civil Support, state and local governments and other critical activities in real

time.

Liaison and command and control arrangements with other Executive Branch activities,

especially DoD, are critical for effective prevention, defense, and response. A strong liaison and

command and control system will facilitate exchange of information and matching requirements

with capabilities, and should be a fundamental consideration during the planning phase. As a

minimum, NHSA should have liaison centers with counterterrorism activities in the Federal

Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency.

 

22 See Road Map pp. 14-25.

National

Homeland

Security

Agency

Directorates

-Prevention

-Critical Infrastructure

Protection

-Emergency Preparedness

& Response

National Crisis

Action Center

Customs

Service

Border

Patrol

Coast

Guard

10 Regional

Offices
13

Prevention of attacks on computer-dependent critical infrastructures (such as common

services, communications, transportation, banking, finance, and energy systems) is particularly

important. The NHSA's CIP directorate will assume responsibility for this function, including

both government and private systems. Specifically, the CIP directorate will oversee physical

assets and information networks and the CIP director will serve as the Critical Information

Technology Assurance and Security Office (CITASO) to coordinate efforts to prevent and/or

defend against attacks on critical infrastructure. In order to fulfill these responsibilities ISACs,

the CIAO, the NIPC, and the I3P should be incorporated into the NHSA, and CIP directorate

should be given oversight of their activities.23

2. Implementation Blueprint. The NHSA, when operational, will help ensure that

critical homeland security activities are consolidated to improve their effectiveness and to help

ensure the objectives of the three-layered strategy are achieved. Although new agencies can be

created by Executive Order, the scope of the NHSA's activities, the need to have its director

confirmed by the Senate, the requirement to have it funded by Congress as an independent

agency, and the proposed structure of the new organization suggest that a better approach would

be to create the organization by Act of Congress.24 Congressional involvement at the start

increases the chances that the organization will receive the support that it needs in the crucial

early years of its existence. Even though the Congressional process will require more time (and

more compromises) than an Executive Order, its advantages appear to offset the delay that could

occur in the committee and conference processes.

The first step is to establish an interagency task force to develop a detailed reorganization

plan that will serve as the basis for legislation and for implementation of that legislation.25

Legislation, once enacted, will provide a charter, a broad organizational concept, and the

authority for the agency to undertake certain tasks. However, it is not likely to provide enough

detail to permit orderly shifts of responsibilities, assets or resources, nor will it provide guidance

on administrative and logistics requirements. The interagency task force should be chaired by a

senior official from the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and be empowered to draft a

plan that assigns responsibilities and milestones for implementation.26 Because transfer will

involve bureaucratic territorial issues, the principal responsible for preparing the reorganization

plan and the legislative package must be seen as impartial and with access to the President by all

those concerned.

The task force should also begin the process of developing policy and procedures for

NHSA operation, and it should consult closely with the interagency team that is preparing the

comprehensive HLS strategy (see Recommendation 1, discussed in the previous section). As

part of its activities, it should identify early on secondary missions for the NHSA and potential

 

23 Presently, the CIAO is a subordinate element of the Commerce Department and NIPC is under the auspices of the FBI.

24 For example, as noted in Recommendation 3, the NHSA will include three existing activities that currently belong to other

Departments. Transferring those activities will require legislation, and Congress is more likely to enact that legislation if it

is involved in creation of NHSA at the outset.

25 This follows the model used in the establishment of both the Department of Energy and FEMA.

26 When FEMA was originally established, OMB chaired a team (composed of representatives from affected agencies) that

prepared a comprehensive reorganization plan for the President on a six-month time schedule. Among other things, the plan

identified the programs and the amount of overhead that would be transferred to FEMA. Once prepared, the plan was

submitted to Congress for approval. Once approved, OMB prepared and signed the determination order, which specified the

personnel, funds, and equipment that would be transferred to FEMA and the President signed two Executive Orders to start

up FEMA and to execute OMB's reorganization plan.
14

unintended consequences of the reorganization strategy. The reorganization plan produced in

this step should be convertible to an Executive Order when establishment legislation has been

enacted. The reorganization plan should also include provisions for organizational transfers as

called for in Recommendation 3.

At the outset, the task force should review the lessons and experiences from other

agencies. Two of the most recent are the Department of Energy and FEMA, both established

during the Carter Administration. Slightly different methods were used for each organization,

and the task force may find useful precedents. This review could be done under the auspices of

the OMB; although the actual research could be outsourced to the private sector or to a Federally

Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC).
15

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Establish interagency task force

to develop a reorganization plan

and legislation creating NHSA

President establishes by

Executive Order; task force

should be chaired by OMB or

another Executive Office of

the President activity.

Within 2 months of decision to

establish NHSA—Providing

current legislation does not pass

2. Review lessons from previous

department/agency establishments

OMB and/or Office of the

Director of FEMA27

Within 3 months of decision to

establish NHSA

3. Identify stakeholders and

analyze their positions and

interrelationships; prepare

strategy for building support and

managing objections

OMB, NSC Staff, White

House Congressional Liaison,

FEMA, joining

organizations28

Within 4 months of the decision

to establish NHSA

4. Consult with key Members of

Congress and their staffs

NSC Staff and White House

Congressional Liaison

As soon as possible after decision

to establish NHSA

5. Vet interagency task force

reorganization plan

Task Force Chair Within 3 months of first task

force meeting

6. Submit reorganization plan and

proposed legislation to Congress

for approval

Executive Office of the

President

Within 6 months of first task

force meeting

7. Revise reorganization plan

based on Congressional approval

and submit revised reorganization

plan to the President for approval

Task Force Chair Within 2 months of receiving

Congressional approval

8. Approve plan and sign

executive order directing

implementation

President As soon as possible following

receipt of reorganization plan

from the task force

9. Oversee implementation of

reorganization plan

OMB Over a period of 1 year

10. NHSA declares agency fully

operational

NHSA Director Within 1 year following issuance

of the Executive Order

11. Assess requirements and

capabilities of transferred

organizations and allocate

resources as appropriate

NHSA Director For inclusion in the budget

prepared after one full year of

NHSA operation.

Table 4. Illustrative Work Plan for the National Homeland Security Agency

In conjunction with this step, OMB, the NSC Staff, FEMA, and the White House

Congressional liaison office should identify stakeholders and analyze their positions.

Stakeholders in this case include all organizations likely to be affected by the establishment of

NHSA; the transfer of organizations to it; and Members of Congress, key Congressional staffers,

 

27 From the outset, an entity within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) should be charged with preparing a

reorganization plan and overseeing the course of that plan from draft, through Congressional deliberation, through full

implementation. Alternatively, a non-EOP organization (such as FEMA) might be selected for this task; however, other

organizations with stakes in the reorganization are likely to regard an entity with a clear interest in the outcome with

mistrust.

28 See Recommendation 3.
16

and non-government entities. This analysis will determine where support lies for creating the

NHSA, where there is opposition, and where there are neutrals that might be turned into allies.

For each of these categories, a strategy for enhancing support and/or minimizing opposition

should be developed and implementation responsibilities assigned. This step is potentially more

critical for the transfer of organizations than it is for creating the NHSA because more is at stake

for both gaining and losing organizations and Members of Congress who may lose oversight

authority. The value of building and managing stakeholder support should not be underestimated

under these circumstances, and it should begin as early as possible in the process.

As the process takes shape, the Executive Branch should begin consultations with

selected Members of Congress and their staffs to identify legislative champions.29 These

consultations should be bipartisan and focus on determining the best possible organizational

structure. Because existing organizations are to be transferred to the NHSA once it is

established, Committee of Jurisdiction Chairs and Ranking Members who currently have

oversight of those organizations must be included in all consultations.30

Apart from Appropriations, at least six Congressional Committees (and relevant

Subcommittees) are currently involved in oversight of the USCG, the Border Patrol, the Customs

Service, and the other activities discussed above.31 Enacting transfer legislation will require the

approval of each of these Committees, as well as the entire House and Senate. Many of those on

Capitol Hill with an interest in any of these organizations are influential enough to block or delay

passage of necessary legislation unless persuaded to act differently. Some will see the transfers

as a loss of power if they perceive that once transferred, the organizations will fall under the

jurisdiction of different Committees. To the extent possible, these concerns should be addressed

by the Administration's reorganization plan and/or accommodated during negotiations once

legislation is submitted.

The task force must consider a number of issues as it develops the transformation plan. It

must examine the roles and missions of the new organization and those organizations that will

join it. In doing so, it must consider which functions, if any, will remain with the organizations

from which transferred activities come. For example, the USCG contributes substantially to

border security, but it is also involved in other activities such as search and rescue at sea and

enforcing maritime safety regulations. The task force must determine whether those activities

will transfer with the USCG, or remain in the Transportation Department. These sorts of

considerations have mission, function, and budget implications that cannot be ignored.

Transfer of assets and organizational entities to the NHSA should occur according to the

schedule provided with the task force's reorganization plan. A crucial step for the transfer is to

 

29 Because Committee Chairs have a great deal of influence over the consideration of bills in committee, and the leadership has

authority over consideration of marked-up legislation on the floor, it is important to find Congressional champions among

the leadership of both chambers.

30 Language to create the NHSA will be introduced in the House of Representatives during this session of Congress by Rep.

Mac Thornberry (R-TX). Although this legislation may eventually pass both chambers, the Executive Branch should act

immediately to consult with Mr. Thornberry and other interested parties on Capitol Hill to assist in its passage and to shape

amendments as necessary. The fact that legislation has been introduced does not obviate the need to examine the lessons of

the past or to conduct a thorough stakeholder analysis.

31 Committees of Jurisdiction include Senate Committee Finance; Senate Committee on the Judiciary; Senate Committee on

Commerce, Science, and Transportation; House Committee on Ways and Means; House Committee on the Judiciary; House

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. A transfer resolution would most likely have to survive each of these

Committees before it would be reported out for a floor vote.
17

allocate sufficient real estate and facilities to accommodate the new organization and its

missions. The effectiveness of the NHSA will be decreased and the required start-up and

transition periods increased if new the agency headquarters is spread among several office

buildings or, worse, separate geographic locations.32 Finding sufficient space to house the entire

agency may require relocation of other government activities, and provisions for this should be

included in the reorganization plan. Consideration should also be given to locating the NHSA in

a facility that is physically secure, perhaps on a nearby military reservation. Once it is

operational, it will become a lucrative, high-value target for terrorists.

Another crucial consideration is staffing. NHSA as described by the Commission will

incorporate FEMA and other organizations and activities intact. However, some consideration

must be given to ensure that there is adequate staff to provide oversight of all aspects of NHSA,

including transferred organizations. The existing FEMA structure lacks sections and personnel

with the knowledge and experience to provide oversight of activities merging into NHSA from

the Departments of Justice, Transportation, and Treasury. Thus provisions must be included for

staff to permit the NHSA headquarters to exercise oversight and due diligence.

The task force must also consider the manner in which the NHSA will interact with other

government and non-government organizations. The NHSA will be represented at the NSC

Principals' and Deputies' Committees, and it should be a regular participant in intelligence

community activities. The processes by which this interaction will be carried out are important

and if they deviate from the standard interagency processes, appropriate provisions must be made

in the transition plan.

The reorganization plan crafted by the interagency task force should contain transition

schedules noting the dates by which specific NHSA functions will become operational. It is

unrealistic to expect that the new agency will be instantaneously fully functional, and while some

activities that were performed by FEMA will continue uninterrupted in the new organization,

there will be a delay in performing other activities. Because all of the activities transferred into

NHSA are vital to the security of the nation, reasonable transition schedules will allow

organizational assimilation by NHSA without degrading quality or performance.

Once the draft reorganization plan has been prepared, it should be vetted within the

interagency and become a subject for continued consultation with Members of Congress and

their staffs. After revision based on this coordination, the plan should be included in the

legislative package sent to Congress by the President, and key Administration officials should be

prepared to testify in support of the transfers.

It is likely that the legislation that is finally passed by Congress will differ somewhat

from the Administration's proposals. If the differences are significant and apt to be deleterious,

then it may be appropriate to advise the President to veto it. However, if properly supported by

the Administration, it is probable that resulting legislation will make some modifications but

adhere to the underlying transfer concept. The Administration's reorganization team should be

prepared to accommodate those changes in the reorganization plan.

 

32 Although operational activities should properly remain in the field, headquarters and command and control elements should

be centralized for optimum value.
18

When modifications based on approved legislation have been made, the reorganization

plan should be presented to the President together with appropriate Executive Orders directing

implementation. The chair of the reorganization task force should be responsible for overseeing

implementation according to milestones included in the final reorganization plan.

Once implementation is complete and the organizations have been transferred to NHSA,

the director of NHSA should undertake a requirements-to-capabilities review to determine gaps

in effectiveness. The Commission noted several improvements necessary to strengthen the

USCG, the Border Patrol, and the Customs Service once transferred. These include improved

and upgraded equipment. An NHSA assessment of requirements, capabilities, gaps and

redundancies will enable the agency to identify shortcomings, prioritize them, and include them

in the first budget prepared following one year of operation.

3. Process Implications. All of the organizations that will be incorporated within the

NHSA will have different process requirements. Some interface only with other government

organizations, while others interface with both public and private sector activities. The cultures

of each organization are different and there is a potential for these differences to be disruptive.

The NHSA must use a collaborative approach to designing internal processes that will take

activity preferences and needs into account, and this should be one of the new agency's first

undertakings. Insofar as possible, organizations that are folded into the NHSA should be

allowed to retain legacy processes for internal management.

The NHSA should use established interagency processes to govern its relationships with

other Federal government activities wherever possible, and processes described by OMB for

preparing and submitting its budget. Its relations with state and local governments should be in

accordance with the processes and procedures employed by FEMA to avoid confusion and

simplify interaction from the outset. For a detailed business process map, please refer to

Appendix C.

4. Personnel Implications. Agency personnel allocations will be as specified in the

annual budget once enacted into law. Transfer of activities into NHSA from external activities

must include sufficient oversight and overhead staff. Transfers of adequate oversight and

administrative personnel may prove troublesome. This is likely to be true especially if some

traditional functions of transferred agencies remain with their original organizations. Should that

be the case, then the retaining organization may argue that it needs to keep a portion of the

oversight structure in order to accomplish retained missions satisfactorily.

In addition, the new directorates within NHSA will require staffing at some level

adequate enough to ensure the objectives of creating NHSA and transferring organizations into it

are achieved. HLS is a complex mission area—unless the NHSA is adequately staffed it is not

likely to be capable of meeting expectations.

As the personnel allocation plan is formulated, consideration must be given to staffing the

NHSA's planning cell adequately. A key feature of the NHSA will be its ability to prepare and

oversee the preparation of myriad plans that will enable the HLS strategy to be effectively

implemented. Unless personnel allocations include sufficient experienced planners, the ability of

NHSA to fulfill this requirement will be limited.
19

5. Issues. Taken in conjunction with Recommendation 1 (developing a comprehensive

strategy), Recommendations 2 and 3 present unique opportunities. First, they allow the

Executive Branch to design an organization that is specifically structured and adequately

resourced to carry out the HLS strategy. This appears preferable to parceling out responsibilities

among a number of departments and agencies, given the nature of the threat and the need to

prepare for it promptly. Second, it emphasizes the Administration's high-priority commitment to

HLS as a holistic function, instead of discrete activities that are only occasionally

synchronized—usually under circumstances requiring an immediate response when it is too late

to prevent or defend against threats.

Although the Federal government ultimately will be responsible for creating NHSA,

officials in Washington should enlist the aid of state and local authorities (e.g., the National

Governors Association) to facilitate support in Congress. Without Congressional support and the

willingness of Committee chairs to relinquish control over activities that will be incorporated

into NHSA, the Administration will have difficulty in acquiring the necessary legislation.

As noted in Recommendation 1, there will be bureaucratic resistance to changing the

status quo. A new organization will result in the restructuring of other organizations and the

reordering of priorities and resource allocation agreements. Many are likely to see such changes

as a zero sum game in which some gain at the expense of others. This will lead to tensions

between the activities involved that must be carefully managed. Government bureaucracies and

their supporters on Capitol Hill may employ tactics that can delay or derail NHSA establishment

unless the White House intervenes.

Culture clashes between residual FEMA staff and personnel from activities that are

joining NHSA should not be underestimated. They can cause confusion, lower morale, and

reduce effectiveness. Organizations such as the Border Patrol, Customs Service, the Coast

Guard and other transferred activities have well-established, sophisticated cultures that are

different from each other and different from FEMA. They have also had different

responsibilities in the past. These cultures dictate to a large extent the way these organizations

perceive the world, the manner in which they approach decision making, and their expectations

concerning their roles and missions, inter alia. Changes in cultures together with changes in

missions and operating requirements will be traumatic.

Accommodating cultural predilections will be difficult, but unless and until done, NHSA

will not operate effectively and its leadership will spend inordinate amounts of time focused on

internal squabbles. The NHSA leadership should take care, first, not to impinge on existing

organizational cultures unless it is necessary to do so. Organizations with different cultures can

coexist productively, and it is not necessary to force them into the same mold in each and every

activity. However, when it is necessary to modify the cultures of individual member

organizations to improve the operations of the whole, ameliorating potential disruptions will

depend on accommodation.33 As the NHSA begins to develop its internal processes and

procedures, it should establish task forces composed of all entities that will comprise the agency.

These task forces should be structured along functional lines and be charged with developing

methods of doing business that take cultural preferences into account. An integration group

 

33 For example, NHSA will develop a central budget and that is likely to require organization-wide processes to assist in the

development. In all probability, this would require modifications in the ways that member organizations make resource

allocation decisions and prepare their budget submissions.
20

composed of senior officials from each subordinate organization should oversee functional task

force efforts and craft appropriate agency-wide processes and procedures.

During the creation of FEMA, overhead requirements were contentious and under

estimated by a wide margin. According to a FEMA reorganization participant, this occurred

because those organizations tapped to provide functions to FEMA went to great lengths to avoid

doing so.34 Bureaucratic maneuvering and willingness to contest analyses that identify overhead

requirements may cause substantial delays. In the end, it may result in a new agency that is

unable to exercise appropriate oversight or to support the activities and functions in its charter.

At the extreme, a new agency could be rendered so ineffective that is disestablished.

Preventing these sorts of problems in NHSA will require continuous involvement by the

reorganization team's chair and frequent reviews. The team chair must also select an

independent activity credible to all participants to conduct analyses of overhead requirements.

These analyses must be thorough and must be supported by the team chair.

Issue Approach

1. Bureaucratic resistance based on perceptions

of risk and/or loss of stature

Top-down leadership throughout all phases of

the establishment process

2. Cultural clashes between subordinate

elements of the new NHSA

Collaborative crafting or operational methods,

processes, and procedures

3. Tendency to minimize overhead

requirements

Forceful intervention by the reorganization

team chair and thorough independent analyses

of overhead requirements

Table 5. Impediments to Establishing NHSA

6. Implementation Means. Implementing this recommendation will require a

combination of legislation and Executive Orders. Legislation has already been introduced in the

House of Representatives that, if passed and signed into law, will satisfy Congressional

requirements. If this legislation fails or is substantially modified, the Administration should

develop a legislative package and forward it to Congress in accordance with the time schedule

contained in the blue print. The Executive Orders to implement this legislation within the

Executive Branch should be drafted by the reorganization team.

C. Improving Homeland Security Intelligence

1. Background. As the Commission noted in its reports, high quality intelligence

estimates are essential to preventing and defending against attacks. The National Intelligence

Council (NIC) can play an important role in providing that intelligence. The NIC responds

 

34 Interview with Mr. William R. Cumming, February 6, 2001. Mr. Cumming was a member of OMB's reorganization team

for FEMA (ca. 1974-1978).

Recommendation 4: The President should ensure that the National Intelligence Council:

include homeland security and asymmetric threats as an area of analysis; assign that

portfolio to a National Intelligence Officer; and produce National Intelligence Estimates

on these threats.
21

directly to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and functions in a sense as the DCI's "think

tank." A small, bureaucratically flat organization, the NIC consists of a Chairman, a Vice

Chairman, and approximately 12 National Intelligence Officers (NIOs).35 Each NIO has a

deputy and a small staff that is typically composed of career intelligence officers.

NIOs include career intelligence officers as well as experts appointed to the Council from

academia and the private sector. NIOs act as functional or regional advisors to the DCI and

senior policy makers throughout the government. They produce National Intelligence Estimates

(NIEs) which are authoritative documents coordinated across the intelligence community, and

which draw on a variety of sources. It is through the NIEs that the NIC influences policy and

strategy within the government.

2. Implementation Blueprint. This recommendation may be implemented without

legislative action. The President simply directs the DCI to make HLS and asymmetric threats a

priority and assign that portfolio to an NIO. The DCI has wide latitude in overseeing the NIC.

Title 50, United States Code, empowers the DCI to adequately staff the NIC (without specifying

the number of staff members), and neither Title 50 nor any existing Executive Order restricts the

number of NIOs nor the areas they must cover. However, to make the mission an enduring one,

an Executive Order should be issued by the President directing the DCI to incorporate HLS as a

priority requirement.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline36

1. President directs DCI to

include HLS as a priority area;

assign it to an NIO; and

develop NIEs

President At the President's discretion

2. DCI determines the best

method to implement

Presidential guidance

DCI In accordance with the

President's instructions

3. DCI consults with

Congressional Select

Committees on Intelligence

DCI As appropriate

4. DCI staffs position and

provides NIE guidance

DCI As appropriate

5. NIO produces NIE NIO Approximately 2 months

following appointment

Table 6. Illustrative Work Plan for the National Intelligence Council

In order to carry out the President's directive, the DCI could assign the HLS and

asymmetric threat portfolio to one of the existing NIOs, and increase that NIOs staff

appropriately, or he/she could create a new NIO position. Since existing NIOs already have

substantial workloads, creating a new position may be the better option, and would ensure full

time attention.

 

35 The Vice Director oversees NIC staff elements for evaluation; outreach and strategic planning; and senior review,

production, and analysis.

36 The timeline is notional and will be affected by Administration priorities, the time required to establish the position and

adequately staff it, and other factors.
22

Once an NIO is designated and assigned HLS responsibilities, he/she and the staff can

begin preparing NIEs almost immediately. Initially, the length of time required to develop

information and transform it into an NIE will depend on the experience and skill of the NIO and

the staff. Once developed by the NIO, NIEs are coordinated across the Intelligence Community.

Intelligence activities may concur with the NIOs findings, offer comments to improve the value

of the document, or explain why they disagree. Completed NIEs are provided to senior officials

with appropriate security clearances and the need to have the information.

Although there appears to be no requirement to involve Congress in this decision, it

seems appropriate to consult the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence during the process by which the NIO is created and

staffed. Consulting with the Committees enables them to advise the DCI on their preferences

and will facilitate dealing with the Committees on HLS matters in the future.

3. Organization and Process. There are no significant changes to NIC organization or

processes.

4. Personnel Implications. A relatively small increase in NIC size of approximately 10

personnel will be required to implement this recommendation.

5. Issues. There are no significant impediments or other issues in implementing this

recommendation. As noted in the discussion of the blue print, the Administration should consult

with the appropriate Congressional Committees to ensure it understands (and where possible,

accommodates) their concerns.

6. Implementation Means. Presidential directive (e.g., NSPD; Executive Order; verbal

instructions); draft language is attached in Appendix B.

D. Establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security

1. Background. The Commission notes that DoD has a significant role to play in HLS;

however, no single office has responsibility for coordinating and overseeing the department's

HLS capabilities. For example, there is an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense who has

responsibility for support involving WMD events, while the Army's Director of Military Support

is responsible for non-WMD contingencies. The diffuse nature of responsibilities and the lack of

an office with oversight of all HLS support activities suggest that lines of authority and

accountability are blurred.

Creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security (ASD (HLS))

would centralize policy oversight and improve coordination within the Department of Defense

and between DoD and the interagency. The ASD (HLS) would ensure that HLS considerations

are included in military planning and are adequately addressed during Planning, Programming

and Budgeting System (PPBS) processes. He/she would also have responsibility for establishing

Recommendation 5: The President should propose to Congress the establishment of an

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within the Office of the Secretary of

Defense reporting directly to the Secretary.
23

crisis action coordination procedures within the department to support more effectively during

emergencies. The ASD (HLS) would also represent the Secretary of Defense in interagency

HLS processes and with NHSA officials.

Precedents for creating the Office of ASD (HLS) include the establishment of the office

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflicts (ASD

(SOLIC)) by the 1987 Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986. ASD (SOLIC) was organized to ensure that special operations and

low intensity conflict were assigned an appropriate priority by the military and resourced

accordingly.37 The office of the ASD (SOLIC) has provided the guidance and oversight

envisioned by the Congress to a large extent.

2. Implementation Blueprint. Section 138 of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.),

authorizes nine Assistant Secretaries of Defense. Section 138 specifies titles and responsibilities

for four of the Assistant Secretaries and allows the Secretary of Defense latitude with respect to

the others.38 If the Secretary of Defense elects to do so, he could establish an Office of ASD

(HLS) by abolishing one of the existing offices and establishing ASD (HLS) in its stead.39

Alternatively, he could seek an amendment to Section 138, Title 10 U.S.C. to authorize 10 ASDs

and include the ASD (HLS) among the specified ASDs. If he selects the first alternative, he has

more latitude in prescribing duties for the ASD (HLS), at least initially. On the other hand, if he

elects to ask Congress to create the position, there is a risk that Congress will determine at least

some of the duties as part of the bargain. (Draft language creating the position in law is included

in Appendix B.)

Once created, the Secretary of Defense can staff the office from within existing

manpower allocations or request additional allocations from Congress as an increase in the

Department's end strength. The office is likely to be up and running more quickly if staff is

drawn from existing full time equivalent (FTE) allocations than if the department asks for a

personnel increase specifically for the Office of ASD (HLS). Requesting additional manpower

from Congress for the ASD (HLS) is also likely to limit staffing flexibility.

 

37 ASD (SOLIC) was created together with the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to which all special operating

forces were assigned. Unlike other Unified Commands, USSOCOM has its own budget. While the USCNS/21 envisions

strengthening the HLS capabilities resident in the United States Joint Forces Command, it does not recommend establishing

a separate Unified Command for HLS with authorities similar to USSOCOM.

38 The four ASD positions specified in Title 10 U.S.C. are: Reserve Affairs; Command, Control, Communications, and

Intelligence; Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and Legislative Affairs. As of February 2001, the other ASDs

are: Force Management Policy; Health Affairs; International Security Affairs; Strategy and Threat Reduction; and Public

Affairs.

39 This approach was used during implementation of the Defense Reform Initiative when the office of the ASD for

International Security Policy was eliminated and the office of the ASD for Strategy and Threat Reduction was established.

USCNS/21 Recommendation 24 advocates abolishing the ASD for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC)

and reorganizing the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. (Road Map, p. 65). If Congress approves abolition

of ASD(SOLIC), ASD(HLS) could be established in its stead.
24

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline40

1. Establish an internal DoD

task force

Secretary of Defense or his

agent

As appropriate

2. Begin consultations with

Congress

Task force chair Within 1 month following the

first task force meeting

3. Task force prepare and vet

reorganization plan

Task force chair Within 4 months of first

meeting

4. Approve reorganization

plan

Secretary of Defense As appropriate

4a. Prepare legislative

package (if necessary)

Task force chair Within 2 months of plan

approval

5. Prepare DoD Directive

governing ASD (HLS)

activities

Task force chair Within 2 months of approving

creation of ASD (HLS) or

final Congressional action

7. Approve DoD Directive Secretary of Defense Within 1 month of receipt

8. Implement reorganization

plan

Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense DASD (HLS)

Within 6 months of approval

or final Congressional action

Table 7. Illustrative Work Plan Creation of ASD (HLS)

Initially, the Secretary of Defense should establish an internal DoD task force to identify

ASD (HLS) responsibilities and staffing requirements. To facilitate coordination with other

Executive Branch activities that may occur simultaneously, this task force should include the

department's representative to interagency groups preparing the comprehensive HLS strategy

(Recommendation 1) and/or developing the reorganization plan to establish the NHSA

(Recommendation 2). (This task force might be a DoD task force that examines all department

HLS issues, including this recommendation and Recommendation 6, a discussion of which

follows.)

The task force will prepare a reorganization plan for the Secretary's approval. It is

essential that the task force consider very carefully the functions and responsibilities of the new

ASD and how his office will interact with other elements of the department. The resulting plan

should include the draft of a Department of Defense Directive that charters the office and assigns

it responsibilities, as well as a staffing plan. The plan could also include recommendations

concerning Congress' role in establishing the office. Recommendations for creating the office

without formal Congressional action should include concepts for disestablishing the office of an

existing ASD to keep the total number of ASDs within the bounds specified by Section 138.

If the Secretary determines that Congress should officially create the position by

amending Section 138, Title 10 U.S.C., the task force, in conjunction with the department's legal

counsel and the ASD for Legislative Affairs, should prepare an appropriate packet and strategy.

Regardless of whether the Secretary elects to create the position without Congressional

participation or requests a formal amendment to Title 10 U.S.C., consultations with Congress

will be useful and should occur early in the process. Once the position is created, Congress will

have oversight over its activities and the relationship is likely to be more productive if

consultations occur beforehand.

 

40 Time schedule is notional and will be affected by department priorities and political factors.
25

Once formally created, the office should be established quickly and a Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense for HLS should be appointed to oversee start up, pending Presidential

nomination and Senate confirmation of the ASD.41 Rapid creation ensures optimum value to the

Department and that sufficient staff is available to assist the ASD nominee during confirmation.

3. Process Implications. The Office of the ASD (HLS) will use existing DoD

processes to interact with other DoD activities and NSC-approved processes for interagency

transactions.

4. Personnel Implications. ASD offices are staffed according to responsibilities and

requirements. While there is no average size, when examined over a period of years ASD offices

have ranged in size from 30 to about 60 personnel, exclusive of operating agencies and activities

for which they have oversight. Staffing for the ASD (HLS) could be drawn from existing DoD

activities according to functional expertise or other criteria. Or the Department could ask for an

end strength increase, either in conjunction with a request for amendment of Section 138 or as

part of a budget submission.

5. Issues. Recommendation 5 complements Recommendations 1, 2, and 6 and will

improve DoD contributions to HLS requirements. During preparation of the reorganization plan,

the Secretary's task force should ensure that there are safeguards for transferring personnel from

elsewhere within the Department to the ASD (HLS) staff. Care should be taken so that joining

personnel have the necessary grades and expertise (both functional and bureaucratic) to

contribute immediately. It is important to ensure that personnel transferring from other

organizations also have sufficient longevity remaining in civil service so that turmoil from

retirements and resignations is minimized in the critical first years.

It is also important for the Secretary of Defense to establish processes and procedures for

interaction with ASD (HLS) and to ensure that the Under Secretaries and other ASDs are aware

of them. New organizations sometimes have difficulty entering established cultures, and, in

some cases, are minimized by older organizations. OSD's Executive Secretariat should ensure

that the ASD (HLS) is included in meetings and briefings as appropriate; assist the office of the

ASD (HLS) in developing regimes that ensure access to the Secretary; and, ensuring that other

organizations within OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services understand the role, responsibilities

and authorities of the ASD (HLS).

Issue Approach

1. Attributes of personnel transferred into ASD

HLS from elsewhere in DoD

Task force should establish criteria for

transferees that includes expertise and

longevity.

2. Effective integration within DoD Develop processes and procedures for ASD

(HLS) to interact with the rest of DoD and

promulgate the offices' roles, responsibilities,

and authorities.

Table 8. Considerations for Establishing ASD (HLS)

 

41 The office will probably have at least two DASDs depending on roles, responsibilities, and requirements specified in the

Department of Defense Directive governing the office. To ensure a smooth transition, at least one of the initial DASDs

should be a career civil servant familiar with DoD methods of operation and processes.
26

6. Implementation Means. Implementation of this recommendation may be

accomplished either on the authority granted to the Secretary of Defense by Title 10, U.S.C., or

by Congressional action to amend Section 138, Title 10, U.S.C.

E. Establishing Homeland Security as a Primary Mission for the National Guard

1. Background. The National Guard at present is organized, trained, and equipped to

conduct sustained overseas combat in support of the nation's National Security Strategy, National

Military Strategy, and the military's operational plans. This is a primary mission for the Guard,

but it has other missions as well. It is also responsible for disaster, humanitarian, emergency

assistance, consequence management and other missions as assigned by the state governors.

Because it has dual responsibilities within both federal and state venues, it is uniquely positioned

to assume a larger role in providing capabilities—including disciplined, trained, and

appropriately equipped forces—to fulfill HLS requirements.

Recommendation 6 incurs some organizational changes as some elements of the National

Guard transform into entities more capable of performing HLS functions. The size of these

elements and their internal composition cannot—and should not—be determined until a

requirements-capabilities assessment has been completed. It is likely, however, that the 10

existing regional centers in the FEMA and NHSA structure will each have transformed National

Guard assets associated with them, either as organic structures or in a supporting role.

National Guard, and especially Army National Guard (ARNG), participation in HLS

activities is not new.42 The National Guard has a distinguished history of HLS contributions

dating from colonial times and its militia heritage through its more recent assistance to state and

federal authorities during natural and manmade catastrophes. Although the Guard has primary

DoD responsibility for disaster relief, it does not have the entire panoply of HLS responses as a

primary mission. At present, it performs these missions by using forces trained and equipped for

an entirely different mission—that of conventional combat.

In recent years, this approach has worked well, but the likelihood of much larger events

involving weapons of mass destruction and/or catastrophic failures of vital systems is likely to

overwhelm the present system. This is especially true if an attack on the homeland occurs during

a major crisis abroad. Under such circumstances, the National Command Authorities (NCA) are

likely to be faced with difficult decisions. Treating assistance to civil authorities as a lesser

mission, and providing little training or specialized equipment to perform it, entails substantial

risks in terms of preventing, defending against, and responding to HLS threats.

In order to prepare for future HLS requirements more effectively, the Commission

believes that HLS should be assigned to the National Guard as a primary mission, equal in

 

42 Although many of the responsibilities will fall on ARNG organizations, Air National Guard (ANG) assets such as medical

evacuation and transportation capabilities should not be overlooked.

Recommendation 6: The Secretary of Defense, at the President's direction, should make

homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard, and the Guard should be

organized, properly trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission.
27

stature to the current mission of sustained warfighting.43 In support of this mission, some

National Guard units could be reorganized, trained, and equipped for HLS activities. This

approach not only improves response capabilities, it adds a deterrent value and improves the

nation's ability to defend against attacks. Once HLS is assigned as a primary mission, existing

efforts to enhance Guard HLS capabilities will serve as the foundation for further improvements.

2. Implementation Blueprint

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline44

1. Direct DoD to implement the

recommendation

President 18 months prior to date required

for budget submission to OMB

2. Establish DoD task force Secretary of Defense Upon receipt of Presidential

directive

3. Conduct comprehensive

requirements-capabilities

assessment

DoD Task Force assisted by

the NHSA and state governors

4 months following first meeting

4. Vet assessment results,

conclusions, and recommended

actions

DoD Task Force 2 months following completion of

assessment

5. Begin Congressional

consultations

DoD Task Force and OSD

legislative affairs

Concurrent with Step 4 and

continuing through Step 12

6. Provide vetted report to

Secretary of Defense

DoD Task Force 1 month following completion of

Step 4

7. Include report provisions in

Defense Planning Guidance

(DPG)

Under Secretary for Policy

and PA&E

Upon approval of report by

SecDef

8. Program for reorganization,

training and re-equipping

Services In accordance with Planning,

Programming and Budgeting

System milestones

9. Review programs PA&E and Joint Staff In accordance with PPBS

milestones

10. Prepare budget and

legislative packages

OSD In accordance with PPBS

milestones

11. Finalize implementation

instructions

OSD and Joint Staff Within 3 months of legislative

enactment

12. Complete reorganization and

re-equipping

Services and National Guard Within year of enactment

13. Review/refine requirementscapabilities assessmentServices and National Guard Starting 1 year after enactment

Table 9. Illustrative Work Plan for Transforming Elements of the National Guard

Implementing this recommendation requires a combination of Executive and Legislative

Branch actions. Assigning HLS as a National Guard primary mission of equal status with

warfighting missions (and in some cases a dual mission with warfighting missions) can be done

 

43 It is important to note that the Commission does not intend for HLS to be the primary mission of the National Guard, only

that HLS be made a primary mission.

44 Timelines are notional and will be affected by a number of considerations including priorities and political considerations.
28

by the Secretary of Defense with Presidential Authorization. DoD can also adjust training

requirements for the Guard to increase the amount of HLS related training time, providing

Congress does not prohibit that adjustment.45 Reorganization of some Guard units for specific

HLS requirements as envisioned by the Commission can be done by DoD, although the

department should enlist Congressional support and the support of state officials before doing

so.46 Re-equipping Guard units for HLS-specific requirements, as proposed in the

recommendation, may require some expenditure of funds if the equipment is not already in the

inventory in sufficient quantities, and that will require Congressional approval.

Recommendation 6 may be implemented in isolation from other recommendations;

although its value will increase if linked to Recommendations 1 and 2. Recommendation 6

should occur in conjunction with implementation of Recommendation 1, developing a

comprehensive HLS strategy, and reorganization, training, and re-equipping efforts should

conform to requirements developed during that process. Recommendation 6 will also be

enhanced if it is linked to Recommendation 2, establishing the NHSA. Since the Director of the

NHSA will have responsibility for portions of the comprehensive strategy including response,

he/she should participate in requirements and capabilities deliberations, as recommended by the

Commission.47 The representatives of state governors should participate, also, to ensure their

requirements and existing capabilities are taken into account.

Once the President directs the Secretary of Defense to implement the recommendation,

the Secretary could begin by instructing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the

ASD (HLS)48, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD (RA)) to

convene a task force.49 Among others, this task force could include representatives from the

Under Secretaries for Policy, Readiness and Personnel, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,

and Comptroller; the National Guard Bureau (NGB); the Office of Program Assessment and

Evaluation (PA&E); and non-DoD activities as appropriate (e.g., the task force preparing the

reorganization plan for creating the NHSA and/or FEMA). Under CJCS, ASD (HLS) and ASD

(RA) leadership, the task force would examine options for implementing the recommendation

and develop a detailed implementation plan.50

As part of this effort, the task force should direct a comprehensive threats-requirementscapabilities assessment for both conventional warfighting and HLS missions. Assessment results

will determine how much existing National Guard force structure is excess to warfighting

requirements and thus may be available for HLS missions. (Although some ARNG units have

 

45 It is conceivable, for example, that Congress could prohibit training for HLS activities by stipulating that funds appropriated

to DoD not be spent for that purpose; however, such a prohibition is probably not likely.

46 Although specific reorganization activities will result from an assessment of requirements and capabilities/capacities studies,

indications are that most reorganization is likely to focus on improving National Guard response capabilities, especially its

ability to respond effectively to WMD incidents and to train others to perform similar functions. This will enhance existing

efforts to create civil support teams and to provide command and control and coordination through regional agreements

between states and Joint Task Force Civil Support, an element of DoD's Joint Forces Command headquartered in Norfolk,

Virginia.

47 Road Map, p. 24.

48 See previous recommendation on creating an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security.

49 In order to improve coordination and the value of both recommendations, this task force could be the same task force as that

formed to consider creation of the Office of the ASD(HLS).

50 This is an integrated approach designed to craft a single reorganization plan that includes changes to the mission,

reorganization, training, and equipping instructions. Alternatively, implementation could involve incremental approaches

that begin with a redefined mission and then proceed to reorganization, etc.
29

been assigned missions in DoD's "Forces For" allocations and in Unified Command plans, a

number of units remain without warfighting missions. The Commission believes that HLS units

can be drawn from among those units who are not currently apportioned to the Unified

Commands.)

The threats-requirements-capabilities assessment will also indicate the extent to which

HLS requirements exist that do not have matching capabilities so that reorganizations, training,

and re-equipping are conducted against specific needs. In essence, the assessment will provide

DoD information on the size and composition of the units needed to respond to HLS threats and

the kinds of specialized equipment necessary for them to be ready to do so in light of present and

anticipated threats. These requirements will then be matched against capabilities that exist in the

current force inventories. Equipment, training, and personnel transfer plans can be prepared

based on this assessment, and where equipment shortages exist research and development and

procurement actions can be undertaken consistent with the President's priorities.

Vetting and marketing assessment results and reorganization actions and procurement

actions that the assessment suggests must be extensive. At a minimum, the Military

Departments, the Joint Staff, NHSA, representatives of governors, OMB, the DoD General

Counsel, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Legislative Affairs must be included.

Their comments and recommendations should be carefully examined and included in the task

force's report to the Secretary of Defense. It is especially important to consider the impact on

warfighting capabilities of the Unified Commands and the Army's overall transformation efforts

of specializing some ARNG units. Once units have been allocated, trained, and equipped for

HLS, it will be difficult and time consuming to convert them back to their traditional missions.

The task force report should include language that assigns HLS as a primary National

Guard mission and identifies specific ARNG and Air National Guard (ANG) units that will be

reorganized for HLS functions and specifies the activity that will become their proponent (e.g.,

the National Guard Bureau, Joint Forces Command, NHSA). There may be cases in which units

assigned to HLS have dual missions or in which units that are specially trained and equipped for

consequence management are earmarked for overseas consequence management activities.

However, many of these units should be removed from the list of deployable units and thus be

unavailable to support Unified Command war or theater engagement plans beyond those

prepared by the Joint Forces Command for HLS events.51 The report should also identify and

provide cost estimates of expenditures required for re-equipping and re-training National Guard

units assigned HLS missions.

National Guard units reapportioned to HLS will most likely fall under the authority of

Joint Forces Command's Joint Task Forces Civil Support when federalized. At other times, they

will remain under the command and control of state governors. In both cases, they must be able

to interact effectively with the NHSA and with the NHSA's regional offices. During crises,

National Guard HLS units may be federalized or may operate under the directions of state

governors or NHSA offices, depending on requirements and the scope of the disaster. The

 

51 It may be prudent to assign both an HLS mission and a conventional warfighting mission to some types of units that exist in

small numbers. In time of crises, the National Command Authorities (NCA) would make the decision as to whether these

units were to be retained in the United States for HLS missions or deployed to a theater of operations. In the case of dual

missioned units, the Secretary of Defense or his representative will make the routine decisions concerning training emphasis.
30

nature of these relationships should be addressed in the task force's report to the Secretary and

appropriate language should be included in the DPG and the Unified Command Plan (UCP).

When the Secretary of Defense approves the task force report and designates HLS as a

National Guard primary mission, appropriate changes in strategy and programming instructions

should be included in the next DPG and UCP. In addition to fiscal guidance, both documents

should include instructions concerning planning activities for the transformed units and the chain

of command that will exercise authority over them. Instructions concerning research and

development and procurement should become a priority issue during the annual program reviews

conducted prior to budget preparation. Decisions made during the program reviews should be

included in the next budget submission.

Congressional support for reorganization, re-training, and re-equipping efforts is critical.

Administration officials should seek Congressional support early on and include key Members of

Congress and their staff in consultations. It is also important that they consult with state

governors and their adjutant generals early in the process. DoD should be prepared to provide

analytical conclusions that underpin the reorganization plan and to conduct a campaign to help

Members understand the rational for change and the benefits that will accrue from it.

As noted, in conducting this campaign, it is important to ensure that state officials are

included since their ability to influence Members' votes affecting their states may be crucial.

These officials include governors, adjutant generals, and county and municipal officials in areas

where units will be re-organized. A second group of influential stakeholders that must be

included are the associations that represent the National Guard and Reserve forces (e.g., the

National Guard Association, the Reserve Officers Association, and the Association of the United

States Army).

Department officials should make clear in their dealings with Congress that the

transformation of National Guard assets will have optimum value when done in conjunction with

that of other government activities (e.g., organizing the NHSA). It is important to convey to

Congress the message that the National Guard is only one of a number of activities that can

contribute to HLS requirements and it should not be viewed as sole contributor.

Following appropriate DoD program reviews and consultation with Members of

Congress, DoD should submit legislation and budget requests to formalize reorganization and

obtain transformation funding. Once these requests become law, DoD should finalize

implementation arrangements and establish milestones for completion. Final arrangements and

schedules should be coordinated with states and with the NHSA.

3. Process Implications. New processes or substantial modifications of existing

processes will be required for transformed National Guard organizations to interact effectively

with the NHSA, described in Recommendations 2 and 3. The Guard interacts with FEMA

during emergencies, and these processes could become the basis for necessary modifications. In

a general sense, the National Guard operates as a subcontractor for FEMA at present. The

transition will be improved if the NHSA and the National Guard jointly design new processes.

4. Personnel Implications. The Commission's recommendation envisions the

transformation of existing National Guard organizations rather than creating new ones.

Accordingly, there is likely to be little, if any, increase in personnel required to perform HLS
31

missions, although specific numbers will be available only after requirements-capabilities studies

have been completed. If transformed organizations are drawn from among National Guard units

that do not have an assigned mission in support of operational plans, it is unlikely that additional

personnel will be required to support warfighting missions.52 The recommendation's major

impact on personnel is that some Guard personnel who might have been forced out of the service

as a result of mission needs assessments will remain, their positions warranted by HLS activities.

5. Issues. Although Recommendation 6 may improve HLS capabilities, especially in

terms of effective response, it will meet with resistance in some quarters. Not all National Guard

personnel will welcome the change, and some active component military officials may view the

transformation as harmful to warfighting capabilities. The latter concern should be addressed

adequately during the threats-requirements-capabilities assessment conducted at the outset.

Another opponent to the proposed changes will be the fire and police services in the affected

localities. For example, the International Association of Fire Chiefs has been a vociferous

opponent and critic of the National Guard's Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.

National Guard concerns are likely to center on three related factors. First, the loss of

prestige that may be perceived in converting from a combat force to a force designed for other

missions. Included in this is local loyalty to unit lineage and honors, as well as loyalty to

particular branches within the Army (e.g., infantry, armor, artillery, etc.). Accompanying this

will be perceptions that opportunities for advancement and promotion are likely to be less in

units that are specialized and, for some, out of the military mainstream. There will also be

concerns about loss of resources. The extent to which these perceptions are widely and strongly

held by those likely to be directly affected and those within the larger Guard community who are

sympathetic to them, will define the amount of resistance to the transformation.

Some have suggested that one way to assuage the first factor is to assign National Guard

dual missions. If this option is accepted, it instructs units earmarked for HLS to prepare, train,

and equip themselves for both HLS and traditional warfighting activities. Although this

approach would reduce concerns about transforming units into something other than warfighting,

and would prevent any National Guard units from being exclusively earmarked for homeland

security, it is not without disadvantages. If an HLS event occurred during a time when U.S.

forces were deployed (or were deploying) overseas to respond to a contingency, National Guard

dual missioned units might not be available to respond to the crisis if they had already deployed.

A second consideration in assessing dual missions is that it is difficult for the National Guard to

maintain high readiness standards at present. If a second mission were added, it is likely that at

least some units would not be able to achieve and maintain acceptable levels of readiness for

both. Under those circumstances, and faced with tough resource allocation decisions, some

commanders may elect to give priority to traditional warfighting missions, moving HLS

requirements to a lower priority. Thus, assigning dual missions will only guarantee fully ready

HLS units if additional resources—in terms of funding and additional training days each year—

are also provided.

 

52 The issue of missions for National Guard units continues to be a contentious one. Most Air Force NG units have missions in

support of the Active Component Air Force. Although some Army NG units have been assigned missions in Unified

Command operational plans, most have not. The National Guard contends that the reasons why these units have not been

assigned a mission is related more to Active Component parochialism than to operational shortcomings. The debate has

continued at least since the 1994-95 Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) Report, which recommended eliminating

a number of Army NG divisions. The issue was also contested during the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. It does not

appear that it will be resolved in the near future.
32

The second National Guard concern focuses on the impact of turbulence. Historically, it

has often taken as much as five years to convert a unit from one function to another. This is due

in part to re-training requirements and procurement delays, but the impact often makes the idea

of service in the National Guard so unattractive that many unit members choose not to reenlist.

Offsetting this concern will require assigning a high priority for resources and training sites to

transitioning units and completing the transformation in much less time.

A third objection will focus on the proposed relationship between transformed units and

the NHSA regions and whether placing Guard units under NHSA control will deprive the states

of assets needed in times of emergency. The National Guard will point out that no habitual

relationship between the Guard and FEMA regions exists now. As noted earlier, the Guard acts

as a subcontractor for FEMA, and in doing so provides assets as required from different states.

State governors will be reluctant to allow a regional entity control over units that belong to their

states for fear that doing so will deprive them of crucial assets in time of emergency. Depending

on how much and what kinds of state assets are earmarked for NHSA use, a state or township

could find itself faced with an emergency to which it cannot respond adequately if its units are

supporting an NHSA emergency elsewhere. Or some localities could find themselves without

critical services when police, firefighters, healthcare professionals, and others are mobilized and

sent elsewhere.53 A potential solution is to ensure that HLS assets drawn from the National

Guard are apportioned in such a way that sufficient assets remain available to local officials. A

second solution would be to assign the HLS mission to the National Guard as a primary mission,

but convert Army Reserve assets to HLS units and transfer them to the Guard, resulting in a net

increase in National Guard strength. There are, of course, drawbacks to this alternative, too.

It would be risky to underestimate the impact of the transformation or the potential for

resistance. Recommendation 6 amounts to a culture change in which personnel who perceive

themselves as members of what some describe as the warrior culture now find themselves

involved in something completely different—even if only as a dual mission assignment.

Overcoming this resistance will require several approaches, including adopting incentives for

transformation. These incentives could take the form of a higher grade structure within HLS

organizations that would increase promotion opportunities. Incentives could also include

promotion of some officers who come up through the HLS organizational structure to general

officer as a matter of course. Equally important, senior officers and the civilian leadership must

convey and sustain a sense of importance to HLS units that their mission is vital and that they are

indispensable.

Some Members of Congress will be concerned about the transformation. The extent that

they support or oppose the recommendation will depend on their equities, the forcefulness of the

National Guard lobby in support or opposition, and how well the Administration argues its case.

If the case is compelling and supported by sound analysis of threats, requirements, and

capabilities, then Congressional support is more likely to be forthcoming. Equally important is

the effort to gain support of state and local officials who will influence Congressmen and

 

53 Although some studies suggest the percentage of local police, fire, and medical officials in the National Guard is actually

fairly low, the political stakes involved make this a significant issue. State and local officials are likely to oppose any option

that appears to reduce their capabilities to deal with local catastrophes effectively. They are likely to view any reduction in

their capabilities to respond in what they consider to be an adequate fashion with great distrust, and will convey their

concerns to Members of Congress—who are likely to sympathize with them.
33

Senators from their states. Key Members should be identified early and DoD should begin

consultations during the requirements-capabilities assessment phase.

Issue Approach

1. Obtaining National Guard buy-in to mission

change and transformation of some units

Senior leaders must reaffirm the critical nature

of the mission and develop appropriate

incentives for those assigned to them,

including additional resources

2. Obtaining Congressional support for

transformation

DoD must consult with key Members early in

the process and provide Committees of

Jurisdiction with analytical underpinnings for

the change, including threat-requirementscapabilities calculations.

3. National Guard Concerns about loss of

prestige/status as units are converted from

combat to non combat roles

Consider impact and where appropriate assign

units dual missions

4. Impact of turbulence caused on

transformation on retention and recruiting

Devise appropriate timelines and allocate

resources and priorities to reduce

transformation times

5. Adequacy of remaining assets to deal with

emergencies in states when HLS units are

under the operational control of NHSA regions

Carefully apportion HLS units so that no state

is deprived of its resources in the event of an

emergency elsewhere

Table 10. Impediments to Transforming National Guard for HLS

6. Implementation Means. Presidential directive (e.g., National Security Presidential

Directive (NSPD); Executive Order); draft language is attached in Appendix B. Following the

threats-requirements-capabilities assessment, the department should include funding requests for

shortfalls in its budget as soon as practicable.

F. Improving Executive-Legislative Cooperation for Homeland Security

This recommendation should be implemented in accordance with the rules of the House

of Representatives and the Senate, with members appointed and responsibilities assigned

accordingly.

Recommendation 7: Congress should establish a special body to deal with homeland

security issues, as has been done with intelligence oversight. Members should be chosen for

their expertise in foreign policy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and appropriations.

This body should also include members of all relevant Congressional committees as well as

ex-officio members from the leadership of both Houses of Congress.
34

III.ISSUES, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES

A. Developing a Comprehensive Strategy

Taken in conjunction with Recommendation 2 (establishing a National Homeland

Security Agency) and Recommendation 3 (transferring organizations to the new agency),

development of a comprehensive strategy presents unique opportunities:

• Permits the Executive Branch to develop a strategy and design an organization to

carry out that strategy;

• Emphasizes the fact that the Administration assigns a high priority to homeland

security;

• Increases the chances that an attack on the homeland can be prevented, or, if it does

occur, appropriate responses will occur rapidly to minimize damages and speed a

return to normalcy; and

• Having a strategy in place will have deterrent value.

There are few impediments to creating an HLS strategy, but they include:

• Bureaucratic resistance to changes that such a strategy—which changes the status

quo—may impose. Managing this resistance will require top down leadership.

B. Creating a National Homeland Security Agency and Enhancing its Capabilities

Recommendations 2 and 3 present unique opportunities, especially if these

recommendations are implemented in conjunction with Recommendation 1:

• Permits the Administration to design an organization specifically for HLS

requirements and to link it to a comprehensive strategy;

• Reinforces HLS as an Administration priority and conveying that message to those

who may seek to take advantage of what they perceive as a weakness; and

• Presents an opportunity to develop closer working relationships with state and local

authorities.

As noted in Recommendation 1, there will be bureaucratic resistance to changing the status quo.

• Many are likely to see such changes brought about by the creation of the NHSA as a

zero sum game in which some gain at the expense of others. Overcoming the

resistance that will occur as a response to the risks of change will require top-down

leadership and a clear communications plan. It will also require involving all affected

activities in the processes that create the new agency and enhance its capabilities.
35

• The mix of cultures in a new organization can produce considerable friction and

adversely impact the agency's performance. Ameliorating culture-based disruptions

requires sensitivity and including all organizations in designing processes and

procedures.

• Congress may also object to the new agency. Congressional opposition can be

minimized through early and continuous consultation.

• Past experience in creating new departments and agencies indicates that there is a

tendency to underestimate overhead and supervisor requirements. These

requirements should be addressed early in the process and should include the need for

additional supervisors in those departments that lose activities but retain some

responsibilities for their functions (e.g., collections of customs revenue when the

Customs Service transfers to the NHSA).

C. Improving Homeland Security Intelligence

There are no significant impediments or other issues in implementing this

recommendation. However, the Administration should consult with the appropriate

Congressional Committees to ensure it understands and accommodates their concerns.

D. Establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security

Recommendation 5 complements Recommendations 1, 2, and 6 and will improve DoD

contributions to HLS requirements. Significant issues include:

• Title 10 U.S.C. allows the Department of Defense nine Assistant Secretary positions

and specifies four of those positions, thus establishing and ASD for HLS is not

permitted under the law as it is currently written. Overcoming this impediment will

require Congress to authorize and additional ASD, or disestablishing an existing

ASD.

• Creating a new ASD-level office will require the transfer of personnel from other

activities to the new organization. During reorganization the Secretary's task force

should ensure that there are safeguards for transferring personnel from elsewhere

within the Department to the ASD (HLS) staff.

• Once created, the new office must be effectively integrated within the DoD

bureaucracy. This will not occur automatically, and the OSD Executive Secretariat

must ensure that the ASD (HLS) is included in meetings and briefings as appropriate.

The Executive Secretary should also assist the ASD (HLS) in developing regimes that

ensure access to the Secretary and ensure that other organizations within OSD, the

Joint Staff, and the Services understand the role, its responsibilities and authorities.

E. Establishing Homeland Security as a Primary Mission for the National Guard

Although Recommendation 6 will improve HLS capabilities, especially in terms of

effective response, it will meet with resistance in some quarters. Not all National Guard
36

personnel will welcome the change, and some active component military officials may view the

transformation as harmful to warfighting capabilities. Some specific concerns follow.

• Many National Guard units scheduled to receive HLS as a primary mission will be

concerned about the loss of prestige that will occur when they convert from combat

forces to forces designed for other missions. There will also be concern about

potential recruiting difficulties, decreased opportunities for advancement and about

loss of resources. The extent to which these perceptions are widely and strongly held

by those likely to be directly affected and those within the larger Guard community

who are sympathetic to them, will define the amount of resistance to the

transformation. Ameliorating these concerns will require incentive programs that

may include a higher grade structure within HLS organizations that would increase

promotion opportunities. Incentives could also include promotion of some officers

who come up through the HLS organizational structure to general officer as a matter

of course. Equally important, senior officers and the civilian leadership must convey

and sustain a sense of importance to HLS units that their mission is vital and that they

are indispensable.

• Some Members of Congress will be concerned about the transformation.

Congressional support is crucial and obtaining it will require a combination of direct

consultations at the national, state, and local levels. In addition, DoD officials must

provide analysis that supports assigning HLS as an additional mission and resourcing

it accordingly. The extent that Members of Congress (and officials in state and local

governments who can influence Members of Congress) support or oppose the

recommendation will depend on their equities, the forcefulness of the National Guard

lobby in support or opposition, and how well the Administration argues its case.

F. Improving Executive-Legislative Cooperation for Homeland Security

No issues or impediments were noted for Recommendation 7; although depending on

how Congressional leadership approaches the recommendation, impediments could arise if

Members believe their authority and/or influence would be weakened by implementation.
37

IV. IMPLEMENTATION MEANS

HLS recommendations depend on the introduction and passage of legislation, Executive

Orders, or authoritative actions by Cabinet-level officials.

A. Developing a Comprehensive Strategy

Implementation could be achieved by Presidential directive (e.g., NSPD, Executive

Order, verbal instructions). (It is noteworthy that the House of Representatives will consider

legislation this year (HR 525) that would, if enacted, require the Administration to develop a

comprehensive HLS strategy.)

B. Creating a National Homeland Security Agency and Enhancing its Capabilities

Implementing this recommendation will require a combination of legislation and

Executive Orders. Legislation has already been introduced in the House of Representatives that,

if passed and signed into law, will satisfy Congressional requirements. If this legislation fails or

is substantially modified, the Administration should develop a legislative package and forward it

to Congress in accordance with the time schedule contained in the blue print (see Section II.B.)

The Executive Orders to implement this legislation within the Executive Branch should be

drafted by the reorganization team.

C. Improving Homeland Security Intelligence

Presidential directive (e.g., NSPD, Executive Order, verbal instructions); draft language

is attached in Appendix B.

D. Establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security

Implementation of this recommendation may be accomplished either on the authority

granted to the Secretary of Defense by Title 10, U.S.C., or by Congressional action to amend

Section 138, Title 10, U.S.C.

E. Establishing Homeland Security as a Primary Mission for the National Guard

Presidential directive (e.g., NSPD, Executive Order); draft language is attached in

Appendix B. Following the threats-requirements-capabilities assessment, the department should

include funding requests for shortfalls in its budget as soon as practicable.

F. Improving Executive-Legislative Cooperation for Homeland Security

This recommendation should be implemented in accordance with the rules of the House

of Representatives and the Senate, with members appointed and responsibilities assigned

accordingly.
38

V. PERSONNEL IMPLICATIONS.

A. Developing a Comprehensive Strategy

Although not necessary, a small permanent staff to assist the working groups and to

maintain continuity could be formed, drawing upon the interagency for membership. If the

National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) is chartered, a staff director and some key

members could be drawn from the NHSA since it will play a central role in implementing the

strategy.

B. Creating a National Homeland Security Agency and Enhancing its Capabilities

Agency personnel allocations will be as specified in the annual budget once enacted into

law. Transfer of activities into NHSA from external activities must include sufficient oversight

and overhead staff. Transfers of adequate oversight and administrative personnel may prove

troublesome. This is likely to be true especially if some traditional functions of transferred

agencies remain with their original organizations. Should that be the case, then the retaining

organization may argue that it needs to keep a portion of the oversight structure in order to

accomplish retained missions satisfactorily.

In addition, the new directorates within NHSA will require staffing at some level

adequate enough to ensure the objectives of creating NHSA and transferring organizations into it

are achieved. HLS is a complex mission area. Unless the NHSA is adequately staffed it is not

likely to be capable of meeting expectations.

As the personnel allocation plan is formulated, consideration must be given to adequately

staffing the NHSA's planning cell. A key feature of the NHSA will be its ability to prepare and

oversee the preparation of myriad plans that will enable the HLS strategy to be effectively

implemented. Unless personnel allocations include sufficient experienced planners, the ability of

NHSA to fulfill this requirement will be limited.

C. Improving Homeland Security Intelligence

A relatively small increase in NIC size of approximately 5 to 10 personnel will be

required to implement this recommendation.

D. Establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security

ASD offices are staffed according to responsibilities and requirements. While there is no

average size, when examined over a period of years, ASD offices have ranged in size from 30 to

about 60 personnel, exclusive of operating agencies and activities for which they have oversight.

Staffing for the ASD (HLS) could be drawn from existing DoD activities according to functional

expertise or other criteria. Or the Department could ask for an end strength increase, either in

conjunction with a request for amendment of Section 138 or as part of a budget submission.

E. Establishing Homeland Security as a Primary Mission for the National Guard

The Commission's recommendation envisions the transformation of existing National

Guard organizations rather than creating new ones. Accordingly, there is likely to be little, if
39

any, increase in personnel required to perform HLS missions, although specific numbers will be

available only after requirements-capabilities studies have been completed. If transformed

organizations are drawn from among National Guard units that do not have an assigned mission

in support of operational plans, it is unlikely that additional personnel will be required to support

warfighting missions.54 The recommendation's major impact on personnel is that some Guard

personnel who might have been forced out of the service as a result of mission needs assessments

will remain, their positions warranted by HLS activities.

F. Improving Executive-Legislative Cooperation for Homeland Security

If Congress creates select committees on HLS, additional staff will be required to support

them. The number will vary according to requirements, responsibilities, and the rules of each

chamber.

 

54 See footnote 53 above.
VI. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:

IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINT MATRIX
1-A

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Homeland Security

Recommendation Action Responsibility Implem

The President should develop acomprehensive strategy toheighten America's ability toprevent and protect against allforms of attacks on thehomeland, and to respond tosuch attacks if prevention andprotection fail

Appoint an interagency policygroup, designate a chair, andprovide initial guidance

President Within 

office

Develop and coordinate draftstrategies within the interagency

Policy group chair Within 

receivi

Present strategy for approval tothe NSC

Policy group chair Within 

receivi

Approve strategy and provideimplementation instructions

President Within 

approv

Prepare HLS implementationplans

Lead Agencies Within 

approv

Direct periodic exercises andreviews

President As app

Create a National HomelandSecurity Agency (NHSA) withresponsibility for planning,coordination, and integratingvarious U.S. GovernmentActivities involved in homelandsecurity; do this by using theFederal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA)as a key building block
2-A

Recommendation Action Responsibility Implem

The President should proposeto Congress the transfer of theCustoms Service, the BorderPatrol, and the Coast Guard tothe National Homeland SecurityAgency, while preserving themas distinct entities

 Establish interagency task forceto develop a reorganization planand legislation creating NHSA

President establishes byExecutive Order; task forceshould be chaired by OMB oranother Executive Office ofthe President activity.

Within decisioNHSA—legisla

Review lessons from previousdepartment/agencyestablishments

OMB and/or Office of theDirector of FEMA

Within decisioNHSA

Identify stakeholders and analyzetheir positions; prepare strategyfor building support andmanaging objections

OMB, NSC Staff, White HouseCongressional Liaison, FEMA,joining organizations

Within decisioNHSA

Consult with key Members ofCongress and their staffs

NSC Staff and White HouseCongressional Liaison

As soodecisioNHSA

Vet interagency task forcereorganization plan

Task Force Chair Within 

task fo

Submit reorganization plan andproposed legislation to Congressfor approval

Executive Office of thePresident

Within task fo

Revise reorganization plan basedon Congressional approval andsubmit revised reorganizationplan to the President for approval

Task Force Chair Within 

receiviapprov

Approve plan and sign executiveorder directing implementation

President As soo

followireorgathe tas
3-A

Recommendation Action Responsibility Implem

Oversee implementation ofreorganization plan

OMB Over a 

NHSA declares agency fullyoperational

NHSA Director Within 

issuanorder

Assess requirements andcapabilities of transferredorganizations and allocateresources as appropriate

NHSA Director For inc

preparyear o

The President should ensurethat the National IntelligenceCouncil includes homelandsecurity and asymmetric threatsas an area of analysis; assignthat portfolio to a NationalIntelligence Officer; andproduce National IntelligenceEstimates on these threats.

President directs DCI to includeHLS as a priority area; assign it toan NIO; and develop NIEs

President At the 

discret

DCI determines the best methodto implement Presidentialguidance

DCI In acco

Presid

DCI consults with CongressionalSelect Committees onIntelligence

DCI As app

DCI staffs position and providesNIE guidance

DCI As app

NIO produces NIE NIO Approx

followi
4-A

Recommendation Action Responsibility Implem

The President should proposeto Congress the establishmentof an Assistant Secretary ofDefense for Homeland Security(ASD (HLS)) within the Office ofthe Secretary of Defensereporting directly to theSecretary.

Establish an internal DoD taskforce

Secretary of Defense or hisagent

As app

Begin consultations withCongress

Task force chair Within 

the firs

Task force prepare and vetreorganization plan

Task force chair Within 

meetin

Approve reorganization plan Secretary of Defense As appPrepare legislative package (ifnecessary)

Task force chair Within 

approv

Prepare DoD Directive governingASD (HLS) activities

Task force chair Within 

approv(HLS) Congre

Approve DoD Directive Secretary of Defense Within Implement reorganization plan DASD (HLS) Within 

approvCongre
5-A

Recommendation Action Responsibility Implem

The Secretary of Defense, atthe President's direction, shouldmake homeland security aprimary mission of the NationalGuard, and the Guard shouldbe reorganized, properlytrained, and adequatelyequipped to undertake thatmission.

Direct DoD to implement therecommendation

President 18 mo

requiresubmis

Establish DoD task force Secretary of Defense Upon r

Presid

Conduct comprehensiverequirements-capabilitiesassessment

DoD Task Force assisted bythe NHSA and state governors

4 monmeetin

Vet assessment results,conclusions, and recommendedactions

DoD Task Force 2 mon

comple

Begin Congressionalconsultations

DoD Task Force and OSDlegislative affairs

Concuand coStep 1

Provide vetted report to Secretaryof Defense

DoD Task Force 1 mon

comple

Include report provisions in DPG Under Secretary for Policy and

PA&E

Upon aSecDe

Program for reorganization,training and re-equipping

Services In acco

Planniand Bu(PPBS

Review programs PA&E and Joint Staff In acco

milesto
6-A

Recommendation Action Responsibility Implem

Prepare budget and legislativepackages

OSD In acco

milesto

Finalize implementationinstructions

OSD and Joint Staff Within 

legisla

Complete reorganization and reequipping Services and National Guard Within Review/refine requirementscapabilities assessment Services and National Guard Startin

enactm

Congress should establish aspecial body to deal withhomeland security issues, ashas been done effectively withintelligence oversight.Members should be chosen fortheir expertise in foreign policy,defense, intelligence, lawenforcement, andappropriations. This bodyshould also include members ofall relevant CongressionalCommittees as well as ex-officiomembers from the leadership ofboth Houses of Congress.

To be implemented inaccordance with the rules of theHouse of Representatives andthe Senate, with membersappointed and responsibilitiesassigned accordingly.
APPENDIX B:

DRAFT LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS
1-B

The White House

Washington

[month, day], 2001

National Security Presidential Directive XX

Memorandum for The Vice President

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Secretary of Defense

The Attorney General

The Secretary of the Interior

The Secretary of Agriculture

The Secretary of Commerce

The Secretary of Health and Human Services

The Secretary of Transportation

The Secretary of Energy

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Subject: A Comprehensive Homeland Security Strategy

I. A Growing Potential Vulnerability

The United States possesses both the world's strongest military and its largest national economy.

Those two aspects of power are mutually reinforcing and dependent. However, attacks against

American citizens on American soil, possibly causing heavy casualties, are likely over the next

quarter century. This is because both the technical means for such attacks, and the array of

actors who might use such means, are proliferating despite the best efforts of American

diplomacy.

These attacks may involve weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass disruption. As

porous as our physical borders are in an age of burgeoning trade and travel, our "cyber borders"

are even more porous – and the critical infrastructure upon which so much of the U.S. economy

depends can now be targeted by non-state and state actors alike. America's present global

predominance does not render it immune from these dangers. To the contrary, U.S. preeminence

makes the American homeland more appealing as a target, while America's openness and

freedoms make it more vulnerable.
2-B

II. President's Intent

It has long been the policy of the United States to assure the security of the American homeland.

I intend that the United States will undertake to develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten

America's ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attack on the homeland, and to

respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail.

III. Guidelines

The following issues should be addressed in the homeland security strategy:

1. Preparing the American people for prospective threats, and increasing their awareness of

what federal and state governments are doing to prevent attacks and to protect them if

prevention fails;

2. Giving new priority to homeland security, and making it a central concern for incoming

officials of all Executive Branch departments, particularly in the intelligence and law

enforcement communities;

3. Putting in place new government organizations and processes, eliminating where possible

staff duplication and mission overlap;

4. Instruments and activities to prevent potential attacks against the American homeland;

5. Instruments and activities to protect the American homeland from attack; and

6. Managing the consequences of a catastrophic attack on the American homeland.

IV. Implementation

No later than 180 days from the issuance of this directive, the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs will submit to me a report detailing this comprehensive homeland

security strategy. The strategy should be developed by the Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs in coordination with the Principals Committee and relevant agencies involved in

Homeland Security missions.
3-B

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION

H. R. 1158

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

March 21, 2001

Mr. THORNBERRY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Government Reform.

A BILL

To establish the National Homeland Security Agency.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America

in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘National Homeland Security Agency Act’’.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The security of the United States homeland from nontraditional and emerging threats

must be a primary national security mission of the United States Government. Attacks against

United States citizens on United States soil, possibly causing heavy casualties, are likely during

the next quarter century, as both the technical means for carrying out such attacks, and the array

of actors who might use such means, are proliferating despite the best efforts of United States

diplomacy.

(2) Attacks on United States soil may involve weapons of mass destruction and weapons

of mass disruption. As porous as United States physical borders are in an age of burgeoning trade

and travel, its cyber borders are even more vulnerable, and the critical infrastructure upon which

so much of the United States economy depends can now be targeted by governments as well as

individuals. The preeminence of the United States makes it more appealing as a target, while its

openness and freedoms make it more vulnerable.

(3) Despite the serious threat to homeland security, the United States Government has not

yet adopted homeland security as a primary national security mission. Its structures and

strategies are fragmented and inadequate. The assets and organizations that now exist for

homeland security are scattered across more than two dozen departments and agencies, and all

50 States.

(4) Guaranteeing that homeland security is achieved within a framework of law that

protects the civil liberties and privacy of United States citizens is essential. The United States

Government must improve national security without compromising established constitutional

principles.
4-B

(5) A comprehensive strategy and new organizational structures to prevent and protect

against attacks on the United States homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and

protection should fail, are urgently needed.

(6) Through the National Homeland Security Agency, the United States Government will

improve the planning and coordination of Federal support to State and local agencies to

rationalize the allocation of resources, enhance readiness in order to prevent attacks, and

facilitate recovery if prevention fails.

SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY AGENCY.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a National Homeland Security Agency

(hereinafter in this Act referred to as the ‘‘Agency’’).

(b) DIRECTOR.—There shall be at the head of the Agency a Director, who shall be

appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall

be compensated at the rate provided for level I of the Executive Schedule under section 5312

of title 5, United States Code. The Director shall serve as an advisor to the National Security

Council.

(c) DUTIES.—The duties of the Director shall be the following:

(1) To plan, coordinate, and integrate those United States Government activities

relating to homeland security, including border security and emergency preparedness, and

to act as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.

(2) To work with State and local governments and executive agencies in protecting

United States homeland security, and to support State officials through the use of regional

offices around the country.

(3) To provide overall planning guidance to executive agencies regarding United

States homeland security.

(4) To conduct exercise and training programs for employees of the Agency and

establish effective command and control procedures for the full range of potential

contingencies regarding United States homeland security, including contingencies that

require the substantial support of military assets.

(5) To annually develop a Federal response plan for homeland security and

emergency preparedness.

SEC. 4. TRANSFER OF AUTHORITIES, FUNCTIONS, PERSONNEL, AND ASSETS

TO AGENCY.

The authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the following entities are hereby

transferred to the Agency:

(1) The Federal Emergency Management Agency, the ten regional offices of which

shall be maintained and strengthened by the Agency.
5-B

(2) The United States Customs Service, which shall be maintained as a distinct entity

within the Agency.

(3) The Border Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which shall be

maintained as a distinct entity within the Agency.

(4) The United States Coast Guard, which shall be maintained as a distinct entity

within the Agency.

(5) The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office and the Institute of Information

Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Commerce.

(6) The National Infrastructure Protection Center and the National Domestic

Preparedness Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

SEC. 5. ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECTORATES AND OFFICE.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECTORATES.—The following staff directorates are

hereby established within the Agency:

(1) DIRECTORATE OF PREVENTION.—The Directorate of Prevention, which

shall be responsible for the following:

(A) Overseeing and coordinating all United States border security activities.

(B) Developing border and maritime security policy for the United States.

(C) Developing and implementing international standards for enhanced security in

transportation nodes.

(2) DIRECTORATE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.—The

Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection, which shall be responsible for the

following:

(A) Acting as the Critical Information Technology, Assurance, and Security

Officer of the Agency to coordinate efforts to address the vulnerability of the United

States to electronic or physical attacks on critical infrastructure of the United States,

including utilities, transportation nodes, and energy resources.

(B) Overseeing the protection of such infrastructure and the physical assets and

information networks that make up such infrastructure.

(C) Ensuring the maintenance of a nucleus of cyber security experts within the

United States Government.

(D) Enhancing sharing of information regarding cyber security and physical

security of the United States, tracking vulnerabilities and proposing improved risk
6-B

management policies, and delineating the roles of various government agencies in

preventing, defending, and recovering from attacks.

(E) Coordinating with the Federal Communications Commission in helping to

establish cyber security policy, standards, and enforcement mechanisms, and working

closely with the Federal Communications Commission on cyber security issues with

respect to international bodies.

(F) Coordinating the activities of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to

share information on threats, vulnerabilities, individual incidents, and privacy issues

regarding United States homeland security.

(G) Assuming the responsibilities carried out by the Critical Infrastructure

Assurance Office before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(J) Assuming the responsibilities carried out by the National Infrastructure

Protection Center before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(K) Supporting and overseeing the management of the Institute for Information

Infrastructure Protection.

(3) DIRECTORATE FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE.—The

Directorate for Emergency Preparedness and Response, which shall be responsible for the

following:

(A) Carrying out all emergency preparedness and response activities carried out

by the Federal Emergency Management Agency before the date of the enactment of this

Act.

(B) Assuming the responsibilities carried out by the National Domestic

Preparedness Office before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(C) Organizing and training local entities to respond to emergencies and

providing State and local authorities with equipment for detection, protection, and

decontamination in an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction.

(D) Overseeing Federal, State, and local emergency preparedness training and

exercise programs in keeping with current intelligence estimates and providing a single

staff for Federal assistance for any emergency (including emergencies caused by flood,

earthquake, hurricane, disease, or terrorist bomb).

(E) Creating a National Crisis Action Center to act as the focal point for

monitoring emergencies and for coordinating Federal support for State and local

governments and the private sector in crises.

(F) Establishing training and equipment standards, providing resource grants, and

encouraging intelligence and information sharing among the Department of Defense, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, State emergency

management officials, and local first responders.
7-B

(G) Coordinating and integrating activities of the Department of Defense, the

National Guard, and other Federal agencies into a Federal response plan.

(H) Coordinating activities among private sector entities, including entities within

the medical community, with respect to recovery, consequence management, and

planning for continuity of services.

(I) Developing and managing a single response system for national incidents in

coordination with the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the

Department of Health and Human Services, and the Centers for Disease Control.

(J) Maintaining Federal asset databases and supporting up-to-date State and local

databases.

(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.—There is

established in the Agency an Office of Science and Technology, the purpose of which shall be to

advise the Director regarding research and development efforts and priorities for the directorates

established in subsection (a).

SEC. 6. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) BIENNIAL REPORTS.—The Director shall submit to Congress on a biennial basis—

(1) a report assessing the resources and requirements of executive agencies relating to

border security and emergency preparedness issues; and

(2) a report certifying the preparedness of the United States to prevent, protect

against, and respond to natural disasters, cyber attacks, and incidents involving weapons

of mass destruction.

(b) ADDITIONAL REPORT.—Not later than the date that is one year after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to Congress a report—

(1) assessing the progress of the Agency in—

(A) implementing the provisions of this Act; and

(B) ensuring the core functions of each entity transferred to the Agency are

maintained and strengthened; and

(2) recommending any conforming changes in law necessary as a result of the

enactment and implementation of this Act.

SEC. 7. COORDINATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS.

The Director shall establish and maintain strong mechanisms for the sharing of

information and intelligence with United States and international intelligence entities.
8-B

SEC. 8. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING PROCESS.

The Director shall establish procedures to ensure that the planning, programming,

budgeting, and financial activities of the Agency comport with sound financial and fiscal

management principles. Those procedures shall, at a minimum, provide for the planning,

programming, and budgeting of activities of the Agency using funds that are available for

obligation for a limited number of years.

SEC. 9. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, SAFETY, AND HEALTH

REQUIREMENTS.

The Director shall—

(1) ensure that the Agency complies with all applicable environmental, safety, and

health statutes and substantive requirements; and

(2) develop procedures for meeting such requirements.

SEC. 10. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act shall take effect on the date that is months after the date of the enactment of this

Act.
9-B

PROPOSED FINAL BILL

A BILL

To amend title 10, United States Code, relating to the Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in

Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

 This Act may be cited as the __________ Act of 2001/2002.

SECTION 2. AMENDMENT TO TITLE 10.

Section 138(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by amending the following:

 (a) change "nine" to "ten". It should read:

"(a) There are ten Assistant Secretaries of Defense, appointed from civilian life by the

President, by and with the consent of the Senate."

(b) add:

"(6) One of the Assistant Secretaries shall be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Homeland Security. He shall have as his principal duty the overall supervision (including

oversight of policy and resources) of homeland security activities of the Department of Defense.

The Assistant Secretary is the principal civilian adviser to the Secretary of Defense on homeland

security matters including all military support to civil authorities, and (after the Secretary and

Deputy Secretary) is the principal homeland security official within the senior management of

the Department of Defense."
10-B

Executive Order XX – Homeland Security Intelligence Activities

Good intelligence is the key to preventing attacks on the homeland and therefore homeland

security should become one of the intelligence community's most important missions. Better

human intelligence must supplement technical intelligence, especially on terrorist groups

covertly supported by states. Fuller cooperation and more extensive information-sharing with

friendly governments will also improve the chances that perpetrators will be detained, arrested,

and prosecuted before they ever reach U.S. borders. The intelligence community also needs to

embrace cyber threats as a legitimate mission and to incorporate intelligence gathering on

potential strategic threats from abroad into its activities. For that purpose, by the authority

vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, and in

order to enhance the security of the United States by improving the quality and effectiveness of

intelligence available to the United States, it is ordered as follows:

Section 1. The National Intelligence Council shall include homeland security and asymmetric

threats as an area of study.

Section 2. There is hereby established within the National Intelligence Council, a National

Intelligence Officer with the homeland security portfolio. The National Intelligence Officer for

homeland security shall be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Section 3. The National Intelligence Officer for homeland security shall produce National

Intelligence Estimates as needed.
11-B

Executive Order XX – National Guard Homeland Security Activities

The National Guard, whose origins are to be found in the state militias authorized by the United

States Constitution, should play a central role in the response component of a layered homeland

defense strategy. For that purpose, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution

and statutes of the United States of America, and in order to enhance the security of the United

States by improving the quality and effectiveness of homeland security activities, it is ordered as

follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of Defense shall assign homeland security to the National Guard as a

primary mission and shall ensure that the National Guard is reorganized, trained, and equipped to

undertake the homeland security mission.

At present the Army National Guard is primarily organized and equipped to conduct sustained

combat overseas. In this the Guard fulfills a strategic reserve role, augmenting the active

military during overseas contingencies. At the same time, the Guard carries out many state-level

missions for disaster and humanitarian relief as well as consequence management. For these, it

relies upon the discipline, equipment, and leadership of combat forces. The National Guard

should redistribute resources currently allocated predominantly to preparing for conventional

wars overseas to provide greater support to civil authorities in preparing for and responding to

disasters, especially emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.

Such redistribution should flow from a detailed assessment of force requirements for both theater

war and homeland security contingencies. The Department of Defense should conduct such an

assessment, with the participation of the state governors and the NHSA. In setting requirements

the Department should minimize having forces with dual missions or relying on active forces

detailed for major theater war.

The National Guard should be reorganized to fulfill its historic and Constitutional mission of

homeland security. It should provide a mobilization base with strong local ties and support. It is

already "forward deployed" to achieve this mission and should:

• Participate in and initiate, where necessary, state, local and regional planning for responding

to a WMD incident;

• Train and help organize local first responders;

• Maintain up-to-date inventories of military resources and equipment available in the area on

short notice;

• Plan for rapid inter-state support and reinforcement; and

• Develop an overseas capability for international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
APPENDIX C:

HOMELAND SECURITY PROCESS MAPS
HLS RECOMMENDATION 1: COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY - STRA

President National Security Adv isor NSC Staff National Homeland Security 

Agenc y (NHSA) Interagenc y Inter-Branc h Policy Coordination Committees

(PCC)

Ap p 

Stra t

De v e lo p 

Re c o m m e n d a tio n s 

fo r th e Pre s id e n t

Re v ie w Stra te g y

Re a c h 

Co n s e n s u s ?

Re fin e a n d 

De v e l o p Op ti o n s

Pre s e n t Stra te g y to 

NSC

Re a c h 

Co n s e n s u s ?

Re fin e a n d 

De v e l o p Op ti o n s

Sta rt

De v e lo p PCC 

Fra m e wo rk

Es tablis h 

In te ra g e n c y 

W o rk i n g Gro u p

De v e lo p Dra ft 

Stra te g ie s

No

Yes

No

Yes
HLS RECOMMENDATION 2: CREATE NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY AGE

P resi d en t NS C OM B In t erag en cy I n t er- B r an ch P o l i cy C o o rd i n at i o n 

C o m m i t t ees (P C C )

D i scu ss B u d g et 

I ssu es & O p t i o n s

E x ch an g e 

In fo rm at i o n , 

P r o p o sal s, an d 

E v al u at i o n s 

B ear i n g o n P o l i cy 

D eci si o n s 

(C o n t i n u al l y )

D i scu ss A g en cy 

B u d g et an d 

N at i o n al S ecu ri t y 

P o l i cy Issu es

"H eari n g s"

E st ab l i sh G u i d an ce 

w ith N S P G S t art R ev i ew A p p 

M ak e D ec

R eso l v e A g en cy A p p eal ?

P assb a

D eci si o n t o 

P r o v i d e B u d g et P r ep 

In st ru ct i o n s, C ei l i n g s, 

an d A ssu m p t i o n 

G u i d an ce an d 

P r o ced u r es f o r P rep ar i n g 

N at i o n al S ecu ri t y B u d g et 

A n n ex

A ssi st A g en cy 

w i t h B u d g et 

P rep arat i o n

Id en t i fy Issu es fo r 

D i scu ssi o n B et w een 

O M B & A g en cy

R ev i ew A g en cy 

B u d g et 

S u b m i ssi o n

E n t er B u d g et E st i m at es i n t o 

BPS

C o n d u ct D i rect o r' s 

R ev i ew an d M ak e 

D eci si o n

P assb ack D eci si o n t o 

A g en cy

A p p eal Issu e

 P r ep ar e f o r P resi d en t i al 

C o n si d er at i o n 

S u b m i t A g en cy 

B u d g et w i t h 

N at i o n al S ecu ri t y 

B u d g et A n n ex

A ccep t 

D eci si o n ?

In co rp o rat e D eci si o n 

In t o B u d g et 

S u b m i ssi o n an d 

N at i o n al S ecu ri t y 

B u d g et A n n ex

N o

Y es

N o

Y es

A

M arch - Ju n e Ju n e - S ep t emb er S ep temb er - No v emb er 
Road Map for National Security

Addendum on Implementation

National Security Council Implementation Plan

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
1

Executive Summary

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21) has made five

recommendations that affect national security policy and budget development, and the role and

structure of the National Security Council.

USCNS/21ST CENTURY RECOMMENDATIONS1

14. The President should personally guide a top-down strategic planning process and delegate

authority to the National Security Advisor to coordinate that process.

15. The President should prepare and present to the Congress an overall national security budget

to serve the critical goals that emerge from the National Security Council strategic planning

process. Separately, the President should continue to submit budgets of the individual national

security departments and agencies for Congressional review and appropriation.

16. The National Security Council should be responsible for advising the President and for

coordinating the multiplicity of national security activities, broadly defined to include economic

and domestic law enforcement activities as well as the traditional national security agenda. The

NSC advisor and staff should resist the temptation to assume a central policymaking and

operational role.

17. The President should propose to the Congress that the Secretary of Treasury be made a

statutory member of the National Security Council.

18. The President should abolish the National Economic Council, distributing its domestic

economic policy responsibilities to the Domestic Policy Council and its international economic

responsibilities to the National Security Council.

Table 1. Summary of National Security Council-related Recommendations

This implementation plan provides suggested actions to initiate USCNS/21

recommendations for emphasizing strategic planning and budgeting, and improving national

security policymaking. The Commission recommends that the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor) coordinate a top-down strategic planning

process and preparation of a national security budget. The Commission also recommends the

National Security Advisor and National Security Council (NSC) staff refrain from a

policymaking and operational role; the Secretary of the Treasury become a statutory member of

the National Security Council; and the National Economic Council (NEC) be abolished,

distributing its responsibilities to the NSC and Domestic Policy Council.

Of the five recommendations in this implementation plan, one requires legislation:

establishing the Secretary of the Treasury as a statutory member of the NSC. The remaining

recommendations can be implemented through presidential directive or Executive Order.

The key issue identified in this implementation plan includes managing cultural change

with regard to national security strategic planning. Within some departments cultural

impediments to planning exist that will impact the establishment of an effective national security

strategic planning process since long-range planning is counter to some departments' culture.

 

1 Recommendations addressed in this implementation plan are extracted from Road Map for National Security: Imperative for

Change, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21)'s Phase III report, posted on January 31, 2001

at www.nssg.gov, and published on March 15, 2001. All references are based on the published version. (Hereafter cited as

Road Map.)
2

Cultural impediments could also hinder redefining the role of the National Security Advisor and

staff as "honest brokers" and policy coordinators, while refraining from involvement in

operational activities and policy formulation.
3

Implementation Plan: National Security Council

I. READER'S GUIDE

This reader's guide provides a brief introduction to the contents and layout of this

implementation plan.

A. Background

The charter that created the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

(USCNS/21) directed the Commission to include implementation concepts for its

recommendations as part of its final report.2 This document provides those concepts for the

Commission's recommendations pertaining to the National Security Council (NSC).

At the outset of its work in 1998, the Commission identified the need to reevaluate the

national security structure in order to integrate the diverse components required to support

national security early in the 21st century. It addressed threats in its initial report, New World

Coming: American National Security in the 21st Century, and elaborated on strategies to deal

with these threats in its second report, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving

Security and Promoting Freedom.3 In its third report, Road Map for National Security:

Imperative for Change, the Commission offers specific recommendations for organizing the U.S.

national security apparatus to streamline crosscutting policymaking and integrate international

economics into national security policymaking.

B. Scope of Implementation Plan

This plan identifies steps to implement the recommendations offered by the Commission.

These actions are meant to guide the reader in understanding the implications of the

recommendations provided by the Commission. The plan also highlights issues raised by the

recommendations, including challenges in implementing them, and provides options to facilitate

implementation. Throughout the plan, tables are used to simplify presentation, and format

remains the same for each recommendation to facilitate comparisons.

The Commission's final report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,

contains five major recommendations suggesting National Security Council coordination of a

strategic planning process, and improving the structure of the National Security Council and its

staff.4 Specifically, the recommendations focus on devising a top-down strategic planning

process aimed at linking national security objectives to resource allocation and, in so doing,

preparing an overall national security budget; streamlining the functioning of the NSC staff by

re-orienting it as a national security policy coordinator to oversee crosscutting policies;

establishing the Secretary of the Treasury as a statutory member of the National Security

Council; and dissolving the National Economic Council, integrating its international economic

responsibilities with the NSC and domestic economic responsibilities with the Domestic Policy

Council (DPC).

 

2 USCNS/21 Charter, July 1998 is contained in Appendix 2 of Road Map.

3 All USCNS/21 reports are available at the Commission's website www.nssg.gov.

4 Road Map also contains a synopsis of the findings contained in earlier Commission reports.
4

C. Implementation Plan Layout

Section II of this plan provides a blueprint for implementing the Commission's

recommendations pertaining to the National Security Council. This section suggests actions that

could achieve the objectives laid out in the recommendations for developing a national security

strategic planning process and national security budget; limiting the role of the National Security

Advisor and NSC staff; and further integrating international economics into national security

policy. This section also identifies responsibility for those actions and provides a timeline for

each action. Appendix B includes a matrix summarizing the information in this section.

Section III describes issues, challenges, and opportunities raised by the recommendations

and presents potential courses of action to address them.

Section IV describes means by which the recommendations can be implemented,

including legislative and executive actions. Draft legislative language and notional executive

order language to implement these recommendations are included in Appendices C and D.

Section V describes implications for the personnel affected by these recommendations.

Section VI includes the appendices.
5

II. IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINTS

A. National Security Strategic Planning

In an effort to provide an overall strategic framework to guide national security

policymaking and resource allocation, the Commission recommends developing a strategic

planning process that integrates capabilities across Executive Branch agencies.

1. Background. In their detailed assessment, the Commission recognized a disconnect

between the process for establishing national security objectives and the process for allocating

resources. Responding to the complex threat environment described in the Commission's Phase I

report, New World Coming: American National Security in the 21st Century, requires an

integrated approach combining the capabilities of a number of Executive Branch agencies. This

can be achieved through National Security Council-coordinated interagency planning. Crisis

response often consumes attention, leaving little or no time for deliberate planning. The

Commission recommends crosscutting planning, which captures the President's national security

priorities and translates them into long-term plans that will guide resource allocation.

The Commission's recommendation proposes a framework designed to integrate

domestic, foreign, military, and economic policies by centralizing the overall direction and

management of the country's national security activities. The framework would guide national

security activities by means of a strategic planning process that lays out "how the allocation of

resources ... serves the nation's overall national security goals."5 Consequently, the process

would institute closer coordination and cooperation between agencies on national security

matters, especially by drawing in Executive Branch agencies not traditionally involved in

national security.

2. Implementation Blueprint. The blueprint in Table 2 provides suggested actions to

implement the Commission's recommendation, describes who is responsible for the action, and

suggests when the action should be initiated.6

 

5 Road Map, p. 48.

6 This implementation blueprint is designed to accommodate the Bush Administration's National Security Council system as

described in National Security Presidential Decision (NSPD)-1.

Recommendation 14: The President should personally guide a top-down strategic

planning process and delegate authority to the National Security Advisor to coordinate

that process.
6

Actions Responsibility Timeline

Task the National Security Advisor to

institute a top-down strategic planning

process

President As soon as practicable

(should be linked to the

budget preparation

cycle)

Initiate and coordinate an NSC staff

outline of priority goals and objectives

based on the President's national

security vision

National Security Advisor As soon as possible after

decision to establish

strategic planning

process

Establish national security strategic

goals and priorities that provide the

basis for the National Security

Strategy (NSS)

NSC Principals Within 30 days after

receiving NSC staff

outline

Evaluate goals and priorities identified

by Principals and translate into

specific guidance; draft the National

Security Planning Guidance (NSPG)

document

NSC Deputies Committee

(NSC/DC) and Office of

Management and Budget

(OMB) Director (document

drafted by NSC staff)

Within 60 days after

receiving priorities from

Principals, finalized by

March

Approve and distribute NSPG on a

limited basis

President No later than March

Table 2. Suggested National Security Strategic Planning Process

To initiate a formal strategic planning process, the President should issue a directive

tasking the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA or National Security

Advisor) to coordinate a top-down planning process that fosters a coherent national security

policy effectively linking policy, strategy, programming and budgeting. See Appendix A for a

process map that highlights the groups involved in the strategic planning process.

Since the process would be designed to guide department and agency activities that fulfill

the President's national security vision, it should be initiated and coordinated by the National

Security Advisor. National Security Council staff should prepare an outline of the President's

top priority national security goals and objectives based on his vision. The NSC Principals7

should use the outline as a starting point to translate the President's vision into defined,

strategically critical goals and priorities, which would eventually form the basis for the National

Security Strategy (NSS).

Together with the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC), NSC staff would draft more

specific guidance based on the critical strategic goals and priorities identified by the NSC

Principals for the Deputies review and approval. This relatively short, classified document

(possibly 20-25 pages) would provide substance to the Principals' goals and priorities, resulting

in the National Security Planning Guidance (NSPG). Conceptually, this document would link

the President's strategically critical goals and priorities with regional objectives integrating

 

7 The term “NSC Principals” refers to the NSC Principals Committee, which is the senior interagency forum for considering

policy issues affecting national security. Under NSPD-1, the Principals Committee consists of the Secretaries of State,

Treasury, and Defense, the Chief of Staff to the President, and chaired by the National Security Advisor. The Director of

Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Attorney General, and Director of the Office of Management and

Budget may participate as necessary.
7

foreign policy, economic and military activities; assign responsibility for the development of

deliberate plans for intelligence collection, engagement and contingency operations; direct

resource allocation of crosscutting activities including preventative diplomacy, crises response,

non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and homeland security; provide fiscal guidance; and specify

directions for resource allocation to meet presidential priorities. It is essential that the Director

of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) be involved to provide management,

programming, and budgeting advice. Development of the NSPG could use the NSC

organizational structure to rationalize department and agency crosscutting activities. The

NSC/DC, NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC), and OMB would review the NSPG, ensuring it

incorporates coordinated policy direction and priorities.

Once the President approves that the National Security Planning Guidance reflects his

priorities and provides sufficient instruction for the departments, it should be distributed on a

limited basis for implementation. Launching the process will require additional time to establish

the procedures. Once prepared, the National Security Planning Guidance should build upon the

previous NSPG. Its preparations should precede the departments' budget preparation and,

ideally, distribution of the final NSPG should occur in March to initiate departments' budget and

planning processes.

The departments should use the National Security Planning Guidance to direct the

development of their budget submissions. The NSPG would be broad, highlighting critical goals

for applicable departments, but provide enough detail to instruct and guide departments as to

priority programs and activities. Additionally, the national security planning process would not

necessarily be required annually because it would provide long-term policy objectives that would

not change in one budget cycle.

3. Process Chart. See Appendix A for a process map outlining the National Security

Planning Guidance strategic planning process.

4. Personnel Implications. Establishing a top-down strategic planning process would

have minimal staffing implications. Implementing the recommendation relies upon NSC staff

and the National Security Council interagency process in which personnel would be involved as

part of their normal duties. However, it might be advantageous to recruit some NSC staff with

strong management and planning skills to assist the NSC/DC in drafting the NSPG, and oversee

and track the progress of the strategic planning process.

5. Issues. By initiating development of the guidance and approving its final form, the

President provides the interagency community with the caliber of leadership that has sometimes

been absent in the past. The interagency community, aware of his role and interests and

equipped with an authoritative document, is in a better position to plan, program, and respond to

the strategic environment in a systematic way.

Linking the NSPG to the President's annual budget is key to optimizing its value. In this

sense it is closely related to Recommendation 15, which calls for the development of an overall

national security budget. The NSPG translates the President's national security goals, objectives,

and priorities into operationally useful directions. Both the resulting document and the process

by which it is prepared are important for enhancing national security to meet 21st century threats.

By linking the National Security Planning Guidance to annual budget submissions, the President
8

and his top advisors have a framework to evaluate and integrate department programs and

budgets.

The NSPG preparation process brings together in a disciplined manner key interagency

players to examine issues and events. In turn, this will improve interagency planning and

coordination. Although it may be argued that an annual review will be time consuming, once the

initial NSPG has been approved and disseminated, subsequent versions would be evolutionary

and less difficult to produce. Reviewing programmatic issues at the macro level in light of the

President's objectives and priorities, the NSPG preparation process offers opportunities to

examine plans and improve planning coordination as well as to identify and refine

responsibilities and roles.

While the NSPG would form the basis for programs and planning, it would also serve as

the foundation for the National Security Strategy. The NSS is an unclassified document that

Congress requires the Administration to publish annually. However, the NSPG will be a

classified Executive Branch Working document, and thus its distribution will be limited.

A central impediment to the National Security Planning Guidance and the process by

which it is produced will be bureaucratic inertia. The reluctance of some departments and

agencies to engage in long-range planning could impede the success of the national security

strategic planning process. For many, "long range" is measured in months, or at most a year.

There is a cultural preference for this in some departments. If part of the periodic reviews of the

NSPG include reviews of plans, as they should, then this is likely to engender resistance on the

part of activities that do not engage in rigorous long-range planning.

Bureaucratic impediments also could hinder the effectiveness of the strategic planning

process and will require both leadership and meaningful incentives to overcome. Some have

argued that the lack of meaningful change in the past was in part due to the absence of top-down

leadership. Without it, the bureaucracies were able to capture key processes and products.

When changes occurred, they were at the margins and resulted from trade-offs that protected the

equities of all involved. There is no guarantee that the NSPG will eliminate this and, indeed,

without senior leadership involvement, it too could be another bureaucratic exercise. This

involvement has to be substantive, and, where matters are delegated to subordinate groups,

members of the NSC/DC and NSC/PC must hold them accountable for adhering to guidance. In

a very real sense, the men and women the President appoints to his Administration will have to

hold the line on his goals and objectives against entrenched bureaucratic elements. The more the

President changes the nation's national security goals and priorities to deal with new realities, the

more resistance will be encountered. The President's appointees must be alert to this and exert

control over the NSPG production process and programming and budgeting processes.

Maintaining this control will require the use of authority granted to appointees by virtue

of their positions, and development of meaningful incentives. If the line is held only by dint of

authority, the result is likely to be malicious compliance—a state in which the bureaucracy drags

its feet or, in the extreme, purposefully makes wrong turns while it waits out the Administration.

Appointees should provide the leadership that will win over bureaucratic opponents and

implement measures as appropriate. Whatever the approach, senior appointees should be alert to

the need for incentives for change and adopt those that are most likely to help them make their

case.
9

Once the initial NSPG has been developed, there will be a tendency to neglect it, relying

instead on lower levels to implement it and keep it current. While the press of other matters

makes this understandable, allowing this to happen is likely to undermine an excellent concept.

The NSPG must be seen as a dynamic document that emerges from an ongoing process in which

the Administration's senior leadership maintains a continuing interest.

B. National Security Budget

In order to resource activities that support the strategic goals and priorities identified in

the national security strategic planning process (see previous recommendation), a national

security budget should be prepared.

1. Background. The Commission recommends a "goal-oriented budget" designed to

highlight "the most critical national security goals," delineating select departmental programs

and activities that contribute to key national security policy goals and the resources required to

achieve those goals.8 Establishing a national security budget is likely to improve Executive

Branch management by highlighting the visibility of budget items that support these key national

security goals. For example, the first national security budget may consolidate a few

crosscutting budget items such as homeland security, counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, nuclear

threat reduction, and science and technology. Over time, as the process is refined, it may evolve

to incorporate additional crosscutting security issues. Meanwhile, identifying the multiple

activities that support crosscutting strategic goals will make gaps, seams, and overlaps become

apparent, allowing the President to make trade-offs between activities to fulfill his priorities. In

addition, preparing a goal-oriented budget would highlight efficiencies so resources could be

channeled towards preventive strategies.

2. Implementation Blueprint. The blueprint in Table 3 provides suggested actions to

implement the Commission's recommendation, describing who is responsible for the action and

when the action should be initiated.

 

8 Road Map. pp. 48-49.

Recommendation 15: The President should prepare and present to the Congress an

overall national security budget to serve the critical goals that emerge from the NSC

strategic planning process. Separately, the President should continue to submit budgets

for the individual national security departments and agencies for Congressional review

and appropriation.
10

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

Task National Security Advisor and the

Director of OMB to initiate

development of a pilot national security

budget

President Following completion of

NSPG

Provide guidance for developing the

pilot national security budget to select

departments and agencies involved in

key crosscutting national security

activities

National Security

Advisor and Director

of OMB through NSC

staff

Concurrent with above

Direct and ensure the select

departments' budget submissions are

developed to reflect National Security

Planning Guidance and include pilot

annex to regular budget submission

with the key crosscutting national

security activity line items duplicated

from department budget

Department Principals

and Deputies

June – September

Review department budget submissions

for compliance with National Security

Planning Guidance and pass back to

departments with further guidance and

instruction, as necessary

OMB September – November

Combine department-identified crossfunctional line items into an integrated

pilot national security budget annex for

the President's approval

OMB September – December

Consult with Congress conveying the

value of separate cross-functional

budget and receive feedback from

Congress

OMB and White

House Congressional

Liaison staff

December– January

Submit pilot national security budget to

Congress as annex to President's

budget request

White House No later than the first

Monday of February

Table 3. Suggested Development of a Pilot National Security Budget

Recommendation 14 advocates a framework for establishing strategic priorities that links

strategy to resources through planning. The strategic planning process should be tied to the

budget cycle to achieve the best results. In so doing, the framework lays the foundation for

developing an integrated national security budget as recommended by the Commission.

While it is usually the Office of Management and Budget's role to ensure resources

correspond to policy priorities, the security environment has become increasingly complex,

making it difficult to assess multiple department programs that may directly or indirectly

correlate with critical strategic goals identified by the President and the NSC Principals. The

national security strategic planning process attempts to align department programs and activities

to national security priorities by means of the National Security Planning Guidance (described in
11

the previous recommendation), which could also cultivate the eventual development of a

comprehensive national security budget.

An initial budget should be developed to consolidate key cross-functional issues before

deciding to establish a complete national security budget. The initial, or pilot, national security

budget would not be a full national security budget, but rather an expanded cross-functional

budget compiling critical crosscutting areas. The President should designate the National

Security Advisor and Director of OMB to direct and provide guidance for developing the pilot

national security budget to select departments and agencies involved in key cross-functional

activities. This budget would initially consolidate key crosscutting national security activities

such as homeland security, counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, nuclear threat reduction, and

science and technology. In addition to consolidating crosscutting activities, the process would

identify the total effect of cross-functional activities, gaps and duplication as well as potential

trade-offs between agencies' programs.

Initially, the pilot national security budget would be composed of critical crosscutting

activities described above. The National Security Advisor, NSC staff, and OMB would prepare

guidance for departments to develop their pilot national security budget annex that would include

only the department's activities and programs that support the identified crosscutting activities

(i.e., homeland security, counter-terrorism, etc.). Department principals and/or deputies should

be responsible for overseeing the pilot national security budget annex preparation and ensuring it

reflects the national security strategic goals and priorities outlined in the NSPG. During the

budget review process, OMB would also ensure departments' budgets reflect the National

Security Planning Guidance and are aligned with national security priorities. As in the current

budget review process, OMB would pass back budgets for further action, as appropriate after its

review. The "pass back" is based upon OMB decisions concerning the budget and provides

additional guidance and instruction to the department. See Appendix A for a more detailed

description of the budget process.

Meanwhile, Congress should be consulted as to the purpose and value of cross-functional

budgets. This action would provide the opportunity for Congress to offer improvements to the

process and product. White House and OMB Congressional Liaison staff should undertake the

responsibility to inform Congress of the national security budget annex prior to submitting the

President's budget request in early February to receive feedback.

Once the budget review process is finalized by OMB and approved by the President, the

budget request along with the pilot national security budget annex should be sent to Congress no

later than the first Monday in February.

3. Process Chart. See Appendix A for a process map depicting the budget process.

4. Personnel Implications. Implementation of this recommendation relies on using

current department budget preparation processes, NSC, and OMB staff. However, to develop a

full national security budget would require a modest staff increase at the department level in

order to identify and consolidate national security line items from within a department's budget

to create the national security annex.

5. Issues. Establishing a national security budget is an effort to emphasize each

department's programs and activities that contribute to the rising number of crosscutting national
12

security activities. It also provides visibility over resources so they can be managed in

accordance with the President’s national security priorities, and provides feedback into the

NSPG process to assist in reallocating funds, if necessary. Implementing new procedures to the

budget cycle may initially encounter bureaucratic resistance, because "visibility" over funding

priorities may place other funding areas at risk. This process may also take some time for

adjustment. The process assumes the NSC Principals and Deputies, along with NSC staff, will

promulgate the National Security Planning Guidance that will assist departments in identifying

their budget line items to be included in the national security budget annex.

C. National Security Council Role

The Commission believes that the role of the National Security Council has evolved from

that of Presidential national security staff and coordinator to public spokesmen and policymaker.

This recommendation suggests that, since the National Security Advisor and NSC staff are, in

fact, the President's staff not subject to Senatorial confirmation, policymaking, and operational

activities should remain with accountable Cabinet-level officials that are required to answer to

Congress.

1. Background. The role of the National Security Advisor was originally perceived as

that of an "honest broker," presenting policy options and alternatives to the President and

overseeing national security policy development and implementation. However, the National

Security Advisor and the NSC staff have taken on an operational role as opposed to a policy

coordination role. Their involvement in operational functions detracts from their intended

functions as policy coordinators and overseers of policy implementation. The Commission

believes that the changing role of the National Security Advisor and the NSC staff has occurred

because Presidents have increasingly centralized policy making and execution within the NSC.

This has partly resulted from the increasing overlap of domestic, economic, and foreign policy,

making it difficult to identify a department or agency to lead on a particular policy issue.

2. Implementation Blueprint. Since the National Security Advisor and NSC staff are

the President's national security staff, it is at the President's discretion whether to implement this

recommendation, or how best to do so. The blueprint in Table 4 provides suggested actions to

implement the Commission's recommendation, describing who is responsible for the action and

when the action should be initiated.

Recommendation 16: The National Security Council should be responsible for advising the

President and for coordinating the multiplicity of national security activities, broadly defined

to include economic and domestic law enforcement activities as well as the traditional

national security agenda. The NSC advisor and staff should resist the temptation to assume a

central policymaking and operational role.
13

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

Establish a mandate for NSC

staff through Presidential

directive

President As soon as possible (include

in Presidential directive)

Consolidate NSC support

functions such as legislative,

press, communications, and

speech writing functions with

White House staff

President As soon as possible (include

in Presidential directive)

Table 4. Suggested Actions to Clarify Role of NSC Advisor and Staff

The roles and responsibilities of the Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs (or National Security Advisor) and the NSC staff should be identified in the President's

directive establishing the Administration's interagency process.9 These roles and responsibilities

should accommodate the President's management style, give the National Security Advisor and

staff authority to act as the honest broker and policy coordinator for interagency issues, but limit

operational and policymaking authority.

In a subsequent directive, the White House Chief of Staff (or other senior official) should

reconfigure the NSC staff in a manner that facilitates timely and useful advice and policy

coordination. This directive should include re-assigning communications, press, legislative, and

speech writing activities to the White House staff.

Presently, the current Administration has already taken steps to return the position of the

National Security Advisor to an honest broker role and reduced staff levels by a third. The

NSC's communications and legislative responsibilities have been eliminated, while the press and

speechwriting staffs have been trimmed.10

3. Organization/Process Map. No significant process implications were identified.

4. Personnel Implications. No significant personnel implications were identified.

5. Issues. The management style of the President and National Security Advisor will

influence the culture of the National Security Council staff to a certain degree; however,

implementing this recommendation still may encounter cultural resistance due to predetermined

perceptions as to the role of the NSC staff established in the previous Administration. Incoming

NSC staff may perceive themselves as an operational entity, expecting to have a hand in policy

formulation. It may become more difficult to attract high quality staff if it is perceived they will

not have a role in policymaking. In order to return the NSC advisor and staff to the role of

"honest broker" and policy coordinator, NSC staff candidates should be recruited using specific

qualification criteria. Recruiting NSC staff from think tanks and academia may impart a culture

of analytical and strategic thinking, but could also inject negative characteristics such as the lack

of practical knowledge about the workings of the national security apparatus. Additionally, more

 

9 This has been accomplished with the publication of National Security Presidential Directive-1, "Organization of the

National Security Council System."

10 DeYoung, Karen and Steven Mufson. "A Leaner and Less Visible NSC" Washington Post. 10 February, 2001. p. A01.
14

analytical-minded staff are more likely to consider unintended consequences and impacts beyond

the objective of a particular policy. Instilling these types of staff characteristics in the NSC

could promote a culture complementary to other proposed tasks and roles recommended by the

Commission, including supporting NSC Principals and Deputies in preparing the National

Security Planning Guidance, predisposing the staff to strategic thinking and long-term planning.

D. Composition of National Security Council

Recognizing the impact of economics on national security, each President over the past

30 years created a means to integrate international economic issues into national security

policymaking.11 To ensure economic issues are considered and coordinated with national

security activities, the Commission recommends the Secretary of the Treasury become a

statutory member of the National Security Council.

1. Background. As global financial and economic issues impact significantly on U.S.

national security policy, it is crucial that economic policy be coordinated and integrated with

broader national security considerations. The Commission believes that designating the

Secretary of the Treasury as a statutory member of the National Security Council "would signify

the importance of truly integrating economic policy into national security policy."12

Additionally, maintaining the Treasury Secretary's direct involvement in national security

policymaking would ensure economic implications are considered as national security policy is

developed.13

2. Implementation Blueprint. Because membership of the National Security Council

is specified in the United States Code, the President should request the Congress modify the

statute to include the Secretary of the Treasury as a permanent member of the NSC. Table 5

below lays out how this proposal could be implemented.

 

11 The Clinton Administration specifically extended formal membership on the National Security Council to the Secretary of

the Treasury in Presidential Decision Directive 2. However, because the NSC rarely met under the Clinton Administration,

this did not solve the problem of integrating international economics with national security.

12 Road Map. p. 52.

13 Under the new Administration, the National Security Advisor has expanded NSC meetings to include the Secretary of the

Treasury. The Treasury Secretary is still not a statutory member, however, and such membership would imply changes in

NSC staff economic expertise to support him.

Recommendation 17: The President should propose to the Congress that the

Secretary of Treasury be made a statutory member of the National Security

Council.
15

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

Request that Congress amend

Title 50, Section 402 U.S.C.

to include the Secretary of

the Treasury as a statutory

member of the NSC

President At the President's earliest

convenience after taking

office

Establish a Policy

Coordination Committee

(PCC)14 for international

economic and financial

policies chaired by the

Treasury Department

President As soon as possible (include

in Presidential directive)

Task Treasury with chairing

the PCC for International

Finance

President Concurrent with above

Table 5. Proposed Plan to Statutorily Include Secretary of the Treasury in NSC

The President should provide language that amends the membership of the National

Security Council to include the Secretary of the Treasury. Suggested legislative language is

included in Appendix C.

To ensure Treasury Department actions are coordinated with other national security

activities within the NSC process, Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) have been established

within the NSC structure for international finance and transnational economic issues.15 These

interagency coordination committees are co-equal with other NSC committees and contain

appropriate membership.

3. Organization Chart/Process Map. No significant organization or processes issues

were identified.

4. Personnel Implications. No personnel implications were identified other than

ensuring appropriate economic expertise is recruited to the NSC staff to support development of

economic policy and the Secretary of the Treasury membership. Much of this expertise could

come from implementing Recommendation 18 below.

5. Issues. No significant issues were identified.

 

14 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1, "Organization of the National Security Council System" designates

interagency coordination fora as Policy Coordination Committees (PCC), formerly Interagency Working Groups (IWG).

15 Per the publication of NSPD-1, two NSC/PCC's are established: International Finance (chaired by Treasury) and

Transnational Economic Issues (chaired by Assistant to the President for Economic Policy).
16

E. Economic Responsibilities of National Security Council

The Commission recommends that the National Security Council be responsible for

coordinating international economic policy as well as other national security policies.

1. Background. The Commission advises that international economic and financial

policies be closely coordinated and integrated with national security policymaking activities.

2. Implementation Blueprint

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

Disestablish the National

Economic Council (NEC)

President Immediately

Appoint a Deputy National

Security Advisor responsible

for international economic

affairs

President Concurrent with above

Realign responsibilities of

DPC and NSC staffs for

conducting domestic and

international economic policy

respectively

National Security Advisor Within 30 days after above

Appoint more international

economic experts to the NSC

staff

National Security Advisor Concurrent with above

Realign responsibilities of

NSC, DPC, Council of

Economic Advisors, and

other economic advisors to

the President

President Concurrently with realigning

responsibilities of DPC and

NSC staffs

Table 6. Suggested Integration of Economics with National Security Policy

Executive Order 12835 established the National Economic Council (NEC) and its

purpose was to coordinate domestic and international economic policy. This Executive Order

should be revoked and the President should designate the NSC as the entity responsible for

international economic policy coordination in his Presidential directive shaping the NSC

structure.16 The NSC directive should also appoint a Deputy National Security Advisor

responsible for international economics. Meanwhile, the President should amend Executive

Order 12859, "Establishment of the Domestic Policy Council," to include in its functions

responsibility for coordinating and overseeing implementation of domestic economic policy.

 

16 NSPD-1 does not disestablish the NEC but subsumes most of its responsibilities into the NSC.

Recommendation 18: The President should abolish the National Economic Council

(NEC), distributing its domestic economic policy responsibilities to the Domestic Policy

Council and its international economic responsibilities to the National Security

Council.
17

Since the NSC and DPC would take on the previous roles of the NEC, the responsibilities of the

NSC and DPC staffs would need to be realigned to accommodate the additional functions.

Transferring international economic policy coordination to the NSC is an effort to ensure

that economic and financial policies are consistent and integrated with foreign policies. The

Commission also recommends the NSC recruit experts in international economics for its regional

and functional offices to ensure economic matters are not overlooked. Qualified economists on

the NSC staff must be able to support Secretary of the Treasury presence on the NSC

(Recommendation 17 above), and integrate international economics into national security policy

decisions.

Since coordination and oversight of economic policy would lie within the NSC, DPC,

and Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), their roles would have to be clearly defined in order

to avoid duplication of responsibilities and avoid disruption of interagency coordination.

Additionally, the NSC, DPC, and CEA should work closely together to coordinate their activities

and advice to the President. This might be achieve by designating the Deputy National Security

Advisor as the President's chief economic advisor in order to oversee and coordinate activities

between the NSC, DPC, CEA, as well as the Department of the Treasury. This could be

accomplished through regularly scheduled meetings to discuss and coordinate domestic and

international economic issues.

3. Organization/Process Chart. No significant organizational or process implications

were identified.

4. Personnel Implications. NEC staff are drawn from the Office of Policy

Development in the Executive Office of the President, as well as staff temporarily assigned from

other departments or agencies; by fellowships; and shared staffing arrangements with the NSC.

Typically, there is considerable staff turnover with a new incoming Administration, so NEC staff

would be prepared for changes. The NSC and/or DPC staffs could absorb remaining NEC staff.

While the Commission recommends recruiting staff with international economic

expertise the Commission does not believe this recommendation would necessarily require an

increase in overall NSC staffing. The Commission recommends reviewing staff functions to

determine whether the new organization would allow the transfer of positions from traditional

national security functions to economic functions. However, attracting staff with strong

economic expertise may prove difficult since professional economists would be less inclined to

leave their positions to work in an organization not traditionally recognized in economic ranks.

5. Issues. The NEC was designed to integrate domestic and international economic

policy development and coordinate economic policy with national security policy. Although it

was planned as a counterpart organization to the NSC, the NEC has generally been unable to

raise the profile of economic considerations with regard to national security policy formulation.

Integrating international economics as a function of the NSC may allow for increased

consideration of economic implications in national security policy; however, a gap remains

between domestic and international economic policy coordination.

The recommendation suggests separating the responsibilities of the NEC so that domestic

economic policy would be managed by the DPC and international economic policy would be

managed by the NSC. However, because of increasing globalization and the transnational
18

character of economics, domestic economic policy will invariably have repercussions

internationally and international economic policy will impact the U.S. domestic economy.

The international impact of domestic economic policy will require close coordination

between the DPC and NSC. To resolve this gap between domestic and international economic

policy development, the Deputy National Security Advisor should be designated as the

President's chief economic advisor in order to oversee and coordinate domestic and international

economic policy, and promote economic considerations in national security policy formulation.
19

III.ISSUES, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES

The National Security Council, the National Security Advisor and the NSC staff reflect

the style of the President; therefore, these recommendations rely upon the initiative and

leadership of the President and NSC Principals.

A. Strategic Planning Process

A central impediment to the National Security Planning Guidance and the process by

which it is produced will be bureaucratic inertia. The reluctance of some departments and

agencies to engage in long-range planning could impede the success of the national security

strategic planning process. For many, "long range" is measured in months, or at most a year.

There is a cultural preference for this in some departments. If part of the periodic reviews of the

NSPG include reviews of plans, as they should, then this is likely to engender resistance on the

part of activities that do not engage in rigorous long-range planning.

Overcoming bureaucratic impediments requires both top-down leadership and

meaningful incentives. Some have argued that the lack of meaningful change in the past was in

part due to the absence of top-down leadership. The President's appointees must be alert to this

and exert control over the NSPG production process and programming and budgeting processes.

Additionally, appointees should identify incentives that will win over bureaucratic opponents and

implement them as appropriate.

Once the initial NSPG has been developed, there will be a tendency to neglect it, relying

instead on lower levels to implement it and keep it current. While the press of other matters

makes this understandable, allowing this to happen is likely to undermine an excellent concept.

The NSPG must be seen as a dynamic document that emerges from an ongoing process in which

the Administration's senior leadership maintains a continuing interest.

B. National Security Budget

Establishing a national security budget is an effort to emphasize the rising number of

crosscutting national security activities. It also provides visibility over resources so they can be

managed in accordance to the President's national security priorities, and provides feedback into

the NSPG process to assist in reallocating funds, if necessary. Implementing new procedures to

the budget process may initially encounter bureaucratic resistance, because "visibility" over

funding priorities may place other funding areas at risk. This process may also take some time

for adjustment. The process assumes the NSC Principals and Deputies, along with NSC staff,

will promulgate the National Security Planning Guidance assisting departments in identifying

their budget line items to be included in the national security budget annex.

C. Economic Policy Coordination

The recommendation to abolish the National Economic Council suggests separating its

responsibilities so domestic economic policy would be managed by the Domestic Policy Council

and international economic policy would be managed by the National Security Council.

However, because of increasing globalization and the transnational character of economics,

domestic economic policy will have repercussions internationally and international economic

policy will impact the U.S. domestic economy.
20

The international impact of domestic economic policy will require close coordination

between the DPC and NSC. To resolve this gap between domestic and international economic

policy development, the Deputy National Security Advisor should be designated as the

President's chief economic advisor in order to oversee and coordinate domestic and international

economic policy.
21

D. Issues and Suggested Approaches

The table below summarizes key issues identified in this implementation plan and the

recommended approaches for addressing each challenge.

Issue Approach

Bureaucratic impediments may hinder the

implementation of a top-down strategic

planning process.

Senior managers need to demonstrate

leadership, while proposing meaningful

incentives that will win over bureaucratic

opponents. This will require senior leaders

to build a climate of trust with employees

and convince them that making the change is

in the best interest of the organization and

will better prepare the organization for the

future.

Reluctance of some departments and agencies

to engage in long-range planning.

Senior leaders should promote a strategic

planning culture among the interagency by

including reviews of plans during the

periodic reviews of the NSPG.

Absent any forcing function to initiate and

maintain the NSPG process, there will be a

tendency to neglect it.

The President and senior leaders must take

ownership in the NSPG, holding subordinate

levels accountable for implementing the

process. Also, the President and Principals

must demonstrate their commitment to the

process so departments will take it seriously.

This might involve, for example, speeches,

visits to departments by the President, and

enforcing the fiscal guidance so that it is in

line with the NSPG.

Reluctance of some departments and agencies

to participate in developing a functional budget

on key crosscutting national security issues.

The President and senior leaders must take

ownership in the functional budgeting

process and tie it to the NSPG. They must

hold subordinate levels accountable for

implementing the process, and OMB must be

ready to lead and guide preparation of the

functional budget.

Predetermined expectations as to the role of

NSC staff may deter qualified applicants from

pursing positions on the staff.

Target NSC staff recruitment to candidates

from think tanks and academia predisposed

to analytical and strategic thinking.

Separating economic policy between the NSC

and DPC creates a gap between domestic and

international economic policy advice and

coordination.

Designate the Deputy National Security

Advisor for international economics as the

President's chief economic advisor in order

to oversee and coordinate domestic and

international economic policy.

Table 7. Suggested Approaches to Recommendation Challenges
22

IV. IMPLEMENTATION MEANS

Four of the Commission's five recommendations concerning the National Security

Council require implementation by means of presidential directive or executive order. Only one

recommendation would require legislation to be implemented.

A. Legislative Changes

Recommendation 17 would require legislative action. In order to make the Secretary of

the Treasury a statutory member of the National Security Council, Title 50, Section 402 of the

U.S. Code would require amendment.

Recommendation Action

The President should propose to the Congress that the Secretary of

the Treasury be made a statutory member of the National Security

Council.

Legislation

Table 8. Recommendation Requiring Legislation

Those Congressional committees with jurisdiction include the House Committee on

Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs and International

Relations; House Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General

Government; Senate Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government

Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia; and Senate Appropriations

Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government.

See Appendix C for sample draft legislative language.

B. Executive Orders

Recommendation 18 would require an Executive Order to disestablish the National

Economic Council.

Recommendation Action

The President should abolish the National Economic Council,

distributing its domestic economic policy responsibilities to the

Domestic Policy Council and its international economic

responsibilities to the National Security Council.

Executive Order

Table 9. Recommendation Requiring Executive Order

See Appendix D for a sample draft Executive Order.
23

C. Presidential Directives

Three of the Commission's five recommendations affecting the National Security Council

could be implemented by means of presidential directive.

Recommendation Action

Since the centrality of strategy should drive the design and

implementation of U.S. national security policies, the President

should personally guide a top-down strategic planning process and

delegate authority to the National Security Advisor to coordinate that

process.

Presidential Directive

The President should prepare and present to the Congress an overall

national security budget to serve the critical goals that emerge from

the NSC strategic planning process. Separately, the President should

continue to submit budgets of the individual national security

departments and agencies for Congressional review and

appropriation.

Presidential Directive

The National Security Council should be responsible for advising the

President and for coordinating the multiplicity of national security

activities, broadly defined to include economic and domestic law

enforcement activities as well as the traditional national security

agenda. The National Security Advisor and staff should resist the

temptation to assume a central policymaking and operational role.

Presidential Directive

Table 10. Recommendations Requiring Presidential Directive
24

V. PERSONNEL IMPLICATIONS

There are minimal personnel implications incurred by these recommendations. While

some of the recommendations imply reducing or eliminating staff, they would not have

significant personnel implications since traditionally a large staff turnover occurs in the National

Security Council and National Economic Council staff with a new incoming Administration.

Many NSC and NEC staff are civil, military, or foreign service employees on temporary

assignment, and as a result, they return to their respective departments as Administrations

change.
VI. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:

NSC STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS MAP
NSC – Recommendation 14; Top-Down Strategic Planning Process – National S

Presid en t Natio n al Secu rity Ad v iso r NSC Staff Prin cip als Co mmittee (PC) Dep u ties Co mmittee (DC) In terag en cy

S tart

In sti tu te a T o p -Do wn 

S trat eg ic P lan n in g 

P ro cess

Ou tl in e P rio ri ty 

Go al s an d Ob j ectiv es 

b ased o n Visio n

E x p ress Natio n al 

S ecu rity Visio n

E stab lish Natio n al 

S ecu rity S trateg ic 

Go al s an d P rio rities

P ro v id e B asis fo r 

NS S

E v al u ate Go als an d 

P rio rities in NS S

T ran slate i n to 

S p ecific Gu id an ce

Draft C lassified NS P G

Alo n g with OM B

R ecei v e an d R ev iew NS P G 

Alo n g with OM B

Ap 
NSC – Recommendation 15: Overall Budget Preparatio

P resi d en t NS C OM B In t erag en cy Discuss Budget Issues & Options Exchange Information, Proposals, and Evaluations Bearing on Policy Decisions (Continually) D i scu ss A g en cy B u d g et an d P o l i cy Issu es "H eari n g s" Establish General Budget and Fiscal Policy Guidelines Start R ev 

M 

R eso l v e A g en cy A p p eal ? 

D ec

Provide Budget Prep Instructions, Ceilings, and Assumption Guidance Assist Agency with Budget Preparation Id en t i fy Issu es fo r D i scu ssi o n B et w een O M B & A g en cy R ev i ew A g en cy B u d g et S u b m issio n 

E n t er B u d g et E st i m at es i n t o BPS C o n d u ct D i r ect o r ' s R ev i ew an d M ak e D eci si o n P assb ack D eci si o n t o A g en cy A p p eal Issu e P rep are fo r P r esi d en t i al C o n si d erat i o n S u b m i t A g en cy B u d g et 

A ccep t D eci si o n ? I n co r p o r at e D eci si o n In t o B u d g et S u b m issio n 

N o Y es N o Y es

A

March - June June - September S ep temb er - No v emb er 
APPENDIX B:

IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINT MATRIX
Recommendation Action Responsibility Im

Institutional ReformStrategic Planning and BudgetingThe President should personally guide atop-down strategic planning process anddelegate authority to the National SecurityAdvisor to coordinate that process.

Task the National Security Advisor toinstitute a top-down strategic planningprocess

President As soon 

linked t

Initiate and coordinate an NSC staff outlineof priority goals and objectives based on thePresident's national security vision

National SecurityAdvisor

As soon establis

Establish national security strategic goalsand priorities that provide the basis for theNational Security Strategy (NSS)

NSC Principals Within 

staff ou

Evaluate goals and priorities identified byPrincipals and translate into specificguidance; draft the National SecurityPlanning Guidance (NSPG) document

NSC/ DC and OMBDirector (documentdrafted by NSC staff)

Within prioritieMarch

Approve and distribute NSPG on a limitedbasis

President No later 

The President should prepare and presentto the Congress an overall national securitybudget to serve the critical goals thatemerge from the NSC strategic planningprocess. Separately, the President shouldcontinue to submit budgets of theindividual national security departmentsand agencies for Congressional review andappropriation.

Task NSC Advisor and the Director ofOMB to initiate development of a pilotnational security budget

President Followi

Provide guidance for developing the pilotnational security budget to selectdepartments and agencies involved in keycrosscutting national security activities

NSC Advisor andDirector of OMBthrough NSC staff

Concurr
Recommendation Action Responsibility Im

Direct and ensure the select departments'budget submissions are developed to reflectNational Security Planning Guidance andinclude pilot annex to regular budgetsubmission with the key crosscuttingnational security activity line itemsduplicated from department budget

DepartmentPrincipals andDeputies

June – S

Review department budget submissions forcompliance with National SecurityPlanning Guidance and pass back todepartments with further guidance andinstruction, as necessary

OMB Septem

Combine department-identified crossfunctional line items into an integrated pilotnational security budget annex for thePresident's approval

OMB Septem

Consult with Congress conveying the valueof separate cross-functional budget andreceive feedback from Congress

OMB and WhiteHouse CongressionalLiaison staff

Decemb

Submit pilot national security budget toCongress as appendix to President's budgetrequest

White House No later 

Februar
Recommendation Action Responsibility Im

NSC Staff and AdvisorThe NSC should be responsible foradvising the President and for coordinatingthe multiplicity of national securityactivities, broadly defined to includeeconomic and domestic law enforcementactivities as well as traditional nationalsecurity agenda. The NSC advisor andstaff should resist the temptation to assumea central policymaking and operationalrole.

Establish a mandate for NSC staff throughPresidential directive

President As soon 

presiden

Consolidate NSC support functions such aslegislative, press, communications, andspeech writing functions with White Housestaff

President As soon 

presiden

The President should propose to Congressthat the Secretary of Treasury be made astatutory member of the National SecurityCouncil.

Request that Congress amend Title 50,Section 402 U.S.C. to include the Secretaryof the Treasury as a statutory member of theNSC

President At the P

after tak

Establish a Policy Coordination Committee(PCC) for international economic andfinancial policies chaired by the TreasuryDepartment

President As soon 

Presiden

Task Treasury with chairing the PCC forInternational Finance

President Concurr
Recommendation Action Responsibility Im

The President should abolish the NEC,distributing its domestic economic policyresponsibilities to the Domestic PolicyCouncil (DPC) and its internationaleconomic responsibilities to the NationalSecurity Council.

Disestablish the NEC President ImmediAppoint a Deputy National SecurityAdvisor responsible for internationaleconomic affairs

President Concurr

Realign responsibilities of DPC and NSCstaffs for conducting domestic andinternational economic policy respectively

National SecurityAdvisor

Within 

Appoint more international economicexperts to the NSC staff

National SecurityAdvisor

Concurr

Realign responsibilities of NSC, DPC,Council of Economic Advisors, and othereconomic advisors to the President

President Concurr

respons
APPENDIX C:

DRAFT LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE
1-C

PROPOSED FINAL BILL

A BILL

To amend title 50, United States Code, relating to the composition of the National Security

Council.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America

in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

 This Act may be cited as the __________ Act of 2001/2002.

SECTION 2. AMENDMENT TO TITLE 50.

Section 402(a) of title 50, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the

following:

'(8) the Secretary of the Treasury'
APPENDIX D:

DRAFT EXECUTIVE ORDER
1-D

DRAFT EXECUTIVE ORDER

Executive Order ____

Revocation of Executive Order 12835

By the authority vested in me as President of the United States by the Constitution and laws of

the United States of America, including section 105, 107, and 301 of title 3, United States Code,

it is hereby ordered as follows:

Executive Order 12835 of January 27, 1993, "Establishment of the National Economic Council,"

is hereby revoked, effective at noon ____, 2001.

(Presidential Signature)

THE WHITE HOUSE,

(Date)
Road Map for National Security

Addendum on Implementation

Department of State Implementation Plan

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
1

Executive Summary

This implementation plan recommends a course of action for executing the

recommendations of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century for improving the

functioning of U.S. foreign policy. The Commission made three major recommendations: the

reorganization of the Department of State to facilitate the integration of regional and functional

policy issues; the abolition of the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S. AID) and the

consolidation of its foreign assistance functions within the reorganized Department of State; and

the enhancement of strategic planning within the Department of State, by creating a specialized

office.

The Commission also recommended reorganizing the jurisdiction lines of the Senate and

House subcommittees that appropriate funds for the Department of State and all U.S.

international activities to facilitate the evaluation of international affairs programs and the people

and infrastructure that carry them out. In addition, the Commission addressed the need for

improving the management of diplomacy by enhancing the selection process for Ambassadors so

that management and leadership skills are included in the criteria and by proceeding with the

right-sizing of embassies. A summary of these recommendations is in Table 1 below.

USCNS/21ST CENTURY RECOMMENDATIONS1

19. The President should propose to the Congress a plan to reorganize the State Department,

creating five Under Secretaries, with responsibility for overseeing the regions of Africa, Asia,

Europe, Inter-America, and Near East/South Asia, and redefining the responsibilities of the Under

Secretary for Global Affairs. These new Under Secretaries would operate in conjunction with the

existing Under Secretary for Management.

20. The President should propose to the Congress that the U.S. Agency for International

Development be consolidated into the State Department.

21. The Secretary of State should give greater emphasis to strategic planning in the State

Department and link it directly to the allocation of resources through the establishment of a

Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office.

22. The President should ask Congress to appropriate funds to the State Department in a single

integrated Foreign Operations budget, which would include all the foreign assistance programs

and activities as well as all the expenses for personnel and operations.

23. The President should ensure that Ambassadors have the requisite area knowledge as well as

leadership and management skills to function effectively. He should therefore appoint an

independent, bipartisan advisory panel to the Secretary of State to vet ambassadorial appointees,

career and non-career alike.

Table 1. Summary of Recommendations

The Commission also offered important supporting recommendations for U.S. embassies.

Specifically, the Commission called for "right-sizing" all American posts overseas to ensure that

embassy activities are more responsive to emerging challenges and recommended that Embassies

be reorganized into sections reflecting the new State Department reorganization. In addition, the

Commission called for improving the coordination and integration of interagency views in the

 

1 Recommendations addressed in this implementation plan are extracted from Road Map for National Security: Imperative for

Change, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21)'s Phase III report, posted on January 31,

2001, at www.nssg.gov, and published on March 15, 2001. All references are based on the published version. (Hereafter

cited as Road Map.)
2

foreign policy realm. Specifically, the Commission recommended that the President establish

National Security Council (NSC) Policy Coordination Committees for each major region,

chaired by the respective regional Under Secretary of State, to develop regional strategies and

coordinated government-wide plans for their implementation. The Commission also

recommended ensuring that the regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) incorporate nonmilitary

considerations into their planning, and that they rely on their political advisers to ensure close

links with the Ambassadors in the region. Finally, the Commission recommended that the

President ask the Secretary of State to instruct the regional Under Secretaries to meet at least

semi-annually with the ambassadors located in their region (with one such meeting each year

being held in the same general location as the regional CINCs.)

Two of the Commission's major recommendations in this section, reorganizing the

Department of State to integrate functional and regional policy issues and the abolishment of

U.S. AID, will require the enactment of legislation. This implementation plan identifies the

elements of such legislation, recognizing that consultations with Congress will determine the

eventual content of the legislation. The Commission, however, intends to offer general

guidelines for a reorganization of U.S. foreign policy structures while retaining the flexibility of

the Secretary of State to organize the Department in the optimal way to carry out its statutory

functions.

The key issue identified in this implementation plan, aside from the need to secure

Congressional support for the recommendations, is the impact on personnel of the proposed

consolidation of U.S. AID into the Department of State. There may be personnel efficiencies

that result after the consolidation has taken place.
3

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I. READER'S GUIDE

This reader's guide provides a brief introduction to the contents and layout of this

implementation plan.

A. Background

The charter of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

(USCNS/21) directed the Commission to include implementation concepts for its

recommendations as part of its final report.2 This document provides those concepts for the

Commission's recommendations pertaining to the Department of State and the Agency for

International Development (U.S. AID).

In its final report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, the

Commission identifies a number of deficiencies in the organization and processes of the U.S.

Government for the development and implementation of national security policy. Among these

deficiencies, the Commission highlighted certain weaknesses in the organizational structure of

the Department of State that prevent it from assuming a leadership role in making and

implementing U.S. foreign policy. In particular, the Commission determined that the current

organization of the Department does not lend itself to the integration of regional and functional

policy goals—an increasingly important objective to meet some of the global and transnational

challenges identified by the Commission in its first report, New World Coming: American

Security in the 21st Century, or to execute national security policies proposed in the

Commission's second report, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security

and Promoting Freedom. As a result, the Commission recommends a reorganization of the

Department of State that would eliminate co-equal bureaus with responsibility for functional and

regional issues and instead facilitate the examination of functional issues in a regional construct.

The Commission also perceived a requirement to better integrate U.S. foreign assistance with

overall U.S. foreign policy goals. To this end, the Commission proposes abolishing the U.S.

Agency for International Development as a separate agency and integrating its functions fully

into the Department of State.

The Commission also determined that additional changes were needed outside the

Department of State to help it regain its leadership in foreign policy. Thus, the Commission

recommends the revision of procedures for appropriating funds for the conduct of U.S. foreign

policy and for integrating foreign and national security policy across the interagency.

B. Scope of Implementation Plan

This implementation plan identifies steps that can be taken to implement the

Commission's recommendations pertaining to the Department of State. These actions are not

designed to present definitive answers; rather they provide a framework for thinking about the

best ways to put the Commission's findings into practice. The plan also highlights issues raised

 

2 USCNS/21 Charter, July 1998 is contained in Appendix 2 of Road Map.
4

by the recommendations, including challenges in implementing them, and provides options to

facilitate implementation. Throughout the plan, tables are used to simplify presentation and

format remains the same for each recommendation to facilitate comparisons.

The Commission has made five major recommendations to improve the functioning and

effectiveness of the Department of State and U.S. foreign policy in general. The

recommendations focus on reorganizing the Department of State to integrate the analysis of

functional and regional issues, consolidating U.S. AID into the reorganized State Department,

and emphasizing strategic planning within the Department. In addition, the Commission has

recommended integrating appropriations for the State Department and for U.S. foreign assistance

and foreign operations; improving the selection process and preparation of Ambassadors.

Important supporting recommendations focused on "right-sizing" embassies and improving

interagency coordination on regional issues.

Implementing these recommendations will require a mix of legislation, departmental

action, and Presidential direction. The key challenge in implementing the recommendations will

be in obtaining Congressional support and enabling legislation for the reorganization of the

Department of State and the abolition of U.S. AID. The latter will also generate additional

challenges as it raises the possibility of personnel redundancies, which may require the

implementation of early retirement or buyout incentives.

C. Implementation Plan Layout

Section II of this plan provides a blueprint for implementing the Commission's

recommendations pertaining to the Department of State. This section suggests actions that could

be taken to achieve the objectives laid out in the recommendations for reorganizing the

Department of State, integrating U.S. AID into the reorganized Department; improving planning

processes within the Department; transferring budget jurisdiction in the Congress; improving the

selection process for Ambassadors; right-sizing embassies; and improving inter-agency

coordination. This section also identifies responsibility for those actions and provides a notional

timeline for each.

Section III describes issues, challenges, and opportunities raised by the recommendations

and presents potential courses of action to address them.

Section IV describes means by which the recommendations can be implemented,

including legislative and executive actions.

Section V describes implications for the personnel affected by these recommendations,

including personnel transfers, reclassification, and training.

Section VI contains the appendices. Appendix A includes a matrix summarizing the

information in this implementation plan. Appendix B contains draft legislative language to

implement the recommendations addressed in this plan. Appendix C includes a process map

depicting the State Department planning process as modified according to the Commission's

recommendations. Appendix D contains a draft of National Security Presidential Directive-1.
5

II. IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINTS

This section provides recommended courses of action for implementing the

Commission's recommendations pertaining to the Department of State and U.S. foreign policy.

Each recommendation is described briefly and a course of action, or blueprint, is recommended

for actualizing it. This section also briefly describes the impact of the recommendation on

processes within or among organizations and for the organization's personnel, if any. Finally, the

section briefly describes challenges or issues that might result from the implementation of the

recommendation. Issues arising from the Commission's recommendations on the Department of

State are described in more detail in Section III of this chapter.

A. Responsibilities of Under Secretaries

1. Background. The Commission believes the Department of State is hampered by its

current organizational structure, which has resulted from recent efforts to address "functional"

policy issues, such as human rights, democracy, law enforcement, refugees, political-military

affairs, and nonproliferation from an over riding global—rather than regional—perspective. The

Department's current organization, which subordinates regional and functional bureaus to Under

Secretaries with functional responsibilities, discourages integration of functional and regional

perspectives. As a result, the Department often generates competing policy views. In the

Commissioners' view, the Department "rarely speaks with one voice, thus reducing its influence

and credibility in interactions with the Congress and its representation abroad."3 The current

organization of the Department of State is pictured in Figure 1 below.

The Commission thus proposes reorganizing the Department predominantly along

regional lines, with functional bureaus subsumed under five regional Under Secretaries

addressing policy related to the following regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter-America, and

Near East/South Asia. Each Under Secretary would oversee bureaus responsible for political

affairs (bilateral relations with countries in the region), security affairs (e.g., security assistance,

arms control, nonproliferation, and terrorism as relevant in the region), and economic and

transnational affairs (e.g., human rights, foreign assistance, economic issues) as relevant in the

region.

In addition, the Commission proposes redefining the role of the Under Secretary for

Global Affairs, making this the third-ranking officer within the Department, with responsibilities

for issues that transcend regions. This Under Secretary would be Acting Secretary in the absence

of both the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Figure 2 below illustrates the resulting organization

of the Department of State.

 

3 Road Map, p. 53.

Recommendation 19: The President should propose to the Congress a plan to

reorganize the State Department, creating five Under Secretaries, with responsibility

for overseeing the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter-America, and Near

East/South Asia, and redefining the responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Global

Affairs. These new Under Secretaries would operate in conjunction with the existing

Under Secretary for Management.
6

Figure 1. State Department Organization Chart4

Figure 2. Reorganized Department of State

 

4 The source for this chart is U.S. Department of State, Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 1997, and Reorganization Plan

and Report Submitted by President Clinton to Congress on December 30, 1998. It depicts the Department's organization

prior to January 2001, when the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity and Civil Rights (EOOCR) reported both to the

Under Secretary for Management and to the Secretary of State. It is shown on the chart with lines connecting it to both.

Chief of Staff Executive Secretariat

Executive Secretary

Deputy Secretary of State

Secretary of State

Under Secretary 

for Political Affairs

Under Secretary 

for Economic, Business

 & Agricultural Affairs

Under Secretary 

for Arms Control &

International Security

Under Secretary 

for Management

Under Secretary 

for Global Affairs

Under Secretary for

Public Diplomacy & 

Public Affairs

CounterTerrorism

Coordinator

S/NIS S/RPP OIG S/P

PA

L H INR S/CPR

NEA SA

WHA

EAP EB PM CA A

FMP M/FSI

DS M/DGP

EEOCR CIO

M/DGP

/MED

PRM

OES

INL

DRL

AF

U.S. Permanent 

Representative to the

United Nations

Nonproliferation

Arms

Control

Information

Programs

EUR

IO

U.S. Agency for

 International 

Development

U/S 

Europe

U/S 

Global Affairs

U/S 

Africa

U/S 

Inter-American

Affairs

U/S

Near East &

South Asia

U/S 

Asia

U/S 

Management

Secretary of State

Deputy

Legislative Affairs

Public Affairs

Legal Adviser

Strategic Planning,

Assistance, and Budget Office

Intelligence and Research

Inspector General

Political Affairs Security Affairs Economic &

Transnational

Affairs
7

2. Recommended Blueprint. To implement this recommendation, the Department of

State will require legislation amending those sections of the U.S. Code that establish certain roles

and responsibilities within the Department. Establishing five regional Under Secretaries while

retaining the Under Secretary for Global Affairs and the Under Secretary for Management

increases the number of Under Secretaries at the State Department to seven. Because the U.S.

Code limits the number of Under Secretaries to six, the reorganization detailed above would

require amending the law to allow one additional Under Secretary position.5

The U.S. Code also specifies the titles and responsibilities of the Under Secretary for

Arms Control and International Security and the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy.6 Under

the reorganization envisioned by the Commission, the responsibilities now discharged by the

Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security would migrate to bureaus headed

by Assistant Secretaries, while the functions of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy would

migrate to an Assistant Secretary-level official reporting directly to the Secretary of State. These

changes would also require amending the law.

The law also establishes an Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Labor, and Human

Rights, an Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, an Assistant Secretary for Verification

and Compliance, and an Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International and Scientific Affairs.7

Under the reorganization, the functions of these Assistant Secretaries could be subsumed by the

office of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs or distributed among the Assistant Secretaries in

charge of economic and transnational affairs under each regional Under Secretary. Legislation

would also be required to disestablish this office.

Finally, the reorganization proposed by the Commission envisions a total of 18 Assistant

Secretaries reporting to the five regional Under Secretaries and the Under Secretary for Global

Affairs. The law currently limits the number of Assistant Secretaries within the State

Department to 24.8 The Department will therefore have to review the positions it plans to

classify as Assistant Secretaries, aside from those reporting to the regional Under Secretaries and

the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, to determine whether a change in legislation is required

by the reorganization. (This review is discussed below.)

To implement the reorganization described above, the Department of State may choose to

draft and submit to Congress a legislative proposal, or consult with Congress on the elements of

the reorganization and work with the committees of jurisdiction as they draft this legislation. In

either case, the legislative proposal will need to cover the following elements, at a minimum:

• Increasing the number of Under Secretaries of State;

• Repealing the provisions establishing an Under Secretary for Arms Control and

International Security and an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy;

 

5 U.S. Code, Title 22, Chapter 38, Section 2651(b), specifies "There shall be in the Department of State not more than 6

Under Secretaries of State...."

6 U.S. Code, Title 22, Chapter 38, Section 2651(b)(2) provides for an Under Secretary for Arms Control and International

Security and Section 2651(b)(3), for an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy.

7 U.S. Code, Title 22, Chapter 38, Section 2561(c)(2) establishes the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human

Rights, and Labor; Section 2652(b) an Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs; Section 2652(c) an Assistant Secretary

for Verification and Compliance; Section 2655(a) an Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International and Scientific Affairs.

8 U.S. Code, Title 22, Chapter 38, Section2651(c).
8

• Repealing the position of Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and

Labor;

• Repealing the position of Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs;

• Repealing the position of Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance; and

• Repealing the position of Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International and

Scientific Affairs.

More detailed information regarding the elements of such a legislative proposal are in Section

IV.A., of this paper and in Appendix B.

The actions detailed in the following matrix (Table 2) suggest means to prepare for

submitting a legislative proposal to Congress.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Task State Department staff to draft a plan for

the reorganization

Secretary of State Within 15 days

2. Review statutory requirements for Under

Secretary positions

State Department Within 30 days

3. Review requirements for Assistant Secretary

positions

State Department Concurrent with above

4. Draft plan for reassigning responsibilities of

Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries

State Department Within 90 days

5. Integrate State Department reorganization plan

and U.S. AID's consolidation plan and submit to

President9

State Department and

U.S. AID

Within 150 days

6. Formulate strategy for presenting plan to

Congress

White House, State

Department, U.S. AID

Within 180 days

7. Hold consultations with Congress and modify

plan as appropriate

White House, State

Department, U.S. AID

Within 210 days

8. Present legislative proposal to Congress as

modified per Congressional consultations or

consult with Committees of jurisdiction and

request legislative changes

White House Within 240 days

Table 2. Implementation Matrix for State Department Reorganization

Within 15 days from the acceptance of this recommendation, the Secretary of State would

initiate action by appointing State Department staff to draft a plan for the reorganization of the

Department. As a first step, the staff would review the statutory requirements for Under

Secretary and Assistant Secretary positions affected by the reorganization. This action should

occur within 30 days of the acceptance of these recommendations.

 

9 The Commission also recommends integrating U.S. AID into the Department of State (Recommendation 20) and believes

these recommendations should be implemented concurrently. Steps for integrating U.S. AID into the Department of State

are detailed in Section II.B, below.
9

Second, the Department would draft a plan for reassigning roles and responsibilities of

the current Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries to the six Under Secretaries and 18

Assistant Secretaries envisioned by this recommendation. In preparing this plan, the Department

would evaluate any impact the recommendation may have for other positions discharging

administrative or other functions. For example, this recommendation envisions retaining an

office of planning and resource allocation and the offices of public affairs, and intelligence and

research, legislative affairs, inspector general, and legal adviser in a direct reporting role to the

Secretary. The Secretary would have to determine whether the officials holding these positions

should be classified as Assistant Secretaries of State. In addition, four positions currently

reporting to the Under Secretary for Management carry Assistant Secretary rank. The

Department should therefore determine whether legislation is required to increase the number of

Assistant Secretaries to accommodate administrative or support positions common to the

Department as a whole.10

In preparing this plan the Department would also review any personnel changes required

by the reorganization for both Foreign Service and Civil Service staff. For example, the

Department should determine whether the reorganization affects staffing levels in the bureaus

and, if so, how these requirements should be met. The Department should also identify any

training shortfalls created by the reorientation of the bureaus towards functional analysis. This

evaluation should be complete within 90 days of acceptance of this recommendation.

The reorganization plan would then be integrated with the plan for consolidating U.S.

AID into the Department of State, as described in the Section II.B., and submitted to the

President. This action would occur within 150 days of acceptance of this recommendation.

In the next 30 days, the White House, State Department, and U.S. AID would formulate a

strategy for presenting the proposal for the State Department reorganization and U.S. AID

integration to key Congressional stakeholders. Over the next 30 days after that, the White

House, supported by the State Department and U.S. AID would hold consultations on Capitol

Hill and modify the plan as appropriate. Finally, the White House would submit the

reorganization plan to Congress as a legislative proposal within 240 days of accepting the

recommendation. In essence, the purpose of the actions described above is to help the

Department anticipate and prepare for Congressional questions, and ensure that the

reorganization accommodates both the policy and administrative functions of the Department.

3. Process Implications. The reorganization has implications for the State

Department's process for assembling the International Affairs Budget. Currently, the budget is

assembled based on the requirements highlighted in the Bureau Performance Plans, which in turn

are based on performance plans submitted by the U.S. missions operating in each Bureau's

regional or functional area of concern. Recasting bureaus as functional, rather than regional,

entities, and placing bureaus under the authority of regional Under Secretary will require

modification of this process. At the very least, the Bureaus should be required to submit

performance plans, which should then be integrated by the staff of the Under Secretary in

Integrated Performance Plans.

 

10 The Commission envisions that Assistant Secretaries would head the bureaus of Legislative Affairs, Public Affairs, and

Intelligence and Research. Together with the 18 Assistant Secretaries reporting to the five regional Under Secretaries and

the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, and the four Assistant Secretaries currently reporting to the Under Secretary for

Management, the total number of Assistant Secretaries in the Department would be 25. The draft legislative proposal in

Appendix B reflects this higher number.
10

Although changes could be made on the margin to the Department of State's planning

process to accommodate this reorganization, the Commission recommends a more fundamental

overhaul of the planning process within the Department of State. This recommendation and

resulting procedural changes are described in Section C below.

4. Personnel Implications. Reorganizing the Department of State under regional

Under Secretaries will not have significant repercussions for personnel levels and policy within

the Department. Personnel changes may occur at the margin as bureaus are reorganized under

the regional Under Secretaries and their responsibilities are changed to address functional issues.

The Department may also have to reevaluate the grade of certain positions and develop

descriptions for new positions, such as that of Deputy Under Secretary, which currently do not

exist.

The reorganization of the Department, however, may have training implications for the

Department's Civil and Foreign Service employees. The Department would have to reevaluate

the training needs of personnel staffing the functional bureaus to determine whether training

currently provided is adequate to accommodate the increased emphasis in such areas as

economic analysis, arms control, and project management. Such training adjustments may be

made in the context of overhauling and improving the Foreign Service and Civil Service

professional education systems proposed by the Commission in Recommendations 41 and 42.11

5. Issues. This recommendation involves a major change in structure and process

within the Department of State. A major challenge in implementing this recommendation will be

the perception on the part of Department staff that the reorganization will have added an

additional reporting layer. This recommendation may also be met with resistance from the

Department's Bureaus, which may perceive a loss of direct access to the Secretary and a loss of

flexibility in this redesign. These issues are explored in more detail in Section III of this paper.

B. Consolidation of U.S. AID into the State Department

1. Background. The Commission believes the current organization of the U.S.

government for foreign assistance hinders the integration of foreign aid resources and national

security objectives. Today, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State

Department share responsibility for foreign assistance activities but lack a mechanism to

integrate these programs into preventive strategies. In addition, the dispersal of foreign

assistance roles and responsibilities means that in times of crisis neither the Secretary of State

nor the U.S. AID administrator would have the authority to commit U.S. foreign aid resources

quickly to stem or influence crises as they develop. Finally, the current organization hinders the

coordination of aid activities with other responses, including military responses, by other

agencies, such as the Department of Defense (DoD). To facilitate the integration of foreign

assistance and foreign policy objectives, the Commission recommends folding U.S. AID into the

 

11 For greater detail on these recommendations, see implementation plans for Foreign Service and Civil Service.

Recommendation 20: The President should propose to the Congress that the U.S. Agency

for International Development be consolidated into the State Department.
11

reorganized Department of State, thereby making the Secretary of State the official of primary

responsibility for foreign aid.

2. Implementation Blueprint. The Commission believes the integration of U.S. AID is

an integral part of the reorganization of the Department of State and should occur concurrently

with the reorganization of the Department along regional lines, as described in the previous

section. Accordingly, the matrix in Table 3 below highlights the actions to be taken to plan for

the consolidation of U.S. AID into the reorganized Department of State.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. President to task State Department

and U.S. AID to draft plan for

incorporating U.S. AID functions

into Department of State

White House Within 15 days and

concurrently with adoption of

recommendation for

reorganizing the State

Department

2. State Department and U.S. AID to

form working group to study

statutory implications of

recommendation

Secretary of State Within 30 days

3. Working group to draft plan

consolidating U.S. AID functions

into the Department of State

State Department

and U.S. AID

working group

Within 120 days and concurrent

with plan for reassigning the

responsibilities of Under

Secretaries and Assistant

Secretaries of State

4. Integrate U.S. AID consolidation

plan into State Department

reorganization plan and submit to

President

State Department and

U.S. AID working

group

Within 150 days

5. Formulate Congressional strategy

for presenting plan and legislative

proposal to Congress

White House, State

Department, and U.S.

AID

Within 180 days

6. Hold consultations with Congress

and modify plan as appropriate

White House, State

Department, and U.S.

AID

Within 210 days

7. Present legislative proposal for

State Department reorganization and

U.S. AID integration to Congress

White House Within 240 days

Table 3. Implementation Matrix for U.S. AID Consolidation

In preparation for requesting Congressional action for integrating U.S. AID into the

Department of State, the President should task the Department of State and U.S. AID to draft a

plan for consolidating U.S. AID's functions into the Department. This request should come

within 15 days of adopting this recommendation and should occur concurrently with the

adoption of the recommendation to reorganize the State Department policy functions under five

regional Under Secretaries and one Under Secretary for Global Affairs.

Within 30 days, the State Department and U.S. AID should form a joint working group

for drafting the consolidation plan. The first task of this working group would be to review the
12

statutory requirements for folding U.S. AID's functions into the Department of State. The

working group would then begin drafting a plan detailing how the roles and responsibilities of

U.S. AID bureaus should be folded into bureaus of the reorganized Department of State.

The plan should address the implications of consolidation for U.S. AID's personnel. For

example, the plan should detail whether U.S. AID personnel will be absorbed fully into the State

Department regional bureaus to administer foreign assistance programs or whether personnel

redundancies would result. In the latter case, the plan should include contingency provisions.

Finally, the plan should consider the disposition of U.S. AID's assets and estimate the total costs

of the consolidation, including the costs of absorbing functions and personnel and disposing of

excess infrastructure. The plan should be complete within 120 days.

The U.S. AID consolidation plan would then be integrated with the State Department

reorganization plan and presented to the White House within 150 days. Working with the State

Department and U.S. AID staff, White House staff would formulate a strategy for vetting the

integrated plan with key stakeholders in Congress within 180 days. The White House, State

Department, and U.S. AID team would hold consultations with Members and staff from

committees of jurisdiction within 210 days.

After such consultations, the plan could be modified and the President could present a

legislative proposal to Congress for the consolidation of foreign assistance functions within 240

days of the recommendation's adoption.

3. Process Implications. The consolidation of AID into the Department of State may

have implications for the review and administration of assistance programs.

4. Personnel Implications. The personnel implications of this recommendation may be

substantial. U.S. AID is staffed by approximately 2000 direct hire personnel and 4,000

employees hired locally in countries where assistance programs are implemented.12 Of the 2,000

direct hire employees, approximately 75 percent are Civil Service employees and 25 percent are

members of the U.S. AID Foreign Service.13 The consolidation of U.S. AID will require the

Department of State to absorb most of these personnel. The Department of State has a total Civil

Service workforce of about 27,000 employees, 60 percent of which work overseas.14 Of this

total, approximately 6,000 are from the Civil Service and 9,000 are from Foreign Service. The

remainder are foreign nationals working for U.S. missions abroad.15

The consolidation will likely highlight opportunities for personnel efficiencies. U.S. AID

and the State Department will need to understand what kinds of contracts or agreements are in

 

12 USAID, Budget Justification FY 2001, and The Fiscal Year 1998 USAID Accountability Report.

13 Interview with USAID official, November 18, 1999.

14 Office of Finance and Management Planning, "Budget in Brief," U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, February 1,

1999, http://www.state.gov./www.budget/2000/00summary.html. This figure includes employees of the former U.S.

Information Agency (USIA) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which were incorporated into the

State Department in 1999 pursuant to Section 1601 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (PL 105-

277).

15 These figures are derived from the U.S. Department of State website, "Overview of the Department of State," at

http://www.state.gov/www/dept/fmp/97org_struct.pdf. According to this website, State Department Foreign Service

employees in 1997 constituted approximately 35 percent of the total; the Civil Service, 22 percent of the total; and foreign

service nationals employed in administrative positions at missions overseas, approximately 43 percent of the total.
13

place for the employment of foreign nationals and understand the implications the consolidation

could have. This will require a thorough understanding of any restrictions that might exist in

dealing with foreign national employees. For the consolidation to succeed, it will require close

coordination with the appropriate labor union(s).

The State Department and U.S. AID have several options to consider in dealing with

personnel in redundant positions. One of the first things they should consider is if these

individuals can effectively be absorbed by the recommended ten to fifteen percent staff increase

to provide a training float. The Commission recommended such a float for both the Foreign

Service and the Civil Service. 16 If after this consideration there are still "excess" personnel,

then U.S. AID and the State Department should consider whether they can achieve an acceptable

staff profile in a reasonable amount of time through normal attrition or if more drastic measures

will be required. If early retirement or buyout incentives are employed, budgetary implications

will have to be considered. If this does become a reality, the consolidation should be planned

carefully to minimize the loss of employees with critical skills.

As consolidation plans evolve and the new organization takes shape, new positions may

be required and old positions may change enough to require new position descriptions and

reclassification. New positions or changing job requirements may require additional training for

employees to perform more effectively. Once the consolidated organization is designed and job

requirements are identified, the Department should conduct a skills/training gap analysis. The

results of this analysis can be used to tailor the training curriculum to meet the needs of the

Department. The Foreign Service implementation plan calls for a review and expansion of the

professional development opportunities offered to Foreign Service employees. The data from

this skills/training gap analysis could help determine what types of opportunities should be

provided.

5. Issues. The key challenge in implementing this recommendation will be to manage

the personnel redundancies that may result from the consolidation of U.S. AID functions in to

the Department of State, as described above. Another key consideration in preparing for the

consolidation is that of melding the core values and cultures of the two organizations. If

consolidation occurs, the organization will want to have a consistent "look and feel." A senior

team, with representatives from both organizations, should meet to define the core values for the

consolidated organization. This should be done well in advance of the actual consolidation and

the outcome communicated to employees. There should be a concerted effort to educate the

senior leaders in both organizations, if the core values are going to have meaning, and if the

consolidated organization is going to have a common culture, the behaviors will have to be

modeled from the very top levels of leadership on down. If employees do not see their leaders

embracing this change, then the chances are they will not either.

C. Emphasis on Strategic Planning

Recommendation 21: The Secretary of State should give greater emphasis to

strategic planning in the State Department and link it directly to the allocation of

resources through the establishment of a Strategic Planning, Assistance and Budget

Office.
14

1. Background. Currently the Department of State's policy, resource planning, and

budget functions are divided among three offices: Policy Planning (S/P), which conducts shortand medium-term planning; the office of Resources, Plans, and Policy (S/RPP), which oversees

the preparation of the Department's strategic plan and coordinates Department-wide program

planning and budget preparation; and the office of Finance and Management Policy (FMP),

which, among other functions, shares with S/RPP responsibility for preparation of the

International Affairs Budget. The Commission believes this division of functions reduces the

effectiveness of the Department in decision making, as it separates strategy and planning from

resources considerations.

The reorganization will facilitate further improvement of the planning and budget process

within the Department.17 The Department has developed a process based on the submission by

missions and bureaus of annual performance plans. The plans are presented to the Secretary of

State, refined accordingly, and used by S/RPP to develop the programmatic elements of the

International Affairs Budget, and by FMP to develop elements of the budget request that cover

State Department operations. Integrating S/RPP and those FMP functions relating to planning

and the international affairs budget will further rationalize the budget and planning process by

pulling together the consideration of programmatic and operational expenses and investments.

Consolidating strategy, planning, and budget functions in one office reporting to the

Secretary will also facilitate the adjudication of finite resources among competing priorities.

Currently, when programs compete for resources, it is up to the Under Secretaries of State, who

form the Department's Corporate Board, to resolve differences among bureaus—a process more

conducive to compromise than difficult decision making. By integrating the functions of

strategic planning, program planning, and budgeting into the Strategic Planning, Assistance and

Budget Office (SPAB), reporting directly to the Secretary, the Department will facilitate the

consideration of resource allocation in the context of the Department's policy goals and

priorities. Thus, under the Commission's proposed reorganization, the Strategic Planning,

Assistance and Budget Office would define the department's overall foreign policy goals and

priorities; plan and prioritize the department's assistance programs; oversee the budget planning

process; and adjudicate any differences among the Under Secretaries.

In a separate recommendation, the Commission has recommended instituting an

interagency strategic planning process guided by the President and coordinated by the National

Security Advisor.18 This process would result in a National Security Planning Guidance

(NSPG) that would guide Executive Branch Departments and Agencies involved in national

security policy in their internal planning and budgeting. In addition to describing steps to

establish the new Strategic Planning, Assistance and Budget Office, therefore, this blueprint

recommends steps for linking the State Department's strategic planning process to the new

National Security Planning Guidance.

 16 For more information on the concept of the training float, see the implementation plan for Commission's recommendation

for the Foreign Service.

17 The State Department's resource planning process is described in detail in the Addendum to the Commission's Report. See

Volume V "Organizational Description: Office of the Secretary of State."

18 See the National Security Council implementation plan for more information on the process for developing the National

Security Planning Guidance.
15

2. Implementation Blueprint. The following matrix describes notional steps to

establish the office of Strategic Planning, Assistance and Budget.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Draft departmental memorandum

establishing the authorities and

responsibilities of the Strategic

Planning, Assistance and Budget

Office

Office of the

Secretary of State

Within 60 days

2. Draft plan to disestablish the

offices of Policy Planning (S/P) and

Resources, Plans, and Policy

(S/RPP), and integrate the budget

planning functions of Office of

Finance and Management Policy

(FMP) into the new office as

appropriate

Office of the

Secretary of State,

Under Secretary for

Management (M)

In conjunction with above

3. Review planning process to

improve links to resource

management

New Office of

Strategic Planning,

Assistance, and

Budget, M, FMP

Within 120 days

4. Promulgate new strategic and

resource planning process

Secretary of State Within 130 days

5. Integrate new Strategic Planning,

Assistance and Budget Office into

State Department reorganization

plan

State Department,

U.S. AID working

group

Within 150 days

Table 4. Implementation Matrix for Strategic Planning, Assistance and Budget Office

Neither S/RPP, FMP, nor S/P are established by law, thus the Department will be able to

consolidate their functions through departmental action.19 As a first step, the Office of the

Secretary should define the specific roles and responsibilities of the Strategic Planning,

Assistance, and Budget Office. Concurrently, the Secretary's staff, in conjunction with staff

from S/RPP, FMP, and S/P would draft a plan for disestablishing S/RPP and S/P, and folding

personnel and duties from these offices and FMP into the new office as required. This action

should be taken within 60 days of the adoption of this recommendation. Because the Strategic

Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office will have to make difficult resource allocation

decisions, it will be desirable to ensure it is perceived across the Department as having a direct

reporting relationship to the Secretary of State. The Department may want to consider

announcing the establishment of the office through suitable means, such as a departmental

memorandum from the Secretary.

The new office should conduct a review of the State Department's strategy, policy, and

program planning process to strengthen its links to resources management. This action should be

taken within 120 days of the establishment of the new planning office. Among the issues to

 

19 The Department documents the duties of each office in the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). The appropriate sections of the

FAM addressing the organization and responsibilities of S/P, FMP, and S/RPP would have to be changed.
16

consider for improving the links between strategic and resources planning is the prioritization of

foreign policy goals.

The Department has undertaken commendable efforts to develop a process for relating

policy goals to programmatic objectives and budgetary requirements. This process relies on the

preparation by missions and bureaus of annual Performance Plans, which directly relate the

objectives and programs in the year ahead to the policy goals stated in the International Affairs

Strategic Plan.20 Without the ability to prioritize objectives across bureaus and missions,

however, the Department lacks a basis for directing the allocation of resources among and within

bureaus, or for guiding mid-course budgetary adjustments. One of the functions of the Strategic

Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office will be to support the Secretary in developing this list of

priorities. The priorities would be based on guidance provided by the President and would

inform the development of the International Affairs Strategic Plan (IASP), as well as of the

Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) and Bureau Performance Plans (BPPs).21 A notional

description of how this process could work for the State Department is in Section 3 (Process

Implications) below.

To the extent possible, the Strategic Planning, Assistance and Budget Office should also

consider options for coordinating its planning efforts with planning by other agencies, especially

the Department of Defense (DoD). For example, opportunities exist for contributing to DoD's

Operational Plans (OPLANs) and Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs).

Finally, the Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office should modify the current

process for developing the international affairs budget based on the reorganization of the bureaus

under regional Under Secretaries (Recommendation 19 described above.) This process review

should occur within 120 days.

Once the new process has been designed, the Secretary of State should promulgate the

new procedures to the Department within 130 days. Meanwhile, the State Department and U.S.

AID working group developing the State Department reorganization plan would integrate the

new Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office into their design within 150 days.

3. Process Implications. The reorganization of the State Department and the

development of top-down guidance from the President affect the State Department's planning

and budget process. First, the subordination of functional bureaus under regional Under

Secretaries and the Under Secretary for Global Affairs would require Bureau Performance Plans

to be integrated into broader documents produced by the staff of the Under Secretaries. The

current process is based on the production of Bureau Performance Plans, which justify planned

programs in terms of the foreign policy goals they fulfill and establish resource requirements for

programs. In a reorganized State Department, the regional Under Secretaries and the Under

Secretary for Global Affairs would be in the best position to produce performance plans that

 

20 For a more detailed description of the program planning process within the Department of State see the chapters on the

European Bureau and the Office of the Secretary of State, in Volume V of the Commission's Addendum on Structure and

Process Analyses to the Phase III report.

21 As envisioned by the Commission (see Recommendation 14 in Road Map), the President's guidance would be developed, in

a top-down process, within the National Security Council (NSC) and disseminated to Departments and Agencies by the NSC

principals. For more information on the format and content of the President's guidance and on the process for developing it,

see the National Security Council Implementation Plan.
17

integrate planned programs across a region, or in the case of the Under Secretary for Global

Affairs, integrate related functional programs. Figures 3 and 4 below show the difference.

Second, the development of top-down guidance from the President presents an

opportunity for injecting more specificity into the State Department's planning and budget

process. The President's national security planning guidance would form the basis for a

document, produced by the Secretary, that imparts specific policy direction to the Under

Secretaries, bureaus, and missions in preparing their performance plans, based on the President's

priorities. This document should compliment the IASP, but would be more detailed, classified if

necessary, and provide the prioritization the process now lacks.

Responsibility for developing the Department's detailed guidance based on the President's

priorities would reside with the new office of Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget, which

would obtain direction and supervision directly from the Secretary. This International Affairs

Planning Guidance would be reviewed and approved by the Secretary of State. The bureaus and

missions would then use the detailed guidance, together with the IASP, to draft the BPPs and

MPPs. The staff of the Under Secretaries would then integrate the BPPs into Integrated

Performance Plans (IPPs).

Figure 3. Planning Process before Reorganization

Sec State

S/RPP

Bureaus

Missions

BPPs

MPPs

International

Affairs Budget

Review BPPs

Under Secretaries

Review and

develop issues

Review BPPs

IASP
18

Figure 4. Planning Process after Reorganization

The Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office would review the IPPs and

develop a list of questions and issues to be considered by the Secretary during his review. The

Under Secretaries would then present their IPPs to the Secretary of State and modify them as

appropriate. Finally, the Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office would utilize the

modified IPPs to produce the International Affairs Budget request with the assistance of the

Office of Management and Budget. This notional process is illustrated in Figure 5. (Also see

Appendix C for a more detailed process map.)

Sec State

Strategic Planning,

Assistance and

Budget Office

Bureaus

Missions

BPPs

MPPs

International

Affairs

Budget

Review BPPs

Under Secretaries

Review and

develop issues

IPPS

IASP
19

Figure 5. DoS Planning Process Tied to the NSC

One downside of this enhanced process is that it creates an additional layer of review and

additional work in the form of the IPP. However, in its redesign of the planning process, the

Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office could address this problem by streamlining the

format for BPPs, MPPs, and IPPs. In theory, the process itself would become less cumbersome

with each year, as missions, bureaus, and Under Secretaries modify the existing three plans.

4. Personnel Implications. The personnel implications of this recommendation are

minimal. Most of the staff for the new office of Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget may

be drawn from the existing S/RPP, FMP, and S/P offices. Few redundancies are likely to result,

as many of the S/P staff are detailed Schedule C personnel or detailed from elsewhere in the

Department.22 Training requirements for personnel may also be minimal, since they are

performing complementary functions in their current offices.

5. Issues. Before integrating the current planning and budgeting processes, a thorough

understanding of the processes must exist. Additionally, efficiencies, handoffs, and

improvements must be identified before structuring the new process.

As for Recommendation 19, the major challenge in implementing this recommendation

will be the perception on the part of Department staff that the functions of the Strategic Planning,

Assistance, and Budget Office detract from the responsibilities and authorities of existing offices.

If the planning process is modified along the lines suggested above, the perception may also arise

 

22 See Chapter 6, entitled "Director of Policy Planning," in Volume V of the Addendum on Structure and Process Analyses to

the Commission's Road Map report.

Sec State

SPAB*

Bureaus

Missions

BPPs

MPPs

IAPG

(draft) Issue 

papers

International

Affairs

Budget

Review IPPs

*Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office

**International Affairs Planning Guidance: classified, if need be, more detailed than IASP, prioritized, and

based on the President’s National Security Planning Guidance.

Under Secretaries IPPs

NSC

National Security

Planning Guidance

IASP IAPG**

(final)
20

that an additional layer of work has been added to an already overburdened staff. These issues

are explored in more detail in Section III of this paper.

D. Integration of Foreign Operations and State Department Budget Requests

1. Background. The bulk of appropriations for State Department and U.S. international

affairs activities are made by four subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations

Committees in Congress: the Senate Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary Subcommittee,

the House Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary Subcommittee, the Senate Foreign

Operations Subcommittee and the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee.23 These four

committees share responsibility for appropriating the majority of funds supporting U.S.

diplomatic and international activities. More specifically, the Subcommittees on Commerce,

Justice, State and the Judiciary appropriate funds for the Department of State's operations,

covering items such as human resources, infrastructure, and diplomatic security, and U.S.

contributions to international organizations. The Subcommittees on Foreign Operations fund

U.S. foreign programs by appropriating funds for items such as development and security

assistance, migration and refugee assistance, peacekeeping operations, foreign military

financing, and international military education and training. The Subcommittees on Foreign

Operations also have jurisdiction over U.S. AID.

The organization of the Congressional committees of jurisdiction determines the

presentation of the International Affairs Budget (Function 150 of the President's Budget), which

is organized into two major sections, one showing items for consideration by the Foreign

Operations Subcommittees, and the other showing items for the Commerce, Justice, State, and

Judiciary Subcommittees. In essence, the current division of labor among subcommittees creates

an artificial division between international affairs programs meant to further U.S. goals and the

people and infrastructure that support those programs. This separation hinders the ability of the

Department to present a convincing case to Congress.

Just as the Commission believes there is value in better integrating various elements of

U.S. foreign policy by reorganizing the State Department, there will be value in integrating the

review of the State Department budget by evaluating programs and the support infrastructure for

those programs together. Specifically, this reform would allow the Administration to present its

request for specific programs in light of the President's overall strategic goals. It will also ensure

that the various assistance programs are integrated, rather than simply a collection of

Administrations' political commitments and Congressional earmarks. Finally, it will give the

Administration an opportunity to replace the existing budget categories with different titles to

 

23 Some appropriations for U.S. international affairs activities, for example for the U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service, are made

by the Senate and House Subcommittees on Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies; others, such for the

activities of the U.S. Institute of Peace, are made by the Senate and House Subcommittees on Labor, Health and Human

Services, and Education.

Recommendation 22: The President should ask Congress to appropriate funds to

the State Department in a single integrated Foreign Operations budget, which

would include all the foreign assistance programs and activities as well as all the

expenses for personnel and operations.
21

better reflect the purpose of a program. To this end, the Commission recommends that Congress

consider appropriating funds for the State Department into a single appropriation.

2. Implementation Blueprint. Should Congress decide to accept this recommendation,

the matrix in Table 5 below suggests some notional steps to follow.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Senate leadership and House

leadership appoint separate panels to

make recommendations for

transferring all jurisdiction for State

Department appropriations to

Foreign Operations appropriations

subcommittees

Senate and House

Leadership

Within 60 days

2. Panels report recommendations

for reorganization to Senate and

House leadership

Congressional panels Within 90 days

3. Senate and House leadership

consult on panels' recommendations

and reconcile differences as

appropriate

Senate and House

leadership

Within 120 days

4. Senate and House pass resolutions

reorganizing appropriations

committees

Senate and House At start of next Congress

Table 5. Implementation Matrix for "Right-Sizing" Embassies

Should the Senate and House decide to reorganize the appropriations subcommittees,

each might choose to appoint Congressional panels to review the implications of transferring all

responsibility and jurisdiction for international affairs appropriations to the Foreign Operations

Appropriations Subcommittees of the Senate and House. This would not entail abolishing any

subcommittees, as the Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary Subcommittees of both

chambers would continue to discharge their responsibilities with respect to appropriations for the

Commerce Department, the Justice Department, and the Judiciary. Similarly, the Labor, Health

and Human Services, and Education Subcommittees and the Agriculture Subcommittees would

only relinquish a limited amount of oversight, as the amounts of international affairs funding

they oversee is small in comparison to the budgets of the other agencies for which they are

responsible. The panels would also review implications of the reorganization for the staff

requirements of the Foreign Operations Subcommittees once they acquire responsibility for

additional appropriations.

The panels might report their conclusions and recommendations independently to the

leadership of the Senate and House. The Senate and House leadership would then consult

regarding each other's planned reorganization to ensure that they are consistent with each other.

Finally, each chamber would submit and pass a resolution formalizing the new organization of

the Appropriations Subcommittees at the beginning of the next Congress.

3. Process Implications. While opportunities for process improvement may exist, no

significant process implications were identified.
22

4. Personnel Implications. The personnel implications of this recommendation are

likely to be minimal. While the Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary Appropriations

Subcommittees may lose some staff, the Foreign Operations Subcommittees are likely to acquire

additional staff to reflect their increased responsibilities. The net effect of the reorganization on

personnel may be null.

5. Issues. The jurisdiction of Committees reflects to some extent political

considerations as well as tradition. Changing responsibilities of some Committees may affect the

specific interests of Senators and Members and, as a result, this recommendation may prompt

significant changes in membership not only on the appropriations subcommittees, but also

through other committees. For this reason, it may be most appropriate to implement the

recommendation in conjunction with a new Congress.

E. Ambassadorial Appointments

1. Background. U.S. Ambassadors represent U.S. interests from embassies in 160

foreign countries, and from a number of missions to international organizations. Increasingly,

Ambassadors preside over embassy and mission staffs representing a number of different U.S.

government agencies.24 As a result, a key challenge for Ambassadors is to manage the

embassies' and missions' varying activities in an integrated fashion, planning and coordinating

the programs of all agencies represented among their staffs, including assistance and law

enforcement activities. The Commission therefore believes that Ambassadorial appointees

should be selected among candidates with strong leadership and management skills. To this end,

the Commission supports appointing an independent, bipartisan panel to advise the Secretary in

evaluating career and non-career candidates for Ambassadorial positions.

2. Implementation Blueprint. The matrix in Table 6 below suggests some notional

steps for establishing the Ambassadorial appointments review panel.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Establish operating parameters for

panel

Secretary of State Within 6 months

2. Request Congressional funding

for panel

White House FY 03 budget

3. Solicit names of panel members White House, State

Department,

Congress

Within 18 months

Table 6. Implementation Matrix for Ambassadorial Appointments

 

24 Currently, more than 30 federal agencies maintain a presence abroad.

Recommendation 23: The President should ensure that Ambassadors have the requisite

area knowledge as well as leadership and management skills to function effectively. He

should therefore appoint an independent, bipartisan advisory panel to the Secretary of State

to vet ambassadorial appointees, career and non-career alike.
23

The first step might be for the Secretary of State to establish the parameters for the

independent review panel, including the number of members the panel should have; whether it

should have support staff and a support infrastructure and where these would be located; the

general procedures for reviewing Ambassadorial appointments; and the general procedures for

reporting to the Secretary. If the Secretary determines that funding will be required to sustain the

panel, his staff would have to ensure that the International Affairs budget request includes the

necessary resources. The Secretary might then solicit names for prospective panel members

from the State Department, the White House, and Congress.

3. Process Implications. While opportunities for process improvement may exist, no

significant process implications were identified.

4. Personnel Implications. This recommendation does not have substantial personnel

recommendations. A small staff might be required to support the panel, for example in

organizing the panel's formal discussions. Personnel requirements, however, are likely to be

minimal.

5. Issues. No significant issues were identified.

F. Embassy Operations

1. Background. The Commission endorses the recommendation of the Overseas

Presence Advisory Panel to "right-size" (i.e., establish the correct size and sites) for U.S.

embassies.25 The Department of State has already begun this process. The Commission urges

the Department to complete the process and in so doing, reorganize the embassies and missions

to reflect the recommended reorganization of the State Department bureaus.

 

25 U.S. Department of State, America's Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory

Panel, November 1999. The Panel concluded that right sizing would result in staff reductions of ten percent for all agencies

represented abroad, with a total savings of $380 million per year.

The Secretary of State should lead a process of "right-sizing" all American posts

overseas. The process must ensure that embassy activities are responsive to the

emerging challenges and encourage greater flexibility in the size and concept of

embassies and consulates to serve specialized needs.

Embassies should be reorganized into sections reflecting the new State Department

organization: political, security, and economic/transnational affairs.
24

2. Implementation Blueprint. The matrix in Table 7 below suggests a notional process

to carry out the Commission's recommendation.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Secretary of State to direct review

of ongoing efforts to "right-size"

embassies and preparation of a plan

detailing efforts to date and the way

ahead

Secretary of State Within 18 months

2. Secretary of State should

promulgate a policy for reorganizing

U.S. missions according to new

organization of Department of State

Secretary of State Following approval of

legislation redefining the roles

and responsibilities of the

Under Secretaries of State

Table 7. Implementation Issues and Approaches

If such information is not readily available, the Secretary could request an update on the

"right-sizing" initiative. Based on this update, efforts could then be directed to complete the

"right-sizing" process. The Secretary of State should also consider promulgating a policy for

reorganizing U.S. embassies and missions according to the new organization of the Department.

3. Process Implications. While opportunities for process improvement exist, no

significant process implications were identified.

4. Personnel Implications. The process of right sizing embassies may yield some

personnel redundancies. The impact of right-sizing can be minimized by absorbing redundant

personnel in the training float recommended by the Commission for the Foreign Service and

Civil Service (Recommendations 41 and 42).26 This would also obviate the need to increase

budgets to make up for the additional personnel required to sustain a 15 percent personnel float.

5. Issues. No significant issues were identified.

G. Interagency Regional Coordination

The President should establish NSC policy coordination committees for each major region,

chaired by the respective regional Under Secretary of State, to develop regional strategies

and coordinated government-wide plans for their implementation.

The President should direct the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the regional

Commanders-in-Chief incorporate nonmilitary considerations into their planning, and that

they rely on their political advisers to ensure close links with the Ambassadors in the

region.

The President should ask the Secretary of State to instruct the regional Under Secretaries

to meet at least semi-annually with the ambassadors located in their region (with one such

meeting each year being held in the same general location as the regional CINCs.)
25

1. Background. The Commission believes the security environment of the 21st century

will be marked increasingly by transnational challenges and regional responses. Problems such

as movements of refugees, ethnic violence, the spread of deadly disease, and environmental

disasters tend to overflow national boundaries. Responses, also, take on a multinational

character, as intervention often requires securing access rights from several neighboring

countries, and as regional or international organizations step in to contain or resolve the problem.

Today, the United States is not optimally organized to address regional problems through

regional approaches. U.S. diplomatic activity revolves around embassies and missions

accredited to individual states or organizations and no mechanism exists to prompt them to

coordinate their activities regionally. The unified military commands are organized regionally,

but their primary focus is on military contingencies. In addition, although Commanders-in-Chief

(CINCs) have Political Advisers from the Department of State, there is no process for ensuring

input from the civilian agencies into military planning. The Commission believes this situation

creates a gap between the CINC and the Ambassador, who often will be carrying out

complementary parts of policy.

To remedy this problem, the Commission recommends that the President direct the

agencies responsible for implementing national security policy to cooperate in regional planning.

To support such interagency coordination, the President should:

• Establish within the NSC structure policy coordination committees for each region, to

be headed by the regional Under Secretaries of State. These committees would

develop regional strategies and coordinate government-wide plans for their

implementation.27

• Direct the Secretary of Defense to have regional CINCs institute a process through

their Political Advisers to involve the Ambassadors in their region in their military

planning.

• Direct the Secretary of State to instruct the regional Under Secretaries to meet at least

semi-annually with the ambassadors located in their region (with one such meeting

each year being held in the same location as the regional CINCs.)

2. Implementation Blueprint. All of the above recommendations can be implemented

by Presidential directive and none require legislation or intermediary steps.

3. Process Implications. While opportunities for business process improvement may

exist, no significant process implications were identified.

4. Personnel Implications. No significant personnel implications arise from the above

recommendations.

5. Issues. No significant issues were identified.

 26 See the implementation plan for the Commission's recommendations for the Foreign Service for greater detail on the

training float concept.

27 The current Administration released National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1, "Organization of the National

Security Council System," which replaces Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) with six regional and 11 functional "Policy

Coordination Committees." See Appendix D for the text of NSPD-1.
26

III.ISSUES, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES

A. Establishment of Regional Under Secretaries

The Commission's recommendation for reorganizing the Department of State by

establishing five regional Under Secretaries and one Under Secretary for Global Affairs to which

functional bureaus will report may encounter resistance within the Department. Currently, State

Department bureaus are empowered to report directly to the Secretary of State for the regions

and functional issues for which they are responsible. Under the reorganization, therefore, the

bureaus may perceive a loss of authority and flexibility.

The reorganization may be challenged also on the basis that the enhanced authority of the

regional Under Secretaries inherent in this recommendation adds an extra layer of review, which

some may argue will slow down the decision making process. This problem may not

materialize, however, if the Under Secretaries focus on integration and management, leaving to

the bureaus the bulk of the responsibility for providing functional or regional policy expertise

and relying on them accordingly. To maintain this division of labor, it is key that those

appointed to Under Secretary of State positions be selected on the basis of their management

skills as well as regional expertise.

B. Consolidation of U.S. AID into the State Department

The consolidation of U.S. AID functions into the State Department presents a challenge

in that it is likely to result in some personnel redundancies. Some redundancies may occur

among foreign nationals currently employed by each agency, others among Foreign Service and

Civil Service employees. U.S. AID and the State Department will need to understand what kinds

of contracts or agreements are in place for the employment of foreign nationals and understand

the implications the consolidation could have. This will require a thorough understanding of any

restrictions that might exist in dealing with foreign national employees. For the consolidation to

succeed, it will require close coordination with the union(s).

The State Department and U.S. AID have several options to consider in dealing with

personnel in redundant positions. One of the first things they should consider is if these

individuals can effectively be absorbed by the recommended ten to fifteen percent staff increase

to provide a training float. The Commission recommended such a float for both the Foreign

Service and the Civil Service. If after this consideration there are still "excess" personnel then

U.S. AID and the State Department should consider whether they can achieve an acceptable staff

profile in a reasonable amount of time through normal attrition or if additional measures will be

required. If early retirement or buyout incentives are employed they will need to consider the

budgetary implications. If this does become a reality it should be planned carefully to minimize

the loss of the employees with critical skills.

C. Emphasize Strategic Planning

This recommendation may also generate opposition on the basis that it requires an

additional layer of review that could slow down decision making. The recommendation gives

enhanced responsibility to the Under Secretaries for the preparation of the International Affairs

Budget. Once bureaus are recast as functional and subordinate to regional Under Secretaries, the

Under Secretaries would be best placed to produce performance plans that integrate planned
27

programs across a region, or in the case of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, that integrate

related functional programs. As a result, the reorganization may lead to a perception that it

creates additional work in the planning process.

While the enhanced planning process requires additional layers of review, it may prove

less cumbersome if the format for MPPs, BPPs, and the integrated plans to be produced by the

Under Secretaries' staffs is streamlined. Over the years, as well, this problem may take care of

itself, as continuity in policy allows missions, bureaus, and Under Secretaries' staff to modify

existing performance plans rather than creating entirely new documents.

D. Summary Table

Table 8 below summarizes key issues identified in this implementation plan and the

related approaches for addressing each challenge.

Issue Approach

1. Reorganization of State Department may

slow down decision making by adding

additional layer of review

Emphasize the management and integration

aspects of the Under Secretary positions.

2. Integration of U.S. AID functions into

Department of State may result in Foreign

Service, Civil Service, and Foreign National

personnel redundancies

Explore potential for absorbing excess

personnel by instituting a "training float" of ten

to 15 percent.

Review agreements in place with respect of

Foreign National personnel.

Work with unions to address problems early

on.

3. Enhanced strategic planning coupled with

reorganization will require an additional layer

of program planning by Under Secretaries

Streamline performance plans formats further.

Table 8. Issues and Approaches
28

IV. IMPLEMENTATION MEANS

Recommendations for reorganizing the Department of State and consolidating U.S. AID

into the Department depend on the introduction and passage of legislation. The recommendation

for establishing regional Policy Coordination Committee can be realized through the

promulgation of a Presidential national security directive.

A. Legislative Changes

Since the Commission's recommendations on the Department of State and U.S. AID are

to be implemented together, one bill should address both elements. The legislation should

provide enough direction to the Secretary to reorganize the Department as envisioned by the

Commission's recommendations, while giving the Secretary enough flexibility to determine how

best to effect this reorganization. Draft legislation implementing the Commission's

recommendations is at Appendix B.

1. Reorganization of the Department of State. To realize the Commission's

recommendations, legislation would have to repeal existing limits on the number of Under

Secretaries. The U.S. code limits the number of Under Secretary positions within the

Department of State to six and of Assistant Secretary positions to 24. The reorganization of the

Department of State along the lines of five regional Under Secretaries and an Under Secretary

for Global Affairs will require increasing the total number of Under Secretaries within the

Department to seven, necessitating a repeal of the current limit.28 The number of Assistant

Secretaries would increase by one, necessitating an increase in the current limit.29

The legislation would also have to repeal eight statutory positions:

• The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs;

• The Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security;

• The Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor;

• The Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs;

• The Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance;

• The Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International and Scientific Affairs;

• The Special Coordinator for Counter Terrorism; and

• The Special Coordinator for Water Policy Negotiations and Water Resources Policy.

Some of the functions of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

could be folded into the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Transnational Affairs, while

others could be executed by an office of Public Affairs reporting directly to the Secretary.30 The

 

28 There will continue to be an Under Secretary for Management, whose functions will not change substantively. 

29 The Commission's recommended reorganization will require a total of 18 Assistant Secretaries reporting to the five regional

Under Secretaries and the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. Four Assistant Secretaries currently report to the Under

Secretary for Management and the reorganization will not affect their functions significantly, although some of the planning

and budgeting functions of FMP will transfer to the new office of Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget. The

Commission envisions the bureaus of Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and Intelligence and Research will be headed by

Assistant Secretaries, requiring and increase in the total number of Assistant Secretaries to 25.

30 The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was established by the Foreign Affairs Reform and

Restructuring Act of 1998, which integrated USIA into the Department of State. This position consequently discharges
29

functions of Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security and of the Assistant

Secretary for Verification and Compliance will be transferred to the Assistant Secretaries for

security under each new Under Secretary. The functions of the regional Assistant Secretaries

would transfer to the Assistant Secretaries under the Regional Under Secretaries. The functions

of the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, the Assistant Secretary for

Oceans and International and Scientific Affairs, and the Special Coordinator for Counter

Terrorism would transfer to the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. In addition, the Assistant

Secretaries for Economic and Transnational Affairs under each regional Under Secretary would

follow those issues as appropriate. Under the State Department reorganization envisioned by the

Commission, no Special Coordinators should be required, as the Under Secretary for Global

Affairs and the Assistant Secretaries reporting to that office would handle any non-region

specific issue.

2. U.S. AID Integration. To implement the Commission's recommendations,

legislation would have to disestablish U.S. AID as an independent agency and transfer its foreign

assistance functions to the Secretary of State. The legislation would also have to ensure the

transfer to the Department of State those U.S. AID personnel associated with the functions being

absorbed by the Department of State. In addition, the legislation would have to require the

appropriate disposition of U.S. AID assets. The legislation would also ensure the transfer of all

unexpended U.S. AID appropriations to the Department of State. Following the enactment of

this legislation, the President would amend Executive Order 13118, which implemented the

provisions of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act that established U.S. AID as an

independent agency, through the issuance of another Executive Order, in accordance with the

enacted legislation.

3. Requirement for a Report to Congress. The legislation would grant the Secretary

of State authority for carrying out the reorganization and would require the Secretary to submit a

detailed plan to Congress explaining how the reorganization would be carried out. This plan

would detail the specific transfer of functions that would occur in the Department to enable the

absorption of U.S. AID and the establishment of the regional Under Secretaries, the Under

Secretary for Global Affairs, and the Assistant Secretaries for Political Affairs, Economic and

Transnational Affairs, and Security Affairs. The legislation would specify a date by which the

organization plan must be reported to Congress. Figure 6 summarizes what must be considered

and accomplished in order to implement the new legislation.

 certain functions formerly carried out by USIA, such as cultural and educational exchanges that might be absorbed by the

functional bureaus under the regional Under Secretaries.
30

Reorganization of Department of State

• Repeal requirement for Under Secretary for Arms Control and International

Security

• Repeal requirements for Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy

• Repeal requirement for Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and

Labor

• Repeal requirement for Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs

• Repeal requirement for Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and

Compliance

• Repeal requirement for Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International and

Scientific Affairs

• Repeal requirement for Coordinator for Counter Terrorism

• Repeal requirement for Special Coordinator for Water Policy Negotiations and

Water Resources Policy

• Increase number of Under Secretaries allowed in the Department to seven

• Establish the authorities of Under Secretaries for Africa, Europe, InterAmerican Affairs, Near East and South Asia, and Asia

• Establish the authorities of six Assistant Secretaries for Political Affairs, six

Assistant Secretaries for Economic and Transnational Affairs, and six Assistant

Secretaries for Security Affairs and increase the number of Assistant Secretaries

to 25

Abolishment of U.S. AID

• Repeal the establishment of U.S. AID as an independent agency

• Transfer the functions of U.S. AID to the Department of State

• Transfer associated U.S. AID personnel to the Department of State

• Enable the disposition of U.S. AID assets, the transfer of unspent appropriations

to the Department of State

Reorganization Plan and Report to Congress

Figure 6. Basic Elements of Implementing Legislation

4. Committees of Jurisdiction. Committees of jurisdiction for legislation affecting the

Department of State and U.S. AID are the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House

International Relations Committee, the Senate Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary

Appropriations Subcommittee, the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, the

House Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary Appropriations Subcommittee, and the House

Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee.

B. Presidential Directives

The Commission's recommendation for establishing policy coordination committees for

each major region of the world, chaired by the respective regional Under Secretary of State, has

been implemented by issuance of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1, which is

included at Appendix D.
31

V. PERSONNEL IMPLICATIONS

The only major personnel implications identified in this implementation plan are from the

consolidation of U.S. AID into the Department of State. Approximately 6,000 Foreign Service,

Civil Service, and foreign national personnel staff U.S. AID. After personnel associated with

U.S. AID functions are transferred to the Department of State, it is possible that some personnel

redundancies will result.

The State Department and U.S. AID have several options for dealing with personnel in

redundant positions. First, they should consider whether excess personnel could effectively be

absorbed by the ten to fifteen percent staff increase recommended by the Commission to

establish a training float in the Foreign Service and Civil Service. The State Department and

U.S. AID could also evaluate the effects of normal attrition, to determine whether this may help

achieve a more acceptable staff profile. Alternatively, the State Department and U.S. AID would

have to consider more early retirement or buyout incentives, evaluating the budgetary

implications of these steps and taking appropriate steps to obtain the necessary resources.

Should this option be necessary, it should be planned carefully to minimize the loss of the

employees with critical skills.

U.S. AID and the State Department will also need to understand what kinds of contracts

or agreements are in place for the employment of foreign nationals and understand the

implications the consolidation could have. This will require a thorough understanding of any

restrictions that might exist in dealing with foreign national employees. For the consolidation to

succeed, it will require close coordination with the appropriate labor union(s).

As consolidation plans evolve and the new organization takes shape, new positions may

be required and old positions may change enough to require new position descriptions and

reclassification. New positions or changing job requirements may require additional training for

employees to reach anticipated performance levels. Once the consolidated organization is

designed and job requirements are identified, the Department should conduct a skills/training gap

analysis. The results of this analysis can be used to tailor the training curriculum to meet the

needs of the Department. The Foreign Service implementation plan calls for a review and

expansion of the professional development opportunities offered to Foreign Service employees.

The data from this skills/training gap analysis could help determine what types of opportunities

should be provided.
VI. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:

IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINT MATRIX
1-A

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Department of State

Recommendation Action Responsibility Im

The President should propose toCongress a plan to reorganize theState Department, creating fiveUnder Secretaries, withresponsibility for overseeing theregions of Africa, Europe, InterAmerica, and Near East/South Asia,and redefining the responsibilities ofthe Under Secretary for GlobalAffairs. These new UnderSecretaries would operate inconjunction with the existing UnderSecretary for Management.

Task State Department to draftplan for reorganization

Secretary of State Within 

Review statutory requirements forUnder Secretary positions

State Department Within 

Review statutory requirements forAssistant Secretary positions

State Department Concu

Draft plan for reassigningresponsibilities of UnderSecretaries and AssistantSecretaries

State Department Within 

Integrate State Departmentreorganization and AID'sconsolidation plan and submit toPresident

State Department and AID Within 

Formulate strategy for presentingplan to Congress

White House, StateDepartment, AID

Within 

Hold consultations with Congressand modify as appropriate

White House, StateDepartment, and AID

Within 
2-A

Recommendation Action Responsibility Im

Present modified legislativeproposal to Congress or consultwith committees of jurisdictionand request legislative changes

White House, StateDepartment, and AID

Within 

The President should propose to theCongress that the U.S. Agency forInternational Development beconsolidated into the StateDepartment.

President to task StateDepartment and AID to draft planfor incorporating AID functionsinto the Department of State

White House Within 

with adfor reoDepart

State Department and AID toform working group to studystatutory implications ofrecommendation

Secretary of State Within 

Working group to draft planconsolidating AID functions intothe Department of State

State Department and AIDworking group

Within with plresponSecretSecret

Integrate State Departmentreorganization and AID'sconsolidation plan and submit toPresident

State Department and AIDworking group

Within 

Formulate strategy for presentingplan to Congress

White House, StateDepartment, and AID

Within 

Hold consultations with Congressand modify as appropriate

White House, StateDepartment, and AID

Within 

Present legislative proposal forState Department reorganizationand AID integration to Congress

White House Within 
3-A

Recommendation Action Responsibility Im

The Secretary of State should givegreater emphasis to strategicplanning in the State Departmentand link it directly to the allocation ofresources through the establishmentof a Strategic Planning, Assistanceand Budget office.

Draft interdepartmentalmemorandum establishing theauthorities and responsibilities ofthe office of Strategic Planning,Assistance, and Budget.

Office of Secretary of State (S) Within 

Draft plan to disestablish theoffices of Policy Planning (S/P)and Resources, Plans, and Policy(S/RPP), and itnegrate thebudget planning functions of theOffice of Finance, Management,and Planning into the new officeas appropriate.

S, Under Secretary forManagement (M)

In conj

Review strategic planningprocess to improve links toresource management.

New Office of StrategicPlanning, Assistance, andBudget, M, Office of Financeand Management Policy(FMP)

Within 

Promulgate policy on strategicplanning

Secretary of State Within 

Integrate new Strategic Planning,Assistance, and Budget Officeinto State Departmentreorganization plan

State Department and AIDworking group

Within 
4-A

Recommendation Action Responsibility Im

The President should ask Congressto appropriate funds to the StateDepartment in a single integratedForeign Operations budget, whichwould include all the foreignassistance programs and activitiesas well as all the expenses forpersonnel and operations.

The President Within 

Senate leadership and HouseLeadership appoint separatepanels to make recommendationsfor transferring all jurisdiction forState Department appropriationsto Foreign OperationsSubcommittees

Senate and House leadership Within 

Panels report recommendationsfor reorganization to Senate andHouse leadership

Congressional panels Within 

Senate and House leadershipconsult to reconcile differences

Senate and House leadership Within 

Senate and House passresolutions reorganizingcommittees as appropriate

Senate and House At star

The President should ensure thatAmbassadors have the requisitearea knowledge as well asleadership and management skills tofunction effectively. He shouldappoint an independent advisorypanel to the Secretary of State to vetambassadorial appointees, careerand non-career.

Establish operating parametersfor panel

Secretary of State Within 
5-A

Recommendation Action Responsibility Im

Request Congressional fundingfor panel

White House FY 03 

Solicit names of panel members White House, State

Department, Congress

Within 

The Secretary of State should lead aprocess of "right-sizing" all Americanposts overseas. The process mustensure that embassy activities areresponsive to the emergingchallenges and encourage greaterflexibility in the size and concept ofembassies and consulates to servespecialized needs.

Secretary of State to direct reviewof ongoing efforts to "rightsize"embassies, and preparation of aplan detailing efforts to date andthe way ahead.

Secretary of State (S) Within 

Secretary of State to promulgatepolicy for reorganizing U.S.missions according to neworganization of Department ofState

Secretary of State Follow

legislareorga

The President should establish NSCinteragency working groups for eachmajor region, chaired by therespective regional Under Secretaryof State, to develop regionalstrategies and coordinatedgovernment-wide plans for theirimplementation.

President to issue PresidentialDecision Directive establishingregional policy coordinationcommittees chaired by StateUnder Secretaries.

The President, NSC staff Within 

The President should direct theSecretary of Defense to ensure thatthe regional CINCs incorporatenonmilitary considerations into theirplanning, and that they rely on theirpolitical advisers to ensure closelinks with the Ambassadors in theregion.

The President Within 
6-A

Recommendation Action Responsibility Im

The President should ask theSecretary to State to instruct theregional Under Secretaries to meetat least semi-annually with theambassadors located in their region(with one such meeting each yearbeing held in the same generallocation as the regional CINCs).

The President Within 
APPENDIX B:

DRAFT LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE
1-B

DRAFT LEGISLATION

PROPOSED FINAL BILL

A BILL

To enhance achievement of the nation's foreign policy goals by consolidating, reinvigorating,

and strengthening the foreign assistance functions of the United States within the Department of

State.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE REORGANIZATION

 TITLE I--GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the __________ Act of 2001/2002.

SEC. 102. PURPOSES.

The purposes of this reorganization are--

(1) to clearly establish and increase responsibility and accountability within the offices of

the Department of State

(2) to closely integrate regional and functional activities, minimizing competing policy

views within the State Department

(3) to strengthen--

(A) the coordination of United States foreign policy; and

(B) the leading role of the Secretary of State in the formulation and articulation of

United States foreign policy;

(4) to consolidate and reinvigorate the foreign assistance functions of the United States

within the Department of State by--

(A) abolishing the United States Agency for International Development, and

transferring the functions of this agency to the Department of State while preserving

the special missions and skills of this agency;

(B) providing for the reorganization of the Department of State to maximize the

efficient use of resources, which may lead to budget savings, eliminated redundancy

in functions, and improvement in the management of the Department of State;

(5) to ensure that programs critical to the promotion of United States national interests be

maintained;

(6) to allow for an increase in State Department resources necessary to carry out the

nation's foreign policy.
2-B

SEC. 103. DEFINITIONS.

(1) AID- The term `AID' means the United States Agency for International Development.

(2) AGENCY; FEDERAL AGENCY- The term `agency' or `Federal agency' means an

Executive agency as defined in Section 105 of title 5, United States Code.

(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- The term `appropriate

congressional committees' means the Committee on International Relations and the

Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on

Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(4) COVERED AGENCY- The term `covered agency' means the following agency: AID.

(5) DEPARTMENT- The term `Department' means the Department of State.

(6) FUNCTION- The term `function' means any duty, obligation, power, authority,

responsibility, right, privilege, activity, or program.

(7) OFFICE- The term `office' includes any office, administration, agency, institute, unit,

organizational entity, or component thereof.

(8) SECRETARY- The term `Secretary' means the Secretary of State.

TITLE II—UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CHAPTER 1—GENERAL PROVISIONS.

SEC. 201. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This title, and the amendments made by this title, shall take effect on the earlier of—

(1) [Month, Day, Year;] or

(2) the date of reorganization of the United States Department of State pursuant to the

reorganization plan described in Section 401.

CHAPTER 2—ABOLITION AND TRANSFER OF POSITIONS AND FUNCTIONS

SEC. 202. ABOLITION OF POSITIONS.

The Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security is abolished.

The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is abolished.

The Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Labor, and Human Rights is abolished.

The Coordinator for Counterterrorism is abolished.

The Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs is abolished.
3-B

The Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance is abolished.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International, Environmental, and Scientific

Affairs is abolished.

The Special Coordinator for Water Policy Negotiations and Water Resources Policy is

abolished.

SEC. 203. ESTABLISHMENT OF POSITIONS.

The regional Under Secretaries of Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter-America, and Near East/South

Asia are now established.

Assistant Secretaries for the bureaus of Political Affairs, Security Affairs, and Economic and

Transnational Affairs under each regional Under Secretary and the Under Secretary for

Global Affairs are now established.

In accordance with this Act, seven Under Secretaries for the Department of State are now

established:

Five Regional Under Secretaries;

one Under Secretary for Global Affairs;

and one Under Secretary for Management.

In accordance with this Act, twenty-five Assistant Secretaries for the Department of State are

now established:

Eighteen Assistant Secretaries under the regional Under Secretaries and the Under

Secretary for Global Affairs, four Assistant Secretaries under the Bureau of Management,

and three Assistant Secretaries for Legislative Affairs, Intelligence and Research, and

Public Affairs.

SEC. 204. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

There are transferred all functions of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International

Security, and any office or statute, reorganization plan, Executive Order, or other provision

of law to the Assistant Secretaries the Secretary of State deems appropriate.

There are transferred all functions of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public

Affairs, and any office or statute, reorganization plan, Executive Order, or other provision of

law to the Assistant Secretary (-level) reporting directly to the Secretary of State.

There are transferred all functions of the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Labor, and

Human Rights, and any office or statute, reorganization plan, Executive Order, or other

provision of law to the Assistant Secretaries of the Economic and Transnational Affairs

bureaus under each regional Under Secretary (or to the Under Secretary of Global Affairs).

There are transferred all functions of the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs,

and any office or statute, reorganization plan, Executive Order, or other provision of law to

the Assistant Secretaries the Secretary of State deems appropriate.
4-B

There are transferred all functions of the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and

Compliance, and any office or statute, reorganization plan, Executive Order, or other

provision of law to the Assistant Secretaries the Secretary of State deems appropriate.

There are transferred all functions of the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and

International, Environmental, and Scientific Affairs, and any office or statute, reorganization

plan, Executive Order, or other provision of law to the Assistant Secretaries the Secretary of

State deems appropriate.

There are transferred all functions of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism, and any office or

statute, reorganization plan, Executive Order, or other provision of law to the Assistant

Secretaries the Secretary of State deems appropriate.

There are transferred all functions of the Special Coordinator for water policy negotiations

and water resources policy, and any office or statute, reorganization plan, Executive Order,

or other provision of law to the Assistant Secretaries the Secretary of State deems

appropriate.

The role of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs is redefined as the third ranking officer

within the Department of State, with responsibilities for issues that transcend regions.

CHAPTER 3—CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

SEC. 205. REPEALS.

The following sections of the Title 22 U.S.C. shall be repealed:

2651(b)(2), 2651(b)(3), 2651(c)(2), 2651(e), 2652(b), 2652(c), 2655(a), 2686(a)

SEC. 206. AMENDMENTS.

The following sections of the 22 U.S.C. 2651a. shall be amended:

2651(b) to read "There shall be in the Department of State not more than 7 Under Secretaries

of State, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the

Senate"

2651(c)(1) to read "There shall be in the Department of State not more than 25 Assistant

Secretaries of State, each of whom will be appointed by the President, by and with the advice

and consent of the Senate"
5-B

TITLE III-UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER 1--GENERAL PROVISIONS.

SEC. 301. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This title, and the amendments made by this title, shall take effect on the earlier of--

(1) [Month, Day, Year;] or

(2) the date of abolition of the United States Agency for International Development

pursuant to the reorganization plan described in Section 401.

CHAPTER 2--ABOLITION AND TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS.

SEC. 302. ABOLITION OF UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT.

The United States Agency for International Development is abolished.

SEC. 303. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITIES TO SECRETARY OF STATE.

There are transferred to the Secretary of State all functions of the Administrator of the United

States Agency for International Development, and any office or component of such agency,

under any statute, reorganization plan, Executive Order, or other provision of law, as of the

day before the effective date of this title.

As the Secretary of State deems appropriate:

There are transferred to the Assistant Secretaries of the Department of State regional bureaus

all functions of the Agency for International Development's following geographic bureaus:

Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR), Asia and the Near East (ANE), Latin America & the Caribbean

(LAC), and Europe and Eurasia (E&E).

There are transferred to the Under Secretary of the Global Affairs of the Department of State

all functions of the following Agency for International Development's functional bureaus:

Global Programs, Field Support & Research (G) and Humanitarian Response (BHR). The

residing Under Secretary of Global Affairs is authorized to delegate these functions to the

Assistant Secretary of Global Affairs, as they deem appropriate.

There are transferred to the Secretary of State all functions of the following Agency for

International Development's headquarters bureaus: Management (M), Legislative and Public

Affairs (LPA), and Policy and Program Coordination (PPC). The Secretary of State is

authorized to delegate these functions to Department of State Under Secretaries and Assistant

Secretaries as deemed appropriate.
6-B

There are transferred to the Secretary of State all functions of the Agency for International

Development Office of the Inspector General.

SEC. 304. TRANSFER OF POSITIONS.

Except as otherwise provided, any reference in any statute, reorganization plan, Executive

Order, regulation, agreement, determination, or other official document or proceeding to-

(1) the Director of the United States Agency for International Development shall be

deemed to refer to the Secretary of State;

(2) the United States Agency for International Development, AID, shall be deemed to

refer to the Department of State.

CHAPTER 3--CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

SEC. 305. REPEALS.

(a) The following sections of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (22

U.S.C. 6501 et seq.) are repealed: Section 102 ( 22 U.S.C. 6501), Section 413 (22 U.S.C. 6563),

Section 522 (22 U.S.C. 6592).

(b) The following sections of Executive Order 13118 are repealed: 1-2 a, b c and e.

SEC. 306. AMENDMENTS.

The following sections of the Foreign Affairs Reform shall be amended:

Section 102 (22 U.S.C. 6501), Section 511 (22 U.S.C. 6581), Section 601 (22 U.S.C. 6601),

Section 613 (22 U.S.C. 6613)

TITLE IV--TRANSITION

CHAPTER 1--REORGANIZATION PLAN.

SEC. 401. REORGANIZATION PLAN AND REPORT.

 (a) SUBMISSION OF PLAN AND REPORT- Not later than 60 days after the

 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the

 appropriate congressional committees a reorganization plan and report

 regarding--

 (1) the abolition of the two Under Secretaries of State in accordance with this Act;

(2) the abolition of the four Assistant Secretaries of State in accordance with this Act;

(3) the abolition of two Coordinators of State in accordance with this Act;
7-B

(4) the establishment of five regional Under Secretaries and 18 Assistant Secretaries in

accordance with this Act;

(5) the transfer of functions from the abolished Under Secretaries

to the newly formed regional Under Secretaries with the provision of this Act;

(6) the transfer of functions from the abolished Assistant Secretaries to the Assistant

Secretaries of the Political, Security, and Economic and Transnational Affairs bureaus

with the provision of this Act;

(7) the transfer of functions from the abolished Coordinators of State to the appropriate

positions;

 (8) the abolition of the United States Agency for International Development in

 accordance with this Act;

(9) the termination of the affairs of the agency abolished under this Act;

(10) the transfer to the Department of the functions and personnel of the agency consistent

with the provisions of this Act; and

(11) the consolidation, reorganization, and streamlining of the Department in connection

with the transfer of such functions and personnel in order to carry out such functions.

(b) PLAN ELEMENTS- The plan transmitted under subsection (a) shall contain, consistent

with this Act, such elements as the President deems appropriate, including elements that--

(1) identify the functions of each Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary and Coordinator

that will be transferred to the newly formed positions under this plan;

(2) identify the functions of the Agency for International Development that will be

transferred to the Department under the plan;

(3) specify the funds available to the Agency for International Development that will be

transferred to the Department as a result of the transfer of functions of such agency to the

Department;

(4) specify the proposed allocations within the Department of unexpended funds

transferred in connection with the transfer of functions under the plan;

(5) specify the proposed disposition of the property, facilities, contracts, records, and other

assets and liabilities of the Agency for International Development in connection with the

transfer of the functions of such agency to the Department;

(6) specify the steps to be taken by the Secretary of State to reorganize internally the

functions of the Department, including the consolidation of offices and functions, that will

be required under the plan in order to permit the Department to carry out the functions

transferred to it, and within it, under the plan;
8-B

(c) MODIFICATION OF PLAN- The President may, on the basis of consultations with the

appropriate congressional committees, modify or revise any part of the plan transmitted under

subsection (a) until that part of the plan becomes effective in accordance with subsection (e).

(d) REPORT- The report accompanying the reorganization plan for the Reorganization of the

Department of State submitted pursuant to this section shall describe the implementation of

the plan and shall include--

 (1) a detailed description of--

 (A) the actions necessary or planned to complete the reorganization;

(B) the anticipated nature and substance of any orders, directives, and other

administrative and operational actions which are expected to be required for completing

or implementing the reorganization; and

(C) any preliminary actions which have been taken in the implementation process;

(2) the number of personnel and positions of the Agency for International Development

(including civil service personnel, Foreign Service personnel, and detailees) that are

expected to be transferred to the Department, separated from service with such agency, or

eliminated under the plan, and a projected schedule for such transfers, separations, and

terminations;

(3) the number of personnel and positions of the Department (including civil service

personnel, Foreign Service personnel, and detailees) that are expected to be transferred

within the Department, separated from service with the Department, or eliminated under

the plan, and a projected schedule for such transfers, separations, and terminations;

 (4) a projected schedule for completion of the implementation process; and

(5) recommendations, if any, for legislation necessary to carry out changes made by this

Act relating to personnel and to incidental transfers.

 (e) EFFECTIVE DATE-

(1) IN GENERAL- The reorganization plan described in this section, including any

modifications or revisions of the plan under subsection (c), shall become effective on the

earlier of the date for the respective covered agency specified in paragraph (2) or the date

announced by the President under paragraph (3).

(2) STATUTORY EFFECTIVE DATES- The effective dates under this paragraph for the

reorganization plan described in this section are the following:

(A) [Month, Day, Year] with respect to the Reorganization of the Department of State

(B) [Month, Day, Year] with respect to the abolition of the Agency for International

Development.
9-B

(3) EFFECTIVE DATE BY PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION- An effective date

under this paragraph for a reorganization plan described in this section is such date as the

President shall determine to be appropriate and announce by notice published in the

Federal Register, which date may be not earlier than 90 calendar days after the President

has transmitted the reorganization plan to the appropriate congressional committees

pursuant to subsection (a).

(f) PUBLICATION- The reorganization plan described in this section shall be printed in the

Federal Register after the date upon which it first becomes effective.

CHAPTER 2--REORGANIZATION AUTHORITY.

SEC. 402. REORGANIZATION AUTHORITY.

(a) IN GENERAL- The Secretary is authorized, subject to the requirements of this Act, to

allocate or reallocate any function transferred to the Department under any title of this Act,

and to establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue such organizational entities within the

Department as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out any reorganization under this Act,

but this subsection does not authorize the Secretary to modify the terms of any statute that

establishes or defines the functions of any bureau, office, or officer of the Department.

(b) REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS ON REORGANIZATION PLAN- The

reorganization plan transmitted under Section 401 may not have the effect of--

 (1) creating a new executive department;

(2) continuing a function beyond the period authorized by law for its exercise or beyond

the time when it would have terminated if the reorganization had not been made;

(3) authorizing a Federal agency to exercise a function which is not authorized by law at

the time the plan is transmitted to Congress;

(4) creating a new Federal agency which is not a component or part of an existing

executive department or independent agency; or

 (5) increasing the term of an office beyond that provided by law for the office.

SEC. 403. TRANSFER AND ALLOCATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL- Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the assets, liabilities (including

contingent liabilities arising from suits continued with a substitution or addition of parties),

contracts, property, records, and unexpended balance of appropriations, authorizations,

allocations, and other funds employed, held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made

available in connection with the functions and offices, or portions thereof, transferred by any

title of this division shall be transferred to the Secretary for appropriate allocation.
10-B

(b) LIMITATION ON USE OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS- Except as provided in subsection

(c), unexpended and unobligated funds transferred pursuant to any title of this division shall

be used only for the purposes for which the funds were originally authorized and

appropriated.

 (c) FUNDS TO FACILITATE TRANSITION-

(1) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION- Funds transferred pursuant to subsection (a)

may be available for the purposes of reorganization subject to notification of the

appropriate congressional committees in accordance with the procedures applicable to a

reprogramming of funds under Section 34 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act

of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2706).

(2) TRANSFER AUTHORITY- Funds in any account appropriated to the Department of

State may be transferred to another such account for the purposes of reorganization,

subject to notification of the appropriate congressional committees in accordance with the

procedures applicable to a reprogramming of funds under Section 34 of the State

Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2706). The authority in this

paragraph is in addition to any other transfer authority available to the Secretary of State

and shall expire on [Month, Day, Year].

SEC. 404. TRANSFER, APPOINTMENT, AND ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL.

(a) TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL FROM AID- No later than the date of abolition of

AID, all personnel and positions of AID shall be transferred to the Department of State at the

same grade or class and the same rate of basic pay or basic salary rate and with the same

tenure held immediately preceding transfer.

(b) ASSIGNMENT AUTHORITY- The Secretary, for a period of not more than 6 months

commencing on the effective date of the transfer to the Department of State of personnel, is

authorized to assign such personnel to any position or set of duties in the Department of State

regardless of the position held or duties performed by such personnel prior to transfer, except

that, by virtue of such assignment, such personnel shall not have their grade or class or their

rate of basic pay or basic salary rate reduced, nor their tenure changed. The Secretary shall

consult with the relevant exclusive representatives (as defined in Section 1002 of the Foreign

Service Act and in Section 7103 of title 5, United States Code) with regard to the exercise of

this authority. This subsection does not authorize the Secretary to assign any individual to any

position that by law requires appointment by the President, by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate.

(c) SUPERSEDING OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW- Subsections (a) through (c) shall be

exercised notwithstanding any other provision of law.

SEC. 405. INCIDENTAL TRANSFERS.

The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, when requested by the Secretary, is

authorized to make such incidental dispositions of personnel, assets, liabilities, grants,

contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations,
11-B

allocations, and other funds held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made available in

connection with such functions, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of any title of

this division. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the

Secretary, shall provide for the termination of the affairs of all entities terminated by this

division and for such further measures and dispositions as may be necessary to effectuate the

purposes of any title of this division.

SEC. 406. AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY OF STATE TO FACILITATE TRANSITION.

Notwithstanding any provision of this division, the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of

the head of the appropriate Federal agency exercising functions transferred under this

division, may transfer the whole or part of such functions prior to the effective dates

established in this division, including the transfer of personnel and funds associated with such

functions.

SEC. 407. FINAL REPORT.

Not later than [Month, Day, Year], the President, in consultation with the Secretary of the

Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall submit to the

appropriate congressional committees a report which provides a final accounting of the

finances and operations of the agencies and positions abolished under this Act.
APPENDIX C:

DOS RECOMMENDATION 21: EMPHASIZE STRATEGIC PLANNING – S

SECSTATE Un d er Secretaries Strateg ic Plan n in g , Assistan ce, an d Bu d g et 

Office (SPAB) Bu reau s Missio n s 

Draft B P P s Usi n g IAS P an d IAP G Draft IAP G R efl ect i n g P resi d en t ' s P ri o ri t i es

R ev i ew IAP G

Di st ri b u t e IAS P an d 

IAP G t o B u reau s an d 

M issio n s

C reat e IP P s b y 

In t eg rat i n g B P P s an d 

MPPs

S t art Dev el o p IAS P F o rward P resi d en t i al P ri o ri t i es t o S P AB

Draft M P P s Usi n g 

IAS P an d IAP G

Dev el o p Issu e P 

fo r S ecS t at e

Ap p ro v e? 

No

Yes
APPENDIX D:

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-1
The White House

Washington

February 13, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

 THE SECRETARY OF STATE

 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

 THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

 THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

 THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

 THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

 ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

 DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

 CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

 DIRECTOR, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

 CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

 ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

 ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY

 COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

 CHIEF OF STAFF AND ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

 FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

 DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

 CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE

 CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

 CHAIRMAN, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK

 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

 COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD

 ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE

 ADMINISTRATION

 CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

 DIRECTOR, PEACE CORPS

 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

 DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

 DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

 PRESIDENT, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

 CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

 COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE

 ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

 PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

 ARCHIVIST OF THE UNITED STATES

 DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE

SUBJECT: Organization of the National Security Council System

This document is the first in a series of National Security Presidential Directives. 

National Security Presidential Directives shall replace both Presidential Decision 
Directives and Presidential Review Directives as an instrument for communicating 

presidential decisions about the national security policies of the United States. 

National security includes the defense of the United States of America, protection of our 

constitutional system of government, and the advancement of United States interests 

around the globe. National security also depends on America's opportunity to prosper in 

the world economy. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the 

National Security Council to advise the President with respect to the integration of 

domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. That remains its 

purpose. The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security 

policy as it affects the United States - domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and 

economics (in conjunction with the National Economic Council (NEC)). The National 

Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in 

the effective development and implementation of those national security policies. 

The National Security Council (NSC) shall have as its regular attendees (both statutory 

and non-statutory) the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary 

of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National 

Security Affairs. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisors to the NSC, shall also attend NSC meetings. The 

Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are 

invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Counsel to the President shall be consulted 

regarding the agenda of NSC meetings, and shall attend any meeting when, in 

consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, he deems it 

appropriate. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and 

Budget shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. For the 

Attorney General, this includes both those matters within the Justice Department's 

jurisdiction and those matters implicating the Attorney General's responsibility under 28 

U.S.C. 511 to give his advice and opinion on questions of law when required by the 

President. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior 

officials, shall be invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate. 

The NSC shall meet at my direction. When I am absent from a meeting of the NSC, at my 

direction the Vice President may preside. The Assistant to the President for National 

Security Affairs shall be responsible, at my direction and in consultation with the other 

regular attendees of the NSC, for determining the agenda, ensuring that necessary papers 

are prepared, and recording NSC actions and Presidential decisions. When international 

economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC, the Assistant to the President for National 

Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy shall perform 

these tasks in concert. 

The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) will continue to be the senior interagency 

forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security, as it has since 1989. 

The NSC/PC shall have as its regular attendees the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the 

Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff to the President, and the Assistant 

to the President for National Security Affairs (who shall serve as chair). The Director of 
Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall attend where 

issues pertaining to their responsibilities and expertise are to be discussed. The Attorney 

General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall be invited to 

attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. For the Attorney General, this 

includes both those matters within the Justice Department's jurisdiction and those matters 

implicating the Attorney General's responsibility under 28 U.S.C. 511 to give his advice 

and opinion on questions of law when required by the President. The Counsel to the 

President shall be consulted regarding the agenda of NSC/PC meetings, and shall attend 

any meeting when, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National 

Security Affairs, he deems it appropriate. When international economic issues are on the 

agenda of the NSC/PC, the Committee's regular attendees will include the Secretary of 

Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, the Assistant to the President for 

Economic Policy (who shall serve as chair for agenda items that principally pertain to 

international economics), and, when the issues pertain to her responsibilities, the 

Secretary of Agriculture. The Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser to the Vice 

President shall attend all meetings of the NSC/PC, as shall the Assistant to the President 

and Deputy National Security Advisor (who shall serve as Executive Secretary of the 

NSC/PC). Other heads of departments and agencies, along with additional senior 

officials, shall be invited where appropriate. 

The NSC/PC shall meet at the call of the Assistant to the President for National Security 

Affairs, in consultation with the regular attendees of the NSC/PC. The Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs shall determine the agenda in consultation with 

the foregoing, and ensure that necessary papers are prepared. When international 

economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC/PC, the Assistant to the President for 

National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy shall 

perform these tasks in concert. 

The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) will also continue to serve as the senior subCabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. 

The NSC/DC can prescribe and review the work of the NSC interagency groups 

discussed later in this directive. The NSC/DC shall also help ensure that issues being 

brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for 

decision. The NSC/DC shall have as its regular members the Deputy Secretary of State or 

Under Secretary of the Treasury or Under Secretary of the Treasury for International 

Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the 

Deputy Attorney General, the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 

the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff to the President for Policy, the Chief of Staff and 

National Security Adviser to the Vice President, the Deputy Assistant to the President for 

International Economic Affairs, and the Assistant to the President and Deputy National 

Security Advisor (who shall serve as chair). When international economic issues are on 

the agenda, the NSC/DC's regular membership will include the Deputy Secretary of 

Commerce, a Deputy United States Trade Representative, and, when the issues pertain to 

his responsibilities, the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, and the NSC/DC shall be 

chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs for 
agenda items that principally pertain to international economics. Other senior officials 

shall be invited where appropriate. 

The NSC/DC shall meet at the call of its chair, in consultation with the other regular 

members of the NSC/DC. Any regular member of the NSC/DC may also request a 

meeting of the Committee for prompt crisis management. For all meetings the chair shall 

determine the agenda in consultation with the foregoing, and ensure that necessary papers 

are prepared. 

The Vice President and I may attend any and all meetings of any entity established by or 

under this directive. 

Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by 

multiple agencies of the United States Government shall usually be accomplished by the 

NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main 

day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall 

provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC 

system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. Each NSC/PCC 

shall include representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies 

represented in the NSC/DC. 

Six NSC/PCCs are hereby established for the following regions: Europe and Eurasia, 

Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa. 

Each of the NSC/PCCs shall be chaired by an official of Under Secretary or Assistant 

Secretary rank to be designated by the Secretary of State. 

Eleven NSC/PCCs are hereby also established for the following functional topics, 

each to be chaired by a person of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank 

designated by the indicated authority: 

Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations (by the Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs); 

International Development and Humanitarian Assistance (by the Secretary of State); 

Global Environment (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 

and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy in concert); 

International Finance (by the Secretary of the Treasury); 

Transnational Economic Issues (by the Assistant to the President for Economic 

Policy); 

Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness (by the Assistant to the President for 

National Security Affairs); 
Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning (by the Secretary of Defense); 

Arms Control (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs); 

Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense (by the Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs); 

Intelligence and Counterintelligence (by the Assistant to the President for National 

Security Affairs); and 

Records Access and Information Security (by the Assistant to the President for 

National Security Affairs). 

The Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG) will continue to function as an interagency 

coordinator of trade policy. Issues considered within the TPRG, as with the PCCs, 

will flow through the NSC and/or NEC process, as appropriate. 

Each NSC/PCC shall also have an Executive Secretary from the staff of the NSC, to be 

designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Executive 

Secretary shall assist the Chairman in scheduling the meetings of the NSC/PCC, 

determining the agenda, recording the actions taken and tasks assigned, and ensuring 

timely responses to the central policymaking committees of the NSC system. The 

Chairman of each NSC/PCC, in consultation with the Executive Secretary, may invite 

representatives of other executive departments and agencies to attend meetings of the 

NSC/PCC where appropriate. 

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in 

consultation with the Vice President and the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense,

may establish additional NSC/PCCs as appropriate. 

The Chairman of each NSC/PCC, with the agreement of the Executive Secretary, may 

establish subordinate working groups to assist the PCC in the performance of its duties. 

The existing system of Interagency Working Groups is abolished. 

• The oversight of ongoing operations assigned in PDD/NSC-56 to Executive 

Committees of the Deputies Committee will be performed by the appropriate regional 

NSC/PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups to provide coordination 

for ongoing operations.

• The Counter-Terrorism Security Group, Critical Infrastructure Coordination 

Group, Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness, Consequences Management and 

Protection Group, and the interagency working group on Enduring Constitutional 

Government are reconstituted as various forms of the NSC/PCC on CounterTerrorism and National Preparedness.
• The duties assigned in PDD/NSC-75 to the National Counterintelligence Policy 

Group will be performed in the NSC/PCC on Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 

meeting with appropriate attendees.

• The duties assigned to the Security Policy Board and other entities 

established in PDD/NSC-29 will be transferred to various NSC/PCCs, depending 

on the particular security problem being addressed.

• The duties assigned in PDD/NSC-41 to the Standing Committee on 

Nonproliferation will be transferred to the PCC on Proliferation, Counterproliferation, 

and Homeland Defense.

• The duties assigned in PDD/NSC-35 to the Interagency Working Group for 

Intelligence Priorities will be transferred to the PCC on Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence.

• The duties of the Human Rights Treaties Interagency Working Group established 

in E.O. 13107 are transferred to the PCC on Democracy, Human Rights, and 

International Operations

• The Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group established in E.O. 

13110 shall be reconstituted, under the terms of that order and until its work ends in 

January 2002, as a Working Group of the NSC/PCC for Records Access and 

Information Security.

Except for those established by statute, other existing NSC interagency groups, ad hoc 

bodies, and executive committees are also abolished as of March 1, 2001, unless they are 

specifically reestablished as subordinate working groups within the new NSC system as 

of that date. Cabinet officers, the heads of other executive agencies, and the directors of 

offices within the Executive Office of the President shall advise the Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs of those specific NSC interagency groups chaired 

by their respective departments or agencies that are either mandated by statute or are 

otherwise of sufficient importance and vitality as to warrant being reestablished. In each 

case the Cabinet officer, agency head, or office director should describe the scope of the 

activities proposed for or now carried out by the interagency group, the relevant statutory 

mandate if any, and the particular NSC/PCC that should coordinate this work. The Trade 

Promotion Coordinating Committee established in E.O. 12870 shall continue its work, 

however, in the manner specified in that order. As to those committees expressly 

established in the National Security Act, the NSC/PC and/or NSC/DC shall serve as those 

committees and perform the functions assigned to those committees by the Act. 

To further clarify responsibilities and effective accountability within the NSC system, 

those positions relating to foreign policy that are designated as special presidential 

emissaries, special envoys for the President, senior advisors to the President and the 

Secretary of State, and special advisors to the President and the Secretary of State are also 
abolished as of March 1, 2001, unless they are specifically redesignated or reestablished 

by the Secretary of State as positions in that Department. 

This Directive shall supersede all other existing presidential guidance on the organization 

of the National Security Council system. With regard to application of this document to 

economic matters, this document shall be interpreted in concert with any Executive Order 

governing the National Economic Council and with presidential decision documents 

signed hereafter that implement either this directive or that Executive Order. 

[signed: George W. Bush]

cc: The Executive Clerk 
Road Map for National Security

Addendum on Implementation

National Security Education Act Implementation Plan

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
1

Executive Summary

This implementation plan recommends a course of action for executing the

recommendation of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century to expand the

National Security Education Act of 1991 to ensure the federal government continues to attract a

talented workforce to government service.

USCNS/21ST CENTURY RECOMMENDATIONS1

39. Congress should significantly expand the National Security Education Act (NSEA) to

include broad support for social sciences, humanities, and foreign languages in exchange for

military and civilian service to the nation.

Table 1. Summary of Recommendation

This implementation plan provides concepts for the Commission's recommendation

concerning the National Security Education Act. In the Human Requirements for National

Security chapter of the Phase III report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,

the Commission highlights a number of factors that are discouraging highly qualified people

from considering government service. Therefore, the Commission advocates that the Executive

Branch undertake a campaign to "reinvigorate and enhance the prestige of service to the

nation,"2 attracting talented individuals to government service.

The 1991 National Security Education Act (NSEA) funds scholarships for undergraduate

students, fellowships for graduates students, and grants to higher learning institutions and is

designed to focus individuals on international studies and foreign languages to staff U.S.

government national security-related agencies. Recipients of scholarships and fellowships are

required to enter government service with a federal agency involved in national security affairs.

If, after making a "good faith" effort, a recipient is unable to find federal employment, the

scholarship or fellowship recipient may work in the field of higher education.

 Currently, the NSEA has three key elements: the National Security Education Program

(NSEP) that administers scholarships, fellowships, and institutional grants; the National Security

Trust Fund, to which funds are appropriated annually by Congress for the purpose of supporting

the NSEP; and the National Security Education Board, composed of officials of Cabinet rank and

additional presidential appointees, charged with developing the criteria for awarding the

scholarships and recommending any changes in the program to the chairman of the Board.

The NSEP is administered by the National Security Education Program Office. The

Institute of International Education (IIE) and the Academy for Educational Development (AED),

both non-profit organizations, provide administration for the scholarship and fellowship

programs based on guidance of the NSEP Office. In addition, the National Security Education

Program Office, based at the National Defense University, provides executive office support to

the National Security Education Board and administers the institutional grants program.

 

1 The recommendation addressed in this implementation plan is extracted from Road Map for National Security: Imperative

for Change, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21)'s Phase III report, posted on January 31,

2001, at www.nssg.gov, and published on March 15, 2001. All references are based on the published report. (Hereafter

cited as Road Map).

2 Road Map, p. 89.
2

The Commission proposes reinforcing the Act by expanding the existing authority,

increasing the subject areas qualifying for undergraduate scholarships and graduate fellowships

and extending the length of the scholarships from the current maximum of two years to a

maximum of four years. The Commission also recommends modifying certain requirements for

the scholarships and fellowships; expanding the scope of the NSEA by providing professional

development programs for scholarship and fellowship recipients; and extending student loan debt

relief options for those individuals who choose government service after completing their

education. These proposals are an effort to attract highly qualified and motivated individuals to

careers in military and civilian government service and offer national security agencies and

departments the opportunity to choose from among the nation's best and brightest.

Implementing this recommendation will require amending the National Security

Education Act. This implementation plan identifies the elements of such a legislative

amendment, recognizing that consultations with Congress will determine the eventual content of

the amendment.

The key constraining issue identified in this implementation plan is the significant

resource requirement for funding the proposed expansion of the National Security Education

Act. The recommendation reflects an expanded focus for the NSEA, making other academic

studies, beyond just language and foreign studies, eligible for scholarships under NSEP and

providing a significant increase in benefits through longer scholarship award periods and

repayment of student loans.
3

Implementation Plan: National Security Education Act

I. READER'S GUIDE

This reader's guide provides a brief introduction to the content and layout of the National

Security Education Act (NSEA) implementation plan. The guide first provides a brief contextual

background that will aid the reader in understanding the content of this document; it then

addresses the scope of the implementation plan; and finally it outlines the layout for the rest of

this document.

A. Background

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century concluded that "the United

States finds itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence in government."3 The

declining orientation toward government service as a prestigious career has, in some instances,

made it difficult for government departments and agencies—particularly those involved in

national security affairs—to compete with the private sector in attracting and retaining talent.

Also troubling to the Commission is the cynicism with which many Americans view the

government and government officials.

To help navigate the 21st century security environment, the Commission believes the

United States "must strengthen government (civil and military) personnel systems in order to

improve recruitment, retention, and effectiveness at all levels."4 To this end, the Commission

has proposed a broad set of recommendations aimed at improving the Foreign Service, the Civil

Service, and Military Personnel policies so as to attract highly qualified individuals across the

country to their ranks and to improve current retention rates. But just as key to the effort to

bolster the government's human resources will be motivating a new generation of leaders to seek

careers in government, especially in the national security departments and agencies, so that

government agencies will have a large pool of talented and committed individuals from which to

select and grow dedicated staff. The Commission thus advocates a "national campaign to

reinvigorate and enhance the prestige of service to the nation... to attract the best Americans to

military and civilian government service."5

To achieve this objective, the Commission proposes a significant expansion of the 1991

National Security Education Act (NSEA) to fund scholarships for undergraduate students,

fellowships for graduates students, and grants to higher learning institutions, for the purpose of

developing a cadre of individuals educated in international studies and foreign languages to staff

U.S. national security agencies. Recipients of scholarships and fellowships are required to enter

government service with a federal agency involved in national security affairs, or work in the

field of higher education if a recipient is unable to find federal employment after making a "good

faith" effort.

 

3 Road Map, p. 87.

4 Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom, The U.S. Commission on

National Security/21st Century (USNCS/21)'s Phase II Report, April 15, 2000, p. 9.

5 Road Map, p. 89.
4

The NSEA has three key elements: the scholarships, fellowships, and institutional grants

which comprise the National Security Education Program (NSEP); the National Security Trust

Fund, to which funds are appropriated yearly by Congress (and separately from the

appropriations Congress makes for departments and agencies) for the purpose of supporting the

NSEP; and the National Security Education Board, a body comprised of officials of cabinet rank

and additional presidential appointees, charged with developing the criteria for awarding the

scholarships and recommending any program changes to the Secretary of Defense. The National

Security Education Board is chaired by the Secretary of Defense and composed of the Secretaries

of Education, State, Commerce, and Energy, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the

Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities, or their representatives. In addition, it

includes six presidential appointees, subject to Senate confirmation, who are usually drawn from

higher learning institutions around the country.

The National Security Education Program is supported by an infrastructure that

administers the programs and supports the National Security Education Board. The Institute of

International Education (IIE), a national nonprofit organization, administers the undergraduate

scholarships, and the Academy for Educational Development (AED), also a nonprofit,

administers the graduate fellowships based on guidance provided by the National Security

Education Program Office. In addition, National Security Education Program Office, based at

the National Defense University, provides executive office support to the National Security

Education Board.

In order to expand the Act, the Commission proposes broadening the existing authority of

the NSEA to diversify the pool of students eligible for undergraduate scholarships and graduate

fellowships and extending the length of the scholarships from the current maximum of two years

(two separate one year scholarships) to a maximum of four years. The Commission also

recommends modifying certain requirements for the scholarships and fellowships, so that

scholarships may be used for other academic studies beyond study abroad and foreign language

instruction. In addition, the Commission envisions expanding the scope of the NSEA program to

provide professional development for scholarship and fellowship recipients, so as to prepare

students to enter government or military service at the end of their studies. Finally, the

Commission proposes adding student debt relief to entice additional individuals to service who

have completed their studies without benefit of the scholarship or fellowship program. The

objective of these recommendations is to motivate students to choose government service, thus

expanding the pool of highly qualified individuals from which federal agencies may recruit.

B. Scope of Implementation Plan

The Commission's final report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,

contains one broad recommendation for expanding the NSEA.6 This recommendation includes

four supporting recommendations:

• Increasing the subjects currently designated for study;

• Extending the award period for NSEA scholarships;

 

6 Road Map also contains a synopsis of the findings contained in earlier Commission reports.
5

• Establishing a professional development element as part of the scholarship to prepare

students to fulfill their service requirements; and

• Providing a student loan repayment plan for those who choose government service but do not

participate in the NSEA scholarship and fellowship program.

This plan identifies steps to be taken to implement the recommendations offered by the

Commission and guides the reader in understanding the implications of the recommendations.

The plan also highlights issues raised by the recommendations, including challenges in

implementing them, and provides options to facilitate implementation. Throughout the plan,

tables are used to simplify presentation and format remains the same for each recommendation to

facilitate comparisons.

C. Implementation Plan Layout

Section II of this plan provides a blueprint for implementing the Commission's

recommendations pertaining to the NSEA. This section suggests actions that could be taken to

achieve the objectives laid out in the recommendations: increase the subjects currently

designated for study; offer one- to four-year scholarships; include a professional development

element; and provide debt relief for those who choose government service after completing their

education. It also identifies responsibilities and provides a notional timeline for each action.

Appendix A includes a matrix summarizing the information in this section.

Section III describes issues, challenges, and opportunities raised by the recommendations

and presents potential courses of action to address them.

Section IV describes means by which the recommendations can be implemented,

including legislative action and policy guidance. Draft language for necessary legislative actions

to implement these recommendations is included in Appendix B.

Section V addresses personnel implications.

Section VI contains the appendices.
6

II. IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINTS

This implementation plan describes issues and requirements raised by Commission

recommendations, and provides options that, if adopted, will facilitate implementation of those

recommendations. The plan identifies general responsibilities for actions required to implement

the Commission's recommendations. It also identifies reasonable timelines for these actions and

arranges actions in sequence. Throughout the plan, tables are used to simplify presentation and

format remains the same for each recommendation to facilitate comparisons.

A. Expand the National Security Education Act

1. Background. Due to increasing competition from the private sector in recruiting

high-caliber individuals, the Commission proposes expanding the authority of the National

Security Education Act of 1991 to provide additional incentives to attract students to civilian and

military government service. Currently, the NSEA provides limited scholarships and fellowships

for studying foreign languages and foreign area studies for those areas of the world critical to

U.S. national security, particularly those areas that are less commonly studied. Scholarship

recipients commit to government service in a national security field or to teaching for a period

equal to that of the scholarship.7 The NSEA expansion proposed by the Commission maintains

the requirement for government service, but broadens the criteria for awarding scholarships to

provide incentives for service to a broader and more diverse pool of students.

Providing attractive incentives is an important element in recruiting capable individuals

for government and military service. The revised Act would expand the pool of students eligible

for undergraduate scholarships and graduate fellowships and increase the length of scholarships

up to four years. Participation in a professional development activity would be required of

scholarship and fellowships recipients under the amended NSEA.8 The Commission also

proposes extending education-related debt relief for those individuals who choose government

service after completing their studies.

The following blueprint addresses actions required to amend the NSEA and enact all of

the supporting recommendations: increasing the subjects currently designated for study by

expanding the focus beyond language and foreign studies; extending the award period for NSEA

scholarships to allow up to four year scholarships; establishing a professional development

element as part of the scholarship to prepare students to fulfill their service requirement; and

providing a student loan repayment plan for those who did not receive NSEA scholarships or

fellowships and who choose government service after completing their education. Subsequent

sections include a table for each supporting recommendation that outlines additional steps

 

7 The Act also permits the use of funds to develop faculty expertise in languages and foreign area studies for less commonly

studied countries.

8 The Commission recommends professional development for NSEA scholarships recipients, as well as for beneficiaries of

the National Security Science and Technology Education Act (NSSTEA), Recommendation 11 in Road Map for National

Security.

Recommendation 39: Congress should significantly expand the National Security

Education Act (NSEA) to include broad support for social sciences, humanities, and foreign

languages in exchange for military and civilian service to the nation.
7

necessary to implement them, the organization responsible for each action, and a notional

implementation timeline for each action. Each table is followed by a narrative description of the

actions necessary to implement each supporting recommendation.

2. Recommended Blueprint.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Set objectives for an expanded NSEA Secretary of Defense, as

chairperson of the Board,

with Board support

30 days

2. Identify stakeholders who might help or

hinder the process and develop a plan to

engage those who support the change

National Security

Education Board

30 days

3. Draft amended National Security

Education Act

Secretary of Defense, as

chairperson of the Board,

with Board support

45 days, concurrent with

Task 2

4. Consult with relevant Congressional

committee members and staffers

Secretary of Defense, as

chairperson of the Board,

and relevant stakeholders

60 days, concurrent with

Task 2

5. Prepare relevant documents

(applications and other supporting

materials)

National Security

Education Board and its

administrative agents9

60 days after passage of

amendment

5. Develop a plan for communicating the

change and the benefits of the program

National Security

Education Board

60 days after passage of

amendment

Table 2. Expanding the National Security Education Act

Each supporting recommendation requires amending the National Security Education Act

of 1991. (Draft language for a legislative amendment is included in Appendix B.) The National

Security Education Board will be a key player in defining the elements of an expanded NSEA

program. The reasons are threefold. First, this is its legislative mandate. The NSEA established

the National Security Education Board to develop the criteria for awarding scholarships and to

make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding required changes to the program.

Second, the composition of the Board includes key stakeholders from the national security

agencies who would have an interest in the results of an expanded NSEA. Third, the Board

already has in place a process and structure for reviewing scholarship and fellowship award

criteria, with the support of the Executive Secretary of the Board,10 and the National Security

Education Program Office.

As indicated above, The National Security Education Board is chaired by the Secretary of

Defense and composed of the Secretaries of Education, State, Commerce, and Energy, the

Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities, or

their representatives, as well as six presidential appointees drawn from institutions of higher

learning. The Commission also recommends that the Board be expanded to include several new

 

9 The Academy for Educational Development (AED) administers the graduate fellowships, the Institute of International

Education (IIE) administers the undergraduate scholarships, and the National Security Education Program Office

administers the institutional grants program.

10 The Executive Secretary is the chief executive officer of the Board, appointed by the Board, and is a full time employee of

the Board.
8

members. The Secretary of the Treasury should be added to reflect the Commission’s

recommendation that he also become a statutory member of the National Security Council.11

The Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) should also be included to provide

input on national security human resource requirements. Finally, the Director of the Office of

Management and Budget should be designated a Board advisor to provide guidance on the

budgetary implications of various NSEB decisions.

In developing a legislative proposal, the Board will have to work closely with, and under

direction of, the Secretary of Defense. Indeed, the Secretary of Defense, and the other Cabinet

Secretaries represented on the Board, will have a crucial role in establishing the objectives of the

expanded NSEA and enlisting the support of the President and Congress for an expanded NSEA.

To accomplish the required legislative changes, the Secretary of Defense and other stakeholders

should begin consultations with select members of Congress and their staffs to identify

legislative champions and to seek commitment to adopting the proposed changes to the NSEA.12

These consultations should be bipartisan and stress the benefits of expanding the NSEA for each

Member's constituency. Key targets in Congress are the chair and ranking members of the

Appropriations Committees (and relevant subcommittees) because the proposed expansion of the

NSEA requires an increase in the National Security Education Trust Fund; the Senate Armed

Services Committee; the House Armed Services Committee; the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee; the House International Relations Committee; the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence; and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Commitment of the current generation of leaders, both in Congress and in the Executive

Branch, will be key to securing expansion of the NSEA. An expanded NSEA will require

additional resources to fund longer scholarships and fellowships, professional development

programs, and the loan repayment program. The Administration thus will have to champion the

program, clearly articulating the government's human capital requirements to meet the challenges

of the 21st century national security environment. Ideally, the President should make a statement

supporting the program. More broadly, the Administration will have to champion the idea of

renewing interest in government service, and reversing negative public attitudes toward

government performance and government careers.

The Department of Defense should lead the effort of seeing the amendment through

Congress. In addition, in his role as chairperson of the Board, the Secretary of Defense should

be prepared to testify before Congress, and other members of the Board should also be prepared

to appear before Congress if supporting testimony is required. The Executive Secretary of the

Board should coordinate the dissemination of information (e.g., proposed draft legislation, a

summary of the changes and why they are important, a summary of anticipated benefits, an

estimate of required additional funding, and supporting statements from stakeholders) to

Congressional committee staffs.

After passage of the amended NSEA, the Board should direct its administrative agents to

prepare revised applications and supporting materials reflecting the changes that will expand the

NSEA. Since the expansion represents a fundamental change in the program, the Board should

 

11 See recommendation 17 in Road Map, pp. 51-2.

12 Because Committee Chairs have a great deal of influence over the consideration of bills in committee, and the leadership has

authority over consideration of marked-up legislation on the floor, it is important to find Congressional champions among

the leadership of both chambers.
9

consider developing a plan for communicating the expanded program to college and university

students and administrators to raise awareness. The Board may choose to rely on its

administrative agents to communicate the changes, as information on the current program is most

readily available through these agents. The Executive Secretary of the Board should take the

lead in providing guidance to the administrative agents and ensuring that a consistent message is

delivered to the public.

3. Process Implications. No significant process implications were identified.

4. Personnel Implications. Some personnel implications are anticipated. There is a

potential that the National Security Education Program Office would need a minimal increase in

personnel to assist with oversight of and reporting on the expanded Act.

5. Issues. Three key issues will affect the passage of an expanded NSEA. First, it will

be necessary to obtain the support of the Administration for an expanded national security

scholarship and fellowship program as an incentive to government service. Second, it will be

crucial to win Congressional champions for the amendment to secure its passage in Congress.

Finally, it will be necessary to obtain the required funding for an expanded program. A sound

legislative strategy will help in addressing the latter two points.

B. Increase the Subjects Currently Designated for Study

1. Background. The current NSEA already contains a great deal of flexibility in the

fields of study for which scholarships and fellowships are awarded. The original legislation was

worded so as to give the National Security Education Board discretion to determine subjects of

study for which students could receive scholarships and fellowships. As a result, scholarships

and fellowships have been awarded to students studying subjects varying from molecular

biology, to mathematics, international relations, foreign languages, and more. The NSEA also

charges the National Security Education Board with periodically reviewing the disciplines

covered by the Act to ensure that the scholarships and fellowships are targeting enough diverse

subjects, especially "critical" areas of study.

Although the NSEA as currently structured allows students to study almost any

subject, it requires study abroad for the award of scholarships and the study of a foreign language

for the award of both scholarships and graduate fellowships. To create opportunities for a more

diverse pool of students, the Commission proposes expanding beyond the already successful

foreign language and area study focus, while still providing scholarships for foreign languages

and study abroad. The expanded program would also provide scholarships for students in other

academic disciplines without language or study abroad requirements. Under the expanded

NSEA, the fields of emphasis (e.g., social sciences, history, law) would have the same priority as

the geographic areas and languages of emphasis. For example, an individual who chooses to

study history would be eligible for a scholarship without adding a foreign language or overseas

study component.

An expanded Act would increase the subjects currently designated for study.
10

2. Recommended Blueprint

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Review fields, geographic areas and

languages of emphasis based on expanded

program objectives

National Security

Education Board

30 days after passage of

amendment

Table 3. Increasing the Subjects Currently Designated for Study

The previous section described the actions to be taken by the Board and the Department

of Defense to amend the NSEA. That amendment would include a section eliminating the

foreign language and study abroad requirements as described above. The revised NSEA would

thus result in a broader pool of scholarship and fellowship applicants.

Once the legislative change is approved, however, the National Security Education Board

would have to continue its periodic reviews of the disciplines to be covered by the scholarships

and fellowships to ensure that they include a broad spectrum of subjects important for national

security. The emphasis in this review should be to determine whether the subject areas covered

by the NSEA need to be further broadened in response to specific human resources requirements

national security agencies may face. The Board also might consider downplaying the hard

sciences should Congress enact the National Security Science and Technology Education Act,

also proposed by the Commission, which addresses these areas specifically.13

3. Process Implications. No significant process implications were identified.

4. Personnel Implications. No significant personnel implications were identified.

5. Issues. There are no major issues involved in reviewing the guidelines since this is a

function the Board already serves. The main issue will be convincing the relevant Congressional

committee members and staff that a fundamental change in focus, de-emphasizing the

international study requirement, is in the best interest of the program.

C. Offer One- to Four-Year Scholarships

1. Background. Under the current NSEA, undergraduate scholarships are awarded for

up to one academic year. Freshmen and sophomore scholarship recipients are eligible to reapply

as upperclassmen for a second scholarship. However, the maximum coverage through the

National Security Education Program (NSEP) is two academic years. The current maximum

coverage for fellowships is six academic semesters. The Commission would like to see this

coverage expanded to offer scholarships of up to four years, since a longer scholarship is likely

to be a more attractive incentive than a one or two year scholarship.

 

13 See recommendation 11, Road Map, pp. 40-2.

An expanded act would... offer one- to four-year scholarships good for study at qualified

U.S. universities and colleges.
11

2. Recommended Blueprint

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Review and modify scholarship award

guidelines

National Security

Education Board

45 days after passage of

amendment

Table 4. Offer One- to Four-Year Scholarships

The current NSEA does not restrict the length of scholarships; it states in part that, "The

National Security Education Board shall conduct a program of awarding scholarships to

undergraduate students... to enable such students to study abroad, for at least 1 semester...."

The NSEA also provides the Board the authority to "develop criteria for awarding scholarships,

fellowships, and grants...."14

Upon passage of the revised NSEA, the Board should meet to review and modify, as

necessary, the scholarship award criteria. Although the Board has the authority to develop

criteria for awarding scholarships, fellowships and grants, it might be advisable to share the

intent of its changes with key Congressional members and staffers prior to implementation to

have the opportunity to address concerns and minimize resistance. The Board should then share

any changes in the guidelines with its administrative agents to allow them to incorporate these

changes into their processes and documents.

3. Process Implications. No significant process implications were identified.

4. Personnel Implications. No significant personnel implications were identified.

5. Issues. There are no major issues involved in developing new guidelines. The main

issue will be getting additional funding to cover longer scholarship periods.

D. The Scholarship Program Should Include a Professional Development Element

1. Background. The Commission recommended that in order to prepare the students to

fulfill their service requirements, the scholarship program should include a training (professional

development) element.15 This element could be used to help students: more fully understand the

roles of different departments and agencies involved in national security, explore specific types

of jobs that may be of interest to them, and gain valuable work experience. It also could be a

mechanism to build camaraderie among like-minded students – those interested in public service

and more specifically in national security.

 

14 Public Law 102-183.

15 The original recommendation stated that the scholarship program should include a training element. The terminology has

been changed in this implementation plan to professional development. The intent of this element is to prepare students to

be more effective as they enter the professional workforce and fulfill their service obligations.

To prepare students to fulfill their service requirements, the scholarship program should

include a professional development element.
12

2. Recommended Blueprint

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Identify appropriate types and lengths

of professional development activities

National Security

Education Board

60 days

2. Design professional development

activities

National Security

Education Board, with

support of National

Security Education

Program Office

90 days after completion

of task 1

3. Develop process to assess

effectiveness of professional

development activities

National Security

Education Board, with

support of National

Security Education

Program Office

First assessment one year

after implementation of

professional development

requirement

Table 5. Include Training Element in Scholarship Program

Upon passage of the revised NSEA, which would include a professional development

element as a condition of the scholarship and a requirement for the departments and agencies to

support this program, the Board should meet to identify the appropriate types and lengths of

professional development activities. Some suggestions for consideration follow.

The Board should consider offering a variety of professional development activities of

varying lengths and formats. Those students with a scholarship of less than two years may only

be required to devote two weeks to professional development activities. One option is a two

week seminar, to be held in Washington, DC or at selected college campuses in other locations,

designed to introduce students to practical information on the operations of the U.S.

Government; specific information about different departments and agencies involved in national

security, including structure and processes; the type of work available; and important skills for

successful job performance. Such a seminar could also provide practical instructions on how to

apply to various national security departments and agencies and how to complete security

requirements. The program would provide a broad overview and introduce students to

individuals in a variety of national security related positions. The ideal location for such a

program would be Washington, DC because of easy access to a wide variety of individuals

currently working in national security related positions; with some modifications, however, it

might also be conducted in other locations.

Scholarships of two years or more might require an internship of at least two-months

duration, possibly in addition to a two week seminar as outlined above. The Board should

consider a variety of internship possibilities to meet the professional development requirement.

Potential internships could include: interning in a national security related position, interning in a

non-national security-related federal government position, interning with state or local

government, or interning in the private sector.16 Any of these experiences could provide

valuable learning and help the student gain work experience that could be translated to a national

security-related position. Internships should be for a minimum of two months to allow time for

 

16 A variety of internship options increases the possibility that students can find paying internships or an internship close to

home that would minimize student expenses.
13

the student to acclimate to the organization and have the opportunity to get involved and make a

contribution. Internships served as a part of the professional development requirement would not

count toward fulfillment of the individual's service requirement.

NSEP currently has an undergraduate federal internship award program – a grant for

scholarship recipients who pursue unpaid internships (or internships with a monthly stipend of

no more than $500 a month) within the NSEP-approved federal agencies or offices. This

program, which provides partial coverage for travel and living expenses, should be open to all

students pursing eligible internships, whether for professional development or to meet their

service requirement.

The Board, with the support of the Executive Secretary and the National Security

Education Program Office, will need to consider the details of such a professional development

seminar. To this end, the Board could award an institutional grant to a university to develop the

program and then contract with universities or other qualified organizations to deliver the

program. Or it could contract with a qualified think tank or consulting firm to develop and

deliver the program.17

For those recipients of NSEA scholarships who choose to fulfill their government service

requirement by entering military service, the professional development element might be

fulfilled by attending ROTC or PLC training, or Officer Candidate School.

Once the professional development program is in place, the Board should contract with a

qualified organization to assess the effectiveness of the professional development activities in

preparing students for a national security-related career in the federal government and allow for

adjustments later on. The first assessment should be conducted after the first round of

professional development activities to assess student perceptions of their relevance and

helpfulness.18 A second, more comprehensive assessment should be scheduled for three or four

years after implementation. This will allow time for some students to participate in professional

development activities, finish school and transition into the workforce, giving them a different

perspective on the benefits and relevance of the professional development activities.

Assessments should be conducted periodically to ensure that the professional development

activities are adding value to the NSEP.

3. Process Implications. No significant process implications were identified.

4. Personnel Implications. No significant personnel implications were identified.

5. Issues. The main issues will be gaining agreement on what options should be

included in the professional development element and getting additional funding to cover the

design, development, delivery, and also basic student expenses (airfare, room and board) for

those students involved in the two week seminar. The Board, through its Executive Secretary,

can provide oversight while contracting out the design, development, administration, and

assessment of the program.

 

17 An example of a similar activity for mid-career professionals that the Government contracts out for delivery is the Defense

Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP).

18 An initial needs assessment should be conducted prior to design of the professional development activities.
14

E. Provide for Those Who Choose Government Service After Completing Their Education

1. Background. In addition to broadening the NSEA scholarships and fellowships, the

Commission believes other incentives should be provided to attract high caliber individuals to

government service. For those students who do not participate in the NSEA scholarship program

but choose government service after completing undergraduate or graduate studies, the

Commission proposes a student loan repayment program as another means to recruit high-quality

Civil Service, Foreign Service, and military personnel.

2. Recommended Blueprint

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Determine funding requirements for

expanding the NSEA to include a student

loan repayment program and request an

increase in the National Security

Education Trust Fund

National Security

Education Board, with

support from NSEA

administrative agents

During budget

preparation process to

include in President's

budget request

2. Establish criteria/qualifications for

loan repayment eligibility

National Security

Education Board, with

support NSEA

administrative agents

60 days, concurrent with

Task 1

3. Establish loan repayment schedule and

procedures

National Security

Education Board, with

support from NSEA

administrative agents

60 days

Table 6. Provide for Repayment of Student Loans

The Commission recommends establishing a program under the National Security

Education Act providing government repayment of student loans for those who choose

government service in national security agencies after completing their education. While student

loan repayment authority for federal agencies currently exists under Title 5 U.S.C., Section

5379,19 this authority limits the amount of loan repayment employees can receive under the

program. The Commission suggests the NSEA be amended to provide national security agencies

another loan repayment authority that does not restrict the amount for which an employee is

eligible in an effort to attract and retain high quality individuals to national security government

service.

The student loan repayment program would provide an attractive incentive for students

who were unable to take advantage or were unaware of the NSEA scholarships and fellowships,

and serve as a continued effort to attract talented individuals to careers in the Civil Service,

Foreign Service, or the military after completing their education. Additionally, national security

agencies should find such a program very appealing since the program would be funded through

the National Security Education Trust Fund, not from agencies' annual appropriations.

 

19 See "Repayment of Student Loans," Proposed Rules, Federal Register (Volume 66, Number 52): March 16, 2001.

The Act should also provide further incentives for government service.
15

Currently, under the Title 5 authority, funding for student loan repayment comes from individual

agencies' budgets so that agencies must balance their interest in extending loan repayment

incentives to potential employees with other pressing concerns, such as salaries and hiring.

In establishing the program, the National Security Education Board will require cost

estimates to determine the increased funding requirement for the Trust Fund and ensure

appropriate budget requests are presented and enough funds appropriated in the next budget

cycle. Securing the significant increased funding required to support the program may encounter

competition for government appropriations. It will be necessary, therefore, to enlist the support

of the Administration for this effort so that a convincing case can be made to Congress.

The Commission believes the student loan repayment program under the NSEA should

be as far reaching as possible. To establish as broad a pool of eligible beneficiaries as possible, it

should be targeted not to attract only those individuals who would be likely hired for "hard-tofill" positions. It should cover privately insured loans as well as federally insured or guaranteed

loans. Limits (or "caps") on loan payment amounts also should not be set. Based on these broad

goals, and because the National Security Education Trust Fund is not a source of open-ended

funding, NSEA administrative agents, with direction from the Board, should define and publish

the eligibility criteria and specific guidelines on how the loan repayment program is

administered. Additionally, the Board should determine which agencies and types of positions

would qualify to receive funds under the NSEA loan repayment program and publish appropriate

guidance. Eligibility criteria and guidelines for program applicants should clarify that it is at the

agencies' discretion how to implement the program and an applicant's agency may choose not to

offer this benefit.

In order to entice employees in the program to remain in government service, the loan

repayment schedule should have a graduated structure in which the percentage of repayment

increases annually, providing greater rewards for employees choosing to remain in civilian or

military government service longer. For example, the repayment schedule may be structured to

repay 10 percent of a student's educational debt for the first year of service, 15 percent for the

second year, 20 percent for the third and fourth years, and 35 percent the fifth year of service. It

will be important to establish contractual arrangements requiring students to refund the federal

government if they voluntarily leave government service before fulfilling their committed

service time under the program.

NSEA administrative agents should prepare program descriptions, guidelines, eligibility

criteria, and applications and distribute to qualified agencies once the program is launched.

3. Process Implications. No significant process implications were identified.

4. Personnel Implications. NSEA administrative agents may require additional

personnel for developing student loan repayment program guidelines and eligibility criteria and

for selecting program participants. Administration of the student loan repayment program could

be managed under the current structure established in the provisions of Title 5 U.S.C., Section

5379, coordinated by the Office of Personnel Management and administered by individual

agencies’ human resource departments. Depending on program utilization, agencies may be

required to make minimal staff increases in human resource departments to adequately

administer the program.
16

5. Issues. A significant obstacle for implementing this recommendation is securing

funds to support the student loan repayment program. There is great competition for government

funds, which will intensify as elements of the proposed tax cut plan are adopted by Congress.

Expanding the National Security Education Act and creating an attractive image of government

service should be perceived as a top priority of the Administration in order to improve funding

opportunities for NSEA programs.

Considering the significant resources required to fund the student loan repayment

program, Congress may argue that the authority already exists under Title 5 U.S.C., Section 5379

for such a program. As chairman of the National Security Education Board, the Secretary of

Defense should emphasize to Congress the need to recruit and retain a talented workforce for

those positions essential to the nation's security.

Under the Title 5 authority, repayment of student loans is funded by individual agencies'

budgets. Repayment of student loans under the NSEA program will be funded by the National

Security Education Trust Fund causing disputes between non-designated national security

agencies and those designated as national security agencies by the National Security Education

Board. National security-designated agencies may be viewed as receiving preferential treatment

by non-designated national security agencies.
17

III. ISSUES, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES

A. General Description

There are a number of significant issues associated with the recommendation to expand

the NSEA. The issues deal with convincing the Executive Branch and relevant Congressional

committee members and staffers that the NSEA should be expanded and that additional funding

should be allocated for this program.

B. Issues and Suggested Approaches

This section outlines the issues and suggested approaches for mitigating their negative

impact. Four broad issues are raised by the Commission's recommendation to expand the NSEA:

obtaining additional funding, gaining support of the Executive Branch, achieving Congressional

approval, and assessing the effectiveness of the NSEA in attracting highly qualified candidates

into the federal workforce. Each issue will be addressed in turn.

The first and most significant issue is obtaining additional funding to support the

expanded requirements of the NSEA – longer scholarships and student loan repayment. There is

currently great competition for government funds and this could intensify if a tax cut is adopted

by Congress. To facilitate appropriation of additional funds, the Board and its stakeholders will

need to tell a compelling story about the urgent need for expansion of the program and the

significant benefits that it will provide. It should also have some proposals for what offsets

could be made to free up additional funds for the Trust Fund. The Board members may even

consider showing their unwavering commitment by pledging a portion of their Departments'

budgets to the fund the Trust Fund.

The second issue is gaining the support of the Executive Branch for reinvigorating and

enhancing the prestige of service to the nation to help overcome the crisis of competence in

government. The General Accounting Office has already identified "Strategic Human Capital

Management" as a high-risk challenge and OMB has also acknowledged this as an area in critical

need of improvement. This has caused a great deal of attention to be focused on how to ensure

that the government has the quality workforce it needs (the right people in the right places with

the right skills) to operate effectively and efficiently.

The third issue, obtaining Congressional approval, could prove to be more difficult

since partisan politics plays more of a role. The chair of the National Security Education

Board—the Secretary of Defense—and other Administration representatives who will consult

with Congress regarding the proposed expansion of the NSEA will have to ensure that they take

into account concerns of both sides of the Congressional aisle. The Board should have a clear

understanding of what it hopes to accomplish by expanding the Act (e.g., reduce recruiting costs,

increase the pool of qualified applicants, reduce the time to fill vacant positions, lower the

attrition rate) and be able to clearly articulate that vision to Congressional committee members

and staffs through the chairman of the Board or other Board representatives.

The fourth issue is assessing the effectiveness of the NSEA in attracting qualified

candidates to the federal national security workforce. As increased emphasis is placed on

performance budgeting and accounting for results in the federal budget process, the Board should

be prepared with a plan to assess the effectiveness of the expanded program in attracting and
18

retaining qualified candidates. This is one major reason why OPM should be included on an

expanded Board and why it, or a qualified consultant, might be considered to conduct the

assessment. Since the law already requires an annual report to Congress, the Board could use the

annual reporting as an opportunity to share its assessment results.

The fifth issue is dramatically improving the federal hiring process to facilitate the

hiring of NSEA recipients. Although there are some alternative methods for NSEP participants to

enter government service,20 it is still critical to improve the federal hiring process to remove as

many potential barriers to government service as possible. Highly qualified scholarship and

fellowship recipients should not be impeded from entering government service by slow and

inefficient hiring processes. It is essential that these processes be fundamentally modernized

along the lines of recommendations made in the Commission’s report.21

C. Summary Table

The following table provides a review of the specific issues and suggested approaches to

resolving them.

 

20 NSEP has collaborated with OPM to develop an Internet-based system called NSEP-NET that connects NSEP participants

directly to potential federal employers. Federal HR managers can search the NSEP-NET database of participant resumes for

specific types of expertise. In addition, NSEP has obtained a blanket excepted appointment hiring authority for all of its

award recipients, allowing federal agencies to hire award recipients without regard to any other hiring restrictions (except

they must have a position and funds to pay a salary). The downside is that these are not career positions, they are four-year

term positions.

21 See recommendations throughout the chapter “Human Requirements for National Security” in Road Map, pp. 87-110.
19

Issue Approach

1. Obtain additional funding • Have a compelling "story" to justify the need for

additional funds

• Clearly outline the significant benefits that the

additional funds will achieve

• Be prepared with proposals for what offsets could

be made to free up additional funds for the Trust

Fund

• Consider showing unwavering commitment by

pledging a portion of the Department budget for

each Board member to the fund the Trust Fund

2. Gain the support of the Executive

Branch • Build on the OMB and GAO finding that there is

currently a human capital crisis in the federal

government

• Clearly outline how the expanded NSEA will help

to address the human capital crisis

3. Obtain Congressional approval • Consult with and address the concerns of both

major parties

• Clearly articulate the expected benefits of an

expanded NSEA

4. Assess the effectiveness of the NSEA

in attracting qualified candidates to the

federal national security workforce.

• Conduct an assessment of the effectiveness of the

NSEA

• Implement a standard tracking mechanism for use

by all participating departments or agencies

• Report successes and develop plans to overcome

any disappointing results

5. Modernize federal government hiring

processes

• Conduct assessment of current practices.

• Report successes and develop overall plans to

improve the processes.

• Implement other Commission recommendations

(see Civil Service and Foreign Service

implementation plans).

Table 7. Summary of Issues and Approaches
20

IV. IMPLEMENTATION MEANS

The Commission's recommendations will require amending the National Security

Education Act. See Appendix B for draft amendment.
21

V. PERSONNEL IMPLICATIONS

Minimal personnel implications were identified. The National Security Program Office

may have a slightly larger oversight role as it acts for the Board in managing contracts for

professional development design and delivery and program assessment. However, this should

not be a significant increase and would require little or no increase in personnel.
VI. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:

IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINT MATRIX
1-A

INSTITUTIONAL REFORMNational Security Education Act

Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

I. Overall Recommendation: Congress should significantly expand the National Security Education Act (NSEA) to include broad sciences, humanities, and foreign languages in exchanges for military and civilian service to the nation.

1. Set objectives for expanded NSEA Secretary of Defense, as

chairperson of the Board, withBoard Support

3

2. Identify stakeholders who might help or hinder theprocess and develop a plan to engage those whosupport the change

National Security Education Board 3

3. Draft amended National Security Education Act Secretary of Defense, as

chairperson of the Board, withBoard support

4T

4. Consult with Congressional committee membersand staffers

Secretary of Defense, aschairperson of the Board, andrelevant stakeholders

6T

5. Prepare relevant documents (applications and othersupporting materials)

National Security Education Boardand its administrative agents

6a

6. Develop a plan for communicating the change andthe benefits of the program

National Security Education Board 6

a

Increase the subjects currentlydesignated for study

1. Review fields, geographic areas and languages ofemphasis based on expanded program objectives

National Security Education Board 3

a

Offer one- to four-yearscholarships good for study atqualified U.S. universities andcolleges

1. Review and modify scholarship award guidelines National Security Education Board 4

a

The scholarship programshould include a professionaldevelopment element

1. Identify appropriate types and lengths ofprofessional development activities

National Security Education Board 6

2. Design professional development activities National Security Education Board,

with support of the National SecurityEducation Program Office

9T

3. Develop process to assess effectiveness ofprofessional development activities

National Security Education Board,with support of the National SecurityEducation Support Office

Fapre
2-A

Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

Provide further incentives forgovernment service

1. Determine funding requirements for expanding theNSEA to include a student loan repayment program

and request an increase in the National SecurityEducation Trust Fund

National Security Education Board,with support from NSEAadministrative agents

DpP

2. Establish criteria/qualifications for loan repaymenteligibility

National Security Education Board,with support from administrativeagents

6T

3. Establish loan repayment schedule and procedures National Security Education Board,

with support from administrativeagents

6
APPENDIX B:

DRAFT LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE
1-B

Amendment to the National Security Education Act of 1991

IN GENERAL- The National Security Education Act of 1991 is amended as follows—

REFERENCES- Any reference in this Act to scholarships, fellowships, and grants shall be

considered to be a reference to scholarships, fellowships, grants, and loan repayments.

SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE, FINDINGS, AND PURPOSES.

 (a) in subsection (b), by amending subparagraph (7) to read as follows:

 "(7) American colleges and universities must place new emphasis on improving the teaching

in areas of discipline that are critical to the Nation's interest"

 (b) in subsection (c), by amending subparagraph (2) to read as follows:

 "(2) To increase the quantity, diversity, and quality of the teaching and learning of subjects

in fields that are critical to the Nation's interest"

SEC. 802. SCHOLARSHIP, FELLOWSHIP, AND GRANT PROGRAM is amended--

 (a) in subsection (a)(1), by amending subparagraph (A) and (C) to read as follows:

 "(A) awarding scholarships to undergraduate students and fellowships to graduate students

who are United States citizens in order to enable students to pursue education in the United

States in areas of discipline which will result in government service employment "

 "(C) awarding grants to institutions of higher education to enable such institutions to establish,

operate, or improve programs that include areas of discipline that are critical to the Nation's

interest"

 (b) in subsection (a)(1), subparagraph (B) is omitted

 (c) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting subparagraph (D) and (E) to read as follows:

 "(D) providing professional development instruction to scholarship and fellowship recipients

to broaden knowledge in the area of government service"

 "(E) repayment student loans held by a government service employee in a national security

position"

 (d) in subsection (a)(2), by amending subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) to read as follows:

 "(A) _____% of such amount for the awarding of scholarships pursuant to paragraph (1)(A)"

 "(B) _____% of such amount for the awarding of fellowships pursuant to paragraph (1)(B)"

 "(C) _____% of such amount for the awarding of grants pursuant to paragraph (1)(C)"
2-B

 (e) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting subparagraph (D) and (E) to read as follows:

 "(D) _____% of such amount for the professional development instruction pursuant to

paragraph (1)(D)"

 "(E) _____% of such amount for the repayment of student loans pursuant to paragraph (1)(D)"

SEC. 803. STUDENT LOAN REPAYMENTS is inserted following SEC. 802.--

(a)

(1) An employee shall be ineligible for benefits under this section if such employee

occupies a position which -

(A) is excepted from the competitive service because of its confidential, policydetermining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character; or

(B) is not subject to subchapter III of this chapter.

 (b)

(1) The head of an agency may, in order to recruit or retain highly qualified professional

personnel, establish a program under which the agency may agree to repay (by direct

payments on behalf of the employee) any student loan previously held by such employee.

(2) Payments under this section shall be made subject to such terms, limitations, or

conditions as may be mutually agreed to by the agency and employee concerned.

(3) An employee selected to receive benefits under this section will receive a set

percentage of loan amount reductions for each year the employee remains in government

service based on the following scale-

(A) 10% reduction in loan amounts for the 1st year of employment

(B) 15% reduction in loan amounts for the 2nd year of employment

(C) 20% reduction in loan amounts for the 3rd and 4th years of employment

(D) 35 % reduction in loan amounts for the 5th year of employment

(4) Nothing in this section shall be considered to authorize an agency to pay any amount

to reimburse an employee for any repayments made by such employee prior to the

agency's entering into an agreement under this section with such employee.

(c)

(1) An employee selected to receive benefits under this section must agree in writing,

before receiving any such benefit, that the employee will –

(A) remain in the service of the agency for a period specified in the agreement,

unless involuntarily separated; and

(B) if separated involuntarily on account of misconduct, or voluntarily, before the

end of the period specified in the agreement, repay to the Government the amount

of any benefits received by such employee from that agency under this section.

(2) The payment agreed to under paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection may not be required

of an employee who leaves the service of such employee's agency voluntarily to enter

into the service of any other agency unless the head of the agency that authorized the

benefits notifies the employee before the effective date of such employee's entrance into

the service of the other agency that payment will be required under this subsection.

(3) If an employee who is involuntarily separated on account of misconduct or who

(excluding any employee relieved of liability under paragraph (2) of this subsection) is

voluntarily separated before completing the required period of service fails to repay the
3-B

amount agreed to under paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, a sum equal to the amount

outstanding is recoverable by the Government from the employee (or such employee's

estate, if applicable) by -

(A) offset against accrued pay, compensation, amount of retirement credit, or

other amount due the employee from the Government; and

(B) such other method as is provided by law for the recovery of amounts owing to

the Government. The head of the agency concerned may waive, in whole or in

part, a right of recovery under this subsection if it is shown that recovery would

be against equity and good conscience or against the public interest.

(4) Any amount repaid by, or recovered from, an individual (or an estate) under this

subsection shall be credited to the appropriation account from which the amount involved

was originally paid. Any amount so credited shall be merged with other sums in such

account and shall be available for the same purposes and period, and subject to the same

limitations (if any), as the sums with which merged.

(d)

(1) An employee receiving benefits under this section from an agency shall be ineligible

for continued benefits under this section from such agency if the employee -

 (A) separates from such agency; or

 (B) does not maintain an acceptable level of performance, as

 determined under standards and procedures which the agency head

 shall by regulation prescribe.

(e)

In selecting employees to receive benefits under this section, an agency shall, consistent

with the merit system principles set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 2301(b) of

Title 5 USC, take into consideration the need to maintain a balanced workforce in which

women and members of racial and ethnic minority groups are appropriately represented

in Government service.

(f)

Any benefit under this section shall be in addition to basic pay and any other form of

compensation otherwise payable to the employee involved.

(g)

The Director of the Office of Personnel Management, after consultation with heads of a

representative number and variety of agencies and any other consultation which the

Director considers appropriate, shall prescribe regulations containing such standards and

requirements as the Director considers necessary to provide for reasonable uniformity

among programs under this section.

SEC. 803. NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION BOARD is amended--

 (A) in subsection (b), by inserting (8), (9), and (10) to read as follows:

 "(8) The Secretary of Treasury."

 “(9) Director of the Office of Personnel Management.”

 “(10) Director of the Office of Management and Budget as an advisor to the National

Security Education Board.”

 (B) subsection (d)(4)(A) is omitted
4-B

 (C) in subsection (d), by inserting (6), (7), and (8) to read as follows:

 "(6) Develop procedures for loan repayment process"

 "(7) Provide professional development instruction requirements"

 "(8) Establish a performance review mechanism to monitor the benefits of the program and

evaluate cost and benefits of the program to be included in the annual report"

SEC. 804. NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION TRUST FUND is amended--

 (A) in subsection (b), by inserting (B) and (C) to read as follows:

 "(B) for student loan repayments in accordance with the provisions of this title; and"

 "(C) for professional development instruction in accordance with the provisions of this title;

and"

SEC. 806. ANNUAL REPORT is amended—

 (A) subsection (b)(1) is omitted

 (B) in subsection (b), by amending (5) to read as follows:

 "(5) an analysis of the results of the program for the previous fiscal year, and cumulatively,

to include, at a minimum-

(A) the percentage of individuals who received assistance under the program who

subsequently became employees of the United states Government;

(B) in the case of individuals who did not subsequently become employees of the United

States Government, an analysis of the reasons why they did not become employees and an

explanation as to what use, if any, was made of the assistance by those recipients;

(C) the percentage of loan repayment recipients who separated from employment prior to

the period specified in their agreement

(D) the uses made of grants to educational institutions
Road Map for National Security

Addendum on Implementation

Foreign Service Implementation Plan

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
1

Executive Summary

The overall goal of the recommendation for the Foreign Service provided below is to

enhance the effectiveness and motivation of the Foreign Service. The Commission believes a

committed and motivated Foreign Service is critical to the success of the restructuring proposal

for the State Department. Table 1 shows the Commission's recommendation for the Foreign

Service.

USCNS/21ST CENTURY RECOMMENDATIONS1

41. The President should order the overhauling of the Foreign Service system by revamping the

examination process, dramatically improving the level of on-going professional education, and

making leadership a core value of the State Department

Table 1. Summary of Recommendations

Recruitment is one of the Foreign Service's main concerns. It has an extraordinarily long

hiring process that causes it to lose many good candidates between the time of first contact and

the date on which a new hire enters service. The Commission would like to see this process

streamlined, while maintaining its competitive nature, to facilitate efforts to attract and hire high

quality candidates. The implementation plan addresses potential expansion of the Alternative

Examination Program, use of computer-based testing, and investigation of other innovative

approaches.

The Commission also recommended eliminating the blindfolding process for the oral

exam. Starting with the March 2001 oral exams, applicants must provide information on their

backgrounds during the individual portion of the oral exam. The implementation plan

recommends an analysis of the outcome of this new approach.

The Commission cited lack of professional educational opportunities as a problem both

for the quality of Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) who stay and as a reason for those who leave.

This implementation plan outlines a process for evaluating the relevance of current educational

offerings, determining what types of offerings should be added, and addresses the Commission's

recommendation for a ten to fifteen percent training float to allow FSOs to take advantage of

training opportunities. In addition, the plan addresses the need to change the organizational

culture and place more value on professional development.

The implementation action dealing with the Commission's recommendation to make

leadership a core value of the State Department addresses the need to define clearly leadership in

the Foreign Service context and identify core leadership competencies. It stresses the importance

of holding individuals accountable for "living" the leadership core values with suggestions on

how that can be accomplished.

Changing the name of the Foreign Service to the U.S. Diplomatic Service can be

accomplished through legislation. Draft legislative language is provided in Appendix B.

 

1 Recommendations addressed in this implementation plan are extracted from Road Map for National Security: Imperative for

Change, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21)'s Phase III report, posted on January 31, 2001

at www.nssg.gov, and published on March 15, 2001. All references are based on the published version. (Hereafter cited as

Road Map.)
2

Two overarching issues that could be stumbling blocks to successful implementation of

these recommendations are resistance to change—the recommendations reflect a significant

organizational culture change along with some process changes—and obtaining a budget

increase to support the recommended training float. These and other potential challenges are

addressed in Section III of this document.
3

Implementation Plan: Foreign Service

I. READER'S GUIDE

This reader's guide provides a brief introduction to the content and layout of the Foreign

Service implementation plan. The guide first provides a brief contextual background that will

aid the reader in understanding the content of this document; it then addresses the scope of the

implementation plan; and finally it outlines the layout for the rest of this document.

A. Background

The Secretary of Defense's charter that created the United States Commission on

National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21) directed the Commission to include implementation

concepts for its recommendations as part of its final report.2 This document provides those

concepts for the Commission's recommendations pertaining to the Foreign Service.

In its institutional reform chapter, the Commission found that the proliferation of

international activities by other agencies and internal weaknesses have eroded the State

Department's effectiveness at some core functions. This has seriously weakened the State

Department and its mission. The Commission recommended a significant restructuring of the

State Department, addressed in a separate Implementation Plan. The Commission concluded that

changes in the Foreign Service, to make it more effective and motivating, were critical to the

success of the recommended State Department restructuring. In addition, in an effort to bolster

the external reputation of the Service, the Commission recommended changing the name to the

U.S. Diplomatic Service. This change, it is hoped, will serve as a reminder that this group of

people does not serve the interests of foreign governments but rather is a key part of ensuring

U.S. national security.

B. Scope of Implementation Plan

This plan will identify steps to be taken to implement the recommendations offered by

the Commission and guide the reader in understanding the implications of the recommendations.

The plan will also highlight issues raised by the recommendations, including challenges in

implementing them, and provide options to facilitate implementation. Throughout the plan,

tables will be used to simplify presentation and format will remain the same for each

recommendation to facilitate comparisons.

The Commission's final report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,

contains one broad scope recommendation for overhauling the Foreign Service.3 This broad

recommendation includes modifying the examination process, streamlining the hiring process,

improving on-going professional education opportunities, inculcating leadership as a core value

within the State Department, and changing the name of the Foreign Service to the U.S.

Diplomatic Service.

 

2 USCNS/21 Charter, July 1998 is contained in Appendix 2 of Road Map.

3 Road Map also contains a synopsis of the findings contained in earlier Commission reports.
4

The Commission's recommendations represent significant changes for the Foreign

Service, changes that may not come easily. These changes will require new processes and a new

mindset—a change in the organizational culture. The Commission's recommendations are likely

to be met with resistance by those who intellectually disagree with the recommended changes

and by those who just do not like change. Knowing this, there are actions that can be taken to

minimize resistance and reinforce the desired new behaviors. Section III below presents more

detail on the resistance that could arise and the opportunities available to address these issues and

reinforce the "new" way of doing business.

C. Implementation Plan Layout

Section II of this plan provides a blueprint for implementing the Commission's

recommendations pertaining to the Foreign Service. This section suggests actions that could be

taken to achieve the objectives laid out in the recommendations: revamp the Foreign Service

examination process, improve the on-going professional education opportunities, make

leadership a core value of the State Department, and change the name of the Foreign Service to

the U.S. Diplomatic Service. It also identifies responsibility and provides a notional timeline for

each action. Appendix A includes a matrix summarizing the information in this section.

Section III describes issues, challenges, and opportunities raised by the recommendations

and presents potential courses of action to address them.

Section IV describes means by which the recommendations can be implemented,

including legislative action and policy guidance. Draft language for necessary legislative actions

to implement these recommendations is included in Appendix B.

Most of the recommendations for the Foreign Service can be implemented without

legislative changes or executive orders. However, it will take significant senior-level

commitment within the State Department for the recommended changes to be implemented

successfully. The biggest challenges to successful implementation are gaining the buy-in and

active support of the Department's senior leadership, addressing resistance among the "rank and

file" within the Foreign Service, and obtaining increased funding. It will be important to

communicate effectively throughout the implementation process, not only what changes are

occurring but also why. During the implementation process the Foreign Service should look for

opportunities to involve employees and the American Foreign Service Association; this will help

them feel a part of what is going on and gain a sense of ownership.

Section V explains that implications of personnel changes are interwoven with and

addressed in previous sections.

Section VI contains the appendices.
5

II. IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINTS

This implementation plan highlights issues and requirements raised by Commission

recommendations, and provides options that, if adopted, will facilitate implementation of those

recommendations. The plan identifies general responsibilities for actions and provides draft

implementation language. It also identifies reasonable timelines for actions and arranges actions

in sequence. Throughout the plan, tables are used to simplify presentation and format remains

the same for each recommendation to facilitate comparisons.

A. Overhaul the Foreign Service

1. Background. The Commission determined that an effective and motivated Foreign

Service is critical to the success of the Commission's recommendations for restructuring the State

Department. Its recommendation regarding the Foreign Service aims to make the Service more

effective and motivated. The rationale behind the recommendation is that, according to many

close observers, the Foreign Service no longer attracts and retains the quality of people needed to

meet the diplomatic challenges of the 21st century.

A sampling of the problems facing the Foreign Service include a slow recruiting and

hiring process that loses many applicants to other jobs before they can enter service and

increasing opportunities in the private sector that pay better and are easier on families. These,

and other issues, led the Commission to recommend an overhaul of the Foreign Service system.

2. Implementation Blueprint. The following section includes a series of tables, one

for each sub-recommendation. These tables outline the steps necessary to implement the subrecommendations, the organization responsible for each action, and a notional implementation

timeline for each action. Each table is followed by a narrative description of the actions

necessary to implement each sub-recommendation.

B. Revamp the Examination Process—Shorten the Hiring Process

1. Background. The Foreign Service is faced with significant recruiting challenges.

There are 25 percent fewer people taking the entrance exam than in the mid-1980s. The

extraordinarily long lag time between taking the exam and the first day of work is a deterrent to

many applicants. During that time, applicants are likely investigating other career opportunities

and many are not willing to wait up to two years when they have other offers that will allow

them to start within a few weeks of their initial contact. In today's fast moving information age,

the Foreign Service's time lag is not well tolerated. Shortening the hiring process is one step in

making the Foreign Service more competitive in the war for talent.

Recommendation 41: The President should order the overhauling of the Foreign Service

system by revamping the examination process, dramatically improving the level of on-going

professional education, and making leadership a core value of the State Department.

Shorten the hiring process dramatically without compromising the competitiveness of

the system.
6

2. Recommended Blueprint

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Evaluate success of the Alternative

Examination Program (AEP)

Director General of

the Foreign Service

2 months

2. If AEP is deemed a success, determine the

types of applicants that could effectively be

screened through the AEP versus the

traditional written exam

Director General of

the Foreign Service

2 months after completion of

previous task

3. Define criteria for AEP eligibility Board of Examiners

for the Foreign

Service

2 months after completion of

previous task

4. Write policy guidance expanding AEP

availability to all relevant applicants

Director General of

the Foreign Service

1 month after completion of

previous task

5. Develop computer-based written exam Director General of

the Foreign Service

3 months (concurrent with

first task)

6. Ensure delivery and security mechanisms

are in place for computer-based exam

Director General of

the Foreign Service

4 months starting

concurrently with previous

task

7. Test computer-based exam for one exam

cycle

Board of Examiners

for the Foreign

Service

First exam offering in 2002

8. Evaluate feasibility of letting applicants

sit for exam at different times throughout the

year

Director General of

the Foreign Service

4 months (concurrent with

tasks 1 and 5)

9. Conduct a best practices analysis to

evaluate the possibility of adapting other

innovative streamlined hiring approaches for

use in the State Department

Director General of

the Foreign Service

3 months

10. If promising alternatives are found in the

study in the above step, charter a team(s) to

tailor for Foreign Service

Director General of

the Foreign Service

1 month after final report

from previous action

Table 2. Steps to Revamping the Examination Process

Shortening the exam part of the hiring process involves several steps. The logical first

step is to evaluate the effectiveness of the Alternative Examination Program (AEP)4. If it is

deemed to be successful, the Foreign Service should expand its use of the AEP.5 If the program

is expanded beyond government employees, the Board of Examiners will need to determine the

criteria for AEP eligibility. The criteria definition should be undertaken with care to ensure that

there is a link between the criteria and successful job performance. The Board of Examiners

should then write new policy guidance for approval by the Director General of the Foreign

Service. These activities should be accomplished within seven months.

 

4 The AEP is a skills-based test consisting of 12 essays and two questionnaires. Eligibility is currently limited to Federal

Government employees, eligible veterans, and individuals with status or non-competitive eligibility. Peace Corps

Volunteers, Fascell and National Security Educational Program (NSEP) Fellows and Presidential Management Interns

(PMIs) are also eligible to apply.

5 The vacancy announcement (the method of alerting government employees of the AEP) with an opening date of May 17,

1999 indicated that the AEP is a pilot but that "the Department of State plans, in future, to open it to all applicants".
7

Concurrent with the AEP evaluation, the Foreign Service should also work to develop a

cost-effective computer-based version of the written exam. Test development and testing should

take no more than three months, assuming that the task is essentially translating the paper version

to computer and not a major exam redesign. The State Department also will need to assure that

the proper delivery and security procedures and mechanisms are in place. While development is

underway, the Department could draft the policies and procedures that will govern computerbased test administration. The timeline allows for an additional month after test development to

develop and implement policies and procedures. Much of this work can be conducted

concurrently with test development.

The Board of Examiners should also assess the feasibility of allowing applicants to sit for

the exam at different times throughout the year. The Board has approval and funding for two test

administration dates this coming year, as opposed to the one per year that has been offered

historically. Considerations in the feasibility assessment would include, at a minimum: a cost

benefit analysis; how to maintain the integrity of the exam (for example the exam would

probably have to be proctored to assure that the named individual is indeed the one taking the

exam and that reference materials are not being used); and the ability to arrange for test

locations, equipment and proctors on an ongoing basis.

A best practice analysis should be conducted to assess the potential of adapting other

innovative hiring strategies for use in the Foreign Service. This study could be accomplished

most effectively with the assistance of an outside contractor that already has familiarity with best

practice hiring strategies and the Office of Personnel Management, which has knowledge of

innovative practices within the federal government. The timeline allows three months for

completion of the best practice analysis—this includes study design, data collection and analysis.

If best practices are found that could be adapted to streamline the hiring process for the Foreign

Service, the State Department should charter a team(s) to do further analysis and to adapt and

tailor relevant processes for the Foreign Service.

The team should include a representative from the Board of Examiners, a representative

from the Bureau of Human Resources that deals with recruitment, and representatives from

various levels and cones within the Foreign Service as well as a representative from the

American Foreign Service Association. A team of six to eight people should be able to do the

job. The team may want to have a consultant to help it efficiently and effectively accomplish its

objective. The team should provide detailed action plans for specific steps to shorten the hiring

process without compromising the competitiveness of the system. These recommendations

should be provided to the Director General of the Foreign Service. The Director General, or a

designee, should be available throughout the team's existence to serve as the team sponsor,

provide general guidance and act as a sounding board.

Since the desired outcome is to shorten the hiring process, the Foreign Service should

consider addressing the issue holistically, by reviewing the process from initial contact through

first day of work. An integrated approach that considers the interrelationships among all parts of

the process may be more effective in shortening it than simply focusing on the exam. The

charter to the team working this issue (probably a mix of Foreign Service representatives and

outside experts) would be to streamline the hiring process without compromising the

competitiveness of the system or the quality of successful candidates.
8

3. Process Implications. Expanding use of the AEP would change the process for

evaluating exams. The current written exam is a combination of multiple choice and essay

questions. However, the essay is only scored if the candidate passes the multiple choice section.

The AEP is in essay format requiring examiners to read and evaluate all submissions. In

addition, the AEP does not require on-site administration. Individuals can complete the AEP at

their leisure as long as they meet the submission deadline.

Switching over to a computer-based written exam, or even adding it as an option, will

again have implications for the testing process. A different type of testing facility would be

required, a computer lab versus desks or tables.

4. Personnel Implications. The focus of this entire implementation plan is personnel

and therefore personnel implications are interwoven throughout this report.

5. Issues. If AEP eligibility is expanded significantly it could prove to be more time

intensive and require additional examiners to read and score all the essays. In addition, there

could be resistance to any change in the examination process by those who view the current

process as successful in selecting in high quality candidates. Cost could also be a barrier to some

changes. Developing and administering a computer-based test will take investment and securing

a computer lab for test administration could be harder and more expensive than securing a

location with tables or desks.

C. Revamp the Examination Process—Discontinue the Oral Exam Blindfolding

1. Background. The Foreign Service, like all other organizations, wants to hire the best

qualified applicants, with relevant knowledge and experience. The Commission found that the

oral exam, as historically administered, did not support the goal of attracting and hiring those

with the range of knowledge and skills necessary for an effective 21st century Foreign Service.

The blindfolding policy, which does not allow the examiners access to any background

information about the applicant, damaged the effectiveness of the exam process by excluding

consideration of applicants' professional and other relevant experiences.

The Foreign Service has just initiated actions to eliminate blindfolding for part of the oral

exam. The morning group exercise will still be conducted blind; however, the individual oral

exercises no longer will be. Each candidate must bring to the oral exam a completed application

form and a Statement of Interest. As a part of the individual exercises, the candidate must

respond to questions about his or her experience and motivation for a Foreign Service career.

This new process is being used with candidates for the first time in March 2001.

Discontinue the oral exam's blindfolding process.
9

2. Recommended Blueprint

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Assess impact of unblindfolding the

individual portion of the oral exam. Develop

report for Director General of the Foreign

Service.

Board of Examiners for

the Foreign Service

March 2002

1 year from initial

implementation

2. Assess whether blindfolding should be

eliminated from group exercise.

Director General of the

Foreign Service

Same as previous task

Table 3. Assessment of the Blindfolding Process

Since the Foreign Service has already taken steps to discontinue blindfolding for part of

the exam process, the recommended actions are to evaluate the impact of this change and assess

the benefit of completely eliminating the blindfolding procedure. One year is recommended for

the assessment timeframe to allow for a significant sample size. The Board of Examiners, in

coordination with Bureau of Human Resources, should complete the assessment and present the

results to the Director General of the Foreign Service.

3. Process Implications. There are no immediate process implications. However, if

the assessment indicates that the entire oral exam should be unblindfolded, there will be some

changes in the process for administering the oral exam.

4. Personnel Implications. The focus of this entire implementation plan is personnel

and therefore personnel implications are interwoven throughout this report.

5. Issues. There are no significant issues associated with this recommendation.

D. Dramatically Improve the Level of On-going Professional Education

1. Background. The Commission points out that a successful Foreign Service requires

officers who consistently build new knowledge and skills. Foreign Service employees, with the

important role they play in national security, should be at the leading edge in policy and

management skills. Current on-going professional education is focused mainly on language

training. Although other professional education opportunities exist through the Foreign Service

Institute (FSI),6 there is no incentive, and minimal opportunity, to take advantage of these

offerings. The Foreign Service could benefit in many ways (for example, higher quality staff,

improved retention, greater draw for recruiting) from increasing employees' ability to take

advantage of professional education opportunities, and ensuring that professional education

opportunities are of the highest quality. Professional education should challenge the best and

brightest within the Service and prepare them to develop and implement U.S. foreign policy.

 

6 FSI's programs include courses in administrative, consular, economic/commercial, political, public diplomacy and

information management fields; leadership and management development; crisis management training; study of the world's

major regions and countries; and 60 languages.

Dramatically improve the level of on-going professional education.
10

2. Recommended Blueprint

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Establish a working group to review

on-going professional education and

training curricula

Director of the Foreign

Service Institute

2.5 months

2. Identify mandatory courses in

functional topics, languages, leadership

and management, and possible new

offerings

Director of Human

Resources

1.5 months after

completion of previous

task

3. Define training milestones that must be

met for promotion or advancement to

supervisory positions

Director of Human

Resources

Concurrent with previous

task

4. Develop structure for rotating

personnel through professional

development effectively with minimal

negative impact on mission

Director of Human

Resources

2 months after completion

of previous task

5. Determine ideal levels and cones for

the 10-15 percent additional personnel

(allowing for that proportion of the

overall service to be in training at any

given time)

Director of Human

Resources

Concurrent with previous

task

6. Validate exact budget increase

necessary to support professional

development float

Director of Human

Resources

1 month after completion

of previous task

7. Develop business case for increased

budget and staffing request

Director General of the

Foreign Service/Director of

Human Resources

1 month after completion

of previous task

8. Consider alternative training delivery

methods (correspondence, internet,

additional partnerships with universities

or other educational institutions)

Director of the Foreign

Service Institute

Provide recommendations

4 months after completion

of task 1

9. Develop plan for communicating

changes to employees

Director of Human

Resources and Director of

the Foreign Service Institute

Ongoing throughout the

process

Table 4. Improvement of On-going Professional Education

The first step in increasing the level of on-going professional education is to review

current professional development offerings and determine if any changes are needed. This

should be done by a team including, at a minimum, representatives from the Foreign Service

Institute and the Bureau of Human Resources. It would be a good idea also to include a few

employees from different cones and levels on the team. The timeline allows four months for the

first iteration of this study. To be effective, this review should include a survey of, and/or focus

groups with, Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) at all levels to gain a better understanding of

current and anticipated training needs to ensure that they are well equipped to serve our national

security. If the consolidation of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) and the

State Department recommended by the Commission goes forward, the team should consider
11

whether any special professional education needs will be required as a result of this merger.7

This analysis of professional development needs should not be a one time event. A process for

regularly evaluating these needs should be established to ensure that Foreign Service personnel

are provided with leading edge educational opportunities. This regular assessment should be a

joint process between FSI and the Bureau of Human Resources.

After making recommendations on the professional education curricula, the team should

identify what professional education should be mandatory for all, or a certain subset of,

employees. This should include consideration of, and recommendations for, any training

milestones that would be required for promotion or advancement to supervisory positions.

Once mandatory courses and milestones have been established, the Bureau of Human

Resources should identify the cones and levels that would allow for the most effective use of the

recommended ten to fifteen percent training float. This would provide a target toward which to

work. For example, if a specific six month course was required for every mid-level FSO in the

economic cone, it would be important to have the right kind of staff to cover key positions while

others were in training.

If the consolidation of U.S.AID and the State Department occurs, it could result in the

elimination of some duplicate functions performed in both organizations.8 These "excess"

positions could potentially be the beginning of the float. However, any increase in positions

beyond the current complement would require a budget increase, unless offsetting efficiencies

are achieved elsewhere. The Bureau of Human Resources should validate the necessary budget

increase to support the float9 and develop a business case supporting the float request. The State

Department will need to develop and submit an increased budget with justification; a strong

business case will help "sell" the request.

The Bureau of Human Resources will also need to develop a policy and structure for

rotating personnel through training in a way that maximizes the benefits and minimizes the

negative impact on the mission.

In an effort to facilitate access to professional education opportunities, the Director of the

Foreign Service Institute should charter a team to consider the potential for employing

alternative delivery methods such as the internet, correspondence courses, or additional

partnerships with universities or other educational institutions. At a minimum this study should

include a cost-benefit analysis and also consider the ability to maintain a high standard of quality

for professional education opportunities for Foreign Service officers.

Finally, this magnitude of change will have a significant impact on personnel and it will

be important to educate employees on new professional education opportunities and

requirements. The Bureau of Human Resources and FSI should work together to develop and

implement a comprehensive communication plan.

 

7 See recommendation 20 in the Commission's Phase III Report: Road Map.

8 See recommendations in Department of State Implementation Plan.

9 In Diplomatic Readiness: The Human Resources Strategy, the Bureau of Human Resources identifies the number of

positions (466) and cost ($48.4 million) for adding positions to cover non-language training needs including increased

emphasis on leadership and management development.
12

3. Process Implications. The main process impact will be figuring out how to rotate

FSOs through professional education effectively so that they get the training they require in a

timely manner without having an adverse impact on the organization's mission. If alternative

professional education delivery methods are considered viable and eventually are implemented,

there will be significant implications for the training process.

4. Personnel Implications. The focus of this entire implementation plan is personnel

and therefore personnel implications are interwoven throughout this report.

5. Issues. The two biggest issues associated with this recommendation are procuring an

increased budget to cover the recommended ten to fifteen percent training float and changing the

perception of the importance of ongoing professional development within the Foreign Service.

E. Make Leadership a Core Value of the State Department

1. Background. The Commission determined that currently there is a lack of focus on

leadership and management at the State Department, which results in a lack of these capabilities

throughout the organization. The changes the Commission has recommended for the State

Department can only be achieved with strong senior leadership. Congress is more likely to fund

necessary programs and policies if it is confident of strong departmental leadership and

management from the Secretary of State on down. In addition, research has shown that

leadership is a key component of employee commitment and retention. Improved leadership and

management will help with retention efforts and also improve the Foreign Service's contribution

to the overall mission of national security.

Make leadership a core value of the State Department.
13

2. Recommended Blueprint

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Define leadership in Foreign Service context Director General of

the Foreign Service

2 months

2. Review and validate leadership competencies Director of Human

Resources

3 months after completion

of previous task

3. Develop evaluation criteria guidelines for

selection of senior State Department officials

Director of Human

Resources

1 month after completion of

previous task

4. Write policy requiring use of evaluation

criteria in selecting senior State Department

officials for career positions

Director of Human

Resources

2 weeks after acceptance of

previous task outcome

5. Share evaluation criteria with President and

encourage their use in selecting Presidential

appointees

Secretary of State 1 month after acceptance of

evaluation criteria

6. Ensure that performance evaluation system

holds individuals accountable for living the

leadership values

Director of Human

Resources

Begin analysis after

acceptance of second task

6. Ensure that recognition and promotion

systems recognize and reinforce the importance

of leadership

Director of Human

Resources

Begin analysis after

acceptance of second task

8. Develop plan for communicating changes to

employees

Director of Human

Resources

Begin upon acceptance of

first task

Table 5. Making Leadership a Core Value

The first step in increasing the focus on leadership is to define leadership in a context that

is meaningful for the Foreign Service. The Director General of the Foreign Service should

charter a team to address this issue. The next step would be to review and validate the existing

leadership competencies.10 The existing competencies are those identified by the office of

Personnel Management (OPM) as essential to successful leadership in the Federal Sector. The

Foreign Service should validate that these are the leadership competencies that are essential for

successful State Department leaders and Foreign Service Officers. They should identify the few

core leadership competencies that differentiate outstanding leaders within the State Department

and Foreign Service. Once these competencies have been identified, they should be used as a

key evaluation tool in selecting individuals for leadership positions within the Foreign Service

and more broadly within the State Department. The Bureau of Human Resources should develop

evaluation criteria, incorporating the leadership competencies, for selection of all senior State

Department officials and prepare policy guidelines so candidates are consistently evaluated

against these criteria. The Secretary of State should share these guidelines with the President and

encourage their use when selecting presidential appointees. Presidential appointees are a key

part of the leadership team within the State Department; if leadership is to become a core value,

it must be embraced by these senior leaders.

For leadership to become a core value, individuals must be held accountable for "living"

those values. This means they should be incorporated into the performance management system

 

10 The current leadership competencies are outlined in Leadership Competencies: A Road Map to Leadership Development,

Department of State Publication 10601.
14

and the promotion and employee recognition systems should recognize and reinforce the

importance of leadership as a core value of the Foreign Service and the State Department.

Accountability is key to effective implementation. The Director of Human Resources should

authorize a project to incorporate formally the core leadership competencies as a part of the

performance evaluation system and to investigate other creative means of reinforcing the critical

importance of leadership and recognizing outstanding leaders.

A change of this nature must be effectively communicated throughout the Service

providing a clear definition of what effective leadership is, describing any changes in the

promotion, recognition or performance evaluation systems, and employing multiple methods of

communication to ensure everyone has a chance to get the message. One of the strongest

messages that can be sent to employees is seeing senior leaders model the desired behaviors.

3. Process Implications. Implementing the recommendation could impact the process

for selecting senior State Department officials, including Presidential appointees. In addition, a

new or revised performance evaluation system and process may be required to hold individuals

accountable for living the leadership core values.

4. Personnel Implications. The focus of this entire implementation plan is personnel

and therefore personnel implications are interwoven throughout this report.

5. Issues. Embracing leadership as a core value goes to the very heart of the

organizational culture. Changing an organization's culture takes time, and this is a change that

requires the full support of senior leadership.

F. Change the Foreign Service's Name to the U.S. Diplomatic Service

1. Background. The Commission recommended changing the name of the Foreign

Service to the U.S. Diplomatic Service in an effort to reinforce the reality that this group of

people serves U.S. interests and national security—not the interests of foreign states.

2. Recommended Blueprint

Action Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Draft legislation changing the Foreign

Service's name to the U.S. Diplomatic Service

Director General of the

Foreign Service

1 month

2. Sell the name change to Congress Director General of the

Foreign Service

Concurrent with previous

task

Table 6. Changing the Foreign Service Name

Changing the name of the Foreign Service will require legislation (See Appendix B) to

redesignate the Foreign Service within the Department of State as the U.S. Diplomatic Service.

The State Department could initiate Congressional action by drafting a legislative proposal with

which to begin consultations on Capitol Hill, or it could request that the Congressional

committees of jurisdiction include this change in the next authorization act. The Director

Change the Foreign Service's name to the U.S. Diplomatic Service.
15

General of the Foreign Service should make significant efforts to educate members of Congress

and key Congressional committee staff members about the benefits of the name change to

facilitate their support.

3. Process Implications. No significant process implications were identified.

4. Personnel Implications. The focus of this entire implementation plan is personnel

and therefore personnel implications are interwoven throughout this report.

5. Issues. The main issues that could impact implementation of this recommendation

are the potential resistance to a name change or disagreement over the new name.
16

III.ISSUES, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES

A. General Description

The two overarching issues raised by the recommendations outlined above are

overcoming resistance to major cultural change and obtaining needed budget increases. If the

recommendations to improve the level of on-going professional education and to institute a

training float are implemented, they could significantly impact the Foreign Service Institute,

possibly requiring a larger staff and a larger budget to support additional educational

opportunities.

The Foreign Service has the opportunity, with effective implementation of the

recommendations: to become a more attractive employer, better able to attract and retain the

right kinds of people; and more importantly, to more effectively fulfill its role in developing and

implementing U.S. foreign policy.

B. Issues and Suggested Approaches

The following sections outline, by major sub-recommendation, the issues and suggested

approaches for mitigating their negative impact.

1. Revamp the Examination Process. Revamping the examination process and

subsequently shortening the hiring process would prove to be advantageous for the Foreign

Service in attracting highly skilled and qualified candidates. Currently, the Service is losing

solid candidates due to the time it takes to complete the entire hiring process. The AEP has the

potential both to screen applicants effectively and to reduce the current lengthy hiring process.

Expanding the AEP could meet with resistance from those who came in through the old

system and may question the rigor of anything different. If AEP eligibility is limited to certain

types of applicants, it is more likely to be challenged as being discriminatory in some way. If

eligibility is limited, the Board of Examiners should work with the Bureau of Human Resources

and the Director General of the Foreign Service to ensure that they have legally defensible

criteria for eligibility. In order to minimize misunderstandings, policies regarding use of the

AEP should be clearly communicated to potential applicants and employees. A communication

plan and strategy should be developed to ensure that such individuals understand and are held

accountable for using the new process.

Developing and offering a computer-based written exam may require additional funding

and locating computer labs for test administration. It also may cause resistance. Modern

technology should make it fairly easy to computerize the written exam and assure security.

However, changing a long accepted practice often is not easy. If these changes were instituted,

the Foreign Service would need to communicate the new process within and outside the Service.

It also should assist current Foreign Service employees in understanding the reasons for the

change and how it would benefit the Service.

2. Dramatically Improve the Level of On-going Professional Education. Improving

the level of on-going professional education presents many potential challenges, not the least of

which is procuring an increased budget. Convincing the President and Congress that there is a

real need for a training float and that scarce budgetary resources should be used to create this
17

float could be a daunting task. In fact, the Department has tried unsuccessfully to obtain a

training float in the past.11 Developing a solid business case for the training float will help in

making the case for the additional funding. The Secretary of State should actively engage the

Bureau of Legislative Affairs in selling this idea to key members of Congress and their staffs.

The Department could then address major concerns before presenting a formal request—thus

maximizing the probability of success. The Secretary of State and the Director of the Foreign

Service should be ready to appear on Capitol Hill to justify the budget request.

Another significant barrier is the current perception of training within the Foreign

Service. Many senior level Foreign Service officers are proud that the only professional

education they have had, since initial orientation, is in foreign languages.12 Senior leaders will

need to be supportive of professional development opportunities and be willing to send their best

people. If some courses are mandatory and there is a professional development float, managers

will be more willing to let people go, confident that they can fill the vacated position. If

employees return from training and are able to demonstrate that the training makes them a better

employee, senior leaders should become more supportive.

If the FSI is not already doing so, it should institute a training assessment process that

evaluates the "real world" relevance and applicability of its training for FSOs. If training is to be

embraced as a valuable part of the culture, the courses will need to have "real world"

applicability, producing employees who are better equipped for their jobs as a result of attending

training.

3. Make Leadership a Core Value of the State Department. The main challenges in

making leadership a core value of the State Department are the impact it would have on the

culture of the Department and ensuring that competencies in leadership are a significant

consideration in selecting senior leaders, including Presidential appointees. This is an initiative

that will have to start at the top and trickle down. If senior leadership does not endorse the

change, it will not occur. In order to facilitate senior leadership buy-in, the Department should

involve senior leaders in defining the core leadership and management competencies required of

them.

Furthermore, unless senior leaders are held accountable for "living" the leadership core

values, these values most likely will not become ingrained in the culture. The assessment

process for senior leaders may need to include a 360 degree review process to gather sufficient

input from multiple sources on the effective demonstration of leadership core values.

If the performance management system is modified, a significant investment in training

and communication will be required. All employees will need to understand clearly the new

system and what it means for them personally.

4. Change the Foreign Service's Name to the U.S. Diplomatic Service. The main

problems that might arise with changing the name of the Foreign Service to the U.S. Diplomatic

Service are resistance from member of Congress to changing the Service's name or disagreement

over the new name. The Director General of the Foreign Service and State Department

 

11 Developing Diplomats for 2010: If Not Now, When? By Stephanie Smith Kinney. This document can be found at

http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat.

12 Developing Diplomats for 2010: If Not Now, When?
18

representatives should work closely with the committees of jurisdiction, the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee, to facilitate the process

and ensure that the reasons for the requested name change are clearly understood.

C. Summary Table

The following table provides a review of the specific issues and suggested approaches to

resolving them.

Issue Approach

1. Resistance to change of any kind • Develop an internal communication strategy

that communicates the changes including:

reason, timing, benefits, and expectations.

Communicate consistently and often.

• Involve employees and the American Foreign

Service Association in designing and

implementing the changes.

2. Obtain a budget increase to support the

training float • Develop a business case and strong budget

justification and aggressively educate OMB

and Congressional committee members on the

need for the training float and thus the budget

increase.

3. Position professional education, other than

language training, as value-added • Ensure that professional education has "real

world applicability."

• Regularly assess the relevance of course

offerings.

• Assess effectiveness of professional

education.

4. Make leadership a core value • Clearly define leadership in the context of the

Foreign Service.

• Clearly define and communicate core

leadership competencies.

• Include leadership competency as a key factor

in evaluating individuals for senior leadership

positions.

• Hold individuals accountable for living the

leadership core values.

5. Potential resistance from members of the

Congressional Committees of jurisdiction to

changing the name of the Foreign Service

• Educate committee Members and staff as to

the reasons for the name change.

Table 7. Summary of Issues and Approaches
19

IV. IMPLEMENTATION MEANS

Most of the Commission's recommendations can be implemented without legislative

action or executive orders. The two exceptions are addressed below.

A. Improve the Level of On-going Professional Education

The recommendation to improve dramatically the level of on-going professional

education will require an increased budget. Thus, the State Department will need to prepare a

budget submission that accounts for the necessary budgetary increases.

B. Change the Foreign Service's Name

The recommendation to change the name of the Foreign Service requires legislation. See

Appendix B for draft legislation.
20

V. PERSONNEL IMPLICATIONS

The focus of this entire implementation plan is personnel and therefore personnel

implications are interwoven throughout this report.
VI. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:

IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINT MATRIX
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Foreign Service

Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

I. Overall Recommendation: Overhaul the Foreign Service system by revamping the examination process, dramimproving the level of on-going professional education, and making leadership a core value of the State DepartmShorten the Hiring ProcessDramatically Without Compromisingthe Competitiveness of the System

1. Evaluate success of the AlternativeExamination Program (AEP)

Director General of theForeign Service

2 

2. If AEP is deemed a success, determine thetypes of applicants that could effectively bescreened through the AEP versus the traditionalwritten exam

Director General of theForeign Service

2 copr

3. Define criteria for AEP eligibility Board of Examiners for

the Foreign Service

2 copr

4. Write policy guidance expanding AEPavailability to all relevant applicants

Director General of theForeign Service

1 copr

5. Develop computer-based written exam Director General of the

Foreign Service

3 w

6. Ensure delivery and security mechanisms arein place for computer-based exam

Director General of theForeign Service

4 copr

7. Test computer-based exam for one examcycle

Board of Examiners forthe Foreign Service

Fin 

8. Evaluate feasibility of letting applicants sitfor exam at different times throughout the year

Board of Examiners forthe Foreign Service

4 w
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

9. Conduct a best practices analysis to evaluatethe possibility of adapting other innovativestreamlined hiring approaches for use in theState Department

Director General of theForeign Service

3 

10. If promising alternatives are found in thestudy in the above step, charter a team(s) totailor for Foreign Service

Director General of theForeign Service

1 reac

Discontinue the Oral Exam'sBlindfolding Process

1. Assess the impact of unblindfolding theindividual portion of the oral exam. Developreport for Director General of the ForeignService.

Board of Examiners forthe Foreign Service

Myeim

2. Assess whether blindfolding should beeliminated from group exercise.

Director General of theForeign Service

Sta

Dramatically Improve the Level ofOn-going Professional Education

1. Establish a working group to review ongoing professional education and trainingcurricula

Director of the ForeignService Institute

2

2. Identify mandatory courses in functionaltopics, languages, leadership and management,and possible new offerings

Director of HumanResources

1copr

3. Define training milestones that must be metfor promotion or advancement to supervisorypositions

Director of HumanResources

Cpr

4. Develop structure for rotating personnelthrough training effectively with minimalnegative impact on mission

Director of HumanResources

2 copr

5. Determine ideal levels and cones for the 10-15 percent additional personnel (allowing forthat proportion of the overall service to be intraining at any given time)

Director of HumanResources

Cpr
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

6. Validate exact budget increase necessary tosupport professional development float

Director of HumanResources

1 copr

7. Develop business case for increased budgetand staffing request

Director General of theForeignService/Director ofHuman Resources

1 copr

8. Consider alternative training deliverymethods (correspondence, internet, additionalpartnerships with universities or othereducational institutions)

Director of the ForeignService Institute

Premco

9. Develop a plan for communicating changesto employees

Director of HumanResources and Directorof the Foreign ServiceInstitute

Oth

Make Leadership a Core Value of theState Department

1. Define leadership in Foreign Service context Director General of the

Foreign Service

2 

2. Review and validate leadership competencies Director of Human

Resources

3 copr

3. Develop evaluation criteria guidelines forselection of senior State Department officials

Director of HumanResources

1 copr

4. Write policy requiring use of evaluationcriteria in selecting senior State Departmentofficials for career positions

Director of HumanResources

2 acpr

5. Share evaluation criteria with President andencourage their use in selecting Presidentialappointees

Secretary of State 1 

acev
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

6. Ensure that performance evaluation systemholds individuals accountable for living theleadership values

Director of HumanResources

Bacta

7. Ensure that recognition and promotionsystems recognize and reinforce the importanceof leadership

Director of HumanResources

Bacta

8. Develop plan for communicating changes toemployees

Director of HumanResources

Bacta

Change the Foreign Service's Nameto the U.S. Diplomatic Service

1. Draft legislation changing the ForeignService's name to the U.S. Diplomatic Service

Director General of theForeign Service

1 

2. Sell the name change to Congress Director General of the

Foreign Service

Cpr
APPENDIX B:

DRAFT LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE
1-B

Draft Legislative Language

An agency name change requires language that would be included in an Authorization Bill.

The language would include:

SEC _____. REDESIGNATION OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE.

(a) REDESIGNATION- The Foreign Service within the Department of State shall after the date

of the enactment of this Act be designated as the U.S. Diplomatic Service.

(b) REFERENCES- Any reference in any law, regulation, document, record, or other paper of

the United States or in any other provision of this Act to the Foreign Service shall be considered

to be a reference to the U.S. Diplomatic Service
Road Map for National Security

Addendum on Implementation

Civil Service Implementation Plan

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
1

Executive Summary

The primary objective of the Civil Service recommendations discussed in this addendum

is to develop and maintain a strong Civil Service workforce to support U.S. national security.

Accomplishing this goal requires the government to improve recruiting and retention, provide

better market-based compensation packages, and enhance professional development

opportunities.

The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century's (USCNS/21) charter

directs the Commission to include implementation concepts for its recommendations as part of

its final report. This document provides implementation concepts for the recommendations

pertaining to the Civil Service, shown in Table 1.

USCNS/21ST CENTURY RECOMMENDATIONS1

42. The President should order the elimination of recruitment hurdles for the Civil Service, ensure

a faster and easier hiring process, and see to it that strengthened professional education and

retention programs are worthy of full funding by Congress.

43. The Executive Branch should establish a National Security Service Corps (NSSC) to enhance

civilian career paths, and to provide a corps of policy experts with broad-based experience

throughout the Executive Branch.

Table 1. Summary of Recommendations

In the Commission's Phase III report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for

Change, the Commission states that there are problems in the Civil Service that require

"substantial and immediate attention." Lengthy recruiting practices, compensation that is not

comparable with the private sector, and promotion practices that reward longevity instead of

performance are just a few of the reasons why people do not consider government employment

at all, or leave before retirement. At the same time, there is a great need for Civil Service

employees who possess skills in information technology, math, science, and a variety of foreign

languages.

The Commission recommends several ways the federal government can attract people to

the Civil Service, including market-based compensation, reducing the length of time of the

recruiting process, offering professional and technical training, and providing challenging and

rewarding career paths. The Commission also recommends establishing a National Security

Service Corps (NSSC) that allows senior civilian workers the ability to work in different national

security organizations throughout the Executive Branch.

The Civil Service implementation plan provides implementation blueprints for nine

Commission sub-recommendations. These blueprints include actions to:

• Significantly increase recruiting programs through such programs as the

National Security Education Act that will link educational benefits to a service

requirement;

 

1 Recommendations addressed in this implementation plan are extracted from Road Map for National Security: Imperative for

Change, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21)'s Phase III report, posted on January 31,

2001, at www.nssg.gov, and published on March 15, 2001. All references are based on the published version. (Hereafter

cited as Road Map.)
2

• Revamp the security clearance process to provide for more efficient and timely

processing of employment applications;

• Provide additional funds to maximize agencies' options in recruiting and

retaining high-quality personnel;

• Increase agency end-strengths by 10-15 percent to allow workers to attend

critical professional education courses without sacrificing overall organization

performance;

• Use existing—and seek additional—authorities to allow direct hiring and

provide for more market-based compensation;

• Use and expand Office of Personnel Management (OPM) authorities to lift pay

cap restrictions on Civil Service and military information technology (IT)

professionals;

• Expand the Cyber Corps, whereby the U.S. Government pays for two years of a

student's education in exchange for two years of IT service;

• Outsource IT support functions where appropriate; and

• Establish an interagency coordination group to help the Office of Personnel and

Management develop new provisions.

This implementation plan also provides a detailed blueprint for establishing the

National Security Service Corps.

Five issues that could be stumbling blocks to successful implementation of these

recommendations include:

• A lack of clear definition of each program's requirements for the national

security organizations within the context of different governing personnel

authorities;

• The requirement for additional Congressional appropriations to implement

many of the Civil Service recommendations;

• The potential that changing security clearance procedures will not be popular

with most agencies because it is complex and difficult to implement;

• The challenges inherent in outsourcing government functions; and

• The need to obtain "buy-in" from both agencies and participants as a

prerequisite to an enduring NSSC program.

These and other potential challenges are addressed in Section III of this document.
3

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: CIVIL SERVICE

I. READER'S GUIDE

This reader's guide provides a brief introduction to the content and layout of the Civil

Service implementation plan. First, it provides a brief contextual background that aids the reader

in understanding this document; then addresses the scope of the implementation plan; finally it

provides the layout for the remainder of the document.

A. Background

The Charter of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

(USCNS/21) directed the Commission to include implementation concepts for its

recommendations as part of its final report.2 This document provides those concepts for the

Commission's recommendations pertaining to the Civil Service.

In the Commission's Phase III report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for

Change, the Commission states that there are problems in the Civil Service that require

"substantial and immediate attention." Lengthy recruiting practices, compensation that is not

comparable with the private sector, and promotion practices that reward longevity instead of

performance are just a few of the factors that dissuade more people from considering government

employment or induce them to leave before retirement. At the same time, there is an increasing

need for Civil Service employees who possess skills in information technology (IT), math,

science, and a variety of foreign languages.

To compete with the private sector, the federal government must make changes in the

ways it recruits, compensates, and retains its employees. The Commission recommends several

ways to attract people to the Civil Service, such as offering market-based compensation,

reducing the length of time of the recruiting process, offering professional and technical training,

and providing challenging and rewarding career paths.

The Commission's Phase III report argues that effective foreign and national security

policy will require traditional national security agencies and economic agencies to develop a

broader based, more integrated corps of national security policy experts. The Commission

recommends establishing a National Security Service Corps (NSSC) that provides mid-level and

senior civilian policy professionals the opportunity to work in different national security

organizations throughout the Executive Branch to ensure better policy integration.

B. Scope of Implementation Plan

This implementation plan identifies steps that can be taken to implement the

recommendations offered by the Commission. These actions are meant to guide the reader in

understanding the implications of the USCNS/21 recommendations. The plan also highlights

issues raised by the recommendations, including challenges in implementing them, and provides

options to facilitate implementation. Throughout the plan, tables are used to simplify

presentation and format remains the same for each recommendation to facilitate comparisons.

 

2 USCNS/21 Charter, July 1998 is contained in Appendix 2 of Road Map.
4

The Commission's final report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,

contains one broad and one specific recommendation for the Civil Service. The first

recommendation pertains to Civil Service recruiting, retention, and professional development

and is broken down into nine supporting initiatives. The second recommendation is aimed at

enhancing civilian career paths and providing a corps of policy experts with broad-based

experience throughout the Executive Branch through rotational assignments and professional

education.

The Commission believes its recommendations for improving the Civil Service can be

implemented without legislative changes or Executive Orders. Additional appropriations,

however, will be necessary to fund the initiatives. Implementation of the Civil Service

recommendations will require full understanding and utilization of a number of human resources

tools currently in place. The recommendations will also take significant commitment from

senior leaders and human resources directors in the national security community and

coordination with key agencies such as the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Clearly,

the greatest challenge to successful implementation is obtaining support and additional funding

for the recruiting, retention, and training initiatives. During the implementation process, it is also

important for Civil Service agencies to work collaboratively to increase the potential for

achieving the goals of improved recruiting and retention.

C. Implementation Plan Layout

Section II of this plan provides a blueprint for implementing the Commission's Civil

Service recommendations. This section suggests actions to achieve the objectives laid out in the

recommendations for improving hiring and retention in the Civil Service and for creating more

broad-based leaders; it identifies responsibility for those actions; and it provides a notional

timeline for each action. Appendix A includes a matrix summarizing the information in this

section.

Section III describes issues, challenges, and opportunities raised by the recommendations

and presents potential courses of action to address them.

Section IV summarizes the means by which the recommendations can be implemented.

Section V describes implications for the personnel affected by these recommendations,

including personnel transfers, reclassification, and training.

Section VI contains Appendix A, which summarizes in table format the actions,

responsibilities, and timelines required for achieving the Commission's recommendations.
5

II. IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINTS

This implementation plan highlights issues and requirements raised by Commission

recommendations and provides options that, if adopted, will facilitate implementation of those

recommendations. This plan offers specific sequential actions to achieve the objectives laid out

in the recommendations (and sub-recommendations) for improving recruitment and retention of

Civil Service employees, streamlining the security clearance process, outsourcing information

technology jobs where appropriate, and creating a National Security Service Corps. The

blueprints also identify responsibility for those actions and a timeline for each action.

A. Recruitment and Retention of Civil Service Employees

1. Background. The nation will face a major challenge in attracting and retaining a

high quality workforce for government service. Over 60 percent of the current workforce is

eligible for early or regular retirement today. Adding to this dilemma is the difficulty in

attracting new personnel to government employment and the increasing competition with the

private sector for the best and the brightest. While dealing with the prospect of replacing much

of the present workforce over the next several years is a challenge, it also creates an opportunity

to infuse new talent and ideas into the federal workforce. An even more acute problem,

particularly for the national security community, is attracting and retaining individuals in high

demand occupations such as information technology and low-density language specialists.

Several attempts have been made in the last decade to address the challenge of attracting

and retaining a highly skilled federal workforce. Indeed, the Commission believes some of these

problems are self-imposed. Government-wide and departmental authorities exist that address

many of these problems. Unfortunately, few agencies have taken full advantage of the tools

available. This is due in part to the fact that funds for recruiting and retention programs come

from the same pool of money for salaries; therefore, departments must make very difficult

decisions on how to spend personnel resources.

To address recruitment and retention problems in the Civil Service, the Commission

offered nine specific sub-recommendations focusing on means to improve general hiring and

personnel practices, means to attract IT talent, and means to ensure better interagency

coordination on personnel issues. Table 2 identifies these sub-recommendations.

Recommendation 42: The President should order the elimination of recruitment hurdles for

the Civil Service, ensure a faster and easier hiring process, and see to it that strengthened

professional education and retention programs are worthy of full funding by Congress.
6

42.(A) Recruiting, Hiring, Retaining, and

Training

1. Significantly increase recruiting programs through

programs like the National Security Education Act,

which will link educational benefits to a service

requirement

2. Revamp the security clearance process to provide

for more efficient and timely processing of job

applications

3. Provide additional funds to maximize agencies'

options in recruiting and retaining high-quality

personnel

4. Increase agency end-strengths by 10-15 percent to

allow for critical professional education

42.(B) Secure and Retain IT Talent 1. Use existing and seek additional authorities to

allow direct hiring and provide for more marketbased compensation

2. Use and expand the Office of Personnel

Management authorities to lift pay cap restrictions

on former Civil Service and military IT

professionals

3. Expand the Cyber Corps, whereby the U.S.

government pays for two years of a student's

schooling in exchange for two years of IT service

4. Where appropriate, outsource IT support functions

42.(C) Interagency Coordination Group Establish an interagency coordination group to help

OPM develop new provisions

Table 2. Specific Sub-recommendations for Improving

Recruitment and Retention

2. Implementation Blueprint. The following sub-section includes a series of tables,

one for each sub-recommendation. These tables outline the steps necessary to implement the

sub-recommendations, the organization responsible for each action, and a notional

implementation timeline for each action. Each table is followed by a narrative description of the

actions necessary to implement each sub-recommendation.
7

a.) Recruiting, Hiring, Retaining, and Training

In its Phase III report, the Commission states that “a national campaign to reinvigorate

and enhance the prestige of service to the nation is necessary to attract the best Americans to

military and civilian government service.” As part of this national campaign, the Commission

recommends that the government increase recruiting. One way to do this is through the passage

of a National Security Science and Technology Education Act (NSSTEA) and expansion of the

National Security Education Act (NSEA). Although expanding the NSEA is covered in a

separate implementation plan, it is useful to summarize here, along with the NSSTEA

recommendation:

• NSSTEA (Recommendation 11 in the Commission’s Phase III Report) – The

President should propose, and Congress should pass, a National Security Science and

Technology Education Act (NSSTEA) to support students' pursuits of degrees in

science, mathematics, and engineering. The Act should also contain provisions for

loan forgiveness and scholarships for those in these fields entering government or

military service.

• NSEA (Recommendation 39 in the Commission’s Phase III Report) – Congress

should significantly expand the National Security Education Act (NSEA) to include

broad support for social sciences, humanities, and foreign languages in exchange for

military and civilian service to the nation.

The current National Security Education Act of 1991 provides limited undergraduate

scholarships and graduate fellowships for students to study a variety of subjects, including

foreign language and foreign area studies. The Act also allows the use of funds at institutions of

higher learning to develop faculty expertise in the languages and cultures of less commonly

studied countries. Recipients incur an obligation either to work for an office or agency of the

federal government involved in national security affairs, or to pursue careers as educators for a

period equal to the time covered by the scholarship.

An expanded Act would increase scholarship opportunities and increase the length of the

scholarships to up to four-years at qualified U.S. universities and colleges. It would also remove

certain limitations on scholarship recipients, such as the requirement for overseas study. Upon

graduation, scholarship recipients could fulfill their service in a number of ways, including:

active duty in the U.S. military; service in National Guard or Reserve units; working in national

security departments and agencies as Civil Servants; or as Foreign Service Officers. To prepare

students to fulfill these service requirements, the scholarship program might include a training

regimen, although this would likely vary significantly for military and civilian service. One

model of this training regimen might be a civilian equivalent of the Reserve Officers Training

Corps (ROTC) or Platoon Leader Course (PLC) that includes academic elements as well as

training in government offices during the summers.

To encourage individuals who have already graduated, and thus have not had the

opportunity to obtain an NSEA scholarship, to enter government service, the Act should offer

loan deferral, reduction, and forgiveness incentives. For example, educational loan repayments

Significantly increase recruiting programs through programs like the National Security

Education Act, which will link educational benefits to a service requirement.
8

could be deferred, reduced by a set percentage each year, or eliminated while individuals serve in

government. In such cases, the government would assume the financial obligations of the

graduate, so that neither financial nor educational institutions suffer.

The Commission believes the combination of the NSSTEA and an expanded NSEA will

prepare Americans for many forms of service and more generally will help recruit high-quality

Civil Service and military personnel.

Although creating the NSSTEA and expanding the current NSEA will provide two

valuable recruitment tools, the federal government must also do more to raise the awareness of

these programs to undergraduate and graduate students, especially those enrolled in crucial

disciplines. In addition, departments and agencies must expand their recruitment programs

generally, in order to bring qualified younger professionals into service.

Table 3 suggests actions for increasing recruitment of students into federal service.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. OPM takes the lead on a

nationwide recruiting campaign

OPM Immediate

2. Agencies identify recruitment

needs and develop plans to recruit

college students using existing and

new recruitment tools

Heads of recruiting at

individual agencies

3 months

3. Agencies recruit at college

recruitment fairs and use outside

recruitment firms as necessary

Recruiting

departments at

individual agencies

Ongoing after completion of

previous step

4. Congress enacts the NSSTEA Congress 1 year

5. Congress provides additional

funding for the NSSTEA and

expansion of the NSEA

Congress FY03 budget

Table 3. Specific Sub-recommendation for Increasing Student Recruitment

The Office of Personnel Management should work with the national security agencies

and take the lead to establish and administer a nationwide recruiting campaign for attracting

undergraduate and graduate students to the national security components of the Civil Service.

By taking the lead in this campaign to renew interest in and attract the best students to public

service, OPM will be able to provide consistent messages and recruiting materials, which

demonstrate to students that Civil Service, especially in national security positions, is an

excellent choice for those who seek a challenging and rewarding career. OPM materials should

also provide detailed information on the NSEA and NSSTEA. As the lead office, OPM will also

be able to advise government agencies and departments on the recruiting tools and incentives

available to students and graduates. Meanwhile, national security agencies should work with

OPM, the NSEA Board and the agency that will administer the NSSTEA to ensure that enough

positions are available for recipients of the scholarships made available by the NSEA and the

NSSTEA.

Agencies and departments must identify their current and future personnel needs as well

as identify the colleges and universities that will most likely be able to provide students with the
9

skills to fulfill those needs. OPM can provide agencies with guidance, tools, and information

about colleges and universities during this process. More generally, some agencies must begin

recruiting again.

Agency recruiting departments should attend college and university fairs on a regular

basis to establish rapport with guidance counselors and placement officers. Agency and

department recruiters should provide information to college students throughout their college

careers on scholarships and incentives for repayment of student loans in return for federal

service. To make longer term recruiting more effective, agencies and departments should be

active in high school career days whenever possible.

A successful recruiting campaign will also require Congressional action. The President

should request Congress to enact the NSSTEA and expand the NSEA. Congress should provide

the funding for these recruiting incentives during the budget cycle so that they can be used to

attract the talent needed now for national security positions in the Civil Service. This is

especially important in light of the number of Civil Service employees eligible or soon-to-be

eligible for retirement.

The length and complexity of most federal government job applications and security

clearance processes are devastating in an economy where private sector firms can make on-thespot offers. The Director of Recruitment at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recently

stated that the "CIA's biggest (recruiting) challenge is that potential employees often receive

multiple offers from private sector companies while they are waiting for the agency to complete

their [security] background check."3 The security clearance process is cumbersome, and there is

usually a large backlog of background investigations. Thus, it is clear that security clearance

requirements increase the time required to hire new employees. However, it is not clear that all

positions "coded" for security clearances actually require the specified level of clearance, and

verifying security requirements is an important first step to reducing the time between initial

contact with a recruiter and first day of work.

At the same time, the process by which security clearances are granted should be

streamlined without sacrificing thoroughness to allow national security agencies and departments

the ability to compete with the commercial sector for IT and other skilled employees. To support

the overhaul of the security clearance processes, the Commission recommends that agencies and

departments re-code positions to allow some employees to start work before receiving final

security clearances. The Commission also recommends establishing a bipartisan Commission

drawn from the Executive and Legislative Branches of government to examine methods of

streamlining the security clearance process, while maintaining the rigor required for national

security positions.

 

3 Strong, Joseph C. Anselmo, "CIA Tech Recruiting", Washington Techway, October 17, 2000. For example, the process by

which security clearances are granted usually requires months. During that time, prospective employees have little recourse

but to wait for an official offer. Many applicants therefore choose other jobs in the interim. Often, by the time the security

clearance is finally granted, they have already found lucrative and interesting employment outside of the government.

Revamp the security clearance process to provide for more efficient and timely processing

of job applications.
10

Individual agencies already have the authority to make decisions to re-code positions.

Executive Order No. 12968, Section 2.1 authorizes federal agencies to make decisions about the

level of security clearance its positions require.4 Other relevant legislation and Executive Orders

that govern employee access to classified information for all Executive Branch agencies and

departments include:

• U.S. Code Title 50 - War and National Defense, Chapter 15 - National Security,

Subchapter VI - Access to Classified Information, Section 435. Procedures

• Executive Order No. 12958. Classified National Security Information, April 20,

1995 (within Title 50)

• Executive Order No. 12968. Access to Classified Information, Aug. 2, 1995

(within Title 50)

It is important to note that, although the process is complex, each agency has the

authority to determine the level of clearance that positions warrant. Each agency also has

specific criteria for coding clearance requirements. All agencies have their own ideas and

cultural biases regarding the extent to which classified material must be safeguarded. This is

important in the present environment because agencies and departments may be reluctant to

overstep what have become cultural norms to consider re-coding positions because of recent

high-profile security breaches. However, doing so may help alleviate the backlog for some

applicants.

Table 4 suggests actions for streamlining the security clearance process and for

identifying and re-coding positions where possible. The White House should form an ExecutiveLegislative Commission to review the security clearance processes and generate new ideas for

streamlining them.5

 

4 Section 2.1 of Executive Order 12968 states that "authorization for access to classified information pursuant to Executive

Order No. 12829 may be granted by the head of a department or his designee, including but not limited to, those officials

named in section 8 of this order, to an individual, hereinafter termed an ''applicant," for a specific classification category

only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so."

5 The Clinton Administration, in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 29, established the Security Policy Board and other

associated entities to coordinate, review, and recommend changes to security policy and procedures. The Administration of

President George W. Bush, with the promulgation of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1, has transferred the

duties of the Security Policy Board and associated entities to unspecified Policy Coordination Committees established by

NSPD 1.
11

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Consult with Congress about

establishing an ExecutiveLegislative Commission to

streamline the security clearance

process

White House and

OPM

Immediate - 3 months

2. Obtain authorization and funding

for the Commission and any

supporting staff

White House FY03 budget

3. Appoint security clearance policy

experts to take part in the

Commission

Congress and

Executive Branch

Upon Congressional

authorization for Commission

and appropriations of operating

funds

4. Report on findings and

recommendations for streamlining

the security clearance process

Commission 6 months from inception of

Commission

5. Using Commission

recommendations, make legislative

or executive level changes to the

security clearance process

White House,

Congress, OPM

6-12 months after Commission

report

6. Agencies and departments

involved in the security clearance

process or holding positions

requiring security clearances

implement the changes

recommended by the ExecutiveLegislative Commission

Individual agencies

and departments

Upon Congressional, OPM,

and/or Presidential

authorizations

7. Heads of agencies and

departments that require security

clearances review positions for recoding; establish guidelines/criteria

for this review

White House 3 months concurrent with step 1

8. Agencies review security

clearance requirements and identify

those positions that could be recoded

Senior managers in

individual agencies

4 months

9. Review identified positions and

authorize re-coding as appropriate

Agency head or

senior security

manager at each

agency

6 months after re-coded

positions are identified

10. If necessary, make legislative or

executive level changes for the

purpose of improving the process of

re-coding positions

White House,

Congress, OPM

Ongoing

Table 4. Implementation Matrix for Revamping the Security Clearance Process
12

A bipartisan Executive-Legislative Commission should be set up to find ways to

significantly reduce the time in which investigations are completed and reduce the current

backlog of investigations and reinvestigations.6 Establishing a Commission of this caliber will

require the support of the President and Congress, as members would be drawn from both the

Executive and Legislative Branches and Congress would have to appropriate operating funds.

The White House, with the assistance of OPM, should begin consultations with Congress

immediately to introduce the idea of such a Commission and specify its mandate. Consultations

on the mandate should explore all options for improving the security clearance process, including

outsourcing and privatization of security clearance processes, as well as reviewing the adequacy

of currently allocated resources. Similarly, consultations on the composition of the Commission

should include the appointment of private sector experts among Commission members.

Following these consultations, the President should present a legislative proposal to

Congress for establishing the Commission, including recommendations for its composition,

charter, and operating procedures. Simultaneously, the President should request Congressional

funding for the Commission by including a funding request in the next budget presented to

Congress.

Once the Commission has been authorized and funded by Congress, the President and

Congress should appoint members according to the procedures authorized by law. Some

prospective government members include officials from the Government Accounting Office

(GAO), OPM, the House Armed Services, Veterans Affairs (VA), International Relations, and

Government Reform Committees; the Senate Armed Services Committee and Subcommittee on

Personnel7. Representation from the Treasury, Commerce, State and Defense Departments

should also be considered.

The Commission should report its findings to Congress within a year of beginning its

work. Its recommendations should address streamlining security clearance processes and

reducing the backlog of investigations and re-investigations. The Commission should explore

the efficacy of using business process reengineering or other process improvement mechanisms

to enable swift but thorough background investigations. It should also make recommendations

on the benefits of improving current automated systems or creating new ones. Reducing the

backlog of investigations will require streamlining the process and investments in a viable

information technology infrastructure and dependable automated systems that support

background investigation processes.8

The President and Congress should then work together to enact the recommendations of

the Commission. If additional legislation or executive action is warranted, Congress and the

President should provide the new authorities as soon as possible to enhance recruiting by

 

6 A Joint Security Commission was established in May 1993, by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central

Intelligence to review security policies and procedures. It was convened twice and issued reports on its work in 1994 and

1999. Establishing an Executive-Legislative Commission would renew attention on this issue.

7 GAO has extensive involvement in review of the background investigation process, especially Defense Security Service

(DSS) processes, and has made many recommendations to DSS for improvements in the past. OPM also has extensive

experience, having conducted background investigations through its Investigations Services department until it privatized

this function, setting up the U.S. Investigations Service, Inc. in July, 1996.

8 In recent years, DSS has faced criticism for failing to conduct investigations in a timely manner. Reasons for these

problems include: a reduction in personnel due to downsizing, lack of proper training for investigators, and failure of

information technology systems that were supposed to help streamline the process.
13

eliminating the long security clearance process. Agencies and departments should modify

current practices to reflect any changes in legislation or executive authorities. The Defense

Security Service, OPM, the U.S. Investigations Service, and any other organizations that perform

security clearance investigations should do the same.

To initiate the process of identifying and re-coding positions, the White House should

issue a memorandum to departments and agencies directing a review of positions requiring

security clearances, particularly those filled by new entrants. This memorandum would provide

guidance regarding the types of positions to review and the criteria to be used in reviewing them.

Senior managers in individual agencies and departments should then begin a threemonth review of positions, as appropriate, to identify those positions that could be re-coded

to allow workers to begin working in a shorter amount of time while awaiting their

clearance or a higher level clearance.

Agency heads or senior security managers at each agency should then review the

identified positions and authorize re-coding where appropriate. Agency heads have the

authority to determine the access of individuals to the agency's classified information.9 Recoding positions may require changes to building structures, such as walls and barriers;

changes to access-limiting devices, such as locks, ciphers and other devices; changes in

policy and other agency manuals; and other changes that would limit access or change

procedures needed as a result of re-coded positions. To determine the degree to which recoding positions and making necessary changes to provide for those new codings makes

sense, a cost-benefit analysis should be performed. To determine the security risks

involved in re-coding positions, a risk assessment also should be performed.

After all assessments are performed and final decisions are made on re-coded positions,

agencies should immediately update vacancy announcements to reflect the new security

requirements and notify recruiters (internal and external to the agency) and hiring managers

about the changes made. Findings, including lessons learned and re-coding decisions, should be

reported to the Executive-Legislative Commission discussed above, together with

recommendations for improving the position re-coding process.

If necessary, OPM, Congress, and/or the White House should make legislative or

executive level changes for the purpose of improving the process of re-coding positions.

Agencies and departments should report findings to the Executive-Legislative Commission,

established for streamlining the security process, during the course of identifying and re-coding

positions.

Funding has been a significant hurdle to improving recruitment and retention rates across

the Civil Service. Indeed, agencies have at their disposal a number of tools to address

recruitment and retention challenges. Various OPM and departmental authorities allow agencies

the ability to offer bonuses, allowances, and education benefits as recruitment, retention, and

 

9 This authority is provided by Executive Order No. 12968, Section 2.1.

Provide additional funds to maximize agencies' options in recruiting and retaining highquality personnel.
14

career development tools. Several of these tools were authorized by the 1990 Federal Employees

Pay Comparability Act (P.L. 101-509). Other authorities OPM developed include the following:

• Recruitment and Relocation Bonuses – Agencies have discretionary authority to

make a lump-sum payment of up to 25 percent of basic pay to a newly

appointed employee or to an employee who must relocate. [5 U.S.C.5753; 5

CFR Part 575, Subparts a and b]

• Retention Allowances – Agencies have discretionary authority to make

continuing payments of up to 25 percent of basic pay to an employee and up to

10 percent of basic pay to a group of employees with high qualifications and a

reasonable likelihood of leaving government service. [5 U.S.C.5753; 5 CFR

Part 575, subparts c]

• Repayment of Student Loans – Agencies can offer student loan repayments up

to $6,000 per year for a maximum of $40,000 to individuals with an offer of

employment and to current employees. [5 CFR Part 537]

Using the full extent of these authorities can reduce recruiting and retention

problems. Unfortunately, the use of these tools has been hindered, in part, by a lack of

resources. Because funding for these tools comes from agencies' Salary and Expense

budgets, agencies are forced to chose between funding positions and using resources to

help alleviate recruiting and retention problems. The Commission therefore recommends

providing additional funds to maximize agencies' options in recruiting and retaining highquality personnel. Table 5 provides an implementation plan for obtaining more funding to

allow agencies to utilize the available programs for recruitment and retention.
15

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Establish guidance and fiscal

parameters for a review of the

effective use of recruitment and

retention authorities

OMB 1 month

2. Agencies review funding

requirements for the effective use of

recruitment and retention authorities

HR directors and senior

agency officials

3 months

3. Establish performance metrics for

each of the recruiting and retention

authorities

HR directors and senior

agency officials

Concurrent with previous task

4. Agencies adjust budget

submissions to reflect funding

requirements for using recruitment

and retention authorities

HR directors and senior

agency officials

2003 budget cycle

5. Work with members of Congress

to establish the need for additional

funds

OPM, individual

agencies

Immediately following

previous task

6. Work with department officials,

OMB, and Congress to modify the

budget and develop appropriations

language

HR directors, senior

agency officials

individuals responsible

for budget preparation

2003 budget cycle

Table 5. Implementation Matrix for Increasing Recruiting and Retention Funds

As a first step, OMB should establish guidance and fiscal parameters for agency reviews.

Then, each agency must identify funding requirements to take advantage of existing recruitment

and retention authorities. Agency human resources (HR) directors should meet with senior

managers to outline the available authorities and the impact that added funding is likely to have

on recruitment and retention. As a group, agency senior managers and HR officials should make

strategic decisions about the types of recruiting and retention tools the organization will use, the

types of occupations and situations for which the tools will be used, and a general budget for

each type of tool. As a part of the review, agencies should develop performance metrics

associated with each of the recruitment and retention tools. These metrics, if properly designed

and consistently tracked, would help to ensure the return on investment from the funds expended

on recruitment and retention.

Agencies must then adjust their budget submissions to include additional funding for

recruiting and retention authorities over the next fiscal year. At the same time, OPM and the

individual agencies should work with Congress to establish the need for the additional funding in

order to take advantage of existing recruiting and retention tools. The agencies must then work

with their departments, OMB, and Congress to support budget submissions.

The Commission noted that professional education is required to maintain a

"knowledgeable cadre of national security professionals" in the Civil Service. Although

Increase agency end-strengths by 10-15 percent to allow for critical professional education.
16

professional education opportunities exist, there is no incentive, and minimal opportunity, to take

advantage of these offerings. Policy offices of national security departments and agencies are

already overburdened. Thus, if a manager decides to send a person for professional education,

there is no replacement. Because short-term pressures are so intense, managers often prefer to

keep their best people working, rather than lose them for weeks or months at a time while they

complete professional education programs.

However, managers should view professional education as a benefit rather than an

inconvenient drain on personnel resources. The Civil Service will accrue considerable long-term

benefits from increasing opportunities for employees to take advantage of professional education

programs and ensuring that professional education opportunities are of the highest quality. For

example, a well-conceived professional education program will yield higher quality staff,

improved retention, and serve as a greater recruiting draw.

To offset managers' concerns about being short-handed if their personnel are involved in

professional education, the Commission recommends increasing national security affairs offices’

end-strengths within each agency by 10-15 percent. This increase will allow employees to take

advantage of professional education opportunities without reducing productivity. In addition to

increasing available staff, agencies should also consider several other factors to improve the level

of on-going professional education. These factors include the current professional education

opportunities in the Civil Service, agency professional education requirements, professional

education (including travel) budgets, and the procedures for rotating professionals to cover

shortages created by professional education. Table 6 outlines the steps for addressing these

issues and the Commission's recommendation.
17

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Establish consistent and replicable

procedures for individual agencies to

review ongoing professional

education and training curricula

Agency director, training

or HR director, line

managers

2 months

2. Review existing professional

education and training curricula

including courses, seminars,

workshops, and tutorials

Agency training director 3 months after completion

of previous task

3. Consolidate findings and rank

order existing courses by relevance

and criticality

Training director and key

supervisors, with

involvement of line

managers

2 months after completion

of previous task

4. Identify mandatory courses in

functional topics, languages,

leadership, and management

Agency director, training

or HR director, with

involvement of line

managers

2 months after completion

of previous task

5. Define learning mastery that must

be met for promotion or

advancement to supervisory

positions

Agency director, training

or HR director, with

involvement of line

managers

Concurrent with previous

task

6. Develop structure for rotating

personnel through training

effectively, coupled with potential

for distance learning, resulting in a

minimal negative impact on mission

Agency director, training

or HR director, with

involvement of line

managers

2 months after completion

of previous task

7. Determine ideal levels and

occupations for the 10%-15%

additional personnel (allowing for

that proportion of the overall service

to be in training at any given time)

Agency director,

Training or HR director,

with involvement of line

managers

Concurrent with previous

task

8. Identify budget increase necessary

to support training float

Agency director,

Training or HR director,

with involvement of line

managers

1 month after completion of

previous task

9. Develop business case for

increased budget and staffing request

Agency director,

Training or HR director,

with involvement of line

managers

1 month after completion of

previous task

10. Develop plan for communicating

changes to employees

Agency director,

Training or HR director,

with involvement of line

managers

Ongoing throughout the

process

Table 6. Implementation Matrix for Increasing Agency End-Strength

to Support Professional Education
18

The first step in increasing the level of ongoing professional education is for each agency

to review current professional education offerings with regard to knowledge, skills, attitudes, and

abilities necessary for learning, maintenance, and improvement of performance capabilities.

This process will serve as the method to determine if any changes are needed and should be done

by developing a replicable and consistent set of procedures for individual agencies to review

ongoing professional education and training curricula. After the initial review, educational

offerings should be reviewed regularly for their relevance to the policy community. The first

step would be to compare core and specialized competencies with representatives from each

agency’s Office of Professional Development, their Office of Human Resources, coupled with

participation of policy line managers.

The timeline allows five months for the first iteration of this study. To be effective, this

review should include a survey of, and/or focus groups with agency employees at all levels to

gain a better understanding of current and anticipated training needs to ensure that they are well

equipped to serve national security. The iterative process of the study includes reviewing

existing professional education and training events, which may take the form of courses,

seminars, workshops, and tutorials (including distance learning). Outcomes from the process

will take the form of ranked listings of existing instructional events, along with their relevance

and criticality to the agency.

This professional education analysis should not be a one-time event, but rather a

continuing process that accommodates changes in technologies, policy issues, regulations, and

operations. A process for regularly evaluating professional education should be established at all

agencies to ensure that national security personnel are provided with leading edge educational

opportunities.

After making recommendations on the professional education curricula, agencies should

identify whether any professional education should be mandatory for all, or a certain subset of,

employees. This assessment should include consideration of, and recommendations for,

professional education milestones that would be required for promotion or advancement to

supervisory positions.

Each agency’s human resources department should identify the necessary budget increase

to support the training float and develop a business case supporting the training float request.

Agencies will need to develop and submit increased budgets with justifications. Strong business

cases will help sell the requests.

Human resources also must develop a policy and structure for rotating personnel through

professional education in a way that will maximize the benefits and minimize the negative

impact on the department or agency's mission. An alternative to traditional classroom-based,

fixed time, instructional offerings should be considered in terms of distance learning.10 Finally,

this change will have a significant impact on personnel and it will be necessary to educate

employees on new professional education opportunities and requirements. Human resources and

professional development should work together to develop and implement a comprehensive

communication plan.

 

10 This approach is in accordance with Executive Order 13111, Using Technology to Improve Training Opportunities for

Federal Government Employees, January 12, 1999. Furthermore, that Executive Order was enhanced by EO 13188,

Amendment to EO 13111, Extension of the Advisory Committee on Expanding Training Opportunities, January 12, 2001.
19

b.) Secure and Retain IT Talent. The Commission gave special priority "to

measures to secure and retain IT talent in the most mission-critical areas." It suggested that

direct hire authority and more market-based compensation are needed to compete with the

private sector for IT expertise. For the most part, adequate authorities exist to create incentives

for IT specialists to join and remain in government service. The biggest challenge for national

security agencies is to implement recruitment and retention programs for IT and other hard-to-fill

positions that effectively take advantage of existing authorities.

There are significant differences between the intelligence agencies that support the

Defense Department (i.e., National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office

(NRO), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),

intelligence components of military departments), the CIA, and other agencies with national

security missions with respect to their governing personnel authorities and the flexibility these

authorities afford. Table 7 below provides a brief overview (and guide for the remainder of the

section) of the differences in direct hire and market-based compensation by governing personnel

authority.

Use existing and seek additional authorities to allow direct hiring and provide for more

market-based compensation.
20

Defense Intelligence

Community

CIA Other National Security

Agencies

Governing

Personnel

Authority

10 U.S.C. 1601-14 50 U.S.C.

National Security Act

of 1947

5 U.S.C.

Oversight Secretary of Defense

(SECDEF)

Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI)

U.S. Office of Personnel

Management

Direct Hiring

Authorities All appointments

excepted from

competition

All appointments

excepted from

competition

• Outstanding Scholar

(GS-5/7)

• Bilingual/Bicultural

(GS-5/7)

• Some positions are in

the excepted service

(excepted from

competition)

Market-based

Compensation • IT Special Salary

Rates

• Three pay bands, pay

can be set at market

rates within the band

• Partially marketbased salaries for

computer specialists

• Pay banding for

other selected

occupations

• IT special salary rates

• Request demonstration

project authority

Table 7. Personnel Authorities for National Security Agencies

This section outlines the governing personnel authorities and associated personnel

flexibilities related to direct hiring and market-based compensation for IT personnel in each

group. Because the personnel authorities are different for different agencies, this section

proposes one implementation plan for the Intelligence Community (e.g., defense related

intelligence agencies and the CIA) and another for those agencies with national security missions

governed by 5 U.S.C. (also called the competitive service.)

1.) Securing and Retaining IT Talent in Selected Intelligence Community

Agencies. Intelligence community agencies, with the exception of the CIA, are primarily

governed by the Defense Civilian Personnel System (DCIPS) under Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

DCIPS was enacted in 1996 and allows intelligence agencies significant human resources

latitude. DCIPS provides included agencies with the following personnel flexibilities:

• Direct hire authority – All positions under DCIPS are excepted service

(excepted from competition) and thus agencies can make direct hires.
21

• Pay banding11 – All applicable pay grades are collapsed into three pay bands.

Agencies can set individual pay within the entire pay band enabling marketbased compensation within the bands.

The CIA personnel system is governed by the National Security Act of 1947 (Title

50 of the U.S. Code). As a result, the CIA is exempt from some Title 5 requirements and

has the ability to request special personnel authorities from Congress as needed to

effectively pursue their intelligence mission. The CIA can make direct hires and marketbased salary offers as follows:

• Direct hire authority – The CIA is exempt from Title 5 with respect to hiring, so

recruiters are authorized to make conditional on-the-spot offers to candidates

who meet basic qualifications. The Agency reserves the right to rescind the

offer if necessary.

• Market-based compensation – Computer specialists are paid special salary rates

using a pay grade system, similar to the Government Service (GS) system, that

is partially based on market rates. The Agency also uses pay banding for other

selected occupations.

Intelligence Community agencies that support DoD do not take full advantage of the

flexibilities authorized under their governing personnel legislation. In fact, many follow Title 5

regulations in whole or in part. The reasons for this are numerous. First, using Title 5 personnel

regulations and procedures ensures Merit Principles are followed and thus limits the risk of

prohibited personnel practices and grievances. Second, many defense intelligence agencies

obtain personnel services from regionalized personnel centers that provide personnel services to

several defense agencies, primarily agencies subject to Title 5. The centers and their personnel

specialists may be either unwilling or unable to focus on developing programs that take

advantage of DCIPS flexibilities. Third, personnel specialists who have years of experience in

the competitive service rules and regulations may not be well informed about the flexibilities of

Title 10 and may be concerned about the risks associated with programs outside of these rules

and regulations. Fourth, managers in the defense intelligence agencies are accustomed to

personnel offices dictating human resources practices. They may not be well trained or

comfortable with their new authority to make hiring and pay decisions. Finally, organizations

that represent employee interests work to ensure employee protections that are a hallmark of the

competitive service are continued under Title 10 and 50.

To address the issues mentioned above and maximize the flexibilities afforded under

Titles 10 and 50 the following actions are suggested:

 

11 Pay banding is a compensation method whereby pay grades are collapsed into a few pay bands that encompass a greater

salary range. In pay banding managers typically have more flexibility to set pay for an individual than in a pay grade system

like the General Schedule system used by most agencies in the competitive service.
22

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Appoint a DCIPS Ombudsman for

all personnel centers that service

intelligence agencies

Intelligence agency

directors

1 month

2. Conduct a study to determine

which IT positions need to be paid at

market-based salaries

DCIPS ombudsmen

and HR directors

2 months

3. Establish programs (including

direct hire authorities and marketbased compensation) that take full

advantage of the flexibility afforded

under Titles 10 and 50

DCIPS ombudsmen

and HR directors

3 months

4. Develop a guidance document that

outlines flexible programs and how

to implement them for personnel

specialists and managers

DCIPS ombudsmen

and HR directors

3 months

5. Conduct a major organization

change effort that fully educates

personnel specialists on the

flexibility under Titles 10 and 50 and

prepares them to provide appropriate

guidance to managers

Intelligence agency

directors, DCIPS

ombudsmen, and HR

directors

6 months

6. Establish metrics to track success Intelligence agency

directors, DCIPS

ombudsmen, and HR

directors

1 month

7. Create and appropriately staff one

personnel center that services all

DCIPS clients

Intelligence agency

directors

2 years

Table 8. Implementation Matrix for Achieving Personnel Flexibility

in the Intelligence Community

To increase the possibility of using the direct hiring and market compensation authorities,

intelligence community agency directors should appoint an ombudsman for DCIPS. This

ombudsman would champion the full use of existing authorities and serve as the bridge between

agency managers and personnel. The ombudsman should work with the personnel centers and

agency managers to identify IT positions that should be paid market-based salaries to fulfill

critical skills gaps, develop programs that meet the unique human resources needs of each

agency, and ensure roadblocks to successful implementation are avoided. The ombudsmen must

also prepare a document that explains what recruiting, retention, and compensation actions can

be implemented; how to implement them, the level of approval or coordination required; and

points of contact/references. A request for additional funds for paying market-based salaries

must be prepared, also.

In addition to appointing an ombudsman, major changes must take place in those portions

of the intelligence community that support the Department of Defense community. To start,
23

personnel specialists must become well versed in the authorities that apply to the agency they

service. To be effective, specialists must be given the tools and training that enable them to

become true consultants to agency managers. Personnel specialists should be able to give sound

guidance to managers regarding options for hiring and compensating employees without being

prescriptive. Intelligence agency managers must have a better understanding of the human

resources decisions they are empowered to make. They must be provided the training and tools

necessary to make informed human resources decisions. A guidance document should be the

cornerstone for these training efforts. To ensure the programs meet manager needs, comply with

merit principles and do not create funding overruns, the ombudsmen and their agency managers

should create metrics to track the performance of these programs.

Ultimately, the defense intelligence agencies should come together to create and staff one

personnel servicing center devoted to providing the agencies with appropriate IT human

resources consultation services that takes full advantage of DCIPS authorities. This center would

have staff devoted to each agency to create programs that meet each agency's unique

requirements but would work together to leverage best practices and achieve financial savings.

The consolidation into one personnel servicing center would result in efficiencies as well as

greater effectiveness, as different procedures and methodologies could be rationalized and

simplified.

2.) Other National Security Agencies. In contrast to Intelligence Community

activities, other national security agencies are primarily governed by Title 5, and therefore have

much more limited personnel flexibility. However, these agencies do have some direct hire

authorities and avenues for more market-based compensation. A resolution to a class action

lawsuit in 1981, the Luevano Consent Decree, authorized two direct hiring programs to fill jobs

at the GS-5 and 7 level in the competitive service:

• The Outstanding Scholar Program, in which agencies can directly hire college

graduates with a 3.5 or higher or who were in the top 10 percent of their

undergraduate class, and

• The Bilingual/Bicultural Program that allows agencies to directly hire

individuals with Spanish language proficiency or knowledge of Hispanic

cultures to benefit job performance.

Since OPM delegated examining authority to all competitive service agencies, the ability

to make direct hires for special "shortage category" positions rests with each individual agency.

However, agencies must still apply the "rule of three"12 and veterans preference in making these

direct hires. These requirements make it nearly impossible to make on-the spot offers, unless

agencies are filling an extremely large number of vacancies for one occupation. Prior to

government-wide delegated examining, OPM granted the authority for agencies to make direct

hires for special shortage categories without these restrictions.

A few national security agencies have excepted service positions, including the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Like agencies included in DCIPS, the FBI could make direct

 

12 The "rule of three" refers to the process used in the competitive service of referring the top three most qualified candidates to

a hiring manager for selection.
24

hires. However, the agency has chosen to require most new hires to take a general exam prior to

consideration.

With respect to more market-based compensation, competitive service agencies can set

employee pay higher than step 1 of the pay grade range if the applicant has superior

qualifications [5 U.S.C. 5333, 5 CFR Part 531.203, Subpart c]. OPM also is authorized to

establish special salary rates for certain hard-to-fill occupations. Any department can request a

special salary rate but the department must coordinate the request with other federal agencies

with employees in similar occupations and localities [5 U.S.C. 5305; 5 CFR Part 530, Subpart c].

In addition, OPM released a memorandum (CPM 2000-14) on November 3, 2000 to

human resources directors that authorized paying special salary rates to IT workers in Grades 5-

12 effective January 2001. Rates were established based on market compensation for IT

workers. In their research, OPM found that the "most severe IT staffing problems are found at

the lower, entry level grades."13 OPM is continuing to monitor the staffing situation for IT

professionals in grades 13 and above. In the November memorandum, OPM also mentions that

"agencies may request higher special rates for specific IT specialties, grade levels and or

geographic areas, and a related occupation not covered by the current memorandum."14

A final option for establishing more market-based compensation for agencies under Title

5 is to seek approval from OPM to establish personnel demonstration projects. These projects

are authorized under Title VI of the Civil Service Reform Act and provide a structure for testing

and introducing beneficial change in personnel practices. This is the vehicle through which an

agency or organization obtains the authority to waive existing Title 5 law and regulations in

order to propose and test interventions. Most agencies that have established demonstration

projects have a pay banding component that allows for more market-based compensation.

Table 9 outlines suggested actions that competitive service agencies can take to use direct

hire authorities and more market-based compensation.

 

13 United States Office of Personnel Management Memorandum, Subject: Special Salary Rates for IT Workers, Henry

Romero, Associate Director for Workforce Compensation and Performance, November 3, 2000. (Hereafter, Romero

memorandum.)

14 Romero memorandum.
25

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Change the delegated examining

authority to eliminate the application

of "rule of three" and veterans

preference for direct hiring

OPM 6 months

2. Review the use of direct hire

provisions for excepted service

positions

Individual agency HR

directors and senior

officials

 Concurrent with previous task -

2 months

3. Review the need for additional

special salary rates for IT

professionals, make special salary

rate request to OPM if needed

Individual agency HR

directors and senior

officials

 Concurrent with previous task -

2 months

4. Review options for and agency

desire to establish a personnel

demonstration project

Individual agency HR

directors and senior

officials

2 months after completion of

previous task

5. Consider the advantages and

disadvantages of developing

personnel legislation similar to

DCIPS to better meet national

security hiring and compensation

requirements

A National Security

Interagency

Coordination Group,

to be established as

recommended by the

U.S. Commission on

National Security/21st

Century15

Concurrent with previous tasks

- 1 month

Table 9. Implementation Matrix to Increase Use of Direct Hire Authorities

and Market-based Compensation

The first step for agencies in the competitive service category (i.e., those governed by

Title 5) is to expand the effective use of direct hire authority. This will require OPM to eliminate

the requirement to apply the "rule of three" and veterans preference in "shortage category" direct

hires. For OPM to agree to authorize agency use of the direct hire authority, OPM may want to

reserve the authority to define the shortage category occupations or locations. This delegation

should allow agencies sufficient authority to make on the spot offers to highly sought after IT

talent. In addition, those agencies that have excepted service positions should consider the

advantages and disadvantages of making on-the-spot offers for highly sought-after IT

professionals.

Since OPM recently released special salary rates based on market compensation for IT

professionals, agencies should be able to make salary offers to IT applicants that are more in line

with market rates. However, to ensure the ability to offer salaries that are commensurate with

the market, agencies should review their specific needs and request additional special rates for IT

professionals if unable to meet staffing goals. If agency officials do not feel that special salary

rates can resolve staffing problems related to competitive compensation, they should consider

establishing a personnel demonstration project. However, this decision should not be taken

 

15 The Commission has proposed creating a National Security Interagency Coordination Group to help OPM develop new

provisions to improve recruiting and retention. The responsibilities of this Group are detailed later in this paper.
26

lightly. Demonstration projects involve considerable human and financial resources, including

the cost associated with continuous evaluation.

If the individual agencies with national security missions find that the above actions

cannot remedy their recruiting and retention problems, they should consider the possibility of

requesting legislative authority similar to DCIPS, the personnel authority in 10 U.S.C. for the

defense agencies in the Intelligence Community. This review could be undertaken by the

National Security Interagency Coordination Group recommended by the U.S. Commission on

National Security/21st Century to help OPM devise new retention and recruiting initiatives (and

addressed later in this paper.) Such a review should address both the advantages and

disadvantages of pursuing this legislative remedy.

Civilian and military retirees are often good candidates for national security positions that

require senior IT expertise. However, the pay cap restrictions imposed by public law are a

disincentive to employment with the federal government for retirees. Section 5532 of Title 5

United States Code placed caps on the amount of pay military and civilian federal retirees could

receive if they were employed by the federal government after retirement. In essence, the law

was designed to avoid situations where the combination of a retiree's annuity and civilian salary

would total more than the Executive Level V salary. Federal retirees are not subject to this pay

cap when they choose private sector employment. To help attract federal retirees with IT talent,

the Commission endorses the recommendation of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) Council, a

group of departmental and agency Chief Information Officers, to use and expand existing OPM

authorities to lift pay cap restrictions on former Civil Service and military IT employees.

Upon agency request, OPM can grant a "dual compensation waiver," which allows

agencies to lift these pay cap restrictions on a case-by-case basis [5 CFR part 553]. In October

1999, Section 651 of PL 106-65 repealed the reduction in pay for retired military personnel.

Therefore, the pay cap is no longer a disincentive to former military employees and dual

compensation waivers are now only required for civilian employees. Table 10 outlines actions

for expanding the use of available authorities.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. OPM should consider lifting dual

compensation waivers for Civil

Service retirees

OPM 6 months

2. Agencies should publicize that

there is no pay cap restriction for

military retirees and that the pay cap

can be lifted for civilian retirees for

critical positions

Individual national

security agencies

Concurrent with previous task –

2 months and ongoing

Table 10. Implementation Plan for Lifting Pay Cap Restrictions

OPM should consider permanently lifting the dual compensation pay caps for civilian IT

employees. This move would enable agencies to take advantage of the senior IT talent pool of

civilian, as well as military retirees. In order to entice these retirees to return to federal service,

Use and expand OPM authorities to lift pay cap restrictions on former Civil Service and

military IT professionals.
27

agencies must advertise the fact that dual compensation limits no longer apply to military retirees

and can be lifted for civilian retirees. Many former federal employees left federal employment

thinking that their pay would be reduced if they returned; they may be enticed back to

government service once they are aware that pay caps no longer apply.

For entry level IT talent, the Commission recommends expanding the newly authorized

"Cyber Corps." The Cyber Corps is an outcome of the National Plan for Information Systems

Protection, An Invitation to a Dialogue (January 2000) developed by the National Coordinator

for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter Terrorism.16 This plan addressed the need

for a cadre of trained computer science and information technology specialists. One of the

programs in the plan calls for the creation of a Scholarship for Service (SFS) program and the

development of a high school recruitment and training initiative. This initiative will fund up to

300 students per year in their pursuit of graduate or undergraduate degrees in the IT security

field. In return, the students must agree to serve in the federal IT workforce for a fixed period

following graduation.

Progress has been made in instituting this initiative, although its impact is still to be

determined. The National Science Foundation (NSF) is currently offering grants to colleges and

universities with the appropriate information assurance degree programs. Students will be

selected for the scholarship program from the colleges and universities that win these grants.

Program requirements and deadlines are published on the NSF website. Once the grants are

awarded, OPM will advertise the program (OPM will make the final student selections.) The

President's FY01 budget requested funding ($11.2M) for approximately 100 students in the startup year with a goal of 300 students in future years. The Commission believes that the “Cyber

Corps” should be expanded to include not only information assurance programs, but also other

computer science and IT programs as well.

Once students complete the program, they will be placed throughout the federal

government in information assurance positions. The NSA is currently a key stakeholder in the

program. Table 11 outlines steps to expand this program.

 

16 CIO Council, Plan for Implementing the Federal IT Workforce Challenge Recommendations, September 2000, p. 10.

Expand the Cyber Corps, whereby the U.S. Government pays for two years of a student's

schooling in exchange for two years of IT service.
28

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Coordinate with and provide

support to NSF, OPM, and CIAO in

establishing and expanding the

program17

National Security

Agencies

representatives

Immediately

2. Develop legislative proposal to

increase funding for program

National Science

Foundation

2 months

3. Coordinate legislative proposal

with OMB and Congress and modify

based on feedback obtained

National Science

Foundation

1 month

4. Seek change in appropriations

legislation

National Science

Foundation

3 months

Table 11. Implementation Matrix for Expanding Cyber Corps

The first step national security agencies need to take to help expand the Cyber Corps is to

become actively involved with the NSF, OPM, and the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office

(CIAO) in their development and management of this program. These agencies need to lend

support to these organizations and make sure their interests are incorporated into the program.

Representatives of affected national security agencies need to stress the importance of expanding

the Cyber Corps to computer science and IT disciplines where shortages exist, in addition to

information assurance programs.

NSF must then develop a budget proposal that increases funding for the program to fund

Cyber Corps scholarships and work with members of Congress to support the proposal. Finally,

NSF will need to modify the proposal based on OMB and Congressional input and seek a change

in the appropriations language.

Where appropriate, the Commission believes agencies and departments should consider

outsourcing IT functions to compensate for IT skill shortages. The NSA intends to do this for a

portion of its non-mission IT needs, allowing NSA to focus its limited set of in-house IT

expertise on developing and operating core intelligence technologies. The impetus for

outsourcing may also emerge for other reasons (e.g., to upgrade or skip a generation of

technology, to save operating costs and avoid capital costs). In any case it is important for an

organization to establish the specific benefits it seeks before proceeding.

Table 12 suggests actions for outsourcing IT and other support functions where

appropriate.

 

17 CIAO refers to the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, an organization created by Presidential Decision Directive

(PDD) 63 to coordinate the federal government's initiatives in critical infrastructure protection.

Outsource IT support functions where appropriate.
29

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. After identifying reasons that

outsourcing may be advantageous,

determine the potential benefits that

might accrue by outsourcing

Cabinet Secretaries or

agency directors

giving direction to

their CIOs

1 month

2. Determine the state of the IT

workforce in-house and its adequacy

(e.g., skills, number, and

compensation) for the next five

years' IT mission and workload

CIOs and appropriate

IT workforce experts

3 months

3. Respond to OMB guidance on

FAIR Act inventories and Circular

A-76

Agency or

department heads,

delegating to CIOs

2 months

4. Conduct A-76 study, if

appropriate, leading to either

(1) outsourcing or (2) continued

performance by a streamlined inhouse IT workforce

CIO, with appropriate

A-76 study support

and training

9-12 months minimum

5. Provide training in contract

management to staff to increase skill

levels in order to oversee the quality,

cost, and timeliness of products and

services by third parties18

HR training managers

in individual agencies

No later than two months before

contract award

6. Provide change management

support to ensure organizational and

staffing shifts are understood and

accepted

Line and HR

managers, with

appropriate expert

support

Concurrent with previous task

Table 12. Implementation Matrix for Outsourcing IT

Support Functions Where Appropriate

Agency and department heads should first task their Chief Information Officers with

identifying agency mission-critical IT positions. Concurrently, CIOs should be tasked with

identifying the potential opportunities and benefits of IT outsourcing. The CIOs need to firmly

identify the goals of such a measure, which, as noted above, may include many factors at least as

important as a gap in the available IT skills base. The CIO must also identify the subset of IT

functions that are eligible for outsourcing. At the same time, positions that are "inherently

governmental" need to be identified and sheltered from outsourcing. However, it must be noted

that judgements in this regard, based on the same policy guidance (rooted in Office of Federal

Procurement Policy Letter 92-1), result in remarkably different interpretations.

Once the appropriate functions are identified, they need to be mapped to current

positions. This kind of analysis often lacks objectivity. It is critical that individuals with

independence and objectivity perform this analysis. Sometimes, support from outside the agency

is necessary to achieve this objectivity.

 

18 The idea for this action comes from Human Capital Meeting the Governmentwide High-Risk Challenge, United States

General Accounting Office, February 1, 2001, Testimony of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, p.

8.
30

After identifying the pertinent IT positions, the CIOs should review the requirements for

personnel inventories laid out in the FAIR Act, as well as the study requirements pertinent to

OMB Circular A-76.19 In addition, officials should review their agencies' responses to the OMB

Director's February 9, 2001 memorandum that addresses the importance of A-76 within an

agency's GPRA Performance Plan. It is worth observing that the OMB Circular A-76 outlines a

structured process designed to save money and provide the most effective service to the agency,

and does not encourage outsourcing for its own sake.

If an A-76 study is deemed appropriate, the CIO needs to develop a plan of action and

determine where the specialized and other resources for the study will originate. Many agencies

use contract support for these studies because of their transitory nature, expertise requirements,

and the needs for objectivity.

For those positions deemed inherently governmental, the CIO should assess how these

functions can be made more efficient and effective. If there are opportunities there, an

improvement-oriented study separate from the A-76 study should be considered. To ensure that

a contract that may result from the A-76 process is well managed, agencies should rigorously

train contract managers. This training should be timed so that the information is fresh when

contract start is anticipated.

Finally, modified sourcing arrangements produce significant organizational changes,

which need to be addressed through a concerted change management effort:

• The disposition of any staff displaced by outsourcing IT functions or simply

streamlining them;

• The processes that link the contractor to the subject set of customers (e.g.,

service ordering, problem resolution); and

• The residual functions and organizational structure and staffing of the IT

function.

All of these require attention, strong two-way communication and, other change

management efforts with employees, as well as analytical work to implement the changes

successfully.

c.) Establish an Interagency Coordination Group

Finally, the Commission suggests that agencies with national security missions form an

interagency coordination group. This group will work with OPM to develop innovative

approaches and obtain further Civil Service flexibilities and authorities. In addition, the group

 

19 The FAIR Act refers to the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, which directs federal agencies to outsource or

privatize all non critical, non inherently governmental functions and activities. OMB Circular A-76 describes the process

agencies must follow to determine whether activities or functions can be outsourced.

Establish an interagency coordination group to help OPM develop new provisions.
31

can help facilitate the implementation of the Commission's recommendations within the various

national security agencies. As these recommendations impact several agencies with various

personnel systems, the group can serve as a central point for discussing implementation issues

and strategies. The group should consist of human resources directors or their designees from

each of the national security agencies, as well as representatives from OPM. The Commission

believes the National Security Council should establish the interagency coordination group,

decide who should head it, and provide guidance. The following table outlines actions for this

group.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Convene an interagency

coordination group for national

security personnel

HR directors (or

designees) for each

agency, OPM

representative

Immediate

2. Establish objectives, milestones

and metrics for group; inform the

National Security Council

HR directors (or

designees) for each

agency, OPM

representative

1 month and ongoing

3. Review the applicability and

limitations of existing recruitment

and retention authorities; share best

practices and lessons learned in

recruitment and retention among

agencies

HR directors (or

designees) for each

agency, OPM

representative, CIO

Council representative

2 months

4. Determine which new regulations

are needed to improve recruiting and

retention in the Civil Service;

identify new provisions required for

existing regulations; develop

methods to expand the use of

"limited scope" authorities

HR directors (or

designees) for each

agency, OPM

representative

2 months

5. Work with OPM to draft

regulatory language for new or

revised authorities

HR directors (or

designees) for each

agency, OPM

representative

3 months

6. Agency directors implement new

regulations/authorities as appropriate

HR directors (or

designees) for each

agency

6 months

Table 13. Implementation Matrix for Interagency Coordination Group

The human resources directors (or designee) for each of the national security agencies

and an OPM representative should form a national security personnel interagency coordination

group to help OPM develop new personnel provisions. Intelligence community personnel could

act as advisers and provide lessons learned in implementing recruitment and retention programs.

This group, once convened, should identify specific objectives, milestones and metrics to ensure

progress toward their goal. The group should coordinate with the National Security Council on

its objectives and report progress on a regular basis.
32

To start, the coordination group must review existing recruitment and retention

authorities. This review should include authorities specific to an agency as well as those for

specific personnel systems. This review should specifically identify the limitations of current

authorities. During the course of this action, agencies can use this opportunity to share best

practices and lessons learned from their own organization's experiences. As a result of this

review the group must determine which new regulations are needed to improve recruiting and

retention in the Civil Service, identify new provisions required for existing regulations, and

develop methods to expand the use of "limited scope" authorities. Individual agency evaluations

of recruitment and retention regulations, authorities and programs should enable the group to

make significant progress on this action in a fairly short time frame.

The group could assist OPM in developing regulatory language for new authorities or

plans for expanding existing programs that do not require specific regulations. Once these

authorities or programs are established, agencies should incorporate them into their recruitment

and retention strategic plans.

3. Process Chart. Although Recommendation 42 may eventually result in changes to

existing personnel processes, no immediate implications arise.

4. Personnel Implications. The Commission recommends increasing staffing levels by

10-15 percent to ensure a full complement of staff is available while personnel are away for

professional education. This staffing increase will require justification by the agencies and

departments to secure Congressional appropriations. The President and department heads must

also give support and guidance for this initiative, emphasizing its importance to Congress.

The disposition of any staff displaced by outsourcing IT must be addressed. Agencies

will want to ensure all IT employees are effectively placed in mission-critical positions. For

example, NSA's Project Groundbreaker, in which NSA plans to outsource non-core IT positions,

may displace up to several thousand current NSA employees.20 Some of those employees will

be retained to serve in core-IT functions. Others are being given the option of joining one of the

private sector companies that win the contract. NSA understands the difficult situation that

many of these workers will face and is including measures in its contract award that ensures

these private sector firms hire displaced workers who want to work for these companies.

5. Issues. There are several relevant issues related to the Commission's

recommendation for eliminating recruitment hurdles for the Civil Service, making the hiring

process faster and easier, and designing professional education and retention programs worthy of

full funding by Congress. These issues are briefly described below and discussed in greater

detail in Section III:

• Addressing the personnel requirements of the national security Civil Service is a

complex undertaking because the departments and agencies are governed by

different personnel authorities. No one set of solutions will address all of the

national security organizations' needs.

 

20 Verton, Dan, "Breaking the Mold, The National Security Agency Readies a Mega IT Outsourcing act in Hopes of Retooling

Its Back-Office Information Systems," Federal Computer Week, 12/04/2000.
33

• Almost all of the recommendations concerning recruitment, retention, and

career development require additional funding. Departments and agencies have

been reluctant to fund some of these programs in the past. Congress and/or the

White House may also be reluctant to fund these initiatives.

• In light of the recent attention raised by security incidents and complexities in

changing security clearance procedures, agencies may be reluctant work on

streamlining the security clearance process.

• Outsourcing is a difficult and time consuming approach. Recent reports of the

NSA outsourcing project indicate the Agency has reduced the scope and

foregone many of the original solutions and beneficial aspects. There is also a

gap between the outsourcing goals and results in the Department of Defense.

B. Establish a National Security Service Corps

1. Background. The Commission, in its Phase II report, stated that "traditional national

security agencies (State, Defense, CIA, NSC staff) will need to work together in new ways, and

economic agencies (Treasury, Commerce, U.S. Trade Representative) will need to work closely

with the national security community" to meet the requirements of the 21st century security

environment. Better integration of these agencies in policy development and execution requires

a human resource strategy that achieves the following objectives: expanded opportunities to gain

expertise and to experience the culture of more than one department or agency; an assignment

and promotion system that rewards those who seek broad-based, integrative approaches to

problem solving instead of those focused on departmental turf protection; and the erasure of

artificial barriers among departments.

The current Civil Service personnel system does not achieve these objectives because

career civilians in the national security field rarely serve outside their parent agency.

Establishing a National Security Service Corps would serve to broaden the experience base of

senior managers and develop leaders skilled at producing integrated solutions to U.S. national

security policy problems.

The Commission envisions the NSSC to be open to personnel in the higher grades,

possibly GS-12 through the Senior Executive Service (SES) level. Individuals would apply to

join the program and then seek to fill positions designated for the NSSC in participating agencies

other than their own. If selected, NSSC participants would work at the new agency for a

minimum of two years. Upon completion of the "tour," the NSSC participant would apply for a

position at the same level or next level up within his or her parent agency.

Civil Service personnel involved in policy formulation and implementation from the

Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Energy and the new National

Recommendation 43: The Executive Branch should establish a National Security Service

Corps (NSSC) to enhance civilian career paths, and to provide a corps of policy experts with

broad-based experience throughout the Executive Branch.
34

Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) would participate in the NSSC.21 These departments and

the proposed NHSA are essential to interagency policymaking on key national security issues.

Although the Commission believes the Foreign Service should remain separate from the NSSC,

all policy positions at the Department of State's headquarters will be included in the rotational

pool. At the same time, Foreign Service officers will be able to compete for NSSC positions in

all the participating departments. The Commission also envisions giving NSSC personnel the

ability to fill select positions in some overseas embassies and at military unified commands.

Intelligence community personnel would not be part of the NSSC in order to preserve the

separation that exists between intelligence support to policy and policy-making. However, a

limited number of NSSC positions should be created in interagency intelligence community

centers such as the Non-Proliferation Center and the Counter-Terrorism Center.

2. Implementation Blueprint. Table 14 provides suggested actions for establishing the

National Security Service Corps.

 

21 The Commission recommends creating a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) to address homeland security

threats. See Recommendation 2 in the Commission's Phase III report: Road Map, and the implementation plan for this

recommendation.
35

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. OPM convenes an interagency

task force to study the

implementation requirements of the

NSSC

OPM 1 month

2. Agency and department heads

and/or their chosen senior

representatives meet as a task force

to discuss NSSC issues and report

findings to OPM

OPM and agency

heads or senior

personnel

representatives of

participating agencies

6 months

3. OPM should issue proposed

directives describing the basic tenets

of the NSSC

OPM 6 months after receiving task

force report

4. OPM, after receiving comments,

should issue final directives for

NSSC establishment

OPM 3 months after issuing proposed

regulations

5. Obtain agency buy-in to the

concept of the NSSC and

communicate the NSSC program to

employees

Individual agencies Begin immediately after the

decision to establish the NSSC

and continue throughout the

duration of the program

6. OPM should establish and head an

NSSC board with eligible national

security agencies and departments

OPM and the heads

of personnel and

policy from eligible

agencies and

departments

Concurrent with issuing final

regulations

7. Agencies need to identify policy

positions to become NSSC positions

Individual agency

heads of personnel

3 months after OPM issues final

regulations

8. Agencies determine internal

procedures for selecting staff to

participate in the NSSC program

Individual agency

heads of personnel

with NSSC board

guidance

3 months after OPM issues final

regulations

9. Agencies establish guidelines for

rotational assignments, professional

training, promotion, and other issues

Individual agency

heads of personnel

with NSSC board

guidance

6 months after OPM issues final

regulations

Table 14. Implementation Matrix to Establish a National Security Service Corps

To initiate the NSSC, OPM should convene an interagency task force, chaired by the

Director of OPM and composed of the heads of all participating agencies and departments and/or

their chosen senior level policy and human resources representatives. The OPM Director may

appoint an Assistant Director or other senior official to assist in the management of the Task

Force. The purpose of the task force would be to:
36

• Formulate the goals of the NSSC;

• Resolve any issues regarding the feasibility of implementing the NSSC;

• Evaluate relevant Civil Service rules and regulations (e.g., limiting competition

for positions to NSSC participants, requiring NSSC participation for promotion

to certain positions);

• Create specific provisions of participating agencies and departments regarding a

rotational program of this type;

• Establish a board to provide guidance and oversight for the program;

• Formulate interagency compacts and cooperative agreements between

participating federal agencies and departments regarding: the establishment and

function of the NSSC; incentives for individuals to join the Corps; professional

education and training; and any other issues relevant to the establishment and

continued operation of the NSSC.

One of the issues facing the task force will be the degree to which the Foreign Service

should be included in the NSSC program. The Commission recommends that the Foreign

Service remain separate from the NSSC; however, it envisions a close relationship between the

Foreign Service and the NSSC. Foreign Service personnel could serve in NSSC positions and

other NSSC participants could hold positions currently held by Foreign Service officers,

eventually allowing the lines between the NSSC and Foreign Service to "blur."

The task force will provide compacts of the NSSC participants, as well as other pertinent

findings and information to the Director of the Office of Personnel Management no later than six

months after convening.

Within six months of receiving the NSSC task force report, OPM should issue a proposed

directive, describing the basic tenets of the NSSC. The proposal should include a 60-day request

for opinions by all stakeholders, especially personnel and policy experts from the eligible

agencies and departments as well as other personnel experts in government and the private

sector. After the 60-day comment period and allowing another 30 days to make any changes,

OPM would issue a final directive establishing the NSSC. It should be noted that, in accordance

with the Commission's opinion, no legislative action should be required to institute this program.

When the decision is made to create the NSSC and the NSSC interagency task force is

convened, agencies must establish support for the NSSC initiative across the affected

departments and agencies. Agency and department heads should be involved in the formation of

NSSC and ensure that employees are involved in the NSSC program.

Concurrent with issuing final directives for establishing the NSSC, OPM should establish

an NSSC board to include the heads of personnel and policy heads from the participating

agencies and departments. To get different perspectives on rotational programs from those

outside government, the board could also include personnel and policy experts from the private

sector. The NSSC board, headed by OPM, would work with agencies and departments to
37

develop consistent policies for rotational assignments, professional education, and promotion.

Guidelines for identifying positions would also be discussed, but final identification of positions

as well as the criteria for selecting personnel who volunteer for the NSSC would be left up to the

discretion of each individual agency or department. The Commission envisions that all policy

positions in participating agencies and departments could ultimately be included in the NSSC. In

developing NSSC guidelines and criteria, participating agencies should leverage the lessons

learned from the Defense Department's Policy Career Development Program and other similar

developmental programs that include the benefits of rotational assignments.22

The NSSC board should have the power to ensure that agencies and departments comply

with the agreed upon rules and regulations. The NSSC board should also continue to offer

guidance and ensure that agencies and departments participate equitably in the NSSC (e.g.,

designate adequate NSSC positions, provide professional education consistent with the needs of

NSSC positions, etc.). The board would need to establish standards and criteria for the

professional experience and education of NSSC members to ensure that all NSSC participants

are fully qualified to perform their rotational assignments. The board should also delegate

execution of professional education to the participating agencies and departments. Finally, the

board should settle any disputes that arise between agencies.

The NSSC board will also need to address a number of issues while developing

programs:

• Identify positions across participating agencies.

• Determine equitable benefits within the rotational system.

• Establish incentives to attract high-caliber personnel and rewards participation.

Agencies and department heads must ensure that prospective NSSC employees

understand the benefits of joining the NSSC. Civil Service employees who plan or planned

to serve in only one agency or department for their entire career must be shown the value

of gaining experience in more than one agency. It will be incumbent upon agencies and the

NSSC board to provide the correct guidance, promotion opportunities, professional

development, and leadership to foster this cultural change. Limiting competition for

selected positions to NSSC participants may require new OPM regulations since this

practice is not currently allowed in the Civil Service.

With guidance from the NSSC board, agencies must decide how the NSSC program will

be implemented by designating positions for NSSC members and establishing guidelines for

rotational assignments. Identification of NSSC positions should be concluded three months after

OPM issues its final directives. It is currently envisioned that a person who is selected to be a

part of the NSSC will rotate to another NSSC position in another agency for at least two years.

 

22 The National Security Service Corps (NSSC) is modeled on the Policy Career Development Program (PCDP) and the

Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires military personnel to serve in Joint command positions for

promotion to senior officer ranks. The Department of Defense's Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) set up the

Policy Career Development Program to facilitate assignments for GS-12 through SES level personnel. In these one to two

year rotational assignments, personnel can serve at the Departments of State, Energy, Justice, and Commerce, and on the

NSC Staff.
38

After the tour, the NSSC member would compete for a higher NSSC position at his or her home

agency or, if not promoted, return to a position at his or her same level. Rotations to other

departments and interagency professional education would be required in order to hold certain

positions or be promoted to certain levels.23 An increase in agency end-strengths by 10-15

percent to allow for critical professional education would provide the float necessary for senior

managers to allow employees to attend training. Provisions would need to be established to

guarantee participants the opportunity to return to a similar position at their parent agency at the

same grade level or higher as when they left to pursue an NSSC assignment elsewhere.

Agencies should determine internal procedures for selecting staff to participate in the

NSSC program. This should take place concurrent with identification of NSSC positions.

Agencies must strike a careful balance between the career fulfillment and utility that rotational

positions will provide and the need for agency and department experts who can ensure the

continuity necessary for mission fulfillment. Managers must buy into the idea that allowing

policy personnel to gain knowledge from other agencies will ultimately allow those personnel to

leverage that knowledge to the benefit of the home agency and the nation's national security

goals. The NSSC also will provide career mobility that some Civil Service personnel desire and

chances for promotion that may not be presently available.

Agencies should establish guidelines for rotational assignments, professional training,

promotion, and other issues within six months after OPM issues its final regulations. Agencies

must decide on the types of particular professional training that will benefit NSSC participants so

they will be prepared for their rotational assignments and future promotions.

3. Process Chart. The NSSC will establish a new process of personnel rotations among

national security agencies. The details of this process, however, require further definition before

a chart depicting this process can be developed.

4. Personnel Implications. To backfill the positions of NSSC workers who are

attending professional training, agency end-strengths should be increased by 10-15 percent to

compensate for personnel away at professional education training or at a rotational assignment

(See Recommendation 42 (A) 3 in this report).

5. Issues. The key challenge of the NSSC program is to provide a challenging career

advancement path for national security professionals in the government. This program must

establish incentives to attract highly qualified personnel, and create a set of metrics to track the

success of the program. Current civil service promotion systems do not favor rotation of

personnel across government departments and agencies.

 

23 For example, departments might designate that personnel must hold one assignment outside his or her parent department in

order to become a member of the SES and another such assignment to be promoted to SES-4. [SES pay scales are

numbered one through six. An additional rotation is suggested for promotion to SES-4 because this is the pay grade at

which many SES members serve during their final tours, when they generally have the highest level of responsibility for

interagency activities.]
39

III.ISSUES, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES

Many in the federal government understand that the Civil Service must act immediately

to recruit and train personnel with the skills necessary to meet the requirements of the 21st

century. The Commission's recommendations focus on this immediate need for improving the

Civil Service. A number of specific issues will need to be addressed in order to fulfill the

Commission's recommendations. These issues are discussed below:

• First, additional Congressional appropriations are required to implement many

of the Civil Service recommendations.

• Second, it will be challenging to clearly define each of the program

requirements for the national security organizations within the context of

different governing personnel authorities.

• Third, changing security clearance procedures is complex and will be difficult

to implement.

• Fourth, outsourcing government functions is a challenging and complex

process.

• Fifth, "buy-in" from both agencies and participants must be obtained in creating

an enduring NSSC program.

These issues and strategies to address them are discussed below.

A. General Description

1. Obtain Additional Congressional Appropriations. Many of the Commission's

recommendations require additional monetary and human resources to be implemented. They

require additional funds to maximize recruiting options; lift pay cap restrictions on former

government employees; increase staffing levels 10-15 percent to maintain a training “float”; and

expand the Cyber Corps program The fact that the agencies involved are governed by several

appropriations bills complicates this request. An added difficulty is that several of the

organizations are small agencies within larger departments that may not consider national

security their primary mission.

To obtain funding, strong Presidential support will be required for this overarching

program. Each agency or department would have to prepare its own budget justifications for

many of these recommendations, especially the 10-15 percent increase of staffing levels to

maintain a training "float" and additional funds to maximize recruiting options. The other

recommendations that require additional funding could be requested individually. The budget

increases will require substantial top-down support from the Executive Branch.
40

2. Implement Programs for Agencies with Different Personnel Authorities. A

primary challenge national security agencies face in implementing the Commission's

recommendations is to define clearly each of the suggested programs. Of particular difficulty is

developing Civil Service programs for agencies that are governed by different personnel

authorities. As discussed in the section on direct hire authority and market compensation, these

agencies are governed by at least three types of personnel authorities. This fact impacts the

parameters of the programs that can be developed. The national security agencies must work

together to define programs that meet their unique needs and work within their human resources

framework.

However, this requirement presents an opportunity for coordinating and integrating the

human resources policies and procedures of agencies and departments with national security

missions. Traditionally, agencies operate very independently within the national security

community. The community will need to work together in new ways to achieve the Civil

Service objectives. This type of collaboration holds a great opportunity for building and

maintaining the highest quality workforce.

3. Streamline the Security Clearance Process. Addressing the Commission's

suggestion to streamline the security clearance process is complex, and this recommendation

may encounter resistance as a result. First, re-coding positions may increase the perceived risk

for security breaches. Thus, agencies and departments may be reluctant to consider making

significant changes in streamlining the clearance process or re-coding positions because of recent

high-profile security breaches.

Second, there is a plethora of systems for coding positions among national security

agencies. Each agency has the authority to determine the level of security clearance positions

warrant and the individual methods for coding positions' clearance requirements. Achieving a

uniformly streamlined clearance process may be difficult as a result.

Finally, the recommendation may encounter resistance based on specific cultural attitudes

and other issues relating to security within each agency. Each agency has its own ideas and

cultural biases regarding the extent to which classified material needs to be safeguarded. In

addition, re-coding positions may be more difficult if the physical layout of buildings used by

agencies and departments prevents separating personnel holding different levels of security

clearances.

4. Outsource. Outsourcing government functions is a challenging process because of

issues involving employee outplacement, contract management, and realizing cost savings.

There are two primary issues of which agencies need to be particularly mindful when

considering IT outsourcing. Initially, agencies need to establish goals they hope to achieve

through outsourcing. There are a number of possible outcomes from outsourcing, including cost

savings, reducing the government "brain drain," and realizing a technology upgrade. The

outsourcing plan must be designed to accomplish the specific goals the agency wants to achieve,

including positioning its limited pool of Civil Service IT talent in functions critical to the mission

of the agency. If careful planning does not occur up front, the agency is unlikely to achieve its

desired outcomes.

In addition, outsourcing is a profound change for any organization. For example,

outsourcing affects customers by introducing new service providers, it displaces employees, it
41

creates a need for restructuring an organization, and it introduces a new culture in ways as simple

as having new faces in the hallways. As such, agencies that undertake outsourcing should

incorporate change management efforts from the beginning.

5. Building Support for the NSSC Program from Both Agencies and Participants.

The key challenge of the NSSC program is to identify enough interesting and challenging

positions to attract participants, at the same time ensuring that managers have knowledgeable and

experienced support while their employees are on NSSC rotations. If neither of these issues is

addressed, managers will not allow or encourage their top staff to participate in the program and

potential participants will not want to enroll in or continue with the program. To address the

situation, the NSSC program must be structured to include a sufficient number of rotational

positions while leaving enough support for managers.

An additional challenge is equal participation from agencies. The program will not work,

for example, if one agency rotates its people out but does not take other agencies' employees.

For the program to be successful, each agency must identify a comparable number of positions

for the NSSC. Department and agency leaders must buy into the concept of the NSSC and make

a commitment to equal participation for the program to be effective.

Ultimately, the success of the NSSC and other rotational assignments will also depend on

continuing oversight that ensures that pay, promotion potential, and opportunities are fair and

equitable.

B. Issues and Suggested Approaches

Table 15 presents issues related to implementing the USCNS Civil Service

recommendations and some of the possible approaches for effectively dealing with them.
42

Issue Approach

1. Obtain additional appropriations The President must be the catalyst for funding

by including Civil Service hiring,

compensation, and retention improvements in

his agenda to Congress.

Agencies can collaborate on some funding

initiatives as a group, but others can only be

addressed by each agency seeking higher

appropriations.

2. Define programs for agencies with different

personnel authorities

The Civil Service interagency coordination

group can serve as a forum to discuss these

issues, share best practices, and build stronger

ties between the national security agencies.

The coordination group should develop metrics

for these programs that measure success from a

variety of perspectives and regularly monitor

performance.

3. Streamlining the security clearance process Study lessons learned from successful

implementations of clearance process

streamlining.

Conduct risk assessments to determine the

security risks involved in re-coding positions

outweigh changes in the security clearance

process.

4. Address outsourcing challenges Develop a business case for outsourcing that

addresses specific outcomes.

Incorporate change management efforts into

the process from the beginning.

5. Create "buy-in" for the NSSC program from

both agencies and participants

Obtain buy-in and a written commitment to

participate in the NSSC program from each

national security agency.

Structure program to include an adequate

number of rotational positions while leaving

adequate support for manager.

Provide program oversight that ensures pay,

promotion potential, and opportunities are fair

and equitable.

Table 15. Issues and Approaches for Civil Service Reform
43

IV. IMPLEMENTATION MEANS

No executive order, Presidential directive, or legislative authority is needed to support the

Civil Service recommendations related to recruiting and retention.
44

V. PERSONNEL IMPLICATIONS

This section contains personnel implications resulting from implementation of the

recommendations laid out in this plan.

The Commission recommends increasing staffing levels of national security departments

and agencies by 10-15 percent to ensure a full complement of staff is available while personnel

are away at training. This staffing increase will require justification by the agencies and

departments and Congressional appropriation. The President and department heads must also

give support and guidance for this initiative and stress its importance to Congress.

The disposition of any staff displaced by outsourcing IT functions or simply streamlining

must be addressed. Many agencies will want to ensure all employees are effectively placed in

mission-critical positions. For example, NSA's Project Groundbreaker, in which NSA plans to

outsource non-core IT positions, may displace up to several thousand current NSA employees.24

Some of those employees will be retained to serve in core-IT functions. Others are being given

the option of joining one of the private sector companies that win the contract. NSA understands

the difficult situation that many of these workers will face and is including measures in its

contract award that ensures these private sector firms hire displaced workers who want to work

for those companies.

 

24 Verton, Dan, "Breaking the mold, The National Security Agency Readies a Mega IT Outsourcing Pact in Hopes of

Retooling Its Back-office Information Systems," Federal Computer Week, 12/04/2000.
VI. APPENDIX
APPENDIX A:

IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINT MATRIX
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

Personnel: Building Human CapitalThe Civil Service42. The President should order the elimination of recruitment hurdles for the Civil Service, ensure a faster and easier to it that strengthened professional education and retention programs are worthy of full funding by Congress.42.(A) Recruiting, Hiring, Retaining, andTraining1. Significantly increase recruiting programsthrough programs like the National SecurityEducation Act, which will link educationalbenefits to a service requirement

OPM takes the lead on a nationwiderecruiting campaign

OPM 

Agencies identify recruitment needs anddevelop plans to recruit college students usingexisting and new recruitment tools

Heads of recruiting atindividual agencies

Agencies recruit at college recruitment fairsand use outside recruitment firms asnecessary

Recruitingdepartments atindividual agencies

Congress enacts the NSSTEA Congress Congress provides additional funding for theNSSTEA and expansion of the NSEA

Congress 

2. Revamp the security clearance process toprovide for more efficient and timelyprocessing of job applications

Consult with Congress about establishing anExecutive-Legislative Commission tostreamline the security clearance process

White House andOPM

Obtain authorization and funding for theCommission and any supporting staff

White House 
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

Appoint security clearance policy experts totake part in the Commission

Congress andExecutive Branch

Report on findings and recommendations forstreamlining the security clearance process

Commission 

Using Commission recommendations, makelegislative or executive level changes to thesecurity clearance process

White House,Congress, OPM

Agencies and departments involved in thesecurity clearance process or holdingpositions requiring security clearancesimplement the changes recommended by theExecutive-Legislative Commission

Individual agenciesand departments

Heads of agencies and departments thatrequire security clearances review positionsfor re-coding; establish guidelines/criteria forthis review

White House 

Agencies review security clearancerequirements and identify those positions thatcould be re-coded

Senior managers inindividual agencies

Review identified positions and authorize recoding as appropriate Agency head or senior security manager at

each agency
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

If necessary, make legislative or executivelevel changes for the purpose of improvingthe process of re-coding positions

White House,Congress, OPM

3. Provide additional funds to maximizeagencies' options in recruiting and retaininghigh-quality personnel

Establish guidance and fiscal parameters for areview of the effective use of recruitment andretention authorities

OMB 

Agencies review funding requirements for theeffective use of recruitment and retentionauthorities

HR directors andsenior agency officials

Establish performance metrics for each of therecruiting and retention authorities

HR directors andsenior agency officials

Agencies adjust budget submissions to reflectfunding requirements for using recruitmentand retention authorities

HR directors andsenior agency officials

Work with members of Congress to establishthe need for additional funds

OPM, individualagencies

Work with department officials, OMB, andCongress to modify the budget and developappropriations language

HR directors, senioragency officialsindividualsresponsible for budgetpreparation

4. Increase agency end-strengths by 10-15percent to allow for critical professionaleducation

Establish consistent and replicable proceduresfor individual agencies to review ongoingprofessional education and training curricula

Agency director,training or HRdirector, linemanagers

Review existing professional education andtraining curricula including courses, seminars,workshops, and tutorials

Agency trainingdirector

Consolidate findings and rank order existingcourses by relevance and criticality

Training director andkey supervisors
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

Identify mandatory courses in functionaltopics, languages, leadership, andmanagement

Agency director,training or HRdirector, with linemanagers

Define learning mastery that must be met forpromotion or advancement to supervisorypositions

Same as above 

Develop structure for rotating personnelthrough training effectively, coupled withpotential for distance learning, resulting in aminimal negative impact on mission

Same as above 

Determine ideal levels and occupations forthe 10-15 percent additional personnel(allowing for that proportion of the overallservice to be in training at any given time)

Same as above 

Identify budget increase necessary to supporttraining float

Same as above 

Develop business case for increased budgetand staffing request

Same as above 

Develop plan for communicating changes toemployees

Same as above 

42.(B) Secure and Retain IT Talent1. Use existing and seek additionalauthorities to allow direct hiring and providefor more market-based compensation

Appoint a DCIPS Ombudsman for allpersonnel centers that service intelligenceagencies

Intelligence agencydirectors

Conduct a study to determine which ITpositions need to be paid at market-basedsalaries

DCIPS ombudsmenand HR directors
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

Establish programs (including direct hireauthorities and market-based compensation)that take full advantage of the flexibilityafforded under Titles 10 and 50

DCIPS ombudsmenand HR directors

Develop a guidance document that outlinesflexible programs and how to implementthem for personnel specialists and managers

DCIPS ombudsmenand HR directors

Conduct a major organization change effortthat fully educates personnel specialists onthe flexibility under Titles 10 and 50 andprepares them to provide appropriateguidance to managers

Intelligence agencydirectors, DCIPSombudsmen, and HRdirectors

Establish metrics to track success Intelligence agency

directors, DCIPSombudsmen, and HRdirectors

Create and appropriately staff one personnelcenter that services all DCIPS clients

Intelligence agencydirectors

2. Use and expand the Office of PersonnelManagement authorities to lift pay caprestrictions on former Civil Service andmilitary IT professionals

Change the delegated examining authority toeliminate the application of the "rule of three"and veterans preference for direct hiring

OPM 

Review the use of direct hire provisions forpositions in the excepted service

Individual agenciesHR directors andsenior officials

Review the need for additional special salaryrates for IT professionals, make special salaryrate request to OPM if needed

Individual agency HRdirectors and seniorofficials

Review the options for and agency desire toestablish a personnel demonstration project

Individual agency HRdirectors and seniorofficials
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

Consider the advantages and disadvantages ofdeveloping personnel legislation similar toDCIPS to better meet national security hiringand compensation requirements

A National SecurityInteragencyCoordination Group,to be established asrecommended byUSCNS/21

3. Expand the Cyber Corps, whereby theU.S. government pays for two years of astudent's schooling in exchange for two yearsof IT service

Coordinate with and provide support to NSF,OPM, and CIAO in establishing andexpanding the program

National SecurityAgenciesrepresentatives

Develop legislative proposal to increasefunding for program

National ScienceFoundation

Coordinate legislative proposal with OMBand Congress and modify based on feedbackobtained

National ScienceFoundation

Seek change in appropriations legislation National Science

Foundation

4. Where appropriate outsource IT supportfunctions

After identifying reasons that outsourcingmay be advantageous, determine the potentialbenefits that might accrue by outsourcing

Cabinet Secretaries oragency directorsgiving direction totheir CIOs

Determine the state of the IT workforce inhouse and its adequacy (e.g., skills, number,and compensation) for the next five years' ITmission and workload

CIOs and appropriateIT workforce experts

Respond to OMB guidance on FAIR Actinventories and Circular A-76

Agency or departmentheads, delegating toCIOs

Conduct A-76 study, if appropriate, leading toeither (1) outsourcing or (2) streamlined inhouse IT workforce

CIO, with appropriateA-76 study supportand training
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

Provide training in contract management tostaff to increase skill levels in order tooversee the quality, cost, and timeliness ofproducts and services by third parties

HR training managersin individual agencies

Provide change management support toensure organizational and staffing shifts areunderstood and accepted

Line and HRmanagers, withappropriate expertsupport

42.(C) Interagency Coordination GroupEstablish an interagency coordination groupto help OPM develop new provisions

Convene an interagency coordination groupfor national security personnel.

HR directors (ordesignees) for eachagency, OPMrepresentative

Establish objectives, milestones and metricsfor group; inform the National SecurityCouncil

HR directors (ordesignees) for eachagency, OPMrepresentative

Review the applicability and limitations ofexisting recruitment and retention authorities;share best practices and lessons learned inrecruitment and retention among agencies

HR directors (ordesignees) for eachagency, OPMrepresentative, CIOCouncil representative

Determine which new regulations are neededto improve recruiting and retention in theCivil Service; identify new provisionsrequired for existing regulations; developmethods to expand the use of "limited scope"authorities

HR directors (ordesignees) for eachagency, OPMrepresentative

Work with OPM to draft regulatory languagefor new or revised authorities

Agencies HR directors(or designees), OPMrepresentative
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

Agency directors implement newregulations/authorities as appropriate

HR directors (ordesignees) for eachagency

43: The Executive Branch should establish aNational Security Service Corps (NSSC) toenhance civilian career paths, and to providea corps of policy experts with broad-basedexperience throughout the Executive Branch.

1. OPM convenes an interagency task force tostudy the implementation requirements of theNSSC

OPM 

Agency and department heads and/or theirchosen senior representatives meet as a taskforce to discuss NSSC issues and reportfindings to OPM

OPM and agencyheads or seniorpersonnelrepresentatives ofparticipating agencies

OPM should issue proposed directivesdescribing the basic tenets of the NSSC

OPM 

OPM, after receiving comments, should issuefinal directives for NSSC establishment

OPM 

Obtain agency buy-in to the concept of theNSSC and communicate the NSSC programto employees

Individual agencies 

OPM should establish and head an NSSCboard with eligible national security agenciesand departments

OPM and the heads ofpersonnel and policyfrom eligible agenciesand departments

Agencies need to identify policy positions tobecome NSSC positions

Individual agencyheads of personnel

Agencies determine internal procedures forselecting staff to participate in the NSSCprogram

Individual agency HRwith NSSC boardguidance
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsibility 

Agencies establish guidelines for rotationalassignments, professional training,promotion, and other issues

Individual agencyheads of personnelwith NSSC boardguidance
Road Map for National Security

Addendum on Implementation

Military Personnel Implementation Plan

Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
1

Executive Summary

The Military Personnel reforms discussed in this section must be viewed as part of an

overall national campaign to enhance the prestige of government service. The primary objective

of the Commission's recommendations on military personnel is twofold: to re-establish the

covenant between those who serve in uniform and the nation, and to modernize personnel

systems which are largely premised on Cold War manpower assumptions. In order to

accomplish these two objectives, the Commission recommends major modifications to the

recruitment, career management, and military service reward systems in order to recruit and

retain a high quality force. Improvements must be made in enlistment, commissioning, career

management, compensation, benefits, and retirements to make military service rewarding and

competitive with the Civil Service and the private sector. While these systemic changes will

increase the likelihood of retaining a qualified force, two other major tools (not discussed in this

plan) are required to aid recruitment of that force: 1) an expanded and enhanced National

Security Education Act (NSEA) and 2) the creation of a National Security Science and

Technology Education Act (NSSTEA).1 These acts would provide college scholarships or

school loan repayments in exchange for service. The implementation of these two acts are

integral to the Commission's overall approach to military personnel reform. Aside from the

recruitment acts, Table 1 summarizes the two other recommendations concerning military

personnel, which are reviewed in this plan.

USCNS/21ST CENTURY RECOMMENDATIONS2

44. Congress should significantly enhance the Montgomery G.I. Bill, as well as strengthen

recently passed legislation supporting veteran's benefits—including transition, medical, and home

ownership—for qualified veterans.

45. Congress and the Defense Department should cooperate to decentralize military personnel

legislation dictating the terms of enlistment/commissioning, career management, retirement, and

compensation.

Table 1. Summary of Recommendations

The U.S. military faces recruitment and retention problems. Even with significant force

reductions, it has been unable to recruit sufficient numbers of personnel with the needed

technical skills and abilities. Too many key personnel, some with unique and valuable skills, are

leaving the military in advance of retirement or at the earliest possible retirement points. Rigid

career management, retirement and pay systems constrain the Services' ability to make the

necessary changes to recruit and retain a quality force. Promotion and retention authority,

together with pay, benefit, and retirement systems, are too inflexible to compete with private

industry or even with the Civil Service workforce. Although each Service has unique human

requirements, the military personnel system is essentially "one size fits all" that is centrally

controlled and managed. Furthermore, military benefits, such as the Montgomery G.I. Bill and

Veterans' benefits, have not kept pace with the economic realities.

 

1 Recommendations 11 and 39 from Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, the U.S. Commission on

National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21)'s Phase III report, posted on January 31, 2001 at www.nssg.gov, and published

on March 15, 2001. All references are based on the published version. (Hereafter cited as Road Map.)

2 Ibid. Recommendations addressed in this implementation plan are extracted from Road Map.
2

Enactment of all Commission military personnel recommendations will establish the

tools and authority for service secretaries to recruit and retain quality personnel from all walks of

American life.
3

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: MILITARY PERSONNEL

I. READER'S GUIDE

This reader's guide provides an introduction to the content and layout of this

implementation plan.

A. Background

The Charter of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

(USCNS/21) directed the Commission to include implementation concepts for its

recommendations as part of its final report.3 This document provides those concepts for

Recommendations 44 and 45 pertaining to Military Personnel.

While the Commission envisioned a bold pathway to achieve national security goals,

none of its recommendations will succeed without a qualified workforce able to carry out these

mandates. As stated in the Commission's third report, Road Map for National Security:

Imperative for Change, "[I]f we allow the human resources of government to continue to decay,

none of the reforms proposed by this or any other national security commission will produce

their intended results." Unless changes are made in the military personnel systems, the military

will continue to experience rapid turnover, a brain drain as the workforce reaches retirement age,

and increased inability to recruit and retain qualified personnel willing to serve.

The Commission's recommendations on military personnel focus on four areas:

enhancing the professionalism of the Armed Services, changing recruitment methods, changing

promotion systems, and revamping the retirement system.

B. Scope of Implementation Plan

This implementation plan identifies steps to be taken to implement the Commission's

recommendations. The plan also highlights issues raised by the recommendations, including

challenges in implementing them, and provides guidelines to facilitate implementation.

Throughout the plan, tables are used to simplify presentation, and the format remains the same

for each recommendation to facilitate comparisons.

Besides the enhanced NSEA (described separately) and the creation of the NSSTEA the

first recommendation in this section focuses on enhancing the Montgomery G.I. Bill and

Veterans Affairs (VA) benefits under Title 38 of the U.S. Code. The second recommendation

concerns decentralizing military personnel legislation dictating the terms of

enlistment/commissioning, career management, retirement, and compensation. Five specific

sub-recommendations fall under this second recommendation:

• Revise the Defense Officers Personnel Management Act of 1980;

• Revise 1999 National Defense Authorization Act (Retirement);

• Revise US Code Title 37 (Compensation);

 

3 USCNS/21 Charter, July 1998 is contained in Appendix 2 of Road Map.
4

• Revise 1974 Aviation Career Incentive Act; and

• System Integration of Reserve, Guard and Active Duty personnel systems.

To obtain the necessary support, top-level leadership needs to acknowledge that current

systems are not working; indeed, that the very systems that brought them to their leadership

positions are no longer effective. These recommendations raise a variety of issues for

implementation, especially the recommendation on decentralization. The Commission

recommends changing traditional centralized military personnel systems that date back to 1947

and earlier, and replacing them with decentralized systems and new paradigms such as pay for

performance, two-track career systems, special pay rates for some personnel, new promotion

regulations, and a revamped retirement system.

Congress will need to enact legislation to implement these recommendations. An

implementation strategy that enlists the support of affected parties in Congress, the Executive

Branch, veterans groups, and active duty personnel, will be instrumental in furthering the

necessary legislation. In addition, specific strategies need to be developed to address the

necessary support for additional funding to target selective pay incentives, bonuses, and

retirement options, as well as to enhance VA and G.I. Bill benefits. Finally, the policy of

"grandfathering" personnel already receiving retirement and veterans' benefits is integral to

success of such strategies.

Each of the two recommendations has the ability to stand alone on its own merits.

However, it is the combination of the enhanced NSEA and the recommended NSSTEA together

with the two recommendations presented here, that offers the greatest potential for recruiting and

retaining the best military force. Many of the sub-recommendations require pilot testing before

final decisions can be made on implementation. This will require participation from the military

(such as pilots or nurses) in the design of limited tests, analysis of the results, and development

of implementation plans for wider usage. Therefore, final legislation, especially in reforming

DOPMA, should be postponed until completion of the demonstration projects and analysis of

their results is completed. Section III provides a more detailed analysis of these issues,

opportunities and challenges.

C. Implementation Plan Layout

Section II of this plan presents a blueprint for implementing the Commission's

recommendations pertaining to Military Personnel. Section II.A describes actions that could be

taken to achieve the objectives laid out in recommendation 44; it identifies responsibility for

those actions and provides a notional timeline for each action. Section II.B describes actions

needed to achieve the objectives laid out in recommendation 45 and provides a notional timeline

for each action. Appendix A includes a matrix summarizing the information in this section.

Section III describes issues, challenges, and opportunities raised by the recommendations

and presents potential courses of action to address them.

Section IV describes means by which the recommendations can be implemented. Draft

legislative language to implement these recommendations is not included since these

recommendations need to be researched more thoroughly and strategies need to be implemented

to obtain buy-in by the stakeholders.
5

Section V describes implications for the personnel affected by these recommendations,

including personnel transfers, reclassification, and training.

Section VI contains two appendixes. Appendix A includes a matrix summarizing the

information in this implementation plan. Appendix B proposes a draft Executive Order directing

Executive Branch departments to establish a Military Personnel Reform Committee (MPRC)

under Department of Defense leadership.
6

II. IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINTS

In addressing those Commission's recommendations which specifically impact military

personnel, the President should establish by Executive Order a Military Personnel Reform

Committee (MPRC) to function under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of Defense. The MPRC

will make recommendations, draft legislation, coordinate testing and monitor implementation of

improved personnel systems that will ensure the very highest quality personnel continue to serve

our nation in uniform. The Chairman of MPRC would report to the Office of the President on an

annual basis.

A. Establish a Personnel Policy Coordinating Committee

Table 1 provides an implementation blueprint for establishing the Military Personnel Reform

Committee to direct and oversee the activities of the designated subcommittees.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. A Presidential Executive Order (EO)

establishes the MPRC with Secretary of Defense

as Chairman to assess, recommend, and monitor

implementation of an improved personnel system

for the military.

President 60 days

2. The Secretary of Defense acting as Chairman

of the MPRC coordinates and conducts its

meetings.

Secretary of Defense 90 days

3. MPRC charters subcommittees to analyze

current policies and corresponding legislation;

review and further develop Commission

recommendations.

Military Personnel

Reform Committee

45 days

Table 1. Establishment of Military Personnel Reform Committee (MPRC)

By the direction of the President, the Secretary of Defense would act as Chairman of the

MPRC and be tasked to study military personnel issues concerning recruitment, retention, and

career management throughout the Armed Services. Besides the MPRC Chairman, committee

members would include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of Veterans

Affairs, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and other personnel as

determined by the Secretary of Defense. The Committee will report ongoing efforts to the Office

of the President on a regular basis, but not less than annually.

B. Enhance the Montgomery G.I. Bill and Service Benefits

Recommendation 44: Congress should significantly enhance the Montgomery G.I.

Bill, as well as strengthen recently passed legislation supporting veteran’s benefits—

including transition, medical, and home ownership—for qualified veterans.
7

1. Background. The military is experiencing difficulty recruiting and retaining quality

people. While recruiting costs have risen by nearly one-third over the last four years,

Department of Defense (DoD) quality indicators of those enlisted have declined by 40 percent.

The G.I. Bill has proven to be a strong recruitment incentive and, like Title 38 (VA Benefits), an

important reward for military service. However, these benefits have not kept pace with current

recruitment incentives in the corporate or civilian sector. In light of the military's current

recruitment and retention challenges, the Commission has recommended that the G.I. Bill's

entitlements be modified to make it a stronger recruitment tool and reward for military service.

The Commission recommended enhancing the G.I. Bill by having entitlements equal the

median tuition costs of four-year colleges; indexing payments to keep pace with tuition inflation;

accelerating full-term payments to recipients; extending the period of usage from 10 to 20 years;

supporting technical training alternatives; not requiring payments or cost sharing from Service

members; making benefits transferable to dependents after the Service member serves 15 years

on active duty; and carrying a sliding scale for up to full benefits for Reservists called to active

duty for overseas contingency operations. The Commission also recommended enhancing VA

medical, home ownership, and transition benefits.

2. Implementation Blueprint. In order to implement the Commission's

recommendations for enhancing the Montgomery G.I. Bill and Title 38, U.S.C., the MPRC

should establish a subcommittee composed of representatives from the Departments of Veterans

Affairs and Defense. The subcommittee should more fully develop this recommendation,

working with the House and Senate Committees on Veterans Affairs to develop appropriate

legislation or provide support for pending legislation. Table 2 provides an implementation

blueprint for recommendation 44, showing actions required, responsibility, and a notional

implementation timeline.

Both the G.I. Bill and VA benefits have traditionally been considered rewards for

military service, and were seen as more lucrative than any comparable benefits offered for civil

service or in the private sector. Because of this perception, they have been excellent recruitment

and retention incentives in the past. The suggested improvements and enhancements to these

benefits will strengthen this tool and make it relevant for the 21st century.
8

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Designate a subcommittee to analyze current

policies and legislation; develop plan for

improvements, including alternatives, costs,

funding sources, and "grandfathering" issues

Military Personnel

Reform Committee

(MPRC)

45 days

2. Report back to MPRC for advice and

guidance; make appropriate changes to plan

based on comments; gain approval from

interagency MPRC

VA-led subcommittee Bi-monthly

3. Identify and verify costs with the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB), if needed

Subcommittee 90 days

4. Prepare draft legislation, if needed Subcommittee and

Congressional liaison

office of VA

45 days

5. Implement legislation when passed VA, DoD Within one year following

passage unless otherwise

specified in the law

Table 2. Implementation Matrix for Recommendation 44: Enhance G.I. Bill and Benefits

The MPRC should establish a subcommittee designated to study the recommendations

made by the Commission, and review current law and policy concerning the G.I. Bill and Title

38. Members of this subcommittee should currently be involved in implementing the G.I. Bill,

veterans' health, transition benefits, and VA loan/home ownership policy, inter alia. The

subcommittee should include members from the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Defense,

Education, and Health and Human Services (HHS).

The subcommittee should review current policy and legislative language and the

Commission's report to begin focusing efforts on possible improvements. While Table 3 shows

relatively recent efforts, there have been many older studies and efforts that provide background

for the subcommittee to use as a foundation for its work. Working closely with Congressional

staff already involved in pending legislation, the subcommittee should identify stakeholders

(including current Service members, personnel who have recently retired or separated from the

Service, health care providers, and insurers) and develop strategies for dealing with each of these

interest groups. One strategy would be the development and implementation of communications

plans to satisfy, or at least address, stakeholder needs. Very vocal stakeholders include Veterans

of Foreign Wars (VFW), American Legion, and other veterans' groups that have their own

agendas and whose support for legislation would be critical. In the case of active duty and

retired/separated military, stakeholder management could take the form of focus groups or

surveys to involve the personnel who will benefit most from the changes, and use their input to

craft specific recommendations. As the beneficiaries of the system, they could be a useful source

for specific areas that need improvements to make the Montgomery G.I. Bill and Title 38 more

attractive to current and future military personnel. This involvement would help create buy-in

and encourage efforts by non-active duty personnel to lobby Congress.

Congressional interest in these recommendations is high and bills advocating similar

positions were introduced in the 106th and 107th Congresses. Representative Christopher Smith

(R-NJ), Chairman of the House Committee on Veterans Affairs, and Representative Bob Stump
9

(R-AZ), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, propose introducing bills to

increase the ceilings for payments of tuition and fees under the Montgomery G.I. Bill. Senator

Max Cleland (D-GA) is a strong proponent of increased G.I. Bill and VA benefits. In the last

Congress, he introduced S.495, an amendment to the FY00 Defense Authorization Bill that

would have permitted service members to transfer their Montgomery G.I. Bill entitlement, in

whole or in part, to qualified dependents. The amendment was not included in the final bill. The

table below illustrates actions currently pending in Congress relative to the Commission’s

recommended enhancements.

Recommendation H.R. 320 H.R. 801 S. 131

Enhance the G.I. Bill

by having

entitlements equal

the median tuition

costs of four-year

colleges; index G.I.

Bill payments to

keep up with tuition

inflation

Amends Chapter 30

of Title 38 by adding

Section 3043:

Payment of Enhanced

Educational

Assistance by adding

“the Secretary shall

pay to the educational

institution providing a

course under an

approved program of

education to an

eligible individual

under this subchapter

who is enrolled in the

course the actual cost

of tuition and fees

otherwise payable by

the individual. Such

cost may not exceed

the amount charged to

similarly

circumstanced nonveterans.”

Amends Section 3015

of Title 38 by making

the monthly stipend

“equal to the average

monthly costs of

tuition and expenses

for commuter students

at public institutions

of higher education

that award

baccalaureate

degrees.” The amount

of the stipend would

be determined before

the beginning of each

fiscal year and take

into account tuition

and fees, the costs of

books and supplies,

the costs of board,

transportation costs

and other nonfixed

educational expenses.

Amends federal

veterans benefits

provisions to change

the amount of

monthly veterans'

educational assistance

allowance to an

amount equal to the

average monthly cost

of tuition.

Accelerate full-term

payments to

recipients

Amends Section 3014

of Title 38 by adding

“an individual entitled

to basic educational

assistance under this

subchapter may elect

to receive an

accelerated payment

of the basic

educational assistance

allowance."

N/A N/A

Extend eligibility

from 10 to 20 years

N/A N/A N/A
10

Recommendation H.R. 320 H.R. 801 S. 131

Support technical

training alternatives

Amends Section

3542(c) of Title 38,

by expanding the

definition of

“educational

institution” to include

training for

technological

occupations offered

by vocational schools,

correspondence

schools, stateapproved alternative

teacher certification

programs, training

required for

certification in a

vocation or profession

in a technological

occupation and other

institutions furnishing

education for adults.

Amends Section

3452(c) of Title 38,

by including courses

to fulfill requirements

for the attainment of a

license or certificate

generally recognized

as necessary to obtain,

maintain, or advance

in employment in a

profession or vocation

in a technological

occupation.

N/A

Do not require

payments or cost

sharing from Service

members

Amends Section 3011

of Title 38 by

removing the

requirement of a

reduction in basic pay

for eligibility of

Montgomery G.I. Bill

entitlement

N/A N/A

Make benefits

transferable to

dependents after the

Service member

serves 15 years on

active duty

N/A N/A N/A

Carry a sliding scale

for up to full benefits

for Reservists called

to active duty for

overseas contingency

operations

N/A N/A N/A
11

Recommendation H.R. 320 H.R. 801 S. 131

Enhance medical,

home ownership and

transition benefits

N/A Title 1, Section 201 of

this Act provides for

increase in transition

assistance. The Act

amends Section

7722(d) of Title 38,

stipulating the

“Secretary shall

provide such aid and

assistance to members

of the Armed Forces

as part of their

transition assistance

programs under

section 1144 of Title

10"; amends Section

7723(a) to include

Veterans Assistance

Offices in transition

assistance and amends

Section 7724 to

include military

installations.

N/A

Table 3. Pending Legislation on the Montgomery G.I. Bill and VA Benefits

As this subcommittee develops plans and policies, it should consult with the Military

Personnel Reform Committee for advice and guidance. The subcommittee should prepare a

formal report with specific recommendations. After gaining MPRC approval for these

recommendations, the subcommittee, in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget

(OMB), should determine costs involved for implementing proposed enhancements.

Additionally, the subcommittee should prepare draft legislation, if needed, in accordance with

department protocols. The final step is the departmental preparation of a final legislative

package that is forwarded to Congress. The subcommittee would implement any resulting

legislation through appropriate regulations and organizational changes, as needed. The VA

subcommittee that designed the legislative package could be assigned responsibility for

implementation.

3. Process Implications. There are no immediate procedural implications raised by this

recommendation.

4. Personnel Implications. The subcommittee that conducts the initial analysis and

works closely with Congress on pending legislation should be composed of senior-level officials

drawn from the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Defense and other

departments and agencies, as necessary. Additional support and liaison from DoD may be

needed in identifying focus group members or survey participants, and in developing legislative

strategy and testifying before Congress.
12

The Commission's recommendations involve extending and increasing existing benefits;

therefore, the same personnel who currently manage these policies and programs within the VA

may be able to manage the enhanced programs as part of their current workload. However, if it

is anticipated that a significantly larger number of veterans would take advantage of these

enhanced programs, or the programs substantially increase management requirements, additional

personnel might be necessary to administer them. It is likely that Congressional committees of

jurisdiction would ask Administration officials testifying in support of the legislation for

estimates on personnel increases. Therefore, determining required staff increases should begin

immediately, since legislation is already pending before Congress.

C. Decentralize Military Personnel Legislation

1. Background. The Department of Defense faces enormous challenges in meeting

recruitment and retention goals due to difficulties with promotion, compensation, and benefits

for its military personnel. In fiscal year 1998, the proportion of new, high-quality recruits ranged

from 57 percent in the Army to 74 percent in the Air Force. The trend in the proportion of high

quality accessions has been declining since 1993.4 This is particularly disturbing, since today's

military environment requires people with greater technical skills and aptitudes.

Recruitment and retention difficulties may be due to a combination of factors, some of

which are external to the military, such as a booming economy and the availability of jobs in the

civilian sector. Yet, some are internal, such as a decrease in military benefits, high personnel

tempo (PERSTEMPO), and other quality of life issues. While DoD already has chartered a

working group (Retention Working Group) reporting to the DASD (Military Personnel Policy) to

address enlisted forces retention issues, the Commission believes that significant changes need to

be made to the systems used for recruitment, retention, promotion, and compensation.

To this end, the Commission recommended that specific legislation be changed to permit

flexibility in the personnel systems affecting pay, promotion, retention, and retirement. House

Resolution 9, introduced in Congress in 1999, expressed the “sense of Congress that a

comprehensive effort is required to revitalize and sustain the all-volunteer force and address the

decline in quality of life for members of the Armed Forces and their families” and specifically

recommended a pay raise for the military.

The Commission provides some suggested actions concerning specific legislative acts

that require revision, and recommendations for increasing cooperation and movement between

systems. These suggestions are represented in the following sub-recommendations. Following

this discussion, implementation blueprints for all of the sub-recommendations will be shown in

Section C.2.

 

4 25th Annual DOD Report on Social Representation in U.S. Military Services. High school diploma graduates who score in

the top 50% on the AFQT, categories I through IIIA are considered high quality, according to this report.

Recommendation 45: Congress and the Defense Department should cooperate to

decentralize military personnel legislation dictating the terms of

enlistment/commissioning, career management, retirement, and compensation.
13

Generally, DOPMA requires all of the Services to conform to the same rules, regulations,

and quotas, despite differences in Service-specific needs and missions, availability of qualified

personnel, and recruitment and retention rates.

Certain regulations govern the amount of time personnel are allowed to remain in service.

Usually, an officer must retire or be separated if he/she has been passed over for promotion

twice, reached age 55, or reached the mandatory retirement date (expressed as years of service)

for his/her grade. (Exceptions to these guidelines apply to those eligible for selective early

retirement or those specifically selected for continuation on a case-by-case basis.) Commonly

referred to as the "up or out" system, it is partially based on the need for a young, vigorous

military force on the battlefield. As modern warfare has changed, the need for raw

unsophisticated manpower has decreased in all of the Services, and in many career fields.

Experienced and knowledgeable personnel are effective warfighters in today's environment.5

The Commission recommends extending the possibility of alternative career paths for

experienced personnel in certain career fields (without expectation of promotion), at the

discretion of the Service secretary. Prime examples of such a policy would include specialists in

the fields of logistics, acquisition, and information technology, but many other specialties may

also be tested.

The Commission also believes that some individuals who are not interested in higher

command and upper level enlisted supervisory duties might be content becoming “career

specialists.” These personnel could remain at lower rank levels for a full career, rather than be

forced out at mandatory retirement "flowpoints" by grade and active duty service limits, if

allowed to do so. If current legislation and policies were changed, these individuals could be

extended up to or beyond 30 years if appropriate and qualified. This option would be especially

attractive if systemic changes were made to reward subject matter expertise and experience

rather than enforcing the "up or out" policy. In addition to policy changes, a merit pay system

could help achieve this change.

The Army, in its "Leveraging Human Resources in the 21st Century" report, stresses that

there should be a commitment "to recognize different parts of an organization that employ

different strategies and need human resource management systems tailored to their needs."6 In

that document, the Army recommends "seek[ing] legislative authority to tailor the personnel

 

5 "Envisioning the Future of Naval Service, Planning Assumptions for 2020,"

http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/assistsecnav/asn_mra/becraft/hrm21/envis.html.

6 Leveraging Human Resources in the 21st Century, found at www.perscom.army.mil/opmsxxi

Sub-recommendation 45(a): Revise The Defense Officers Personnel Management Act

(DOPMA) to provide Service Secretaries increased authority to selectively exempt

personnel from "up-or-out" career paths, mandatory flight assignment gates, the double

pass-over rule, mandatory promotion and officer/enlisted grade sizes, the mandatory

retirement “flowpoints” by grade, and active duty service limits. The individual Services

should be funded to test alternative career and enlistment paths that are fully

complemented by modified compensation, promotion, and retirement/separation

packages.
14

management systems to the particular needs of different parts of the organization." The Air

Force has also recognized that "there are numerous paths to success within each career field" and

attempts to offer their officer corps careers tailored to individual needs.7

Alternative career/enlistment paths could include dual tracks of command and specialist

personnel. Specialists could stay at the O-4 or E-6 level, for example, with variable pay

dependent on quality of performance. Specialists (as opposed to command track personnel)

would more often receive merit pay, based on experience and seniority, to compensate for fewer

promotion opportunities compared to those in command tracks.

Command supervisory track personnel could be offered faster promotion opportunities

than specialists, since they would be given leadership and supervisory duties, but less merit pay.

There is some precedent for alternative pay scales. For example, currently, Medical Corps

officers are paid on a different pay scale than are other officers, based on their advanced degrees

and the acknowledged difficulty in recruiting doctors. Widespread use of this system would

allow the expansion of alternative pay scales to include other occupational specialties requiring

advanced degrees, or skills for which the private sector pays a premium (e.g., information

technology specialists).

Some support for these recommendations already exists among national security experts.

For example, in A Bipartisan Report to the President-Elect on Foreign Policy and National

Security, Frank Carlucci, Robert Hunter, and Zalmay Khalilzad have recommended that

[the] Department of Defense ... consider a variety of options [including]:

increase compensation across the board; overhaul the compensation system,

targeting it at the most pressing problems; or restructure military careers. Some

combination of all these options may be required. However, even targeted

increases need to be supplemented by other tactics to increase the flexibility of

the military compensation system to allow it to respond rapidly to changes in the

civilian economy and in military personnel requirements. Such tactics might

include special bonuses to increase retention of critical personnel, separation pay

and tax-sheltered retirement savings plans to allow more flexible retirement

schedules, and additional recruiting resources to attract new types of recruits. 8

A RAND study9 of various options to increase recruitment and retention concluded that

targeted pay raises to senior personnel and enlistment bonuses provided the most cost-effective

means to meet recruitment and retention goals.

 

7 Officer Career Path Guide, 16 November 2000, found at www.afpc.randolph.af.mil.

8 Carlucci,Frank, Robert Hunter, and Zalmay Khalilzad, A Bipartisan Report to the President-Elect on Foreign Policy and

National Security, MR-1306-RC, 2000 (RAND), pp 38-39.

9 Asch, Beth J. and James R. Houck, Rand Report on Military Compensation: Trends and Policy Options, RAND, 1998.

Sub-recommendation 45(b): Revise the 1999 National Defense Authorization Act to

permit testing of a conversion of the defined benefit systems to a partial defined

contribution system, as well as early vesting schedules and other progressive alternatives to

the current military retirement system. Allow the Services to shape modified retirement

plans to complement alternative career paths and specialty service.
15

The current retirement system for the military is an “all or nothing” system.10 Personnel

must stay on active duty for at least 20 years to receive any retirement pay.11 A modified system,

which would allow “vesting” at 10 years, for example, would permit personnel to work for the

military for 10 years, leave the military, and then at age 55 or 62, receive a retirement package

based on their 10 years of service. Personnel who chose to make a career in the military would

be offered retirement packages after 20, 25, 30, or 35 years of service. Currently there is no

monetary reward for staying in the military much past 20 years; at 26 years officers receive their

last full longevity raise. The system is designed to entice personnel to leave at 20 years with half

pay. If personnel serve beyond 20 years, the difference in compensation is only 50 percent.

They would receive 50 percent of their pay if retired; if they continue to serve, they receive their

full pay, which is only 50 percent greater than their retirement pay would have been, plus any

bonuses or promotions occurring after 20 years.

A recent effort to augment retirement annuities was the 2000 extension of the Civil

Service Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) to active duty personnel. Once TSP takes effect in 2002,

personnel will be given the option of investing up to 5 percent of their basic pay and any amount

from special pay, incentive pay, and bonuses (up to a current Internal Revenue Service [IRS]

limit of $10,500 total per year) in a self-directed investment program run by the Federal

Government. The Secretary of Defense is permitted to establish retention incentives that allow

matching funds, up to 5 percent of pay, for a 6-year service commitment.

Actual participation in the plan does not start until 2002, thus it would be premature to

suggest that the military Services are receptive to a self-funded supplemental system until the

system has been in effect for some time. Moreover, it will not be possible to assess the impact of

this plan for several years. However, TSP is a step toward some form of contributory retirement

plan to supplement the primary retirement system.

This recommendation recognizes inequities in the current system, whereby noncommissioned officers (NCOs) at the E-8 level, for example, receive less than three times the

basic pay of an E-2, and it acknowledges the importance of senior non-commissioned officers.

Targeted pay raises for lower or mid-level personnel have caused a compression of the pay table,

resulting in this pay inequity for E-8 personnel. Correcting the pay table and/or instituting merit

pay systems that give additional pay for expertise and experience would reward senior enlisted

personnel for their years of experience and subject matter knowledge.

Generally, an E-2 has less than two years of service and little experience or job

knowledge. An E-8 in any of the Services typically has 12-15 years (or more) of service; is an

 

10 The current non-vested retirement system is unique to the military. Private sector and civil service retirement systems (since

the inception of the Federal Employees Retirement System in the mid-1980s) are portable systems.

11 The Selective Early Retirement option, in effect during the "active force drawdown" period from 1992-1999, permitted a

Service member with more than 15 years of service, but less than 20 years, to retire. This option is no longer in effect.

Sub-recommendation 45(c): Revise U.S. Code Title 37 (Compensation) to correct

immediately the pay compression of senior NCOs in all the Services and test merit pay

systems and alternative pay schedules based on experience, performance, and seniority.
16

expert in a particular career field; serves as a second level supervisor; and has significant duties

and responsibilities. Despite the value of their service to the nation, E-8s receive less than three

times the basic pay of enlisted personnel who have recently entered the Service, have few skills,

and much less experience. At various points in the past, E-8s received approximately seven

times the basic pay of E-2. The Commission believes that current pay tables are an anomaly,

counterproductive and require targeted revision.12

The purpose of what is commonly called the "gate" system was to ensure that personnel

receiving the Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) were professional aviators serving in

aviation assignments and to ensure that the Services were receiving an appropriate return on

flight training investments. However, by requiring aviators to spend the majority of their careers

flying, the Services keep them from developing the broad joint perspective and skills necessary

to become senior leaders, unless they give up their flight pay. In other words, pilots under the

current system are penalized by the loss of flight pay if they do not fly. But, in order to

undertake career broadening assignments that will enable them to provide increased value to

their Service and thus to the nation, they must take non-flying jobs.

Although pay is not the only reason for pilot retention problems, the pay gap between

commercial pilots and military pilots is extremely wide, and also causes many pilots to leave the

Services at the earliest possible separation point. A GAO report dated March 2000, showed that

"The Air Force reported that the cumulative continuation rate among pilots (the likelihood that

pilots who complete 6 years of service would go on to complete 11 years) dropped 41 percent

from 1995 through 1998 (from 87 to 46 percent ). Similarly, the Navy reported that cumulative

aviation continuation rates decreased from about 50 percent in 1996 to about 32 percent in 1998.

Continuation rates among mid-career pilots decreased 5 percent in the Air Force and 2

percent in the Navy when comparing 1998 with 1996-97."13 Flight pay helps to offset the

differential between commercial pilot pay scales and military base pay. Thus, if an officer must

choose to sacrifice flight pay to take assignments that are prerequisites to attaining senior levels

within their Service, the lure of commercial aviation may prove irresistible. As discussed earlier,

giving Service Secretaries discretion in continuing incentive pay to officers undergoing career

broadening experiences is a retention tool in itself that goes hand-in-hand with the purpose of the

Aviation Career Incentive Act of 1974.

 

12 It is noteworthy that total compensation packages, including housing allowance and rations that are usually available to E-8s

but not to E-2, bring total compensation package for an E-8 to a ratio closer to 5:1 over E-2 package.

13 GAO/NSIAD-0060 "Military Personnel Report," dated March 2000.

Sub-recommendation 45(d): Revise U.S. Code Title 37 (Compensation) to allow Service

Secretaries discretion concerning continued flight pay for pilots undergoing non-flying

career-broadening billets by modifying the 1974 Aviation Career Incentive Act.

Sub-recommendation 45(e): Reconcile a new DOPMA system (active duty) with ROPMA

(Reserves), with the Technician Act (1968), the Guard AGR Act (National Guard), and with

Civil Service personnel systems to facilitate and encourage increased movement among

branches.
17

An interagency committee should be formed to develop this concept, but the thrust of the

recommendation is to enhance recruitment and retention across all systems, and recognize that

federal service can be expressed in many ways: through uniformed service, civil service, or a

combination of the two. Reconciliation of the various personnel systems could be as farreaching as developing career paths that extend from active duty service to civil service to

reserve service; providing authority for the President to appoint civilians to active duty at any

time, or to simply provide a mechanism (as suggested in the Navy's Strategic Human Resources

Management blueprint14) whereby the personnel systems of the community members (civilian,

active duty, reservists, guardsmen) remain separate, but the policies and practices become

congruent. Depending on the recommendations the interagency committee develops, changes to

Title 10, military personnel and pay regulations, Title 5, civilian personnel regulations, and DoD

and other agency Appropriations Acts could be necessary.

2. Implementation Blueprint. To address these sub-recommendations, the MPRC

should establish subcommittees to study the sub-recommendations in depth and recommend

improvements to military personnel systems and benefits as a means of recruiting and retaining

high quality forces.

Although the Commission divided recommendation 45 into five sub-recommendations,

they are interdependent, and actions to improve one sub-recommendation would impact the other

sub-recommendations. Therefore, the Military Personnel Reform Committee should establish

subcommittees that address more than one sub-recommendation. For example, subrecommendations 45(a), (b), (d) directly impact sub-recommendation 45(e), and vice versa. If

specific aspects of DOPMA, the Aviation Career Act and the 1999 National Defense

Authorization Act are changed (concerning recruitment, retention, career management and

retirement), then reconciling military personnel systems with civilian personnel systems (subrecommendation 45(e)) will be affected. Because sub-recommendations 45 (a), (b), and (d)

concern changing several aspects of military personnel systems, they are treated similarly in

developing an implementation plan. The blueprints highlight actions required, responsibility,

and a notional implementation timeline. Implementation timelines in all tables are sequential,

unless otherwise noted.

a. Implementation Blueprint for Sub-Recommendations 45(a), (b), and (d).

Table 4 provides an implementation blueprint for establishing a MPRC subcommittee designated

to address sub-recommendations 45(a), 45(b) and 45(d), revising DOPMA, the 1999 National

Defense Authorization Act, and the 1974 Aviation Career Incentive Act.

 

14 See footnote 5.
18

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Establish a DoD-led subcommittee designated

to analyze current policies and legislation

concerning DOPMA, 1999 National Defense

Authorization Act, and 1974 Aviation Career

Incentive Act and system integration.

Military Personnel

Reform Committee

45 days

2. Prepare a plan for improvements (including

implementation plans for appropriate

demonstration projects)

DoD-led

Subcommittee

365 days

3. Report back to MPRC for advice and guidance;

make appropriate changes to plan based on

comments; gain approval from MPRC

DoD-led

Subcommittee

Quarterly

4. Identify and verify costs with OMB Subcommittee 90 days

5. Prepare draft legislation to implement plan DoD-led

Subcommittee and

Congressional liaison

office of DoD

60 days

6. Send legislative package to Congress for

introduction and passage

DoD Immediately following

above action

7. Implement legislation when passed DoD Within one year following

passage unless otherwise

specified in the law

8. Evaluate results of demonstration projects Military Personnel

Reform Committee,

Subcommittee,

personnel specialists

within DoD

On-going efforts and

intensively after

demonstration project

concludes

9. Recommend to Secretary of Defense any

changes to demonstration projects and/or whether

they should be expanded to entire Service or

DoD-wide

Military Personnel

Reform Committee,

subcommittee

9 months after conclusion

of demonstration project

Table 4. Implementation Blueprint for Sub-Recommendations 45(a), (b), (d)

Revise DOPMA, Revise 1999 National Defense Authorization Act, and Revise 1974

Aviation Career Incentive Act

The MPRC should establish a subcommittee designated to study the recommendations

made by the Commission, and review current law and policy concerning DOPMA, the 1999

Defense Authorization Act and Title 37, U.S.C., Career Aviation Act. Members of this

subcommittee should be senior-level personnel currently involved in implementing the

recruitment, retention, retirement and pay systems of the military, inter alia. The subcommittee

should report back regularly to the MPRC for input, guidance and approval. Any work done by

the subcommittee should be coordinated with the other subcommittee designated to address subrecommendation 45(e).
19

Once established, the subcommittee should review current policy and legislative

language and the Commission's report to focus its efforts on possible improvements. It should

identify stakeholders (including current service members, personnel who have recently retired or

separated from the service, veterans' groups, such as Retired Officers Associations) and develop

strategies for dealing with each of these interest groups. One important part of this strategy will

be the development and implementation of a communications plan to satisfy, or at least address,

stakeholder concerns. For example, in the case of active duty and retired/separated military,

stakeholder management could take the form of focus groups or surveys that involve the

personnel who will be most affected by the changes, and use their input to craft specific

recommendations. As users of these systems, they can be a good source for specific areas that

need improvements to make the pay, retention, recruitment, and promotion systems attractive to

current and future military personnel. By involving them in the process, they also may become

natural allies of DoD in the attempt to push the legislation through Congress.

After the subcommittee has developed a plan with specific recommendations (including

identification and design of demonstration projects) and in conjunction with the Office of

Management and Budget, it should determine costs involved for implementing proposed

enhancements. Additionally, the subcommittee should prepare draft legislation, if needed.

When required legislation becomes law, the Department of Defense and the individual Services

would implement the legislation through appropriate regulations and organizational changes, as

needed. The subcommittee could be assigned responsibility for implementation.

Since the legislation would create demonstration projects only, the subcommittee should

continue its work by monitoring the demonstration projects. Once demonstration projects are

complete, the subcommittee and MPRC should evaluate the results, and then recommend to the

Secretary of Defense whether the demonstrations should be expanded DoD-wide and/or Servicewide. If such a recommendation is made, new legislation should be crafted and the legislative

process implemented again.

b. Implementation Blueprint for Sub-Recommendation 45(c). Subrecommendation 45(c) deals with an anomaly in the current pay system. Actions to correct this

anomaly are straightforward and should not pose any problems in implementation. Table 5

provides an implementation blueprint for sub-recommendation 45(c), revising Title 37 of the

U.S. Code to correct pay compression of senior NCOs.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Establish a subcommittee designated to

coordinate with the Quadrennial Review on

Military Compensation (QRMC); to support the

work of the QRMC, specifically in the area of

E-8 compensation

Military Personnel

Reform Committee

45 days

2. Provide support to the QRMC, as needed Subcommittee 120 days

3. Implement legislation when passed DoD Within one year following

passage unless otherwise

specified in the law.

Table 5. Implementation Blueprint for Sub-Recommendation 45(c)

Revise U.S. Code Title 37 to Correct Pay Compression of Senior NCOs
20

The Military Personnel Reform Committee should establish a subcommittee designated

to study the recommendations made by the Commission and coordinate with members of the

Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) to develop a more equitable basic pay

scale for E-8 personnel. As work proceeds, the subcommittee and the Quadrennial Review

members should consider what impact a change to E-8 basic pay will have on E-9 personnel, and

make changes to E-9 pay accordingly. The Quadrennial Review members are tasked with

developing pay policy and schedules, working with OMB to estimate the costs of the

recommendations, and preparing appropriate legislation to be sent to Capitol Hill. The Eighth

Quadrennial Review in 1997 adopted a more inclusive perspective of compensation and focused

greater emphasis on underlying principles and concepts, seeing compensation as one portion of a

strategic human resources initiative. The Ninth Quadrennial Review, in progress, appears to be

focusing its efforts on smaller, more timely reports on various pay issues as they arise through

the course of the year. Enlisted pay issues are one of the areas being studied. Top enlisted

personnel from each Service serve on an advisory panel, headed by the Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Military Personnel Policy). The subcommittee could work with the

QRMC members to ensure attention is focused on the current E-8 pay inequities and report back

to the interagency task force for guidance and approval.

c. Implementation Blueprint for Sub-Recommendations 45(e). Table 6 provides

an implementation blueprint for sub-recommendation 45(e), reconciling DOPMA, ROPMA, the

Technician Act, the Guard AGR Act, and the Civil Service personnel systems.

Actions Responsibility Implementation Timeline

1. Establish a subcommittee to develop policy

and procedures to reconcile various personnel

systems

Military Personnel

Reform Committee

45 days

2. Report back to MPRC for advice and

guidance; make appropriate changes to plan

based on comments; gain approval from MPRC.

Subcommittee Quarterly, during course of

study

3. Identify and verify costs with OMB Subcommittee 90 days

4. Prepare draft legislation, if needed Subcommittee 90 days

5. Implement legislation when passed or

implement regulations when signed

DoD, OPM, and any

other agencies

affected

Within one year following

passage unless otherwise

specified in the law

Table 6. Implementation Blueprint for Sub-Recommendations 45(e)

Reconcile DOPMA, ROPMA, Technician Act, Guard AGR Act, and Civil Service

Personnel Systems

Sub-recommendation 45(e) proposes changes to both military and civilian personnel

systems and, once fleshed out, has the potential to affect the entire federal workforce. If

sweeping changes are made to all the systems, separate subcommittees should be formed to

outline the specific personnel policy changes required and to develop legislation and/or

regulations necessary to implement these changes.

The Military Personnel Reform Committee should establish a subcommittee designated

to study and review current law and policy concerning personnel policies of the uniformed

services and civil service. Members of this subcommittee should be senior-level personnel
21

currently involved in implementing the personnel systems of the military, including the Reserves

and National Guard as well as active duty and civilian personnel systems. The subcommittee

should also include appropriate staff from the Office of Personnel Management, who will

represent the civilian personnel systems.

Once established, the subcommittee should review current policy and legislative

language and the Commission's report to identify feasible options. It should identify

stakeholders (including active duty, Reservists, guardsmen, civilian employees) and develop

strategies for dealing with each of these interest groups. After the subcommittee has developed

specific recommendations and decided on the scope of the overlap desired between systems, it

should report its findings to the MPRC for approval of its recommendations.

The subcommittee, in conjunction with OMB, should determine costs involved for

implementing proposed enhancements. If separate pay schedules remain in effect, costs should

be minimal in implementing this recommendation. If the systems, including pay, are combined,

then additional oversight will be required and costs could increase in order to implement the

recommendations.

The subcommittee should prepare draft legislation in accordance with department

protocols in order to implement its recommendations. If the subcommittee determines that

legislation is not needed, it should use the same basic procedure to produce appropriate

departmental regulations and policy changes and to implement them throughout the military and

civil service bureaucracies. Congressional efforts are already underway to address this issue.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 17, introduced in the 107th Congress, expresses “the sense of

Congress that there should continue to be parity between the adjustments in the compensation of

members of the uniformed services and the adjustments in the compensation of civilian

employees of the United States.”

The Department of Defense, the Services, and the Office of Personnel Management

should implement the recommendations whether mandated by legislation or departmental

regulation. The subcommittee could be assigned responsibility for leading and monitoring

implementation efforts and studying the results.

3. Process Implications. There are no immediate process implications from these

recommendations.

4. Personnel Implications. The various subcommittees of the Military Personnel

Reform Committee that would conduct the initial analyses and develop the legislative packages

should be composed of senior-level officials drawn from the Department of Defense, and other

departments and agencies as necessary. Support and liaison from the various Services may be

needed in identifying focus group members or survey participants and in developing legislative

strategy and testifying before Congress.

The Commission's recommendations involve decentralizing current regulations and

policies at the DoD level; therefore, the personnel who currently manage these policies and

programs would be required to manage multiple programs, requiring additional oversight and

personnel. Each Service may need additional personnel to manage the Service-specific

programs. Additionally, the scope of the other systemic changes to the personnel systems
22

recommended by the various subcommittees will have an impact on personnel requirements. If

the respective subcommittees make minimal changes to the system, then the subcommittees

themselves could accomplish much of the work. If the subcommittee recommends large-scale

changes to the current systems, then additional personnel may be required to develop and

implement new systems. It is likely that Congressional committees of jurisdiction would ask

Administration officials testifying in support of the legislation for estimates on personnel

increases. Therefore, determining required staff increases should begin simultaneously with

development of the legislative packages.

The Commission's recommendations also call for an adjustment of pay schedules.

Additional personnel should not be required to manage this change. The same personnel who

currently administer pay systems would make the necessary changes to the system and maintain

their current workload under the new pay schedule.
23

III. ISSUES, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES

The recommendations on military personnel are efforts to change personnel systems,

benefits, and aspects of the military culture itself to attract and retain a high quality military force

for the 21st century. In order to implement these recommendations, certain issues need to be

addressed, opportunities seized, and challenges overcome. Six interdependent issues must be

addressed in order to implement the Commission's recommendations: providing funding for

these enhancements for adequate total compensation; obtaining buy-in and support from military

personnel; changing military culture; developing a legislative strategy; establishing

demonstration projects; and "grandfathering" personnel already in the systems. These issues and

the strategies to address them are discussed below.

A. General Description

1. Funding the Initiative. The military is already scheduled to receive a 4.56 percent

across-the-board annual pay increase in 2001, and President George W. Bush has recommended

an additional increase of $1.4B for salaries. As of early March, two members of Congress have

submitted legislation for large military pay raises as well.15 Despite a strong show of support by

the President and Congress, these bills will face stiff challenges from other sources competing

for funding. MPRC members will need to estimate the cost of each sub-recommendation and

develop a cohesive strategy to obtain the required funds in this resource-constrained

environment. Alternative sources of funding should be considered as part of this process. For

example, educational grant funding, such as Pell grants, could instead be spent on enhancing G.I.

Bill educational benefits, or trade-offs among the sub-recommendations should be considered if

full funding for all is not possible.

2. Obtaining Support from Military and Retired Personnel. Experts in change

management agree that support from top levels of an organization is required for change to

occur. They also agree that to foster buy-in, people who would be affected by these changes

should be included in designing the replacement systems. One method of demonstrating

inclusion is through an extensive system of surveys and focus groups that convey the message to

organization members that their views are important. Data from these efforts could be used to

assist in designing the new systems.

Another crucial ingredient to manage change effectively is a viable communications

strategy that facilitates efforts to market changes to the workforce. As this strategy and the

specific recommendations are developed, members of the Military Personnel Reform Committee

and proponents of these recommendations must identify senior military personnel who could

champion the envisioned recommendations. However, it may be difficult to obtain senior

military support, if they will have to testify that the very systems that brought them to the top are

no longer relevant.

3. Changing the Military Personnel System Culture. Several factors currently bring

pressure to bear on the military. First, a strong commercial economy offers alternative

employment with very attractive compensation packages to potential military recruits and current

 

15 Representative Dennis Rehberg (R-MT) introduced legislation to increase military pay by an extra 3.5%, to 8.1%, with the

3.5% beginning in the month after enactment. Representative John P. Murtha (D-PA) has proposed raising military pay by

7.3% in 2002.
24

military personnel. Second, the impact of technology has influenced the upcoming generation.

Potential recruits will expect more rapid advancement than is currently experienced, and will not

be willing to serve lengthy apprenticeships to achieve advancement. Third, the current and

future generations that will make up the military will continue to value "self-reliance, education,

and flexibility, and strive for meaningful rewards and job security through employability." 16

From employers, they will demand access to technology, continuous learning opportunities, and

somewhat more flexible and alternative working environments.17 To meet these demands, the

Department of Defense must design and implement new systems, which, in themselves, will

cause changes—if not in the culture itself, then in traditional ways of thinking about

compensation and benefits. Some of the changes envisioned are depicted in the following table.

Present Military Personnel System Envisioned Career Management

A culture in which the norm is retirement

after a 20-30 year career unless specifically

extended or extended as a result of

promotion to general/flag officer.

A culture with alternative retirement options: 35-

40 year career possibility; vesting after 10 years,

so that leaving without "full" retirement is an

alternative "norm."

A culture that is essentially Up or Out—

those who are not promoted are forced out

regardless of their skills or experience.

A culture that allows service members to remain

at a lower level for a full career.

A culture in which those who reach senior

positions do so through a command track,

regardless of personal preferences.

A culture in which a specialist option is an

acceptable alternative to traditional paths and

permits those who choose it to receive adequate

compensation based on merit.

A culture where one-size-fits-all personnel

and compensation systems are the norm.

A culture in which personnel and compensation

systems are flexible enough to change to reflect

changing needs.

A culture that requires members to move

frequently.

A culture that offers the choice of a career in one

place in a choice of career tracks

A culture of separate and unequal career

systems between active and reserve

components and civil service that prevents

easy transfer between them.

A culture in which an overlap between active

duty/reserve/civilian personnel systems is

expected and encouraged.

A culture in which pay raises are based on

grade and longevity.

A culture in which pay is based on performance.

A culture in which recruits joined out of

patriotism, economic necessity, opportunity

for upward mobility, draft, family

background, or "hero" ethic.

A culture in which recruits joined out of

patriotism, economic incentives, opportunity for

upward mobility, family background, or "hero"

ethic.

Table 7: Comparison of Current and Envisioned Personnel System Culture18

Experts on change have written extensively on the difficulty of changing a culture. One

suggestion is changing the systems within the culture, thus accelerating change.19 If the

 

16 Envisioning the Future of Naval Service: A Strategic Human Resource Management System for the 21st Century.

17 Ibid.

18 Based on material in Envisioning the Future of Naval Services: A Strategic Human Resource Management System for the

21st Century, op.cit, and Vandergriff, Donald E., The Revolution in Human Affairs, found at http://d-n-i.net/FCSFolder/vandergriff-rha/sid086.htm
25

Commission's recommendations are followed and recruitment, retention, promotion, and

retirement systems are changed in themselves, people already in the systems and future recruits

will have to accept the new culture.

4. Developing a Legislative Strategy. It would be unrealistic to expect that these

legislative recommendations will be accepted without debate within Congress. Some members

will be sponsors and champions of these proposals; others, whose constituents' interests lie

elsewhere, will oppose them. The Executive Branch's Military Personnel Reform Committee

and subcommittees charged with developing legislation must also develop strategies for moving

these packages through Congress. They should craft these strategies after consultation with

appropriate Members of Congress and their staffs and the strategies should include plans for

managing stakeholders in both chambers and those who can influence Congress (including those

who support the legislation, those who oppose it, and those who are neutral).

5. Establishing Demonstration Projects. Many of the recommendations require

developing demonstration projects within one community prior to implementing them Service or

DoD-wide. Careful studies must be undertaken to ensure that appropriate communities

participate in demonstration projects, and that they are adequately designed and funded. The

challenge of demonstration projects is obtaining funding that will last over several years, so the

demonstration projects can provide meaningful data of the recommendations' success or failure.

If successful, then additional legislation would be required to expand the project to other

elements of the Service or DoD-wide.

6. "Grandfathering." The Military Personnel Reform Committee and subcommittees

will need to analyze the effect of any legislation concerning the G.I. Bill and VA enhancements

on personnel already receiving these benefits and determine if they remain in the former systems

or transferred to the new, enhanced systems. What magnitude of costs would extending benefits

to this large constituency entail? What mechanisms would be used to transfer personnel to the

new systems? What is the impact, for example, on healthcare systems if all veterans were

permitted to use military hospitals? What would the impact be on private healthcare systems if

veterans were given healthcare insurance for private care? Could and would current health care

practitioners accept such insurance? These are challenges the subcommittees would need to

address as they craft legislation.

B. Issues and Suggested Approaches

Table 8 provides specific information on the issues raised above, and suggested

approaches to overcoming challenges.

 19 An example of resisting change until the system forced change upon the culture itself was the recent introduction of local 10

digit telephone dialing. U.S. consumers vehemently rejected the idea of using 10 digit local telephone numbers. However,

when telephone systems were unable to handle the volume of subscribers without instituting use of Area Codes for local

dialing, and programmed telephone systems to only work with 10 digit numbers, the public rapidly adjusted to this change.
26

Issue Approach

1. Funding Determine costs; consider economies to offset; obtain

Congressional and White House support for

recommendations.

2. Military buy-in Develop strategy to obtain support at highest levels of

organization; cascade down to workforce; use focus groups

and surveys to learn what those affected by changes really

want; use their involvement to foster buy-in and input to draft

recommendations

3. Culture change/Change

management

Develop a comprehensive communications plan; obtain

leadership support; involve all levels of personnel (active

duty, retired and recently separated) into developing

recommendations and new systems. Communicate plans and

recommendations early and often.

4. Legislation Develop legislative strategy, including use of representatives

from DoD and the VA, veterans' groups, Congressional

liaison offices, Executive Branch, as appropriate.

5. Demonstration projects Study; find appropriate community to participate in the pilot;

gain support and buy-in; design/scope pilots, including time

frame; test pilot; analyze results; develop widespread

implementation plan; write legislation to expand pilots.

6. "Grandfathering" of benefits Study implications of any proposed enhancements to

Montgomery G.I. Bill and VA benefits if extended to veterans

already eligible for such benefits. Cost out implications of

these enhancements and design a system to transfer current

beneficiaries to new systems

Table 8. Issues and Approaches to Implement Military Personnel Recommendations
27

IV. IMPLEMENTATION MEANS

An Executive Order and a Department of Defense Directive should be issued to form a

high-level, Military Personnel Reform Committee (MPRC) that will direct and oversee a number

of subcommittees designated to study various options to improve recruitment and retention of the

Armed Services. The MPRC, reporting to the Secretary of Defense, would discuss military

personnel issues, while the subcommittees would research and develop more fully the

recommendations proposed by the Commission. Subcommittees would report their progress to

the MPRC on a regular basis and receive advice and guidance from the Committee. When the

MPRC approves the subcommittees' specific recommendations, legislation and/or regulations

would be needed to implement the recommendations. After any recommended pilot programs

are complete, and the results are evaluated, additional legislation to expand the pilots to other

elements of the Services or DoD also would be required.
28

V. PERSONNEL IMPLICATIONS

Members of the Military Personnel Reform Committee (MPRC) and its various

subcommittees would be current employees of the Executive and Legislative branches of

government. Members could be detailed from their current agencies to work on the various

subcommittees as needed. Additional support from DoD in providing personnel to participate in

focus groups or surveys would be needed. Personnel who currently manage programs affected

by the Commission's recommendations may be able to manage enhanced programs as part of

their current workload. However, for example, if it were anticipated that a significantly larger

number of veterans would take advantage of increased benefits, or if additional management

oversight would be needed to manage new programs (such as a melded personnel system for

civilian employees and service members), additional personnel would be needed to administer

the programs. Determining staff increases should be a part of the subcommittees' work as they

develop the recommendations more fully.

Failure to implement these recommendations will result in a reduced military

establishment, as current recruitment and retention problems will only continue to degrade.

Implementing the recommendations will provide the military with a workforce fully capable of

responding to national security challenges of the 21st century.
VI. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A:

IMPLEMENTATION BLUEPRINT MATRIX
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Military Personnel

Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsib

1. An Executive Order and a Department of DefenseDirective establish a Military Personnel Reform Committee(MPRC) to study military personnel issues affectingrecruitment, retention and career management throughoutthe Armed Services

President andSecretary ofDefense

2. Establish subcommittees to analyze current policies andcorresponding legislation; review and further developCommission recommendations

Military PersReform Com

Congress should significantly enhancethe Montgomery GI Bill, as well asstrengthen recently passed legislationsupporting veteran' s benefits-includingtransition, medical, and home ownershipfor qualified veterans.

1. Designate a subcommittee to analyze current policies andlegislation; develop plan for improvements, includingalternatives, costs, funding sources, and "grandfathering"issues

Military PersReform Com

2. Report back to MPRC for advice and guidance; makeappropriate changes to plan based on comments; gainapproval from MPRC

VA-ledsubcommitte

3. Identify and verify costs with the Office of Managementand Budget (OMB), if needed

Subcommitte

4. Prepare draft legislation, if needed Subcommitte

Congressionaliaison office VA

5. Implement legislation when passed VA, DoD 
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsib

Congress and DoD should cooperate todecentralize military personnellegislation dictating the terms ofenlistment/commissioning, careermanagement, retirement andcompensation:a) Revise DOPMA; b) Revise 1999National Defense Authorization Act; d)Revise Title 37 U.S. Code by modifyingthe 1974 Career Aviation Act.

1. Establish a DoD-led subcommittee designated to analyzecurrent policies and legislation concerning DOPMA, 1999National Defense Authorization Act, and 1974 AviationCareer Incentive Act

Military PersReform Com

2. Prepare a plan for improvements (includingimplementation plans for appropriate demonstrationprojects)

DoD-ledSubcommitte

3. Report back to PRC for advice and guidance; makeappropriate changes to plan based on comments; gainapproval from Coordinating Committee

DoD-ledSubcommitte

4. Identify and verify costs with OMB Subcommitte5. Prepare draft legislation to implement plan DoD-led

SubcommitteCongressionaliaison office DoD

6. Send legislative package to Congress for introductionand passage

DoD 

7. Implement legislation when passed DoD 
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsib

8. Evaluate results of demonstration projects Personnel Re

Committee,Subcommittepersonnelspecialists wiDoD

9. Recommend to Secretary of Defense any changes todemonstration projects and/or whether they should beexpanded to entire Service or DoD-wide

Personnel ReCommittee,Subcommitte

c) Revise U.S. Code Title 37 to correctthe pay compression of senior nonCommissioned Officers (NCOs) in all ofthe Services

1. Establish a subcommittee designated to coordinate withthe Quadrennial Review on Military Compensation(QRMC); to support the work of the QRMC, specifically inthe area of E-8 compensation

Personnel ReCommittee

2. Provide support to the QRMC, as needed Subcommitte3. Implement legislation when passed DoD 

e) Reconcile a new DOPMA withROPMA, with the Technician Act, theGuard AGR Act, and with Civil Servicepersonnel systems

1. Establish a subcommittee to develop policy andprocedures to reconcile various personnel systems

Military PersReform Com

2. Report back to PRC for advice and guidance; makeappropriate changes to plan based on comments; gainapproval from PRC.

Subcommitte

3. Identify and verify costs with OMB Subcommitte4. Prepare draft legislation, if needed Subcommitte
Recommendation Implied Subtask Responsib

5. Implement legislation when passed or implementregulations when signed

DoD, OPM, any other ageaffected
APPENDIX B:

DRAFT EXECUTIVE ORDER
1-B

Title 10, 37 and 38:

Executive Order xxxxx of (date)

Subject: Establishment of the Military Personnel Reform Committee (MPRC)

By the authority vested in the office of the President by the Constitution and the laws of

the United States of America, I do hereby establish the Military Personnel Reform

Committee (MPRC). This Committee will function under the Chairmanship of the

Secretary of Defense, to review the policies and legislation concerning military personnel

recruitment, retention and career management systems. The MPRC will make

recommendations, draft legislation, coordinate testing and monitor implementation of

improved personnel systems that will ensure the very highest quality personnel continue

to serve our nation in uniform. Therefore it the following is ordered:

Section 1. Establishment. (a) There is hereby established by my authority the Military

Personnel Reform Committee (MPRC).

(b) The MPRC shall consist of:

(1) Chairman: The Secretary of Defense;

(2) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

(3) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs:

(4) the Secretary of the Army;

(5) the Secretary of the Navy;

(6) the Secretary of the Air Force;

(7) the Commandant of the Coast Guard; and

(8) other representatives as may be determined by members and as

approved by the MPRC Chairman.

Section 2: Functions. (a) The Chairman of the MPRC shall report to this office on an

annual basis. The Chairman of the MPRC will work closely with appropriate members

of Congress to obtain their advice, support and concurrence with all MPRC actions

affecting military personnel.

(b) The MPRC shall have three principal roles:

(1) Chartering subcommittees to address the various military personnel

issues affecting recruitment, retention and career management

throughout the Armed Services by analyzing current policies, future

needs, and concrete plans to test and evaluate improved personnel

systems;

(2) Providing authority, leadership, coordination, and guidance to the

subcommittees; and
2-B

(3) To act as responsible authority to both Congress and the

Administration for implementation of military personnel reforms

through executive action and/or Congressional legislation.

Section. 3. General Provisions. (a) This order is intended only to improve the internal

management of the executive branch and it is not intended to create any right, benefit or

trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party

against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.