Warsaw Pact, which had been little more than a
paper organization for several years after it was
founded in 1955, finally started to acquire a few of
the trappings of a real alliance.

These efforts to strengthen the Warsaw Pact were
initiated by Khrushchev, but they were given even
greater emphasis by Brezhnev. Unlike Khrushchev,
who had sought to cut Soviet conventional forces
and to rely predominantly on long-range nuclear
missiles, Brezhnev committed the Soviet Union
to a full-scale military buildup that expanded both
conventional and nuclear weapons. The growth
and modernization of Soviet conventional forces
during the Brezhnev era facili-
tated major improvements in
Soviet combat units in Eastern
Europe, whose role was to
serve as the “main strategic
echelon” of the Warsaw Pact.

The increased vigor of the
Pact helped to shore up the
Soviet Union's position in
Eastern Europe by allowing
more of the financial costs
of “defending the socialist
commonwealth” to be passed
off onto the East European
governments while avoiding
any commensurate change in
the way the alliance operated.
All the Soviet-dominated struc-
tures of the Warsaw Pact were
preserved. Wartime control of
allied forces was retained by
the Soviet High Command, and
even in peacetime the Pact’s
joint military exercises were infrequently—and then
only symbolically—under the command of East
European generals. Moreover, all the top posts in
the Pact’s Joint Command were still reserved exclu-
sively for Soviet officers.

Soviet hegemony in the Warsaw Pact was further
strengthened in the early to mid-1960s by a series
of top-secret bilateral agreements providing for the
deployment of Soviet tactical nuclear warheads
and nuclear-capable delivery vehicles on the terri-
tory of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary. The agreements were described
as coming “within the framework of the Warsaw

a as

Pact,” but all nuclear warheads were kept under
strict Soviet control, and the dual-capable delivery
vehicles that the East European countries
possessed would have come under direct Soviet
command if they had ever been equipped with
nuclear warheads during a crisis. Moreover, the
thousands of tactical nuclear weapons deployed by
Soviet forces on East European territory were not
subject to any sort of “dual-key” arrangement analo-
gous to the procedures adopted by NATO in the
mid-1960s to give the West European governments
an effective veto over the use of American tactical
nuclear weapons. Whenever Warsaw Pact exercis-
es included combat techniques for nuclear warfare
(as they routinely did from
early 1962 on), all decisions on
whether to “go nuclear” were
reserved exclusively for Soviet
political leaders and military
commanders. East European
leaders were not even consult-
ed. Despite efforts by Romania
and one or two other East-bloc
governments in the 1960s to
establish some form of nuclear
“sharing” within the Warsaw
Pact, the East European states
were never given any say in
the use of the alliance’s “joint”
nuclear arsenal.

The growth of Soviet strate-
gic nuclear power in the 1960s
also helped to strengthen
Moscow’s sphere of influence
in Eastern Europe. Even at
the time of the Hungarian
revolution in 1956, when the Soviet Union's only
means of delivering a nuclear attack against the
continental United States was a limited number
of long-range bombers, U.S. intelligence officials
warned President Dwight Eisenhower that any
steps aimed at “preparing for military intervention”
in Hungary “would materially increase the risk of
general war,” including the possibility of a nuclear
exchange. With the advent of Sputnik in October
1957 and the USSR’s subsequent deployments of
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), as well as
the expansion of the Soviet heavy bomber force, the
Soviet Union by the early to mid-1960s clearly had
the capacity to wreak untold destruction upon the

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 19


40

> :
ton se ost.

“counterrevolutionary,” and in the spirit of the "counter-
revolutionary elements” who “attempted to undermine the
Hungarian people's socialist achievenents" in 1956. The most
cainous part of the article is that it judges guilty by associa-
tion “certain leading figures in Czechoslovakia” who have sade
“ambiguous statements in vhich they try to minimize the danger
inherent in the counterrevolutionsry '2000 Words',” This

probedly points to Dubcek himself.

5. The heightened Soviet pressure constitutes a demand on
Dubcek to balt or reverse the basic current of political evolu-
tion in Czechoslovakia since last January, They are tacking up
this demand with an evident threat of military force. To satisfy
the Soviets now, Dubcek would have to make sone visible concession,
such 45 the reimposition of press censorship; or the arrest of
the authors of the "2000 Words;" or the purge of sone of Dubcek's
literal associates who have been criticized by the Soviet press,
Such ee Cisar or Kriegel; or his acquiescence in the permacnt
stationing of some foreign troops on Czechoslovak soil. It would
be extremely difficult for Dubcek to make any of these concessions
at this point without running s serious riek of public disorder,
with @ strong anti-Soviet cast. ‘Thus the most recent developments

| THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA



Approved For eee SP SER BHT R000200290008-1

25Xx1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
12 guly 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Czechoslovak-Soviet Struggle

Summary

Soviet-Czech relations are again at a point of
high tension. Moscow has publicly likened the situ-
ation in Czechoslovakia today to that which existed
in Hungary just before the revolt there twelve years
ago. The message, though implicit, was clear to all:
Soviet troops which were moved into Czechoslovakia
were placed there not for the "exercises" that provided
@ pretext, but as a token of Moscow's readiness to in-
tervene militarily if worst came to worst. The Soviets
have not been persuaded by Dubcek's repeated assurances
that he can control the situation, and they have not
seen the course of liberalization he has set in train
slowed or changed. They have, therefore, been in no
hurry to withdraw the forces they have positioned in
his country.

For their part, the Czech leaders seem not to
have lost their nerve. Indeed, their resolve seems to
have stiffened under Soviet pressure. There is little
choice for them but to stand their ground on the key
issues, They seem to understand more clearly than
their Soviet overlords that what has been set in mo-
tion in Czechoslovakia will not easily be reversed,

Note: Thte memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It
bae prepared jointly by the Office of Current Intel-
ligence and the Office of Strategia Researeh and eo-
ordinated with the Office of National Fetimates.

TOP SECRET

36 | THECIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA


|

Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290004-5
TOP SECRET

—7 25x1

in the peacetime military administrative structure
without identity as an existing operational force.
The service units are at low or cadre strength and
are only concerned with the routine day-to-day
supply and maintenance of a garrisoned army.

lu. | 25X1
the Soviets have carried out many of the steps needed
for mobilization. A vital feature of the exercise
was the announced mobilization of reservists and
civilian vehicles. The Soviets later announced that
the exercise had been expanded to include Polish and
East German armed forces, While we are unable to
confirm the scope of the Soviet mobilization, the
announcements clearly imply that it is of major pro-
portions. Such an effort could by now be sufficient
to support a doubling of Soviet army strength in
Eastern Europe. There is no evidence, however, of
any extensive mobilization of low-strength Soviet
divisions.

12. According to Warsaw Pact plans, mobilization
begins with the alerting of key command and control
personnel and their separation from the peacetime
administrative structure. Reservists and civilians
must be called up and integrated in the required
units, Some men and vehicles will be used to augment
reduced-strength combat elements, with the great
majority used to create the rear service units. Some
supply units are at low strength and can be filled
out by adding the required mix of men and vehicles.
Other units must be created entirely from mobilized
resources. Many civilian transportation organizations
are mobilized with no more than minor modification of
their existing organizational structure. Concurrently
with these steps, the rail transportation system for
westward movement must be geared up and much of the
available rolling stock assembled at unit areas and
at border transshipment points.

13, In the current buildup, Polish rail cars
reportedly began to be massed about 23 July. Further
evidence suggests that Soviet forces from the Baltic
and Belorussian Military Districts began entering
Poland about 28 July. Forces from these areas

= 25x1
TOP SECRET |
Approved For Release 2009/04/21 | CIA-RDP94T00754R000206290004-5

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 45


CZECHOSLOVAK
CRISIS, TIMELINE |
JANUARY - AUGUST 1968 8



THE AFTERMATH

ASSESSING DAMAGE AND, IMPACT

.



; .

might sound the death knell over the Czechoslovak
party conservatives, Moscow's last hope for a brake
on reformism in Prague. The congress would have
meant not a check on the momentum of the Czechoslovak
reform movement, but its confirmation. In addition,
the cost of maintaining the mobilization of massive
intervention forces may have created pressures in the
leadership to use these forces or disband them.

7, Despite the smoothness of the Soviet mili-~
tary operation in Czechoslovakia, a number of Soviet
political actions suggest that the decision to exe-
cute the plan of intervention came at a fairly late
stage. Among these were Dobrynin's approach to the
President, the convening of the Central Committee
in the midst of the top leaders’ vacation, the flimsi-
ness of the legal base for Soviet action, and the
failure to surface quickly an alternative leadership
in Prague. Thus it would appear that Soviet inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia did not follow naturally
from the Cierna meeting but represents, instead,

a scrapping of the position arrived at there.



: — a

Approved Fer lone 00H Ee nae HENRI INEI OTP

th 2. In tho fins) analyste intelligonco coverage of this crisis
wae adequate up. to the point of the dociaion to invadg Cxcchosloyakia,
‘The capabilities of the forces to carty aut the invasion was olcarly

stated. The {intention to invade was not known until efter the fact,

Sea

‘The lack of abtiity to assaze more accuratoly the likelihood ef this

MoS Stay

intents the point of intelligence failure in the Caccht crisis.

-

L/ 3. There are cortain areas of possible limprovement in

intelligence performance which have been taken under consideration by

25x1
the SWWG for possible referral te action agencies. Those areas

521 ree A

%. The SWWG belioves that the Soviet actions during the
period of May-August 1968 offer an unique opportunity to study the pro-
cedures utilized by the USSR to conduct military operations, Scidom
hau a major military power mado auch a large-acale cepicymont of

forces undor non-wartime conditions which permit 4 study of the

many facots ravoaled by those operations in something of an acadomic

25X1

\

y s 495R001300130018-7



<7 oR ae

Ae:

So EL OTe

Approved For Rejgese MOSPORT Nm tsentsnones

DRAFT{—__}22 Nov 68

SUMMARY

The development of the Czech crisis was protracted, extend-
ing from January 5, 1968 when Dubcek replaced Novotny. The
possibility of the impending crisis was recognized from its inception,
with an initial report on January 11 of the beginning of far reaching
changes in Czech life.

The intelligence community became increasingly concerned
with and reported the growing ferment in Czech life and the impact
thig might have on other countries in Rantern Murape. On March 20
a recommendation was made to the Senior Interdepartmental Group
that they take the implications of the situation under consideration,

A State Department Task Force on Czechoslovakia was formed in
April and NATO set up an intelligence watch with a special daily report-
ing procedure in May.

The confrontation at Dresden on March 23 between Dubcek and
the leaders from the Sovict Union, East Gormany, Poland, Hungary
and Rumania was inconclusive and satisfied no one. A month later,
on April 23, an intelligence memorandum reported that Dubcek's

program had led to a bloodless but nevortheless very real revolution

SECREI

Approved For Release 2006/02/01 ; CIA-RDP80B01495R001300130019-7

SEM



( CONFIDENTIAL (

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 August 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Soviet Decision to Intervene in
Czechoslovakia

1. Between the end of the Cierna-Bratislava
meetings and yesterday's invasion nothing happened
inside Czechoslovakia to support Moscow's claim
that these meetings were a great victory for Com-
munist orthodoxy. Neither was there a notable
recrudescence in Czechoslovakia of the “anti-~
socialist" trends which brought on the Warsaw
meeting and its harsh ultimatum. Thus, we doubt
that a rising sense of alarm in Moscow is the
essential explanation for Soviet intervention.

2. The Soviet politburo on its return to
Moscow did not summon the Central Committee to
report on the Cierna and Bratislava meetings, but
instead issued a communique in the name of the
entire politburo saying that those meetings were
a good piece of work. The Soviet leaders seem
shortly thereafter to have scattered for their
usual summer holidays. The Soviet press stood
down its attacks on Czechoslovakia. The appear~
ance given was that Moscow was willing at least
to give the Czechs--presumably chastened by the
nearness of their approach to the brink--a
respite. What went on in Czechoslovakia during
the short span of time since Cierna proved
only that the Czechs had not understood Cierna
to mean that they should put their reform move-
ment into reverse.

3. It is not likely that the Soviets, even
though they have persistently underestimated
the strength of reformist spirit in Czechoslovakia
expected miracles to be done by Dubcek in three
weeks' time. Even if Dubcek had promised them,
there was no chance he could deliver. What, then,
brought the Russians, after they had decided to

—CONFIDENTIAE-

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA || al

Ee

aS


obviously could not be sure of that at the time. The
very fact that China was seeking to foment discord
within the Soviet bloc was enough to spark conster-
nation in Moscow.

The growing unease in Moscow about the effect of
the Sino-Soviet split in Eastern Europe was piqued
still further when Romania began to embrace foreign
and domestic policies in the 1960s that were at
times sharply at odds with the Soviet Union’s own
policies. Initially, the Romanian quest for autonomy
was inspired by the USSR’s attempts in 1961 to
mandate a supranational economic integration
program for CMEA, which would have relegated
Romania to being little more than a supplier of
agricultural goods and raw materials for the more
industrialized Communist countries. In response,
Romania began shifting much of its foreign trade
away from CMEA toward the West and the Third
World. In April 1964, the Romanian government
issued a stinging rejection of the Soviet scheme.
From then on, the reorientation of Romanian foreign
trade gathered pace. By the late 1960s, Romania’s
trade with other CMEA countries as a proportion of
its total foreign trade had dropped from 70 to just 45
percent.

Before long, Romania's defiance extended from
economic matters into foreign policy and military
activities as well. Romania staked out a conspicu-
ously neutral position in the Sino-Soviet dispute,
refusing to endorse Moscow's polemics or to join
in other steps aimed at isolating Beijing from the
rest of the Communist bloc. In 1967, Romania
became the first East European country to estab-
lish diplomatic ties with West Germany, a step that
infuriated East German leaders. That same year,
the Romanians refused to attend the Karlovy Vary
conference and maintained full diplomatic relations
with Israel after the other Warsaw Pact countries

had broken off all ties in the wake of the June 1967
Middle East War.

More important, Romania adopted an indepen-
dent military doctrine of “Total People’s War for the
Defense of the Homeland,” as well as a national
military command structure entirely separate from
that of the Warsaw Pact. Several years earlier, in
1958, the Romanian government had requested
and obtained the withdrawal of all Soviet troops
from Romania, but in the mid-1960s the new
Romanian leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, went much
further by prohibiting joint Warsaw Pact maneu-
vers on Romanian territory and sending only token
forces to participate in allied exercises elsewhere.
Ceausescu also stopped sending Romanian army
officers to Soviet military academies for training
and began openly challenging Soviet domination
of the Warsaw Pact’s military command structures.
When the Soviet-Romanian treaty of friendship and
cooperation came up for renewal in 1967-1968,
Ceausescu insisted that provisions be added to
ensure that Romanian troops would be used only
in Europe and only against “imperialist” countries,
not against other Communist states. (Ceausescu
was thinking of China when he first proposed these
amendments, but the
provisions ended up
being just as relevant
to operations against
Czechoslovakia.)
Soviet leaders
strongly resisted
Ceausescu’s
demands, but
ultimately gave in.
Although Romania
had never been a
crucial member of
the Warsaw Pact,

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 23


~

 s- af : cuca
T-0-P s-34-R E. “i S¢ 05890-68 _
m

indicate that the chancea for a violent Soviet intervention

have sharply increased.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

dua esl.

ABEOT SMITH
Chairaan

-4

1-0-7? s-. a |

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 41




B-R-C-R-E-T

al

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CEFICE G? NATIONAL ESTIMATZS

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO, 10-68

SUBJECT: The Crisis in Soviet-Czechoslovak Relations”

‘SUMMARY

leaders ore high, and such a move can no longer be excluded.

ORR

of Current Intelligence,

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

downgrading and
S-E-C-R-E-T declaseification

Approved For Release 2b07/03113 : cia-npe7aR0be87A000500010051-5

34 | THECIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

oat ee
sae an ee

Approved For Refease 2007/03/13’: CIA-ROP7980088799000500010051-5

10 May 1968

During the last week or so Soviet concern over developments
in Czechoslovakia has clearly been increasing at a rapid rate.
We belicve that the Soviets have isoucd a serious warning to Prague
to arrest its wayvard course, and that, if this proves ineffective,
Moscow intends to use additional sanctions. The best judgment that
con be made at this stage is that the Soviets will probably stop
short of military intervention, But the stakes for the Soviet

*
This wemorandum wae produced solely by CIA, It was prepared by
the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the Office

25X1

25X1



U.S. homeland. Although Soviet strategic nuclear
forces at the time still lagged well behind those

of the United States, the important thing, as was
shown by President John F. Kennedy's overwhelm-
ing desire to avoid a nuclear exchange during the
1962 Cuban missile crisis, was that Soviet ICBMs
could now inflict “unacceptable damage” on the
United States. This new capability reinforced the
pattern that emerged as early as June 1953, when
the threat of Soviet nuclear or conventional retali-
ation against Western Europe helped deter NATO
from coming to the defense of East German workers
who had risen up en masse against the Communist
regime. The much more dire consequences from
any potential nuclear confrontation with the Soviet
Union by the mid-1960s led U.S. Secretary of State
Dean Rusk to acknowledge that “our capacity to
influence events and trends within the Communist
world is very limited. But it is our policy to do what
we can....” Notions of “rollback” and “liberation” had
been fanciful even in the 1950s, but they were all
the more irrelevant by the mid- to late 1960s.

In the political sphere, as with the drive for
economic integration and closer military relations,
the Soviet Union accorded high priority to the goal
of increased Soviet-East European cohesion. That
goal was strongly endorsed by East European
leaders who had come to be key figures in the
1960s, notably Wiadystaw Gomutka of Poland and
Walter Ulbricht of the German Democratic Republic
(GDR). The Soviet Union's firm backing for Ulbricht
during the severe crises of the late 1950s and early
1960s, when deepening economic strains and a
large-scale exodus of East German citizens to West
Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

had raised doubts about the very existence of the
GDR, was crucial in preserving East Germany's
frontline role in the Warsaw Pact. In particular,
Khrushchev’s decision to permit the building of the
Berlin Wall in August 1961 halted the mass efflux of
refugees from the GDR, staved off a further deterio-
ration of the East German economy, and allowed
the East German Communist party (formally known
as the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, or SED) to
reassert tight control in the GDR.

Soviet relations with Poland and East Germany
remained a top priority in Moscow after Brezhnev
took office. Brezhnev’s chief foreign policy adviser
in the 1960s, Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, recalled
that the Soviet leader “greatly admired and respect-
ed” Gomutka and Ulbricht, and that Brezhnev, in
turn, “acquired vast authority among the leaders
of the other socialist states.” As both Ulbricht and
Gomutka encountered daunting political challenges
at home in the latter half of the 1960s, they looked
increasingly to Brezhnev for support against their
domestic rivals, a trend that gave the USSR even
greater influence in Poland and East Germany.
(The unequal nature of these relationships became
painfully evident when Brezhnev withdrew his
backing for Gomutka and Ulbricht at the beginning
of the 1970s, and both were quickly ousted.)

The USSR’s hegemonic position in Eastern
Europe was further enhanced by a highly publi-
cized conference in Moscow in November 1960,
which brought together high-level officials from 81
of the world’s Communist parties and reaffirmed
the “universally recognized vanguard role” of the

20 | THECIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA


26

Fe ace neieigaiaath tka

| CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

12 Jamuery 1968

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM 40. 1-68
GUBJECT: Czechoslovakia: A New Direction*

|
| The demotion of Czechoslovakia's Party First Secretary, Antonin
| : Novotny, after ll years in his post, signifies more then = change
Of personalities, A Buropean Communist state is becoming less
Communist and more European, and neither the pace sor the goals of
‘the transition are likely to please Moscow. The forces vhich
succecded in removing Novotny -- presumably against the dosirca

of the Soviets -~ are now beginning to place emphasis not only on

id

6 memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared
the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the
ce of Current Intelligence,

ge

| THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA



- — ~—

Hoxha, sparked a crisis with the Soviet Union by
openly aligning his country with China, a precedent
that caused alarm in Moscow. Quite apart from

the symbolic implications of Hoxha’s move, Soviet
leaders had always regarded Albania as an impor-
tant member of the Warsaw Pact because of “its
superb strategic location on the Mediterranean
Sea.” The rift with Yugoslavia in 1948 had eliminat-
ed the only other possible outlet for the Soviet Navy
in the region. To ensure that Albania could serve
as a full-fledged “military base on the Mediterranean
Sea for all the socialist countries,” the Soviet Union
had been providing extensive weaponry, equipment,
and training to the Albanian army and navy. In
particular, the Albanian navy had received a fleet

of twelve modern attack submarines, which initially
were under Soviet control but were gradually being
transferred to Albanian jurisdiction. Khrushchev
believed that the submarines would allow Albania

to pose a “serious threat to the operations of the
NATO military bloc on the Mediterranean Sea,” and
thus he was dismayed to find that Soviet efforts

to establish a naval bulwark on the Mediterranean
might all have been for naught.

SOVIET SUPREME 1G1f COMMAND (VGK

As soon as the rift with Albania emerged, the
Soviet Union imposed strict economic sanctions,
withdrew all Soviet technicians and military advisers,
took back eight of the twelve submarines, disman-
tled Soviet naval facilities at the Albanian port of
Vloré, and engaged in bitter polemical exchanges
with Albanian leaders. Khrushchev also ordered
Soviet warships to conduct maneuvers along
the Albanian coast, and he secretly encouraged
pro-Moscow rivals of Hoxha in the Albanian Labor
Party to carry out a coup. The coup attempt was
rebuffed, and the other means of coercion proved
insufficient to get rid of Hoxha or to bring about a
change of policy. In December 1961, Khrushchev
severed diplomatic relations with Albania and
excluded it from both the Warsaw Pact and CMEA.
However, he was not willing to undertake a full-scale
invasion to bring Albania back within the Soviet
orbit, not least because of logistical problems and
the likelihood of confronting stiff armed resistance.
The “loss” of Albania, though trivial compared to
the earlier split with Yugoslavia and the deepening
rift with China, marked the second time since 1945
that the Soviet sphere of influence in East-Central
Europe had been breached.

To make matters worse, Soviet leaders soon
discovered that China was secretly attempting to
induce other East European countries to follow
Albania’s lead. At a closed plenum of the CPSU
Central Committee in December 1963, a high-
ranking Soviet official responsible for intra-bloc
relations, Yurii Andropov, who became head of the
Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) in 1967,
noted that the Chinese had been focusing their
efforts on Poland, Hungary, and East Germany:

The Chinese leaders are carrying out a pol-
icy of crude sabotage in relation to Poland,
Hungary, and the GDR. Characteristic of
this is the fact that in September of this
year, during conversations with a Hungarian
official in China, Politburo member Chu De
declared that China would welcome it if
the Hungarian comrades diverged from the
CPSU’s line. But, Chu De threatened, if
you remain on the side of the revisionists,
we will have to take a stance against you.

China's efforts to lure these three countries (and
possibly others) away from Soviet control a la
Albania bore little fruit in the end, but Soviet leaders

22 | THECIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA


Approved For Riffease 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP798008877%500500010051-5
S-E-C-R-B-T

1, ‘The Soviet leadership, after several months of fretting;
fuming, and temporizing, seems now to have decided that heavy
pressures will be needed to push the alarmingly wayward Czechs
ack into line. Signs of this from Moscow, Prague, ani elecwhere
have begun to accumulate at a startling rate, In the last day or
two there has been evidence of some Soviet troop movements in
Poland ond Esst Germany toward Czechoslovek frontiers. Chsoces
of at least an open politicel clash of some sort between the two
countries, or of an open clash between contending forces within
Czechoslovakia, or of both, thus seem to be increasing, and
repidly so,

The Moscow Neetings

2. Precisely what took place during Alexander Dubcek's
burried trip to Moscow lest weekend remains a mystery. A Czech
source's description of the meetings ea "rough", however, seems
plausible. The Soviet leaders, who were inclined initially to
view post-Hovotny political developments in Czechoslovakia os
“revisionist”, are said to see them now -- es did Ulbricht from
the very beginning -- as “counterrevolutionary,” (A similer change

in Soviet terminology took place in October 1956 vis-a-vis Hungary.)

The subsequent quick convocation in Moscow of the four Eastern

-~2-

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 35


THE KREMLIN,

THE PRAGUE SPRING,
AND

THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE

BY MARK KRAMER
PROFESSOR, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Until the late 1980s, the Soviet Union's determina- That threat sufficed to hold the bloc together for —
tion to preserve Communism in East-Central Europe more than twenty years, even when tested by severe
was not in doubt. When Communist regimes in crises like the one in Poland in 1980-1981. But soon “)
Eastern Europe came under violent threat in the after Mikhail Gorbachev came along and wasno
1950s—in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in longer willing to use military force in Eastern Europe,
1956—Soviet troops intervened to subdue those the whole Soviet bloc collapsed. Because of the
challenges. A very different problem arose in 1968, legacy of 1968, all the East European regimes still
when Czechoslovakia embarked on a dramatic, but lacked the legitimacy they would have needed to
entirely peaceful, attempt to change both the internal sustain themselves without Soviet military backing.
complexion of Communism and many of the basic The invasion of Czechoslovakia saved Soviet-style
structures of Soviet-East European relations. This Communism in Eastern Europe for more than two
eight-month-long experiment, widely known as the decades, but it could not forestall the eventual demise
“Prague Spring,” came to a decisive end in August of the bloc.

1968, when hundreds of thousands of Soviet and
Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia.

This paper draws on recently declassified archival
materials and memoirs to provide a reassessment of
Neither the Soviet Union nor Czechoslovakia exists the 1968 crisis, showing how the confrontation with
any longer, but the legacy of the Prague Spring euch Czechoslovakia fit into Soviet policy toward Eastern
the Soviet invasion still | ing felt. The reforms = Europe. The paper begins by discussing the context
that took place i E 11968 under of the 1968 crisis, highlighting .

0 béek offered the fi first etal ane DBO and 1960s. It



<7 oR ae

Ae:

So EL OTe

Approved For Rejgese MOSPORT Nm tsentsnones

DRAFT{—__}22 Nov 68

SUMMARY

The development of the Czech crisis was protracted, extend-
ing from January 5, 1968 when Dubcek replaced Novotny. The
possibility of the impending crisis was recognized from its inception,
with an initial report on January 11 of the beginning of far reaching
changes in Czech life.

The intelligence community became increasingly concerned
with and reported the growing ferment in Czech life and the impact
thig might have on other countries in Rantern Murape. On March 20
a recommendation was made to the Senior Interdepartmental Group
that they take the implications of the situation under consideration,

A State Department Task Force on Czechoslovakia was formed in
April and NATO set up an intelligence watch with a special daily report-
ing procedure in May.

The confrontation at Dresden on March 23 between Dubcek and
the leaders from the Sovict Union, East Gormany, Poland, Hungary
and Rumania was inconclusive and satisfied no one. A month later,
on April 23, an intelligence memorandum reported that Dubcek's

program had led to a bloodless but nevortheless very real revolution

SECREI

Approved For Release 2006/02/01 ; CIA-RDP80B01495R001300130019-7

SEM



ean

Pact.” Still, the Soviet leadership had not decided
what to do. Very much still depended on Dubéek
and Czechoslovakia. “Some appropriate conces-
sions” from Dubéek would remove the need for
military action. So would a conservative overthrow
of Dubéek.

The crisis seemed to be reaching a climax at the
end of July, when Soviet leaders traveled to Cierna
nad Tisou, on the Czechoslovak border, to meet
with the Czech Politburo. The bilateral talks were
cloaked in secrecy, but on 31 July the Soviet wire
service TASS reported that the talks at Cierna had
an atmosphere of “frankness and comradeship,”
which, according to CIA analysts, was Soviet code
for tough talk but no action. Ominously, however,
that same day Dubéek’s family was reported leav-
ing Czechoslovakia for

Western intelligence included photo-reconnaissance
satellites, covert intelligence collection performed
by USAF aircraft transiting the Berlin traffic cor-
tidors (and by SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft along
the inner German border), SIGINT collection sites
in southern Germany and on the Teufelsberg in
occupied Berlin, and-particularly important dur-

ing the Czechoslovak crisis—observations by the
Allied military missions in East Germany. There
also appeared to have been some agent reporting
available.

Military tensions ratcheted up in the last half of
March, as the USSR concentrated troops along the
Czech-East German border in the period leading
up to the Warsaw Pact summit in Dresden. This
was judged to be a preventative measure, but on

9 May CIA reported

Yugoslavia.

The Cierna confer-
ence concluded on 1
August and was almost
immediately followed by
a general Warsaw Pact
summit at Bratislava.
Two days later the only
written statement to
emerge from either of
these meetings was pro-
duced. It was little more
than a statement of alliance solidarity, combined
with an affirmation of the principles of Marxism-
Leninism. With this, the crisis seemed to be over.
The Czechoslovak leadership apparently had mol-
lified its Soviet and Warsaw Pact allies, at least for
the time being. Dubéek seemed to have won.

Less than three weeks later the Soviet Union
invaded Czechoslovakia.

CIA Military Reporting

As a member of the Warsaw Pact, Czechoslovakia
was perforce under a fairly high level of routine sur-
veillance. As tensions heightened over the spring
and summer of 1968, so did the attention paid
to Czechoslovakia by US and NATO intelligence
services. The full panoply of sources available to

that Soviet troops in
Poland had been seen
south of Krakow mov-
ing in the direction of
Czechoslovakia. Noting
that the Soviets had

a total of 39 divisions
available, should they
decide to intervene
militarily, CIA concluded
that “[i]Jt would appear
that Moscow has decid-
ed to do some saber-rattling in order to influ-

ence the Czechoslovaks to put a brake on their
democratization.”

The next month, the Soviet Union began a series
of Pact-wide military exercises designed to mask the
build-up of forces against Czechoslovakia. These
included:

+ Sumava or Bohmerwald: over 20-30 June,
acommand post and communications exer-
cise involving Soviet, East German, Czech,
and Polish troops in Czechoslovakia.

+ Niemen: from 23 July to 10 August, a rear-
services exercise.

+ Skyshield: an air defense exercise, conduct-
ed over 11-20 August.

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 9




The leaders of the & Union appear to have |
conceded, though qcuayinghr, | the Czechoslovak y's
right to reform itself and to attempt a Communist
. “democratization.” Brezhnev and Kosygin and the
leaders of the Eastern European states nevertheless
obviously fear the spread of such concepts to their
own countries. The only limits placed on the new
Czechoslovak regime by Moscow, however, are ee
ence pro aie Communist Party retain primacy
that honor its commitments to’ the USSR,
the other Communiat states, and the international
Communist movement. Dubcek has agreed, but the man-
ner in which he and the Russians interpret these
eeeee is certain to be a constant source of fric~
On.

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 29


internal reform as a necessary precondition for the
stability of the Warsaw Pact.

Although the Pact had been created in 1955 as a
“paper organization” to counter the rearming of West
Germany and
the coopera-
tive effort of the
Western allies
in NATO, by
the early 1960s
the Warsaw
Pact gradually
was acquiring
more form and
substance as
a military alli-
ance. Under
Khrushchev, the
Pact had become the mechanism by which Moscow
could introduce large-scale troop reductions, prin-
cipally in conventional forces deployed to Europe.
With substantially fewer forces on the ground in
Eastern Europe, Moscow had more at stake in mak-
ing the alliance work. Thus, although the non-Sovi-
et members of the Warsaw Pact had little choice in
joining the organization, once members of an alli-
ance with the Soviet Union, they found they had a
relatively greater voice in ordering their own affairs.

By 1965, the Warsaw Pact was becoming a
framework in which the nations of Eastern Europe
could exercise

a growing level
of autonomy. (
General dis-

enchantment
with Marxist
economics and
Soviet-style
politics and the
growing attrac-

tion of the West
were giving the
states of Eastern

Europe “both the
incentive and the opportunity for striking out on their
own,” noted the Office of National Estimates (ONE),

in a special memorandum in 1965. “The Soviets,”
according to ONE, would find it difficult to arrest the
process; “though crises are an ever-present danger,
we believe that these countries will be able success-
fully to assert their own national interests gradually
and without provoking Soviet intervention.” The
Prague Spring
thus seems

to have been
evaluated as
part of a broader
reform move-
ment with the
Warsaw Pact as
awhole. There
was the cautious
belief that Sasha
Dubéek-if he
were very care-
ful and very, very
lucky—just might
pull it off.

CIA Analysis and the Prague Spring

Agency analysis in the Prague Spring focused in

on two critical factors. This first of these was the
importance of the Czechoslovak armed forces

to Warsaw Pact military planning. In a war with
NATO, the Czechoslovak army would have formed
the first echelon of a Warsaw Pact attack into
southern Germany, intended to outflank any NATO
effort to defend along the inner-German border
and, ultimately, to drive across Bavaria and Baden-
Wirttemberg to the Rhein. The Czechoslovak
military leadership was given command of the Front
and would have retained command of its armed
forces in wartime-which put Czechoslovakia, along-
side Poland, in a privileged position in the Warsaw
Pact hierarchy. The reduction of Soviet ground
forces in the early 1960s had only increased the
importance of the Czechoslovak army to Soviet/
Warsaw Pact war planning.

The second factor was the importance of the
Czechoslovak economy within the Soviet bloc.
Czechoslovakia was among the most industrially
developed of the Warsaw Pact countries, yet it had
suffered the most from 20 years of communist rule.

6 | THECIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA


THE CLA &
STRATEGIC WARNING:

THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AN OVERVIEW.

The Czechoslovak crisis, as it came to be known,
started in January 1968, when Alexander Dubéek
was elevated to the post of First Secretary of the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz), replac-
ing moribund Antonin Novotny, who had served

as First Secretary since 1957. Under Dubéek, the
communist leadership embarked on a program of
dramatic liberalization of the Czechoslovak politi-
cal, economic, and social order, including the over-
haul of the CPCz leadership, increased freedom of
speech, surrender of authority to the Czech National
Assembly by the Communist Party, real elections at
local and national levels, and even the suggestion of
legalizing non-communist political parties.

In all, the crisis lasted more than a year, with the
first nine months consisting of Czech reforms trig-

intact through April 1969, when Dubéek was finally
replaced as First Secretary by a more pro-Soviet
Gustav Husak. y

YS
Dubéek and the Prague Spring: A Threat to the M74
Warsaw Pact? yon

All this alarmed Moscow and the leadership of the
Warsaw Pact, but throughout the Prague Spring,
Dubéek went out of his way to demonstrate his a
personal loyalty to Moscow and Prague's iMteniion

to remain firmly within the Warsaw Pact military alli-
ance. How sincere he was in these remonstrations
is difficult to say, but Dubéek and his allies clearly
feared a repetition of the Hungarian uprising of

1956, brutally crushed by Soviet troops.

These fears were mirrored in Washington and,
to a certain extent, even in Moscow. Certainly the
Kremlin, under the nearly comate e | adership of |

_ Leonid Brezhnev, had no


Soviet-East European relations for the next 21
years.

CONTEXT OF THE 1968 CRISIS

From November 1956, when Soviet troops crushed
a popular uprising in Hungary, to January 1968,
when the Prague Spring began, Soviet-East
European relations underwent several notable
changes. Some developments facilitated greater
Soviet control over Eastern Europe and better
cohesion among the Warsaw Pact states, but
numerous other factors tended to weaken Soviet
control and to create fissures within the Eastern
bloc.

Sources of Cohesion

From the early 1960s on, the Soviet Union sought
to invigorate the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA), which had been largely
dormant since it was created by Stalin in 1949.
Both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev hoped
to use the CMEA as a means of formally integrat-
ing the Soviet and East European economies. The
“Basic Principles of Socialist Economic Integration,”
announced by Khrushchev with much fanfare in
1961, did not yield many results in the end; but

the Soviet Union was able to exploit its economic
preponderance to promote bilateral integration

with each of the CMEA member-states, especially
in trade relations. The unusually large proportion
of foreign trade that the East European countries
conducted with the Soviet Union and with other
CMEA members rose to nearly 70 percent in the
1960s, except in the case of Romania. This trend
did not bring the supranational integration that
Soviet leaders had envisaged, but it did ensure

that the East European states remained crucially
dependent on (and therefore beholden to) the Soviet
Union for key economic goods, particularly energy
supplies.

The Soviet Union also fostered greater intra-bloc
cohesion in the military sphere, a policy reflected in
the newly emerging concept of “coalition warfare.”
This approach, as described in a classified report by
Soviet military planners in the mid-1960s, called for
a rapid, massive offensive against the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) by a combination of
Soviet and East European forces using both nuclear
and conventional weaponry:

The defense strategy of the socialist coun-
tries must focus on seizing the most impor-
tant regions and lines, and on absolute-
ly preventing an incursion by the adver-
sary’s forces into the territory of the social-
ist countries. The strategy will be based
on nuclear strikes in conjunction with the
use of conventional firepower and mobile
operations by combined forces, and also
on the wide-scale use of obstruction.

To underscore the new emphasis on joint military
operations, Soviet leaders took several steps to
improve the capacity of East European troops to
perform effectively alongside Soviet forces. With
Moscow's backing, all the East European states
significantly modernized and expanded their armies
in the 1960s; and they made renewed efforts to
promote the interoperability and standardization of
Warsaw Pact armaments. From October 1962 on,
the Soviet Union conducted joint military exercises
with the East European armies. As a result, the

18 | THECIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA


here, as is common knowledge: cars are
running, rolls are baked, and so forth...

Tensions Rise

In general, CIA analysis seems to have accurately
characterized attitudes inside the Soviet Politburo.
Correctly deducing that the Soviet leadership was
split over the need for intervention, the Office of
National Estimates reported that—at least for the
time being—the Kremlin had accepted the Czech
reforms as the lesser of two evils. Although there
was strong evidence of Soviet “anxieties” over
the Czech reforms, Dubéek continued to prove
himself to be adept at balancing reforms inside
Czechoslovakia with continued adherence to
doctrines of communism and pledges to uphold
Czechoslovakia’s military commitments to the
Warsaw Pact. There thus seemed reason to
hope that, although Soviet pressure on
Czechoslovakia would increase over “the long hot
summer,” the Soviets would “take no ‘harder,’ i.e.,
military measures.”

Relations between Moscow and Prague deterio-
rated steadily in the next few months. The Soviet
Politburo remained reluctant to sanction military
action, but CIA in late April reported that “[djevelop-
ments since the Dresden meeting indicate that the
Russians and the Eastern Europeans were dissatis-
fied with the results of the conference and remained
concerned about Czechoslovakia’s course.” By
mid-June, Czechoslovakia was reported to be in
an “uneasy truce” with Moscow. Dubéek report-
edly was now playing for time, hoping that he could
implement enough reforms quickly to present the
Kremlin leadership with a fait accompli. “At some
stage in the game,” the Agency reported, “the
Soviets will...become aware that their earlier hopes
for a return to anything like the status quo ante in
Czechoslovakia were without foundation. It is the
Czech hope that this realization will have come too
late and that the Soviets’ reactions will be minimal.”

It was now clear to Agency analysts that the
Politburo viewed developments in Czechoslovakia
with growing unease. Indecision still reigned in
Moscow, but the only thing preventing the Soviet
Union from intervening militarily was concern over
the broad impact of yet another violent repression
of an Eastern European bid for autonomy. On 17
July, the Office of National Estimates warned CIA
Director Helms: “We know of no way of foretelling
the precise event in Czechoslovakia which might
trigger...extreme Soviet reaction, or of foreseeing
the precise circumstances which might produce
within the Soviet leadership an agreement to move
with force.” But the Soviets believed that com-
munist authority in Czechoslovakia was seriously
threatened. “The possibility will exist for some time
that the Soviets will choose to intervene rather than
permit Czechoslovakia to...move decisively toward...
an open disavowal of communism or of the Warsaw

8 | THE CIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA


. asd asabtiaeiiee pene

Ceausescu’s growing recalcitrance on military affairs
and foreign policy posed serious complications for
the cohesion of the alliance.

Developments outside the Communist bloc also
contributed to the loosening of Soviet control in
Eastern Europe. The perceived threat of German
aggression, which had long unified the Warsaw
Pact governments, had gradually diminished. In
the mid-1960s, West Germany had launched its
Ostpolitik campaign to increase economic and politi-
cal contacts in Eastern Europe, a campaign whose
potentially disruptive impact on the Soviet bloc
was well recognized in Moscow. As far back as
November 1956, senior officials in the CPSU Central
Committee apparatus had expressed strong misgiv-
ings about the effect that conciliatory overtures from
the FRG might have on Poland and Czechoslovakia
in the wake of the Hungarian revolution. They
warned that if circumstances went too far, Poland
“would no longer be interested in hosting Soviet
troops” and that both Czechoslovakia and Poland
might “pursue neutrality.” That notion seemed
far-fetched at the time, no matter how much West
German policy might change; but by the mid- to late
1960s, as
the FRG’s
Ostpolitik
gathered
pace, those
earlier
warnings
seemed
all too
plausible.

Soviet policy in Eastern Europe also was increas-
ingly constrained by the improvement in U.S.-Soviet
relations that occurred after leaders on both sides
recognized how close they had come to war during
the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. The new
relationship was symbolized by the signing of the
Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August 1963.
The incipient superpower détente raised hopes in
Moscow that strategic nuclear arms control agree-
ments and increased economic ties would be forth-
coming. Such prospects gave the Soviet leader-
ship an incentive to proceed cautiously in Eastern
Europe before taking actions that would undermine
the détente and provoke Western retaliation (though
the escalating U.S. military involvement in Vietnam
presumably had the opposite effect). The advent

of a more cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship even
spawned fears in Europe, both West and East,

Ulbricht
\

that the superpowers
might eventually seek

a formal condominium

at the expense of the
Europeans. Although this
concern was especially
acute in East Germany
(where Ulbricht constantly
worried that the Soviet
Union might cut a deal
over his head), similar
anxieties were present

in almost all of the East
European countries.

Note: The complete article, with footnotes, appears
on the DVD.

24 | THECIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA


lOO
STRATEGIC

WARNING
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

is:



ANTICIPATING
SURPRISE

THE SOVIETS INVADE



service report that Soviet leaders had been sum-
moned to Moscow for an urgent Politburo meet-
ing-which, in fact, had occurred on 18 August. This
was unusual in itself: Soviet leaders normally spent
August entrenched in their dachas, and only a crisis
would suffice to get them out.
Clarke, Lehman, and Helms
agreed that, taken together
with the military alert in Central
Europe, the emergency
Politouro meeting was a sure
indicator something was about
to happen, most probably the
invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Helms was already sched-
uled to meet with President
Johnson and decided to con-
vey the information personally.
Remarkably, LBJ rejected that
conclusion, saying, “Dick, that Moscow meeting is to
talk about us.” What Johnson knew, and Helms did
not know, was that the Soviet Union and the United
States were due to make a joint announcement on
21 August concerning the planned strategic arms
limitation talks. Not unreasonably, but unfortunately,
LBJ believed that to be the subject of the meeting in
the Kremlin.

The President and his advisers soon were dis-
abused of that notion. At 2300, central European
time, on 20 August, a Soviet special forces battalion
landed at and occupied Prague airport. At 2311
NATO radar monitors reported that the air space

around Prague was covered with artificial “snow,”
blanking out radar screens and preventing observa-
tion of what was happening. Just a few hours later,
at 2200, EDT, Helms was summoned back to the
White House for an emergency meeting. The inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia was
underway. Given the swift-
ness of events, it is hard to
see how Johnson could have
received more warning than
he did. Official Washington
was holding its breath in
August 1968, waiting to see
what the Soviets would do.
Ample, precise, and accurate
strategic warning concerning
events in Eastern Europe had
been pouring in all summer.
The August calm before the
storm may have meant that much of the intelligence
community was surprised by the invasion when it
occurred, but there had been no indication that the
Soviets had stood down in Eastern Europe, nor had
strategic warning ever been withdrawn.

A CIA memorandum prepared immediately after
the invasion noted that the decision to intervene
must have come very late in the game. Exactly how
and when Moscow's forbearance “became unrav-
eled” was something of a mystery. To CIA analysts,
however, it was clear that the decision had come
sometime after the Cierna nad Tisou and Bratislava
conferences. The time that elapsed, the scattering

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 11


_ ee ~—

Of the three, the rear services exercise was
regarded as the most ominous, since it involved
recalling reservists, requisitioning transport from
the civilian economy, and mobilizing forces from
Latvia to Ukraine-measures that obviously could
be designed to cover the mass movement of troops
against Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, although
CIA warned that these exercises could well be signs
of military intervention, most analysts in the US
intelligence community continued to believe that the
Soviet Union would exercise restraint.

The situation grew more ominous in July. On 26
July, CIA reported that the Polish Government was
under great pressure to prepare for an invasion.
The Soviet 32nd Army in Poland had mobilized, as
had large forces in East Germany. Five Polish divi-
sions in the Silesian Military District were at a high
state of readiness. That same day, substantial ele-
ments of three East German divisions moved into
restricted areas 75 miles south of Berlin. To find out
more, USAF SR-71s flew along the inner German
border, from where they could monitor develop-
ments up to 100 KM inside East Germany.

By the end of the month, most of the Soviet troops
in Czechoslovakia had been withdrawn, but they
remained just outside the country and Western
observers noted that the route signs leading into
Czechoslovakia for the military movements had
been left in place. Four Soviet divisions in Hungary
were reported moving into the field, roadblocks were
set up and convoys were seen moving in the direc-
tion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet air forces on
31 July were
detected mak-
ing contingency
preparations for
operations in
Czechoslovakia,
while high-level
military officials
in Moscow
were reported
operating on an indefinite alert status. Three days
later, CIA’s Office of Strategic Research (OSR)
warned, “[iJt would appear the Soviet high com-
mand has in about two weeks’ time completed

military preparations sufficient for intervening in
Czechoslovakia if that is deemed necessary by the
political leadership.”

CIA Warning and the Czech Invasion

Over the next three weeks, CIA was forced to func-
tion without the support of its principal collection
asset, photo-reconnaissance satellites. The film-
return systems in use at the time lacked the flex-
ibility to respond to the rapidly changing situation in
Czechoslovakia. A KH-4B satellite was in orbit, but
its canister was not recovered until after the inva-
sion. When it was, the film showed Soviet forces
deployed to invade-airfields packed with aircraft,
Soviet military vehicles painted with white crosses to
distinguish them from identical Czech equipment.

By this point in
time, however,
overhead recon-
naissance was not
really necessary;
there already was
ample intelligence
from other sources
to show that, by
the end of July,
the Warsaw Pact
was mobilized
for an invasion of
Czechoslovakia.
The next two weeks or so were something of an
anti-climax, for the simple reason that the Soviets
themselves had not decided to intervene. This
hesitation gave some reason to hope that an inva-
sion was not forthcoming-but, with nearly 40 Soviet
divisions on the move, it was clear the Soviet alert
remained in place. When the Soviets did decide
on 18 August to intervene, it was announced by
SIGINT reporting of a Soviet military communica-
tions blackout all over Central Europe.

Two days later, on the morning of the invasion,
Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms met
with Bruce Clarke (Director of Strategic Research
in the Dl) and Richard Lehman (the Dl's Director
of Current Intelligence) for an update on the
Czechoslovak situation. Lehman relayed a wire

10 | THECIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA


5
:
1

edna ft eres eee Oe eee

sigs

=a: Approved For@please 2 EAR Te1s-n0P808014988001300130019-7 i

Sitio

St ee eet Sh a

atmosphere. Much more can be done with the evidence accumulated

over the past few months than has becn possible in these post mortem

studies which have been prepared by busy people also occupied by

on-going responsibilities. Conscquently, we recommend an intensive

further study of the evidence be made by an objective group, This

study possibly could be achieved by the establishment of an ad hoc
group established solely for the purpose and staffed by representatives
from CIA, DIA, State, NSA and the military services, Alternatively,
such a study might be undertaken under’ contract by a suitable existing
research organization. Specific guidance for such a study, would have
to be developed and preparations of this guidance would be a major
undertaking. The SWWG, if directed, could monitor the development
of this guidance which would require major contributions from

member agencies.

[ee 25x1 . |
_ Strategic Warning Working Group



Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : ClA-RDP24T00754R000200290004-5
TOP SECRET

25x11

Military Events

1. As the Soviet-Czech confrontation has in-
tensified, the Soviets have increasingly relied on
the threat of military intervention to deter Czech
resistance, The Czech armed forces, in contrast,

‘ have not shown any indications of preparing for
hostilities.

® 2. In early May, the Soviets moved a few divi-
sions to positions near the Czech border, In mid-
June elements of these divisions, tactical air units, 2X1
and high-level staffs entered Czechoslovakia under
the guise of a Warsaw Pact exercise. Most of these
-units subsecauently left)

25x1

3. In mid-July the Soviet pressure tactics .
yentered hase.
aexi _ /yontexed_a new phase eae
” K Dn zs July the Soviet press reported ex=
@ €ensive mobilization of men and equipment throughout

the western USSR as part of a large rear services
exercise. Moscow later announced that the exercise
had been extended to East Germany and Poland.
(25Xx1

4. Soviet, Polish, and East German forces were
subsequently massed in areas near the Czech border.
By 30 July five armies were known to have been poised
against Czechoslovakia, and there have been indi-
cations of further reinforcement from the USSR (see

map). In addition, tactical air forces near the
Czech border have been increased from 14 to 24 regi-
ments.

r 5. On 31 July large Soviet units--at least one
division--were sighted in central Czechoslovakia.

6. In short, it appears that the Soviet high
command has in about two weeks’ time completed
military preparations sufficient for intervening
in Czechoslovakia if that is deemed necessary by
the political leadership. (For a detailed chro-
nology of events, see Annex.)

=igte
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/04/21 | CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290004-5

25X1

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 43


Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R00987A000800010004-9
~ ~

S-E-C-R-E-T

2. ‘The compromise seems to have come about, sequentially,
48 4 result of strong Soviet pressures, rising Czech concern,
mildly concessionary Czech responses, and, finally, the Soviets’
oun anxiety to find some way to avoid direct military interven-
tion. It 4s true, nonetheless, that if quiescence has been
restored to the relationship, it is by no means assured in-
definitely. An undetermined number of Soviets are currently
engaged in a Warsaw Pact exercise on Czech soil; their presence
serves, at a minimm, as en ominous reminder to the Dubcek
Tegime of Soviet power and of the USSR's continuing interest in
Czech developments. The recently concluded plenum of the
Czechoslovak Central Committee was reassuring to the Soviets
in some respects but not at all in others. Dubcek, in fact, is
working both sides of the street. He is trying to buy off
Moscow with promises of continued Communist authority in Czech-
oslovakia end unswerving Czech loyalty to the Warsaw Pact. At
the same time, he is seeking to strengthen his domestic position
by pledging at least the gradual growth of democracy at hone
and independence abroad.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Approved For Release 2008/12/11 ; CIA-ROP79R00967A000800010004-9

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 31

suka ie


wiT. 4h 013,007 Am

APPROVED FOR HELEASE ‘SRoReT
CATE: EEp 2004

: P ; a 4S.
¥o: 42989 3. 4tp1 (0 1pZSves SC No. 08380/68 a
Directorate of ritvense:
nea:
20 poguae 968

INTBLLIGRNCE MEMORANDUM,
Me event ovakia

. 2, About 2300 hours, local time Pragus, (1800
hours EDT) on 20 August Soviet, Polish, East Garman,
Rungarian ana Bulgarian troops began moving into
Czechoslovakia, according to a Prague radio broad~
cost. Prague radio stated that the troops were
moving into Czechoslovakia without the knowledge .
of Czechoslovak party and govaznment leaders, r
= . 2. At2UShours, Prague radio appealed to all ’ bs
citizens to maintain calm and to offer no resistance
te the troops moving into thea country, According
to the broadcast no commands had boen issued to
Czechoslovak military forces to defend the country.
In Progua, the Wational Assesdly (parliament) ond . ’
the party central commitoe immediately assembled,
‘they apparently are still 4n seosion.


Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800010004-9
~ w
S-E-C-R-E-T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

13 June 1968

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 12-68
*
SUBJECT: Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Pause

1, ‘The related crises in internal Czechoslovak politics
end in Soviet-Czechoslovak relations seem to have eased -= at
home, into a delicate and perhaps temporary domestic equilibrium
ond, abroad, into an uneasy truce with Moscow, The regime of
Party leader Dubcek and Premier Cernik has, in effect, promised
that it will control the pace of domestic reform; Moscow has
gained the appearance of Czech compliance; but Prague seems st
the same time to have been able to preserve the essential sub-
stance of its democratic experiment. :

* ‘This memorandum was produced solely by CIA, It was prepared
‘by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the
Office of Current Intelligence.

GROUP I
Excluded fram automatic
downgrading and
declassification
8-E-C-R-E-T

Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800010004-9



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AUGUST 21, 1968

anes

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The tragic news from Czechoslovakia shocks the conscience of the world. The
Soviet Union and its allies have invaded a defenseless country to stamp out

a resurgence of ordinary human freedom. It is a sad commentary on the
Communist mind that a sign of liberty in Czechoslovakia is deemed a fundamental
threat to the security of the Soviet system.

The excuses offered by the Soviet Union are patently contrived. The
Czechoslovakian Government did not request its allies to interfere in its
internal affairs. No external aggression threatened Czechoslovakia.

The action of the Warsaw Pact allies is in flat violation of the United Nations 4
Charter. We are consulting urgently with others to consider what steps should be
undertaken in the UN. Ambassador Ball has been instructed to join with others in
the Security Council to insist upon the Charter rights of Czechoslovakia and

its people.

Meanwhile, in the name of mankind’s hope for peace, I call on the Soviet Union 7
and its associates to withdraw their troops from Czechoslovakia. I hope 4
responsible spokesmen for governments and people throughout the world will support
this appeal. It is never too late for reason to prevail.



In 1948, Czechoslovakia was better off than West
Germany, but by 1968 per capita output had slipped
to about two-thirds that of the Federal Republic, in
addition to major differences in quality. Moscow
was aware that popular opinion in Czechoslovakia
blamed the old-line party hierarchy for its relative
decline. “Economic pressure is a major force for
political change in Eastern Europe,” noted a March
1968 intelligence report. Without meaningful reform,
Czechoslovakia’s problems “may become acute in
the next two or three years...”

To CIA, the Czechoslovak economic crisis meant
that Soviet leaders were concerned over the stabil-
ity and reliability of Prague’s military contribution
to the Warsaw Pact. They thus were likely to be
receptive to anything that promised a solution to
Czechoslovakia’s internal problems. Moscow also
realized that the first result of a premature attempt
to decisively intervene in Czechoslovakia likely
would be demoralization of the Czechoslovak mili-
tary. At the same time, the Kremlin was concerned
that the “contagion” of Czech democratization not
spread nor that the Czechoslovaks themselves go
too far in creating an open society. All these factors
seemed to ad up to a Soviet decision to watch, wait,
and hope for the best, while preparing for the worst.

Setting Limits on Reform

As the snows of winter melted, it became possible
to hypothesize that
Dubéek’s “social-
ism with a human
face” would find a
place in the Warsaw
Pact. On 23 March,
Czechoslovakia
was the main topic
of discussion at a
Warsaw Pact sum-
mit in Dresden.

CIA reported that
Moscow had used
the occasion to put a limit on how far Dubéek could
go, but that

[i]f the new leadership in Prague pro-
ceeds carefully...good progress can be

ean

made....[I]n view of its political, economic
and military importance to the USSR and
the Soviet Bloc, the CSSR cannot start
an anti-socialist or anti-Soviet policy. The
USSR would not allow this...[but] there [is]
no anti-socialist or anti-Soviet movement
involved in the new political evolution of the
CSSR...only a strong movement for democ-
ratization and liberalization of the system.

Consequently, according to CIA, the Soviet leader-
ship “...did not consider Dubéek as someone willing
to start an anti-Soviet line.”

This conclusion was supported by the CPCz
Party Action Program, published on 10 April. The
Directorate of
Intelligence (DI)
noted that it was
“restrained in tone,
realistic and rela-
tively free of cant...
disappointing to the
radical reformers
in some aspects.”
Armed with this evi-
dence of Dubéek’s
moderation and the
Kremlin's tolerance,
by the end of April,
the DI had conclud-
ed that the leaders of the Soviet Union appeared
to have “grudgingly accepted” the Czechoslovak
reforms. The only limits placed on these reforms
were the continued primacy of the CPCz and that
Czechoslovakia honor its military and economic
commitments to the USSR. An unsigned CIA
memorandum argued that the Soviets could have
applied economic pressure, had they wanted to halt
Dubéek’s reforms and cited as evidence a Czech
radio broadcast:

AKCNi

PROGRAM

Let us not forget that..our cars run on
Soviet gas, two out of three rolls are baked
from Soviet flour, and our gigantic metal-
lurgical combines would come to a standstill
within a few days after Soviet ore shipments
stopped. Nothing of the sort is happening

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 7


a as

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in
the international Communist movement. East
European party leaders worked closely with Soviet
Officials at the conference to ensure that the partici-
pants would support Moscow’s calls for increased
“unity” and “solidarity” with the CPSU in the “stand
against imperialism.” Much the same was true of a
subsequent all-European conference of Communist
parties, held in Karlovy Vary in April 1967, a few
years after Brezhnev had replaced Khrushchev.
The conference was notable mainly for its continu-
ity in emphasizing the USSR’s preeminent role in
European Communism.

Sources of Friction

Despite these signs of greater Soviet-East European
cohesion, most developments during the early
Brezhnev years pointed not toward an increase

of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, but toward a
loosening of that control. In part, this trend reflected
the growing heterogeneity of the East European

societies, but it also was due to the schism in
world Communism that had been opened by the
Sino-Soviet conflict. A bitter split between the
two leading Communist powers, stemming from
genuine policy and ideological differences as well
as from a personal clash between Khrushchev
and Mao Zedong, developed behind-the-scenes
in the late 1950s. The dispute intensified in June
1959, when the Soviet Union abruptly terminated
its secret nuclear weapons cooperation agreement
with China. Khrushchev’s highly publicized visit
to the United States in September 1959 further

antagonized the Chinese, and a last-ditch meeting
between Khrushchev and Mao in Beijing right after
Khrushchev's tour of the United States failed to
resolve any of the major issues dividing the two
sides. From then on, Sino-Soviet relations steadily
deteriorated.

By the time Brezhnev took office in October
1964, the Sino-Soviet split had become a central
feature of world politics, with important conse-
quences for Soviet-East European relations. All
the East European Communist leaders had learned
of the rift in June 1960, when Soviet and Chinese
Officials attending the Romanian Communist Party's
congress traded polemics and recriminations. Over
the next several months, as news of the conflict
spread throughout the world, Khrushchev and Mao
made a few additional attempts to reconcile their
differences; but the split, if anything, grew even
wider. The ascendance of Brezhnev failed to
ameliorate the situation. Initially, a few officials on
both sides hoped that the change of leadership in
Moscow would permit the two countries to achieve
at least a partial rapprochement and to restore a
semblance of unity in the international Communist
movement, but those hopes proved illusory. Enmity
between the two sides intensified and moved ever
closer toward an armed clash.

The spill-over from the Sino-Soviet conflict into
Eastern Europe was evident almost immediately, as
the Soviet Union and China vied with one another
for the backing of foreign Communist parties. In
late 1960 and early 1961 the Albanian leader, Enver

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 21


25X14

Approved For Qgjease FREER To orcoanrasdeots00:20019-7

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUUJECT: Post Mortem on Czech Crisis

REFERENCE: USIB-D-24.1/5, 11 October 1968

1. In decordance with matructions contained in rufexence,
tho Strategic Warning Working Group (SWWG) roccivod the post
snortem roporta On the Cacch crisis prepared by CLA, DIA, NSA und
INR, and yeviewed thom thoroughly, The CLA and DIA reports are
studies in considerable detail of the intelligence coverage of the Czech
sentandie Cerny ttre g PYG veratth attire Mire Hersieterty et © eee teeth ficou
20 Auguet by Sovint and other Eastern Duropean forces. ‘The INR
aummavy addrevecs some aspects of the crisis of particular concern
to the State Department and the NSA report givos dotaile of SIGINT
coverage during this perlod. These four reports, taken together,
preannt & thorough, comprehtnsivo and very dutalied ruviuw of all
intalligence activities--colluction, analysix and roporting--during the
nine month poried of developing crisis and Zinal militasy intervention.
‘The reports ara so complate in thomaclvcs that no attempt wae made
to summarize them asa single document, A very briof summary of

events and intelligence coverage thereo! ia attached as Annex A,

The INR, CIA, DIA and NSA roports aro attached in subscquent annexes,

25X41



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CIA's Historical Collections Division gratefully acknowledges the following organizations for their courtesy in
providing material for this collection.

ABC News VideoSource CBS News Information Resources
125 West End Avenue 524 West 57" Street
New York, NY 10023 New York, NY 10019
Pacifica Radio Archives The Herb Block Foundation
3729 Cahuenga Boulevard, West 1730 M Street, NW
North Hollywood, CA 91604 Washington, DC 20036
www.pacificaradioarchives.org
The New York Times-PARS Time, Inc.
International Corp. TimeReprints_US@time.com

253 West 35" Street
New York, NY 10001

Other Video, Audio, and Photographs provided by:
Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library Audiovisual Archives
2313 Red River Street
Austin, TX 78705

ABC and CBS News Video Clips Provided by:
Vanderbilt University Television News Archive
110 Twenty-first Avenue, South
Nashville, TN 37203

Music provided by:

Kevin MacLeod
www.incompetech.com

The complete bibliographic citations for all of the material provided by the above may be
found on the DVD.

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA |

65


38

T-0-P WE-C-R-E-’ = Sc 05890-68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

‘APPROVED FOR RELEASE
OATE:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Crisis in Czechoslovakia

1, Relations between Moscow and Prague have deteriorated
to the loveat point since the change in the Czechoslovak leader-
ship in January, The situation appesrs to be moving tovard 4
dectotve stage.

2. During the Warsav Pact exercise in June, the Soviets ia-
troduced several thousand military personnel into Czechoslovakia.
The bulk of these remin in the country, concentrated northwest
and northeast of Prague. Western military attache sightings
have not confirmed the presence of such large numbers of Soviet
troops, Some four to six divisions have apparently been moved
into positions in close proximity to the Czechoslovak frontier.
The number of Soviet troops which have actually entered the

country cannot be determined,

GRouP 1

torn
(ota)
m

Excluded from autamtic

downgrading and
declassification

1-0-P ‘ania! |

| THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA



\

ne)
10-P <2-0-5-2-2 fa 8c 05890-68 fhiy)

3. Stor? about 10 July five sew communications links

controlled by the Soviet General Staff have been established:

tvo terminals appear to be located in Czechoslovakia; » third

ia located near Budapest; another 1s near Urhgorod on the Soviet-
Czechoslovak border; the lsst is southwest of Magieburg, Bast
Germany. These additional links indicate an expectation by the
Soviets of > substantial increase in communications. The estab~
Lishnent of these terminals suggests, though it does not prove,

& movement or preparations for s movement of Soviet troops Into

Czechoslovakte free the USSR, Mungary, and Bast Germany

4k. Withie the last tvo weeks increased propaganda indicates
thet Hoscow hes sade some nev deciatons regarding Czechoslovakia.
On 27 June the "2000 Words" Declaration of the Czechoslovak
libernis (sony of them Communiot Party members) was published in
several Czechoslovak newspapers. On 30 June TASS wnnounced that
the Warsav Pact exercise vas ended, then cancelled the anncunce-
pent & fev hours later, In early July Moscow, Wnreav, Pankow,
Budapest, and Sofia sent private letters to Prague, apparently
Warning the Czechoslovek Purty leadership and eumoning the Ceochs
to = meeting; the Dutcek regine refused to attend. On 11 July
Pravds attacked the "2000 Worda” Declaration as being

ak We

m

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 39




= soe OS
OUTED CTS

economic reforms but political reforms as well. ‘The latter will

pertain mainly to domestic affaire ~~ the reduction of arbitrary
party authority -- but also, inevitably, to foreign affairo. The
nev forces in Prague are concerned with internal political
pluralion, aa are the Yugoslave, ané vith national sovereignty,
0s ore the Romanians,

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 27


Approved Rew Release 2005/12/24 ; CIA-RDP79ROOS#8A001400020006-1
S-E-C-H-E-?

1. Contrary ‘to indications Isst week that Hoscoy was pre+
paring to crack down hard on the Cxechs and on the Dubeek Leader-
ahip, the Goviets now appear to be giving the Cxechs scar
opportunity to put their own house in order, The most virulent
Soviet accusations against the Czechs have lately been mted and
have been accompanied by praise of both Dubcek and Byobods. This
turnabout -- the third time the Soviet prese hsa changed its line
on Duboek = and other anomller (including, first and most con-
spicuously, the apparent lack of any clear-cut occupstion policy
once the invasion had been completed) has auggested Soviet in-
decision or even serious disagreements within the Soviet leadership.
The following discussion offers seew notions on bow things might
GO now inaide Czechoslovakia, how the Soviets might view this
Process, what the circumstances might be within the Soviet leaders
ehip, and, finally, a very brief consideration of the possible
impact of the Czech affnir on genera) Sovict policy.

The Scene in Ceechoalavakia

2. ‘The Crechoslovak leaders surely dié their best in Moscow,
under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, to obtain an.
honorable settlement and the withdrawal of all Warsaw Fact troops
from Ceeck soil. But Dubcek and hie comrades -- with their

~2-

BoE O-Ra R= T
Approved For Release 2005/12/24 ; CLA-RDP72R00904A001400020006-1



DVD CONTENTS

The Central Intelligence Agency's Information Management Services reviewed, redacted, and released
hundreds of documents related to the 1968 Czechoslovak-Soviet crisis for this event. The accompanying

DVD contains over 500 documents and 2,000 pages of material. All documents are also available on the CIA
website at www.cia.gov.

The material is organized into the following categories.

— The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia document collection—featuring CIA intelligence reports,

Bureau of National Estimates intelligence estimates and special memos, open source material, post
mortems, and other reporting.

- Audio clips—cabinet meetings, public statements and interviews by LBJ and cabinet members.

— Photos and imagery.

— Video clips of various events related to the Soviet invasion and the LBJ administration's reaction to it.

This DVD includes information on how to view the materials and will work on most computers.
The documents are in .PDF format.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this booklet are those
of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the
Central Intelligence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present.
Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US
government endorsement of an article's factual statements and_ interpretations.

66 | THECIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA


SPONSORS

The Historical Collections Division (HCD) of CIA’s Information Management Services is responsible
for executing the Agency’s Historical Review Program. This program seeks to identify, collect, and
review for possible release to the public documents of significant historical importance.

The mission of HCD is to:

+ Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the information and intelligence that
has helped shape the foundation of major US policy decisions.

+ Broaden access to lessons learned, presenting historical material to emphasize the
scope and context of past actions.

+ Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts
and effects arising from past decisions.

+ Uphold Agency leadership commitments to openness, while protecting the national
security interests of the US.

+ Provide the American public with valuable insight into the workings of the Government.

Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library and Museum

The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum is one of eleven presidential libraries administered
by the National Archives and Records Administration. The Library houses 45 million pages of
historical documents which include the papers from the entire public career of Lyndon Baines Johnson
and also from those of close associates. These papers and the vast administrative files from the
presidency are used primarily by scholars. The museum provides year-round public viewing of its
permanent historical cultural exhibits. Special activities and exhibits are sponsored privately by the
Friends of the LBJ Library and its parent organization, the LBJ Foundation.

The mission of the LBJ Library is to:

+ Preserve and protect the historical materials in the collections of the Johnson Library
and make them readily accessible;

+ Increase public awareness of the American experience through relevant exhibitions and
educational programs;

+ Advance the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum's standing as a center
for intellectual activity and community leadership while meeting the challenges of a
changing world.

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 3


46 | THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 Si VIET- D INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVA\ IA
——}

Approves For Release 2000/04/21 CIA-RDP94TO0754R000200280004-5
TOP SECRET

heretofore have not bean involved with Czechoslovakia,
This movement approximates expected actions of the
Soviet Union in the event of a reinforcement against
NATO. It is possible that because of the shift of
three GSFG armies towards Czechoslovakia, the Soviets
feel a need to fill the void created in their defenses
against NATO.

14, Warsaw Pact procedures allow movement to
begin before ali the units are created or brought up
to strength since the front is designed for phased
deployment Deployment involves moving the units by
road or trains in such order that they arrive with
organizational integrity. The numbers of men and
vehicles involved, combined with the complexity of
the routing and scheduling, require a high degree of
control and maximum utilization of the transportation
network for a successful and timely operation. Once
the front is organized and the transportation network
made ayailable, about four divisions per day or approxi-
mately one army could be moved from the western USSR
through Poland.

The Threat

‘Uunlts Nave redeployed

(outnwara Within East Germany to the area closest to

western Czechoslovakia, where the eight full-strength
Czech divisions are located.

16. The Polish field army from the Silesian
Military District has been reoriented toward the
Czechoslovak border. At least one Soviet army from
the Carpathian Military District is partially deployed
inside Czechoslovakia,

i7. Military attache observations indicate that
the Soviet Southern Group of Porces in Hungary is

out of garrison snd that its four divisions ure now
close to the Czech frontier,

<5
TOP SECRET! |

—
e0 For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDPS4T00754R000200290004-5

25xt

> key a



44

Approved For Release 2009/04/21 - CIA-ROP94T00754R000200290004-5
TOP SECRET, _| ss

25X1

Mobilization

7. %In developing this military posture, the
Soviets and their Polish and East German allies
have mobilized to a degree unprecedented in peace-
time, despite the danger of provoking counteractions
by the West and destabilizing the military situation
in Central Europe.

25X1

9. Existing combat units at the division or
army level are not, by themselves, capable of sus-
tained military activity. The Warsaw Pact forces
are structured so that only the front-level organi-
zation is capable of sustained independent action,
with the facility for continuous re-supply of the
combat units. By design, the line divisions and,
to a large degree, the armies have only combat re-
sponsibilities and rely on the front and the front
rear services for the bulk of their logistic require-
ments. Effective employment of the combat elements
is contingent upon the early establishment of a
functioning rear services organization. Although
individual divisions can be moved over long distances
prior to mobilization, they cannot fight for more
than a few days without this support.

10. Except for the Soviet forces in Germany,
Soviet ground forces have little front organization
or functioning rear services elements in peacetime.
Front staff and headquarters elements are submerged

=u3'=
—=

~ TOP SECRET |
Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290004-5

25x1

| THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA



3-5 Jan Novotny resigns as First 8-10 May Soviet troop movements reported along Czech
ecretary of Communist Party and is border. Soviet troops in East Germany move southward.

Alexander Dubéek. .

8-14 May Soviet Army delegation visits Czechoslovakia.
*

: 20°May The Soviet. Union notifies the Johnson
MA » Administration of its renewed interest in SALT talks.

23 Mar Dubéek and Czech leaders 17-22 May Soviet Premier Kosygin and Defense Minister
“m

Warsaw Pact meeting in Dresden. | Grechko visit Prague accompanied by commanders of So-
Czechoslovaks urged to be cautious in the viet forces that have taken up positions 6n Czech border.
ae biireforpas. 31 May First Warsaw Pact troops enter Czechoslova-

kia for maneuvers scheduled to begin 20 June.

Late Mar Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev
issues warnings against imperialist subversion
of communist countries. First Soviet steps

in mobilizing support for intervention in Jun Warsaw Pact maneuvers formally end. Soviet troops
Czechoslovakia. remain in Czechoslovakia.

APRIL
5 Apr Action Program of reforms adopted by Czech =A
Central Committee. 18 Jul Radio Moscow increases its daily
P : broadcasts to Czechoslovakia. Secretary of
IWAY State Rusk denies rumors that the US warned
. the USSR against military intervention in
~ 4-5 May Dubéek, Smrkovsky, and Cernik meet with Czechoslovakia.

. Soviet leaders in Moscow.
23 Jul Moscow announces large rear service
exercise to take place in western USSR.
Czechoslovak military officials state 5,000 to 6,000
Soviet troops remain in country. An estimated
2,000 Soviet troops are reported encamped at
Zilina, Czechoslovakia.

25 Jul Soviets announce large air defense
CZECHOSLOVAKIA exercise over a broad area of USSR.
on
~-GRISIS TIMELINE 29 Jul Meeting of Czech and Soviet Party

leaders in Cierna nad Tisou begins.

8 May Leaders of Warsaw Pact countries (excluding
Czechoslovakia and Romania) convene in Moscow. No
communique is issued.

= AUGUST 1968

ae? ~
14 _| THE CIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA


Approved For Muthase 2005/12/24 : CIA-RDP79R00904Am0 1400020006-1
SECRET

CENTRAL EHTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

3 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Consequences of Czechoslovakia

accept the results of the Soviet-imposed Moscow compromise, vbich --
in exchange for the Soviets conditional acceptance of the Dubcek
leadership and for « vague Soviet promise someday to vithirav the
forces -- commits Prague to renewed fealty to the USSR
broad and to « return to more orthodox communist policies at bome,
Moscow thus seems to have accomplished its principal immediate aims,
the reversal of Czechoslovakia's movement svay frou the Bloc, the
collapse of the Czech experinent in @ new form of liberal and inde-
pendent socialien, and the erection of new barriers sgainst the
emergence of any Czech-like develoywenta elsevbere ip Eastern Europe.

keong the coste of such for the USSR, hovever,
are the explosive political strains ty
Soviet leadership; the Of anti-Soviet

ba ry Lactic h ination dL py pauetticra Purope; and -- despite
Soviet hopes to the contrary -~ the possible disruption of «
WLivky- Or povtaS Talister acnaea the cette

GROUP 2
GaE@C-R-E-T Excluded from automatic
Gownradiog and

Approved For Release 2005/12/24 : ClA-ROPTSROGSEARNETSOGNI00de-1



se aa

Approved For Rebudse 2006/09 (} fi FROPEOBO1495RGR800190019-7

in Czechoslovakia and that Soviet and other leaders obviously feared
the spread of these concepts to their own countries. It was recognized
and reported by the intelligence analysts that this constituted a threat
to vital Sovict interests and that if political pressures failed, the
Soviets would face a choice between acceptance and military action,
Intelligence publications first began to suggest that a Soviet
military intervention in Czechoslovakia was a real possibility in late
March. This warning was repeated and on May 10 definite evidence

of Sovict troop concentrations and mancuvers on the Czech border

“was reported for the first time.

Reporting on Soviet military preparations and maneuvers from
May 10 on was thorough. Our reporting was able to make the
important distinctions among the relatively small deployments for

extensive

political purposcs in May, the/deployments involved in the Warsaw
Pact exercises in Czechoslovakia in June/July, and the very large
deployments, complete with mobilization and reinforcement from
tho rear arcas, which were undertaken from the second half of July
and culminated in the actual invasion, Their capability to intervene

in Czechoslovakia at any time should they elect to do so was clearly

stated. However, it was not possible to report when the decision to

4 invade was being taken, when the Soviet troops had received their
orders and were preparing to move, or when the Sovict troops actually
q began to move. ECREY
7 Approved For Release om : CiA-ROPEOBD1495R001300130019-7
c Age OS, .. _e

|

si

nd






Approved For Release 2006/11/20 : CIA-RDP94TO07S54RO! eoomaeaane
x1

TOP SECRET]

1. There is no longer any pretense that the
Soviet units that arrived in Czechoslovakia in mid-
June for what the Czechs once hopefully billed as
a standard communications exercise were departing
gracefully and on time. It is now a matter of the
Czechoslovaks "negotiating" their removal.

2. Some of the foreign forces have been with-
drawn--the Czechoslovak minister of defense uses
the figure 35 percent--but Soviet ground force ele-
ments in unknown numbers, as well as aircraft and
tanks, remain. They may all go in the near future.
On the other hand, the Russians may try to keep a
military presence in Czechoslovakia until such time
as they feel easier about political trends within
the country. Or the units that participated in the
June exercises may be pulled out, but only temporar-
ily. The Soviet commander of the Warsaw Pact is
said already to have proposed that another "exercise"
be held in Czechoslovakia next month. The Russians
may devise yet other forms of military pressure.

The Soviet

3. While these questions remain, there can no
longer be any question that the Warsaw Pact, to which
Prague has repeatedly affirmed its allegiance, is
one of Moscow's chosen instruments of leverage with
the Czechoslovaks. Under its cover, the Soviets, in
a real sense, have already intervened militarily in
Czechoslovakia. It is also clear that, in their un-
dulating course, Soviet-Czechoslovak relations are
again at a point of high tension.

4. This has been the pattern of relations ever
since the old order in Prague was overthrown in Janu-
ary, and unless the Czechoslovak regime lurches more
sharply to the left or right than it has yet done,
this pattern may persist for some time. Moscow must
realize that it cannot turn the clock back in Czecho-
slovakia, even if it wanted to. But the Soviets want
greater certainty than they now have that the new
order in Prague is stabilizing, is master in its own
house, and has the will and the way to force internal
political ferment to subside.

=3-

THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 37


DECLASSIFIED

INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS

CHARTING THE

_ PRAGUE SPRING -



STRATEGIC
WARNING &

* "Tue ROLE Or INTELLIGENCE

Declassified Intelligence Documents (selected excerpts)...
—

TM charting the Prague Spring...
Ye
The Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis Unfolds
=

eraipating Surprise: The Soviets Invade........:..


'

. 4. ‘There have bean, ag yot, no indications
* ef ground forces movements into Czechoslovakia,
"pur dt de Likely that éeploymant occurred. fom
“assembly positions in Cxachoslovakia's borders in
. Bast Germony, Poland, the USSR, and Hungary. At
least 25 divisions had been dopioyed in thase aroas
for several wooke. ao recontiy as three daye ago
thoy had rohesreed a plan to move into western
** Geuchoslovaktay, : te
5. A member of the Sovict delegaticn to the
“UM has stated that tha Soviet govarnmont and dts
- Warsaw Pant allies Were intervening militarily in
Ceachoclovakia at the dequest of the Czechoslovak
govarnment. Otherwise, there had been no official’
Soviet statement, eithor as to the act of intervention
or as to the pretext on which the action is based,



THE SOVIET-
CZECHOSLOVAK
CRISIS UNFOLDS ==



Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290004-5
TOP SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 August 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Military Developments in the
Soviet-Czech Confrontation
Summary

Soviet. military pressure against Czechoslovakia
has grown steadily as the political confrontation
has intensified. Within the last two weeks five
field armies have been poised near Czech borders,
Soviet tactical air forces near Czechoslovakia have
been increased 70 percent, and large Soviet troop
units have been seen moving inside Czechoslovakia.

Soviet troop activity in May and June appeared
to be mainly a show of force. This troop activity
had limited value as a genuine threat of large-scale
intervention because the units involved were in a
peacetime configuration and lacked the support ele-
ments necessary for extended combat.

In mid-July, however, the pressure tactics entered
anew phase. The Soviets began a major call-up of
civilian reservists and vehicles in the western USSR
--an unprecedented move for them in peacetime--necessary
to support deployments in Eastern Europe. The evi-
dence, however, does not suggest any extensive mobili-
zation of low-strength divisions.

The full scope of the Soviet mobilization is not
known, but by now it could have provided a control
and support structure sufficient to support a doubling
of Soviet ground forces strength in Eastern Europe.

Bote: Thie memorandum wae produced aolely by CIA.
Tt was prepared by the Office of Strategie Reasearch.

TOP SECRET | |
roved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP94700754R000200290004-5

42 | THECIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA


28

“SECRET
Wo found Use only
No Dissem Abroad/Cont:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
23 April 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Czechoslovakia in Transition
Summary

Alexander Dubcek's beliefs that domestic repres-
sion must cease and that the time has come for Czecho-
slovakia to take its place in the family of nations
have led to a bloodless but pewcecreians very real
revolution in Czechoslovakia. unbending and un-
imaginative leadership of ery Novotny has been
supplanted by a new administration dedionted to pol-
icies based on Dubcek's ideas, These include pro-
tection of the rights of the individual, the cules of
iaw, a foreign policy serving the genuine interests
of the country, and broad economic reforms. The
party has promised to institutionalize such changes
at a measured pace.

Dubcek still is faced with significant domes-
tic opposition as distinct conservative and progres~-
sive factions have now emerged in the party. There
ig no reason to believe that he will, or safely
could, renege on his promises for changes, though
he probably will find L it difficult in some instances
ore move ahead as directly and rapidly as he might

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
Te was prepared by the Ofeice of Current Intelli-
gence and coordinated with the Office of Economic
Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Of-
fice of National Estimates, and the Clandestine

| THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA



. aust asabgetiee pene

of the Soviet leadership to their dachas for the
August holidays, the attitude of the Soviet press, the
anodyne communiques that were issued after each
meeting all were indicators that the Dubéek govern-
ment was being given more time-to do what was
not clear. “The mostly likely explanation,” Agency
analysts concluded, “appears to be that, under the
impact of internal pressures within the leadership
and of importuning from its anxious allies in Eastern
Europe...the fragile balance in the Soviet leader-
ship which produced the Cierna agreement has, in
the space of less than three weeks, been upset in
favor of those who may all along have wanted the
toughest kind of policy....” With the political scales
in Moscow in such precarious balance, “it would not
have needed a great shock to upset them.”

And so, in the early morning hours of 21 August,
Czechoslovakia was invaded from the north, east,
and south by 20 Warsaw Pact divisions totaling
some 250,000 men. At the same time, the positions
vacated by these units were backfilled by 10 Soviet
divisions. Once strategic points in Czechoslovakia
were occupied, most of these forces redeployed
into western Czechoslovakia, restoring the front
against NATO. There they were backed by the
full might of the Warsaw Pact, including thousands
of nuclear weapons targeted against Western and
Central Europe. Nothing short of a world war was
likely to get them out. In 1938, the Western powers
had responded to threats against Czechoslovakia
by backing down, rather than face a Nazi Germany
they falsely believed was ready for war. In 1968
they had no choice.

Note: This essay, complete with footnotes, appears
on the DVD.

12 | THECIA& STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA




6. According to a press roport from London, 2%
tolephone contact betwoon Britain and the Soviet
Union was cut soon after Prague Radio's announcement
of intervention.
7. The Soviet intervention came hard on reports
jion of the
Soviet Central Committes. Soviet leaders inter-

of the convening of an extraordinary

rupted their vacations in order to attend the

session, according to these reports. This sequence
suggests that the Soviot leadership was seeking tho
last-minute approval of the Contral Committee for

a Gecision which had already been made, Tho
circumstancos raiae tho possibility that the decision
resulted from a rebellion within the Politburo against .

policies Which, in recent weeks, have appeared to \
put the USSR on the short end in the Boviet-
Czechoslovak conflict.



52 | THECIA& STRATE

GIC WARNING: THE 1968 St

a

( CONFIBENTIAT. (

step back at Cierna, to give the signal yesterday
te crush the Czechoslovaks?

4. It may be some time before we can answer
this question with any assurance. On the strength
of what we know now, the most likely explanation
appears to be that, under the impact of internal
pressures within the leadership and of importuning
from its anxious allies in Eastern Europe, the So-
viet decision at Cierna to give Dubcek and company
more time became unravelled. This would suppose-~
as there seems some reason to suppose--that the
Soviet politburo when it went to Cierna was divided
in mind, and that the standoff reached there de-
rived mostly from Soviet irresolution. The fragile
balance in the Soviet leadership which produced the
Cierna agreement has, in the space of less than three
weeks, been upset in favor of those who may all
along have wanted the toughest kind of policy and
have made use of the time and developments since
Cierna to undo the agreement.

5. If, indeed, the political scales in Moscow
have been in such precarious balance, it would not
have needed a great shock to upset them, but only the
absence of solid signs that developments in Prague
were going Moscow's way. There were few of these.

In the short time available to Dubcek his efforts

to demonstrate that he could insure the unquestioned
domination of the Communist party had not been impres-
sive. Czechoslvak information media remained unruly
and unrepentant. There was no indication that non~-
Communist political elements--for example, the Club
of Committed Non-Party People and the revived
Socialist party--were being forced to take cover.
Despite the renewed pledges of fidelity to CEMA
given at Cierna, there continued to be much talk

in Prague of broader economic ties with the West.

6. The visits to Prague of Tito and Ceausescu
were all too visible reminders that the ranks of in-
dependent Communist states were swelling. And,
finally, with preparations moving ahead rapidly
for the party congress scheduled to open on 9 Sep-
tember, it was becoming clear that the congress

¥: 7

, Pettey

At bei

ECHOSLOVAKIA
ee



30 Jul Moscow announces
rear services exercise has been
extended to East Germany and
Poland. US embassy in Warsaw
receives reports of Soviet troops

moving into Poland from the USSR.

More Soviet troops move into East
Germany.

31 Jul US attache sees two large
Soviet convoys in central Czecho-
slovakia. Soviet forces in Hungary

11-20 Aug Soviets conduct air defense exercise (Operation Skyshield) over large
part of western USSR.

19 Aug Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorniy return from vacation early to attend an
emergency meeting of the Politburo.

LBJ receives a letter from Kosygin proposing that the President announce, on 21 Au-
gust, that US-Soviet arms limitation talks will be held in Leningrad on 30 September.

20 Aug Warsaw Pact troaps cross border into Czechoslo-
vakia. Ruzyne Airport near Prague is occupied by Soviet
airborne troops.

move into assembly areas. East
German and Polish reserves are
reportedly called up.

1 Aug Czech leaders return to Prague and assure citizens
that an understanding has been reached with the Soviets.

1-14 Aug Soviet press ceases its attacks on
Czechoslovakia.

3 Aug Czechoslovak leaders meet with’Warsaw Pact
leaders in Bratislava. A joint communique is issued.

The.remaining troops from the June Warsaw Pact exercise
leave Czechoslovakia. Decreased fear of intervention is
evident throughout the JOhnson Administration following the
Bratislava meeting.

7-9 Aug Most Soviet Politburo members leave Moscow
and vacation near the Black Sea.

20-21 Aug Western leaders are informed of the Soviet
invasion through their respective Soviet ambassadors.
President Johnson calls an emergency meeting of the
National Security Council.

21 Aug Additional troops enter the major cities
and countryside of Czechoslovakia. They. occupy
Central. Committee HQs and Prague radio station.
Dubéek and other party leaders are arrested.

Soviet news agency Tass issues a statement

on the invasion that includes an unsigned letter
requesting Soviet military assistance, purportedly
from Czechoslovak officials.

Czech Party Presidium issues a statement that
condemns the invasion of their country and denies
that any Czechoslovak official requested Soviet
military assistance.

Johnson condemns invasion in televised sp€ech.

Ma THE CIA & STRATEGIC WARNING: THE 1968 SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA |

ist