U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

73–594 DTP WASHINGTON : 2001

OVERSIGHT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS

MANAGEMENT GETTING RESULTS?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 19, 2000

Serial No. 106–244

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

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Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250

Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

THOMAS COSTA, Professional Staff Member

JASON CHUNG, Clerk

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Counsel

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C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on July 19, 2000 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Edwards, Bert T., Chief Financial Officer and Assistant Secretary for

Finance and Management Policy, U.S. Department of State; and David

G. Carpenter, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and Director

of the Office of Foreign Missions, U.S. Department of State .................... 5

Williams-Bridgers, Jacquelyn L., Inspector General, U.S. Department of

State; and Ben Nelson, Director, National Security and International

Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office ....................................... 31

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Carpenter, David G., Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and

Director of the Office of Foreign Missions, U.S. Department of State,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 18

Edwards, Bert T., Chief Financial Officer and Assistant Secretary for

Finance and Management Policy, U.S. Department of State, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 8

Nelson, Ben, Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of ................... 54

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 3

Williams-Bridgers, Jacquelyn L., Inspector General, U.S. Department of

State, prepared statement of ....................................................................... 35

(1)

OVERSIGHT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS

MANAGEMENT GETTING RESULTS?

WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS

AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Mica, and Tierney.

Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and counsel;

J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior

policy advisor; Robert Newman and Thomas Costa, professional

staff members; and Jason M. Chung, clerk; David Rapallo, minority

counsel; Jean Gosa and Earley Green, minority assistant clerks;

and Chris Traci, minority staff assistant.

Mr. SHAYS. This hearing of the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations of the Government Reform Committee is now in order on a hearing entitled,

‘‘Oversight of the State Department: Is Management Getting Results?’’ I welcome our witnesses and our guests.

Early last year, the subcommittee heard testimony on four critical challenges confronting the Department of State [DOS]; enhancing security of American personnel and facilities overseas; rightsizing the U.S. presence abroad; upgrading information technologies, including financial systems; and complying with the planning requirements of the Government Performance and Results

Act.

We revisit these issues this morning because, despite some

progress, the Department still seems hobbled by hidebound processes and an excuse-prone management culture reluctant to change

them.

According to the General Accounting Office and the DOS Inspector General, the Department underestimated the near-term feasibility and cost of urgently needed security enhancements at U.S.

facilities. Key recommendations of the Overseas Presence Advisory

Panel appear doomed to be studied to death or ignored altogether.

The disappearance of a DOS laptop computer containing sensitive information underscores how much the Department has yet

to accomplish in reconciling demands for flexible, but secure, information and financial systems.

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We could be more certain the Department was on a trajectory to

solve these problems if all the goals and measures required by the

Results Act were in place; but they are not.

The 1999 DOS performance report, the first required by the act,

lacks specificity. According to the IG, the plan ‘‘does not provide decisionmakers in the executive branch or Congress with a clear assessment of the Department’s progress . . .’’ The lack of specifics stems, in part, from the apparent belief at

Foggy Bottom that much of the Department’s work is just too intangible or too important to be categorized and quantified by the

same base enterprise that counts visa applications.

But Results Act requirements apply as fully to diplomacy as to

passport processing; so DOS leadership needs to focus on Department-wide performance plans, goals, and measures that demonstrate tangible progress in all aspects of their work.

As a management approach to urgent issues like Embassy security, worldwide information systems, and the overall shape of our

national presence abroad, the Results Act offers DOS an incremental, but inevitable, path through bureaucratic stalemates and cultural resistance once thought intractable. It is a path the Department must demonstrate a greater willingness and ability to follow.

Our goal, as an oversight subcommittee, is to be a constructive

force for change at the Department of State, to focus attention on

progress and problems in achieving the Nation’s global mission. In

that effort, we continue to rely on the cooperation, the dedication,

and the expertise of many, including our witnesses this morning.

We look forward to their testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Our first panel, and we have two, is the Honorable

Bert T. Edwards, Chief Financial Officer, Assistant Secretary for

Financial Management and Policy, U.S. Department of State; and

the Honorable David G. Carpenter, Assistant Secretary for diplomatic Security and Director of the Office of Foreign Missions, U.S.

Department of State.

I would just ask if you anticipate any of your colleagues will be

responding to a question, we would want them to stand and swear

them in, just so we do not have to do that again, if you think that

is a likelihood. So I will ask you both to stand. If there is anyone

else, they should be requested to stand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. I will note for the record that our witnesses responded in the affirmative.

Mr. Edwards, we will start with you. We have a 5-minute clock.

We will rotate it, and give you another 5, if you need it. Then we

will go from there.

Mr. Edwards, welcome.

STATEMENTS OF BERT T. EDWARDS, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND DAVID

G. CARPENTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DIPLOMATIC

SECURITY AND DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of your

subcommittee who may join you, for allowing me and Assistant

Secretary Carpenter the opportunity to appear before you today to

discuss key management challenges facing the Department of

State, in particular implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act and management of security programs.

As you know, Patrick Kennedy, the Assistant Secretary of State

for administration, was scheduled to join us today to help respond

to your questions. But he is tied up in the Camp David talks, and

has asked me to apologize for his absence.

The Department of State cannot meet the challenges in these

management areas without the strong support and leadership of

your committee, as well as that of our authorization and appropriations committees.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to give a brief

statement on Strategic Planning at State. Assistant Secretary Carpenter will follow with a brief statement on security management,

after which we would be pleased to respond to questions on management issues that you or your colleagues may have.

The Department continues to make progress in building a unified

process for policy and resource management, based on strategic

planning and performance measurement.

The process begins early each calendar year with the preparation

by overseas posts of Mission Performance Plans. All agencies at

post are invited by the Chief of Mission to participate in the preparation of these plans, which are then reviewed in Washington by

an interagency team.

The MPPs are then used by the Department’s regional, functional, and management bureaus to formulate annual Bureau PerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:36 Aug 28, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\73594.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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formance Plans that set out long-term goals and short-term objectives in their areas of responsibility for achieving the overall strategic goals of the Department.

A formal review of each bureau’s plan is conducted by the Department’s Corporate Board. This process has just started and will

extend into September.

The internal planning documents from the bureaus and missions

form a basis for the Department’s Annual Performance Plan, which

is submitted as part of our budget presentation.

In response to comments from GAO, OMB, and our own Inspector General, we significantly revised the Annual Performance Plan

for fiscal year 2001. It is a more comprehensive plan than prior

versions, and uses a template to display goals, outcomes, strategies, and resources.

The Performance Plan follows the framework of the Department’s Strategic Plan, which was first published in September

1997. An updated version of that Strategic Plan is circulating in

draft to all of our customers, stakeholders, and partners, including

committees of the Congress. We will incorporate their comments

and publish the revised Strategic Plan this September. A Senior

Advisory Group at the Assistant Secretary level is leading this

project.

We have recently published our first-ever Annual Performance

Report, covering fiscal year 1999. State had good results in 1999,

which range from the complex diplomacy leading to the trials of

two terrorists for the 1988 Pan Am bombing over Lockerbie, to efforts which forged a coalition of NATO nations to successfully stop

ethnic cleansing and murder in Kosovo.

Last month, we worked with the GAO on a review of our fiscal

year 1999 Performance Report, and our fiscal year 2001 Performance Plan. Both the GAO and the Department’s Inspector General

have played a constructive role in helping us improve the Department’s planning operations.

Ideally, performance measurement and evaluation for international affairs should be carried out on an interagency basis but,

in practice, this is extraordinarily difficult.

One way the Department attempts to coordinate with other agencies is through the International Affairs Strategic Plan, which we

created in concert with them. The plan identifies 16 long-term

goals for the entire U.S. Government not just the Department of

State. The role of the Department of State is defined for each of

the goals, as well as the lead agency for a particular goal.

No matter how good we make our planning process, unless we

have the resources to carry out our plans, much of the planning

work will be wasted.

For too many years, the Department’s budgets, except most recently for security, have been held below current services. As a result of these cuts, the Department is in increasing danger of becoming a hollowed-out organization. Thus, we strongly encourage the

Congress to support the President’s fiscal year 2001 request for the

Department of State.

This effort to better coordinate our planning with that of other

agencies working in the international arena dovetails with the

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multi-agency effort to implement the report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel.

The OPAP report was triggered by the tragic bombings of our

Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998. The

implementation report has been submitted to the Secretary of State

for her approval, and describes both the results of our OPAP implementation efforts and what remains to be done.

As Chief Financial Officer of the Department, and with a key

focus of this testimony being on performance, I would like to take

this opportunity to mention briefly our success in three areas of financial management.

First, the Department has reduced the number of material weaknesses reported in response to the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act from 19, at the start of fiscal year 1995, to only 4 at

the close of fiscal year 1999, of which 3 will be closed this year.

Second, we are proud that, for the last 3 years, we have received

an unqualified opinion from our Inspector General and the IG’s

independent contractor, who conducted the annual audits of our

agency-wide financial statements.

Finally, while our financial management systems are currently

reported as the Department’s one remaining material weakness,

substantial progress has been made in bringing the systems into

compliance with the requirements of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act. We are already in compliance with two

of the act’s three requirements.

Let me finish my remarks by describing one of the Department’s

major accomplishments of the last year; the successful integration

of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. Information Agency into the Department.

This massive undertaking, the largest structural change to the

U.S. Government’s foreign affairs administration in decades, has

proceeded more smoothly than anyone expected. Putting these

functions under one Cabinet Secretary has already enhanced the

consistency and integrity of our foreign policy. In the near term, we

will need to invest significant resources to maximize the benefits

of this integration.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Edwards follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Edwards.

Mr. Carpenter.

Mr. CARPENTER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome this opportunity to testify before you on the security

profile of State Department facilities, both domestic and abroad.

On August 7, 1998, our Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,

and Nairobi, Kenya, were bombed simultaneously by extremists

bent on the destruction of American presence throughout the

world. These tragedies unleased a massive and intensive effort to

provide much needed security improvements at all our posts overseas.

Although much has been accomplished, more needs to be done.

Our overseas facilities are generally more secure now than in August 1998, but the continuing threat environment worldwide requires that we not lose focus, that we continue to explore new ways

of protecting ourselves, and support a program for new Embassy

construction.

Our goal following the bombings was to immediately improve the

security of our threatened consulates and Embassies, and we have

done so. But at the outset, let me say that it is important for this

subcommittee to know that we still have a very basic problem that

cannot be fixed quickly.

The vast majority of our diplomatic posts fail to meet one of the

most basic security standards, namely, the 100 foot setback standard. Until we can build Embassies meeting the setback and other

security standards, our efforts cannot provide the degree of security

all of us want for our people and facilities.

Having recognized that we still have grave security concerns

overseas, it is also important for the subcommittee to know that we

have done a lot and that our Embassies and consulates are more

secure now than ever before. In this regard, let me review for you

what we have done throughout the security upgrade program.

Some of these actions have been based solely on DOS initiatives.

Others were suggested by the Accountability Review Boards

chaired by Retired Admiral William J. Crowe, the report of the

Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, and the Office of the Inspector

General.

We are aggressively upgrading security at low and medium

threat level posts to standards that previously only applied to high

and critical rated posts. We no longer believe, in an era of

transnational terrorism, that we have low or medium threat posts,

nor do we believe that we will always receive tactical intelligence

of an imminent attack. Simply put, we must be prepared to meet

the most violent terrorist attacks at all of our facilities all of the

time.

The physical security upgrades we have put in place at our Embassies and consulates include reinforced perimeter walls, bollards,

hardened guard booths, vehicle barriers, and shatter resistant window film.

We are upgrading and deploying security equipment to provide

better lighting, cameras, and video recorders; bomb detection

equipment; armored vehicles, alarm, and public address systems;

and x-ray equipment. Where possible, we have mitigated the lack

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of sufficient setback by closing streets and providing for mandatory

vehicle inspections.

We have also expanded our Anti-Terrorism Assistance Training

to aid foreign police in combating terrorism through such appropriate programs as surveillance detection, border security, explosive detection, crisis management, and maritime security.

In addition, we have installed alarm systems at Embassies and

consulates to alert personnel to impending emergency situations,

and have instituted a program for the employees to ‘‘duck and

cover’’ when the alarms are sounded.

We have also created a new security environment threat list with

a modified methodology and criteria for determining threat levels.

This process now addresses transnational terrorism as a distinct

category, as well as the threats from indigenous terrorism and political violence, and the threats from intelligence services, both

technical and human and, of course, crime.

DOS has also changed the focus of its training courses for Regional Security Officers and Special Agents to give them greater

training on counter-terrorism methodology; explosive ordinance recognition and disposal; chemical/biological weapons threats and defenses; and surveillance detection techniques.

In response to a specific recommendation from the Accountability

Review Board, we are also working with the FBI to better analyze

law enforcement information, which might have a bearing on

threats to our missions overseas and to more quickly disseminate

that information to appropriate posts.

To that end, a DOS special agent has been detailed to the International Terrorism Section at FBI Headquarters, and the DOS special agents are participating in the FBI’s Terrorism Task Force.

DOS has also established the Office of the Coordinator for Chemical Biological Countermeasures. That office, which is conducting a

worldwide survey to determine vulnerabilities, has purchased and

is distributing chemical biological equipment to all posts.

As part of its educational program, it has distributed instructional materials, including a pamphlet, videos, and a series of cables, to alert all posts to the nature of the threat, and to provide

defensive guidance. It has also established a comprehensive training program for security professionals and first responders.

The newest addition to our programs and of major significance

has been the establishment of surveillance detection programs at

almost all of our overseas posts. A critical lesson learned from the

bombings is that there is intense surveillance conducted against

our facilities prior to an attack.

Since going operational in January 1999, surveillance detection

teams, most of which work with host government’s security services, have observed over 700 suspected incidents of surveillance

against our personnel and facilities. It has, in a sense, expanded

our security perimeter and zone of control beyond our previous limitations.

The surveillance detection program is clearly a ‘‘work in

progress,’’ but we feel that it is destined to become a major aspect

of our overseas security defenses.

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Finally, and I believe most importantly, DOS has hired 200 new

special agents, which has allowed for the creation of 140 new security officer positions abroad.

By the end of fiscal year 2000, we will have 420 DOS special

agents serving as security officers in 157 countries. DOS has also

hired 20 additional diplomatic couriers, 17 security engineers, 34

maintenance technicians, and 46 civil servants in support of overseas security.

Although the African bombings necessarily caused me to focus

my attention most closely on overseas security at the beginning of

my tenure, three incidents in the Main State building brought

home to all of us the need to strengthen domestic information security, as well.

In February 1998, an unknown male in a tweed coat carried

away classified documents from the Secretary’s suite of offices.

That case, which was investigated by the FBI, is in an inactive status at this time.

The second incident came to light on December 8, 1999, when

Russian Intelligence Officer Stanislav Gusev was arrested on the

street outside the State Department, as he listened in on a meeting

in the Department’s Oceans and International Environmental Scientific Affairs’ conference room, via a bug planted in the chair railing. Gusev, who had diplomatic immunity preventing his prosecution in the United States, was asked to leave the country.

The investigation by the FBI continues into, among other things,

how the bug was planted. That inquiry is still underway.

The third incident was, of course, the disappearance of the laptop

believed to have sensitive compartmented information material on

its hard drive from a Bureau of Intelligence and Research conference room in January of this year.

DOS had responsibility, together with the FBI, after the fact, for

investigating the security violation, but not for protecting the information beforehand. At this time, the loss of the laptop containing

SCI material is under active investigation by DOS and the FBI.

Mr. Chairman, we learned some valuable lessons about our security posture domestically from these incidents. The fundamental

problem making such security lapses possible was not an absence

of proper policies and procedures, as those are and have been in

place. The problem was simply carelessness; that is; non-compliance and/or disregard for established regulations.

These incidents prompted us to take measures which complement existing regulations and procedures, and are designed to

change the lax attitude toward security at the State Department.

I believe that we have made substantial progress. We have tightened security in the Secretary’s suite of offices. We have adopted

a rigorous, comprehensive escort policy; worked to strengthen computer safeguards; and assigned uniformed officers to patrol specific

floors inside the building.

At Main State, we have an after-hours inspection program of department offices. We also continue our program of bringing Marine

Security Guards in training into the Department, 10 times a year,

to conduct security sweeps.

We have provided security awareness briefings to over 5,000 Department personnel. In addition, we have closed D Street outside

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the building to traffic, and installed cement barriers around the entire building, thus lessening our physical vulnerability.

Finally, and directly because of the laptop incident, the Secretary

decided, after consulting with the Director of Central Intelligence,

that DOS should take over from INR the responsibility for protection of SCI material in accordance with DCI requirements. We are

committed to working hand-in-glove with INR and the DCI to make

this transfer as smooth as possible.

In March, I convened an inter-agency review panel, comprised of

senior security representatives from the FBI, DOD, the Secret

Service, the CIA, and diplomatic security. The panel was asked to

review the counter measures currently in place to protect against

unauthorized access to Main State building and classified information.

I also requested that they make recommendations to improve security at Main State. The panel’s report is complete, and has been

sent to the Secretary. Once she and the administration have had

an opportunity to review it, I will be glad to share it with the subcommittee.

The panel confirmed our assessment of known weaknesses in our

programs, and recommended both short and long-term solutions,

that it believed will enhance security at Main State. Their findings

center on Main State’s access, controls, its physical security, information security, security awareness, our uniform protective officer

program, and the creation of a chemical biological program.

I am convinced that the development of a strategic plan to fund

and implement these findings will result in a significant improvement in our programs.

The Secretary’s leadership in raising security awareness has

been invaluable. She has personally emphasized security at every

opportunity for the purpose of strengthening the culture of security

at State.

As you know, on May 3, she held a Department-wide town meeting on security issues, because of the laptop incident. In the course

of that meeting, she stressed that each of our employees must be

‘‘our neighbor’s keeper’’ when it comes to security.

The position that she has taken with respect to individual responsibility among our diplomats, that regardless how ‘‘skilled you

may be as a diplomat . . . if you are not professional about security, you are a failure,’’ has resonated throughout the Department.

Further, when she told the Department employees that the press

reports were accurate, and that she was, indeed, ‘‘furious’’ about

our security lapses, any mistaken belief anyone might have had

that the Secretary wanted simply to let this blow over and be forgotten was forcefully corrected.

It is also significant that Ambassador Marc Grossman, who was

sworn in as the new Director General of the Foreign Service on

June 19th of this year, is committed to working with us to increase

employee accountability with respect to security matters.

That is important because while the Bureau of Diplomatic Security investigates security lapses, it is the Director General who disciplines those who commit the security violations of infractions.

Ambassador Grossman’s tough-minded position with regard to

security is certain to resonate throughout the Department.

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Ambassador Grossman and I have agreed to an action plan,

which the Secretary has approved, for strengthening security and

accountability, that includes the following: require each bureau in

the Department and each mission overseas to include in its Bureau

and Mission Program Plans specific steps for increasing security

awareness; require a report on all security incidents in the field to

be reported immediately to the Department, and ensure that an

employee’s permanent security incident record is updated and

available for reference from Washington and overseas; prospectively increase the sanctions and penalties for security incidents;

link security awareness to the promotion and tenuring process by

including ‘‘security awareness and accountability’’ in promotion and

tenuring precepts, and in all employees’ work requirement statements; and require that full field security investigations conducted

on candidates for Presidential appointments include security incidents.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that what we have done and are doing,

combined with the stark, ugly reality of what security failures

produce, have gone a long way in raising awareness at the Department.

I think that we have reached the point where the decided majority of State Department employees have recognized that a threat

exists; that poor practices are unacceptable; that security is a high

priority with the Secretary, this administration, and this Congress;

and that employees will be held accountable for lapses.

I can assure you that the Secretary, the Director General, and

I will continue to drive home those points as forcefully as possible.

Finally, and of great significance with regard to the future of security within the Department, the Secretary has identified a need

for the creation of a new Under Secretary for Security, Law Enforcement and Counter-terrorism. This proposal is currently being

reviewed within the administration.

We believe that such a position will clearly establish lines of accountability and responsibility with respect to the Department’s security, law enforcement, and threat functions.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. As I indicated, we

have been diligent in our efforts to upgrade security at our overseas ports, and we have been successful in making those facilities

safer now than ever before. We have also worked very hard to improve our security posture domestically.

Nevertheless, there is still much that needs to be done. We do

not intend to stop until we have completed the upgrade of the facilities abroad and completed also our efforts to ensure our security

domestically.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

If you could just wait a second, please.

If it is OK with both of you, what we are going to do is, we are

going to get our next panel just to come up, and we will exchange

seats.

I have some questions, but then I would be asking questions

twice and having statements. I think we can make the hearing

shorter and more efficient.

So we are going to ask the next panel to come up. Mr. Edwards

and Mr. Carpenter will both just listen to the presentation of Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers and Ben Nelson. So we will swear them

in next.

I think we can make this a fairly succinct hearing this way, and

I appreciate your cooperation. I will ask you both to stand, because

I will swear you in. Thank you.

Is there anyone else that you might want to respond to questions?

Mr. NELSON. There may be, from GAO.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. That is helpful, just in case you need to

respond. You may not have to.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. For the record, all three have responded

in the affirmative. If we call on you, we will give the transcriber

your card, and we will take care of that.

Ms. Bridgers, we will start with you as Inspector General, this

time, and we will go with you, Mr. Nelson, after that. Really, what

I am looking to do is just to have you put your statements on the

record, and I will be asking you a few questions.

I appreciate the State Department being flexible this way. They

can hear what you are saying, and it gives them an opportunity to

respond.

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Sure.

Mr. SHAYS. And that is the way we will proceed. So you have the

floor.

STATEMENTS OF JACQUELYN L. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND BEN

NELSON, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify on major management challenges facing the Department.

Today, I would like to focus my remarks first on the Department’s implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act; and second, on the management of security programs,

both at our Embassies overseas and here at home.

The Department’s strategic planning process has improved from

previous years, but it still does not fully comply with the Results

Act. The Department has not yet developed overall priorities for its

strategic goals and, consequently, has no overall basis for allocating

resources to priorities.

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My office’s work has also identified the need for improved performance information in the Department’s bureau and mission

level plans.

Although more comprehensive than the fiscal year 1999 to 2000

plan, the Department’s 2001 Performance Plan does not address all

of the shortcomings found in last year’s plan.

The revised format includes a more detailed description of the

Department’s activities toward achieving its goals, but there is

minimal discussion of the inter-agency coordination, resource allocation, data limitations, and whether or not the data can be verified and validated.

Also, the 2000 plan does not include some of the performance

goals, indicators, and management challenges that were identified

previously, with no explanation as to why they were excluded this

year.

Beginning in 1998, the Department required that all bureaus

submit annual performance plans, organized around the Department’s 16 strategic goals and three diplomatic readiness goals.

OIG has made recommendations to the Department on how it

can improve its bureau plans. Recently, we have made recommendations on how strategic planning could be better used to

report the results of the Department’s work in reducing trade barriers in the telecommunications area, and the need for better performance data to assess the Department’s initiatives on recruiting

foreign service specialists.

OIG’s work has also focused on the planning efforts at our Embassies. As with the bureaus, each Embassy is asked to submit annually a mission performance plan. Our post-inspections have

found that despite its usefulness in improving communications at

post, the process of developing the Embassy-level plans has generally not met the objectives set by the Department’s planners.

Although the Department instructed posts to focus only on the

most important goals and objectives, rather than produce a full

mission activity inventory, lengthy mission performance plans generally catalog each post’s activities, rather than prioritizing them.

Lengthy MPPs are partially a reflection of the Department’s lack

of prioritization of its overall strategic goals.

The Department stated that it cannot prioritize its work, because

U.S. interests in any one part of the world at any one time may

reflect a different order from other parts of the world.

In the absence of clearly stated priorities, posts will have little

incentive to prioritize their own goals and objectives. Without a

clear statement of those priorities, the Department cannot meet the

act’s intent or its own goal to align resources with priorities.

The Department’s fiscal year 1999 performance report reflects

the weaknesses of its performance plan. Without annual performance goals, the performance report generally provides a narrative

list of accomplishments under each of the 16 strategic goals, and

an annex of information on the measures for illustrative goals or

performance goals.

Consequently, the report does not provide decisionmakers with a

clear assessment of the Department’s progress against its goals.

Without increased management attention to setting priorities

and developing overall performance goals that can be used to asVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:36 Aug 28, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\73594.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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sess its performance, the Department will be unable to make significant progress under the Results Act.

To date, we have seen limited evidence that goals and measures

are used in the agency’s decisionmaking process. Until that happens, bureau and post officials will continue to be frustrated with

what they consider to be a paper exercise, and decisionmakers will

be limited in their ability to determine the effectiveness of their

programs.

The second major challenge for the Department that I will address today is the need to ensure the safety and security of U.S.

personnel and facilities overseas. Security continues to be a paramount concern for the Department.

Security lapses at Main State clearly demonstrate that the Department must address vulnerabilities in protecting vital information on the domestic front, as well as overseas.

By the end of this summer, OIG will have evaluated the physical

security and emergency preparedness of 68 Embassies, since the

1988 bombings of our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

This past year, none of the 42 Embassies we inspected met all

the security standards; standards designed to protect our personnel. The lack of a 30 meter setback, as outlined by Ambassador

Carpenter, was the most prevalent deficiency.

Addressing inadequate setback, combined with the lack of antiram barrier perimeter walls and adequately protected windows,

will require a major long-term construction effort.

Actions have been taken or are underway to correct these items

that the Department can quickly fix, such as improving the local

guard force, lighting, or alarms at a chancery.

Last year, before this subcommittee, I discussed emergency preparedness and the importance of conducting crisis management exercises and the emergency drills at posts. Despite their importance,

OIG has found that most posts are not routinely conducting mission-wide exercises of all the required drills.

In response, the Department has recently issued instructions to

all Chiefs of Missions to conduct these drills.

Turning my attention to Washington, following several security

incidents at Main State, my office was requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to evaluate the effectiveness of Department policies and procedures for protecting classified documents.

We found that the Department had programs in place to evaluate

individuals’ need to handle classified information. but that improvements to enhance security awareness and controls to prevent

unauthorized access were required.

Highly classified documents relating to intelligence reporting

were not safeguarded in accordance with Government regulations.

Significant numbers of uncleared visitors were permitted

unescorted access to Main State. They were not always escorted to

areas where classified information was handled, processed, and discussed.

Finally, unit security officers were not well informed about and

did not have the authority to enforce security requirements.

The Department has taken important first steps to address these

concerns. However, administrative actions taken to discipline emVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:36 Aug 28, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\73594.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ployees have been and remain ineffective in correcting poor security practices.

Some of the most difficult security issues to correct, both domestically and overseas, deal with information security. In many ways,

improving information security may be a bigger challenge than improving physical security, because many of the corrections involve

personal behavior, rather than technical equipment.

Correcting identified vulnerabilities requires sustained management attention, leadership, technically qualified people, money, and

the desire to do things differently.

Mr. Chairman, in your invitation to testify this morning, you

asked that I address the Department’s implementation of the Results Act and its management of security programs.

The Department’s strategic planning process has improved over

the past 2 years. But absent a global priority setting process, we

see a need, at a minimum, to establish within geographic regions

and areas of activity a process for using strategic planning as a

basis for allocating resources to priorities.

In security, the Department has responded well to the need to

move quickly in the aftermath of the bombings, and to effectively

use emergency funding.

The Department’s success, however, is dependent on how well

and for how long it exercises disciplined attention to effective security practices, and remains committed to the funding, construction,

maintenance, and continual improvement of that infrastructure.

As the Department and the Congress embark on this very expensive commitment, the requirement for the Office of Inspector General is to continue to provide the specialized oversight of the use

of those funds for security enhancements.

The Department is now moving from the emergency response

mode to a more strategic approach for the rebuilding of our foreign

affairs infrastructure, and so must the OIG with the sustained program of expertise in the oversight of these initiatives.

Your continued support for the OIG in this regard is much appreciated. I will answer questions at the appropriate time.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Williams-Bridgers follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Ms. Williams-Bridgers.

Mr. Nelson.

Mr. NELSON. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to be here today to provide an update on the Department of State’s progress in addressing many of the security

and other management challenges raised during a hearing before

this subcommittee last year.

These challenges arise from the Department’s responsibility to

maintain operations at over 250 overseas locations to support its

mission and that of about 40 other U.S. Government agencies, and

to protect over 50,000 U.S. and foreign national employees at hundreds of overseas facilities.

The State Department spends a substantial amount of its $4.3

billion foreign affairs administration budget on business-type activities that support its global operations.

These activities provide staff overseas with access to financial

and information services, security, housing, personnel services, and

more.

In making decisions on the size and capacity of the support

structure at any particular location, State must consider the views

of other U.S. Government agencies, including Defense, Commerce,

Agriculture, Treasury, and Justice.

Since last year’s hearing, an independent advisory panel has examined the U.S. overseas presence, and recommended options for

streamlining and right-sizing overseas operations, consistent with

U.S. policy priorities and a vastly changing world, with new requirements for security, communications, technology, and service.

Many of the panel’s recommendations address concerns that we

have raised over the years.

My testimony will focus on State’s progress in addressing the

challenges it faces in its efforts to achieve a more secure, efficient,

and effective network of operations, including its response to the

recommendations from the independent advisory panel.

Mr. Chairman, the major challenges that the Department faces

are the same as those identified last year, and which you enumerated in your opening comments.

This includes better utilizing the Government Performance and

Results Act process to improve strategic and performance planning

in the pursuit of overall mission, policy, and operational objectives;

improving the security of U.S. personnel and facilities at overseas

locations in a cost effective and timely manner; determining the

right-size and location of U.S. overseas presence to both improve

the efficiency of operations and reduce the security burden; and finally, upgrading information and financial management systems to

further improve communications, accountability, and decisionmaking.

State has indicated that it will need several billion dollars in capital construction and other investments over several years to

achieve operations that can effectively support U.S. overseas interests.

To successfully meet any of these challenges, the Department

needs to have a clearly articulated vision, a coherent strategy, and

congressional commitment and oversight to make sure that intended results are achieved.

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Let me provide a brief summary of State’s progress, remaining

challenges, and obstacles in each of the four areas that I mentioned.

The leadership team at the Department has recognized many of

these challenges, and has devoted substantial resources to addressing them. As a result, State has made considerable progress in

many areas, but still faces significant obstacles in achieving an efficient, effective, and secure overseas platform to support U.S. interests.

Briefly, in the area of strategic and performance planning, our

evaluations have shown that State’s strategic and performance

plans have had their strong points. However, they have only partially met the requirements of the 1993 Government Performance

and Results Act.

State’s strategic plan defined U.S. interests and clarified U.S.

foreign policy goals. Its annual performance plan for fiscal year

2000 showed improvement over prior years’ plans, in terms of linking strategies and measures to goals.

However, the plan also fell short in a number of areas. For example, it did not present a complete picture of baselines, targets, and

measures for some of the strategic goals, and did not elaborate on

how State plans to work with other agencies to achieve progress on

cost cutting issues such as trade policy and stopping the flow of illegal narcotics.

State recently issued its fiscal year 1999 performance report, the

first one required under the Results Act, and its performance plan

for fiscal year 2001. Both have some of the same weaknesses found

in prior planning efforts.

In particular, the performance report does not adequately demonstrate State’s level of success in achieving desired outcomes, or

the way in which State’s actions actually led to the achievement of

desired goals.

State recognizes that it needs to continue to strengthen its strategic and performance planning as part of its overall effort to improve management and address critical issues.

The next area is security. In light of the potential for terrorism

by groups opposed to U.S. interests, enhancing the security of Embassies and consulates might well be the most significant challenge

facing the Department.

In the aftermath of the bombings of two United States Embassies

in Africa in 1998, State, using about $1.5 billion in emergency supplemental funds, started to significantly upgrade security at all of

its overseas posts and build new facilities that meet higher security

standards.

However, the Department faces many challenges to its goals in

this area. State has made progress in implementing certain emergency security upgrades, such as initiating a surveillance detection

program, and providing armored vehicles. But because of the scope

of the program, many facilities are still awaiting enhancements

such as barriers, walls, and other safeguards.

In addition, due to more stringent security requirements and better documentation of what is needed at individual posts, State estimates that the emergency upgrades may cost hundreds of millions

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of dollars more than originally envisioned, and will likely take several years to complete.

Moreover, State is encountering several obstacles in its efforts to

construct new and more secure Embassies and consulates, including difficulties in purchasing suitable sites for buildings, and gaining agreement among agencies on future staffing levels and resulting requirements.

Another key challenge for State is to right-size its overseas presence. State is in the early stages of examining options to restructure overseas presence, in light of changing needs in the post-cold

war world and advances in technology.

We have recommended that State reexamine the way it conducts

overseas administrative functions, such as relocating and housing

employees.

From my work, we have also suggested that State explore the potential for regionalizing certain functions, and making greater use

of technology and outsourcing, to achieve efficiencies and improve

performance. Actions in these areas could potentially reduce the

overseas presence.

State has established several committees to consider the recommendations of the overseas presence advisory panel, regarding

right-sizing and greater use of information technology, and the

management of capital facilities.

The last area, Mr. Chairman, involves information and financial

management. Consistent with our recommendations, State has

made many improvements in its information and financial management systems. State was able to successfully meet Y2K challenges

and received unqualified opinions on its financial statements for

fiscal years 1997, 1998, and 1999. However, it faces continuing

challenges in this area.

Currently, there is no common platform serving all agencies operating overseas. Despite the success I mentioned, State still does

not have an integrated financial management system that meets

the requirements of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996.

Improvements in these areas would provide managers with more

timely information that they need to operate in a more businesslike

fashion, and to make cost-based decisions.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks. I would be

happy to answer any questions that you may have.

[NOTE.—The GAO report entitled, ‘‘State Department Overseas

Emergency Security Program Processing, But Costs Are Increasing,’’ may be found in subcommittee files.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Nelson.

What I am thinking of doing, and I do not think this will be awkward, is to invite the State Department to come on back, and just

have a dialog. I have listened to your presentations. There is nothing that we all cannot deal with, collectively.

So I would invite both of our former witnesses to come. We will

kind of squeeze you all in, and we will just bring one more chair

in, too.

Let me just get one housekeeping thing out of the way. I ask

unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record. The record will

remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, that is

so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statement in the record. Without objection,

that is so ordered.

I let your testimony, in some cases, go beyond 10 minutes, because I just wanted your comments on the record. I am not sure

we are going to have a lot of questions. I have a more general one.

Some of my enthusiasm has been taken away, because I felt it

almost arrogant that State somehow feels that they do not come totally and completely under the Results Act. In other words, somehow their mission is so different that they would not.

I asked my staff, does the GAO and IG come under it? The IG

comes under the Results Act, I believe. Is that correct?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Actually, Mr. Shays, the Results Act

does not specifically require the IGs to do it. But the IG community, as a whole, has endorsed GPRA, and we think it is good for

Government, and it is good for us.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. So almost all of the IGs do comply with

the letter and the spirit of GPRA.

Mr. SHAYS. And the GAO’s office?

Mr. NELSON. I think, technically, we are not covered by it, but

we do fully comply with it.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Mr. NELSON. GAO is a major supporter of it, and believes that

it is an excellent tool to focus the agency’s activities to make sure

that we are achieving our critical mission objectives.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Mica and I have been strong supporters of congressional accountability, getting Congress under all the laws. We

are not technically under it either. Although I think probably, in

our various offices, we try to comply with a lot of it.

So I guess I just need to put that on the record. I said, how dare

the State Department feel somehow that they are unique? This

may be an assumption that is wrong.

I get the sense, from your testimony, Mr. Edwards, that there is

an attempt to deal with the Results Act, but that somehow people

that you work with feel that your mission is so unique that you

really cannot come under it. I would like you to address that issue.

Mr. EDWARDS. I think that is an excellent question, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, when part of your goals are to have things not

happen, such as the outbreak of war or pestilence and things like

that, it is difficult to measure your success. But we have developed

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a multi-disciplinary team of Assistant Secretaries, and we are

working to find a way.

Just as, I might say, having spent most of my career in the private sector, corporations find a way to measure their effectiveness,

we are going to attempt to do this.

It is relatively easy to measure output, such as number of treaties signed, and negotiations, and so forth. The outcomes, which is

really what GPRA is all about, are daunting for us.

We are working with the Mercatus Center, George Mason University, and as I indicated in my testimony, our IG and the GAO,

to develop methodologies so that we can do a much better job of

seeing how many arrows hit the center of the target, and how

many are in the periphery or flying into space and not hitting the

target.

I might comment in response to the IG’s issue on prioritizing

strategies, we are, of course, at the mercy of what happens out of

our control.

For example, I am sure you are aware of the very severe problems in Fiji and the South Pacific Islands places where no one ever

dreamed there would be a problem. But we went and ordered departure in both of those posts, and worked with the Australian and

New Zealand military to get people in harm’s way out.

So we are working very diligently on what many people would

regard as a ‘‘back water area’’ to try to restore democracy and functioning governments in those two areas.

In many cases, issues occur. Of course, as we speak, hopefully,

many of us have our fingers crossed that there will be some agreement toward ending the Mideast crisis at Camp David, within the

next 24 or 48 hours, before those leaders leave the country.

So prioritizing a year or 2 years ahead of time certainly would

be ideal. But geographically prioritizing some of those to specific

areas or specific countries does pose a big challenge for us.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say, I was just trying to get a sense of

attitude. Is the State Department contending that they somehow

do not come under parts of the Results Act, or in some way cannot

come under it?

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, not at all; I think there are some who would

like not to be under it.

But I can assure you that the management bureaus, headed by

Under Secretary Cohen, of which Assistant Secretary Carpenter

and I are a part, are struggling and determined to find a way that

we can measure each of our approximately 30 bureaus in terms of

what they are accomplishing.

Mr. SHAYS. I cannot imagine the fact that outcomes cannot be

predictable as being an excuse for not being under the act. I would

think that FEMA can make the same argument. I mean, you know,

we do not know what disasters will come our way.

But they would, I would think, set goals that would be able to

respond to simply not dealing with the predictable. That would be

one of the areas, on how effectively do you respond to what is not

predictable, and how quickly can you respond. I would think there

would be ways that you could measure, dealing with that.

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Let me just ask you, Mr. Nelson or Ms. Williams-Bridgers, what

is your sense of the attitude of the State, the DOS, in terms of trying to comply to the Results Act?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. I share Mr. Edwards’ expressions that

the State Department does consider itself to be held accountable to

the Results Act. They are struggling, as many other agencies are

struggling, with clear definition of outcomes and the measures of

progress toward achieving those outcomes.

This is why, in our full statement, we have said that, given that

the Department acknowledges the need for some outcome-oriented

goals, and given they acknowledge the need for some flexibility in

any type of priority setting process that they establish in the Department to allow them to respond to crisis and unanticipated

events, it is imperative that they have in place some credible process for establishing those priorities; and then have a resource allocation system that allows the funds to flow, according to those

changing priorities.

I do think it is a cultural attitude that will change with some

education about the importance of priority setting; the importance

of having a coordinated approach, an integrated approach of the

mission planning process with Washington.

Mr. SHAYS. I will come right back to you in a second. Mr. Nelson,

do you want to respond?

Mr. NELSON. Yes, I believe that the senior leadership in the Department has a major challenge in convincing the rank and file of

the importance of strategic and performance planning.

We have seen improvements in the Department’s plans. But the

plans, themselves, really are not that important.

It is the process that you go through in putting together the

plans, where you try to align activities with your missions, to make

sure that they are contributing to the outcomes that are desired;

and that you have a clear sense of what outcomes you want to

achieve. So the process itself is a very critical and important management tool.

I believe the Department’s own fiscal year 2000 plan points out

the challenge in convincing a large number of people in the Department that performance planning is a useful exercise. I believe there

is a reference to that problem in the year 2000 performance plan.

Mr. SHAYS. OK, let me just have either of you, from our second

panel, just describe to me the area where you think the State Department finds it the most difficult to deal with strategic and performance planning.

Give me an example of something that your employees might

have told you about a dialog, or saying, my God, how do we come

under it, under this area? Can you think of any?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. I can think of it at two levels.

First, at the mission level, the Embassies, what we found at the

Embassies are some best practices, where the Embassies will engage all other U.S. Government agencies at post, the Chief of Mission, or the DCM, and have a good dialog about what is your understanding of our goals here in this region, in this country; what

is your sense of priorities; and then developing that collective understanding and shared vision of what they are to accomplish in

countries. That is very good.

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What falls down for the missions is, once they send those plans

back here to Washington to the bureaus, they are not getting the

kind of clear guidance and feedback from the bureaus that the Embassies believe is necessary in order for them to proceed with some

assurance that they are walking in concert with what Washington

believes to be the greatest sense of priorities, and the greatest area

in need of attention by the mission.

So it is the communication that occurs at post that is very good,

but not back here to Washington. It has improved somewhat. We

have seen some improvement within the past year, but there is

much more need for clarity; there is much more need for a dialog

and very specific feedback from bureaus in Washington.

Mr. SHAYS. I can think of one criticism, in my contact with Embassy officials. They do not have the ability, or at least did not

have the ability to communicate from Embassy to Embassy. They

did not have the ability to share. They did not have technology that

would give them the latest abilities to communicate.

It strikes me as important, and any where it is important, within

an Embassy and between Embassies and among Embassies, and so

on.

Mr. MICA. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. MICA. I just got through reading part of the update, here. On

the point you are talking about, I cannot believe that this is correct.

They said they are doing a little demo in the next fiscal year, and

it would be 2 to 21⁄2 years before they can actually install a global

communication system. Is that still correct, according to someone’s

testimony here?

Mr. EDWARDS. I am not sure which testimony, Congressman,

that you are referring to.

Mr. MICA. Well, does anybody know? I mean, I think the chairman makes an incredible point. I am absolutely appalled, and I

have been in the Embassies around the world. It is almost laughable. I would fire people’s asses, excuse me, if this was any kind

of operation.

It is absolutely unbelievable that they cannot communicate. They

do not even have basic e-mail communication in some of these

places.

In one Embassy that we went into, they take turns using a computer. In the report, and I just read it in here in one of these, it

says it is going to be 21⁄2 years before they have any kind of a communication system.

Here it is. They had a suggestion from the panel for a single unclassified global communications network to serve all U.S. agencies

with oversized presence.

It could be billed to the cost of $200 million. That is peanuts. It

goes into the State, in its fiscal year, and this would be 2001, for

two pilot posts. It says if it is proven workable and funded, State

believes it could get operational in about 21⁄2 years, according to

page 12 of this report.

Mr. NELSON. Is this the GAO testimony?

Mr. MICA. Yes.

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Mr. SHAYS. Let me just comment, just as an illustration on something.

Mr. MICA. To me, it is just mind boggling.

Mr. SHAYS. This is just as an illustration of something. I would

like you all to comment, and then I am going to give up the floor.

We know that in some Embassies, they can communicate back to

DC, but they cannot communicate to another Embassy. They cannot even communicate sometimes within the Embassy, from one

employee to another. You have State Department employees. You

have Commerce Department employees.

I guess what I am trying to say to you, Mr. Edwards, is that it

would strike me that the Department would gain tremendously by

deciding what its strategic plans are, or what its performance goals

are, because it would highlight where we have scarce resources.

So my objective today is to hopefully learn if there is still a cultural bias against dealing with strategic planning and so on, point

one. So that is one concern. I am going to let you respond in a second.

Mr. Carpenter, I just want to get on the table a concern I have.

I can understand that we cannot re-do buildings.

I understand that probably the administration has asked for less

money than it needs. Then you all are in the position to defend it.

Then we have this wonderful ability to claim ignorance, because we

were not asked for what you truly need.

So one is, I would love to know more. That is not for this hearing, but we need to know more what you really truly need.

Given that we are not going to rebuild buildings and move them,

the thing that I find of most concern is that there is not, evidently,

based on what we have heard today, the kind of practice runs on

what you do if there is an emergency; what happens if there is a

crisis with this; what happens if a bomb goes off; what happens if

a terrorist is in the building, and what do we do?

Those are the kinds of things that I would think we would want

to be doing to compensate for what we are not doing. So that is

kind of where I am coming from. Those are my two areas.

I would love you, first, Mr. Edwards, just to respond to the issue

that I just previously raised. Then I will come to you, Mr. Carpenter, and we will ask Mr. Nelson and Ms. Williams-Bridgers to

respond. Then we will go to you, John.

Mr. EDWARDS. OK, I would like to start off first of all, with the

Information Resource Management Bureau, which is, again, one of

the bureaus that Assistant Secretary Carpenter works with. They

would support accelerating that.

Our problem is that our information technology request for 2000,

for example, was reduced substantially from the prior year. A lot

of that 21⁄2 years is simply buying the hardware.

We have, within the OPAP review, one of the three committees

deal with an IT platform. We have, quite frankly, a problem getting

the tenants at our posts to agree to use a common platform.

We have tenants that are funded by various committees. Sometimes they come with gold plated Cadillacs, while our ALMA program, which we have been putting into the Embassies, would be

functionally late model Chevrolets. So for all of our tenants to work

with the same equipment is not the easiest thing in the world.

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Mr. SHAYS. I think it is important to point this out, and it is

somewhat extraordinary, but it also is of tremendous concern. I am

just trying to illustrate another way where the State Department

could benefit tremendously by dealing with the Results Act. You

could highlight these points in a way that could give you a tremendous amount of weight in dealing with your tenants.

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, I would agree completely with that observation, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. EDWARDS. We are attempting to do that through the OPAP

working groups, one of which is the IT group I mentioned; the second is facilities; and the third is right-sizing.

We have just had an initial meeting, for example, with Embassy

in Paris. Not surprisingly, every one of the agencies who were

there objected to any suggestion that they were overstaffed. So this

is going to be very difficult. But I think from an inter-agency point

of view, a collective answer cannot be, we cannot reduce a single

person.

Mr. SHAYS. You see, what you may conclude is that you need the

benefits of the Results Act more than any department, rather than

less.

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, I think in this case, you are absolutely correct.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, in this case, even when you mention that you

are bringing in some technology, if it does not fit in with an overall

plan, it just may be a waste and an expensive effort.

Anyway, I want to let Mr. Mica respond. My goal is quite simple

today. I just want you to be enthusiasts for coming in to the Results Act. Then I would like you to feel pain and suffering, if you

do not. [Laughter.]

Mr. Carpenter, do you want to just respond to that?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, I totally agree that security drills are critical to any security program overseas.

We have requirements that security drills be run; whether they

be for fires, bombs, terrorist attacks. Chemical biological seems to

be the newest threat that has befallen us, for which you have to

have a plan to evacuate, or take the appropriate action.

Our requirement currently has been to do these annually in most

posts, and semi-annually in those higher threat posts.

We just recently, in May, sent out a cable, once we were advised

by the IG that their experience was that this was not being done,

admonishing them, requiring them to do that immediately.

Clearly, that is one of our defensive measures out there. That is

as important as having delta barriers up and all the other equipment in place, if you are not dwelling on this.

Mr. SHAYS. I do not know if annually is going to be enough for

you. If it is annually, I do not think there is a sense of urgency.

Mr. CARPENTER. You are right. Certainly, annually, to have a fire

drill may not be adequate, when we have, at certain times of the

year, changes in the number of personnel at posts, and turnover in

our foreign service cadre. It has to be a focus. We are attempting

to make it a focus, along with a lot of other programs at post.

We have been, in the course of the last 2 years, been focusing

clearly on having a plan, should something occur at one of these

77

Embassies, because we believe very seriously that we will have another incident at a post overseas. At the posts that are prepared,

the casualties will be the lesser. That is our goal.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I have gone well over my time. I invite

Mr. Mica to continue. Just let me recognize the presence of Mr.

Tierney. We will get to you when Mr. Mica is done. Thank you. You

have the floor, Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Well, again, I am just totally frustrated that after years of looking at State, and finding out the very basic operational need, which

is communications, if you cannot communicate, either within the

Embassy or between Embassies, or adequately internationally,

there is a problem. So I am totally frustrated by what I have read

here, if you could not tell.

It also appears like the ‘‘inmates are running asylum.’’ On the

right-sizing overseas, what is the status of that? You are telling me

now, for example, Paris says that they cannot give up one position.

They are all essential.

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, the Ambassador has, as you know, testified

that he believes it could be reduced. We had our inter-agency meeting, where the tenants disagreed; not the State Department position.

Mr. MICA. OK, well, my question is not that. My question is,

what is the mechanism for bringing about the change? Do we have

in place, within State, or do we need congressional action? How do

you right-size these overseas operations?

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, we have a number of inter-agency teams.

Secretary Albright actually chaired a meeting of the Cabinet.

Mr. MICA. Well, has somebody made a decision, and we will use

Paris, as to what the right-size should be?

Mr. EDWARDS. That is being worked on. Some decisions have

been made. For example, in my bureau, we have filed a report with

the Congress of how we intend to reduce our financial service center in Paris from about 120 people to 14 or maybe 10 or so, and

moving them to Charleston, SC.

Mr. MICA. The right-sizing of overseas operations has been going

on for how long now?

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, actually, many of the right-sizing has been

going on for years.

Again, in my bureau, at one point, we had 23 financial centers.

We are now down to three. Two to 3 years from now, we will be

down to two, with two-thirds of that in the United States and onethird still in Bangkok, which is a very efficient, very low cost operation, housed in our former Embassy.

Mr. MICA. Again, you know, we are trying to talk about accountability, responsibility, and certain acts that we have put in to try

to make this all work.

Within the agency, you are telling me the Secretary has the authority to do this. I understand the Ambassador, even, has the authority to do this.

Mr. EDWARDS. Right.

Mr. MICA. Well, why is it not done?

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Mr. EDWARDS. Well, most of the growth, Mr. Congressman, has

actually been in our tenant agencies, who have applied for permission to increase their staffing, because of their program mandates.

Mr. MICA. OK, well, what if we just take State personnel? I was

in one of the hearings, and I have seen testimony from the Ambassador about this. What about handling just your balliwick; not

downsizing?

I sat with our former colleague, Tom Lantos, son-in-law, Ambassador Dick Swett. I sat with him, and he brought in the Ambassadors from the Baltic and some of the emerging nations up there.

They are totally inadequately staffed for some of these new emerging posts. We have got them coming out of the walls in Paris.

I know it is hard to get them out of Gay Paree, but how do we

make this thing work? What is wrong?

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, what has to work is, there are agencies that

have people at a particular post. In some posts, there may be 25

or 30 agencies, and in other posts, there may be State and USAID

and maybe one other.

Mr. MICA. How many USAID are in Paris?

Mr. EDWARDS. USAID has very few in Paris, if any.

Mr. MICA. I would hope so. That was just one of those quick

questions. [Laughter.]

Mr. EDWARDS. Paris and London have probably the largest list

of tenants.

Mr. MICA. Well, part of the problem is here in the Congress, because it is multi-jurisdictional. All these agencies have their own

budgets, their own turf, their own jurisdiction. But somebody needs

to get a handle on this.

Again, my question is, just to restate it, how do we get rightsizing to work?

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, let me just cover a couple of the points, and

then Assistant Secretary Carpenter can chip in, and our Inspector

General, as well.

We have regionalized, for example, in Ft. Lauderdale, service

areas for Western Hemisphere Bureau, because you can fly from

south Florida to practically every one of the countries. So we have

regional specialists there, as opposed to spreading them through 15

or 20 countries.

We have regionalized a lot of our medical personnel, so that they

can get to nearby posts relatively quickly, by available air service.

I mentioned, in my bureau, we have gone from 23 to 3 financial

service centers, and have filed a plan to get that down to 2.

Mr. MICA. OK, so you are telling me, from a technical standpoint

and an authority standpoint, State already has the authority to do

what they need to do, at least within your bailiwick, which is

State?

Mr. EDWARDS. We do have that.

Mr. MICA. So it is a management decision, and either the Secretary or one of the Assistant Secretaries or the Ambassador is not

carrying that through, for example, in Paris.

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, our Ambassador probably is the lead Ambassador, in terms of right-sizing, in that particular case. He would

like to significantly reduce.

Mr. MICA. But why is that not done?

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Mr. EDWARDS. Well, in inter-agency, we had our first meeting.

Mr. MICA. I do not even want to fire anybody. [Laughter.]

I am just trying to move them where we need them.

Mr. EDWARDS. Help? [Laughter.]

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Yes, Mr. Mica, I have comments on a

couple of different issues that you have raised.

One is, what the State Department has done. I think they have

undertaken a number of initiatives, over the years. One is the overseas staffing model, where they try to get a concept model in place

that would help them to identify is the right number of people to

do certain work in the mission, given the work requirements in a

mission.

But that concept has lapsed, basically. It was no longer considered to be very useful in actually assigning people or staffing positions overseas.

The Department has also attempted efforts at regionalization, as

Mr. Edwards has mentioned, at the financial service centers in

Paris, and in Charleston, to provide administrative services.

I think that to the extent the Department can continue to explore

how to regionalize administrative services, that will help to address

some of the growth in staffing that we have, and then the imminent security-related concerns.

The Department has also been exploring the use of the American

presence post concept; minimal presence of American officers. In

Lyon, we just reestablished such a post, in France, under the very

wise counsel and guidance, I believe, of Ambassador Rohatyn,

there.

But then to the larger issue of what can we do to right-size the

total U.S. Government presence overseas, I think there are tools in

place. National Security Directive NSDD–38 provides the Ambassadors, the Chiefs of Missions, with the requisite authorities to

make calls on whether or not staffing has outgrown the ability of

the Department to provide security for U.S. personnel overseas.

Unfortunately, there is not oftentimes the will by the Chief of the

Mission to exercise that authority, or the support back here in

Washington, for a Chief of Mission, who wants to make that call,

that we have reached our tolerable limits, and we can no longer

provide for safety and security of our U.S. Government employees

overseas.

ICASS is another tool that this Congress passed with several objectives. One is not only to share the costs across all Federal agencies for their presence overseas, but to make them make the tough

calls about whether or not the U.S. Government can afford the cost

of their presence overseas, which has grown over time.

Unfortunately, OIG believes that ICASS has not met the full intent of congressional legislation. That needs to be revisited, because

cost serves as a very equalizing factor, when people are making decisions on whether or not they need the additional 10 or 15 people.

It is not State, as Mr. Edwards has mentioned, that has been the

growth agent overseas. It is other agencies.

So we do need congressional attention from committees such as

yours, which have the broad based jurisdiction to ask the questions

of whether or not other agencies have deliberated truthfully the

cost of their presence, and whether or not they are picking up the

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cost of their presence overseas, and whether or not we can provide

the security and the dollars that are necessary to provide security

for all the people that find themselves working overseas now.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to give everybody

a change to ask questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr.

Mica.

Mr. Carpenter, let me ask you, about your written testimony,

and I assume that you repeated it when you were speaking. I

apologize for being at another committee hearing when you were

talking.

You made the statement, I believe, or at least in writing you

made the statement that the fundamental problem in security at

Headquarters was with carelessness, rather than with the Department’s security policies. What exactly were you getting at, with

that?

Mr. CARPENTER. That would be individual responsibility. The Department has a lot of rules, a lot of regulations, a lot of policies

that are in place that speak to a good, positive security program.

However, people may choose to violate those, or exceptions have

been made to those.

One of the realities of what I inherited 2 years ago, we had a security program that was a program of exceptions that were made.

They probably were good at the time. There may have been some

sound reasoning to them at the time. But over time, I think that

reasons and logic sort of dissipated, and we had sort of swiss

cheese.

What we have been in the process in the last 2 years is trying

to patch all those holes. There are no exceptions. You will abide by

these.

But what is critical to any good security program is an ability to

enforce it. We also felt that we were lacking there. We had the program. The program was in place. We just did not have the people

to monitor and enforce it, which is critical.

Mr. TIERNEY. So it was a manpower thing?

Mr. CARPENTER. Manpower, yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. I mean, in May, the FBI said that foreign spies

have been unescorted and had access, by working undercover as

news correspondents. Has that been addressed?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, it has, with the FBI.

Mr. TIERNEY. What have you done?

Mr. CARPENTER. I would be glad, in another forum, to tell you

exactly what we have done. I would suggest that that should not

have been the subject of an open forum discussion, last time.

But we have taken measures, and we are working very closely

with the FBI and the CIA, as a matter of fact, and have a working

agreement with them. This whole issue is well understood, and is

being well coordinated between all three agencies.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, there were reports also that there was no

screening procedure to ensure that the swipe access identification

cards that were issued to employees and visitors were actually in

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the possession of their actual owners. Have there been steps taken

to remedy that?

Mr. CARPENTER. Not completely; no sir, we are working on a system that it is unacceptable to not have a redundant system; whereby, you simply swipe a card, where no one is looking at the picture

on the card for positive identification.

We are looking at a system that will probably have a pin number. It may have, in other parts of the department, biometrics involved. So there are redundant systems, and that is what we are

hoping to have in place, shortly.

Mr. TIERNEY. Biometrics being a thumb print type of thing?

Mr. CARPENTER. A thumbprint or a retina recognition.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK, there was also a report that none of the 140

offices handling classified material at Headquarters had been inspected for listening devices or cameras, and there was no policy

to record the receipt or return of classified materials. Has that

been addressed?

Mr. CARPENTER. One of those statements is incorrect.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK.

Mr. CARPENTER. Following the bugging, we did a top to bottom

sweep, TSCM, on all of the conference rooms and offices of the

building. That was reported erroneously.

The second part of your questions was what?

Mr. TIERNEY. That people were not being inspected for listening

devices or cameras.

Mr. CARPENTER. That is people coming into the building?

Mr. TIERNEY. Right.

Mr. CARPENTER. People are run through metal detectors at our

entrances; visitors that is. That continues to be our policy.

Mr. TIERNEY. But with respect to listening devices or cameras,

there are no additional steps taken in that regard?

Mr. CARPENTER. Listening devices are tough. We run people

through metal detectors. We check their bags, their belongings,

when they come in. It is not, currently, against Department regulations to bring a camera into the Department of State.

Mr. TIERNEY. Regarding the Marine Corps. Guards, and you

know where I am going on this one, are said to have had practice

for their overseas postings by having surprise inspections at State

Department Headquarters.

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. On an average, supposedly they turned up 63 problems per visit. Then those inspections were canceled, because there

was too much paperwork. Is there any accuracy to that, or what

has been done with regard to that situation?

Mr. CARPENTER. There is accuracy in the numbers of documents

founds left out, from time to time. That has not been canceled.

The program was decelerated, as the Marines did not have training classes going on where we could bring them in. That is a very

robust program, and something that we found extremely valuable

to our building security program, to have them come in and do a

very, very thorough sweep of offices.

Mr. TIERNEY. I just have one last question.

82

We were told that a lot of contract employees, security guards,

are only subject to cursory police checks. Supposedly, only 15 out

of 100 candidates actually had security clearances.

The press, and believe me, I understand that they are not always

accurate, by any stretch of the imagination, indicate that the CIA

has been so troubled by this record that they routinely withhold information that is classified.

That might be a potential impairment of the ability of the State

Department employees and officials to carry out their work. Is

there any truth to that?

Mr. CARPENTER. I have no knowledge of the CIA withholding any

information from the Department of State, based on those particular issues.

We have a very good working relationship with the CIA. No one

has suggested that. However, I would suggest that if we do not get

our security act together at State, that would be something that I

would expect them to broach with the Department.

That is why we are working aggressively to get the programs

back on a level that they should have been; that they never have

been on before, I might add, so that we do not have to face that

potential inevitability.

Mr. TIERNEY. What is your assessment of just how far along you

are in that process?

Mr. CARPENTER. It is clearly a work in progress. I would suggest

that we have made some tremendous strides in some very major

areas.

As was referred to earlier with our escort policy, the Department

of State had never had an escort policy. That was a huge undertaking. It has paid, I think, tremendous dividends.

But there is a lot of work left to be done. As I mentioned in my

statement, only recently were we given the responsibility for the

security of SCI information. That is an incredible undertaking.

There is a lot of work to be done there, and we are only scratching

the surface. We are probably 5 percent there, with 95 percent to

go.

In other areas, we have made some tremendous strides in our

physical security, increasing the number of guards. Overseas, our

programs have raised dramatically. I think we have a real positive

story there. Domestically, we still have a lot of work to do.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now is everything internal, or do you need this

Congress to do anything to facilitate?

Mr. CARPENTER. We continue to be, as a lot of agencies would tell

you, resource poor.

I think in the security element, in the security realm, all of the

things that we got from the emergency supplement are nice and

much appreciated.

However, you need to have professional law enforcement people

to oversee these programs. That is the area that we are pushing

very hard for more professionals. We need more people to enforce

this.

Without an ability to enforce the good programs and policies and

procedures that we have, we will be back in front of you, explaining

another security incident state. That is why we are in the process

83

of trying to prepare that for the Congress, as to what our needs

will be.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Bridgers, what are your thoughts on all of

this?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. I think that the Department has made

remarkable strides in addressing security, both overseas and in response to the recent incidents here.

In response to your question of what more is needed, I think it

would be continued vigilance at top management levels in the Department. I think we should be setting a tenure for no tolerance

or zero tolerance, for misconduct in the Department.

In fact, that is the only area of outstanding response from the

Department to the recommendations that we have made about the

handling of classified information. That is the need for the Department to improve its disciplinary process to ensure that for those

people who repeatedly violate security regulations that proper administrative action is taken.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Nelson, I do not want to leave you out of this. I would like

you to have an opportunity to tell us your thoughts on it. You were

getting pretty comfortable sitting back there. [Laughter.]

Mr. NELSON. Well, it is hard to have a discussion about financial

management versus one about security and spies and notebooks

being taken from the Department. I understand that.

We have been following the news reports and the hearings that

have been held regarding these issues at the Department.

It is fairly clear that there are some challenges. It seems clear

from all that I can hear that the Department is aware of it, and

is taking some steps to deal with these security issues.

Our work at GAO, let me digress and say, has been mainly in

looking at the vulnerability of states’ information systems to unauthorized access. We have worked closely with the Department to

bring about some improvements in that particular area of information security versus security related to access to State Department

facilities.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Thank you all.

Mr. SHAYS. I do not have many more questions. But the more I

hear the responses to the questions, and also hear the questions

themselves, I am more convinced that the State Department would

benefit from being out in the forefront of wanting strategic goals

and performance goals. I would just think it would be invaluable

to the agency.

As it relates to just thinking about it, in terms of security, is it

not possible, and maybe it has happened, that in thinking about security, you realize that you may have to downsize a vulnerable facility, even in a not high risk area, but clearly in a high risk area?

I guess I would want to ask Mr. Carpenter if that is happening.

I mean, if we have a facility that is truly vulnerable, I would like

to think that it is not filled with people.

Mr. CARPENTER. I would like to think that, also, Mr. Chairman.

We have been, I think, very aggressive, but I think we need to be

more aggressive in the future.

84

We have a set of posts, right now, where we have put them in

bands that we consider to be our most vulnerable posts, even with

the security augmentations that have taken place over the last 2

years.

We are going back to post and suggesting either they engage

more fully with the host country to try to get the setback they

need, either through street closures or some other means, property

acquisitions, or something.

If they are unable to do that, their options then become, you

have to either dramatically downsize, or you have to consider closing your posts and operating offshore, until those security requirements are met.

For those posts right now, we started out with about 15 on that

list. We are down to about eight. They are aggressively trying that.

I say we are down to eight, because seven of those were able to get

host country positive responses. We had streets closed, and so

forth.

We have also looked, as the rotational period comes up this summer, at downsizing the number of replacements going in there. The

goal being to try to mitigate the threat against the post.

We have also, in some instances, moved our personnel from certain locations, more vulnerable locations on a compound, to less

vulnerable. Although the setback is not there, we have given ourselves more setback within the compound that we reside in.

Mr. SHAYS. Is it not true that with the Results Act, if your resources are limited, and you know that you are not going to be

about to make construction changes, that it gives you a little bit

more emphasis and need to realize that you have got to do some

of these low cost types of actions that can help save lives?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. We may have a few questions that we are going to

give you in writing. The questions that I was just asked to ask you

would make sense, but they are pretty standard numbers of when

you will finish construction, and so on. So we are going to followup

on that.

I am pretty much concluded with my questions. I have come to

think that, Mr. Tierney, if you end up becoming the chairman of

this committee, or I am fortunate enough to become the chairman

again, that we would have a wealth of opportunity in just dealing

with two areas, and one in particular with Mr. Mica, on the whole

issue of communication within and inter-communication; and also,

as well, the whole issue of tenants.

I mean, there is just this built-up bias, I think, for having another agency be there in one way, because it is not your budget,

State, and I make that assumption, at least for the personnel. But

then there is a negative in the terms of the lack of control.

If I was an ambassador, and I had all these free wheeling people

from all these different departments in the Embassy, I would demand that I would be able to coordinate their activity in a very

strong way.

I do not have a sense that that is happening. But I will tell you,

if I was using my Results Act effectively, I could document the

need to do that.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman.

85

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, I am done, so you have the floor.

Mr. MICA. I do not know if you have done this. I chair the Drug

Policy Subcommittee. You know, the drug issue runs over probably

12 to 15 different agencies and a number of the committees.

This might be a good project to approach, as we have done, and

I do not know if you have done it before, to ‘‘haul them all in,’’ sit

them down at a table, and then call the appropriator staff and the

authorizing staff into the mix, too.

It is very hard for them to do anything by themselves. I find with

agents, they all sort of dig their heels in. If we get them in a closed

room, we sit them down at a conference table, and we have to try

to move forward. That is what I have tried to do on some of these.

Mr. SHAYS. This is as it relates to the drug effort?

Mr. MICA. Well, no, the communications would be a good one; but

the right-sizing is another one.

Mr. SHAYS. I see, you did this?

Mr. MICA. Oh, I have done that. In DOD, we hauled in State, we

hauled in Treasury.

Mr. SHAYS. He means that figuratively, ‘‘hauled in.’’ [Laughter.]

Mr. MICA. You know, I am a partisan Republican, but we close

the door, and we try to work out a solution. The ranking members

work with us and others.

Sometimes, we can get them to do things, and you do not need

a lot more legislation. But you can also say you want some, and

this takes repetitive meanings, sometimes.

Mr. SHAYS. That is why I felt it was next year’s efforts.

Mr. MICA. Well, I think you have got an opportunity, even to initiate that now. I know there are a lot of things on your platter, but

it might be most helpful. The communications and then the rightsizing are particular issues that are tough for them to solve, I

think, by themselves.

Mr. SHAYS. I agree with that.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Do you have any other questions you

want to ask?

Mr. MICA. No.

Mr. SHAYS. Are there any points that any of the four of you

would like to make; a question that we should have asked, that you

were prepared to answer?

Mr. CARPENTER. Perhaps before Congressman Mica leaves, I

would like to say one thing. I cannot pass up this opportunity, because I know he was either a signatory to or a member of the

Inman Commission, back in 1985, that looked at the State Department.

Mr. MICA. That was my brother, Dan. Now you are in really big

trouble. [Laughter.]

Mr. SHAYS. His brother was a Democrat.

Mr. MICA. And on behalf of the family, we appreciate the recognition. [Laughter.]

Mr. SHAYS. Tell me about his brother. I will listen. [Laughter.]

Mr. CARPENTER. The issue being, in 1985, the staffing size of diplomatic security was the same as it was in 1998, for the bombings.

86

It ramped up after the Inman Commission, and it came back

down, shortly thereafter. I would say that is at least a factor in

what we are experiencing, right now.

My plea or my point here is that we cannot allow what happened

after Inman to happen. I think we all have that responsibility to

ensure that that does not happen again.

I hear a lot of grumblings within my own bureau, and within the

State Department, that we are destined for that. If we are, we are

destined to fail, again. I would just ask your assistance and help

in ensuring that that does not happen, again.

Mr. SHAYS. I am sorry, ‘‘destined to fail’’ in what way? I just

missed the first part.

Mr. CARPENTER. I think if the commitment that appears to be

made by the Hill, to finances, more people, security things rise up,

or we take our eye off the ball, then we will be destined to have

another incident.

Mr. SHAYS. That is fair enough, and important to put on the

record. Thank you.

Mr. Nelson, do you have anything that you would like to say in

conclusion?

Mr. NELSON. I would just like to conclude by saying that the

problems and challenges that the Department faces, I think, are

well recognized.

I think that it will be incumbent upon this committee and the

Congress to make sure that the Department has a clear vision and

strategy for what it would like to achieve, and a commitment that

is supported by the Congress in order to avoid what Mr. Carpenter

referred to.

I think the issues of the U.S. presence, as well as the protection

of a U.S. staff and information, are a critical national security issue

for the country; not for any particular group. Diligence will be required, as well as continued oversight by this committee.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

I am struck by a recollection of the time I had a briefing. As a

state representative, we were invited down, the so-called young

leaders, and there were about 300 of us in a 2-day conference. It

was my total education on realizing that the State Department

thrives on ambiguity. So the Results Act must be that cultural

challenge. [Laughter.]

But I am absolutely convinced, hearing the testimony today, how

important it would be to have a clear vision, and in so many different areas, how beneficial it would be.

Mr. Carpenter, are you all set?

Mr. CARPENTER. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, Ms. Williams-Bridgers.

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to provide

some support and encouragement to this committee, to undertake

the type of initiative that Mr. Mica suggested. I think that it is a

critical issue that has to be addressed in the short term.

Mr. SHAYS. Which one?

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. The information sharing and the need

for inter-agency communications at post.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

87

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. It is not only an issue of importance to

strategic planning, and being able to have open lines of communications about what our goals and priorities are, overseas.

But it also is important, because in this age where information

moves so very quickly, and where our knowledge is not keeping up

with the need to attend to security of information that flows very

quickly, I think it is important to have some kind of collegial discussions with all the agencies and the appropriators and the authorizers, who all have vested interests in making sure that that

type of communication occurs.

Also, it is important, because in some of our critical and national

interests, border security being one which I know this committee

is concerned about, the lack of information sharing by agencies particularly in the Justice Department and INS, with State Department, and consulate offices, about aliens that might bring harm to

the United States, that information is not being routinely shared

with the State Department now.

It is a long standing issue, and it is one that we have brought

to the attention of many committees in the Congress in the past.

It needs immediate attention to ensure that the type of information is made available to State, so that as they adjudicate visas and

issue new laser visas, that carry with them biometric data, that

that will ensure better protection of identifying people who are not

intended recipients of our visas.

But I think that type of information sharing is critical. I would

hope that that issue would be embraced in any future discussions

that this committee might lead.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Edwards, are you all set?

Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, and I am in general agreement with all of my

colleagues here.

I think Mr. Mica was absolutely correct. He had mentioned with

narcotics, for example, there must be 10 to 12 agencies.

One of the issues would be, if each of those 10 agencies, let us

say, have three people in an Embassy, does it make sense, perhaps,

to boil that down to two agencies? So instead of having 20 people,

maybe you can reduce that to 10 to 12, and have a lead agency in

a particular country for these multi-agency issues.

That was discussed at the Cabinet meeting. Attorney General

Reno suggested that, for example, law enforcement might do that.

I might say that her suggestion was met with not a great deal of

concurrence with her fellow law enforcement agencies.

But that is one of the issues that we have, working together. Mr.

Tierney, you had mentioned 100 janitors, and 10 of them were

cleared, or some statistic like that. As you know, we are subject to

the FAIR Act, where we have to contract out essentially non-Government services, domestically.

When you look at a janitor force, one of the things that baffles

me, having come in from the private sector, we have those people

during working hours, because if they are not cleared, we have to

watch what they are doing.

My three colleagues at this table all have routines, when they

come into their front office, somebody has to trail these people

around. If the telephone repairman comes in, he puts all these

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parts out on the floor. You do not know what in the world they are

putting into them.

We have a few Xerox repairmen and a few telephone repairmen

that are cleared. But, you know, when the back-up forces come,

that has introduced a challenge to diplomatic security, as well as

the agency.

You know, those people may be there for nefarious purposes. Of

course, in many cases, these people are in the lower income areas.

Getting people that can pass clearance, from people coming from either immigrants to the country or lower income, is not the easiest

thing in the world.

Mr. TIERNEY. I guess, at least with regard to that, it might do

everybody well to examine whether it makes sense in continuing to

contract out, and run into those repetitive problems, or to have the

staff on hand, and whether that would, in fact, save money. You

would have staff on hand that was just cleared, once and for all.

Mr. EDWARDS. I think that is a good observation. Of course, if

they were cleared, perhaps they could come in where they were not

underfoot, with everybody else, during the 8 busy hours. However,

my own experience is that we are 24 times 7. So the building is

never empty.

But it is discouraging, when you are there with a conference in

your conference room, and the vacuum cleaner is going on in your

front office.

Mr. TIERNEY. For that reason, for security, for a number of reasons, it would seem to make sense that sometimes these policies,

while well intended, sort of wash over.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I wish I could think of a metaphor for ending up with

cleaners. [Laughter.]

Thank you all. It has been a very interesting hearing, actually.

I appreciate your flexibility in doing it this way. I think it worked

better.

Thank you. This hearing is closed.

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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