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[House Report 107-249]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

107th Congress                                            Rept. 107-249
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                     Part 1

======================================================================

 
            BIPARTISAN TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY ACT OF 2001

                                _______
                                

                October 16, 2001.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Thomas, from the Committee on Ways and Means, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                    ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 3005]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Ways and Means, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 3005) to extend trade authorities procedures with 
respect to reciprocal trade agreements, having considered the 
same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend 
that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Introduction....................................................16
          A. Purpose and Summary.................................    16
          B. Background and Need for Legislation.................    16
          C. Legislative History.................................    18
 II. Explanation of the Bill.........................................18
III. Vote of the Committee...........................................46
 IV. Budget Effects of the Bill......................................47
          A. Committee Estimates of Budgetary Effects............    47
          B. Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures...............    47
          C. Cost Estimate Prepared by the Congressional Budget 
              Office.............................................    47
  V. Other Matters To Be Discussed Under the Rules of the House......48
          A. Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations....    48
          B. Statement of General Performance Goals and 
              Objectives.........................................    49
          C. Constitutional Authority Statement..................    49
 VI. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported...........49
VII. Additional and Dissenting Views.................................54
  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND FINDINGS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
  (b) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) The expansion of international trade is vital to the 
        national security of the United States. Trade is critical to 
        the economic growth and strength of the United States and to 
        its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships 
        promote security and prosperity. Trade agreements today serve 
        the same purposes that security pacts played during the Cold 
        War, binding nations together through a series of mutual rights 
        and obligations. Leadership by the United States in 
        international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and peace 
        throughout the world.
          (2) The national security of the United States depends on its 
        economic security, which in turn is founded upon a vibrant and 
        growing industrial base. Trade expansion has been the engine of 
        economic growth. Trade agreements maximize opportunities for 
        the critical sectors and building blocks of the economy of the 
        United States, such as information technology, 
        telecommunications and other leading technologies, basic 
        industries, capital equipment, medical equipment, services, 
        agriculture, environmental technology, and intellectual 
        property. Trade will create new opportunities for the United 
        States and preserve the unparalleled strength of the United 
        States in economic, political, and military affairs. The United 
        States, secured by expanding trade and economic opportunities, 
        will meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

SEC. 2. TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.

  (a) Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives.--The overall trade 
negotiating objectives of the United States for agreements subject to 
the provisions of section 3 are--
          (1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market 
        access;
          (2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers and 
        distortions that are directly related to trade and that 
        decrease market opportunities for United States exports or 
        otherwise distort United States trade;
          (3) to further strengthen the system of international trading 
        disciplines and procedures, including dispute settlement;
          (4) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, and 
        promote full employment in the United States and to enhance the 
        global economy;
          (5) to ensure that trade and environmental policies are 
        mutually supportive and to seek to protect and preserve the 
        environment and enhance the international means of doing so, 
        while optimizing the use of the world's resources; and
          (6) to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of 
        children consistent with core labor standards of the 
        International Labor Organization (as defined in section 10(2)) 
        and an understanding of the relationship between trade and 
        worker rights.
  (b) Principal Trade Negotiating Objectives.--
          (1) Trade barriers and distortions.--The principal 
        negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade 
        barriers and other trade distortions are--
                  (A) to expand competitive market opportunities for 
                United States exports and to obtain fairer and more 
                open conditions of trade by reducing or eliminating 
                tariff and nontariff barriers and policies and 
                practices of foreign governments directly related to 
                trade that decrease market opportunities for United 
                States exports or otherwise distort United States 
                trade; and
                  (B) to obtain reciprocal tariff and nontariff barrier 
                elimination agreements, with particular attention to 
                those tariff categories covered in section 111(b) of 
                the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
          (2) Trade in services.--The principal negotiating objective 
        of the United States regarding trade in services is to reduce 
        or eliminate barriers to international trade in services, 
        including regulatory and other barriers that deny national 
        treatment and market access or unreasonably restrict the 
        establishment or operations of service suppliers.
          (3) Foreign investment.--The principal negotiating objective 
        of the United States regarding foreign investment is to reduce 
        or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to trade-
        related foreign investment by--
                  (A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the 
                principle of national treatment;
                  (B) freeing the transfer of funds relating to 
                investments;
                  (C) reducing or eliminating performance requirements, 
                forced technology transfers, and other unreasonable 
                barriers to the establishment and operation of 
                investments;
                  (D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation 
                and compensation for expropriation, consistent with 
                United States legal principles and practice;
                  (E) providing meaningful procedures for resolving 
                investment disputes; and
                  (F) seeking to improve mechanisms used to resolve 
                disputes between an investor and a government through--
                          (i) mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims;
                          (ii) procedures to ensure the efficient 
                        selection of arbitrators and the expeditious 
                        disposition of claims; and
                          (iii) procedures to increase transparency in 
                        investment disputes.
          (4) Intellectual property.--The principal negotiating 
        objectives of the United States regarding trade-related 
        intellectual property are--
                  (A) to further promote adequate and effective 
                protection of intellectual property rights, including 
                through--
                          (i)(I) ensuring accelerated and full 
                        implementation of the Agreement on Trade-
                        Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
                        referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the 
                        Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 
                        3511(d)(15)), particularly with respect to 
                        meeting enforcement obligations under that 
                        agreement; and
                          (II) ensuring that the provisions of any 
                        multilateral or bilateral trade agreement 
                        governing intellectual property rights that is 
                        entered into by the United States reflect a 
                        standard of protection similar to that found in 
                        United States law;
                          (ii) providing strong protection for new and 
                        emerging technologies and new methods of 
                        transmitting and distributing products 
                        embodying intellectual property;
                          (iii) preventing or eliminating 
                        discrimination with respect to matters 
                        affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, 
                        maintenance, use, and enforcement of 
                        intellectual property rights;
                          (iv) ensuring that standards of protection 
                        and enforcement keep pace with technological 
                        developments, and in particular ensuring that 
                        rightholders have the legal and technological 
                        means to control the use of their works through 
                        the Internet and other global communication 
                        media, and to prevent the unauthorized use of 
                        their works; and
                          (v) providing strong enforcement of 
                        intellectual property rights, including through 
                        accessible, expeditious, and effective civil, 
                        administrative, and criminal enforcement 
                        mechanisms; and
                  (B) to secure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory 
                market access opportunities for United States persons 
                that rely upon intellectual property protection.
          (5) Transparency.--The principal negotiating objective of the 
        United States with respect to transparency is to obtain wider 
        and broader application of the principle of transparency 
        through--
                  (A) increased and more timely public access to 
                information regarding trade issues and the activities 
                of international trade institutions;
                  (B) increased openness at the WTO and other 
                international trade fora by increasing public access to 
                appropriate meetings, proceedings, and submissions, 
                including with regard to dispute settlement and 
                investment; and
                  (C) increased and more timely public access to all 
                notifications and supporting documentation submitted by 
                parties to the WTO.
          (6) Anti-corruption.--The principal negotiating objectives of 
        the United States with respect to the use of money or other 
        things of value to influence acts, decisions, or omissions of 
        foreign governments or officials or to secure any improper 
        advantage in a manner affecting trade are--
                  (A) to obtain high standards and appropriate domestic 
                enforcement mechanisms applicable to persons from all 
                countries participating in the applicable trade 
                agreement that prohibit such attempts to influence 
                acts, decisions, or omissions of foreign governments; 
                and
                  (B) to ensure that such standards do not place United 
                States persons at a competitive disadvantage in 
                international trade.
          (7) Improvement of the wto and multilateral trade 
        agreements.--The principal negotiating objectives of the United 
        States regarding the improvement of the World Trade 
        Organization, the Uruguay Round Agreements, and other 
        multilateral and bilateral trade agreements are--
                  (A) to achieve full implementation and extend the 
                coverage of the World Trade Organization and such 
                agreements to products, sectors, and conditions of 
                trade not adequately covered; and
                  (B) to expand country participation in and 
                enhancement of the Information Technology Agreement and 
                other trade agreements.
          (8) Regulatory practices.--The principal negotiating 
        objectives of the United States regarding the use of government 
        regulation or other practices by foreign governments to provide 
        a competitive advantage to their domestic producers, service 
        providers, or investors and thereby reduce market access for 
        United States goods, services, and investments are--
                  (A) to achieve increased transparency and opportunity 
                for the participation of affected parties in the 
                development of regulations;
                  (B) to require that proposed regulations be based on 
                sound science, cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, 
                or other objective evidence;
                  (C) to establish consultative mechanisms among 
                parties to trade agreements to promote increased 
                transparency in developing guidelines, rules, 
                regulations, and laws for government procurement and 
                other regulatory regimes; and
                  (D) to achieve the elimination of government measures 
                such as price controls and reference pricing which deny 
                full market access for United States products.
          (9) Electronic commerce.--The principal negotiating 
        objectives of the United States with respect to electronic 
        commerce are--
                  (A) to ensure that current obligations, rules, 
                disciplines, and commitments under the World Trade 
                Organization apply to electronic commerce;
                  (B) to ensure that--
                          (i) electronically delivered goods and 
                        services receive no less favorable treatment 
                        under trade rules and commitments than like 
                        products delivered in physical form; and
                          (ii) the classification of such goods and 
                        services ensures the most liberal trade 
                        treatment possible;
                  (C) to ensure that governments refrain from 
                implementing trade-related measures that impede 
                electronic commerce;
                  (D) where legitimate policy objectives require 
                domestic regulations that affect electronic commerce, 
                to obtain commitments that any such regulations are the 
                least restrictive on trade, nondiscriminatory, and 
                transparent, and promote an open market environment; 
                and
                  (E) to extend the moratorium of the World Trade 
                Organization on duties on electronic transmissions.
          (10) Reciprocal trade in agriculture.--(A) The principal 
        negotiating objective of the United States with respect to 
        agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United 
        States exports of agricultural commodities in foreign markets 
        substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities 
        afforded foreign exports in United States markets and to 
        achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in bulk, 
        specialty crop, and value-added commodities by--
                  (i) reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, 
                tariffs or other charges that decrease market 
                opportunities for United States exports--
                          (I) giving priority to those products that 
                        are subject to significantly higher tariffs or 
                        subsidy regimes of major producing countries; 
                        and
                          (II) providing reasonable adjustment periods 
                        for United States import-sensitive products, in 
                        close consultation with the Congress on such 
                        products before initiating tariff reduction 
                        negotiations;
                  (ii) reducing tariffs to levels that are the same as 
                or lower than those in the United States;
                  (iii) reducing or eliminating subsidies that decrease 
                market opportunities for United States exports or 
                unfairly distort agriculture markets to the detriment 
                of the United States;
                  (iv) allowing the preservation of programs that 
                support family farms and rural communities but do not 
                distort trade;
                  (v) developing disciplines for domestic support 
                programs, so that production that is in excess of 
                domestic food security needs is sold at world prices;
                  (vi) eliminating Government policies that create 
                price-depressing surpluses;
                  (vii) eliminating state trading enterprises whenever 
                possible;
                  (viii) developing, strengthening, and clarifying 
                rules and effective dispute settlement mechanisms to 
                eliminate practices that unfairly decrease United 
                States market access opportunities or distort 
                agricultural markets to the detriment of the United 
                States, particularly with respect to import-sensitive 
                products, including--
                          (I) unfair or trade-distorting activities of 
                        state trading enterprises and other 
                        administrative mechanisms, with emphasis on 
                        requiring price transparency in the operation 
                        of state trading enterprises and such other 
                        mechanisms in order to end cross subsidization, 
                        price discrimination, and price undercutting;
                          (II) unjustified trade restrictions or 
                        commercial requirements, such as labeling, that 
                        affect new technologies, including 
                        biotechnology;
                          (III) unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary 
                        restrictions, including those not based on 
                        scientific principles in contravention of the 
                        Uruguay Round Agreements;
                          (IV) other unjustified technical barriers to 
                        trade; and
                          (V) restrictive rules in the administration 
                        of tariff rate quotas;
                  (ix) eliminating practices that adversely affect 
                trade in perishable or cyclical products, while 
                improving import relief mechanisms to recognize the 
                unique characteristics of perishable and cyclical 
                agriculture;
                  (x) ensuring that the use of import relief mechanisms 
                for perishable and cyclical agriculture are as 
                accessible and timely to growers in the United States 
                as those mechanisms that are used by other countries;
                  (xi) taking into account whether a party to the 
                negotiations has failed to adhere to the provisions of 
                already existing trade agreements with the United 
                States or has circumvented obligations under those 
                agreements;
                  (xii) taking into account whether a product is 
                subject to market distortions by reason of a failure of 
                a major producing country to adhere to the provisions 
                of already existing trade agreements with the United 
                States or by the circumvention by that country of its 
                obligations under those agreements;
                  (xiii) otherwise ensuring that countries that accede 
                to the World Trade Organization have made meaningful 
                market liberalization commitments in agriculture;
                  (xiv) taking into account the impact that agreements 
                covering agriculture to which the United States is a 
                party, including the North American Free Trade 
                Agreement, have on the United States agricultural 
                industry; and
                  (xv) maintaining bona fide food assistance programs 
                and preserving United States market development and 
                export credit programs.
          (B)(i) Before commencing negotiations with respect to 
        agriculture, the United States Trade Representative, in 
        consultation with the Congress, shall seek to develop a 
        position on the treatment of seasonal and perishable 
        agricultural products to be employed in the negotiations in 
        order to develop an international consensus on the treatment of 
        seasonal or perishable agricultural products in investigations 
        relating to dumping and safeguards and in any other relevant 
        area.
          (ii) During any negotiations on agricultural subsidies, the 
        United States Trade Representative shall seek to establish the 
        common base year for calculating the Aggregated Measurement of 
        Support (as defined in the Agreement on Agriculture) as the end 
        of each country's Uruguay Round implementation period, as 
        reported in each country's Uruguay Round market access 
        schedule.
          (iii) The negotiating objective provided in subparagraph (A) 
        applies with respect to agricultural matters to be addressed in 
        any trade agreement entered into under section 3 (a) or (b), 
        including any trade agreement entered into under section 3 (a) 
        or (b) that provides for accession to a trade agreement to 
        which the United States is already a party, such as the North 
        American Free Trade Agreement and the United States-Canada Free 
        Trade Agreement.
          (11) Labor and the environment.--The principal negotiating 
        objectives of the United States with respect to labor and the 
        environment are--
                  (A) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with 
                the United States does not fail to effectively enforce 
                its environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or 
                recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner 
                affecting trade between the United States and that 
                party after entry into force of a trade agreement 
                between those countries;
                  (B) to recognize that parties to a trade agreement 
                retain the right to exercise discretion with respect to 
                investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and 
                compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the 
                allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to 
                other labor or environmental matters determined to have 
                higher priorities, and to recognize that a country is 
                effectively enforcing its laws if a course of action or 
                inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such 
                discretion, or results from a bona fide decision 
                regarding the allocation of resources;
                  (C) to strengthen the capacity of United States 
                trading partners to promote respect for core labor 
                standards (as defined in section 10(2));
                  (D) to strengthen the capacity of United States 
                trading partners to protect the environment through the 
                promotion of sustainable development;
                  (E) to reduce or eliminate government practices or 
                policies that unduly threaten sustainable development;
                  (F) to seek market access, through the elimination of 
                tariffs and nontariff barriers, for United States 
                environmental technologies, goods, and services; and
                  (G) to ensure that labor, environmental, health, or 
                safety policies and practices of the parties to trade 
                agreements with the United States do not arbitrarily or 
                unjustifiably discriminate against United States 
                exports or serve as disguised barriers to trade.
          (12) Dispute settlement and enforcement.--The principal 
        negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to 
        dispute settlement and enforcement of trade agreements are--
                  (A) to seek provisions in trade agreements providing 
                for resolution of disputes between governments under 
                those trade agreements in an effective, timely, 
                transparent, equitable, and reasoned manner, requiring 
                determinations based on facts and the principles of the 
                agreements, with the goal of increasing compliance with 
                the agreements;
                  (B) to seek to strengthen the capacity of the Trade 
                Policy Review Mechanism of the World Trade Organization 
                to review compliance with commitments;
                  (C) to seek provisions encouraging the early 
                identification and settlement of disputes through 
                consultation;
                  (D) to seek provisions to encourage the provision of 
                trade-expanding compensation if a party to a dispute 
                under the agreement does not come into compliance with 
                its obligations under the agreement;
                  (E) to seek provisions to impose a penalty upon a 
                party to a dispute under the agreement that--
                          (i) encourages compliance with the 
                        obligations of the agreement;
                          (ii) is appropriate to the parties, nature, 
                        subject matter, and scope of the violation; and
                          (iii) has the aim of not adversely affecting 
                        parties or interests not party to the dispute 
                        while maintaining the effectiveness of the 
                        enforcement mechanism; and
                  (F) to seek provisions that treat United States 
                principal negotiating objectives equally with respect 
                to--
                          (i) the ability to resort to dispute 
                        settlement under the applicable agreement;
                          (ii) the availability of equivalent dispute 
                        settlement procedures; and
                          (iii) the availability of equivalent 
                        remedies.
          (13) WTO extended negotiations.--The principal negotiating 
        objectives of the United States regarding trade in civil 
        aircraft are those set forth in section 135(c) of the Uruguay 
        Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3355(c)) and regarding rules of 
        origin are the conclusion of an agreement described in section 
        132 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 3552).
  (c) Promotion of Certain Priorities.--In order to address and 
maintain United States competitiveness in the global economy, the 
President shall--
          (1) seek greater cooperation between the WTO and the ILO;
          (2) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties 
        to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United States 
        trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards 
        (as defined in section 10(2)), and report to the Committee on 
        Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Finance of the Senate on the content and operation 
        of such mechanisms;
          (3) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties 
        to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United States 
        trading partners to develop and implement standards for the 
        protection of the environment and human health based on sound 
        science, and report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
        House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the 
        Senate on the content and operation of such mechanisms;
          (4) conduct environmental reviews of future trade and 
        investment agreements, consistent with Executive Order 13141 of 
        November 16, 1999 and its relevant guidelines, and report to 
        the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives 
        and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on such reviews;
          (5) review the impact of future trade agreements on United 
        States employment, modeled after Executive Order 13141, and 
        report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on 
        such review;
          (6) take into account other legitimate United States domestic 
        objectives including, but not limited to, the protection of 
        legitimate health or safety, essential security, and consumer 
        interests and the law and regulations related thereto;
          (7) have the Secretary of Labor consult with any country 
        seeking a trade agreement with the United States concerning 
        that country's labor laws and provide technical assistance to 
        that country if needed;
          (8) with respect to any trade agreement which the President 
        seeks to implement under trade authorities procedures, submit 
        to the Congress a report describing the extent to which the 
        country or countries that are parties to the agreement have in 
        effect laws governing exploitative child labor;
          (9) preserve the ability of the United States to enforce 
        rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping and 
        countervailing duty laws, and avoid agreements which lessen the 
        effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines on 
        unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, in order to 
        ensure that United States workers, agricultural producers, and 
        firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the benefits of 
        reciprocal trade concessions;
          (10) continue to promote consideration of multilateral 
        environmental agreements and consult with parties to such 
        agreements regarding the consistency of any such agreement that 
        includes trade measures with existing environmental exceptions 
        under Article XX of the GATT 1994; and
          (11) report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 
        of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, 
        not later than 12 months after the imposition of a penalty or 
        remedy by the United States permitted by a trade agreement to 
        which this Act applies, on the effectiveness of the penalty or 
        remedy applied under United States law in enforcing United 
        States rights under the trade agreement.
The report under paragraph (11) shall address whether the penalty or 
remedy was effective in changing the behavior of the targeted party and 
whether the penalty or remedy had any adverse impact on parties or 
interests not party to the dispute.
  (d) Consultations.--
          (1) Consultations with congressional advisers.--In the course 
        of negotiations conducted under this Act, the United States 
        Trade Representative shall consult closely and on a timely 
        basis with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the 
        Congressional Oversight Group convened under section 7 and all 
        committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate with 
        jurisdiction over laws that would be affected by a trade 
        agreement resulting from the negotiations.
          (2) Consultation before agreement initialed.--In the course 
        of negotiations conducted under this Act, the United States 
        Trade Representative shall--
                  (A) consult closely and on a timely basis (including 
                immediately before initialing an agreement) with, and 
                keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the 
                congressional advisers for trade policy and 
                negotiations appointed under section 161 of the Trade 
                Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2211), the Committee on Ways and 
                Means of the House of Representatives, the Committee on 
                Finance of the Senate, and the Congressional Oversight 
                Group convened under section 7; and
                  (B) with regard to any negotiations and agreement 
                relating to agricultural trade, also consult closely 
                and on a timely basis (including immediately before 
                initialing an agreement) with, and keep fully apprised 
                of the negotiations, the Committee on Agriculture of 
                the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
                Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate.
  (e) Adherence to Obligations Under Uruguay Round Agreements.--In 
determining whether to enter into negotiations with a particular 
country, the President shall take into account the extent to which that 
country has implemented, or has accelerated the implementation of, its 
obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.

SEC. 3. TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY.

  (a) Agreements Regarding Tariff Barriers.--
          (1) In general.--Whenever the President determines that one 
        or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any 
        foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and 
        restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that the 
        purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this Act will 
        be promoted thereby, the President--
                  (A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign 
                countries before--
                          (i) June 1, 2005; or
                          (ii) June 1, 2007, if trade authorities 
                        procedures are extended under subsection (c); 
                        and
                  (B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), 
                proclaim--
                          (i) such modification or continuance of any 
                        existing duty,
                          (ii) such continuance of existing duty-free 
                        or excise treatment, or
                          (iii) such additional duties,
                as the President determines to be required or 
                appropriate to carry out any such trade agreement.
        The President shall notify the Congress of the President's 
        intention to enter into an agreement under this subsection.
          (2) Limitations.--No proclamation may be made under paragraph 
        (1) that--
                  (A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate of 
                duty that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem on the 
                date of the enactment of this Act) to a rate of duty 
                which is less than 50 percent of the rate of such duty 
                that applies on such date of enactment; or
                  (B) increases any rate of duty above the rate that 
                applied on the date of the enactment of this Act.
          (3) Aggregate reduction; exemption from staging.--
                  (A) Aggregate reduction.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), the aggregate reduction in the rate 
                of duty on any article which is in effect on any day 
                pursuant to a trade agreement entered into under 
                paragraph (1) shall not exceed the aggregate reduction 
                which would have been in effect on such day if--
                          (i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem or a 
                        reduction of one-tenth of the total reduction, 
                        whichever is greater, had taken effect on the 
                        effective date of the first reduction 
                        proclaimed under paragraph (1) to carry out 
                        such agreement with respect to such article; 
                        and
                          (ii) a reduction equal to the amount 
                        applicable under clause (i) had taken effect at 
                        1-year intervals after the effective date of 
                        such first reduction.
                  (B) Exemption from staging.--No staging is required 
                under subparagraph (A) with respect to a duty reduction 
                that is proclaimed under paragraph (1) for an article 
                of a kind that is not produced in the United States. 
                The United States International Trade Commission shall 
                advise the President of the identity of articles that 
                may be exempted from staging under this subparagraph.
          (4) Rounding.--If the President determines that such action 
        will simplify the computation of reductions under paragraph 
        (3), the President may round an annual reduction by an amount 
        equal to the lesser of--
                  (A) the difference between the reduction without 
                regard to this paragraph and the next lower whole 
                number; or
                  (B) one-half of 1 percent ad valorem.
          (5) Other limitations.--A rate of duty reduction that may not 
        be proclaimed by reason of paragraph (2) may take effect only 
        if a provision authorizing such reduction is included within an 
        implementing bill provided for under section 5 and that bill is 
        enacted into law.
          (6) Other tariff modifications.--Notwithstanding paragraphs 
        (1)(B) and (2) through (5), and subject to the consultation and 
        layover requirements of section 115 of the Uruguay Round 
        Agreements Act, the President may proclaim the modification of 
        any duty or staged rate reduction of any duty set forth in 
        Schedule XX, as defined in section 2(5) of that Act, if the 
        United States agrees to such modification or staged rate 
        reduction in a negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or 
        harmonization of duties under the auspices of the World Trade 
        Organization.
          (7) Authority under uruguay round agreements act not 
        affected.--Nothing in this subsection shall limit the authority 
        provided to the President under section 111(b) of the Uruguay 
        Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
  (b) Agreements Regarding Tariff and Nontariff Barriers.--
          (1) In general.--(A) Whenever the President determines that--
                  (i) one or more existing duties or any other import 
                restriction of any foreign country or the United States 
                or any other barrier to, or other distortion of, 
                international trade unduly burdens or restricts the 
                foreign trade of the United States or adversely affects 
                the United States economy; or
                  (ii) the imposition of any such barrier or distortion 
                is likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or 
                effect;
        and that the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of 
        this Act will be promoted thereby, the President may enter into 
        a trade agreement described in subparagraph (B) during the 
        period described in subparagraph (C).
          (B) The President may enter into a trade agreement under 
        subparagraph (A) with foreign countries providing for--
                  (i) the reduction or elimination of a duty, 
                restriction, barrier, or other distortion described in 
                subparagraph (A), or
                  (ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on the 
                imposition of, such barrier or other distortion.
          (C) The President may enter into a trade agreement under this 
        paragraph before--
                  (i) June 1, 2005; or
                  (ii) June 1, 2007, if trade authorities procedures 
                are extended under subsection (c).
          (2) Conditions.--A trade agreement may be entered into under 
        this subsection only if such agreement makes progress in 
        meeting the applicable objectives described in section 2 (a) 
        and (b) and the President satisfies the conditions set forth in 
        section 4.
          (3) Bills qualifying for trade authorities procedures.--(A) 
        The provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (in this 
        Act referred to as ``trade authorities procedures'') apply to a 
        bill of either House of Congress which contains provisions 
        described in subparagraph (B) to the same extent as such 
        section 151 applies to implementing bills under that section. A 
        bill to which this paragraph applies shall hereafter in this 
        Act be referred to as an ``implementing bill''.
          (B) The provisions referred to in subparagraph (A) are--
                  (i) a provision approving a trade agreement entered 
                into under this subsection and approving the statement 
                of administrative action, if any, proposed to implement 
                such trade agreement; and
                  (ii) if changes in existing laws or new statutory 
                authority are required to implement such trade 
                agreement or agreements, provisions, necessary or 
                appropriate to implement such trade agreement or 
                agreements, either repealing or amending existing laws 
                or providing new statutory authority.
  (c) Extension Disapproval Process for Congressional Trade Authorities 
Procedures.--
          (1) In general.--Except as provided in section 5(b)--
                  (A) the trade authorities procedures apply to 
                implementing bills submitted with respect to trade 
                agreements entered into under subsection (b) before 
                July 1, 2005; and
                  (B) the trade authorities procedures shall be 
                extended to implementing bills submitted with respect 
                to trade agreements entered into under subsection (b) 
                after June 30, 2005, and before July 1, 2007, if (and 
                only if)--
                          (i) the President requests such extension 
                        under paragraph (2); and
                          (ii) neither House of the Congress adopts an 
                        extension disapproval resolution under 
                        paragraph (5) before June 1, 2005.
          (2) Report to congress by the president.--If the President is 
        of the opinion that the trade authorities procedures should be 
        extended to implementing bills described in paragraph (1)(B), 
        the President shall submit to the Congress, not later than 
        March 1, 2005, a written report that contains a request for 
        such extension, together with--
                  (A) a description of all trade agreements that have 
                been negotiated under subsection (b) and the 
                anticipated schedule for submitting such agreements to 
                the Congress for approval;
                  (B) a description of the progress that has been made 
                in negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, 
                priorities, and objectives of this Act, and a statement 
                that such progress justifies the continuation of 
                negotiations; and
                  (C) a statement of the reasons why the extension is 
                needed to complete the negotiations.
          (3) Report to congress by the advisory committee.--The 
        President shall promptly inform the Advisory Committee for 
        Trade Policy and Negotiations established under section 135 of 
        the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) of the President's 
        decision to submit a report to the Congress under paragraph 
        (2). The Advisory Committee shall submit to the Congress as 
        soon as practicable, but not later than May 1, 2005, a written 
        report that contains--
                  (A) its views regarding the progress that has been 
                made in negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, 
                priorities, and objectives of this Act; and
                  (B) a statement of its views, and the reasons 
                therefor, regarding whether the extension requested 
                under paragraph (2) should be approved or disapproved.
          (4) Status of reports.--The reports submitted to the Congress 
        under paragraphs (2) and (3), or any portion of such reports, 
        may be classified to the extent the President determines 
        appropriate.
          (5) Extension disapproval resolutions.--(A) For purposes of 
        paragraph (1), the term ``extension disapproval resolution'' 
        means a resolution of either House of the Congress, the sole 
        matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 
        ``That the ____ disapproves the request of the President for 
        the extension, under section 3(c)(1)(B)(i) of the Bipartisan 
        Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, of the trade authorities 
        procedures under that Act to any implementing bill submitted 
        with respect to any trade agreement entered into under section 
        3(b) of that Act after June 30, 2005.'', with the blank space 
        being filled with the name of the resolving House of the 
        Congress.
          (B) Extension disapproval resolutions--
                  (i) may be introduced in either House of the Congress 
                by any member of such House; and
                  (ii) shall be referred, in the House of 
                Representatives, to the Committee on Ways and Means 
                and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules.
          (C) The provisions of sections 152 (d) and (e) of the Trade 
        Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (d) and (e)) (relating to the floor 
        consideration of certain resolutions in the House and Senate) 
        apply to extension disapproval resolutions.
          (D) It is not in order for--
                  (i) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval 
                resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance;
                  (ii) the House of Representatives to consider any 
                extension disapproval resolution not reported by the 
                Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, by the 
                Committee on Rules; or
                  (iii) either House of the Congress to consider an 
                extension disapproval resolution after June 30, 2005.
  (d) Commencement of Negotiations.--In order to contribute to the 
continued economic expansion of the United States, the President shall 
commence negotiations covering tariff and nontariff barriers affecting 
any industry, product, or service sector, and expand existing sectoral 
agreements to countries that are not parties to those agreements, in 
cases where the President determines that such negotiations are 
feasible and timely and would benefit the United States. Such sectors 
include agriculture, commercial services, intellectual property rights, 
industrial and capital goods, government procurement, information 
technology products, environmental technology and services, medical 
equipment and services, civil aircraft, and infrastructure products. In 
so doing, the President shall take into account all of the principal 
negotiating objectives set forth in section 2(b).

SEC. 4. CONSULTATIONS AND ASSESSMENT.

  (a) Notice and Consultation Before Negotiation.--The President, with 
respect to any agreement that is subject to the provisions of section 
3(b), shall--
          (1) provide, at least 90 calendar days before initiating 
        negotiations, written notice to the Congress of the President's 
        intention to enter into the negotiations and set forth therein 
        the date the President intends to initiate such negotiations, 
        the specific United States objectives for the negotiations, and 
        whether the President intends to seek an agreement, or changes 
        to an existing agreement; and
          (2) before and after submission of the notice, consult 
        regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Finance of the 
        Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
        Representatives, such other committees of the House and Senate 
        as the President deems appropriate, and the Congressional 
        Oversight group convened under section 7.
  (b) Negotiations Regarding Agriculture.--Before initiating or 
continuing negotiations the subject matter of which is directly related 
to the subject matter under section 2(b)(10)(A)(i) with any country, 
the President shall assess whether United States tariffs on 
agricultural products that were bound under the Uruguay Round 
Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound by that country. In 
addition, the President shall consider whether the tariff levels bound 
and applied throughout the world with respect to imports from the 
United States are higher than United States tariffs and whether the 
negotiation provides an opportunity to address any such disparity. The 
President shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the 
Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry of the Senate concerning the results of the assessment, 
whether it is appropriate for the United States to agree to further 
tariff reductions based on the conclusions reached in the assessment, 
and how all applicable negotiating objectives will be met.
  (c) Consultation With Congress Before Agreements Entered Into.--
          (1) Consultation.--Before entering into any trade agreement 
        under section 3(b), the President shall consult with--
                  (A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
                Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the 
                Senate;
                  (B) each other committee of the House and the Senate, 
                and each joint committee of the Congress, which has 
                jurisdiction over legislation involving subject matters 
                which would be affected by the trade agreement; and
                  (C) the Congressional Oversight Group convened under 
                section 7.
          (2) Scope.--The consultation described in paragraph (1) shall 
        include consultation with respect to--
                  (A) the nature of the agreement;
                  (B) how and to what extent the agreement will achieve 
                the applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and 
                objectives of this Act; and
                  (C) the implementation of the agreement under section 
                5, including the general effect of the agreement on 
                existing laws.
  (d) Advisory Committee Reports.--The report required under section 
135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding any trade agreement 
entered into under section 3 (a) or (b) of this Act shall be provided 
to the President, the Congress, and the United States Trade 
Representative not later than 30 days after the date on which the 
President notifies the Congress under section 3(a)(1) or 5(a)(1)(A) of 
the President's intention to enter into the agreement.
  (e) ITC Assessment.--
          (1) In general.--The President, at least 90 calendar days 
        before the day on which the President enters into a trade 
        agreement under section 3(b), shall provide the International 
        Trade Commission (referred to in this subsection as ``the 
        Commission'') with the details of the agreement as it exists at 
        that time and request the Commission to prepare and submit an 
        assessment of the agreement as described in paragraph (2). 
        Between the time the President makes the request under this 
        paragraph and the time the Commission submits the assessment, 
        the President shall keep the Commission current with respect to 
        the details of the agreement.
          (2) ITC assessment.--Not later than 90 calendar days after 
        the President enters into the agreement, the Commission shall 
        submit to the President and the Congress a report assessing the 
        likely impact of the agreement on the United States economy as 
        a whole and on specific industry sectors, including the impact 
        the agreement will have on the gross domestic product, exports 
        and imports, aggregate employment and employment opportunities, 
        the production, employment, and competitive position of 
        industries likely to be significantly affected by the 
        agreement, and the interests of United States consumers.
          (3) Review of empirical literature.--In preparing the 
        assessment, the Commission shall review available economic 
        assessments regarding the agreement, including literature 
        regarding any substantially equivalent proposed agreement, and 
        shall provide in its assessment a description of the analyses 
        used and conclusions drawn in such literature, and a discussion 
        of areas of consensus and divergence between the various 
        analyses and conclusions, including those of the Commission 
        regarding the agreement.

SEC. 5. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.

  (a) In General.--
          (1) Notification and submission.--Any agreement entered into 
        under section 3(b) shall enter into force with respect to the 
        United States if (and only if)--
                  (A) the President, at least 90 calendar days before 
                the day on which the President enters into the trade 
                agreement, notifies the House of Representatives and 
                the Senate of the President's intention to enter into 
                the agreement, and promptly thereafter publishes notice 
                of such intention in the Federal Register;
                  (B) within 60 days after entering into the agreement, 
                the President submits to the Congress a description of 
                those changes to existing laws that the President 
                considers would be required in order to bring the 
                United States into compliance with the agreement;
                  (C) after entering into the agreement, the President 
                submits to the Congress a copy of the final legal text 
                of the agreement, together with--
                          (i) a draft of an implementing bill described 
                        in section 3(b)(3);
                          (ii) a statement of any administrative action 
                        proposed to implement the trade agreement; and
                          (iii) the supporting information described in 
                        paragraph (2); and
                  (D) the implementing bill is enacted into law.
          (2) Supporting information.--The supporting information 
        required under paragraph (1)(C)(iii) consists of--
                  (A) an explanation as to how the implementing bill 
                and proposed administrative action will change or 
                affect existing law; and
                  (B) a statement--
                          (i) asserting that the agreement makes 
                        progress in achieving the applicable purposes, 
                        policies, priorities, and objectives of this 
                        Act; and
                          (ii) setting forth the reasons of the 
                        President regarding--
                                  (I) how and to what extent the 
                                agreement makes progress in achieving 
                                the applicable purposes, policies, and 
                                objectives referred to in clause (i);
                                  (II) whether and how the agreement 
                                changes provisions of an agreement 
                                previously negotiated;
                                  (III) how the agreement serves the 
                                interests of United States commerce;
                                  (IV) how the implementing bill meets 
                                the standards set forth in section 
                                3(b)(3); and
                                  (V) how and to what extent the 
                                agreement makes progress in achieving 
                                the applicable purposes, policies, and 
                                objectives referred to in section 2(c) 
                                regarding the promotion of certain 
                                priorities.
          (3) Reciprocal benefits.--In order to ensure that a foreign 
        country that is not a party to a trade agreement entered into 
        under section 3(b) does not receive benefits under the 
        agreement unless the country is also subject to the obligations 
        under the agreement, the implementing bill submitted with 
        respect to the agreement shall provide that the benefits and 
        obligations under the agreement apply only to the parties to 
        the agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms 
        of the agreement. The implementing bill may also provide that 
        the benefits and obligations under the agreement do not apply 
        uniformly to all parties to the agreement, if such application 
        is consistent with the terms of the agreement.
  (b) Limitations on Trade Authorities Procedures.--
          (1) For lack of notice or consultations.--
                  (A) In general.--The trade authorities procedures 
                shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with 
                respect to a trade agreement entered into under section 
                3(b) if during the 60-day period beginning on the date 
                that one House of Congress agrees to a procedural 
                disapproval resolution for lack of notice or 
                consultations with respect to that trade agreement, the 
                other House separately agrees to a procedural 
                disapproval resolution with respect to that agreement.
                  (B) Procedural disapproval resolution.--For purposes 
                of this paragraph, the term ``procedural disapproval 
                resolution'' means a resolution of either House of 
                Congress, the sole matter after the resolving clause of 
                which is as follows: ``That the President has failed or 
                refused to notify or consult (as the case may be) with 
                Congress in accordance with section 4 or 5 of the 
                Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001 on 
                negotiations with respect to ____________ and, 
                therefore, the trade authorities procedures under that 
                Act shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted 
                with respect to that trade agreement.'', with the blank 
                space being filled with a description of the trade 
                agreement with respect to which the President is 
                considered to have failed or refused to notify or 
                consult.
          (2) Procedures for considering resolutions.--(A) Procedural 
        disapproval resolutions--
                  (i) in the House of Representatives--
                          (I) shall be introduced by the chairman or 
                        ranking minority member of the Committee on 
                        Ways and Means or the chairman or ranking 
                        minority member of the Committee on Rules;
                          (II) shall be referred to the Committee on 
                        Ways and Means and, in addition, to the 
                        Committee on Rules; and
                          (III) may not be amended by either Committee; 
                        and
                  (ii) in the Senate shall be original resolutions of 
                the Committee on Finance.
          (B) The provisions of section 152 (d) and (e) of the Trade 
        Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (d) and (e)) (relating to the floor 
        consideration of certain resolutions in the House and Senate) 
        apply to procedural disapproval resolutions.
          (C) It is not in order for the House of Representatives to 
        consider any procedural disapproval resolution not reported by 
        the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, by the 
        Committee on Rules.
  (c) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--Subsection (b) of 
this section and section 3(c) are enacted by the Congress--
          (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of 
        Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such are 
        deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and 
        such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that 
        they are inconsistent with such other rules; and
          (2) with the full recognition of the constitutional right of 
        either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the 
        procedures of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and 
        to the same extent as any other rule of that House.

SEC. 6. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR WHICH NEGOTIATIONS 
                    HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

  (a) Certain Agreements.--Notwithstanding section 3(b)(2), if an 
agreement to which section 3(b) applies--
          (1) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade 
        Organization,
          (2) is entered into with Chile,
          (3) is entered into with Singapore, or
          (4) establishes a Free Trade Area for the Americas,
and results from negotiations that were commenced before the date of 
the enactment of this Act, subsection (b) shall apply.
  (b) Treatment of Agreements.--In the case of any agreement to which 
subsection (a) applies--
          (1) the applicability of the trade authorities procedures to 
        implementing bills shall be determined without regard to the 
        requirements of section 4(a) (relating only to 90 days notice 
        prior to initiating negotiations), and any procedural 
        disapproval resolution under section 5(b)(1)(B) shall not be in 
        order on the basis of a failure or refusal to comply with the 
        provisions of section 4(a); and
          (2) the President shall, as soon as feasible after the 
        enactment of this Act--
                  (A) notify the Congress of the negotiations described 
                in subsection (a), the specific United States 
                objectives in the negotiations, and whether the 
                President is seeking a new agreement or changes to an 
                existing agreement; and
                  (B) before and after submission of the notice, 
                consult regarding the negotiations with the committees 
                referred to in section 4(a)(2) and the Congressional 
                Oversight Group.

SEC. 7. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT GROUP.

  (a) Members and Functions.--
          (1) In general.--By not later than 60 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and not later than 30 days after the 
        convening of each Congress, the chairman of the Committee on 
        Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the chairman 
        of the Committee on Finance of the Senate shall convene the 
        Congressional Oversight Group.
          (2) Membership from the house.--In each Congress, the 
        Congressional Oversight Group shall be comprised of the 
        following Members of the House of Representatives:
                  (A) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee 
                on Ways and Means, and 3 additional members of such 
                Committee (not more than 2 of whom are members of the 
                same political party).
                  (B) The chairman and ranking member, or their 
                designees, of the committees of the House of 
                Representatives which would have, under the Rules of 
                the House of Representatives, jurisdiction over 
                provisions of law affected by a trade agreement 
                negotiations for which are conducted at any time during 
                that Congress and to which this Act would apply.
          (3) Membership from the senate.--In each Congress, the 
        Congressional Oversight Group shall also be comprised of the 
        following members of the Senate:
                  (A) The chairman and ranking Member of the Committee 
                on Finance and 3 additional members of such Committee 
                (not more than 2 of whom are members of the same 
                political party).
                  (B) The chairman and ranking member, or their 
                designees, of the committees of the Senate which would 
                have, under the Rules of the Senate, jurisdiction over 
                provisions of law affected by a trade agreement 
                negotiations for which are conducted at any time during 
                that Congress and to which this Act would apply.
          (4) Accreditation.--Each member of the Congressional 
        Oversight Group described in paragraph (2)(A) and (3)(A) shall 
        be accredited by the United States Trade Representative on 
        behalf of the President as official advisers to the United 
        States delegation in negotiations for any trade agreement to 
        which this Act applies. Each member of the Congressional 
        Oversight Group described in paragraph (2)(B) and (3)(B) shall 
        be accredited by the United States Trade Representative on 
        behalf of the President as official advisers to the United 
        States delegation in the negotiations by reason of which the 
        member is in the Congressional Oversight Group. The 
        Congressional Oversight Group shall consult with and provide 
        advice to the Trade Representative regarding the formulation of 
        specific objectives, negotiating strategies and positions, the 
        development of the applicable trade agreement, and compliance 
        and enforcement of the negotiated commitments under the trade 
        agreement.
          (5) Chair.--The Congressional Oversight Group shall be 
        chaired by the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of 
        the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee 
        on Finance of the Senate.
  (b) Guidelines.--
          (1) Purpose and revision.--The United States Trade 
        Representative, in consultation with the chairmen and ranking 
        minority members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
        House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the 
        Senate--
                  (A) shall, within 120 days after the date of the 
                enactment of this Act, develop written guidelines to 
                facilitate the useful and timely exchange of 
                information between the Trade Representative and the 
                Congressional Oversight Group established under this 
                section; and
                  (B) may make such revisions to the guidelines as may 
                be necessary from time to time.
          (2) Content.--The guidelines developed under paragraph (1) 
        shall provide for, among other things--
                  (A) regular, detailed briefings of the Congressional 
                Oversight Group regarding negotiating objectives, 
                including the promotion of certain priorities referred 
                to in section 2(c), and positions and the status of the 
                applicable negotiations, beginning as soon as 
                practicable after the Congressional Oversight Group is 
                convened, with more frequent briefings as trade 
                negotiations enter the final stage;
                  (B) access by members of the Congressional Oversight 
                Group, and staff with proper security clearances, to 
                pertinent documents relating to the negotiations, 
                including classified materials;
                  (C) the closest practicable coordination between the 
                Trade Representative and the Congressional Oversight 
                Group at all critical periods during the negotiations, 
                including at negotiation sites; and
                  (D) after the applicable trade agreement is 
                concluded, consultation regarding ongoing compliance 
                and enforcement of negotiated commitments under the 
                trade agreement.

SEC. 8. ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) In General.--At the time the President submits to the Congress 
the final text of an agreement pursuant to section 5(a)(1)(C), the 
President shall also submit a plan for implementing and enforcing the 
agreement. The implementation and enforcement plan shall include the 
following:
          (1) Border personnel requirements.--A description of 
        additional personnel required at border entry points, including 
        a list of additional customs and agricultural inspectors.
          (2) Agency staffing requirements.--A description of 
        additional personnel required by Federal agencies responsible 
        for monitoring and implementing the trade agreement, including 
        personnel required by the Office of the United States Trade 
        Representative, the Department of Commerce, the Department of 
        Agriculture (including additional personnel required to 
        implement sanitary and phytosanitary measures in order to 
        obtain market access for United States exports), the Department 
        of the Treasury, and such other agencies as may be necessary.
          (3) Customs infrastructure requirements.--A description of 
        the additional equipment and facilities needed by the United 
        States Customs Service.
          (4) Impact on state and local governments.--A description of 
        the impact the trade agreement will have on State and local 
        governments as a result of increases in trade.
          (5) Cost analysis.--An analysis of the costs associated with 
        each of the items listed in paragraphs (1) through (4).
  (b) Budget Submission.--The President shall include a request for the 
resources necessary to support the plan described in subsection (a) in 
the first budget that the President submits to the Congress after the 
submission of the plan.

SEC. 9. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

  (a) In General.--Title I of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111 et 
seq.) is amended as follows:
          (1) Implementing bill.--
                  (A) Section 151(b)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(1)) is 
                amended by striking ``section 1103(a)(1) of the Omnibus 
                Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, or section 282 
                of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act'' and inserting 
                ``section 282 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or 
                section 5(a)(1) of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
                Authority Act of 2001''.
                  (B) Section 151(c)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(c)(1)) is 
                amended by striking ``or section 282 of the Uruguay 
                Round Agreements Act'' and inserting ``, section 282 of 
                the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or section 5(a)(1) of 
                the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
          (2) Advice from international trade commission.--Section 131 
        (19 U.S.C. 2151) is amended--
                  (A) in subsection (a)--
                          (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 
                        123 of this Act or section 1102 (a) or (c) of 
                        the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
                        1988,'' and inserting ``section 123 of this Act 
                        or section 3 (a) or (b) of the Bipartisan Trade 
                        Promotion Authority Act of 2001,''; and
                          (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``section 
                        1102 (b) or (c) of the Omnibus Trade and 
                        Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting 
                        ``section 3(b) of the Bipartisan Trade 
                        Promotion Authority Act of 2001'';
                  (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``section 
                1102(a)(3)(A)'' and inserting ``section 3(a)(3)(A) of 
                the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''; 
                and
                  (C) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 1102 of 
                the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' 
                and inserting ``section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade 
                Promotion Authority Act of 2001,''.
          (3) Hearings and advice.--Sections 132, 133(a), and 134(a) 
        (19 U.S.C. 2152, 2153(a), and 2154(a)) are each amended by 
        striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and 
        Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' each place it appears and 
        inserting ``section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
        Authority Act of 2001,''.
          (4) Prerequisites for offers.--Section 134(b) (19 U.S.C. 
        2154(b)) is amended by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus 
        Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting ``section 
        3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
          (5) Advice from private and public sectors.--Section 135 (19 
        U.S.C. 2155) is amended--
                  (A) in subsection (a)(1)(A), by striking ``section 
                1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
                1988'' and inserting ``section 3 of the Bipartisan 
                Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001'';
                  (B) in subsection (e)(1)--
                          (i) by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus 
                        Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' each 
                        place it appears and inserting ``section 3 of 
                        the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 
                        2001''; and
                          (ii) by striking ``section 1103(a)(1)(A) of 
                        such Act of 1988'' and inserting ``section 
                        5(a)(1)(A) of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
                        Authority Act of 2001''; and
                  (C) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 1101 
                of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' 
                and inserting ``section 2 of the Bipartisan Trade 
                Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
          (6) Transmission of agreements to congress.--Section 162(a) 
        (19 U.S.C. 2212(a)) is amended by striking ``or under section 
        1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and 
        inserting ``or under section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade 
        Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
  (b) Application of Certain Provisions.--For purposes of applying 
sections 125, 126, and 127 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2135, 
2136(a), and 2137)--
          (1) any trade agreement entered into under section 3 shall be 
        treated as an agreement entered into under section 101 or 102, 
        as appropriate, of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111 or 
        2112); and
          (2) any proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to a 
        trade agreement entered into under section 3 shall be treated 
        as a proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to a trade 
        agreement entered into under section 102 of the Trade Act of 
        1974.

SEC. 10. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act:
          (1) Agreement on agriculture.--The term ``Agreement on 
        Agriculture'' means the agreement referred to in section 
        101(d)(2) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 
        3511(d)(2)).
          (2) Core labor standards.--The term ``core labor standards'' 
        means--
                  (A) the right of association;
                  (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
                  (C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or 
                compulsory labor;
                  (D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and
                  (E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
                minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety 
                and health.
          (3) GATT 1994.--The term ``GATT 1994'' has the meaning given 
        that term in section 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 
        U.S.C. 3501).
          (4) ILO.--The term ``ILO'' means the International Labor 
        Organization.
          (5) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' 
        means--
                  (A) a United States citizen;
                  (B) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity 
                organized under the laws of the United States; and
                  (C) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity 
                that is organized under the laws of a foreign country 
                and is controlled by entities described in subparagraph 
                (B) or United States citizens, or both.
          (6) Uruguay round agreements.--The term ``Uruguay Round 
        Agreements'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(7) of 
        the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(7)).
          (7) World trade organization; wto.--The terms ``World Trade 
        Organization'' and ``WTO'' mean the organization established 
        pursuant to the WTO Agreement.
          (8) WTO agreement.--The term ``WTO Agreement'' means the 
        Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered 
        into on April 15, 1994.

                            I. INTRODUCTION

                         A. Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 3005, as amended by the Committee, would establish 
special provisions for the consideration of legislation to 
implement trade agreements. These special procedures, which 
were first enacted in 1974, have expired with respect to 
agreements entered into after April 15, 1994. The purpose of 
this special approval process, previously called ``fast 
track,'' has been to preserve the constitutional role and to 
fulfill the legislative responsibility of Congress with respect 
to trade agreements. At the same time, the process ensures 
certain and expeditious action on the results of the 
negotiations and on the implementing bill, with no amendments.
    H.R. 3005, as amended, would put in place special 
procedures for implementing trade agreements entered into 
before June 1, 2005, with the opportunity for an extension to 
cover agreements entered into before June 1, 2007. These 
procedures are similar to the expired provisions, with 
modifications to expand and broaden consultation with Congress.

                 B. Background and Need for Legislation

    Certain trade agreements cannot enter into force as a 
matter of U.S. law unless implementing legislation making any 
changes to U.S. law to implement U.S. rights and obligations 
under the agreement is enacted into law. Certain procedures, 
previously referred to as ``fast track'' and now referred to as 
``trade promotion authority,'' were first authorized in the 
Trade Act of 1974 in order to implement trade agreements. These 
procedures were first used with respect to the GATT Tokyo Round 
Agreements, which were approved and implemented in the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979. The expedited procedures for the 
implementation of multilateral trade agreements have not been 
significantly altered since 1974 but were expanded in 1984 to 
apply to bilateral agreements. Extended through section 1102(c) 
of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, and 
modified to authorize the President to enter into bilateral 
trade agreements, these procedures were most recently used to 
implement the Uruguay Round Agreements of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). That negotiating authority, as extended in 1991 and 
1993, applied only with respect to agreements entered into 
before April 15, 1994.
    These special procedures required the President, before 
entering into any trade agreement, to consult with Congress and 
to provide Congress advance notice of his intent to enter into 
an agreement. After entering into the agreement, the President 
was required to submit the draft agreement, implementing 
legislation, and a statement of administrative action. The 
President also consulted with Congressional committees of 
jurisdiction on the content of the implementing bill. 
Amendments to the legislation were not permitted once the bill 
was introduced; the committee and floor actions consisted of 
``up or down'' votes on the bill as introduced.
    The Committee believes that trade promotion authority has 
been a highly effective tool in securing a wide range of 
important, market-opening trade agreements for the United 
States. Because of these agreements, the Committee believes 
that the United States has been able to make substantial 
progress in opening markets, lowering tariffs, and reducing and 
ending non-tariff barriers to trade. These agreements are 
extremely beneficial in creating much-needed jobs, stimulating 
the economy, and raising the standard of living for American 
families. Without trade promotion authority in place since 
1994, however, the United States has concluded only one small 
free trade agreement (FTA), while its competitors have 
continued to put in place trade agreements that disadvantage 
U.S. businesses, workers, and farmers. Of the 134 free trade 
agreements negotiated under the GATT/WTO, the United States is 
party to only three--the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement, the 
NAFTA, and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement. Europe, for 
its part, has in force FTAs with 27 countries and is now moving 
into Latin America. Since 1994, Canada (the largest market for 
U.S. exports) has negotiated FTAs with Chile, Costa Rica, and 
Israel, and is conducting preliminary talks with Japan, 
Singapore, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Likewise, Mexico 
(the second largest market for U.S. exports) has trade 
agreements with 31 countries and is now in talks with Japan, 
Korea, and others. The WTO predicts that by 2005 there will be 
more than 250 FTAs. The Committee is concerned that if the 
United States does not have trade promotion authority, it will 
be left further behind as its competitors negotiate 
preferential access in their best interests.
    The Committee believes that the only way that the United 
States can negotiate these beneficial agreements is through the 
well-proven tool of trade promotion authority because it 
ensures certain and expeditious consideration of trade 
legislation while giving Congress a strong role to play during 
negotiation and implementation of trade agreements. In 
addition, trade promotion authority gives U.S. trading partners 
confidence that an agreement agreed to by the United States 
will not be reopened during the implementing process. 
Accordingly, H.R. 3005, as amended, would extend many of the 
provisions of the 1988 Act to future agreements, although 
making a number of improvements, particularly in the area of 
Congressional consultation.
    The Committee strongly believes that passage of this 
legislation is squarely in the national economic and security 
interest of the United States. Granting President Bush Trade 
Promotion Authority will send a strong signal that the United 
States does not intend to revert to isolationism. The Committee 
views TPA as a key element of a broader legislative strategy 
aimed at building confidence in American economic leadership 
and avoiding a global recession.

                         C. Legislative History

    H.R. 2149, the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, was 
introduced on June 13, 2001, by Congressman Crane, on behalf of 
himself, and 62 other House Members. H.R. 3005, the Bipartisan 
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, was introduced on 
October 3, 2001, by Chairman Thomas, on behalf of himself and 
Congressmen Crane, Dreier, Jefferson, Tanner, and Dooley. The 
bill was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and, in 
addition, to the Committee on Rules.
    On October 5 and October 9, the Committee on Ways and Means 
met to consider H.R. 3005. At that time, Chairman Thomas 
offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute, which was 
agreed to by voice vote. The Committee also agreed to, by 
unanimous consent, an amendment offered by Mr. Cardin 
concerning anti-corruption. Mr. Rangel offered an amendment in 
the nature of a substitute, which was defeated by a record vote 
of 12 yeas, 26 nays, and 1 pass. Mr. Doggett and Mr. McDermott 
offered an amendment concerning investment issues and 
procedures to remove trade promotion authority, which was 
defeated by voice vote. The Committee then ordered the bill 
favorably reported, as amended, by a record vote of 26 yeas to 
13 nays.

                      II. EXPLANATION OF THE BILL

                 1. Section 1: Short Title and Findings

Explanation of provision

    The short title of the bill is the ``Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Authority Act of 2001.'' The legislation states that 
Congress finds the expansion of international trade is vital to 
U.S. national security and economic growth, as well as U.S. 
leadership.

         2. Section 2 (a) and (b): Trade negotiating objectives

Present/expired law

    Section 1101(a) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988 (the 1988 Act) set forth overall negotiating 
objectives for concluding trade agreements. These objectives 
were to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market 
access, the reduction or elimination of barriers and other 
trade-distorting policies and practices, and a more effective 
system of international trading disciplines and procedures. 
Section 1102(b) set forth the following principal trade 
negotiating objectives: dispute settlement, transparency, 
developing countries, current account surpluses, trade and 
monetary coordination, agriculture, unfair trade practices, 
trade in services, intellectual property, foreign direct 
investment, safeguards, specific barriers, worker rights, 
access to high technology, and border taxes.

Explanation of provision

    Section 2 would establish the following overall negotiating 
objectives: obtaining more open, equitable, and reciprocal 
market access; obtaining the reduction or elimination of 
barriers and other trade-distorting policies and practices; 
further strengthening the system of international trading 
disciplines and procedures, including dispute settlement; 
fostering economic growth and full employment in the U.S. and 
the global economy; ensuring that trade and environmental 
policies are mutually supportive and seeking to protect and 
preserve the environment and enhance the international means of 
doing so, while optimizing the use of the world's resources; 
and to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of 
children consistent with International Labor Organization core 
labor standards, as defined in the bill.
    In addition, section 2 would establish the principal trade 
negotiating objectives for concluding trade agreements, as 
follows:
     Trade barriers and distortions:
          --expanding competitive market opportunities for U.S. 
        exports and obtaining fairer and more open conditions 
        of trade by reducing or eliminating tariff and 
        nontariff barriers and policies and practices of 
        foreign governments directly related to trade that 
        decrease market opportunities for U.S. exports and 
        distort U.S. trade; and
          --obtaining reciprocal tariff and nontariff barrier 
        elimination agreements, with particular attention to 
        products covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round 
        Agreements Act.
    Services: to reduce or eliminate barriers to international 
trade in services, including regulatory and other barriers, 
that deny national treatment or unreasonably restrict the 
establishment or operations of services suppliers.
    Foreign investment: to reduce or eliminate artificial or 
trade-distorting barriers to trade-related foreign investment 
by--
          --reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle 
        of national treatment;
          --freeing the transfer of funds relating to 
        investments;
          --reducing or eliminating performance requirements, 
        forced technology transfers, and other unreasonable 
        barriers to the establishment and operation of 
        investments;
          --seeking to establish standards for expropriation 
        and compensation for expropriation, consistent with 
        United States legal principles and practice;
          --providing meaningful procedures for resolving 
        investment disputes including between an investor and a 
        government; and
          --seeking to improve mechanisms used to resolve 
        disputes between an investor and a government through 
        mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims, procedures to 
        ensure the efficient selection of arbitrators and the 
        expeditious disposition of claims, and procedures to 
        increase transparency in investment disputes.
    Intellectual property: including:
          --promoting adequate and effective protection of 
        intellectual property rights through ensuring 
        accelerated and full implementation of the Agreement on 
        Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
        including strong enforcement;
          --providing strong protection for new and emerging 
        technologies and new methods of transmitting and 
        distributing products embodying intellectual property; 
        and
          --ensuring that standards of protection and 
        enforcement keep pace with technological developments, 
        and in particular ensuring that right holders have the 
        legal and technological means to control the use of 
        their works through the internet and other global 
        communication media.
    Transparency: to increase public access to information 
regarding trade issues as well as the activities of 
international trade institutions; to increase openness in 
international trade fora, including the WTO, by increasing 
public access to appropriate meetings, proceedings, and 
submissions, including with regard to dispute settlement and 
investment; and to increase timely public access to 
notifications made by WTO member states and the supporting 
documents.
    Anti-corruption: to obtain high standards and appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms applicable to persons from all countries 
participating in a trade agreement that prohibit attempts to 
influence acts, decisions, or omissions of foreign government; 
and to ensure that such standards do not place U.S. persons at 
a competitive disadvantage in international trade.
    Improvement of the WTO and multilateral trade agreements: 
to achieve full implementation and extend the coverage of the 
WTO and such agreements to products, sectors, and conditions of 
trade not adequately covered; and to expand country 
participation in and enhancement of the Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA) and other trade agreements.
    Regulatory practices: to achieve increased transparency and 
opportunity for the participation of affected parties in the 
development of regulations; to require that proposed 
regulations be based on sound science, cost-benefit analysis, 
risk assessment, or other objective evidence; to establish 
consultative mechanisms among parties to trade agreements to 
promote increased transparency in developing guidelines, rules, 
regulations, and laws for government procurement and other 
regulatory regimes; and to achieve the elimination of 
government measures such as price controls and reference 
pricing which deny full market access for United States 
products.
    Electronic commerce: to ensure that current obligations, 
rules, disciplines, and commitments under the WTO apply to 
electronic commerce; to ensure that electronically delivered 
goods and services receive no less favorable treatment under 
trade rules and commitments than like products delivered in 
physical form; and the classification of such goods and 
services ensures the most liberal trade treatment possible; to 
ensure that governments refrain from implementing trade-related 
measures that impede electronic commerce; where legitimate 
policy objectives require domestic regulations that affect 
electronic commerce, to obtain commitments that any such 
regulations are the least restrictive on trade, 
nondiscriminatory, and transparent, and promote an open market 
environment; and to extend the moratorium of the WTO on duties 
on electronic transmissions.
    Agriculture: to ensure that the U.S. trade negotiators duly 
recognize the importance of agricultural issues; to obtain 
competitive market opportunities for U.S. exports in foreign 
markets substantially equivalent to the competitive 
opportunities afforded foreign exports in U.S. markets and to 
achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade; to reduce or 
eliminate trade distorting subsidies; to impose disciplines on 
the operations of state-trading enterprises or similar 
administrative mechanisms; to eliminate unjustified 
restrictions on products derived from biotechnology; to 
eliminate sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions that 
contravene the Uruguay Round Agreement as they are not based on 
scientific principles and to improve import relief mechanisms 
to accommodate the unique aspects of perishable and cyclical 
agriculture.
    Labor and the environment: to ensure that a party does not 
fail to effectively enforce its environmental or labor laws, 
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, 
in a manner affecting trade between the United States and that 
party; to recognize that a party to a trade agreement is 
effectively enforcing its laws if a course of inaction or 
inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of discretion or 
results from a bona fide decision regarding allocation of 
resources; to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners 
to promote respect for core labor standards and to protect the 
environment through the promotion of sustainable development; 
to reduce or eliminate government practices or policies that 
unduly threaten sustainable development; to seek market access 
for U.S. environmental technologies, goods, and services; and 
to ensure that labor, environmental, health, or safety policies 
and practices of parties to trade agreements do not arbitrarily 
or unjustifiably discriminate against U.S. exports or serve as 
disguised barriers to trade.
    Dispute settlement and enforcement: to seek provisions in 
trade agreements providing for resolution of disputes between 
governments in an effective, timely, transparent, equitable, 
and reasoned manner requiring determinations based on facts and 
the principles of the agreement, with the goal of increasing 
compliance; seek to strengthen the capacity of the WTO Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism to review compliance; seek provisions 
encouraging the early identification and settlement of disputes 
through consultations; seek provisions encouraging trade-
expanding compensation; seek provisions to impose a penalty 
that encourages compliance, is appropriate to the parties, 
nature, subject matter, and scope of the violation, and has the 
aim of not adversely affecting parties or interests not party 
to the dispute while maintaining the effectiveness of the 
enforcement mechanism; and seek provisions that treat U.S. 
principal negotiating objectives equally with respect to 
ability to resort to dispute settlement and availability of 
equivalent procedures and remedies.
    Extended WTO negotiations: concerning extended WTO 
negotiations on financial services, civil aircraft, and rules 
of origin.

Reason for change

    The Committee believes that the overall negotiating 
objectives balance the need to open markets and strengthen the 
international trading system with ensuring that trade and 
environment policies are mutually supportive and promoting 
respect for core labor rights, all with the goal of fostering 
economic growth and full employment in the global economic 
system.
    In the list of primary negotiating objectives in H.R. 3005, 
as amended, the Committee intends to update and broaden 
objectives from the 1988 Act.
    Trade barriers and distortions: The language in the first 
negotiating objective covers any tariff or non-tariff barrier 
as well as any policy or practice that is directly related to 
trade, regardless of whether the barrier is imposed at the 
foreign border or at some other point. Moreover, H.R. 3005, as 
amended, addresses policies and practices, not merely a law 
``on its face.'' This includes a policy or practice that has 
the de facto effect of impeding U.S. imports or exports, not 
whether the law is only a de jure barrier. In addition, the 
concept ``policy or practice'' covers barriers imposed under, 
for example, a regulatory, administrative, adjudicatory, and 
investigatory exercise of any level of foreign government 
authority, and is not limited to statutory barriers. Finally, 
it is the Committee's intention that the phrase ``to obtain 
fairer and more open conditions of trade by reducing or 
eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers'' applies to barriers 
imposed by foreign governments at the border as well as 
internal barriers, if any.
    In section 2(b)(1)(B), the Committee intends that the 
Administration continue to seek, on a priority basis, the 
elimination of duties on a reciprocal basis for products 
covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 
as described in page 45 of the Statement of Administrative 
Action accompanying that Act. Although the President was 
successful in obtaining the reciprocal elimination of duties 
for a number of products contained in that list as part of the 
Information Technology Agreement negotiated under the auspices 
of the WTO, there are a number of products on the list for 
which zero-for-zero agreements have not been reached. It is the 
Committee's intention that the Administration pay particular 
attention to the elimination of tariffs on these products, 
which could result in substantial benefits to U.S. industry and 
its workers. For many of these products, U.S. producers remain 
at a significant competitive disadvantage while foreign 
suppliers are able to expand capacity behind high tariff walls.
    In other sectors, tariff inequities are aggravated by 
tariff escalation, which occurs when a country establishes low 
or zero tariffs for raw materials but maintains relatively high 
tariffs for processed products. The Committee intends that the 
Administration continue to pursue ending such practices for the 
sectors covered by the proclamation authority provided in 
section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
    The Committee wishes to emphasize that the overall 
negotiating objectives to obtain more open, equitable, and 
reciprocal market access and to reduce distortions thatdecrease 
market opportunities for United States exports and otherwise distort 
trade are increasingly important for the domestic textile and apparel 
industry as these sensitive products are removed from quota limitations 
and integrated into normal WTO rules.
    The WTO agreement addresses many problems facing the United 
States textile and apparel industry. Article 5 of the WTO 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) recognizes that 
circumvention of quotas frustrate the implementation of the 
Agreement, and calls on all WTO Members to cooperate fully in 
addressing problems arising from transshipment, false 
declaration of country of origin, rerouting, use of fraudulent 
visas, and other means. Article 7 of the ATC requires WTO 
members to take all necessary action to abide by GATT rules and 
disciplines to achieve certain objectives, including improved 
access to their markets, for example by reducing and binding 
tariffs, reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers, and 
facilitating customs, administrative, and licensing 
formalities. Any WTO member that considers that another member 
has not taken such action may bring a complaint before there 
the relevant WTO body, as provided in Article 7, or before the 
Textile Monitoring Body.
    The Committee expresses strong concern that commitments by 
the Administration in the Statement of Administrative Action 
accompanying the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act to pursue 
enforcement of the ATC with respect to high tariff and non-
tariff barriers to United States exports of textile and apparel 
products have not been fulfilled in any way. Major textile and 
clothing exporting countries fail to adhere to the provisions 
of existing agreements discussed above. Average tariff rates on 
textiles and apparel in major exporting countries such as 
India, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Brazil continue to be 
significantly higher than United States tariffs on these 
products. USTR has not actively pursued negotiations to 
implement the market access commitments made in the Uruguay 
Round Agreement.
     Therefore, the negotiating objectives of opening markets 
and reducing distortions in the bill with respect to textiles 
and apparel, is to obtain competitive opportunities for United 
States exports of these products in foreign markets 
substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities 
afforded foreign exports of textiles and apparel in the United 
States by: (1) reducing tariffs on textiles and apparel in 
major textile and apparel exporting countries to the same as or 
lower than those in the United States and; (2) reducing or 
eliminating subsidies that decrease market opportunities for 
U.S. exports of textiles and apparel or unfairly distort trade; 
and (3) ensuring that countries that are members of the WTO 
implement immediately all their obligations to provide 
effective market access for U.S. exports of textiles and 
apparel.
    Finally, in developing negotiating objective for future 
bilateral trade agreements and for the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, the Committee urges the Administration to take into 
account the impact that: (1) all trade agreements covering 
textiles and apparel to which the U.S. is a party, including 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, have had on the U.S. 
industry; and (2) preferential tariff programs such as the 
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act and the Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act have had on the industry.
    Services: The Committee notes that U.S. services exports 
are approaching $300 billion annually. Many markets for U.S. 
services are vast and essentially untapped. As income in 
foreign countries grows, their imports of U.S. services tend to 
rise disproportionately. Thus, negotiations that reduce 
barriers to all modes of supply of services could lead to a 
major expansion of U.S. services exports, resulting in a 
significant improvement in the U.S. balance of payments 
account.
    Not only do certain sectors, such as telecommunications, 
express delivery, financial, energy and information services, 
play a key role in a country's infrastructure, but U.S. 
manufacturers also benefit from efficient services used to 
support production, such as product design and engineering, 
marketing and distribution, outsourcing, and globalized 
logistics strategies. Accordingly, the Committee wishes to 
improve access for all aspects of U.S. services providers.
    In bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, the 
Committee believes it is important to: (1) achieve maximum 
liberalization of trade in all modes of supply, including cross 
border supply of services and movement of natural persons, 
across the widest possible range of services; (2) provide 
rights of establishment with majority ownership and national 
treatment for companies operating in foreign markets; (3) allow 
investors to establish in whatever corporate form is most 
appropriate to their business objectives; (4) grandfather 
existing liberalization commitments; (5) create a free and open 
commercial environment for the development of electronic 
commerce; (6) ensure that market access commitments apply no 
matter what technology is used to deliver the service; (7) 
promote domestic regulatory reform, with the objective of 
committing governments to avoid discrimination against foreign 
service suppliers in their current and future regulations; (8) 
promote transparency of regulatory processes, including rule-
making, granting of licenses, setting of standards, and 
judicial and arbitral proceedings; (9) challenge both the 
desirability and the feasibility of a services safeguard 
regime, especially in light of the impact of such a provision 
on the climate for foreign direct investment; and (10) 
explicitly acknowledge the importance of maintaining free flows 
of financial and other information that is necessary for the 
operation of global business.
    The Committee believes that the liberalization of services 
in the FTAA must exceed what has already been achieved in the 
WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The premise 
of such an agreement should be, in fact, free trade in goods 
and services throughout the region with minimal exceptions or 
limitations. The Committee views the FTAA as an excellent 
opportunity to create one general framework for trade in 
services among the 34 participating economies.
    With regard to bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), such 
as those currently in progress with Chile and Singapore, the 
Committee believes that the United States should be as bold as 
possible in pursuing complete liberalization across a wide 
range of sectors. The ``Top Down'' approach (i.e., negotiating 
modality) is the best way to achieve this liberalization for 
most sectors, and it should be refined as necessary to meet the 
needs of specific sectors. In other words, the Committee 
believes that U.S. negotiators should push countries to 
schedule complete liberalization with a list of exceptions 
where necessary. This contrasts with the complex and cumbersome 
``positive list'' approach that is the basis of the GATS 
structure.
    In the WTO, the services negotiations, along with 
agriculture, are unfolding pursuant to the built-in agenda 
established by the Uruguay Round. Unfortunately, the GATS lacks 
substantive commitments in many areas, and the Committee 
believes a new round must be effective in increasing 
substantive liberalization commitments across the wide range of 
services where the United States is competitive. In addition to 
the ``request and offer'' approach pursued in the Uruguay 
Round, which can be cumbersome and slow for services, the 
Committee is supportive of the use of other more efficient 
negotiating techniques and strategies. The Committee urges 
negotiators to explore the development of negotiating 
techniques such as model schedules, horizontal approaches, and 
clusters.
    Foreign investment: Companies investing abroad do so to get 
closer to their markets, acquire new technologies, form 
strategic alliances, and enhance competitiveness by integrating 
production and distribution. Foreign investment is increasingly 
crucial to the ability of U.S. companies to export, and to the 
international competitiveness of U.S. companies. The Committee 
believes that because trade and investment flows are 
interdependent, rules protecting United States investment 
abroad must be rigorous and enforceable.
    The United States has long been the champion of 
international investment rules because U.S. investors have more 
capital at risk than investors from any other country, and thus 
have the most to gain from effective mechanisms for enforcing 
investor protections. While foreign investors are afforded 
strong protections through the U.S. Constitution, U.S. laws, 
and the U.S. court system--with or without an investment 
agreement--U.S. investors abroad are often consigned to foreign 
laws that may not reflect U.S. or international legal standards 
and local courts that may be corrupt or do not provide 
impartial adjudication.
    Therefore, the Committee intends U.S. negotiators to 
continue to fight for the recognition of the international rule 
of law and respect for international dispute resolution bodies. 
Future trade agreements should guarantee the free movement of 
capital, prohibit performance requirements such as local 
content and export performance requirements, and include, in 
bilateral and regional agreements, a mechanism to allow 
investors to arbitrate investment disputes with host 
governments and obtain relief for damages resulting from 
violations of the agreement.
    The Committee recognizes that the investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanism is a valuable component of investment 
agreements in order to allow U.S. investors access to the rule 
of law and procedures that would be available in the United 
States but also acknowledges that important improvements should 
be added to these traditional procedures. Accordingly, the 
Committee includes measures that ensure that a number of 
safeguards be included in an investor-state dispute settlement 
regime. Specifically, the Committee intends U.S. negotiators to 
seek to: (1) develop new mechanisms to eliminate frivolous 
claims; (2) ensure the efficient selection of arbitrators and 
the expeditious disposition of claims and procedures; and (3) 
increase transparency in investment disputes by, for example, 
ensuring that briefs and arbitration proceedings are open to 
public view. An amicus procedure might also be developed 
whereby interested members of the public could express their 
views on issues before the tribunals.
    Intellectual property: Piracy and counterfeiting rates in 
much of the world remain alarmingly high. The advent of the 
Internet, along with the rapid globalization of the world 
economy, mean that piracy, counterfeiting and other economic 
crimes are, to an increasing extent, global problems. U.S. 
industries based on copyright, patent, trademark and other 
forms of intellectual property rights are among the fastest 
growing and most productive of all sectors of the U.S. economy. 
To enable these export-oriented industries to prosper, it is 
essential that the United States work together with governments 
throughout the world to prevent, punish, and ultimately deter 
these violations.
    It is critical that the previously agreed-to obligations 
regarding protection and enforcement embodied in the WTO Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement are 
effectively, fully, and immediately implemented. The 
enforcement obligations of the TRIPS Agreement are particularly 
important. Although, substantive levels of intellectual 
property protection have increased significantly around the 
world in recent years (due in great part both to U.S. trade law 
initiatives and enhanced WTO disciplines), many countries 
continue to inadequately enforce intellectual property rights. 
Without effective enforcement, the full benefits of the TRIPS 
Agreement cannot be realized.
    Achieving full implementation of TRIPS should be a top 
multilateral priority of U.S. Executive Branch agencies charged 
with trade policy responsibilities. For this reason, among 
others, this Committee does not believe that it is necessary or 
advisable at this time to undertake to amend or improve the 
TRIPS agreement in any new WTO negotiating round. TRIPS 
implementation will require the full attention and strenuous 
efforts of U.S. trade policy officials and their counterparts; 
any negotiation of new intellectual property standards in the 
WTO would threaten this goal.
    Another important objective is to ensure that standards of 
protection and enforcement keep pace with rapid technological 
developments. For example, the Executive Branch should 
encourage countries to ratify and implement the World 
Intellectual Property Organization's (WIPO) Copyright Treaty 
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, which reflect 
enhanced global minimum standards of protection and enforcement 
for the networked digital environment.
    Section 2(b)(4) reflects the view of this Committee that 
strong intellectual property rights protection should be 
accompanied by provisions on liability that are consistent with 
U.S. law, including the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and 
that provide limitations on the scope of remedies available 
against service providers for copyright infringements they do 
not control, initiate or direct, and that take place through 
systems or networks, controlled or operated by them or on their 
behalf. Such limitations also must create legal incentives for 
service providers to cooperate with copyright owners in 
deterring the unauthorized storage, and transmission of 
copyrighted materials.
    Finally, U.S. intellectual property industries based on 
intellectual property continue to suffer from unnecessary and 
discriminatory market access barriers around the globe. U.S. 
negotiators must remain vigilant and excise these barriers 
since they stunt the growth of otherwise highly productive 
industries.
    Transparency: The Committee observes that while the WTO and 
other international trade fora have improved the level of 
transparency in trade negotiations, there remains some lack of 
information to the public concerning their operations and the 
decisions that they make. The Committee believes that enhancing 
the level of transparency at multilateral, plurilateral, and 
bilateral institutions would have twofold benefits. First, it 
would help U.S. citizens and the citizens of other countries to 
have more confidence in the operation of international trade 
institutions and the fairness of dispute settlementdecisions. 
Second, increased transparency and the flow of information from 
international trade institutions would help U.S. exporters to be better 
informed as to U.S. rights under international trade rules and would 
improve compliance with trade agreements.
    Concerning access to appropriate meetings and 
documentation, the Committee believes that the public has an 
important stake in trade decisions, including those involving 
dispute settlement and investment. Since openness will help to 
ensure fairness, it is crucial to allow the public to observe 
meetings and obtain documents, whenever possible. Further, the 
Committee believes that it is important that the documents are 
available as soon as practicable, so that the public has access 
to current information. As an additional means of increasing 
public access to dispute settlement proceedings, U.S. 
negotiators should, among other things, pursue building 
consensus for establishing rules allowing for submission of 
amicus curiae briefs to panels and the Appellate Body of the 
WTO.
    Finally, the Committee has a special concern that 
interested persons have timely access to notifications and 
related documents submitted by WTO members. The Committee 
believes that it is insufficient for persons to have access to 
notifications alone; they must also have access to the 
supporting documentation, wherever possible, in order to 
evaluate the assertions and policy decisions contained in the 
notifications. One example of particular concern to the 
Committee is the series of notifications made by the EU to the 
WTO in the area of agriculture subsidies. The Committee wants 
to assure that U.S. entities, which must compete with EU-
subsidized agriculture, have access to information so they can 
determine whether U.S. rights under the agreement are being 
violated.
    Anti-corruption: The Committee believes that reduction of 
corruption in international trade is fundamental to the 
expansion of free and fair trade around the world. Trade is a 
vital force for economic development, democratization, social 
freedom, and political stability in countries struggling to 
achieve these objectives. Corruption involving the use of money 
and other things of value to influence acts, decisions, or 
omissions of foreign government officials or to secure any 
improper advantage in a manner affecting trade undermines the 
objectives of trade promotion authority legislation.
     The Committee intends that obtaining high anti-corruption 
standards should be a principal negotiating objective for the 
Trade Representative in future TPA trade negotiations. It is 
the Committee's view that high standards are those that are 
equivalent to those established under section 30A of the 
Securities and Exchanges Act of 1934 and sections 104 and 104A 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. Only standards 
equivalent to these will ensure that United States persons, who 
are bound by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, are not placed 
at a competitive disadvantage in international trade.
    WTO agreements: The Committee puts a high priority on the 
effective implementation of agreements concluded under WTO 
auspices--including agreements achieved in the Uruguay Round 
and subsequently in areas such as Basic Telecommunications, 
Financial Services, and Information Technology.
     The ITA, which eliminates tariffs on a wide range of 
products essential to the new economy, was concluded at the 
WTO's first Ministerial Conference at Singapore in December 
1996. As of this writing, the ITA has 55 participants 
representing over 95 percent of trade in the $600 billion-plus 
global market for information technology products. Through its 
work identifying standards, non-tariff measures, and 
possibilities for expansion of product coverage, the WTO 
Committee of ITA participants has demonstrated how the WTO can 
provide dynamic mechanisms for trade liberalization that are 
responsive to the ever-changing nature of sectors such as the 
information technology sector. Unfortunately, several countries 
in Latin America have shown reluctance in the past to joining 
the ITA. It is the Committee's expectation that the FTAA 
negotiations offer a strong opportunity to expand both the 
country participation and the product coverage of this 
important agreement.
    There has been an ongoing debate about the issue of 
implementation among WTO members, some aspects of which 
threaten the integrity of the WTO system and existing 
agreements. For example, with the completion of the transition 
periods provided to developing country members to phase in 
adherence to WTO rules in the areas of trade-related 
intellectual property rights, trade-related investment 
measures, and customs valuation, some of these countries have 
now started to call into question the ``reasonableness'' of 
obligations imposed by the Agreements and have sought to 
``rebalance'' those obligations. It should go without saying 
that the Committee views these requests to renege on past WTO 
commitments as lacking in respect for international obligations 
and the good faith necessary to support an effective trading 
system.
    With respect to the Agreement on Government Procurement, 
the Committee intends for the United States to seek to expand 
the membership of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement; 
seek conclusion of a WTO Agreement on Transparency in 
Government Procurement; and promote global use of electronic 
publication of procurement information, including notices of 
procurement opportunities. In addition, the Committee intends 
for the United States to seek commitments ensuring access to 
foreign government procurement markets through regional and 
bilateral free trade agreements, including the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA).
    Bilateral and regional trade agreements often rely on 
preferential rules of origin to determine whether a good can 
qualify for duty-free treatment. In the area of information 
technology (IT) products, the Committee intends that the 
Administration take full account of the global nature of the IT 
industry in the development and application of preferential 
origin rules. The Committee intends that the Administration 
eliminate the need to apply preferential origin rules to IT 
products to the maximum extent possible. This can be 
accomplished by including adherence to the Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA) as a baseline for commitments in 
bilateral or regional trade agreements. The Committee also 
believes the Administration should make preferential origin 
rules administrable and trade facilitative in any case. Such 
rules should foster administrative ease and market access to 
the maximum extent possible. To this end, the Administration 
should seek rules that: avoid value-content thresholds, avoid 
process-based rules and confer origin based on classification 
changes. The Committee also believes the Administration should 
seek to harmonize preferential origin rules across trade 
arrangements. To the extent preferential rules are 
administrable and trade facilitative, they should be applied 
uniformly across the FTAA and all other preferential trade 
agreements. Rules that vary by trade arrangement create 
operational disruption, administrative burdens, and trade 
impediments.
    Regulatory practices: ``Regulatory reform'' has been given 
great attention by a number of U.S. industry groups in 
approaching new trade negotiations. There is an increasing 
recognition across the spectrum of U.S. industry that legally 
binding commitments to remove or lower trade barriers can be 
nullified by decisions, either of national and regional 
governments or industry standard setting and accrediting 
bodies, that are taken as part of regulatory processes. It has 
also become clear to the Committee that regulatory reform 
encompasses two important prongs: transparency and the need to 
ensure that regulations are fair and that they are applied 
without regard to the nationality of the industry or company 
affected by them.
     While in the United States government processes that take 
place in the ``sunshine'' are taken for granted, this is not 
the case in many other countries. Thus the Committee strongly 
urges USTR to pursue strenuously the negotiation of 
crosscutting transparency disciplines, particularly in the 
areas of services, e-commerce, and government procurement
     The realization of the negotiating objectives relating to 
regulations may require the negotiation of special rules that 
meet the needs of specific sectors for transparency and fair 
regulatory systems. In addition, consultative mechanisms are 
needed to promote increased transparency in the development of 
guidelines, rules, regulations, and laws for government 
procurement and other regulatory regimes. The Committee's 
strong view isthat transparent and fair regulatory systems are 
essential to the continued economic development of U.S. trading 
partners around the world.
    Electronic commerce: Disciplines important to e-commerce 
are more cross-cutting in nature than other sectors, and thus 
other negotiating objectives described elsewhere in this 
section are relevant to e-commerce, such as services, 
investment, intellectual property, transparency, and regulatory 
practices. A critical negotiating objective of the United 
States must be to ensure that current WTO obligations, rules, 
disciplines, and commitments--namely the GATT, GATS and TRIPs 
agreements--apply to this new mode of business, which the 
Committee views as critical to U.S. international 
competitiveness.
    The Committee intends that United States negotiators work 
to: (1) ensure electronically delivered goods and services 
receive no less favorable treatment under trade rules and 
commitments than similar products or services delivered by 
another means; (2) ensure that the classification of such goods 
and services represents the most liberal treatment possible; 
(3) ensure that governments refrain from implementing measures 
that impede electronic commerce; (4) obtain commitments from 
U.S. trading partners that where legitimate policy objectives 
require domestic regulations that affect electronic commerce, 
that their regulations will be least trade-restrictive, 
nondiscriminatory, transparent as possible; (5) achieve the 
extension of the moratorium on duties on electronic 
transmissions; (6) remove tariff and non-tariff barriers that 
impede trade in the hardware and the software used to deploy, 
market and access the e-commerce infrastructure, as well as the 
goods and services that are traded electronically thereon; (7) 
achieve full market access and national treatment commitments 
for services that provide the infrastructure for the internet 
and electronic commerce (e.g., telecommunication, computer, 
advertising, financial, distribution, and express delivery 
services) as well as services delivered electronically; (8) 
expand and deepen basic and value-added telecommunications 
commitments, including the Reference Paper commitments for 
basic telecommunications services; and (9) deter attempts to 
apply basic telecommunications regulations to competitive 
value-added, Internet Service Providers (ISP), and other 
Internet-related services.
    The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement represents an 
important step forward in achieving the objectives on e-
commerce described in the bill and in this report. Currently, 
WTO members only have a political commitment in the form of the 
moratorium of duties on e-commerce. In the FTA, however, Jordan 
legally bound itself to seek to impose no customs duties on 
electronic transmissions and also agreed to seek to not impose 
unnecessary regulation on electronic commerce and not to put in 
place unnecessary barriers to market access for digitized 
products (such as software, video, and music). Jordan also 
committed to seek to refrain from impeding the ability of U.S. 
providers to deliver services through electronic means.
    Jordan made market access and national treatment 
commitments in all sectors critical to completing an electronic 
transaction including telecommunications, computer-related 
services, financial services, distribution services, and 
express delivery services. Finally, the Jordan FTA includes 
commitments for the protection of intellectual property, going 
beyond TRIPs, that address the significant problem of piracy 
faced by all content providers. Jordan's ``TRIPs plus'' 
commitments include: adherence to the provisions of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Digital Treaties 
which include important protections for copyrighted works in a 
digital network environment, including the exclusive right of 
creators to make their creative works available online, using 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as a model; 
critical parallel import protection; and strong guarantees on 
enforcement. Consistent with this Act's major negotiating 
objective on e-commerce, the Jordan agreement will help ensure 
that, where legitimate policy objectives require domestic 
regulation that affects commerce, such regulations will be the 
least restrictive on trade, non-discriminatory, and 
transparent, while promoting an open market environment. Thus, 
the Committee's view is that the Jordan FTA is illustrative of 
state of the art accomplishments that can be achieved as the 
United States moves forward with bilateral trade agreements 
with Chile, Singapore, and with regional agreements such as the 
FTAA. This in turn will lay the groundwork for future efforts 
in developing effective WTO disciplines multilaterally in all 
these important areas.
    Agriculture: With respect to the negotiating objective 
relating to reciprocal trade in agriculture, the Committee 
intends that the United States obtain a level playing field 
throughout the world for agriculture products, both for U.S. 
exporters seeking market access abroad as well as for U.S. 
products that are import-sensitive. The Committee acknowledges 
that trade in agriculture is a critical issue in all trade 
negotiations: bilateral, regional, or multilateral. Thus, the 
Committee has set forth specific objectives, recognizing the 
need to open markets for U.S. agricultural exports while taking 
into account the situation of the import-sensitive portion of 
the U.S. agriculture sector.
    The Committee believes that U.S. negotiators should seek to 
accomplish the objectives set forth in section 2(b)(6), 
including reducing or eliminating foreign tariffs and subsidies 
and, in addition, eliminating practices that decrease U.S. 
market access or distort U.S. or foreign markets, including the 
monopoly status of state trading enterprises; unjustified trade 
restrictions or commercial requirements affecting new 
technologies, including biotechnology; unjustified sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures not based on scientific principles in 
contravention of WTO standards; other unjustified barriers to 
trade; and trade-restrictive rules in the administration of 
tariff rate quotas. The Committee also believes that U.S. trade 
negotiators should work to preserve the right of the United 
States to use agricultural export credit and market development 
programs, as well as bona fide food aid.
    Regarding the U.S. agriculture negotiating proposal 
submitted to the WTO in June 2000, the Committee recognizes 
that one of the U.S. objectives is to reduce substantially 
trade-distorting domestic support in a manner that corrects the 
disproportionate levels of support members use, while 
simplifying the way in which domestic support is disciplined.
    The Committee is concerned about the disparities in the 
relative levels of agricultural production support between the 
United States and other developed countries. The Committee 
notes with interest with that while the maximum U.S. Aggregate 
Measure of Support (AMS) (as reported in the Uruguay Round 
Trade Agreement) is approximately $19.1 billion annually, the 
European Union's AMS is approximately $59.8 billion. Likewise, 
the Committee notes with great concern the disparities that 
exist with regard to export subsidies. For example, the EU 
provides approximately $5 billion annually in export subsidies 
compared to approximately $100 million provided by the United 
States.
    The Committee believes that to correct these disparities, 
any reductions made to the U.S. Aggregate Measure of Support 
must be based upon the U.S. bound commitment ($19.1 billion 
annually, as reported in the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement), 
and not on any lower applied level. Further, subsidy cuts need 
to be reviewed in absolute dollar terms, and not only in 
percentage terms.
    The Committee also believes that establishing a common base 
year for the Aggregate Measure of Support will increase 
certainty and transparency in agricultural subsidy 
negotiations. Under the common base year concept, all countries 
would have to agree to make subsidy commitments based upon data 
from a common set of base years. Therefore, having a common 
base year will help ensure that the United States is not put at 
a disadvantage in these negotiations, since countries would be 
prevented from choosing a base year in which they had unusually 
high agricultural subsidies.
    The Committee recognizes that in order for the U.S. 
agricultural sector to compete on a level global playing field, 
the U.S. Trade Representative must seek disciplines on domestic 
support polices. These disciplines will help ensure that U.S. 
producers face an international trade environment that is based 
upon world market prices.
    Regarding U.S. import-sensitive products, the Committee 
believes that USTR should seek reasonable adjustment periods 
for these products. The Committee alsobelieves that USTR should 
seek improved import relief mechanisms that recognize the unique 
characteristics of perishable and cyclical agriculture. Further, the 
Committee believes that it is important that USTR formulate a specific 
proposal on the treatment of seasonal and perishable agricultural 
products to be employed in the future negotiations in order to develop 
an international consensus on the treatment of such products in 
investigations relating to dumping, safeguards, and other relevant 
trade remedies. Since the Committee also believes that the timing of 
this proposal is of the highest importance, the Committee expects USTR 
to prepare this proposal as soon as possible, especially as the United 
States has commenced negotiations on agriculture in the WTO, as well as 
negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and several 
bilateral free trade agreements.
    The Committee also believes that, during trade 
negotiations, USTR should take into account whether a trading 
partner has failed to adhere to existing agreements, and 
whether trade in a specific product is subject to market 
distortions resulting from the failure of a major producing 
country to comply with its trade agreements with the United 
States.
    The Committee intends that the Administration seek an end 
to unjustified restrictions that affect new technologies, such 
as labeling when used as an unjustified restriction.
    Labor and environment: The Committee believes that trade 
promotion authority may be used with respect to ensuring that a 
foreign government does not fail to effectively enforce its own 
environmental or labor laws, if: (1) the failure reflects a 
sustained or recurring course of action or inaction; and (2) is 
undertaken in a manner affecting trade between the United 
States and that country. The language provides an exception if 
the behavior reflects a reasonable exercise of discretion or 
results from a bona fide decision regarding allocation of 
resources. The Committee used the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement as a model for this language, which permits parties 
to the agreement to retain the right to set their own labor and 
environmental standards.
    In determining whether foreign government policies and 
practices are covered by this negotiating objective, the 
Committee intends that the USTR consult closely with the 
Congress, the private sector, and other interested groups.
    The Committee also believes that the United States should 
seek to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to 
promote respect for core labor standards, as defined in the 
legislation. With respect to the environment, the Committee 
believes that the United States should also seek (1) to 
strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to protect the 
environment through the promotion of sustainable development; 
(2) to promote government practices or policies in the area of 
trade that improve sustainable development and to reduce or 
eliminate practices or policies related to trade that unduly 
threaten sustainable development; and (3) to seek market access 
for U.S. environmental technologies, goods, and services.
    Finally, the Committee recognizes that in certain 
circumstances, aspects of practices and policies involving 
labor, the environment, and other matters may decrease market 
opportunities for U.S. exports or otherwise distort U.S. trade. 
Those aspects of these policies and practices may accordingly 
be included in trade agreements whose implementation qualifies 
for TPA.
    Specifically, the Committee intends that this negotiating 
objective cover the use of labor and environmental laws by 
another country to restrict U.S. access to its market; if 
another country sought to use labor or environmental 
restrictions to limit trade improperly, the United States 
should be able to respond in trade terms.
    Dispute settlement and enforcement: The Committee intends 
that USTR seek provisions in trade agreements providing for 
resolution of disputes between governments in an effective, 
timely, transparent, equitable, and reasoned manner requiring 
determinations based on facts and the principles of the 
agreement, with the goal of increasing compliance. The 
Committee's primary goal with respect to this negotiating 
objective is to promote compliance with trade agreements.
    The Committee also believes that consultations are an 
important means of settling disputes early and effectively, 
without resort to remedies or penalties, and urges USTR to seek 
to establish meaningful consultation mechanisms in trade 
agreements.
    The Committee also supports the use of compensation to 
resolve disputes, whereby a party found to be violating a trade 
agreement lowers tariffs or otherwise increases access to its 
own market to rebalance the loss of concessions brought upon by 
that party's failure to adhere to its obligations. If the 
parties resort to other remedies or penalties, the Committee 
urges USTR to ensure that dispute settlement provisions in 
trade agreements encourage compliance and are appropriate to 
the parties, nature, subject matter, and scope of the 
violation.
    In addition, the Committee strongly believes that the 
remedies and penalties made available to parties under dispute 
settlement should have the aim of not adversely affecting 
parties or interests not party to the dispute while maintaining 
the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism. Too often, 
dispute settlement has the effect of creatingcollateral damage 
by harming parties who had not been involved in the original dispute. 
At the same time, however, the Committee believes that whatever 
mechanism selected should be effective and encourage compliance with 
trade obligations.
    The Committee also intends that trade agreements treat U.S. 
all principal negotiating objectives equally with respect to 
ability to resort to dispute settlement and availability of 
equivalent procedures and remedies. The Committee believes that 
the concept of ``equivalent'' remedy will allow negotiators 
flexibility in determining the appropriate remedies, with the 
fundamental purpose of finding remedies that are effective in 
promoting compliance with the objective at issue even if they 
may not be identical.
    Finally, the Committee notes that the term ``international 
trade'' includes both imports and exports, as well as trade in 
services, trade-related investment, and trade-related 
intellectual property.

            3. SECTION 2(c): PROMOTION OF CERTAIN PRIORITIES

Present/expired law

    No provision.

Explanation of provision

    Section 2(c) sets forth certain priorities for the 
President to address. These provisions include seeking greater 
cooperation between WTO and the ILO; seeking to establish 
consultative mechanisms among parties to trade agreements to 
strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote 
respect for core labor standards; seeking to seek to establish 
consultative mechanisms among parties to trade agreements to 
strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to develop and 
implement standards for environment and human health based on 
sound science; conducting environmental reviews of future trade 
and investment agreements, consistent with Executive Order 
13141 and its relevant guidelines; reviewing the impact of 
future trade agreements on U.S. employment, modeled after 
Executive Order 13141; taking into account, in negotiating 
trade agreements, protection of legitimate health or safety, 
essential security, and consumer interests; requiring the 
Secretary of Labor to consult with foreign parties to trade 
negotiations as to their labor laws and providing technical 
assistance where needed; reporting to Congress on the extent to 
which parties to an agreement have in effect laws governing 
exploitative child labor; preserving the ability of the United 
States ability to enforce rigorously its trade laws, including 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws, and avoid agreements 
which lessen their effectiveness; continuing to promote 
consideration of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) 
and consult with parties to such agreements regarding the 
consistency of any MEA that includes trade measures with 
existing environmental exceptions under Article XX of the GATT.
    In addition, USTR, twelve months after the imposition of a 
penalty or remedy by the United States permitted by an 
agreement to which this Act applies, is to report to the 
Committee on the effectiveness of remedies applied under U.S. 
law to enforce U.S. rights under trade agreements. USTR shall 
address whether the remedy was effective in changing the 
behavior of the targeted party and whether the remedy had any 
adverse impact on parties or interests not party to the 
dispute.

Reason for change

     The Committee believes that there are certain priorities 
that USTR should pursue parallel to trade negotiations in order 
to promote respect for core labor standards and to develop and 
implement standards for environment and human health based on 
sound science. Capacity building within the developing world, 
the establishment of consultative mechanisms, and greater 
cooperation between the WTO and the ILO are important means for 
accomplishing these goals. USTR is to consult regularly with 
Members and the COG regarding its efforts regarding capacity-
building within the developing world and report to the 
Committee on these efforts.
     The Committee also believes that the United States, 
through thorough internal reviews, should continue the existing 
practice of assessing the impact of trade agreements and 
investment components of trade agreements on the environment, 
as it has been doing under Executive Order 13141, and on U.S. 
employment and labor markets. The intent is not to codify the 
Executive Order or guidelines, or to create a mechanism for 
judicial review of these assessments, but to continue the 
process that USTR began under the Clinton Administration on the 
environment and expand it to employment. The Committee believes 
strongly that such reviews will show the positive impacts of 
trade on the environment and on employment.
     In addition, the Committee believes that parallel to the 
trade negotiating process, the Department of Labor should learn 
more about the labor laws of a potential trading partner and 
provide technical assistance, if needed. With respect to 
exploitative child labor, the Committee believes that Congress 
should be aware of the laws of parties to trade agreements with 
the United States.
     The Committee also intends to enhance domestic policy 
coordination and communication, both in the United States and 
in other countries, between Multilateral Environmental 
Agreement (MEA) and trade agreement negotiators, with a view 
toward the continued compatibility of MEA and WTO rules.
     The Committee also intends that USTR take into account 
other important domestic priorities, including the protection 
of legitimate health or safety, essential security, and 
consumer interests.
     The Committee also intends that negotiators preserve, in 
all trade agreements, the ability of the United States to 
enforce rigorously its antidumping and countervailing duty 
laws, and to avoid any agreement that would lessen the 
effectiveness of the current U.S. antidumping and 
countervailing duty remedies. The Committee regards this 
directive as critically important for any new trade agreement 
to serve the overall economic interests of the United States. 
The Committee clarifies that although this provision is not 
included in sections 2 (a) or (b) of the bill (relating to 
negotiating objectives), this is not an indication that the 
resolve to maintain existing U.S. antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws is in any way diminished, and in fact 
it has been included in a section of the bill indicating 
actions the President shall take.
     Finally, the Committee is requiring USTR to provide to the 
Committee, each time it imposes trade remedies to enforce U.S. 
rights under a trade agreement, an assessment of the 
effectiveness of those remedies. The Committee wishes to learn 
whether the remedy was effective in changing the behavior of 
the targeted party and whether the remedy had any adverse 
impact on parties or interests not party to the dispute. This 
provision underscores the Committee's commitment to an 
effective dispute settlement process.

  4. Section 2 (d)-(e): Consultations, Adherence to Obligations Under 
                        Uruguay Round Agreements

Present/expired law

    No provision.

Explanation of provision

    Section 2(d) requires that USTR consult closely and on a 
timely basis with the Congressional Oversight Group appointed 
under section 7. In addition, USTR would be required to consult 
closely (including immediately before the initialing of an 
agreement) with the congressional advisers on trade policy and 
negotiations appointed under section161 of the Trade Act of 
1974, as well as the House Committee on Ways and Means, the Senate 
Committee on Finance, and the Congressional Oversight Group. With 
regard to negotiations concerning agriculture trade, USTR would also be 
required to consult with the House and Senate Committees on 
Agriculture.
    In determining whether to enter into negotiations with a 
particular country, section 2(e) would require the President to 
take into account whether that country has implemented its 
obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.

Reason for change

    The Committee intends that the Administration maintain 
close contacts with the Committee, with Congressional advisers 
on trade policy, and with the newly-formed permanent 
Congressional Oversight Group throughout the negotiation 
process, including immediately before the initialing of the 
agreement. With respect to agriculture negotiations, the 
Committee believes that the Agriculture Committee should have 
improved consultations as well. Such consultations must be both 
meaningful and timely.

                5. Section 3: Trade agreements authority

Present/expired law

    Tariff proclamation authority. Section 1102(a) of the 1988 
Act provided authority to the President to proclaim 
modifications in duties without the need for Congressional 
approval, subject to certain limitations. Specifically, for 
rates that exceed 5 percent ad valorem, the President could not 
reduce any rate of duty to a rate less than 50 percent of the 
rate of duty applying on the date of enactment. Rates at or 
below 5 percent could be reduced to zero. Any duty reduction 
that exceeded 50 percent of an existing duty higher than 5 
percent or any tariff increase had to be approved by Congress.
    Staging authority required that duty reductions on any 
article could not exceed 3 percent per year, or one-tenth of 
the total reduction, whichever is greater, except that staging 
was not required if the International Trade Commission 
determined there was no U.S. production of that article.
    Negotiation of bilateral agreements. Section 1102(c) of the 
1988 Act set forth three requirements for the negotiation of a 
bilateral agreement:
           The foreign country must request the 
        negotiation of the bilateral agreement;
           The agreement must make progress in meeting 
        applicable U.S. trade negotiating objectives; and
           The President must provide written notice of 
        the negotiations to the Committee on Ways and Means and 
        the Committee on Finance of the Senate and consult with 
        these committees.
    The negotiations could proceed unless either Committee 
disapproved the negotiations within 60 days prior to the 90 
calendar days advance notice required of entry into an 
agreement (described below).
    Negotiation of multilateral non-tariff agreements. With 
respect to multilateral agreements, section 1102(b) of the 1988 
Act provided that whenever the President determines that any 
barrier to, or other distortion of, international trade unduly 
burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the United States or 
adversely affects the U.S. economy, or the imposition of any 
such barrier or distortion is likely to result in such a 
burden, restriction, or effect, he may enter into a trade 
agreement with the foreign countries involved. The agreement 
must provide for the reduction or elimination of such barrier 
or other distortion or prohibit or limit the imposition of such 
a barrier or distortion.
    Provisions qualifying for fast track procedures. Section 
1103(b)(1)(A) of the 1988 Act provided that fast track apply to 
implementing bills submitted with respect to any trade 
agreements entered into under the statute. Section 151(b)(1) of 
the Trade Act of 1974 further defined ``implementing bill'' as 
a bill containing provisions ``necessary or appropriate'' to 
implement the trade agreement, as well as provisions approving 
the agreement and the statement of administrative action.
    Time period. The authority applied with respect to 
agreements entered into before June 1, 1991, and until June 1, 
1993 unless Congress passed an extension disapproval 
resolution. The authority was then extended to April 15, 1994, 
to cover the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Explanation of provision

    Proclamation authority. Section 3(a) would provide the 
President the authority to proclaim, without Congressional 
approval, certain duty modifications in a manner very similar 
to the expired provision. Specifically, for rates that exceed 5 
percent ad valorem, the President would not be authorized to 
reduce any rate of duty to a rate less than 50 percent of the 
rate of duty applying on the date of enactment. Rates at or 
below 5 percent ad valorem could be reduced to zero. Any duty 
reduction that exceeded 50 percent of an existing duty higher 
than 5 percent or any tariff increase would have to be approved 
by Congress. Staging authority would require that duty 
reductions on any article could not exceed 3 percent per year, 
or one-tenth of the total reduction, whichever is greater, 
except that staging would not be required if the International 
Trade Commission determined there is no U.S. production of that 
article.
    These limitations would not apply to reciprocal agreements 
to eliminate or harmonize duties negotiated under the auspices 
of the World Trade Organization, such as so-called ``zero-for-
zero'' negotiations.
    Agreements on tariff and non-tariff barriers. Section 
3(b)(1) would authorize the President to enter into a trade 
agreement with a foreign country whenever he determined that 
any duty or other import restriction or any other barrier to or 
distortion of international trade unduly burdens or restricts 
the foreign trade of the United States or adversely affects the 
U.S. economy, or the imposition of any such barrier or 
distortion is likely to result in such a burden, restriction, 
or effect. The agreement must provide for the reduction or 
elimination of such barrier or other distortion or prohibit or 
limit the imposition of such a barrier or distortion. No 
distinction would be made between bilateral and multilateral 
agreements.
    Conditions. Section 3(b)(2) would provide that the special 
implementing bills procedures may be used only if the agreement 
makes progress in meeting the applicable objectives set forth 
in section 2 (a) and (b) and the President satisfies the 
consultation requirements set forth in section 4.
    Bills qualifying for trade authorities procedures. Section 
3(b)(3)(A) would provide that bills implementing trade 
agreements may qualify for trade promotion authority TPA 
procedures only if those bills consist solely of the following 
provisions:
           Provisions approving the trade agreement and 
        statement of administrative action; and
           Provisions necessary or appropriate to 
        implement the trade agreement.
    Time period. Sections 3(a)(1)(A) and 3(b)(1)(C) would 
extend trade promotion authority to agreements entered into 
before June 1, 2005. An extension until June 1, 2007, would be 
permitted unless Congress passed a disapproval resolution, as 
described under section 3(c).

Reason for change

    H.R. 3005, as amended, extends to the President the same 
authority to proclaim tariff modifications as under the 1988 
Act. In addition, the President would be given authority to 
negotiate reciprocal duty eliminations on a sectoral basis 
within the WTO forum. The Committee believes that the 
Information Technology Agreement negotiated by the President 
under the auspices of the WTO to eliminate tariffs for 
information technology products all over the world was a 
substantial accomplishment. The Committee recognizes, however, 
that the President's ability to carry out such agreements is 
limited because section 111(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act provides the President with proclamation authority 
applicable only to a limited number of sectors, that is those 
that were negotiated multilaterally under the WTO and that were 
the subject of negotiations on reciprocal duty elimination 
(``zero-for-zero'') or harmonization during the Uruguay Round. 
Because of the success that the Information Technology 
Agreement promises for U.S. businesses and U.S. workers, the 
Committee wishes to provide authority for this and similar WTO 
sector-specific negotiations even if the sector had not been 
the subject of zero-for-zero negotiations during the Uruguay 
Round.
    Therefore, the purpose of this special tariff proclamation 
authority is to permit the U.S. Trade Representative to 
negotiate sector-specific tariff elimination or harmonization 
agreements at any time during the course of the next round of 
WTO trade negotiations scheduled for later this year. The 
emphasis should be on reaching concrete results as soon as 
possible. The Committee recognizes that other nations may be 
reluctant to make binding commitments early in the 
negotiations, on the theory that this reduces their bargaining 
leverage on other items later in the round. To prevent such 
concerns from slowing progress on near term tariff elimination 
agreements, the Committee intends that the special tariff 
proclamation authority could be used to negotiate provisional 
agreements which would allow for immediate tariff reductions, 
but make permanent duty elimination conditional on a final 
agreement in the new round. This would allow for near term 
benefits from tariff elimination, while preserving the ability 
of countries, including the United States, to condition the 
tariff cuts on a final comprehensive agreement on all subjects 
under negotiation in the new round.
    While the Committee does not intend to limit the possible 
tariff elimination agreements that could be reached under this 
authority, it does wish to identify the following areas where 
it believes that tariff elimination negotiations should be 
focused before the conclusion of the round as a whole:
           Accelerated tariff elimination in those 
        sectors where consensus can be achieved;
           Geographic expansion of the zero-for-zero 
        tariff agreements reached in the Uruguay Round and in 
        the Information Technology Agreement; and
           Geographic expansion of tariff harmonization 
        agreements reached in the Uruguay Round.
    H.R. 3005, as amended, would apply the same substantive and 
procedural requirements to all types of agreements, thus ending 
the special rules for bilateral versus multilateral agreements.
    With respect to the requirements for bills qualifying for 
trade promotion authority, it is the Committee's intent to 
extend authority to the President to negotiate agreements that 
would be subject to the special procedures similar to that 
given to past Administrations.
    The Committee believes that for historical and 
constitutional reasons, it is important to make trade promotion 
authority as tailored as possible so as not to unnecessarily 
intrude on normal legislative procedures. Trade promotion 
authority is an exception to the rule that is permitted only 
because of the recognition of the compelling need to consider 
quickly and efficiently legislation to implement trade 
agreements. The President and the Congress both have important 
powers with respect to trade and foreign affairs issues. 
Therefore, trade agreements do not readily fit the legislative 
model used to consider other types of legislation. Trade 
promotion authority has been developed to assure that trade 
relations with other countries are handled expeditiously and 
efficiently with the involvement of the executive and 
legislative branches. In so doing, the Committee has always 
recognized that this authority should apply only to meet the 
special requirements of trade agreements. To apply the 
authority more broadly would usurp a broad range of 
Congressional authority and prerogatives to make laws in these 
areas.
    Moreover, the Committee believes that every attempt should 
be made to use TPA only for those provisions in the 
implementing bill that are strictly necessary or appropriate to 
implement the agreement. The Committee takes a strict 
interpretation of this language. Specifically, the Committee 
emphasizes that trade promotion authority, particularly section 
103(b)(3)(C), should not apply to proposals to make wholesale 
changes to U.S. law merely because those laws may be addressed 
in the agreement. The Committee has been concerned that a 
number of provisions that were not related to implementing the 
trade agreement at hand have been included in past implementing 
bills.

               6. Section 4: Consultations and Assessment

Present/expired law

    Section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974 and sections 1102(d) 
and 1103 of the 1988 Act set forth the fast track requirements. 
These provisions required the President, before entering into 
any trade agreement, to consult with Congress as to the nature 
of the agreement, how and to what extent the agreement will 
achieve applicable purposes, policies, and objectives, and all 
matters relating to agreement implementation. In addition, 
before entering into an agreement, the President was required 
to give Congress at least 90 calendar days advance notice of 
his intent. The purpose of this period was to provide the 
Congressional Committees of jurisdiction an opportunity to 
review the proposed agreement before it was signed.
    Section 135(e) of the Trade Act of 1974 required that the 
Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations meet at 
the conclusion of negotiations for each trade agreement and 
provide a report as to whether and to what extent the agreement 
promotes the economic interests of the United States and 
achieves the applicable overall and principal negotiating 
objectives of section 1101 of the 1988 Act. The report was due 
not later than the date on which the President notified 
Congress of his intent to enter into an agreement. With regard 
to the Uruguay Round, the report was due 30 days after the date 
of notification.

Explanation of provision

    Section 4 of H.R. 3005, as amended, would establish a 
number of requirements that the President consult with 
Congress. Specifically, section 4(a)(1) would require the 
President to provide written notice and consult with the 
relevant committees at least 90 calendar days prior to entering 
into negotiations. Trade promotion authority would not apply to 
an implementing bill if both Houses separately agree to a 
procedural disapproval resolution within any 60-day period 
stating that the Administration has failed to notify or consult 
with Congress.
    Section 4(b) would establish a special consultation 
requirement for agriculture. Specifically, before initiating 
negotiations concerning tariff reductions in agriculture, the 
President is to assess whether U.S. tariffs on agriculture 
products that were bound under the Uruguay Round Agreements are 
lower than the tariffs bound by that country. In his 
assessment, the President would also be required to consider 
whether the tariff levels bound and applied throughout the 
world with respect to imports from the United States are higher 
than U.S. tariffs and whether the negotiation provides an 
opportunity to address any such disparity. The President would 
be required to consult with theCommittees on Ways and Means and 
Agriculture of the House and the Committees on Finance and Agriculture, 
Nutrition and Forestry of the Senate concerning the results of this 
assessment and whether it is appropriate for the United States to agree 
to further tariff reductions under such circumstances and how all 
applicable negotiating objectives would be met.
    In addition, section 4(c) would require the President, 
before entering into any trade agreement, to consult with the 
relevant Committees concerning the nature of the agreement, how 
and to what extent the agreement will achieve the applicable 
purposes, policies, and objectives set forth in H.R. 3005, as 
amended, and all matters relating to implementation under 
section 5, including the general effect of the agreement on 
U.S. laws.
    Section 4(c) would require that the report of the Advisory 
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations under section 
135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 be provided not later than 
30 days after the date on which the President notifies Congress 
of his intent to enter into the agreement under section 
5(a)(1)(A).
    Finally, section 4(e) would require the President, at least 
90 days before entering into a trade agreement, to ask the 
International Trade Commission to assess the agreement, 
including the likely impact of the agreement on the U.S. 
economy as a whole, specific industry sectors, and U.S. 
consumers. That report would be due 90 days from the date after 
the President enters into the agreement.

Reason for change

    H.R. 3005, as amended, would treat all trade agreements 
concluded under section 3(b) in the same manner for 
consultation purposes and does not differentiate between 
bilateral and multilateral agreements. Accordingly, the bill 
would extend to all such negotiations, and not just to 
bilateral negotiations as in the 1988 Act, the requirement that 
the President provide prior written notice of negotiations.
    The Committee emphasizes the importance of timely, 
complete, and rigorous consultations between the Administration 
and Congress. The improvements made with respect to 
consultations, as compared with the expired provisions, are 
designed to assure maximum Congressional participation before, 
during, and after the trade negotiating process. The Committee 
notes that in the past, consultations have been at times less 
than ideal and wishes to improve this process considerably to 
make it more meaningful. Given the significant Congressional 
role in trade policy set forth in the Constitution, it is 
imperative that Members and their staffs be given periodic and 
timely substantive briefings by U.S. negotiators and access to 
relevant documents and information sources. The Committee 
emphasizes that Congress must be fully involved in all phases 
of the negotiating process and must have the ability to fully 
express its views and exert its constitutional role. The 
Committee intends that throughout the process, the 
consultations address the nature of the agreement in question, 
how and to what extent the agreement will achieve the 
applicable purposes, policies, and objectives set forth in H.R. 
3005, as amended, and all matters relating to implementation 
under section 5, including the general effect of the agreement 
on U.S. laws.
    The provisions require broad consultations, involving 
Committees other than the Committee on Ways and Means. In 
addition, because of the special requirements of agriculture 
tariff negotiations, if there is a great tariff disparity 
between the U.S. duty rate and the rate bound or applied by 
other countries, additional consultation requirements would 
apply.
    H.R. 3005, as amended, would permit the Advisory Committee 
for Trade Policy and Negotiations to submit its report after 
the President notifies his intent to enter into an agreement, 
as opposed to requiring the report be filed on the same day as 
that notification. The Committee believes that the additional 
time would contribute to the usefulness of the report.

            7. Section 5: Implementation of Trade Agreements

Present/expired law

    Before entering into the draft agreement, the President was 
required to give Congress 90 days advance notice (120 days for 
the Uruguay Round) to provide an opportunity for revision 
before signature. After entering into the agreement, the 
President was required to submit formally the draft agreement, 
implementing legislation, and a statement of administrative 
action. Once the bill was formally introduced, there was no 
opportunity to amend any portion of the bill--whether on the 
floor or in committee. Consequently, before the formal 
introduction took place, the committees of jurisdiction would 
hold hearings, ``unofficial'' or ``informal'' mark-up sessions 
and a ``mock conference'' with the Senate committees of 
jurisdiction in order to develop a draft implementing bill 
together with the Administration and to make their concerns 
known to the Administration before it introduced the 
legislation formally.
    After formal introduction of the implementing bill, the 
House committees of jurisdiction had 45 legislative days to 
report the bill, and the House was required to vote on the bill 
within 15 legislative days after the measure was reported or 
discharged from the committees. Fifteen additional days were 
provided for Senate committee consideration (assuming the 
implementing bill was a revenue bill), and the Senate floor 
action was required within 15 additional days. Accordingly, the 
maximum period for Congressional consideration of an 
implementing bill from the date of introduction was 90 
legislative days. Amendments to the legislation were not 
permitted once the bill was introduced; the committee and floor 
actions consisted of ``up or down'' votes on the bill as 
introduced.
    Finally, section 1103(d) of the 1988 Act specified that the 
fast track rules were enacted as an exercise of the rulemaking 
power of the House and the Senate, with the recognition of the 
right of either House to change the rules at any time.

Explanation of provision

    Under section 5(a) of H.R. 3005, as amended, the President 
would be required, at least 90 days before entering into an 
agreement, to notify Congress of his intent to enter into the 
agreement. Section 5(a) also would establish a new requirement 
that the President, within 60 days of signing an agreement, 
submit to Congress a preliminary list of existing laws that he 
considers would be required to bring the United States into 
compliance with agreement.
    Section 5(b) would provide that trade promotion authority 
would not apply if both Houses separately agree to a procedural 
disapproval resolution within any 60-day period stating that 
the Administration failed to notify or consult with Congress.
    Most of the remaining provisions are identical to the 
expired law. Specifically, section 5(a) would require the 
President, after entering into agreement, to submit formally 
the draft agreement, the implementing legislation, and a 
statement of administrative action to Congress, and there would 
be no time limit to do so. The procedures of section 151 of the 
Trade Act of 1974 would then apply. Specifically, on the same 
day as the President formally submits the legislation, the bill 
would be introduced (by request) by the Majority Leaders of the 
House and the Senate. After formal introduction of the 
legislation, the House Committees of jurisdiction would have 45 
legislative days to report the bill. The House would be 
required to vote on the bill within 15 legislative days after 
the measure was reported or discharged from the Committees. 
Fifteen additional days would be provided for Senate Committee 
consideration (assuming the implementing bill was a revenue 
bill), and Senate floor action would be required within 15 
additional days. Accordingly, the maximum period for 
Congressional consideration of the implementing bill from the 
date of introduction would be 90 legislative days.
    As with the expired provisions, once the bill has been 
formally introduced, no amendments would be permitted either in 
Committee or floor action, and a straight ``up or down'' vote 
would be required. Of course, before formal introduction, the 
bill could be developed by the Committees of jurisdiction 
together with the Administration during the informal Committee 
mark-up process.
    Finally, as with the expired provision, section 5(c) 
specifies that sections 5(b) and 3(c) are enacted as an 
exercise of the rulemaking power of the House and the Senate, 
withthe recognition of the right of either House to change the 
rules at any time.

Reason for change

    The procedures established under H.R. 3005, as amended, are 
mainly identical to those of the 1988 Act, with considerable 
additional consultation requirements. The Committee believes 
that these procedures will permit Congress to participate 
meaningfully in the drafting of the implementing bill.
    As with the past provision, there would be no deadline for 
the submission of the legislation by the President once an 
agreement has been concluded, because the Committee intends 
that the Committees and the Administration have as much time as 
necessary to consider the content of the legislation. After the 
formal introduction, certain deadlines are appropriate because 
Congress has already conducted its process informally. The 
Committee believes that the informal mark-up process conducted 
before formal submission of the implementing bill provides the 
Congress, the public, and the private sector ample opportunity 
to participate in the development of the proposed legislation 
and to provide their views to the Administration. The Committee 
encourages and expects the Administration to continue its 
practice of considering carefully the comments made during this 
informal process and of making no changes to the legislation 
beyond those recommended by the Committees. If the 
Administration must make changes to reconcile differing 
recommendations by the relevant Committees, the Committee 
expects that the Administration will continue to consult with 
the affected Committees.
    H.R. 3005, as amended, would add a new procedural step 
requiring that the President submit to Congress, within 60 days 
of signing an agreement, a preliminary list of existing laws 
that he considers would be required to bring the United States 
into compliance with the agreement. This requirement has been 
added out of concern that in the past, Congress has not always 
been timely apprised of the changes to U.S. law that the 
Administration believes are required. This information is of 
vital importance to the Committee in its deliberations.

          8. SECTION 6: TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS

Present/expired law

    No provision.

Explanation of provision

    Section 6 exempts agreements resulting from ongoing 
negotiations with Chile or Singapore, an agreement establishing 
a Free Trade Area of the Americas, and agreements concluded 
under the auspices of the WTO from prenegotiation consultation 
requirements of section 4(a) only. However, upon enactment of 
H.R. 3005, as amended, the Administration is required to 
consult as to those elements set forth in section 4(a) as soon 
as feasible.

Reason for change

    The Committee recognizes the importance of the listed 
negotiations to the United States and the need to implement 
them under trade promotion authority. However, because these 
negotiations have already begun or may have begun before H.R. 
3005 is enacted, it would not be possible for the 
Administration to comply with the prenegotiation consultation 
requirements set forth in section 4(a). Accordingly, the 
Committee believes these requirements should be waived with 
regard to these agreements only. However, the Committee expects 
that the Administration will consult with Congress as soon as 
feasible after enactment of this Act and will continue to 
consult closely with the Committees throughout the negotiations 
so that the Committees may be informed about the issues and 
communicate any concerns.

              9. SECTION 7: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT GROUP

Present/expired law

    No provision.

Explanation of provision

    Section 7 would require the Chairman of the Committee on 
Ways and Means and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance to 
chair and convene, sixty days after the effective date of this 
Act, the Congressional Oversight Group. The Group would be 
comprised of the following Members of the House: the Chairman 
and Ranking Member of the Committee on Ways and Means and three 
additional members of the Committee (not more than two of whom 
are from the same party), and the Chairman and Ranking Member 
of the Committees which would have, under the Rules of the 
House, jurisdiction over provisions of law affected by a trade 
negotiation. The Group would be comprised of the following 
Members of the Senate: the Chairman and Ranking Member of the 
Committee on Finance and three additional members of the 
Committee (not more than two of whom are from the same party), 
and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committees which 
would have, under the Rules of the Senate, jurisdiction over 
provisions of law affected by a trade negotiation.
    Members are to be accredited as official advisors to the 
U.S. delegation in the negotiations. USTR is to develop 
guidelines to facilitate the useful and timely exchange of 
information between USTR and the Group, including regular 
briefings, access to pertinent documents, and the closest 
possible coordination at all critical periods during the 
negotiations, including at negotiation sites.

Reason for change

    The Committee believes that the establishment of the 
Congressional Oversight Group will greatly facilitate the 
meaningful and timely exchange of information and views between 
USTR and Congress. The Group is designed to involve a broad 
bipartisan cross-section of the House and Senate so that USTR 
will benefit from many viewpoints. Specifically, the Committee 
intends that the Group be bipartisan and include representation 
beyond the Ways and Means and Finance Committees to include 
those Committees that have jurisdiction over provisions of law 
affected by a trade negotiation. The composition of the Group 
is flexible to allow for the inclusion, after the convening of 
the Group, of additional Committees if developments in the 
negotiation indicate that they will have jurisdiction over laws 
affected by the negotiation.
    Finally, by developing written guidelines for the exchange 
of information in consultation with the Committee, USTR will 
formally institutionalize the consultation process to maximize 
its effectiveness.

 10. SECTION 8: ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS

Present/expired law

    No provision.

Explanation of provision

    Section 8 would require the President to submit to the 
Congress a plan for implementing and enforcing any trade 
agreement resulting from this Act. The report is to be 
submitted simultaneously with the text of the agreement and is 
to include a review of the Executive Branch personnel needed to 
enforce the agreement as well as an assessment of any U.S. 
Customs Service infrastructure improvements required. The range 
of personnel to be addressed in the report is very 
comprehensive, including U.S. Customs and Department of 
Agriculture border inspectors, and monitoring and implementing 
personnel at USTR, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, 
and the Treasury, and any other agencies as may be required.

Reason for change

    The Committee believes that successful negotiations by 
themselves are not sufficient to realize the benefits from 
freer trade. Monitoring and enforcement are complementary and 
necessary factors in the trade liberalization process. That is, 
meaningful progress will result when trading partners know that 
the United States stands ready to enforce its rights under 
trade agreements. This provision, the Committee believes, will 
help to enhance the enforcement readiness of the United States 
by requiring the President to conduct a systematic review of 
the various agencies involved in border and other types of 
trade monitoring and implementing activities. Further, the 
Committee recognizes that infrastructure improvements are 
important for Customs to maintain adequate border controls. 
Therefore, the provision also requires the President to provide 
a description of any additional equipment and facilities 
required by Customs to enforce the agreement.

                      III. VOTES OF THE COMMITTEE

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the following statements are made 
concerning the votes of the Committee on Ways and Means in its 
consideration of the bill, H.R. 3005.

                       motion to report the bill

    The bill, H.R. 3005, as amended, was ordered favorably 
reported by a roll call vote of 26 yeas to 13 nays (with a 
quorum being present). The vote was as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Representatives                 Yea      Nay            Representatives             Yea       Nay
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Thomas..............................        X   .......  Mr. Rangel.....................  ........        X
Mr. Crane...............................        X   .......  Mr. Stark......................  ........  ........
Mr. Shaw................................        X   .......  Mr. Matsui.....................  ........        X
Mrs. Johnson............................        X   .......  Mr. Coyne......................  ........  ........
Mr. Houghton............................        X   .......  Mr. Levin......................  ........        X
Mr. Herger..............................        X   .......  Mr. Cardin.....................  ........        X
Mr. McCrery.............................        X   .......  Mr. McDermott..................  ........        X
Mr. Camp................................        X   .......  Mr. Kleczka....................  ........        X
Mr. Ramstad.............................        X   .......  Mr. Lewis (GA).................  ........        X
Mr. Nussle..............................        X   .......  Mr. Neal.......................  ........        X
Mr. Johnson.............................        X   .......  Mr. McNulty....................  ........        X
Ms. Dunn................................        X   .......  Mr. Jefferson..................        X   ........
Mr. Collins.............................        X   .......  Mr. Tanner.....................        X   ........
Mr. Portman.............................        X   .......  Mr. Becerra....................  ........        X
Mr. English.............................        X   .......  Mrs. Thurman...................  ........        X
Mr. Watkins.............................        X   .......  Mr. Doggett....................  ........        X
Mr. Hayworth............................        X   .......  Mr. Pomeroy....................  ........        X
Mr. Weller..............................        X
Mr. Hulshof.............................        X
Mr. McInnis.............................        X
Mr. Lewis (KY)..........................        X
Mr. Foley...............................        X
Mr. Brady...............................        X
Mr. Ryan................................        X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           vote on amendments

    A roll call vote was conducted on the following amendment 
to the Chairman's amendment in the nature of a substitute.
    A substitute amendment by Mr. Rangel, was defeated by a 
roll call vote of 12 yeas to 26 nays, with 1 member passing. 
The vote was as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Representatives                 Yea      Nay            Representatives             Yea       Nay
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Thomas..............................  ........        X  Mr. Rangel.....................        X   ........
Mr. Crane...............................  ........        X  Mr. Stark......................  ........  ........
Mr. Shaw................................  ........        X  Mr. Matsui.....................        X   ........
Mrs. Johnson............................  ........        X  Mr. Coyne......................  ........  ........
Mr. Houghton............................  ........        X  Mr. Levin......................        X   ........
Mr. Herger..............................  ........        X  Mr. Cardin.....................        X   ........
Mr. McCrery.............................  ........        X  Mr. McDermott..................        X   ........
Mr. Camp................................  ........        X  Mr. Kleczka....................        X   ........
Mr. Ramstad.............................  ........        X  Mr. Lewis (GA).................        X   ........
Mr. Nussle..............................  ........        X  Mr. Neal.......................        X   ........
Mr. Johnson.............................  ........        X  Mr. McNulty....................        X   ........
Ms. Dunn................................  ........        X  Mr. Jefferson \1\..............  ........  ........
Mr. Collins.............................  ........        X  Mr. Tanner.....................  ........        X
Mr. Portman.............................  ........        X  Mr. Becerra....................        X   ........
Mr. English.............................  ........        X  Mrs. Thurman...................  ........        X
Mr. Watkins.............................  ........        X  Mr. Doggett....................        X   ........
Mr. Hayworth............................  ........        X  Mr. Pomeroy....................        X   ........
Mr. Weller..............................  ........        X
Mr. Hulshof.............................  ........        X
Mr. McInnis.............................  ........        X
Mr. Lewis (KY)..........................  ........        X
Mr. Foley...............................  ........        X
Mr. Brady...............................  ........        X
Mr. Ryan................................  ........       X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Mr. Jefferson passed.

                     IV. BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE BILL

               A. Committee Estimates of Budgetary Effect

    In compliance with clause 3(d)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee agrees with cost 
estimates furnished by the Congressional Budget Office on H.R. 
3005, as amended, set forth below.

                B. Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    In compliance with subdivision 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee states 
that the bill would have no effect on revenues because future 
trade agreements would require implementing legislation.

      C. Cost Estimate Prepared by the Congressional Budget Office

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, requiring a cost estimate 
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, the following 
report prepared by CBO is provided.

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                  Washington, DC, October 11, 2001.
Hon. William ``Bill'' M. Thomas,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3005, the 
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Erin 
Whitaker.
            Sincerely,
                                          Barry B. Anderson
                                    (For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
    Enclosure.

H.R. 3005--Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act

    Summary: H.R. 3005 would restore the President's authority 
to enter into multilateral and bilateral trade agreements with 
Congressional approval or rejection of, but not amendment to, 
those agreements. Enacting the bill would not affect revenues, 
so pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply.
    CBO has determined that H.R. 3009 contains no new private-
sector or intergovernmental mandates as defined in the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would not affect the budgets of 
state, local, or tribal governments.
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: CBO estimates 
that enacting H.R. 3005 would have no budgetary impact.
    Basis of estimate: Before their expiration on June 1, 1993, 
sections 1102 and 1103 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988 granted the President the authority to enter into 
multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. The President 
could reduce certain tariffs by proclamation within specified 
bounds prescribed by the law. For provisions subject to 
Congressional approval, the Congress could not amend 
implementing legislation once it was introduced. Furthermore, 
as long as the President met statutory requirements concerning 
Congressional consultation during the negotiation process, 
Congress was required to act on the legislation following a 
strict timetable. P.L. 103-40 temporarily extended these 
provisions through April 16, 1994, for any trade agreement 
resulting from the Uruguay Round negotiations taking place 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
    H.R. 3005 would restore the President's authority to 
propose trade agreements under an expedited procedure for 
Congressional approval. The bill would have no direct effect on 
revenues, because future trade agreements would require 
implementing legislation.
    Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The bill 
contains no new private-sector or intergovernmental mandates as 
defined in UMRA and would not impose any costs on state, 
tribal, or local governments.
    Estimate prepared by: Revenues: Erin Whitaker. Impact on 
State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Elyse Goldman. Impact on 
the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
    Estimate approved by: Roberton Williams, Assistant Director 
for Tax Analysis.

     V. OTHER MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED UNDER THE RULES OF THE HOUSE

          A. Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives (relating to oversight findings), 
the Committee advises that it was as a result of the 
Committee's oversight activities concerning customs and tariff 
matters, import trade matters, and specific trade-related 
issues that the Committee concluded that it was appropriate to 
enact the provisions contained in the bill.

        B. Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives

    With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that H.R. 
3005 is intended to improve the performance of the Executive 
Branch with respect to negotiating trade agreements to increase 
opportunities for U.S. companies, workers, and farmers.

                 C. Constitutional Authority Statement

    With respect to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, relating to Constitutional 
Authority, the Committee states that the Committee's action in 
reporting the bill is derived from Article I of the 
Constitution, Section 8 (``The Congress shall have power to lay 
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the 
debts and to provide for * * * the general Welfare of the 
United States * * *''.

       VI. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

    In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

TRADE ACT OF 1974

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

TITLE I--NEGOTIATING AND OTHER AUTHORITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

         CHAPTER 3--HEARINGS AND ADVICE CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS

SEC. 131. ADVICE FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION.

  (a) Lists of Articles Which May Be Considered for Action.--
          (1) In connection with any proposed trade agreement 
        under [section 123 of this Act or section 1102 (a) or 
        (c) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
        1988,] section 123 of this Act or section 3 (a) or (b) 
        of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 
        2001, the President shall from time to time publish and 
        furnish the International Trade Commission (hereafter 
        in this section referred to as the ``Commission'') with 
        lists of articles which may be considered for 
        modification or continuance of United States duties, 
        continuance of United States duty-free or excise 
        treatment, or additional duties. In the case of any 
        article with respect to which consideration may be 
        given to reducing or increasing the rate of duty, the 
        list shall specify the provision of this subchapter 
        under which such consideration may be given.
          (2) In connection with any proposed trade agreement 
        under [section 1102 (b) or (c) of the Omnibus Trade and 
        Competitiveness Act of 1988] section 3(b) of the 
        Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, the 
        President may from time to time publish and furnish the 
        Commission with lists of nontariff matters which may be 
        considered for modification.
  (b) Advice to President by Commission.--Within 6 months after 
receipt of a list under subsection (a) or, in the case of a 
list submitted in connection with a trade agreement, within 90 
days after receipt of such list, the Commission shall advise 
the President, with respect to each article or nontariff 
matter, of its judgment as to the probable economic effect of 
modification of the tariff or nontariff measure on industries 
producing like or directly competitive articles and on 
consumers, so as to assist the President in making an informed 
judgment as to the impact which might be caused by such 
modifications on United States interests, such as sectors 
involved in manufacturing, agriculture, mining, fishing, 
services, intellectual property, investment, labor, and 
consumers. Such advice may include in the case of any article 
the advice of the Commission as to whether any reduction in the 
rate of duty should take place over a longer period of time 
than the minimum period provided for in [section 1102(a)(3)(A)] 
section 3(a)(3)(A) of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority 
Act of 2001.
  (c) Additional Investigations and Reports Requested by the 
President or the Trade Representative.--In addition, in order 
to assist the President in his determination whether to enter 
into any agreement under section 123 of this Act or [section 
1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,] 
section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 
2001, or how to develop trade policy, priorities or other 
matters (such as priorities for actions to improve 
opportunities in foreign markets), the Commission shall make 
such investigations and reports as may be requested by the 
President or the United States Trade Representative on matters 
such as effects of modification of any barrier to (or other 
distortion of) international trade on domestic workers, 
industries or sectors, purchasers, prices and quantities of 
articles in the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 132. ADVICE FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER SOURCES.

  Before any trade agreement is entered into under section 123 
of this Act or [section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988,] section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Authority Act of 2001, the President shall seek 
information and advice with respect to such agreement from the 
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, 
State and the Treasury, from the United States Trade 
Representative, and from such other sources as he may deem 
appropriate. Such advice shall be prepared and presented 
consistent with the provisions of Reorganization Plan Number 3 
of 1979, Executive Order Number 12188 and section 141(c).

SEC. 133. PUBLIC HEARINGS.

  (a) Opportunity for Presentation of Views.--In connection 
with any proposed trade agreement under section 123 of this Act 
or [section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988,] section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority 
Act of 2001, the President shall afford an opportunity for any 
interested person to present his views concerning any article 
on a list published under section 131, any matter or article 
which should be so listed, any concession which should be 
sought by the United States, or any other matter relevant to 
such proposed trade agreement. For this purpose, the President 
shall designate an agency or an interagency committee which 
shall, after reasonable notice, hold public hearings and 
prescribe regulations governing the conduct of such hearings. 
When appropriate, such procedures shall apply to the 
development of trade policy and priorities.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 134. PREREQUISITES FOR OFFERS.

  (a) In any negotiation seeking an agreement under section 123 
of this Act or [section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988,] section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Authority Act of 2001, the President may make a 
formal offer for the modification or continuance of any United 
States duty, import restrictions, or barriers to (or other 
distortions of) international trade, the continuance of United 
States duty-free or excise treatment, or the imposition of 
additional duties, import restrictions, or other barrier to (or 
other distortion of) international trade including trade in 
services, foreign direct investment and intellectual property 
as covered by this title, with respect to any article or matter 
only after he has received a summary of the hearings at which 
an opportunity to be heard with respect to such article has 
been afforded under section 133. In addition, the President may 
make an offer for the modification or continuance of any United 
States duty, the continuance of United States duty-free or 
excise treatment, or the imposition of additional duties, with 
respect to any article included in a list published and 
furnished under section 131(a), only after he has received 
advice concerning such article from the Commission under 
section 131(b), or after the expiration of the 6-month or 90-
day period provided for in that section, as appropriate, 
whichever first occurs.
  (b) In determining whether to make offers described in 
subsection (a) in the course of negotiating any trade agreement 
under [section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988] section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
Authority Act of 2001, and in determining the nature and scope 
of such offers, the President shall take into account any 
advice or information provided, or reports submitted, by--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 135. INFORMATION AND ADVICE FROM PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS.

  (a) In General.--
          (1) The President shall seek information and advice 
        from representative elements of the private sector and 
        the non-Federal governmental sector with respect to--
                  (A) negotiating objectives and bargaining 
                positions before entering into a trade 
                agreement under this title or [section 1102 of 
                the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
                1988] section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade 
                Promotion Authority Act of 2001;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Meeting of Advisory Committees at Conclusion of 
Negotiations.--
          (1) The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and 
        Negotiations, each appropriate policy advisory 
        committee, and each sectoral or functional advisory 
        committee, if the sector or area which such committee 
        represents is affected, shall meet at the conclusion of 
        negotiations for each trade agreement entered into 
        under [section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and 
        Competitiveness Act of 1988] section 3 of the 
        Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, to 
        provide to the President, to Congress, and to the 
        United States Trade Representative a report on such 
        agreement. Each report that applies to a trade 
        agreement entered into under [section 1102 of the 
        Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988] section 
        3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 
        2001 shall be provided under the preceding sentence not 
        later than the date on which the President notifies the 
        Congress under [section 1103(a)(1)(A) of such Act of 
        1988] section 5(a)(1)(A) of the Bipartisan Trade 
        Promotion Authority Act of 2001 of his intention to 
        enter into that agreement.
          (2) The report of the Advisory Committee for Trade 
        Policy and Negotiations and each appropriate policy 
        advisory committee shall include an advisory opinion as 
        to whether and to what extent the agreement promotes 
        the economic interests of the United States and 
        achieves the applicable overall and principal 
        negotiating objectives set forth in [section 1101 of 
        the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988] 
        section 2 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority 
        Act of 2001, as appropriate.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

   CHAPTER 5--CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES WITH RESPECT TO PRESIDENTIAL 
                                ACTIONS

SEC. 151. BILLS IMPLEMENTING TRADE AGREEMENTS ON NONTARIFF BARRIERS AND 
                    RESOLUTIONS APPROVING COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS WITH 
                    COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
          (1) The term ``implementing bill'' means only a bill 
        of either House of Congress which is introduced as 
        provided in subsection (c) with respect to one or more 
        trade agreements, or with respect to an extension 
        described in section 282(c)(3) of the Uruguay Round 
        Agreements Act, submitted to the House of 
        Representatives and the Senate under section 102 of 
        this Act, [section 1103(a)(1) of the Omnibus Trade and 
        Competitiveness Act of 1988, or section 282 of the 
        Uruguay Round Agreements Act] section 282 of the 
        Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or section 5(a)(1) of the 
        Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001 and 
        which contains--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Introduction and Referral.--
          (1) On the day on which a trade agreement or 
        extension is submitted to the House of Representatives 
        and the Senate under section 102 [or section 282 of the 
        Uruguay Round Agreements Act], section 282 of the 
        Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or section 5(a)(1) of the 
        Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, the 
        implementing bill submitted by the President with 
        respect to such trade agreement or extension shall be 
        introduced (by request) in the House by the majority 
        leader of the House, for himself and the minority 
        leader of the House, or by Members of the House 
        designated by the majority leader and minority leader 
        of the House; and shall be introduced (by request) in 
        the Senate by the majority leader of the Senate, for 
        himself and the minority leader of the Senate, or by 
        Members of the Senate designated by the majority leader 
        and minority leader of the Senate. If either House is 
        not in session on the day on which such a trade 
        agreement or extension is submitted, the implementing 
        bill shall be introduced in that House, as provided in 
        the preceding sentence, on the first day thereafter on 
        which the House is in session. Such bills shall be 
        referred by the Presiding Officers of the respective 
        Houses to the appropriate committee, or, in the case of 
        a bill containing provisions within the jurisdiction of 
        two or more committees, jointly to such committees for 
        consideration of those provisions within their 
        respective jurisdictions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER 6--CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON AND REPORTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 162. TRANSMISSION OF AGREEMENTS TO CONGRESS.

  (a) As soon as practicable after a trade agreement entered 
into under section 123 or 124 [or under section 1102 of the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988] or under section 
3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001 has 
entered into force with respect to the United States, the 
President shall, if he has not previously done so, transmit a 
copy of such trade agreement to each House of the Congress 
together with a statement, in the light of the advice of the 
International Trade Commission under section 131(b), if any, 
and of other relevant considerations, of his reasons for 
entering into the agreement.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  VII. ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

                     Dissenting Views on H.R. 3005

    Putting forth H.R. 3005, even if one or two Democrats on 
the Committee agree with it, is not true bipartisanship. And it 
particularly fails the test of broad bipartisanship necessary 
during this challenging period for our country.
    This is truly a shame because issues of international 
relationships and trade have traditionally been very 
bipartisan--particularly in the history of this great Ways and 
Means Committee. The Democratic members of this Committee have 
played key roles in the passage of many recent trade bills--the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act, enhanced Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, U.S.-Jordan 
Free Trade Agreement, and the legislation granting Permanent 
Normal Trade Relations to China.
    The Africa bill or enhanced CBI legislation would not have 
occurred without Rep. McDermott and Rep. Jefferson, among 
others, working with Rep. Crane and others. We would not have 
been able to accomplish granting permanent normal trade 
relations to China without the efforts of Rep. Levin working 
with Rep. Bereuter. And we would not have had the prior ``Fast 
Track'' bills without the support and the work of Rep. Matsui. 
Instead of following these successes, the vote today is likely 
the most partisan Committee vote on a trade issue in more than 
a quarter century.
    We understand Congress' constitutional responsibility to 
work with the President in setting trade policy while not 
micro-managing. But we also understand that, as the world's 
most important power, we have a responsibility to workers 
around the world, to the environment in which we share, and to 
the Constitution. Nations should not be permitted to gain 
unfair trade advantages by shirking accepted fundamental 
standards or humanity's responsibility to protect our 
environment. And Congress cannot forget its constitutional 
responsibility to be a full partner with the President in 
setting trade policy.
    The reality of H.R. 3005 does not measure up to the 
rhetoric.
    The Thomas bill falls short in a number of key areas, 
including:
           On labor, the Thomas bill would provide only 
        that a country enforce its own laws whatever they may 
        be. There is only rhetoric and no requirement that a 
        country's law include any of the five core labor 
        standards--bans on child labor, discrimination, and 
        slave labor, and the rights to associate and to bargain 
        collectively.
           On the environment, the Thomas bill does not 
        address key problems in the investment area or direct 
        that concrete steps be taken to integrate Multilateral 
        Environmental Agreements (MEAs) with trade agreements.
           On the critical issue of trade remedies, the 
        Thomas bill does not provide that the President must 
        make progress towards achieving this priority. We 
        believe that the objective of preventing weakening of 
        U.S. trade remedies--e.g., to renew lesser duty or 
        public interest rule--must be scrupulously followed for 
        any new trade agreement to serve the overall economic 
        interests of the United States. The Thomas bill's 
        approach is particularly dissatisfying given recent WTO 
        panel and Appellate Body decisions imposing new 
        obligations on the use of the trade remedies.
           On Congress' role, the Thomas bill mentions 
        ``consultations'' but this is no magic word. This has 
        been in past ``Fast Track'' bills and yet, we have yet 
        to be adequately consulted. Presidents Clinton and Bush 
        never consulted with us. Presidents Reagan and Carter 
        did not consult us. The word means nothing without 
        sufficient incentives to ensure that a President will 
        actually listen in a meaningful way. The Thomas bill 
        not only does not build on the mechanisms included in 
        the last fast track law in 1988, it actually deletes 
        one of those mechanisms.
           In agriculture, H.R. 3019 makes clear that 
        U.S. negotiating objectives for the FTAA negotiations 
        and the WTO negotiations will necessarily be quite 
        different, in view of the fact that certain key U.S. 
        priorities (for example, relating to export subsidies 
        and domestic supports) relate to the policies of the 
        European Union. The EU will not even be at the table in 
        the FTAA negotiations. Accordingly, for the United 
        States to negotiate reductions in domestic supports in 
        the FTAA context, without first securing commitments 
        from the EU in the WTO context, would be tantamount to 
        unilateral disarmament.
           In many other areas, the H.R. 3005 falls 
        short in comparison with H.R. 3019.
    We had hoped during the past year that there would be an 
opportunity to address the substantive issues relating to fast 
track/TPA legislation. The Chairman and others in his party 
have chosen not to do this.
    We offer H.R. 3019, the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating 
Authority Act of 2001, as an affirmative model for the way fast 
track legislation can be written to achieve all of our 
objectives as Americans, Democrats and Republicans together. 
This bill addresses the full range of trade issues ranging from 
agicultural and services trade, to high technology trade and 
electronic commerce, to environment and trade, labor standards 
and trade, and trade remedies, to protection of intellectual 
property rights, opening up the world trading system to public 
view and input from NGOs, businesses and unions, and addressing 
corruption. The bill also addresses the essential issue of the 
constitutional role of Congress. The following section-by-
section summary of H.R. 3019 provides a synopsis of the ways in 
which H.R. 3019 addresses these and other key issues.

                Section-by-Section Summary of H.R. 3019

Overview

    The bill advances the interests of all Americans by 
enabling the United States to take full advantage of new 
trading opportunities for American workers, farmers and 
businesses, and by shaping trade to maximize its benefits and 
minimize its costs. The proposal accomplishes these goals by: 
(1) setting out clear directions through specific negotiating 
objectives for the United States in a wide range of areas and 
(2) updating and strengthening Congress' role in overseeing the 
trade negotiation process.

Section 1--Short Title

Section 2--Negotiating Objectives

            Section 2(a)--Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives
    Section 2(a) sets forth ``overall trade negotiating 
objectives'' that U.S. negotiators are to use to guide them in 
negotiations. These ``overall trade negotiating objectives'' 
are broad-based statements of congressional policy in 16 key 
areas. Unlike the ``Principal Negotiating Objectives'' in 
section 2(b), ``Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives'' are not 
intended to lead to negotiation of specific agreements.
            Section 2(b)--Principal Negotiating Objectives Under WTO
    Section 2(b) contains Congress' principal negotiating 
objectives for the negotiations to be conducted under the 
auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and WTO 
Agreements. These objectives are designed to provide specific 
direction to U.S. negotiators.
    The different levels of economic integration created, and 
the different number and diversity of countries involved, in 
various types of negotiations, create different contexts, 
interests and possibilities for each set of negotiations. 
Accordingly, the bill sets forth separately Congress' 
negotiating objectives for the WTO (section 2(b)), for the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (section 2(c)), and for other 
regional and bilateral trade negotiations (section 2(d)).
    Section 2(b) sets forth U.S. principal negotiating 
objectives for WTO negotiations.
            Section 2(b)(1)--Trade in Agriculture--WTO
    Section 2(b)(1) directs U.S. negotiators to obtain 
competitive opportunities for U.S. exports equivalent to those 
the United States affords foreign agricultural imports and to 
achieve more open trade in agricultural commodities. Specific 
congressional objectives in this area include:
           Reduce the agricultural tariffs actually 
        applied, as well as the maximum allowable tariffs, 
        placing priority on products that are subject to 
        significantly higher tariffs in major producing 
        countries and providing longer phase-in periods for 
        tariff reductions on U.S. agricultural products that 
        are particularly sensitive to imports;
           Enhance the transparency of a country's 
        implementation of its tariff regimes and tighten the 
        rules that regulate how a country can administer tariff 
        rate quotas;
           Eliminate agricultural export subsidies;
           Eliminate or reduce trade-distorting 
        domestic subsidies;
           Require countries with higher subsidy levels 
        than the U.S. to match U.S. levels before agreeing to 
        reduce or eliminate U.S. subsidies;
           Ensure that trade rules do not undermine 
        bona fide U.S. agricultural programs like market 
        development programs, food aid programs, and programs 
        that support family farms and rural communities;
           Eliminate state trading enterprises, which 
        have been used to distort trade in agriculture or, at 
        minimum, adopt vigorous oversight mechanisms to ensure 
        that they operate transparently;
           Eliminate practices that discriminate 
        against perishable or seasonal agricultural products 
        and develop a more effective import safeguard mechanism 
        for these types of products;
           Consider whether negotiating partners have 
        adhered to their current trade obligations, how 
        previous trade agreements have affected the U.S. 
        agricultural sector, and the extent to which countries 
        have meaningfully opened up their agriculture markets 
        in formulating U.S. positions; and
           Treat the negotiation of all WTO issues as a 
        single undertaking to ensure that other countries do 
        not have opportunities to delay progress on agriculture 
        negotiations in the hopes of concluding agreement on 
        other, possibly less difficult, issues.
            Section 2(b)(2)--Trade in Services--WTO
    Section 2(b)(2) directs U.S. WTO negotiators to further 
liberalize international trade in services, e.g., financial 
services, consulting, media products, and telecommunications. 
The specific instructions focus on deepening and broadening the 
commitments in the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). In the GATS, WTO members made specific commitments to 
allow freer trade in service industries. The specific 
objectives advanced by Congress include:
           Extend the GATS commitments to achieve the 
        maximum liberalization in trade in services, 
        particularly to allow businesses to deliver services 
        through all modes of supply;
           Remove barriers that deny national treatment 
        (i.e., discriminate against foreign service providers) 
        or unreasonably restrict the establishment or operation 
        of foreign service suppliers;
           Reduce or eliminate the adverse effects of 
        existing government measures on trade in services;
           Eliminate additional barriers to trade in 
        services, including unreasonable or discriminatory 
        licensing requirements, administration of cartels or 
        toleration of anticompetitive activity and other 
        methods of hindering trade in services;
           Grandfather existing concessions and 
        liberalization commitments as new commitments are made 
        and ensure that concessions that pre-dated the GATS 
        commitments remain in effect;
           Strengthen the GATS obligations to ensure 
        that countries regulate services and service suppliers 
        in a transparent manner and in accordance with 
        principles of due process.
           Oppose cultural exceptions to GATS 
        obligations (e.g., a requirement that television 
        stations reserve a certain minimum percentage of their 
        programming time for locally-produced items);
           Prevent discrimination against like services 
        delivered via electronic means (e.g., application 
        services provided through in person servicing or 
        remotely via the Internet);
            Pursue full market access and national 
        treatment commitments for service sectors essential to 
        electronic commerce; and
           Broaden and deepen the commitments countries 
        have made relating to basic and value-added 
        telecommunications services and financial services; for 
        telecommunications, include strengthening obligations 
        to ensure competitive and non-discriminatory access to 
        public telecommunication networks and ISP and other 
        value-added service providers and preventing anti-
        competitive behavior by major suppliers.
            Action 2(b)(3)--Trade in Manufactured and Nonagricultural 
                    Goods--WTO
    Section 2(b)(3) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to trade in manufactured and 
non-agricultural goods (essentially all non-agricultural 
goods). The specific objectives advanced by Congress are:
           Reduce bound tariff levels (maximum 
        allowable tariffs) to eliminate disparities between the 
        tariffs actually applied and the bound tariffs;
           In sectors where tariffs are approaching 
        zero, negotiate agreements to eliminate duties;
           Eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers in 
        sectors where U.S. imposes no significant barriers to 
        imports and foreign barriers are substantial;
           Eliminate or reduce tariffs on value-added 
        products receiving unequal protection compared to the 
        raw materials used to make those products (tariff 
        inversions); and
           Eliminate other non-tariff barriers, 
        including restrictions on access to distribution 
        networks and information systems; unfair inspection 
        processes; cartels or anti-competitive activity; 
        unreasonable delegation of regulatory powers to private 
        entities; unfair licensing requirements; and other 
        unfair government acts that restrict market access.
            Section 2(b)(4)--Trade in Civil Aircraft--WTO
    Section 2(b)(4) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for trade in civil aircraft, specifically, those already 
approved by Congress in section 135(c) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3555(c)).
            Section 2(b)(5)--Rules of Origin--WTO
    Section 2(b)(5) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for rules of origin--the rules used to determine the origin of 
a good. These rules are relevant for country of origin labeling 
requirements, for certain preferential tariff arrangements, and 
for other reasons. U.S. negotiators are directed to complete an 
international agreement to harmonize rules of origin for 
nonpreferential trade programs as envisioned by article 9 of 
the WTO's Agreement on Rules of Origin.
            Section 2(b)(6)--Dispute Settlement--WTO
    Section 2(b)(6) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators to pursue with respect to the settlement 
of trade disputes. Dispute settlement under the WTO rules has 
increased dramatically compared to dispute settlement under the 
previous GATT-based trade rules. It has become increasingly 
important to ensure that these rules operate effectively and 
transparently. The specific objectives advanced by Congress 
are:
           Improve enforcement of decisions for more 
        prompt compliance;
           Strengthen rules related to evidence 
        requests in proceedings;
           Pursue rules for the management of 
        translation-related issues;
           Require that all government submissions be 
        made public upon submission, with exceptions for 
        business confidential and national security classified 
        information;
           Require that meetings of dispute settlement 
        bodies and transcripts of such meetings be open to the 
        public, with procedures to accommodate business 
        confidential and national security classified 
        information;
           Establish rules to provide for submission of 
        friend-of-the-court briefs, e.g., by nongovernmental 
        organizations, businesses, and unions;
           Strengthen rules to prevent conflicts of 
        interest by panelists;
           Establish formal procedures for panels to 
        seek advice from other international organizations, 
        e.g., the International Labor Organization; and
           Ensure application of the standard of review 
        in the WTO Antidumping Agreement and clarify that this 
        standard of review should apply to cases under the WTO 
        Subsidies/CVD and Safeguards Agreements for reasons of 
        logic and consistency with basic principles of 
        administrative law and jurisprudence.
            Section 2(b)(7)--Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures--WTO
    Section 2(b)(7) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures, e.g., food health and safety standards. The 
specific objectives advanced by Congress are:
           Oppose reopening of the WTO's SPS Agreement.
           Reaffirm that the decision of a country not 
        to adopt an international standard for the basis of an 
        SPS measure does not in itself create a presumption of 
        inconsistency with the SPS Agreement.
           Reaffirm that Members may take sanitary or 
        phytosanitary measures where the relevant scientific 
        evidence is insufficient, or conflicting, provided that 
        the measure is taken in a manner consistent with the 
        SPS Agreement.
            Section 2(b)(8)--Technical Barriers to Trade--WTO
    Section 2(b)(8) contains the principal negotiating 
objectives for U.S. negotiators with respect to technical 
barriers to trade, e.g., unreasonable product standards. The 
specific objectives advanced by Congress are:
           Oppose reopening of the WTO TBT Agreement;
           Increase transparency in the preparation, 
        adoption and application of labeling regulations and 
        standards, recognizing the legitimate role of labeling 
        that provides relevant information to consumers.
            Section 2(b)(9)--Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
                    Property Rights (IPR)--WTO
    Section 2(b)(7) contains the principal negotiating 
objectives for U.S. negotiators regarding intellectual property 
rights. The WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) created important new obligations on 
countries to respect and enforce intellectual property rights 
in their domestic law. The bill calls on U.S. negotiators to 
build upon TRIPs and address other issues that have emerged. 
The specific objectives advanced by Congress are:
           Oppose extension of the date by which 
        countries must implement their TRIPs obligations;
           Oppose extension of the moratorium on ``non-
        violation'' complaints under TRIPs;
           Oppose any weakening of existing TRIPs 
        obligations;
           Ensure that standards of protection and 
        enforcement keep pace with technological developments, 
        particularly on the Internet;
           Prevent misuse by industrialized countries 
        of reference pricing classification systems as way to 
        discriminate against innovative U.S. pharmaceutical 
        products to the detriment of U.S. consumers;
           Clarify that under Article 31 of the TRIPs 
        Agreement, WTO Members are able to adopt measures 
        necessary to protect the public health and to respond 
        to situations of national emergency or extreme urgency, 
        including by taking actions that have the effect of 
        increasing access to essential medicines;
           Encourage Members that take action under 
        Article 31 to also implement policies that respond to 
        all aspects of the public health problem or national 
        emergency; and
           Encourage members of the Organization for 
        Economic Cooperation and Development and the private 
        sectors in such countries to work with other relevant 
        international organizations to assist developing 
        countries in all possible ways to increase access to 
        essential medicines.
            Section 2(b)(10)--Transparency--WTO
    Section 2(b)(10) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to transparency. There are 
two components to transparency. First, there is transparency in 
domestic government regulation--a concept embodied in U.S. law 
through the Administrative Procedures Act and requirements of 
due process. Transparency in government regulation is an area 
increasingly vital to U.S. workers, farmers and businesses 
seeking to export agricultural and manufactured products and 
services, particularly in service sectors like 
telecommunications and financial services. Second, there is 
transparency in the operation of the WTO. The bill addresses 
both of these components. The specific objectives advanced by 
Congress are:
           To conclude an Agreement on Transparency 
        that would:
          --Require that government laws, regulations and 
        judicial decisions be made publicly available;
          --Require adequate notice before amending existing 
        rules or declaring new ones;
          --Encourage governments to open rulemaking to public 
        comment;
          --Require that administrative proceedings in Member 
        countries relating to any agreement be conducted so as 
        to give persons from Member countries affected by such 
        proceedings notice and opportunity to present their 
        positions; and
          --Require Members to establish judicial or 
        administrative tribunals or procedures to review and 
        correct final administrative actions on matters covered 
        by any agreement, allowing parties to the proceeding an 
        opportunity to present their positions.
           Improve public's understanding of and access 
        to WTO system by:
          --Maintaining and expanding official websites, and 
        making meeting minutes and other documents publicly 
        available; and
          --Instituting regular meetings between WTO officials 
        and representatives of non-governmental organizations, 
        businesses, labor unions, consumer groups and other 
        representatives of civil society.
            Section 2(b)(11)--Government Procurement--WTO
    Section 2(b)(11) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to rules for government 
procurement. The WTO includes an Agreement on Government 
Procurement, but this is one of the ``plurilateral'' 
agreements, meaning that not all WTO Members are bound by the 
Agreement. The bill calls for U.S. negotiators to build upon 
the existing agreement. The specific objectives advanced by 
Congress are:
           Expand membership of agreement;
           Conclude WTO agreement on transparency in 
        government procurement; and
           Promote global use of electronic publication 
        of government procurement information to make it easier 
        for U.S. firms to find out about bidding opportunities 
        abroad.
            Section 2(b)(12)--Trade Remedy Laws--WTO
    Section 2(b)(12) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to the trade remedy laws--
antidumping, anti-subsidies/countervailing duty, and import 
surge safeguards remedies. These trade remedy laws and the 
related WTO agreements, establish fundamental rules for the 
trading system and help ensure continued support for trade 
liberalization. Increasingly, however, these trade remedies 
have come under attack in the WTO and through trade 
negotiations. The bill would make clear to our negotiating 
partners that Congress will not accept agreements that weaken 
trade remedies. The specific objectives advanced by Congress 
are:
           Preserve ability of U.S. to enforce trade 
        laws strongly and do not enter into agreements that 
        weaken the effectiveness of domestic and international 
        rules on unfair trade or import surges; and
           Eliminate the underlying causes of unfair 
        trade practices and import surges, including closed 
        markets, subsidization and anti-competitive practices 
        that create and sustain excess capacity.
            Section 2(b)(13)--Trade and Labor Market Standards--WTO
    Section 2(b)(13) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to the critical area of trade 
and labor market standards. The bill sets forth an objective to 
achieve a framework of enforceable multilateral rules as soon 
as practicable that leads to the adoption and enforcement of 
the core, internationally-recognized labor standards in the 
WTO. The specific objectives advanced by Congress towards that 
objective are:
           Establish promptly within the WTO a working 
        group on trade and labor issues to explore the linkage 
        between international trade and investment and 
        internationally recognized workers rights (as required 
        by section 131 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act) and 
        develop methods to coordinate work program with ILO;
           Update the exceptions to trade (article XX 
        of the GATT 1994) and services (article XIV of GATS) 
        rules so that countries could not be penalized under 
        WTO rules for taking actions to carry out ILO 
        recommendations against countries that have 
        persistently violated labor rights, e.g., the ILO 
        recommendation with respect to Burma;
           Include review of labor standards as part of 
        the WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). (The 
        TPRM is the WTO's mechanism for providing regular 
        reviews of each country's compliance with its WTO 
        obligations); and
           Establish a working relationship between the 
        WTO and ILO.
            Section 2(b)(14)--Trade and the Environment--WTO
    Section 2(b)(14) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to the critical area of trade 
and the environment. The specific objectives advanced by 
Congress are:
           Strengthen role of the WTO's Committee on 
        Trade and Environment (CTE), providing the CTE with 
        authority to review and comment on negotiations and 
        review potential effects of liberalization of natural 
        resource products;
           Clarify the environmental exceptions already 
        in the WTO--GATT article XX(b), which allows countries 
        to take measures necessary to protect human, animal and 
        plant life or health, and GATT article XX(g), which 
        allows countries to take measures to conserve 
        exhaustible natural resources;
           Add an exception to the GATT and the GATS so 
        that, where both parties to a dispute have accepted the 
        obligations of a multilateral environmental agreement 
        (MEA), a country could not be penalized under trade 
        rules for taking action in accordance with the MEA;
           Add to the GATS the GATT article XX(g) 
        exception, which allows countries to take measures to 
        conserve exhaustible natural resources, to the GATS. 
        The GATS already includes an exception equivalent to 
        GATT article XX(b);
           Give priority to trade liberalization 
        measures promoting sustainable development;
           Reduce subsidies in natural resource sectors 
        and export subsidies in agriculture; and
           Improve coordination between WTO and 
        international environmental organizations in formation 
        of multilaterally accepted principles for sustainable 
        development.
            Section 2(b)(15)--Institution Building--WTO
    Section 2(b)(15) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to institution building. The 
specific objectives advanced by Congress are:
           Strengthen institutional mechanisms 
        facilitating dialogue and activities between WTO and 
        non-governmental organizations;
           Increase transparency by improving internal 
        communication between the Secretariat and the Members;
           Improve coordination between WTO and other 
        international organizations, including the ILO and the 
        United Nations Environment Programme, to increase 
        effectiveness of technical assistance programs;
           Improve capability of WTO to provide 
        technical assistance to developing countries, to 
        promote the rule of law, and to assist developing 
        countries with efforts to meet their WTO obligations.
            Section 2(b)(16)--Trade and Investment--WTO
    Section 2(b)(16) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to trade and investment. The 
WTO currently includes the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs), which does not contain investor-
state dispute settlement. The specific objectives advanced by 
Congress are:
           Pursue further reduction of trade-distorting 
        investment measures, including restrictions on the free 
        transfer of funds related to investment, discriminatory 
        measures, forcedtechnology transfers, performance 
requirements, forced licensing requirements, and other unreasonable 
barriers to investment; and
           Strengthen enforcement of and compliance 
        with TRIMs.
            Section 2(b)(17)--Electronic Commerce--WTO
    Section 2(b)(17) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to electronic commerce. Rapid 
changes in technology and business models on the Internet have 
stretched existing rules and created new challenges. The 
continued growth of e-commerce requires countries to provide a 
favorable regulatory and trading environment. The specific 
objectives advanced by Congress are:
           Make permanent and binding the moratorium on 
        customs duties on electronic transmissions;
           Ensure that current obligations, rules, 
        disciplines, and commitments under the WTO apply to 
        electronically-delivered goods and services;
           Ensure that the classification of 
        electronically-delivered goods and services provides 
        the most liberal trade treatment possible;
           Ensure that electronically-delivered goods 
        and services receive no less favorable treatment under 
        trade rules than like products delivered in physical 
        form;
           Ensure that governments refrain from 
        implementing trade-related measures that impede 
        electronic commerce;
           Obtain commitments that any domestic 
        regulations affecting electronic commerce are non-
        discriminatory, transparent, and consistent with 
        promoting an open electronic market;
           Pursue a pro-competitive regulatory 
        environment for basic and value-added 
        telecommunications services abroad since these services 
        are vital to electronic commerce; and
           Educate WTO Members about benefits of 
        electronic commerce and work to liberalize trade 
        barriers that directly impede electronic commerce.
            Section 2(b)(18)--Developing Countries--WTO
    Section 2(b)(18) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to developing countries. The 
bill recognizes that developing countries may have special 
needs. The specific objectives advanced by Congress are:
           Enter trade agreements that mutually promote 
        economic growth of developing countries and U.S.;
           Ensure appropriate phase-in periods with 
        respect to obligations of least-developed countries;
           Coordinate with the World Bank, IMF, and 
        other international institutions to provide debt relief 
        and other assistance to promote the rule of law and 
        sound and sustainable development; and
           Accelerate tariff reductions that benefit 
        least-developed countries.
            Section 2(b)(19)--Current Account Surpluses--WTO
    Section 2(b)(19) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to current account surpluses. 
This objective seeks to address countries that maintain large, 
persistent trade balance surpluses because their markets are 
relatively closed to imports. The specific objectives advanced 
by Congress are:
           Develop rules to address large and 
        persistent global account imbalances of countries to 
        impose responsibility on them to undertake policy 
        changes to restore equilibrium.
            Section 2(b)(20)--Trade and Monetary Coordination--WTO
    Section 2(b)(20) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to trade and monetary 
coordination. The specific objectives advanced by Congress are:
           Foster stability in international currency 
        markets and develop mechanisms to protect against trade 
        consequences of unanticipated currency movements.
            Section 2(b)(21)--Access to High Technology--WTO
    Section 2(b)(21) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to access to high technology. 
As a leader in information technology (IT), the United States 
should push hard for liberalization in this sector. The 
specific objectives advanced by Congress are:
           Obtain elimination or reduction of foreign 
        barriers to access by US persons to foreign-developed 
        technology;
           Seek elimination of tariffs on all IT 
        products, infrastructure equipment, scientific 
        instruments and medical equipment;
           Pursue reduction of foreign barriers to US 
        high-tech products;
           Enforce and promote the TBT Agreement to 
        ensure that technical standards and regulations do not 
        serve as barriers to trade in IT and communications 
        products; and
           Require all WTO Members to sign the 
        Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which 
        eliminates tariffs on a wide variety of information 
        technology products. Expand and update the products 
        covered by the ITA.
            Section 2(b)(22)--Corruption--WTO
    Section 2(b)(22) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to corruption. Corruption 
distorts markets and creates inefficiencies. U.S. businesses 
often lose out when corruption interferes with commercial 
transactions abroad. Accordingly, trade rules should address 
the impact that corruption may have on trade. The specific 
objectives advanced by Congress are:
           Establish standards at least as restrictive 
        as those in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
        and establish mechanisms to ensure enforcement of such 
        standards.
            Section 2(b)(23)--Implementation of Existing Commitments 
                    and Improvement of the WTO and WTO agreements--WTO
    Section 2(b)(23) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. WTO negotiators with respect to implementation of the 
existing WTO commitments and improvement of the WTO system. The 
specific objectives advanced by Congress are:
           Ensure compliance of Members with existing 
        obligations and under existing timetables;
           Strengthen the capacity of the WTO's Trade 
        Policy Review Mechanism (a WTO device that provides 
        regular reviews of each country's compliance with its 
        WTO obligations) to review Member implementation;
           Pursue diplomatic and dispute settlement 
        efforts that promote compliance; and
           Extend coverage of WTO Agreements to 
        products, sectors, and conditions of trade not 
        adequately covered.
            Section 2(c)--Principal Negotiating Objectives Under FTAA
    Section 2(c) contains the principal negotiating objectives 
for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations. 
The FTAA is likely to accelerate substantially the economic 
integration of the economies of the Western hemisphere. As is 
typically the case in negotiations designed to lead to a free 
trade agreement, the United States has been pushing for deep 
market-opening and other commitments from the other FTAA 
countries. U.S. objectives need to account for the dynamics of 
these free trade negotiations, as well as for the fact that 
many FTAA countries have different economic structures, 
including labor market and environmental standards, than the 
United States, and these differences may have effects on trade 
and investment flows. In addition, negotiating goals need to 
recognize that FTAA negotiations do not include certain 
countries whose policies or practices are key to U.S. goals in 
the WTO: e.g., members of the European Union and export 
subsidies issues. Accordingly, U.S. objectives with respect to 
a number of important issues vary significantly.
            Section 2(c)(1)--Trade in Agriculture--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(1) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for U.S. negotiators with respect to trade in agriculture. 
Congress would direct the negotiators to obtain competitive 
opportunities for U.S. exports in FTAA countries equivalent to 
those the United States affords FTAA agricultural imports and 
to achieve more open trade in agricultural commodities. The 
specific objectives advanced by Congress are the same as for 
the WTO with noted exceptions:
           Excludes language: (1) to eliminate export 
        subsidies, (2) reduce or eliminate domestic supports, 
        (3) the preservation of market development or food aid 
        programs, which are not at issue in the FTAA, (4) 
        ensure agriculture commitments for countries acceding 
        to the WTO, or (5) objective to treat all negotiations 
        as single undertaking. Non-inclusive of objectives with 
        respect to elimination or reduction of agricultural 
        subsides recognizes that pursuing this objective in the 
        FTAA (which does not include the heavily subsidizing 
        European Union), without ensuring at a minimum that a 
        satisfactory agreement is first undertaken in the WTO, 
        is tantamount to unilateral disarmament by the United 
        States.
           Also includes, establish mechanisms to 
        prevent the export of products from subsidized, non-
        FTAA countries (e.g., the EU) to FTAA countries. This 
        objective complements the omission of an objective 
        related to elimination of export subsides, noted above.
           Also includes, eliminate technology-based 
        discrimination against products and ensure that 
        negotiated rules do not weaken rights and obligations 
        under the WTO's Agreement on the Application of 
        Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. This addition is 
        needed to provide clear guidance with respect to the 
        establishment of SPS standards in the FTAA.
            Section 2(c)(2)--Trade in Services--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(2) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for trade in services. Unlike the WTO, there is no existing 
services agreement in the FTAA. Therefore, U.S. negotiators 
will be able to ensure that maximum liberalization is 
incorporated into FTAA services trade from the inception of the 
agreement. The specific objectives advanced by Congress are the 
same as for the WTO with noted exceptions:
           Excludes language pertaining to the 
        extension of GATS commitments;
           Excludes language relating to the adverse 
        effects of existing government measures, because that 
        language is addressed to deficiencies in the GATS;
           Modifies objectives referring to GATS to 
        make them applicable to FTAA negotiations;
           Also includes, utilize ``negative list'' 
        approach, whereby commitments will cover all services 
        and modes of supply unless expressly excluded--to 
        ensure maximum liberalization;
           Also includes, additional language in 
        principal negotiating statement specifying ``in 
        services in all modes of supply and across the broadest 
        range of service sectors.''
            Section 2(c)(3)--Trade in Manufactured and Non-agricultural 
                    Goods--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(3) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for trade in manufactured and non-agricultural goods. U.S. 
objectives for trade in manufactured and agricultural goods are 
identical in the WTO and the FTAA. Accordingly, the objectives 
here are the same as for the WTO.
            Section 2(c)(4)--Dispute Settlement--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(4) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for dispute settlement. Unlike the WTO, the FTAA does not have 
an existing dispute settlement mechanism, so the negotiating 
objectives in this area seek to ensure that the dispute 
settlement mechanism that is created for the FTAA will address 
problems that have arisen in WTO dispute settlement and will be 
expeditiousand effective. The specific objectives advanced by 
Congress are the same as for the WTO with noted exceptions:
           Excludes objective related to Article 17.6 
        of Antidumping Agreement--there should be no separate 
        antidumping agreement in the FTAA, so there is no need 
        to address this issue;
           Modifies objectives relating to WTO dispute 
        settlement system to make them applicable to the FTAA;
           Also includes, provide for a single, 
        effective and expeditious mechanism for dispute 
        settlement and a single set of procedures applicable to 
        all FTAA agreements--to ensure that all FTAA 
        obligations, including those on labor and environment, 
        may be enforced in the same way;
           Also includes, ensure that dispute 
        settlement system provides in all contexts, for the use 
        of all remedies that are demonstrably effective to 
        promote compliance--to ensure that all remedies are 
        available to enforce all FTAA obligations, including 
        those on labor and environment, and to ensure that the 
        remedies provided have demonstrated effectiveness.
            Section 2(c)(5)--Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
                    Property Rights (IPR)--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(5) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights 
(IPR). Unlike the WTO, the FTAA does not have an existing 
agreement on intellectual property. The specific objectives 
advanced by Congress are the same as for the WTO with noted 
exceptions:
           Excludes certain objectives specific to the 
        implementation and operation of the WTO TRIPs 
        Agreement;
           Modifies other objectives relating to WTO 
        TRIPs Agreement to make them applicable to the FTAA;
           Also includes, ensure that rules provide 
        standard of protection for IPR similar to that found in 
        U.S. law--which would be greater than the protections 
        offered by the WTO TRIPs Agreement;
           Also includes, provide strong IPR protection 
        for new and emerging technologies and new methods of 
        transmitting and distributing products embodying 
        intellectual property;
           Also includes, prevent discrimination with 
        respect to availability, acquisition, scope, 
        maintenance, use, and enforcement of IPR.
           Also includes, provide strong enforcement of 
        IPR;
           Also includes, secure fair, equitable and 
        non-discriminatory market access opportunities for 
        United States persons that rely upon intellectual 
        property protection.
            Section 2(c)(6)--Transparency--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(6) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for transparency. U.S. objectives for transparency are 
essentially identical in the WTO and the FTAA. Accordingly, the 
objectives here are essentially the same as for the WTO, with a 
few modifications accounting for the fact that the 
administrative structure of the FTAA has yet to be established.
            Section 2(c)(7)--Government Procurement--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(7) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for government procurement. U.S. objectives for government 
procurement are identical in the WTO and the FTAA. Accordingly, 
the objectives here are the same as for the WTO.
            Section 2(c)(8)--Trade Remedy Laws--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(8) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for trade remedy laws. U.S. objectives for trade remedy laws 
are identical in the WTO and the FTAA--in both forums, the 
United States should not enter into agreements that lessen in 
any respect the effectiveness of the trade laws and should seek 
to eliminate the causes of unfair trade and import surges. 
Accordingly, the objectives here are the same as for the WTO.
            Section 2(c)(9)--Trade and Labor Market Standards--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(9) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for trade and labor market standards. Many of the FTAA 
countries have very different economic structures, including 
labor market standards, than the United States. These 
differences may have affects on trade and investment flows 
among the FTAA countries, especially since the FTAA is likely 
to accelerate economic integration among the economies of the 
Western hemisphere. Accordingly, the objectives differ 
considerably from those in the WTO:
           Include enforceable rules that provide for 
        the adoption and enforcement of the International Labor 
        Organization's (ILO) five core labor standards (rights 
        to associate and to bargain collectively, bans on 
        discrimination, child labor, forced labor).
           Establish as the trigger for enforcement of 
        the above obligation
          (i) a country's failure to effectively enforce its 
        domestic labor standards in a manner affecting trade or 
        investment; or
          (ii) a country's waiver or derogation from its 
        domestic labor standards for the purpose of attracting 
        investment, inhibiting exports, or otherwise gaining a 
        competitive advantage;
          recognizing that FTAA members retain discretion with 
        respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, 
        and compliance matters and to adopt or modify their 
        laws consistent with the ILO's core labor standards;
           Provide for phased-in compliance as 
        appropriate for least-developed countries;
           Create an FTAA work program to provide 
        technical assistance and positive incentives to FTAA 
        members to aid them in improving their labor laws;
           Provide for regular review of each country's 
        adherence to its labor laws;
           Ensure that the FTAA includes exceptions to 
        allow countries to prohibit products produced by prison 
        labor and child labor and to ensure that countries 
        would not bepenalized for taking actions to carry out 
ILO recommendations, e.g., the ILO recommendation with respect to 
Burma.
            Section 2(c)(10)--Trade and the Environment--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(10) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for trade and the environment. Many of the FTAA countries have 
different economic structures, including environmental 
standards, than the United States. These differences may have 
effects on trade and investment flows between the FTAA 
countries, especially since the FTAA is likely to accelerate 
economic integration among the economies of the Western 
hemisphere. Accordingly, the objectives differ considerably 
from those in the WTO:
           Obtain rules that provide for each country 
        to enforce its domestic environmental laws relating to:
          (i) the prevention, abatement, or control of the 
        release, discharge, or emission of pollutants or 
        environmental contaminants;
          (ii) the control of environmentally hazardous or 
        toxic chemicals, substances, materials and wastes, and 
        the dissemination of information related thereto; and
          (iii) the protection of wild flora or fauna, 
        including endangered species, their habitats, and 
        specially protected natural areas, in the territory of 
        FTAA member countries;
           Establish as the trigger for enforcement of 
        the above obligation
          (i) a country's failure to effectively enforce its 
        domestic environmental laws in a manner affecting trade 
        or investment; or
          (ii) a country's waiver or derogation from its 
        domestic environmental laws for the purpose of 
        attracting investment, inhibiting exports, or otherwise 
        gaining a competitive advantage;
          recognizing that FTAA members retain discretion with 
        respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, 
        and compliance matters and to adopt or modify their 
        environmental laws;
           Provide for phased-in compliance as 
        appropriate for least-developed countries;
           Create an FTAA work program to provide 
        technical assistance and positive incentives to FTAA 
        members to aid them in improving their environmental 
        laws;
           Provide for regular review of each country's 
        adherence to its environmental laws;
           Ensure that the FTAA includes exceptions to 
        allow countries to take measures to provide effective 
        protection for human, animal, or plant life or health; 
        to take measures to conserve exhaustible natural 
        resources; and to take measures in accordance with 
        obligations under multilateral environmental agreements 
        accepted by both parties to a dispute;
           Give priority to trade liberalization 
        measures that promote sustainable development.
            Section 2(c)(11)--Institution Building--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(11) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for institution building. The objectives here are similar to 
those for the WTO. The minor differences in objectives are due 
to the fact that WTO already has an institutional structure, 
while the FTAA does not.
            Section 2(c)(12)--Trade and Investment--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(12) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for trade and investment. Unlike the WTO, the FTAA does not 
have an existing agreement on investment. Drafts of the FTAA 
text indicate that the United States is pursuing an investment 
agreement modeled on Chapter 11 of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which includes a right for investors 
to bring claims directly against a state and is otherwise a 
substantially different agreement from the limited WTO TRIMs 
Agreement. The objectives recognize the value of effective 
investor protections, while also recognizing a concern that has 
arisen under NAFTA Chapter 11 that investor protections written 
too broadly could afford greater rights to foreign investors 
than those afforded under U.S. domestic law, and could 
jeopardize valid environmental and other regulations. 
Accordingly, the objectives differ considerably from those in 
the WTO:
           Reduce or eliminate barriers to investment 
        by securing for investors the rights that would be 
        available under U.S. domestic law, but no greater 
        rights--this provision ensures effective investment 
        protections while also ensuring that foreign investors 
        will receive no greater rights in the U.S. than U.S. 
        investors;
           Ensure national and most-favored nation 
        (i.e., non-discriminatory) treatment for U.S. investors 
        and investments;
           Free the transfer of funds relating to 
        investments;
           Reduce or eliminate performance 
        requirements, forced technology transfers, and other 
        unreasonable barriers to investment;
           Establish standards for expropriation 
        consistent with U.S. law, including by specifically 
        incorporating the U.S. legal principle that a ``mere 
        diminution in value'' does not constitute an 
        expropriation;
           Codify the recent clarifications made by the 
        NAFTA governments to the ``minimum standard of 
        treatment'' investment rules, which were made to 
        correct erroneous decisions by NAFTA arbitration 
        panels;
           Ensure through rules in the text of the 
        agreement that the investor protections do not 
        interfere with legitimate domestic regulations (e.g., 
        domestic health, safety, and environmental 
        regulations), including by specifically clarifying that 
        the agreement standards do not require use of the 
        ``least trade restrictive'' alternative--the specific 
        clarification corrects an erroneous decision by a NAFTA 
        arbitration panel;
           Provide an exception from investment rules 
        for actions taken in accordance with obligations under 
        a multilateral environmental agreement;
           Provide meaningful procedures for resolving 
        investment disputes;
           Provide an independent, non-political 
        approval process before an investor may bring a claim 
        directly against a state in order to screen out 
        frivolous complaints;
           Provide a standing appellate mechanism to 
        correct erroneous interpretations of law;
           Ensure the fullest transparency in 
        investment dispute settlement mechanisms.
            Section 2(c)(13)--Electronic Commerce--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(13) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for electronic commerce. U.S. objectives for electronic 
commerce are essentially identical in the WTO and the FTAA. The 
minor differences in objectives are due to the fact that the 
WTO already has agreements and obligations applicable to e-
commerce, while the FTAA does not.
            Section 2(c)(14)--Developing Countries--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(14) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for developing countries. U.S. objectives for developing 
countries are identical in the WTO and the FTAA. Accordingly, 
the objectives here are the same as for the WTO.
            Section 2(c)(15)--Trade and Monetary Coordination--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(15) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for trade and monetary coordination. U.S. objectives for trade 
and monetary coordination are identical in the WTO and the 
FTAA. Accordingly, the objectives here are the same as for the 
WTO.
            Section 2(c)(16)--Access to High Technology--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(16) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for access to high technology. U.S. objectives for access to 
high technology are identical in the WTO and the FTAA. 
Accordingly, the objectives here are the same as for the WTO.
            Section 2(c)(17)--Corruption--FTAA
    Section 2(c)(17) contains principal negotiating objectives 
for corruption. U.S. objectives for corruption are identical in 
the WTO and the FTAA. Accordingly, the objectives here are the 
same as for the WTO.

Section 3--Congressional Trade Advisors

    The Act enlarges the membership and strengthens the role of 
the statutorily-created congressional trade advisors. Under 
existing law (section 161 of the Trade Act of 1974), the 
Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tem of the Senate 
appoint five Members from the Committees on Ways and Means and 
Finance, respectively, to serve as congressional advisors on 
trade policy and trade negotiations. These five Ways and Means 
and five Finance Members are mandatory appointments, and must 
be made at the start of each Congress. In addition, the statute 
allows the Speaker and President Pro Tem to select additional 
members for designation as congressional advisors on specific 
issues. The additional appointments are discretionary.
    Section 3 of the Act expands the mandatory appointments to 
the congressional trade advisors to include two Members each 
from the House Agriculture Committee and Senate Agriculture, 
Nutrition and Forestry Committees, and two additional Members 
from each House. The Act preserves the Speaker's ability under 
current law to appoint additional advisors (hereafter 
``discretionary advisors''). The Act retains the party ratio 
set forth in existing law (the party in control of a chamber 
has one more appointment than the minority party).
    The Act also strengthens the role of the congressional 
trade advisors in a number of ways. First, the Act requires the 
President to consult with them at specified points in a 
negotiation, such as in formulating negotiating objectives for 
new negotiations (section 5), during the course of negotiations 
(section 6), and prior to entering into an agreement (section 
7). Second, under section 7 of the Act, a majority of the 
mandatory must concur with the President's certification that 
the agreement substantially achieves the principal negotiating 
objectives identified in the Act or developed in consultation 
with Congress for the related implementing bill to be covered 
by fast track procedures. Third, section 5 of the Act requires 
the congressional trade advisors to submit a report providing 
their views regarding extension of fast track authority if the 
President requests extension beyond the initial five-year 
period. Finally, section 3 of the Act allows the statutory 
trade advisors to serve as official advisors to U.S. 
delegations in dispute settlement proceedings.

Section 4--Trade Agreements Authority

    Section 4 provides the President with two types of 
authority: (1) the authority to proclaim certain duty 
modifications without Congressional approval; and (2) the 
authority to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries 
to eliminate trade barriers, and to secure fast track coverage 
for implementing bills related to agreements covering the 
elimination of such barriers.
    With respect to duty modifications, section 4(a) provides 
the President with the authority to proclaim certain duty 
modifications required by a trade agreement without additional 
legislation. This authority, which tracks the 1988 fast track 
grant, is limited by the following. First, for duty rates that 
exceed 5 percent ad valorem, the President is not authorized to 
reduce any rate of duty to a rate less than 50 percent of the 
rate of duty in effect on the date of enactment. Rates at or 
below 5 percent ad valorem can be reduced to zero. Second, no 
duty reduction done by proclamation may exceed more than 3 
percent per year or one-tenth of the total reduction, whichever 
is greater, except for products for which there is no U.S. 
production. These limitations do not apply to reciprocal 
agreements to eliminate or harmonize duties negotiated under 
the WTO or interim agreements leading to the formation of a 
regional free trade agreement.
    With respect to trade barriers, section 4(b) authorizes the 
President to enter into a trade agreement with a foreign 
country if: (1) he determines that any duty or other import 
restriction or any other barrier to or distortion of 
international trade unduly burdens or restricts the foreign 
trade of the United States or adversely affects the U.S. 
economy, or the imposition of any such barrier or distortion is 
likely to result in such a burden, restriction or effect; (2) 
the agreement provides for the reduction or elimination of such 
barrier or other distortion or prohibits or limits the 
imposition of such a barrier or other distortion; (3) the 
agreement substantially achieves the identified negotiating 
objectives; and (4) the President meets other conditions set 
forth in the Act.
    Section 4 also defines what may be included in an 
implementing bill submitted under fast track procedures. Under 
section 4(b), an implementing bill may include only: (1) 
provisions approving the trade agreement and the statement of 
administrative action; (2) if changes to existing law are 
required to implement the agreement, provisions necessary or 
appropriate to implementation; and (3) provisions to provide 
trade adjustment assistance to workers, firms and communities.
    The Act extends fast track authority to the President for 
five years. Fast track authority may be extended for two 
additional years, if the President requests an extension, and 
if neither House of Congress disapproves of the extension 
request. Procedures for consideration of resolutions 
disapproving of the President's extension request are set forth 
in section 4(c), and largely track the procedures set forth in 
the 1988 Act.

Section 5--Commencement of Negotiations

    Section 5 establishes procedural requirements for new trade 
negotiations initiated during the term of the Act for which the 
Administration is seeking fast track procedures. Section 5 
applies only to new negotiations--section 5 does not apply to 
negotiations in the WTO and the FTAA (for which negotiating 
objectives have been identified in the Act), or negotiations 
with Singapore and Chile (which are on-going). Section 5 
requires the President to develop with Congress the negotiating 
objectives to be pursued in a new negotiation, and establishes 
an opportunity for Congress to disapprove of new negotiations 
involving more than one foreign country.
    With respect to development of negotiating objectives, 
section 5(b) provides that at least 90 days prior to initiation 
of negotiations, the President must both notify Congress of his 
intent to negotiate, and submit proposed negotiating 
objectives. Between notification and the start of the 
negotiations, the Act directs the President to work with the 
committees of jurisdiction and the congressional trade advisors 
to develop the specific negotiating objectives to be pursued, 
and in the case of negotiations involving agriculture, to make 
certain evaluations concerning foreign tariff barriers.
    With respect to the role of Congress, section 5 creates a 
legislative mechanism for Congress to deny fast track 
protections to new trade negotiations involving more than one 
foreign country (e.g., new regional negotiations). 
Specifically, under section 5(c), fast track protections are 
denied to such new trade negotiations if both Houses of 
Congress pass a resolution of disapproval during the 90-day 
period between notification of intent to negotiate, and 
initiation of negotiations. Resolutions under section 5(c) are 
privileged (i.e., automatic committee discharge, mandatory 
floor consideration, and time-limited debate, as set forth in 
section 152 (c), (d), and (e) of the Trade Act of 1974).

Section 6--Congressional Participation During Negotiations

    Section 6 of the Act strengthens and expands the 
congressional role during the course of trade negotiations by: 
(1) creating a more active oversight role for the committees of 
jurisdiction and the congressional trade advisors; (2) creating 
the opportunity for periodic congressional review of on-going 
negotiations; (3) requiring the President to examine and report 
to the Congress on specified issues during the course of 
negotiations; and (4) establishing reporting requirements and 
other procedures for the President to meet prior to entering 
into an agreement.
    Section 6(a) requires the President to consult closely and 
on a timely basis with the committees of jurisdiction and the 
congressional trade advisors during the course of negotiations. 
In addition, section 6(b) requires the USTR to develop, in 
consultation with the chairs and ranking members of the Ways 
and Means and Finance Committees and the trade advisors, 
detailed guidelines for briefing committees and the trade 
advisors during negotiations.
    Section 6(c) creates an opportunity for the full Congress 
to review periodically the course of on-going trade 
negotiations, and to revoke fast track authority for a 
negotiation. Specifically, section 6(c) creates a mechanism for 
a sizeable minority of Members in the House or Senate to bring 
to the floor a privileged resolution revoking fast track 
protections for a trade negotiation, or set of negotiations 
(i.e., more than one negotiation may be named in the 
resolution). Privileged resolutions are subject to automatic 
committee discharge, and mandatory floor consideration, and 
gain privileged status if co-sponsored by 145 Members in the 
House, or, in the Senate, if co-sponsored by 34 Senators. For 
fast track procedures to be revoked for that agreement, both 
the House and Senate must pass a disapproval resolution naming 
the same agreement within 120 days. However, the House and 
Senate resolutions need not be identical. Only one resolution 
in each House may gain privileged status per Congress.
    Disapproval resolutions that do not have the requisite 
number of cosponsors, or that are introduced after the first 
privileged resolution, are considered under normal procedures 
(i.e., must be reported by Ways and Means in the House, and 
Finance in the Senate, and are not entitled to automatic floor 
consideration, unless subject to a discharge petition).
    Section 6(d) codifies an existing Executive Order mandating 
environmental assessments for all new trade agreements. Section 
6(d) improves the Executive Order by mandating that the USTR 
and CEQ identify in the assessment presented to Congress: (1) 
the environmental impacts of trade agreements; (2) ways to 
minimize adverse impacts and maximize positive ones; and (3) 
how USTR incorporated the result of the assessment in 
developing U.S. negotiating positions. Section 6(d) also 
codifies the advisory committee on trade and environment (the 
Trade and Environmental Policy Advisory Committee).
    Section 6(e) requires the USTR and the Department of Labor 
to assess and report on the impact of new trade agreements on 
workers, and to develop proposals to mitigate adverse impacts. 
Section 6(e) also codifies the advisory committee on trade and 
labor (the Labor Advisory Committee).
    Section 6(f) requires the USTR to notify Congress at least 
90 days before entering into a trade agreement of language in 
an agreement that could affect U.S. trade laws, or U.S. rights 
and obligations under the WTO safeguards, antidumping and 
countervailing duty agreements.
    Section 6(g) requires the President to report to Congress 
at least 90 days before entering into a trade agreement that 
includes an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism on 
theoperation of the dispute settlement mechanism, including how the 
agreement does not impair a host state's police powers, including its 
regulatory authority.
    Section 6(h) requires the President, prior to signing a 
trade agreement, to consult with the relevant committees of 
jurisdiction and the congressional trade advisors on the nature 
of the agreement, how and to what extent the agreement will 
achieve the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives set 
forth in the Act, and the implementation of the agreement, 
including the impact on U.S. laws.
    Section 6(i) requires the Advisory Committee for Trade 
Policy and Negotiations to provide a report on the trade 
agreement no later than 30 days after the President notifies 
Congress of his intent to sign the agreement.
    Section 6(j) requires the U.S. International Trade 
Commission to provide an assessment of the trade agreement on 
the U.S. economy as a whole, and on specific sectors, no later 
than 90 days after the President signs the agreement.

Section 7--Implementation of Trade Agreements

    Section 7 governs Congressional consideration of a signed 
trade agreement and the accompanying implementing legislation.
    The primary innovation in section 7 is the requirement that 
the President certify that an agreement substantially achieves 
the identified negotiating objectives prior to signing the 
agreement, and that such certification be agreed to by the 
congressional trade advisors for the related implementing bill 
to be covered by fast track procedures. Specifically, under 
section 7 the President is required, at least 120 days before 
signing a trade agreement, to notify Congress of his intent to 
enter into the agreement. No later than 30 days thereafter, the 
President must also present to Congress a statement certifying 
that the agreement substantially achieves the negotiating 
objectives identified for the negotiation.
    After the President submits his certification to Congress, 
the congressional trade advisors have 30 days to review the 
draft agreement and the President's certification, and make an 
independent assessment of whether the agreement substantially 
achieves the principal negotiating objectives. If a majority of 
the congressional trade advisors concurs with the President's 
certification, the procedures under section 151 of the Trade 
Act of 1974 (fast track procedures) apply to the related 
implementing legislation. (The procedures under section 151 of 
the Trade Act of 1974 require Congressional action on 
qualifying implementing bills no later than 90 days after 
formal submission of the agreement and the draft implementing 
legislation. Section 151 requires Congressional consideration 
without amendment.)
    The remainder of section 7 largely tracks the procedures in 
the 1988 Act. Specifically, within 60 days of entering into the 
agreement, the President is required to submit a list of 
changes to existing laws required to bring the United States 
into compliance with the agreement. After signing the 
agreement, the President is required to submit formally the 
agreement, the draft implementing legislation, a statement of 
administrative action, and additional supporting information. 
The supporting information includes: (1) an explanation as to 
how the implementing legislation and the statement of 
administrative action change existing law; (2) a statement 
asserting that the agreement substantially achieves the 
applicable purposes, policies and objectives of the fast track 
bill, and explaining how and to what extent the agreement 
substantially achieves the applicable purposes, policies and 
objectives of the Act; and (3) a statement explaining why the 
implementing bill and statement of administrative action is 
required or appropriate to carry out the agreement.
    The President may submit these documents at any time after 
signing the agreement. The committees of jurisdiction are 
expected to conduct an informal markup of the implementing 
legislation between the time the President enters into the 
agreement, and before he formally submits it, and the proposed 
implementing legislation.

Section 8--Treatment of Certain Trade Agreements

    Section 8 exempts specific trade agreements from the Act's 
pre-negotiation notification requirements and review. The 
exempted negotiations are: (1) the WTO and FTAA negotiations, 
because negotiating objectives are identified in the fast track 
legislation; and (2) negotiations with Chile and Singapore, 
because the negotiations are on-going, and are well along 
toward completion. Section 8 also modifies deadlines for 
certain reports on the exempted agreements.

Section 9--Additional Reports and Studies

    Section 9 requires the President to submit a report on 
trade-restrictive practices of U.S. trading partners, including 
anti-competitive practices by private entities promoted, 
enabled or tolerated by a foreign government. Section 9 also 
requires the USTR to provide Congress with an annual report on 
exchange rate fluctuations.

Section 10--Additional Implementation and Enforcement Requirements

    Section 10 requires the President to submit an enforcement 
plan with each signed trade agreement. The plan must indicate 
whether additional personnel and equipment are necessary for 
the agencies charged with enforcement of the agreement to carry 
out their responsibilities. If additional resources are 
necessary, the President must include a request for such 
resources in his next budget submission.

                                   Charles B. Rangel.
                                   Michael R. McNulty.
                                   Robert T. Matsui.
                                   Sander Levin.
                                   William J. Coyne.
                                   Xavier Becerra.

             Dissenting Views on the Thomas Fast-Track Bill

    Recently, Ambassador Zoellick joined with his ministerial 
colleagues from Canada and Mexico to issue an interpretation of 
some NAFTA Chapter 11 investment provisions. While we 
appreciate this effort, which acknowledges that changes in the 
Chapter 11 model are needed, it is far short of reform. We do 
not believe that these interpretations address many of the most 
fundamental and critical problems with the Chapter 11 rules, 
nor does HR 3005.
    Given the serious problems that we believe exist in NAFTA's 
Chapter 11 on investment, we believe that the U.S. position on 
investment must involve a substantial revision of the Chapter 
11 model. NAFTA's investment provisions have opened the door to 
a number of unexpected legal challenges brought before 
international tribunals by foreign companies seeking financial 
compensation from governments. Many of these challenges have 
been brought on the grounds that foreign investors must be 
compensated when regulation entirely within the scope of 
traditional governmental authority over the environment, health 
and safety or government purchasing threatens their business 
interests.
    Under the vague and overly broad language in the 
substantive provisions of Chapter 11, the actions against the 
United States could result in outcomes that would not be 
possible if the challenges were brought in domestic courts, 
thereby granting to foreign investors greater rights than those 
that are available to U.S. citizens. HR 3005 does nothing to 
change this skewed system against American citizens and 
businesses.
    Moreover, challenges under Chapter 11 are conducted before 
tribunals whose proceedings are not open to the public, whose 
rulings are not required to follow any judicial precedent, and 
whose decisions are not subject to any standard appeals 
process. Further, there is no diplomatic check or screen, such 
as approval from a national government, before private entities 
can bring these cases before international tribunals. HR 3005 
does nothing to allow US citizens to view and participate in 
these court proceedings where their interests are being 
decided, what we ordinarily consider basic legal protections.
    These cases represent a troubling shift of oversight over 
environmental and public interest regulation to international 
tribunals operating behind closed doors. We therefore believe 
that the provisions of Chapter 11 represent a fundamental 
threat to the ability of democratic governments to protect the 
public interest. These provisions should not be repeated in any 
future trade agreement, and HR 3005 does nothing to prevent 
this.
    At the markup, we offered a simple, common-sense amendment 
to address these serious issues. Our amendment, if successful, 
would have:
          Ensured that foreign investors will enjoy no greater 
        protection than that afforded to domestic U.S. 
        investors under the U.S. constitution;
          Required that all private investors gain approval 
        from their home country government before bringing a 
        case under the investment provisions;
          Limited expropriation to cases in which there is 
        direct expropriation of all economically beneficial use 
        of property;
          Limited violations of minimum standard of treatment 
        to a customary international law standard defined as 
        denial of justice and failure to provide full 
        protection and security;
          Provided a clear exception for the governmental 
        exercise of police powers, including legitimate health, 
        safety, environmental, consumer and employment 
        opportunity laws and regulations, and;
          Ensured that all proceedings, submissions, findings, 
        and decisions are promptly made public and that all 
        hearings are open to the public, and ensure that amicus 
        briefs will be accepted and considered by the 
        tribunals.
    The Administration's arguments that any such mandatory 
language should not be accepted is, itself, unacceptable. HR 
3005 presents merely a wish-list of environmental, labor, 
public health and safety goals. If we had unlimited faith in 
the Executive, we would not need any guidelines.
    We believe that unless the important issues outlined above 
are addressed and the Chapter 11 model for investment 
provisions substantially revised, future trade agreements may 
impair our sovereignty and thus both our ability to protect our 
citizens and preserve our country's remarkable natural 
resources. We can make trade agreements that include a shield 
to guard against expropriation of an industry, without giving 
foreign investors a sword to attack our laws. And we can do so 
while opening the entire process to public inspection. We 
respectfully dissent and oppose HR 3005.

                                   Lloyd Doggett.
                                   John Lewis.
                                   Jim McDermott.
                                   Karen Thurman.

                     Additional Views on H.R. 3005

    Every President since 1974--Republican and Democrat--has 
had Trade Promotion Authority. Congress has consistently 
recognized that the Administration must have the authority to 
break down foreign trade barriers, and a bi-partisan majority 
of the United States Congress has consistently supported 
American leadership in opening markets and creating jobs.
    This year, we face the question of how to address the 
emerging issues that have shaped the global economy in more 
recent years, including how to address the competitiveness 
issues raised by varying labor and environmental conditions in 
developing countries.
    The United States cannot negotiate another country's wage 
levels or environmental standards anymore than the United 
States would permit other countries to determine our own, but 
we can and should work cooperatively with our trading partners 
to raise labor and environmental standards. Promoting 
sustainable development practices and respect for worker rights 
is a gradual process.
    As you may know, we spent months working on a 
comprehensive, balanced proposal to grant the President 
authority to negotiate trade agreements. We worked hard to 
ensure that Democratic principles were balanced with the need 
to ensure our products have access to more open markets.
    Like many Members, we found the Crane bill unacceptable. 
After consultations with Representative Rangel and other 
Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee, we engaged in 
discussions on a bill to push forward Democratic ideals. We are 
convinced that our proposal moves the ball forward in a 
balanced, meaningful, and substantial way on labor and 
environmental issues.
    Some have argued that our proposal does not go far enough; 
we strongly disagree.
    ILO Core Labor standards will now be considered in the 
context of trade agreements and negotiations. Negotiators will 
be able to promote respect for these ILO standards; not impose 
them on countries. And our proposal provides for meaningful 
ways for the U.S. to assist countries in improving their labor 
standards. Principal Negotiating Objectives require the U.S. to 
assist in building the capacity for countries to respect worker 
rights (defined in Section 10 (2) of H.R. 3005 as (1) the right 
of association; (2) the right to organize and bargain 
collectively; (3) a prohibition on the use of any form of 
forced or compulsory labor; (4) a minimum age for the 
employment of children; and (5) acceptable conditions of work 
with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational 
safety and health) and to develop more protective environmental 
laws as well as requires countries to enforce the labor and 
environment laws they have.
    The bill also requires the U.S. to establish consultative 
mechanisms to improve worker rights and environmental laws, and 
requires the Secretary of Labor to provide technical assistance 
to developing countries in the development of better labor laws 
and enforcement of those laws. We feel these provisions give 
U.S. negotiators a strong mandate to address labor and 
environmental issues without infringing on the ability of 
negotiators to open markets for U.S. exports and investment.
    Consider other key elements of our proposal:
          The bipartisan proposal includes a substantive, 
        enforceable standard on labor and environment directly 
        taken from the Jordan Free Trade Agreement;
          The bipartisan proposal includes labor and 
        environment objectives which require negotiators to 
        promote respect for core labor standards, sustainable 
        development and environmental protection;
          There is parity of enforcement and the availability 
        for the use of sanctions for ALL negotiating 
        objectives;
          We provide for a substantive, inclusive, and 
        prescriptive role for Congress in the development of 
        trade policy and trade negotiations; and finally,
          The bill incorporates the concept of transparency at 
        all levels of the multilateral trading regime.
    While it is true that this bipartisan legislation does not 
take steps to impose standards on developing countries, provide 
overly prescriptive negotiating objectives, or attempt to grant 
only a limited form of negotiating authority, the bipartisan 
proposal represents substantial progress in the area of U.S. 
trade policy since the 1988 Trade Act.
    Clearly, we are at a crossroads in trying to determine how 
best to improve international labor standards among our trading 
partners. On the one hand, H.R. 3005 presents an opportunity 
for creating a bipartisan consensus in the United States to 
integrate the enforcement of national labor laws into trade 
agreements and to increase the ability of countries through 
trade-related initiatives to have ``core'' labor standards. On 
the other hand, we can continue to argue over whether trade 
agreements must require countries to adopt specific labor laws; 
a position that has no chance of succeeding domestically or 
internationally.
    Some of our colleagues advocate for the imposition of ILO 
standards on developing countries. The United States cannot 
negotiate another country's labor laws anymore than the U.S. 
would permit other countries to determine our own, but we can 
and should work cooperatively to raise labor standards around 
the world.
    A few points on this issue:
    Mandating Trade-based Enforcement of ILO Commitments Will 
Not Be As Effective in Improving Standards As Working 
Cooperatively with Developing Countries. In general, the 
countries whose labor standards we most want to improve will 
simply not agree to adopt commitments in trade agreements to 
enforce ILO conventions or ILO standards subject to trade 
sanctions. Indeed, many of these countries are as skeptical 
about trade and investment liberalization as they are about 
enforceable commitments on labor standards. The perceived 
benefits of trade agreements are insufficient to change the 
longstanding antipathy towards linking these issues in many 
developing countries.
    Mandating Trade-based Enforcement of ILO Commitments Will 
Reduce, Not Enhance, the Effectiveness of the ILO. Developing 
countries will be less likely to agree to new ILO declarations 
or conventions if they see trade sanctions down the road.
    Neither the ``Core Principles'' nor Conventional Standards 
Represent Appropriate Standards to be enforced in Trade 
Agreements. The ``ILO core principles'' do not provide concrete 
or enforceable standards for determining what is a violation. 
They represent general principles that all ILO member nations 
have agreed to pursue. ILO conventions are not appropriate 
standards for the United States to impose even if the other 
country has ratified a particular convention.
          The United States is only party to two core 
        conventions (No. 105, Abolition of Forced Labor (1957) 
        and No. 182, Worst Forms of Child Labor (1999)) and is 
        party to only 12 of the over 150 ILO conventions 
        currently in force.
          The United States has not ratified several of the 
        core conventions, including those on freedom of 
        association and collective bargaining, and other 
        conventions. U.S. labor laws and practices may not be 
        consistent with specific provisions in those 
        conventions.
          The dispute settlement systems typically set up by 
        trade agreements lack the expertise to address whether 
        such labor principles or conventional standards are 
        being adequately enforced.
    Other Mechanisms Would be More Useful to Promote 
Enforcement of ILO Standards. Many developing countries lack 
the capacity or expertise to enforce standards adequately. 
Efforts to provide technical assistance and increase capacity 
are critical to having a positive impact on labor practices 
worldwide. Rather than working outside the ILO to improve the 
enforcement of ILO standards, it would make more sense to work 
within the organization with both the technical expertise and 
all the relevant parties (e.g., governments, labor and 
business) on improving the ILO's existing mechanisms.
    Many on the Committee have expressed concern that the 
bipartisan bill does not go far enough to address labor and 
environmental concerns. While we can always strive for the 
perfect; the bipartisan bill represents substantial progress 
and a balanced approach to trade negotiations. Its provisions 
allow for the achievement of all the goals of the Democratic 
substitute; and it achieves them in a manner that does not 
raise questions regarding the treatment of developing countries 
or regarding the ability of TPA to provide greater confidence 
with our trading partners and our potential trading partners in 
the United States' commitment to enhancing the global economy 
through more liberalized trade.
    The approach to improving labor and environmental standards 
in trade agreements included in the bipartisan TPA bill is 
balanced and responsible and we are pleased that a majority on 
the Committee also recognized H.R. 3005 for having made 
progress in these areas of U.S. trade policy.

                                   William J. Jefferson.
                                   John Tanner.

                                
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