[Cite as Mosser v. Mosser , 2020-Ohio-5122.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WASHINGTON COUNTY SHANE MOSSER, : : Case No. 19CA18 Plaintiff-Appellee, : : vs. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY JENNIFER MOSSER : : Defendant-Appellant. :

_____________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES: Jennifer Mosser, Appellant Pro Se.

_____________________________________________________________ Smith P.J. {¶1} This is an appeal from a Washington County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry that designated Appellee, Shane Mosser, re sidential parent and legal custodian of his minor daughter, H.M. On appe al, Appellant, Jennifer Mosser, raises seven assignments of error f or our review. However, after reviewing the fac ts and applicable law, we find no merit to any of Appellant’s assignments of error and we affirm the judgm ent of the trial court. 1

1 Appellee has not filed a brief or otherwise participated in th is appeal.Washington App. No. 19CA18 2

FACTS {¶2} The parties herein were married on September 30, 2006, and had one child, H.M, who was born on June 24, 2008. On November 5, 2015, Appellee filed for divorce. The court issued a final divorce e ntry and shared parenting decree on December 29, 2016. {¶3} On August 31, 2018, Appellee filed a motion for reallocation of parental rights seeking sole custody of H.M., as well as a moti on for emergency custody due to Appella nt’s “bazar” behavior. In an a ffidavit filed in support of the motion for emergency custody, Appellee averred that Appellant had accused her boyfriend of killing his former wife and that she had stated he was going to kill her also. The affidavit also d escribed records obtained from Nationwide Children’s Hospital indicating Appella nt had taken H.M. there to be treated for a vaginal discharge. The re cords stated Appellant was incoherent at times, was unable to stay on track, and that she appeared “to be hyper-manic.” The affidavit also described pro blems Appellant had caused on H.M.’s softball team’s social media pag e, as well as the fact that Appellant had been banned from the softball fi elds due to her concerning behavior. On September 18, 2018, the Magistrate iss ued a temporary order designating Appel lee the temporary residential parent andWashington App. No. 19CA18 3 legal custodian of H.M. The order granted Appellant supervised visitation only. {¶4} Subsequently, on November 2, 2018, Appellee filed an emergency motion to terminate unsupervised visitation alleging Appellant had recently missed a scheduled visit due to being incarcerated on a parole violation and a theft charge. 2 The motion further alleged that on the next scheduled visit, Appellant refused to return H.M. at the design ated time and instead took the child out of the State of Ohio. The motion al so alleged that upon finally returning H.M., Appellant threatened to kill herse lf in front of the child. On November 2, 2018, the Magistrate issued an order terminating unsupervised visitation between Appellant and H.M. and once aga in ordering supervised visitation consistent with the prior tempor ary order issued on September 18, 2018. Thereafter, on November 8, 2018, the Magistrate sua sponte appointed a guardian ad litem (hereinafte r “GAL”) to

H.M. {¶5} On June 13, 2019 , the GAL submitted her report to the court, which, in pertinent part, recommended that Appellee be designat ed H.M.’s residential parent and legal custodian and that Appellant conti nue with supervised visitation. On June 20, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on

2 Although the temporary order granted only supervised visitatio n to Appellant, it appears that at some point Appellant began having unsupervised visitation with H.M. However, we have been unable to locate an order granting unsupervised visitation.Washington App. No. 19CA18 4 Appellee’s “Motion To Modify Custody.” Appellee was represente d by counsel. Appellant represented herself. Appellee’s counsel in formed the court that the parties had reached an agreement. Counsel repre sented that the agreement incorporated the GAL’s report from the “second ha lf of page 14 and at the very beginning of page 15,” which provided that A ppellee be designated H.M.’s residential parent and legal custodian and th at Appellant continue to have supervised visitation. While on the record, t he Magistrate asked Appellant if she had in fact reached an agreement and was asking the court to adopt that agreement as the court’s order and she veri fied that she had, and she was. {¶6} Subsequent to the hearing, the Magistrate issued a decision indicating that the parties had reached an agreement that Appel lee was to be named the residential parent and legal guardian of H.M. and App ellant would continue to have supervised visitation. Appellant filed no objections to the decision. On August 22, 2019, the trial court issued an agreed judgment entry that adopted the Magistrate’s decision. It is f rom this judgment that Appellant now appeals, setting forth seven assign ments of error for our review. The assignm ents of error are set forth v erbatim below.Washington App. No. 19CA18 5

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 3

I. “TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN GRANTING IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE EXISTING CUSTODY ORDER. PURSUANT TO OHIO RULE 75 (N) TEMPORARY ORDER TO CONDUCT ORAL HEARING WITHIN 28 DAYS DID NOT TAKE PLACE.”

II. “TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN MODIFYING AND REALLOCATING PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. R.C. 3109.04(C)(f)(1)(h) ADJUDICIATION NEGLECT CONSIDER FACT OR ABUSE ACT TO BE THE PERPETRATOR OF CHILD ABUSE.”

III. “TRIAL COURT ERRED GRANTING EMERGENCY CUSTODY. TEMPORARY ORDERWAS TO BE SIGNED BY THE JUDGE PURSUANT TO RULE 53(c).”

IV. “TRIAL COURT ERRED TO CONDUCT DEPOSITIONARY HEARING, RULE 75(K) WITHIN 28 DAYS AND DID NOT TAKE PLACE.”

V. “TRIAL COURT UNNECESSARY DELAY OF PROCESS.”

VI. “GUARDIAN AD LITEM ERRED AND THE REPORT SHOULD BE STRICKEN, DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED PURSUANT TO S. CT. RULE 48.” VII. “VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW, NO JURISDICTION OF SUBJECT MATTER.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW {¶7} “Appellate courts generally review ‘the propriety of a trial c ourt's determination in a domestic relations case’ under the ‘abuse of discretion’

3 It appears from the record that Appellant filed two different appellate briefs one minute apart on September 26, 2019. The assignments of error are worded differ ently in each brief. We address the assignments of error contained in the earlier-filed brief rathe r than the later-filed brief, which was filed without leave of court and should have been stricken from the r ecord.Washington App. No. 19CA18 6

standard.” Clifford v. Skaggs , 4th Dist. Gallia No. 17CA6, 2017-Ohio-8597, ¶ 9, quoting Booth v. Booth , 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028 (1989) (abuse of discretion standard applies to child support, custody, visitation, spousal support, and division of marital property). Under this highly deferential standard, we must affirm the decision of the trial court unless it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. See State v. Beasley , 152 Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16, 97 N.E.3d 474, ¶ 12, citing Blakemore v.

Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). {¶8} However, Appellant failed to object to the temporary orders, t he GAL report, or the Magistrate’s decision. Under Civ.R. 53(D)(3 )(b)(i), a party must file objections within 14 days of the filing of the magistrate's decision. Thus, a “party forfeits or waives the right to chall enge the trial court's adoption of a factual finding or legal conclusion unles s the party objects in accordance with Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).” See Faulks v. Flynn , 4th Dist. Scioto No. 13CA3568, 2014-Ohio-1610, ¶ 17; Civ.R. 53(D)(3 )(b)(iv). Any objections must be “specific and state with particularity a ll grounds for objection.” Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii). Further, objections to fi ndings of fact must be “supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitte d to the magistrate relevant to that finding or an affidavit of that evi dence if a transcript is not available.” Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii). “Excep t for a claim ofWashington App. No. 19CA18 7 plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the co urt's adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifi cally designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ. R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).” Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). “ ‘I n essence, the rule is based on the principle that a trial court should have a chance to correct or avoid a mistake before its decision is subject to sc rutiny by a reviewing court.’ ” Liming v. Damos , 4th Dist. Athens No. 08CA34, 2009- Ohio-6490, ¶ 14, quoting Barnett v. Barnett , 4th Dist. Highland No. 04CA13, 2008-Ohio-3415, ¶ 16. {¶9} For the plain error doctrine to apply, the party claiming erro r must establish (1) that “ ‘an error, i.e., a deviation from a l egal rule’ ” occurred; (2) that the error was “ ‘an “obvious” defect in the trial proceedings[;]’ ” and (3) that this obvious error affected subs tantial rights, i.e., the error “ ‘must have affected the outcome of the trial. ’ ” State v. Rogers , 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22, quot ing

State v. Barnes , 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002); Schade v. Carnegie Body Co ., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 209, 436 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (1982) (“A ‘plain error’ is obvious and prejudicial although neither o bjected to nor affirmatively waived which, if permitted, would have a material adverseWashington App. No. 19CA18 8 affect on the character and public confidence in judicial proce edings.”). For an error to be “plain” or “obvious,” the error must be plain “u nder current law,” and it must be plain “at the time of appellate considerat ion.” Johnson

v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 467, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); accord Barnes at 27; State v. G.C ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP536, 2016-Ohio-717, ¶ 14. {¶10} The plain error doctrine is not, however, readily invoked in civil cases. Instead, an appellate court “must proceed with th e utmost caution” when applying the plain error doctrine in civil cases. Goldfuss v.

Davidson , 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). The Ohio Supreme Court has set a “very high standard” for invoking the p lain error doctrine in a civil case. Perez v. Falls Financial, Inc. , 87 Ohio St.3d 371, 721 N.E.2d 47 (2000). Furthermore , this Court recently noted a s follows regarding the application of the plain error doctrine to domest ic relations

cases: “In appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not fav ored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances wher e error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairne ss, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereb y challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss v. Davidson , 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 1099, syllabus (1997). Because parental rights determinations are difficult to make and appellate courts accord wide latitude to the trial court's consideration of evidence in these cases,Washington App. No. 19CA18 9 “[p]lain error is particularly difficult to establish.” Robinette v. Bryant, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 12CA20, 2013-Ohio-2889, ¶ 28. Sarchione-Tookey v. Tookey , 4th Dist. Athens No. 17CA41, 2018-Ohio2716, ¶ 36. {¶11 } Moreover, we note that none of Appellant’s arguments on appeal set forth how she was prejudiced by the alleged errors o f the trial court and importantly, this matter was resolved through an agre ed judgment entry that was filed after Appellant stated, in open court and on the record, that she was in agreement with Appellee being named the residen tial parent and her being granted only supervised visitation. Finally, we note that all of Appellant’s pro se “arguments” are at most a couple of sentence s in length and make conclusory assertions with little or no record support and no citation to case law. Thus, although we will attempt to ascert ain any reasonable legal argument she poses, “it is not our function to construct the Appellant's arguments for [her].” State v. Billiter , 4th Dist. Scioto No.

15CA3720 , 2018-Ohio-733, 106 N.E.3d 785, ¶ 16.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I {¶12} In her first assignment of err or, Appellant appears to assert that the trial court erred when initially granting an immediate term ination of the parties’ existing custody order without holding a hearing withi n 28 daysWashington App. No. 19CA18 10 pursuant to Civ.R. 75(N). Appellant sets forth the following i ssue presented for review: “R.C. 3109.46 states Juvenile Court has exclusive jurisdiction.” Appellant’s “argument” portion under this assignment of error s tates as follows, in its entirety: “Emergency custody order was not comp liant to 3109.46 that grants immediate termination of an existing custod y order upon receipt also advises Juvenile Court has jurisdiction.” {¶13} As set forth above, because Appellant raised no objection below, she has waived all but plain error. We further note tha t Appellant does not specifically raise a plain error argument on appeal. Regardless, in the interests of justice and to the extent we are able to disce rn Appellant’s pro se arguments, we will conduct a plain error review of the e rror now raised. {¶14} Civ. R. 75(N) addresses temporary orders of spousal support, child support, and custody, and provides in subsection (2) that a party may file a motion seeking a hearing on any of those issues if the p arty is not satisfied with a temporary order. See Goodfleisch v. Goodfleisch , 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 02CA9 , 2003-Ohio-1082, ¶ 34. Civ.R. 75 (N) specifically provides as follows: Upon request , in writing , after any temporary * * * order allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children is journalized, the court shall grant the party soWashington App. No. 19CA18 11 requesting an oral hearing within twenty-eight days to modify the temporary order. (Emphasis added.) There is nothing in the record presently before us that indicat es Appellant made a request in writing pursuant to Civ.R. 75(N) for the tria l court to hold a hearing to address the temporary order terminating shared par enting. Because Appellant failed to avail herself of the procedure prov ided by the Civil Rules to be heard regarding her dissatisfaction with the trial court’s temporary order, she cannot demonstrate any error, let alone pl ain error, on the part of the trial court in failing to hold a hearing within 28 days after issuance of the temporary order. {¶15} Further, we reject Appellant’s argument that the juvenile cour t had exclusive jurisdiction of this matter, pursuant to R.C. 310 9.46. R.C. 3109.46 governs the termination of custody orders upon receipt of notice of a conviction and provides that a Juvenile Court receiving a notice pursuant to 3109.44 retains or acquires jurisdiction over a custody orde r and shall terminate that order. However, the notice discussed in R.C. 31 09.44 is required only if the parent who h as custody of the child killed the other parent. Obviously, that is not the case here so R.C. 3109.46 d oes not apply. Further, Appellant makes no discernable argument as to why she believes this statute applies to the case sub judice.Washington App. No. 19CA18 12 {¶16} Moreover, the domestic relations court possessed continuing jurisdiction over these parties regarding the reallocation of p arental rights and responsibilities as the parties’ previous divorce was grant ed by the domestic relations court and the previous shared parenting plan was issued by the domestic relations court. More specifically, R.C. 3127. 16 provides for the exclusive continuing jurisdiction of domestic relations courts and provides as follows: Except as otherwise provided in section 3127.18 of the Revised Code, a court of this state that has made a child custody determination consistent with section 3127.15 or 3127.17 of the Revised Code has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until the court or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state. Here, the initial child custody determination that was made in conjunction with the prior divorce decree was made consistent with R.C. 312 7.15, which governs a court’s jurisdiction to make initial custody determin ations. Furthermore, R.C. 3127.18 has no applicability here. Thus, the domestic relations court possessed initial, as well as continuing, juris diction to make custody determinations regarding H.M. Accordingly, having foun d no merit to the arguments raised under Appellant’s first assignment of e rror, is overruled.Washington App. No. 19CA18 13

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II {¶17} In her second assignment of error, Appellant appears to allege that the trial court “erred” in its reallocation of parental ri ghts and responsibilities and appears to argue the court failed to take into consideration R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(h), which concerns evidence of abuse and neglect of the child by either parent or a member of the parent ’s household. Appellant claims that the issue presented for review under this assignment of error is as follows: “R.C. 3109 for common pleas to modify a s hared parenting decree when parents disagree.” Appellant’s “argument ” portion under this assignment of error states as follows, in its entire ty: “Pursuant to modify or reallocate parental rights of existing shared parenti ng decree require written findings of fact when parent’s don’t agree, not to grant emergency removal of parental rights and responsibilities upon motion to modify.” {¶18} Normally, decisions concerning child-custody matters will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Babcock v. Welcome, 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3273, 2012-Ohio-5284, ¶ 7. However, as explained above, because Appellant failed to object to the Magistrate’s decision and made no objection to the admission of the GAL’s report, we will address her argument under a plain error standard of review.Washington App. No. 19CA18 14 {¶19} R.C. 3109.04 governs courts awarding parental rights and responsibilities, shared parenting, modifications, the best int erest of the child, and the child’s wishes. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) contains a l ist of ten factors courts must consider when determining the best interest of a child. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (F)(1) In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this section, whether on an original decree allocating parental righ ts and responsibilities for the care of children or a modification of a decree allocating those rights and responsibilities, the cour t shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: * * * (h) Whether either parent or an y member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilt y to any criminal offense involvin g any act that resulted in a ch ild being an abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful a ct that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 2919.2 5 of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding; whether eithe r parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense involving a victim who at the tim e of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in the commission of the offense; and whether there is re ason to believe that either par ent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused chil d or a neglected child[.]Washington App. No. 19CA18 15 Importantly, “unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse are a change of circumstances and may be grounds on which to modify a prior cus tody award.” Beekman v. Beekman , 96 Ohio App.3d 783, 789, 645 N.E.2d 1332 (4th Dist. 1994). {¶20} Appellant seems to suggest on appeal that Appellee sexually abused H.M. and that the trial court failed to take that allega tion into consideration. However, after a review of the record, we can f ind no clear allegation of sexual abuse made against Appellee. Although App ellee states in some of the affidavits filed in support of his pleadings tha t Appellant had taken H.M. to the hospital for a vaginal discharge that she bel ieved was caused by a sexually transmitted disease, it is unclear who App ellant was accusing. The medical records the mselves state that Appellant only referred to “they” or “them” and did not accuse a specific individual. Furthermore, the GAL reviewed the medical records and spoke with both a nurs e and a doctor involved in H.M.’s care and ultimately stated in her rep ort that she did not believe H.M. had been sexually abused or that she had s uffered from a sexually transmitted disease. F urther, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating Appellee has been convicted or pleaded guilty to any abuse or neglect of H.M.Washington App. No. 19CA18 16 {¶21} Additionally, with regard to Appellant’s assertion that writte n findings of fact were required, we note that the record does no t contain a written request by Appellant requesting findings of facts and c onclusions of law pursuant to Civil Rule 52. In the absence of findings of f act and conclusions of law, we generally must presume that the trial co urt applied the law correctly and must affirm if some evidence in the recor d supports its judgment. In re S.S. , 4th Dist. Jackson Nos. 16CA7, 16CA8, 2017-Ohio2938, ¶ 131, citing Bugg v. Fancher , 4th Dist. Highland No. 06CA12, 2007- Ohio-2019, ¶ 10, citing Allstate Fin. Corp. v. Westfield Serv. Mgt. Co ., 62 Ohio App.3d 657, 577 N.E.2d 383 (12th Dist.1989); accord Yocum v.

Means , 2nd Dist. Darke No. 1576, 2002-Ohio-3803, ¶ 7 (“The lack of findings obviously circumscribes our review * * *.”) Moreover , as set forth above, the lack of express findings of fact and conclusions of law was likely due to the fact that the court was proceeding upon an agreement by the parties. Thus, although the trial court did not make an expres s finding regarding the presence of abuse or neglect, we presume the tria l court properly considered that factor in determining the best interes t of H.M. {¶22} Accordingly, having found that the trial court committed no plain error regarding its handling of the abuse allegation, we overrule Appellant’s second assignment of error.Washington App. No. 19CA18 17

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III {¶23} In her third assignment of error, Appellant appears to assert t hat the court erred in issuing the emergency order granting custody to Appellee through the Magistrate without the Judge’s signature pursuant t o Rule 53(C). Appellant claims that the issue presented for review under this assignment of error is as follows: “R.C. 2151.419 Emergency custody order re quires a statement of reason and grounds for motion. Rule 75(I)(1) prom otes to not provide an exclusion.” Appellant’s “argument” portion under th is assignment of error states as follows, in its entirety: “pursu ant to 2151.419, an emergency custody order is to followed by providing a statem ent of reason, copy of motion and grounds for motion granted be provid ed to appellant to deny.” {¶24} A Magistrate’s decision must be adopted by a judge to become a final order. See Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(a). However , “a magistrate may enter orders without judicial approval if necessary to regulate the proceedings and if not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party.” (Emphasis added.) Civ. R. 53 (D)(2)(a)(i); see also State ex rel. Stanley v. Lawson , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2009-L-100, 2010-Ohio-320, ¶ 18 (“[C]ourts of this state ha ve held that [Civ.R. 53(D)(2)(a)(i)] gives a magistrate the ability to make temporary decisions pertaining to the rights of the subject parties.”). The Magistrate’sWashington App. No. 19CA18 18 emergency order in this case granted Appellee only temporary cu stody, until the court subsequently held a hearing and issued a final decisi on. {¶25} Appellant also seems to argue that R.C. 2151.419 applies to th is matter and was not complied with. However, Chapter 2151 of the Ohio Revised Code governs Juvenile Courts. We have already determin ed that the domestic relations court had continuing jurisdiction of thi s matter, not the juvenile court. Further, R.C. 2151.419 addresses “Hearings on efforts of agencies to prevent removal of children from homes.” There was no agency effort to remove H.M. from Appellant’s home. Rather, this matt er began with the civil filing of a motion for emergency custody by H.M. ’s father. Thus, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that R.C. 2151.419 ap plies to this matter. Accordingly, having found no plain error with respect to the Magistrate’s issuance of the temporary order, we overrule Appel lant’s third assignment of error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV {¶26} In her fourth assignment of error, Appellant asserts as follows : “Trial court erred to conduct depositionary hearing, rule 75(K) within 28 days and did not take place.” Appellant claims that the issue presented for review is as follows: “Juv Rule 34 requires depositionary hear ing to beWashington App. No. 19CA18 19 heard, right to counsel.” Appellant’s “argument” portion under this assignment of error states as follows, in its entirety: “Juv. Rule 34, requires disposition hearing to be conducted within 72 hours, case plan be provided by Public Children Service R.C. 5153.16, rules of evidence applied to testimony review. Juv. Rule 4 provide right to counsel, Juv Rule 13, 14 be compliant for custody order.” We construe her assignment of error to assert that the trial co urt erred in failing to conduct a dispositional hearing within twenty-eight days pursuant to Civ.R. 75(K). {¶27} Civ.R. 75 addresses hearings pertaining to “divorce, annulment, or legal separation actions,” not temporary orders. Further, C iv.R. 75(K) specifically provides as follows: (K) Hearing. No action for divorce, annulment, or legal separation may be heard and decided until the expiration of forty-two days after the service of process or twenty-eight day s after the last publication of notice of the complaint, and no action for divorce, annulment, or legal separation shall be hea rd and decided earlier than twenty-eight days after the service of acounterclaim, which under this rule may be designated a crosscomplaint, unless the plaintiff files a written waiver of the twenty-eight day period. Thus, not only is Civ.R. 75 inapplicable to actions involving t he reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities, Civ.R. 75(K) does not require hearings be held within twenty-eight days, but rather provides that a hearing may not be held prior to twenty-eight days “after the last publ ication ofWashington App. No. 19CA18 20 notice of the complaint,” or “earlier than twenty-eight days af ter the service of a counterclaim.” Thus, Civ.R. 75 simply has no applicabilit y here. {¶28} Accordingly, having found no plain error with respect to the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing pursuant to Civ.R. 75(K ), we overrule Appellant’s fourth assignment of error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V {¶29} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error states that “[t]rial cour t unnecessary delay in due process.” Appellant claims that the i ssue presented for review is as follows: Continuance granted for good cause without proper motion for request. Rule 53(d) magistrate failed to record all proceeding s, Rule 56(e) states party may not rest on mere allegations and denials, and must set forth a genuine fact to show cause issue for trial. Appellant’s “argument” portion under this assignment of error s tates as follows, in its entirety: Unnecessary Delay of Process, Ohio Rule 32, continuances granted without providing a motion for continuance request to magistrate granted for good cause shown. Continuance 1/23/18, 1/29/18, 2/22/18. In addition to specific time requirements not meant by a practice of law. We construe her assignment of error to assert that the trial co urt should have addressed Appellee’s change in custody motion in a more expedit ed manner.Washington App. No. 19CA18 21 {¶30} Generally, a decision granting or denying a continuance is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review. Rice v. Lewis , 4th Dist. Scioto No. 09CA3307, 2010-Ohio-1077, ¶ 37. However, as d iscussed above, we review this case under a plain error standard of revi ew. Here, Appellant fails to assert why the failure to grant these contin uances would have changed the outcome of the court’s decision. We simply ca nnot find plain error occurred as a result of the trial court’s decision to continue this matter on several occasions. Accordingly, having found no plai n error in the trial court’s handling of this case, we overrule Appellant’s fi fth assignment of error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI {¶31} In her sixth assignment of error, Appellant asserts that the GAL’s report should have been stricken. She claims the issue p resented for review is as follows: “Guardian Ad Litem testified representin g the medical professional determination of findings. Report is unsubstantia ted.” Appellant’s “argument” portion under this assignment of error s tates as follows, in its entirety: Juv Rule 29. Guardian Ad Litem is to maintain impartiality. Testimony as expert medical professional concluding not sexualWashington App. No. 19CA18 22

abuse occurred should be stricken. As Guardian Ad Litem is not a medical professional with experience to conduct a formal investigation of protocol medical procedures and mandated reporter requirements pursuant to R.C. 2151.421. Guardian Ad Litem Summary was not concluded based off of her own observation of factual evident. Summary report only sole reference is based on conversation with Appellee and Guardian Ad Litem as fact of findings. Guardian Ad Litem final recommendations did not include findings of any investigation or provide reasons of a determination that concluded to recommendation. The report provided is unsubstantiated and only based on an opinion, defamation of private report is made public and should be sealed. Thus, Appellant appears to assert that the GAL’s report was uns ubstantiated and biased, and that the GAL improperly testified as a medical expert in concluding that H.M. was not sexually abused. {¶32} “The explicit role of the guardian ad litem is to investigate the children's best interests as an impartial outsider to the proce edings and assist the trial court in determining whether a dispositional order is in their best interests.” In re A.K. , 9th Dist. Summit No. 26291, 2012-Ohio-4430, ¶ 28, citing Sup.R. 48(A), (B)(1), and (D). We generally “review the trial court’s determination of whether to strike a guardian ad litem's testim ony and report under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Nolan v. Nolan , 4th Dist. Scioto No. 11CA3444, 2012-Ohio-3736, ¶ 23. However, applying a plain erro r standard of review, we find no merit to this assignment of erro r.Washington App. No. 19CA18 23 {¶33} The GAL’s report was based on her investigation of H.M. and the allegations contained in Appellee’s motions and Appellant h as provided no evidence that the GAL was biased in her investigation and re porting. Although the GAL did not testify at the custody hearing, her re port does state that she reached her conclusions and recommendations afte r reviewing the medical records and speaking with one of H.M.’s treating ph ysicians and one of her nurses. Based upon those records and conversations, the GAL stated there did not appear to be evidence of abuse or evidence that H.M. actually ever had a sexually transmitted disease. Thus, the GA L did not simply base her recommendations on information provided by Appe llee. In conducting her investigation and issuing her recommendations an d report, the GAL was not acting as a medical professional, but rather wa s properly acting within the scope of her role as described in Sup.R. 48. Therefore, Appellant has not demonstrated plain error related to the trial court’s acceptance or consideration of th e GAL’s report . Accordingly, her sixth assignment of error is overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VII {¶34} In her seventh assignment of error, Appellant appears to allege that the domestic court lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellee’s change of custody motion because it was required to transfer the case to the JuvenileWashington App. No. 19CA18 24 Court pursuant to R.C. 3109.06. Appellant claims the following issue presented for review: “Pursuant to R.C. 2151.23 no jurisdictio n, 3109.06 temporary order only to transfer to juvenile court for jurisdic tion proceedings., S. Ct. Prac. Rule 11.06 on reopening an applicati on within 90 days of dissolution.” Appellant’s “argument” portion under thi s assignment of error states as follows, in its entirety: violation of due process of law, practice of law. No jurisdict ion of subject matter to grant emergency custody, modify shared parenting decree, investigate sexual abuse allegations, unnecessary S. Ct. Prac. Rule 11.06 for reopening of a file application. {¶35} R.C. 3109.06 provides, in pertinent part and subject to an exception not applicable here, as follows: [A]ny court, other than a juvenile court, that has jurisdiction in any case respecting the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities * * * may, on its own motion or on motion of any interested party, certify the record * * * to the juvenile court for further proceedings; upon the certification, the juvenile court shall have exclusive jurisdiction. {¶36} Appellee filed his motion to change custody in the domestic court, which as addressed in detail above, had jurisdiction to hear this matter. Further, nothing in the record indicates that the dome stic court or either party filed a motion to ce rtify the case to juvenile cou rt. Thus, the domestic court had jurisdiction to resolve Appellee’s motion. Accordingly,Washington App. No. 19CA18 25 having found no error with this case being resolved in domestic court, we overrule Appellant’s seventh assignment of error.

CONCLUSION {¶37} Having found no plain error in any of the assignments of error raised by Appellant, they are all without merit and are overrul ed. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMEDWashington App. No. 19CA18 26

JUDGMENT ENTRY It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to Appellant. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court d irecting the Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pu rsuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Abele, J. and Hess, J., concur in Judgment and Opinion. For the Court,

___________________________ ___ Jason P. Smith Presiding Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a fin al judgment entry and the time perio d for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.