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between January 1998 and September 2001 showed none
that considered the use of aircraft as weapons. Even in the
Autumn 1998 issue of Terrorism and Political Violence, which
was devoted exclusively to aviation terrorism and security,
terrorism expert Brian Jenkins and other contributors did not
address the subject, focusing instead on the threats posed by
traditional hijackings, sabotage, and missiles. Although one
article examines emerging threats—including use of “exotic”
explosives, the use of WMD attacks on aviation targets, and
sabotage of aviation-related computer systems—it does not
consider aircraft as weapons. Similarly, an article entitled
“Aviation Security Update” in the Summer 1998 issue of The
Journal of Counterterrorism and Security International made
no mention of aircrafts as weapons.

(U) Implications

4€} The absence of any analytic assessment on
aircraft as weapons made it less likely that policymakers
would warn the airlines about this particular kind of threat
and that the airlines, in turn, could develop strategies to deal
with suicide hijackers. As the Joint Commission Staff has
indicated, because “the antihijacking training for civil
aircraft crews in place on 9/11 was based on previous
experiences with domestic and international hijackings and
other hostage situations,” it offered little guidance for
confronting suicide hijackers. Indeed, the Air Carrier
Standard Security Program guidance advised flight crews to
refrain from overpowering hijackers.

(U) Accountability

+4} Analysis of the 12 disparate cases cited by the JI
and of other available information does not lead to the
conclusion that any specific attack might occur.
Nonetheless, analysts might reasonably have pulled together
an assessment on aircraft as weapons. This did not occur
because managers elected to use analytic manpower on
other issues and, perhaps, because of analytic mindset

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OIG Report on CIA Accountability *

HESS /ORECON-NOFORN AAR With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

+€) The Team’s independent reviewers found that the
analytic tradecraft in the 34 CTC reports and 12 non-CTC
reports was generally good. Each reviewer examined the
papers independently and, for each product, assigned
numerical scores for elements of tradecraft and of strategic
warning involving the al-Qa’ida threat. After averaging all
the scores for all the CTC papers, most of the 10 tradecraft
elements received a score of 2 or more on a 0-3 scale, 3 being
high.” A comparison of the 34 CTC papers with nine
written in OTI—the only other office to have produced a
sizable quantity of IRs related to al-Qa’ida—shows average
scores for the tradecraft elements to be about even; each
office scored significantly higher than the other on only one
element apiece: CTC on provision of warning and OTI on
actionability. Similarly, average scores for various tradecraft
elements were comparable to those that other independent
reviewers had assigned for IRs on other subjects during
previous OIG inspections.

+€}- These findings generally echo those revealed ina

study by the DI’s
staff. Following the 1998 African embass
ombings, CTC management had commissioned the |
staff to review the Center’s finished intelligence on. .
Bin Ladin and to suggest tradecraft improvements. The
[| __|staff’s report, issued in March 2000, found that the
products CTC disseminated in the year following the
bombings more fully discussed intelligence gaps, analytic
uncertainties, and the line of reasoning used to support
judgments than did those published in the year prior.
Indeed, one of our three reviewers noted that, “Many of the
papers laid out deficiencies and gaps in the reporting, as
well as what could be corroborated from other sources,”
adding however that this may have tempered the overall
message.

=U) The 10 tradecraft elements that our reviewers evaluated were actionability, argumentation,
assumptions, confidence level, context, implications, sourcing, value-added, warning, and
writing. The reviewers also looked at the contribution made by graphics, but, because of
inaccessibility of graphics for many papers, the Team has not incorporated scores for this element
in our overall evaluation.

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differences with respect to some of the facts and
interpretations presented in the JI report, particularly the JI’s
assessment of collection efforts, it agrees with its overall
conclusion that CIA failed both to pursue reporting
concerning KSM’s connections and operations and to
analyze the information it had available. This failure limited
CIA’s ability to review the range of possible al-Qa’ida
options during the period of intense concern in 2001 about a
possible attack against US interests by al-Qa'ida.

(U) Collection Against KSM

+54 |NP} While the Joint Inquiry Report
accurately assesses that the CIA focused its collection effort
against KSM on locating him in order to render him to
justice, it understates the extent of these efforts:

¢ CTC’s Renditions Branch amplified these requirements
with cables in March and October 2000. These contained
background details on KSM and requested that NSA
publish any information regarding KSM’s whereabouts
or activities.

* CTC issued hundreds of requirements cables in its effort
to locate KSM and bring him to justice. These cables
often emphasized the fact that KSM posed a threat and
asked for information about what he was doing and with
whom he was meeting.

4S+/N#} In addition, the JI report’s implicit criticism
of the aforementioned August 2000 cable to the field failed to
‘provide relevant context. While Headquarters indeed stated
in the cable that, “traditional [foreign intelligence] collection
is not our goal with this rendition operation,” it did so in
response to the field’s information that the source on which

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(U) Implications

+854 NE} The fundamental questions that

emerge from a study of covert action prior to 9/11 are:

¢ Did restrictions in the Memorandums of Notification
seriously handicap the CIA effort against al-Qa'ida and
did CIA willfully misinterpret the message the Clinton
Administration was delivering in these MONs?

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* AR 13-6, Appendix I, e, notes that “Managers may be
held accountable in addition for the action(s) or inaction
of subordinates even if the manager lacks knowledge of
the subordinates conduct. Such accountability depends
on: (1) Whether the manager reasonably should have
been aware of the matter and has taken reasonable
measures to ensure such awareness. (2) Whether the
manager has taken reasonable measures to ensure
compliance with the law and Agency policies and
regulations.”

(U) On occasion, the Team has found that a specific
officer was responsible for a particular action or lack of
action, but has not recommended that an Accountability
Board consider the matter. In such cases, the Team has
concluded that, for various reasons, including mitigating
circumstances, the matters in question have not reached the
threshold for Accountability Board consideration.

(U) In several cases, the Team was divided on the
issue of whether or not the performance of a specific
individual should be reviewed by an Accountability Board.
Some Team members concluded the performance in question
warranted a finding of failure to “act in accordance with a
reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence,” as
specified in Agency regulations; others concluded that the
mitigating circumstances were substantial enough to warrant
a finding of responsibility but not a recommendation
concerning accountability. The Team agreed that, when it
had a clear difference of opinion and consensus could not be
reached, it would be appropriate to describe the situation and
note which officials the Team considered responsible.

(U) Methodology

(U) The 9/11 Review Team drew on numerous
sources during its review. The Team:

« Met and spoke with members of the JI Staff regarding
their report as well as with members of the Director’s

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not want to be involved and that “their capabilities
should not be utilized in Afghanistan.”

¢. The former National Security Advisor, in a written
response to the JI, laid out a similar position, asserting
that President Clinton’s top military advisers counseled
that the kind of military operations envisioned in
Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001 (9/11) would
have a low probability of success without advanced
knowledge of where Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) was at a
specific time.

¢ CTC statements and documents, the JI report asserted,
support the conclusion that “the military did not seek an
active role in offensive counterterrorism operations.” It
cited two former Chiefs of CTC who testified to the
reluctance of the military to act without a declaration of
war and without precise intelligence. It found that
lower-level military officers showed more willingness
than senior ones to actively participate in the fight
against terrorism.

¢ The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
said the US military primarily thought about the UBL
threat in terms of force protection, and he added that he
believed that the CIA and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation should have the lead in countering
terrorism. He—and other Department of Defense (DoD)
officials—also repeatedly cited a lack of actionable
intelligence as another reason for the military’s
reluctance to-act. The former JCS Chairman told the JI,
for example, “You can develop military operations until
hell freezes over, but they are worthless without
intelligence.” He also said he did not favor joint
operations with the CIA, seeking to avoid any
dependence on CIA operations for military success.

(U) The JI report concludes that, “in general, . .. the
CIA and US military did not engage in joint operations, pool
their assets, or develop joint plans against Usama Bin Ladin

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(U) Assessment of Joint Inquiry Finding

{S+/NFY The Office of Inspector General (OIG) 9/11

Review Team concurs with the JI’s conclusion that CIA
HUMINT operations were unable to penetrate al-Qa’ida’s
inner circle and that both external and internal factors
limited CIA’s ability to be more effective. However, the
Team differs to some degree with the JI’s analysis and
conclusions about the various flaws in CIA’s operational
strategy. The 9/11 Team: ,

Does not concur that CIA reliance on liaison was
excessive but agrees that it was not balanced with a
strong focus on unilateral operations until after mid-1999.
The Team addresses this issue in detail in Systemic
Finding 15.

Agrees that CIA’s operational focus was on Afghanistan,
although not just to capture UBL but also to gain
HUMINT access to the plans and intentions of his inner
circle there. This strategy did reduce the focus on
HUMINT operations elsewhere, however.

Concurs that the CIA relied on walk-ins as its principal
unilateral sources but disagrees that these afforded little
value as counterterrorism sources.

Agrees that bureaucratic rules may have impeded
recruitment operations—but cannot evaluate the extent

of the negative impact.

+SHANF} The 9/11 Team also assessed two additional

HUMINT collection issues that were not addressed in the JI
findings:

In their additional views to the JI Report, Senators Shelby
and Dewine charged that the CIA had been negligent in
failing to adjust its posture away from official cover to
nontraditional platforms more suited to the terrorist

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‘ecommended them in a cable.
Regardless, as is evident below, The Plan did not provide
a comprehensive framework for a Community approach
against al-Qa'ida.

Neither of these actions was fully realized, however.

+S+/N#F} The Team found that the CIA and the rest of
the IC had limited awareness of the DCI memorandum. The
memorandum was addressed to the DDCI, the
DDCI/Community Management, the ADCI/Military
Support, CIA’s Executive Director, Deputy Director for
Operations (DDO), and Deputy Director for Intelligence
(DDI), with a copy to the DCI’s Counselor. Notably absent
were key IC leaders, such as the Directors of NSA, the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the FBI.” Also missing
were several senior Agency leaders—the Deputy Director
for Science and Technology, the Deputy Director for
Administration, the Comptroller, the Director of
Congressional Affairs, and the General Counsel—who were
playing important roles in the effort against UBL. Similarly,
the memorandum was not released to the Executive Board
or the Resource Board, which were responsible for
evaluating and executing Agency plans.”

“| stated in|__ |interview with the Team. that|__|sent copies of the
DCI’s memorandum to the heads of IC agencies after extracting the covert action portion of it.
The Team has not been able to locate copies. Other information indicates that the DCI and other
senior CIA managers used the statement, “We are at war with Usama Bin Ladin,” in a variety of
briefings to leaders within the Agency, Community, and military, but not until nine months after
the memorandum was written. .

*45)-In his reviewing comments on the draft report, the former DCI takes exception to the
Teams claim that the Call to War memorandum was not “properly communicated.” He asserts
that The Plan had captured key elements of the memorandum and had been fully briefed to the
following: the POI acne. September 1999; the National Security Council (NSC) on
29 September 1999; Richard Clarke on 15 November 1999; National Security Advisor Berger (the
executive summary) on 30 November 1999; the NSC Small Group on 2 and 3 December 1999;
Lieutenant General Kennedy on 4 January 2000; Army Vice Chief of Staff Keane on 31 January
2000; General Taylor, State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator, on 1 July 2000; and
former Secretary of State Kissinger, former DCIs Helms and Woolsey, and selected members of
Congress in July 2001. The Team points out that these briefings occurred between nine and 30
months following the issuance of the memorandum and, even then, did not include all key
Community players, such as NSA.

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Center (CTC) devised in 1999 and pursued through
9/11—as a “new, comprehensive, operational plan of
attack against UBL and al-Qa’ida, inside and outside of
Afghanistan.” However, the JI notes that The Plan was
largely CIA-driven and consisted primarily of covert
action efforts directed at UBL and the development and
deployment of the Predator. It asserts that The Plan was
inadequate as a strategy because of the absence of a
number of important strategic components, including an
IC-wide National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of the
threat posed by UBL, a delineation of the resources
required to execute The Plan, significant participation by
other IC elements and the FBI, a downgrading of other IC
priorities, and attention to the threat to and
vulnerabilities of the US homeland.

(U) The report observes that the IC’s dispersed
nature hampered its effective leadership. It,states that the
relatively few IC officers who worked on the al-Qa’ida target
were geographically separated, often not connected by
secure information technology, and operated within
established bureaucracies that were not attuned to one
another's requirements. It notes that, in such an
environment, leadership was an especially critical factor in
achieving success.

(U) In backing its claim that the DCI failed to marshal
the full range of IC resources, the JI report states that the
inability to realign these resources to combat the threat
Bin Ladin posed was in part a direct consequence of the
limited authority the DCI enjoys over major portions of the
Community. The JI goes on to state that, while the DCI has
statutory responsibility spanning the IC, his actual authority
is limited to the budgets and personnel of components over
which he exercises direct control: the CIA, the Office of the
DCI, and the Community Management Staff (CMS).

(U) The JI also alleges, however, that the DCI failed
to marshal CIA resources, over which he did have control.
The report asserts that, despite the DCI’s call for resource
dedication in his December 1998 Declaration of War against
Bin Ladin, CTC had insufficient personnel before 9/11, /

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TICST NT TORCON, NOFORNT 7k

(U//AIUO) Table of Contents

Executive Summary .

Foreword: Assessing the Joint Inquiry’s Findings... 1

Factual Finding 1: Bringing Together the Available
Intelligemce....eescsssssssssssessscsssssecsssseeessssssesssesssossssssesescesneesessneeess 14

’ Factual Finding 2: Signs of an Impending Attack... 16

Factual Finding 3: The Threat to the United States.

Factual Finding 4: Aircraft as Weapons...

Factual Finding 5: Collective Significance of Relevant
Information ..sssccsssssssccsssesssssseecsessseessesssessssssseesssssnessseeneteccessnee! 41

Factual Finding 5.b: The Watchlisting Failure ........sssssesceeee 42

Factual Finding 5.h: The Hijackers’ Associates in
Germany coorscccssssessssssssecsssseseesssnesesesesseccsssnnenssenssesessessesesseneseseeans 89

Factual Finding 5.i: Khalid Shaykh Muhammad............... 100

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(U) Accountability

+8} Based on its examination, the 9/11 Team believes
CIA mounted reasonably robust efforts| (b)(1)
on terrorist (b)(3)
suspects Mamoun Darkazanli and Muhammad Zammar.
The Team judges that CIA's failure to gain access to these
individuals prior to 9/11 was not due to lack of diligence or
neglect of duty. Accordingly, the Team does not have any
recommendations regarding accountability.

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¢ Known or suspected terrorists who are currently
engaging in terrorist activity against non-US interests, or
who were so engaged within the past 10 years.

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(U) A Central Counterterrorism Database

+~6//*F} The need for a central database that would
house all relevant counterterrorism information and would
be accessible to all IC members was acknowledged years
before 9/11 and is undisputed. The IC Five-Year
Counterterrorism Initiatives of July 1996 lists as one of the
Community’s main initiatives “upgrading community
databases and exploring expanding access to interagency
databases:” These goals were in line with the DCI’s Strategic
Intent for the Intelligence Community of March 1999, which,
among other things, outlined the expectation that the IC
would ... “deploy tools that will establish a shared,
electronic working environment for all communities of
interest.” Progress on a counterterrorism database was
slow, however. Indeed, in his 2 June 2002 testimony to the

“4S+ANE) In his reviewing comments on the draft report, the former DCI observed that, while (b)(1)

the report implies he should have “commanded a result,” that was not the way he worked with

[the Director of NSA] on any issue and that, in the case of he was not empowered to

do so. He further stated that he spoke with the NSA Director numerous times on the issue and

that the President ultimately clarified the matter, as was required. (b)(1)
(b)(7)(d)

[The Team does not contest the DCI’s assertions that the
problem was difficult and that he spoke with the Director of NSA about it many times. The Team
concludes, however, that the DCI was aware of the severity of the issue for several years and that ‘
he therefore had an obligation to see to it that it got resolved more speedily than it did.
© 4G+HNE) In his reviewing comments on the draft report, the former DCI commented that he
had been told the problem was resolved and he had not been asked to intervene further at any

point prior to 9/11.

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+S} The memorandum appears in large measure to
have been an expression of the DCI’s growing concern about
the al-Qa'ida threat, his frustration with the limitations of the
Agency’s covert action programs directed at al-Qa’ida, and
his desire to reinvigorate those programs.” Two senior CIA
officers close to the DCI told the Team they interpreted the
memorandum in this light. Indeed, a number of the
memorandum’s initiatives were not new:

¢ The Directorate of Operations (DO) already was
employing a broad range of human and technical
collection approaches to ascertain UBL’s location and
other critical information for targeting purposes.

¢ The ADCI/C told the Team that he was actively
engaging the collection community to meet CTC
\ requirements.”

¢ SOCOM had already been involved in evaluating CIA’s
operations.

+54 NF} In the memorandum, however, the DCI
did call for two new actions that had the potential to create a
broader, more inclusive Community approach to attacking
the UBL target:

¢ The first was a tasking for the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence (DDCI) to “chair [a] group to coordinate the .
actions proposed above and any other actions which may

“(U) The Team addresses the Agency's covert action programs with respect to al-Qa’ida and
UBL in discussion of Systemic Finding 13.

RSH, N+ According to a January 2004 memorandum summarizing IC Collection
against al-Qa'ida that was written by the ADCI/C and submitted by the former DCI in his
response to the draft report, collectors began focusing on UBL and his organization in the mid-
1990s but intensified their efforts and became more sharply focused after the East Africa embassy
bombings in August 1998 and in response to the former DCI’s urgings. These efforts included
frequent meetings of the National Intelligence Collection Board (NICB), which consisted of the
most senior collection managers in the Community, to develop comprehensive strategies to
support, in particular, CTC’s human operations against al-Qa'ida. In addition, the ADCI/C
chaired a collection cell that met daily and included officers from CIA, NSA, DIA, and NIMA.
The cell focused on tracking al-Qa’ida leaders and their facilities and on integrating collection
and operations.

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follow-up questions by UBL Station. Among other things,
the cable notes that Yousaf departed Bangkok on a flight
bound for Los Angeles on New Year’s Eve and returned the
next day; this should have raised some flags for those
officers following the Millennium threat at that time,
particularly because of the 14 December 1999 arrest of
al-Qa'ida associated terrorist Anmed Ressam, who was
plotting to attack Los Angeles International Airport.”
According to the cable, following Yousaf’s (b)(1)
1 January return to Bangkok, he: (b)(3)

© Departed Bangkok 2 January 2000 for Kuala Lumpur.

¢ Reentered Bangkok on 8 January.

¢ Departed Bangkok on 20 January for Muscat via Karachi.
+€} The Team found no evidence to suggest that

anyone in UBL Station gave any thought to exploiting the

operational opportunity posed by the operative’s intended (b)(3)

or planned travel to the United States. As mentioned, no
one informed the FBI. In addition, no one thought to bring

in the Division. (b)(3)
-(SANF} Indeed, neither UBL Station nor any field (b)(1)
station informed| [about the because (b)(3)
|__|generally works closely with the FBI, this failure resulted :
in a missed opportunity to work with the FBI to monitor the (b)(3)
suspected UBL associates:
« In UBL Station, several officers told the Team that they (b)(3)
did not bring in| [because they believed their briefing
of the FBI about fot claimed (byt)
passage of al-Mihdhar’s travel documents to the Bureau (b)(3)

had fulfilled their responsibility as far as notifying
domestic entities about the threat to the United States.
Moreover, some Station interviewees told the Team that

°46> Khallad indicated in a post-9/11 debriefing that, while the flight he was on went to
Los Angeles, he got off in Hong Kong and returned to Bangkok from there.

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¢ Bin Ladin’s demonstrated predilection to change plans if
he decides that it is too risky to strike the original target.

The| _|study provided numerical scores to seven
tradecraft elements, and alternative analysis consistently
scored well below the other six.

45+7NF} AIG did undertake some measures to
ensure incorporation of alternative analysis in its work on
al-Qa’ida. AIG management required its work force to take
CTC-dedicated alternative analysis training during the’
summer of 2001."* And, in February 2000 and May 2001,
respectively, AIG disseminated two papers specifically
billed as “alternative analysis:”

4SAANE) AlG analysts in| |who.worked most
closely on al-Qa'ida undertook only limited alternative
analysis in the years prior to 9/11, however. Ina review of
analytic papers produced b the Team found only one
example of such analysis;

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That said, CTC’s analytic component, the Assessments and
Information Group (AIG), addressed aspects of these issues
in several more narrowly focused strategic papers and other
analytic products.

+S} The personnel resources of AIG were heavily
dedicated to policy-support and operational-support
activities. Analysts focused primarily on current and tactical
issues rather than on strategic analysis. In the two years
prior to 9/11, the Directorate of Intelligence’s

land others had

raised with CTC managers the need‘to dedicate some
proportion of the analytic work force to strategic analysis, as
was the practice in many DI offices. In early 2001, the DCI
specifically directed CTC to establish a strategic analysis unit
within AIG. The Chief of AIG had for some time been aware
of the need to strengthen the analytic work force and was
working to do so. The strategic analysis unit was formed in
July 2001; as of late July, it was manned by| _|analysts.

+S} The Team found that the National Intelligence
Council (NIC) addressed the al-Qa'ida threat to only a
limited extent. The NIC produced a National Intelligence
Estimate on the terrorist threat to the United States in 1995
and an update in 1997. It did not produce a similar,
comprehensive assessment from that point until after 9/11,
although preparation of such a product was underway, with
a CTC drafter, in the early months of 2001 and was being
edited as of 9/11.

(U) See Team discussions of Factual Findings 2 (Signs
of an Impending Attack), 3 (The Threat to the United States),
and 4 (Aircraft as Weapons) and Systemic Finding 5
(Strategic Analysis) for further information on these topics.

(U) Operations (Unilateral and Liaison)

“SPANF} The Joint Inquiry charges that CIA did not
effectively develop and use human resources to ‘penetrate
al-Qa‘ida’s inner circle, thus significantly limiting the IC’s

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and the other on Bin Ladin’s threats to US interests in
Pakistan.

Similarly, in the period March 2000 through January
2001, AIG produced only two IRs on al-Qa’ida, albeit the
aforementioned strategic ones on al-Qa’ida’s leadership
succession and operational tactics. While increased
tactical analysis responsibilities following the Cole
bombing likely explain the dearth of strategic production
during the latter part of this period, this is not the case
prior to October 2000,

* Between mid-May and late’August 2001, AIG produced
no IRs or similar products on al-Qa’ida. As previously
mentioned, these are the months when policymakers
would likely have found useful an assessment of the

-heightened threat reports received during the early
summer. :

+S} AIG managers have indicated that current and

tactical support to policymakers curbed the group’s ability
to produce longer term strategic analysis. Of particular note,
AIG supported the NSC-led Counterterrorism Security
Group process, which was designed to ensure appropriate
IC follow-up on terrorist threat reporting. As part of this,
AIG officers prepared for, and attended frequent video
teleconferences with other IC members. In spring 2001, AIG
management noted that the group’s preparation time for
NSC-sponsored meetings had more than tripled between

~ 1997 and 2000 to 126.5 analyst/manager days. However,
if—after making allowances for holidays, and sick and
annual leave—one assumes that each year has 220 work
days, then the 43 analysts and managers in AIG as of the end
of 2000 worked a total of 9,460 analyst/manager days.

_ Using AIG's figures, NSC meeting preparation time
therefore accounted for about 1 percent of the group’s
collective work time. Meanwhile, AIG analysts were also,
for a time during the Clinton Administration, producing a

June 2005

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4€} The Team also considers

[ responsible for failing to
produce a Sséiprroduct focusing on the terrorist
threat to the United States. The Team does not recommend
that an Accountability Board review the performance of the
produced other relevant papers
during the 1997-2001 period that included information on
the al-Qa’ida threat!

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ccountability

With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HES/ASH-SORCON-NOFORN AMR

* Ina November 1999 memorandum, the Chief of CTC

stated that the Center’s nonpersonal services (NPS)
budget in FY 2000 was 20 percent less than it had-been in
FY 1999, and that any further loss in real as well as
relative dollars would result in a cut greater than any

* other DO component. Furthermore, the Chief listed a
number of programs that might have to stop entirely as a
result of a cut)

Talking points written for the DCI by the Deputy Chief of
CTC in March 2000, in response to a paper drafted by
NSC Counterterrorism Coordinator Clarke, advised the
DCI to agree with Clarke’s recommendation to “seriously
attrite the al-Qa’ida and affiliates network to the point
where large scale terrorist acts against the US are not
likely,” but also to point out that, “we do not have the
resources to carry it out. Indeed, we are already
spending at a rate that exceeds available resources (our
UBL effort has already spent 140 percent of its budget for
FY 00, for example).”

A 30 March 2000 briefing for the DCI on CTC’s budget

showed 75 percent of CTC’s FY 2000 NPS budget alread:
obligated, committed, and spent, and the

Group’s FY 2000 UBL Operations budget already
overspent by 5 percent. The briefing slides indicated that
CIA must make long-term investments to step up the
offensive against terrorists, but stated that CTC was
mortgaging its future to meet the cost of current crises.

According to a December 2000 CMS document
commenting on the DO’s FY 2001 budget request, “the
scope and pace of CT operations increased significantly
during FY 00 and has left CTC and other components of
CIA with a serious funding shortfall that will extend into
FY 01.”

June 2005

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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 9: INFORMATION
SHARING WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. ;

(U) Systemic Finding 9 of the Joint Inquiry (JI) report
states that, “The US Government does not presently bring
together in one place all terrorism-related information from
all sources. While CTC does manage overseas operations
and has access to most Intelligence Community information,
it does not collect terrorism-related information from all
sources, domestic and foreign. Within the Intelligence
Community, agencies did not adequately share relevant
counterterrorism information, prior to September 11. This
breakdown in communications was the result of a number of
factors, including differences in the agencies’ missions, legal
authorities, and cultures. Information was not sufficiently
shared, not only between different Intelligence Community

) agencies, but.also within individual agencies, and between
/ the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies.”

(U) The report’s accompanying narrative goes on to
say that each of the principal collectors and analyzers of
counterterrorism intelligence in the Intelligence Community
(IC) has its qwn distinct mission, legal authorities and
restraints, and culture, and that these factors often hinder
collaboration and willingness to share information. The
report indicates that agencies still act too often and at too
many levels as a loose collection of entities. It says that, even
after the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, the
Millennium plot, and attacks against US embassies in East
Africa, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
National Security Agency (NSA), and CIA undertook little
sustained effort to work together to collect and share
information about contacts between foreign persons in the
United States and abroad. The Joint Inquiry states that,
while NSA routinely transmitted its finished intelligence
electronically into Counterterrorist Center (CTC) databases,
this was not the case with the FBI’s domestically collected
information.

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e In the fall of 1998, the broadly disseminated CIA cable
that stated that KSM had joined UBL’s organization also
reminded readers that, “the United States regards
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad as a dangerous fugitive with
the skills and the international connections to carry out
further terrorist acts.”

¢54/N#F} Throughout this period, the US Government
was treating KSM as a serious threat. In 1998, the State
Department's Heroes Program had promised an award of
$2 million for information leading to his arrest. By 1999, CIA
cables were referring to a $5 million award for such
information. CTC itself considered KSM its prime renditions
target.

+SHANE)} After mid-1999, most cables originating in
UBL Station that referred to KSM downplayed his
connections to UBL; did not reinforce the type of threat he
represented, and failed to pick up on indications he was a
senior UBL lieutenant. Indications of this lapse include:

¢ A UBL Station cable from August 1999 that provided an
analysis of al-Qa’ida but excluded KSM froma list of
UBL lieutenants.

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hard-target languages, such as Arabic, were at a premium.
CIA University test data from 1998 to 2001 indicate that 85
DO officers were considered Arabic-language qualified
(testing ata level two in two out of three skills.)'” The Team
had no way to assess how many Arabic-qualified officers the
DO needs to perform its mission, however.

+4S+ANF} Despite concerns that inappropriate follow-
on assignments for language-qualified officers have had a
negative impact on Agency language capabilities,” the
Team found that, overall, the Agency has done a good job
assigning these officers to positions where they can improve
their language skills. Almost 90 percent of the 34 officers
whose records we reviewed, who had completed full- or
part-time Agency-sponsored Arabic language training, were
sent to countries where they could further develop their
linguistic skills.

+~S+ANE} CTC experienced the same pressures
regarding language-qualified officers as the rest of the DO.
In 1997, the Center justified a planned increase of 60 people
because its operations elements were short of language-
skilled journeymen-level case officers. A former Chief/CTC
told the Joint Inquiry that the Center placed a heavy
emphasis on hiring people with the right language skills,
and a CTC briefing to the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence in August 2001 asserted that CTC
officers were being provided appropriate language training.

+S+--NF} The Team received conflicting data on the
language capabilities of officers in the Assessments and
Information Group (AIG)—CTC’s analytic unit. On the one
hand, Chief/AIG told the Joint Inquiry that, before 9/11,
about one-third of AIG analysts had a foreign language at
the three level or higher. CIA University test data show,
however, that only eight of the 49 AIG officers in analytical
positions immediately prior to 9/11 had tested at the three
level in at least one of three skills, and that only four of these

46} Between 1998 and 2001, only 15 (or 11 percent) of the Agency's 138 Arabic language-
qualified officers tested at the expert to native level (four or five).

46} This perception was noted in the 1999 DO Language Standards Working Group, the OIG *
Language Inspection of 2001, and 9/11 Team interviews with various officers.

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(b)(3)
¢ Two key CTC individuals| (b)(7)(a)

said they still had
not seen pre-9/11 evidence that KSM was al-Qa’ida.

e Three officers, including| (b)(7)(d)
maintained that CTC did know KSM was al-Qa'ida
before 9/11.

e The rest provided a variety of explanations ranging from
the murky nature of al-Qa’ida and its superb tradecrafi to
the assertion that KSM was not connected to al-Qa’ida
until late in his career.

+~S//NE} In their comments on the IG draft report, a
number of CTC officers challenged the Team’s conclusion
that CTC had convincing evidence before 9/11 that KSM
was aligned with UBL; these officers charged the Team with
relying on 20/20 hindsight. The Team believes, however,
that its analysis and conclusions are based on reliable
reporting that was available to and seen by numerous CTC
officers in the years before 11 September 2001. Several of the
specific arguments made by the reviewers and the responses
of the OIG Team follow:

¢ The reviewers note that KSM’s links to al-Qa’ida were
not known before 9/11, and that no amount of research
would have uncovered KSM’s role as a key UBL
lieutenant. The Team believes that these links were well by
decumented| aes the years before toy”)
September 2001; we have evidence that CTC personnel in (by)
UBL Station, Renditions Branch, and AIG were aware of
this reporting.

¢ The reviewers state that KSM used many different aliases
and these aliases could not be attributed to him. The
Team notes that UBL Station itself provided the linkage
of his various aliases to KSM. This was certainly the case
in the relevant cables cited in this report.

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as head of a worldwide terrorist organization. His reporting
helped establish Bin Ladin’s intent to target the United
States on its own soil and his interest in obtaining weapons

of mass destruction-related materials.

Intelligence Community build a case against UBL and

understand the al-Qa'ida organization.

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|staff
identified the need for such a unit and several months after
the DCI ordered the unit’s establishment suggests.a lack of
urgency on the Dl's part in shifting resources to

(b)(7)(d) counterterrorism. Indeed, according tol sid

the DDI and ADDI devoted extra analytic slots to CTC
only after the DCI intervened in early 2001. “

+€} In regard to the Joint Inquiry’s statement that
CTC did not accept offers of analytic assistance from FAA
and DIA, the Team has found no information that these
organizations made any such offers that were unconditional.
In response to a question following October 2002 testimony
to the JI, CTC officers:

¢ Contacted FAA representatives who told them that the
FAA never offered to provide substantial analytic
support, including personnel. FAA told CTC that it
intended its letter of November 2000, which some may
later have interpreted as an offer of analysis, as an effort
to inform the Center that it was interested in increasing
the scope and quantity of intelligence it received beyond
that of immediate threats to civil aviation.

¢ Recalled that DIA’s offer of analytic assistance was
related to an analytic unit that DIA wanted to create,
subject to CTC providing DIA with access to operational
traffic. Meanwhile, DIA repeatedly refused to fill a DIA-
designated position in the Community Counterterrorism
Board (CCB)—which would have provided access to all
information available to CTC analysts—from early 2000
through 9/11, until CTC provided an analyst to DIA.
The Team’s review confirms that the DIA position—as *
well as other IC positions—on the CCB remained vacant
for many months. In addition, CTC hosted three DIA
detailees, including one in AIG, in 1998 and 1999,

“°4E/}NF} In| May 2005 comments on the second draft of this report! =i
[___ noted that, during AIG’s April 2001 briefing to the DCI on the status of strategic analysis, the
DCI “urged the then-DDI to direct ‘hundreds’ of analysts to CTC.” The 9/11 Team did not hear

this from any other source during either its data collection or first review phase of the report.

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(U) Implications

(U) To the extent that disrupting or preventing the
9/11 terrorist attacks was possible at all, one of the critical
keys was better information sharing. Different agencies had
different pieces of the puzzle. Analysis of all the available
information would not have pointed directly at the who,
where, when, what, and how of the 9/11 plot. Nonetheless,
it might have increased the chances of disrupting the plot at
different points; led to the uncovering of more clues; and
prompted stronger preventive measures with respect to
airport and airline security.

(U) One of the lessons to be learned from-this review
is the importance of formal processes. As is evident in the
Teams discussion of this finding, numerous CIA officers
relied on informal means of ensuring passage of information
to other agencies, which may have had negative
consequences. Reliance on an informal exchange of
information means that:

¢ No record exists of the exchange. This may be the
situation with respect to the claims of UBL Station
officers that they provided al-Mihdhar’s passport and
visa information to the FBI in January 2000. While this
may have been the case, it cannot be demonstrated.

¢ No way exists to reliably retrieve or distribute informally
transmitted information, thus undermining the
usefulness of the information and limiting the ability of
analysts to make the necessary analytic connections.

(U) A second lesson is the value of the processes
already in place for information sharing. The voluminous
flow of raw intelligence data into the Intelligence
Community; the need to protect sources and methods; and
the nature of the terrorist threat that may pose an immediate
danger demand an unprecedented capability to share
information within and outside the IC in a timely and
effective manner. None of the systems and processes the

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sympathizers within the government may have aided
al-Qa'ida. A January 1999 Directorate of Intelligence

(DI) /Office of Transnational Issues Intelligence Report on
Bin Ladin’s finances indicated that “limited” reporting
suggested that “a few Saudi Government officials” may
support Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) but added that the
reporting was “too sparse to determine with any accuracy”
such support. None of the Saudi Government officials
named in that report was a member of al

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Appendix S2-A
-FOP- SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

24 December 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Directory of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for
Community Management
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for

Military Support :

Executive Director
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for intelligence

SUBJECT: Usama Bin Ladin

1.-€FS} We must now enter a new phase in our effort against Bin Ladin.
Our work to date has been remarkable and in some instances heroic, yet each
day we all acknowledge that retaliation is inevitable and that its scope may be far
larger than we have previously experienced.

2. €FS} We must now redouble our efforts against Bin Ladin himself, his
infrastructure, followers, finances, etc. with a sense of enormous urgency.

3. €FS} We must acknowledge that our efforts) scan (b)(1)
no longer be solely relied upon to bring Bin Laden to justice. As a result, we (b)(3)
must now pursue multiple paths simultaneously. This should include:

(b)(3)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U) Coordination of Contact with Foreign Liaison

(S7+ANF} The Team found few problems between CIA
and FBI involving uncoordinated foreign liaison contacts:

. | (b)(7)(d)
could recall specific instances when the FBI

failed to coordinate foreign liaison contacts with the

COSs. However,one| _—_|said that any incidents (b)(7)(d)

that did occur were probably because the FBI officers did

not understand the role and authority of the COS.

Another acknowledged that an FBI field office might

only coordinate with the Legal Attaché.on a domestic

case.

¢ For their part, CIA officers had mixed opinions on the
severity of the problem, but most acknowledged that
problems occurred primarily because of the increased
involvement of the FBI in counterterrorism investigations
overseas and the FBI's culture and lack of understanding
of DCI authorities. Few could recall specific instances
when it negatively affected countertetrorism operations.
ceece ese ee characterized the problem as minor (b)(7)(d)
friction at the working level, which was more an irritant
than animpediment. Inaddition| = sd (b)(7)(d)
told the Team that the problem was not endemic and that

only a handful of incidents had occurred.| (b)(7)(d)
ee said that, while some
coordination failures caused a lot of angst, he felt that

)

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disseminated it. Upon reviewing a copy of the draft in early
February 2004, however/ ] (b)(7)(d)
speculated that it would have required major editing,
including elimination of the top cel | (b)(1)

material. This officer also noted that, on the evening of

5 January 2000, everyone in the Station was under the
impression that someone had already passed the travel
documents to the FBI, as indicated in the 5 January cable
SCALEC 134684”; the draft CIR should have acknowledged
that fact, however, to ensure that the Station was sending a
consistent message to the Bureau.

prescribed formal mechanisms to inform the FBI or other
agencies about al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi’s potential or
actual travel to the United States, CTC officers believe they
used routine, informal channels to keep the Bureau in the
loop:

i
{
|
i
|
+SAANF} Although the CIA did not employ the |

« As mentioned, the UBL Station cable of 5 January 2000,
SCALEC 134684, states that Station personnel had passed !
al-Mihdhar’s travel documents to the FBI. The officer i
who wrote this cable told the Team that she does not
recall who in the FBI received the information or how it i
was passed. The branch chief noted that the CTC detailee ;
to the FBI generally served as a go-between for passage |
of material to the FBI. However, the 9/11 Review Team :
was unable to learn-how or to whom at the FBI this
information was delivered and is unable to confirm or |
refute its successful delivery. Whatever the case, the . 1
Team found no information that anyone in CTC later
checked to ensure that the FBI received the documents,
although two Station officers said that this should have
been the routine follow-up procedure.”

“437+ANE} ALEC is the cable citation (cite) for UBL Station.

*(U) Twenty CTC officers responded to the OIG Team’s interview question dealing with the
issue of sharing information with the FBI. Of those 20, eight said that the correct process was to
send a CIR; 10 indicated that a less formal process (such as a phone call or e-mail) was
appropriate; and 12 said that both a CIR and another method should be used. (See further
discussion in Systemic Finding 9: Information Sharing).

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9/11, both in longer term papers and in the current
intelligence publications.” While several of these were
strong analytic pieces, others were marked by various
tradecraft deficiencies. As such, the quality was, indeed,
uneven.

4S+ANF) Longer-Term Reports. Over the years,
CTC/AIG produced a few standout strategic analytic pieces.
For this review, the team asked three independent reviewers
to assess the quality of IRs and other longer term papers that
focused on UBL and/or al-Qa’ida between 1 January 1997

 (U) CTC officers also conveyed the analytic judgments of these and other strategic pieces
through direct and indirect briefings of key policymakers. However, by their nature, the record
and the content of these nonwritten presentational vehicles are less comprehensive thar those of
written products. As such, when assessing strategic analysis, the Team focused most of its
attention on written reports. Moreover, in its interviews and other research, the Team did not
come across any briefings that covered strategic analytic topics other than those also covered in
the various written products.

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(U) The review team asked interviewees how CTC
shared information about suspected al-Qa’ida associates’
travel to the United States with other agencies, particularly
the FBI; the variety of responses suggests confusion with
respect to the most appropriate and effective procedures. Of
the 30 CTC officers and detailees who responded to the
question:

¢ Eight stated that the correct and formal process was to
send a CIR to the appropriate agencies.

* Ten indicated that some less formal process—such as a
phone call, e-mail, or having the FBI detailees deliver the
information—was the appropriate channel.

¢ Twelve said that officers should use both a CIR and some
other method. |

Thus, most officers agreed that sending a CIR was a
necessary step, but many believed the.CIR alone was not a
sufficient method for ensuring transmittal of the
information.

(U) The responses of ito this
question varied considerably, adding to the confusion:

om \stated that the FBI
detailee should pass the information but that the Station
ideally would follow up with a CIR for the record.”

* | \said that the CIA field and
pertinent DO division reports units were responsible for

'2(U)| emphasized that one problem in information sharing was FBI's inadequate
information-technology infrastructure. [said that, even when CIRs were sent to the FBI, they
[CTC officers] were instructed to follow up with a telephone call to ensure the CIR was not lost.
{__|said that the FBI’s inability to process information played a ‘critical role in the period before
9/11. The Team notes that, while this assessment of the FBI's capabilities may be accurate, the
fact that CTC officers had this perspective made it all the more important that they follow
appropriate procedures to ensure the FBI had recéived relevant information.

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(b)(3)

(b)(7)(d)

(b)(7)(d)

(b)(7)(d)

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(b)(1)

(b)(3) The Team does not repeat these discussions here.

“SHNF} The 1986 Counterterrorism Finding and Subsequent
MONs

+s. The National Security Council (NSC)
closely governed the CIA’s covert action policy toward
terrorism and specifically toward al-Qa’ida and its leaders
throughout the decade before 9/11. The CIA, in turn, was
committed to adhering to the President's policy as
propounded in the authoritative findings and MONs, and it
followed a strict constructionist approach to interpreting
these MONs. That meant the language used in these
documents governed covert action. Past controversies over
various covert action programs, including real or alleged
covert assassination attempts, had seared the collective
memory of CIA managers. That collective consciousness,
the provisions of Executive Order 12333 on assassinations,
and the conviction that the CIA had to avoid anything that
hinted of engaging in assassinations were all strong
influences in the Directorate of Operations (DO) during the
decade before 9/11. Senior Counterterrorist Center (CTC)
managers exemplified the conviction that CIA-sponsored
killings of anyone except in self-defense-were prohibited.

4G). The 1986 Finding
5] dite process of authoritatively defining
the boundaries of CIA covert action against terrorism began
in 1986. |

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(U) Accountability

(U) The 9/11 Review Team refers the reader to its .
discussion of Systemic Finding 9; its discussion of
implications; and its recommendations with respect to
accountability. These apply to the issue of CTC’s
relationships with non-IC agencies as well as to its
relationships with its IC and law enforcement partners.

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with respect to specific'cri
reviews vis-a-vis personal
the training it provides ne'

(U) Looking Ahead

(U) The Team hopes that the readers of this report
will focus on lessons that might be learned with respect to
management and process. Many of the breakdowns
discussed herein involved failure to articulate and
implement policies designed to foster information sharing
and cooperation, reinforce important guidelines and
processes, define and monitor areas of overlapping
responsibility, and provide Agency officers and detailees
with the training and guidance they need to perform their
missions effectively. Other breakdowns involved failures to
set priorities and then to follow through with appropriate
programs and policies.

(U) Several officers who reviewed the OIG’s 9/11
draft stated that the report should have focused on the
broader, systemic problems that had hampered the Agency’s
ability to work more effectively against the al-Qa’ida target.
The Team made no formal recommendations with respect to
these systemic problems in its report, deeming them outside
the scope of its review. In response to a request from the
former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI),
however, the Team drafted a memorandum addressing
Agency failures in the pre-9/11 period that it considered

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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 4: APPLICATION OF
_ TECHNOLOGY

(U) Systemic Finding 4 of the Joint Inquiry (JI) report
states that, “While technology remains one of this nation’s
greatest advantages, it has not been fully and most
effectively applied in support of US counterterrorism efforts.
Persistent problems in this area included a lack of
collaboration between Intelligence Community agencies, a

- reluctance to develop and implement new technical
capabilities aggressively, the FBI's reliance on outdated and
insufficient technical systems, and the absence of a central
counterterrorism database.”

(U) Joint Inquiry Discussion

¢85/,———__| The JI discussion of this finding that (b)(1)
is relevant to the CIA focuses primarily on CIA’s (b)(3)
relationship with the National Security Agency (NSA).
According to the report, friction existed between the two
agencies over “overlapping and greater use of similar
technologies.” It states that interviews with Agency
personnel indicate that, while individual relationships at the
working level were good, those at mid- and upper-
management levels were often strained. The report observes
that, “CIA perceived NSA as.wanting to control technology
use and development, while NSA was concerned that CIA (b)(1)
was engaged in operations that were NSA’s responsibility.”

|It also alleges
that, because of this friction, the Intelligence Community
(IC). devoted significant resources to documenting
authorities and responsibilities, noting that the effort
necessitated “no less than seven executive level memoranda
including one from the President.”

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(S) Appendix F5.b-1: Cables Related to

Cable

Date

Summary

3-Jan-00

SCALEC 134546

3-Jan-00

3-Jan-00

SCALEC 134547 -

3-Jan-00

4-Jan-00

Notes transit of al-Mihdhar through Dubai.

4-Jan-00

Reports that al-Mihdhar’s passport includes a US visa.

4Jan-00

Notes that al-Mihdhar has multiple-entry US visa; provides
visa number.

SCALEC 134589

4Jan-00

jon al-Mihdhar’s

travel.

4Jan-00

of possible lead on UBL
associate.

5-Jan-00

Reports that al-Mihdhar's US visa application lists his
destination as New York.

5-Jan-00

Notes that al-Mihdhar's visa application did not reveal US
entry stamps; defer to UBL to pass to INS.

5-Jan-00

5-Jan-00 *

SCALEC 134684

5Jan-00

Summarizes scheduled influx of UBL associates to Malaysia;
notes that UBL Station had passed al-Mihdhar's travel
documents to the FBI.

6-Jan-00

Reports that al-Mihdhar has arrived.

6-Jan-00

Notes that al-Mihdhar is under surveillance
photos of meeting participants.

SCALEC 134789

7-Jan-00

8-Jan-00

8-Jan-00

Reports that UBL associates departed for Bangkok.

June 2005

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threat posed by Sunni extremists. While this number was
greater than the single advisory that the IICT issued in 2000,
it was below the six issued in 1999 during the run-up to the
Millennium. CIA also warned of the threat in regular IC
teleconferences run by the NSC, in a July 2001 Deputies
Committee Meeting, in several briefings for House and
Senate committees, and in dedicated briefings for the
President in March and July. In addition, during this time
frame, the DCI and a number of other senior CIA officers
called various foreign leaders and heads of liaison services
to alert them of this increased threat.

+~S+ANF} In addition, several threat warnings
regarding al-Qa’ida appeared |
between 1 March and 31 August 2001. | (bus)

|these pieces warned of
the possibility of an impending attack, and several clearly
emphasized the seriousness of the threat.’ These pieces

included:
e Anarticle| —_|that emphasized that the threats (b)(1)
from Bin Ladin—including those his organization made (b)(3)

in public statements—were real and not part of an
al-Qa'ida disinformation campaign.

¢ Apiecethatran| ——_—_|which noted that (b)(1)
operatives linked to al-Qa’ida expected that the near- (b)(3)
term attacks they were planning would have dramatic
consequences, such as destabilizing governments or
causing major casualties.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) e Anarticle [that warned that, while
al-Qa’ida had postponed one terrorist operation for a few
months, others remained in train.

4S+ANE} However, the volume of this reporting| | oy
[|__Was relatively small when compared with other (b)(3)

~ (b)(1)
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Committee in February 2001 that, “CTC currently has
(b)(7)(d) sufficient analytic resources against the terrorist target.”
Similarly, in response to JIS questioning, Said he
believed that, prior to 9/11, CTC had “sufficient analysts for

the analyses produced.”
(b)(7)(d) told the Team that, except in the area of

strategic analysis, there was not a sense of a shortfall in
counterterrorism analysts. Moreover, prior to 9/11, most
AIG analysts did not perceive any shortfall. In the survey
that accompanied the OIG’s inspection of CTC in 2000, only
17 percent of AIG respondents disagreed with the statement
that their work unit had sufficient personnel to accomplish
its mission, well below the 40, 39, and 43 percent who
disagreed with the statement in the rest of CTC, the DI, and
the Agency, respectively." Similarly, 65 percent of the AIG
survey respondents stated that the amount of work they
were expected to do was about right. While 35 percent said
their workload was too much, this was slightly below
comparable figures for the rest of CTC and.the Agency as a
whole. Almost all of the 18 AIG analysts and managers of
analysis whom the OIG interviewed during the 2000-2001
inspection of CTC indicated, when asked about surge
practices, that the group responded well during a-crisis; only
three indicated that they needed more people to do so.
Similarly, when asked what AIG’s biggest obstacle was, only
two cited inadequate resources.”

““4E+ANFY After reviewing the draft report, former AIG managers note that such Congressional
testimony proves nothing about the resource situation, as senior Agency managers strongly
discouraged statements about resource needs “lest this lead either to directives to the Agency to
shift resources from other programs or to the impression that senior management has not done
very well its job of apportioning resources in the first place.”

"" (U) While this survey was conducted immediately prior to the Cole bombing, AIG officers
would have factored into their responses observations made following the Africa embassy
bombings and during the Millennium crisis. In reviewing the draft report, some formér AIG
managers noted that this survey question instead indicates perceptions of whether management
is effectively using the resources it has available. Broader analysis of the results of this
question—which OIG has asked in numerous component surveys over the years—and the
question's specific reference to mission, suggests otherwise.

'"-4} In its interviews, the CTC 2000-2001 inspection team did not directly ask officers if they
had enough analytic resources, since that information could be gleaned from the accompanying
survey.

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¢ Khalid Shaykh Muhammad was identified as Mukhtar
(the Brain), known to be a senior al-Qa'ida planner. The
CIA had this information in August 2001, but did not
exploit or share it.

(b)(1)

Had these pieces of information been shared among the
intelligence and law enforcement communities; had they
been pooled with other available information; and had they
been included in analyses of the spike in threat reporting in
the spring and summer of 2001, the US Government might
have had a better chance of either disrupting the 9/11 plot or
taking preventive measures with respect to airport security.

(U) A number of factors impede interagency
communication and prevent the effective sharing of
information. The JI mentions differing missions and
cultures, legal obstacles, protection of sources and methods,
and lack of focus on the US domestic front. To these the
Team would add the challenges raised by a voluminous flow
of information, bureaucratic turf battles and inertia, unclear,
responsibilities and procedures for moving information, lack
of management oversight and supervision, and personality
clashes.

-8S4 INE} As of 9/11, CIA's relations with the (b)(3)
FBI and NSA, the two agencies with which it has the most
extensive relationship in the area of counterterrorism, had
been strained for a number of years. Officers in these

"° (U) This claim was in the Joint Inquiry Report. See the Team’s discussion of Systemic Finding
10. . . .

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January 2000 Malaysia operation and therefore had no,
chance to add its analytic insight to the al-Mihdhar/
al-Hazmi case.

© That the US Government relied too much on its own
analysts rather than on outside experts.

(U) Assessment of the Finding

+€} The Office of Inspector General (OIC) 9/11
Review Team concurs with some, but not all, of the finding.
The Team: :

¢ Has conflicting information on the adequacy of the
number and the qualifications of analysts devoted to
counterterrorism. As such, the Team is unable to either
agree or disagree with this part of the finding.

¢ Agrees with the main thrust of the finding—that there
was a relative dearth of strategic analysis on al-Qa’ida
and that the quality of this analysis was inconsistent.

(U) Adequacy of Analytic Resources
QV

4& The number of analysts working on
counterterrorism in AIG and in the regional and
transnational offices of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI)
grew in the years prior to 9/11. A review of the work
product of the analysts suggests, however, that the DI and
CTC may have exaggerated:some of the numbers of analysts
they indicated were working on the al-Qa’ida target:

¢ The number of analysts who worked exclusively on
al-Qa’ida—that is, those in AIG's
ew after 1998 but remained
relatively small immediately before 9/11. Prior to the
African embassy bombings, one analyst in the branch

covered al-Qa’ida. After the bombings and the DCI's call
to war, the number increased to three, according to the

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(U) Inadequate IC Leadership

tE4ANE) While the 9/11 Team concurs with the JI
regarding the above deficiencies of the DCI’s Declaration of
War memorandum and The Plan, it believes that there were
more blatant indicators of the inadequacy of the IC’s
strategy, and that these indicators are found throughout the
pages of this report—in the sections describing strained
relations between CIA and other agencies;“ the problems
with information sharing and collaboration across agencies;”
the deficient focus on strategic and alternative analysis in the
products provided to policymakers;* the inadequate
domestic focus;” and the ineffectual redirection of resources
dedicated to this target across the Community.” These
shortcomings cause the Team to conclude that the IC did not

“(U) See Systemic Findings 4 and 7.

“ (U) See Systemic Findings 9 and 10.

“ (U) See Systemic Finding 5.

 (U) See Factual Finding 3.

TM (U) See discussion in this Finding as well as in Systemic Finding 3.

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(U) Backlog of Untranslated Material

+€+ANF} Team interviews and additional research
confirm that the Agency routinely experienced backlogs of
materials requiring translation, although actual data on such
backlogs are unavailable. That said, some units in CIA were
undertaking sometimes-successful efforts to address the
backlogs.

+€+/NF} Previous OIG reports as well as our
interviews reveal that data recovered from clandestine
operations have taken months or longer to process fully.
According to Arabic linguists who support such operations,
collected data are “triaged” according to priority, leaving a
considerable amount of information unexploited. CITO
collected large amounts of information from its overseas
operations but did not have the linguistic expertise to exploit
the material. Although the Team was unable to measure the
impact of these backlogs, it did not find that critical
information about impending terrorist attacks was
overlooked.

(U) Because of the volumes of untranslated
terrorism-related documents it had in its possession, CTC set
up the Translation Transcription Unit, later renamed the
Language Exploitation Branch (LEB), in'1995. CTC staffed
LEB with native linguists—including Arabic-, Dari-, Farsi-,
Pashtu-, Turkish-, and Urdu-speakers—whom it recruited as
independent contractors and trained as intelligence officers.
CTC senior management sustained its commitment to LEB,
enabling the Branch to increase its Arabic linguists from six
in 1996 to 13 in 2000. By November 2000, LEB had 35
linguists fluent in 19 languages; for Arabic, LEB officers
covered eight dialects. In addition, OTE Arabic and Farsi
instructors served as a surge resource for LEB. CTC officers
highly valued the expertise of LEB linguists, who were in
constant demand to travel in support of other US
Government agencies and CIA field stations. In 1999, for
example, LEB linguists worked one weekend supporting the
National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Bureau of

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that it sent critical information on the suspected al-Qa’ida
associates—in particular, al-Mihdhar’s travel documents—to
the FBI. The Team’s research shows that, if CTC officers did
pass this information to the FBI, they did so informally—as
was common practice—rather than following prescribed
procedures. Accordingly, no record exists of sucha
transaction. The Team found that several FBI officers in
CTC had accessed the cables that contained this critical
information as early as January 2000, however, and they also
did not take steps to ensure that this information was
provided to the Bureau.

+} The Team found this issue to be broader than a
failure to nominate al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi for
watchlisting or to fully inform the FBI. Team research shows
multiple occasions in which CIA failed to recognize and
react to operational opportunities presented by the two
al-Qa'ida operatives’ planned and actual travel to the United
States. :

(U) The Watchlisting Failure

(b)(1)
SHY (b)(3)
fan al-Qa’ida-
associated| indicating that suspected
al-Qa’ida associates would travel to Kuala Lumpur in earl
January 2000 for a meeting. UBL Station (b)(1)
recognized this meeting—occurring just days after (b)(3)
the successful disruptions of the Millennium plot—as
possibly nefarious and requested information on the
participants and| the meeting. In response,
|provided
information. |
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drafted a lengthy paper on

al-Qa’ida and Bin Ladin]

48) Similarly, CTC/AIG never produced a paper
expressly focusing on Bin Ladin himself.

[In the late 1990s, analysts
covered various aspects of Bin Ladin in a handful of separate
products: In September 1998, NESA published a useful
paper on Bin Ladin’s political and religious agenda; in late
1998 and 1999, OTI produced several papers on UBL’s
wealth and financial ties; and in January 1999, AIG’s paper,
“How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network,”

But AlIG—which of all relevant analytic units, was in the best
position to do so—produced no comprehensive piece that
pulled this information together along with such other issues

In addition to providing strategic insight on
al-Qa’ida decisionmaking and leadership, UBL Station could
have found such a study extremely useful for targeting
purposes. told the Team he
lobbied AIG for such a paper, noting that it could also serve
as a useful primer for the incoming Administration. It was
not until April 2002 that the CIA produced an operational

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With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks -

(U) Protecting Counterterrorism Programs?

i
'

'* (U) In their comments on the OIG draft,

+5} The JI report states that, to achieve funding
increases for the counterterrorism effort, the IC shielded
counterterrorism programs from budget cuts. Several
Officials from the Office of the CFO and CTC told the Team
they believed that CTC programs were indeed protected. In
addition, per the JI report, the ADDO/RPP had recalled that
the Agency made some attempt to protect counterterrorism
funding. However, the Team found that the Agency
actually subtracted a significant amount of money from
counterterrorism programs.

48

Due to the sheer number of programs involved
in this analysis, the Team did not determine the reason for
every adjustment; a review of the funds that were moved,
however, shows that money left programs identified by the
NSC/OMB database as-counterterrorism for programs not
identified as counterterrorism-related. Table S3-2 shows the
dollar value of adjustments made to counterterrorism
programs each fiscal year.TM

defended their decision to redirect

funds from CTC to the field. They argued that, in order for the Agency to succeed against the
counterterrorism target, funds needed to get to the field. That was where, in their opinion, the
operational work was performed. The Team questions this use of counterterrorism money at the
same time the Agency was requesting additional counterterrorism funding, however, and notes
that some of this money- was subsequently used to pay the gaining DO Divisions’ share of

corporate. taxes.

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+S+HANF} Prior to 1999, CTC management focused
almost exclusively on liaison because it had determined that
unilateral operations would be unproductive. After mid-
1999, with the advantage of hindsight, new CTC
management recognized that liaison could only produce so
much and that keeping the unilateral operational tools in the
toolkit reduced the potential effectiveness of CTC’s
counterterrorism program. At the same time, however, CTC
continued to improve and expand liaison operations. In
short, liaison and unilateral operations are not mutually
exclusive but need to be properly balanced. This balance is
not static but varies by time and place based on a judgment
of the relative operational potential against the required

' investment in terms of resources and risk.

(b)(1)
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(U) Accountability

{SHEN}

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terrorism. Therefore, the Team does not make any
recommendations with respect to accountability.

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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 2: A COMPREHENSIVE
COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND THE
DCI’S ROLE

(U) Systemic Finding 2 of the Joint Inquiry (JI) report
indicates that, “Prior to September 11, 2001, neither the US
Government as a whole nor the Intelligence Community had
a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy for combating
the threat posed by Usama Bin Ladin. Furthermore, the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was either unwilling
or unable to marshal the full range of Intelligence
Community resources necessary to combat the growing
threat to the United States.” |

(U) Joint Inquiry Discussion

+~S+ANF In supporting its charge that the Intelligence
Community (IC) lacked a comprehensive counterterrorism
strategy prior to 11 September 2001 (9/11), the JI criticizes
two broad CIA initiatives:

* The DCI’s Declaration of War Against Usama Bin Ladin
(UBL). The JI points out that the DCI’s December 1998
memorandum, which stated that, “We are at war...I want
no resources or people spared in this effort either inside
the CIA or the Community,” had only a limited
readership. It notes that important members of the
counterterrorism community such as the Assistant
Director of the Counterterrorism Division in the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) were unaware of the memorandum. The JI
concludes that this lack of awareness suggests the
Community was fragmented and operating without a
comprehensive strategy.

¢ The Plan. In his JI testimony, the DCI referred to The
Plan—a broad operational effort that the Counterterrorist

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(U) Just as the JI report covered these issues in detail
in the findings that follow, so too does the Team address
them later in this report. :

(U) Accountability

(U) Because of the scope of the finding, the Team
does not consider accountability here but does so in its
discussion of the remaining factual findings, as well as in
Systemic Findings 5, 9, 10, and 16..

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particularly involving threats to the United States or US
citizens, to other US Government agencies. However, a
review of Agency CIR records shows that the CIA issued no
CIR related to the watchlisting of al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi
during 2000. As the Joint Inquiry notes, the CIA did not
formally nominate the two for watchlisting until 23 August
2001, when UBL Station issued a CIR to that effect.

+§}This failure to recommend for watchlisting in a
timely manner occurred despite frequent Agency reminders
on watchlisting guidelines. |

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

¢ Known or suspected terrorists who pose or may pose a
present threat to US interests in the United States or
abroad.

¢ Known or suspected terrorists not now known to be
engaged in terrorist activities against US interests but
who were so engaged within the past 15 years.

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(b)(1)
Figure S3-4 (b)(3)

(U) Difficulties in Allocating Resources

(U) Two main factors made it difficult for the Agency
to allocate its resources effectively against the evolving
terrorist threat:

¢ The unpredictable nature of the terror threat against the
rigidity inherent in the budget formulation and execution
process.

¢ . The negative impact of supplemental appropriations on
long-term planning.

{Cy The Budget Formulation and Execution Process.
The OIG’s Inspection Report of the Agency’s Budget
Formulation and Execution, released in December 2001,
noted that most CIA officers who deal with the budget as
managers or resource professionals believe the structure and
process do not assist them in obtaining or managing needed
resources because the funds Agency managers receive do
not necessarily match the amount of funds they requested,

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had current test scores.” As of 2001, AIG had no analysts
with current level three or up in Arabic. However, the Team
is aware of several Arabic-qualified officers in AIG who
appear to have continued to maintain and use their Arabic
but who had not undergone current testing.

(E+ANF} FBIS also was experiencing. some shortfalls
in language-capable officers during the last half of the 1990s.
As mentioned earlier, the Service lost 86 positions between
1996 and 1999. Although the number of FBIS officers who

received Arabic language use pay increased (b)(1)
[lin 2000, the number of slots for foreign national (b)(3)
monitors providing Arabic translations in the FBIS overseas
bureaus declined| lin 2000, | ] (b)(1)
| Overall (b)(3)
payments, including salaries and benefits, to all forei;
| national monitors, not just Arabists, dropped : tb3)

Meanwhile, FBIS payments to independent contractors
remained between $5 million and $6 million during the
period, according to information collected during the OIG
inspection of FBIS in 2000.

+~CAANFP} It is unclear how these cuts affected FBIS’s
ability to translate Arabic or other languages relevant to the
terrorist target. On the one hand, FBIS production statistics
for those bureaus doing Arabic translations indicate that
output increased from 1.1 million words per month in 1997
to 1.4 million words per month in 2000. On the other hand,
during the OIG inspection of FBIS in 2000, staff employees
voiced concern that the Service was changing its collection
priorities and that a gain in quantity was resulting in a loss
of quality.

TM (U) Test scores at native proficiency (level five) are valid for six years; all other scores are valid
. for three years. .

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* Did CIA have the assets and liaison relationships needed
to carry out Administration policy to render Bin Ladin
and his lieutenants to justice?

Although some former senior
officials have testified after 9/11 that they were trying to tell
the CIA in the MONs of 1998 and 1999 that they wanted
UBL killed, that message never got through to the CIA. In
fact, in the Team’s judgment, these authoritative instructions
to the CIA did not unambiguously communicate that
message. Repeated references to Bin Ladin possibly being
Killed during a legitimate capture operation—something
CIA[__|proved incapable of doing—consistently clouded
the message. In the one case where the President and the
NSC most forcefully indicated their increased willingness to
countenance the killing of UBL, the MON still included the
phrase, “if a successful capture operation is not feasible.”

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

|The NSC thought it
' was delivering one message. The CIA heard another; it
thought that message was clear and apparently did not seek
further clarification.

The fundamental
’ weakness of the covert action program, however, in the
Team’s judgment, was not with the MONs and their
interpretation but with the assets the CIA could bring to bear
at the time against Bin Ladin in Afghanistan. Within the
parameters of its interpretation of the MONs, the CIA was
aggressive in identifying and pursuing options available in
the region. Despite the fact that CIA had long-established
| relationships with in Afghanistan |
none of its assets or collaborators
ever appears to have been close to capturing or killing UBL
prior to 9/11. All of were either unable or

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worked hard to develop and provide detailed program
analyses, spend plans, and testimony to Congress to make a
case for such funding.”

(U) Adequacy of Funding

+€} The Team found conflicting information on the
sufficiency of counterterrorism funding, and it did not
attempt to reach a conclusion on what the overall level of
funding should have been. It notes, however, that senior
Agency managers, both before and after 9/11, cited lack of
resources as having had a negative impact on

counterterrorism programs. The Team further notes that, at .

a time when Agency managers were strongly petitioning
Congress for supplemental funding for the counterterrorism
effort, they were not making maximum use of the
counterterrorism funds they already controlled; in fact, they
were diverting some of these funds to other programs. Nor
did they try to access additional Agency funds potentially
available to them.

-ESAANE) Agency managers communicated to
various audiences several times prior to 9/11 that financial
resources devoted to counterterrorism were problematic:

¢ Ina cable dated 25 August 1999, the then-Chief of UBL
Station stated that most of the initiatives outlined in the
cable, which focused on rendering and tracking UBL, had
‘not been pursued due to a lack of personnel and financial
resources. He went on to state that, without additional
resources, the stations (mainly NE field stations) would
not make any serious headway against UBL.

” (U) In their comments on the OIG draft, a few former Agency officials stated that the report
failed to recognize the extensive CIA management and Administration efforts to obtain and
defend supplemental appropriations. In his comments to the OIG draft of Systemic Finding 2,
the former DCI stated.that, in 1999, he went out of Administration channels in responding
directly and positively to the former Speaker of the House Gingrich about increasin, funding.
The Team agrees that the DCI’s efforts contributed to the Agency’s receipt of million from

the cae supplemental. | ]

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attributing this to “uneven practices, bad training, anda
lack of redundancy.”

* The CIA failed to notify the FBI about al-Mihdhar’s US
visa and al-Hazmi’s travel to the United States. The JI
refers to the CIA employee who spoke to two FBI officers
in January 2000 about al-Mihdhar’s activities in Malaysia
but did not tell them about al-Mihdhar’s US visa.

¢ CIA did not provide the Malaysia meeting | (b)(3)
cables to all-source analysts outside the CIA, even
though at least two dozen of these cables contained
information of value to such analysts. The Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) identified four leads that it
says its terrorism analysts could have pursued in early
2000 and one.in December 2000 had it received the
information. The report also states that, had DIA
received three key operational cables in August 2001, it
could have taken action concerning the Malaysia
meeting, Moussaoui, al-Mihdhar, and al-Hazmi.

(U) The JI asserts that CIA is concerned that access to
cables would place its sources and methods at risk. Most
analytic personnel recognize this concern, however, and
profess not to want operational details or information about
sources and methods. These analysts see information of
potential significance embedded in the raw data, and believe
CIA filters out many intelligence nuggets before they receive

, , the information. CIA has recognized the value of these data
by integrating its own counterterrorism analysts into CTC,
where they are supposed to have full access to raw traffic.

(U) The Joint Inquiry asserts that longstanding IC
efforts to protect sources and methods have also limited
disclosures to criminal investigators and prosecutors so as to
avoid having intelligence become entangled in criminal
prosecutions. It states that, in deference to those kinds of
restrictions, CIA did not provide the FBI New York Field
Office agents who were investigating the USS Cole bombing
information regarding the al-Qa'ida meeting in Malaysia.

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OIG Report on CIA Accountability
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SCALEC 134804

9-Jan-00

9-Jan-00

Indicates that Station has forwarded surveillance photos to
{UBL

Sain) Ado motes UBL

lassociates

9-Jan-00

Provides, flight manifest for al-
IMihdhar,
al-Hazmi, and others.

9-Jan-00

10-Jan-00

ISCALEC 134871

11-Jan-00

Seeks concurrence to pass surveillance photos

12-Jan-00

Concurs on passage of photos

12-Jan-00

Notes passage of photos’

SCALEC 134925

12-Jan-00

13-Jan-00

Reports on efforts.to locate al-Mihdhar and his watchlisting
fin .
Thailand; identifies Yousaf as fellow traveler.

13-Jan-00

Provides update on UBL associate

13-Jan-00

Requests that obtain additional details on
travelers. :

19-Jan-00

Reports possible identity of al-Mihdhar relative; request
Headquarters pass lead to FBI and that! _|pass. to
[Legatt.

27-Jan-00

SSCALEC 135774

10-Feb-00

10-Feb-00

Concurs on providing information

10-Feb-00

11-Feb-00

Inquires, regarding UBL travelers’ whereabouts.

15-Feb-00

Welcomes opportunity to pass information

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largest disruption operations up to that point were
launched.

¢ The DCI made personal visits to policymakers to
highlight the seriousness and imminence of the threat in
the months leading up to 9/11. Numerous officials
described him as running around town “pounding on
desks” during the spring and summer of 2001.

+S} Community Leadership Authorities. The Team
recognizes the difficulties inherent in the task of harnessing
the Intelligence Community into commitment to, and
execution of, a shared strategy. The JI Report suggests, and
we agree, that the structure of the IC made leadership of it
problematic for a number of reasons. Community
stovepipes, for instance, inhibited greater collaboration on
terrorism. In addition, the Department of Defense controlled
the vast majority of the IC budget. Indeed, numerous
officers suggested in interviews that the best a DCI can hope
to do is, as one put it, “cajole cooperation” through “moral-
suasion.” ,

+4S+ANF} Nonetheless, several authorities provided
the DCI with a platform to move forward with an
Intelligence Community strategy:

¢ The National Security Act of 1947 authorized the DCI to
serve as head of the Intelligence Community by, among
other things, establishing the requirements and priorities
to govern the collection of national intelligence by
elements of the Intelligence Community; approving
collection requirements, determining collection priorities
and resolving conflicts in collection priorities levied on
national collection assets; and promoting and evaluating
the utility of national intelligence to consumers within
the Government. ,

¢ Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39, issued in June
1995, authorized the DCI to lead the efforts of the IC to
reduce US vulnerabilities to international terrorism.

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Information Group (AIG)—CTC’s analytic group—read
this reporting.”

« A September 2000 cable from the field identified
Khalid al-Shaykh al-Ballushi as one of the most
important members of al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. UBL
Station's response indicated that this individual might
well be KSM.|

|

¢ InJune 2001)

|One,

known as Khaled, aka Pacha, was a relative of
Ramzi Yousef and appeared to be one of UBL’s most

trusted lieutentants. He was active in recruiting people
to carry out activities on behalf of UBL.

¢ Aseries of cables in August 2001

yf Csi
described KSM as a well-respected leader within the UBL
organization. RSM was well
respected by UBL Arabs, especially for his “past deeds”
and that he had a large amount of resources and cash.

(b)(3) (SH__|N®} Additional CTC reporting presented
KSM’s links to UBL as a matter of fact.

In addition, the CIA had been well aware of
KSM's close ties to Ramzi Yousef since the mid-1990s and

““SA+ANFY One of the reviewers of the draft report stated that it had not been possible to
understand KSM's role and importance before 9/11 because he had used numerous aliases. The
Team agrees that KSM used numerous aliases and that he was not always identified as KSM by
the source of the field reporting. UBL Station had a good understanding of the aliases used by
KSM, however, and provided the probable identification in its follow-up cables. In every series
of cables that the Team cites in this report, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad is identified as the
probable subject of the reporting, either in the original reporting or in subsequent cables. The
Team found these cables in CTC’s Hercules database by conducting a search using KSM’s name.

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4S} While an imprecise measure, an examination of

Agency personnel data suggests that the amount of

" resources that the DI had devoted to counterterrorism, as of
immediately before 9/11, was generally in keeping with the
personnel resources devoted to issues with like intelligence
priorities. This is not to say that counterterrorism analytic
resources were adequate but that they appeared to be
generally consistent with those assigned to comparably
tiered issues. |

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

+5} In the year prior to 9/11, managers in AIG did
attempt to get more analytic slots. For example, in early
2001, Chief/AIG converted three support positions to
analytic ones. For the most part, this overall effort was
designed to address the long-identified need for a strategic
analytic unit. As a result of the need for additional analysts,
the DI moved three slots to AIG in summer 2001. That this
(b)(1) move occurred more than a year after a review by the DI’s

(b)(3)

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¢ Usama Bin Ladin has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks
in the United States since 1997.

¢ The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have
been part of Bin Ladin’s first serious attempt at a terrorist
strike in the United States.

¢ Bin Ladin’s attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998 show that he prepares operations years
in advance and is not deterred by setbacks.

e Al-Qa‘ida members, including some US citizens, have
resided in or traveled to the United States for years, and
the group apparently maintains a support structure here.

(U)...But in Relatively Few Assessments

+~S++NF} Despite the March 2001 ICA and other post-
1997 NIC products that incorporated the threat posed by
terrorism or that addressed specific terrorist tactics, it was
not until mid-2001 that the NIC, with drafting support from
CTC, undertook another estimate comparable in scope to the
1995 one. This paper was in progress as of 9/11. Among the
reasons for this delay were:

¢ In 1989, DCI Webster moved Community responsibility
for counterterrorism from the NIC to CTC and
eliminated the position of National Intelligence Officer
(NIO) for counterterrorism. While other NIOs followed
counterterrorism in their areas, and the NIO for
Economic and Global Issues had the subject in his
portfolio, no one in the NIC maintained counterterrorism
as his/her chief area of concentration.

e A few senior officials noted that the gap between the
1997 report and the effort that was started in 2001 was
not unreasonable and only a little beyond the average

“4EAANFY In 1998/99, the NIC produced a two-volume NIE at the request of the Federal
Aviation Agency on the standoff threat to US civil aircraft posed by terrorists and others in the
United States and abroad.

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(b)(3)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

+5) On 13 July 2001, the former UBL Station DCOS
recommended to Station personnel that they revisit the
Malaysia meeting| ] (b)(1):

collected any passport or identification data on (b)(3)

al-Mihdhar. The former DCOS noted that he “had finally
foundthecablf sro 5 January 2001] (b)(1):
identifying Khallad in Malaysia meeting with (b)(3)
Khalid al-Midhar.” That day, the Station’s Targeting Branch
Chief noted that she had assigned one of the FBI detailees—
who had notbeeninvolved withthe oy
previously—to this task. This detailee, according to her (b)(3)
interview with the Joint Inquiry staff, was handling other
issues—including a threat to the US Embassy in Yemen—at
this time. Cable audit data show that, on 2 July 2001—prior
to the former DCOS’s recommendation, the detailee accessed
SCALEC 134684 of 5 January 2000, which noted that|_| (b)(1)
[|___|had passed al-Mihdhar’s travel documents to the (b)(3)
FBI. It is unclear why the detailee accessed this cable prior
to receiving the overall request, but, because of its contents,
she likely approached the review of the Malaysia case with
an understanding that the FBI was aware of at least some
aspects of the key travel information.

+5} On 23 July, having seen no action, the former
DCOS e-mailed the Targeting Branch Chief inquiring as to
the status of the request and noting that, “When the next big
op is carried out by UBL hardcore cadre, Khalad will be at or
near the top of the command food chain—and probably
nowhere near either the attack site or Afghanistan. That
makes people who are available and who have direct access
to him of very high interest. Khalid Midhar [sic] should be
[of] very high interest anyway, given his connection to the

(b)(1)
| Ina note the next day to the (b)(3)
UBL Station Chief, the Branch Chief vented about the

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conclusion regarding the proper level of funding for
counterterrorism programs.

+S} The Team did find, however, that during the same
period they were appealing the shortage of resources, senior
officials were not effectively managing the Agency's
counterterrorism funds. In particular, Agency managers
moved funds from the base budgets of the Counterterrorist
Center and other counterterrorism programs to meet other
corporate and Directorate of Operations (DO) needs. The
Team found that from FY 1997 to FY 2001 (as of 9/11),

[__Imillion was redistributed from counterterrorism (b)(1)
programs to other Agency priorities. Some of these funds (b)(3)
were used to strengthen the infrastructure of the DO and, !
thus, indirectly supported counterterrorism efforts; other :
funds were used to cover nonspecific corporate “taxes” and
for a variety of purposes that, based on the Agency's
budgetary definitions, were unrelated to terrorism.

Conversely, no resources were reprogrammed from other
Agency programs to counterterrorism, even after the DCI’s
statement in December 1998 that he wanted no resources
spared in the effort. The Team found that the Agency made
little use of the Reserve for Contingencies to support its
counterterrorism effort. Finally, CTC managers did not
spend all of the funds in their base budget, even after it had
been reduced by diversions of funds to other programs.

+4}; The Team recommends that an Accountability
Board review the performance of the Executive Director, the
Deputy Director for Operations, and the Chief of CTC
during the years prior to 9/11 regarding their management
of the Agency’s counterterrorism financial resources,
including specifically their redirection of funds from
counterterrorism programs to other priorities.

+¢€} Concerning human resources, the Team found
that the unit within CTC responsible for Usama Bin Ladin,
UBL Station, by the accounts of all who worked there, had
an excessive workload. Most of its officers did not have the
operational experience, expertise, and training necessary to
accomplish their mission in an effective manner. Taken
together, these weaknesses contributed to performance
lapses related to the handling of materials concerning

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

-SH+ANFY Although the Team did not.closely examine
the relationships in the foreign field between the FBI's Legal
Attachés and CIA stations on counterterrorism, it did look at
the key partnership that existed) in the winter (b)(1)
of 2000-2001 because the debriefings of an important joint (b)(3)
asset during that period represented another missed
information-sharing opportunity. This joint asset had
described “Khallad,” the senior UBL operative and planner
of the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, linked him to

al-Mihdhar, and identified him from photographs as having
been present at the Malaysia meeting.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1) +~S+ANF} National Security Agency. The problematic
(b)(3) relationship between CIA and NSA negatively affected
* (b)(7)(d) information sharing between the two agencies.
|_| The Team addresses these issues in detail in its .
| (b)(1) discussion of Systemic Findings 4 and 7.:
b)(3
(pra) +EHANFY Relations were initially strained between
UBL Station officers and their NSA counterparts but were
improving before 9/11.|
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(U)- Accountability

+©- On the basis of available information, the Team
believes that the CIA generally handled its relationship with
the US military responsibly and within the bounds of what
was reasonable and possible. CTC clearly pushed forward
theeffortto[ = Ss butt appears to have (b)(1)
received little support at high levels inside and outside the (b)(3)
Agency. Although intelligence on UBL and al-Qa'ida
needed to be better than it was, the Team finds no
negligence in the effort to supply the military with the
detailed intelligence it felt it needed before agreeing to any
operation. Given the difficult operating environment in
Afghanistan| l

|Asa result, the (b)(1)
Team makes no recommendations with respect to
accountability in regard to this finding.

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together the threads from all the threat reporting ©
received in the late spring and early summer. (See
Factual Finding 2.)

+5) Moreover, during the 1997-2001 timeframe, AIG
never published a comprehensive strategic assessment of the
overall threat posed by al-Qa'ida. CTC’s Eight-Day
Project—a post-9/11 study by various analysts who
reviewed the previous two years of intelligence reporting to
determine, among other things, if the Agency had any
indicators that forewarned of the attack of 9/11—noted this
lack, remarking that “such.a paper would undoubtedly be
well-received by the Intelligence Community and
policymakers, and it would serve as a tutorial for new
analysts.” Such a comprehensive assessment would have
been especially useful for the policymakers in the new
Administration as it took office in January 2001. While AIG
produced papers that covered individual aspects of the
organization, such as operations and leadership succession,
none pulled the whole story together. One of the Team’s
reviewers commented that, although the body of work
produced in the five years prior to 9/11 would raise serious
alarm if read in its entirety, most readers—particularly top
policymakers—would have read only some of the material
over a period of years. Another reviewer noted that only a
few publications provided a unifying framework for
consumers. A review of FY 02 Program of Analysis, (b)(3)
developed before 9/11, indicates that the branch planned
several other strategic papers on al-Qa’ida—such as reviews
of UBL’s use of media and al-Qa'ida recruitment—but none
that would have served as'a comprehensive assessment of
the organization’s overall threat.

+¢SPANF} This lack of a “big picture” paper is
surprising given that CTC officers had been working on two
such efforts before 9/11:

¢ Inthe summer of 1998, AIG’s then-most experienced
al-Qa’ida analyst produced several iterations of a draft
IR, “Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qa'ida: Promoting Global
Jihad and Terrorism.” Former AIG managers note that

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which had a negative impact on its ability to detect and
monitor al-Qa'ida. The JI report goes on to contend that,
while a substantial infusion of personnel into CTC took
place following 9/11, no comparable shift of resources
occurred after the DCI’s Declaration of War; prior to the
Millennium crisis; or after the attack on the USS Cole in
October 2000.

(U) Assessment of the Finding

(U) The 9/11 Accountability Review Team has
differences with respect to some of the interpretations
presented in the JI’s discussion of this finding. It agrees
overall, however, that a number of important strategic
elements were missing from the Intelligence Community’s
approach to the threat posed by UBL. The Team also agrees
that the DCI failed to marshal the full range of either IC or
CIA resources in his effort to combat the growing threat to
the United States.

(U) An Incomplete Approach

|
(U) The Team concurs that the IC’s approach to

al-Qa’ida prior to 9/11 was not as comprehensive as it
should have been.” The Team agrees that both the DCI’s

~ December 1998 memorandum stating, “We are at war with
Usama Bin Ladin,” and The Plan were focused primarily on
operations and collection and lacked many of the elements
one would expect in an all-inclusive strategy against
al-Qa’ida. Furthermore, the Team believes that the limited
distribution of the DCI’s Declaration of War memorandum,
both within CIA and across the IC, as well as the lack of a

” (U) The Ji’s charge regarding the absence of a US Government strategy on counterterrorism is

outside the scope of the Team's efforts. In his reviewing comments on the draft report, the former

DCI emphasized his belief that an accurate account of the IC’s strategy cannot be presented

without describing his interactions with Presidents Clinton and Bush, other policymakers and

heads of IC agencies, and the National Security Council. The 9/11 Team notes that the former
DCl is not judged for failure to interact with these individuals, which he did frequently. Rather,
the Team discusses his responsibility, as DCI, for certain deficiencies found in the IC’s approach,
as described in this section.

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reporting from the spring and summer of 2001, actual and
potential al-Qa’ida tactics, and the United States as a target.
The absence of the last of these is especially notable in view
of the fundamental and original mission of the CIA. While
the Team acknowledges that AIG officers were engaged in
many mandatory and/or useful analytic and other activities,
it nonetheless echoes the findings of both the Joint Inquiry
and the Joint Commission that comprehensive, strategic
analysis would have been valuable and should have been
undertaken. Comprehensive assessments would have been

(b)(1) especially beneficial for policymakers in the new
(b)(3) Administration in early 2001. The Team assesses that
(b)(7)(c)

were responsible for these lapses.

+S} However, while CTC managers did not ensure
production of these comprehensive analytic assessments,
there are several mitigating factors:

¢ In regard to broader assessments on al-Qa’ida, Bin Ladin, -
or the United States as a target, AIG and other analytic
units addressed many aspects of these issues in several
more narrowly focused strategic papers and other
analytic products. Given analytic resource
considerations and other policymaker demands, the
Team has not determined that the decisions to cover
these issues in this manner were unreasonable at the
time.

¢ Similarly, although CTC analysts undertook no
comprehensive assessment on the threats received
during the spring and summer of 2001, as the Team notes
in Factual Finding 2, they nonetheless kept policymakers
informed of the general threat—and placed it in
context—in current intelligence pieces, warning
products, and briefings.

; Accordingly, the Team does not recommend that an
Accountability Board review the performance of these
officers.

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(b)(3)

¢ During the same period, Counterterrorist Center (CTC)
Intelligence Reports (IRs) and Commentaries showed a
similar pattern. Of the 30 reports that CTC’s
Assessments and Information Group (AIG) produced
during this time, 15 mentioned specific targets, and nine
of these were in the Middle East. Only four specifically
mentioned the United States as a target, and two of these
did so only in passing.

¢ The same is true with threat advisories and related
products done by the Interagency Intelligence Committee
on Terrorism (IICT). The Threat Advisory Extension that
the IICT issued in early August 2001—the final such
paper prior to 9/11—stated, “The Community continues
to believe that the most likely locales for such an attack
are on the Arabian Peninsula, and in Jordan, Israel, and
Europe.”

+S+ANF; In most of the cases in which the United
States was mentioned as a potential target, it was included at
the bottom of a list of other such targets. For example, one
CTC IR from late 1998 cites 13 countries and six broader
regions before mentioning the United States as a possible
target. In addition, in three warnings in 1999, the ICT added
to its overall warnings about the threat overseas that “...the
possibility that Bin Ladin will still strive to carry out an
attack inside the United States cannot be discounted.”

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Bin Ladin, because he had been fighting for his survival over
the last three months.

s/s NEY The poor quality of Masood’s

helicopters also complicated CTC’s ability to coordinate with
him and evaluate his activities. CTC officers made visits to
the Panjshir Valley aboard these helicopters in 1999 and
early 2000 to supply equipment and training and to
coordinate plans. After one of Masood’s three MI-17
helicopters crashed on 10 April 2000, the ADDO called a
temporary halt to such helicopter-borne visits in order.to
allow for an assessment of the risks to CIA personnel.
Ultimately, in June, the ADDO said that he would approve
the next planned deployment of CIA officers to Afghanistan
only if the helicopters passed a flight safety inspection. That
inspection revealed an impressive list of major problems,
including tears in two of the five main rotor blades and
inoperative instruments. The bottom line from the -
inspection was, “this is a pilot's coffin” and repair was not
feasible. CIA was unable for many months to procure a
replacement and make arrangements for its deployment.

While the helicopter
procurement slowly moved forward, CTC continued to
examine ways to improve the abilities of Masood’s
organization to contribute to the effort against UBL:

¢ Inlate December 2000, in response to a request from
Clarke at the NSC, CTC and NE Division developed a
series of so-called “blue sky” options (i.e., without
consideration of cost or policy constraints) for review by
the current and incoming Administrations. From these
option papers, CTC prepared a briefing for the 2 January
2001 Principals Committee meeting in which it
emphasized Masood’s importance, describing him as the
most viable opposition to the Taliban and someone who,
with further assistance from CIA, could “divert more
UBL resources.” Although the briefing slides omitted
any reférence to Masood’s ability to capture or kill
Bin Ladin, the talking points CTC prepared
simultaneously for the DCI intimated that additional

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
44s SNB} On 12 October 1999, the project (b)(3)

suffered a fatal blow when Pakistani Army Chief of Staff

General Musharraf seized power ina military coup. The

coup essentially doomed the program despite CIA making

serious efforts to keep it alive by enlisting help from the

Ambassador and the lto (b)(1)
persuade Musharraf to support the program. By mid-

December, it was clear that these efforts had been

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[_d
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in Afghanistan prior to September 11, 2001—despite interest
in such joint operations at CIA.”

(U) Assessment of Joint Inquiry’s Finding

+~SH/NF} The Office of Inspector General (OIG) 9/11
Review Team concurs with the JI’s overall conclusions on
this finding as it relates to the CIA. Judging by available
evidence, the Agency was unable to satisfy the demands of
the top leadership in the US military for precise, actionable
intelligence before the military leadership would endorse a
decision to deploy US troops on the ground in Afghanistan

_ or to launch cruise missile attacks against UBL-related sites

beyond the August 1998 retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan
and Sudan. The military demanded a precision that, in
CIA's view, the Intelligence Community was incapable of
providing.

(U) Military interviewees offered their views on why
senior military officials (and policymakers) generally were
reluctant to act on intelligence. One senior military
interviewee|

ltold the 9/11

Team that the military had a cultural reluctance and distrust
about working closely with CIA prior t09/11.| _|said some
in the military feared that, if the military went into
Afghanistan and the going got rough, the CIA would leave
them in the lurch.

+S+ANF} CIA encouraged closer cooperation with
important military partners, and CIA officers worked well

with the military on specificoperations.|

Cc for example, told the 9/11 Team that
CTC got good military support at the operational level,
particularly from]

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4
am

a3

years leading up to 9/11. In his reviewing comments on the
draft report, the former DCI stated that it would have been
helpful to have produced a comprehensive estimate on
al-Qa’ida as background for the incoming Bush
Administration in late 2000-early 2001. The former DCI
concluded, however, that an NIE might not have resulted in
strategic actions to minimize the threat, given the “previous
experience with the estimates in the mid 1990s and the
limited time available to the new Administration before .
September 11.” The Team believes that the failure of the
Community to produce an estimate deprived the IC and
policymakers of the broader strategic look at UBL and
al-Qa’ida that might have provided the background for
assessing the specific threat warnings of the spring and
summer of 2001.

In sum, the 9/11 Team agrees with
the JI that the DCI’s Declaration of War memorandum and
The Plan were limited and that certain important elements—
such as significant participation by IC agencies, the
production of a national estimate, a formal reprioritization of
intelligence targets, and a delineation of resources to
implement these initiatives—were lacking in the years
leading up to 9/11. The 9/11 Team further notes that a
number of senior CIA leaders themselves acknowledged in
interviews that a comprehensive IC strategy was lacking
prior to 9/11. For example,
told us there was no comprehensive strategy before 9/11
and that, while the IC was in better shape today because it
was devoting more personnel and resources to the
counterterrorism issue, and while real national awareness
now existed, the IC still had no comprehensive strategy. In
addition, | ]
discussions took place about developing a coherent and
focused plan, but until the galvanizing event of 9/11, it was
difficult to capture on one page a comprehensive plan on
al-Qa'ida. He called this, “a problem for the Intelligence
Community that needs to be addressed.” Td
[| __[also observed in his interview with the Team that no
IC-wide operational plan existed before 9/11.

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+S+ANF} In the case of the Malaysia meeting,
although one of the FBI detailees in UBL Station drafted a
CIR for the FBI in the DO Unified Cable System (DUCS) on
the morning of 5 January 2000, a review of various DO cable
databases and numerous interviews indicate that CTC never
disseminated this CIR. Incorporating the key information .
from the) cables, the draft CIR provided (b)(1)
al-Mihdhar’s passport data, and noted that he had a (b)(3
multiple-entry US visa and had listed New York as his
destination. The draft listed FBI Headquarters and the FBI's
New York Field Office as intended recipients. Other
individuals, including UBL Station’s FBI Deputy COS
(DCOS), the targeting officer who was running the
operation, and the CTC detailee at the FBI, accessed the draft
cable in the DUCS system on the 5", and the Station’s FBI
detailee from the New York office accessed it two days later.
On the afternoon of the 5", the targeting analyst added a
note on the draft to “hold off on CIR for now per [the
Station’s CIA-officer DCOS].” On 13 January 2000, the FBI
detailee who drafted the CIR sent a copy of it via Lotus notes
to the Station’s CIA DCOS, asking, “Is this a no go or should
I remake it in some way [?]” The Team found no record of
any reply. The FBI detailee accessed the draft again on
11 and 16 February 2000. Ina series of mid-February notes,
the detailee instructed a DO computer systems contractor to
delete numerous “dead” cables in DUCS but specifically
asked this contractor to retain the draft CIR.

+S4/NF} The OIG obtained a copy of this draft CIR

only in January 2004.” Prior to that, none of the many CIA :
or FBI individuals involved in the an (b)(1)
mentioned the existence of such a draft CIR in the numerous (b)(3)

interviews conducted for this and other reviews, including
that of the Joint Inquiry. After receiving it, the Team again
queried many of the principal players. Four years after the
fact, no one—including the FBI detailee author—recalled
anything about the draft CIR, including why CTC never

"4S+ANF} The OIG obtained the version that appeared in the above-mentioned Lotus Note from
13 January 2000. The Team has no information as to when the cable ultimately was deleted from
the DUCS system, but CTC deleted its database in DUCS in late 2002 when the DO
decommissioned DUCS.

TOPSECRETL (b)(1)
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(b)(1)

(b)(3)
SOPSEGRET sd OIG Report on CIA Accountability
“HES/SH/ORECON NOFORN AAR With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks
evidence to suggest that anyone in the Station thought to
discuss such operational options with any____|station or the (b)
FBI.
(b)(1) CHNB| did not employ (b)(1)
(b)(3) timely communications channels in its notification of (b)(3)
UBL Stations that the suspected al-Qa'ida
associates had departed for the Thai capital. The chronology
of communications on 8 January 2000 suggests a
misjudgment on the part of ee hich (b)(1)
had otherwise exhibited strong operational interest and (b)(3)
savvy in regard to the Malaysia operation:
(b)(1) © Ati152 on Saturday, 8 January, the (b)(1)
(b)(3) |sends| (b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
e Atapproximately 1515 Kuala Lumpur time, al-Mihdhar,
al-Hazmi, and Khallad depart Malaysia on a flight bound
for Bangkok.
(b)(1)
e At 1530 Kuala Lumpur time, informs (b)(3)
of this departure. (b)(1)
(b)(3)
.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
FOPSECREH | (b)(1)
THESASHSORCON-NOFORNT 7 it 62 June 2005 (b)(3)

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Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General

IG 2003-0005-IN

(U) OFFICE.OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
REPORT ON
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY
REGARDING FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE
REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS
OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

JUNE 2005

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fe
FOPSECRER sid OIG Report on CIA Accountability (b)(1)
HES/SEL/ORECON- NEFORN LAR With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks os

(b)(1)_
(0)8)

F

IT.

FOPSECREF (b)(1
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sopseerer OIG Report on CIA Accountability (b)(1)
HES/SH/ORCON, NOFORN AMR With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks (b)(3)

not lead to any dramatic increase in the size of CIA’s Middle
East stations or significantly greater numbers of personnel
assigned to CTC.

(U) The JI report also addressed limitations that its
members and staff encountered during their review in
determining actual counterterrorism resources. The report
noted that the ADDO/RPP had stated that measuring how

‘much is spent on counterterrorism is difficult and that the
least precise area of accounting is human resources. Prior to
fiscal year (FY) 1999, the Agency undertook little effort to
track counterterrorism spending because counterterrorism
was not an office or an expenditure center, according to the

report.”

(U) Assessment of the Joint Inquiry’s Findings

(U) The Office of Inspector General (OIG) 9/11
Review Team generally concurs with the JI finding as it
relates to the CIA but disagrees with, or needs to clarify,
some information provided in the narrative. The Team:

¢ Agrees that total funding for CIA declined during the
decade preceding the attacks of 11 September 2001.

¢ Agrees that certain factors made it difficult for the
Agency to allocate its resources effectively against the
evolving terrorist threat.

«Reaches no conclusion on the issue of whether the
Agency had sufficient funding to meet the growing

*(U) Many components throughout the Agency—including CTC, several DO area divisions, and
the Office of Security—execute counterterrorism expenditures. Because each component uses
different program numbers to record their counterterrorism expenditures and a unique
identifier—like an expenditure center—was not coded into the Agency Financial Management
System, the Agency cannot systematically generate the total amount spent on its counterterrorism
effort. In 1999, the Office of the Chief Financial Officet began to manually generate this data
based on a set of program numbers that it believes~-based on its analysis and discussions with
Agency officers—are counterterrorism-related. This manual reconstruction did not provide
actual Agency counterterrorism expenditures; rather it provided a solid estimate.

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.(b)(1),
(b)(3)
June 2005 407 HES/SEHORECON- NOPORNZ AER

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+~SHANF} On 11 July 2001,
ffollow-up|
jabout KSM. |

repeated the claim that KSM traveled

frequently to the United States,

. (U)| There

is no “p” sound in Arabic and, when Arabs use foreign names containing the “p” sound, they
pronounce it as “b.”

“OPSECRET|
June 2005 11l -HES/SH/ORCON-NOPORN/ AMER

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With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HES/}GH/ORECON-NOFORN AER (b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SHANE} The Intelligence Community’s approach to
priorities in the years following PDD-35 was to add issues to
the various tiers, but not to remove any. Nor was there any
significant effort to connect intelligence priorities to resource
issues—providing increases to some while decreasing
resources provided to lower priority issues. The 9/11 Team
believes that a formal reprioritization of intelligence
priorities in the years leading up to 9/11 might have
provided important context for resource decisions relating to
counterterrorism. A number of senior leaders, including the i
DCI, have stated that the IC had to deal with major i
challenges that competed for available resources.” Indeed,
as a Tier 1B issue, terrorism remained at the same level—at (b)(1)
least in the formal prioritization— (b)(3)

until after 9/11.

4S} In his reviewing comments on the draft report,
the former DCI stated that, while he could issue guidance
within the constraints of the overall policy, he could not

ignore a Presidential directive, and the previous (b)(1)

Administration showed no inclination to revisit PDD-35. (b)(3)

| the DCI did affect such a

reprioritization while still working within the parameters of

PDD-35.| (b)(1)
he issued to (3)

the deputy directors and mission support office chiefs a
memorandum establishing counterterrorism as one of the
Agency's three top priorities. At the same time, he identified

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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OIG Report on CIA Accountability FOPSEERET/ | pV”)
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Systemic Finding 14: Collaboration with the Military.......399

Systemic Finding 15: Reliance on Foreign Liaison . 409

Systemic Finding 16: Strategy to Disrupt Terrorist

FUIINg «..esescsssescessssccnssseesssssnsecssssaneesesssvcessasneesensssssesssssssessseeneee! 425

Related Finding 20: Issues Relating to Saudi Arabia......... 437
—FORSECRET, toy”)
ws (b)(3)

June 2005 iti “HES/ASH/ORECON-NOFORN7 AMR

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With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks “HES/SH/ORCON-NOFORN AAR (b)(3)

or even the amounts originally appropriated for their
specific programs. CIA officers interviewed for that
inspection made the following points:

¢ Budget formulation and execution are disconnected.
According to the report, 83 percent of interviewees who
commented onthe usefulness of-the budget blamed this
disconnect for their inability to manage resources well.

¢ Internal Agency “taxes” assessed in the year of execution
render spending plans worthless and make managerial
accountability difficult.”

¢ The Agency does not build a budget request on the basis _
of needs or requests from its components; rather it copes
with a top-line figure provided by OMB. Forty percent
of field manager respondents said they rarely received
the funds they requested.”

+€} During the Team’s current review, many budget
and finance officials elaborated further on the problems they
faced:

. were among (b)(7)(4)
those who agreed that not all Agency requests—
including counterterrorism requests—were fully funded.

cautioned, however, that (b)(7)(a)

one should not conclude that, because counterterrorism

did not receive 100 percent of the funds it requested, it

was not properly resourced. Where claims arose that

counterterrorism was not properly resourced, they were

difficult to substantiate objectively. Although the Team

found no shortage of internal memoranda and

spreadsheets that suggested shortfalls in

 (U) Taxation is a systematic process of reprogramming funds from one activity or group of

activities to another within the Agency. A difficulty with this method is the lack of direct

connection between sources and uses of monies. This calls into question rigorous application of

the “higher priority” requirement.

*(U) Inhis comments on the OlGdraft; —=—=SSS—=smentioned that the Agency does (b)(7)(d)
build a budget based on needs, but then prioritizes those needs in line with fiscal guidance from

OMB.

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’ With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks “HES/SH+/ORECON-NOFORN AR (b)(3)
lead to a situation where an effort to rejuvenate an
enterprise’s core mission is on a path to| million annual (b)(1)
shortages. The SSCI audit team recommended that CIA’s (b)(3)

Executive Director provide the Committee with a detailed
strategic plan of how the CIA would implement and fully
fund the planned increase in core collectors.

+ In addition, the perception—although incorrect—
that CTC received the bulk of funds or, ata minimum, was
protected from taxes, created friction between CTC and the
area divisions, (b)(7)(d)
| Jobserved that the
divisions began to slant their program write-ups toward
counterterrorism in order to justify receiving CTC funds.
Although DO management was aware of this friction, the
DDO stated that the tension between CTC and the area
divisions was merely the “nature of the beast.”

+5} Finally, officers who could have helped CTC
formulate an effective resource strategy and prioritize its
requirements were not always involved in CIC’s budget
process:

¢ DO budget requests typically flow through ORMS, for
example, but several senior officers familiar with the
budget process told the Team that the Chief of CTC
occasionally circumvented ORMS and went directly to
Congress.

¢ Furthermore, when the Chief of CTC reorganized the
Center’s Plans Office in 1999, he eliminated one of the
three plans positions. This caused a rift with the two
remaining plans officers, who left in January 2000. Asa
result, CTC had no plans staff until it filled the Chief of
Plans position four months later.

+€} The budget-related actions of the former Chief of
CTC might also have contributed to a negative perception of
CTC within OMB.
stated that OMB officers were skeptical when the Agency
pushed for permanent increases in its counterterrorism
budget because they thought a lot of it was “crying wolf,”

(b)(7)(d)

June 2005

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(U) Implications

-SHANP) The Chief of CTC prior to 1999 made
reasonable choices in implementing a collection strategy he
believed had the best potential to achieve results based on
his understanding of the target at the time, the meager
operational tools he had available, and the difficult natural
impediments he faced. If this Chief had not discounted the
potential of unilateral operations, CIA would have had two
more years to achieve results. However, if an earlier focus
on unilateral operations had beenvat the expense of work
with liaison on disruptions and renditions, an unintended
consequence might have been the failure to thwart a terrorist
attack against the United States.

+64 ____ NB} Armed with the knowledge that (b)(3)

liaison operations were not achieving the needed access to
al-Qa’‘ida plans and intentions, the CTC Chief who took over
in 1999 made a logical adjustment toward more unilateral
Operations and a focus on Afghanistan, since that was where
the inner core of al-Qa’ida resided. The JI report suggests
that other countries may have had more benign operating
environments where CTC could have achieved better results
in penetrating al-Qa'ida. The Team cannot judge whether

_ the operational potential to acquire an agent with access to
al-Qa'ida plans and intentions would have justified the costs
of pursuing such an agent in other countries far removed
from the al-Qa’ida leadership in Afghanistan. Nonetheless,
by not casting the Center’s net wider, the Chief may have
lost opportunities to penetrate al-Qa’ida.

(U) Accountability

+~CHANFP} CTC officers were extremely committed
and did their best, but HUMINT operations were of only
limited effectiveness against the hard al-Qa’ida and UBL
targets. CTC may have missed opportunities to improve its
results because of the operational choices it made and those
it discarded, such as more active engagement with _| (b)(3)
so that all possible HUMINT platforms were

FOPSEEREH _____d (b)(1)
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With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HES/ST/SORCON NOFORN AER (b)(3)

(U) FACTUAL FINDING 5.H: HIJACKERS’

ASSOCIATES IN GERMANY

+S+AN#) Factual Finding 5.h of the Joint Inquiry (JI)
Report states, “Since 1995, the CIA had been aware of a
radical Islamic presence in Germany, including individuals
with connections to Usama Bin Ladin. Prior to
September 11, 2001, the CIA had unsuccessfully pressured

on (b)(1)
individuals who have now been identified as associates of (b)(3)
some of the hijackers.”

“SH+ASF) The JI Report focuses on CIA’s intelligence rates

on two suspected al-Qa’ida operatives in Hamburg,
Mamoun Darkazanli and Muhammad Zammar|

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June 2005 89 HES/SH/ORCON-NOFORN EAR (b)(3)

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OPSEGRET, sd OIG Report on CIA Accountability
HESTSHTOREONNOFORNT Ara With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

differences between the Office
2001 Inspection Report of th
noted that the latter praised perf
critical. The Team agrees that: t
differences derive, in large p par fr
methodologies.

(U) OIG component insp
performance. They rely heavily:«
those components as, well'as fr
interviewed believe the:co1 po
managed effectively, the.c
the time’of the OIG insp
9/11 review, those whom the
CTC was performing its missio:
Officers, for the most part, und
worked hard against their targel
inspection credited CTC with
perform its mission.

evaluate the findinigs of:
on specific failures highli

purpose of the 9/11'T
11 September in order:
and individual failure ;

(U) Many diffe
9/11 review derive from

¢ The CTC Inspection
on.Usama Bini Ladin’
those targets.

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Figure S3-8

+5} The Team did not assess whether CTC as a whole
had sufficient manpower but did examine the adequacy of
personnel in UBL Station. There, the Team found an overly
heavy workload and a generally inexperienced operations
work force.. CTC’s efforts to augment this staff met with
only limited success.

+€} Heavy Workload in UBL Station. Despite
increases in personriel, the Team believes the composition of
the UBL Station work force was inadequate to address the
heavy workload. Many of those we interviewed indicated
that this was the case. The survey that accompanied the OIG
inspection of CTC in 2001 showed that 57 percent of the 28
UBL Station respondents believed that, most of the time, the
amount of work they were expected to do was too much,
well above the 38 percent of overall CTC respondents who
answered similarly. In addition, 59 percent of Station
respondents disagreed that their work unit had sufficient
staffing to accomplish its mission, compared with 40 percent
of CTC respondents. .

June 2005

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FOPSECREF

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that occasion. Finally, although the targeting officer who
handled was working on other issues
by March 2000, cable audit data show that this officer
reopened various) scales (albeit not the
ones with the travel information) on 22 separate occasions
between early March 2000 and September 2001.

4~S+ANF} Although the Team agrees that the Agency
missed many opportunities to take appropriate actions on
al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, it disagrees with the Joint
Inquiry’s inference that these lapses were the result of any
purposeful withholding of information from the FBI. For
example, the Assistant Legal Attaché in Islamabad
participated in the January 2001 meeting with the |
| ____linked Khallad with the Malaysia meeting.
Moreover, when UBL Station gave copies of the surveillance
photos to the FBI Intelligence Operations Officer, she could
do with these as she pleased, excepting)

] In short, the CIA’s failure
to act until late August 2001 was one of not comprehending
the importance of the information, rather than a lack of
willingness to share with other agencies.

June 2005

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June.” The Teain found that ORMS had sent a list of “critical
funding needs”—including those of CTC—to the Office of
the Comptroller on 6 April 2000. Another month passed
before the former Executive Director requested a|__|million
release from the CIA Reserve for Contingencies. This money
was not available to CTC until June 2000. By that time,
previously requested supplemental funds were also
arriving.” The result was that__|million provided to the
Center in FY 2000 were unspent.”

+~€/ANF} The Team collected interview and other
information that suggested that counterterrorism funding
had not been viewed as a serious problem before the end of

"““4S+ANFY In their response to the OIG draft, some CTC managers commented that funding
discussions consumed a great deal of time. These discussions took place about the same time the
Center would have been attempting to follow up on leads emerging from the Millennium period,
including those that emerged from the Malaysia meeting. These managers also stated that they
“were faced with pressure from the NSC to maintain [their]. operational tempo without adequate
funding....” The Team notes that CTC managers may have had particular difficulty dealing with
funding issues during this period because they were operating without the professional help of a
Plans Staff—largely because of actions taken by the Chief of CTC. This situation is discussed
Jater in this section.

”4S}- By 18 May 2000, CIA had reached an agreement with OMB to fund [million that the
Agency stated was necessary to sustain or erhance its counterterrorism efforts in FY 2000. Of this
amount|__Inillion was to come from two sources within CIA- million from the Reserve
for Contingencies and the balance|___|million) to be reprogrammed from “lower priority
efforts.” The latter action required Congressional approval. The Team found that, while CIA
was engaged in seeking this funding relief, it had actually moved approximately million out
of counterterrorism-designated programs as of that date. Funds were not restored until late July
2000. The Team further notes that the “lower priority efforts” from which the funding came
actually had been the beneficiaries of _|million in corporate taxes by May 2000.

-TM (U) “Unspent funds” are monies—including base, supplementals, and reserve fuinds—not

obligated, expensed, or committed. Although other offices returned unspent funds, this is. a
significant amount for CTC to return, considering that it was requesting additional monies and
indicating that additional activities could be pursued if it had more funds.

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(b)(3)

cable references two January 2000 cables| |
oting al-Mihdhar’s arrival in the Malaysian capital
and departure for Bangkok, it could have triggered a
thorough review that might have flagged the al-Qa’ida
associates’ travel beyond Bangkok.. However, a review of
cable audit data shows that no one in UBL Station accessed
thesel cables electronically in late October
2000, nor.did anyone reopen any of the other{ |
[____|eables that contained the key travel information at
this time.

45| | In November 2000,

[ Iphone
numbers used: by Cole bombing suspect

UBL Station officers analyzed these
numbers and found that had contacted| |
phone numbers used by al-Mihdhar and his colleague
“Nawaf” in January 2000. Inturn| sent acable
on 16 December noting al-Mihdhar’s travel to Kuala Lumpur
and Bangkok and requesting copies of the surveillance
photos taken during the operation. A UBL Station cable of
27 December 2000, which referenced the cable, sought

concurrence to show

one of the Malaysia meeting surveillance photos to a joint

In this
cable, the drafter—the targeting officer who had been
handling the earlier that year—notes that
al-Mihdhar had disappeared in Malaysia after early January.
Throughout December 2000, a more careful review of cable
traffic on the part of the officers in the Station could have
turned up Nawaf’s last name, which —__|had reported
in March 2000, and clarified that al-Mihdhar had
“disappeared” in Thailand, not Malaysia. Such a review

could have served torenew|___ interest in determining
the whereabouts of all the Malaysia meeting participants.

(b)(3) Inearly January 2001, thel =
identified an individual in the

surveillance photo as Khallad. While later information
revealed that the asset had misidentified al-Hazmi as
Khallad, this was the first time the CIA could have directly

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SOPSECRER
HES/SHFORECONNOFORNT AMR

assigned to CTC on 5 January 2000 drafted a message about
the terrorists’ travel that was to be sent from CIA to the FBI
in the proper channels. Apparently because it was in the
wrong format or needed editing, the message was never
sent, On the same date, another CTC officer sent a cable to
several Agency addressees reporting that the information
and al-Mihdhar’s travel documents had been passed to the
FBI. The officer who drafted this cable does not recall how
this information was passed. The Team has not been able to
confirm that the information was passed, or that it was not
passed. Whatever the case, the Team found no indication
that anyone in CTC checked to ensure FBI receipt of the
information, which, a few UBL Station officers said, should
have been routine practice.

4S} Separately, in March 2000, two CIA field locations
sent to a number of addressees cables reporting that
al-Hazmi and another al-Qa’ida associate had traveled to the
United States. They were clearly identified in the cables as
“UBL associates.” The Team has found no evidence, and
heard no claim from any party, that this information was
shared in any manner with the FBI or that anyone in UBL
Station took other appropriate operational action at that
time.

+& In the months following the Malaysia operation,
the CIA missed several additional opportunities to nominate
al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar for watchlisting; to inform the FBI
about their intended or actual travel to the United States;
and to take appropriate operational action. These included a
few occasions identified by the Joint Inquiry as well as
several others.

+} The consequences of the failures to share
information and perform proper operational followthrough
on these terrorists were potentially significant. Earlier
watchlisting of al-Mihdhar could have prevented his
re-entry into the United States in July 2001. Informing the
FBI and good operational followthrough by CIA and FBI
might have resulted in surveillance of both al-Mihdhar and
al-Hazmi. Surveillance, in turn, would have had the
potential to yield information on flight training, financing,
and links to others who were complicit in the 9/11 attacks.

June 2005

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¢ In mid-August 2001 sent out requests
for information on Zacarias Moussaoui, who had been
arrested in Minnesota earlier in the month. These cables
noted Moussaoui’s enrollment in flight lessons and his
praise of Islamic martyrdom.

+~€+ANF)- Current open-source information also
existed on plans—and, in one case, actions—to conduct
suicide air crashes with the intent of bringing down a target
other than the aircraft itself.” This information, although
involving nonterrorists, should be factored in when
considering the overall issue of terrorist use of aircraft as
weapons, since terrorists can adopt tactics from awareness of
others’ activities. Indeed, the JI implicitly acknowledges this
when it includes among its 12 exemplars the two cases
involving planned use of aircraft as weapons by Iran and
Iraq. Other examples include:

¢ In April 1999, police investigating the shootings at
Columbine High School in Colorado found that the two

”(U) In addition to these current examples, it is well known that Japanese kamikaze pilots used
planes as weapons toward the end of World War II. In an historic case that offers a closer parallel
to the 9/11 attacks, in 1974 failed businessman Samuel Byck unsuccessfully tried to hijack a
commercial airliner with the intent of crashing it into the White House in order to assassinate
President Nixon. Finally, the concept of employing aircraft as weapons has been utilized in
popular fiction, most notably in Tom Clancy’s best-sellers, Debt of Honor (1994) and Executive
Orders (1996), in which a Japanese pilot crashes a hijacked 747 into the US Capitol Building.

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e Direct the Incident Review Panel, which validated
international terrorist incidents for statistical and other
purposes.

(U) The former DCI explained in his testimony to
Congress in 2002 that CTC was to establish community
reach by incorporating representatives from as many of the
relevant agencies as possible into the Center’s structure in
order to provide connectivity, encourage sharing and
communication, and assist in breaking down cultural
barriers to cooperation and collaboration. He noted,
however, that positions identified and reserved for these
agencies on the CCB were not always filled and that the
Center had to reach out to organizations

ito fill them.

(U) Indeed, before 9/11, only one of the five analyst
positions in the Threat Warning Group (TWG) was filled,

andthe _| position had been vacant since January 2000.”
. Additionally, according to the To
officers serving in the CCB and TWG did not interact
regularly with other CTC elements. While much of the
production of these interagency elements was prepared by
AIG analysts—not by CCB detailees—and, while the latter
officers had access to CTC information, lack of staffing
resources and regular interaction limited their ability to
perform their responsibilities fully and effectively.”

(U) Pre-9/11 interagency forums were not designed
to review and exchange the types of raw and operational

* (U) For additional information on the CCB, see Systemic Finding 2.

*(U) In his comments.on the OIG draft report, the former DCI stated that the OIG Inspection
Report on CTC had stated that, “CTC fulfills inter-Agency responsibilities for the DCI by
coordinating national intelligence, providing warning, and promoting the effective use of
Intelligence Community resources on terrorism issues and indicated that CTC was performing
this function effectively.” The Inspector General acknowledges the DCI’s point. The inspection
report of CTC, published in August 2001, included these statements, charitably but ill-advisedly
using language that described CTC’s Community mission rather than more well-founded
language that would have described in greater detail, and with more care, the actual performance
of CTC in fulfilling these responsibilities. In fact, the earlier inspection team did not identify
these as problematic issues and, thus, did not engage in intensive data gathering on them in the
way that the more recent 9/11 Review Team has done.

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(b)(7)(d)
| _ buccessors took the CCB’s IC responsibility seriously. In
addition, lindicated that, after (b)(7)(d)
the position of NIO for Counterterrorism was abolished in
1989, no entity assumed responsibility for a comprehensive
IC strategy on counterterrorism.”

©} DCI's Efforts to Marshal Resources

+E+ANFY A key component of the DCI’s lack of broad
strategic leadership concerns the marshalling of resources
against the counterterrorism effort. The Team found that the
DCT’s efforts helped secure additional funding for the
Agency from the Congress, but his efforts to redirect
resources, both at the Agency level and in the IC in general,
were ineffectual.

+5} Agency Resources. From Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 to
FY 2001, no significant internal CIA resources were
redirected to CTC, nor were CTC base funds protected from
corporate and DO adjustments.” Based on interview data
and a review of the Agency’s financial and personnel
resources during FY 1999-2001, the Team did not find
evidence that the DCI had redirected any significant amount
of resources at an Agency level in response to his
Declaration of War, the Millennium crisis, or the attack

4S AANB. In his reviewing comments on the draft report, the former DCI indicates his belief
that, “The report appears to presume that I was the only official in our government who was
responsible for designing a strategy for operating against al-Qa'ida” and that, as such, the report
“fails to provide important context and understanding of what we were attempting to
accomplish.” The subject of a broader US government strategy vis-a-vis terrorism was outside
the scope of this report. For information regarding national counterterrorism strategy, the reader
is directed to The Report of the National Commission on Terrorism of March 2000 on
“Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism,” chaired by Ambassador

Paul Bremer; the reports of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, commissioned in 1999 and known as the
Gilmore Commission; and the Hart-Rudman Commission, also established in 1999, to look at
broad issues of national security including terrorism. . .

” (U) Inits assessment of the DCI’s efforts to marshal resources against a growing
counterterrorism threat, the JI focuses on events beginning with the DCI’s Declaration of War
against UBL in the first quarter of FY 1999. Accordingly, the Team has focused on this timeframe
in its assessment of this finding. For a more complete discussion of the Agency’s management of
counterterrorism resources, see Systemic Finding 3, which also includes a detailed discussion of
the impact of the DCI’s Declaration of War on counterterrorism resources.

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simultaneously conduct traditional agent recruitment and
intelligence collection mission. Nor did the Agency have a
strategic plan on linguistic skills.

(U) Assessment of Joint Inquiry’s Findings

+€+ANF} The Office of Inspector General (OIG) 9/11
Review Team agrees in part with the JI assessment that the
CIA:

¢ Lacked an adequate strategy to deal with language
capabilities.

¢ Was ill-prepared to handle the challenges of efficiently
and accurately translating volumes of foreign language
data in support of the mission, especially in times of
crisis. The Team uncovered no evidence, however, that
translators missed any critical warning of terrorist ~
actions.

We have contradictory information on the Agency’s ability
to deal with a perceived chronic shortage of skilled language
specialists.

(U) Lack of an Agency Language Policy

4S+ANF} Language capability has long been key to
the CIA’s foreign intelligence mission. Language skills are

critical for translating and assessing foreign-language data
collected both clandestinely and overtly, recruiting and
handling agents, working with liaison services, dealing with
walk-ins and conducting debriefings, supporting technical
and covert action operations overseas, and fully
understanding the cultures involved in political and
leadership analysis. The inability to deal in the local
language may restrict a station’s asset pool, limit both liaison

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¢ The Chief of the Targeting Branch electronically accessed
189 documents. This officer also accessed both cables
relatively early in the morning, cpening
for 12 seconds and for
three minutes.

¢ The Chief of the Operations Branch electronically
accessed 214 documents, including both of the key cables
later in the afternoon. This officer accessed
for 14 seconds and
for 29 seconds.

° The DCOS accessed 217 documents, including

|which he had open for

17 seconds early in the morning. The DCOS had also
been in on the previous day, a Sunday, during which he
accessed 49 documents, indding
He had this cable open for 25 seconds.

¢ The COS opened 219 documents. He accessed
[ for only six seconds and
never opened)

(U) Inexperience in Operations

4S+/NB} The officers of UBL Station working _|

bese aseratiorar lt the exception of the COS, did not
ave operational backgrounds; this may explain why they

did not follow up on other operational opportunities posed
by. the al-Qa’ida associates coming to the United States. Of
the 14 officers serving in operational positions in the Station
at the time of eee es oly one had taken the
Field Tradecraft Course and only three others had taken the
Accelerated Operations Course. Moreover, none had had
any overseas tours as operations officers. Even the Station’s
Operations Branch Chief was a Directorate of Intelligence
(DI) officer with no formal operational training as of early
2000. That said, this branch chief and other Station officers
did have relevant on-the-job training, honed by past
operational successes. Nonetheless, the lack of operational
experience within the Station was a recurring theme that

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¢ In 1999, an OIG Inspection Report of the Clandestine
Information Technology Office (CITO), the joint DO-
DS&T office that targeted information systems from.1996
to 2000, noted that processing voluminous foreign
language data collected from computers would require a
major investment in foreign language translators,
suggesting a need to acquire additional linguists to
provide timely translations.

¢ The OIG Inspection of the Agency’s Foreign Language
Capabilities, issued in June 2001, echoed previous studies
that had warned of expected increased demands for
foreign language capabilities and had stated that the
Agency was not prepared to meet those demands. The
Report also confirmed serious shortfalls at the Agency in
specific languages, but noted that OIG survey data
showed the Agency population evenly divided on
whether or not the Agency had adequate language skills.

(E77 NF) Within CIA, the level of effort exerted to
increase the pool of language-qualified officers varied by
office and by directorate. Despite a 1987 study by an Agency
econometrician that found no statistically significant
correlation between the LIP and language capabilities, most
Agency offices continued to rely on the LIP to achieve their
goals. However, some components attempted other means,
such as targeted recruitments of new hires, to reverse the
downward trend. Impeding their efforts was a climate of
budget cuts and shrinking programs.

+SHANF} The challenge was greatest within the DO,

which relies on language-capable officers to conduct its
business in the field. Indeed, the Director of the CIA

" University Language Institute and three Counterterrorist
Center (CTC) officers, who regularly traveled overseas to
support stations, observed that the DO did not have enough
Arabic-qualified officers in the field to interview assets,
debrief walk-ins, or support technical operations on
demand. Staff officers with native linguistic skills for certain

"YE -AANF} CITO’s functions were incorporated into the DO/Information Operations Center in
August 2000.

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Team members extracted a program listing for
FY 1996-FY 2001 from that database and used it to query
AFMS. Budget officials in the Office of the Chief Financial
Officer (CFO) also told the Team that, beginning with
FY 1999, the Agency had ceased disclosing counterterrorism
as a separate line of business within the CBJB.

(U) Agency Funding and Infrastructure

#5} Following the end of the Cold War, Agency
resources decreased in terms of purchasing power.

(b)(1)
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+€ According to several Agency and CMS officials,
although on the increase, the small budgets of the mid- to
late-1990s had a particularly negative impact on CIA’s
infrastructure. The OIG Inspection of CIA’s Budget
Formulation and Execution process, published in December
2001, noted that Agency managers believed that core
mission activities eventually suffer when they are funded by
dollars taken from infrastructure. |

(b)(1)
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ina bind by the late-1990s.

*” (U) The CFO's calculations are based ona Department of Defense deflator scale that tecognizes
a higher “inflation rate” on personal services costs.

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counterparts, they nonetheless averaged a respectable 8.6
years since their entry on duty.'”

(U) Educational characteristics of the AIG analytic

° work force also indicate that the group was appropriately
qualified as of 9/11. For example, of the 39 pre-9/11 AIG
officers for whom the Team has academic records, 23 had
earned masters degrees and six had PhDs. In addition, a
review of Agency training records shows that, on average,
each AIG analyst had taken three Agency-sponsored
training.courses devoted to analysis prior to 9/11. Most
officers had also taken pertinent courses on
counterterrorism, operations, and substantive regional or
technical issues.” .

+ In addition, some senior customers at State and
the National Security Council (NSC), whom the OIG
interviewed in its 2000-2001 inspection of CTC, praised the
expertise of AIG officers. During interviews for that
inspection, policymakers singled out several experienced
analysts and managers in AIG for kudos.

+8} Finally, while the Joint Inquiry claims that
counterterrorism analysts did not have access to critical
operational information, the Team’s research found
otherwise. Within a few years prior to 9/11, all AIG analysts
had access to CTC’s Hercules database, which contains
CTC’s operations traffic. In addition, the DI’s| | (b)(1)
database and various open source databases were available (b)(3)
to these officers.

(U) Inconsistent Quality of Strategic Analysis

(U) The CIA’s counterterrorism analysts did produce
numerous pieces of strategic analysis in the years prior to

“” 4} Again, this contradicts the Joint Inquiry’s report, which said that analysts in CTC had three
years experience compared with eight among DI officers.

“-4€y Nonetheless, in the survey that accompanied the 2000-2001 Office of Inspector General
inspection of CTC, only 56 percent of AIG analysts agreed that they had received adequate
training for their current job, as compared with 67 percent for CTC as a whole and 78 percent for
the rest of the DI.

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+~€} Customer Assessment. Prior to 9/11, a few CTC
customers had expressed concern about the quality of AIG
analysis. While the Team did not interview customers
during this current review, the 2000-2001 inspection of CTC
found that some customers were concerned that AIG
analysts were not doing enough to provide context for
policy decisions. In particular, military customers wanted
more predictive analysis with clearer implications and
analyses that spotted trends or knit together the threads of
information.

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reserved for DIA, NSA, FBI, and State/INR in the Center’s
Community Counterterrorism Board (CCB)” were not

always filled; indeed, according to his testimony, the Center
(b)(1) had to reach out to other organizations
(b)(3) to fill them.

In spite of CTC’s charter and the role he had expected it to
play, the DCI did not act to alter either the way CTC was
fulfilling its Community role or the way the Community was
fulfilling its obligation to CTC.

SHANF} In his reviewing comments on the draft
report, the former DCI quoted the August 2001 OIG
Inspection Report on CTC, which stated, “CTC fulfills inter-
Agency responsibilities for the DCI by coordinating national
intelligence, providing warning, and promoting the effective
use of Intelligence Community resources on terrorism
issues.” The 9/11 Team notes that the report's language
accurately describes the mission of CTC and also notes that
the 2001 inspection report praised the CCB for its
coordination role in facilitating terrorist threat warnings. At
the time of 9/11, however, four of the five warning slots on
the CCB’s Terrorism Working Group (TWG)—the group that
produced these warnings—were vacant; only the unit chief
and one warning officer were in place.

{€+ANE) Moreover, the detailing of representatives
from outside agencies to CTC did not ensure that these
representatives were in fact fulfilling a Community
coordination role. As is discussed fully in the Team’s
treatment of Systemic Finding 9, CTC’s detailee program
was neither well defined nor effectively managed. Indeed,
some sénior managers told the Team that they believed CTC

was not fully executing its Community coordination role. (b)(7\(d )
One aid that the high-water mark of
the CCB process was recorded before 1997 (b)(7)(d)

"-+ENE} The Community Counterterrorism Board (CCB) was the Community management
component of the DCI Counterterrorist Center; it served as the Executive Secretariat for the
Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT). Its functions included management of
the Counterterrorism Community Terrorist Threat Warning System and coordination of
interagency terrorist threat alerts, advisories, and assessments. The Chairman of CCB also served

as Chairman of the IICT.

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large entourage moved to an isolated desert camp in

Helmand Province, where he stayed for about a week.

Bin Ladin’s camp, according to|___|reports, was many (b)(1)
miles from a larger hunting camp used by visitors from the (b)(3)
United Arab Emirates (UAE). UBL reportedly visited the

UAE camp regularly during his:stay in Helmand, but he

may have spent some or all of his nights at his own

encampment. On 10-11 February, CTC and policymakers

contemplated launching a cruise missile attack against UBL (b)(1)
(b)(1) ; after’ reported that he intended to stay at his camp (b)(3)
(b)(3) that night. Although Chief/UBL Station told the JI that the

ae had provided solid information on Bin Ladin’s

location on 11-12 February 1999, others in the decision chain,
such as the NSC Counterterrorism Coordinator, according to
a Kean Commission Staff Statement, were unconvinced that

(b)(1) : the intelligence was reliable. Team review of the cables from

(b)(3) Cc tindicates that! __—_—|were unable to (b)(1)
provide the kind of detailed, verifiable information that the (b)(3)
“political and military leadership required to launch the

missiles, and, as before, the information depended entirel

on the reporting of one source, the (b)(1)

| = | (b)(3)
me Officials had legitimate concerns

that UAE royals were in Afghanistan at the hunting camp

and might have been killed by a strike aimed at Bin Ladin.

The result was that, lacking the support of senior officials, no

missile attack was launched.

In May 1999, another opportunity (b)(3)
seemed to arise that offered the chance to.attack Bin Ladin
following his return to Kandahar on the 13". During the
next week, CTC’s tribal asset network staged what UBL
Station described at the time as its “largest and most
sustained effort to track, locate, and capture UBL since it
began working against UBL in the fall of 1997.” For several
daysandnights| UBL Station (b)(1)
contemplated an ambush of a Bin Ladin convoy or an attack (b)(3)
on him by the tribal assets while he slept or a US cruise
missile attack on one of his houses in the Kandahar area.
CTC files from this period are full of cables and e-mails
discussing UBL’s location and contemplating attacks. On

16-17 May, however, __—_|reported that Bin Ladin (b)(1)
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(b)(1) credited the second COS with making an effort to meet with
(b)(3) : his NSA counterparts more often than his predecessor,
(b)(7)(d) however. Meetings were held every other weel

land relations improved. Several

[stated that the relationship had become positive and
collaborative before 9/11.

(U) Defense Intelligence Agency. ‘The Joint Inquiry
discusses the DIA and its lack of access to CIA operational
cables only briefly. In its discussion, it states that, after 9/11,
DIA identified numerous leads in ts—s—sOY (b)(3)
cables that its analysts could have pursued had the
information been shared. The Team agrees that leads in
these cables could have been pursued analytically.

(b)(3)

(U) Products and Processes

(U) Prior to 9/11, CTC passed information to IC
agencies both formally.and informally. Team interviewees
widely recognized the Central Intelligence Report (CIR) as
the proper and formal channel to provide relevant
counterterrorism information to other US Government
agencies, although some told the Team that it was not
necessarily an effective instrument for getting information
into the hands of the appropriate officers. Interviewees also
indicated that informal channéls were sometimes more
effective in getting information to the proper recipient in
other agencies—and that this was particularly true with the
FBI”

*' (U) A number of officers, both from CIA and FBI, expressed frustration with the state of the
FBI's information-technology infrastructure and the inability to know what information had been
transmitted. In order to make sure a message had been relayed, these officers stressed, it was
necessary to, make contact with someone. Many officers indicated that FBI’s computer systems
are outdated and that the FBI has no central repository for information and_no effective means of
tracking information.

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e¢ On5and 6 January 2000, the CTC detailee briefed the FBI

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|Both FBI
officers agreed with that approach. The team found no
evidence, however, that the briefer mentioned or
included travel or visa information in these briefings or
at any other time, even though cable audit data show that
this officer was aware of this information.

¢ Ashort note on al-Mihdhar appeared in the UBL

Millennium Threat Executive Briefing Summary

provided to the FBI Director on 6 January 2000. This note

indicates. that al-Mihdhar had arrived in Kuala Lumpur
| It did not, however, provide (b)(1)
or refer to the visa information. (b)(3)

+~SAANFAlthough the Team found no evidence to
confirm or refute that CIA informally passed critical
information on al-Mihdhar to the FBI in January, the creation
and review of the draft CIR and cable audits conducted for .
this review show that the four FBI detailees in CTC opened a
number of cables associated with the in (b)(1)
January 2000." Indeed, several opened some of the cables (b)(3)

containing the critical travel information. Within a week of
the cable dissemination dates:

¢ Two FBI detailees opened [Which (b)(1)

mentions al-Mihdhar’s US visas. (b)(3)

“46> During January 2000, the four detailees opened six, 10, 13, and 18 of the relevant cables,
respectively, according to computer system audits.

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(U) FACTUAL FINDING 2: SIGNS OF AN IMPENDING
ATTACK

(U) Factual Finding 2 of the Joint Inquiry (JI) report
states that, “During the spring and summer of 2001, the
Intelligence Community experienced a significant increase in
information indicating that Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida
intended to strike against US interests in the very near
future.”

+€ The Finding notes that some Intelligence
Community (IC) personnel described as unprecedented the
increase in threat reporting during the months leading up to
11 September 2001 (9/11). Among the many examples cited
of stepped-up reporting during the March-September 2001
time frame, the National Security Agency (NSA) issued 33
communications indicating the possibility of an imminent
attack by al-Qa’ida. The Finding also acknowledges that the
IC advised senior policymakers of the likelihood of an
attack, including in threat advisories, National Security
Council (NSC) briefings, and current intelligence pieces,
although the nature of the reporting did not lend itself to
any specificity.

(U) Assessment of the Finding

+€} The Office of Inspector General’s 9/11 Review
Team agrees that, in the months prior to 9/11, the
Intelligence Community received numerous indications of
an impending al-Qa’ida attack. The Team also agrees that,
during part of the spring and summer, the number of these
indicators increased. However, the Team cannot fully
concur with the finding as stated, in that research shows that
this increase did not continue throughout the entire six-
month period leading up to 9/11. Nor did the Team find
that this increase was unprecedented across all broad
intelligence collection systems, as the Finding’s narrative
suggests.

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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 3: COUNTERTERRORISM
RESOURCES

(U) Systemic Finding 3 of the Joint Inquiry (JI) report
states that, “Between the end of the Cold War and
September 11, 2001, overall Intelligence Community funding
fell or remained even in constant dollars, while funding for
the Community’s counterterrorism efforts increased
considerably. Despite those increases, the accumulation of
intelligence priorities, a burdensome requirements process,
the overall decline in Intelligence Community funding, and
reliance on supplemental appropriations made it difficult to
allocate Community resources effectively against an
evolving terrorist threat. Inefficiencies in the resources and
requirements process were compounded by problems in
Intelligence Community budgeting practices and
procedures.”

(U) Joint Inquiry Discussion

(U) The report’s accompanying narrative goes on to
state that the Intelligence Community (IC) cited a lack of
money and people to explain why agencies failed to produce
more intelligence on al-Qa’ida, did not arrest or disrupt
more terrorists, and were otherwise limited in their response
to the growing terrorist threat. The report further notes that
IC officials contended that the increasing resources they
received were not sufficient to meet the growing threat;
indeed, a former Chief of the Counterterrorist Center (CTC)
testified that a lack of resources was a major impediment for
CTC. The JI report goes on to state that the IC shielded
counterterrorism programs from budget cuts. The report
also notes that the Associate Deputy Director for Operations
for Resources, Plans and Policies (ADDO/RPP) had recalled
that some attempt to protect counterterrorism funding was
made after the Declaration of War memorandum against
al-Qa'ida that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)

“issued in December 1998; however, this memorandum did

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« While CTC personnel increased by 7 percent| |
luring FY 1998-1999, the most significant increase
in CTC personnel—39 percent—occurred during FY1996-
1997, prior to the Declaration of War.

-S} In contrast, CTC did reallocate resources to
strengthen the fight against al-Qa’ida. During FY 1998-2000,
UBL Station resources increased substantially, partly as a
‘result of funds that the Center reprogrammed from other
CTC programs:
(b)(1)
(b)(3) ¢. Station core program expenditures grew by 76 percent
from, _|million in FY 1998 to[___ million in FY 1999.
This increase continued into FY 2000, when expenditures
doubled to|__|million, largely as a result of greater
funding for operations and travel.

¢ Manning for UBL Station also increased significantly,
from| _—_jin FY 1998 to|_ lin FY 1999. Nonetheless,
Station personnel interviewed for this report believed
this still was not enough to deal with the overwhelming
workload.

(U) Impact and Implications of Resource Decisions

4} CIA management actions and statements created
a contradictory picture on the financing of counterterrorism
efforts. If Agency managers believed—as they stated both
before and after 9/11—that counterterrorism programs were
not adequately funded, then they had an obligation to use
the money available to them. However, both CTC and the
counterterrorism issue as a whole actually lost funds in CIA
internal funding reprogrammings, and CTC did not request
significant funds from the CIA Reserve for Contingencies
until late FY 2000.

+~©} Agency and CTC managers failed to make |
maximum use of the funds available to them in the war
against UBL and al-Qa’ida. One cannot know whether this
caused Headquarters or field station officers to slow down

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CIA to more fully consider the potential of the United States
asa target. The JI investigation revealed examples such as
the Phoenix memorandum in which FBI officers had
information about al-Qa’ida activities in the United States
that they did not share with CIA. Interview data reinforce
this; three CTC analysts noted that they were aware of
probable relevant information that the Bureau did not make
available to them. One FBI detailee to CTC noted that the
Bureau had some 70 active investigations in the United
States against people with some connection to al-Qa'ida.
AIG incorporated this information into its 6 August 2001
PDB.

Finally, as the Joint Inquiry report (b)(3)
indicates, reporting was available in the spring and summer
of 2001 suggesting that al-Qa’ida was planning some activity
in the United States:

|
¢ InjJune2001/ —S_s|diisseminated a cable in (b)(1)

which a collaborative contact indicated, among other (b)(3) |
things, that “Khaled”—a Bin Ladin associate and |
Ramsi Yousef relative, who the Station suggested may be

Khalid Saykh Muhammad—was active in recruiting

people to travel to the United States to “carry out

unspecified actions on behalf of Bin Ladin.” According

to the source, Khaled was continuing to travel to the

United States as of late May. An audit of viewers shows

that several AIG analysts opened this cable. (For more

information on this cable, see Factual Finding 5.i.)

e InJuly, a call-in contacted the US Embassy in Abu Dhabi
and said that a group composed mainly of Pakistani UBL
supporters was in the United States planning to conduct
a terrorist operation involving high explosives. CTC
relayed this information to the FBI, the State Department,
the Federal Aviation Administration, and others in the
form of two Central Intelligence Reports (CIRs).

« In August, UBL Station disseminated recent information
that the FBI had received from a Palestinian walk-in—

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+8/AN#} In regard to information sharing with other
government entities, the Team found that the Interagency
Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) did relay
relevant information to the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and others.
Prior to 9/11, the Agency, through the IICT, disseminated
numerous threat advisories involving possible aircraft
hijackings., One such advisory from March 2000, which
restricted its focus to the likelihood that terrorists would
empioy hijackings to free incarcerated colleagues, noted that,
“in the 1990s, limited reports of questionable reliability
suggested Bin Ladin-associated groups or individuals had
discussed a suicide hijacking...into a monument or city.”
The text goes on to term this unlikely, however, given that it
does not offer the terrorists an opportunity for dialogue
regarding their key goal of obtaining the release of captive
members. It also minimized the prospects for hijackings
within the United States, as compared with those initiated
outside the country, arguing that it “would be a more
difficult operation to execute.”

4AGHNFY Other Relevant Information

4 NB} In addition to the reporting that the JI

cites in its finding, other information was available on
terrorists’ interest in pilots and pilot training:*

“¢SHANB} The FBI had additional information on this subject of which the CIA was unaware. For
example, the CIA did not see the Phoenix memorandum until April 2002. In addition, an FBI
officer told the JI in October 2002 that, in 1999, two Saudis on a commercial flight between
Phoenix and Washington, DC, twice tried to enter the cockpit. After an emergency landing, FBI
officers investigated but decided not to pursue a prosecution.

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Table $3-2

+S} In essence, the Agency and DO used CTC base
funds to augment programs not specifically designated for
counterterrorism. | stated
that CTC had been viewed as a “cash cow.” For example,
FY 1996 was the only fiscal year in which CTC received more
funds from internal DO redistributions of base funds than it
lost. During FY 1997-2000 and FY 2001 before 9/11, the net
impact of DO adjustments was an overall reallocation of
approximately| million from CTC programs to other DO
programs that may.or may not have been counterterrorism-
related.

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structures that provide little central direction to what any
individual or cell might be planning.

+E+ANF} CTC management did not consider KSM to
be an associate of UBL in 1996, so it assigned responsibility
for him to IEB. | (b)(7)(d)
told the Team that he took with him to the Station
the officers who had followed KSM and had hoped that CTC
management would assign the KSM target to his unit.

CHAE After the split, IEB was understaffed and
overworked, according to the branch chief at the time. This
chief complained that COS/UBL Station had taken the most
experienced officers with him, leaving IEB with only six or
seven officers. Furthermore, he stated that IEB remained
extremely busy working on a variety of issues, including the
TWA 800 crash and the Khobar Towers bombing. The unit
continued to follow KSM and orchestrated several
unsuccessful attempts to render him from Qatar, but other
crises took precedence. The upshot was that IEB did not
work actively on KSM after January 1997.

+~&+AF} In late 1997, CTC moved responsibility for
KSM to its new Renditions Branch (RB). CTC management
had created RB to work with the FBI to render terrorists, i
such as KSM, whom the United States had indicted. CTC
cables and our interviews strongly support the conclusion,
which the Team shares with the Joint Inquiry, that the
Centers focus on KSM from 1998 through 9/11 was heavily
oriented towards rendition planning.

4€+ANF} The RB officer assigned responsibility for
KSM began tracking KSM in 1998 and continued to do so
after 9/11. This officer believed the FBI had the lead on
KSM because of the US warrant, and he cooperated with the
FBI to identify operational leads. The New York Special
Agent working the KSM issue, who had been tracking KSM
since the Manila Air Plot of 1995, told the JI that he also
considered KSM an FBI case, not a joint. case with the CIA.
In his interview, the RB officer said that he worked both
KSM and Abdul Rahman Yasin, but that Yasin took
precedence because he had more information on him.

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agencies had tried, with considerable success, to improve
relations in order to enhance their missions and foster
information sharing. The OIG stated in its 2000-2001
Inspection Report of CTC that, since the OIG’s previous
inspection in 1994, the Center had “broadened and
deepened its operational partnerships with other US
Government organizations working the terrorist target.”
Evidence collected by the 9/11 Team supports this
conclusion.”

+S+/NF)} Nonetheless, overcoming all the obstacles to
information sharing and sustaining cooperation proved to be
difficult:

¢ The FBI and CIA had different missions and goals.
Whereas the FBI was focused on using its information in
court and its sources as witnesses, the CIA concentrated
on acquiring more information and protecting its sources
from exposure. Differences in tradecraft flowing from
these differing objectives may have hampered or even
prevented information sharing.

e NSA and CIA had differences in mission and tradecraft,
as well as differing interpretations of legal authorities.
(See the Team’s discussion of Systemic Findings 4 and 7.)
NSA was particularly concerned about protecting the
tights of US citizens by not passing on information it had
collected that might have involved such individuals.

 (U) A number of officers who reviewed this report noted differences between the conclusions
of the OIG’s 9/11 Report and those of its 2001 Inspection Report of CTC. These differences
derive from distinct taskings and methodologies. OIG component inspections rely heavily on
information obtained from officers within those components as well as from partners and
customers. The Inspection Team based its conclusions with respect to information sharing
primarily on interviews with CTC officers and concluded that CTC’s interactions with its
community partners had improved dramatically. The 9/11 Team, on the other hand, focused on
specific pre-9/11 failures that had been highlighted by the Joint Inquiry.

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admittedly, identified as a fabricator—alleging al-Qa’ida
threats to New York City.

e LaterinAugust| S—SS=Si att UBL (b)(1)

operative Abu Zubaydah was considering mounting (b)(3)
terrorist operations in the United States.

While none of these cables offered specifics, analysts made
no mention of them in published warning pieces prior to
9/11, including in the 6 August PDB.

{E+ANE} The widespread IC view that an impending
al-Qa'ida terrorist attack would be against US targets
overseas meant that policymakers focused much less on
such an attack in the United States. Similarly, the IC had
done no recent broad analytic assessment of the threat to the
United States that could have served to invigorate
policymaker attention to the issue.

(U) Accountability

+EAANF} The preponderance of reporting during the
spring and summer of 2001 pointed to an al-Qa'ida attack on
US interests overseas. As such, the Team finds no
accountability issues in CIA’s pre-9/11 assessment that
al-Qa’ida’s main target would be abroad.

+EC+ANE) Nevertheless, the Team believes that CTC
should have made more frequent references in finished
analytic product to the United States as a possible target.
This is particularly the case given Usama Bin Ladin’s
declaration of his intent to conduct attacks in the
United States, the precedent of the 1993 WTC bombing, and
the intelligence reporting that kept coming in well into 2001.
The Team finds this to be part of a broader failure of
strategic analysis, which it assesses in Systemic Finding 5.

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support for Masood could have long-term benefits in
rendering UBL.

e Later in March 2001, after receiving a request from the
NSC to prepare a finding or a MON that would support
a significant increase in assistance to both Masood and
the Uzbeks, CIA developed a new draft finding that
included assistance to Masood's forces
|__ million. The finding was still awaiting finalization
and approval on 11 September.

Even during late 2000 and early
2001, while continuing to support Masood financially, CTC’s
evaluations of the performance of Masood indicated little
satisfaction with or confidence in Masood’s performance.

¢ In December 2000, CTC acknowledged in its “blue sky”
option paper that some observers were concerned that
Masood was largely a spent force. It admitted that he
was “generally despised by the majority Afghans” and
that he was disliked even among the Afghan
oppositionists, who saw him as only looking out for the
interests of his fellow Tajiks and Panjshiris.”

45+ PNE} The then-DDO on 22 December 2000 indicated his skepticism about the “blue sky”
Masood option Program, writing without elaboration that ’ ‘substantively, I question the Masood

support concept.”

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personnel lacked the expertise to run operations. Several
officials voiced concern that CTC personnel did not have the
proper expertise, operations experience, or requisite skills to
perform their jobs effectively. Other interviewees told the
Team that the lack of operational expertise negatively
affected UBL Station’s credibility with COSs, its support to
field operations against al-Qa’ida, and its ability to respond
properly to DO traffic.” Indeed, the first Chief of UBL
Station was a DI officer. That said, UBL Station officers had
gained considerable experience on the job, conducting

_ successful operations against al-Qa‘ida.

48} The operations credentials of the UBL Station
officers in 2000 and 2001 were not those that one would
expect, given the importance of the al-Qa’ida target. Based

* ona review of the staffing records, the Team found that, in
2000: .

e While the COS had both formal operations training and
relevant overseas experience, he was gone frequently,"
leaving his deputy—who had neither—in charge.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

In

"4S A4NE} In their response to the OIG draft, CTC managers stated that the Center attempted to
balance operational and analytical demands with the skills and expertise it had available to it
during a period when the entire Agency was understaffed. They referenced the 2001 CTC
inspection report, which concluded that “CTC has limited options for dealing with this perceived
personnel shortage....Center employees are managing this perceived shortage in a way that
leaves many vulnerable to burnout and allows little time for strategic work. Personnel regularly
work extra hours and are only able to perform what they perceive to be the essential tasks. One
manager commented that the demand on the staff means that they go from crisis to crisis and are
not able to look at trends or more long-range issues to get ahead of the terrorists.” The Team
agrees with this description of the Station’s workload and the resulting pressure on its staff.

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(U) Implications

4E+ANFY Although the Team found a lack of an
Agency-wide language strategy before 9/11, it could not
find any definitive indication that limited language
capabilities or limited numbers of language-qualified
officers had a demonstrably negative impact on the
Agency’s handling of the counterterrorism target. We were
hindered in this assessment by a lack of quantifiable data,
especially the absence of an Agency-wide database of
language capabilities. Such data are necessary for the
Agency to assess its weaknesses and formulate a strategy to
address current capabilities and projected shortfalls.

+S/+/NF} Before 9/11, as we also note in Systemic
Finding 11, 95 percent of the information CTC relied on to
disrupt terrorist activities came from walk-ins. In order to
vet these walk-ins in their own language in a timely manner,
the Agency required language-qualified officers. The Team
has no objective evidence to determine whether or not the
Agency had “adequate” numbers of qualified officers in
hard-target languages to conduct its business. Nor can the
Team assess whether or not opportunities were lost in
collecting foreign intelligence or assisting in covert action
because of an inability to quickly surge language-qualified
officers. Therefore, we can neither agree nor disagree with
the JI on the sufficiency of language-qualified officers to
support the Agency’s mission. Nor can we objectively assess
whether or not vital information was missed because such
information was not translated in a timely fashion.

(U) Accountability

ES ANFY For over 20 years, CIA failed to develop
and implement an Agency-wide strategy to address foreign
language capabilities in spite of numerous studies calling
upon the Agency to do so. Whatever the reason—the
actions of individual components or individuals; lack of.
evidence; or sheer chance—the Team did not find that the
lack of such a strategy had a negative impact on the war on

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'* (U) According to the Act, in the case of funds proposed for an activity in a formal budget
request to Congress, funds shall be deemed “specifically authorized” for an activity, “only to the
extent that the Congress both authorized the funds to be apportioned for that activity and
appropriated the funds for that activity;” in the case of funds not formally requested, “the
Congress both specifically authorized the appropriation of the funds for the activity and

appropriated the funds for the activity.”

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either their obligation to place people on watchlists or the
criteria by which watchlist decisions should be made.

(U) Assessment of the Finding

(U) Although the Office of Inspector General’s 9/11
Review Team agrees with much of the discussion in this
Finding, the Team has found that CIA’s pre-9/11
information sharing with non-IC agencies—although far less
extensive than its information-sharing arrangements with IC
agencies—was more robust than the JI implies.

(U) The Team agrees with the Joint Inquiry that CIA
did not share all relevant information concerning hijackings
and the use of aircraft as weapons with the FAA. Thé Team
addresses the substance of the reporting in its discussion of
Factual Finding 4 and will do that again in this finding. The
Team is unable to either confirm or refute the JI’s specific
allegation that the FAA had not received three of 12 reports;
that two others had been derived from State Department
cables; and that one was not received at all by the FAA until
after 9/11. Our own research does show, however, a mixed
record with respect to CIA’s sharing of information relating
to possible attacks involving aircraft. The Team reviewed
13 incidents of reporting concerning a threat from the
Middle East involving either hijacking or using airplanes as
weapons during the period from 1994 to September 2001.
While the Team can confirm that nine of these were passed
to FAA, the Team found no record that the other four were.

(U) The Team concurs that the CIA had sufficient
information to connect al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi to UBL, the
East Africa embassy bombings, and the attack on the USS
Cole by late 2000. On at least two major and several lesser
occasions, the Agency had the information necessary to
recommend these individuals for watchlisting by the State
Department as well as by INS and US Customs. It also
should have recommended that they be placed on the FAA’s
no-fly list; in fact, the 23 August cable recommending that
these men be watchlisted was not sent to the FAA. The

June'2005

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(b)(1)
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comparison, of the serving in operations
positions in the Washirigton-based Station in
2000, 100 percent had both formal operations training
and practical overseas experience."”

¢ Ofthe[—__|serving in Intelligence Officer

Generalist positions, including the account manager
for had neither formal operations

training nor practical opérations experience overseas; the

remaining officer had both.

In 2001, the overall level of operations expertise was about
the same if not worse, according to a review of Agency
training and official travel records. Moreover, the Team
found that, as UBL Station staffing increased, the overall
Agency experience of those working in the Station declined
from an average of 12.8 years at the end of FY1998 to

7.4 years by the end of FY 2001, according to Agency data.

4S+/NE Efforts Made to Augment Staff. To make
up for shortfalls, CTC augmented its staff in several ways:

The Center utilized a number of detailees from other
government agencies. During the period FY 1996-2001,
the number of detailees in CTC fluctuated from

4to9 percent of totalCTC manning.|
detailees were in CTC at one time or another during this
period, about the same as the number of employees who
worked in UBL Station over the same timeframe. A
former Chief of CTC told the Team that, to obtain more
resources, CTC would press other agencies for additional
detailees; this was not a popular option with these

"(U)i stated in|__|review comments that UBL Station had few operations

officers at the outset because its original mission had been to analyze UBL’s finances. By 1997,
however, the Station had a more operational focus.| __|said that|__/had tried to get more
operational personnel into the unit and had repeated conversations with the DDO about the need
todo so. The problem was that there were none to be found without taking them from the area
divisions and from the field. The Team recognizes that operations officers were in short supply, .
but notes that a similar “virtual” station that dealt with|____|had a far higher proportion of
operations officers during this period than UBL Station. The Team believes that the high priority
of the target warranted an infusion of officers with operations expertise into the Station.-:

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(b)(3)
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HESTSTTFOREON, NOFORN7 Wik With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks (b)(1)
(b)(3)
contrast, sent a reminder to (b)(1 )
(b)(1) on 11 February. This could explain why (b)(3)
(b)(3) directed its 5 March cable primaiily ca (b)(1)
(b)(1) and only “infoed” UBL Station. Indeed, UBL (b)(3)
(b)(3) Station’s final correspondence on the (b)(1)
a cable providing tearline information to (b)(3)
(b)(1) was on 16 February 2000, although (b)(1)
(b)(3) | continued exchanging (b)(3)
cables through early March.
4~S+ANF} This lack of operational attention is evident
in the absence of followthrough regarding) (b)(1)
| early March (b)(3)

referring to al-Hazmi and Yousaf’s travel to the United

States. Although, as mentioned, cable audit data show that

several officers in UBL Station opened these key cables—

usually the day of or the day after theit dissemination—

when queried for this review, none 'recalled reading them.

Interviewees told the Team that other, more pressing,

activity required their attention during this time span. A

review of cable traffic sent or received by UBL Station

during the first part of the week of 5 March 2000 shows that

the Station was involved in several ongoing operations at

that time and was preparing for Station personnel to TDY to
and elsewhere. Station personnel also (b)(1)

told the Team that, from the start, they were not sure how (b)(3)

“bad” the Malaysia meeting participants were and that

Station officers had to focus on people whom they explicitly

knew were high risk.” However, our review of UBL Station

cables from early March 2000 shows that some Station

officers were still doing routine traces and other work on

other individuals with reported possible connections to

al-Qa’ida.

+~SHANF> The travel itinerary of Yousaf (a.k.a. .
Khallad), as indicated is intriguing (b)(1)
and, in itself, should have stimulated some operational (b)(3)

"4S}- In comments provided after reviewing this draft, | (b)(7)(d)
states that “Given the insignificance of Hazmi and Mihdar [sic] at the time, I

stand by my initial comments that we devoted exactly the resources they deserved on the basis of

what we knew.”

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Figure S11-4

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

+~S+ANF) In interviews conducted during the OIG’s
inspection of CTC in 2000-2001, customers evaluated
counterterrorism reporting positively. Most] | (b)(1)
|___ field customers of CTC’s reports termed the (b)(3)
reporting useful, good, or meeting their needs. The few
Washington customers who commented on CTC reporting
also called it important and valuable. The 9/11 Team did
not contact CTC customers for this current review.

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“continuing conflict between Intelligence Community
agencies,” as it applies to CIA and NSA,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The Team covers
the problematic nature of the relationship between CIA and
NSA
(b)(1)
lin its (b)(3) °
treatment of Systemic Finding 4. As noted in our treatment
of that finding, various written communiqués between
senior leaders of CIA and NSA, as well as a Presidential
memorandum, sought to clarify authorities
fa (by(1)
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request, stating that, “We are well aware that Khalad is an
important lead. But he is no more important than any of the
other Yemen targets who we know were part of the Cole
bombing.” After noting that Station personnel did not know
whether Khalad from the Malaysia operation was
identifiable with Khalad Attash of the Cole bombing, and
that they therefore did not know whether Khalid al-Mihdhar
was part of the bombing, the Branch Chief indicated that she
respected the former DCOS “as much as anyone but this is
ridiculous. I’m sick of getting second-guessed by him and
having him send you notes about his pet theories...Should
you want to get this out before [the FBI detailee] can, I will
ask someone else. It does deserve attention, but I believe we
have assigned it the proper priority.” Audit data show that,
at this point, the FBI detailee began accessing the bulk of the
cables related to the meeting. Among others, on 24 July, the
detailee opened which referenced
(b)(1) al-Mihdhar‘s multiple-entry US visa; on 8 August, the officer
(b)(3) viewed| Jand| |which

provided the additional travel document details. Not until
21 August, however, did the FBI detailee open the 6 March

(b)(1) cable that mentioned the US travel.” At this

(b)(3) point, the officer went to the Station expert on watchlisting,
who drafted the CIR that the Station sent to the State
Department, the FBI, and other agencies on 23 August.

4S} Finally, numerous CTC officers opened or
reopened many of [cables while’
conducting various traffic searches prior to 9/11, according
to a review of cable audit data, and each of these occasions
represents another missed opportunity. For example, in
mid-September 2000, a staff operations officer in IEB opened
33 of these cables, including the two cables from March 2000
as well as all of the January 2000 ones with travel data, yet
did not initiate any response; in the Team’s interview of July
2008, this officer could not recall looking at these cables on

*4S} Although computer system audit data indicate Me en electronically
accessed the 5 March lcable,|__ noted to the OIG Team that ased the CIR on this
cable. It is possible that) [was using a hard-copy version of this cable that someone else had

provided, although the audit data indicate that the former DCOS was the only individual from
the Station to access and print this cable between June 2000 and 24 August 2001.

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With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HESASH-FOREON-NOFORN ith

(U) Analyzing the Threat to the United States...

(U) Analysts produced some key reports that
addressed the terrorist threat in the United States in general
and the al-Qa’‘ida threat in particular. These included some
National Intelligence Council (NIC) products, and an
Intelligence Report and a PDB done by CTC/AIG.

4{SHANF} Prior to 9/11, the NIC produced two major
products that focused on the potential for terrorist attacks in
the United States. The 1995 National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE), “The Foreign Terrorist Threat in the United States,”
notes that, “Terrorists may be more inclined than before to
retaliate with violence for US policies in the Middle East and
toward Muslims in general.. The [1993] bombing of the
World Trade Center (WTC) probably crossed a threshold for
more large-scale terrorist attacks.” The estimate goes on to
cite US targets deemed especially at risk, including national
symbols and transportation infrastructure. Two years later,
the NIC published an Intelligence Community (IC) Brief that
revisited and updated the 1995 NIE. This Brief reaffirmed
the threats cited in 1995 and added Usama Bin Ladin’s claim
that he had received a fatwa (religious authorization) to
attack US targets anywhere in the world until US troops
leave Saudi Arabia and that he had discussed plans to carry
out attacks in the United States.

(U) In December 2000, the NIC also published an
unclassified assessment, “Global Trends 2015,” which
included a few sections that addressed the overall terrorist
threat to the United States. That publication, which the NIC
briefed throughout the policymaking community and which
was featured on ABC’s Nightline in January 2001, stated
that, “Some potential adversaries will seek ways to threaten
the US homeland. The US national infrastructure—
communications, transportation, financial transactions,
energy networks—is vulnerable to physical and electronic
attack... Foreign government and groups will seek to
exploit such vulnerabilities using conventional munitions,
information operations, and even WMD.” The report made
no specific mention of Bin Ladin or al-Qa’ida.

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CIA reporting! ]

pre-September 2001 provided strong evidence that
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad was a senior lieutenant in
al-Qa'ida. Neither UBL Station officers nor AIG analysts
picked up on the significance of the information, however.

The JI ma emphasized the June 2001 cable[__|

that discussed KSM’s connections to UBL and his
possible operations in the United States.

rates | The| cable of 28 August 2001
identified KSM as Mukhtar.

+*S+ANF) A September 2000 cable directed to UBL
Station reported that an individual
identified as Khalid al-Shaykh al-Ballushi was one of the
most important members of al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. UBL
Station’s response cable indicated that Khalid al-Shaykh
al Ballushi might well be KSM, who was a fugitive for his

(b)(1) role in the Manila Air Conspiracy. Itasked|

(b)(3) gather more information| ———_ including why al-
Ballushi was considered an important person within al-

«  Qa‘ida and what he had done for al-Qa’ida. The Team
(b)(1) found no response to this specific request,
(b)(3) and UBL Station took no further action on it. |

~SHANE} The June 2001 cable
associates of UBL.

“4SAANE} The cable from UBL Station, sent on 28 September 2000, was originated and
authorized by reports officers and released by the Chief of UBL Station.

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(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(3) 454s |NB} Asa consequence, when (b)(1)

| __and CTC reached the conclusion that the’ (b)(3)

constituted too narrow a base for covert action against UBL,
they looked at as an option.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

4S4 (MBE By 22 December 1998, efforts to gain (b)(3)

Pakistani assistance had reached a temporary dead end,
however. The US Government exerted pressure on the
Pakistani Government, including calls from President

Clinton to Prime Minister Sharif on 18 December
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specifically dedicated to the production of such analysis, and
absence of oversight on terrorism analysis by senior DI
managers. In addition, IC organizations closely associated
with CIA—the NIC and the Interagency Intelligence
Committee on Terrorism (IICT)—produced few strategic
pieces on the terrorist organization.

(U) Current, Tactical, and Other Demands

45} Many AIG officers told the Team that current and
tactical demands prevented them from doing more strategic
analysis than they did. Indeed, the CTC inspection of 2000-
2001 found that, “Analysts acknowledge that the constant
state of crisis and strong demand from policymakers and
Agency senior managers limit their ability to conduct
strategic research and develop in-depth expertise.” In
spring 2001, AIG managers cited current and tactical
demands while making the case for additional resources to
staff the planned strategic analysis unit. Among other
things, they noted that production of PDBs and SEIBs had
more than doubled between January 2000 and March 2001.

+54+4ANF;} Despite this, comparison of selected DI
issues’ pre-9/11 production of current intelligence (PDBs
and SEIBs) and IRs shows that several DI issues had similar
or even heavier current intelligence burdens but still
produced more long-term pieces per capita than did AIG.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

June 2005

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and transferring them to justice. The Report states that, after
this transfer, CTC issued few collection requirements
regarding KSM’s activities and, in August 2000, cabled to the
field that, “traditional [foreign intelligence] collection is not
our goal with this rendition operation.” The Report says
that only once prior to 9/11 did an analyst write
requirements intended to gather information about KSM’s
role and plans.

4S+ANF} In June 2001, the CIA broadly disseminated
a cable to the intelligence and policymaking communities
that emphasized KSM’s ties to Bin Ladin and indicated that
KSM (here identified as Khaled) traveled to the United
States frequently and actively recruited individuals to travel

outside Afghanistan, including to the United States, to carr
out unspecified activities on behalf of UBL. Co (b)(1)
hile it was clear from Khaled’s (b)(3)

comments that the recruits would be engaged in planning
terrorist-related activities, he did not explicitly say so. The JI
report states that the CIA did not find this information to be
credible but thought that it was worth pursuing in case it
was accurate. The report claims that the Agency apparently
did not recognize the significance of a Bin Ladin lieutenant
sending terrorists to the United States and asking them to
establish contact with colleagues already here.

+S+/NF} Finally, the Jl report argues that KSM is the
common thread running between WTC-1 and the 9/11
attacks. The report concludes that the IC’s efforts against
KSM reveal problems in understanding al-Qa’ida activities
and structure and in formulating a coherent response. It
charges that the IC devoted few analytic or operational
resources to tracking KSM or understanding his activities;
that coordination was irregular at best; and that what little
information was shared was usually forgotten or dismissed.

(U) Assessment of Joint Inquiry’s Finding

(U) The Office of Inspector General (OIG) 9/11
Review Team concurs with the Joint Inquiry’s analysis and
conclusions with respect to this finding. While the Team has

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+€} —Inefficiencies in Managing and Leveraging Counterterrorism
Resources

+} According to the OIG budget inspection of 2001,
CIA officers at all levels believed that the culture of the
Agency did not foster good financial management. That
inspection found that less than half of the 25 Agency
component chiefs interviewed thought that sufficient
incentives were in place for managers to make resource-
savvy decisions. Rather, they stated:

¢ Managers who save money one year may receive a
smaller budget the following year.

¢ Bad budget decisions have little impact on an officer’s
subsequent career.

¢ Managers who plan poorly or behave noncorporately are
bailéd out with more funding.

+) Like the rest of the Agency, the DO and CTC had
difficulty managing and leveraging resources.| | (b)(7)(d)
eee Stated that CTC, in particular, did not work
with DO area divisions to determine what resources—
including personnel—were available before forwarding
requests. This lack of coordination made the DO and CTC
inefficient because it was impossible to optimize resources
across the directorate. In addition, the lack of end-to-end
budget building often left funding for infrastructure and
support costs on the cutting room floor. An example of this

is the DO 2005 plan, which called for placing 500 new core

collectors in the fil, indicated inan (b)(7)(d)
interview with the Team that this plan served as his

approach to addressing counterterrorism resources.

However, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

issued a report in May 2001 stating that the DO plan’

contained no consideration of basic necessities such as

financial resources, adequate workspace, and technical and
communications support. The SSCI report further asserted

that prudent corporate resource management should not

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had received reports of Yousef’s connections to UBL and
al-Qa’ida. | (b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U) Declining Appreciation of KSM’s Significance

SAAN UBL Station focused on KSM and the
potential danger that he posed from the mid-1990s through
mid-i999, when its focus on KSM’s significance, operational °
importance, and links to Usama Bin Ladin faded. From mid-
1999 through 11 September 2001, the Station appears to have
made little effort to look at KSM’s connections to UBL in
order to better understand how al-Qa’ida was operating and
where KSM might fit into its operations. While the Center’s
Renditions Branch maintained a high level of interest in
where he was, it had little apparent interest in who he was
and what he might be planning.

4S+/NF} Cables from the early years of UBL Station
conveyed a sense of urgency on KSM:

. (b)(1)
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This occurred over a period of years—both before and
after the DCI’s Declaration of War memorandum, which
expressly directed that no resources be spared against
Bin Ladin.

¢ The DDO from mid-1999 to 9/11, for failing to protect
CTC base funding, a portion of which was régularly
redistributed to other DO components for programs that
often were unrelated to counterterrorism. The DO did
not significantly increase funding for counterterrorism in
the years following the issuance of the DCI’s Declaration
of War memorandum; rather, CTC’s budget request grew
by only 3-4 percent per year and accounted for a
declining share of the DO overall budget during FY 1999-
2001. The DDO from mid-1999 through September 2001
was overseeing the redirection of counterterrorism base
funding during the period when the Agency was stating
authoritatively that it was short of funds for
counterterrorism and needed supplemental funding.

¢ The Chief of CTC from mid-1999 to 9/11, for not fully
utilizing the financial resources available to the Center,
including failure to expend both money in his base
budget and supplemental funds. Despite paying various
taxes and leaving significant budgetary authority unused
at yearend, he continually pressed Congress for
supplemental funding. These actions and statements
created a contradictory picture on counterterrorism
financing for those inside and outside of the CIA.

* The two Chiefs of CTC in the three years before 9/11, for
not ensuring that UBL Station received trained
operations personnel it needed to do the job.

+€} The Team believes the DDO from mid-1997 to
mid-1999 is responsible for redistributing DO
counterterrorism base funding to other DO components for
programs that were unrelated to counterterrorism during
the seven-month period between the receipt of the DCI’s
Declaration of War memorandum in late December 1998.and
his retirement in late July 1999. His comparatively short

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formal, written document articulating The Plan, are further
evidence that these two initiatives, if intended as strategies
to drive the IC’s war against al-Qa’ida, were inadequate.

+S} The Declaration of War.” The DCI’s —

memorandum of December 1998 listed seven specific
operational actions that the DCI wanted addressees to
pursue with respect to the al-Qa’ida target:

Engagement of liaison services.

Provision of timely and accurate information to the
military for targeting purposes.

Engagement of the collection community to ensure it was
meeting CTC’s requirements (including holding
meetings, to be chaired by the Assistant DCI for
Collection (ADCI/C), with the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA), and officers from other IC agencies).

Pursuit of conventional and special collection methods to
attack UBL.

“(U) A copy of this memorandum is found at the end of this section in Appendix $2-A. The
Team devoted special attention to this memorandum because it figured prominently in the JI
report to support the charge that the IC lacked a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.

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5} Nor were the contents of the memorandum
communicated down the CIA chain of command.
Numerous officers at all levels claimed never to have heard
of the memorandum or not to have had much familiarity
with it. |

(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)

|In short, neither the DCI nor his
staff disseminated his memorandum as broadly as would
have been required for it to have had real impact in forging a
comprehensive IC or CIA approach to the battle against
al-Qa’ida.

+E AAP} In addition
[ | suggested that

the memorandum had little practical effect because they
were already doing everything they could, considering the
resource constraints. The latter remarked that the money
and officers that were going to CTC were being taken out of
the Agency’s hide and that the result was that the area
divisions—which he referred to as the “lifeblood of CTC’”—
were weakened. With the Agency getting fewer resources,
he told the Team, it actually wound up with less money to
fight terrorism. Finally, some senior managers viewed the
memorandum as little more than an emphatic statement. A
senior manager close to the DCI said it was characteristic of
the DCI’s dramatic style and speculated that the
memorandum probably was interpreted in this context. This
manager said the fact that there was no infusion of resources
into CTC showed that people had not taken the
memorandum seriously. |

the memorandum was important in that it
showed the DCI understood the issue, but added that it
“didn't mean a hill of beans” outside CIA.
“it was what a
coach would say to his team when he wanted the team to do
the best it could with whatithad.”| told the
Team that he thought the memorandum had been

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(b)(7)(d)

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former DCI has confirmed that CIA’s performance with
. respect to watchlisting was marked by what he termed

“uneven practices, bad training, and a lack of redundancy.”
The Team agrees that the FBI also was not formally notified
of the possible presence in the United States of these men
until late August 2001—although the FBI detailee to UBL
Station was aware of this in May 2001. CIA did not forward
information regarding al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi to either IC
or non-IC agencies as it should have done. We also agree
that cooperation and collaboration among the
Counterterrorist Center (CTC), ] (b)(3)

|___Jand the FBI’s JTTFs were insufficient. (See Factual
Finding 5b and Systemic Findings 9 and 11 for the Team's
discussion of these issues.)

(U) The flaws that hampered information sharing
among IC agencies inhibited information sharing with non-
IC agencies as well. The Team will not repeat the
conclusions and recommendations it addresses in Systemic ~
Finding 9 but believes that they are relevant to this finding.
In this section, the Team will discuss information sharing
only as it relates to CIA relations with those non-IC agencies

(b)(3)

(U) The JI indicated that its focus on the IC limited
the extent to which it explored the issue of information
sharing with non-IC agencies. We have not taken a broader
look either but have examined only the issues that the JI

discussed.

(U) Information Sharing with Non-Intelligence Community
Agencies

(U) The methods the CIA used to share information
with non-IC agencies before 9/11 were similar to those it
used with IC agencies, albeit on a smaller scale. Detailees
played an important, although far from exclusive, part.

“Central Intelligence Reports (CIRs) were the primary
product for relaying information and warnings. And non-IC

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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 16: STRATEGY TO DISRUPT
TERRORIST FUNDING

Ss Systemic Finding 16 of the Joint Inquiry (b)(1) -
(Jl) report indicates that, “The activities of the September 11 (b)(3)
hijackers in the United States appear to have been financed,
in large part, from monies sent to them from abroad. Prior
to September 11, there was no coordinated US Government-
wide strategy to track terrorist funding and close down their
financial support networks. |

the US Government was unable to disrupt financial support
for Usama Bin Ladin’s terrorist activities effectively.”

In its accompanying discussion, the JI (b)(1)
goes on to note that the CIA: (b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

e - Never determined the extent of UBL’s (b)(1)

financial resources, (b)(3)

Po

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Systemic Finding 1: Meeting the Global Terrorist
Challenge....scssessssssssssersserssecsescsscsssssnscstecsseesecssesesceasvesensenversoes 127

Systemic Finding 2: A Comprehensive Counterterrorism
Strategy and the DCI’s Role .....essssecsssssssesssneessssiecsseesesneeees 128

Systemic Finding 3: Counterterrorism Resources...
Systemic Finding 4: Application of Technology .........s00+ 204
Systemic Finding 5: Strategic Analysis .....cssssssssesssseesssese 224

Systemic Finding 6: Inadequate Foreign Language
Capabilities

Systemic Finding 7: Computer Exploitation ........sssssssesee 283

Systemic Finding 9: Information Sharing Within the
Intelligence COMMUNIEY.......sessscsseseerseeseeseresssessseenseeesseessees 286

Systemic Finding 10: Information Sharing with Non-IC

Members 313

Systemic Finding 11: HUMINT Operations Against
AD-Qa ida crsscccssssssseseesesccnssnnssseesccsessnnneseseedecenunessscecessseessnsnaneesecs 323

Systemic Finding 13: Covert Action .sssssssssssscssseecessessesseees 350

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Group--AlIG’s analysts and managers of analysis numbered
47." DO elements of CTC also had DI analysts and others
working as targeting analysts during this timeframe.
Meanwhile, the number of analysts working on
counterterrorism in general within DI offices grew from
about 31 in September 1998 to 46 in August 2001, according
to data the Agency provided to the Joint Inquiry in mid-
2002. ‘

+S} Regardless. of the size, the Team has collected
contradictory information as to whether AIG’s analytic
resources were adequate to do the job. This is not to imply
that the team considers that pre-9/11 analytic resources
were adequate but that the conflicting information was such
that the Team reached no conclusion on the issue.

+S} On the one hand, many officers indicated that the
(b)(7)(d) numbers were too small. As the Joint Inquiry report

mentions, the DCI in 2002 acknowledged that the number of
analysts had been too small. Inaddition[ told
the Team that the DI’s movement of some 215 analysts into
OTA a few weeks after 9/11 suggests that the number
beforehand was inadequate. Moreover, a handful of CTC
managers termed AIG‘s workload excessive, implying the
need for more analysts. Several CTC officers told the Team
that they could not do more strategic analysis prior to 9/11
because AIG had too few analytic resources and an excessive
‘workload. For example, about one-fourth of the 23 CTC
analysts and managers of analysts who responded to our
question on the absence of strategic analysis on terrorist use
of aircraft said that CTC lacked the analytic resources to do
such an analysis, given the demands of meeting the daily
current load. :

45} On the other hand, information, mainly from
before 9/11, suggests that knowledgeable officers perceived
analytic resources to be generally adequate. For example,
the CIA Executive Director told the Senate Appropriations

'°4} In earlier years, AIG also had several editors and research support officers who occupied
analytic positions, By 10 September 2001, these numbered only two. These officers have not
been included in these counts.

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(b)(7)(d)

suggesting that CIA was not reluctant to welcome
rotatees from DIA.

(U) Qualifications of Analysts

(U) The OIG 9/11 Review Team also collected
conflicting information regarding the qualifications of
analysts devoted to counterterrorism. Consequently, the
Team neither concurs with nor disputes the Joint Inquiry’s
assertion that analysts in AIG were less qualified than those
elsewhere in the DI.

+ Interviews and other information from former
AIG managers suggest that many analysts who worked in
AIG prior to 9/11 were relatively unqualified. An
examination of AIG officer biographies shows that several
had little prior experience working as analysts. In an
interview conducted during the CTC inspection of 2000-
2001, |group needed
more experienced people. Former AIG managers, in
commenting on the draft report, noted that, in the year prior
to 9/11, the Group had only some 10 analysts who had the
experience and time-on-account to do strategic analysis.

+~©& Indeed, time-on-account data suggest that the
CTC analysts were at a disadvantage when compared with
other analysts. For example, as of 9/11, officers in AIG
analytic positions had averaged 25 months working in CTC;
in contrast, analysts on Tssue—a comparably sized
unit—had worked on their issue for about twice as long,
according to Agency biographic data. In large part, the
relatively short time on counterterrorism accounts resulted
from:

¢ ' The legacy of previously maintaining AIG positions as
rotational ones. Until AIG established its own career
service in 1997, most officers in the group generally
rotated back to the DI after a two- to three-year stint.
’ This greatly curbed development of expertise. As of
9/11, however, this was changing, as 11 AIG officers—no

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(U) Lack of DI Guidance

5} Senior DI management made no effort to push
production of strategic analysis on al-Qa’ida. In interviews
for this review, several CTC and DI senior managers
confirmed that no effort existed at the DI level to pull
together a broader program of analysis on al-Qa’ida.
Meanwhile, the DI had for several years produced longer
term, in-depth analytic papers on a variety of issues as part

by3 of its premier| | None of the (b)(3)
(by) | _ |papers done in the years prior to 9/11, however, was on
terrorism. The lack of such| __ papers is surprising given (b)(3)

that, among the relatively few papers produced during the
two-year period prior to 9/11, were two—"The Global
Heroin Threat” and “The International Crime Threat
Assessment”—that dealt with transnational issues covered
in another center, the Crime and Narcotics Center.

+S} Aside from some of OTI’s work on al-Qa’ida |
finances and a few other efforts, DI components undertook
little strategic analysis on al-Qa’ida:

¢ Inlate 1998, NESA produced two important papers on
al-Qa’idd (b)(1)
(b)(3)

| While
NESA analysts produced papers on other terrorism

issues, these were focused on state sponsorship of (b)(7)(d)
terrorism. old the Team that,

because al-Qa’ida was not associated with a country, it

was outside that office’s scope. That said, as previously

mentioned, NESA still claimed that it had the equivalent

of four full-time analysts working on al-Qa’‘ida as of

August 2001.

+ OTs thas (b)(3)
collaborated successfully with numerous regional office
components on conferences and reports on various
country-specific, regional, and global issues. (b)(1)

(b)(3)

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information that would have shed light on the nature of the
danger he posed was individual, collective, and systemic.

4S+/N#} Despite its focus on Usama Bin Ladin and

his lieutenants, UBL Station generally overlooked the

significance of KSM from mid-1999 through the attacks of

11 September 2001. Failure to focus on KSM’s operational

significance and his increasing ties to the al-Qa’ida

organization in the late 1990s hindered the Station’s ability

to understand the implications of the reporting in 2000 and

2001 that noted KSM’s role in al-Qa’ida. While the Station

responded] (b)(1)
(b)(3)

it did not follow up in any other way. Nor
did it pick up on the reports of KSM’s links to UBL, his

alleged travel to the United States, and his identification as
Mukhtar in the summer of 2001. Regardless of who had i
responsibility for KSM operationally, the Team believes UBL !
Station had a responsibility to review consistently the :
structure and capabilities of al-Qa’ida.

+~SHANF} A number of officers had access to these
cables and were involved in the cable traffic back and forth.
Some of these officers were relatively junior, however, and
not in a position to understand the significance of the cables
on their own. The Team believes that ultimate responsibility
for tracking individuals who might be associated with UBL
rested with UBL Station and that responsibility for
overseeing the work of the Station belonged to Station
management.

4S+7NF) Up until mid-1999, UBL Station had been
doing a good job of keeping track of KSM and noting the
threat that he posed in numerous cables—in spite of the fact
that Renditions Branch had the lead role with respect to
tracking him. After mid-1999, UBL Station did not follow
through in the same way and even began to discourage field
stations from alerting it to KSM’s activities, advising them to
deal with RB instead.| ]

(b)(7)(c)

for failure to provide oversight and guidance to the

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+S+ANF} Several senior DO managers and CTC
officers acknowledged that these guidelines affected how

case officers approached operations. (b)(7)(d)
‘said it had the effect of steering case officers

to targets no less important, but unlikely to involve “dirty
asset” issues. |

lacknowledged that the

guidelines served as another bureaucratic hoop that made
recruitments more difficult, and another officer who served
\said that it was a general
complaint in the Station that they felt handcuffed by these
tules.

(b)(7)(d)

(U) Insufficient Use of Nonofficial Cover Platforms

(U) The JI report did not address the issue of NOC
utilization, but, as noted earlier, US Senators Shelby and
Dewine cited it as a significant Agency shortcoming in
addressing the terrorist threat. Senator Shelby sums up
these views: “The CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) has

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{SH NF} The May 1998 Capture Operation. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

The increased sense of danger in February 1998 brought
high-level deliberations of offensive operations, including
both an airstrike against Tarnak farm and forcible rendition
of Bin Ladin.” Any such operations put a premium on
quality assets able to support either activity directly or
indirectly. The Chief of CTC informed the NSC’s .
Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) that CIA had assets
in place that might, over time, be able to pinpoint

Bin Ladin’s command and ‘control facilities. The CSG made

a recommendation, accepted by the National Security
Advisor, that CIA should move ahead and prepare an
operational plan anda draft MON authorizing a forcible
rendition of UBL. [tentatively projected (b)(1)

May as a potential window for carrying out the operation. (b)(3)
UBLand| —_ Stations both (b)(1)
believed that, despite their flaws, the tribal assets were (b)(3)

providing generally valuable and credible intelligence.
Apparently concerned that the tribal assets were losing
credibility in Washington, both Stations sought to refute the
negative.assessments and to press forward with the
rendition effort:

e In late January and early February 1998, the two Stations
exchanged cables that registered dissent from CTC’s
critical counterintelligence assessment of the tribal asset.
said it considered the assertions made
in the memorandum flawed and/or inaccurate. The COS
said he had full trust and confidence in the tribal assets... .

* Inthe late winter and spring of 1998, (b)(1)

lauded the quality of the assets’ preparations for.a ~ (b)(3)
rendition operation and their plan for a capture

(b)(1) (b)(3)

a

(b)(3)

Moreover, on 23 February 1998, Bin Ladin issued a fatwa in which he and other fundamentalist
leaders publicly called for Muslims to unite to kill Americans and their allies.

June 2005

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¢ The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) Strategic Plan of 1996
identified language skills that would be required by 2000,
including a critical need for Farsi and other languages.

In 1997, however, the DI rescinded its formal language
policy: In 1999, the DI Council on Intelligence
Occupations concluded that knowledge of a foreign
language was an important part of expertise
development for certain analytic sub-occupations, such
as country/regional political analysts, rather than a core
capability for all analysts. Similarly, the DI did not make
language capability an explicit requirement for
membership in the Senior Analytical Service when it
inaugurated that program in January 2000. Although the
DI continued to participate in the LIP, a comparison of
LIP awards to DI and DO officers shows far less paid,
proportionately, to DI officers; this presumably reflects
both the fact that fewer employees were positioned to/
take advantage of this program and the lack of consensus
on its value.

EAN The information we have collected on
resources, specifically the issue of whether or not resources
dedicated to language training and translation declined 5
during the 1990s, is contradictory. There was an overall
decline in Agency resources during this period, as well as a
decline in resources dedicated to training. We believe, but
cannot demonstrate, that funding for language training also
declined. Nor can we demonstrate the impact of such a
decline on language programs and the Agency’s language
capability.

{SHANE} By Fiscal Year (FY) 1992, all Office of
Training and Education (OTE) funds were in a precipitous
decline. In September 1998, as part of the effort to
determine whether or not training should become part of the
Agency’s Working Capital Fund (WCF), OTE’s Language
Training Division (LTD) reviewed the CIA’s language
program, scrutinizing the quality of language instruction
and seeking to eliminate unnecessary overhead. LTD sought

“ (U) OTE was the Agency’s training body prior to the creation of CIA University in February
2002.

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United States—hereafter called the Kean Commission—at its
24 March 2004 hearings that President Clinton had given
“the CIA broad, lethal and unprecedented authorities
regarding bin Laden [sic] and his lieutenants. The
president's willingness to destroy Osama bin Laden [sic] and
his lieutenants was made unmistakably clear in August 1998,
the one time we had actionable intelligence as to bin Laden's
whereabouts. The president ordered a cruise missile attack
against him.”"*

The sentiments CIA officers (b)(1)
expressed to the 9/11 Review Team and to the Kean (b)(3)
Commission were quite different. The Kean Commissions
24 March 2004 statement on intelligence policy captured
general CIA sentiments as expressed to the OIG.9/11
Review Team: “But if the policymakers believed their intent
was clear, every CIA official interviewed on this topic by the
Commission, from the DCI to the official who actually
briefed the agents in the field, told us they heard a different
message. What the United States would let the military do is
quite different, the DCI said, from the rules that govern
covert action by the CIA. CIA senior managers, operators,
and lawyers uniformly said that they read the relevant
authorities signed by President Clinton as instructing them
to try to capture Bin Ladin, except in the defined
contingency. They believed that the only acceptable context
for killing Bin Ladin was a credible capture operation. “

Documentary evidence from 2000 (b)(1)
. and 2001 also indicates that the CIA continued to believe it (b)(3)

was operating under considerable restraint.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

7 A ‘senior DO officer noted the following about the last two sentences in this (b)(1)
paragraph: "[A] Cruise missile strike is an overt U.S. military action and providels] little insight (b)(3)
and no authority as to the limits of CIA covert action." The Team agrees; a clear distinction must

be made between covert action and military strikes.

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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 6: INADEQUATE FOREIGN
LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES

(U) Systemic Finding 6 of the Joint Inquiry (JI) report
states that, “Prior to September 11, the Intelligence
Community was not prepared to handle the challenge it
faced in translating the volumes of foreign language
counterterrorism intelligence it collected. Agencies within
the Intelligence Community experienced backlogs in
material awaiting translation, a shortage of language
specialists and language-qualified field officers, and a
readiness level of only 30 percent in the most critical
terrorism-related languages.”

+4€+/MF} In further discussion, the JI report notes
that the shortage of language specialists qualified to process
large amounts of foreign language data in general, and
Arabic in particular, was one of the most serious issues
limiting the ability of the Intelligence Community (IC) to
assess and report on terrorist activities in a timely fashion. It

notes that analyzing, processing, translating, and reporting
(b)(1) al-Qa‘idarelated’ commnications require
(b)(3) high levels of language and target knowledge expertise. The

large number of communicants whose native origins cover
all of the major Arabic dialects, combined with their use of
idiom, slang, cover terms, insider references, along with
misspellings and typographical errors, make this analysis
linguistically and analytically difficult.

+E ANF} To support its finding, the JI cites testimony
by the Director of the CIA University Lariguage Institute
that, before 11 September 2001 (9/11), the Agency had an
adequate number of Arabic speakers in the field but could
not surge to fight a worldwide war on terrorism and

‘= (U) The Team did not address the issue of readiness level, as the report's narrative on this
issue applies only to the National Security Agency. In addition, the Team did not address the
post 9/11 language inadequacies that the report covers, considering these to be beyond the
Team’s mandate.

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° The next day, ———Ssespondded by
noting with interest the travel of the two al-Qa’ida
associates to the United States.

+5) Computer system audits of CTC’s Hercules
database and the DO’s MDSX and databases show (b)(3)
that numerous officers, many in positions to take action,
accessed one or more of the six cables that contained this
visa or travel information.” According to the audit, some 50
to 60 officers accessed each cable within a week of its
dissemination. Typically, more than half of those who
opened these cables were CTC officers, including
individuals in UBL Station, the Islamic Extremist Branch
(IEB), and the Assessments and Information Group (AIG).
Among those key officers who opened all or most of these
cables were many in UBL Station,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Many Headquarters officers in
East Asia and Near East Divisions also accessed these cables,
according to computer system audits.

+5} None of the officers who read or wrote these
cables, however, nominated the two suspected al-Qa’‘ida
operatives for the State Department's watchlist at the time.
No one in the field or at Headquarters followed any of the
prescribed guidance for nominating individuals for
watchlisting (see below). Similarly, no one in Headquarters
followed any other recognized way to make such a
nomination, including issuance of a Central Intelligence
Report (CIR). CIRs are reports designed to officially
communicate classified Agency-acquired information,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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attacking al-Qa’ida but also an acknowledgement that the
contributions from liaison were uneven. Twenty-five of the
29 officers who addressed this issue pointed to the high
value of liaison but also noted that results ranged from

excellent to poor. |
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
. Four Station officers questioned the value of
liaison, albeit from a narrow perspective. One judged liaison
as adding no value except for productive relations with the (by(1)
(b)(3)
+~SHANFY A June 1999 CTC assessment on the
cooperation of 22 liaison services also points to varied levels
of liaison cooperation. This study:
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Table F4-1: Intelligence Cited by the Joint Inquiry as Examples of Terrorist
Use of Aircraft as Weapons

Date Case Cited by Joint Inquiry

Comment

12/1994 | Algerian extremists hijack an Air France
plane and threaten to crash it into the
Eiffel Tower.

French authorities deceived the terrorists into
landing and killed them.

1/1995 | Abdul Hakim Murad, a terrorist
associated with Ramzi Yousef, plans to
crash an airplane into CIA Among other acts, the terrorists behind this plot
Headquarters. also planed to blow up 12 planes over the Pacific
simultaneously.
1/1996 | Terrorists associated with the Blind This misinterprets the facts; the cable relating this

Shaykh plan to fly a plane from
Afghanistan and launch a suicide attack
on the White House.

threat does not clarify the nature of the planned
suicide vehicle.

10/1996 | Iran plans to hijack a Japanese plane and
crash it into Tel Aviv.

An example of country, rather than terrorist,
consideration of aircraft as weapons.

1997 A terrorist group plans to use
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to attack US
targets, such as embassies.

Not an example of “aircraft as weapons” akin to the
attack of 9/11.

8/1998 | A group of unidentified Arabs plan to The cable noted that the informati:
fly an explosive-laden plane from a as
foreign country [Libya] into the World uncorroborated. The Joint Inquiry acknowledges
Trade Center. that the Federal Aviation Administration found this
plot to be highly unlikely, given the state of Libya’s
civil aviation program, which had deteriorated
under years of UN sanctions.
9/1998 CIA provided this information to senior policy-

al-Qa’ida plans to fly an explosives-
laden plane into a US airport.

makers

11/1998 | Turkish Islamic extremists plan to crash
a plane into Ataturk’s tomb

CTC was unable to confirm a linkage between the
Turkish group and al-Qa'ida.

2/1999

information that Iraq is

developing a squad of suicide pilots to
crash into US and British forces.

The Joint Inquiry notes that CIA found this to be
unlikely for several reasons—including Iraqi
problems recruiting such pilots—and implies this
may be more disinformation that Baghdad is
feeding the West via the opposition. Regardless, it
is an example of country, rather than terrorist,
consideration of aircraft as weapons.

3/1999 | Anal-Qa’ida member plans a hang Not an example of “aircraft as weapons” akin to the
glider attack on Egypt's Presidential attack of 9/11. Palestinian groups attempted or
palace. made several such attacks on Israel in the late 1980s.

4/2000 | Al-Qa’ida terrorists plan to hijack a A traditional hijacking; not an example of “aircraft
plane to Afghanistan, blowing it up if as weapons.”
they failed.

8/2001 | Al-Qa’ida plans to crash a plane into the had
US Embassy in Nairobi. [overheard this information 10 months earlier.

This table is classified SECRETHNOFORN-

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CTC had difficulty filling the branch chief position, however,
and the new chief did not come aboard until 10 September
2001. .

+5 Despite starting up the branch, it appears that
CTC had not directed this group of analysts to focus
specifically on Usama Bin Ladin or al-Qa'ida, as the various
studies had suggested. Indeed, most of the projects that
had underway as of late July 2001 were general, (b)(3)
somewhat academic, studies that cut across all terrorist
groups. According to the Analysis Enhancement Plan, these
projects included:

¢ Choreography of a Terrorist Attack.

. Terrorist Counterintelligence Capabilities.
¢ Decapitating Terrorist Organizations.

¢ Terrorist Reliance on Criminal Activity.

¢ The Next Generation of Terrorist Devices and
Techniques.

¢ Anti-Globalists Headed for Terrorism.
* Who's Who in the International Mujahidin Network.
¢ Bridging the Sunni-Shia Divide.

It is interesting to speculate whether the paper on the

mujahedin would have spelled out the relationship between

KSM and al-Qa’ida or whether the one on terrorist

techniques might have pointed to the use of aircraft as

weapons, but had no time-to. produce any of these (b)(3)
prior to 9/11.

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senior Agency officials—including the DCI himself—said .
hampered efforts against UBL and al-Qa’ida.”

(U) Statute provides the DCI with the authority to
transfer resources from other agencies to perform specified
functions: :

¢ Section 104(d) of the National Security Act of 1947
authorizes the DCI as Head of the IC to move funds and
personnel within the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP). Section 104(d) has conditions, however,
that govern its application. It provides that any
movement of funds within the NFIP be based on higher
priority needs and unforeseen requirements. In addition,
the head of the affected department must agree to the
transfer. Finally, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) must approve the
transfer, and the agency must notify Congress.

¢ Section 5 of the CIA Act authorizes the DCI to transfer
funds into and out of the Agency to perform CIA
functions. The DCI uses Section 5 authority primarily to
direct appropriations from the Department of Defense to
the Agency or to execute other transfers of funds to the
Agency as directed by the Administration. As with
Section 104(d), Section 5 requires OMB approval;
although Section 5 does not require Congressional

“4€}-In testimony following 9/11, the then-DCI described to the JI his inability, before
September 11, to generate [the] necessary support within the Executive Branch: He stated that,
“{I would ask every] year in [the] budget submission... I’m not talking about the Committee.
I'm talking about the front end at OMB and the hurdle you have to get through to fully fund
what we thought we needed to do the job. Senator Kyl once asked me ‘How much money are
you short?’ ‘I'm short $900 million to $1 billion every year for the next five years’ is what I
answered.” The Team has been unable to locate supporting documentation for the budget
figures included in the DCI's testimony. The Team asked several officials—both current and

former |Ond |stated that he recalled the DCI's (b)(7)(d)
testimony, but knew of no specific spreadsheet or budget option that the DCI would have had in
mind when he said:he could use an additional $900 million to a billion per year. fo] (b)(7)(d)

presumed that the DCI was probably thinking of the attempts made in the fall of 1998, 1999, 2000,
and spring 2001, when he requested that the Administration increase the NFIP topline

(by(1)
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» HHESAST//ORECON NOPORNAAAR- With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

spotty track record, the rendition plan should have been ©
tried because it was the best chance available, and it afforded
little risk to Americans.”

+5+/___'NF} It is doubtful, however, that the

operation had the necessary support among senior
policymakers to get approval even if the CIA leadership
below the DCI had recommended it. Both a
contemporaneous report—based on secondhand
information—and subsequent recollections indicate that the
White House viewed the operation as badly flawed. In late
May 1998, advised that the Chargé had told
him that he had heard that the operation had been cancelled.
The Chargé said that, according to the information reaching
him, the NSC’s National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism ;
Richard Clarke had said he did not like the plan, considering
it “half-assed.” In his book, Ghost Wars, Washington Post
managing editor Steve Coll reports that one of the senior
Clinton Administration officials he interviewed called it a
“stupid plan” and told him that Clarke had shown disdain
for it at the time.”

+484 SNE} On 29 May, UBL Station informed

the field that CIA had received an order to stand down for
the time being. The reasons cited in the cable were:

ES HIME)
[ Jasserted in|
interview with the Kean Commission that the operation was cancelled because the National
Security Advisor and the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia thought the Saudis would deliver
Bin Ladin by pressuring or bribing the Taliban to surrender him. There is one piece of evidence
that suggests that the DCI had hopes the Saudi intervention with the Taliban might pay off, but it
is dated 10 days after the decision was made. According to documentation provided by the
Director's Review Group, the DCI sent an e-mail to the National Security Advisor recommending
that, “no action be taken on the other options currently under consideration on how to-deal with
the Bin Ladin threat. If the Saudi effort is successful—and I believe that the Crown Prince will
spare no effort in the process—we may be able to gain control of Bin Ladin without any loss of
life.” The desire in June to play out the Saudi initiative, 10 days after the decision to stand down

- on that operation had been made, does not mean this desire caused the tribal asset capture
operation to be cancelled.
** (U) Clarke, in his book, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free
Press, 2004), p. 149, said that the DCI and he made the decision not to proceed with the operation
in order “to avoid getting all of our Afghan assets killed for nothing.”

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informal means of communication to inform the FBI, it
makes no recommendation related to accountability.

+S} That said, no one in UBL Station informed the
Bureau about al-Hazmi’s departure from Bangkok on a
flight bound for the United States after learning about this
| jin March 2000, (b)(1)}
nor did any UBL Station officer take any other prompt, (b)(3)
relevant operational action. Although no one in the Station
now recalls reading these cables, audit records indicate that
several officers had them open for enough time to absorb the
critical information they contained. While the Team notes
that the targeting officer was the main point of contact
handling the operation, her inexperience placed her ina
poor position to understand all the operational opportunities
available. |

(b)(7)(c)

to ensure prompt action
relevant to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar during several later
opportunities between then and August 2001. Regardless of
other Station priorities or the importance of the two future
hijackers in the al-Qa’ida organization, these were identified
al-Qa’ida associates with known planned or actual travel to
the United States. In terms of particular considerations for

(b)(7)(c)

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+ One aspect of tradecraft that the reviewers found
wanting in these IRs, however, was consideration of
implications. In addition to scoring this tradecraft element
relatively low, on average, the reviewers noted that:

e “One of the most striking characteristics of this material
is the absence in many papers of any discussion of
implications. In those papers where the implications of a
development were put forward, there was—with some
notable exceptions—a constrained, tentative quality to
the analysis.”

e “A large number of the papers...did not score well in the

implications category.... |
maintained, ‘all good papers had a beginning,

middle, and end.’ Too many papers in this package
failed to pass that test because they did not have an
‘end.’” This is contrary to the [ Ireview, which had
noted a substantial improvement in CTC/AIG’s
incorporation of implications into its products in the year
following the African embassy bombings, as compared
with the year before. The difference between the two
studies possibly results from the different time periods
considered.

~S4___ NF) Current Intelligence. AIG also

submitted several strategic analysis pieces on al-Qa'ida to
the current intelligence publications—the President's Daily
Brief (PDB) and the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief
(SEIB). |

June 2005

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Review Group (DRG), which provided the initial CIA
response to the JI report.

¢ Had complete access to documentation gathered by the JI
and the DRG, as well as to reports of interviews
conducted by both groups and to Office of Congressional
Affairs write-ups of these interviews. Toward the end of
the review, the Team also examined Kean Commission
interviews, hearings, and findings.

¢ Conducted interviews of over 200 officers including
current and former senior CIA managers currently or
formerly serving as Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence (DDCI), Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence, Executive Director, Deputy Executive
Director, Deputy Director for Operations (DDO), Deputy
Director for Intelligence (DDI), Deputy Director for
Science and Technology (DDS&T), and Chief Financial
Officer (CFO); CIA staff employees; detailees to the i
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) from the Federal Bureau |
of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency
(NSA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and
other agencies; and a number of contractors.

* Collected and reviewed information from database
holdings, cable traffic from CTC’s Hercules database, and
Lotus Notes e-mail correspondence.

¢ Made extensive use of complete access to pre-9/11 CTC
hard-copy-and soft-copy files.

¢ Reviewed numerous books, journals, and other open-
source documents.

e Drew on the OIG’s inspection of CTC, conducted in 2000-
2001, and the accompanying employee survey.

In addition to these sources, which proved beneficial for all
aspects of the review, the Team tapped various other sources
in its assessment of specific findings.

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(b)(1)
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(U) Technology Development and Implementation

+S} The 9/11 Review Team believes the JI report
understates the difficulty of conducting clandestine technical
operations against al-Qa'ida. First, the main theater,
Afghanistan, had no US diplomatic or CIA Station presence °
and had a communications infrastructure that had been
demolished by decades of civil war. Second, the target itself
was elusive: CIA was essentially collecting against small
cells of people who were constantly changing the technology
by which they communicated.

‘ +S} Despite these obstacles, the 9/11 Team believes
that the CIA mounted a reasonably robust technical effort
against UBL and al-Qa’ida. The Agency did not implement
all of the possible solutions it explored and was not always
successful in the operations it undertook; nonetheless, by :
employing a variety of approaches, CIA was able to achieve
notable successes. |

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(U) Scope

(U) While the JI developed a total of 35 findings—15
of which it termed factual, 16 systemic, and four related—
the Team focused only on the 23 findings that pertained
directly to CIA. In those 23, the Team considered the
performance of officers of other government entities when
appropriate but only assessed the performance of CIA
officers. While several of the systemic findings address
aspects of the broader issue of counterterrorism, the Team
has generally responded to these findings by focusing on
their relevance to the more specific issues of al-Qa’ida,
Usama Bin Ladin (UBL), and the events leading up to 9/11.

(U) For each relevant finding, the Team tried to
determine whether or not the JI’s conclusions and charges
were accurate. .Where they were, the Team has tried to
explain the reasons for them and to determine responsibility;
where appropriate, the Team recommends that an
Accountability Board review the performance of specific
individuals. Where the Team found that the JI charges were
not wholly accurate or complete, it has attempted to set the
record straight.

(U) In general, the Team found that Agency officers
from the top down worked hard against the
al-Qa'ida target. Those whom the Team believes were
deserving of recognition have already received monetary
awards and other forms of formal acknowledgment. The
Team is not recommending that any additional individuals
be recognized.

(U) The Review Team found no instance in which an
employee violated the law. The Team found, however, that
Agency officers did not always perform their Agency duties
ina satisfactory manner—that is, they did not, in a particular
instance, act “in accordance with a reasonable level of
professionalism, skill, and diligence,” as required by Agency
regulations.

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HESS ORECON, NOFORN TAR

15-Feb-00

[ALEC 136056

16-Feb-00

24-Feb-00

5-Mar-00

Reports that al-Hazmi flew to Los Angeles on 15 January;

notes| travels,|

6-Mar-00

|some of the UBL
[associates had entered the United States.

This Table is classified SEEREF

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(b)(1)
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(U) Value of Walk-ins

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

+S+ANF} A memorandum from an AIG manager in

May 2000 shows that CTC was fully aware it had significant
collection gaps. This memorandum stated that, among other
key issues, the Intelligence Community lacked information
on:

‘ walk-ins was a (b)(3)
former| officer in UBL’s organization, _|
and walked in
to the US Embassy} This walk-
in which defined UBL

June 2005

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e Actasa force multiplier, that is, as additional personnel
who in some cases have the right languages, cultural
backgrounds, skills, and experience

(b)(1)
(b)(3) ¢ Have legal jurisdiction in their own countries

e Have access in remote or hostile parts of the world) |

+S+ANF} The JI report also points out several
weaknesses of liaison that can hinder cooperation and even
aid terrorists. Citing. testimony, the JI report notes that:

¢ Some services are reluctant to share information

implicates their citizens in terrorism, |

because of legal
restrictions and indifference to the al-Qa’ida threat.

+ Severalserviced are

excessively bureaucratic.

“AS+ASFF The JI report points out other factors that
hinder liaison cooperation, including unauthorized leaks of
information revealing liaison cooperation to the press, the
United States’ ability to overwhelm a small liaison service
with too many demands, US laws—particularly the death

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With his reviewing comments on the (b)(3)
draft report, the former DC] submitted documentation
stating that a meaningful strategy could not be developed to
deal with any threats—either existing ones or newly
emerging ones—unless CIA and the Community as a whole
were rebuilt and given a new direction. He offered, as
evidence of his involvement in this strategic rebuilding
activity, a number of strategic plans that were developed
between 1999 and 2001, including, among others, the March
1999 DCI Strategic Intent for the US Intelligence Community
and the September 2001 Findings of the 2001 Quadrennial
Intelligence Community Review.: The 9/11 Team does not
disagree that rebuilding of the CIAand the Community was
a necessary undertaking, or that the plans cited by the
former DCI were legitimate steps toward accomplishing that
task. The Team points out, however, that none of these
plans was intended to be or constituted a strategy for a war
against terrorism in general or against al-Qa’ida in
particular:

¢ The DCI Strategic Intent for the US Intelligence
Community, for example, outlined five broad objectives
whose aim was to unify the Community through
collaborative processes; invest in people and knowledge;
develop new sources and methods for collection and
analysis; adapt security to the new threat environment;

r and improve corporate management of resources. While
it mentioned, as background, that terrorism was a
growing threat and that the Community should “give
serious attention” to it, its principal focus was the
“business of intelligence,” infrastructure, and work force
issues. |

(b)(1)
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(U) Ownership of information is a cultural problem,
according to the JI. The DCI reinforced this in his JI
testimony, confirming that filtering would continue—that
even the all-source analysts at Homeland Security would not
have access to all raw intelligence on a routine basis. This
ownership issue means that the originating agency is free to’
edit and otherwise truncate the information it collects before
it disseminates it to other agencies. All-source analysts
argue that, in the world of counterterrorism, the originating
agency may not recognize information in these data as
having significance to analysts elsewhere.

(U) The Joint Inquiry also includes a discussion of
Department of Justice procedures governing the FBI's -
sharing of FISA-derived intelligence information—called the
Wall. It concludes that IC agencies have been overly “risk
averse” in dealing with FISA-related matters, restricting
matters far beyond what was required.

(U) Assessment of the Finding

(U) The Office of Inspector General (OIG) 9/11
Review Team agrees with the Joint Inquiry on this finding
but differs with some of the facts and interpretations laid out
in its discussion.

(U) The Team agrees with the JI that IC agencies,
including the CIA, did not adequately share relevant
information before 9/11. This issue is critical because CTC
does not collect terrorist-related information from all
sources, nor is it the US Government's only focal point for
counterterrorism analysis.

+€4+ANF Critical information related to the 9/11
attacks that was not adequately shared included:

e = =Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, who had been linked
|the 1998
bombing of the US embassies in Africa, met in Malaysia
with several other individuals in January 2000 and
subsequently entered the United States. CIA had this

June 2005

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
; ; (b)(1)
- 4} The August 1998 MON (b)(3)
5+ *NEr The MON that President (b)(1)
_ Clinton signed was dated 20 August 1998, shortly after the (b)(3)

al-Qa’ida bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi and

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address counterterrorism'in general and the

al-Qa’ida target in particular as collaboratively or
comprehensively as was warranted by the nature of the
threat described by the DCI. The DCI clearly considered
counterterrorism a top priority. He was more deeply
engaged in pursuing the operational and warning aspects of
the war on terrorism, however, than in utilizing every
mechanism available to him, as DCI, to direct needed
resources from lesser priority programs to the
counterterrorism effort.

+E+ANF)} The DCI’s Engagement. During the years
prior to 9/11, the DCI was personally engaged in following
CIA’s prosecution of the war against UBL. The 9/11 Team
does not dispute that his efforts resulted in actions that
likely saved lives. Beginning as early as summer 1999, he
was receiving regular updates once or twice a day on efforts
to track and disrupt UBL. the (b)(7)(d)
only rival for CIA executive-level attention was Kosovo, but
daily meetings did not occur for that issue. Clearly, the
DC's actions demonstrate his. tireless, personal effort to
warn and inform.

The DCI was deeply and (b)(1)
personally active in sounding the alarm about the threat (b)(3)
posed by UBL on numerous occasions to many different
audiences at the policy level:”

e During the Millennium threat in late 1999, the DCI
warned the President to expect “between 5 to 15 terrorist
attacks against American interests both here and
overseas.” :

. Beginning in 1999, in his annual testimony to the
Congressional committees on the worldwide threat, the

7 (U) The 9/11 Team intends the following to be an illustrative, not an exhaustive, list of
activities undertaken by the DCI.

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have required forceful intervention on the part of the
DCL”

+SAANF} Finally, the DCI did not ensure that CTC
was fulfilling its role as strategic coordinator of the
Community’s counterterrorism efforts as effectively as it
should. The DCI had the authority to vest CTC with this
role,’ and. CTC’s stated mission included—in addition to
implementing a comprehensive operations program and
exploiting all-source intelligence to produce in-depth
analysis—coordination of the IC’s counterterrorism
activities. Center managers did not emphasize the latter
function, however. In reviewing the Center's briefing notes
and memoranda as well as interview data, the Team found
that CTC’s focus was heavily operational.”

4 In his response to Congressional questions for the
record following his 17 October 2002 testimony, the DCI
explained that, when CTC was established in 1986, the
intention was to give it a Community reach. This was to be
accomplished by incorporating representatives from as
many of the relevant agencies as possible into the Center's
structure to provide connectivity, encourage sharing and
communication, and assist in breaking down cultural
barriers to cooperation and collaboration. The DCI stated in
his testimony, however, that positions identified and

"4S Ape} See the Team’s treatment of Systemic Findings 4, 7, and 9. In his reviewing comments

on the draft report, the former DCI stated that, while the report implies he should have

“commanded a result,” that was not the way he worked with [the Director of NSA] on any issue

and that, in the case of ihe was not empowered to do so. He further stated that the (b)(1 )
President ultimately clarified the matter, as was required. The 9/11 Team does not argue that the (b)(3)
DCI should have “commanded a result.” Rather, it argues that the DCI had a responsibility to

take serious interagency differences to the level necessary for their resolution. The President did

not clarify the matter until after 9/11.

*(U) Per the National Security Act of 1947, Section 303; 50 USC 405; and Executive Order 12333,

§1.5(j), “[The DCI shall] establish appropriate staffs, committees, or other advisory groups to

assist in the execution of the Director's responsibilities.”

* (U) For a full discussion of CTC’s operational focus see Systemic Findings 11 and 15. For a

discussion of CTC’s analytic efforts, see the Team’s treatment of Systemic Finding 5.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3).

(SAANFY As of early 2001, however, CIA recognized
that the ability of its sources, both unilateral and liaison, to
report on terrorist plans and intentions as well as to
effectively disrupt terrorist activities left important gaps.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U) The Liaison/Unilateral Balance

+S+ANE} The Team’s discussion of Systemic Finding
11 describes the evolution of CTC’s operational focus froma
primary emphasis on liaison operations to a reemphasis on _
unilateral operations. |

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(U) FACTUAL FINDING 1: BRINGING TOGETHER
THE AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE

(U) Factual Finding 1 of the Joint Inquiry (JI) states
that, “While the Intelligence Community (IC) had amassed
a great deal of valuable intelligence regarding
Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities, none of it
identified the time, place, and specific nature of the attacks
that were planned for September 11, 2001. Nonetheless, the
Community did have information that was clearly relevant
to the September 11 attacks, particularly when considered
for its collective significance.”

(U) The Finding goes on to note that, while it found
no “smoking gun,” various threads and pieces of
information available to the IC prior to 11 September 2001
(9/11) were significant and relevant, at least in retrospect.

(U) Assessment of the Finding

-+€} The Office of Inspector General’s 9/11 Review
Team (the Team) concurs with the finding. The Team has
had access to finished intelligence that was unavailable to
the Joint Inquiry and has reviewed reporting that the JI did
not examine, but it, too, has uncovered no information that
provided any of the specifics necessary to warn of the
particular events of 9/11. At the same time, the Team agrees

a that the IC had relevant information prior to 9/11 on such
subjects as al-Qa’ida’s intent to conduct an attack soon, its
desire to attack in the United States, and terrorists’ use of
aircraft as weapons. While the CIA developed some of the
relevant lines of analysis as fully as a reasonable observer
would expect, it did not do so with all such lines, nor did
anyone in CIA pull these various threads together prior to
9/11.

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requested that IC agencies provide personnel to staff the
CCB. .

4€} The DCI could have been successful in making
additional transfers of funds and personnel in support of the
counterterrorism effort, had he attempted them. Indeed, the
Section 104(d) transfers that took place during 1996-2001
show that agency heads have, on occasion, agreed to such
transfers. Moreover, transfers under Section 5 have no
similar restrictions to those imposed on Section 104(d).

-S+/SF} In his comments on the OIG draft, the
former DCI stated that transferring funds from other
Community agencies to support counterterrorism efforts
presumes incorrectly that funding in other agencies was
sufficient for them not only to conduct their mission, but
more importantly to meet the transformational objectives
incorporated in the five-year budget submissions. He
indicated his belief that he had to balance the CIA’s and the
Community’s needs to fund strategic programs and any
“major reductions to NFIP agencies’ budgets in the year of
execution would have only worsened their financial plight.”
Furthermore, the former DCI stated that he did not “believe
we could or should move large amounts from NSA, NIMA
or even NRO to CIA’s counterterrorism program without
understanding the overall impact of such funding shifts on
the missions of those agencies. For it is fundamental that the
programs of those agencies are also a vital part of the
counterterrorism effort. CTC’s program needed more, not
less imagery; it needed more, not less signals intelligence.”
He opined that “any short-term gain in CTC’s program
would have been more than offset by the impact of further
cuts in our collection and processing systems.”

+S+/7NF} Given the limitations that the former DCI
included in his comments to the OIG draft, ice.; the
Administration would not provide top line adds to the NFIP
budget and transferring funds from one IC agency to
another was neither timely nor effective, the Team believes
the former DCI had an obligation to use the money available
to him. However, both CTC and the counterterrorism issue
as a whole actually lost funds in CIA internal funding

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The resulting report, among other things, concluded that
relatively few-IC products took a longer term, more
strategic look at threat situations.

* Inresponse to the Cole review report, the DCI issued a
memorandum.to the Executive Director, DDI, and the
Deputy Director for Operations in early February 2001,
requesting that CTC inform him of the actions it planned
to take to address the matter of a strategic analysis unit
and other matters. On the memorandum, the DCI added,

’ in writing, “This is what I want to focus on—How to
build the analytical cadre in CTC so that there is a
separate strategic assessments group—whose job is to
think out of the box—to provide context.”

¢ In April 2001, the Chief of AIG made.a presentation to
the DCI and DDCI on “Creating a Strategic Assessment
Capability in CTC.” This presentation noted that,
without infusion of senior analysts, it would take AIG
three to seven years to achieve results on strategic
terrorism analysis. It also indicated that, prior to
receiving the new positions and people needed to start
the branch, AIG would immediately expand the mission
of its Transnational Terrorism Branch to include
production of strategic perspectives. That said, this
branch did not produce any strategic assessments on
al-Qa’ida before 9/11.

¢ In May 2001, the Executive Director sent a memorandum
to the DDI requesting that he play a central role in
building a strategic analytic capability in CTC to ensure
that the Center “gets the resources.and personnel needed
to make this happen.”

(U) CTC started up a strategic analysis unit! ) (b)(3)

| in July 2001. When CTC updated the DCI on its
Analysis Enhancement Plan in late July, it noted that seven
analysts were in place in the branch, including four senior
analysts reassigned from elsewhere in the DI and a senior

CTC analyst with long experience working on Bin Ladin.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
+€)The July 1999 MON .
On 4 July 1999, President Clinton (b)(1)
signed another MON| (b)(3)
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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 13: COVERT ACTION

(U) Systemic Finding 13 of the Joint Inquiry (JI)

report states that, “As early as August 1998, U.S.
Government policymakers wanted Usama Bin Ladin to be
killed, and believed that CIA personnel were aware of their
intent. However, prior to September 11, 2001, the
policymakers did not wish to waive the bar on
assassinations and did not provide clear and unfettered
authorization to the CIA to kill Bin Ladin or to undertake .
covert attacks against al-Qa’‘ida’s financial assets. For its
part, the CIA was reluctant to seek the authority to
assassinate Bin Ladin, and averse to taking advantage of any
ambiguity or vagueness in the authorities it did receive that
might have allowed it more flexibility. These factors shaped
the types of covert action the CIA was authorized to, and
did, undertake against Bin Ladin. Because of the restrictive
nature of the authorities that were provided to CIA—as well
as the inherent difficulties of the task—covert action appears

"to have had little impact on al-Qa'ida or Usama Bin Ladin
before September 11.”

(U) Joint Inquiry Discussion

(b)(1)

(b)(3) In support of its finding,
the JI discusses the five Memorandums of Notification
(MON) that President Clinton signed and that authorized
CIA covert action against Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) and his

sorcerer | . . (0X1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(7)(d)

(b)(1)
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junderstanding of UBL’s finances and received
|this would not stop
Bin Ladin.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(SA++NF) Nonetheless, UBL Station efforts on finances
continued (b)(1)
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Dar es Salaam, |

(b)(1)
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none was purposeful. He explained that FBI’

Headquarters knew and followed the rules, but FBI field
offices did not always tell their own Headquarters what
they were doing. |

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(d)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(d)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(d)

- (U) Implications

+SHANF} CIA’s reliance on foreign liaison services

* was essential to its ability to disrupt al-Qa’ida and to thwart
some terrorist attacks on the United States. The Agency did
a good job of exploiting the advantages of liaison operations
to pursue disruptions, renditions, and agent operations ©
against al-Qa'ida and to produce intelligence on the target.
Liaison capabilities and cooperation were uneven;
disruptions and renditions had only short-term effects; and
liaison support was not sufficient to gain access to al-Qa’ida
plans and intentions or to warn of and thwart many
al-Qa'ida terrorist attacks.

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the material in this paper served as the basis for a
briefing the DCI gave to the President after the August
1998 African embassy bombings.

this paper was an overly long, unwieldy conglomeration
of facts in need of a good deal of work prior to
publication. After managerial review, the analyst—who
by then had commenced a rotation in the DO—produced
another draft in January 1999. Because of the analyst’s
absence and because management continued to have
analytic and presentational concerns with the draft, AIG
managers decided to divide up the paper’s themes
among four different analysts and have them produce

‘separate papers. Prior to 9/11, CTC had published three

of these—one in January 1999 on Bin Ladin’s command
system (this was already underway but drew on material
from the earlier draft of the paper); one in November

. 2000 on al-Qa’ida’s modus operandi; and another in

August 2001 on Afghanistan as an incubator for
terrorism. As is evident, many months separated the
production of these papers. While the Team’s
independent reviewers assessed these three as among
CTC’s best on al-Qa'ida, they ranked the unpublished
draft as high-as those on all tradecraft issues except
clarity of writing.” Moreover, the reviewers assessed the
unpublished draft to be better than any published by
CTC in terms of providing an understanding of
al-Qa’ida’s leadership, operations, and communications.
One of our reviewers termed the paper a significant
missed opportunity, stating that, “it could have been
made ready for publication given a reasonable amount of
additional analytic effort plus sufficient management
guidance.”

(U) The reviewers examined the January 1999 draft of this paper.

June 2005

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Agency managers to plan and allocate their resources
against the counterterrorism target. Although, as stated
earlier, counterterrorism expenditures almost doubled
during FY 1996-2001, the base budget for CTC remained at
or below 10 percent of total DO spending. To achieve the

increase in funding, the DO relied on supplemental (b)(7)(d)
appropriations, pene that CTC’s
base funding (although significantly increased from the mid-

to late-1990s) was inadequate for a program that needed to (b)(7)(d)

expand. _added that CTC “lived on” supplemental

funding and that, although! _ [ried to increase CTC's base (b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(d) budget,|_|had to economize internally.

-+S)- Relying on supplemental appropriations to fund
counterterrorism efforts has been challenging for Agency
managers and may have had an impact on mission
performance.” The 2001 OIG budget inspection noted that,
while supplemental funds allowed the Agency to maintain ~
operational activity begun in prior years, they did not meet
its long-term needs. This affected Agency officials’ abilities
to plan programs—especially multiyear programs—because
the tenure of most supplemental appropriations prior to
9/11 was one-year. An additional concern with
supplemental appropriations is uncertainty about when
Congress and OMB will make the funds available to the
Agency. Planning and executing counterterrorism programs
have been especially difficult when those funds are not

(b)(1) available until late in the fiscal year. For example, Congress
(b)(3) approved fin new funds under the FY 2000
counterterrorism supplemental; however, due to the late (b)(1)

appropriation of the supplemental funds, the Agency chose, (b)(3)
and wasallowed,toholdonto| ito cover FY 2001
counterterrorism requirements.”

*(U) Inhis comments to the OIG draft of Systemic Finding 2, the former DCI agreed that relying
on supplemental appropriations made it extremely difficult to build long-term programs with
strategic integrity for the CIA’s counterterrorism efforts.

(b)(1)
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(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(U) Non-IC detailees provided the Team the same
description of CTC’s lack of guidance on watchlisting as did
IC detailees. They were not aware of CTC watchlisting

procedures or guidance but understood the watchlistin
requirements of their own agencies.

(b)(7)(d)
indicated that CTC officers who requested the
watchlisting were responsible for writing the CIR, however,
not the detailee. [Ino formal threshold existed for (b)(7)(d)
watchlisting, just a subjective one based on knowledge and
expertise.

(U) Two non-IC detailees discussed their problems in
moving information from CTC to their agencies. One
indicated that some CIA officers were reluctant to share
information with non-IC components because of the risks to
sources and methods. Another stated that electronic
information sharing was problematic because of systems
weaknesses at the home agency.

+S+ANF} CIA did not typically deal.directly with
state and local law enforcement agencies prior to 9/11.
Rather, it worked through other agencies, primarily the FBI,
to disseminate threat information to such organizations. FBI
headquarters and the field office where the suspected

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(U) Weaknesses of Strategic Analysis

+4} A comprehensive examination of CTC/AIG’s
strategic analysis record on al-Qa'ida prior to 9/11 shows
many missing elements.. Among other things, AIG:

¢ Did not produce comprehensive reports on several issues
that could have been under prime consideration for
strategic analysis coverage.

¢ Only occasionally employed alternative analysis
techniques.

¢ Seldom explored the possibilities of denial and deception
(D&D) analysis.

(U) Issues Not Covered

4S} Perhaps of greater significance than the
inconsistent quality of analysis was AIG’s absence of
comprehensive strategic analysis on numerous critical
topics.

¢ CTC’s strategic analysis on.the United States as a
potential target was largely limited to the items in the
early August 2001 PDB/SEIB and the January 2000 IR,
“Terrorist Plotting in Canada and Jordan: Lessons
Learned About Bin Ladin and the Broader Sunni
Extremist Network.” This report indicates that recently
available information confirms AIG’s “analysis since the
August 1998 bombings in East Africa that Bin Ladin-and
his allies have developed plans to hit targets on US soil;”
no other pre-9/11 report delves into these plans. (See
Factual Finding 3.)

¢ While AIG wrote a short piece for the current intelligence
publications in late June 2001 on how al-Qa’ida was

planning high-profile attacks, this relied principally on
information received the previous week (b)(1)
| |CTC analysts (b)(3)

did not produce any comprehensive piece that pulled

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and 10 September 2001." Among the 34 such papers done
by CTC/AIG, our independent reviewers singled out a
handful of strong efforts.” These include:

¢ “Bin Ladin Network Rattled But Still a Potent Force.”
One reviewer noted that, from the title through the last
paragraph, this November 1998 assessment conveys the
gravity of the threat posed by Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida.

¢ “How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist
Network.” This report from January 1999 paints a vivid
picture of a highly dangerous terrorist group with a
focused leadership structure.

e “Bin Ladin’s Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and
Adaptable.” This assessment, done in November 2000,
highlights the gravity of the threat al-Qa’ida poses to the
United States abroad. It clearly depicts Bin Ladin and
al-Qa'ida as dangerous enemies of the United States
and—unlike most other AIG papers done after mid-
1998—reminds readers of the implications of UBL’s
February. 1998 fatwa calling on all Muslims “to kill
Americans and their allies, both civilian and military,
worldwide.”

e “Sunni Extremists Sinking Roots in Afghanistan.” This
August 2001 report paints a realistic picture of the
implications of terrorist groups operating freely in
Afghanistan. One of our reviewers commented, “No
reader can come away from this report without a clear
appreciation of the value of the safe haven the terrorists
have developed in this country.”

(b)(7)(d)

‘© (U) These reviewers consisted of two former senior managers anda

senior analyst] ] (b)(7)(d)
4} The Team does not mean to indicate that these 34 reports represent all of AIG’s strategic,

longer term production. AIG produced many additional IRs on other terrorist groups—

including some with links to al-Qa’ida—and on other topics. The Team’s reviewers did not

examine these. In commenting on this draft, a former AIG manager indicated that the Group

produced 68 strategic papers on Bin Ladin between August 1998 and September 2001. This

count, however, includes papers in which al-Qa’ida is mentioned but is not the central focus. It

also includes an NIE and several papers produced by other DI offices.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Table S5-1

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

4S} Moreover, an examination of the chronological
record of AIG’s production shows periods in which few IRs
were produced on al-Qa'ida:

¢ During the months March through November 1999, for
example, AIG produced only two longer term papers on
al-Qa’ida—one on the organization's chemical program

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ANB) Elsewhere in the report, (b)(1)

the JI devotes a section to technology gaps focusing (3) (b)(1)

principally on NSA. (K(b)(3)
: (b)(3)

. :

°

(U). With regard to the issue of a central

counterterrorism database, the JI report provides no

information or clarification other than the assertion in the

finding itself.

(U) Assessment of Finding and Discussion
: (b)(3)

The 9/11 Review Team
concurs with portions of the JI report on this finding but
disagrees with others as well as with some of the facts and
interpretations presented in the discussion. The Team:

¢ Agrees that significant differences existed between CIA
and NSA over their respective atthorities and that
executive-level attention was devoted to deconflicting

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Mukhtar as KSM, it might have been better able to =
understand the specifics of the threat posed by al-Qa'ida. In [
their interviews, CTC officers clearly stated that they were

unaware of this connection until after 9/11. As indicated po
above, however, the Team found a 28 August 2001 cable to
UBL Station ————__sidentifying KSM as (b)(1)

Mukhtar. While late in the day, this report might well have (PNG
triggered an examination of KSM’s possible role in al-Qa’ida. P
4884} The Team also found that (b)(3)

Agency officers did not pursue information related to
Mukhtar and therefore failed to collect intelligence that

ultimately proved to be relevant to the 9/11 attacks. (b)(1)_.
(b)(3)~

Meanwhile, additional (Py)

intelligence linked Mukhtar with senior al-Qa’ida operative =
Abu Zubaydah. | (b)(1)
b)(3)#

(b)( iF:

=

imminent threat posed by Abu Zubaydah, while a later slide :
stated that the Bin Ladin organization might be in the throes | -
of advanced preparations for a major attack—most probably

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The DCI recognized the need for such a plan, and directed
that it be created, but did not follow up to see that this was
done, and it was not. Notable efforts were undertaken prior
to 9/11 to stimulate IC collection on terrorism, at the
initiative of the ADCI/Collection and in response to the
DC1’s injunctions, but in the absence of a formal,
coordinated effort, the IC’s operational, analytic, and
resource capabilities were not integrated and used to
maximum effectiveness. In particular, no comprehensive IC
analytic examination of the threat posed by UBL and
al-Qa’ida had been undertaken, formal actions had not been
initiated to raise the priority-of terrorism relative to other
intelligence issues, and funds and personnel earmarked for
counterterrorism were not effectively marshaled prior to
9/11. However, in light of the actions the DCI did take to
address the al-Qa'ida target, no recommendation for
Accountability Board consideration of performance is made.

+~C+ANB) The Team finds that the DDCI in 1998, per

the DCI’s Declaration of War memorandum, was responsible

for ensuring that an interagency group was created to
identify and pursue a comprehensive set of strategic options
for addressing the UBL threat. This did not happen. It is not
clear, however, whether this was due to neglect on the part
of the DDCI, or whether the action was reassigned by the
DCI. For this reason the Team does not recommend that an
Accountability Board review the DDCI’s performance in this
matter.

June 2005

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and unilateral operations, and make a station more
dependent on liaison in pursuing its mission. !

+{SHANFY Historically, the CIA has recognized the
need to motivate and reward officers to develop and
maintain language skills, but Agency-wide attempts to deal
with the language issue have yielded unimpressive results:

¢ Inthe 1970s, CIA established the Language Development
Program, which provided language instruction and
broad policies on requirements, testing, and proficiency.
Responsibility for the program lay with the Deputy
Directors, several other senior officials, and the Agericy’s

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FOPSECRER

(U) As such, the Team concludes that CTC’s
approach to non-IC detailees before 9/11 was virtually the
same as its approach to IC detailees. The Center provided
little oversight and guidance to these individuals. They had
to balance their roles as integrated officers and
representatives of their home agencies in the manner they
thought appropriate.

(U) Products and Processes

(U) CTC used CIRs extensively to relay information
about suspected terrorists or potential terrorist operations to
non-IC agencies. From 1 January 2001 through

" 11 September 2001, for example, CTC sent approximately

300 CIRS to the Department of Transportation in general, 50
to the FAA in particular, 200 to US Customs, and 150 to
INS.” Many of these reports contained unclassified
tearlines that could be passed to appropriate agencies,
including state and local law enforcement agencies, for their
use.

Key CIRs that CTC disseminated to the
FAA and other agencies during this period include:

” (U) Many of these CIRs had multiple addressees.

June 2005

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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(d)

-6+7NFYOn the other hand, a number of senior CIA
officers and CTC managers admitted their concern that the
guidelines did have a negative impact on the willingness of
field officers to pursue problem cases:

¢ A former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence felt that
senior Agency leaders were never able to convince DO -
working-level officers that these guidelines were to
protect the Station and case officers and not to hinder
their efforts.

(b)(7)(d) ¢ Another identified one terrorist case that led
to an oral reprimand of the|

| The reprimand (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) came after Congress learned that al
(b)(3) ora terrorist group. (YMA)

added that the DCI’s handling of this
incident helped send the message to the DO that the DCI

would not protect anyone.

. said that] |found that it was a common (b)(7)()
misperception in CTC before 9/11 that any potential
asset with human rights baggage was an automatic
nonstarter. | spent time explaining to CTC officers that (b)(7)(d)
this was not so. :

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analysts and managers of analysts who responded to our
question on the absence of strategic analysis on terrorist use
of aircraft said that CTC lacked the analytic resources to do
such an analysis, given the demands of meeting the daily
current intelligence load.

45/ ANF} In addition, some CTC officers may not
have considered the use of aircraft as weapons because such
activity had never actually occurred, at least at the hands of
terrorists. In contrast, terrorists have long employed other
aircraft-related attacks—mid-air bombings of aircraft since
1949, aircraft hijackings for political extortion since 1968, and
man-portable missile attacks on civilian aircraft since 1976,
according to academic sources. A former Chief of CTC told
the JI in 2002 that, “Our focus was purely on hijackings and
bombings. Until the last few years, I would be hard-pressed
to give an example of Sunni suicide bombings. [It was] not
part of their culture, [although it] has always been a part of
Shia Muslim culture...” As mentioned previously, the CIR
that went to the FAA and others in March 2000 considered
Usama Bin Ladin’s use of. aircraft as weapons to be unlikely.
Indeed, the IICT paper that addressed the same issue as the
CIR did not address aircraft as weapons at all. Finally, one
CTC manager told the Team that, when another CTC
manager first presented information about Moussaoui’s
arrest and desire to fly 747s, senior Agency officers present
laughed and seemed to wonder why they were being told
this information.

4S+/NE} Some judged that intelligence on the subject
was inadequate. A senior analytic manager in CTC noted
that they lacked good, strong intelligence on the subject. One
analyst mentioned that the pieces of intelligence cited by the
JI were 12 among thousands received during the period in
question. One senior DI manager told the Team that, “There
is no way that someone could have picked out the aircraft
piece pre-9/11...The dots stand out in retrospect more [now]
than before 9/11.”

(U) Finally, terrorism experts outside government
had undertaken little to no study of the issue. A review of
articles published in two academic journals on terrorism

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(b)(1)

Ore

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(d)

+¢S+ANE} The Team also found one potent indicator
that, within CIA, both in the field and at CTC, there was
doubt about the value of such attacks: )

In December 2000, CTC prepared an options paper for
the NSC that expressed strong doubt about the value of
military strikes against Bin Ladin or Taliban targets. One
section of the options paper, which the Team could not
confirm was ever sent to the White House but which was
prepared for coordination within the CIA, laid out

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© One detailee opened which provides
al-Mihdhar’s passport data. Audit data show that this
officer printed out the cable on the day of its
dissemination, which should have afforded him a greater
opportunity to peruse the cable.
(b)(1) ; oh ii
(b)(3) ¢ Two detailees opened| which lists

New York as al-Mihdhar’s destination.

In addition, three FBI detailees reviewed SCALEC 134684 of
5 January, which noted that CTC had passed al-Mihdhar’s
travel data to the Bureau.

6} The Station may have missed an opportunity to
re-engage the FBI on the operation later in January 2000. On
the 19"; sent a cable requesting that UBL

(b)(1) Station pass a lead to the FBI Washington Field Office about
(b)(3) a possible family tie of al-Mihdhar to an extremist in Yemen.
Po also requested that eweamtom the Legal
Attaché in the Embassy. The Team found no evidence in
(b)(1) traffic that either station carried out these actions. On
(b)(3) 20 January, however, presumably in response to a query
about the cable, the targeting officer who was the

main POC on the operation e-mailed the DCOS that, |
jumping the gun.” Although the note also stated that the
“FBI has been kept abreast of the situation,” the Team has no
information that anyone in the Station had communicated
anything about the operation with anyone in the FBI, aside
from the detailees in the Station, after 6 January 2000.”

+S} Among the detailees who followed the
operational traffic was the FBI/New York’s representative in
UBL Station. The Team found that this FBI officer—whose
(b)(1) main responsibility was to read as much traffic as possible
(b)(3) and advise New York of relevant information gleaned from

Agency cables—viewed at least 13 messages related to the
including the short but critical
He failed, however, to pick up on the

New York angle, the US visas, or the potential travel to the

".48}- The Station’s FBI DCOS was among those copied on this note.

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(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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(U) The Team agrees with the Joint Inquiry that CIA,
specifically UBL Station, did not pay adequate attention to
threat activity linked to the United States; its focus was on
radical activity overseas. This appears to have reflected a
mistaken perception on the part of many CIA officers that
the Agency did not have responsibility for tracking the
terrorist threat to the domestic United States. The fact that
FBI does have primary responsibility for activity within the
United States does not absolve CIA of its responsibility to
collect on and analyze foreign threats to the United States.

(U) The Team agrees with the JI that CIA had a
problem passing operational traffic to other agencies in a
timely and effective manner. Problems include:

¢. The volume of traffic.

The time-consuming nature of sanitizing operational data
to remove sensitive sources and methods information
and putting those data into a format that is suitable for
passing to other agencies.

« Confusion about who is responsible for conveying the
information.

* Unclear guidelines about the means for conveying it.
¢ Ineffective oversight and management of process.
e Cultural inertia.

(U). With respect to the specific issue of CIA’s failure
to recommend the watchlisting of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar
anid to inform the FBI that al-Mihdhar had a visa to enter the

United States in January 2000 and that al-Hazmi had entered
the United States in March 2000, the Team:

* Notes that the Agency has acknowledged that it did not
sufficiently focus on watchlisting.

¢ Differs with the JI’s conclusion that the failure reflected
CIA’s reluctance to share information because of its

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¢ Reviewed the OIG Inspection Report on Agency Budget
Formulation, and the OIG Audit Report on
Reprogramming.

4S+ANF} In addressing findings relating to
information sharing, the Team:

e Extensively reviewed all operational cables and other
cable traffic related to ] (b)(1)
s well as cables related to selected other CTC (b)(3)
operations conducted around the same timeframe; and
cables related to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.

¢ Reviewed viewership audits of the Hercules, MDSX, and

databases to determine who opened relevant (b)(3)
cables and cables relating to (b)(1)
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad prior to 9/11. (b)(3)

¢. Consulted with the Department of Justice Office of
Inspector General inspectors who were examining the
watchlisting issue from the FBI’s standpoint.

° Assessed badge-in/badge-out data for individuals in
UBL Station for key weeks in January and March 2000.

(U) In addressing findings relating to strategic
analysis, the Team:

¢ Conducted a thorough review of current intelligence
pieces on al-Qa'ida written for the President's Daily Brief
and Senior Executive Intelligence Brief during the period
1 January 1998 to 10 September 2001.

¢ Engaged three former senior DI officers to conduct an
extensive evaluation of all Intelligence Reports and CTC
Commentaries on al-Qa’ida produced between 1 January
1997 and 10 September 2001.

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terrorist was scheduled to arrive reviewed the IC-origin
travel information and worked with INS, Customs, and local
law enforcement to intercept, conduct surveillance, or
interview the subject. CTC also could issue warnings
through the National Threat Warning System—possibly
with an accompanying National Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System alert, which broadcast.an
unclassified version of the threat to state and local law
enforcement.

(U) Interagency Forums

(U) The CCB played an important role in issuing
threat warnings to non-IC agencies, drafting many of the
CIRs containing counterterrorism warnings. Cd

[_ told the Team that the threshold for reporting
information to non-IC agencies was low and that any
information dealing with a specific threat to US airlines
would have gone to the FAA; another said that the CCB
widely disseminated its weekly threat matrix, to which non-
IC detailees to CTC had access:

» (b)(7)(d)

(U) Implications

(U) The limited amount of information that the Team
has collected on the issue of CTC and non-IC agencies
indicates that, while these relationships were more robust
than the Joint Inquiry indicated, they were less extensive
than those between CTC and other IC and law enforcement
agencies. It is conceivable that more active communication
and cooperation between CIA and the non-IC agencies could
have affected the outcome of 9/11. For example, had
al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi been placed on the FAA’s no-fly
list in late August 2001, when CTC recommended the two
for watchlisting, they would not have been able to board
American Airlines Flight 77 on'11 September 2001 using
those names. CTC did not send the cable recommending
watchlisting to the FAA, however.

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believed the amount of work they had to do was too much,
as compared with 38 percent who felt that way in CTC as a
whole. .Among other taskings, station personnel prepared
almost daily briefings for the DCI; these occupied significant
portions of the day for some UBL Station managers. In
addition, the Station handled numerous meetings with
liaison services, provided target briefings toa variety of
audiences, and was responsible for exploiting the large
amount of information picked up during raids against UBL-
associated terrorist targets. These taskings and
overwhelraing anecdotal information from Station officers
and other personnel suggest that the Station generally had a
heavy workload.

4S+AN®) The OIG’s inspection of CTC also reflected
the stressful work environment for the Center as a whole.
That report noted that, “Center employees frequently
operate in a state of crisis—resulting from a series of terrorist
incidents and multiple known threats—and amidst strong
demands from policymakers and Agency senior managers.
Moreover, a substantial proportion of CTC personnel believe
that their work unit does not have sufficient personnel to
accomplish the mission. This combination leads to
employee burnout and leaves little time for strategic
reflection on both analysis and operations—potentially
leading to missed opportunities. Employees told us that
they deal with this situation by working extra hours and
frequently they have time for only the most essential tasks.”
The report further indicated that, “CTC also must cope with
information overload, frequently resulting from successful
operations against terrorist cells. Most Center interviewees
who had an opinion gave mixed reviews of CTC’s ability to
effectively exploit the data the Center collects. They
generally believed that the Center does its best to scope,
scan, and prioritize information for immediate action. Some
officers acknowledged, however, that the demands placed
on CTC do not allow it to exploit all the information it
collects. As a consequence, the risk exists that a potential
warning will go unidentified.”

+~S+ANB) The Team examined the Station’s cable
traffic during the critical month of March 2000 as a way of

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(b)(3)
(b)(7)(d)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

454 NB} The Team found that the increased

focus on unilateral operations resulted in increased
recruitment of unilateral assets and an increase in unilateral
reporting | | Figure $11-1 shows

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individuals who were to become the 9/11 hijackers. The
Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the
performance of the Chiefs of CTC during the period 1997-
2001 regarding the manner in which they staffed the UBL
component.

+¢€}The Team found that certain units within CTC
did not work effectively together to understand the structure
and operations of al-Qa’ida. This situation had a
particularly negative impact on performance with respect to
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), the mastermind of the
9/11 attacks. The Team, like the Joint Inquiry, found that
CTC’s assigning principal responsibility for KSM to the
Renditions Branch had the consequence that the resources of
the| «UBL Station, and CTC analysts (b)(3)
were not effectively brought to bear on the problem. CTC
considered KSM to be a high-priority target for
apprehension and rendition, but did not recognize the
significance of reporting from credible sources in 2000 and
2001 that portrayed him as a senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant and
thus missed important indicators of terrorist planning. This
intelligence reporting was not voluminous and its
significance is obviously easier to determine in hindsight,
but it was noteworthy even in the pre-9/11 period because it
included the allegation that KSM was sending terrorists to
the United States to engage in activities on behalf of
Bin Ladin.

+} The evidence indicates that the management

approach employed in CTC had the effect of actively

reinforcing the separation of responsibilities among the key

CTC units working on KSM. The Team recommends thatan_ _(b)(3)

Accountability Board review the performance of the (b)(7)(c)
and

for failure to provide proper ene and guidance to their (b)(7)()

officers; to coordinate effectively with other units; and to

allocate the workload to ensure that KSM was being covered

appropriately. The Team also recommends that an

Accountability Board review the performance of the Chief of

CTC for failure to ensure that CTC units worked ina

coordinated, effective manner against KSM. Finally, the

Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the

performance of the| for (b)(7)(c)

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United States. Moreover, no one in UBL Station, including
this detailee’s FBI colleagues, flagged any of the messages
for his attention throughout the operation, even though FBI
New York was the recognized Office of Origin—the
Bureau’s lead office—for al-Qa’ida issues.

+S} Whether or not anyone in the Station passed
information on.al-Mihdhar to the FBI in January, no one
informed the Bureau about the information in the|

cables from March that indicate that

al-Hazmi and Yousaf—clearly noted in the cables as “UBL
associates” —had boarded flights bound for the United
States. Nor has anyone claimed that this occurred. In
addition, three of the FBI detailees to CTC never accessed
these critical March 2000 cables at all, and the other FBI
detailee only did so in August 2001, after Station
management asked her to revisit the Malaysia meeting.

(U) The Operational Failure

+(GHANF} Although the was one
that CIA and FBI took seriously because of the perceived

threat that the traveling al-Qa'ida associates posed against
US interests in Southeast Asia, the team found that many in
UBL Station and elsewhere appear to have dropped focus on

fter 8 January 2000, when the travelers
departed for Bangkok. Indeed, the relatively rapid pace of
activity in cable.traffic during the first week of January
dropped off thereafter. For example:

* | ____|did not send out a cable on its efforts to

locate the travelers until 13 January, four days after UBL
Station had sent out an “Immediate” cable requesting
notification of| __—_|that the travelers had arrived.
Yet UBL Station sent out no reminders during this four-
day interval.

e For six weeks afte. cable of 13 January,
that ——_issued no cables on the status of the travelers.
However, UBL Station again sent out no reminders. In

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e At approximately 1620 Bangkok time (1720 Kuala
Lumpur time), the al-Qa’ida associates arrive in the Thai
capital.

¢ UBL Station officers read) —s—SCt
0823 Eastern Standard Time (EST) Saturday morning.

(b)(1) After some delay, UBL Station sends a NIACT cable to
(b)(3) lalbeit delaying
transmission until after|
(b)(1) :
(b)(3) ] Accordingly, ] ]
officers do not read the or UBL
cables until around on the 9th,

at which point the al-Qa’ida travelers had been in
Thailand for some 16 hours. According to

| __Jof 13 January, notified
within an hour of receiving the NIACT cable, but the

(b)(1) travelers had not registered at the hotels listed on their
(b)(3) landing cards|

If ad sent a timely NIACT cable
n 8 January or otherwise notified ina
timely manner, the possibility exists—however slim—that

(by(1) |
(b)(3) |

(U) More Missed Opportunities?

-+~S+ANF} In the months following,

[| __the CIA missed several other opportunities to
nominate al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar for watchlisting, to
inform the FBI about their intended or actual travel to the
United States, and to take appropriate operational action.
These occasions include the three identified by the Joint
Inquiry (January 2001, late May 2001, and June 2001) as well
as several others.

(b)(3) #5, |On23 October 2000, sent out
: a cable tasking UBL Station to conduct traces.on individuals
possibly associated with the Cole bombing. Because this

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with whom the Team spoke about this relationship agreed
that the two agencies routinely battled over turf. At least as
early as June 1998, senior CIA and NSA officials began
meeting to work out these differences. Nonetheless, the
differences remained unresolved well into 2001.

ESA ANFY While many CIA officers tended to view
NSA as the guilty party in this longstanding feud, the Team
found evidence that CIA was to blame as well.

"LS77NET In his reviewing comments on the draft report, the former DCI observed that the
August 2001 OIG Inspection Report on CTC stated that, “CTC’s relationship with NSA has
improved dramatically since the last inspection.” He added that, while there were conflicts over
the years among officers of CIA and NSA, the two organizations have worked effectively on the
most difficult national security challenges, and offers, as evidence, “Successes we have had
together in decimating the al-Qa'ida leadership to date.”

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personalities, logistics, foreign visitors, movements, and
relations with the Taliban. These sources occasionally
provided threat information as well but had no access to the
al-Qa’ida inner circle. Moreover, these and other sources
never provided any intelligence relevant to the 9/11
operation that anyone could act upon prior to September 11.

+S7+ANF} The JI acknowledges that CIA faced a
number of external impediments that made al-Qa’ida a hard
target to penetrate:

¢ Members of the inner circle of Usama Bin Ladin (UBL)
had close bonds established by kinship, wartime
experience, and long-term association.

¢ Information about major terrorist plots was not widely
shared within al-Qa’ida.

¢ Many of UBL’s closest associates lived in war-torn
Afghanistan, where the United States had no official
presence.

¢ Pakistan provided the principal access to al-Qa’ida’s
main operating area in southern Afghanistan, but US-
Pakistani relations were strained.

4¢S+ANF} The JI implies that CIA had a flawed human
intelligence (HUMINT) operations strategy and identifies
several self-created impediments that limited the Agency's
success in obtaining unilateral penetrations of al-Qa’ida.
These impediments included:

¢ -Reliance on liaison. While acknowledging that most
disruptions.of al-Qa'ida activities abroad before 9/11
resulted from foreign government operations, the JI
report concludes that CIA’s reliance on foreign services
to develop human sources meant that CIA had
insufficient focus on unilateral operations.

¢ Focus on disruption and capture. The report indicates
that, per the National Security Council’s direction, CIA’s

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agencies. UBL Station officers differentiated among the
several FBI detailees working in their station. Two
essentially served as CIA officers working regular
accounts, they said, while two others served as liaison to
the FBI.”

* -~€+ANEF} In contrast, the detailees whom the Team
interviewed emphasized the lack of clarity with respect to

their responsibilities and authorities:

¢ An FBI Special Agent who served as Deputy Chief/UBL -
Station confirmed that the FBI detailees were fully
integrated and assigned a broad range of cases, the same
as Agency officers, although their expertise in dealing
with the FBI was used when needed. He emphasized
that these representatives were not there to be data
miners for the FBI; given their case loads, they were
unable to monitor everything that came in and out of the
station or to make operational decisions as to whether the
information should be shared with the FBI. That decision
remained with the officer assigned to the case.

Another FBI detailee indicated that, after several months -
with no job definition, guidance, or training, there was
no choice but to jump in and work as a fully integrated
CIA officer.

The FBI detailee from the New York Field Office did
serve ina liaison capacity. His responsibility was to read
as much traffic as possible and advise New York of
relevant information gleaned from agency cables. ‘CTC
gave him access to the traffic relating to UBL, and he was
not assigned other responsibilities. This officer was

TM(U) Inhis comments on the final draft of the report, indicated that day-

(b)(7)(d)

to-day supervisory responsibility over the detailees fell to|

went on to say that this deputy apparently also believed the detailees understood the information
sharing aspect of their jobs, because| did not express any concern to the contrary. One of the
individuals who served as| |told the Team, however, that the
FBI detailees could not be expected to manage the information exchange between the two
agencies; the officer following the particular case had to be responsible for doing so. If an FBI
detailee was following an issue, he or she should recognize when something should be shared. ,
According to this individual, there was always a question about whether or not detailees were

authorized to pass information.

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|
+€} The Team found that the DCI was actively and :

forcefully engaged in the counterterrorism efforts of the CIA.

Beginning in 1999, he received regular updates, often daily,

on efforts to track and disrupt UBL. He was personally

engaged in sounding the alarm about the threat to many

different audiences in the policy community, military,

Congress, and public, and he worked directly and

personally with foreign counterparts to encourage their

cooperation. :

+¢S+ANF} In December 1998, the DCI signed a
memorandum in which he declared: “We are at war.” In
addition to directives related to collection programs and
other matters, this memorandum stated that the Deputy
Director for Central Intelligence (DDCI) would chair an
interagency group to formulate an integrated, interagency
plan to counter the terrorist challenge posed by
Usama Bin Ladin. The DCI wrote that he wanted ”...no
resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or
the Community.”

~SHANE} The Team found that neither the DCI nor
the DDCI followed up these warnings and admonitions by
creating a documented, comprehensive plan to guide the
counterterrorism effort at the Intelligence Community level.
The DDCI chaired at least one meeting in-response to the
DCI directive, but the forum soon devolved into one of
tactical and operational, rather than strategic, discussions.
These subsequent meetings were chaired by the Executive
Director of the CIA and included few if any officers from
other IC agencies. While CIA and other agencies had
individual plans and important initiatives underway, senior
officers in the Agency and Community told the Team that no
comprehensive strategic plan for the IC to counter UBL was
created in response to the DCI’s memorandum, or at any ,
time prior to 9/11.

-+S+ANP} The DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) was
not used effectively as a strategic coordinator of the IC’s
counterterrorism efforts. CTC’s stated mission includes the
production of all-source intelligence and the coordination of
the IC’s counterterrorism efforts. Before 9/11, however, the
Center’s focus was primarily operational and tactical. While

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

The report emphasized that the JI (b)(3)
had made “no final determinations as to the reliability or
sufficiency of the information” regarding Saudi issues raised
by its inquiry.

(U) Assessment of the Finding ©

Many of the points of this finding (b)(3)
relate to the FBI’s investigative efforts on the Saudi
intelligence presence in the United States and of Saudi
officials’ contacts with terrorists in the country, and, as such,
the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 9/11 Review Team
defers consideration of these to the Department of Justice
and the FBI. The Team lacks access to the full range of
investigative materials in FBI possession and is therefore
unable to either concur or dissent on those points. In

rates addition, the Team encountered no evidence that the Saudi
Government knowingly and willingly supported al-Qa'ida
terrorists. Individuals in both the Near East Division (NE)
and the Counterterrorist Center (CTC)
told the Team they had not
seen any reliable reporting confirming Saudi Government
involvement with and financial support for terrorism prior
to 9/11, although a few also speculated that dissident

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among those who read the January 2000 cable from
Jiddah indicating that al-Mihdhar had a multiple-entry
US visa and that his final destination was New York; he
took no action on it, however.”

(P)(") While _lofficer detailed to UBL Station from Jul

2001 through July 2002 performed liaison duties for (b)(1)

in the station, her primary position was as a fully

integrated targeting officer responsible for accounts in

two CTC units. A CTC officer confirmed that the detailee

was expected to do UBL Station work, but| often (b)(1)

pushed her to do other things. The detailee said that

Station management clearly explained her

responsibilities and provided guidance for what she

could and could not send back | A CTC officer (b)(1)

indicated, however, that the guidelines for passing

information were not clear and that it often was hard for

the detailee to determine what she should and should not

pass) | CTC did not complete her MOU until the (b)(1)

end of her tour. ©

e One of detailees to UBL Station, who served (b)(1)
from February 1997 to August 2000, indicated that her
perception of her role was quite clear and that most of :
her time was spent doing liaison| | From day one, (b)(1)
she had exactly the same accesses as the CIA personnel;
was able to look at internal operations cables; and
prepared Central Intelligence Reports [with any (b)(1)
lead information she found in them.

+E}/NF} While many CTC managers and officers

told the Team that the primary responsibility of the detailees
was to provide liaison with their home agencies, the Center’s
internal documents reinforce the perception of some of the
detailees that they were expected to perform’as integrated
CTC officers. A set of talking points prepared by CTC in the
summer of 2001 stated that these detailees play an integral
role iri the functions of CTC and work as analysts and

* operations officers, “having all the same accesses and
clearances.” A post-9/11 CTC memorandum indicates that

* (U) For further discussion of this issue, see the discussion of Factual Finding 5b.

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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 11: HUMINT OPERATIONS

AGAINST AL-QA’IDA

6f NB Systemic Finding 11 of the Joint

Inquiry (JI) report states that, “Prior toSeptember 11, 2001,
the Intelligence Community did not effectively develop and

use human sources to.penetrate the al-Qa’ida inner circle.
This lack of reliable and knowledgeable human sources
significantly limited the Community’s ability to acquire
intelligence that could be acted upon before the

September 11 attacks. In part, at least, the lack of unilateral
(.e., US-recruited) counterterrorism sources was a product

" of an excessive reliance on foreign liaison services.”

(U) Joint Inquiry Discussion

464 NB} The JI acknowledges that the

Counterterrorist Center (CTC) made a number of creative

efforts to unilaterally penetrate al-Qa’ida especially after the
East Africa embassy bombings in August 1998.

LY) 6/[____ NE} CTC interviewees told the JI staff
that the Center at various times had

[__outside the al-Qa’ida inner circle who were
reporting on the terrorist organization and

who were being developed for recruitment

prior to 11 September 2001 (9/11). The CIA and Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) handled the best source jointly.

In addition, the report notes that the CIA managed a
networkof ———_jin Afghanistan that reported
information on Bin Ladin-related security details,

June 2005 323 HES/ST//OREON-NOFORN TAR

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¢ In October 1998, the DCI approved a plan, with the tribal
assets playing an important middleman role, to have a
dissident Taliban commander lure UBL out of Kandahar
to an ambush site in exchange for $500,000. Despite
prodding from the Station, the tribal assets were unable
to motivate the dissident Taliban leader to live up to his
promises to render Bin Ladin.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

b)(3 : :
(3) : which had beena —_(b)(1)
consistent proponent of the tribal assets, revealed its (b)(3)

frustration in a 17 November cable in which it said it was
sending home the.landing zone team that had been in
Pakistan for some time awaiting a Bin Ladin rendition.|__|

Iso expressed his “disappointment” with the lack of (b)(1)
progress on the capture effort and said he was scheduling “a _(b)(3)
frank discussion” with the principal assets. A Spot Report
from UBL Station the next day, disseminated to high-level

leadership, reflected the cumulative impact of the assets’
inaction. Building on an eable from (b)(1)
18 November, it asserted that it was time to “consider other (b)(3)

options which might be launched concurrent with the [tribal
assets] initiative.” It added that, during the past month and
a half, “several times it appeared possible” that the assets
would attempt a capture operation; “yet in each case, the
effort was not made for one reason or another.”

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+S:+ANP} Notification of| _ |about the travel to the (b)(3)
United States would almost certainly have led to greater
operational opportunities involving the FBI. According to a
senior FBI detailee to UBL Station, prior to 9/11, the
Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities had two
views on whether to allow suspected terrorists into the
United States. He also noted that it was strictly a judgment
call on the part of those involved as to which approach to
utilize:

. (b)(7)

QD

)

That said, a CIA officer who had worked with the FBI in the
New York City JTTF told the Team that another option (b)(1)
would have been for the FBI to do nothing. (b)(3)

+5:44NE} In the case of the BL
Station did not initiate discussion with _|and the FBI to (b)(3)

discuss these options after the Station learned that
al-Mihdhar possessed a US visa and intended to go to New
York. Once the Station learned in March that al-Hazmi had
entered the United States in mid-January, it could have
initiated discussion on the first option while keeping the
second in mind if the suspected al-Qa’ida associates left the
country and then tried to re-enter, as al-Mihdhar eventually
did in 2001. In any case, the 9/11 Review Team found no

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© (U) The Office of Security and its predecessors recorded expenditures for antiterrorism
activities; CTC did not.

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readers navigate throug
Its purpose was to.avoid
specific actions: within:t
paragraph one, rath

CIA, it is clear who is: respi
not duplicated;.and that C)
Operations never:inténd
implied or indirect actio
message or not.

+SHANF} Contributing to this issue were cable-
writing problems and practices in the field:

¢ The key 5 March cable [was poorly written. (b)(1)
In particular, its subject line read, “UBL Associates: (b)(3)
Identification of Possible UBL Associates,” rather than
something like, “UBL Associates Travel to the United
States,” which likely would have garnered more
attention from cable readers. It also did not provide a
comment on any of the enticing information regarding
passport numbers or departures on flights bound for the
United States, except for noting in paragraph three that
Yousaf and al-Mihdhar had traveled to Bangkok
together. In addition, ent the cable as an (b)(1)
“Immediate” but only sent it “Info” to (b)(3)
UBL Station. Moreover, in the Action Required line, it
states: “None, FYI.”

b)(1
« While picked up on the travel information tpyt3)
in this cable, its own response
cable deferred action to UBL Station. According to the

ffelt that its (b)(1)

response—that it found the individuals’ travel to the (b)(3)
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-FOP-SECRETF

- 4, €F8}-We need an integrated plan which captures these elements and

others which may be appropriate. This plan must be fully coordinated with the
FBI.

5. (F3} We are at war. The DDCI will chair the group to coordinate the
actions proposed above and any other actions which may be possible.. | want no
resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community.

cc: Counselor to the DCI

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counterterrorism threat. The Team found, however, that,
at a time when the Agency was authoritatively stating
that.it was short of funds for counterterrorism and was
requesting supplemental funding from Congress, Agency
managers were not making maximum use of funding
that was available to them for counterterrorism.

¢ Disagrees that CIA shielded its counterterrorism
program, but cannot comment on whether the IC as a
whole protected counterterrorism programs.

¢ Did not assess the sufficiency of personnel in CTC asa
whole, but agrees that the number of people with
operational expertise in CTC’s Usama Bin Ladin (UBL)
Station was not adequate.

¢ Agrees that the DCI’s Declaration of War did not
produce an increase in counterterrorism resources.

+€} Finally, the JI report did not specifically address
the issue of management of available counterterrorism
resources. On the basis of its review of CTC funds and
personnel prior to 11 September 2001 (9/11), however, the
Team questions CTC management's performance in
overseeing and leveraging resources against the
counterterrorism target.

(U) The Budgeting Process, Terminologies, and Methodology

+S} CIA’s budget formulation process begins nearly
two years prior to the associated fiscal year of execution.
The Community Management Staff (CMS) conducts the
initial external review of the Agency’s request. The Office of *
Management and Budget (OMB) then follows with its
Budget Estimate. Results from these two exercises
eventually are incorporated into the Agency’s Congressional
Budget Justification Book (CBJB), which serves as CIA’s
financial and personnel resource request for the coming

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issues. The Team does not believe that this issue, in itself,
justifies a recommendation related to accountability.

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[

¢ In September 1999, Library of Congress researchers

prepared an in-depth, unclassified assessment on the
psychology of terrorism at the behest of the National
Intelligence Council (NIC). Acknowledging the 1995
plot, this report suggested that al-Qa’ida could conduct
retaliatory attacks against the United States by crash-
landing aircraft packed with high explosives into the
Pentagon, CIA Headquarters, or the White House.

¢ While most analysts agree that the Egypt Air 990 crash of
October 1999 was unrelated to terrorism, a few CTC
analysts did consider such a linkage, according to
interview data.|

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and delayed the preparation of Agency approaches| _|

ee hs negatively affecting the timel
and effective functioning of the exchange with Cn
terrorism issues.

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings
11 (HUMINT Operations Against Al-Qa’ida) and 15
(Reliance on Foreign Liaison), Factual Finding 5h (The
Hijackers’ Associates in Germany), and Related Finding 20
(Issues Relating to Saudi Arabia) for additional information.

(U) Covert Action

+€} The Joint Inquiry charged that US policymakers
had wanted Usama Bin Ladin killed as early as August 1998
and believed CIA personnel understood that. However, the
government had not removed the ban on assassination and
did not provide clear direction or authorization for CIA to
kill Bin Ladin or make covert attacks against al-Qa’ida|__|

The JI said that the CIA was reluctant to

seek authority to assassinate Bin Ladin and averse to taking
advantage of ambiguities in the authorities it did receive that
might have allowed it more flexibility. The JI argued that
these factors shaped the type of covert action the CIA
undertook against Bin Ladin and that, before September 11,
covert action had little impact on al-Qa’ida or Bin Ladin.

The findings and conclusions of the
Review Team correspond with most but not all of the JI
conclusions. The Team believes that the restrictions in the
authorities given the CIA with respect to Bin Ladin, while
arguably, although ambiguously, relaxed for a period of
time in late 1998 and early 1999, limited the range of
permissible operations. Given the law, executive order, and
past problems with covert action programs, CIA managers
refused to take advantage of the ambiguities that did exist.
The Team believes this position was reasonable and correct.
Ultimately, the Team concludes the failure of the Agency’s
covert action against Bin Ladin lay not in the language and
interpretation of its authorities, but in the limitations of its
covert action capabilities. CIA’s heavy reliance on a single

June 2005

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JL, the DCI stated that the IC still had 58 separate
watchlisting databases.

+6} Although the 9/11 Review Team concurs that the
IC lacked a central counterterrorism database, the team
- believes it is relevant to point out two specific efforts CIA
had underway as early as 1995 to link the Community
electronically:

¢ CACTIS (the Community Automated Counterterrorism ~
Intelligence System), initiated in 1995, provided IC
users’ access to terrorism-related cable traffic and
publications and afforded them the ability to search for
summaries and statistics in CTC’s New Incident
Summary Database, the US Government's official
database of record on terrorist incidents, according to the
Agency’s FY 1997 Congressional Budget Justification
Book. The DCI's Terrorism Warning Group, under the
management of the Community Counterterrorism Board,
oversaw the CACTIS effort. In 1996, CTC touted CACTIS
as a prime illustration of the Center’s role in
consolidating and streamlining Community programs. It
said that CACTIS would merge independent and
increasingly obsolete systems into a single, multi-
purpose, improved data-sharing network. According to
the CACTIS Program Manager, drawbacks to the system
included its nonavailability on user desktops and its
slowness. These factors prevented users from utilizing
the system to its full advantage.

¢ CT-Link, which connected government agencies involved
in fighting terrorism, was initially deployed in October
1999 as a successor to CACTIS.

 (U) In addition to the WARN-5 agencies, CACTIS was available to smaller agencies, such as ©
the US Postal Inspection Service, US Defense Nuclear Agency, and US Army Counterintelligence

Center.

June 2005

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FoORseeRER

HES/SHOREON NOFORNZ AR

+~SAANF} That said, in reviewing the Team’s
discussion on the lack of an estimate in Systemic Finding 2,
which addresses the role of the DCI, the former DCI notes
that ”...after 1997, senior policymakers in the previous
Administration, including the President and Secretaries of
State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of the
FBI and the National Security Advisor, became so deeply
and personally involved in counterterrorism issues that
another estimate would have added little to what they
already understood.” He further indicates that, “In terms of
the current Administration, I believe it would have been
helpful at the beginning of the Administration to have
produced'a comprehensive estimate on al-Qa‘ida. An NIE
would have provided useful background as we engaged the
incoming national security team on terrorism.... However,
it is problematic at best to know whether strategic protective
actions would have been taken to minimize the threat, given
our previous experience with the estimates in the mid 1990s,
and the limited time available to the new Administration
before 11 September.”

(SAAS) Although information uncovered about the
Millennium plots clearly established the United States as an
al-Qa’ida target, CTC undertook no strategic assessment of
the United States as a target aside from the January 2000
Canada-Jordan IR and the 6 August 2001 PDB. Analysts
cited several reasons for this:

¢ Of 26 current and former AIG analysts and managers
queried, 10 said that AIG did not look at the United
States because this was the purview of the FBI. A couple
of analysts said their management accordingly
discouraged such efforts.

e Five AIG officers noted that not enough information
existed on the subject to produce an assessment.

© Three said that lack of personnel prevented such a study.

+~S+-NF} Broader access to FBI information about
al-Qa'ida activities in the United States could have allowed

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(b)(1),
(b)(3)
In interviews, most of the (b)(3)

analysis in recall utilizing no alternative analysis, and
they did not do any because they (b)(7)(d)
“did not have the luxury to do so.” That said, the’
FY 02 Research Plan listed a paper, “Key UBL Assumptions (b)(3)
Check,” which was to take a comprehensive look at the key
assumptions underlying analysis of the entire Bin Ladin
issue and which likely would have employed alternative
analysis techniques; 9/11 occurred before the branch could

get to this paper.

-~S/++N#} Probably in résponse to this dearth of pre-
9/11 alternative analysis, on 12 September 2001, the DCI
created the Red Cell, a unit of senior DI analysts and other
IC officers tasked with thinking “outside the box” on
counterterrorism. In short order, the Red Cell’s
nontraditional approach began receiving praise from the
President, Vice President, and other senior policymakers.
Later, the Red Cell’s mandate expanded to other intelligence
topics.

(U) Denial and Deception

$SFANE} CTC/AIG rarely utilized D&D techniques
“to assess al-Qa’ida tactics. Indeed, the Team found only two
examples of AIG’s examination of possible al-Qa’ida D&D,
both done in summer 2001:

(b)(1)
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travel, training, and salary. These MOUs did not document
key job elements, job expectations, or other roles and
responsibilities. This lack of documentation was reflected in
the differing perceptions of detailee responsibilities held by
the CTC work force.

(U) CTC managers and officers, in interviews with
the Team, tended to argue that the primary responsibility of
detailees was to serve-as Tiaison between CTC and their
agencies:

. One) —Csstatted that he told detailees (b(7)(4)

when they arrived that they were to serve as the formal
liaison between CTC and their agencies, bring their skill
sets to bear on the problems at hand, and be their
agencies’ eyes and ears in CIA, remaining alert to what
their agencies needed.

* Another Sai that the detailees’ (b)(7)(d)

primary function was watchlisting and that their
secondary function was to act as liaison between CIA-and
their agencies.*

e A majority of the CTC officers queried on this issue
argued that detailees should serve as liaison to their
home agencies, passing on information of value. Most of
these officers acknowledged, however, that many
detailees worked more for the CIA than for their home

** (U) In their comments on the OIG draft; CTC managers repeated their belief that the detailees’
responsibility to report back to their home agencies was clear. | J} ~ (b)(7)(d)
emphasized that the detailees had access to all pertinent operational traffic and that, by
definition, the key job element of every detailee was to keep his/her home office informed. He
stated that, “This is self-evident.” He also argued that the OIG’s criticism of the handling of
detailees is contradicted by the fact that not one detailee complained about his/her use in UBL * .
Station. [artes also placed the blame on the detailees for failing to share (b)(7)(d)
information with their home agencies. He argued that, to the extent such sharing did not occur,
the failure was due to the “cultural idiosyncrasies” of each agency and perceived differences of
mission and controlling authority. Based on its interviews with detailees and the way CTC
actually operated, however, the Team concludes that the views held by CTC management were
not effectively communicated to either the detailees or the Agency officers in UBL Station. The
Team agrees| that none of the detailees complained about (b)(7)(d)
the way he or she was used in UBL Station; for the most part, these officers felt they were part of
the Station and doing good work for the Station.

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1997 and March 1999) are of other types of planned air
attacks on US targets, one (the case from April 2000)
involves a traditional hijacking threat, and another (the case
from January 1996) is an apparent misinterpretation of the
facts. It should also be noted that two of the eight valid
cases (the ones from October 1996 and February 1999) do not
involve terrorists as perpetrators but rather countries, albeit
ones that support terrorism. (See Table.) In addition, the
reports are diverse and are scattered over a seven-year
period.

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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 14: COLLABORATION WITH
THE MILITARY

SHAN} Systemic Finding 14 of the Joint Inquiry (JI)
report states that, “Senior US military officials were reluctant

_ to use US military assets to conduct offensive
* counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, or to support or

participate in CIA operations directed against al-Qa’ida
prior to September 11. At least part of this reluctance was
driven by the military’s view that the Intelligence
Community was unable to provide the intelligence needed
to support military operations. Although the US military
did participate in three counterterrorism efforts to counter
Usama Bin Ladin’s terrorist network between August 1998
and September 2001, most of the military’s focus was on
force protection.” .

(U) Joint Inquiry Discussion 5

(U) In its discussion, the JI further asserts that
National Security Council (NSC) officials, Counterterrorist
Center (CTC) officers, and senior US military officers differ
“regarding the US military’s willingness to conduct

. operations against Usama Bin Ladin prior to

September 11 2001. In general, however, these officials
indicate that senior military leaders were reluctant to have
the military play a major role in offensive counterterrorism
operations.in Afghanistan prior to September 11... .”

(U) The report then cites a number of sources that
affirm its portrayal of military reluctance:

e The NSC’s National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, told the
JI that “’the overwhelming message to the White House
from the uniformed military leadership” was that it did

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hard-pressed to determine the source of particular
tradecraft strengths or flaws.

Since most such pieces did not go beyond warning of
impending al-Qa‘ida attacks, it would be unfair to assess
them across a full range of tradecraft elements.

That said, the Team’s own cursory examination shows the
quality of most of the SEIBs and PDBs to be adequate and
reveals no consistent tradecraft problems.

45+ /NF)-However, the proportion of al-Qa’ida-
related current intelligence pieces that were strategic in
nature was relatively low, especially prior to the change in -
the PDB format in January 2001. Between 1 January 1998

"and 20 January 2001, only one-fifth of the al-Qa'ida related

pieces in the current publications were strategic in nature;
about half of the current articles done during this period
were straightforward warning pieces, and many of these
presented only the threat described in some recently
received report without providing any value-added analysis.
The remaining pieces were more informational in nature

June 2005

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they were focused on operations outside the United
States, did not consider the United States their
responsibility, and did not have the resources to develop

cases with (b)(3)
« At the same time, none of the relevant field stations (b)(3)
addressed its cables to the appropriate|__|stations,
The then-COS (b)(1)
told the Team that his station did not do so (b)(3)

because, as a field station| _wusnwa not know if (b)(1)
these targets were suspicious enough to warrant (b)(3)
aggressive follow-up action by other components of the

US Government inside the United States. As such, he

believes Headquarters had to make the decision to bring (b)
in|__|to undertake any aggressive action in the United

States. Indeed| Jof 8 January (b)(1)
defers to Headquarters for follow-up action on the (b)(3)

traveling UBL associates.

+S+ANF} Despite UBL Station's reasons for not (b)(3)
involving) __|a review of cable traffic shows that UBL
Station personnel were aware of comparable situations
involving travel of al-Qa’ida associates to the United States

and that they took appropriate action involvin; at the (b)(3)
time. For example, on 5 January 2000, (b)(1)
reported that al-Qa'ida associates Abdallah al-Malki—who (b)(3)

the CIA believed to be procuring radio equipment on behalf
of Islamic extremists associated with UBL—and

Bassam Kandar had departed Ottawa for Las Vegas via
Detroit that day, coincidentally around the same time the

(b)(1) Malaysia operation was unfolding. informed UBL
(b)(3) Station as well as the relevant stations, (b)(3)
(b)(1) [| __ Jand—in the cable’s action line—suggested that
(b)(3) UBL Station notify FBI Headquarters of al-Malki’s travel.
UBL Station in turn requested that, notify the (b)(1)
Las Vegas Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). In addition, (b)(3)
between 8 December 1999 and 10 January 2000, UBL Station
sent four CIRs to the FBI on al-Malki’s associates and travel (b)(1)
plans. Cable audit data show that UBL Station officers were (b)(3)
reading th traffic around the same time they were
reading the affic. (b)(1)

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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 7: COMPUTER
EXPLOITATION

(b)(1)

(b)(3) a
cs: Systemic Finding 7 of the Joint

Inquiry (JI) report states that, “Prior to September 11, the
Intelligence Community’s ability to produce significant and
timely signals intelligence on counterterrorism was limited
by NSA’s failure to implement e-mail and computer
exploitation capabilities aggressively, continuing conflict
between Intelligence Community agencies, NSA’s cautious
approach to any collection of intelligence relating to
activities in the United States, and insufficient collaboration

_ between NSA and the FBI regarding the potential for
terrorist attacks within the United States.”

8/|

The report states that CIA perceived NSA as
wanting to control technology deployment and (b)(1)
development, while NSA was concerned that CIA was (b)(3)
conducting NSA-type operations. It observes that, “no less
than seven executive-level memoranda (including one from
the President) were issued in attempts to delineate CIA and
NSA responsibilities in this collection area.”"” The JI further
notes that NSA’s Chief of Data Acquisition stated that this
was an issue during his entire three-year tour, but that the
Chief of the NSA Signals Intelligence Directorate indicated
the situation was improving as evidenced by the executive
memorandums.

(U) Assessment of Finding and Discussion

as, ANE) The 9/11 Review Team (b)(1)
agrees with the portion of this finding that refers to the, (b)(3)

~” " (U) The Team addresses these memoranda in its discussion of Systemic Finding 4.

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various compartmented programs.|_———_|detailees (b)(7)(d)
said that, if they needed access to RH material, they got it.

None of the detailees we interviewed said that these

restrictions impeded their ability to share relevant

information with their agencies.”

(U) CTC’s management of its detailee program in the
pre-9/11 period led to confusion about roles,
responsibilities, and guidelines for sharing information. The
Center’s use of the detailees as fully integrated CTC officers
limited their ability to perform their information-sharing
responsibilities. It also created confusion about whose
responsibility it was to effect information sharing. Lack of
clarity with respect to guidelines for passing information
added to the confusion.

(U) Prior to 9/11, neither their home agencies nor
CTC consistently made clear to detaileés their
responsibilities to serve as liaison with their home agencies
and to ensure that information moved back and forth in an
effective and timely manner. This was particularly the case .
with the FBI detailees in UBL Station. Detailees were put in
the difficult position of having to negotiate theirown - -
responsibilities and to respond to two taskmasters, often
with different missions and expectations. Job duties could
range from one ‘extreme (serving solely as the home agency’s
representative to CTC) to the other (serving in an integrated
fashion as a CTC officer) with a variety of possibilities in the
middle.

SHANE} CTC did not document the job
responsibilities of detailees to the Center. Typically,
detailees from one organization to another receive
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) that spell out
mutually acceptable responsibilities. "“ While detailees to
CTC had MOUs, these were strictly administrative
agreements outlining such issues as time and attendance;
performance appraisals; security standards; and payment for

"® (U) The Team has found no information relevant to the Joint Inquiry’s discussion of
information sharing that was limited by either RH or Eyes Only restrictions.

(b)(7)(d)

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(b)(7)(4) analysts [were not working on KSM before b)\(3 i
9/11, however, because they never thought he was a (2) d
member of al-Qa’ida. | | (b)(7)(d)
followed KSM because of his possible connections
to the Philippines. | (b)(7)(d)
AIG had no analysts designated to follow KSM, |
maintained an interest in KSM becausi lhe was “a (e)(7)(a)
bad guy.” |
; (b)(3) |
+~S4ANF) In his response to the OIG draft, (b)(7)(d)

emphasized that the argument that KSM played a key role in

al-Qa'ida throughout the period prior to 9/11 is false—that, H

as KSM himself has acknowledged, he was neither a formal (b)(3)

member of al-Qa’ida nor a member of its leadership council. (b)(7)(d)
ent on to emphasize the extremely poor

nature of the reporting on al-Qa’ida’s leadership and the fact

that KSM did not fit into any of the known categories of that (b)(1)
leadership. The Team believes, however, that there was (b)(3)
considerable reporting in the years before9/11/ (b)(3)

which should have alerted analysts in AIG,
to the possibility that KSM was

working with al-Qa’ida. More important, the Team believes
that AIG analysts should have been covering KSM because
he had been recognized by CTC as a key terrorist target
since the mid-1990s; because he was known to represent a
serious potential terrorist threat to the United States; because
he was considered by CTC to be operationally active; and
because, from the late 1990s on, he was identified as having
close links to al-Qa’ida. The Team believes that all of these
considerations outweigh the argument that analysis of KSM
was not warranted because he-was perceived to be neither a
formal member of al-Qa’ida nor a member of its leadership
council.

+€+A4F} The Team has found no mention of KSM in
any finished intelligence product—Intelligence Report (IR),
Presidential Daily Brief (PDB), Senior Executive Intelligence
Brief, and Terrorism Review—that AIG did between 1998
and 9/11. The Southeast Asia analyst told the Team that he

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© The reviewers indicate that, because CTC was pursuing
hundreds of known terrorists and thousands of possible
terrorists, there was no reason it should have focused
particularly on KSM. The Team believes that KSM’s
status as one of the US Government's top rendition
targets; his past actions, known capabilities, and ongoing
extensive travel, which were well known to CTC
personnel; and the indications from 1998 through 2001
that he had close relations with al-Qa’ida should have
made hima leading target forCTC. Indeed (b)(7)(d)

lin his own comments on this report, stated that

KSM was, in fact, one of CTC’s high priority targets
before 9/11.

e The reviewers state that KSM’s connections to al-Qa’ida
were limited during the mid-1990s, and it was not until
he relocated to Qandahar in 1999 that his role within the
organization grew beyond his previous fairly
autonomous connections. The Team notes the field and
Headqurters reporting cited above, indicating that KSM’s
contacts with al-Qa’ida did indeed become more formal
in the 1998-1999 period; the Team believes there was
sufficient reporting to have alerted CTC officers to KSM’s
changing status with respect to al-Qa’ida.

© The reviewers indicate that, before 9/11, intelligence
reporting with respect to KSM was very bad; some was
pure fabrication, some was recycled information, and
some was information that inflated the importance of the
source. The Team has provided source descriptions in
the text of the report and notes that UBL Station took key
reporting on KSM seriously during the 1990s; the source
reporting from 2000 and 2001 received praise from the
DO and UBL Station.

(U) Mukhtar the Brain

+~S+ANF} The JI report also implied that CIA might
have been able to determine that KSM and Mukhtar, “the
Brain,” whom the IC knew to be a close associate of UBL,
were one and the same. Had CIA been able to identify

(b)(1)
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+S} The Team recommends that an Accountability :
Board review the performance of key, (b)(7)(c)

for failing i
to ensure that someone in the Station informed the FBI and |
took appropriate operational action regarding al-Hazmi in
March 2000. In addition, the Team recommends that the
Accountability Board assess the performance of the latter
three managers for failing to ensure prompt action relevant
to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar during several later
opportunities between March 2000 and August 2001.

(U) Broader Information Sharing Issues. The Joint
Inquiry charged that CIA’s information-sharing problems
derived from differences among agencies with respect to
missions, legal authorities, and cultures. It argued that CIA
efforts to protect sources and methods fostered a reluctance
to share information and limited disclosures to criminal
investigators. The report also alleged that most Agency
officers did not focus sufficiently on the domestic terrorism
front, viewing this as an FBI mission. The 9/11 Review
Team’s findings are similar in many respects, but the Team
believes the systemic failures in this case do not lie in
reluctance to share. Rather, the basic problems were poor
implementation, guidance, and oversight of processes
established to foster the exchange of information, including
the detailee program.

+€}- CTC and UBL Station had on their rosters
detailees from many different agencies, including the FBI,
NSA, Federal Aviation Administration , and State
Department. The manner in which these detailees were
managed left many of them unclear about the nature of their
responsibilities. Many CIA managers and officers believed
the detailees were responsible for conveying information to
their home agencies, while most of the detailees maintained
that they were working as CTC officers and had neither the
time nor the responsibility to serve as links to their home
agencies. The Team found, at a minimum, that there were
fundamental ambiguities about the responsibilities of the
detailees as they related to information sharing, and that
these responsibilities were never delineated explicitly or in

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(b)(7)(d)

after 9/11. As stated in Factual Finding 3, the Team heard
several reasons for the delay in revisiting a broad NIE on the
terrorist threat, including that no National Intelligence
Officer (NIO) maintained counterterrorism as his or her chief
area of concentration and that no policymaker had requested
such a study. Nonetheless, the delay in initiating another
NIC estimative product focusing on this issue is striking,
considering the major terrorist incidents that had occurred
after 1997 and the limited two-year outlook of the 1997 ICB.

+SAANF} While an NIE may not necessarily have
broken new ground analytically on al-Qaida, as with most
estimates it could have pulled together an IC consensus and
raised policymaker awareness. Of greater importance, an
NIE could have laid out in strategic terms the threat
Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida posed,|

|It also could
have reminded policymakers of the threat of Bin Ladin’s
1998 fatwa. Moreover, such a paper most likely would have
brought together information and analysis on the
organization’s tactics, weapons, leadership, finances,
communications, recruitment, appeal, and relations with
regional governments. No published NIE, DI, or CTC paper
. ever did this prior to 9/11.

4~5+ANF) In reviewing the Team’s discussion on the
lack of an estimate (See Systemic Finding 2), the former DCI
notes that, ”...after 1997, senior policymakers in the previous
Administration, including the President and Secretaries of
State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of the
FBI and the National Security Advisor, became so deeply
and personally involved in counterterrorism issues that
another estimate would have added little to what they
already understood.” He goes on to say, however, that, “In
terms of the current Administration, I believe it would have
been helpful at the beginning of the Adiministration to have
produced a comprehensive estimate on al-Qa’ida. An NIE
would have provided useful background as we engaged the
incoming national security team on terrorism... However,
it is problematic at best to know whether strategic protective
actions would have been taken to minimize the threat, given
our previous experience with the estimates in the mid-1990s,

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would be spending the night at a particular location and that
he would not be traveling, opening the door to a cruise
missile attack.

454, LNB} While the wheels in Washington (b)(3)

went into motion again to consider a missile attack, the
Principals in the end declined to proceed, just as they had in
December. Concerns about the precision of the intelligence,

circumstances of timing, collateral damage, and signs of
deception may have contributed to the refusal (b)(1)
to launch missiles at the time. The Principals met to (b)(3)

deliberate on the launch only 10 days after the United States
mistakenly attacked the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade based
(b)(1) on faulty information supplied by the CIA. Evidence
(b)(3) : suggested |
did not know where Bin Ladin really was on 17 May, while
telling CIA that they knew where he was spending the night,
in the Team‘ s iudgment probably killed all chance of

action.” j
(b)(3) 4454 NF The last known instance where: the (b)(1)
may have attempted to attack Bin Ladinalso (b)(3)
ended in failure and raised additional questions about
skills and reliability. On 9 August 2000,
| (b)(1)
revealed a possible attack b)(1 (b)(3)
(b)(1) ona UBL convoy. Subsequent exchanges between tb3)
(b(3) [_____jand-Headquarters revealed several
discrepancies between what! seemed to (b)(1)

(b)(1) indicate about the operation and what one of the (b)(3)

(b)(3) described| —=————~—<C*~‘C*~CSCSCS Latter in the month,
[cabled Headquarters thatthe (b)(1)

had admitted that he embellished the reporting “a little.” (b)(3)

4S /NFY A more general explanation for deciding against action that was applicable to all

contemplated cruise missile attacks was the inherent delay in the process. According to UBL

Station’s late May 1999 assessment of the 13-19 May period, even with improvements in

timeliness, the normal delays from the time, observed events to the time the (b)(1)
information about those events arrived at CIA Headquarters would be from one to three hours. (b)(3)
The time needed first to process the information at Headquarters and to get a National Command

Authority decision to launch missiles and then for the cruise missiles to arrive at their target

made for great uncertainty whether the person targeted (Bin Ladin) would remain in place long

enough to be hit.

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ona US or Israeli target—and that Abu Zubaydah was at the
hub of this activity. Had anyone in CTC picked up on the
identification of KSM as Mukhtar, he or she might have
connected some of the dots.

(U) Reasons for Lack of Focus on KSM

+SAANE, There were several reasons for CIA’s
inability to fully comprehend KSM’s significance:

« A fragmented organizational structure and a rigid
division of responsibility created a prolonged artificial
divide within CTC that resulted in KSM’s falling between
the cracks operationally.

¢ AIG paid virtually no analytic attention to KSM prior to
9/11, despite the potential danger he had posed since the
mid-1990s and frequent reporting on his continuing
operational activity.

(U) Arbitrary Assignment of Responsibility for KSM

4E+NE) The creation of UBL Station in 1996 split
responsibility for coverage of Islamic extremist groups; this
negatively affected CIA’s handling of KSM. Prior to 1996,
IEB was CTC’s single operational unit responsible for
covering all Sunni extremists, including UBL and KSM. In
1996, however, CTC created UBL Station and moved it out of
Headquarters to operate as a “virtual” station. The Station
reported directly to CTC’s deputy chief of operations, while
IEB was subordinated to the chief of offensive programs
wha, in turn, reported to the chief of operations. UBL
Station took responsibility for al-Qa’ida and associated
groups, and IEB retained responsibility for other Sunni
extremist groups. Because Bin Ladin’s role was not clearly
understood, however, and because Sunni extremists tended
to have multiple ties, the division made it more difficult for
the two units to track and reconcile information.

indicated that trying to label people al-Qa’ida is

a wasted effort, as terrorist associations are often loose

June 2005

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gunmen planned to hijack an aircraft after the shooting
and crash it into New York City on a suicide mission.

In October of that same year, an Air Botswana pilot, in an
apparent suicide act of revenge against his company,
crashed his plane into three other Air Botswana planes
on the ground, thereby destroying them and crippling
the airline financially.

+(S+ANF} Finally, much information is available on

terrorist suicide bombers employing other types of vehicles
as weapons. In particular, al-Qa'ida attacked US targets
using trucks during the African embassy bombings and a
boat in the Cole attack. Indeed, in late October 2000, CTC
analysts wrote a two-page memorandum

that addressed terrorist capabilities for conducting maritime
attacks.

(U) The Agency Did Consider Terrorists’ Use of Aircraft
as Weapons...

+S+ANF} CIA officers were well aware that terrorists

could conduct an attack employing aircraft as weapons, and
some factored this into their work:

Many Agency officers knew about the 1995 plan to crash
a plane into CIA Headquarters. This account had
appeared in both clandestine cable traffic and, later, in

n-source literature.
i that, following the discovery of this
information, CTC worked with the FBI and the FAA to
take measures on aircraft security. One CTC officer cited
this case as underlying the decision to evacuate the
Headquarters Building on 9/11 after the planes hit the
WTC and the Pentagon.

June 2005

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With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HES+ASE REONNOFORNT 7 IMR

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
requested that the CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG)
review the findings of their Joint Inquiry (JI) Report and
undertake whatever additional investigations were
necessary, to determine whether any Agency employees
were deserving of awards for outstanding service provided
before the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), or should be
held accountable for failure to perform their responsibilities
in a satisfactory manner.

(U) The Accountability Review Team assembled by
the Inspector General (IG) focused exclusively on the issues
identified by the JI. The IG was not asked by the Congress to
conduct a comprehensive review of the capabilities and
functioning of the Agency’s many components involved
with counterterrorism programs, and the Team did not do
so. Asa result, this account does not document the many
successes of the Agency and its officers at all levels
(including many whose actions are discussed in this report)
in the war on terrorism, both before and after 9/11.

(U) Similarly, because this report was designed to
address accountability issues, it does not include
recommendations relating to the systemic problems that
were identified. Such systemic recommendations as were
appropriate to draw from this review of the events of the
pre-9/11 period have been forwarded separately to senior
Agency managers. In its regular program of audits,
investigations, and inspections, the OIG continues to review
the counterterrorism programs and operations of the
Agency, identifying processes that work well and those that
might be improved.

(U) After conducting its review, the Inspector
General Team reports that, while its findings differ from
those of the JI on a number of matters, it reaches the same
overall conclusions on most of the important issues.

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4ESHANE} These failures to act and reporting
inconsistencies in the fall of 1998 were crucial backdrops to
policymaker decisions in late December. By 4 December, the
DCI himself was convinced that the tribal assets by
themselves were not going to solve the Bin Ladin problem.
In his Call-to-War memorandum, he wrote, “We must
acknowledge that our efforts with the [tribal assets] can no
longer be solely relied upon to bring Bin Ladin to justice. As
a result, we must now pursue multiple paths
simultaneously.”TM

The price of the dashed hopes of (b)(3)
action against UBL by the tribal assets became clearer in (by(1)

December. On 20 December, [reported (b)(3)

Bin Ladin’s return to Kandahar where the tribal assets could
most easily monitor his activities. This set up an intense
period during which the assets considered a ground attack
on Bin Ladin, while policymakers and CIA considered a
cruise missile attack. |

(b)(1)
After some delays, (b)(3)
on 23 December they picked either 25 or 26 December for

their operation to capture Bin Ladin.

The Chief of UBL Station,
meanwhile, reported) on 22 December that tbyt3)
(b)(1
|He predicted thatthe rate
interest in this| mong the CIA leadership and at the

NSC would be “intense.” Asset-reporting problems on the
22TM prevented any action on that day. On 23 December, at
noon and then again at 7:30 pm Islamabad time, (b)(1)

“pomed that Bin Ladin| ] (b)(3)

ES AANP With this information in hand, the CIA
and policymakers, including the National Security Advisor,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Attorney General, the
DCI, and the Assistant DCI for Collection (ADCI/C), among
others, deliberated on launching a cruise missile attack

U) See'Systemic Finding 2 for more details on the Call-to-War memorandum and its impact.

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notification, such notification occurs by custom and
practice.”

+5} From FY 1996 to FY 2001, the DCI exercised his
authority to transfer funds from one IC agency to another

several times, but none of these funds were designated for (b)(1)
programs targeting UBL.or al-Qa’ida: During this (b)(3)
timeframe, | J -

kix.transfers
that were executed under Section 5 and Section 104(d) E

(b)(1)

authority,| (b)(3)

| Of these transfers, only one—

was

for a program designated as counterterrorism-related, but

these funds were forapartofthe) = s—s—=isdS: (b)(1)
program. The remaining funds were (b)(3)

designated for programs or efforts that were not

counterterrorism-related. |

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

+6. [the DCl also did not transfer (b)(7)(d)

any personnel from one IC agency to another from Fiscal
Year 1996 to 2001, even though he had the authority to do
this under Section 104(d). For example, he might have

*® (U) In his comments on the OIG draft, the former DCI stated that as a practical matter, he could
never count on approval of transfers in the year of execution in a timely manner. They required
the concurrence of Agency directors, the Director of OMB, the Secretary of Defense, and six
committees of Congress. It took months.of effort to secure transfers. In his view, “year of
execution transfers were never a way of meeting, pressing requirements in a timely manner.”

[ Section 5 authority requires OMB approval; (b)(7)(4)
although the statute does not require that the Agency notify Congress, the Agency does so as a
matter of custom and practice. Co that Section 104(d) has more (b)(7)(d)

conditions: the Director of OMB must approve, and Congress must be notified. While the Team
cannot attest to the timeliness of this process, it notes that transfers did indeed take place under
both authorities. Furthermore, the DCI’s voluntary practice of notifying Congress in the case of
Section 5 transfers and obtaining the concurrence of components other than OMB and Congress
in the case of both Section 5.and 104(d) transfers may well have contributed to the lack of
timeliness.

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(b)(7)(d)

(b)(7)(d)

+} Agency officers echoed such statements after’
9/11: :

¢ The DCI was asked in testimony, “Did you really have
what you felt comfortable with as far as resources to be
able to fight this war [against UBL] at that point in time?”
He responded, “No,” and went on to say that “money
was a big issue. . . it was an enormous tension among all
the other things we were trying to do with the money we
had at hand.”

e Inresponse to a question on how the DO responded to
the DCI’s Declaration of War, the then-Deputy Director
for Operations (DDO) told the 9/11 Team that the
clandestine service had been dramatically downsized
and that the DO 2005 plan, which was created in 1997-
1998, was an attempt to rebuild the service. He also
stated that, two weeks prior to 9/11, he had persuaded
the DCI to go to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and request an additional] _|million in
order to rebuild the DO.

. [told the Team in an interview
that resources were insufficient to create a global
counterterrorism center.

+EAANP|
because

of the increased spending to counter the Millennium threat,
CTC was not going to make it financially to the end of

FY 2000 and would be three months short. As such, CTC
would not be able to operate. ‘emembered

the DCI mE him to, “...do what's right for the country,

blow it out.” tated that he did just that. The
Team’s review shows a different picture, however.

. ¢G+ANF) After a greatly increased rate of spending
through January 2000, CTC spending dropped off until

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their operational pace out of concern that funds were not, or
would not be, available. It is clear, however, that additional
counterterrorism operations could have been funded with
the monies transferred out of CTC and other
counterterrorism programs, as well as from funds left
unspent at the end of each fiscal year.

+€ Although the Team did not attempt to reach a
conclusion about the sufficiency of pre-9/11 staffing in CTC
as a whole, it is clear that UBL Station personnel did not
have the appropriate operational expertise or background.
The lack of adequate staffing was a factor in the stations
inability or failure to:

‘¢ Develop a comprehensive operational program that went
beyond the Station’s Afghanistan-focused efforts. (See
Systemic Finding 11.)

¢ Undertake better targeting efforts against Bin Ladin and
other al-Qa'ida leaders.

¢ Ensure appropriate follow-up—including information
sharing with other agencies—of various operations, such
as, (See (b)(1)
Factual Finding 5b.) (b)(3)

(U) Accountability

+ Aftera review of the JI report and our
independent review of counterterrorism resources, the Team
recommends that an Accountability Board review the
performance of the following individuals:

e The Executive Director from July 1997 to March 2001, for
failing to protect CIA counterterrorism program money.
Ata time when the Agency was authoritatively stating
that it was short of funds for counterterrorism and
needed supplemental funding, the Executive Director
- was overseeing the transfer of funds from
counterterrorism programs to other Agency priorities.

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(b)(3)

(U) Failure to Ensure Passage of Information to the FBI

+€+ANF} In addition to the failure to watchlist
al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in a timely fashion, CTC officers,
as well as the FBI detailees to CTC, also failed to ensure that
pertinent FBI Headquarters and field officers received
information relevant to the two individuals’ travel.

+S} As is the case with the State Department, the
proper and formal channel to provide CIA information to
the FBI is through issuance of a CIR, and UBL Station had a
strong record of sending CIRs to the Bureau. Indeed, 14 of
24 DO CTC officers queried on the issue identified the CIR
as the proper channel for communicating al-Qa’ida leads to
the FBI. During the period 1 January 1998 to 10 September
2001, UBL Station produced 1,018 CIRs—about one-third of
the CIRs that CTC initiated during the period—according to
a review of cables in Hercules. The vast majority of these
went to the FBI, and in many cases the Bureau was the only
external recipient. A number of these CIRs alerted the FBI to
terrorists or terrorist associates’ actual or intended travel to
the United States. In addition, CIRs to the FBI included
requests for traces, US phone numbers linked to suspected
terrorists, and other information.

+} Interviews indicate, however, that many CTC
personnel used informal channels such as fax, telephone
calls, or hand delivery to pass information to other agencies,
particularly the FBI. In some cases, they said they used these
channels to augment formal ones; in other cases, they were
used in lieu of CIRs. A few interviewees told the Team that
the FBI could not find information passed via CIRs in their .
systems. For that reason, informal means of information
exchange were critical to the working relationship between
CIA and the community, especially the FBI.

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(U) In addressing findings relating to leadership and

management issues, the Team:

Reviewed documentation relating to Principals and
Deputies Committee meetings and to Agency resource
and covert action decisionmaking groups.

Examined various National Security Council
memorandums and taskings; Executive Orders;
Presidential Decision Directives; DCI Directives and
Authorities; and DCI memorandums, talking points, and
correspondence.

The Team’s request to interview the former DCI was not
met because of his schedule; the Team did, however,
review transcripts of his numerous statements and
testimony with respect to 9/11.

Read transcripts of various Congressional hearings.
Reviewed CIA OIG Inspection Reports on the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service and Foreign Language in
the Agency, and examined the Special Task Force Report

on the Language Incentive Program.

(U) In addressing findings relating to resources, the

Team:

.

Exploited information gleaned from the Agency
Financial Management System (AFMS), AFMS/Forest
and Trees Database, Acquisition Requests (ACQUIRe)
database, and the Approving Officer Authorities
database. :

Reviewed various Congressional Budget Justification
Books and Apportionment and Reapportionment (A&R)

schedules from Accounting Operations.

Reviewed UBL Station personnel resource data.

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¢ VISAVIPER guidance indicates that the field station
(b)(1) collecting the information is expected to report
(b)(3) candidates for waichlisting

said that the field had primary
responsibility for watchlisting, and one key CTC officer
told the Team that the —(b)(1)

(b)(3)
thad the
responsibility for watchlisting al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi.

¢ Some interviewees, however, including many in CTC,
felt that the Center, which was set up to manage
transnational issues and staffed with Intelligence
Community personnel, was responsible for nominating
terrorists or suspected terrorists who cross national
boundaries. Further confounding the situation is the fact
that UBL Station was in some respects both a field
element with Station-like authorities and a Headquarters
element within CTC. :

¢ Finally, fan other interviewees (b)(7)(d)
indicated that watchlisting was a primary responsibility
of those officers from other agencies who were detailed
to CTC.

+SHANF) Prior to 9/11, CTC did not have any
standard or consistent practices for handling watchlisting
activities, despite the fact that the Center assumed
responsibility for communicating the watchlisting guidance
in 1998. The Center had no single point of responsibility for
watchlisting. Each branch had complete responsibility for
all activity associated with terrorist groups assigned to it.

" 4S} Officers can also initiate CIs recommending watchlisting of terrorists and their associates

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officers in the Station, coordinate effectively with other units,
and allocate the workload to ensure that Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad was being covered appropriately.

+€+ANF} The Team also recommends that the Board
review the performance of the Chief of CTC from mid-1999
through September 2001 for failure to ensure that CTC units
were working together effectively on KSM. The Chief of
CTC stated in his interviews that KSM was one of a number
of UBL’s key lieutenants that CTC was after and that SEG
would have been responsible for tracking him—not
Renditions Branch. His deputy said that UBL Station and
Renditions Branch would have worked on KSM together.
Their subordinates in CTC did not have the same
understanding of their responsibilities, however. As
demonstrated earlier, after mid-1999, officers in UBL Station
did not believe or behave as though they had any
responsibility to focus on KSM; rather, they deferred to
Renditions Branch.

4EH/NB) |

The fact that KSM had been a
key rendition target for CTC since the late 1990s; the nature
of the threat he posed, particularly to the domestic United
States; his continuing and extensive operational activity; and
his growing ties to al-Qa’ida—all reflected in field and
Headquarters reporting from the mid-1990s through
11 September 2001—should have been reflected in the

analytic product! —_| It was not.

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« In May 2001, when Counterterrorist Center (CTC)
officers shared photos of al-Mihdhar with FBI
Headquarters for purposes of identifying another Cole
bombing suspect.

¢ InJune 2001, when CTC personnel met with FBI officials
in New York to discuss the Cole. On this occasion, CTC
personnel also showed FBI officials photos of the
Malaysia meeting participants. The report indicates that,
although al-Mihdhar’s name was mentioned in the
meeting, the CIA officers refused to provide additional
information about him and about the circumstances
surrounding the photos.

4} The narrative concludes by noting that a CTC
officer serving at the FBI finally recognized the significance
of the two terrorists in July 2001; at his suggestion, an FBI
detailee to CTC researched the case and, on 23 August 2001,
notified the FBI and requested that the State Department
watchlist the two individuals.

(U) Assessment of the Finding

+The Office of Inspector General 9/11 Review
Team concurs with the Joint Inquiry’s overall conclusions
that critical information on al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi lay
dormant within the Intelligence Community for a year and a
half. In addition, the Team agrees that, in January and
March 2000, the CIA was sufficiently aware of the
information within its possession to nominate the two for
watchlisting but failed to do so. The 9/11 Team also agrees
that the CIA missed three other opportunities to act on the
information within its possession, and the Team found
additional missed opportunities. However, the Team
disagrees with the Joint Inquiry’s inference that these
instances were examples of Agency officers purposefully not
sharing information with the FBI.

4€} In regard to information sharing with the FBI, the
Team has found nothing to confirm or refute CTC’s claims

June 2005

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Counterterrorism Center, or some other unit, analysts must
have access to all the information necessary to make
informed judgments.

(U) Accountability

+€} CTC’s documented failures to share information
ina timely, effective, and proper manner with other agencies
inside and outside the Intelligence Community as well as
with other CIA components were individual, collective, and
systemic. For this reason, the Team recommends that an
Accountability Board review the performance of the
following individuals:

¢ The Chiefs of CTC from 1998 through September 2001 for
failing to provide effective management oversight in the
area of information sharing to.include: effective
leadership of CTC’s detailee program—particularly
establishing and implementing a clear policy that defined
the responsibilities of detailees in terms of sharing
information with their home agencies; establishing and
implementing a clear policy that defined the
responsibilities of CTC officers.in terms of sharing
information with other agencies with a need to know;
ensuring that the processes to accomplish this goal were
in place and being used; and intervening to improve
working relations between UBL Station and other
entities, both internal and external.

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(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings
13 (Covert Action), 14 (Collaboration with the Military), and
16 (Strategy to Disrupt Terrorist Funding) for more
information on these issues.

(U) Technology

The Joint Inquiry charged that
technology had not been fully and effectively applied in
support of US counterterrorism efforts. The Team found
that significant differences existed between CIA and NSA
over several critical issues. One of these involved a dispute
over which agency had authority!

This dispute had not yet been resolved
in September 2001. The second issue involved NSA’s
unwillingness to share raw SIGINT transcripts with CIA;
this made it more difficult for CTC to perform its mission
against al-Qa’ida. In the late 1990s, however, NSA managers
offered to allow a CTC officer to be detailed to NSA to cull
the transcripts for useful information. CTC sent one officer
to NSA for a brief period of time in 2000, but failed to send
others, citing resource constraints. The Team recommends
that an Accountability Board review the performance of the
Chiefs of CTC for their failure to detail officers to NSA ona
consistent, full-time basis to exploit this material in the years
before 9/11. -

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings
4 (Application of Technology) and 7 (Computer
Exploitation) for discussion of the technology issue.

June 2005

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operation.” In early May 1998, he cabled Headquarters
that, contrary to his expectations, the assets had
delivered a plan he described as “impressive” and
“almost as professional and detailed an operational
scenario as would be done by any US military special
operations element.” It was, he wrote, “about as good as
it can be.””

UBL Station also lauded the
credibility of the tribal network's reporting

#5/|___—_s NF} UBL Station also sought to build
confidence in the rendition operation in other ways. It
completed a successful dress rehearsal of the air portion of
the operation and asked the Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) for its evaluation of the plan. JSOC said
that the plan was generally not too different from what they
might have come up with but that it had some notable gaps,
including one that depended on the|__———_| positive
confirmation that Bin Ladin was actually onsite in the VIP
area of Tarnak farm.

In early- and mid-May 1998, UBL
Station received de facto approval to proceed with the
necessary preparations for a possible June attack. Because of
the potential for significant loss of life, CTC believed it
needed a new MON authorizing the assault on Tarnak farm.
That draft MON won approval within the Agency during

"SH NE The plan listed three options for the rendition operation: abducting Bin Ladin
from the Tarnak farm;

TM 46) In an interview with the 9/11 Review Team in 2003, the COS said that, while the plan was
professional, he gave it a 20-30 percent chance of success because of the problem of guaranteeing
that Bin Ladin was in his residence at the time of the raid.

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4S+ANE) The Team does agree that, during the
summer of 2001, many observers perceived the indicators of
a possible attack to be unprecedented:

e In late June 2001, the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) sent
out a cable to all stations noting the Director of Central
Intelligence’s request to share with liaison tearline
information stating, “Over the last several months, we
have seen unprecedented indications that Bin Ladin and
his supporters have been preparing for a terrorist
operation.” In addition to an increase in sensitive
reporting, the tearline noted a surge in the release of
public information and statements on the part of

Bin Ladin.
© Inearly July ] (b)(1)
the “unprecedented increase in terrorist threat (b)(3)

reporting,” indicating that al-Qa'ida was poised to attack
US and Israeli interests.

° The Defense Intelligence Agency based its 30-day
extension of a 20 July 2001 Defense Terrorism Warning
Report on “the fact that since 21 June there have been an
unprecedented number of indicators of near-term
al-Qa’ida attacks.”

+€- SIGINT and HUMINT Warnings

b)(1
4SAANE) Signals intelligence (SIGINT) warnings of a (b)(4)
possible terrorist attack did increase.

opseeRer| (b)(1)
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45} In addition to the absence of significant focus on
or participation by other IC agencies, the JI alleges—and the
9/11 Team agrees—that The Plan did not incorporate other
elements that might have made it a more comprehensive
strategy, including:

+ Addelineation of the resources that would be required to
execute it. A review of The Plan shows that it raised the
need for additional resources but did not elaborate. The
Team discusses resources later in this section and in its
treatment of Systemic Finding 3.

« Acall for the downgrading of other IC priorities to
balance the counterterrorism initiatives.”

¢ AnNIE or similar IC-wide estimative product on
terrorism. j

e Any attention to the threat to and vulnerabilities of the
US homeland. The Team addresses this issue in Factual
Finding 3.

{S++} No Action to Downgrade Other Priorities.
The intelligence priorities in place on 11 September 2001

were based on Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-35,
signed by President Clinton on 2 March 1995. (b)(1)
| (by(3)

“45} While acknowledging that this is indeed true, the Team notes that neither a reprioritization
of targets nor an NIE would logically have been part of an operational plan, nor would it have
been necessary to downgrade other priorities in order to execute The Plan.

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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 5: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS”

\

(U) Systemic Finding 5 states that, “Prior-to
September 11, the Intelligence Community’s understanding
of al-Qa’ida was hampered by insufficient analytic focus and
quality, particularly in terms of strategic analysis. Analysis
and analysts were not always used effectively because of the
perception in some quarters of the Intelligence Community
that they were less important to agency counterterrorism
missions than were operations personnel. The quality of
counterterrorism analysis was inconsistent, and many
analysts were inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained,
and without access to critical information. As a result, there
was a dearth of creative, aggressive analysis targeting
Bin Ladin and a persistent inability to comprehend the
collective significance of individual pieces of intelligence.
These analytic deficiencies seriously undercut the ability of
US policymakers to understand the full nature of the threat,
and to make fully informed decisions.”

+8} The accompanying narrative goes on to term
analytic focus on al-Qa'ida by the Intelligence Community
(IC) and the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) as “woefully
inadequate:”

e In terms of numbers, the report states that the branch in
CTC’s analytic unit, the Assessments and Information
Group (AIG), that focused ori al-Qa’ida had only five
full-time analysts working on that issue between 2000
and 11 September 2001 (9/11); that AIG as a whole had
only devoted the equivalent of some 34 analysts to the
subject prior to 9/11; and that—including officers from
elsewhere in the C[A—fewer than 40 analysts were
working on al-Qa’ida. It notes that the DCI
acknowledged to the Joint Inquiry that the number of

““(U) Asa result of a conflict of interest, the Inspector General recused himself from ”
deliberations on the performance of Agency components and individuals relating to this issue.
Two successive Deputy Inspectors General did participate in accountability discussions
regarding strategic analysis and all other issues.

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(U)...But Not in an Analytic Assessment

{5+ANF} Despite the available intelligence and other
information, analysts did not produce an analytic
assessment of the general threat posed by terrorists’ use of
aircraft as weapons. The only time that the DI analysts in

CIC wrote specifically about aircraft as weapons was ina
memorandum
Jabout an al-Qa’ida

plan to crash a plane into a US city. Analysts in the DI, the
NIC, and the IICT did write National Intelligence Estimates,

and various other warning reports that covered
other threats to aviation, such as those posed by traditional
hijackings—both for political extortion and for sabotage—
and by shoulder-fired weapons,’ but none produced broader
intelligence products that delved specifically into the use of
aircraft as weapons. Similarly, CTC’s November 2000
Intelligence Report, “Bin Ladin’s Terrorist Operations:
Meticulous and Adaptable,” notes several methods of attack
that al-Qa‘ida had employed or had the capability and intent
to employ, but it does not consider the potential use of
aircraft as weapons.

+S+/N#} Among the reasons that interviewees cited
for the absence of such an assessment was inadequate
analytic resources, although, as the Team discusses in
Systemic Finding 5, the explanation may be that different
conclusions were reached about the most effective utilization
of analytic personnel. About one-fourth of the| CTC

“48+/NFY The NIC, with drafting assistance from CTC/AIG, produced an estimate in October
1998—Standoff Threats to Civil Aviation. This NIE addresses the overall threat to aircraft posed
by Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADs), as used by state and nonstate actors—
particularly terrorists: While it did not examine the issue of aircraft being used as weapons, the
NIE did note that, “Although threats by Bin Ladin and his supporters to use MANPADs or RPGs
[rocket-propelled grenades] against US targets have been confined to targets abroad thus far, we
are concerned that the focus could shift to domestic attacks.” The estimate includes a list of 19 US
airports that the FAA deemed to be at greatest risk of attack, based on level of activity and special
significance; the list includes the airports later used by the 9/11 hijackers.

June 2005 37 “HES/SH/ORECONNOFORN AMR

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differences between the two agencies in an effective
manner.

¢ The CTC Chiefs from mid-1998 through 11 September

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(U) The OIG provided to relevant individuals the
draft texts of those portions of the 9/11 review that related
to their respective performances. Those officers provided
comments and responses to the draft. The Team carefully
reviewed and responded to many of the specific comments,
correcting factual errors; removing material that was no
longer relevant; incorporating material from the responses
that provided insight into specific issues; and changing a
number of recommendations relating to accountability. The
OIG then made available to all of these individuals the text
of the entire report, with the exception of language
specifically relating, to recommendations for accountability
reviews of the performance of other individuals. The Team
again reviewed individual responses, correcting factual
errors and making language changes where appropriate.’

(U) The Inspector General, in this review,
recommends that the CIA Director establish an
Accountability Board—in accordance with Agency
regulations—made up of individuals who are not employees
of the CIA to review the cases where the performance of
individual employees was found to fall short of the
standard.’ Where failures were collective and/or systemic,
the Team has recommended that an Accountability Board
determine the accountability of those managers who were in
position to oversee and correct the particular situation before
9/11. The Team emphasizes that, in discussing the conduct
of Agency officers, it is addressing performance with respect
to specific events—not the overall performance of the
individual.

> (U) Many reviewers criticized the report for failing to emphasize sufficiently the many successes
of CTC and UBL Station in the battle against al-Qa’ida. The Team agrees that these successes are
not documented in the report. The report does not focus on the overall record, which includes
many successes in the war on terrorism. This fact derives from the tasking given the OIG, which
dictated a review of perceived breakdowns and failures of process—not an overall review of
CIA‘s performance against the al-Qa'ida target.

*(U) Agency Regulation 13-6 describes the nature and processes of the Agency Accountability
Board (AAB). It states that a CIA Director or Deputy Director would convene the AAB “when
events to be examined indicate significant failures of fundamental CIA missions or
responsibilities, involve systemic failures, or involve very senior Agency officers.” It goes on to
state that, “In cases involving review of the actions of very senior Agency officials, the DCI or
DDCI may request an outside body to conduct an accountability review and make
recommendations directly to him/her as appropriate.”

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54 AY

9/11. Had this information been correlated| ]

lunderstanding of
KSM/Mukhtar’s methods of operating, and concerns about

. an imminent al-Qa'ida threat, however, it is possible that
stronger and more predictive analysis might have resulted.

+€+ANF} Moreover, CTC’s operational focus on
disruption in general and on rendition in the case of KSM
appears to have limited its ability to gain a better
understanding of al-Qa’ida’s structure and operations,
including the role of KSM. A broader approach that used
the full scope of intelligence in CTC files would have helped
CIA better understand both KSM’s intentions and those of
al-Qa’ida.

4C+ANF} There was a lack of synergy within the
Center between operations and analysis on KSM. Failure in
each area fed failure in the other. Had the analysts focused
on KSM, for example, they would have been in a better
position to drive collection. Had the operations officers been
more aware of the implications of KSM’s travel and
operational activity from mid-1999 through the summer of
2001, their cables might have better informed analysis. CTC
did not provide an environment that fostered development
of either a systematic operational approach to KSM as a
target or a coherent analytical effort to understand who he
was, with whom he was working, and what he might do.

(U) Accountability

+S4AN#} The failure to follow up on KSM’s
significance and to recognize and:incorporate incoming

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3.

es

that factored in the
broader context the m
the United States. For
al-Qa'ida threat to the

(U) Possible Reasons Behind These Failures

-+€} The OIG’s 9/11 Review Team believes that a mix
of systemic and individual failures were at play in the
failures to nominate for watchlisting, inform the FBI, and
pursue operational opportunities.” In addition to an overall
lack of standard procedures related to watchlisting, specific
reasons within UBL Station include the process for handling
incoming cables; work overload; lack of operations
experience among key personnel; and unclear or inattentive
managerial oversight. Contributing to the failures were
actions taken or not taken by certain field stations.

*(U) The Team addresses several of these underlying systemic problems in our discussion of
other findings, including information sharing in Systemic Finding 9 and noninvolvement of, _|
in Systemic Finding 11.

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the situation had.not changed; it states that, because these
community representatives are generally integrated desk
officers in CTC branches, they do not have time to review all
of the disseminated threat warning reports and must rely on
CTC analysts to forward relevant information to their home
agencies.

. C7 PNFY Unclear information-sharing guidelines
reinforced the confusion with respect to the detailees’ roles
and responsibilities. One detailee told the Team that they
received confusing and mixed messages over their authority
to share information. At one time, he said, CTC officers told
the detailees that they were authorized to share information
with their home agencies; later, they were told that they had
to ask before sharing.

+{E77NFY Finally, in spite of the recognized need to
share information, the processes in place to do so, and the
fact of considerable sharing, the culture of UBL Station
reflected the DO’s culture of reluctance to compromise
operational traffic. The 9/11 Review Team’s evidence for
this is primarily anecdotal in nature. The Team notes,
however, that one detailee in UBL Station was reprimanded
(probably properly so) for mishandling information he had
provided to his home agency; the Team has no indication
that anyone in UBL Station was ever reprimanded for not
sharing information.

(U) With respect to the detailee program, the Team
found no information that CTC or UBL Station management
systematically reinforced the importance of information
sharing processes to include: explaining who had primary
responsibility for implementing and tracking the process;
clarifying the guidelines for sharing information properly;
providing the mentoring and training that would have
helped detailees and CIA officers alike accomplish their
information sharing responsibilities in a more consistent and
effective manner.

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CTC or the IICT did have access to this material. The Team
addresses the issue of information sharing in Systemic
Finding 9. °

(U) Reliance on Government Analysts

+&} The Joint Inquiry also says that the US

Government relied too heavily on its own analysts for
counterterrorism analysis. The Team believes any question
of accountability for this aspect of the finding lies with the
policymakers rather than with the IC. Nonetheless, the

. Team notes that an examination of pre-9/11 back issues of
“Terrorism and Political Violence,” one of the premier
academic journals on terrorism, shows several articles
focusing on such organizations as the Irish Republican Army
and Aum Shimrikyo—and even on animal rights groups—
but none on al-Qa'ida. In addition, the author of Through
.Our Enemies Eyes notes that the body of work on Bin Ladin
by Western academics and political analysts was sparse
before 9/11. This suggests that al-Qa’ida was not a major
focus of pre-9/11 academic analysis, likely because of the
same issues involving access to information on the group
that made it a hard intelligence target; thus, academia and
think tanks did not offer policymakers much in the way of
unique analytic insight on the topic before 9/11.

(U) Implications

+€) The Team finds no basis on which to conclude
that more strategic analysis on the part of AIG, particularly
on the al-Qa’ida topics that CTC did not address prior to
9/11, would have necessarily led analysts or intelligence
consumers to predict the events of 9/11; it nonetheless
believes such analysis would have had an impact:

¢ In particular—as AIG analysts told the Team during the
2000-2001 inspection of CTC—such analysis could enable
them to predict terrorists’ patterns of behavior or

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Figure R20-1 .

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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 15: RELIANCE ON
FOREIGN LIAISON

+S/7NFY Systemic Finding 15 of the Joint Inquiry (JI)
report states that, “The Intelligence Community depended
heavily on foreign intelligence and law enforcement services
for the collection of counterterrorism intelligence and the
conduct of other counterterrorism activities. The results
were mixed in terms of productive intelligence, reflecting
vast differences in the ability and willingness of the various
foreign services to target the Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida
network. Intelligence Community agencies sometimes failed
to coordinate their relationships with foreign services
adequately, either within the Intelligence Community or
with broader US Government liaison and foreign policy
efforts. This reliance on foreign liaison services also resulted
in a lack of focus on the development of unilateral human
sources.” : :

(U) Joint Inquiry Discussion

~ (SANE) The JI report further explains that, since
al-Qa'ida was engaged in a worldwide struggle against the
United States, the Intelligence Community (IC) recognized
early on that an effective US response to al-Qa’ida must also
be global and that foreign intelligence and security services
(liaison services) would be important allies in fighting
terrorism. In the case of CIA, the JI states that the
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) increased efforts to improve
liaison ties| (b)(1)
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options for pressuring the Taliban to deny UBL
safehaven in Afghanistan within 30 days under the 1986

Finding. It reported that the paper had been prepared
with significant input fon It said the (b)(1)
only option was a military one, stating, “We strongly (b)(3)

recommend against military strikes against UBL and/or
Taliban targets because 1) they would be ineffective
against these dispersed targets and 2) they would likely
be perceived by the Pakistani government as an anti-
Pakistan move rather than an action aimed at UBL.”

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+SHANF) The Team found no evidence to prove that
liaison was better than unilateral or vice versa. Each had

unique advantages and disadvantages. Moreover, we did
find that they were not mutually exclusive.

|CTC carried
out its largest and most effective disruption operations

during the 1999-2000 Millennium celebrations and the _|
and liaison played a key role in these.

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against the USS Cole.” Moreover, the Team determined
that, during FY 1999-2001, Agency officials redirected

$13.3 million of CTC base funds from the Center to cover
corporate and DO adjustments; some of these funds went to
programs that were not related to counterterrorism,
according to the Agency’s official accounting system.

+S} The Team had difficulty assessing the sufficiency
of personnel working in CTC and UBL Station.” While the
numbers did increase, several officials told us that the
increase was not sufficient to cover an overwhelming

workload:

(U) Intelligence Community Resources. While the

DCI did not have control of major portions of the IC budget,
he did have certain legally sanctioned authorities to trarisfer
money and personnel between IC agencies. This allowed
him to augment the agencies’ budgets and personnel for
high-priority targets such as.al-Qa’ida. The DCI had this
option available to him prior to 9/11, and he could have
utilized it to address the resource limitations that several

” (U) In their comments on the OIG draft] [commented that the then-DCI did

“declare war” but did not give the DO any additional funds to fight that war.

"4 The former DCI contends in his reviewing comments that the report accuses him of “not
marshalling sufficient resources for counterterrorism.” The 9/11 Team points out that the report
addresses the matter of sufficiency only as it relates to personnel, not funding, and only in the .
context of addressing the JI’s charge that CTC had insufficient personnel prior to 9/11. The Team.

notes that, prior to 9/11, the former DCI himself complained about the shortage of

counterterrorism funds; the record shows, as described in this section however, that he did not

use every available means at his disposal to alleviate this shortage.

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+SA+ANF} In addition, although the NIC’s March 2001
Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), “Threats to the
Contiauity of Government,” covers a broad array of threats
to the United States—notably Russian and Chinese military
and nuclear threats—the paper identifies nonstate terrorists |
such as al-Qa’ida as providing the greatest threat. The ICA |
includes a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assessment !
that states, “Usama Bin Ladin, Al-Qa’ida, and affiliated
extremist groups currently pose a clear and immediate
threat to US interests. During the past seven years,
individuals associated with or sympathetic to Bin Ladin
have conducted or conspired to conduct attacks in the
United States.”

+~S+ANF} In CTC, analysts produced in early 2000 one
IR that largely focused on the United States as a target. This
paper assessed then-current information on anti-US
Millennium plots by Islamic extremists in Canada and
Jordan. While reiterating a lack of specificity in the relevant
threat reporting, the paper concludes, among other things,
that:

¢ “Information suggesting a Bin Ladin role in these plots
tends to confirm our assessment in recent months that
plans for another round of terrorist attacks—including
targets on US soil—are ready for implementation.”

¢ “The extent of Bin Ladin’s operational activity in the
United States and Canada...is greater than previously
estimated.”

4~S+ANF} Perhaps the principal analytic products that
focused on the al-Qa’ida threat to the United States prior to
9/11 were a PDB current development done on 6 August
2001 and its equivalent that appeared in the SEIB the
following day. CTC/AIG drafted this piece after
consultation with the PDB staff, which sought to address
President Bush’s oft-repeated query regarding the al-Qa'ida
threat to the United States, according to the President’s
briefer at the time. This article notes that:

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linked al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to a known al-Qa’ida
operative. Yet this information did not trigger a
re-examination of the Malaysia meeting or any action
involving these al-Qa’ida associates at the time. Indeed, a
review of cable audit data shows that only the targeting
officer accessed any Malaysia-meeting cables during the
December 2000-January 2001 timeframe.

48

| followed up on an
FBI debriefing of a Cole bombing detainee by taking another
look at the Malaysia meeting. On 15 May, this individual
viewed and printed out several cables related to the meeting,
including the March 2000, cable, which notes
al-Hazmi’s travel to the United States.” That same day, he
requested that UBL Station send the surveillance photos to
FBI Headquarters. He provided these photos to an FBI
Intelligence Operations Specialist (IOS). Also on the 15", the
former DCOS queried the Cole bombing analyst in AIG

43) Coincidentally, the Station's eo tnarmenuonsi pulled up many of these cables—

including the cables from January 2000 that mentioned US visas, but not the ones from March
that mentioned US travel—on 15 May 2001. Ina July 2003 interview with the Team, however,
this officer could not recall any reason why| __|would have opened these cables at this time. An
audit of this officer’s e-mails received during mid-May 2001 shows no relevant communications
with either the AIG analyst or the former DCOS.

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doubt encouraged by the creation of the career service—
each had more than four years experience in CTC.

¢ The large number of officers who had recently entered on
duty or transferred into AIG. Indeed, 14 AIG officers had
been in the group for less than six months as of 9/11.
(Several of these individuals had recently moved to CTC
to fill the new strategic analysis unit.)

+) Other information from the years before 9/11
suggests that AIG personnel had the appropriate skills mix.
When the Team asked these officers what were the ~
consequences of AIG staffing levels and skills mix, most of
those who'addressed the latter point replied that the group
had many strong, experienced analysts. Moreover, in the
OIG 2000 survey of CTC, 78 percent of AIG respondents
agreed that their work unit had the appropriate skills mix to
accomplish the mission, about the same as the comparable
figure for the DI as a whole and above the overall Agency
figure. In addition, Agency data indicate that the average
grade of analysts in AIG was 12.5 as of 1 January 1999, only
a little less than the 13.0 for analysts in the DI as a whole.

+} Whatever the case, AIG analytic qualifications
_ improved greatly shortly before 9/11, following the influx of
several more experienced analysts into the Strategic Analysis
Unit. Although this occurred just before 9/11 and therefore
had little impact on the Group’s strategic or other output
prior to 9/11, it nonetheless shows that the Center was
addressing the qualifications issue. A comparison of
analysts and managers in analytic slots in CTC/AIG with
those in the DI as of 10 September 2001 shows that both
groups had about the same average grade level: 12.7 for
CTC compared with 12.9 for the DI. Although AIG‘had no
SIS-level or active GS-15 analysts, GS-14s accounted for
more than one-quarter of its analysts immediately prior to
9/11. As of 9/11, CTC analysts on average actually had
more overseas experience than the wider DI analytic
population | Agency (b)(1)
Human Resources data show that, while CTC officers had (b)(3)
almost three years less Agency experience than their DI

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(b)(7)(d)

(U) Partnering

(U) Developing relationships at various levels
between organizations is another effective way to bolster
cooperation and enhance information sharing. CTC has
developed relationships with a number of counterterrorism
units in other IC agencies. These relationships are valuable
and productive. At the same time, they are dependent on
the commitment and capability of the individuals
responsible for maintaining them; vulnerable to
disagreements growing out of mission and cultural
differences; and susceptible to bureaucratic battles over turf,
inertia, and personality clashes. These complications were at
play in CTC’s relationships with its key partners.”

(U) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. The key
pre-9/11 CIA-FBI relationship with respect to al-Qa’ida, that
between UBL Station and the FBI’s New York Field Office
(the Bureau's “office of origin” or office with responsibility
for al-Qa'ida), was troubled at best and dysfunctional at
worst. Numerous interviewees told the Team that particular
animosity existed between the managers of those
organizations in the 1997-1999 timeframe. Al
detailee in UBL Station stated that, in 1999, the former DCI
and former FBI Director Freeh met to discuss the animosity
and lack of coordination between the two units. Following
that meeting, the Team, the FBI sent! to the
Station to help mend the relationship.|__|
said that the Chief of Station (COS) did not receive him well
but that things improved under the next COS.
told the Team that| realized a “clearing of the air” with
FBI New York was needed, but that the New York Bureau
Chief “never changed his stripes.” One[ sd

told the Team that the Station detailee from the New York

Field Office was there to “spy” for that office’s chief, who
did not trust the Station. ein turn, said| _|felt

'® (U) The Team looked at these relationships only from the CIA’s perspective, although it
interviewed detailees to CTC from other agencies. In addition, the Team discusses only CTC’s
relationships with FBI, NSA, and DIA because that was the Joint Inquiry’s focus. The Team did
not review the CIA’s important partnerships on counterterrorism with other agencies, including
the State Department's Bureau of Inielligence and Research and the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (now the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency).

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operational practices, allowing the Center's operational
components to “get ahead of the target.”

* By putting threat warnings in context and providing a
more complete picture of al-Qa’ida, increased strategic
analysis would also have heightened policymaker
awareness and provided a more complete understanding
of the threat.

e Pulling together a broad assessment on al-Qa’ida—either
in the form of an: NIE, an Intelligence Report, or some
other vehicle—in late 2000 or early 2001 would have put
the organization's overall threat in better context for the
incoming Administration.

e Creative, out-of-the-box thinking could have led
counterterrorism analysts to.consider previously
unexamined ideas. Indeed, broader strategic analysis of
terrorist tactics might have pieced together the available
information on terrorist use of aircraft as weapons. A
broader overall assessment on al-Qa’ida might have
involved a closer look at Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's
links to al-Qa’ida and the potential danger that he posed.

(U) Accountability

+~©&- On the issues of adequacy and qualifications of
analytic resources, the Team sees no question of
accountability. The Team has not seen definitive evidence
that the Agency lacked the personnel resources needed to
conduct overall al-Qa'ida analysis, and the Team assesses
that CTC and others had taken steps immediately prior to
9/11 to ensure that counterterrorism analysts were
appropriately qualified.

+5} In regard to strategic analysis on al-Qa'ida,
however, the Team concludes that AIG missed opportunities
to provide comprehensive strategic assessments on such key
topics as the overall strategic threat posed by al-Qa’ida,
Bin Ladin as an individual, placing in context the threat |

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| As a consequence, the Team does
not make any recommendation with regard to accountability
on this issue.

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reprogrammings. Furthermore, although the former DCI
did transfer funds into CIA from other agencies, he did not
utilize those funds for programs targeting UBL or al-Qa’ida.
The former DCI’s comments notwithstanding, the 9/11
Team judges that his failure to redirect funds and personnel
from noncounterterrorism programs contradicts his 1998
Call to War memorandum in which he stated, “We are at
war... .I want no resources or people spared in this effort,
eitherinside CIA or the Community.”

(U) Implications

+4E+/NE} Effectively meeting the al-Qa'ida threat
required a multilevel approach on the part of the Intelligence
Community. At the operational level, CTC was focused on
addressing the threat, and the DCI was fully engaged in this
effort. At the broader, strategic level, however, the efforts by
the IC and the CIA were less comprehensive, and
managerial leadership on the part of the DCI was less
effective. As a result, US policymakers and the nation were
not able to realize the full advantage of their intelligence
capabilities. As discussed in this and other findings, a
comprehensive, strategic framework could have prompted
enhanced exploitation of the full range of key intelligence
components such as analysis, interagency cooperation, and
resources. This could have positioned the IC to more
effectively counter the challenges that the al-Qa'ida target
posed. In addition, a more comprehensive approach could
have resulted in a more complete understanding and
portrayal of the magnitude of the threat, possibly prompting
a consensus within the US Government to move against UBL
earlier and more aggressively than it did.

(U) Accountability

+E+ANF} The Team concludes that the former DCI,
by virtue of his position, bears responsibility for the failure
of the IC to formulate and implement a comprehensive,
documented strategic plan to counter al-Qa’ida and UBL:

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this officer recalled that the then-Chief of CTC would give
what he called the “dead-baby” speech.” CS (b)(7)(d)

| _ [also believed that the Chief of CTC’s approach was
not effective, adding that the latter did not get a-.resource
package together until a few months before 9/11, when he
began working on an operational plan to fight terrorism in
Afghanistan.

(U) Adequacy of Personnel Resources
+5} Personnel resources assigned to the rates
counterterrorism and al-Qa’ida targets increased during
FY 1996-2001. The number of people working in CTC grew :
(59 percent) during that period, with the (b)(1)
most significant growth (38 percent) occurring (b)(3)
during FY 1996-1997."" Staffing for the Assessments and
Information Group (AIG)—CTC’s analytic group—grew by (b)(1)
(b)(1) 34percent| | during this timeframe," and (b)(3)
(b)(3) personnel in UBL Station increased by 153 percent| |

" (U) The implied logic of such a reference is that failure to support a particular request could

allow some terrorist act to go ahead, resulting in innocent deaths, including of infants.

"°(U) The Agency, at the request of the JI, reviewed its counterterrorism effort during 1998 to

2002 and provided data‘on the estimated people “work-years” spent on counterterrorism.

According to these data, total Headquarters staff work-years devoted to al-Qa'ida grew (b)(3)
lofficials (b)(7)(d)
involved in collecting these data described them as “good ball park figures.” The Team reviewed

these data but could not independently verify them with any degree of certainty. As a result, the

Team chose to focus on the number of personnel working in CTC during 1996 to 2001. Although

these data do not include the number of officers outside of CTC working these targets, the data

show a trend in the number of personnel dedicated to work the counterterrorism and al-Qa’ida

targets during this timeframe.

TM (U) The Team discusses the adequacy of analytic resources devoted to counterterrorism in

Systemic Finding 5.

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been too reluctant to develop nontraditional HUMINT
platforms, and has stuck too much and for too long with the
comparatively easy work of operating tinder diplomatic
cover from US embassies. This approach is patently.
unsuited to HUMINT collection against nontraditional
threats such as terrorism or proliferation targets, and the
CIA must move emphatically to develop an entirely new
collection paradigm involving greater use of nonofficial
cover (NOC) officers.”

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(d)

*(U) “September 11 and Imperative of Reform in the US Intelligence Community, Additional

Views of Senator Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” JI

Final Report, Appendix — Additional. Views of Members of the Joint Inquiry. December 10, 2002;

page 12.

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D With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

: the next fiscal year and did the same with| _Imillion of (b)(1)
1 the pre-9/11 FY 2001 supplemental. In FY 2000, the (b)(3)
1 money came late in the fiscal year; as such, it was
arguably a prudent decision to carry over those funds.
However, the circumstances were somewhat different in
FY 2001. During December 2000, Congress appropriated -
an additional] illion of counterterrorism money but (b)(1)
required that CIA submit a spend plan for approval by (b)(3)
January 2001. The spend plan the Agency provided on
22 January 2001 did not even list requirements for
| __|million of those funds, and CIA did not ask OMB to (b)(1)
release supplemental funds to benefit CTC until July (b)(3)
2001. Portions of these multiyear supplemental funds
brought in during the latter part of FY 2001 remained
unspent at the time of the 9/11 attacks.”

e Finally, as will be discussed in the next section of this
finding, the Agency did not reprogram Agency-level
funds from other intelligence priorities to
counterterrorism. Instead, it moved funds out of
counterterrorism programs to other activities, sometimes
via corporate or directorate taxes.

i - (b)(1)
Figure 3-5 (by(3)

(U) Agency officials stated that waiting for Congressional approval and DoD reprogramming
delayed the spending of these funds.
1

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(U) FACTUAL FINDING 5.B: THE WATCHLISTING
FAILURE

(U) Factual Finding 5.b states that “The Intelligence
Community acquired additional, and highly significant
information regarding Khalid al-Mihdhar and
Nawaf al-Hazmi in early 2000. Critical parts of the
information concerning al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi lay
dormant within the Intelligence Community for as long as
18 months, at the very time when plans for the September 11
attacks were proceeding. The CIA missed repeated
opportunities to act based on information in its possession
that these two Bin Ladin-associated terrorists were traveling
to the United States, and to add their names to watchlists.”

4} The Joint Inquiry’s accompanying narrative notes
that CIA had sufficient information to watchlist al-Mihdhar
in early January 2000 and to watchlist al-Hazmi two months
later. Although CIA Headquarters had retransmitted
watchlisting guidance to the field as recently as December
1999, Directorate of Operations (DO) officers involved in the
Malaysia case did not follow this guidance. CIA officers
advised the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the
Malaysia meeting and say they passed information about
al-Mihdhar’s US visa. However, no record exists of its
passage.

+ The narrative goes on to state that CIA officers
missed other opportunities to nominate the two individuals
for watchlisting and to pass critical information about their
US visas and travel to the FBI:

e In January 2001, when they were investigating
Khallad Bin Attash, the al-Qa’ida terrorist who was the
principal planner of the USS Cole bombing and who had
attended the Malaysia meeting under the name
Salah Bin Yousaf.

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had similar account-specific tasks; the Team did not attempt
to collect or calculate relevant statistics for purposes of
comparison.

“Sy These current, tactical, and other demands also
imposed on AIG managers’ time, sometimes apparently
hindering their ability to review longer term papers ona
timely basis. Indeed, several AIG officers told the Team
during the 2000-2001 CTC inspection and during this current
review that certain AIG managers at the branch and group
level served as bottlenecks for paper review. Some
complained of managers taking months to turn around
papers, while other papers never got out. When asked in the
2000-2001 CTC inspection to identify the biggest obstacle
facing AIG, about 30 percent of the 14 analysts who
answered—as well as one of the AIG managers—identified
the Group’s product review as such an obstacle.

(U) Absence of a Strategic Analysis Unit

SHANE} A key reason why CTC did not conduct
much strategic analysis on Bin Ladin is that, until shortly
before 9/11, it had no protected unit devoted expressly to
research and production of such analysis, as did many of the
‘DI’s regional offices, as well as OTI. However, the Center
had been long aware of the need for such a unit:

¢ The March 2000| staff report suggested that CTC (b)(3)
“seek to insulate some analysts from daily production
pressures to enhance the production of in-depth
analysis” on Bin Ladin and his organization.

* Inits inspection of CTC, conducted between September
2000 and February 2001, OIG found that CTC had made
no changes in regard to the| _|report’s (b)(3)
recommendations on strategic analysis.

¢ Following the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, the
DCI ordered a comprehensive review of the Intelligence
Community's reporting and assessments of the threat
environment in Yemen in the year prior to the attack.

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|This was

the first indication that anyone in CTC noticed the travel to
the United States. Although this revelation ultimately led to
nominating al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar for watchlisting, it
took the Station three critical months to do so.

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”46}-The Los Angeles travel information was in the last line of the DCOS’s 12-line note that
preceded the cable he was forwarding in Lotus notes.

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Language Development Committee. However, no senior
officer was in charge of the overall program; despite a
requirement for an annual Agency progress report, the
Team uncovered no evidence that any had been
produced.

¢ In 1979, the Agency introduced the Language Incentive
Program (LIP), which provided monetary rewards to
officers who tested at various levels of expertise or who
used language skills in their jobs.* In January 1996, a
task force recommended modification of the LIP to
encourage learning those languages critical to the
Agency’s mission and to provide monetary awards for
demonstrated professional use of the language.
According to CIA University data, however, two-thirds
of students who complete language training do not
return for testing, suggesting that they have little
confidence in their abilities or limited incentive to do so,
despite the LIP.

e Also in 1979, the National Academy of Public
Administration, a congressionally chartered nonprofit
corporation, studied CIA language capabilities and called
for a comprehensive program to identify languages
required to support the mission; resources to recruit
officers who could develop and maintain these skills; and
leadership to address broad language program issues.
The Agency undertook no.program to follow up on these
recommendations, however. :

‘8 (U) Awards could be for achievement, use, or maintenance. Individual components
determined which positions qualified for LIP awards.

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(U) Joint Inquiry Discussion

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like’a “pariah” because he was considered New York's
“spy;” many of his supervisors and peers did, in fact,
characterize him that way.

+~€+ANF) UBL Station had smoother—albeit not
particularly close—relations with the counterterrorism office
at FBI Headquarters and its UBL Unit. An August 1999
briefing for the DCI indicated that the Station intended to
hold monthly meetings with the FBI’s squad, but our
interviews suggest that these meetings were irregular at
best. Although one officer told the Team that regular
meetings occurred, most who responded to the Team’s
question indicated that they were unaware of meetings
between the two groups. One said that
"these meetings were'not very effective because the FBI only
wanted to talk about what was happening overseas. A
indicated that no regular meetings
occurred but that} the head of the FBI’s Bin Ladin
Squad each made two or three trips to the other’s office and
had established a good working relationship.”

"4H

|The Team agrees that UBL Station’s relations with both

the FBI and NSA improved but found that underlying tensions between the
_ Station and both agencies continued.

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FOPSECRER

With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HES/ASHOREON, NOFORN TAMER

SHANE} The JI report indicates that KSM came to the
attention of the IC in early 1995, when information linked
him to Ramzi Yousef’s Bojinka Plot, also referred to as the
Manila Air Conspiracy, in the Philippines. The plot
involved bombing US airplanes flying Asian routes, killing
the Pope, and crashing an airplane into CIA Headquarters.
KSM is Yousef’s uncle, and the two are married to sisters.
Both were linked to the'1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center (WTC-1) and were indicted by a US grand jury in
1996. The US Government kept KSM’s indictment under
seal until 1998, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and CIA tried to locate him and take him into custody.
In 1995, the National Security Council’s Policy Coordination
Group concluded that KSM was a top priority target.

SHANE} The JI report notes that the CIA had
information about KSM prior to 9/11, including that he:

¢ Had traveled with Usama Bin Ladin (UBL)

« Was working in Qatar in 1995 and 1996, During this
time, the Agency was unsuccessful in efforts to render
him|

* Took “jihad” leave in 1995, presumably to fight in Bosnia,

¢ Had moved to Quetta, Pakistan, by March 1998,
according to FBI information.

* Had flown into Nairobi (using one of his known aliases)
in August 1998, prior to the embassy bombing there.

The JI report goes on to say that this information led CIA to
see KSM as part of Bin Ladin’s organization.

+S+ANF} According to the JI report, by early 1998, the
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) had moved responsibility for
KSM from its Islamic Extremist Branch (IEB) to the
Renditions Branch (RB), which focused on finding terrorists

June 2005

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+{€+ANF) Although hardly optimal, some planning

can be done within the context of supplemental
appropriations.
stated, for example, that, from late FY 1998 through FY 2001,
supplemental appropriations were largely expected—
although the amounts were uncertain—which did allow for
planning. In addition, when Congress permits CIA to hold
its supplemental funds beyond a one-year tenure, Agency
managers can compensate for funding difficulties. The
decisions to carry forward amounts from both the FY 2000
and pre-9/11 FY 2001 counterterrorism supplemental
appropriations demonstrate CIA’s ability to compensate—to
a certain extent—for immediate or high-priority
counterterrorism requirements that might have been (b)(1)
underfunded. As mentioned earlier, the Agency carried (b)(3)
forward | |million from the FY 2000 supplemental into

(b)(1) FY 2001 rather than use the funds for existing unfunded

(b)(3) requirements. Of the [million FY 2001 counterterrorism

‘ supplemental funds that Congress appropriated in

December 2000, CIA didnot use____million until (b\1)
FY 2002.” Even though several Agency officials-familiar (b)(3)
with the counterterrorism budget believed that the Agency
could have spent the funds for counterterrorism programs in
FY 2001—although not necessarily against the UBL or
al-Qa'ida targets—the Agency chose to hold onto the money,
creating a “reserve” that could augment or replace a future
supplemental.. This sort of last-minute funding: does not
permit either long-term planning or investment in long-term
programs, as increases in base funding do. .

(b)(7)(d)

(U) Despite these long-term planning issues, CIA
obviously was better off receiving this money than not.
Such supplemental funding for counterterrorism was the
result of earnest efforts on the part of the DCI, the DDO, the
CFO's Office, and other Agency officials. These officers

"4S Congress approved _|million for the CIA via Public Law 106-554 and appropriated the (b)(1)
entire amount in December 2000. The funds provided in the FY 2001 counterterrorism (b)(3)
supplemental were available for one year once the funds were reprogrammed fromthe |

Jaccount. The (b)(1)
Agency transferred|__Imillion from the jaccount to the laccount during March- (b)(1) - (b)(1)
July 2001 and chose to hold onto the remaining] The (b)(3)
remaining funds were transferred from thd Account in March 2002. (b)(1)

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May, and on 22 May it went to the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence (DDCI) for signature and transmission
to the NSC. After overcoming initial concerns from the
Attorney General about the potential for causing accidental
deaths among women and children within Bin Ladin’s
compound, it appeared headed for Presidential approval.

+#8/____ NP} Indications that the rendition (b)(3)

operation would receive approval evaporated suddenly in

late May, however, even before the 29 May Principals’

meeting that was to consider the plan. Shortly before that

date, the senior leaders in the CIA responsible for

recommending such an operation to the DCI, after a review

of the whole operation, decided against continuing the .

preparations, at least for the time being.

(b)(7)(d)

told the Team they all advised
against proceeding with the plan. Ina reflection of the DO
leadership's views at the time, the then-DDO, ina
memorandum to the National Security Advisor on 12 June
1998, expressed confidence in CIA’s ability to “conduct the
extraction and transport phases” of the rendition but said
that CIA “assesses the assets’ ability to both capture

Bin Ladin and to deliver him to United States officials as
low.”

+S+4NEF} The standdown of the operation was a bitter
disappointment to some UBL Station personnel. In
interviews with the Team, some CIA officers closely
associated with the preparations for the operation expressed
confidence in the assets and in the likely success of the
operation. Others expressed less certainty about its
prospects. One said that, even though the tribal assets had a

(b)(1)

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the collection depended could not be trusted as a collector of
such intelligence. The Headquarters cable went on to say
that the source might still be used to provide actionable
information on rendition targets, including KSM.

464 NB As the Joint Inquiry emphasized,

however, these requirements and cables to the field reflected
little effort to focus on the reasons for or significance of
KSM’s frequent and widespread travel. Moreover, they did
not put his travel into a broader context, such as his role in
coordiriating worldwide planning for terrorist operations in
cooperation with Usama Bin Ladin. Renditions Branch,
which had primary responsibility for KSM within CTC,
focused on locating and capturing him.

(U) Reporting on KSM

+S+ANF} As the JI report indicates, before
September 11, Agency reports on KSM noted:

¢ His connections to Ramzi Yousef, UBL, and other leading
Islamic extremists.

° His extensive international travel.

¢ The nature of the threat he had posed in the past,
including his involvement in WTC-1 and the purported
plans to fly an explosives-laden plane into CIA
Headquarters; to train Arab pilots in the United States;
and to conduct suicide terrorist attacks against facilities
in the United States, including the White House.

+S+4N; In addition to what the JI noted, CIA also
had information alleging that, among other things, KSM
had:
¢ Attended a university in the United States.

¢ Worked as an engineer when he resided in Qatar in the
mid-1990s.

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With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HES/SH//ORECON- NOFORN ivi (b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
+€) The February 1999 MON
ry .
5, ANE}When CIA began to look for new pV”)

covert action options to reduce its dependence on its tribal (BS)
(b)(1) assets, it considered another CIA contact in Afghanistan,
(b)(3) anti-Taliban military leader Ahmad Shah Masood.

| By February 199)

President Clinton signed a MON that amended the

24 December MON to include working with Masood in the
scope of lethal offensive operations envisioned by the earlier
MON.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

The Chief of the Near East Division
had originally raised Masood, among other options, for
dealing with UBL, according to a 6 February 1998 UBL
Station report on a high-level meeting. The DCI, DDCI,
Executive Director, and ADDO agreed at that meeting that
all possible opportunities should be pursued. Nonetheless,
UBL Station did not move aggressively to make Masood a
partner in the pursuit of UBL until late 1998, although

(b)(1) Masood had signaled a desire to open a dialogue with CIA
(b)(3) about a counterterrorism program in September 1998. (b)(1)
4is4 NE) Only after the (b)(3)

(b)(1) had failed to deliver Bin Ladin in the fall of 1998 and with :

(b)(3) encouragement from did CIA pursue the (b)(1)
Masood option. On 17 and 18 November, (b)(3)
kicked off a discussion of alternatives, arguing that it was

(b)(1) time for a reassessment. UBL Station moved quickly to raise

()(3) | proposals plus other options with CIA’s
leadership and with policymakers. These options included
approaching Masood, although UBL Station officers still did
not see much promise in him. |

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

It quickly became apparent that Masood, by
his own admission, had little capability to independently
monitor and target Bin Ladin and was preoccupied with his
battles with the Taliban. Nevertheless, in late February 1999, (b)(1)
the President signed a MON,|——_authorizing (b)(3)
(b)(1) Masood to carry out an operation to capture Bin Ladin|__|
(b)(3) | The authorities provided
in the MON, calibrated by the handwritten language of the
President himself, restricted Masood to a capture attempt
during which Masood's forces, if they met resistance, might
kill UBL.

{S/F} The message of limited potential for (b)(3)

using Masood against Bin Ladin repeated itself on several
occasions over the period up until 9/11, despite CTC and
NE’s efforts to enhance Masoods capabilities. In October
1999, for example, Masood acknowledged to COS/UBL
Station that he had devoted little time to collecting on - -

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(U) The OIG 2001

¢ The Inspection. Team based its overall
dramatic improvement in CTC’s're
and the Federal Bureai
with CTC personnel. The
management of technolo;
involving UBI: Station.

The Inspection Team di
allocated or reallocated agai
was required of the 9/111

¢ The CTC Inspection di
Community. The 9/11

+5)-Some differences b
from distinct methodologies:
¢ The Inspection Team c ec

gathering strategy. Thi
enhanced search capabi

¢ The 9/11 Team-gained a
Hercules, as well a

e The9/11 Team reques
thereby gaining cons

Review Group,
teviewing material fro

UBL and conducte

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U) Interpreting the MONs

wide divergence of opinion (b)(1)
continues to.exist between CIA and former members of the (b)(3)
Clinton White House regarding the extent of the authorities
granted to CIA for dealing with Bin Ladin. NSC officials
assert emphatically that the Clinton Administration, in fact,
made obvious its desire for Bin Ladin to be killed. Former
National Security Advisor Berger, for example, repeating
sentiments he had expressed to the Joint Inquiry, told the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the

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from State Department cables; and one was not received at
all by the FAA until after 11 September 2001 (9/11).

(U) The JI report also states that, prior to 9/11, the
FAA itself had key intelligence information regarding
Ahmed Ressam—the terrorist apprehended on his way from
Canada to Los Angeles Airport at the time of the
Millennium—and that it might not have shared this
information with the IC. The FAA conducted a detailed
analysis of Ressam’s bomb materials and connected them
with the mid-1990s Bojinka Plot to blow up commercial
airliners over the Pacific. The report indicates that it is
unclear whether or not these findings were formally
communicated to the CIA.”

(U)' According to the JI report, the CIA and the
National Security Agency had sufficient information
available to connect al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi to
Usama Bin Ladin (UBL), the East Africa embassy bombings,
and the USS Cole by late 2000. It concludes that, on at least
three different occasions, these agencies should have placed
the two individuals on the State Department, Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), and Customs watchlists.
This was not done, nor was the FBI notified of their potential
presence in the United States until late August 2001.

(U) The JI states that the CIA also did not provide the
State Department with almost 1,500 terrorism-related reports
until shortly after 9/11. These reports led to the addition of
almost 60 names of terrorist suspects to the State
Department's watchlist.. Also, due to a lack of awareness of
watchlisting policies and procedures among CIA personnel
before 9/11, this information was not provided to INS and
Customs for their watchlists. Intelligence officers at the
Departments of Energy and Transportation also did not
have access to names on the watchlists. In his testimony, the
former DCI stated that CIA personnel had not understood

”” (U) The 9/11 Review Team's response to this Finding of the JI report focuses on CIA
information sharing with non-IC agencies, rather than the other way around. The Team searched
several reports databases, however, and fotind no indication this material was shared.

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overblown by the Joint Inquiry; he said that the DCI would
frequently cogitate about something over the weekend, then
come in and issue a memorandum.

ESHANFY The Plan. In the summer of 1999, the
operational plan of attack against al-Qa‘ida that would
become known as The Plan began to emerge. Elements of
The Plan were outlined in a 25 August 1999 cable from UBL
Station to the field bearing the subject line,

“Usama bin Ladin—The Way Ahead,” in which the then-
Chief of UBL Station sought to begin a dialogue between the
field and Headquarters on possible new approaches to
capturing Bin Ladin and disrupting his operations.

outlined strategies for targeting
Bin Ladin’s lieutenants|

* (U) The station established in January 1996 to target UBL was initially called TFL because of
Bin Ladin’s known status as a terrorist financier. It was later renamed UBL Station.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Moreover, these assets
were of questionable reliability and had limited
capabilities for achieving the desired results—a

debilitating combination. | | (b)(1)
(b)(3)

¢ Although CIA took a strict constructionist approach to
interpreting the MONs, it considered and experimented
with a number of covert action options for disrupting
al-Qa’ida and apprehending Bin Ladin within the

constraints of White House policy,
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
+S} The Team has covered several aspects of covert
action in its discussion of other findings. The Team
examines: .
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° (b)(3)
e
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With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HESHAH/ORCON-NOPORNAAR- (b)(3)

-FOP-SEGREF

a. Discussions with all liaison services who may have a
capability to capture and render Bin Ladin to justice.

b. Active and immediate efforts to ensure that we
are able to provide the military with timely and
accurate information for targeting purposes
against Bin Ladin himself and facilities, training
camps, etc. associated with him worldwide.

c. Immediate operational exploitation, planning and threat

warning) (b)(1)
(b)(3)

both unilaterally and in concert with liaison partners.

d. We must isolate liaison relations which have the potential for
greatest gain and recontact at senior levels. (b)(1)
(b)(3)

e. We need to immediately push the rest of the collection
community to make Bin Ladin and his infrastructure our top
priority. | want Charlie Allen to immediately:chair a meeting
with NSA, NIMA, CITO, and others - to ensure that we are
doing everything we can to meet CTC's requirements.

f. | want to know that we are pursuing all available
conventional and special collection methods to get after
Bin Ladin, his infrastructure, people and money.

g. (b)(1)
(b)(3)

etc. which may be of assistance to our efforts.

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ever created, despite his specific direction that this should be
done.

SHAME) The JI report discussed a persistent strain in
relations between CIA and the National Security Agency
(NSA) that impeded collaboration between the two agencies
in dealing with the terrorist challenge from al-Qa’ida. The
Team, likewise, found that significant differences existed
between CIA and NSA over their respective authorities. The
Team did not dccument in detail or take a position on the
merits of this disagreement, but notes that the differences
remained unresolved well into 2001 in spite of the fact that
considerable management attention was devoted to the
issue, including at the level of the Agency’s Deputy
Executive Director. Senior officers of the CIA and the IC
Management Staff stated that these interagency differences
had a negative impact on the IC’s ability to perform its
mission and that only the DCI’s vigorous personal
involvement could have led to a timely resolution of the
matter.

+~&- The Team recommends that an Accountability
Board review the performance of the former DCI for failing
to act personally to resolve the differences between CIA and
NSA in an effective and timely manner.

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings
2 (The DCI’s Role); 4 (Application of Technology); and 7
(Computer Exploitation) for discussion of these issues.

(U) Management of CIA’s Resources for Counterterrorism

+} Funding for the Agency’s counterterrorism
programs increased significantly from Fiscal Year (FY)1998
to FY 2001 as a result of supplemental appropriations. These
funds were appropriated, in part, because of the efforts of
the CIA’s Director and senior leaders to convince the
Administration and Congress that the Agency was short of
resources for counterterrorism and other key programs. The
Team preparing this report did not attempt to reach a

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(U) Accountability

(U) The Team’s examination of the facts and
circumstances surrounding this issue did not uncover an
instance where any CIA person’s individual performance
could be characterized as lacking. Best efforts were made to
pursue the target within the significant constraints imposed.

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Figure $3-7

Amal

it did not protect counterterrorism
programs against corporate-level taxes. During FY 1997-

2000 and FY 2001 before 9/11, the Agency reprogrammed a
net of | |million of CTC base funds to cover corporate
adjustments. To pay corporate taxes, the Agency salami-
sliced counterterrorism programs, among many others,
rather than cut entire programs.
| __|attempts to tax at a program level had not been
successful because it was more difficult and the Agency was
not good at cutting programs.
the first level of appeal to corporate

taxes was the directorate, which in CTC’s case would have
been the DO. Normally, a list of activities deemed:to be not
taxable was submitted and the CFO would try to honor such

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Despite the fact that KSM remained a top-priority rendition
target, the RB officer stated that KSM was on’a backburner
until after 9/11.

~E+ANF} It is clear from reviewing many of this
officer's cables that the focus of CTC’s effort on KSM was to
locate him and render him to justice. Numerous cables
referring to KSM’s frequent travels included a warning that
this was a dangerous individual, possibly traveling toa
location to organize a terrorist operation. The cables sought
intelligence on KSM’s travels, meetings, and actions so as to
help find him, but they did not seek to learn more about his
connections, intentions, and methods of operating. No one
in CTC ever pulled together these individual operational
cables into an assessment that might have contributed
insight into both KSM’s operations and those of al-Qa'ida.

4E+ANF} New CTC management moved UBL Station
and IEB under a single organizational umbrella, the Sunni
Extremist Group (SEG), in late 1999—in part to end the

tension and competition between the two. Responsibility for i
KSM remained in RB, however. (b)(7)(d)
[ ltold the Team that :

his group was overwhelmed with targets; since Renditions

Branch wanted to retain responsibility for KSM, he did not ‘
go to the mat on the issue. did (b)(7)(d)
not consider KSM an al-Qa’ida figure] KSM

was autonomous and not subordinate to UBL.

4€+/NE) The responses of senior CTC managers to
the JI’s questions about KSM suggested that they either were
not aware of or did not understand the impact of the
division of responsibilities. |

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

4S77NFY At least in some instances, however, the
Agency found that high-level delays impeded cooperation.

(U) “Boots on the Ground”

+~SHANP) Available evidence supports the JI report's
assertion that the CIA was unable to overcome the
opposition of the military leadership to putting US military
forces on the ground in Afghanistan prior to September 11.
The 9/11 Team interviews of those officers who were most
knowledgeable about CIA-DoD interactions are consistent
with comparable JI interviews and with the relevant
testimony. to the Joint Inquiry hearings.

-ESHANF) A key impediment—but certainly not the
only one—was CIA’s inability to provide intelligence with
the specificity demanded by the top military leadership. In
an August 1999 cable to the field, the Chief of Station (COS)

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principal lieutenants

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

linton Administration national security
Officials asserted the CIA had authority to kill UBL, knew
that the Administration wanted UBL dead, but was not
aggressive in using its authorities.

(b)(1)
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Li Finally, the JI report outlines the

TM" (U) Section 503 (50 U.S.C. 413b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, defines
covert action as “activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government
will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” Covert-action does not include traditional
intelligence, counterintelligence, security and law enforcement activities. The President must set
forth in a written “finding” his determination that the covert action supports identifiable foreign
policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United
States. A Memorandum of Notification, signed by the President, is required for any significant
change to a previously approved covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a
previously approved finding. These include circumstances involving the use of force, significant
tisk of injury or loss of life, significant US foreign policy considerations, increases in funding, or
involvement of new third parties.

*? (U) Executive Order No. 12333 of United States Intelligence Activities (December 4, 1981,

46 F.R. 59941) paragraph. 2.11, Prohibition on Assassination, states: “No person employed by or
acting on behalf of the United Sates government shall engage in, or-conspire to engage in,
assassination.”

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to protect instructional capability in core hard-target-
associated languages—particularly Arabic, Chinese, Farsi,
Korean, and Russian; it had difficulty finding instructors for
these languages, however, because OTE had no systematic:
recruiting procedures for language instructors and could not

(b)(1) pay salaries beyond a certain threshold. LTD’s nonpersonal

(b)(3) services (NPS) training budget dropped from| million in
FY.1998tol iin FY 1999, increased to| _|million in
FY 2000,thendroppedto—_jin FY 2001." Faced with
the prospect of increased costs because of the anticipated
movement of the language program into the WCF, a number
of DO and DI managers, whose officers comprised most of
LTD’s customer base, examined their requirements and
opted to use commercial language schools.“

“SHASF} Despite the budgetary roller coaster, CIA
University officials state that they generally met Agency
demands for language training."” They told us that, until
2001, the number of students planning for overseas
assignments and enrolled in full-time language training
‘remained constant. | |

(b)(1)
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|OTE was
able to increase staff positions by 40 percent after a hiring
freeze was lifted in April 2001.

SHAN} The Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS)—the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

"*(U) Ultimately, language training did not become part of the WCF.

"“46}-The CIA University officials noted that the Language Institute often could not meet
requests for customized training in cases in which'students had existing proficiency or had
schedules that conflicted with established Language Institute schedules.

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(b)(1)
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(U) Determining Bin Ladin’s Wealth

4¢SHANF} During the years prior to 9/11, analysis of
UBL’s financial assets was focused in the DI’s Office of
Transnational Issues (OTI). Analysts in this office prepared
six Intelligence Reports (IR) along these lines during 1998-
2000.” Many of these were prepared at the request of the
NSC. In addition to the NSC, recipients of this analysis
included Treasury, the FBI, and the State Department.

+SAANB) Such analysis was difficult. (b)(1)
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*®4€} In addition, prior to 9/11, the DCI Counternarcotics Center also issued several papers that
discussed UBL’s role in the narcotics trade.

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fopsecrer
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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 1: MEETING THE GLOBAL
TERRORIST CHALLENGE

(U) Systemic Finding 1 of the Joint Inquiry (JI) Report
states that, “Prior to September 11, the Intelligence
Community was neither well organized nor equipped, and
did not adequately adapt, to meet the challenge posed by
global terrorists focused on targets within the domestic
United States. Serious gaps existed between the collection
coverage provided by US foreign and US domestic
intelligence capabilities. The US foreign intelligence
agencies paid inadequate attention to the potential for a
domestic attack. The CIA’s failure to watchlist suspected
terrorists aggressively reflected a lack of emphasis on a
process designed to protect the homeland from the terrorist
threat. Asa result, CIA employees failed to watchlist
al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. At home, the counterterrorism
effort suffered from the lack of an effective domestic
intelligence capability. The FBI was unable to identify and
monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qa’ida and
other international terrorist groups operating in the United
States. Taken together, these problems greatly exacerbated
the nation’s vulnerability to an increasingly dangerous and
immediate international terrorist threat inside the United
States.”

(U) This finding serves to sum up many of the JI’s
overall conclusions. Accordingly, the Office of Inspector
General's 9/11 Review Team examines this finding’s broad
range of issues in the remaining systemic findings as well as
in several of the factual findings already addressed.

!

(U) Accountability

(U) The Team does not address accountability issues
for this broad finding but instead addresses accountability
matters, where pertinent, with regard to the specific
systemic findings that follow.

June 2005

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analysts devoted to following al-Qa'ida was too small.
That said, it also indicates that CTC refused to accept
offers of analytic help from the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA).

* In terms of analytic experience, the report critiques the
relatively junior status of CTC analysts, claiming that, on
average, they had only three years of analytic experience
in contrast to eight years for analysts in the DI as a
whole. It notes that CTC did not have enough qualified
analysts to produce in-depth analysis.

+}-The Joint Inquiry Report further states that CIA
analysis on al-Qa’‘ida was oriented toward the tactical rather
than the strategic. For example, the National Intelligence
Council produced no National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
on al-Qa’ida. The Report claims that this focus on the crisis
de jour meant that analysts had no time to spot trends. It.
quotes the Director of CTC’s Office of Terrorism Analysis
(OTA)—the post-9/11 successor to AIG—as acknowledging
that strategic research production had remained flat prior to
9/11 but that CTC had recognized its shortcomings and was
taking steps to address them. The Report also quotes the
testimony of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to the
Joint Inquiry: “:..the strategic analytical part of this has to
be big and vibrant to give you the chance to be predictive...”

4S} The narrative makes additional claims about
analysis, including:

¢ That analyst opinion was given no weight, especially
among operations officers, who allegedly did not like to
take direction “from the ladies from the Directorate of
Intelligence.” :

¢ That CIA was reluctant to provide raw data to analysts
outside the Agency. For example, it says that DIA stated
that it did not see the operations traffic on the

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unsuccessful, according to a review of cable traffic related to
the project. |
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for UBL Station noted that, “There has been much interest in
pursuing an operatio: At.
this time, however,

We met with
ion 18 August to

review requirements Bottom line; if we
can collect sufficient data on a particular] (b)(1)

(b)(3)

SH ANFY CIA did not push the military on this
count:

e According to an earlier COS/UBL Station, CTC did not
ask for military forces on the ground during his tenure
(through mid-1999). He said that it was clear all along
that the “military didn’t want to play very strongly” in
Afghanistan operations. He said CTC repeatedly asked
the military for two special operations specialists—a
planner and an analyst—but the military had no interest
in sending them.

June 2005

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desire to protect sources and methods. Indeed, detailees
from FBI and from other agencies in CTC had complete
access to the operational traffic; these individuals share
the responsibility of passing it to their agencies. As such,
the Team concludes that the breakdown resulted from
the failure of both CIA and FBI officers to focus
sufficiently on the important passport, visa, and travel
information contained in the cable traffic of early 2000
and to pass this information to the relevant agencies in
the appropriate manner.

Disagrees that legal and other restrictions prevented the
CIA from providing to the FBI’s New York Field Office
information regarding the al-Qa’ida meeting in Malaysia.
Rather, the failure to turn this information over to the FBI
reflected the broader failure by UBL Station, including its
FBI detailees, and of other CTC officers to ensure passage
of information to the relevant agencies; the breakdown
was one of process, not policy or. intent.

The Team addresses information sharing involving the
Malaysia operation in Factual Finding 5.b.

(U) Vehicles for Sharing Information

(U) Intelligence Community leaders have long

understood the importance of sharing information among
agencies and have made numerous, good-faith efforts to
facilitate the flow of information. CIA and NSA, in
particular, have had long records of preparing and issuing
their reporting to a wide array of customers, using a variety
of vehicles, including:

Exchanges of detailees.
Partnering.
Creation of processes and products.

Establishment of interagency forums.

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against Bin Ladin while he slept. Recollections vary slightly
in detail but agree on the most important point: the outcome
of the meeting. The CIA presented its information derived
from the tribal assets. CTC appeared confident that the
information was accurate, initially offering an estimate of
75-percent reliability; under questioning from the National
Security Advisor, however, it lowered the estimate to

50 percent. According to one participant, in response to
concerns from some Principals about the potential for killing
innocent civilians, the military presented two estimates that
diverged greatly on the anticipated extent of the collateral
damage. One participant recalls that the JCS J-2 asserted
that the coll. 1 wi lerable. Then officers
from the gave numbers (b)(1)
perhaps three times as high as those from the J-2.” In the
end, the session ended with the decision not to act. The DCI
in his testimony later said that, in this case, as in others
where policymakers contemplated missile attacks against
Bin Ladin, information on the Saudi terrorist’s location was
based on a single thread of intelligence, and they made the
decision that it was not good enough. Others told the Team
that the estimated collateral damage was also an important
factor.

454 NFP Meanwhile, the tribal assets’

schedule for a capture operation continued to slip.

(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

The disappointments regarding
capturing or killing Bin Ladin persisted in 1999 despite :
vigorous pursuit by UBLStations| | (OC)
in early February, Bin Ladin and his (b)(3)

74S+¢NF} The ADCI for Collection recalls that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pulled
out charts estimating a high number of deaths and injuries and that he said the proponents of
launching the missiles “want me to kill 600 people.”

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be possible.” Although the then-DDCI told the Team
that he did not recall what he had done in response to
this tasking, te Team found evidence that he did chair at
least one IC-wide meeting. Meetings with more limited
participation and chaired by the CIA’s Executive Director
soon replaced this forum, however.” Discussions at
these meetings were largely operational in nature, and
did not include important elements that might have
made them more comprehensive.” For example, the
absence of representatives from the offices responsible
for analysis, finances, and personnel resources, as well as
from the broader Intelligence Community, meant these
meetings could not benefit from their perspectives or be
informed by analytic or resource considerations. The
9/11 Team was unable to establish whether the DCI was
aware of the nature of these meetings, but it found no
evidence that he did anything to follow up on this
tasking.”

¢ The second was a tasking to develop an “integrated plan
which captures these elements and others which may be
appropriate.” It is unclear whether the operational plan
that became known as The Plan emerged out of this Call-
to-War tasking. On the one hand, the DCI told the Joint
Inquiry Committee that The Plan resulted from his
request in “early 1999” for a baseline review of CIA's
operational strategy against Bin Ladin. On the other
hand, a CIA response to a Question for the Record
following the DCI’s testimony stated that this request
stemmed from the Declaration of War. However,
precursors of The Plan date to November 1998—a month
before the Declaration of War—when the then | (b)(1)
(b)(3)

*(U) Attendance at these meetings was limited to the Chief and Deputy Chief of CTC, the

ADCI/MS and ADCI/C, the DCI’s Counselor, and the DDO or ADDO.

“(U) The Team requested, but did not receive, copies of minutes of these meetings; the Team

was unable to determine whether minutes for these meetings were recorded. The Team relies on

its interview with the former Executive Director for this information.

“(U) At the same time, the DCI was reportedly chairing meetings with the heads of IC agencies

every two weeks and, while counterterrorism was discussed, it was certainly not the.sole focus of

these meetings. Accordingto. ————S—SCS=S “nobody dropped everything for terrorism; (b)(7)(d)
other serious issues abounded. Terrorism was a priority to be sure, but still relative to other

concerns.”

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agencies with intelligence and analysis on terrorist financing
prior to 9/11.

#5|___| In regard to the CIA-specific issues
raised in the JI report, the Team:

¢ Concurs that the Agency failed to successfully attack
Bin Ladin’s money, but not for a lack of trying.

¢ Disagrees that the Agency did not assess the extent or
nature of Bin Ladin’s financial resources.

e Agrees that bureaucratic obstacles and legal restrictions
inhibited the partnership with the Department of the
Treasury from reaching its full potential.

Disagrees that the CIA did not|

' (U) Efforts to Attack Bin Ladin’s Money

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with counterterrorism in the period before 9/11.” The CCB
was expected to:

e Serve as the Executive Secretariat for the Interagency
Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT)—the
interagency forum created in April 1997 for coordination
and cooperation on counterterrorism-related intelligence

' activities—and directed the activities of the IICT’s seven
subcommittees, which dealt with discrete issues. The '
IICT consisted of nearly 50 intelligence, law enforcement,
defense, security, and regulatory agencies. Any US
Government organization with a legitimate counter-
terrorism or antiterrorism interest was eligible to join and
participate in the Committee’s two monthly meetings—
one on warning and one’‘on general issues.

e Manage the Community Terrorist Threat Warning
System, which coordinated Community
terrorismwarnings and assessments prepared by
members of the five key agencies (State/INR, NSA, CIA,
DIA, and FBI).

_¢ Manage the DCI’s Terrorism Warning Group (TWG).
The TWG produced Terrorist Threat Assessments and
Advisories—analytic products drafted by IC analysts and
coordinated within the IC—designed to provide senior
civilian and military policymakers with strategic and
tactical warning of impending foreign terrorist attacks on
US persons, facilities, and interests.’ Once the TWG,
which relied heavily on CTC analysts, authored a threat
assessment, every agency in the IICT coordinated on the
final version.

e Organize Community analytic exchanges with other
governments.

"® (U) With the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) after 9/11, the CCB was

folded into TTIC.
TM(U) See Systemic Finding 5 for discussion of the CCB’s intelligence production on

, counterterrorism.

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©} The Tribal Assets

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<S/+/NFY After Bin Ladin moved to Afghanistan in
May 1996 and settled in Taliban-controlled Kandahar
Province in the spring of 1997, CIA used a group of Afghan
tribal assets as its principal source of information about
Bin Ladin’s location. The Agency had utilized these assets
previously in its efforts to find and bring to justice
Mir Aimal:Kansi, who had attacked and killed CIA
employees in front of CIA Headquarters in January 1993. As
it turned out, however, these assets were never strong, well
placed, and multifaceted enough to provide the intelligence
needed to convince policymakers that they had a firm basis
for a US military attack. The assets’ weaknesses were
manifest in an apparent lack of capability or an
unwillingness to carry out US plans and in an absence of
asset depth for both reporting and action. These problems,
in turn, gradually eroded confidence in the assets’
capabilities and credibility at Headquarters and elsewhere in
Washington, making US cruise missile attacks based on
asset-supplied information increasingly unlikely.

+54 A Rough Start. In April 1997, NE and

CTC officers decided that should ask the
senior Afghan tribal asset to use his villagers to collect
information on Bin Ladin. By the end of May the Station
reported that the tribal assets were eager to begin
[ | At the same time,

~ UBL Station outlined its end goal for the operation: use the
tribal network to capture UBL and bring him to justice

“S+ANF} Questions about the capabilities of the tribal
assets and subsources to execute a plan and about the

ttustworthiness and accuracy of their reporting on Bin Ladin
began to appear in the fall of 1997.

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time that the NIC normally took to revisit such broad
topics.

Unlike the case involving many other estimates, no
policymaker had requested such a study. Indeed, none
had requested the 1995 estimate; former DCI Woolsey
had asked the NIC to produce that NIE. Similarly, no
policymaker had requested the NIE that was in process
as of 9/11, despite the NIC’s fishing expeditions for such
requestors.

+{S+ANE} The post-1997 delay in initiating another

NIC estimative product focusing on the terrorist threat to the
United States is striking, given:

Despite divesting other aspects of counterterrorism
analysis from the NIC, the 1989 decision on IC
responsibility for counterterrorism reaffirmed the NIC’s
role in producing estimates on the subject.

The major terrorist incidents that occurred in the
following years, including Bin Ladin’s February 1998
fatwa against the United States, the August 1998 African
embassy bombings, and the October 2000 USS Cole
bombing.

The resulting increase in understanding of the threat
posed by al-Qa’ida, which the NIC’s 1997 IC Brief only
touched upon.

The 1997 IC Brief’s statement that “The Intelligence
Community believes the danger of additional foreign
terrorist attacks on US soil will persist over the next two
years,” along with the pattern established with the 1997
Brief following up on the Estimate from two years earlier,
which implies a re-examination in 1999.

The fact that no other IC entity was undertaking any
comparable broad assessment of the terrorist threat to the
United States.

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[sid Following the Cole bombing,.the

number increased to five, where it remained until 9/11.

e In addition, analytic coverage of al-Qa'ida grew in other

AIG branches. On the basis of CTC’s response to a July
2002 Congressional query, the equivalent of 29 AIG
analysts worked on al-Qa’ida in AIG’s|

branches as of August 2001, compared with only six in
August 1998.” This would mean that the proportion of
AIG analysts working on al-Qa’ida grew from 24 percent
to 83 percent during the period. However, an
examination of production topics suggests that AIG was
devoting a greater percentage of its work force to other
terrorist organizations in the year prior to 9/11 than its
statistics would suggest. Forty percent of the Intelligence
Reports (IRs) that AIG produced during the period
September 2000-August 2001 focused on al-Qa’ida or

Bin Ladin, according to AIG’s IR Log, and all of the
articles and most of the highlights that appear in the
CIALink version of CTC’s Terrorism Review during this
period cover issues other than al-Qa‘ida. Moreover,
about three-quarters of the pieces for the Senior
Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) that AIG did during
the six months prior to 9/11 covered terrorist groups
other than al-Qa‘ida, such as Hizballah.

¢ The number of DI analysts working on al-Qa’ida outside

(b)(1)
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of CTC also increased in the three years prior to 9/11. In
response to the mid-2002 Congressional query, the DI
indicated it had devoted the equivalent of almost eight
analysts to-al-Qa’ida in September 1998 and that this
increased to 15 in August 2001. The largest
concentrations of these analysts were in the| _|

| _|Group of the Office of Transnational Issues
(OTI) and the Issue in the Office of Near

Eastern and South Asian Analysis (NESA). However, an
examination of production records causes the Team to

""4€} CTC actually reported the equivalent of nine analysts in September 1998 and 33:8 in
August 2001. From these, we have subtracted the three and five analysts, respectively, working

in at those times.

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redirected to programs that were most likely not
counterterrorism.’” For example:

b)(1 .
rates ¢ InFY 1999, the Agency redirected million of
counterterrorism funds to th

infrastructure, million to the former Directorate of

(b)(1) Administration’s Business Process Reengineering,
(b)(3) to security background investigations, and
million to multiple Information Management Staff

programs; the latter came from CTC’s CACTIS program,

¢ In FY 2000, CTC paid over| million in nonspecific
corporate "taxes".
(b)(1)
(b)(3) * In FY 2001, the Agency redirected|_| million of
. counterterrorism funds from the Office of Technical
Collection to the Directorate of Science and Technology's
Working Capital Fund rent, another _|million to
Directorate executive training and miscellaneous
contracts,and|_—_|to help fund million write-
off for an NE Division erroneous paymen

” (U) These programs were not on the list of counterterrorism programs provided to the Team
by the CFO's office.

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these. | (b)(1)

 - Agrees that the IC had no central database that included
all information relevant to counterterrorism. We note,
however, that the JI report fails to mention systems such
as the Community Automated Counter Terrorism
Information System (CACTIS) and Counterterrorism-
Link (CT-Link) that CIA had in place as early as 1995 and
that were designed to link the Community.

¢ . Disagrees with the JI’s charge that the CIA was reluctant
to develop and implement new technical capabilities
aggressively. The CIA made vigorous attempts to
leverage technology against al-Qa'ida. Indeed, the
Agency demonstrated an impressive degree of creativity
in its exploration of alternative solutions, although it was
not always as successful in implementing them. The JI
appears to disparage CIA’s technology efforts by
characterizing them as “seemingly robust” and
evidencing the DDS&T’s retrospective comment. The
team does not feel the DDS&T’s remark was intended to,
or did, invalidate the number and variety of programs
developed.

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. Disagrees with the JI’s characterization of CIA’s and

The 9/11 Team found that the two systems
were needed because of different requirements.

(U) CIA-NSA: A Problematic Relationship”

-€PS77NFJ The difficult relationship between CIA and
NSA was longstanding. More than half of the CIA officers

TM (U) During the final review of this draft, the Team discussed the relevant findings herein with
various senior NSA legal, operations, and technology officials.

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1S} RELATED FINDING 20: ISSUES RELATING
TO SAUDI ARABIA

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focusing on operations is critically important and does not
necessarily mean that other elements of mission will be
ignored, the Team found that this nearly exclusive focus—
which resulted in many operational successes—had a
negative impact on CTC’s effectiveness as a coordinator of
IC counterterrorism strategy. The Team found that the most
effective interagency effort against UBL was that of the
Assistant DCI for Collection, who, from the early months of
1998 to 9/11, worked with representatives of several
intelligence agencies to stimulate collection.

+544} In the years leading up to 9/11, the DCI
worked hard and with some success, at the most senior
levels of government, to secure additional budgetary
resources to rebuild the CIA and the IC. At the same time,
the Team found that he did not use his senior position and
unique authorities to work with the National Security
Council to elevate the relative standing of counterterrorism
in the formal ranking of intelligence priorities, or to alter the
deployment of human and financial resources across
agencies in a coordinated approach to the terrorism target.
While the nature of the IC makes the mission of managing it
problematic and difficult, the DCI at the time had.some
authority to move manpower and funds among agencies.
The Team found that, in the five years prior to 9/11, the DCI
on six occasions used these authorities to move almost
| million in funds from other agencies to the CIA fora

number of important purposes,
| One of these transfers helped fund a

Middle East program that was terrorism-related, but none
supported programs designed to counter UBL or al-Qa'ida.
Nor were DCI authorities used to transfer any personnel into
these programs in the five years prior to 9/11.

+~CHANF} The Team notes that the former DCI
recognized the need for an integrated, interagency plan, and
believes that such a plan was needed to mobilize all of the
operational, analytic, and resource capabilities of the IC to
enable the several agencies of the Community to work
cooperatively and with maximum effectiveness against
al-Qa’ida. At the same time, the Team concludes that the
former DCI, by virtue of his position, bears ultimate
responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was

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(U) Assessment of the Finding

(U) The Office of Inspector General 9/11 Review
Team concurs with the main points of the JI finding.

+~S+/NFHIn regard to the 9/11 hijackers’ finances,
subsequent investigation indicates that the terrorists began
funding their operation nearly two years in advance.
According to Counterterrorist Center (CTC) analysts, the 19
hijackers opened 24 US-based checking accounts; each
hijacker had at least one account in his name, and three were
jointly held. Funding for the accounts originated in the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), but the terrorists used
facilitators in Germany to obscure this. While in the United
States, the hijackers dealt almost exclusively in cash or debit
cards and kept their transactions below $10,000. According
toofficersinCTC, ————~SCSS=sStotth ing the
hijackers’ financial behavior would have raised a red flag at
that time. |

+~E+ANF; As for the lack of a coordinated US
Government strategy on terrorist funding, the Team found
no evidence of such a strategy, although we did not examine
the issue fully, considering it outside our scope. The Team
does believe, however, that CIA was providing other federal

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reporting. |

+€y Although the CIA used many vehicles to inform
the policymakers of the threat, CTC analysts did not write
any Intelligence Report (IR) or similar product during the
late spring or summer that provided any assessment of the
overall threat. IRs earlier in the year warned of threats in
Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Yemen; between mid-May 2001
and 9/11, however, CTC wrote no IRs that provided a
comprehensive analysis of all the threats being received or
that put the then-current warning environment in context.
In fact, the few IRs that CTC wrote during the late spring
and summer of 2001 included no threat warnings at all.

(U) Accountability

(U) The Team makes no recommendation concerning
accountability in regard to this finding. However, the Team
notes that the failure to provide a broad assessment that
pulled together all the threat information received during
spring and summer 2001 is part of the broader problem of
inadequate comprehensive strategic analysis, which the
Team assesses in its discussion of Systemic Finding 5.

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sharing such information. |_Jargued that UBL Station (b)(7)(d)
was not at the same level as a field station and thus did
not have the same responsibility.

° One said that such information would be (b)(7)(d)
given to the detailee, or the Station would do a CIR,

although the FBI did not act on many CIRs.

¢ . Another | [stated that Station officers gave the (b)(7)(d)
information to the FBI representative in the station or to
the CIA representative at the FBI through an informal
process.

+57 7NFY In spite of the apparent confusion, UBL
Station had an impressive record of sending CIRs to other
agencies. As noted in the discussion of Factual Finding 5b,
from 1 January 1998 through 10 September 2001, UBL
Station produced over 1,000 CIRs—about one-third of the
CIRs that CTC initiated during that period—according to.a
review of cables in the Hercules database. The vast majority
of these went to the FBI; in many cases the Bureau was the
only external recipient. A number of the CIRs alerted the
FBI to terrorists’ or terrorist associates’ actual or intended
travel to the United States.

+4S+/NEF} The FBI detailees to UBL Station drafted
about one-fifth of the Station’s CIRs during this period,
demonstrating that they considered writing CIRs to be
among their responsibilities. While one FBI detailee stated
that detailees wrote CIRs only on issues for which they were
responsible, the Team’s review of CIRs in Hercules indicates
that detailees also wrote CIRs on issues that were not part of
their own accounts.

(U) Interagency Forums

(U) The Community Coordination Board (CCB),
which functioned administratively within CTC, was the
most significant working-level interagency group dealing

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(U) FACTUAL FINDING 5.1: KHALID SHAYKH
MOHAMMED

(574NF) Factual Finding 5.i of the Joint Inquiry (JI)
report states that, “Prior to September 11, the Intelligence
Community had information linking Khalid Shaykh
Mohammed (KSM), now recognized by the Intelligence
Community as the mastermind of the attacks, to Bin Ladin,
to terrorist plans to use aircraft as weapons, and to terrorist
activity in the United States. The Intelligence Community,
however, relegated KSM to rendition target status following
his 1996 indictment in connection with the Bojinka Plot and,
as a result focused primarily on his location, rather than his

‘activities and place in the al-Qa’ida hierarchy. The
Community also did not recognize the significance of
reporting in June 2001 concerning KSM’s active role in
sending terrorists to the United States, or the facilitation of
their activities upon arriving in the United States. Collection
efforts were not targeted on information about KSM that
might have helped better understand al-Qa’ida’s plans and
intentions, and KSM’s role in the September 11 attacks was a
surprise to the Intelligence Community.”

(U) Joint Inquiry Discussion

4S+ANF} The JI report further states that information
that the Intelligence Community (IC) obtained after
September 11, 2001 (9/11) identified Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad (KSM)*—also known as Mukhtar “the Brain,”
Khaled, Pacha, Sheikh Khalid, Khalid al-Shaykh al-Ballushi,
and Muhammad Nabi, among other names—as the
mastermind of the attacks. Before 9/11, KSM had played a
major role in several Islamic extremist plots that were
notable for the large number of casualties they sought to, the
use of airplanes, and their focus on symbolic targets.

*(U) Following FBIS transliteration guidelines, the Team uses the spelling “Muhammad”
instead of “Mohammed.”

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+4€+ANF} Other data collected during the Team’s

interviews provide possible insight as to why UBL Station
personnel felt overwhelmed and overworked. Several UBL

' Station personnel told the Team that other responsibilities,
such.as preparing charts and providing briefings to senior
Agency management on a daily basis took time away from
conducting their normal activities. In addition, a few UBL
personnel expressed the sentiment that it was stressful
working in an environment where decisions might make the
difference between life and death. Although the Team
cannot assess the impact of this perception, it is reasonable
to assume that it would contribute to employees’ feelings of
being overwhelmed.

+C+ANF) Inexperienced Officers. Before 9/11,
CTC’s ability to attract and retain experienced personnel was
hampered by the perception that working in CTC was not
career enhancing.” For example, a former CTC reports
officer stated that DO trainers would warn Clandestine
Service Trainees (CSTs) not to go to a center because they
would not be promoted or receive overseas assignments. A
former CTC plans officer stated that CTC was always
looking for people—especially operations officers—and in
the 2000 timeframe still had to convince CSTs that CTC was
a good place to work. CTC’s reputation as an intense and
stressful center that required its officers to work long hours
did not help its recruitment efforts.

+€+ANF) UBL Station officers had a positive
perception of their own capabilities and expertise. In their
responses to the survey conducted for the inspection of CTC
in 2001, 79 percent of Station personnel said they believed
their work unit had the appropriate skills mix to accomplish
its mission, about the same as CTC respondents (77 percent)
and higher than the response for the Agency as a whole
(71 percent). More recent Team interviews indicated that
Station personnel continued to hold this opinion.

+~€+ANF} In contrast, the Team’s interview data
indicate that many DO officers believed UBL Station

? (UY) See Systemic Finding 5 for more on the expertise and skill mix of CTC/AIG analysts.

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group of assets, who were of questionable reliability and had
limited capabilities, proved insufficient to mount a credible
operation against Bin Ladin. Efforts to develop other
options had limited potential prior to 9/11.

64S The Joint Inquiry (b)(1)
states that US military officials were reluctant to use military (b)(3)
assets to conduct operations in Afghanistan or to support or
participate in CIA operations against al-Qa'ida prior to 9/11.

At least in part, this was a result of the IC’s inability to

provide the necessary intelligence to support military

operations. The findings of the Team match those of the JI as

they relate to the CIA. The Agency was unable to satisfy the

demands of the US military for the precise, actionable

intelligence that the military leadership required in order to \
deploy US troops on the ground in Afghanistan or launch !
cruise missile attacks against UBL-related sites beyond the :
August 1998 retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan.

Differences between CIA and the Department of Defense

over the cost of replacing lost Predators also hampered

collaboration over the use of that platform in Afghanistan.

The Team concludes, however, that other impediments,

including the slow-moving policy process, reduced the

importance of these CIA-military differences. The Team

believes CIA handled its relationship with the US military

responsibly and within the bounds of what was reasonable

and possible.

The Joint Inquiry charges that the CIA (b)(1)
failed to attack UBL’s finances and failed to work (b)(3)
cooperatively with the Department of the Treasury to .
develop leads and establish links to other terrorist funding
sources. The Team, likewise, found that CIA failed to attack
Bin Ladin’s money successfully but finds that this was not
for lack of effort. |

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

The Team also agrees that bureaucratic
obstacles and legal restrictions inhibited CIA’s partnership
with the Department of the Treasury.

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(b)(1)
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(b)(7)(d)

HUMINT emphasis was on pinpointing the location of
UBL and his principal lieutenants in Afghanistan so as to
capture and render them to law enforcement authorities.
As a consequence, the report suggests that CIA did not
focus as heavily as it could have on recruiting relevant

sources in other locations fo

Value of walk-ins.””|

Dirty asset rules.”" CTC personnel told the JI that they
did not view guidelines issued by former Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) John Deutch in 1996
concerning CIA recruitment of human sources with poor
human rights records or who had committed proscribed
acts as an impediment to pursuit of terrorist recruitments
in al-Qa’ida. Nonetheless, the JI was skeptical, noting.
that a July 2002 report of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Terrorism
and Homeland Security found that CIA officers in the
field did feel constrained by these guidelines.”

* (U) For simplicity, we use the term walk-ins to refer to volunteers who walk in, call in, or write
in offering to provide information of value.
TM457+4F} Dirty asset rules is the shorthand description for regulations that govern the

operational use of agents tainted by criminal acts or involvement in human rights abuses.

TM(U) US House of Representatives, Permanent Select Comniittee on Intelligence, Subcommittee
on Terrorism and Homeland Security, Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance
Prior to 9-11, dated 17 July 2002, pp. 27-29.

June 2005

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writing. The Team recommends that an Accountability
Board review the performance of the two Chiefs of CTC
during the years before 9/11 concerning their oversight of
the Center’s practices in management of the detailee

program.

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Factual Finding 5b
(The Watchlisting Failure) and Systemic Findings 9
(Information Sharing Within the IC) and 10 (Information
Sharing with Non-IC Members) for elaboration on these
issues.

(U) Strategic Analysis

+5} The Team, like the JI, found that the IC’s
understanding of al-Qa’ida was hampered by insufficient
analytic focus, particularly regarding strategic analysis. The
Team asked three individuals who had served as senior
intelligence analysts and managers to conduct an
independent review of the Agency’s analytic products
dealing with UBL and al-Qa’ida for the period from 1998 to
2001 and assess their quality. They found that, while CTC’s
tradecraft was generally good, important elements were
missing. Discussion of implications was generally weak, for
example. Most important, a number of important issues
were covered insufficiently or not at all. The Team found:

¢ No comprehensive strategic assessment of al-Qa’ida by
CTC or any other component.

¢ Nocomprehensive report focusing on UBL since 1993.
e No examination of the potential for terrorists to use
aircraft as weapons, as distinguished from traditional

hijackings.

¢ Limited analytic focus on the United States as a potential
target.

¢ No comprehensive analysis that put into context the
threats received in the spring and summer of 2001.

June 2005

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(U). Ahmad Shah Masood

(b)(3)

Already in 1998 it was apparent to
many at Headquarters that the heavy dependence ona
single source for locational information on Bin Ladin and for
attempts to capture or kill him and his lieutenants was a
major handicap. It weakened CTC’s ability to win approval
for US military action, and it was an impediment to
validating the reporting that it was getting from)

Moreover, the repeated failure of the
act raised the possibility that they would never be able to
. make a serious move against UBL. Thus, by the end of 1998,
CTC moved to consider other alternatives, including
Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad Shah Masood.

CTC had established a relationshi

with Masood|

|The CIA had long
tracked Masood’s activities in the Afghan struggle against
the Soviets during which Masood had distinguished himself.
Still, Masood's overall track record rendered a mixed picture
[On the one hand, as Chief/CTC
wrote in December 2000, “Masood will only cooperate with
the CIA when the CIA’s and Masood’s interests overlap.”
Masood also had limited capability to capture or kill
Bin Ladin, having suffered debilitating setbacks, including
loss of Kabul, in the war with the Taliban. His area of
strength and control was in the Panjshir Valley, and thus
remote from Bin Ladin's most frequent location.. CIA also
had what it judged to be reliable reporting implicating
|On the other
hand, Masood had unique virtues as an ally of the United
States against Bin Ladin. During the course of the Afghan
civil war, he became the last leader opposed to the Taliban
who retained control of a significant amount of territory
inside Afghanistan. In addition, his territory was accessible
from outside of Afghanistan and offered expanded
possibilities for the CIA to conduct various operations
directed against the al-Qa'ida leadership.

June 2005

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HES/SH+ORCON-NOFORN AER: With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks —_()(3)

Concerning certain issues, the Team concluded that the
Agency and its officers did not discharge their
responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. As a result, the
Inspector General recommends that the Director, Central
Intelligence Agency establish an Accountability Board made
up of individuals who are not employees of the Agency to
review the performance of some individuals and assess their
potential accountability.

(U) In its deliberations, the Team used a “reasonable
person” approach and relied on Agency regulations—which
are subjective—concerning standards of accountability. A
discussion of those regulations is included in the Foreword.
While the Team found that many officers performed their
responsibilities in an exemplary fashion, it did not
recommend individuals for additional recognition because
these officers already have been rewarded.

(U) The Team found no instance in which an
employee violated the law, and none of the errors discussed
herein involves misconduct. Rather, the review focuses on
areas where individuals did not perform their duties in a
satisfactory manner; that is, they did not—with regard to the
specific issue or issues discussed—act “in accordance with a
reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence,” as
required by Agency regulation. On occasion, the Team has
found that a specific officer was responsible for a particular
action or lack of action, but has not recommended that an
Accountability Board review the officer’s performance. Such
a conclusion reflects the Team’s view that extenuating
circumstances mitigate the case.

(U) The findings of greatest concern are those that
identify systemic problems where the Agency’s programs or
processes did not work as they should have, and concerning
which a number of persons were involved or aware, or
should have been. Where the Team found systemic failures,
it has recommended that an Accountability Board assess the
performance and accountability of those managers who, by
virtue of their position and authorities, might reasonably
have been expected to oversee and correct the process. In
general, the fact that failures were systemic should not
absolve responsible officials from accountability.

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4SHANPY cable of 28 August

2001

|to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad as Mukhtar|

The Team found no evidence

of reaction to this information
individuals before 9/11.

‘rom any of these units or

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(U) SYSTEMIC FINDING 10: INFORMATION
SHARING WITH NON-IC MEMBERS

(U). Systemic Finding 10 of the Joint Inquiry (JI)
report states that, “Serious problems in information sharing
also persisted, prior to September 11, between the
Intelligence Community and relevant non-Intelligence \
Community agencies. This included other federal agencies ,
as well as state and local authorities. This lack of
communication and collaboration deprived those other
entities, as well as the Intelligence Community, of access to
potentially valuable information in the ‘war’ against
Bin Ladin. The Inquiry’s focus on the Intelligence
Community limited.the extent to which it explored this
issue, and this is an area that should be reviewed further.”

(U) The report goes on to state that, at each level,
communications with potentially valuable partners in the
war against terrorism, including other federal agencies and
state and local authorities, were restricted. Officials in the
Departments of Treasury, Transportation, and State told the
Joint Inquiry that, although they received threat information
from the Intelligence Community (IC), this often lacked
context, limiting their ability to estimate the value of the
information and take preventive action. In addition, the
report indicates that the IC did not share all of its threat
information with the non-IC entities that needed it the most.

(U) For example, the former Director of Central
Intelligence testified that, overa seven-year period, CIA had
disseminated to the appropriate agenicies—such as the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—some 12 reports pertaining to
possible use of aircraft as terrorist weapons. Subsequently,
the JI report says, the Transportation Security Intelligence
Service (TSIS)—formerly the Intelligence Office at FAA—
researched the 12 reports to determine what actions had
been taken. TSIS reported that it had no record of having
received three of those reports; two others had been derived

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office that collects, translates, and analyzes foreign media—
also was dealing with the general CIA downsizing. In1996,
top Agency managers determined that FBIS had not
implemented enough cuts and ordered it to undergo larger
budget reductions. Between 1996 and 1999, FBIS’s budget
had declined by 33 percent and 86 positions had been cut. It
is unclear how many of the 86 positions included staff
linguists or if linguists filling those positions were absorbed
by other Agency offices. In addition, while the OIG FBIS
Inspection of 2000 noted that FBIS funds had not been
protected, FBIS did receive additional non-personal services
funds for technological development and to underwrite
some of its downsizing costs. Moreover, FBIS benefited
from counterterrorism supplemental funds and, in FY 1997,
a $3 million add back. Furthermore, throughout this period,
the FBIS budget remained a constant percent of the DS&T
budget. Although the OIG Inspection found that many FBIS
employees believed senior managers had not done enough
to protect’the FBIS core mission, the 9/11 Team did not find
any objective data on the level of effort by FBIS or senior
DS&T managers to ensure that FBIS received sufficient
resources.

(U) Shortfalls in Language-Capable CIA Officers

+€//NF} The Team was unable to obtain usable data
on the number of language-capable staff officers or on the
number of such officers deemed necessary to meet job
requirements. In the case of the former, the CIA has no
accurate Agency-wide database of officers claiming
language capability. While CIA University’s LTD maintains
a database of employees who submit to language testing in
three skill areas—reading, speaking, and understanding—
the University managers believe, and Agency studies have
shown, that these data underestimate the number of
employees with language ability, as many employees do not
test regularly. While some Agency components have tried
to determine how many linguists or language-qualified
officers would be needed in any given year, no
comprehensive, Agency-wide attempt to quantify this need

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(U) Assessment of Joint Inquiry’s Findings fr
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
< (b)(1)
“eH L (b)(3)
(b)(1) there was no opportunity for officers to act on this

information unless CIA officers took the initiative to forward
it.

+5) Although almost two-thirds of the DO officers
| whom the Team interviewed expressed pre-9/11 familiarity
with the VISAVIPER program, most did not recall seeing
any specific guidance on the program. Reports officers were
most knowledgeable of the specific guidance and
procedures; field case officers were less familiar with the
specifics but knew about the program from their work
overseas| | However, about (b)(1)
one-half of the CTC Headquarters-based officers the Team _ —(b)(3)
questioned said they were unaware of VISAVIPER guidance
prior to 9/11; this group includes several managers.

(S7+7ANF}-Team interviews of DO officers and other
research show a variety of views about who was ultimately
responsible for watchlisting any particular individual:

(b)(1)
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wopseeres| (b)(1)
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requests. | did not recall (b)(7)(d)
CTC falling into this category, however.”
(b)(1) 5} The amount of funds reprogrammed from CTC’s (b)(1)
(b)(3) base budget from FY 1996-2001 before 9/11 totaled (b)(3)

million—_imillion for other corporate priorities
and million to internal DO requirements. Although this

tus) amount represents a small percentage of CTC’s total base
budget, which cumulatively totaled some | million for (b)(1)
these years, the fact that these movements occurred (b)(3)
(b)(1) demonstrates that the Agency as a whole and the DO did
(b)(3) not protect counterterrorism resources.’ The DDO from

mid-1997 to mid-1999 redirected approximately million
from DO counterterrorism programs to other priorities after
issuance of the DCI’s Declaration of War memorandum. His

successor stepped up this practice, moving| _|million (b)(1)
from the counterterrorism base between August 1999 and (b)(3)
10 September 2001.

Sy The Team found that funds moved from
counterterrorism programs included amounts that were

=U) [stated that corporate taxes “played havoc with DO. planning and

affected all operational activity, to include CTC activity and funding.” [went on to state that (b)(7)(d)
the DO’s critical mission was not funded properly and corporate taxes added to that burden.

“Good management and good leadership demanded that we not blindly pour dollars into any

single area, CTC included. Rather; the responsibilities of command demanded prudent

rioritization of all spending. The CTC budget was not always spent or spent prudently.”

eS hared the view that corporate taxes were burdensome and believed the

DO should have been relieved of most of this burden, given the paucity of its resources. Since

the DO was not relieved from taxes) Stated that he “could not exempt CTC, (b)(7)(d)
whose resources dwarfed those of other DO components, from its share of the burden...” Again,

the Team notes that funds redirected from CTC to other DO Divisions were often then used by

those divisions to pay corporate taxes and did not go to higher priority operations.
‘Sy Ir|__|comments on the OIG draft report, tated that the need (b)(7)(d)
to fund the Agency’s Strategic Direction, which the DCI had announced in May 1998, was in

large part responsible for the taxes that affected counterterrorism programs. Strategic Direction

was an aggressive program that consisted of several major elements, including increasing the (b)(1)
number of deployed operations officers|__|and the riumber of analyst championing a (b)(3)
new avenue to meet the technology challenges of the day; and finding new ways to.deliver

support services in a timely and more cost effective manner.

argued that Strategic Direction efforts were expected to add to the robustness of activities such as
counterterrorism. The Team notes, however, that the Agency’s:practice of reallocating funds or (b)(7)(d)
“taxing” began in FY 1996, well before implementation of Strategic Direction, and continues to

the present.

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(U) In its deliberations, the Team has drawn on
Agency Regulation (AR) series 13—Conduct: Accountability
and Discipline:

¢ AR 13-1,c, (4) states that, “Employees...are expected to
perform their duties in a professional and satisfactory
manner. An employee who is responsible for a
significant failure to act in accordance with the level of
professionalism and diligénce reasonably to be
expected... has not lived up to this standard....”

e AR 13-1, d, addresses the responsibility of managers,
noting that, “Managers ultimately are responsible for the
actions or inactions of their subordinates and should
institute reasonable measures to ensure compliance with
Agency standards of conduct.”

¢ AR 13-3, c, (1) addresses discipline, stating that, “All
employees, including managers, are expected to...
perform Agency duties in a satisfactory manner. Those
who fail to do so may be subject to disciplinary action,
which may range from an oral admonition to termination
of employment...”

(U) The Team also applied the standards for
accountability discussed in AR 13-6, Appendix I:

¢ AR 13-6, Appendix I, c, indicates that, “Any finding of
deficient performance must be specific and may include
omissions and failure to act in accordance with a
reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence.”

¢ AR 13-6, Appendix I, d, states that “Determinations
under the above standard will be based in part on
whether the facts objectively indicate a certain action
should have been taken or not taken and whether the
employee had the opportunity and the responsibility to
act or not act.”

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TOPSECREZ

With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HESSHSOREON,NOFORN7 AR

never had enough information on KSM to make the PDB
threshold. Although the Joint Inquiry stated that the
Southeast Asia analyst was “concerned that KSM might be ._
using Asia as a platform for anti-US terrorist operations and
was providing support to local extremist groups, such as the
Abu Sayyaf Group,” an October 2000 AIG IR that provides a
comprehensive assessment of all Islamic terrorist networks
operating in Southeast Asia makes no mention of KSM.

+E+ANF} Finally, most of the CTC officers we queried
said that AIG provided little to no support to the Renditions
Branch. A few officers said that the Southeast Asia analyst
would have been involved in supporting Renditions on
KSM. That analyst told the Team, however, that he did not
have much contact with Renditions Branch. Similarly, the

[told the Team he could not _

remember any analysts following KSM prior to 9/11.

(U) Implications

CTC’s failure to focus on KSM
analytically from the mid-1990s through September 2001
limited its ability to. put together important pieces of the
puzzle in the period leading up to 9/11. Failure to
understand the nature of the threat posed by KSM; his
continuing operational activity; and the growing evidence of
his connections to UBL and al-Qa’ida limited CTC’s ability
to review the range of possible al-Qa'ida options. One of the
values of analysis and of a written analytic record is the
creation of connective tissue that protects institutional
memory and provides context for new developments.
During the period of intense concern in 2001 about a
possible attack against US interests by al-Qa’ida, a
complementary focus on KSM might have caused CIA
analysts to review aspects of the various plots associated
with KSM, including his intentions to strike US domestic
targets, to use airplanes as weapons, and to use Arabs
trained in the United States as pilots. A focus on these
particular tactics might have provided a context for
assessing the reporting on Moussaoui in August 2001.

June 2005

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rates 454 NB) l (b)(3)
Indeed, the Team believes these ideas
and CIA’s elicitation and examination of them attest to its
willingness to study nontraditional solutions, even if it
reveals a lesser degree of success in their implementation.
(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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Figure $15-2 ; rates

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engaged in the effort to target al-Qa’ida. Nonetheless, the
9/11 Team believes that Center management made
reasonable choices in implementing the HUMINT collection
strategy it believed had the best potential to achieve results
against al-Qa'ida. Given the inherent and systemic
impediments it faced, CTC continually adapted its HUMINT
operations to try to penetrate the al-Qa‘ida target and
disrupt its activities. Accordingly, the Team makes no
recommendations with respect to:accountability for these
decisions. .

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OIG Report on CIA Accountability
With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

difficult operational challenges and constraints CIA faced in
carrying out covert action operations inside Afghanistan.

(U) Assessment of the Finding

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

The Office of Inspector

General (OIG) 9/11 Accountability Review Team concurs
with many but not all of the conclusions in this finding from
the JI report. The Team differs in its analysis of some facts
and interpretations in the report’s discussion of the finding.
It found the following: ‘

¢ CIA officers perceived the MONs signed by President

Clinton between August 1998 and December 1999 as
circumscribing permissible operations against Bin Ladin
even though these MONs relaxed some of the previously
existing restrictions significantly.”

In view of the provisions of the law.and Executive Order
12333 and of past problems with covert action programs,
CIA was reluctant to take advantage of any ambiguity or
vagueness in the authorities it did receive. Ultimately,
however, the MONs were not crucial obstacles in
determining the failure of CIA offensive operations
against UBL and his lieutenants. :

The CIA’s covert action capabilities against Bin Ladin in
Afghanistan were extremely limited. Beginning in late
1998, the CIA sought to broaden the base of assets upon
which it built its covert action program against the Saudi
terrorist. Its available options for enhancing its ability to
reliably locate and then capture or eliminate Bin Ladin
were weak, however. This reduced the CIA, for much of
the period prior to 9/11, to relying heavily ona single set
of tribal assets

*4Sy One DO reviewer of this draft objected to the use of "perceived" in this sentence, asserting
that the circumscription of CIA’s authorities was no mere perception, given President Clinton’s
action in striking out authorizing language in the February 1999 MON. The Team here is
generalizing, not focusing only on the February MON, and it continues to believe that
"perceived" is appropriate in view of a countervailing White House perception.

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failure to produce any analytic coverage of
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad from 1997 to 2001."

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Finding 3
(Counterterrorism Resources) and Factual Finding 5i
(Khalid Shaykh Muhammad) for further information on
these issues.

(U) Information Sharing

+~€} The Team’s findings related to the issue of
information sharing are in general accord with the JI’s
overall assessment of CIA’s performance. Like the JI, the _
Team found problems in the functioning of two separate but
related processes in the specific case of the Malaysia
operation of early 2000: entering the names of suspected
al-Qa'ida terrorists on the “watchlist” of the Department of
State and providing information to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) in proper channels. The Team also found
that CTC did not forward relevant information to (b)(1)

(b)(3)
In regard to broader issues of

information sharing, the Team found basic problems with
processes designed to facilitate such sharing. In particular,
CTC managers did not clarify the roles and responsibilities
of officers detailed to CTC by other agencies.

+S+ANF} The Malaysia Operation. Agency officers
did not, on a timely basis, recommend to the Department of
State the watchlisting of two suspected al-Qa’ida terrorists,
Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. These individuals,
who later were among the hijackers of 9/11, were known by
the Agency in early January 2000 to have traveled to Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, to participate in a meeting of suspected
terrorists. From Kuala Lumpur, they traveled to Bangkok.
In January 2000, CTC officers received information that one

of these suspected terrorists had a US visa; in March 2000,
\

'(U) Asa result of a conflict of interest, the Inspector General recused himself from deliberations
on the performance of Agency components and individuals relating to the KSM issue and to the
strategic analysis issues discussed below. The two successive Deputy Inspectors General did
participate in accountability discussions regarding analysis and all other issues.

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forsserer_

With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks THES/STH7OREON NOFORNZ AMR

contributed to a failure to retain and continually reinforce an
understanding of his significance—and thus to recognize the
importance of the cables emphasizing his role in al-Qa’ida in
2000 and 2001.

+¢S+ANE} In mid-1999, CTC embarked on its new Plan
against. Usama Bin Ladin. Part of this plan involved the
targeting of UBL lieutenants,
IKSM
did not make it to the list of lieutenants until after 9/11, in

spite of cables from the field identifying him as a senior aide
to UBL.

(U) Lack of Analysis”

+€+ANFY CTC’s Assessments and Information Group
produced no analysis dealing with KSM. This vacuum of
analysis is particularly notable given KSM’s high priority as
a rendition target; the wealth of information available to AIG
| field and
Headquarters reporting on the nature of the threat he posed;
his ongoing and extensive travels, often linked by CTC to
possible planning for terrorist operations; and reporting !

increasingly close ties to al-Qa’ida.

+©} No AIG Branch was given or took responsibility
for KSM. Eight of the 10 individuals the Team queried said
that no one in the Group was responsible for working on
KSM. |
analysts who followed the UBL network knew about KSM
and knew he was an important player, but that no one
analyst focused on him. |

have focused on KSM. said that

“(U) Asa result of a conflict of interest, the Inspector General recused himself from deliberations
on the performance of Agency components and individuals relating to this issue. Two successive
Deputy Inspectors General did participate in accountability discussions regarding analysis of
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.

June 2005

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(U) Dirty Asset Rules

+SHANFy Although the 9/11 Review Team believes
that the weight of evidence tilts to the conclusion that the
dirty asset rules hampered the effectiveness of unilateral
operations, the Team’s review of this issue surfaced
contradictory information.

-S+ANF} On the one hand, most CIA officers the
Team interviewed said the rules had no impact, since senior
Agency leadership approved every case that officers put
forward:

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(b)(7)(d)

(b)(7Xa)

the| land wrote reports of interest to the. __| One
officer said that others in CTC would relay warnings to
the detailee who would then communicate them to the
.The detailee kaw his role differently. L]

said that| job was to churn out reports for CTC and
that|__|covered weapons of mass destruction and cyber
threats, as well as aviation threats. This officer agreed
that] |was a resource within CTC for the| land

. would answer questions when asked, but he insisted that
it was not his job to serve as liaison to the, | For
example, the Team’s review of available data suggests
the detailee was not formally involved in drafting the
CTC cables of August 2001 that discussed Moussaoui’s
suspicious flight training on 747s. In fact, the detailee
said that, |had no recollection of such cables. L_]
indicated that someone had sent a CIR on the subject for

|___|to coordinate; although! remembers that it was
going to the FBI and Customs but not the | |was
too busy doing other things to work on it and did not

believe it was |job tonotify thd |"

* Oneofthe) ——_detailees to CTC echoed dl
had

colleague’s perspective. aid that, while

some responsibility as a officer, primary job

was that of CTC desk officer, tracking Pakistani groups.
said that CTC officers occasionally asked| _ [to check

th database to which| _|had access, to see whether

° The etailee said that detailees made their own way
in CTC. indicated that his own role had evolved in an

ad hoc fashion and that |was in CTC to watch out first
for his home agency's needs and then for the CIA's needs.
|__|said that CTC managers did not think about where
they should place detailees and what their roles should
be.

"SE +ANF} Our review of the Hercules database indicates that CTC did not issue a CIR on

Moussaoui before 11 September. The FBI issued a cable discussing the case on 4 September and
sent it to the FAA, Customs, and INS!

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agencies were included in interagency forums, such as the
,Community Counterterrorism Board (CCB), and received
the product of those forums. There were fewer detailees; ~
fewer formal communications; and fewer formal and
informal partnerships between CIA and these agencies than
between CIA and members of the intelligence and law
- enforcement communities, however.

(U) In addition, before 9/11, high-level attention to
CIA’s information-sharing performance with respect to non-
IC agencies appears to have been episodic rather than
sustained and/or systematic. The Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence told the Team, for example, that, when
he was Deputy Chairman of the National Intelligence
Council (1995-1997), he had asked for permission to brief the
FAA on the increased threat of airline hijackings. He
indicated that this was a noteworthy event, however, not
one that was repeated or reinforced.

(U) Detailees

(U) In 2000 and 2001, from four to eight officers from
non-IC organizations were detailed to CTC; none of these
was assigned to UBL Station, however. The FAA had three
officers in CTC in 2000 and-one in 2001; the Department of
Energy had two in both years; Customs had two in 2000 and
one in 2001; and INS had one in 2000 but none in 2001.
These officers had the same access to information as their
CTC and IC colleagues.

+SHANE) As. was the case with IC detailees, CTC
officers and the non-IC detailees with whom the Team spoke
viewed the responsibilities of the latter differently. CTC
officers emphasized the detailees’ responsibility to serve-as
liaison to their home agencies, while the detailees
emphasized their roles as integrated CTC officers:

e The _detailee to CTC from 2000 to 2002 was (b)(7)(d)
- assigned to the Center’s Requirements and Reports Staff. :
CTC officers agreed that this detailee had access to all the
traffic, established the threshold for material passed to

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(U) Renewed Focus on Recruitments

+~SAANE} In mid-1999, the new Chief/CTC
determined that the Center’s al-Qa’ida effort was weighted
too heavily toward disruptions and that CTC needed to

(b)(1) focusitseffortsonrecruitingg == sts~S~=~sSd

(b)(3)
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told the Team that the earlier double-tap strategy was too
heavily focused on liaison and the FBI and that the new
Chief had put renewed focus on unilateral operations.

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fiscal year.” The CBJB is due to Congress, by law, on the
first Monday in February (eight months prior to year of
execution). Usually, the pertinent Congressional committees
begin marking this request up/down in June and come
together to resolve any differences in conference in
September. Once the submission is authorized and
appropriated, CIA knows its base budget as well as the
amount of the CIA Reserve for Contingencies.
Supplemental funding requests are subject to a separate
process and are normally addressed once execution is
underway.

*€> The Agency Financial Management System
(AFMS) is CIA’s accounting system of record, and,
consequently, the Team used it as much of the basis for its
analysis in this area. AFMS describes the base budget, to
include Congressional marks, as regular (REG)
‘appropriations, although REG may also include certain
supplemental funds. When such funds are included, AFMS
associates a separate label, or reason code, with the
supplemental to help differentiate it. The “Gingrich
Supplemental” of FY 1999 was more explicitly accounted for
by the assignment of its own unique fund type (REG3).

+~&} Precise identification of funds dedicated to
counterterrorism is difficult, as the Team discovered that
such funds were not reliably labeled within AFMS.

® (U) In his response to this revie stated that CMS played a large part in the
CIA budget process, whic _ said did not work _|went on to state that the CMS staff built the
budget with detailed input from individual CIA directorates. “What emerged in every instance
was a CMS defined budget submission which bore no resemblance to the CIA input requests.”
stated that the CIA in-house budget process was also flawed, and for the DO
that meant insufficient funding. On the other hand ASS inan
interview conducted prior to 9/11, that the DO exhibited no budgeting skills whatsoever. It
typically waited until the budget execution year to formulate its budget and then dangled high
priority items in order to manipulate a Reserve for Contingencies release.
“ (U) The CIA Reserve for Contingencies consists of funds set aside to meet unforeseen
requirements and unique operational opportunities that were not budgeted for in the normal
process.

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data that the Joint Inquiry focused on in its report. They
were not staffed sufficiently to perform such a role and to
take advantage of the access they may formally have had to

raw DO operational traffic. | ] (b)(7)(d)
told the Team, for example, that the TWG
operated quite separately from CTC and that its officers

dealt with finished intelligence—not with operational traffic.
Thus, if analysts within CTC did not pull together the
threads of specific threat reporting from the operational
traffic, it was not likely to get done within the CCB,

(U) Interagency forums have considerable value as
places for officers from different agencies to come together
to assess their common understanding of available
information and to provide a coordinated view of potential
threats. They can only be as good as the officers that staff
them and the information these officers bring to the table,
however. Unfortunately, in the period leading up to the
attacks of 11 September 2001, there were an insufficient
number of officers in these forums and those that were there
were not in position to exploit the raw intelligence that
resided in the databases of the member agencies.

(U) Databases

(U) The IC has tried to enhance the exchange of
information by constructing shared databases containing
relevant counterterrorism information. As indicated in the
discussion of Systemic Finding 4, the IC (primarily CIA) had
developed systems before 9/11 that were designed tos serve
as central systems for sharing information on
counterterrorism; these did not fulfill expectations for
performance and effectiveness, however.

The IC also has numerous tactical (b)(3)
databases, constructed for a variety of purposes, including
sharing the names of suspected terrorists and sharing
telephone numbers that provide leads and linkages. It
would be a large. undertaking to assess the value and
effectiveness of these programs; the Joint Inquiry did not
pursue this issue nor has the Team done so.

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“Usama Bin Ladin’s Finances: Some Estimates of Wealth,

Income, and Expenditures,”

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e Examined other Agency analytic products on
counterterrorism, including pertinent ones written since
11 September 2001.

¢ Examined CTC’s July 2001 Analysis Enhancement Plan.

(U) In addressing findings relating to unilateral and
liaison operations and covert action, the Team:

¢ Used the Hercules database to conduct surveys of report
sourcing and extensive reviews of cable traffic on specific
covert operations.

¢ Assessed information from the AFMS database.
e Reviewed foreign liaison training records.

e Examined all Memorandums of Notification regarding
Bin Ladin.

(U) In addressing findings relating to technology, the
Team:

¢ Reviewed OIG inspection reports on the Clandestine
Information Technology Office and its successor, the
Information Operations Center.

e Examined legal opinions and other memorandums
between CIA and NSA and between senior Agency
managers.

e Reviewed documentation on specific technical projects.

,

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DCI repeatedly highlighted UBL as a dominant threat to
the United States.”

¢ In December 1998 and May 1999, the DCI sent to
members of the policy community a series of urgent
letters that provided warnings on the UBL threat and
indications of potential attack. Recipients of these
memoranda at one time or ariother included the

- President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of

Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
White House Chief of Staff, the National Security
Advisor, and:the National Counterterrorism
Coordinator. Additionally, in early 1999, the DCI sent
similar updates to various individuals at the National
Security Council, the Departments of State, Justice, and
Transportation; the Defense Intelligence Agency; FBI;
NSA; the Federal Aviation Administration; and the
military.

¢ The DCI interacted personally with foreign liaison
partners in attempts to secure their assistance in tracking
Bin Ladin. ‘Following the bombings of the East African
embassies, for example, he sent personal letters to a
number of foreign liaison officials requesting their help
in gaining information on Bin Ladin and his possible
connection, to the bombings.. In July 2001, he phoned 13
foreign liaison counterparts to urge them to redouble
their efforts against al-Qa'ida. As the former DCI points
out in his reviewing comments on the draft report, his
nurturing of relationships with liaison services around
the world was an important factor in securing their
cooperation during the Millennium period when the

4Sf NE} In his 1999 briefing, for example, he stated that, “First, there is not the
slightest doubt that Usama bin Ladin, his worldwide allies, and his sympathizers are planning
further attacks against us;...he will strike wherever in the world he thinks we are vulnerable.” In
his 2000 testimony, he stated that, “Islamic terrorist groups account for many—but certainly not
all—f the threats... Foremost among them is Usama bin Ladin, who remains determined to
strike further blows against America ... we believe he could still strike without additional
warning.” In 2001, he stated that, “Usama bin Ladin and his associates remain the most
immediate and serious threat.”

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daily memorandum on Bin Ladin for the NSC. Then again,
analysts in the Balkans.and Arab-Israeli issues, among
others, were producing daily situation reports around this
time as well.

ES} NFF Tactical support to the Directorate (b)(3)

of Operations (DO) also occupied a good deal of AIG analyst

time. In early 2001, AIG managers noted that the average

AIG analyst was spending 30 percent of his or her time

directly supporting DO activity. In interviews conducted for

this review, AIG analysts told the Team that they spent

anywhere from 10 percent to 90 percent of their time reading

DO operations traffic. Among other things, AIG officers
commented on DO TDs, graded DO reporting, and vetted

DO threat reports, which trebled in volume between 1997 - (b)(1)
and 2000, according to CTC statistics. Analysts also (b)(3)
supported the DO by participating innumerous
intelligence exchanges and helping to develop targeting

plans. AIG analysts also undertook such support as a

targeting study on al-Qa’ida WMD sites,

|Indeed, the 2000-2001

inspection of CTC found that “the consensus from AIG’s
operational counterparts in CTC is that analyst support to
operations planning continues to be one of the strengths of
the Center.” While the Team collected no comparable
information on DO support by other DI issue groups,
information gathered during OIG inspections of various DI
offices suggests that the proportion of time AIG analysts
spent supporting the DO was indeed greater than that in
other DI offices.

—-SyAIG officers had other demands on their time as
well. Among these, AIG analysts. drafted numerous [ICT (b)(1)

products, (b)(3)

and produced country threat
assessments for senior policymakers; the latter reports
numbered 108 in 2000, according to CTC statistics. In
fairness, it should be noted that analysts in DI offices also

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(b)(1)
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|told the Team that|
considered CTC’s balance between collection and disruption

to be appropriate.

(b)(1)
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TM“4E+HNBY Double-tap refers to the shooting tactic of firing two rounds quickly (tapping the
trigger twice) to neutralize a threatening aggressor. However, in this context, it refers to law
enforcement action against terrorists including monitoring, questioning, and arresting suspected
terrorists under whatever criminal statutes. possible, thereby accomplishing two goals:
disrupting potential terrorist attacks and obtaining intelligence information on terrorist activities.

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(U) Reasons Limiting Strategic Analysis

+ Several reasons underlie the inadequate attention
to strategic analysis on al-Qa‘ida. These include other
démands on analysts’ time, the lack of an analytic unit

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With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HES/SH/OREON- NOFORN] Avie

profile of Bin Ladin, but, even then, it was the DCI’s UBL
Task Force that undertook such a study, not. AIG.

, $SAANE}Many of AIG’s post-1998 reports, both long-

term and current—also lacked emphasis on Bin Ladin’s
February 1998 fatwa authorizing the killing of Americans.
Indeed, this absence independently and particularly struck
the reviewers. One noted that the fatwa was a watershed
development that had “too soon became a distant image in
the rear view mirror.” AIG’s November 2000 paper on

Bin Ladin’s terrorist operations does a good job linking the

fatwa to al-Qa’ida’s operational doctrine. Nonetheless, CTC
did not mention the fatwa in the few post-1998 products that
touched on the United.States asa target, such as the January

2000 Jordan-Canada IR or the 6 August 2001 PDB.TM

(U) Alternative Analysis

+5+/NF} CTC also undertook few alternative analysis

studies during the years prior to 9/11. Indeed, the March
2000 study faulted AIG for not incorporating more
alternative analysis into its products, given: :

¢ The “surprise” of the East Africa bombings and the lack
of consideration beforehand of attack scenarios beyond
those supported by existing reporting and assumptions
about Bin Ladin’s preferred target locations.

¢ CTC’s recognition in its post-Africa bombing evaluation
that errant assumptions about Bin Ladin’s intentions led
analysts and policymakers to conclude that he would not

act in Africa.

¢ Bin Ladin’s breaks with more characteristic terrorist
behavior in planning and carrying out operations.

*“4€}-Similarly, FBIS, which readily issued a translation of the fatwa on the day of its release—
23 February 1998—missed an opportunity to analyze the fatwa and related statements by

Bin Ladin and associated extremists. Indeed, a search of FBIS's website reveals that the
organization issued only two foreign media notes or foreign media analyses focusing on

Bin Ladin or al-Qa'ida between 1 January 1998 and 10 September 2001. -

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Station’s FBI DCOS initially assigned the targeting officer to
handle the operation because the travel was originating in
Yemen, within that officer’s area of responsibility, and
because the Station had no one covering Southeast Asia at
the time. Although that DCOS soon departed the Station,

the COS, the other DCOS, and the Operations and Tar; eting
Branch Chiefs continued to tad (b)(1)

traffic and to oversee the officer’s work. In responding to (b)(3)
this draft report, indicated that
the management oversight was not confusing, in that, (b)(7)(d)
(b)(7)(d)
| That said,

while this officer and the other Station managers opened one
or both of the early March cables noting that the al-Qa’ida
associates had traveled to the United States, none ensured
that the targeting officer—who by then had begun working
on other issues, including the terrorist threat to the Sydney
Olympics—or any other Station officer took appropriate
action at the time. As mentioned, when the Team
interviewed these managers, none recalled reading these
cables; at the time, however, they may have assumed that
one of the other managers was handling the case. Given the
targeting officer’s newness, lack of operations experience,
and unfamiliarity with Southeast Asia, dedicated close
supervision of the operation was in order.

(U) Implications

+~€} The consequences of the failure to pursue proper

operational followthrough with the information acquired in
while difficult to fully assess, were (b)(1)

potentially dire: (b)(3)

|

e By itself, watchlisting al-Mihdhar in early January 2000, |
when his travel document data first became available, i
could have prevented his entrance into the United States !
in mid-January. On the other hand, watchlisting |
al-Hazmi in March 2000, when the CIA got access to his |
travel documentation would not have kept al-Hazmi out

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that RB and UBL Station would have worked a target -
such as KSM together.

(U) In their comments on the draft report, CTC
officers defended the fact that responsibility for KSM had
been transferred to the Renditions Branch. They argued that
US Government policy mandates that law enforcement take
the lead in pursuit of an indicted terrorist and that RB was
the key focal point of interaction with the FBI. They stress
that efforts to capture KSM would not have been more
successful had CTC linked him to al-Qa’ida. Finally, they
say that assigning the hunt for KSM to RB was a logical way
to share the workload within CTC and criticize the OIG
report for claiming that an already overworked UBL unit
should have been given primacy. The Team does not claim,
however, that efforts to capture KSM would have been more
successful had his links to al-Qa’ida been established. Nor
does the Team argue that primary responsibility for KSM
should have been given to a UBL unit. Rather, the Team
believes that assigning KSM to RB should not have
prevented UBL Station and AIG from focusing on the
continuing danger that KSM posed; the nature of the danger
that he posed; his growing importance within al-Qa’ida; and
the possible implications of his association with UBL.

+C+ANF} Several CTC interviewees told us that KSM
moved slightly off the screen during the period around the
Millennium, when it became clear that al- Qa’ida was
massing resources for jihad. The shift from awareness of
KSM’s significance to lack of awareness roughly coincides
with the mid-1999 merger of UBL Station and IEB under
SEG. Moreover, several of the UBL Station officers who had
crafted cables noting KSM’s ties to UBL had moved on by
mid-1999; this included the former Chief of Station. A loss
of institutional memory in the case of KSM may have

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+~S+ANF}-In general, the Agency has deferred the
language-development issue to its directorates, expecting
each to deal with its own specific needs:

¢ In April 2001, the Directorate of Operations (DO)
established a Language Training Group, which
recommended that the Deputy Director for Operations
(DDO) appoint a senior officer to develop a framework
for DO language policy, evaluate language development
needs across the directorate, coordinate language
development plans and policies with other directorates
and training entities, and represent the DO’s language
interests to the IC. It was not until Juine 2003, however,
that the DO formally promulgated these
recommendations as-part of the DCI Strategic Plan for
Language.

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(U) Handling Incoming Cables

SHANE} Many UBL Station officers evidently did not
read the entire contents of key cables. A number of the
critical cables sent to UBL Station had Action-Required lines
that read “None, FYI” and listed the Station among the Info
recipients. Many Station personnel told the Team they did
not have time to read “Info” traffic. However, the
Headquarters dissemination line on almost all the 40 cables
listed only UBL Station as having action, meaning that the
Station was the Headquarters element within CIA that had
the responsibility to react to them. Judging from interview
responses and audit data of individual officers’ cable
access,” UBL Station personnel ‘may have looked at only the
first line—the Action Required line—then quickly moved to
the next document if no specific action was required of them.
Indeed, audit data show that some officers routinely opened
many of the cables they received for less than 10 seconds.
Interviews of some senior Station managers show that they
worked long hours.and weekends, partly to read cables to
ensure that the Station missed none of its actions.

*(U) While the time in which individuals kept a cable open on the computer system is a good
general indicator of the attention that the individual gave to the cable, it does not necessarily
translate directly into reading time. On the one hand, the cable could be printed, allowing for
greater time for perusal. On the other hand, a relatively long period in which a document was
open does not necessarily mean that the reader was viewing it for the entire time; he or she could
have had a phone call or some other interruption while the document was on screen.

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(U) Detailees

¢ Development of shared databases and electronic
communications networks. ,

None of these methods is foolproof, however; all remain
vulnerable to such obstacles as differences in mission and

culture.” - ©

(U) One of the most effective means of implementing
the timely and effective exchange of information on
counterterrorism has been the éxchange of personnel
between CTC and other agencies... In 2000 and 2001, other
agencieshad| _ officers detailed to CTC. In 2000 and
2001, UBL Station alone had detailed to it four FBI a

| CTC itself had three officers
detailed outside the Agency during that period.”

(U) Without exception, CTC personnel and detailees
from other agencies told the Team that detailees had access
to all CTC cable traffic except Restricted Handling (RH) and
eyes-only traffic; such traffic was compartmented on a need-
to-know basis for both detailees and CIA employees.| |

representatives indicated that they also had access to

 (U) The Team’s review focuses on information sharing issues as seen from the CIA
perspective. The team did not collect documentation from or interview officers at Intelligence
Community agencies other than the CIA, although we did interview officers from those agencies
who were detailed to CTC.

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(U) Impact of the Declaration of War

+5} As the JI report mentions, in the December 1998
Declaration of War, the’DCI indicated that he wanted the
CIA and the IC to spare no resources or people in their
efforts against UBL. However, on the basis of interview data
and the Team’s review of the Agency’s financial and
personnel resources during FY 1998-1999, the Team did not
find any indication that the Agency, at the corporate level,
reallocated a substantial amount of either following the
DCl’s Declaration of War."®

+$} Although funding and personnel allocated to CTC
increased between FY 1998 and FY 1999, the increase to base
resources was not substantial and did not result from a
permanent reallocation of Agency resources:'”

« . The Team’s review of CTC’s base resources shows that,
in FY 1999 alone, the net impact of DO adjustments on
CTC’s base funds was an overall reallocation of

illion from CTC programs; as mentioned, some of
these funds went to programs not specifically designated
as counterterrorism-related. . .

¢ CTC base budget submissions for FY 1999-2001 increased
by.only 3-4 percent per year after dramatic increases the
prior two years. As mentioned previously, the
formulation of both the FY 2000 and 2001 budgets began
after the issuance of the Declaration.

"*(U) In their comments on the OIG draft] ___—_ tated that the then-DCI did
“declare war,” but did not give the DO any additional funds to fight that war. However, the
Team notes that the DO also continued to redirect funds from counterterrorism programs.
'4G+HNFY In his comments to the OIG draft of Systemic Finding 2, the former DCI noted a
difference between the OIG’s 9/11 Review and its 2001 Inspection Report of CTC—in particular,
that in areas where the latter had praised performance, the former is critical. Thé Team agrees
that there are differences; these derive from distinct taskings, terms of reference, and
methodologies. The Inspection Team did not look at how Agency resources were being allocated
or reallocated against the counterterrorism target. Such a review was required of the 9/11 Team,
which included two auditors.

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Table S3-1

+S} Reliance on Supplemental Appropriations.
From FY 1999 to FY 2001, the DO relied heavily on
supplemental appropriations to fund counterterrorism
rather than building counterterrorism requirements into its
base budget. Interview data and results of the OIG budget
inspection show that this reliance made it difficult for

‘

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these officers had information that the other had flown from
Bangkok to Los Angeles.

-+S+/NFY In the period January through March 2000,
some 50 to 60 individuals read one or more of six Agency
cables containing travel information related to these
terrorists. These cables originated in four field locations and
Headquarters. They were read by overseas officers and
Headquarters personnel, operations officers and analysts,
managers and junior employees, and CIA staff personnel as
well as officers on rotation from NSA and FBI. Over an
18-month period, some of these officers had opportunities to
review the information on multiple occasions, when they
might have recognized its significance and shared it
appropriately with other components and agencies.
Ultimately, the two terrorists were watchlisted in late
August 2001 as a result of questions raised in May 2001 by a
CIA officer on assignment at the FBI.

+S} In 1998, CTC assumed responsibility for
communicating watchlisting guidance in the Agency. As
recently as December 1999, less than a month before the
events of early January 2000, CTC had sent to all field offices
of the CIA a cable reminding them of their obligation to
watchlist suspected terrorists and the procedures for doing
so. Field components and Headquarters units had
obligations related to watchlisting, but they varied widely in
their performance. That so many individuals failed to act in
this case reflects a systemic breakdown—a breakdown
caused by excessive workload, ambiguities about
responsibilities, and mismanagement of the program.
Basically, there was no coherent, functioning watchlisting

program.

+S} The Review Team recommends that an
Accountability Board review the performance of the two
Chiefs of CTC in the years between 1998 and 2001
concerning their leadership and management oversight of
the watchlisting program.

+S+ANF} Agency officers also failed to pass the travel
information about the two terrorists to the FBI in the
prescribed channels. The Team found that an FBI officer

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many DO officers, including senior officials, raised in Team
interviews. A few of the individuals detailed from other
agencies to CTC also remarked on this situation.

+{SH+ANF} Of particular note, the targeting officer who
handled had little to no operations

experience at the time. |

-(b)(3)

(U) Confusing Chain of Command

+S+ANS} Several interviewees depicted a chaotic
atmosphere in UBL Station during the early months of 2000,
with no single supervisor fully aware of activity underway
at any point in time. Indeed, interviews indicate that no
particular officer was responsible for monitoring traffic to
ensure all actions had been addressed. In January 2000,
responsibility for general operational activity against al-
Qa’ida fell to the Operations Branch, with assistance from
the Targeting Branch. Branch members were loosely
assigned geographic areas of responsibility. Tasking of any
Branch was normally handled via Lotus notes and could
originate from any of five senior managers within UBL
Station—the COS, two DCOSs, or the Operations and
Targeting Branch Chiefs. Each officer was responsible for
monitoring his or her own activity.

+SHANFy This confusing management oversight may
have been partly at fault for the failure to follow up on the
March cables| | The

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(b)(1) Figure S3-2

(b)(3)

(U) Agency’s Counterterrorism Finances |

+S} In contrast to the overall CIA budget, the
Agency’s expenditures on the counterterrorism target—
which include amounts spent on both counterterrorism and
antiterrorism activities—increased significantly after the end
of the Cold War, particularly during the latter half of the
1990s. (See Figure S3-3.) According to data from AFMS:

¢ Total expenditures on the counterterrorism target
(including base funds, supplementals and reserve
releases) almost doubled)
[In FY 1999,
expenditures show a spike due to the Gingrich

supplemental of which went to

counterterrorism programs.

®43} Most of the supplemental money allocated to counterterrorism programs went to
components otherthanCIG, million,

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4S/ANF} In January 1996, CTC established a virtual
station—UBL Station—to “target Islamic terrorist financier

Usama Bin Ladin;| | (b)(1)
(b)(3)
[The first Chief of
Station (COS) was a senior Directorate of Intelligence (DI)
officer; |
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* (Uy A hawala receives money for the purpose of making it, or an equivalent value, payable to a
third party in another geographic location, whether or not in the same form. The establishment
may or may not be documented. These transactions are outside the conventional banking
system.

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tenure after the Declaration is insufficient for such actions to
be referred to an Accountability Board.

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information but did not fully appreciate its importance; it
finally passed the information to some agencies on

23 August 2001—but it did not pass it to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA).

¢ Khallad (Tawfiq Muhammad Salih Bin Rashid al Atash—
also known as Salah Saeed Muhammad Bin Yousaf), who
was linked to the Africa bombings and who subsequently
was identified as one of the planners of the attack on the
USS Cole, was one of those who attended the Malaysia
meeting. The links between Khallad and the two
hijackers who had entered the United States, al-Mihdhar
and al-Hazmi, were not shared effectively between the
FBI and CIA.

¢ Khallad (then known by CIA as Bin Yousef, an al-Qa'ida
associate who had attended the Malaysia meeting) had a
ticket on a flight bound for Los Angeles on 31 December
1999, departing on 1 January 2000. CIA did not share this
information.”

¢ Suspected al-Qa’ida terrorists were engaged in flight
training in the United States—analysis included in the
FBI’s Phoenix Memorandum. The FBI had this
information in June 2001, but did not share it.

« Zacarias Moussaoui, arrested in August 2001, had taken
flight training in the United States. While this information
was shared within the intelligence and law enforcement
communities, it may not have been shared with the FAA.

¢ Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, who had been involved in
the Bojinka Plot, linked to al-Qa'ida and the Africa
bombings, involved in plots to use aircraft as weapons
and to strike at the domestic United States, reportedly
had sent terrorists to the United States for the purpose of
conducting terrorist opetations. The CIA had this
iformation in June 2001.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(d)

Investigation, and Egyptian officials in translating the Egypt
Air 900 cockpit voice recorder.

(U) LEB worked hard to address periodic surges in
untranslated materials. In early 2000, for example, the unit
formed the Interagency Document Exploitation Task Force”
to handle clandestinely acquired terrorist-related
documents. According to a CTC spot commentary from the
time, that Task Force worked more than 1,500 man-hours in
three weeks to process 40,000 pages of captured computer
material; provided a cursory review for leads on imminent
threats; and forwarded the material to LEB personnel for
further and more detailed linguistic exploitation.

+~S+/+NFY Nonetheless, backlogs in hard-target
language translation requests remained. Available statistics
and responses compiled in 2004 from seven of the linguists
employed before 9/11 reveal that LEB had to cope with
almost triple the number of translation requests between
1996 and 2000. For Arabic translations, material would be
triaged with the expectation that it would receive a second
look and a more complete translation later. Translators tried
to surge according to demand, but secondary reviews
languished on occasion.

+~SHANP+ FBIS also is called upon in times of surge.

that FBIS seemed increasingly unable to respond
quickly to time-sensitive requests for translation.

TM (U) The Task Force included personnel from DoD, NSA, the FBI, and CIA.

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penalty—that inhibit extradition by foreign governments,
and bilateral differences on nonintelligence issues. The
report then states that coordination between US agencies is
not integrated with overall US policy and that independent
relationships with the same foreign intelligence services can

. bea problem, although it acknowledges that CIA and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have improved
coordination on dealing with liaison.

(U) Assessment of Joint Inquiry Finding

(SA+ANF}-We concur with some, but not all, of the jl
finding on this issue:

¢ We agree that relations with foreign intelligence services
produced mixed results in terms of cooperation and
productive intelligence. We also agree on the advantages
and disadvantages of foreign liaison.

¢ We disagree, however, that interagency coordination
posed a significant problem. Although the Team found a
few instances of faulty coordination of liaison contacts,
these had only incidental impact on counterterrorism
effectiveness. We also disagree that CTC relied too
heavily on liaison; while we concur that CTC focused
principally on liaison in the mid-1990s (as we discussed
in Systemic Finding 11), in mid-1999 the Center adjusted
its operational focus to seek more unilateral human
sources to complement its liaison efforts.

-We discuss liaison cooperation broadly under this finding
and focus specifically on] ;
cooperation under Factual Findings 5h and Systemic
Finding 20, respectively.

(U) Liaison Cooperation

+S+ANF} Our interviews of senior managers and
officers in the Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) Station found a strong
consensus that liaison was important to understanding and

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um

j worry...CTC can pay.” He went on to say that this was
no longer the situation, however.

- (SHANF) The Team’s review of counterterrorism and
CTC funding data indicates that, even after funding
problems for counterterrorism became more apparent
during 1999, Agency managers did not make maximum use
of the funds that were available for counterterrorism:

¢ The Team found that Agency managers made little use of
the CIA Reserve for Contingencies. (b)(1)

(b)(3)

¢ The DCI never exercised his authority as head of the IC
to move funds within the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP) for programs targeting UBL or al-Qa'ida.
The DCI did exercise these authorities several times .
during FY 1996-2001, however, moving funds from other
agencies into the CIA to cover non-UBL or al-Qa'ida
programs. (See Systemic Finding S-2 for more details.)

¢ On several occasions, Agency managers did not spend

supplemental funds—which they had requested—in the

year they received them.” In FY 1999, the bulk of the

one-year “Gingrich” Supplemental arrived on the

Agency's books by January 1999, and all of it came by

March. The CIA returned nearly| _| million of this (b)(1)
| supplemental to the US Treasury five years later as (b)(3)
i ‘unspent funds, however, according to Agency records.
: In the case of multiyear supplemental funds, as .
po mentioned aie Agency officials elected to carry

forward illion of the FY 2000 supplemental into Pus}
\ . :

TM(U) In his comments to the OIG draft] agreed that, “CTC did not always spend
funds available.” °

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4 The December 1998 MON .
b)(1 : +S/ANF} In the ensuing months, the pressure to deal
tbe 3) with Bin adin mounted.|

(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

ae ee]

JOn 18 December 1998, the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) sent one of a series of
warning memorandums to senior policymakers. In it, he
said he was “greatly concerned by recent intelligence
reporting indicating that Usama Bin Ladin is planning to
conduct another attack against US personnel or facilities
very soon.”

(b)(1)
E57 NB (b)(3)

The MON, signed by the President on
24 December 1998, bore the same title as the one signed on
20 August 1998, |

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counterterrorism funding, the Team was unable to
determine when the material was compiled and whether
any had been forwarded to Congress or other external
parties. .

e A few Agency officials familiar with DO and CTC
resources stated that CTC requested top-line increases to
its base budget|

(b)(1)
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the Agency
supported the idea of permanent increases, but that OMB
was skeptical about the Agency’s claims for additional
funding needs.

onseREE | | (ox)
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During their time in Kuala

po

Lumpur, the al-Qa’ida associates met in an apartment. After
the associates’ departure, identified
the owner as Yazid Sufaat, later revealed to bea Malaysian
chemist and extremist who also hosted Zacarias Moussaoui
in fall 2000. Despite UBL Station’s desire to keep track of the
travelers in Bangkok,| __—_—_|received the information
about their arrival too late to conduct surveillance and did
not learn of their mid-January departure from Thailand until
early March. (See Appendix F5.b-1 at the end of this section

fora chronological account of the cables involved |

CARE afforded two occasions in

which CIA officers had sufficient information to nominate
future 9/11 hijackers al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi for State
Department's watchlist:

¢ Inearly January 2000, immediately prior to the two

suspected al-Qa’ida associates’ arrival in Kuala Lumpur,

pe pesponded to UBL Station’s request for
information with cables that indicated that al-Mihdhar, a
Saudi passport holder, had a valid multiple-entry US visa
that expired in April of that year. also noted that
al-Mihdhar's visa application did not reveal any US entry
stamps; the Base deferred to UBL Station to inquire with
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) elements
about al-Mihdhar. During the same nek
cabled that al-Mihdhar’s visa application listed

New York as his destination.

* Two months later, on 5 March, cabled
information from that al-Mihdhar had
departed the Thai capital on an unknown date, that
al-Hazmi had departed on a flight bound for Los Angeles
on 15 January, and that fellow Malaysia meeting
participant Salah Bin Yousaf (later identified as Khallad)
had been in and out of Bangkok several times since late
December, including on flights bound to and from

Los Angeles, and had departed for Oman on 20 January.
also provided passport numbers for the

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(U) Impact

+5} Although many observers agree that the NSA-
CIA relationship was problematic, the 9/11 Review Team is
unable to measure the consequences that this situation had
on the two agencies and their ability to perform their
missions. Nonetheless, the Team acknowledges the
perception of senior CIA and Community Management
officials that the impact was significant. The relationship
was in the process of being addressed at executive levels of
CIA during the summer of 2001. The fact that this
problematic relationship was permitted to persist for as long
as it did and to the degree that it did, however, given the
enormity of the threat and the potentially disastrous
implications of noncooperation, we consider to be a specific
and notable failure.

(U) Accountability

(b)(1)

+8 As noted in this report, a troubled relationship
existed between CIA and NSA, the seriousness of which was
acknowledged by senior CIA and Community Management
leadership and perceived as detrimental to the missions of
both agencies. This relationship persisted over the course of
several years. Furthermore, with the exception of one short-
term stint, CTC failed|

‘an arrangement to which
had agreed—potentially resulting in valuable

information being overlooked, including during the run-up
to the Millennium and the increased threat environment of
2001. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board
review the performance of the following individuals:

¢ The DCI from the pre-9/11 period, for failing to take
action personally on a more timely basis to resolve the

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(b)(1)
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Watchlisting training was on-the-job, and officers learned to
do CIRs by copying the work of others.

+~S+ANF} UBL Station did nominate almost|__|
individuals for watchlisting prior to 9/11, but interviews
indicate that this activity was not a priority. Most officers
were clear about the criteria and threshold for watchlisting,
especially of individuals with known terrorist connections
and plans to travel to the United States, and the Station had
at least one officer whom the others recognized as an
authority on watchlisting. However, the decision to
watchlist was left to the discretion of the individual working
a particular case and was therefore dependent on his or her
experience and possibly guidance from a supervisor. In
addition, our interviews of Station personnel indicate that
they did not consider the issue to be a priority until July
2000, when a new Chief of Station (COS) arrived and began
to press them to be more active in watchlisting.

+S+/NE} UBL Station’s record on nominating
individuals for terrorism watchlists was better than that of

Jreinforcing
the importance of VISAVIPER with their staffs, and in May

June 2005

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1999, but that it became an increasing problem during and
after the Millennium:

° | |told the (b)(7)(d)
Team that CTC was well funded and had “all of the
money it needed.”

(b)(7)(¢) -| believed that funding was
: sufficient. | told the Team that the (b)(7)(d)
Station had sufficient money. (b)(7)(d)

said that the Station never dropped an operation as a
result of lack of funds. Moreover,

(b)(7)(d) stated that a CTC reprogramming of
; million in FY 1997 to help fund the Mir Aimal Kansi (b)(1)
reward did not adversely affect the Station, again (b)(3)

implying that it had ample financial resources.

e Many Agency officials interviewed did not believe that
any CTC programs—technical or otherwise—had to be
phased out or cut as a result of inadequate funding.
Indeed, (b)(7)(d)
stated that, “it was almost embarrassing how much
money CTC had.” At the same time, however, many of
these officials also noted that; if CTC had had more
funds, it might have been more effective, pursued new
initiatives, or increased its operational tempo.

© On2 December 1999, the then-Chief of CTC sent a cable
to all DO stations and bases implying that funding had
not been an issue prior to that time. In this cable he
stated, “We are all accustomed to spending CTC money
freely. How many times have we said, ‘don’t

(b)(7)(d)

; (b)(7)(a)
TM'(U) In his response to the OIG draft, istated that, throughout| |
tenure (mid-summer of 1997 to the fall of 2001), there was never, ti recollection, a request for (b)(7)(d)

additional! counterterrorism monies other than one funding issue with|__|and resolution of

NSC-mandated programs.| _ |stated, “Moreover, as the OIG report indicates, managers in both (b)(3)
CTC and the DO conducted themselves and made decisions that did not suggest that : .
counterterrorism funds were a constraining issue.” recalled the situation (b)(7)(d)
differently, indicating that the Executive Director never offered to help with resources. Rather,
[__|said, the latter was preoccupied with adhering to the Agency’s budget guidance and had (b)(7)(d)
made it clear that CTC was not to express a need for more resources or people—even if asked.
(b)(7)(a)
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(U) Accountability

{E> The Team has subsumed accountability for this
issue under Systemic Finding 4.

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“Cabinet-level consensus that the risk of collateral damage
was too high, concerns about the lack of precision in the
description of what the tribal assets might encounter in the
way of armed resistance inside the Tarnak compound, and
concerns that the purpose and nature of the operation would
be subject to unavoidable misinterpretation and
misrepresentation—and probably public recriminations—in
the event that Bin Ladin, despite our best intentions and
efforts, did not survive.”

S/| NE) Although ostensibly postponed, in (b)(3)
reality the Tarnak farm operation had little chance of success
even if approved, in the. Team's judgment. On 26 May 1998,
20 days before the operation was scheduled to take place,
Bin Ladin abruptly disappeared, abandoning his semi-
permanent lifestyle at Tarnak farm never to return except for
brief visits; it is not clear what precipitated this change. The
cruise missile attacks aimed at UBL in August, following the
al-Qa’ida-led bombing of US Embassies in Africa, made the
probability of capturing Bin Ladin at Tarnak farm even
lower, as UBL adopted security countermeasures.

Unsuccessful Later Efforts.’.An in- (b)(3)
depth review of the documentation concerning the tribal
assets after the May 1998 standdown reveals that the assets .
repeatedly indicated that they were moving forward with
preparations for an attack or were completing plans for.an
assault on Bin Ladin in one of his houses with the aim of
capturing him. Each time, however, something arose or
stood in the way. For example:

¢ The tribal assets told) son 22 August that . (b)(1)

they would be ready to carry out a rendition operation (b)(3)
by mid-September. Headquarters gave approval in mid-
September, but no such operation ever.occurred. A

former Chief of CTC told the Joint Inquiry, according to

the JI report, that the tribal assets abandoned three

planned attempts to capture Bin Ladin in September and

October 1998, ] (b)(1)

‘once because his security was too (b)(3)
‘ormidable.

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Team has discussed is perfect, but it is important that all be
developed and used to the greatest possible extent.

(U) The 9/11 Review Team believes that one of the
most effective mechanisms for dealing with the flow of raw
intelligence data within the IC is a well-defined and well-
managed detailee program. Detailees should represent the
interests of their home agencies first. Their role should be to
review available information from the perspective of their
agencies; determine what should be transmitted and how it
should be transmitted; obtain the necessary approval from

~ the host agency; then send it out in the proper manner and

to the appropriate officers. This approach appears to us to
offer the best chance that the relevant information will be
mined from the raw traffic and conveyed to the appropriate
agencies in a timely and effective manner.

(U) For this approach to work, however, IC agencies
must consistently:

¢ Send high-performance officers.on detail to other
organizations. That entails making an investment of
people and resources as well as recognizing and -
rewarding those officers who are willing to take on such
responsibility.

¢ Provide detailees with MOUs that clearly articulate their
information sharing responsibilities.

¢ Create effective guidelines, products, and processes for
conveying relevant information to the appropriate
agencies.

e Ensure effective and consistent management and
supervision of detailee programs.

(U) Finally, it is important that the IC ensure that
those who are doing threat warnings for the Intelligence
Community have access to all the data. Whether that
warning is being done in a Community Coordination Board,
a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, a National

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ability to acquire actionable intelligence before 9/11. The
report argues that this lack of sources resulted from an
excessive reliance on foreign liaison services and walk-ins
(sources who volunteer); a focus on disruption and capture
rather than collection; and adherence to the dirty asset rules
(guidelines that restricted the recruitment of sources who
had committed certain proscribed acts).

+~S+AN#F} The Review Team did not find that CIA’s
reliance on liaison for collection was excessive but did find
that) this reliance was not balanced with a strong
focus on developing unilateral assets. The Team did not find
that CIA reliance on walk-ins was misguided;

Although the CIA focused its al-Qa’ida
operations on Afghanistan, possibly limiting its ability to
focus elsewhere, the Team believes that this approach was
reasonable and that its purpose was collection on al-Qa‘ida
as well as disruption of al-Qa’ida’s activities. While
agreeing that the dirty asset rules may have created a climate
that had the effect of inhibiting certain recruitment
operations, the Team is unable to confirm or determine the
extent of the impact. Finally, the Team found that several
operational platforms, specifically the Nonofficial Cover
(NOC) program| ]
were not effectively engaged in the battle against al-Qa'ida.
In the case of the NOC program, this reflected the weakness
of the program itself. In the case _iit reflected CTC’s
focus on Afghanistan and the priority of its attempts to
penetrate al-Qa‘ida’s inner circle.

SAAN} The Team found that the CIA’s relations
with foreign liaison services were critical to its ability to
disrupt al-Qa’ida and thwart some terrorist attacks on the
United States. While the capabilities and cooperation of
liaison services were uneven, the program itself did not
detract from CIA’s efforts to mount its own unilateral
operations. The Team did raise serious questions about
whether CTC prior to 9/11 had made the most effective use

2

liaison services in its operations against al-Qa'ida. This

June 2005

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454 NB} Problems affecting confidence in the

reliability of the tribal assets developed:on other fronts in
late 1997:

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other issues for which the level of effort would remain the
same, be temporarily reduced, or be minimized.*

+€} The Absence of a National Intelligence
Estimate. The 9/11 Team believes that the absence of an
estimative product on the threat posed by al-Qa'ida and
UBL in the four years leading up to9/11 was a strategic
error. As explained in Factual Finding 3 and Systemic
Finding 5, the NIC had not produced an NIE on the
terrorism threat to the United States since 1995, with an
update in 1997; it had never done a paper of any kind
devoted to the overall threat posed by al-Qa'ida.“

+ESHANP} The 9/11 Team believes that the former
DCI bears some responsibility for the failure of the NIC to
produce timely estimative work on terrorism. On the one
hand, the DCI had indicated that he wanted the NIC to play
an expanded role in galvanizing the Community. Ina June
1998 memorandum to the then-NIC Chairman, he stated that
the NIC had a major role to play in achieving “better
integration, collaboration, and synergy across Intelligence
Community.” But he never called upon the NIC to produce
an estimate on al-Qa’ida or terrorism generally in the four

°(U) The former DCI also commented that the Team’s report makes the assumption that,
“without a Presidential Directive being issued, senior policymakers and the leaders of the
Intelligence Community were ignorant that countering terrorism was a key priority.” The 9/11
Team points out that—whatever the case—the policymakers’ focus on counterterrorism did not
result i in any realignment of resources from lesser priority areas to counterterrorism-related areas.
“(U) The 9/11 Team believes that the absence of such an estimate may have been, in part, an
unintended consequence of the decision made in 1989 to place Community responsibility for
counterterrorism warning in CTC, while leaving the responsibility for producing counter-
terrorism NIEs with the NIC. The record suggests, however, that the NIC did not pursue this

task aggressively. attributed the 1989
decision to the fact that the an ad been competing voices. He argued that the move
had been poorly executed, however, and that the need to create the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center after 9/11 constituted an admission that CTC had not become the Community player
originally envisioned.|_sSatid there had been concern at the time of
the transfer of responsibility that CTC would focus on the tactical aspects of the account and
would neglect the longer-term, strategic view. He said that other agencies also had worried that
CTC would not have the objectivity of the NIC. tld the Team
that the transfer of Community responsibility to CTC had never worked, but that he could recall

no discussion of revisiting the decision—nor did the Team find any evidence of such a
discussion.

TOPGHEREH

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target.”” The Team found that the Directorate of
Operations (DO) made little use of nonofficial cover
. (NOC) officers or nontraditional platforms to address the
(b)(1) al-Qa'ida target because these platforms were indeed too
(b)(3) weak to offer much potential.

(U) The Balance Between Collection and Disruption

4S+ANF} CTC’s HUMINT strategy regarding UBL

(b)(1) evolved over the years from one focused on disruptions and
(b)(3) ”
capture| |
| |eTc
never achieved access to UBL’s inner circle.
(U) Early Focus on Disruption
y
b)(1 , .
(pits) +S+7NF) Prior to mid-1999, CTC’s main focus was
(b)(7)(d) ; disruption| |
| |
Wwell aware that CIA
had been unsuccessful at penetrating the inner core of
(b)(1) P 8
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(d)
: necessary for CIA to use the information it was
: collecting to take action to disrupt the terrorist infrastructure
(b)(1) before it could be used to attack the United States.
(b)(3)
(b)(7)(d)

*U) “September 11 and Imperative of Reform in the US Intelligence Community, Additional
Views of Senator Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” JI
Final Report, Appendix — Additional Views of Members of the Joint Inquiry, 10 December 2002.

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of the country, since he was here already. Watchlisting
al-Mihdhar after March—even as late as mid-May 2001,
when UBL Station again becarne aware of his travel—
could have prevented his re-entry on 4 July 2001.
Nonetheless, if this had occurred, al-Qa’ida may well
have continued the 9/11 plot, either with a replacement
or with one fewer team member.

¢ Good operational followthrough, however, including
proper notification of the FBI and| could have resulted
in surveillance of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar once they were
in the United States. This, in turn, would have had the
potential to yield information on flight training, sources of
finance, contacts with other hijackers, links through
Malaysian apartment owner Yazid Sufaat to Moussaoui,
and contacts with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.

(U) Accountability

+€} So many CIA officers at Headquarters and in the
field could have taken appropriate and timely action to
notify appropriate State, FBI, INS, and other US Government
officials about al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, but did not do so,
that the Team considers these failures systemic. However,
when the Team examines the record in detail, the
responsibility and potential accountability of some
individuals emerge.

+} In regard to watchlisting:
¢ Broadly publicized, periodic guidance lays out the

responsibility of stations and bases on the VISAVIPER
program. |

|This did not
occur. However, as the record shows, these overseas

facilities,aswellas| ss SSCSCS=*sdSad engaged

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(U) FOREWORD: ASSESSING THE JOINT INQUIRY’S
FINDINGS

(U) Introduction

(U) In issuing its final report on 10 December 2002,

the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community

Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001 (9/11) recommended that the CIA
Inspector General (IG) should “review the factual findings
and the record of this Inquiry and conduct investigations
and reviews as necessary to determine whether and to what
extent personnel at all levels should be held accountable for
any omission, commission, or failure to meet professional
standards in regard to the identification, prevention, or
disruption of terrorist attacks, including the events of
September 11, 2001. These reviews should also address
those individuals who performed in a stellar or exceptional
manner, and the degree to which the quality of their
performance was rewarded or otherwise impacted their
careers.”

(U) Accordingly, in February 2003, the Office of

Inspector General (OIG) constituted the 9/11 Accountability
Review Team to examine the Joint Inquiry’s (JI) findings that

were relevant to the CIA. The IG named the then-Assistant
IG for Inspections to lead this multidisciplinary team.
Although the composition of the Team changed in the
ensuing months, during the bulk of its operating time the
Team also included four inspectors—including individuals
on rotation from each of the mission directorates and the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) area—two auditors,
one investigator, a contractor with significant Agency and
inspections experience, a research assistant, and a secretary.
None of the members of the team had worked in the
Counterterrorist Center or had counterterrorism as a
primary area of expertise; several had worked on various
aspects of the counterterrorism issue previously, however.

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(U) FACTUAL FINDING 4: AIRCRAFT AS WEAPONS

(U) Factual Finding 4 of the Joint Inquiry (JI) report
states that, “From at least 1994, and continuing into the
summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community received
information indicating that terrorists were contemplating,
among other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons.
This information did not stimulate any specific Intelligence
Community assessment of, or collective US Government
reaction to, this form of threat.”

+S+ANF} In support of this finding, the JI report cites
12 cases of pre-9/11 intelligence reporting that describe
plans by terrorists and others to use aircraft as weapons,
albeit acknowledging questionable source credibility for
some of these reports. The Report also notes that some but
not all of these reports were disseminated within the
Intelligence Community (IC) and to other agencies, and that
some senior foreign policy officials from both the Clinton
and the Bush Administrations did not recall receiving any
information on specific threats involving use of aircraft as
‘weapons.

(U) Assessment of Joint Inquiry’s Findings

+ The Office of Inspector General's 9/11 Review
Team concurs with the JI’s overall conclusion on this finding :
as it relates to the CIA. The Directorate of Operations i
disseminated some reports on the planned use of aircraft as ;
weapons, and other information on the subject was available
as well. However, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) and
others in the IC—while producing a few intelligence
products that made mention of the subject—did not pull
together this information into any assessments.

+¢SHANP} The Team found that, of the 12 cases the JI
cites, only eight are solid examples of use of airplanes as
weapons. Among those that are not, two (the cases from

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TESTS TORE ON, NOFORN7 Wit

more clearly ascertaining the burden of the workload when

the key cables| |were
received. A review of Hercules data holdings shows that
UBL Station received, on average, 36 DO action cables each
day that month. When “info” cables, like the two from

| lare included, the Station

received an average of 221 DO cables per day for the month,

according to cable counts provided by CTC Hercules
Support. Because the Station was covering a key
transnational issue, this was more than comparably sized
DO field stations, although UBL Station sent out fewer
cables per day that month than such field stations. Adding
in cables from the Departments of Defense and State, the
National Security Agency, and other agencies, UBL Station

received an average of 534 action and info cables per day in

March.” Lotus notes received add even more to the total.
Station officers told the Team that, to get through sucha
large cable load, they practiced triage, opening those
messages that appeared to be the most critical to their
mission.

SAAN} An examination of documents actually

accessed provides a more refined indicator of workload, and

an audit of key UBL Station officers’ actual reading habits
shows the volume of traffic handled during the key day of

6 March 2000, a Monday. On that day, an audit of computer

system access shows that:

© The targeting officer electronically accessed 160

documents—including cables, Lotus notes, and messages

in other databases. This officer opened the two key

cables within 15 minutes of badging in around 0715 that
morning. The officer had open for

33 seconds and lpen for
one minute and five seconds.”

*(U) The Team did not have comparable comparative total cable counts for other stations.

*4€}-Although the|

cable was disseminated a full day earlier than the!

one, all the individuals discussed here who accessed both on the 6th opened the

one first.

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systemic. This memorandum, sent to the DDCI on
24 September 2004, contained 19 recommendations designed
to help overcome the identified deficiencies.

(U) The OIG review covered the period leading up to
11 September 2001, and the Team did not track changes
implemented since that time. With the lessons learned from
this review and others, however, the Team believes a future
OIG team should be able to review policies and processes
currently affecting CIA’s counterterrorism efforts in order to
evaluate whether they are being implemented effectively
and systematically.

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¢ PDD-62 of May 1998 specified that CIA was the lead
agency for preemption and disruption of foreign
terrorists abroad and directed CIA to develop and
coordinate for interagency approval disruption program
plans and specific actions.

Furthermore, the Community's periodic review of priorities
provided the DCI with a mechanism to formally reprioritize
intelligence targets to reflect the heightened threat of
counterterrorism relative to other targets.

{&//*#F; In addressing the al-Qa'ida target, the DCI
did not exploit these authorities as fully as he might have to
bring the Community together in the war against UBL.” For
example:

¢ The Team found no evidence that the DCI intervened to
broaden the scope of or attendance at the meetings he
had called for in the Call-to-War memorandum so that
they might include representation both from all relevant
IC agencies and from analytic, financial, and human
resource entities within CIA. The Team believes that the
absence of an analytic focus and the lack of utilization of
resource mechanisms in this IC strategy were significant
omissions.

¢ As is discussed elsewhere in this report, serious tensions
existed between CIA and NSA; resolving them would

® (U) The DDCI/CM also did not play a prominent role in facilitating the development of an IC
strategy against al-Qa’ida and UBL. The 9/11 Team notes, however, that, according to DCID 1/1,
her principal responsibility was to execute the responsibilities of the DCI that related to:
providing and promoting services of common concern; promoting common administrative
practices; collection; and development of an annual budget. The DDCI/CM and her Staff would
not normally have been involved i in developing Community-wide strategies against specific
targets.

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FOPSECRER
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454 NF} Allefforts to strengthen Masood

came to a sudden end before he had accomplished any
notable covert actions that were a serious threat to

Bin Ladin. On the morning of 9 September 2001, two Arabs
posing as journalists met with Masood. While Masood was
greeting them, one of the Arabs detonated a bomb hidden in
his clothing, mortally injuring Masood.

Retrospectively, CTC employees
split in their assessments of CIA's Masood program. A few
CTC officers interviewed by the 9/11 Review Team asserted

"that the DDO’s refusal to permit CIA officers to deploy from

Dushanbe via Masood’s helicopters doomed the Masood

program. Other interviewees, including a senior NE officer,

a former Chief/CTC and a former COS/UBL Station,
defended the DDO. Given the documented level of risk of
flying in Masood’s helicopters and the uncertainty about a
payoff from the relationship with Masood, the Team sees no
sound basis for challenging the DDO’s decision.

eS NE} In contrast, a 29 May 2001 memorandum from Chief/CTC to Richard Clarke

at the NSC on possible nonmonetary assistance to the Northern Alliance claimed that the

Lo

June 2005

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4S+AN#; Although CTC did not pick up on the
significance of past reporting on Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad before 9/11, it quickly saw its relevance in the
wake of the attacks. l

+€+ANE} In the summer of 2003, the OIG Team asked
CTC officers why they had failed to understand the
significance of reporting indicating that KSM was associated
with al-Qa’ida prior to 9/11. Of the 14 people who
responded:

*45} A month after the attacks, on 17 October 2001, CTC recommended that Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad be watchlisted.

“46> This one-paragraph cable was in response toacablesent| __———_indicating a possible
sighting of KSM. The UBL Station cable asked that|___ forward all future action on Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad to CTC/RB; it was drafted, authorized, and released by officers in UBL
Station.

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THESTSI7 7S ORECONNOFORN 77M With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks (b)(3)
(b)(1)
Nevertheless, the Team observes that the complicated (b)(3)

dynamics of liaison relationships, including lack of common
goals and counterintelligence problems, suggest that CTC

managers made reasonable judgments| (b)(1)
a mes - 8)

$S+ANF} The Joint Inquiry particularly criticized CIA

for the conduct of its operational ‘ihe | (b)(1)
It noted that CIA had unsuccessfully pressed (b)(3)
authorities for additional information on individuals later

identified as associates of some of the hijackers. It placed

some of the blame for this on CIA’s decisions (b)(1)
The (by(3)
Team also found that CIA was unable to acquire the

information cited by the JI but found that it made repeated
efforts to do so and that its lack of success was the result of a

(b)(1) difficult operating environment and limited cooperation on

(b)(3) the part of The Team concluded that
the decisions made with respect to were (b)(1)
reasonable. (b)(3)

+SHANE) The Joint Inquiry also argued that both the
FBI and CIA had failed to identify the extent of support from
Saudi nationals or groups for terrorist activities globally or
within the United States and the extent to which such
support, to the extent it existed, was knowing or inadvertent.
While most of the JI discussion on the Saudi issue dealt with
issues involving the FBI and its domestic operations, the
report also| ] (b)(1)
The Team found that a significant (b)(3)
gap existed in the CIA’s understanding of Saudi extremists’
involvement in plotting terrorist attacks. The primary
reasons for this gap were the difficulty of the task, the hostile

operational environment, and) (b)(1)
Cd (013)

+~S+ANF} The Team also found, however, that UBL
Stationand| ————_were hostile to each other and (b)(1)
working at cross purposes over a period of years before (b)(3)
9/11. The Team cannot measure the specific impact of this
counterproductive behavior. At a minimum, however, the
Team found that organizational tensions clearly complicated

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has been undertaken. Several Agency studies over the years
have reviewed the CIA’s position regarding its cadre of
language-capable officers, with an eye to perceived current
and future shortfalls, however.

+E+/NP} Various studies have indicated that the CIA
lacked or would soon lack adequate numbers of language-
qualified officers:

¢ A1994 Agency-wide study of critical languages projected
significant shortfalls in Arabic, Farsi, Turkish, and
several other languages. It is not clear what data were
used in this study, however.

* A 1995 survey of current CIA critical foreign language
resources, conducted by the LIP Task Force, reportedly
showed shortfalls in the same critical languages
identified in the 1994 study, particularly at the
intermediate and advanced proficiency levels.
According to this survey, the “early out” retirement
program had resulted in the departure of officers with
language capabilities, including 25 with Arabic and three
with Farsi. Although the Task Force’s recommendations
focused on restructuring the Language Maintenance
Award criteria to be more closely aligned with PDD-35
and subsequent directives, one recommendation was that
components annually designate and update their
language use positions. These data were to be provided
to OTE. The OIG Report on Foreign Language in the
Agency of June 2001 recommended a zero-based review,
especially in the DO, of all overseas positions to identify
current and future language proficiency requirements,
suggesting that the data components had been providing,
despite the LIP Task Force recommendation, were
inadequate. ,

¢ In 1999, the DO Language Standards Working Group,
perceiving weaknesses in the Agency’s language
resources, suggested a review of the assignments process
as a means to change the situation.

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(U) FACTUAL FINDING 5: COLLECTIVE
SIGNIFICANCE OF RELEVANT INFORMATION

(U) Factual Finding 5 states that, “Although relevant
information that is significant in retrospect regarding the
attacks was available to the Intelligence Community prior to
September 11, 2001, the Community too often failed to focus
on that information and consider and appreciate its
collective significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack.
Neither did the Intelligence Community demonstrate
sufficient initiative in coming to grips with the new
transnational threats. Some significant pieces of information
in the vast stream of data being collected were overlooked,
some were not recognized as potentially significant at the
time and therefore not disseminated, and some required
additional action on the part of foreign governments before a
direct connection to the hijackers could have been
established. For all those reasons, the Intelligence
Community failed to fully capitalize on available, and
potentially important, information.”

(U) The Joint Inquiry addresses this issue in 10
subfindings. The Team found that the majority of these
focus on other agencies. However, three are quite relevant
to the CIA:
¢ 5.b, The Watchlisting Failure.
¢ 5.h, The Hijackers’ Associates in Germany.

¢ 5.i, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.

The Team examines the results of these findings and
relevant accountability in the three sections that follow.

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With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks “HES7SI/ SORECON-NOFORNT Avi (b)(3)

agencies, however, because many detailees did not
return to their home.agencies. (See Figure S3-9.)"*

¢ The Agency tended to address CTC’s personnel needs in
times of crises, such as during the Millennium threat or
following the East Africa Embassy bombings and the
USS Cole attack, by temporarily surging other personnel .
into the Center. However, this caused additional stress (b)(7)(d)

onan already overwhelmed work force.|
recalled that, after the Africa

Embassy bombings, the Station’s request for officers with
knowledge of operations and cable-writing skills was
met with three-CSTs on their first interims. While these
CSTs were undeniably astute and contributed to Station
efforts by the end of their three-month assignment, the.
officer noted that it still took valuable time to train
them.'”

¢ CTC also hired contractors to help address personnel
needs. The number of term employees (blue-badge
contractors) was relatively small, however, and the Team
was unable to obtain reliable data on the number of

- independent and industrial contractors working in CTC

during FY 1996-2001. Thus, the Team was not able to
assess the full extent of CTC’s efforts to augment its staff
using contractors.

e _ Finally, CTC leadership reduced its' (3)
Co from|__|in FY 1998 to jin FY 2000, in (b)(1)

part to free up positions that could be used to enhance (b)(3)
the number of personnel elsewhere in CTC. However,

"“CE+ANFY Moreover, using these detailees to fulfill Center responsibilities meant that the (b)(7)(d)
detailees were not able, or were less able, to perform the mission of sharing information with
their home agencies. (See Systemic Finding 9—Information Sharing for further discussion of this

issue.) : (b)(7)(d)
 (U) In commenting on the draft of this report, noted that [had
raised the issue of CTC staffing, especially UBL Station staffing, many times.|__stated that the (b)(7)(d)

Station’s two pre-9/11 chiefs both “resisted efforts to assign new people to the Branch [sic],

claiming that the need to train and supervise any new people would detract from the Branch’s

operation and make their task more difficult.” has a different perspective, | (b)(7)(d)

indicating that, during his tenure, had never offered more resources or

people to the Center. (b)(7)(d)
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appeared to be one of UBL’s most trusted lieutenants.
Among other things, the cable said that Khaled was active in
recruiting people to come to.the United States to carry out
unspecified terrorist activities on behalf of UBL and that he
continued to travel frequently to the United States himself.”
Several UBL Station officers saw this cable, including the
Chief of Station and the Chief of the Targeting Branch;
several analysts from CTC/AIG also saw the cable as did the
officer in Renditions Branch who was tracking KSM.*

“Khaled” might be Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad. Neither UBL Station officers nor AIG
analysts appear to have focused on the significance of the
information in terms of al-Qa’ida’s structure and
organization, the role played by KSM, or the possible
threat to the United States. -

¢ The Renditions Branch responded to the field,

While expressing doubt that the real KSM would
actually come to the United States, the cable indicated
that, if KSM did come to the United States, this would
pose both a threat and an opportunity. The cable
concluded by reminding that
Renditions Branch had primary action on KSM and
should be the recipient of future cables concerning him.”

“4SA#¢FY Khalid Shaykh Muhammad obtained a visa to visit the United States
|There is no evidence he

entered the United States

“48} This was determined by an audit of computer system access.
”48} This cable was originated by the RB officer tracking KSM and coordinated with an officer in
CTC/IEB.

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(b)(1) |

(b)(3)
|Many of the better
examples of strategic analysis, however, occurred after
January 2001, when the DI revamped the publication to meet
the heightened current intelligence demands of the new
Administration. |
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
¢ . Anaforementioned piece from 6 August on Bin Ladin’s
determination to strike in the United States. (See
discussion in Factual Finding 3.)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

-+€}- The Team did not conduct a comparable outside
independent qualitative review of the pre-9/11 current
intelligence production on al-Qa’ida because:

* Most of the finished current intelligence products had
passed through several layers of editorial review outside
of CTC, so a retrospective assessment would be

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and the limited time available to the new Administration
before 11 September.”

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U) Other Analytic Issues in the Finding

(U) As mentioned, the Joint Inquiry Report also
addresses other issues in the finding, notably the lack-of
respect for analysis shown by operations officers, inadequate
information sharing with analysts outside the Agency, and
the US Government's overreliance on its own analysts.

(U) Operations View of Analysis

+} Despite the operations support that AIG
provided and the overall strong relationship between
operations and analysis in the Center as a whole, many UBL-
focused operational officers in CTC indicated they either

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* Although the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation,
and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) had devoted the
equivalent of nine arialysts to looking at terrorism as of
August 2001, only one of these was working specifically
on al-Qa’ida. WINPAC and its predecessor
organizations produced only one paper that touched on
al-Qa’ida, a 1998 report on Sudanese VX nerve agent
production, evidently deferring to AIG’s CBRN Branch
on long-term production.

(U) Little Strategic Analysis Elsewhere

+{S+ANF) As the Joint Inquiry Report makes clear, and
has been addressed elsewhere in this report (see Factual
Finding 3), the NIC undertook no NIE specifically assessing
al-Qa’ida, even though DCI Webster’s 1989 memorandum
transferring IC counterterrorism responsibility from the NIC
to CTC reaffirmed the NIC’s continued role in producing
estimates on counterterrorism. Indeed, before 9/11, more
than cursory mention of al-Qa'ida or Bin Ladin had
appeared in only a few pre-9/11 NIC publications—the 1997
Intelligence Community Brief (ICB) that followed up on the
1995 NIE, “The Foreign Terrorist Threat in the United
States;” the 1998-1999 NIE, “Standoff Threats to US Civil
Aviation,” which dealt with the specific terrorist threat from
shoulder-fired missiles and comparable weapons; the March
2001 Intelligence Community Assessment “Threats to the
Continuity of Government;” and the May 2001 NIE,
“Afghanistan: Implications of a Taliban “Victory.” While
the NIC’s broadly publicized, unclassified assessment,
“Global Trends 2015,” made mention of a potential threat to
the US ‘homeland, it did not specifically refer to al-Qa’ida or
to any other terrorist group.” In mid-2001, the NIC, with
drafting assistance from CTC, began work on another
estimate on terrorism, but this paper was not published until

* (U) As mentioned in the Team’s discussion of Factual Finding 3, this unclassified NIC product
focused on a wide array of future demographic, economic, political, and other concerns. The
discussions on terrorism account for a few paragraphs in this long study.

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question these numbers also. Whereas OTI’s production

record supports the claim of 3.75 OTI analysts working

on al-Qa’ida as of 1 August 2001, NESA’s claims of the

equivalent of four analysts devoted to the issue seem

high, considering that NESA produced no IRs on the

organization after 1998 andthat_ told the (b)(7)(d)
Team that the office did not work on al-Qa’ida because it

was nota country. Similarly, he eens (b)(1)
Issue in the Office of Russian and European Analysis (b)(3)
(OREA) claimed the equivalent of 2.5 analysts working

on al-Qa’ida as of 1 August 2001; an examination of

OREA production submitted for this inspection suggests
that this figure, too, is inflated and probably reflects the

number of analysts working on.the (b)(1)
account, only a portion of whom covered links to > (b)(3)
al-Qa’ida.

+4€} The Team therefore cannot accurately determine
the overall-size of the analyst cadre devoted to working on
al-Qa’ida immediately prior to 9/11. The Team believes it is
probably somewhat higher than the Joint Inquiry’s figure of
“fewer than 40” but, based on our analysis, it is below the
49—34 in AIG plus 15 in the DI—which CTC offered in 2002
as the number of analysts working on al-Qa’ida prior to
9/11."

4S} The number of analysts devoted to terrorism in
general also grew over the years. At the end of 1997, AIG
had 30 analysts and managers of analysts in analytic
production units, according to the (b)(1)
This had increased to 34 by the end of 1999 and 43 by the (b)(3)
end of 2000. As of 10 September 2001, following a recent
influx of several new officers—including some senior

officers for the Group’s newly established] si (b)(1)
(b)(3)

*8.(U) One of the problems with these full-time analyst-equivalent numbers is that they represent
a combination of numerous recollections of how individuals spent their time at work, and such
personal recollection can be inflated: For additional information on analytic resources, see
Systemic Finding 3.

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(U) The JI report indicates that several factors
hampered the FBI's sharing of information with the CIA.
The Acting Chief of the FBI’s Radical Fundamentalist Unit .
said that, before 11 September 2001 (9/11), the FBI would
think to provide CIA with information obtained through the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) only when it
was also passing that information to a foreign government.
Moreover, legal concerns relating to traditional separation
between law enforcement and intelligence operations
hindered sharing of operations; the FBI typically used FISA
information only in connection with cases for which that

’ information was obtained and did not routinely disseminate
it within the FBI or to other IC members. Finally, poor FBI
information technology reduced information sharing.

(U) Culture and policy issues also limited the extent
to which CIA shared counterterrorism information within
the IC, according to the JI report. Most Agency officers did
not focus on the domestic terrorism front, viewing it as an
FBI rather than a CIA mission, and this accounted for some
information-sharing problems. At times, the report says, the
CIA ignored threat activity linked to the United States,
focusing on radical activity overseas. One CIA officer told
the JI that he did not consider the reported travel of two
suspected al-Qa'ida associates—later to become 9/11
hijackers—to Los Angeles to be important and that he was
interested only in their connection to Yemen.

(U) The JI’s discussion of this finding also returns to
itsassessment of, = ——————S—SC—SSs|coveerred in Factual (b)(3)
Finding 5b. The report indicates that:

¢ Onat least three occasions between January 2000 and
August 2001, the CIA failed to recommend future
hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar for
watchlisting. It notes that the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) acknowledged in his testimony that
CIA was not sufficiently focused on advising the State
Department to watchlist all terrorist operatives,

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+~SHANFY CIA efforts in December 1999 to disrupt
al-Qa'ida plans to carry out terrorist attacks during the

millennium offer a snapshot of the level of cooperation and
effectiveness of CTC’s liaison relations

(U) Liaison Intelligence Production

+S+AN} Liaison reporting was an important source
of information on the counterterrorism target before 9/11.
Indeed, during the period 1 January 1998-11 September 2001,

June 2005

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OIG Report on CIA Accountability 4OPSECRFE (oy(®)
With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HES/SH}}ORCON-NOFORN R- (b)(3)

(U) The Review Team found that Agency officers
from the top down worked hard against the al-Qa’ida and
Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) targets. They did not always work
effectively and cooperatively, however. The Team found
neither a “single point of failufe” nor a “silver bullet” that
would have enabled the Intelligence Community (IC) to
predict or prevent the 9/11 attacks. The Team did find,
however, failures to implement and manage important
processes, to follow through with operations, and to
properly share and analyze critical data. If IC officers had
been able to view and analyze the full range of information
available before 11 September 2001, they could have
developed a more informed context in which to assess the
threat reporting of the spring and summer that year.

(U) This review focuses only on those findings of the
Joint Inquiry that relate to the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Team cooperated with the Department of Justice
Inspector General and the Kean Commission as they
pursued their separate inquiries. For this report, the Team
interviewed officers from other agencies who had been
detailed to the CIA in the period before 9/11, but did not
undertake to interview systematically other officers outside
CIA and the IC Management Staff. This report reaches no
conclusions about the performance of other agencies or their
personnel.

(U) Senior Leadership and Management of the Counterterrorism
Effort

(U) The JI concluded that, before 9/11, neither the US
Government nor the IC had a comprehensive strategy for
combating al-Qa’ida. It charged that the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) was either unwilling or unable to marshal
the full range of IC resources necessary to combat the
growing threat to the United States. The OIG Team also
found that the IC did not have a documented,
comprehensive approach to al-Qa'ida and that the DCI did
not use all of his authorities in leading the IC's strategic
effort against UBL.

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OIG Report on CIA Accountability TOPSECREF sid (b)(1)
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United States to be “interesting”—had already
overstepped the __|bounds in highlighting another (b)(1)

information to UBL Station. Accordingly, while (nV)
directed its cable to UBL Station— (b)(1 )
informing and others—it noted that action (b)(3)
required was, “None, FYI”.
Of note, both cables’ Headquarters dissemination lines

assigned the Headquarters action for each cable solely to
UBL Station.

+S} The cable audit data suggest, however, that the
time that several key UBL Station officers spent reading the

key/ cables was sufficient to (b)(1)
absorb the information about the US travel. The cable audit (b)(3)
data show that eight UBL Station officers opened |
| within (b)(1)
a week of dissemination on 5 and 6 March, respectively, and (b)(3)

another six officers opened one or the other during that time

frame; several of these 14 officers were managers in the

Station. Additional cable access audit data—which show

when individuals opened particular pieces of traffic then

moved on to another piece—for four of these officers b)1

indicate that these particular individuals had the (b)(1)

cable open for an average of 21 seconds and the (b)(3)
cable open for an average of one minute 13 seconds.

Members of the Review Team who examined the same

cables were easily able to read through the cable text,

including the references to US travel, in about the same

times. This suggests that factors besides inadequate reading

time may underlie the failures to act on this information as
far as these four officers are concerned.

(U) Work Overload

+S//N#} UBL Station personnel told the Team that an
overwhelming amount of incoming traffic and daily taskings
kept them from reading entire cables, causing them to miss
critical information. The OIG survey that accompanied the
2000-2001 inspection of CTC echoed these comments,
showing that 57 percent of UBL Station respondents

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(b)(1)

+S+/*#; In regard to human intelligence (HUMINT)
reporting, al-Qaida threat reporting did increase between
April and June 2001, but then declined through the rest of
the summer:

¢ Directorate of Operations telegraph disseminations (TDs)
that warned of an impending al-Qa’ida attack grew from
five in April to 20 in June before dropping again to 14 in
August. Contrary to overall perceptions at the time,
however, the April-June jump was not without
precedent. Indeed, the increase in threat reports issued
between August and October 1999 was steeper and the
number greater. In addition, the spring 2001 increase
started from a low base, as the number of threats
received in April 2001 was the lowest since the Cole
bombing of October 2000.

¢ An examination of all TDs on al-Qa’ida—i.e., not just the
threat-related ones—shows a similar increase between
April and June 2001 followed by a drop later in the
summer. Again, this growth was from a low starting
point, as the number of such TDs disseminated in April
was the lowest since July 1998, immediately prior to the
African embassy bombings.

e Finally, all cables that CIA issued on al-Qa'ida increased
by 63 percent to 958 during the period April-July 2001.
This increase was also not unprecedented, as al-Qa’ida-
related cables had nearly doubled to more than 1,500 per
month between September and December 1999.

(U) Informing the Policymakers

+~€} The Team’s review confirms that the CIA kept
senior policymakers informed of the threat. For example,
between March and August 2001, the Interagency
Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) issued four
threat advisories or extensions highlighting the imminent

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(U) CIA Pre-9/11 Covert Action Options

FSF ANE) In the end, the restrictions imposed (b)(1)
on operations by the MONs were an inhibition to killing (b)(3)
Bin Ladin, but they were not the real reason for the failure to
capture or destroy him and his lieutenants. That failure, in
the judgment of the 9/11 Review Team, resulted from the
weakness of CIA's covert action options.

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¢ Taken paramilitary training in Afghanistan.

¢ Joined Abdul Rasul Sayaaf’s Islamic Union, an Afghan
resistance group, in Pakistan in the late 1980s.

¢ Been involved in other Yousef plots, such as attacking
Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto and bombing a Shia
shrine in Iran.

Moreover, the hundreds of cables that the Agency (b)(1)
disseminated on KSM during the 1990s trace his extensive (b)(3)
travels,

454 INF} The knowledge that the CIA gained . (b)(3)

about the Manila Air Conspiracy, with which KSM was
closely associated, was compelling in establishing the high
priority of KSM as a target. Philippine authorities had
arrested and interrogated one of the accomplices of

Ramzi Yousef and KSM, Abdul Hakim Murad, in the mid-
1990s. Murad laid out the various plans the Yousef group
had developed, including planting bombs on US passenger
aircraft flying Asian routes and having a suicide pilot crash
an explosives-packed aircraft into CLA Headquarters.

Murad said| ] (b)(1
[ |that he had planned to use (b)(3
his skills to crash a plane into CIA Headquarters.
464 NB} CIA also had reporting on KSM that (b)(3)
suggested strong ties to UBL, if not formal membership in
al-Qa'ida:

° “Sheikh Khalid,” identified by Agency Headquarters as
KSM, was very close to UBL and had joined UBL’s
organization in Afghanistan in 1998. This information
was included ina series of Agency cables in the fall of (b)(1)
1998;| (b)(3)
CTC officers in the Renditions
Branch, UBL Station, and the Assessments and

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ignored AIG analysis or found it of little use. When the
Team asked how accessible and how helpful AIG analysis
was to UBL Station, one-third of the 24 Station officers who
responded termed this analysis not useful, untimely, or
wrong; another third said they never saw the analytic
product." Indeed, a number of Station officers said they
relied on their own analysis, and several said that the IC’s
real expertise on Bin Ladin was in the Station, not AIG. In

the 2000 inspection of re iicated (b)(7)(d)
that DO officers’ suspicion of analysis was the biggest :

obstacle that the Group faced. The apparent lack of
communication between UBL Station and AIG regarding the
former COS’s in-depth work on Bin Ladin is another
indication of the disconnect between the two groups.

+} Regardless, the Joint Inquiry Report's sole piece

of evidence for its assertion that the DO gave no weight to
analytic opinion is that some operations officers told the

~ Inquiry that they did not like to take direction from the
“ladies from the Directorate of Intelligence.” Team research
and discussions with members of the Joint Inquiry Staff
suggest that these referenced ladies were actually then-
current and former DI officers serving in UBL Station. The
problems some DO officers had with these DI officers who
were serving as operations officers is therefore not a valid
example of the DO’s consideration of analytic opinion but
rather of internal CTC management and resource utilization
issues.

(U) Information Sharing

+€} The Joint Inquiry states that analysts outside the
Agency, such as at DIA, did not have access to CIA
operations traffic and other CLA-origin information.
However, the Team’s research shows that officers from DIA,
FAA, NSA, and other organizations who were on detail to

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in little to no VISAVIPER activity during the prior year
despite familiarity with the program, and no one in
Headquarters had questioned their lack of attention to
the program. Moreover, these stations and bases were
providing the travel information to UBL Station, which
was in a better position to ascertain the other part of the
watchlisting criteria: the individuals’ involvement with
terrorist organizations. :

¢ The Team notes, however, that the DO at Headquarters
and in the field paid inconsistent and inadequate
attention to the VISAVIPER program prior to 9/11.
Although the Office of the DDO and, later, CTC/RR
included VISAVIPER information in numerous terrorism
guidance cables it sent to the field prior to 9/11, this
repeated effort appears to have been a bureaucratic
exercise, with the VISAVIPER guidance usually buried in
the middle of each cable. Indeed, most DO interviewees
told the Team that they could not recall seeing any
VISAVIPER guidance, and about one-third were not
familiar with the program at all. Because CTC had
assumed responsibility for communicating the : i
watchlisting guidance from 1998 onward, the Team :
recommends that an Accountability Board assess the
performance of the Chiefs of CTC from 1998 until
11 September 2001 for the systemic failures involving
lack of understanding and inadequate management and
implementation of this program. The Team notes,
however, that the latter Chief of CTC had been in place
only about five and a half months at the time of the
Malaysia operation and thus had had less time to devote
to overseeing the VISAVIPER program than had his
predecessor.

+} As for the Agency’s failure to use proper channels
to inform the FBI about the planned and actual travel of the
al-Qa’‘ida associates to the United States, UBL Station did not
use prescribed channels to pass along to FBI Headquarters
al-Mihdhar’s travel document information. However,
because the Team cannot confirm or refute statements by
UBL Station officers that they used commonly accepted

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(U) FACTUAL FINDING 3: THE THREAT TO THE
UNITED STATES

(U) Factual Finding 3'of the Joint Inquiry (JI) states
that, “Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of
2001, the Intelligence Community received a modest, but
relatively steady, stream of intelligence reporting that
indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within the
United States. Nonetheless, testimony and interviews
confirm that it was the general view of the Intelligence
Community, in the spring and summer of 2001, that the
threatened Bin Ladin attacks would most likely occur
against US interests overseas, despite indications of plans
and intentions to attack in the domestic United States.”

+~SAANF} The JI report further notes that
“Communications intercepts, the arrests of suspected
terrorists in the Middle East and Europe, and a credible
report of a plan to attack a US Embassy in the Middle East
shaped the Community's thinking” that the attack would be
overseas. That said, the JI cites numerous cases of
intelligence related to the al-Qa’ida threat in the United
States, including reporting in May 2001 that al-Qa’ida
members were planning to infiltrate the country to conduct
terrorist operations, and in late summer 2001 that an
al-Qa’ida associate was considering such attacks. The
Report acknowledges that the President received such threat
information, including in an August 2001 President's Daily
Brief (PDB).

(U) Assessment of Joint.Inquiry’s Findings

+€} The Team concurs with the JI’s Finding. The
preponderance of intelligence reporting indeed suggested
that the likely attack targets would be US interests overseas.

+{S+ANFY Following upon the reporting trends,
finished intelligence reiterates this view:

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unwilling to undertake the task. The information from these
assets, moreover, was never precise enough or judged
reliable enough to permit policymakers to confidently
launch cruise missile attacks on the basis of their reporting
alone after August 1998. |

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

}In short, CTC
pressed ahead with the capabilities it had, but they were
inadequate for fulfilling the assignment.

(U) Accountability

4S+ANF} In the Team’s judgment, the JI report is
correct in its conclusion that CIA covert action had little
direct impact on Bin Ladin before 9/11. Because CTC was
generally aggressive in trying to identify, use, and fortify the
various options for covert action against Bin Ladin available
to it, the Team sees no issue of accountability on this finding.
While senior managers in the Agency were more cautious
than UBL Station managers in pursuing covert action against
Bin Ladin, their caution was prudent and well founded, not
a sign of an aversion to risk. Lacking unambiguous policy
and legal direction to kill Bin Ladin, Agency officers
properly did not attempt to do so. The simple truth, in the
Team’s opinion, is that the assets available to CIA and the
covert action options and parameters that policymakers had
approved prior to 9/11 were insufficient to fulfill the
mission of capturing or killing UBL or his lieutenants.

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