The Airman-Scholar invites both full-length articles and short “letters to the editor” comments. 

Please submit in accordance with the following 

guidelines:

1. Full-length articles should be approximately 

6,000 words in length, although all submissions 

will be considered.

2. Articles should be submitted as hard copy with 

accompanying 3.5 disk (not returned)

3. Articles will be edited to conform with AirmanScholar format; proofs will not be sent to authors 

prior to publication.

4. Articles are encouraged from all knowledgeable 

members of the academic and military communities. Publication of outstanding papers by USAFA 

cadets and other service academy students is a particular goal of Airman-Scholar.

5. Articles must be received by 1 September 

2003.

6. Send articles to:

34th Education Group

Attn: Airman-Scholar

2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 2A2

USAF Academy, CO 80840-6264

From the Editor:

In this issue...

We have two articles by Maj Michael J. 

McCarthy both relating to issues with nuclear weapons. “Ready for Anything” and “The Four Elements” give some insight and historical perspectives 

which are still valid and thought provoking. Maj. 

White’s article on joint warfighting, “How Joint,” 

suggests that there is still some work to be done in 

the way we desire to conduct war. 

The remainder of the publication is devoted 

to papers written by cadets at the US Air Force 

Academy and represents an excellent cross section 

of thinking from the Education Group’s Military 

Strategic Studies sections. In the future the AirmanScholar will devote a large percentage of its space to 

showcasing the best in USAF Academy cadet writing on military topics. To this end we will include 

the best papers obtainable from the History, Political Science, Philosophy and Military Strategic Studies programs. We welcome all departments focusing 

on the general theme of Contemporary Military 

Thought which guides the Airman-Scholar. 

In seeking to showcase current military 

thought as represented by cadets at USAFA we are 

also trying to illuminate the issues which the future 

USAF leaders are grappling with as they prepare for 

an uncertain future. As much as any other thing, 

these issues presage the future of the Air Force and 

the kinds of problem solvers that will be coming 

forth from the hallowed halls of USAFA. As these 

same leaders express themselves in their attempts 

at recommendations for solutions or suggest methods of thinking about solutions, we hope to 

capture the “nuggets” of truly useful concepts and 

thoughts. A forum of sorts for an eclectic set of 

assertions, recommendations, and suggestions for 

thinkers engaged in the profession of arms to consider, to mine and to refine all coming from the 

fertile minds and hearts of the future leaders of the 

US Air Force. 
2

AIRMAN SCHOLAR

Published by the 34th Education Group 

at the 

United States Air Force Academy

Spring 2003

Vol VIII, No 2

Commandant of Cadets

Commander 34th Training Wing

Brig Gen Johnny Weida

Commander and Permanent Professor, 

34th Education Group

Col Thomas A. Drohan

Editor 

Glenn Ferguson

Assistant Editor

Maj. Charles “Dutch” Dusch

The 34th Education Group’s mission is to oversee curriculum 

development and instruction in Military Strategic Studies for 

the cadets of the US Air Force Academy. This consists of courses 

covering Military Theory and Strategy, Officership, Airmanship, Aerospace Theory and Doctrine, and Joint and Coalition 

Operations. Group personnel conduct research on a variety 

of topics, including international security, space-related issues, 

military service culture, and educational modeling. Research 

activities are coordinated through the 34th Education Group 

Research Office.

The opinions expressed in AIRMAN SCHOLAR do not represent any official policies of the Commandant of Cadets, US 

Air force Academy, US Air Force, or US government. They are 

presented to stimulate discussion on current military issues and 

domestic and international affairs.

AIRMAN SCHOLAR is published twice annually. If you have 

comments concerning articles, would like to contribute an article for publication, or desire to receive AIRMAN SCHOLAR, 

please contact us at:

34th Education Group

att: AIRMAN SCHOLAR

2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 2A2

USAF Academy CO 80840-6264

(719) 333-3255 or DSN 333-3255

e-mail: 34EDGAirman.Scholar@usafa.af.mil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

3 Ready for Anything: 

Tension and Compromise in the Safety, Security, 

and Readiness of Strategic Nuclear Forces

by Maj Michael J. McCarthy

8 The Four Elements:

Creating the Foundations of US 

Strategic Nuclear Policy

by Maj Michael J. McCarthy

12 How Joint?

by Maj Richard White

14 The War in Bosnia:

How USAF Fighter Squadrons Addressed Friction 

in Tactical Operations

by Maj Charles D. Dusch, Jr.

20 Terrorism, who cares?

Japanese Perceptions and Approaches to Terrorism

by C1C Jason Kramer

36 The Intelligence World and the 

Prometheus Process

 by C2C P.J. Davis

39 Calling the Audible by C1C Adam J. Kawatski

42 Neocortical Warfare:

A Future Revolution in Military Affairs

C1C Barbara Soucy

45 The State of Airlift

by C2C Beacher Randy Webb III

48 The Role of Air Power in 

Peacekeeping and Peace Making by C2C John Oberle

50 Info Ops: The Need for Organization by C2C Jamison Richart

54 Street Wars: MOUT and the USAF

by C1C Lee A. Staab III

58 RMA: Info Ops

by C1C Grant Coppins

63 Combat Search and Rescue for the German 

Armed Forces

by C1C Georg G. Schafer, GAF

66 The New Longbow: Space Weaponry, Medieval 

Knights, and the Future of the United States at 

War

by C1C Jared Smith

70 Authors’ Biographies
3

Ready for Anything:

Tension and Compromise in the 

Safety, Security, and Readiness of 

Strategic Nuclear Forces

by Maj Michael J. McCarthy

Late in the afternoon on August 

5, 1945, Captain Deke Parsons finally 

made the decision. He would wait until 

the Enola Gay actually took off from 

North Field on Tinian before he inserted 

the conventional explosive and its uranium gun in the rear of the Little Boy 

atomic bomb. He had seen other B-29s 

roll off the runway at takeoff, crashing 

into each other, and the ensuing explosion had killed not only the crews but 

also rescue workers. If the Enola Gay 

blew up and the Little Boy was armed, 

the resulting explosion could destroy half 

the island. It was against policy and he 

had only ten hours to learn how to arm 

the weapon in flight. But he made the 

decision to do it anyway. To Parsons, it 

was clear that the safety and security of 

the forces on Tinian overshadowed the 

readiness of the weapon on what was to 

be the very first atomic mission.1 Since 

the dawn of the atomic age, there has 

always been a tension between the need 

to provide safety and security for strategic 

nuclear weapons in daily operations and 

the need to ensure the strategic nuclear 

force is ready for immediate action. This 

tension is never fully resolved—each of 

the components (safety, security, and 

readiness) has its own complexities and 

forces its own imperatives on the operations and activities of strategic nuclear 

forces. Even today, after fifty-seven years 

of experience, the policy of the Department of Defense embodies that concept: 

“Nuclear weapon system safety, security, 

survivability, and use control are interrelated. Decisions concerning one shall 

not be made without consideration of the 

effect of those decisions on the others.

2

 This paper will examine the relationship between those considerations, particularly during the decision process to 

employ strategic nuclear weapons in conflict.

The Imperative for Safety

Captain Parsons understood the 

imperative for safety. Nuclear weapons 

in the early years were dangerously unstable, and much of what was known about 

the actual events during the implosion 

was based on theory and a few experiments. An accident involving a nuclear 

warhead could lead to thousands of unintended combat or peacetime casualties. 

Since 1950, there have been over thirty 

accidents involving nuclear warheads; 

fortunately, and largely due to safety procedures and weapons design, most were 

relatively minor in scale. 3 Even today, 

safety of the nuclear warheads remains a 

critically important criterion in the development, maintenance, and daily operations of the nuclear force. It is Defense 

Department policy that all nuclear 

weapons shall incorporate positive 

measures to prevent them from producing a nuclear yield in the event of an 

accident or incident, including the possibility of a weapon being jettisoned.4

Safety measures must guard 

against two considerations: technical malfunctions or failures of components or 

subsystems within the weapon or delivery system; and human error. 5 However, safety precautions can often mean 

a reduction in readiness. For example, 

one early method to ensure safety of 

nuclear bombs was to physically separate the nuclear components from the 

rest of the bomb, combining them and 

arming the weapon only when actually 

required. Early bombs used a manual Inflight Insertion and In-flight Extraction 

(IFI/IFE) method, which posed additional safety concerns; some later weapons had an automatic IFI/IFE process. 

However, the imperative for increased 

responsiveness and reliability soon overshadowed this safety procedure. In the 

mid-1950s, “sealed-pit” weapons, which 

contained the nuclear material as an 

integral part of the system, were introduced, and by early 1963, they comprised 

the majority of nuclear weapons in the 

US arsenal. 6Since sealed-pit weapons are 

considered “constantly ready,” they have 

their own unique safety considerations:

Nuclear safety was achieved in sealed pit 

systems by finely balancing the quantities of fissile and high-explosive materials so that a nuclear yield could not 

result if the explosives were accidentally 

ignited. This approach achieved “onepoint safety.” That is, an accidentally 

dropped warhead, or one exposed to a 

fire as in an aircraft crash, would, if detonated, produce no significant yield.... 

With a well-designed and tested onepoint safe nuclear system, all safety and 

control features could be satisfied by adequate electrical system design. 7

Another example demonstrates 

the balance between safety and readiness 

in the strategic nuclear missile force. The 

first generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles, including the Atlas and 

Titan, used liquid fuel so volatile that it 

could not be stored within the missile. 

The maintenance crews would have to 

undertake a complex and delicate fueling procedure before the missile would 

be ready for operations; should it not be 

fired, all the fuel had to be drained out 

to reduce the risk of explosion. These 

necessary safety precautions meant it 

could take over an hour before the force 

could respond to an enemy strike. Using 

such volatile liquid fuels was clearly not 

acceptable, and within several years the 

safer and more responsive solid-fueled 

Minuteman and Polaris missiles replaced 

the dangerous Atlas and Titan missiles. 8

In both of these examples, the 

tension between safety and readiness was 

resolved through improvements in technology that fortunately resulted in both 

greater safety and improved readiness. 

Some situations, however, are not so 
4

favorably resolved. In many cases, the 

human factor cannot be as easily 

controlled. Human involvement in 

an activity always brings an inherent 

safety risk; stress-induced pressures in 

training or combat can increase the likelihood of human error and accident.

The constant training, exercises, 

and maintenance procedures that are 

inherently a part of readiness for combat 

can dramatically increase the risk of an 

accident, despite safety precautions. Most 

safety-related events involving nuclear 

weapons are a result of aircraft accidents 

engaged in training missions, including 

the highly publicized incident in January 1965 involving the mid-air collision 

of a KC-135 tanker and a B-52 bomber 

with four nuclear weapons near Palomares, Spain. Only two of the bombs 

were recovered, and 1400 tons of contaminated soil had to be removed after a 

non-nuclear explosion spread radioactive 

debris. 9 Although the Department of 

Defense had previously decided to eventually discontinue airborne alerts of the 

B-52 bomber force, the safety implications arising from this accident contributed to the cancellation of the program. 10

The Imperative for Security

The security of nuclear weapons 

is equally important. Their destructive 

power is so great that the consequences of 

unauthorized use are almost unthinkable. 

One concern is the threat from sabotage 

or terrorism; therefore the Departments 

of Defense and Energy have established 

comprehensive security procedures and 

security response forces at nuclear weapon 

facilities and operational bases, along 

with methods for evaluating their effectiveness. Retired Air Force General Chris 

Adams described these methods at Strategic Air Command (SAC):

To stimulate consistent interest 

and awareness, SAC operated a security 

evaluation system. The system’s twophased approach utilized a specially 

trained team whose mission was to surreptitiously breach a unit’s security measures. 

These teams used false identifications 

and false orders, picture badges with 

photos other than the wearers’ photos 

inserted, and other creative schemes 

to “get inside” a secure area. ... 

The second phase of these evaluations included complete audits of security procedures, inventories of classified 

materials, and tests (both oral and 

written) for personnel having responsibility for maintaining documents and/or 

systems security. The system seldom 

failed beyond an occasional administrative mishap. 11

Security procedures and considerations against the threat of sabotage 

and terrorism do not generally affect the 

responsiveness of the active force; arguably, they may serve to increase the readiness by instilling in the minds of the 

personnel manning the weapons the seriousness of their duties. Two other concerns, however, have a direct impact on 

readiness: deliberate actions that could 

lead to a planned but unauthorized detonation of a nuclear device, and inadvertent actions that could lead to an 

unplanned detonation.

President Harry S. Truman was 

among the first to recognize that nuclear 

weapons were more than just another 

bomb, and that the decision to employ 

them must be made carefully by a competent political authority. Dropping a 

nuclear bomb was a political statement 

more than a military activity, and he did 

not want “to have some dashing lieutenant colonel decide when would be 

the proper time to drop one.” 12 Therefore, he placed the custody of all nuclear 

weapons under the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and mandated that only 

by presidential order could they be transferred to the military. 13 While ensuring 

positive control, this decision had enormous implications for the readiness and 

responsiveness of the force. In 1947, 

General George C. Kenney, the Commanding General of the Strategic Air 

Command, noted: “The VHB [Very 

Heavy Bomber] groups of the Strategic 

Air Command are now capable of 

taking off ... within a few hours after 

an order to do so is received; but if 

the atomic bomb is used the takeoff 

might be delayed, by factors beyond 

the control of the Air Force....” 14

The decision to deploy B-29s to 

Europe at the beginning of the Berlin 

Crisis in 1948 demonstrated the implications of ensuring the security of nuclear 

weapons by having them in AEC custody. Although not of the type modified to carry nuclear weapons, the B-29s 

were deployed to send a message to the 

Soviet Union that nuclear weapons could 

be used to protect American interests 

in Europe. However, neither the AEC 

nor Eighth Air Force was prepared to 

transfer custody or transport the weapons to Europe. The turmoil surrounding 

the deployment underscored the need for 

better planning and eventually led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to authorize 

the military to have custody of nuclear 

weapons in peacetime in order to increase 

operational readiness. 15

By the late 1950s, the pendulum had started to swing in the other 

direction. While the military was pleased 

with custodianship, civilian authorities 

and observers began to examine the possible consequences. In 1958, Fred Ikles 

of the RAND Corporation suggested 

that “combination locks” be installed on 

nuclear weapons to prevent unauthorized 

or accidental detonations. Likewise, scientists like John Foster at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and Harold Agnew at 

Los Alamos Laboratory were arguing for 

increased safety and control measures. 

By the early 1960s, procedural and physical restraints were established that reinstated a higher level of control on the use 

of nuclear weapons.

These procedural and physical 

restraints were based upon the concept 
5

of never allowing a single individual 

to have the ability to launch a nuclear 

weapon. At least two, and often a significant number, of predetermined individuals were required to conduct certain 

activities, usually in a specified sequence, 

in order to make a nuclear weapon ready 

for use. Some of the procedures were 

simple but effective, such as establishing 

a “no-lone zone” around nuclear weapons, thus assuring that all sensitive activities such as maintenance and arming are 

not accomplished by a single individual 

but rather by two with the same level of 

authority and training. 16 Other procedures are more complex, such as those 

required to launch Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles, which involve reading the 

launch message to the entire crew, having 

it confirmed by two sets of officers (not 

including the commanding officer, weapons officer, or navigation officer), issuing special keys which themselves permit 

the closing of switches in a proscribed 

sequence, thus arming and launching the 

weapon. 17 

Mechanical and electromechanical devices also help ensure the 

security of nuclear weapons. Early and 

simple ones included simple sets of standard combination locks, the combinations of which were held by two separate 

individuals. However, the most common 

and secure device is the Permissive Action 

Links (PAL), which came into widespread 

use following the issuing of National 

Security Action Memorandum 160 by 

the Kennedy Administration in 1962. 

PALs are electro-mechanical devices that 

lock the warhead in an inert status and 

only allow it to be unlocked through 

two sets of codes, each held by a different individual. 18 The PALs incorporated 

into the nuclear warheads are designed 

in such a way that any attempt to bypass 

them will simply disarm the weapon. 19

These physical and procedural 

restraints on nuclear weapons impose 

limitations on the readiness of the strategic nuclear force, and to a certain extent 

the ability to carry out a launch order. 

First, these procedures, including the 

unlocking of any PALs, take time. Yet 

time is the one luxury a nuclear conflict 

does not permit. The intelligence community may offer some level of strategic 

warning, which permits some advance 

preparations or preliminary discussions 

on response and employment options. 

However, tactical warning of a strategic 

nuclear attack may provide less than 

thirty minutes in which to make and 

carry out a launch decision. Should the 

president delay in his decision, or any 

of the intermediary commands delay in 

their issuing of launch orders, bomber 

crews may not take off in time and missile crews may not launch in time to 

avoid destruction in the first wave of 

strikes. Second, should the crews insert 

the wrong codes (perhaps over nervousness) more than a specified number of 

times, some PALs will lock up and prevent further use, even with the proper 

codes, thereby rendering the weapon useless in conflict. 20 Third, great thought 

must be given to the distribution of the 

codes. Too wide a distribution will undermine security; too restricted will undermine survivability and responsiveness. 21

One important consideration, 

however, is that military forces retain the 

full physical ability to launch nuclear 

weapons—civilian authorities do not 

retain any of the keys or codes that are 

used to unlock and enable nuclear detonation. Although the president and 

defense secretary have nuclear launch 

codes (carried by their military aides), 

these codes are used to authenticate 

the user’s identity rather than used to 

actually unlock the PALs or initiate an 

arming sequence. The launch authorization codes are actually kept in certain 

military command centers and disbursed 

throughout the strategic nuclear force in 

accordance with set procedures to ensure 

they would only be used when authorized. 22

Clearly, another key aspect of 

ensuring safety and security (and, conversely, readiness) is ensuring that the 

individuals entrusted with the operational 

security and employment of nuclear 

weapons are reliable and responsible. 

There are three aspects to this consideration. First, these individuals must be 

highly trained and constantly tested to 

ensure the possibilities for human error in 

the security realm are reduced to a minimum. Second, these individuals must 

be mentally sound and psychologically 

and professionally reliable to ensure they 

will not deliberately detonate a nuclear 

weapon without authorization. In other 

words, eliminate those individuals who 

may “go crazy and launch a nuke,” or 

those when in combat may launch a 

nuclear weapon without authorization 

when faced with an unfavorable tactical 

situation. Third, these individuals must 

be mentally sound and psychologically 

and professionally reliable to ensure they 

will detonate a nuclear weapon when so 

ordered. In this case, eliminate those 

individuals who, despite their training, 

may hesitate or refuse to carry out a 

lawful order because of a concern of the 

awesome consequences of their actions.

The Department of Defense 

implemented the Personal Reliability 

Program (PRP) 23 as a method for evaluating the reliability and responsibility 

of those individuals in the security and 

employment of nuclear weapons. This 

program includes psychological testing, 

mental health evaluations, and interviews with commanding officers. Retired 

General Russell E. Dougherty, former 

Commander in Chief of Strategic Air 

Command, outlined his perspective: “No 

one in the nuclear commands has an 

inherent ‘right’ to be entrusted with 

nuclear weapons responsibilities; those 

who are assigned such duties must meet 

a high standard of ‘human reliability.’...

Deviations from these standards, or aber-
6

rant personal behavior, will result in further, immediate scrutiny, and probably 

removal from nuclear weapons duties.”

24

The imperative for security is 

included within the current Department 

of Defense policy: “There shall be 

positive measures to prevent deliberate 

prearming, arming, launching, or releasing of nuclear weapons, except upon 

execution of emergency war orders or 

when directed by competent authority.... There shall be positive measures to 

prevent inadvertent prearming, arming, 

launching, or releasing of nuclear 

weapons in all normal and credible abnormal environments. 25

The Imperative for Readiness

Deterrence works because adversaries believe the United States has both 

the will and capability to respond to 

a nuclear attack with its own nuclear 

strike. That capability rests upon bombers and missiles constantly poised for 

action, while the will rests upon the 

belief that should the president give the 

order for a nuclear strike, it can and will 

be carried out. Together, these components drive an imperative for readiness.

As mentioned, Truman established the policy that only the president 

can authorize the use of nuclear weapons. 

But what if the president is unable to 

do so? Eisenhower recognized that such 

limited control undermines the readiness of the strategic nuclear force, and 

he apparently delegated “discretionary 

release authority” to the commanders of 

selected major commands, such as Air 

Defense Command, Strategic Air Command, and others (although the evidence 

is sketchy). In the event of a nuclear 

conflict, when response time is limited 

and the president was for some reason 

out of communication or unable to 

authorize a response, these commanders 

had the authority to launch defensive 

or retaliatory strikes.26

The Kennedy administration 

took a dim view of this authority and 

the general loosening of restrictions on 

the employment of nuclear weapons that 

had taken place during the Eisenhower 

era. As mentioned, the widespread use 

of PALs and procedural controls were 

implemented beginning in 1962. The 

military initially saw these requirements 

as detrimental to readiness, but eventually accommodated their use and 

viewed them as increasing stability, 

security, safety, and, by mandating 

procedural actions, responsiveness.

The human component remains 

critical in ensuring readiness, as well. As 

mentioned, the Personal Reliability Program is designed to also ensure individuals involved in the employment of 

nuclear weapons are mentally sound 

and psychologically and professionally 

reliable to ensure they will detonate a 

nuclear weapon when so ordered. General Dougherty was subject to criticism 

from the media when he discharged an 

officer who, when questioned during 

the Personal Reliability Program interviews whether he would launch nuclear 

missiles, always qualified his statement 

with personal reservations. This officer 

was technically competent, operationally 

savvy, and otherwise highly professional, 

but Dougherty could not allow him to 

impose his own criteria on the employment of nuclear weapons. 27 Frequent 

realistic exercises help ingrain into these 

bomber crews and missile launch officers the trust that properly authenticated 

orders should be carried out without hesitation.

Since the early 1990s, the United 

States has gradually decreased the readiness of its strategic nuclear force without 

decreasing its ability to launch a strike, 

if needed. Few bombers sit alert today, 

and missiles are reportedly not aimed at 

any targets in the Russian Federation. 

But the command and control structure, operational procedures, and security 

devices in place still permit the ability to 

respond to a strike under tactical warning. But the tension between security and 

readiness remains. One area in which this 

is evident is the concept of “de-alerting.”

De-alerting is defined as removing the nuclear warhead from the missiles and physically separating them so 

that it would take hours or days to reconstitute and rearm them. Proponents 

of the concept argue that it will significantly increase security and stability 

because it would reduce the readiness 

of the strategic nuclear force: “move 

nuclear forces off hair-trigger, launch-onwarning status, and thus make an ‘accidental launch’ scenario highly unlikely.”

28 Having a “force-in-being” preserves 

the concept of deterrence, but having 

the warheads separated from the missiles 

creates a delay in retaliation that assures 

more reliable and safe control. 29 However, opponents sees a “zero-alert” status 

as inherently destabilizing simply because 

the desire for greater security (and safety) 

decreases the readiness of the force. In 

times of increased international tensions, 

nuclear powers would be inclined to 

increase the readiness of their nuclear 

forces by taking steps to “remate” the 

warheads and missile in order to be sure 

not to be caught off-guard by a surprise 

attack. However, the very action of 

remating the weapons would cause the 

opposing side to take the same actions, 

escalating the confrontation. 30

Conclusion

There for a while it looked like 

Deke Parson’s precautions with Little Boy 

were going to be necessary. Colonel Paul 

Tibbets held the overweight B-29 on the 

runway as long as he could, trying to 

build up enough speed to lift the plane 

and its special payload into the air. Captain Robert Lewis, the copilot, couldn’t 

help but reach for the controls as he 

saw the end of the runway and the dark 

waters of the Pacific rushing toward him. 

Lewis, along with other members of the 

crew, thought they would run out of 
7

runway, their mission ending in a burning fireball before it really got started. 

At the last moment, Tibbets pulled back 

on the wheel, lifting the Enola Gay into 

the sky. It was 2:45 in the morning, 

August 6, 1945, and the first mission of 

the atomic age. 31

The imperatives of safety, security, and readiness for nuclear weapons 

create a never-ending tension, the considerations of each having to be weighed 

with the others. Resolution of these 

imperatives can create stability and support deterrence, or they can create instability and promote crisis. This tension 

is exacerbated during times of nuclear 

confrontation and conflict, when the 

decision to employ strategic nuclear weapons adds pressures to the compromises 

that have been made during peacetime. 

(Endnotes) 1

 Peter Wyden, Day One: Before Hiroshima 

and After (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

1984), 241-242.

2

 DODD-3150.2, DoD Nuclear Weapon 

System Safety Program, 23 December 1996, 

downloaded from on 3 March 2002.

3

 Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: 

The Secret History (New York: Orion 

Books, 1988), 227-229.

4

 DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program, 23 December 1996.

5

 Donald R. Cotter, “Peacetime Operations: 

Safety and Security,” in Ashton B. Carter, 

John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. 

Zraket, editors, Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institute, 1987), 42.

6

 Hansen, 110, 226-227

7

 Cotter, 43.

8

 Jacob Neufeld, The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 

1945-1960, General Histories Series (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 

1990), 213-214.

9

 Hansen, 229.

10 Cotter, 29.

11 Chris Adams, Inside the Cold War: A 

Cold Warrior’s Reflections (Maxwell Air 

Force Base, Alabama: 1999), 99-100.

12 Walter Millis, editor, The Forrestal Diaries

(New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 458.

13 Walton S. Moody, Building a Strategic Air 

Force (Washington, DC: Air Force History 

and Museums Program, 1996), 126-127.

14 Ibid, 170.

15 Richard Collier, Bridge Across the 

Sky: The Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 

1948--1949 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 

Company, 1978), 67-68; Moody, 214-215; 

and Richard A. Paulson, The Role of 

Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War Era

(Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 1994), 

4.

16 Cotter, 50.

17 Ibid., 52.

18 Cotter, 47-49.

19 The Harvard Nuclear Study Group, “How 

Might A Nuclear War Begin?”, in C.W. and 

E.R. Wittkopf, editors, The Nuclear Reader’s Press, 1989), 265.

20 Cotter, 49.

21 Ibid., 51.

22 Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental 

Nuclear War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1993), 50-51.

23 Sometimes known as the Human Reliability Program.

24 Russell E. Dougherty, “The Psychological 

Climate of Nuclear Command, in Ashton 

B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles 

A. Zraket, editors, Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institute, 1987), 413.

25 DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program, 23 December 1996.

26 Blair, 46-52.

27 Dougherty, 414.

28 Robert A. Manning, “The Nuclear Age: 

The Next Chapter,” Foreign Policy, Winter 

1997/1998, 83

29 Bruce Blair and Leon Sloss, “Avoiding 

Launch on Warning,” in Hans Binnendijk 

and James Goodby, editors, Transforming 

Nuclear Deterrence (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 1997), 

18.

30 Ibid., 19-20.

31 Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan Witts, 

Ruin From the Air: The Enola Gay’s 

Atomic Mission to Hiroshima (Chelsea, 

Michigan: Scarborough Publishers, 1990), 

301-303.
8

The Four Elements:

Creating the Foundations of US 

Strategic Nuclear Policy

by Maj Michael J. McCarthy

The development of the strategic nuclear policy of the United 

States over the past fifty years has been 

evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Since the late 1940s, the policy 

has been based upon the premise that 

the primary role of nuclear weapons is 

deterrence—to deter an enemy from 

threatening the United States with its 

own nuclear weapons. The implementation of that policy has changed, 

as will be described below, but generally only in an evolutionary way, based 

upon historical legacy, the desires of 

the political and military leaders, and 

the circumstances of the national security situation. That implementation 

can be tracked through the evolution 

of the nuclear strategy and the development of strategic nuclear forces.

There are four key elements 

of our current policy of nuclear 

deterrence: recognition of the political and diplomatic aspects of nuclear 

weapons; a declared, comprehensive, 

and deliberated policy; a credible 

warfighting capability; and a viable 

target base (and a detailed understanding of the targets) to hold at 

risk. All four of these elements 

were in place by the end of the Kennedy administration. While there 

are many important and even critical 

events that shaped our nuclear policy 

over the past fifty years, there is one 

that stands out beyond all others: 

the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. 

These four elements were solidified 

following the Cuban Missile Crisis 

and together formed the foundation 

of today’s US strategic nuclear policy. 

While administrations since Kennedy’s have changed how the policy is 

implemented, none have significantly 

altered or abandoned the policy of 

deterrence, or modified any of its 

fundamental elements.

Nuclear Policy under Truman

President Harry Truman, who 

authorized the use of the atomic 

bomb against Japan, provided little 

guidance and policy for their use in 

the post-war era. Little was necessary 

at this point—the US had very few 

weapons and only a limited ability to 

employ them, and the Soviet Union 

had none, and virtually no ability 

to threaten the United States with 

conventional forces. Truman essentially saw nuclear bombs as terror 

weapons, to be used only as a 

last resort.1 He did, however, 

vaguely comprehend their value as a 

deterrent force in conventional conflicts. Truman authorized the deployment of B-29 bombers to Europe 

at the beginning of the Berlin Blockade as a way of demonstrating to 

the Soviet Union that military action 

against the airlift would be met with 

an atomic strike.2 He also implied 

that atomic weapons could be used 

in Korea should the military situation deteriorate. Both of these efforts 

ultimately backfired: the B-29s sent 

to Europe had no ability to drop 

nuclear weapons, and the Soviet 

Union probably knew that; and the 

statement that atomic weapons might 

be used in Korea was almost immediately retracted.3

Truman did initiate one key 

element of deterrence policy—civilian control over the employment of 

nuclear weapons. He placed the weapons under the physical control of the 

Atomic Energy Commission (a policy 

that would later be rescinded by President Eisenhower) and he dictated they 

would never be used without presidential approval. In his words, he did 

not want “to have some dashing lieutenant colonel decide when would be 

the proper time to drop one.”4 This 

policy recognized and acknowledged 

the political and diplomatic aspects of 

nuclear war, and it is critical to an 

effective deterrence policy. Adversaries must know and understand that we 

view and treat nuclear weapons differently than conventional weapons, 

and their use implies a much greater 

political and military confrontation. 

Nuclear weapons are not simply a 

bigger bomb to be used by military 

commanders as they see fit; they are 

the weapons of last resort, used when 

political leaders feel the security and 

existence of the nation are at risk. 

It also implies that resolution of a 

nuclear conflict, impending or ongoing, requires greater diplomatic efforts 

under greater pressures and time constraints. While the concept was original conceived under Truman, it more 

fully developed under later administrations. Nonetheless, this critical 

element of our deterrence policy has 

remained constant throughout the last 

half century.

In the absence of any comprehensive national policy on the employment of nuclear weapons, the Air 

Force, the only service with the ability to deliver nuclear weapons, began 

developing its own employment strategies based on its perceived successes 

with the strategic bombing campaigns 

of World War II. During the 1930s, 

faculty members at the Air Corps Tactical School had developed the American theory of strategic bombardment. 

This theory included specifically targeting key industrial and economic 

targets rather than deployed military 

forces to render the adversary with 

neither the will nor the ability to continue fighting. The apparent success 

of this theory, coupled with the lack of 

reliable information on Soviet military 

forces, meant early nuclear war plans 

targeted urban and industrial areas. 
9

Joint Emergency War Plan HALFMOON, issued in 1948, was a prime 

example of this early “countervalue” 

targeting strategy. HALFMOON had 

both an atomic and a conventional 

component designed to “initiate as 

early as practicable an air offensive 

against vital elements of the Soviet 

war-making capacity.”5 Atomic bombequipped units (at the time, only the 

509th Composite Group) would strike 

the approximately twenty cities in the 

Soviet Union which contained the 

largest share of war-supporting industry, while conventionally-equipped 

B-29 units would strike oil targets 

and port facilities and lay mines in 

Soviet ports, waterways, and shipping 

lanes.6

Since the administration and 

the military saw nuclear weapons as 

simply a bigger bomb with some 

inherent threatening value, it was left 

to the academic community to seriously examine the fundamental nature 

of these weapons and their effect on 

national security policies. The first 

academic to address this issue was Professor Jacob Viner of the University 

of Chicago, who in September 1945 

recognized the vast difference between 

conventional and atomic weapons. 

Knowing that other nations would 

eventually have such weapons, he 

postulated that they would cease to 

have any military utility other than 

for deterrence: “Retaliation in equal 

terms is unavoidable and in this sense 

the atomic bomb is a war deterrent, 

a peace-making force.”7 The following year, Bernard Brodie summed up 

the essence of the issue: “Thus far the 

chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From 

now on its chief purpose must be to 

avert them. It can have almost no 

other useful purpose.”8 This thought 

would serve as the backbone of the 

deterrence policy for the next fifty 

years.

Nuclear Policy under Eisenhower

Unlike Truman, President 

Eisenhower recognized the need to 

formulate and promulgate a declared 

policy on the use of nuclear weapons. 

His policy was Massive Retaliation, in 

which the initiation of conventional 

conflict by the Soviet Union would 

bring an instant nuclear response. 

Like Truman, Eisenhower recognized 

the value of nuclear weapons as a 

deterrent against conventional wars, 

and Massive Retaliation was designed 

to prevent the initiation or escalation 

of conventional conflicts.9 It was also 

intended to deter the Soviet Union 

from engaging in a nuclear conflict—

Massive Retaliation made that option 

foolhardy.

Eisenhower’s strategy, developed in 1953 and codified in NSC162/2, was based on “a strong military posture, with emphasis on the 

capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking 

power.” His Secretary of State, John 

Foster Dulles, made the policy public 

in 1954, stating “The way to deter 

aggression is for the free community 

to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of 

its own choosing,” and those means 

“was to depend primarily upon a great 

capacity to retaliate, instantly.”10 Massive Retaliation was the first declared 

policy describing the potential use of 

nuclear weapons. 

A declared, comprehensive, 

and deliberated policy is a critical element of an effective deterrence strategy, because first, it lets our adversaries know that we do intend to deter 

them from certain actions (deterrence 

has no meaning unless the adversary 

knows you are doing it); and second, it 

demonstrates to the adversary seriousness of our intentions. Although many 

disagreed with the policy of Massive 

Retaliation, few disagreed with the 

desire to deter the Soviet Union from 

military adventurism, and no one disagreed with the desire to let the Soviet 

leadership fully and completely understand our intentions. There is considerable debate over specific issues and 

some policy deliberations and decisions remain classified and therefore 

not publicly released. However, since 

the early 1950s the United States 

has always had a declared, deliberated 

policy on the use of its nuclear weapons within the construct of deterrence.

Eisenhower recognized that 

for his policy of Massive Retaliation to 

have any credibility, a powerful striking force and the willingness to use 

it must back it. While it is difficult to 

demonstrate willingness, it is not difficult to demonstrate latent power. In 

a buildup that began at the end of the 

Truman administration and continued unabated throughout the Eisenhower presidency, the military (and in 

particular the Air Force) developed an 

awesome capability to wage nuclear 

war on a global scale. The inventory 

of nuclear warheads grew from 1,000 

in 1953 to 18,000 in 1960, the 

yields increased to the megaton range, 

ballistic missiles were operationally 

deployed, tactical nuclear weapons 

came under development, and nuclear 

weapons became operational within 

the Navy and eventually the Army.11

The increasing size and complexity of the US strategic nuclear 

arsenal brought with it additional 

problems. Prior to 1960, each theater 

commander developed his own target 

lists for nuclear strikes, yet even with 

some coordination between the commanders, these lists often contained 

duplicate entries. The establishment 

of the Joint Strategic Target Planning 

Staff (JSTPS) and the integration of 

all target lists into the Single Inte-
10

grated Operational Plan (SIOP) alleviated this duplication and allowed for 

more effective planning of the growing 

nuclear arsenal.12 The culmination of 

this effort was the first national-level 

strategic nuclear war plan—SIOP 62. 

As impressive as the planning 

effort was, however, SIOP-62, illustrated the ultimate folly of Massive 

Retaliation. It contained only one 

option—launching all strategic nuclear 

weapons at the beginning of any 

nuclear war, effectively destroying 

every major Soviet, Chinese, and allied 

city, and killing up to 425 million 

people. There was no distinction 

between military and urban/industrial 

targets—both were hit during the initial strike, and there was no provision 

for reserves.13

Having the ability to attack an 

enemy is important; knowing what to 

attack is equally important. A critical 

element of the policy of deterrence as 

it developed was the ability to hold at 

risk a viable set of targets within the 

Soviet Union. While strategic planners implicitly knew that the Soviet 

Union, as an industrialized nation, 

had manufacturing, electrical, chemical, transportation, and oil facilities 

and systems that would make excellent 

targets, they had little detailed information on how many or where they 

were. Until the Eisenhower administration, most of the intelligence on 

the Soviet Union came from the interrogation of thousands of German soldiers who had been captured by the 

Soviet Union and eventually repatriated, captured German aerial photographs from World War II, out-ofdate maps (some from the czarist era), 

and the observations of the occasional 

tourist or business traveler.14 But the 

Air Force required detailed, current, 

encyclopedic knowledge of the Soviet 

political, economic, social, and military infrastructures if it was going 

to be able to conduct nuclear strike 

operations. This pressing need led 

to the development of the U-2 and 

the overflight program, imagery and 

signals intelligence satellites, and a 

huge national intelligence community 

system. The ultimate result of these 

collection programs was a detailed 

understanding of the Soviet structures, 

which could then be developed into 

target databases, which could then be 

used in war plans.

Nuclear deterrence was a 

viable strategy against the Soviet 

Union (and against lesser adversaries, 

such as China), because there was a 

set of targets that could be held at 

risk that were important enough to 

the continued existence of the Soviet 

state that the Soviet leadership was not 

willing to risk conflict. Despite their 

extensive efforts at camouflage, concealment, deception, and civil defense, 

the Soviet leadership knew that a 

nuclear exchange would be more costly 

than they could bear. This element is 

crucial to the effectiveness of a nuclear 

deterrence policy, and one reason why 

nuclear deterrence is not usually viable 

against a non-state organization such 

as a terrorist group.

Also during the Eisenhower 

administration, the targeting strategy 

for nuclear strikes began to shift once 

the Soviet Union developed a capability to strike the United States with 

nuclear weapons delivered by longrange bombers. These forces now 

topped the list of targets in the Soviet 

Union, with the intent of “blunting 

the enemy’s initial threat.”15 While 

this was the beginning of a counterforce strategy, there was little concern 

over any first-strike capability, as both 

sides would require up to 30 days to 

deliver a nuclear attack.16

Nuclear Policy under Kennedy

By the early 1960s, the four 

key elements of a deterrence policy 

were in place: recognition of the political and diplomatic aspects of nuclear 

weapons; a declared, comprehensive, 

and deliberated policy; a credible warfighting capability; and a viable target 

base (and a detailed understanding of 

the targets) to hold at risk. All four 

continued to evolve, but their content 

remained consistent.

Seeing the Massive Retaliation 

policy as too rigid and unworkable, 

and therefore unrealistic, the Kennedy 

administration adopted a new deterrence policy: Flexible Response. This 

policy had a number of distinct features:

· China and the satellite countries were separated from the 

USSR for targeting purposes.

· Soviet strategic forces were separated from Soviet cities on 

U.S. target lists.

· Strategic reserves were to be 

held by the US in accordance 

with the concept of intrawar deterrence [deterring a 

second or third strike].

· US command and control systems were to be protected to 

allow “controlled response.”

· Soviet command and control 

was to be preserved, at least 

in the initial stages of any 

nuclear conflict.17

The Kennedy administration also 

flirted with the concept of exclusive 

counterforce targeting (attacking only 

the Soviet strategic forces, while deliberately sparing the cities), but backed 

off after it became clear that this 

policy would raise concerns about a 

first-strike capability. Kennedy implemented Flexible Response early in his 

administration, and most of the essential planning had been completed by 

the time the Soviet Union introduced 

missiles into Cuba in the fall of 1962.

The Cuban Missile Crisis 

proved to be one of the pivotal 
11

moments of Cold War history, and 

essential to understanding the development of strategic nuclear deterrence. The details of the crisis do 

not need to be repeated here. What 

is important is the aftermath—the 

effects of the crisis on strategic nuclear 

policy.

During the crisis, both American and 

Soviet leaders understood that the 

confrontation in Cuba, should it lead 

to military conflict, would likely lead 

to a nuclear exchange. Millions would 

be killed on both sides, and both 

countries and a good portion of the 

rest of the world would suffer the 

effects for generations. While deterrence was only credible if one side 

recognized the other was willing to 

use nuclear weapons, the “brinksmanship” that went with this confrontation brought the world uncomfortably 

close to nuclear war. Some efforts had 

to be made to control situations, so 

that deterrence did not become a way 

to start wars rather than a way to stop 

them. 

The soberness experienced by both 

sides in the aftermath of the crisis led 

to specific practical steps that would 

serve to strengthen deterrence. The 

first of these was the establishment of 

a teletype hotline between the White 

House and the Kremlin giving them 

a dedicated, instantaneous, and relatively secure means of communication in the event of a similar crisis, 

thereby permitting joint diplomatic 

efforts instead of nuclear strikes to 

resolve confrontations. The second 

was the establishment of fail-safe 

devices, known as permissive action 

links, on U.S. nuclear weapons to 

ensure they could not be used without an input from the National Command Authorities. The third was a 

treaty that prohibited tests of nuclear 

devices in the atmosphere, in the sea, 

or in outer space. The fourth was an 

effort for nuclear disarmament that, 

while unsuccessful, set the stage for 

future arms limitation and reduction 

agreements.18

The Cuban Missile Crisis 

changed the relationship between the 

US and the USSR with regard to 

nuclear deterrence. No longer could 

the US assume a position of strategic 

superiority—instead, there was relative nuclear parity. And both sides 

recognized that the risks and results of 

nuclear war were too high to unnecessarily challenge the policy of deterrence.

Nuclear Policy since Kennedy

By the mid-1960s, the essential elements of deterrence policy were 

in place, and subsequent administrations made changes only within the 

accepted context of these elements. 

All continued to accept that nuclear 

weapons have a unique political and 

diplomatic aspect; improvements to 

command and control systems can be 

seen in the light of increasing positive control, and the series of strategic arms limitation and reduction 

agreements underscore the political 

and diplomatic dimensions of these 

weapons. All presidents have either 

adopted the declared policy of their 

predecessor, such as Johnson, or implemented their own, such as Nixon, 

but these policies were simply variations on the theme of deterrence. 

All have continued to insist on a 

strong, responsive offensive force to 

provide credibility to their policies; 

even the massive reductions taken 

under the Bush and Clinton administrations were done so with an eye 

toward maintaining capability and in 

some cases modernizing elements of 

the force. The most recent DOD 

policy expands that concept to include 

non-nuclear strategic capabilities and 

active and passive defenses within 

the military force designed to deter 

adversaries.19 And all administrations 

have recognized that deterrence always 

depends on finding and holding at 

risk that which the adversary holds 

dear.

Conclusion

The strategic nuclear policy of 

the United States has developed in an 

evolutionary rather than revolutionary 

manner. Although not always overtly 

declared, since the late 1940s the 

policy has been based upon the premise that the primary role of nuclear 

weapons is deterrence. The implementation of that policy has changed, 

but also in an evolutionary way, based 

upon historical legacy, the desires of 

the political and military leaders, and 

the circumstances of the national security situation. And by the mid-1960s, 

the essential elements of deterrence 

policy were in place, and subsequent 

administrations made changes only 

within the accepted context of these 

elements. These four key elements—

recognition of the political and diplomatic aspects of nuclear weapons; 

a declared, comprehensive, and deliberated policy; a credible warfighting 

capability; and a viable target base 

(and a detailed understanding of the 

targets) to hold at risk—along with 

the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 illustrate the evolutionary nature of the 

US strategic nuclear policy. While 

administrations since Kennedy’s have 

changed how the policy is implemented, none have significantly altered 

or abandoned the policy of deterrence, 

or modified any of its fundamental 

elements.

(Footnotes) 1

 David Alan Rosenberg, “U.S. Nuclear 

War Planning, 1945-1960,” in Strategic Nuclear Targeting, edited by 

Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson 

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 

1986), 38.

2

 Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chieof 
12

([Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: 

Office of History, Joint Strategic 

Target Planning Staff ], 1990), 1-4.

13 Desmond Ball, “The Development 

of the SIOP, 1960-1983,” in Strategic 

Nuclear Targeting, edited by Desmond 

Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 1986), 62.

14 Rosenberg, 39-40.

15 Rosenberg, 44.

16 Ibid.

17 Ball, 63.

18 John Sharnik, Inside the Cold War: 

An Oral History (New York: Arbor 

House, 1987), 160; and Louis J. Halle, 

The Cold War as History (New York: 

Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), 

411; and Martin Walker, The Cold 

War: A History (New York: Henry 

Holt and Company, 1993), 179.

19 “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” 

by Secretary of Defense Donald H. 

Rumsfeld, January 10, 2002, downloaded from www.defenselink.mil on 

February 21, 2002.

How Joint?

by Maj Richard White

Prior to 1986, the question 

was why couldn’t the military services cooperate jointly? The lessons 

of Operation EAGLE CLAW, the 

aborted attempt to rescue American 

hostages in Iran, and Operation 

URGENT FURY, the embarrassing 

U.S. invasion of Grenada, were abject 

lessons of the need for change. Convinced that these cases were exceptions, that the same organizational 

structure that fought and won World 

War Two was fundamentally sound 

and necessary to face down the Soviets in a potential World War Three 

scenario, the DoD did little to effect 

change. Congress, looking at the military record since WW II, felt differently: Korea, draw; Vietnam, loss; 

Iran, failure; Grenada, mess. Since 

DoD failed to solve the problem internally, Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Act forcing an external 

solution on the DoD. The results 

seemed to speak for themselves: 

Panama, win; Gulf War, win; Kosovo, 

win; Afghanistan, win. Now some 

argue the military’s become too joint, 

endangering the service cultures and 

traditions that have made the U.S. 

armed forces the most formidable 

in the world. Others cite on-going 

budget battles and say the services still 

haven’t gone far enough. The question then is how joint can the military 

become? What is the most effective 

mix of military capability and how 

can it be achieved?

The answer is that military 

forces can never become fully joint. 

There will never be 100% integration. 

Congress can mandate a single military department and issue every service member a purple uniform, and 

the problem will still persist. Why? 

The answer is specialization. So long 

Staff and National Policy, Volume II, 

1947 – 1949, History of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Series (Washington, 

DC: Office of Joint History, 1996), 

69.

3

 William Taubman, Stalin’s American 

Policy: From Entente to Détente to 

Cold War (New York: W. W. Norton 

and Company, 1982), 194; and Robert 

Cecil, A Divided Life: A Personal 

Portrait of the Spy Donald Maclean

(New York: William Morrow, 1989), 

75, 82-83; and James F. Schnabel and 

Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and National Policy, Volume 

III, 1950-1951, The Korean War, Part 

One, History of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Series (Washington, DC: Office 

of Joint History, 1998), 155.

4

 Walter Millis, editor, The Forrestal 

Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 

1951), 458.

5

 “Brief of Short Range Emergency 

War Plan (HALFMOON)” in Containment: Documents on American 

Policy and Strategy, 1945 – 1950, 

edited by Thomas H. Etzold and John 

Lewis Gaddis (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 1978), 315-323.

6

 Ibid.; and Walton S. Moody, Building a Strategic Air Force (Washington, 

DC: Air Force History and Museums 

Program, 1996), 198-200.

7

 Theodore Draper, “Nuclear Temptations: Doctrinal Issues in the Strategic Debate,” in The Nuclear Reader, 

edited by C.W. and E. R. Wittkopf 

(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989), 

25-26.

8

 Ibid., 26.

9

 Richard A. Paulson, The Role of 

US Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold 

War Era (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1994), 4.

10 Ibid.

11 Paulson, 5-8.

12 Paulson, 8; and Charles K. Hopkins, 

Unclassified History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS)

“Everything is very simple 

in war, but the simplest 

thing is difcult. These 

difculties accumulate and 

produce a friction which 

no man can imagine 

exactly who has not seen 

war.”

Karl von Clauswitz
13

proposals. What is necessary is a third 

party to make the tough decisions and 

choose the best solution for the given 

circumstances. This third party exists, 

it’s called the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense. They’ve been around 

since 1947. So, why is there still a 

problem? There’s a problem because 

the SECDEF hasn’t been given the 

requisite authority to make the tough 

decisions. We’ve appointed a CEO 

of a multi-billion dollar corporation, 

but the stock holders are calling the 

shots! The current controversy over 

the Army Crusader is an excellent case 

in point. 

The Crusader is an $11 billion, top-of-the-line, state-of-the-art, 

artillery piece. The Army advocates 

the program because, among other 

reasons they know that historically 

artillery kills more enemy than any 

other weapon; that’s why it’s called 

“The King of Battle.” At an estimated 

40 tons per cannon, though, the Crusader doesn’t fit SECDEF’s plans for 

a lighter, more mobile military. The 

current War on Terrorism has only 

served to emphasize the importance of 

Nathan Bedford Forrest’s Civil War 

dictum: “Get there the fustest with the 

mostest.” Unfortunately, it’s not easy 

to deploy 40 ton cannons anywhere 

quickly. Despite this obvious problem, Secretary Rumsfeld has encountered stiff resistance trying to cancel 

the program and implement his Revolution in Military Affairs, a blueprint 

for more expeditionary forces. Why? 

Because Congress is involved! Legislators have rallied to protect their 

own special interests effectively nullifying SECDEF’s authority. The 

biggest obstacle to quelling military 

budget battles and achieving closer 

DoD unity is Congress’ diluting 

SECDEF’s authority.

 

as there are different forms of warfare, i.e., land, sea, air, space, and 

information, we will need warrior specialists with mastery of their particular medium. Because of the complex 

nature of each, it’s unreasonable to 

expect every member to master them 

all. Is this necessarily bad? The 

answer is no. The basic idea behind 

jointness is to use “the right tool for 

the right job.” It does no good if 

your tools are blunt or rusty. We 

want our military forces, to borrow an 

old Army slogan, “to be the best they 

can be.” Does that mean we endanger each service’s core competencies 

by forcing them closer together; is it 

possible to become too joint?

The answer to this last question is “no,” the military can’t become 

“too joint.” Battle commanders will 

always defer to their weapon systems 

experts before making a decision. 

There will always be different shades 

of purple. Can they still get close 

enough to drown individual service 

cultures and traditions? Will a purple 

culture emerge, become pre-eminent, 

and wash out the green, white, blue, 

and brown? The answer is “maybe.” 

But “maybe” isn’t a bad thing. 

First of all, let’s examine what 

we mean by a “service culture.” A 

service culture is a patterned way of 

thinking perpetuated by the organization. The pattern serves as a template 

for success, the central philosophy a 

surer path to promotion. Today’s 

Army culture is centered on armor, 

the Navy is built around the aircraft 

carrier, the Air Force focused on the 

“fighter mafia”, and the Marines are 

still “Semper Fi”. The problem with 

service cultures is that they’re difficult to change. Success breeds complacency: people who succeed within 

the system and rise to the top tend 

to view the system as good, after all, 

it produced them! Compounding the 

difficulty of change is the conservative nature of the military. The military is inherently conservative because 

decisions affect lives and untested 

ideas can lead to unnecessary deaths. 

Unfortunately, history is the ultimate 

judge of military decisions, there are 

no crystal balls to test ideas in advance 

(wargaming included). Consequently, 

commanders, unless they are desperate, tend to stick to proven methods 

to mitigate risk. This form of “group 

think” was the underlying culprit for 

the wholesale slaughter of the First 

World War: Commanders failed to 

adapt to new battlefield conditions 

but continued to use nineteenth century tactics against twentieth century 

weapons. The catastrophic failure of 

WW I is the single biggest warning 

against the perils of service culture. 

Service culture is also the reason why 

an external agency, Congress, had to 

enforce change on the military by 

the Goldwater Nichols Act. For this 

reason, subsuming individual service 

cultures to a new joint identity may 

not be a bad proposition.

However, if the continuing 

budget battles are any indicator, the 

military still has a long way to go 

before achieving even this theoretical 

limit of jointness. Critics grimly watch 

as resource decisions inflame the worst 

schisms in inter-service rivalry and ask 

why “can’t we just get along?” The 

fact of the matter is there will always 

be differences of opinion among the 

services how best to do the job. As 

most people know, there’s always more 

than one way to get the job done, 

so why should there be any surprise 

if each service proposes their own 

specialized means of accomplishment? 

The good news is they all agree on 

the same objective. Having a range 

of options to choose from is a good 

thing and should be encouraged: we 

want the military to offer alternative 
14

The War in Bosnia: How USAF 

Fighter Squadrons Addressed Friction in Tactical Operations to 

Assure Successful Strategic Outcomes

by Major Charles D. Dusch, Jr.

The following article is as true to 

the spirit and attitude of fighter operations 

as possible in order to give the reader an 

accurate sense of life in that community. 

The author uses footnotes to elaborate on 

jargon. Also, as is common in a USAF 

fighter squadron, the author refers to his 

peers by “tactical call signs”—nicknames 

given to each squadron member by their 

colleagues that is unique and descriptive.

1

 The author dedicates this article to the 

members of “Windmill 02,” the Dutch 

peacekeeping forces in the town of Srebrenica, Bosnia, who tried to defend that 

U.N. safe haven. 2 

This article is a personal account 

of a combat mission over Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer of 1995 from 

the perspective of fighter operations in 

the Combat Air Forces. These operations, which supported U.N. peacekeeping forces on the ground at the tactical level, were a central part of the 

grand strategy of the United States and 

her NATO allies for stability in the Balkans. It was not an easy mission. However, the squadrons which performed 

these operations did so with the same 

professionalism, sense of urgency, and 

dedication to duty expected by our civilian leaders in times of war. Peacekeepers in the air and on the ground often 

met with frustration at the tactical level, 

but their discipline and integrity assured 

ultimate success at the strategic level. 

Fighting came to a halt. Nation-building began. Ordinary people got on with 

their lives.

From this experience, I gained 

a new appreciation for the core values 

which we were taught as cadets and a 

better understanding of the impact of 

“friction” on military operations. Most 

importantly, I recognized how our routine discipline and integrity confirm the 

enormous trust placed in our Armed 

Forces by our great Nation, and contribute to the success of our national 

strategy.

On War

Supporting the U.N. peacekeeping operations in Bosnia was a mission unlike any conventional combat 

missions previously experienced over 

Iraq. Complex rules of engagement 

(ROE) including two unwieldy chainsof-command, ambiguous objectives, and 

a lack of desire for peace among the 

numerous warring factions contributed 

to what the 19th Century Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, called 

“friction in war.” Friction, according to 

Clausewitz, was the factor which distinguished “real war from war on paper.”

3

 Most people think of friction as what 

Clausewitz termed “external friction” 

in war—weather, terrain, and enemy 

actions, for example. Traditionally, one’s 

combat training, exercises, preparation, 

and experience were used to address this 

type of friction. However, Clausewitz 

saw friction in a broader spectrum.

 Clausewitz included factors 

within one’s own organization such as 

fatigue, will, leadership, organization, 

and courage within that spectrum. 4

This friction is what he termed “internal friction.” 5 One’s officer training, 

discipline, and integrity are essential in 

overcoming this form of friction. 6 In 

Bosnia, peacekeeping operations had to 

address both internal and external friction. To do this, the U.N. would rely 

heavily on air forces.

Operation DENY FLIGHT (ODF) 

1993-1995

ODF was the U.N. operation 

to establish a No Fly Zone (NFZ) 

over Bosnia and support U.N. Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) and U.N. 

safe areas on the ground. 7 During 

ODF, the members of NATO—including France—were responsible for establishing safe areas throughout BosniaHerzegovina. Their soldiers occupied 

these areas, but all operations were headquartered in the Bosnian capitol of 

Sarajevo. Their mission was to keep 

the warring factions—including Serbs, 

Croats, and Bosnian Muslims—from 

killing each other in genocidal fashion. 8

Despite the best of intentions, this was 

a daunting task.

As part of the U.N. air forces, 

I deployed with my squadron, the 

494th Fighter Squadron (Panthers), 48th

Fighter Wing from our base at Royal 

Air Force Lakenheath, United Kingdom, to Aviano Air Base in northeast 

Italy. Although the U.N. air forces were 

multi-national in composition, they 

were dominated by the U.S. Air Force 

and Navy. Various aircraft patrolled 

the skies over Bosnia. E-3 Airborne 

Warning and Control System (AWACS) 

aircraft, along with NATO fighters 

and attack aircraft, enforced the NFZ. 

KC-135 aerial tankers from the U.S. 

and France refueled the combat aircraft, 

and EC-130E airborne command posts 

(ABCCC) coordinated operations over 

Bosnia with the Combined Forces Air 

Component Commander (CFACC) at 

the Combined Air Operations Center 

(CAOC) in Vicenza, Italy. 9 

Night Shift

Preparation helps to minimize 

friction in military operations. Fighter 

squadrons and their members develop 

standard practices to minimize friction 

as much as possible. 10 These practices 

may vary and are changed from time to 

time to confuse hostile forces. Adhering 

to squadron standards is the norm, and 

part of an aviator’s duty.

My peacekeeping duty day 

began at 1600 on July 2, 1995, in a 

four-star hotel in the city of Pordenone, 
15

Italy. My first combat mission over 

Bosnia was unlike my previous missions 

over Iraq, as I did not know if my unit 

would fly that night or not. Our squadron was scheduled to sit ground alert 

and only flew if hostilities were anticipated or peacekeepers requested air support. The hotel was normally very quiet 

at that time in the afternoon as I left 

for dinner. The muggy air and bustle 

of Vittoro Emmanuel Street contrasted 

sharply with the hotel as I walked to a 

café the Panthers’ frequented. We called 

it, “the Perch.” 11

My pre-flight ritual included 

dinner and ice-cappuccino with the 

aviators in my flight—the three other 

aircrew (pilots and weapon systems 

officers) I would fly with. 12 Before 

we finished dessert, the day shift aircrew returned from their missions over 

Bosnia. We exchanged news, aircraft 

status, and words on the war. After 

dinner, we returned to our hotel to dress 

and leave for the base. We made the 

20-minute drive from the hotel to our 

Squadron Operations Center (SOC) at 

Aviano. 

Arriving at the SOC, we 

reviewed the aircrew read files, weather, 

and NOTAMS, 13 and signed the appropriate paperwork authorizing us to take 

the jets. “Driller” and “Tee-squared” 

would lead tonight while “Griz” and I 

would fly as the wingman. I couldn’t 

have asked for a better team. The 

basic fighting unit that tactical fighters 

of the day employed was the two-ship 

element, a formation consisting of the 

flight lead and wingman. The flight 

lead was responsible for mission success 

and the safety of his wingman. The 

wingman’s main duty was to execute the 

briefed mission, fly formation on his 

leader, and support him at all times. 14

This formation required a high degree 

of flight discipline—in the air and on 

the ground—in order to successfully 

and safely execute the necessary tactical 

operation. 15 Such discipline was second-nature and a matter of personal 

pride in the squadron. 

It is also unique to military aviation. I have flown with civilian colleagues in the general aviation world, 

many of whom have over 5,000 hours 

in various aircraft. They have repeatedly admired the distinctive attitude 

with which military aviators approach 

aviation—from the preflight through 

post-flight briefings and the sortie in 

between. 

As flight lead, Driller accomplished our squadron-standard preflight 

briefing which informed us how he 

planned on executing the mission. We 

next walked over to the Intelligence Section (Intel) for our pre-mission briefing. 16 It was about 2000 hours. The 

Area of Responsibility—or AOR—was 

hot. The various factions were doing 

their level best to kill each other and 

any peacekeepers that might get in their 

way. Heated artillery exchanges were 

reported throughout Bosnia. It would 

not be a quiet night. Unlike the previous night when we waited on alert 

all night in the SOC, we would fly 

tonight. 

The briefing was deadly serious: 

the Intel officer gave us the locations 

of the numerous anti-aircraft threats we 

would face, including an SA-6 Surfaceto-Air Missile (SAM) battery that was 

believed to have shot down Captain 

Scott O’Grady exactly one month ago 

to the day. 17 We soberly copied our 

Search and Rescue (SAR) information, 

reviewed our escape and evasion plan, 

and signed for our evasion kit and 

“blood chit.” 18 We sanitized—stripped 

off the patches from our flight suits 

and emptied our pockets so as to reveal 

nothing about our unit to potential captors. Each of us carried our military I.D. 

card. 19 I also carried some cash just in 

case I ever went missing, which might 

allow me to “buy” my way to freedom. 

My next stop was the life support trailer where I put on my G-suit, 

survival vest, and parachute harness. I 

checked my flight helmet and oxygen 

mask and then drew my Beretta 9mm 

pistol, extra ammunition clips, GPS, 

and PRC-112 SAR radio. Driller got 

us together to go over a few last minute 

updates he had gotten from Intel. 20

Then it was time to jump into a waiting 

crew van and step to the jet.

Our F-15E Strike Eagles were 

located in several Hardened Aircraft 

Shelters (HAS) at Aviano. As our 

van pulled up, we could see the crew 

chief reviewing the aircraft maintenance 

forms while his assistant lounged against 

the nose wheel. Both men were soaked 

in sweat from accomplishing their preflight checks. It was hot. Although 

it was after 2100 hours, the heat took 

my breath away as I stepped out 

of the air-conditioned van into the 

muggy summer evening wearing my 

40-plus pounds of flight gear. As 

Griz and I approached the jet, both 

enlisted mechanics came to attention 

and saluted. We returned the salutes. 

The crew chief went over the maintenance forms with us while his assistant 

got the cockpits ready. We then began 

our pre-flight checks.

I was very familiar with this particular F-15E that I would fly tonight. 

She and I had spent some time together 

over Northern Iraq. 21 She was no 

stranger to combat either, and tonight 

she was ready for war. I inspected 

her battery of weapons: two AIM-120 

AMRAAM radar-guided air-to-air missiles; 22 two AIM-9M Sidewinder heatseeking air-to-air missiles; four GBU-12, 

500-pound laser guided bombs; 23 500 

rounds of 20mm ammunition for the 

M-61 Vulcan gatling gun; ample cartridges of chaff and flare countermeasures; and three 610 gallon external fuel 

tanks, a total load of 34,000 pounds 

of JP-8 jet fuel and a staggering gross 
16

weight of over 70,000 pounds—10,000 

pounds less than her maximum combat 

weight. 24 As we completed our walk 

around, it was clear the crew chief and 

weapons load crew had done their jobs 

well. We climbed up the ladder and 

strapped on the jet.

The Mission

At 2130 hours, we started 

engines inside our HAS and accomplished our system checks. At 2145 we 

taxied onto the apron and waited for 

Driller to check in on the radios. That 

done, Panther three-one (31) flight—as 

we were known—rolled down the taxiways to the runway to meet a 2210 

takeoff time. Prior to taking the active 

runway, our ground crew removed the 

last safety devices from our weapons 

array. Then they climbed back into 

their vans and drove off into the night. 

At 2209 hours, Driller checked us in on 

control tower frequency:

“Tower, Panther 31 is number 

one, runway zero-five.” 25 

“Panther 31, winds are calm, you 

are cleared for takeoff runway zerofive, change to departure.” 

“Panther 31, cleared for takeoff.”

Both war-laden Strike Eagles 

taxied onto the active runway. Driller 

lit his afterburners to take off first. My 

chest vibrated from the thunder of his 

twin Pratt and Whitney F100-PW-229 

motors, together rating over 58,000 

pounds of thrust, as he rolled down the 

runway. 26 The 50-foot long white-hot 

flame of each augmenter momentarily 

disrupted my night vision. Twenty seconds later we followed him. I locked 

him up with the APG-70 radar and 

followed in trail. As we climbed out 

east over the Adriatic Sea, I ran my inflight systems checks as he contacted 

the NATO AWACS orbiting above and 

accomplished our required checks with 

them. 27 That completed, the senior 

Theatre Battle Manager relayed the 

battle picture to us and cleared us into 

the AOR.

“Panther, Green-‘em up,” 

Driller called over the radio. 28 We 

ran through our pre-combat checklist

and established our Combat Air Patrol 

(CAP) orbit along the eastern Adriatic 

coast of Croatia and the western border 

of Bosnia. 29 There was no doubt where 

the border was this clear summer night. 

All along the mountainous border running north to south were numerous 

flashes from the largest artillery battle I 

have ever seen in my life. The entire 

border from the city of Bihac in the 

northwest to Mostar in the southwest 

was illuminated with the yellow/orange 

flashes of hundreds of firing muzzles 

and exploding shells. They contrasted 

sharply with the white/silver flashes of 

lightning from a line of thunderstorms 

that hugged the northern Adriatic shore 

near Trieste. It was an impressive light 

show, one made by man and one made 

by God.

I was intrigued. Driller’s voice 

broke the spell, “Panther, cold right.” 

We made a turn to the west away from 

the AOR after completing the first “leg” 

of our CAP. Although the ground situation was intense, the aerial picture 

was quiet. We droned through numerous orbits with nothing on our sensors. 

We again turned east towards Bosnia. 

AWACS passed us its periodic “Picture 

Clear” call, affirming the obvious. What 

promised to be an exciting sortie with 

potential for action had turned monotonous. War can be like that: hours 

of monotony punctuated by seconds of 

sheer terror. In such circumstances, 

if one wasn’t disciplined, complacency 

crept in and ended in disaster.

Suddenly, a new, distinct flash 

from Bihac lit up the sky—brilliant, 

laser-intense, huge and screaming skyward. “Panther, check 30 right, SAM 

launch.” Without thinking, our training and discipline kicked in. I heard 

my own voice direct our formation to 

maneuver in order to better assess the 

missile’s intended target. Like a welloiled machine, Panther flight executed 

its briefed SAM drill. Griz continued 

watching the threat as I checked out 

the right side of the jet, remembering 

how the North Vietnamese (and others) 

duped unsuspecting aircrews by firing 

one SAM as a decoy and using another 

SAM from the blind side to get them. 30

All was quiet to the south, however. I looked back in time to see a tremendous explosion on a hill near Bihac. 

My clock told me this encounter lasted 

a few seconds; it felt like half the known 

age of the universe. Following NATO 

procedure, we passed this information 

to AWACS. Later, we were told that 

the Serbs launched a Soviet-built SA-2 

SAM at the Muslims, using it much 

like artillery. Although fired 60 miles 

away from us, the SA-2 appeared much 

closer.

Sarajevo

Our time on station passed. 

Two Marine F/A-18 Hornets relieved us 

so we could fly out of the AOR to refuel 

with a KC-135 tanker. The tanker not 

only passed us fuel but also let us know 

some of the baseball scores from the 

States. We returned to our CAP and 

resumed our patrol. The Marines went 

home to their beds. It was after midnight. The artillery battle raged on, 

silently from our perspective. Away in 

the east towards Sarajevo, new flashes 

appeared. The battle was heating up. 

Not long after, the Theatre Battle Manager called us. We had a new tasking. 

He told us that French UNPROFOR 

peacekeepers in Sarajevo were being 

shelled by Serb mortars and passed us 

the target coordinates. In the dim, 

night-lighting of the cockpit, we studied them carefully as we awaited U.N. 

attack authorization. Time passed and 

no authorization came. The Battle 
17

Manager cleared us back to the tanker 

to refuel. “I’ll have words for you by the 

time you return to station,” he assured 

us. 

Consistent with the ROE at the 

time, “authorization” in Bosnia was not 

a simple process. A dual-sided chain-ofcommand existed, one NATO and the 

other U.N. The NATO chain-of-command required approval from both the 

military and civilian side of the Alliance. 

The NATO process could be awkward, 

but it was normally expeditious. Once 

those authorizations were granted, the 

next level of authorization had to come 

from the U.N. Secretary General’s special envoy in Sarajevo. Final approval to 

attack rested with the Secretary General 

of the United Nations in New York with 

a seven-hour time zone difference. This 

arrangement proved cumbersome on a 

good day. Tonight it was at its worst. 

We returned to our patrol and still 

did not have authorization to attack.

31 Time passed slowly. The flashes 

in the Sarajevo area intensified, the 

French paratroopers were still under fire 

and awaiting our help, and we continued in our orbit growing increasingly 

frustrated, waiting “words” despite our 

repeated inquiries, and boring holes in 

the sky.

We had now been airborne 

almost four hours. Gradually, the artillery flashes died down. Soon it was 

relatively quiet. AWACS called again, 

“Panther, go home.” That couldn’t be 

right, I thought. It must be the night 

flying, or fatigue, or cruising at high 

altitude for so long that I doubted my 

own ears. “Say again,” Driller replied. 

I was not the only one who doubted 

what I heard, but the AWACS controller 

repeated, “Panther, go home.” We were 

incredulous. Superbly combat-trained, 

primed and ready to go to the aid of 

our French allies, we were not expecting 

this order. Driller shot back, “What do 

you want Panther to do with all this gas? 

We can’t land at this gross weight.” I 

thought I heard irritation in his voice. 

There was a pause before we heard the 

Battle Manager’s level voice, “Panther, 

go home. Dump the gas. I’ll talk with 

you back on the ground.” 

We heard AWACS check in 

with Italian radar control as it returned 

to base. We made several more orbits 

until AWACS was safely out of the 

AOR before we too departed our station to head west over the Adriatic. We 

accomplished our post-combat checks 

and opened up the fuel dump vents on 

the trailing edges of our wings, dumping hundreds of gallons of dead dinosaurs which vaporized above the black 

Adriatic. That reduced our total weight 

so we could safely land on Aviano’s 

9000-foot-long runway. Crossing the 

Italian coast, I was suddenly very tired. 

It was after 0200 hours. 32

Driller landed safely. We landed 

next. The ground crews met us as we 

cleared the active runway and safetied 

our weapons, then we returned to our 

HAS. We had no maintenance problems to note in the aircraft forms, which 

meant the ground crews could go home 

early. They were happy to have their jet 

back. It is their airplane we just took 

into harm’s way, after all. Griz and I just 

“borrowed it” awhile. The crew chief 

was disappointed we didn’t drop ordnance. I did not delay my post-flight 

aircraft walk-around because I wanted 

to hear what went on in Sarajevo, but at 

the same time, as a professional airman, 

I did a good post-flight inspection. We 

gave the aircraft forms to the maintenance debrief team, where aircrews 

enter any aircraft flight problems on a 

computer and tell trained repair technicians what problems require correction 

before the jet can fly again. As we came 

out of debrief, the early shift was already 

preparing their jets to fly the next go.

Friction in the Real World

As the flight lead, Driller did 

most of the talking in the debrief. 33 A 

colonel whom I did not know came into 

the SOC. As promised, we were told 

what transpired while we waited to help 

the French. He told us that permission 

to attack had been approved quickly 

by the NATO chain-of-command, but 

when the U.N was asked for authorization, the U.N. authorities in Bosnia 

deferred the decision to the U.N. Secretary General. Apparently, the Battle 

Manager continued, the Secretary General had gone out to dinner in New York 

and could not be found. Our attack 

authorization never materialized. 34 Evidently, the French finally stopped waiting for authorization and fought back in 

self-defense. 35 The colonel concluded 

by adding laconically, “it’s quiet now.”

There was not much else to 

add. We departed the SOC for breakfast in silence. We stopped at an AAFES

36 snack bar near the flight line that had 

been converted from a London double-decker bus and had a great American breakfast—and it was open at 0400. 

We ate silently while the sun came up in 

the haze, promising another hot, muggy 

day in Italy. I kept thinking about all the 

air power assembled to support the U.N. 

peacekeepers and the impact of friction 

caused by the complex authorization 

and ROE. The unspoken thought we 

shared was, what if they had been U.S. 

soldiers in Sarajevo? This was unlike 

anything I had ever seen in my previous years of air combat training. It 

was quite different from what we had 

faced over Iraq. The members of Panther flight got in their rental cars and 

returned to our hotel while the rest of 

the world was just starting to wake up. 

We would be back that evening to do 

our job again—professionally.

I was beginning to understand 

Clausewitz as a practical guide to officership. Character and courage are essen-
18

tial to his “military genius” who could 

overcome friction in war. They were 

“dependable” and would “never fail.”

37 Democracies rely upon warriors to 

be on station and ready to execute as 

ordered. As hard as it was to face, tactical success was subordinate to the overall strategy. The hard thing for any 

peacekeeper was to take a ring-side seat 

to the orgy of genocide in the Balkans. 

This was not how any of us were trained 

to fight. 

But to keep going—to do a professional job—I had to dig deep inside 

to the very roots of my officer training. 

In that well, I found the integrity, fortitude, and discipline that allowed me 

to press on night after frustrating night. 

The real danger in Bosnia and in peacekeeping operations in general, was that 

complacency could seep in. “Complacency kills,” goes the old adage. The 

challenge is to stay alert every sortie in 

order to remain alive and ready to carry 

out national strategy. 

A week later, Panther 31 was 

flying over the besieged U.N. safe haven 

of Srebrenica. We would again be poised 

for battle, ready and able to employ 

decisive air power at the precise moment 

and circumstance it was needed. Once 

again due to internal friction, a crucial 

moment would pass as the U.N. leadership lacked the will to authorize air 

power to defend the U.N. safe haven or 

the UNPROFOR peacekeepers there. 38

As a result, a Dutch peacekeeper would 

be killed and several others wounded. 

Some 6,546 Muslim men and boys 

would be massacred as Serb forces overran the town and committed “the largest single war crime in Europe since the 

Second World War.” 39 

This massacre proved to be a 

catalyst of change. The cumbersome 

chain-of-command was modified. The 

peacekeepers initiated Operation 

DELIBERATE FORCE, conventional 

strikes against Serb forces to end their 

aggression and compel them to obey 

the world community. Those strikes, 

which occurred coincidentally with a 

combined Bosnian/Croat ground offensive, resulted in a strategic withdrawal 

by the Serbs, lifted the siege of Sarajevo, 

and brought the warring factions to the 

Dayton peace talks. 40 

This was war in Bosnia, Operation DENY FLIGHT, and U.N. peacekeeping, a real world example of the 

impact of “friction” on military operations. It required the utmost professionalism, sense of urgency, and dedication to duty necessary in order to 

surmount that friction and assure strategic success. The routine discipline and 

integrity of our Armed Forces, essential 

to successful operations at the tactical 

level of war, are equally essential to the 

success of our national strategy, and 

upon which our Nation can rely. 

Endnotes 1

Author’s experience in the F-4 and 

F-15E. My heartfelt thanks to Lt. Col. 

Kurt Schake, PhD and Eagle Driver for 

his help and mentoring on this paper. 

Tactical callsigns are usually bestowed 

on new squadron members upon completion of their Mission Ready evaluation flight, in which they are certified 

as qualified to perform their duties in 

their primary weapon system, such as 

the F-15, A-10, etc. Naming ceremonies are private squadron events, usually held in the squadron lounge and 

based on traditions that often date back 

to WW I or WW II (depending on the 

age of the particular squadron).

2

 Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, 

Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, 

(New York and London, Penguin Books, 

1996), p. 25. The Bosnian city of 

Srebrenica, on the eastern border with 

Serbia, was one of several cities designated by the U.N. as a “safe haven,” a 

place where refugees could go for protection by U.N. peacekeepers and be 

under the umbrella of the U.N.’s High 

Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). 

Srebrenica was allotted to the Dutch, 

hence their callsign, “Windmill.” This 

is an excellent work.

3

 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976), 

pp.119-121.

4

 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (London, 

Penguin Books Ltd., 1968), pp. 

160-162.

5

 Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton), 

pp.119-121.

6

 Ibid., pp. 105-108. Clausewitz referred 

to these attributes as “strength of mind” 

and “character.”

7

 “Operation Deny Flight,” Reuters News 

Agency Article, December 21, 1995. 8 Ibid.

9

Author’s knowledge and experience 

flying the F-15E and working in the 

CAOC as part of ODF, 1995. 

10 Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton), 

p.101. Clausewitz believes these habits 

are a form of courage to cope with personal danger—one of his elements of 

friction. Courage is an attribute of military genius, which helps to overcome 

friction.

11”The Perch” is an aviation term. In 

an airfield’s overhead traffic pattern, it 

is a point on the downwind leg from 

which one begins to turn on the visual 

approach to landing. In peacetime 

or combat, deploying USAF squadrons 

normally find a place to go to socialize, 

such as the officer’s club, a squadron 

snack bar, etc., and have as normal a 

recreation time as possible. 

12 The F-15E is a two-place fighter with 

dual controls for flying the aircraft and 

operating the systems. In general, the 

pilot flies the jet, navigates, and fires the 

weapons. The weapon systems officer, 

or WSO, runs the radar, the infrared 

targeting system, and defensive countermeasures. A good F-15E crew is very 

difficult to defeat air-to-air or air-toground. See William L. Smallwood, 

Strike Eagle: Flying the F-15E in the Gulf 
19

War’s Inc., 1994).

13NOTAMS–Notices to Airmen, a 

system that disseminates critical information about airfields, airspace, procedures, etc., essential to safe flight operations. Each squadron also maintains a 

series of less critical “read files,” useful 

information on flying operations that 

aircrew members must read and then 

sign or initial compliance. MSS 481, 

Airmanship for Military Aviators, (USAF 

Academy, 2000), Lesson 4. 

14 Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 

3-3 (Unclassified), Combat Aircraft Fundamentals, F-16, (HQ ACC/DOT, 1 

September 1992), p. 3-11.

15 Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 

3-3 (Unclassified), Combat Aircraft Fundamentals, F-15E, (HQ ACC/DOT, 1 

June 1994), p. 3-1.

16The Intelligence section of a squadron is often located in a secure room or 

vault that is colocated with the Weapons and Tactics branch of the squadron. 

It may have one officer and two or three 

enlisted Intel specialists. Their mission 

is to insure that squadron members are 

aware of threats and any knowledge 

about an adversary obtained through 

observation, investigation, analysis, or 

understanding. Intel is the warfighter’s 

key link with our core competency of 

Information Superiority. See Air Force 

Basic Doctrine, AFDD-1, (September 

1997), p. 82.

17Scott O’Grady, Return With Honor, 

(New York, Doubleday, 1995), pp. 

25-29. This work is the only source for 

unclassified, routine USAF fighter operations in Bosnia during the summer of 

1995.

18”Blood Chit,” a promissory note from 

the U.S. government offering to reward 

anyone aiding a U.S. serviceman in distress. Chits are printed in several languages, including English, and can be 

used to communicate. Chits are also 

called “pointy-talkies,” as one find a 

phrase such as “I am injured and require 

medical attention” in English and point 

to its equivalent in another language. 

In the Bosnia AOR, chits had elevn languages printed on them to include Serbian and Serbo-Croatian. See O’Grady, 

Return., p. 15.

19 Ibid., pp. 7-18. 20 Ibid.

21Author’s flying logbook.

22AIM—Air Intercept Missile; 

AMRAAM—Advanced Medium Range 

Air-to-Air Missile (nicknamed, “the 

Slammer”). A new-generation radarguided, all-weather, beyond-visual-range 

air-to-air missile using a 48 lb. highexplosive directed fragmentation warhead and near Mach 4 cruising speed to 

destroy single or multiple targets, including those attempting evasive maneuvers. See Susan H. H. Young, “Gallery 

of USAF Weapons,” Air Force, (May 

2000), pp. 155-156.

23 Guided Bomb Unit.

24Author’s knowledge and experience 

flying the F-15E from 1993-2000. For 

a good description of the aircraft and 

weapons array, see Tom Clancy, Fighter 

Wing, (New York, Berkeley, 1995), pp. 

70-85 and pp. 147-152. An excellent 

source of the F-15E in combat is William L. Smallwood, Strike Eagle: Flying 

the F-15E in the Gulf War’, (Washington D.C., Brassy’s Inc., 1994).

25 Runways are identified by their magnetic heading without the last zero, 

within plus or minus 5 degrees. Therefore, runway 05 has a magnetic orientation of 050 degrees, however, its actual 

magnetic orientation could be between 

045 to 055 degrees. See MSS 481, Airmanship, Lesson 4.

26 Afterburners are devices which inject 

fuel into the exhaust nozzle of a jet 

engine. They boost engine thrust but 

consume more fuel. They are sometimes referred to as “augmenters” or 

“reheat.” Clancy, Fighter Wing, p. 303.

27 Clancy, Fighter Wing, p. 309. 28”Green ‘em up” is fighter pilot jargon 

for accomplishing the pre-combat checklists. MCM 3-3, Combat Aircraft Fundamentals, F-16, p. A3-5.

29 Honig and Both, Srebrenica, p. 19.

30 Smallwood, Strike Eagle, pp. 117-119. 

This tactic, although an old one, can 

be effective as one must honor the first 

attacking missile and maneuver or it 

could prove lethal. By doing so, one 

loses airspeed and potentially maneuverability, making the second missile’s 

job easier. According to Smallwood, 

this appears to be the tactic used by Iraq 

to shoot down Col. Dave Eberly and 

Maj. Tom Griffith in the Gulf War. For 

a Vietnam War account of this tactic, see 

Lt. Col. G.I. Basel, Pak Six, (New York, 

Berkeley Publishing Group, 1982), pp. 

75-76.

31 For some excellent accounts of this 

very complicated authorization chainof-command, see Honig and Both, Srebrenica, pp. 18-21, as well as Michael O. 

Beale, Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of Air 

Power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (Maxwell 

AFB, Air University Press, 1997), pp. 

22-23, and 34. Beale describes the chain 

of command thus, “The NATO chainof-command went from the fighter aircraft through an airborne command 

and control C-130, to the Combined 

Air Operations Center at Vicenza, Italy, 

where the combined force air component commander was the approving 

authority for employing ordnance. The 

other chain-of-command went from the 

UNPROFOR forward air controller on 

the ground through Bosnian Air Support Operations Center located in Kiseljak, Bosnia, and then to Zagreb. There, 

the UNPROFOR commander asked 

U.N. Headquarters in New York for permission to employ ordnance.” In 1994, 

the U.N. Special envoy in Bosnia could 

authorize release, but could defer to 

U.N. Headquarters. My sincere thanks 

to Captain Mike Veneri, USAF Academy, who was an Intel officer for the 

492d FS deployed to Aviano and an 
20

 1 

Terrorism, who cares?

Japanese Perceptions and Approaches 

to Terrorism

by CIC Jason Kramer

The following words were published in 1998, approximately three years 

before the attack on September 11th: 

If the device that exploded in 1993 

under the World Trade Center 

had been nuclear, or had effectively dispersed a deadly pathogen, the resulting horror and chaos 

would have exceeded our ability 

to describe it. Such an act of 

catastrophic terrorism would be 

a watershed event in American 

history. It could involve loss of 

life and property unprecedented in 

peacetime and undermine America’s fundamental sense of security, 

as did the Soviet Atomic bomb test 

in 1949. Like Pearl Harbor, this 

event would divide our past and 

future into a before and after. 1

These words, published in the article 

“Catastrophic Terrorism,” by Ashton 

Carter and John Deutch in the journal, 

Foreign Affairs, were made all too real 

on September 11th, 2001, by the actions 

of Osama Bin Laden and his supporters. 

Experts like Carter and Deutch looked 

at the world environment of their day 

and saw the above scenario as a dangerous future possibility. Unfortunately, in 

many respects, this possibility became a 

reality. Today, terrorist experts are also 

sending warnings of probable danger. In 

today’s volatile and violent world, these 

warnings are increasingly valid. Experts 

state that terrorism is likely to happen in 

the future. They were right before. It 

is entirely likely that they will be right 

again.

Given this information, the next 

question one would ask is this: “What 

are we and our allies doing to protect 

ourselves?” This is an imperative question, and it begs a thorough answer. 

Both elements of this question are important. Since the attack on September 11th, 

scholars, intellectuals, and government 

officials alike have exhaustively evaluated 

American policy concerning terrorism. 

However, the second part of our question is also imperative and must not be 

overlooked. If the United States is to 

be an effective leader in the war against 

terrorism and also protect its citizens 

across the globe, its leaders must have a 

thorough understanding of how its allies 

approach, deter, and defend against the 

threat of terrorism.

The United States’ principle ally 

in Asia is the island nation of Japan. Like 

the United States, Japan lives under the 

threat of terrorist action. As a sophisticated nation and an ally of the U.S., one 

would expect that the Japanese nation 

would approach the threat of terrorism 

with great vigor. However, the members 

of Japanese society view terrorism quite 

differently than the citizens of the United 

States. In short, Japanese society has a 

low awareness of the terrorist threat and 

does not perceive an immediate danger. 

Accordingly, Japan’s efforts on the deterrence and prevention of terrorism are 

much less substantial than those of the 

United States. 

Unfortunately, the apathy 

expressed by the Japanese nation is not 

warranted. History has shown that Japan 

is vulnerable to terrorist action. The 

current threat to the Japanese nation, 

while limited, is very real and should 

not be taken lightly. The policies (or 

lack thereof) of the Japanese government 

that result from this general apathy are 

neither decisive nor effective measures 

towards the prevention of future terrorism. This could prove dangerous for 

both U.S. and Japanese citizens. 

ABCCC Airborne Intelligence Officer 

later serving in the Balkans. He is very 

familiar with this topic and was awarded 

two Aerial Achievement medals for his 

work there.

32Author’s knowledge and experience 

flying the F-15E during ODF.

33For more detail on USAF debrief techniques, see Gregory D. Thomas, “PTP’s: 

How to Construct a Debrief Properly,” 

USAF Weapons Review, (Winter, 1999), 

pp. 18-23.

34 For more on the U.N. authorization 

process, its hesitation to employ air 

power, and the resulting fall of the 

enclave of Srebrenica, see Honig and 

Both, Srebrenica, pp. 15-26.

35 This was not the first time French 

peacekeepers deviated from U.N. procedures. Also in July of 1995, members of the French Foreign Legion, as 

part of the NATO-led rapid reaction 

force, refused to paint their vehicles 

U.N. white. A Legion sergeant, quoted 

in The Washington Post explained, “We 

won’t paint our vehicles U.N. white 

because that’s the color of surrender.” 

See Howard R. Simpson, The Paratroopers of the French Foreign Legion; From 

Vietnam to Bosnia, (Dulles, Virginia, 

Brassey’s Inc., 1997), p. 114.

36 Army and Air Forces Exchange Service. AAFES provides merchandise and 

services to military customers around 

the world.

37 Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton), p. 

101.

38 Beale, Bombs Over Bosnia, p.34. Also 

see Honig and Both, Srebrenica pp. xix, 

3-26. 

39 Honig and Both, Srebrenica, pp. xix, 

3-26. 23,000 women and children were 

expelled from the town.

40 Beale, Bombs Over Bosnia, pp 45-47.
21

The History of Terrorist 

Action in Japan

Japan is no stranger to terrorism. Japan’s history regarding terrorism 

is neither short nor trivial. Terrorists that 

have acted within Japan’s borders include 

such notable groups as the Aum Shinrikyo cult, the culprit of the infamous sarin 

attacks in the Tokyo subway, and the Japanese Red Army. While Japan’s history 

regarding terrorism does not match the 

horror wrought in various other areas of 

the world including the United States, 

this history proves that the Japanese 

nation is not immune to either terrorist 

groups or acts of terrorism. 

The Japanese Red Army, also 

known as the Anti-Imperialist International Brigade, has instigated many acts 

of terrorism across the world. This international terrorist group was formed in 

1970 with the goal of helping inspire 

world revolution by overthrowing the 

Japanese government. Terrorist incidents 

linked to the Red Army include hijackings and an attempt to take over the 

US embassy in Kuala, Lupur. 2 Unfortunately, the acts by the Japanese Red 

Army only scratch the surface of the history of terrorism within Japan.

The Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, participated in several terrorist 

attacks throughout the early 1990’s. In 

April of 1990 the cult participated in a 

failed attempt to spray a biological toxin 

from a vehicle. 3 The spraying attack 

was attempted again on the 3rd of June 

in 1993, but once again was a failure.

4

 In that same year the cult also sprinkled biological toxin in front of the US 

Naval Base at Yokosuka and attempted 

to sprinkle the toxin in front of Narita 

airport. 5 In Matsumoto on the 27th of 

June, 1994, the cult released sarin out of 

a van. The attack caused seven deaths 

and over 150 casualties. 6 These attacks 

were both frightening and destructive. 

However, on March 20th, 1995, the terrorist cult was able to surpass all of its 

past efforts. On this date, the cult successfully executed a mass casualty attack 

upon Japanese civilians. Members of 

the cult released sarin within five different subway cars in a manner so that the 

cars converged at Kasumigaseki, the location of Japan’s bureaucracy. 7 The attack 

killed 12 people and injured approximately 6,000. 8

Since the horror of the subway 

attack in 1995, Japan has continued to 

experience terrorist attacks. Later in 

1995, a man with a screwdriver who 

claimed to be a member of the Aum cult 

hijacked an All Nippon Airways Boeing 

747 flight carrying 350 passengers for 16 

hours. 9 In 1996, the Japanese embassy 

in Lima, Peru was actually taken over. 10

In the article “Terrorism and Antiterrorism in Japan: Aum Shinrikyo and After,” 

Naofumi Miyasaka, an Associate Professor of the Graduate School of Security Studies at Japan’s National Defense 

Academy, and one of a select few Japanese nationals who are experts on terrorism, adds:

International Terrorists have 

attacked or attempted to attack 

Japanese since 1995: first in 

December 1996, with MRTA’s 

hostage-taking at the Japanese 

ambassador’s residence; next in 

Luxor; and again in August 1999, 

with the hostage-taking in Kyrgistan by Islamic armed forces. 11

Based on this information, it can be 

safely concluded that terrorist actions 

consistently caused problems for Japan 

throughout the 1990’s. 

Japanese Society’s Outlook on the 

Threat of Terrorism

Despite these past incidents, 

the Japanese populace currently has an 

astounding lack of concern for the threat 

of terrorism. While feelings of Japanese 

citizens vary, in general, the attitude in 

Japan regarding terrorism borders on 

apathy. This contrasts greatly with the 

heightened concern regarding terrorism 

found among American citizens today. 

In the article “Another Against 

the Other: Terrorism Through Japanese 

Lenses,” Steve McCarty, the Japan president for the World Association for Online 

Education and a professor at Kagawa 

Junior College, Japan, describes this feeling of apathy. He writes:

Most passers by interviewed in 

a youth mecca of Tokyo showed 

concern that Japan or they personally could be harmed by terrorism. But considerable apathy 

was expressed. A mature woman 

said, “I have stopped traveling by 

plane and worry this terrorism will 

spread to the rest of the world.” 

But a 36-year-old man said. “In 

no way, really I was interested after 

the U.S. attacks a few weeks of my 

life and business are not directly 

affected. An 18-year old woman 

said, “No. I have no interest in 

the events” (2). On a BBS I 

predicted with black humor that 

Muslim veils would become a fad, 

not realizing that Muslim scarves 

were already the rage. That shows 

how some young women were able 

to gain ownership of world events.

12

This lack of concern is highlighted by the fact that few people talk 

about terrorist violence. Terrorism is 

rarely talked about on TV, scant research 

within Japan is being done on the subject, and there are few if any college 

courses on terrorism. The topic itself 

is almost taboo within academic circles. 

Because about 70% of the instructors 

in Japan are liberal, the topic itself is 

viewed as right wing. 13 Dr. Katayama, 

a Senior Research Fellow for the Japan 

Defense Agency’s National Institute for 

Defense Studies, also an expert on terrorism, notes that because security topics 
22

were not studied seriously in Japan in the 

past, there is currently a lack of available 

professors with the ability to teach on 

such subjects. He also explains that military matters in general are not very popular among Japanese academics and that 

he does not know of a single strategic 

studies course in a Japanese University. 14

The issue of terrorism receives 

little attention within the Japanese government as well as the general populace. 

Senator Yoshimasa Hayashi of the Japanese House of Councilors, offers some 

valuable insight on how the Japanese government views terrorism. According to 

Senator Hayashi, terrorism is a low priority for the Japanese government. He 

notes that the sense of urgency regarding the immediate possibility of attack is 

simply lower in Japan than it is in the 

United States. He explains that while 

it is a concern, other issues such as the 

economy or current government scandals are receiving more attention. Senator Hayashi also inferred that the rush 

within the Japanese government to support the US operations in Afgahnistan 

following September 11th were actually 

due to concern over saving face, rather 

than an actual concern over terrorism. 

The Japanese government did not wish 

to repeat the dreaded embarrassment or 

“Gulf Trauma” resulting from Japan’s lack 

of support in the Gulf war, and thus 

provided support for the United States 

operations in Afgahnistan. 15 The attitude within the Japanese government differs greatly from the sentiments and concern continually expressed by legislators 

within the United States, who make terrorism both an active and a public issue. 

Both the 1995 sarin attack in 

Tokyo and the recent attack in the United 

States on September 11th failed to significantly raise the level of sustained concern 

among Japanese citizens over terrorism. 

The Japanese seem to easily forget terrorist incidents. 16 Within one year after the 

Tokyo attack, the general public and the 

government lost interest in the issue of 

terrorism. 17 Prior to the September 11th

attack, Professor Miyasaka wrote that the 

Japanese way of thinking about terrorism 

was still the same as it was in the post 

war period “ . . . as if nothing happened 

in 1995- the year that a seas of change 

occurred in the history of world terrorism.” 18 Even after the 9/11 attack, the 

Japanese paradigm regarding terrorism 

was not significantly changed. 19 After 

September 11th, the Japanese people felt a 

rush of fear about terrorism. 20 They cancelled overseas trips to Hawaii, Australia, and even Japan’s Southernmost island 

Okinawa. 21 Yet, their worries quickly 

faded. They forgot about terrorism, just 

like they did after the sarin attack in 

Tokyo. 22 

Reasons Why the Threat of 

Terrorism Receives a Lack of Attention 

in Japan 

The lack of concern about terrorism in Japan is in part a direct result 

of the way that the Japanese approach 

and define (or rather fail to define) terrorism in general. The Japanese people 

generally lack a clear-cut understanding 

of what terrorism is all about. Many Japanese see terrorist organizations as isolated. They think that terrorism involves 

a few thorns such as Al Qaeda, rather 

than a widespread threat. The Japanese 

have not even come up with a basic definition for terrorism. Defining terrorism is the starting point in any effort 

to combat terror, and they haven’t even 

gotten that far. The U.S. State Department has 33 different groups, such as 

the FBI, CIA, etc., who each have their 

own definition of international terrorism. 

Information is shared between these organizations. In Japan, this is not the case.

23 In the book, Terrorism: Prevention 

& Prepardness New Approaches to U.S.-

Japan Security Cooperation, Michael 

Green writes: “According to a Japanese 

legal definition, terrorism is wide spread 

dissemination of fear through violent 

destructive activities in order to achieve 

extreme beliefs, yet the meaning of the 

word “terrorism” is still up for debate.” 24

Professor Miyasaka explains that 

the Japanese perception of terrorism 

is very limited. Even after the sarin 

attack in Tokyo in 1995, the weapons 

of mass destruction attack that shocked 

the world, many Japanese failed to recognize the Aum Shinrikyo cult as terrorists. 25 Professor McCarty explains that 

“The issue was never thought of in terms 

of terrorism, or that view by specialists 

never reached the public.” 26 He further 

notes that the Japanese view terrorism as 

foreign, and the Aum attack was from 

a very mainstream and native element 

of Japanese society. 27 Professor Miyasaka adds that in a group of 300 people 

that he gave a speech to, only half of the 

group felt that the Aum cult had performed a terrorist action. They felt that 

since it was religious in nature, it was not 

terrorism. 28 Michael Green explains: 

American [Terrorism: Prevention 

and Preparedness conference] participants were surprised throughout the course of the discussion at 

the Japanese public’s complacency 

about the implications of the 

Aum attack, but the Japanese side 

explained that this was because 

most people saw Aum as a bizarre 

religious cult without any clear 

ideological or political objectives.

29

In addition to the Aum cult, both an airline hijacker in 1999 and a math teacher 

who bombed a school in 1999 were not 

labeled as terrorists. 30 Professor Miyasaka adds “It is not an exaggeration to say 

that only antiheroes in movies or novels 

are seen as terrorists.” 31

The Japanese are confused about 

what does and does not constitute terrorism. In addition, the Japanese approach 

in general to the issue of terrorism greatly 
23

differs from that of the United States. 

Professor Miyasaka explains that the Japanese do not see terrorism as a security 

issue that should be addressed every 

day. He explains that they see it as 

more of a temporary incident. 32 People 

felt that the sarin attack on Tokyo was 

an unusual occurrence that could never 

happen again. 33 Following the attacks, 

the Japanese did not emphasize vigilance.

34 Rather, they emphasized pointing out 

who executed the attack. 35 This reaction differed greatly from the emphasis 

on vigilance in the United States following the September 11th attacks. 

The Japanese look at the root 

of terrorism more carefully than the citizens of the United States. 36 According 

to Michael Green, Japan is “ . . . more 

sympathetic to the root of global terrorism, and less willing to respond to terrorism as a global problem.” 37 There 

are three main approaches to terrorism 

within Japan: 1) the “root cause theory,” 

this focuses on what creates terrorism, 2) 

the “risk-averse policy,” a policy that one 

should only be concerned with domestic 

terrorism and that casualties should be 

avoided (even terrorist casualties are a 

concern), and 3) the topic of terrorism is 

simply taboo and to be avoided. 38 None 

of these approaches stress vigilance or 

public awareness of the terrorist threat, 

and not one of them would conform to 

the United States’ new “war on terrorism.”

The Japanese perspective regarding the threat of terrorism is invariably 

shaped by their view of Japan’s place 

in the world environment. Mr. Nakai, 

a member of the US Forces Japan J-5 

(plans and policies) office who works 

with government relations and Status of 

Forces Agreement matters explains that 

the Japanese do not perceive a threat in 

the world environment. 39 He further 

explained that the Japanese feel that they 

will be left alone as long as they don’t 

promote offensive or threatening capability. 40 They are under the impression 

that because they are active economically 

(for example selling electronics) and pass 

on lots of money, their country should 

be favored. 41 The majority of the people 

simply feel that if they are peaceful, they 

will not be bothered. 42 “It is a Japanese 

trait to think ‘if we just keep our heads 

down, we will be okay,’ said Toshiyuki 

Shikata, a professor of crisis management 

at Teikyo University. ‘The idea that 

something might happen does not come 

to the Japanese mind.’” 43 They have 

been able to afford to keep this attitude 

because of the bilateral security offered 

by the United States. The U.S. has been 

like a security blanket for them, and 

as Mr. Nakai put it, the Japanese mindset is that “we’re pacifists and nobody’s 

going to bother us but we always have 

big brother to protect us if somebody 

does bother us.” 44 This mindset on basic 

security matters naturally translates to 

the specific issue of the threat of terrorism. 

The Japanese assurance that if 

they are not threatening they will be left 

alone stems from the pacifist attitude 

that has been fundamental to their society since the aftermath of the Second 

World War. Following World War II, 

the Japanese people wanted peace at all 

costs. 45 Peace (heiwa) and human rights 

(jinken) became pillars in the Japanese 

approach to security. 46 Their constitution is known as the “peace constitution,” 

and it disavows the right of armed belligerence. 47 Initially, the Japanese even 

renounced having any form of a military.

48 It took the combined efforts of Macarthur and his staff to finally establish a 

police force in Japan. 49 This police force 

eventually evolved into the Self Defense 

Force Japan wields today. 50 

Today, the pacifist ideology is 

still very well ingrained into their society. 51 According to Professor McCarty, 

this pacifism is conveyed in several areas. 

Teachers generally promote political correctness, any violence is almost totally 

out of public view (in other words, under 

the table), and the media is very onesided, presenting the typical Japanese 

values. “For example, in Afghanistan 

they reported mostly on the bombed 

civilians, and now it is similar with the 

Palestinians.” 52 The Asahi newspaper in 

Japan, read by millions, actually advocated an end to US bombings in Afghanistan prior to the fall of Kabul. 53 Professor McCarty elaborates that “ . . . the 

post-war pacifist ideology has served Japanese people so well that they cling to it 

even when it is no longer viable.” 54

The Japanese are adamant about 

promoting peace. Yet, as a society they 

seem to have trouble delineating between 

peace and freedom. 55 These are two 

very different concepts. Many Japanese 

simply do not seem to quite understand 

the price of freedom itself. 56 The socialist party in Japan did not even recognize 

that their Self-Defense Force was necessary until 1995. 57 In general, military 

members in Japan travel in civilian clothing off base due to the public’s anti-military sentiment. 58 The Japanese want to 

be an Asian Switzerland. Yet, they fail 

to recognize that even Switzerland has a 

very capable military and is prepared to 

defend itself if need be. 59 

It has been quite a struggle for 

Japan as a society to even begin to address 

defense issues at all. Only since the start 

of the Koizumi administration has direct 

dialog regarding defense issues become 

more common. 60 In the United States, 

politicians from across the political spectrum address defense issues. 61 This is 

not true in Japan. 62 According to Senator Hayashi, prior to the cold war, simply 

raising a defense issue could get a politician labeled as a right-wing hawk. 63

This could be detrimental to one’s career. 

This struggle has been manifested in 

both political and scholarly arenas. Only 

recently have a significant number of Japanese scholars begun to show interest in 
24

security topics. 64 

Instead of addressing security 

issues on a regular basis, the Japanese 

tend to sweep them under the rug. Security issues are simply distasteful. Regular 

people generally don’t think very much 

about the military or military matters. 65

The reasons for this are numerous. One 

reason described by Lt. Col Murakami 

of the Japanese Air Self Defense Force is 

the concept of kotodama. One tenant 

of Japanese culture is that if one talks 

about something, it might come true or 

might happen. 66 The word, kotodama 

is a Shinto word implying that words 

themselves have a spirit, and that this 

spirit can be dangerous. 67 

The Japanese like to avoid distasteful subjects if they perceive that they 

have a low likelihood of actually happening. In the United States, problems or 

weaknesses are addressed directly. For 

example, issues like teen pregnancy are 

discussed on networks, the radio, etc. 

In Japan, problems are approached differently. They like to hide or ignore 

problems until they reach crisis level. 

Once this level is reached, the generally 

slow moving government is able to put 

changes into action. 68 

It is a reasonable assertion to say 

that the lack of attention provided to terrorism or security issues in Japan spans 

their entire society. Japanese culture is 

generally very homogenous. Their entire 

culture promotes consensus. 69 They like 

to have everyone on board. 70 The society has even been labeled “ . . . a culture 

that crushes individualism.” 71 While 

this statement may be rather extreme, 

it is true that Japanese culture does not 

promote standouts. This aspect of Japanese culture is furthered by their educational programs. In the Japanese school 

system, “The emphasis is on fitting in, 

on following rules, and on rote memorization. Students are not encouraged to 

analyze or challenge; questions are not 

asked in Japanese classrooms.” 72 Professor McCarty expands on the idea of 

Japanese cultural singularity in the following statement:

It may also be assumed that 

the Japanese national interest on 

each issue is singular and obvious. Japan is not ready to face 

its own actual pluralism, as they 

would open an unwelcome can of 

worms. Have you heard of certain cultures who avoid conflicts 

in the first place because they do 

not have the social mechanisms to 

resolve conflicts once they are out 

in the open? Japan is one of those 

cultures, and so generally the lid 

is kept on controversial issues ala 

“see no evil” and etc. 73

The lack of plurality in Japanese culture 

has a significant effect on how effectively 

they are able to deal with complex political or security issues. 

It is apparent that in the past, the 

Japanese have avoided discussion regarding security issues. This is highlighted by 

the general ignorance and apathy regarding the threat of terrorism. It can also 

be concluded that this problem is manifested across the entire spectrum of Japanese society and culture. This is not 

likely to change drastically in the near 

future. The Japanese mind is not easily 

changed. 74 In general, Japanese simply 

do not like to alter their approach to 

things. 75 Professor McCarty notes that 

“They don’t like change for its own sake, 

so they stick with something comfortable. The unpredictable or surprising 

often has a negative connotation in a 

land of typhoons, tsunami tidal waves, 

earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.” 76

New Trends in Japanese Thinking

Despite the fact that drastic 

changes in the Japanese approach to terrorism or security are not likely in the 

future, change has been slowly but surely 

creeping into the Japanese mindset. After 

the gulf crisis, and the end of the Cold 

War, people have been getting more 

realistic about security issues. 77 The 

younger generations seem to hold the 

consensus that a self-defense force is actually needed. 78 The percentage of members in the Japanese Diet who promoted 

the outdated pacifist stance regarding 

defense issues has been reduced from 

nearly 50% to less than 33%. 79 The 

Diet requires a two-thirds majority to 

alter the constitution, and the numbers 

of those willing to address defense issues 

are nearing that benchmark. 80 Lately, 

direct dialog regarding security issues is 

also a lot more common, and people are 

more willing to discuss things. 81 In Japanese politics today, while politicians must 

still be careful in choosing the words they 

use, it is no longer tantamount to political suicide to advocate necessary changes 

regarding security issues. 82 In addition, 

anti-military sentiment is ebbing. For 

example, students of the National Japanese Defense Academy, the “Boedaigaku” 

are actually required to wear uniforms 

when spending time off base. 

While the Japanese mindset has 

been changing, experts express that more 

change is needed. Professor Miyasaka 

explains that in his opinion, the lack of 

attention paid to terrorism in Japan is 

a fault. 83 Dr. Katayama explains that 

because terrorism is a primarily psychological battle, it is important that members of Japanese society are not too afraid 

of terrorists or terrorist attacks. However, it is important that citizens remain 

conscious and ready to cooperate with 

authorities. He feels that Japanese consciousness needs to be raised. 84 

The Current Threat of Terrorism 

Worldwide

The need for the Japanese to 

increase both their vigilance and awareness of terrorism is intensified by the 

threat of terrorism worldwide. The 

worldwide threat of terrorism has become 
25

both more volatile and more dangerous. 

Admittedly, the terrorist threat to Japan 

seems minor when compared with the 

threat to the United States. However, 

while the threat is low, a significant threat 

does exist. Japan has been attacked 

before, and may be attacked again. In 

this day and age, no country can afford to 

ignore the possibility of terrorism within 

its borders. 

The number of terrorist incidents around the world in the past 

decade has been astounding. In the 

year 2001, there were 348 recorded incidents of international terrorism. In the 

year 2000, the number of attacks totaled 

426. In the year 1999, 395 attacks were 

recorded, and in the four years prior, 

1314 were recorded. In the years 2000 

and 2001, 98 and 68 of these incidents 

occurred in Asia respectively. 85 

Equally astounding is the 

destructiveness of these respective incidents. In February of 1993, the World 

Trade Center in New York was bombed 

by a group led by Ramzi Ahred Yousef. 

The group killed six and injured 1,000. 

In 1993, a plot by Islamic extremists to 

bomb various places in New York was 

uncovered. In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo 

performed the sarin attack in Tokyo. In 

1995, 1996, and 1997 a suicide bombing campaign by the Islamic Resistance 

Movement (HAMAS) killed over 100 

people. In 1995, the Oklahoma city 

bombing by Timothy McVeigh killed 

168. In June of 1996 the Khobar Towers 

were bombed, killing 19 and wounding 

515. In August 1998, US embassies in 

Tanzania and Kenya were bombed, killing over 200. In 1999 Russia was victim 

to apartment bombings that killed several hundred. 86 The shock of the attack 

on the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001 is still being felt worldwide. In the fall of 2001, 23 people 

contracted anthrax and 5 people were 

killed from letters laced with anthrax sent 

around the United States. 87 

The individual terrorists and 

their motivations for these actions are not 

easy to pigeonhole or explain. George 

Tenant, the Director of the CIA, offers 

the following comment on modern terrorists: “ . . . I can tell you that they are a 

diverse lot motivated by many causes.” 88

Terrorist attacks may be used for the purpose of gaining leverage on others due to 

death and destruction (Examples include 

the attack on the US Marine barracks in 

Beirut and the Khobar Towers,) to show 

the flag or to show their adversaries that 

they still pack a punch, or simply an 

act of revenge. 89 Motivation for terrorist action may even be darker than those 

previously described. In a speech by the 

Deputy Chief of the Counter Terrorist 

Center for the CIA, this darker motivation was described. “Even more visceral—and here we come to a mode of 

terrorist thinking that is furthest removed 

from the way you or I think—is the 

objective of inflicting as much pain and 

suffering as possible on an adversary 

simply because of hatred for that adversary.” 90 

While the motivations for terrorism are varied, a noticeable trend 

among international terrorism is plainly 

visible. In short, terrorism is changing. 

The darker motivation for senseless death 

and destruction is becoming more and 

more popular among modern terrorists. 

“The reason is that “political violence,” as 

we have traditionally understood it, is no 

longer the problem.” 91 In the 1960’s and 

1970’s terrorism seemed to involve carefully controlled violence. Today, terrorists are more indiscriminant. 92 “Instead 

of seeking to garner publicity or further 

a distinct political cause, the new perpetrators of acts of terrorism seem to view 

the maximization of casualties as a goal 

in itself.” 93 In the 1990’s, the number of 

international terrorist attacks declined, 

but the overall deaths caused by terrorism actually increased. 94 The following 

quote by the Deputy Chief of the DCI 

Counter Terrorist Center for the CIA in 

1998 elaborates on the new nature of terrorism:

But, while the frequency—the 

raw number of incidents—has 

declined, the lethality of terrorism has, if anything, been tending 

upward in recent years. There 

has been relatively less of the 

finely tuned use of terrorist tactics to acquire bargaining chips, 

and relatively more attempts to 

inflict high casualties, motivated 

by revenge or simple hatred. The 

signature terrorist act of the 1990s 

is not the airplane hijacking or 

group kidnapping, but rather the 

powerful truck bomb that levels 

buildings and kills people by the 

scores, if not by the hundreds. 95

The horror of this indiscriminate violence was illustrated best by the attack on 

the World Trade Center on September 

11th. Unfortunately, the attack may have 

only been a starting point for a new age 

of mass casualty terrorism. “ . . . it raised 

the bar, the way the criteria for judging 

terrorism all of a sudden went from a 

record of 440 victims to seven times as 

many. It almost created two different 

categories of terrorists.” 96 Indiscriminate, mass casualty terrorism is a real 

danger in today’s world, and as Professor 

Miyasaka commented, no one will be 

surprised if it happens again. 97

One of the primary reasons that 

terrorism has changed is the entrance of 

religion as a primary motivator for terrorist actions. Following the end of the 

Cold War, the secular gods or ideologies 

of the respective US and USSR camps no 

longer seemed to be viable. 98 An ideological void was created across the world.

99 Religion is increasingly filling this.

100 In some cases, religious ideology is 

being misused as an excuse to perpetrate 

mass violence. As Jean Zandars writes in 

his work “Assessing the Risk of Chemical 
26

and Biological Weapons Proliferation to 

Terrorists,”

Particularly the religious groups 

associated with apocalyptic millennialism, demptive fanaticism, 

or racist and ethnic hatred are 

said to find justification for their 

acts of violence in the higher 

authority of God. Because of 

their belief systems, mass casualties are not an impediment to 

the furtherance of their goals. 101

Religion not only allows terrorists to 

broaden their support base, it simply 

makes it easier for them to justify mass 

casualty terrorism. 102 The Aum Shinrikyo cult and Osama Bin Laden’s followers are prime examples of those who 

have used religion to justify mass casualty terrorism. While religion has 

become very influential upon terrorism, 

it must be noted that religion is not the 

only thing motivating terrorists across the 

world. As mentioned earlier, the motivations of terrorists are widely varied.

Terrorists have been changing in 

more ways than one. Not only have the 

types of their attacks, their motivations, 

and their justifications been changing, 

but the structures of their organizations 

have been changing too. Terrorist groups 

exhibit a type of social Darwinism; those 

that survive are consistently adapting, 

altering themselves, and learning from 

the mistakes of others. 103 A danger in 

the modern world are cellular groups of 

extremists who can commit an act of terrorism and then disband. 104 The trend 

over the past 15 years has been towards 

“ . . . loosely linked transnational networks.” 105 Due to better communications, information technology, and stronger weapons, smaller groups and individuals now have an increased capability for 

destruction. 106 This trend makes terrorists more volatile, harder to pin down, 

and more dangerous. 

Today’s networked and violently 

motivated terrorists are seeking to apply 

a new assortment of weapons in their 

attempts to wreak havoc. For today’s 

terrorist, weapons primarily include conventional means such as suicide attacks 

and devices such as car bombs. 107 However, as stated by George Tennant, before 

the SSCI on 2 February 2000:

Although terrorists we’ve preempted still appear to be relying 

on conventional weapons, we 

know that a number of groups 

are seeking chemical biological, 

radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) 

agents. We are aware of several 

instances in which terrorists have 

contemplated using these materials. 108

The attack by the Aum cult in 1995 

broke the stigma against using Weapons 

of Mass Destruction (WMD), 109 and the 

current danger of such attacks is significant. It is the opinion of Ashton Carter, 

former assistant Secretary of Defense 

for the United States and John Deutch, 

former Director of Central Intelligence, 

that “The danger of weapons of mass 

destruction being used against America 

and its allies is greater now than at any 

time since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 

1962.” 110 

The threat of terrorist acquisition and use of WMD includes a three 

tiered threat composed of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Each of 

these tiers is a unique threat in itself 

and has different factors influencing their 

possible use by terrorists. Nuclear weapons are often the first thing to come 

to mind when people consider WMD. 

Opinions differ regarding the threat of 

terrorists gaining access to and using a 

nuclear warhead. According to Jason 

Pate and Adam Dolnik, Senior Research 

Associate of the WMD Terrorism Project 

at the Center for NonProliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, “There appears to be an 

inverse relationship between the motivation to kill a large amount of people and 

the ability to do so.” 111 The organizations that have the resources and support base to acquire nuclear weapons 

would risk losing their support base in 

the backlash from a nuclear incident. 112

Thus, those who would use such weapons are generally small groups or individuals, and they simply don’t have the 

resources to access these weapons. 113 

Unfortunately, this is not always 

true, especially when one considers the 

threat of religiously motivated terrorist 

groups. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo looked into purchasing nuclear 

weapons and a cult member actually 

found several prices at which he could 

buy a nuclear weapon; the cheapest being 

15 million dollars. 114 It must be noted 

that the chances of a terrorist group 

obtaining a ready made nuclear warhead 

are small, and construction is very difficult. 115 But, for those who are motivated, the possibility of acquiring small 

amounts of weapons grade nuclear material is quite realistic. 116 In addition, the 

knowledge and expertise required to put 

this material to use may be available if 

the price is right.

Russia is an ample shopping 

ground for any terrorist group seeking 

to obtain nuclear materials. Russia has 

stockpiles of 1,100 metric tons of highly 

enriched uranium and 160 metric tons 

of plutonium. 117 The security for these 

stockpiles is extremely lax. In many 

places, basic security items like fences or 

locks are not adequate, and guards go for 

months without pay. 118 

There have been no confirmed 

reports of missing or stolen former 

soviet nuclear weapons. Still, 

there is ample evidence of a significant black market in nuclear 

materials. The International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

has reported 175 nuclear smuggling incidents since 1993, 18 of 
27

which involved highly enriched 

uranium, the key ingredient in an 

atomic bomb and the most dangerous product on the nuclear 

black market. 119

According to George tennat,

Making matters worse, societal 

and economic stress in Russia 

seems likely to grow, raising even 

more concerns about the security 

of nuclear weapons and fissile 

material. Although we have not 

had recent reports of weapons 

usable nuclear material missing 

in Russia, what we have noticed 

are reports of strikes, lax discipline, and poor moral, and criminal activity at nuclear facilities. 

For me . . . these are alarm bells 

that warrant our closest attention 

and concern. 120

The world considers the danger of nuclear 

materials being smuggled out of Russia 

so great that over the next 10 years, G-8 

countries are planning to spend 20 billion dollars to help former Soviet republics destroy and protect WMD stockpiles.

121 

In addition to possibly gaining 

nuclear material, terrorists may have 

access to the expertise needed to use the 

material as a weapon. In Russia, due to 

economic problems, nuclear technicians 

at times can’t even afford food. 122 This 

leads to the danger that these technicians 

may be bought off, resulting in an expertise “brain drain” to those who can afford 

it. 123 This possibility is very real, and 

was demonstrated by the Aum Shinrikyo 

doomsday cult. The cult actually tried to 

solicit students from Moscow State University and underpaid nuclear scientists. 

Luckily, they failed. In the year 2000, 

the Taliban also tried to recruit a former 

Soviet nuclear expert. Thankfully, they 

too were unsuccessful. 124

The danger of terrorists building 

or purchasing a nuclear warhead is not 

the only threat that terrorists pose involving nuclear material. Should terrorists 

gain access to some amount of expertise, 

and some form of nuclear material (not 

necessarily the type used to build nuclear 

weapons), it is possible that terrorists 

could create a “dirty bomb.” 125 This 

would be a conventional bomb laced with 

nuclear material that would release radiation along with the standard explosion.

126 Depending on the bomb’s contraction, the danger posed by dirty bombs 

may not be much greater than that of a 

conventional weapon. 127 However, the 

possible psychological impact of such a 

weapon and the resulting contamination 

are significant enough that it is considered a weapons of mass destruction. 128 

Other elements of the WMD 

threat include biological and chemical 

weapons. Like the danger posed by a 

nuclear terrorist attack, the threat of a 

biological or chemical attack by a terrorist entity is limited. However, it 

is significant enough to warrant attention. Biological weapons are difficult 

to produce and difficult to employ. It 

is the opinion of Jean Pascal Zandars, 

as expressed in the work “Assessing the 

Risk of Chemical and biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists,” that “ . . 

. only a vertically organized, highly integrated, and ideologically uniform group 

appears to have the capacity to setup and 

operate a large-volume production line 

for chemical or biological weapons in 

absolute secrecy.” 129 Even Aum Shinrikyo, a group that certainly fits that 

description, failed to successfully employ 

biological weapons. The cult attempted 

to produce clostidium botulinum, a bacteria that creates a dangerous toxin. 130

Due to a lack of the proper equipment, 

their attempt failed. 131 

Despite ample budgetary, equipment, and expertise resources, and 

years in which to develop their 

CBW program, Aum Shinrikyo 

failed to use biological agents 

effectively, and achieved relatively 

limited success with their chemical 

program. Aspirant CBW terrorists may well find these observations a deterrent, rather than an 

encouragement from CBW acquisition activities. 132

 This information can be misleading, however, if it leads one to believe 

that chemical or biological terrorists 

attacks are not going to happen. The 

successful sarin attack by the Aum cult 

proved that WMD chemical attacks are 

a very real danger. In addition, should 

a terrorist group be less ambitious, it is 

possible that they could use first generation (non-nerve agent) chemical warfare 

agents such as mustard gas. 133 These 

weapons are easier to produce and arouse 

less suspicion than a substance like sarin.

134 The anthrax attacks in the United 

States demonstrate that biological attacks 

are a viable threat. Luckily, the attacks 

were not designed to cause mass casualties (the letter announced that it was, 

in fact, anthrax, and the use of letters 

themselves for dispensation limited the 

number of casualties). 135 Future attacks 

could be worse. 136 

The nature of international terrorism is changing and the danger that 

terrorists may use WMD is very real. 

For these reasons, terrorism is a threat 

that deserves the utmost concern. This 

concern is especially warranted for the 

United States and her allies, including 

Japan. While the cause for alarm in 

Japan is considerably less than for that of 

the United States, the threat in Asia, and 

to Japan specifically, is viable and warrants serious consideration. 

The Current Threat of Terrorism to 

Japan Specifically

 Any realist must note 

that the terrorist threat to Japan itself 

is limited. In fact, there are many significant factors that minimize the threat 
28

against Japan. The domestic threat is 

narrow. There are no known terrorist 

organizations in Japan with the capability to initiate a continuous campaign of 

terrorism. 137 In addition, according to 

Dr. Katayama, religious terrorism is not 

a danger in Japan. 138 He feels that the 

Aum Shinrikyo cult was unique, and also 

notes that they are currently under strict 

surveillance. 139 He does not predict that 

they will rise again. 140 

The threat from alien terrorists is 

also limited. Professor Miyasaka explains 

that “[he does] not see the movement of 

foreign terrorist organizations in Japan.”

141 According to Dr. Katayama, there 

are not many foreign terrorist groups 

that would want to attack Japan specifically, when compared with the United 

States. 142 There are currently no cells of 

Al Qaeda or other Islamic extremists in 

Japan. 143 Japan simply is not an environment that would be inviting for foreign 

terrorists. Japan is a very homogenous 

society. 144 The culture pervading in 

this homogenous society simply does 

not embrace foreigners. 145 This would 

make it a hard place for foreign terrorists 

to operate. 146 They would have a difficult time blending in or being conspicuous. In addition, Japanese police are 

networked very well; 147 this implies that 

any intrusions by foreign terrorist groups 

would not escape attention. In addition, 

Japan is not a cheap country to live or 

operate in. It would be an expensive 

location for a terrorist to base operations 

from. 148 

It can safely be asserted that the 

Japanese nation is not a “hot target” for 

the terrorists of the world. However, it 

is an ally of the United States, a country 

that could be considered a lightning rod 

for terrorism. As experts have noted, “ 

. . . adversaries of the U.S. will increasingly use asymmetrical threats against 

perceived weak links in the American 

armor—including U.S. allies.” 149 Japan 

and the United States currently have a 

bilateral defense agreement, and there are 

several U.S. military bases in Japan. One 

would not be out of line to beg the question “could the U.S. military bases within 

Japan draw terrorist attacks?” Thankfully, upon evaluation, it can be concluded that while a terrorist action on a 

U.S. base in Japan may happen, it is not 

likely.

 The United States is 

rarely attacked directly, on its own soil. 150

September 11th was the first occurrence 

of such an attack since Pearl Harbor, 

nearly 60 years prior. 151 U.S. installations overseas are thus possible targets 

for violent action. Fortunately, according to professor Miyasaka, U.S. bases in 

Japan are not likely targets for terrorism.

152 There are left wing terrorist organizations and extremists in Japan, for 

example the Chukakuha and the Kakumaruha. 153 These organizations hate the 

U.S. military presence in Japan. 154 However, they are not known to have the 

power to attack US bases. 155 This limits 

the indigenous threat. The international 

threat is limited as well. As explained by 

Commander Belay, the U.S.-Japan alliance is not an integral part of the war 

on terrorism. 156 An attack on the U.S.-

Japan alliance would not hit the United 

States between the eyes. 157 This decreases 

the targeting desirability of U.S. bases in 

Japan. It must be noted, however, that 

the U.S. Naval Base in Yokosuka was 

actually subjected to a biological attack 

in 1990 by the Aum cult, 158 and the possibility of a future terrorist attack cannot 

be completely ruled out.

 While the threat of terrorist 

action in Japan is limited, it is by no 

means non-existent. There are areas in 

which Japan may be at risk, and as the 

1995 sarin attacked proved, not all terrorism can be anticipated. Dangers faced 

by Japan include the threat posed by 

deranged individuals, attacks to gain ransoms, and antagonistic actions by North 

Korea. Each of these dangers is significant and should not be overlooked. 

 Dr. Katayama explains that right 

wing individuals pose a viable danger 

within Japanese society. These individuals can be seen as similar to the Unabomber. They may be unhappy with 

society or desire some sort of revenge in 

return for a perceived wrong. Such persons may be inclined to undertake terrorist action. These dangerous individuals 

can be hard to identify, and because of 

their willingness to be killed, can be even 

more dangerous than leftists. Dr. Katayama also notes that due to technological innovations, it may be possible for 

an individual to obtain or produce some 

form of chemical or biological substance 

with which a terrorist action may be performed. 159 

 Another very real threat to Japan 

and her citizens are acts of crime or terrorism designed to obtain ransom payments. 160 Many Japanese citizens are 

well paid, and ransom acts on citizens 

abroad, in areas such as central Asia or 

Columbia for example, are a danger. 161

In the past, Japanese businessmen have 

been abducted; these abductions sometimes involved terrorists. 162

 North Korea also poses a significant threat to Japanese security. North 

Korea is one of seven states known to 

sponsor terrorism. 163 North Korea itself 

has helped to organize terrorist actions. 

In the 1980’s North Korea helped organize the assassination of South Korean 

cabinet members. 164 In addition, “Some 

evidence also suggests [North Korea] in 

1999 may have sold weapons directly or 

indirectly to terrorist groups.” 165 When 

one considers the fact that North Korea 

locally manufactures various chemical 

weapons, 166 the danger posed by such 

sales is startling. 

 North Korea’s belligerence has 

not been solely directed against South 

Korea. In the past, North Korea has 

offered support to terrorists who have 

acted against Japan. The North Korean 
29

government currently provides a “safe 

haven” for four individuals who hijacked 

a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea 

in 1970. 167 Recently, North Korea has 

continued to antagonize the Japanese 

nation. In the 1990’s, North Korea 

launched ballistic missile tests over Japanese territory twice, once in August 

of 1998 and once in May of 1993. 168

Most recently, in March of 1999, North 

Korean spy boats entered Japanese territorial waters. 169

 According to Dr. Katayama, 

direct terrorist action against Japan sponsored by Korea is not very likely due 

to the threat of American retaliation. 170

However, this past Summer, Dr. Katayama mentioned that North Korea posed 

a threat to Japan as a potential kidnapper of Japanese citizens. 171 He explained 

that there was a danger that North Korea 

would abduct Japanese and use them 

as teaching aids to spies in training. 172

These suspicions were confirmed recently 

in talks between Kim Jong Il and Koizumi, the Japanese Prime Minister. Kim 

Jong Il confirmed that 10 Japanese citizens had been abducted, only four of 

which are still alive. 173 

Some feel that the North Korean leader’s 

open discussion of this issue may signal 

that the danger of North Korean antagonist action is subsiding. According to 

writers at CNN:

Japanese officials say there is an indication that Pyongyang’s usual tough stance 

was softening -- a sign the isolated 

and impoverished communist nation was 

looking to strike a deal with Tokyo. “We 

sense North Korea has changed, expressing more willingness to listen to our 

proposals and to talk, “Japanese Foreign 

Minister Kenji Hiramatsu told reporters 

on Monday. Observers say North Korea 

is also worried about its relationship with 

the United States since it was branded as 

part of an “axis of evil” along with Iran 

and Iraq by U.S. President George W. 

Bush in January. 174

Such statements seem to be cause for 

optimism. However, a few friendly statements do not eliminate North Korea’s 

belligerent track record, nor do they 

negate the security threat posed by the 

wayward nation. North Korea’s past 

actions, and the fact that North Korea 

actually kidnapped Japanese citizens, provide even more reasons for Japan to take 

terrorism and asymmetric threats very 

seriously. 

Japanese Lack of Action

 Terrorist threats to Japanese security are as real as they are dangerous. 

These threats lie in the context of a 

world environment where terrorism is 

taking on a new and more deadly color 

and the destructive tools that terrorists 

may employ are both horrific and available. In this environment, many countries have developed policies to both 

respond to and deter terrorist action. 

Unfortunately, in this arena, Japan is 

sorely behind. Japan’s failure to develop 

effective policy in this area is a direct 

result of the lack of awareness or understanding of the terrorist threat on the 

part of Japanese society as a whole. 

 The idea of actively deterring terrorism is not revolutionary. In their work 

“Catastrophic Terrorism,” as printed in 

Foreign Affairs in 1998, Ashton Carter 

and John Deutch convey the idea that 

terrorism may, in fact, be deterred. They 

wrote: 

At least three measures are needed 

to prevent and deter catastrophic 

terrorism: an international legal 

initiative outlawing the development or possession of weapons 

of mass destruction, a National 

Information Assurance Institute, 

and a stronger federal support for 

strategic risk analysis. 175 

Although some may dispute the effectiveness of its efforts, the US government 

has attempted to maintain a proactive 

policy in the prevention and deterrence 

of terrorists. In the work Terrorism: 

Prevention and Preparedness, (written 

prior to September 11th), Michael Green 

explained that the United States 

attempted to deter and pressure terrorists 

by not giving in to terrorist demands, singling them out, punishing state sponsors, 

bringing terrorists to justice, aiding other 

countries in anti-terrorism, and preparing for worst case scenarios. 176 Efforts 

made by both the United States and 

other countries have been increased since 

the attack on the World Trade Center. 

US efforts at deterrence have been translated into the new “war on terrorism.” 

The prevention and elimination of terrorism is something that the American 

government has made plain that it feels is 

both possible and of the highest priority.

 The action taken by the United 

States contrasts greatly with the lack of 

action undertaken by Japan. It seems 

that Japan does not even consider the 

deterrence of terrorists. Their intelligence capabilities are dwarfed by the 

United States, 177 and their military security emphasis is still on defending from 

Cold War style invasions. 178 Their internal security is also inadequate. While 

their police force performs actions to 

counteract dangerous groups or individuals, these actions are not designed for, 

nor suitable for the deterrence of terrorists. Japanese police like to maintain 

trust and support in their local areas. 179

Consequently, they do not like to cause 

disturbances. Rather than confronting 

antisocial groups, Japanese police forces 

prefer to contain them. 180 This containment policy is analogous to the international communist policy outlined by 

Kennan for the United States in the 

1950s. 181 “ . . . Japan does not eliminate 

antisocial organizations outright. It takes 

time to weaken the groups. For example, 

to counter the Kyokusa that flourished 

in the late 1960s, Japanese police have 
30

been waiting for the movement’s members to age.” 182 Unfortunately, this type 

of approach will do nothing to deter 

possible terrorists. Professor Miyasaka 

explains that “The containment is . . . 

not based upon threat assessments but 

on Japan’s strategic culture. The problem 

is that it is not enough to prevent and 

combat future terrorism; some will act 

beyond borders, ally with foreign groups, 

become interested in WMD, and misuse 

computers.” 183 The Japanese did establish local anti-terrorism squads (or SATs) 

in 1977, however, they hesitate to use 

them to the point that “ . . . the Japanese 

government has continued to avoid drastic measures as long as possible, even if 

hostages and/or policemen were killed.”

184 Due to Japan’s lack of willingness to 

employ them, such squads do not add 

much to Japan’s internal security, nor are 

they an effective deterrent.

A Problem that Needs to be Solved

 Japan does not effectively deter 

or defend against terrorist action. As 

explained by Professor Miyasaka, Japanese failure to develop effective policy is 

a direct result of the society’s general lack 

of understanding, definition, or threat 

perception in regards to terrorism. 185

Due to the lack of awareness or understanding within Japanese society, the Japanese government feels very little pressure 

to deal with the issue. This problem 

needs to be solved. The threat to the 

Japanese nation as a whole, and her individual citizens requires that action be 

taken. In a country where the government requires either crisis or overwhelming consensus to act decisively, 186

one would desperately hope that both 

the Japanese citizens and the Japanese 

government can open their eyes before 

another mass casualty attack forces the 

issue upon them. 

Bibliography

Interviews:

Interview. Commander John Belay. 

Bilateral Plans Action Officer 

for US Forces Japan. USAFA 

Cadets Kaly McKenna, Ryan 

Jodoi, and Jason Kramer. 3 July 

2002.

Interview. Dr. Katayama, Senior Research 

Fellow, National Institute for 

Defense Studies, Japan Defense 

Agency. USAFA Cadets Kaly 

McKenna and Jason Kramer. 5 

July 2002. 

Interview. Lt. Colonel Hiroshi 

Murakami, Japan Air Self 

Defense Force. USAFA Cadets 

Kaly McKenna and Jason 

Kramer. 26 June 2002.

Interview. Mr. Dennis R. Pitts. Chief, 

History Office, Fifth Air Force 

and 374th Air Lift Wing. USAFA 

Cadets Kaly McKenna, Ryan 

Jodoi and Jason Kramer. 25 

June 2002.

Interview. Mr. Nakai. USFJ J-5 Office. 

USAFA Cadets Kaly McKenna, 

Ryan Jodoi, and Jason Kramer. 

27 June 2002.

Interview. Senator Yoshimasa Hayashi, 

Member of Japan’s House of 

Councilors. Lt Col Cunico, 

USAF and USAFA Cadets Kaly 

McKenna, Ryan Jodoi and Jason 

Kramer. 8 July 2002.

Interview. Via Email. Steve McCarty. 

Japan President, World Association for Online Education. Professor Kagawa Junior College. 

USAFA Cadets Kaly McKenna 

and Jason Kramer. 28 June 

2002.

Interview. Professor Naofumi Miyasaka, 

Associate Professor of the Graduate School of Security Studies at 

Japan’s National Defense Academy. USAFA Cadets Kaly McKenna and Jason Kramer. 30 May 

2002. 

Interview. Via Email. Professor Naofumi 

Miyasaka, Associate Professor 

of the Graduate School of Security Studies at Japan’s National 

Defense Academy. USAFA 

Cadets Kaly McKenna and Jason 

Kramer. 1 July 2002. 

Other Sources:

Bellamny, Christopher. “The Rise of the 

DIY Terrorist.” The Independent (London). 31 July 1996. 

Accessed 9 May 2002. Lexis 

Nexis. 

Carter, Ashton, John Deutch and Philip 

Zelikow. “Catastrophic Terrorism: Talking the New 

Danger.” Foreign Affairs. Nov/

Dec 1998. Vol. 77. Issue 6, Page 

80. Accessed 1 October 2002. 

<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/

1 9 9 8 1 1 0 1 f a e s s a y 1 4 3 4 /

ashton-carter-john-deutchphilip-zelikow/

catastrophic-terrorism-tackling-thenew-danger.html>. Article page 

1. 

“Central Intelligence Agency- Public 

Statements of Potential terrorist 

use of Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear 

(CBRN) Agents Since July 

1997.” Accessed 1 August 

2002. 

“Chemical Terrorism in Japan: The Matsumoto and Tokyo Incidents.” 

Part of a working draft of 

the WHO publication “Health 

Aspects of Biological and Chemical Weapons,” 2nd. Ed. Accessed 

9 May 2002. <http://www.opcw.org/
31

resp/html/japan.html>.

“Combating Proliferation of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction.” Report 

of the commission to Assess 

the Organization of the Federal 

Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. 14 July 1999. 

Accessed 1 October 2002

. <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/

program/deutch/11910book.pdf>. 

Cordesman, Anthony H. and Arleigh A. 

Burke. Defending America: Terrorist Organizations and States 

and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Center for Strategic and 

International Studies. 24 September 2001. Accessed 3 July 2002. 

<http://www.csis.org/burke/hd/

reports/TerrOrgs%20010924ud.pdf>. 

“Dirty Bombs.” Terrorism- Questions 

+ Answers, by the Council on 

Foreign Relations. Publishers 

of Foreign Affairs. Accessed 19 

September 2002

. <http://www.terrorismanswers.com/

weapons/dirtybomb.html>.

Dr. Karman, Eli. “Intelligence and the 

Challenge of Terrorism in the 

21st Century.” 5 November 

1998. A paper presented at the 

conference “A Counter-Terrorism Strategy for the 21st Century: The Role of Intelligence” 

At the Morris E. Curiel Center 

for International Studies of the 

Tel Aviv University on Nov 1-2 

1998.

Falkenrah, Richard A. and Robyn Pangi. 

John F. Kennedy School of 

Government at Harvard University. “Preparing For the Worst: 

Mitigating the consequences of 

Chemical and Biological Terrorism.” A Paper prepared for 

the round table symposium on 

“Terrorism: Prevention and 

Preparedness” October 30-31, 

2000. Tokyo, Japan. Published 

in Terrorism: Prevention & 

Preparedness, New Approaches 

to U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation. Japan Society Inc. 2001. 

Green, Michael. Terrorism: Prevention 

& Preparedness, New 

Approaches to U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation. Japan Society 

Inc. 2001. 

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. “The Rise of Complex Terrorism.” Foreign Policy 

Magazine. Accessed 2 July 2002. 

<http://www.foregnPolicy.com/

issue_janfeb_2002/homer-dixon.

html>. 

“Is the West Doing Enough to Keep 

Former Soviet Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Out of Terrorists’ 

Hands?” Terrorism- Questions 

and Answers by the Council on 

Foreign Relations, publishers of 

Foreign Affairs. Accessed 1 July 

2002. 

<http://www.terrorismanswers.

com/home>. 

Kaplan, David E and Andrew Marshall. 

The Cult at the End of the 

World: The Terrifying Story of 

the Aum Doomsday cult, from 

the Subways of Tokyo to the 

Nuclear Arsenals of Russia. New 

York: Crown Publishers, 1996. 

“Loose Nukes.” Terrorism- Questions 

and Answers by the Council on 

Foreign Relations, publishers of 

Foreign Affairs. Accessed 1 July 

2002. <

http://www.terrorismanswers.com/

weapons/loosenukes.html>. 

“Loose Nukes.” Terrorism- Questions 

+ Answers, by the Council on 

Foreign Relations. Publishers of 

Foreign Affairs. Accessed 1 July 

2002

. <http://www.terrorismanswers.com/

weapons/loosenukes2.html>. 

 

McCarty, Steve. “Another Against the 

Other: Terrorism Through Japanese Lenses.” Accessed 28 June 

2002. <http://www.nyu.edu/classes/

keefer/joe/mccarthy1.html>.

Miyasaka, Naofumi. “Terrorism and 

Antiterrorism in Japan: aum 

shinrikyo and after.” A Paper 

Prepared for Roundtable Symposium on Terrorism: Prevention and Preparedness. October 

30-31, 2000. Tokyo Japan. 

Printed in Terrorism: Prevention & Preparedness, New 

Approaches to U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation. Japan Society 

Inc. 2001. 

“North Korea Admits Japanese Kidnappings.” CNN.COM. Posted 

17 September 2002. Accessed 

20 September 2002. <http://

www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/

0 9 / 1 7 / n k o r e a . j a p a n /

index.html>.

Pate, Jason. Senior Research Associate 

and Manager Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Terrorism Project Monterey Institute of International Studies. “Anthrax and Mass-Casualty 

Terrorism: What is the Bioterrorist Threat After September 11?” Accessed 2 July 2002. 

<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1101/

ijpe/pj63pate-2.hm>.

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001. 

“Africa, South Asia, and East Asia 
32

Overviews.” US Department of 

State. Accessed 25 June 2002. 

<http://www.state.gov/documents/

organization/10290.pdf>. 

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001. 

“Appendix B: background 

Information on Designated 

Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” US Department of 

State. Accessed 25 June 2002. 

<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/

pg+rpt/2001/pdf1>.

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001. 

“Appendix I: Statistical Review.” 

Published by US Department of 

State. Located at FindLaw.com. 

Accessed 29 October 2002. 

<http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/

d o s / t r r p t 2 0 0 1 /

dostrrpt2001p17.pdf >. 

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001. 

“Overview of State-Sponsored 

Terrorism.” US Department of 

State. Accessed 25 June 2002. 

<http://www.state.gov/documents/

organization/10296.pdf>. 

Speech by Deputy Chief, DCI Counter 

Terrorist Center. Central Intelligence Agency. 11 November 

1998. World Affairs Council, 

Naples, Fl. Accessed 9 May 

2002. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/

speeches/int/terr.html>. 

Struck, Doug. “At World Cup, Terrorism is Biggest Foe: Security 

Extraordinary for Month-Long 

T o u r n a m e n t . ” 

WashingtonPost.com. 31 May 

2002. Accessed 1 July 2002. 

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=a36525>. 

Struck, Doug. “At World Cup, Terrorism 

is Biggest Foe: Security Extraordinary for Month-Long Tournament.” WashingtonPost.com. 

31 May 2002. Accessed 1 July 

2002. 

<http://www.washingtonpost.com

/ w p - d y n / a r t i c l e s / A 3 6 5 2 5 -

2002May30.html >. 

“The Anthrax Letters.” Accessed 1 July 

2002. <http://www.terrorismissues.com/

weaons/anthraxletters.html>.

“Tighten Security, Say Japan 

officials.” United Press International. 27 June 1995. LexisNexis. 

Accessed 9 May 2002.

“US Congressional Testimony. Disarmament Diplomacy—Issue 

Number 34. Statement by 

George J Tennant, Director of 

the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA), to a senate Armed Services Committee hearing on 

Projected National Security 

Threats.” 2 February 1999. 

Accessed 26 June 2002. <http://

www.acronym.org.uk/34doc4.htm>. 

Zandars, Jean Pascal. “Assessing the Risk 

of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists.” 

The Non Proliferation Review. 

Fall 1999. Peace Research Institute. Accessed 1 October 2002. 

<.http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/

vol06/64/zander64.pdf>. 

Acknowledgements

USAFA Cadets Kaly McKenna and Ryan 

Jodoi researched along side of 

me. Without their assistance, 

my sources would have been 

much more limited.

Major Carson Tavenner, Department of 

History, USAF Academy and 

Mrs. Yumiko Guajardo, Department of Foreign Languages, 

USAF Academy, each edited and 

revised my paper, helping me to 

create a better final product. 

I would like to thank Lt Col Steve Cunico 

who mentored me during my 

research, provided the other 

cadets and I with workspace, 

and helped to connect us with 

excellent sources. His help was 

invaluable.

I would also like to thank all those who 

were willing to be interviewed as part of 

our research. 

Their expertise provided the 

bulk of the information applied in this 

paper. 

(Endnotes)

1

 Carter, Ashton, John Deutch and Philip 

Zelikow. “Catastrophic Terrorism: Talking the New Danger.” Foreign Affairs. 

Nov/Dec 1998. Vol. 77. Issue 6, Page 

80. Accessed 1 October 2002. <>. Article page 1. 

2

 Red Army information in this paragraph was found in the following source: 

Cordesman, Anthony H. and Arleigh 

A. Burke. “Defending America: Terrorist Organizations and States and Weapons of Mass Destruction”. 24 September 2001. Center for Strategic 

and International Studies. Accessed 3 

July 2002. <http://www.csis.org/burke/

hd/reports/TerrOrgs%20010924ud.pdf>

3

Kaplan, David E and Andrew Marshall. 

The Cult at the End of the World: The Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday cult, 

from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear 

Arsenals of Russia. New York: Crown 

Publishers, 1996. Page 58.

4

 Kaplan. Pages 93-94.

5

’s National Defense Academy. USAFA 

Cadets Kaly McKenna and Jason Kramer. 

30 May 2002. 

6

 Kaplan. Pages 140-144.
33

7

 Kaplan. Page 1.

8

 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001. “Appendix B: background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” 

US Department of State. Accessed 25 

June 2002. <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/

pg+rpt/2001/pdf1>.

9

 “Tighten Security, Say Japan officials.” 

United Press International. 27 June 

1995. Lexis-Nexis. Accessed 9 May 

2002. 

10 Green, Michael. Terrorism: Prevention 

& Preparedness, New Approaches to U.S.-

Japan Security Cooperation. Japan Society Inc. 2001. Page 18.

11 Miyasaka, Naofumi. “Terrorism and 

Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo 

and after.” A Paper Prepared for Roundtable Symposium on Terrorism: Prevention and Preparedness. October 30-31, 

2000. Tokyo Japan. Printed in Terrorism: Prevention & Preparedness, New 

Approaches to U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation. Japan Society Inc. 2001. Page 

74.

12 McCarty, Steve. “Another Against 

the Other: Terrorism Through Japanese 

Lenses.” Accessed 28 June 2002. 

<http://www.nyu.edu/classes/keefer/joe/

mccarthy1.html>. Page 1.

13 Information up to this point in this 

paragraph is from Interview. Professor 

Miyasaka. 30 May 2001.

14 Interview. Dr. Katayama, Senior 

Research Fellow, National Institute for 

Defense Studies, Japan Defense Agency. 

USAFA Cadets Kaly McKenna and Jason 

Kramer. 5 July 2002. 

15’s House of Councilors. Lt Col Cunico, 

USAF and USAFA Cadets Kaly McKenna, Ryan Jodoi and Jason Kramer. 8 

July 2002.

16 Interview. Miyasaka. 30 May 2002.

17 Interview. Dr. Katayama. 

18 Miyasaka. “Terrorism and Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo and after.” 

Page 69.

19 Interview. Miyasaka. 30 May 2002.

20 Interview. Dr. Katayama. 

21 Interview. Dr. Katayama. 

22 Interview. Dr. Katayama. 

23 Information up to this point in paragraph from Interview. Miyasaka. 30 

May 2002.

24 Green. Page 39.

25 Miyasaka. “Terrorism and Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo and after.” 

Page 76.

26 Interview. Via Email. Steve McCarty. 

Japan President, World Association for 

Online Education. Professor Kagawa 

Junior College. USAFA Cadets Kaly 

McKenna and Jason Kramer. 28 June 

2002.

27 Interview. McCarty. 

28 Interview. Miyasaka. 30 May 2002.

29 Green. Page 21.

30 Miyasaka. “Terrorism and Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo and after.” 

Page 76.

31 Miyasaka. “Terrorism and Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo and after.” 

Page 76. 

32’s National Defense Academy. USAFA 

Cadets Kaly McKenna and Jason Kramer. 

1 July 2002. 

33 Interview. Lt. Colonel Hiroshi 

Murakami, Japan Air Self Defense Force. 

USAFA Cadets Kaly McKenna and Jason 

Kramer. 26 June 2002.

34 Interview. Lt. Col Murakami. 

35 Interview. Lt. Col Murakami. 

36 Green, page 20.

37 Green, page 20.

38 Miyasaka. “Terrorism and Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo and after.” 

Pages 73-74.

39 Interview. Mr. Nakai. USFJ J-5 

Office. USAFA Cadets Kaly McKenna, 

Ryan Jodoi, and Jason Kramer. 27 June 

2002.

40 Interview. Nakai.

41 Interview. Nakai.

42 Interview. Nakai. 

43 Struck, Doug. “At World Cup, Terrorism is Biggest Foe: Security Extraordinary for Month-Long Tournament.” 

WashingtonPost.com. 31 May 2002. 

Accessed 1 July 2002. 

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/

ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node

=&contentId=a36525>. 

44 Interview. Nakai. 

45 Interview. Nakai. 

46 Miyasaka. “Terrorism and Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo and after.” 

Page 72.

47 Interview. Nakai.

48 Interview. Mr. Dennis R. Pitts. Chief, 

History Office, Fifth Air Force and 374th

Air Lift Wing. USAFA Cadets Kaly 

McKenna, Ryan Jodoi and Jason Kramer. 

25 June 2002.

49 Interview. Pitts.

50 Interview. Pitts.

51 Interview. McCarty.

52 Interview. McCarty.

53 McCarty. “Another Against the Other: 

Terrorism Through Japanese Lenses.” 

Page 1.

54 McCarty. “Another Against the Other: 

Terrorism Through Japanese Lenses.” 

Page 1.

55 Interview. Commander John Belay. 

Bilateral Plans Action Officer for US 

Forces Japan. USAFA Cadets Kaly McKenna, Ryan Jodoi, and Jason Kramer. 3 

July 2002.

56 Interview. Commander Belay.

57 Interview. Pitts.

58 Interview. Pitts.

59 Interview. Nakai.

60 Interview. Lt. Col. Murakami.

61 Interview. Dr. Katayama.

62 Interview. Dr. Katayama.

63 Interview. Senator Hayashi.

64 Interview. Dr. Katayama.

65 Interview. Lt. Col. Murakami.

66 Interview. Lt. Col. Murakami.

67 Interview. Lt. Col. Murakami.

68 All information in this paragraph 

is from Interview. Commander John 

Belay.

69 Interview. Commander Belay.

70 Interview. Commander Belay.

71 Kaplan. Page 27.

72 Kaplan. Page 27.
34

73 Interview. McCarty. 

74 Interview. Miyasaka. 30 May 2001. 

75 Interview. Miyasaka. 30 May 2001.

76 Interview. McCarty.

77 Interview. Senator Hayashi.

78 Interview. Senator Hayashi.

79 Interview. Senator Hayashi.

80 Interview. Senator Hayashi.

81 Interview. Lt. Col. Murakami.

82 Interview. Senator Hayashi.

83 Interview. Miyasaka. 30 May 2002.

84 Last three sentences from Interview. 

Dr. Katayama. 

85 Data is this paragraph is from Patterns 

of Global Terrorism 2001. “Appendix 

I: Statistical Review.” Published by 

US Department of State. Located at 

FindLaw.com. Accessed 29 October 

2002. 

<http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/

dos/trrpt2001/dostrrpt2001p17.pdf >. 

86 Information on terrorist attacks from 

Falkenrah, Richard A. and Robyn Pangi. 

John F. Kennedy School of Government 

at Harvard University. “Preparing For 

the Worst: Mitigating the consequences 

of Chemical and Biological Terrorism.” 

A Paper prepared for the round table 

symposium on “Terrorism: Prevention 

and Preparedness” October 30-31, 

2000. Tokyo, Japan. Published in Terrorism: Prevention & Preparedness, New 

Approaches to U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation. Japan Society Inc. 2001. Pages 

47-48.

87 “The Anthrax Letters.” Accessed 1 July 

2002. <http://www.terrorismissues.com/

weaons/anthraxletters.html>.

88 Cordesman, Anthony H. and Arleigh 

A. Burke. Defending America: Terrorist 

Organizations and States and Weapons of 

Mass Destruction. Center for Strategic 

and International Studies. 24 September 2001. Accessed 3 July 2002. <http:/

/www.csis.org/burke/hd/reports/

TerrOrgs%20010924ud.pdf>. Page 5.

89 Speech by Deputy Chief, DCI Counter Terrorist Center. Central Intelligence 

Agency. 11 November 1998. World 

Affairs Council, Naples, Fl. Accessed 9 

May 2002. <>. Page 2.

90 Speech by Deputy Chief, Page 3. 

91 Bellamny, Christopher. “The Rise 

of the DIY Terrorist.” The Independent 

(London). 31 July 1996. Accessed 9 

May 2002. Lexis Nexis. Page 1 

92 Last two sentences paraphrased from 

Falkanrah. Page 47.

93 Zandars, Jean Pascal. “Assessing the 

Risk of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists.” The Non 

Proliferation Review. Fall 1999. Peace 

Research Institute. Accessed 1 October 

2002. <.http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/

vol06/64/zander64.pdf>. Page 23.

94 Dr. Karman, Eli. “Intelligence and 

the Challenge of Terrorism in the 21st

Century.” 5 November 1998. A paper 

presented at the conference “A CounterTerrorism Strategy for the 21st Century: 

The Role of Intelligence” At the Morris 

E. Curiel Center for International Studies of the Tel Aviv University on Nov 1-2 

1998.

95 Speech by Deputy Chief, Page 3.

96 “Religion and Terrorism.” Interview 

with Dr. Bruce Hoffman. Religioscope. 

22 February 2002. Accessed 2 July 2002. 

<http://www.religioscope.com/info/

articles/003_Hoffman_terrorism.htm>.

97 Interview. Miyasaka. 1 July 2002. 

98 “Religion and Terrorism.” Page 3.

99 “Religion and Terrorism.” Page 3.

100 “Religion and Terrorism.” Page 2.

101 Zandars. Page 23.

102 “Religion and Terrorism.” Pages 4-7.

103 “Religion and Terrorism.” Page 4.

104 Speech by Deputy Chief. Pages 4-6.

105 Pate, Jason. Senior Research Associate 

and Manager Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Project Monterey Institute of International Studies. “Anthrax 

and Mass-Casualty Terrorism: What 

is the Bioterrorist Threat After September 11?” Accessed 2 July 2002. 

<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1101/

ijpe/pj63pate-2.hm>.

106 Homer-Dixon, Thomas. “The Rise 

of Complex Terrorism.” Foreign Policy 

Magazine. Accessed 2 July 2002. 

<http://www.foregnPolicy.com/

issue_janfeb_2002/homer-dixon.html>. 

Page 2.

107 Dr. Karman. Page 1.

108 “Central Intelligence Agency- Public 

Statements of Potential terrorist use 

of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear (CBRN) Agents Since 

July 1997.” Accessed 1 August 2002. 

<http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/

pub_statements_cbrn.html>.

109 Dr. Karmon. Page 1.

110 Carter. Article Page2.

111 Interview. Via Email. Jason Pate and 

Adam Dolnik. 3 July 2002. USAFA 

Cadets Jason Kramer and Kaly McKenna. 

112 Interview. Jason Pate and Adam 

Dolnik. 

113 Interview. Jason Pate and Adam 

Dolnik. 

114 Kaplan. Page 191.

115 Interview. Jason Pate and Adam 

Dolnik.

116 Interview. Jason Pate and Adam 

Dolnik.

117 “Loose Nukes.” Terrorism-Questions 

and Answers by the Council on Foreign 

Relations, publishers of Foreign Affairs. 

Accessed 1 July 2002. Page 1.

118 “Loose Nukes.” Page 1.

119 “Loose Nukes.” Page 1. 

120”US Congressional Testimony. Disarmament Diplomacy—Issue Number 34. 

Statement by George J Tennant, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA), to a senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Projected National 

Security Threats.” 2 February 1999. 

Accessed 26 June 2002. <http://

www.acronym.org.uk/34doc4.htm>. 

121’ Hands?” Terrorism- Questions and 

Answers by the Council on Foreign 

Relations, publishers of Foreign Affairs. 

Accessed 1 July 2002. <http://

www.terrorismanswers.com/home>. 

Page 1.
35

122 “Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Report of the 

commission to Assess the Organization 

of the Federal Government to Combat 

the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. 14 July 1999. Accessed 1 

October 2002. Page 2.

123 “Combating Proliferation of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction.” Page 2.

124 Information from the last four sentences from “Loose Nukes.” TerrorismQuestions + Answers, by the Council on 

Foreign Relations. Publishers of Foreign 

Affairs. Accessed 1 July 2002. Page 2.

125 “Dirty Bombs.” Terrorism- Questions 

+ Answers, by the Council on Foreign 

Relations. Publishers of Foreign Affairs. 

Accessed 19 September 2002. <http://

www.terrorismanswers.com/weapons/

dirtybomb.html>. Page 1.

126 “Dirty Bombs.” Page 1.

127 “Dirty Bombs.” Page 1.

128 “Dirty Bombs.” Page 1.

129 Zandars. Page 31.

130 Kaplan. Page 52.

131 Kaplan. Page 53.

132 “Chemical Terrorism in Japan: The 

Matsumoto and Tokyo Incidents.” Part 

of a working draft of the WHO publication “Health Aspects of Biological and 

Chemical Weapons,” 2nd. Ed. Accessed 9 

May 2002. <http://www.opcw.org/resp/

html/japan.html>.

133 Zandars. Page 32.

134 Zandars. Page 32.

135 Pate, Jason. “Anthrax and MassCasualty terrorism: what is the Bioterrorist threat After September 11?” Page 

2.

136 Pate, Jason. “Anthrax and MassCasualty terrorism: what is the Bioterrorist threat After September 11?” Page 

2.

137 Interview. Dr. Katayama. 

138 Interview. Dr. Katayama.

139 Interview. Dr. Katayama.

140 Interview. Dr. Katayama.

141 Interview. Via Email. Professor 

Miyasaka. 1 July 2002. 

142 Interview. Dr. Katayama.

143 Interview. Miyasaka. 1 July 2002. 

144 Struck, Doug. “At World Cup, 

Terrorism is Biggest Foe: Security 

Extraordinary for Month-Long Tournament.” WashingtonPost.com. 31 

May 2002. Accessed 1 July 2002. 

< http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A36525-2002May30.html >. 

Page 5.

145 Interview. Commander Belay.

146 Struck. Page 5.

147 Interview. Commander Belay.

148 Interview. Commander Belay.

149 Green. Page 15.

150 Interview. Nakai. 

151 Interview. Nakai.

152 Interview. Miyasaka. 1 July 2002. 

153 Interview. Miyasaka. 1 July 2002. 

154 Interview. Miyasaka. 1 July 2002. 

155 Interview. Miyasaka. 1 July 2002. 

156 Interview. Commander Belay.

157 Interview. Commander Belay.

158 Interview. Miyasaka. 1 July 2002. 

159 All information in this paragraph up 

to this point was from Interview. Dr. 

Katayama.

160 Interview. Miyasaka. 1 July 2002. 

161 Interview. Miyasaka. 1 July 2002. 

162 Interview. Dr. Katayama.

163 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001.

“Africa, South Asia, and East Asia 

Overviews.” US Department of State. 

Accessed 25 June 2002. 

<http://www.state.gov/documents/

organization/10290.pdf>. Page 15.

164 Interview. Dr. Katayama.

165 Cordesman. Page 18.

166 Cordesman. Page 22.

167Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001.

“Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism.” US Department of State. Accessed 

25 June 2002. <http://www.state.gov/

documents/organization/10296.pdf>. 

Page 68.

168 “Combating Proliferation of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction.” Page 2.

169 “Defense Agency Seeks Funds for 

SDF to Fight Terrorism.” Mainichi Daily 

News. 4 August 1999. Accessed 9 May 

2002. Lexis-Nexis. 

170 Interview. Dr. Katayama.

171 Interview. Dr. Katayama.

172 Interview. Dr. Katayama.

173 “North Korea Admits Japanese Kidnappings.” CNN.COM. Posted 17 

September 2002. Accessed 20 September 2002. <http://www.cnn.com/

2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/09/17/

nkorea.japan/index.html>.

174 “North Korea Admits Japanese Kidnappings.” 

175 Carter. Article Page5.

176 Green. Pages 18-19.

177 Interview. Nakai.

178 Interview. Miyasaka. 30 May 2002.

179 Miyasaka, Naofumi. “Terrorism and 

Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo 

and after.” Page 77.

180 Miyasaka, Naofumi. “Terrorism and 

Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo 

and after.” Page 77.

181 Miyasaka, Naofumi. “Terrorism and 

Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo 

and after.” Page 77.

182 Miyasaka, Naofumi. “Terrorism and 

Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo 

and after.” Page 77.

183 Miyasaka, Naofumi. “Terrorism and 

Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo 

and after.” Pages 77-78.

184 Miyasaka, Naofumi. “Terrorism and 

Antiterrorism in Japan: aum shinrikyo 

and after.” Page 74.

185 Interview. Miyasaka. 30 May 2002.

186 Interview Commander Belay.

“You shall judge a man by 

his foes as well as by his 

friends.” 

Joseph Conrad
36

The Intelligence World and 

the Prometheus Process

by C2C P.J. Davis

Since September 11th the American intelligence community has come 

under attack from many different quarters in light of a perceived failure to detect 

and interdict the terrorist organization, 

Al Queda. Though much of the criticism is arguably unwarranted and unfair, 

any major intelligence failure should provide cause for reflection on the current 

system and investigation into potential 

areas for improvement. In contrast to the 

failures of Sept. 11th, the Desert Storm air 

campaign is one of history’s most successful operations. Creator of the campaign, 

retired Col. John Warden, took the lessons of his Air Force career and applies 

them to the business world through the 

Prometheus Process. Col. Warden’s Prometheus Process possesses elements of 

strategy and thought that offer potential 

keys to fixing the shortcomings of American’s intelligence community. 

Fig 1. Factbook on Intelligence: 

The Intelligence Community

Problems with Intelligence

One particular problem with the 

current intelligence community is the 

very nature of the modern world. Until 

1991 and the fall of the Soviet Union, 

the intelligence community was postured 

to meet one threat, that of communism. 

The majority of America’s foreign efforts 

were directly or indirectly targeted to 

counter Soviet influence. The Soviet 

threat was relatively well known and 

based on the existence of Russia as a rational state actor, primarily Westphalian in 

nature. Yet, 1991 changed the world at a 

significantly fundamental level, ushering 

in a new age of non-state actors, rogue 

states, and irrational fundamentalism. 

Despite a new world order, the intelligence community continues to operate 

largely under the direction of President 

Reagan’s 1981 Executive Order 12333 

(Shulsky, Schmitt 202). Russ Travers 

states in “The Coming Intelligence Failure,” “Now, no agency has either the 

critical mass of analysts or, in most 

cases, the charter to look in depth at 

the political, military, 

social, economic, and 

cultural aspects of a 

problem. In the end, 

the lack of fusion and 

integration capability 

means that the IC 

[Intelligence Community] 1 “whole” is substantially less than the 

sum of its parts” (Travers). As a relic of 

the Cold War, E.O. 

12333 defines an 

intelligence community inadequately 

structured to cope 

with the rapidly 

changing post Cold 

War world and the 

new threats that face 

the United States.

Significant to the intelligence 

community’s inability to cope with a rapidly changing world is the large number 

of agencies involved in either intelligence 

collection or analysis. Fig. 1 illustrates 

the basic structure of the intelligence 

community.

In theory, the Director 

of Central Intelligence is “the primary 

adviser to the President and the National 

Security Council on national foreign 

intelligence matters” (DCI and his Principal Deputies). The CIA website says 

of the director, “Executive Order 12333, 

issued by President Reagan on 4 December 1981, gives the DCI authority to 

develop and implement the National Foreign Intelligence Program and to coordinate the tasking of all Intelligence Community collection elements” (DCI and 

his Principal Deputies). Yet, despite the 

important role of the DCI, Fig. 1 illustrates the extreme decentralization of the 

intelligence community to such a point 

that the DCI does not directly control all 

the assets necessary to provide the President with an overall intelligence perspective on the world. This shortcoming can 

result in missed opportunities for sharing 

information and the lack of a complete 

intelligence picture, evidenced by Sept. 

11th.

One specific current problem in 

the IC community is a distinct lack of 

human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. A July 2002 report created by the 

Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence states:

CIA did not sufficiently penetrate 

the al-Qa’ida organization before 

September 11th. Because of the 

perceived reduction in the threat 

environment in the early to mid 

1990’s, and the concomitant reduction in resources for basic human 

intelligence collection there were 

fewer operations officers, fewer stations, fewer agents, and fewer intelligence reports produced” (After-
37

good). 

The Committee’s criticism echoes widely 

held sentiment in the post Sept. 11th

world. The solution, according to Committee members is that, “CIA leadership 

must ensure that HUMINT collection 

remains a central core competency of the 

agency...More core collectors need to 

be put on the streets” (Aftergood). The 

lack of effective HUMINT demands an 

institutional change within CIA and the 

intelligence community as a whole.

A second issue related to the 

intelligence community is the poor performance of the FBI prior to Sept. 11th 

in regards to information sharing. The 

Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security says of the FBI, “FBI’s 

main problem going forward is to 

overcome its information sharing failures” (Aftergood). In order to fix this 

shortcoming, the report goes on to suggest that, “‘Ensuring adequate information sharing’ should be communicated 

throughout the Bureau as the Director’s 

top priority...” (Aftergood). Inability 

to share information, while a shortcoming of the FBI specifically, is also an 

entrenched aspect of the intelligence 

community as a whole. Compartmentalization and “need to know” requirements prevent the kind of information 

overlap that would aid in a comprehensive intelligence picture across agency 

boundaries.

The Prometheus Process

In 2002, Col. John Warden, 

principal architect of the 1991 Gulf War 

air campaign co-authored a book titled 

Winning in Fast Time. Col. Warden’s 

work details a technique targeted at the 

business world called the Prometheus 

Process. Winning in Fast Time describes 

the Prometheus Process as a “systematic 

and proven process for designing winning strategies,” making the claim that, 

“You won’t win in the twenty-first century by merely reacting to change...To 

win, you must decide what you want 

your tomorrow to be, and then make it 

happen faster than the rate of change in 

your competitive environment” (Warden, 

Russell 5). The Prometheus process is 

generally organized under the four broad 

labels of Design the Future, Target for 

Success, Campaign to Win, and Finish 

with Finesse (Warden, Russell xi). The 

four disciplines are defined as follows:

Design the Future – 

Winning in Fast Time describes 

Design the Future as, “about painting 

a clear and compelling picture of your 

destination, measuring strategic success, 

and defining the rules of conduct for the 

organization” (Warden, Russell 47). 

Target For Success – 

Target For Success is,” about 

selecting the right targets for action 

using a powerful system model–what we 

will call, in Chapter 9, the “Five Rings”–

and then defining the Desired Effects” 

(Warden, Russell 48).

Campaign to Win – 

Campaign to Win is, “about 

aggressively executing your system strategy. This is the phase of Prometheus 

in which you commission parallel campaigns and organize for success” (Warden, 

Russell 48).

Finish with Finesse – 

Finish with Finesse is, “about 

an often overlooked aspect of strategy–

preparing for the inevitable ending of 

products, processes, and businesses. To 

remain a perennial winner, you must 

plan the endgame in advance” (Warden, 

Russell 48).

The Prometheus Process, though 

specifically designed for the business 

world, carries potential application to 

the intelligence community and suggests 

possible solutions to the current woes 

plaguing America’s intelligence agencies.

Prometheus Process Related to the 

Intelligence Community

As a systematic method of how 

to think, the Prometheus Process helps 

organizations determine a desired future 

and how to accomplish that future 

(Warden, Russell 6). Applying these 

principles to the intelligence community offers potential solutions to the 

shortcomings of the various agencies. 

Though an exhaustive relating of the 

Prometheus Process and the intelligence 

community is far beyond the scope of 

this paper, a few select instances validate the assumption that Col. Warden’s 

brainchild is applicable. 

Design the Future

 One of the elements 

discussed by Col. Warden under Design 

the Future is the “tool” of Open Planning (Warden, Russell 71). Describing 

the weakness of a system that does not 

employ the Open Planning principle, 

Winning in Fast Time says, “Most of us 

have grown up in organizational environments where only certain selected people 

take part in important discussions. The 

results of these meetings rarely get translated in enough detail and with enough 

nuance to allow those who didn’t participate to understand the thinking well 

enough” (Warden, Russell 72). The 

result is uninformed individuals unable 

to make “smart decisions on their own” 

(Warden, Russell 72). The principle of 

Open Planning involves meetings with 

more than just senior management discussing issues on the “strategic level” and 

not the “tactical” (Warden, Russell 72, 

73). 

 Related to the 

intelligence community, Open Planning 

at first glance seems impossible because 

of the high security associated with intelligence operations and information disseminated on a “need to know” basis. 

Yet, specifically in relation to potential 

reorganization or suggestions to improve 

interaction on a day-to-day basis between 

various elements of the intelligence 

community, Open Planning provides a 

medium for brainstorming that gives a 
38

voice to junior members whose opinions 

may not always reach to the top. As the 

foot soldiers of any organization, junior 

level workers understand the intricacies 

of day-to-day operations in the context 

of modern reality at a level senior management may not interact with. While 

including the average case officer, special 

agent, or office analyst in the process 

to fix the organizational shortcomings of 

the intelligence community, senior management benefits from a reality check 

that a rank exclusive process might miss.

Target for Success

 One of Col. Warden’s most 

prominent management tools is the Five 

Rings Model. The model identifies five 

“components” common to any “system” 

that “...contain one or more Centers 

of Gravity that will have a significant 

impact on the entire system if they are 

altered in any way” (Warden, Russell 

112, 113). The model includes Leadership, Processes, Infrastructure, Population, and Agents components (Warden, 

Russell 112).

 For the intelligence community, the Five Rings model provides 

an integrated approach to dealing with 

problems that helps resolve the issue 

of fragmentation identified by Russ Travers in the previously quoted statement 

from “The Coming Intelligence Failure.” 

Each contributing agency of the intelligence community approaching problems 

through the common basis of the Five 

Rings model would constitute a significant step toward dealing with the existing decentralization of problem solving 

and endemic fragmentation. If the community were to organize with a common 

framework to approaching intelligence 

issues, cross-talk between organizations 

would become smoother and more productive.

 Despite the advantages 

of the Five Rings model, two precautions to instituting a common community-wide approach in the intelligence 

world are necessary to address. First, a 

common approach could create groupthink (groupthink is the tendency to 

view a situation without constructive discussion, suppressing alternative explanations to the accepted answer) amongst 

the various agencies. In the case of intelligence professionals advising the President 

on issues of international concern, groupthink is dangerous at best and deadly at 

worst. Secondly, a common approach 

to the intelligence mission throughout 

U.S. agencies might increase the vulnerability of assets to effective counterintelligence. As a result, any adoption 

of the Five Rings model as a common 

framework throughout the intelligence 

world must couple with increased protection against hostile counterintelligence 

efforts.

Campaign to Win

 Part of the Prometheus Process’ discussion of campaigning to win is 

“Organizing for Success” (Warden, Russell 152). Warden and Russell state that, 

“Organizational structure is important 

because it shapes individual behaviors 

and causes certain patterns of events to 

reoccur” (Warden, Russell 153). The 

structure of a corporation or entity plays 

a significant role in determining the success or failure of an organization’s mission (Warden, Russell 153).

 Alluded to previously in 

this discussion, the current structure of 

the intelligence community bears partial 

responsibility for failures associated with 

Sept. 11th. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director 

of the Joint Inquiry Staff, states in her 

“Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part 1” of 

September 18, 2002:

For example, officials at the NSA 

whom we have interviewed were 

aware of DCI Tenet’s December 

1998 declaration that the Intelligence Community was “at war” 

with Bin Ladin. On the other 

hand, relatively few of the FBI 

agents interviewed by the Joint 

Inquiry Staff seem to have been 

aware of DCI Tenet’s declaration. 

(Aftergood) 

A disconnect between the FBI and CIA, 

one which is to some extent structurally 

implicit, helped to prevent a completely 

coordinated approach to dealing with 

Osama Bin Ladin. 

According to the Prometheus Process, 

organizational structure is critical to guaranteeing organizational success. In the 

case of the intelligence community, organizational restructuring could proceed in 

a variety ways. Though a detailed discussion of restructuring is a topic for further 

research, options might include creating 

a Director of National Intelligence. This 

suggestion was previously offered in the 

Borden-Mcurdy legislation in the 1990’s 

(Commission on the Roles). 

Finish with Finesse

 “Finishing with Finesse” is one 

area in which the Prometheus Process 

has less to offer the intelligence community. The intelligence mission is never 

finished. As long as the United States 

continues to exist as a sovereign nation, 

the need for accurate, timely intelligence 

will remain. The “endgame” is nonexistent in the intelligence community.

 Though “Finish with Finesse” is 

not applicable to the general intelligence 

mission, the principle does bear some 

applicability to individual intelligence 

operations. America cannot remain inevitably involved in all areas of the globe. 

Currently the U.S. continues long term 

operations in the Sinai, Korea, Bosnia, 

and the Middle East that hold little 

promise for resolution. The intelligence 

community must effectively manage limited resources to prevent entanglement 

in long-term commitments, focusing 

instead on issues of immediate concern.
39

Conclusion

 The Prometheus Process is a tool of management and strategy specifically designed for the business 

world. Yet, the principles outlined by 

Col. John Warden and Mr. Leland Russell offer suggestions on how to solve the 

current shortcomings of America’s intelligence community. Effectively linking 

the practice with the community will 

help to ensure that Sept. 11th is truly an 

event of history and continue the transformation of U.S. intelligence agencies 

into a potent force for a new era.

Bibliography

Aftergood, Steve. “Joint Inquiry Staff 

Statement, Part I: Eleanor Hill, 

Staff Director, Joint Inquiry 

Staff: September 18, 2002” FAS 

Intelligence Resource Program: 

2002 Congressional Hearings. 

17 Oct. 2002. Federation of 

American Scientists. 

< http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/

2002_hr/091802hill.html>

Aftergood, Steve. “Counterterrorism 

Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9-11: A Report 

to the Speaker of the House of 

Representatives and the Minority Leader” FAS Intelligence 

Resource Program: 2002 Congressional Reports. 15 Nov. 2002. 

Federation of American Scientists. <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/

2002_rpt/hpsci_ths0702.html> 

Warden, John A. and Leland A. Russell. 

Winning In Fast Time. Montgomery: Venturist Publishing: 

2002.

Factbook on Intelligence: The Intelligence Community. 10 Sept. 02. 

Central Intelligence Agency. < 

http://www.odci.gov/cia/

publications/facttell/index.html> 

Factbook on Intelligence: The DCI 

and his Principal Deputies. 

10Sept02. Central Intelligence 

Agency. <http://www.odci.gov/cia/

publications/facttell/index.html> 

Shulsky, Abram, and Gary J. Schmitt. 

Silent Warfare: Understanding 

the World of Intelligence. 3ed. 

Washington D.C: Brassey’s, 

2002.

Travers, Russ. “The Coming Intelligence Failure.” Studies in 

Intelligence: A collection of articles on the theoretical, doctrinal, operational, and historical aspects of intelligence. 1. 

(1997) < http://www.cia.gov/csi/

studies/97unclass/index.html> 

United States. Commission on the Roles 

and Capabilities of the United 

States Intelligence Community. 

“The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community-An Historical Overview.” Preparing for the 

21st Century: An Appraisal of 

U.S. Intelligence. GPO, 1996. < 

http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/

epubs/int/int022.html>

· Note: The date of access is not 

included for URL sites

· Note: The latest update date for 

URL sites, when included, is an 

estimate based on other pages 

associated with the specific cite

(Endnotes) 1

 The acronym is not spelled out in the 

original quote

Calling the Audible

by C2C Adam J. Kawatski

The present world situation is 

different from the one the United States 

faced in years past. With the Soviet 

Union no longer a direct threat to the 

nation, the United States is recently finding itself involved in limited, conventional conflicts. However, the number 

of nuclear capable countries and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack are 

increasing. How does this affect America’s nuclear employment stance? America is working to answer this question. 

The United States is adapting its nuclear 

doctrine to the changing world climate 

in order to maximize benefits of nuclear 

capability.

Now that the Cold War is over, 

Russia has become a different kind of 

threat. There is no longer the nuclear 

standoff between two superpowers. The 

weapons are still in Russia, but the political and military organization is but a 

fraction of the previous Bear’s. In a 

Senate testimony, Dr. Loren Thompson, 

a leader in the nuclear research field, 

states that the United States is more concerned about Russian nuclear accidents 

or theft than they are about deliberate 

aggression (2). 

Along with the unpredictable 

Russian threat are the new threats from 

rising nations that wish to reduce the 

United States’ power in the world. Stephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras write 

in A New Nuclear Century, “The United 

States, now left alone as the world’s sole 

military superpower, finds that nuclear 

weapons are the great equalizer of the 

weak against the strong” (154). This 

statement voices the fact that some of 

these nations may seek reduction of the 

United States’ power through the use 

of nuclear weapons. Other weapons of 

mass destruction cannot be discounted. 

“[There are] half a dozen rogue states,” 

describes Dr. Thompson, “with programs 

“The conventional army 

loses if it does not win. The 

guerilla wins if he does not 

lose.”

Henry Kissinger
40

to develop weapons of mass destruction, 

and terrorist movements [. . .]” (2). The 

deterrence theory of the Cold War may 

not work with these new threats. “Deterrence theory a la the Cold War, based on 

realist premises that assume risk averse 

and cost-benefit sensitive leaders, may 

no longer hold tenable for leaders armed 

with weapons of mass destruction and 

motivated by ‘irrational’ or ‘illogical’ 

objectives [. . .],” Cimbala and Scouras 

write of the shift in enemy paradigm 

(145). They echo, “[former] Secretary 

of Defense William Perry’s comment 

that future terrorists or rogue regimes 

‘may not buy into our deterrence theory. 

Indeed they may be madder than MAD 

[Mutual Assured Destruction]’” (Cimbala and Scouras 145). It is to these new 

nation threats as well as terrorist organizations that the United States must adapt 

its nuclear doctrine. 

The United States is beginning 

this adaptation to maximize the benefits 

of nuclear capability. “The United States 

cannot afford to ignore its nuclear doctrine, allowing it to sit on the shelf 

until another threat arises;” states the Air 

Force Doctrine Document 2-1.5, Nuclear 

Operations, “doctrine must be ‘living’ 

if it is to be effective” (v). Recently, 

the Bush administration released a plan 

called the Nuclear Posture Review that 

calls for the change in doctrine. In Dr. 

Thompson’s Senate testimony she relays 

the review as an “effort to modernize the 

nation’s nuclear strategy and forces so 

that they remain effective in a radically 

transformational global security environment” (2). Dr. Thompson adds that 

the goal of the change is to “reduce reliance on deterrence by acquiring offensive and defensive capabilities for coping 

with accident-prone or irrational adversaries,” explaining the shift from Cold 

War deterrence (4). 

In order to meet these new 

offensive and defensive requirements, the 

Nuclear Posture Review lays down a “New 

Triad” “of capabilities that would combine nuclear and conventional offensive 

forces, missile defenses, and a revamped 

nuclear weapons infrastructure” (“U.S. 

Nuclear Forces, 2002” 70). The New 

Triad also sets out a new system of 

nuclear warhead management. The main 

feature is the reduction in numbers of 

operationally deployed warheads from 

the present ten-thousand plus to three 

thousand, eight-hundred in 2007, and 

to between one thousand, seven hundred 

and two thousand, two hundred by 2012 

(“U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2002” 70-71). 

The warheads taken out of operation will, 

however, be stored in a “responsive capability” in which they could be ready for 

operational deployment in several weeks 

if the need arises (Klare 6). Another 

feature of the New Triad involves the 

replacement of operational nuclear weapons with “powerful and accurate conventional weapons” (Krieger 1). The missile defense is another leg of the New 

Triad. David Krieger in his article on 

the Nuclear Posture Review describes the 

purpose of the missile defense stating 

“[The] missile defenses will be deployed 

ostensibly to protect the United States 

from attack by a rogue state or terrorist” 

(1). In addition, the Nuclear Posture 

Review calls for the upgrading of existing nuclear infrastructure systems to 

include platforms, communications, targeting and control.

Part of the restructuring of 

the nuclear infrastructure includes the 

upgrading of the bomber leg of the old 

Triad. Most bomber capabilities will 

remain unchanged. Both the B-52H 

and the B-2 bombers will be kept on 

high alert, and the F-117 will be kept 

on low alert (“U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2002 

72-73). The Nuclear Posture Review 

does not call for a decrease in the number 

of non-strategic nuclear weapons. This 

means that the F-16 and F-15E, and 

soon the future Joint Strike Fighter, will 

continue a mission capability of delivering tactical nuclear weapons (“U.S. 

Nuclear Forces 72-73). A major change 

is in store for the B-1B bomber. “[Until 

recently] the air force has maintained 

[the B-1B] in a ‘nuclear rerole’ status. 

This meant that if necessary, the bombers could return to nuclear missions 

within months,” explains the article, 

“U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2002”,“Under the 

new NPR [Nuclear Posture Review], 

the remaining ninety-two B-1Bs will be 

removed from ‘rerole’ status” (72). In 

addition, the B-1B is set to be eliminated 

from the inventory (Thompson 3). 

The Nuclear Posture Review will 

affect the missile leg of the old Triad as 

well. The offensive force of ICBMS will 

face several changes in this adaptation. 

The review calls for a five and a half billion dollar plan to “improve the [Minuteman III’s] accuracy and reliability and 

extend its service life past 2020” (“U.S. 

Nuclear Forces, 2002” 71). Another 

change in posture is that operational missiles will soon each carry a single warhead instead of the three to five that were 

payloaded during Cold War alert (“U.S. 

Nuclear Forces, 2002” 71). Also, the 

fifty MX missiles in the inventory will be 

eliminated, leaving five hundred Minuteman III’s on alert (Thompson 4). The 

United States is, however, planning for a 

new ICBM to be ready in 2018. According to the article “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 

2002,” “The Pentagon says it needs new 

ICBMs with extended range and the ability to hit mobile, hardened, and deeply 

buried targets.” (71) 

The other change to the old Triad’s missile leg is the development of 

a missile defense system. The “missile 

defenses can have a ‘dissuasive effect’ on 

potential enemies” by making it more 

difficult for a country to war with the 

United States (“U.S. Nuclear Forces, 

2002” 74). The missile defense leg will 

consist of two to three airborne lasers 

for short-range interception of ballistic 

missiles, a mid-range interceptor made 
41

up of ballistic missiles launched from 

submarines, and an undescribed, longrange interception system based in Alaska 

(“U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2002” 74). These 

new missile systems will be used to 

defend the United States from ballistic 

missile attack. 

The New Triad also encapsulates 

a crossover from nuclear to conventional 

weapons. Michael Klare writes in his 

article “A New Pentagon ‘Triad’”,“ [the] 

Nuclear Posture review is ‘presaging a 

diminished US reliance on nuclear weapons in favor of ‘conventional’ munitions’” (qtd. in 6). The reason the United 

States seeks to transition to conventional 

is because new technological advancements have made today’s conventional 

weapons more lethal, precise, and highly 

accurate (Krieger 2, Leopold 10). They 

incorporate precision guidance from satellite and other advanced information systems (Leopold 10). These new conventional weapons along with the advanced 

technology will be used to “hit hardened 

and deeply buried targets” (Leopold 10). 

For example the United States is developing systems like “a satellite-guided glidebomb that could penetrate sixty feet of 

extremely hardened material” a task previously assigned to more capable nuclear 

weapons (Thompson 3). This paradigm 

shift in thinking follows the “belief that 

conventional weapons now have the 

capability to replace nuclear weapons in 

deterring an enemy from attacking” and 

the belief that future targets will consist 

of hardened bunkers or facilities deep in 

the earth (Krieger 2).

The New Triad calls for a 

“revamped nuclear weapons infrastructure” also (“U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2002” 

70). The United States plans to put 

into operation in 2006 and 2008 new 

satellites that are “nuclear-survivable 

(e.g. against high-altitude electromagnetic pulse), anti-jam, low and medium 

data rate communications to strategic 

and tactical users” (“U.S. Nuclear Forces, 

2002” 75). These new satellites will 

augment the MILSTAR system, which is 

scheduled to take over all nuclear communications in 2003 (“U.S. Nuclear Forces, 

2002” 75). This communications capability will be part of new “secure, wideband communications between national 

decision makers, command centers and 

operational forces,” adds Dr. Thompson 

on this issue in her Senate testimony (10). 

The nuclear infrastructure improvements 

also involve consolidating the nuclear 

command and control capacity. This 

concept entails, for example, transitioning from EC-135s and E-6Bs acting as 

nuclear command and control platforms 

to just the E-6Bs (“U.S. Nuclear Forces, 

2002” 75).

The United States is seeking to 

maximize the benefits of nuclear capability. The new system will offer the 

United States greater options for dealing 

with unperceived events. The Pentagon 

phrases this idea of the new system as 

“offer[ing] a portfolio of capabilities and 

the flexibility to address a spectrum of 

contingencies” (qtd. in Klare 6). This 

flexibility is rooted in the ability to have 

nuclear weapons in storage that could 

restore maximum nuclear capability if 

necessary as well as a wide array of highlyadvanced conventional forces. Targets 

are evolving into deeply buried, hardened facilities, some of which may contain command-and-control functions and 

weapons of mass destruction (“Defense: 

A Better Posture” 1). The new system 

provides both the weapons and the information and communications that will 

complement each other in the destruction of these new targets (U.S. Nuclear 

Forces, 2002” 75). 

The United States seeks to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction. “[The] fundamental purpose of America’s nuclear arsenal is to 

deter an enemy’s use of weapons of mass 

destruction,” states Air Force Doctrine 

Document 2-1.5, Nuclear Operations

(1). Now, the new system incorporates 

the capabilities to deter “an enemy”, who 

may be irrational, by the use of conventional means too. Indeed the new 

capabilities may allow the United States 

the ability to preempt an enemy’s use of 

weapons of mass destruction (“Bush goes 

nuclear” 3, “Defense: A Better Posture” 

1). 

The United States is the most 

powerful country in the world. It 

attained this standing through military 

prowess, specifically nuclear capability. 

Air Force Doctrine states that the goal 

behind using nuclear weapons is to 

achieve U.S. political objectives and 

resolve a conflict on terms favorable to 

the United States (United States 12). 

These changes in the nuclear doctrine 

seek to maximize the benefits of being 

nuclear capable. “The principle aim 

of the Administration’s nuclear policy,” 

Michael Klare, author of “A New Pentagon ‘Triad’” explains, “is [. . .] to firmly 

instill nuclear weapons in a new U.S. 

Strategy designed to insure permanent 

US military supremacy” (6). In this 

new era, the Soviet style deterrence 

may not work against rogue nations or 

nations with irrational leaders. Therefore, the reorganization, which involves a 

new offense capability made up of both 

nuclear and conventional weapons, a 

defense against missiles, and an upgrade 

to the infrastructure, gives the United 

States an ability to achieve total deterrence and freedom to act (Klare 7). 

Michael Klare again expresses the United 

States’ goal writing, “[The United States 

has a] new grand strategy in which 

nuclear weapons will be wedded to missile defense and high-tech conventional 

arms to perpetuate America’s ‘sole superpower’ status” (6). 

The United States is adapting its 

nuclear doctrine to the changing world 

climate in order to maximize benefits of 

nuclear capability. With the changing 

world, a change in nuclear doctrine is 
42

Neocortical Warfare: 

A Future Revolution in 

Military Affairs

C1C Barbara Soucy

Throughout history, warfare has 

been the violent subjugation of an opponent’s will on the field of battle, an art 

that has been honed to such a point that 

military power today is global in projection and almost instantaneous in application. What if it were possible to change 

battlefields, to truly fight the will of an 

enemy in the arena of the mind and 

achieve victory without violence according to Sun Tzu’s “acme of skill?” At 

the moment, this is the fantasy of psychological operations with the creation 

of neocortical warfare: the melding of 

advanced physics modeling, upcoming 

nanotechnology, and reverse psychology 

to move beyond reacting to an opposing will and instead guide it in a desired 

direction.

Neocortical warfare has its scientific roots in advanced physics modeling, 

an intricate combination of statistical 

analysis and simulation that is growing 

in its application. Especially visible in 

highly volatile systems like stock markets 

or areas of high-density profit exchanges, 

simplified neocortical warfare has been a 

business tool that has grown in precision 

and popularity for the past several years. 

Today, stock brokerages enlist the aid of 

physicists in the development of investment plans, employing them as predictors of the stock market. Analyzing 

a company and its closest competitors, 

these physicists are supported by staffs 

that procure all available data on the 

situations, competitions, and trades surrounding a stock. With this data, a physicist creates a model that incorporates 

initial conditions and probabilities and 

then predicts an output using comprehensive rate equations. These models 

are required to be so precise that they 

can predict the fluctuation in percentage 

points in the stock environment by considering the state of the market at opening time. These models are, even now, 

capable of taking into account the effects 

of not only the stock mob, but also individuals and their actions as they pertain 

to the growth or failure of a stock on a 

daily basis.

Early applications of neocortical 

warfare in the military environment can 

also be seen. Simplistic models have 

been used to evaluate past battles in 

order to gain experience and an understanding of warfare that, at the moment, 

is limited to a Jominian view of warfare. 

As such, these elementary models consider only quantifiable data and disregard 

principles of war such as maneuver or 

surprise. What follows is a description 

of a combat simulation done by students 

in advanced physics classes at the United 

States Air Force Academy. The results 

show the rudimentary aspects of neocortical warfare in that, if applied to a 

similar situation in the future, they could 

make a specific prediction of outcomes 

based on analytical modeling.

The battle recreated was that of 

Iwo Jima in 1944, a classic conflict of 

attrition that the Japanese did not plan to 

survive as they fought from entrenched 

positions in tunnels against the invading 

American forces. There was little strategy involved as men and machines were 

sent against their opponents in waves, 

finally ending in American victory. This 

model took into account the initial conditions of forces and evaluated combat 

effectiveness, lethality, and survivability 

of units on each side. Once variables like 

damage capability, attack rate, accuracy, 

and survivability were able to generate 

results consistent with historical records, 

they were then applied to the analysis of 

the battle. The units were allowed to 

interact by way of statistical modeling, 

and the final results matched the air and 

ground phases of Iwo Jima.

The United States began with 

necessary. The Nuclear Posture Review 

addresses this need for change calling for 

a reorganization of the nuclear doctrine 

and capabilities of the United States. 

The adaptations include offense made up 

of both conventional and nuclear weapons, defense made up of a missile defense 

system, and an upgraded nuclear infrastructure. These adaptations of developing more flexible response systems and 

enabling the countering of those with 

weapons of mass destruction through a 

new type of deterrence and active preemption, allow the United States to maximize the benefits of nuclear capability 

and the right to stand alone as the superpower in the world. 

 Works Cited

“Bush Goes Nuclear.” The Nation 1 

Apr. 2002: 3.

Cimbala, Stephen J. and James Scouras. 

A New Nuclear Century. Wesport, CT: Praeger, 2002. 

 “Defense: A Better Posture.” National 

Review 8 Apr. 2002: 1.

Klare, Michael T. “A New Pentagon 

‘Triad’.” The Nation 18 Feb. 

2002: 6-7.

Krieger, David. “Putting disarmament 

on the shelf.” Humanist Mar./

Apr. 2002: 1-2.

Leopold, George. “Nuke Strategy Eyes 

New Tech.” Electronic Engineering Times 14 Jan. 2002: 

10.

Thompson, Loren B. “Nuclear Posture 

Review.” FDCH Congressional 

Testimony. 16 May 2002.

“U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2002.” Bulletin of 

the Atomic Scientists May/Jun. 

2002: 70.

United States. USAF. Nuclear Operations. AFDD 2-1.5. 15 July 

1998.
43

Figure 1

69,000 Marines armed with standard 

munitions and flame-throwers, along 

with armored vehicles and bombers to 

aid in the assault. Already entrenched 

on the island in tunnels or committed 

to aerial defense were 21,000 Japanese 

soldiers. The tables above show their 

respective capabilities in several areas as 

studied by the cadets.

Combined by relatively simple rate 

equations that compare each unit’s effectiveness when in combat against each 

other, the model was able to accurately 

depict outcomes of the battle. In 

the initial stage, the entire island was 

bombarded by US bombers who were 

attacked only by inferior Japanese fighters 

as the Japanese marines tried to remain 

entrenched and under cover during this 

time. The result was a dramatic decrease 

in the number of combat capable Japanese fighters, a slight decline in US 

bombers, and little effect on the 

entrenched Japanese marines.

The second phase of the battle 

involved the land invasion in which 

only the ground units of each 

side participated. The historical 

results are accurately reflected by 

the model as the United States lost 

nearly 7000 soldiers but the Japanese were almost totally wiped out.

Figure 1: This graph depicts the 

rates of decline for each unit. The 

US marines are the thin dashed line 

at top, US flamethrowers are the thick 

dashed line, the US armored vehicles are 

barely seen at the bottom left corner of 

the graph due to their relatively small 

numbers, while the Japanese marines are 

the swiftly declining thin solid line.

Capable of accurately modeling 

the battle of attrition, this overly simplified model shows how combat simulations could be used as elementary versions of neocortical warfare in order to 

quantify future events.

Moving beyond these limited 

models of physics and allowing the military to see through the eyes of the 

enemy, nanotechnology would be the 

technological framework of neocortical 

warfare. For the information arena of 

war, researchers would be capable of 

creating a net of tiny computers, linked 

as a sensor array and able to span the 

globe. Initially the size of a dime and 

progressively shrinking as the technology 

is refined, such sensors would consist of 

a miniscule power source, either solar 

or chemically driven, a limited detection 

capability, and a tiny transmitter to relay 

information. The power source would 

be the restrictive variable for size and 

range. However, should a subatomic 

energy source be harnessed for nanotechnology, the possibilities as far as scale 

and projection of such sensors would be 

limitless. A minimal detection capability 

would be necessary not only to maintain 

initial size restraints but also to limit 

cost. It would be far less expensive to 

create a million dime-sized sensors capable of detecting one or two inputs than 

a thousand sensors capable of detecting 

a dozen inputs (Libicki, “Mesh and Net” 

31). In any case, considering the scale of 

the sensors on which this informational 

net is based, the inputs noted by each 

sensor need not be alike. For example, 

one sensor could activate at a hormone 

present in human sweat, another at the 

fumes of petroleum, others at certain 

biological agents. If millions of these 

are created in small size and dispersed 

across a theatre, there would be little need 

for multiple functions in each apparatus. 

Their size would grant them the capacity to overlap, lying side by side and yet 

activating and generating signals when 

different stimuli are detected (Soucy). 

Provided that the size of these sensors 

eventually dwindles below the percepTable 1: Graph of variables associated with each combat unit in the combat simulation for Iwo Jima.
44

tion of the human eye, the result would 

be a network of information capable of 

being generated and sustained by technology that is indistinguishable from the 

very dust.

Such a net of sensors would necessitate a transition from the current form 

of platform-based warfare, such as tanks, 

logistics vehicles, and nonstealth air systems. A net with the capability of disguising itself and capable of detecting 

any programmable input, from fuel to 

proteins, would make such platforms 

obsolete, too easily detectable and, as 

such, too easily destroyed. The initial 

shift would be to a form of pop-up warfare, where assets are hidden as much as 

possible and used only when necessary 

(Libicki “Small and Many” 194). Any 

use at an inappropriate time would lead 

to the immediate destruction and loss 

of such assets. With nanotechnology, 

never again would an opponent be blind 

to developments such as the left hook 

of Operation Desert Storm. The shift 

in warfare would involve a form of blitzkrieg that emphasizes overcoming the 

sensor array long enough to use assets 

effectively and allow them to disappear. 

What, however, will happen when stealth 

capability is no longer able to fool sensors? For example, if a way were ever 

devised to detect gravity waves, any 

weapon, personnel, or asset with mass 

could be detected. A new strategy must 

step beyond such constraints out of the 

physical realm; the next battlefield would 

be the mind.

Building on physics modeling and 

the influx of information created by 

nanotechnology, neocortical warfare may 

be able to incorporate the psychological 

operations that directly attack the will 

of the enemy. With a nearly ubiquitous 

intelligence network, it may be possible 

to know the enemy so well that the perceptions and actions of an opponent can 

not only be predicted but redirected in a 

beneficial manner. How can an enemy 

be led to a desired end? By intimately 

know his actions and subtly changing 

what he believes to be inviolable—his 

perception of the global situation—one 

can lead an enemy into situations where 

the only rational outcome is the one 

desired. An embodiment of right-brain 

activity, neocortical warfare would 

emphasize shaping the behavior of an 

opponent, moving well beyond the limitations of physical violence (Szafranski 

403). An ethereal way of fighting, it 

strives to use the prejudices, thoughts, 

emotions, and predilections of an opponent against him.

An example of neocortical warfare on a smaller scale that is 

used today goes under the criminal profiling technique of reverse psychology. 

An agent on the case of a known suspect 

may be able to take the facts available 

on a string of crimes, use background 

knowledge of the person, and attempt 

to become the suspect in some fashion. 

In doing so, the agent must adopt the 

customs, mannerisms, habits, and desires 

of the perpetrator in order to discover 

and predict possible future actions that 

cannot be seen with limited information 

or within the present biases. 

Neocortical warfare is like the 

reverse psychology of today, but on a 

grand scale. Stepping outside of the ethnocentricities inherent in every society, it 

is a way of knowing enough that one can 

become the opponent, complete with the 

biases and customs of its respective culture. Neocortical warfare may even be 

applied to opposing commanders, truly 

bringing battle to the arena of the mind 

and playing on the thoughts, fears, and 

concerns of commanders of an opposing force by uniquely tailoring threats 

and psychological attacks to the weaknesses of each.

By immersing oneself in the these 

elements in order to mirror the psyche of 

an opponent and understand his possible future courses of action, one can use 

this knowledge to guide enemy actions 

to the most beneficial or least destructive 

alternative. In this manner, neocortical 

warfare might be a first step into a new 

warfare of the mind. The intelligence 

provided by microscopic sensors could 

be used to create comprehensive analytical models. Incorporating these into 

psychological operations, a military could 

then create situations for an opponent, 

guiding him away from victory through 

is own choices.

Bibliography

1. Libicki, Martin C. “The Small and the 

Many.” In Athena’s Camp. Eds. 

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. 

Santa Monica: RAND, 1997. p. 

191-216.

2. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Trans. Samuel 

B. Griffith. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

3. Howard, Michael. Clausewitz. Oxford: 

University Press, 1983.

4. Szafranski, Richard. “Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill.” In 

Athena’s Camp. Eds. John Arquilla 

and David Ronfeldt. Santa Monica: 

RAND, 1997. p. 395-416.

5. Toffler, Alvin and Heidi Toffler. War 

and Anti-War. New York: Warner 

Books, Inc., 1993.

6. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. Report on Sensor 

Technology for Difficult Targets. 

Vol. 1: Summary; SAB-TR-01-01; 

June 2001.

7. Lowell, John J., Major, USAF, DFP, 

USAFA. Interview. Member of 

Scientific Advisory Board, 2001.

8. Soucy, Robert R., Lt Col, Ret, USAF. 

Interview.

9. Libicki, Martin C. The Mesh and the 

Net. Washington, DC: National 

Defense University, 1994.
45

The State of Airlift

by Beacher R. Webb III

The United States possesses 

the most powerful and technologically 

advanced military in the world. However, its dominating potential is useless 

unless it can be brought to bear effectively at the decisive time and place. 

The need for sufficient and capable 

mobility assets arises from this principle. 

Especially now, with the shifting world 

environment and changing role of the 

U.S. military, the need for global mobility has become even more pronounced. 

Specifically, the airlift component of 

global mobility is crucial to the effectiveness of military forces in modern 

warfighting. In his 1992 report, Keeping MAC Airborne, Major J E. Page of 

the U.S. Marine Corps noted that in the 

post Cold War world, “Airlift will be the 

only mode of transporation (sic) which 

can quickly and effectively impose sufficient forces to prevent a situation from 

developing to such magnitude that it 

becomes too costly in lives and equipment for U.S. intervention” (Keeping 

5-6). But are the current airlift capabilities of the United States Armed Forces 

sufficient to meet modern and future 

requirements? After careful review of 

the facts, a shortfall in airlift capability is 

indeed present. The United States will 

need to bolster its airlift forces if it is to 

continue to meet and overcome the ever 

increasing need for airlift in the twentyfirst century.

In examining the state of airlift 

and determining whether or not a shortfall exists, the first step is to assess the 

current capabilities of U.S. airlift forces. 

These capabilities are certainly not trivial. In Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm alone, 111 C-5 Galaxies, 

227 C-141 Star Lifters, and 117 commercial aircraft transported 500,000 

passengers and 577,000 tons of supplies 

(Keeping 6). Major William L. Nichols 

of the U.S. Air Force records in his 

report, Strategic Mobility for the Future, 

that these aircraft flew over 15,000 strategic airlift sorties with 124 planes landing in the desert each day at the height 

of operations (Strategic 4). Meanwhile, 

C-130’s provided airlift within the theatre of operations to over 209,000 

people and 300,000 tons of cargo 

(Strategic 4). About.com’s article, “Airpower in Operation Desert Storm,” concludes, “Viewed in ton miles, the airlift 

of Operation Desert Shield/Storm was 

equivalent to repeating the Berlin Airlift 

-- a 56-week operation -- every six 

weeks.” 

Current airlift capabilities are 

largely determined by the characteristics 

of their force structure and organizations. An ever increasing majority of 

U.S. airlift assets fall under the Air 

Force’s Air Mobility Command. Headquartered at Scott AFB, Illinois, Air 

Mobility Command employs 52,990 

active duty, 9,240 civilian, 45,260 Air 

Force Reserve, and 35,420 Air National 

Guard personnel (About.com). The 

active duty component of Air Mobility 

Command consists of two numbered 

air forces and twelve air force bases 

(About.com). Seventy-one Air Reserve 

units of at least group level fall under 

Air Mobility Command when it is fully 

mobilized (About.com). 

While the distribution of Air 

Mobility Command’s assets among the 

Air National Guard and Air Force 

Reserve underscore the importance of 

non-active duty components to airlift, 

special emphasis should be placed on 

the role of commercial aircraft in bolstering U.S. airlift capabilities. Working 

with commercial airlines the government created the Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

(CRAF), so that in times of national 

emergency, commercial aircraft can be 

called upon to supplement military airlift. In his Global Security article, 

“Civil Reserve Air Fleet,” John Pike, the 

director of GlobalSecurity.org, explains 

that commercial airlines participate in 

the CRAF program in exchange for 

the Department of Defense’s peacetime 

business, a market that has increased in 

value by over a billion dollars in recent 

years (Civil 1). The Civil Reserve Air 

Fleet was employed for the first time 

in history in Operation Desert Shield, 

where it was responsible for twentyeight percent of the cargo and twothirds of the personnel airlifted into the 

theatre (About.com). When fully mobilized, CRAF nearly doubles U.S. airlift 

capability (About.com). 

An analysis of the specific airframes used to conduct airlift provides 

further insight into U.S. airlift capabilities. The C-5 Galaxy, C-141 Star Lifter, 

and C-17 Globemaster III are the primary airframes responsible for strategic 

airlift. The Air University’s U.S. Air 

Force Online Encyclopedia states that 

there are seventy C-5 Galaxies remaining in the Air Force inventory. These 

aircraft, costing 167.7 million dollars 

each, are extremely large and capable 

of carrying 291,000 pounds of cargo, 

including outsized, bulky army equipment, in its mammoth cargo compartment, which is thirteen feet high and 

nineteen feet wide (U.S.). The Air 

Force also possesses a total of 241 C-141 

Star Lifters, which are economical aircraft costing only 8.1 million dollars 

each and capable of carrying 68,725 

pounds of cargo (U.S.). The C-17 

Globemaster III is the most recent addition to the U.S. airlift fleet, and its 

inventory is expected to reach 120 

aircraft (U.S.). At a unit cost of 

180 million dollars, these technologically advanced aircraft are capable of airlifting 170,900 pounds of cargo, including outsized equipment (About.com).

As impressive as the current 

capabilities of U.S. airlift are, the 

modern demands placed on it are staggering as well. In his thesis presented 

to the School of Advanced Airpower 

Studies, Bedding Down with C-O-T-S, 

Major Christopher J. Bence of the 

U.S. Air Force comments, “In any one 

week, AMC typically executes more 

than 2,000 missions in more than 40 

countries” (3). The reality is that 

as the United States maintains and 
46

increases its world-wide commitments 

while decreasing its permanent overseas 

basing, the U.S. military is becoming 

more and more dependent on airlift 

for both deployment and sustainment. 

Nichols agrees by asserting that the 

nation’s military strategy in the post 

Cold War world has shifted to demand 

increased global military presence while 

centralizing into a predominantly 

CONUS based force (Strategic 3). The 

effect is shocking. Bence writes, “Airlift 

operations — whether responding for 

humanitarian assistance, natural disaster relief, or peace enforcement combat 

operations — have quadrupled within 

the last decade” (Bedding 50). 

Increased commitments and a 

continental force are not the only factors increasing the burden on airlift 

forces. A combination of budget cuts 

and aging forces is also straining the 

capabilities of mobility assets. The 

average C-141 Star Lifter is now thirtyfour years old (Strategic 5). While this 

aircraft was designed to fly for only 

30,000 flight hours, the average C-141 

Star Lifter exceeded 32,000 flight hours 

in 1993, which generates both safety 

and reliability concerns (Strategic 5). 

The United States Air Force had 

planned on these aircraft continuing in 

service until 2010 (Strategic 6). In the 

early 1990’s, a total of 210 C-17 Globemaster III aircraft were ordered to supplement, not replace, the aging C-141 

Starlifter in providing airlift, but Congress cut the funding for the program, 

reducing the number to be built to 120 

(Keeping 8). These 120 aircraft are 

now being depended on as the replacements rather than the supplements to 

241 C-141 Starlifters. Bence concludes 

that “the United States has continually 

reallocated or cut funding for national 

airlift assets, creating an unacceptable 

airlift shortfall that undermines US 

national security strategy” (Bedding 

21).

In addition to larger demands 

and smaller budgets, a number of government studies prove that there is 

indeed a shortfall in airlift capabilities. 

The first of these studies was the Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study 

of 1981, which concluded that in wartime the United States would require the 

ability to airlift eighty-three million tonmiles-per-day (MTM/D), and at bare 

minimum, the U.S. should maintain a 

capacity of sixty-six MTM/D (Bedding 

25). This baseline has never been met 

(Bedding 25). Another study, known 

as the Mobility Requirements Study, 

took place in 1992 to determine post 

Cold War airlift requirements (Bedding 

25-26). This study reduced the baseline 

to a requirement of fifty-seven MTM/D, 

which also has never been met (Bedding 

26). The most recent study conducted 

was the Mobility Requirements Study 

Bottom Up Review Update in 1995, 

which was modeled after a 2001 projected force structure (Bedding 26). 

Under fiscal pressures, the participants 

in this study resolved to lower the airlift 

baseline requirements further to 49.7 

MTM/D (Bedding 26). Even with the 

reduced baseline, the shortfall remains, 

with the combined airlift capacity of 

both military and commercial airlift 

totaling only about 45 MTM/D (Bedding 27). In 1996, a study titled Airlift 

2025: The First with the Most set out to 

determine projected airlift requirements 

for the year 2025 and concluded, “The 

current air mobility system will not support the air logistics requirements we 

are likely to face in 2025” (Airlift 4). 

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force at 

the time, General Ronald R. Fogleman, 

voiced his concerns to the participants 

of the study, “The single biggest deficiency in the Department of Defense is 

lift” (Airlift 4).

A number of possible solutions 

have been posed to remedy the shortfall 

in airlift capabilities, while not greatly 

increasing the airlift budget. One alternative is to rely more heavily on sealift. 

This idea seems appealing when one 

considers that ships can carry larger 

loads, and sealift was responsible for 

transporting ninety percent of all cargo 

moved in Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm (Strategic 9). In fact, 

Nichols points out that “one dry cargo 

ship can carry the equivalent tonnage of 

approximately 2.5 days of airlift” (Strategic 9). However, the speed and flexibility of airlift remain essential to the 

military’s rapid global mobility in today’s 

world, a role that cannot be fulfilled by 

sealift. Bence offers an excellent example: 

During the 1973 Arab –Israeli 

War, the USAF flew more than 

500 sorties supporting Israel. 

Within 48 hours of the decision 

to act, the first airlift sorties 

landed in Israel delivering critical 

supplies and equipment to America’s ally. In contrast the first 

sea lift vessel to reach port 

—although carrying more tonnage than all the airlift sorties 

combined —arrived 20 days after 

hostilities erupted but 12 days 

after the cease-fire. (Bedding 3)

Another possible answer to the 

airlift shortfall is to rely more heavily 

on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet or even 

switch over completely to a contracted 

airlift. Major Dale L. Dekinder of the 

U.S. Air Force considers the plausibility 

of this option in his thesis, Express It: 

Privatization of Airlift, but finally rejects 

it, quoting LeMay, “The military has 

core airlift needs of crucial importance 

at the outset of emergencies that reliance 

for anything but a seasoned, properly 

equipped, disciplined military force is 

a folly....Where the security of the free 

world is suddenly threatened, we cannot 

wait for the acquisition of commercial 

airlift” (7). Also, there are many limitations on the military use of commercial aircraft, including the inability of 

such aircraft to transport outsized army 

equipment, the political ramifications of 

flying commercial aircraft into dangerous combat zones, and the fact that 

commercial aircraft are not capable of 

aerial refueling (Strategic 7). 
47

A more plausible solution to the 

airlift shortfall is the direct bolstering of 

the airlift fleet by increasing the funding 

of airlift organizations and purchasing 

more aircraft. Such action must also 

include the gradual replacement of the 

aging fleet’s current inventory. Specifically, both Nichols and Page agree that a 

greater number of C-17 Globemaster III 

aircraft would best improve overall capability. As a critical part of the modern 

national strategy and a prerequisite for 

the timely deployment and sustainment 

of forces in all military operations outside the United States, airlift must 

be given the priority, funding, and 

resources needed to be effective. This 

is not the part of the budget to compromise on.

After careful analysis, it is clear 

that the United States will need to bolster its airlift forces if it is to continue to 

meet and overcome the ever increasing 

need for airlift in the twenty-first century. Despite the incredible capabilities 

of the United States’ airlift assets; there 

is still a shortfall due to ever increasing 

demands, the transition to a continental 

force, aging aircraft, and budget constraints. Now is the time for the United 

States to take action, bolster its airlift 

forces, and safeguard the effectiveness 

of the most dominant military in the 

world. 

Works Cited

About.com. 28 Oct. 2002. About, Inc. 28 

Oct. 2002 <http://usmilitary.about.com/

library/ milinfo/affacts/blaffacts.htm>. 

Airlift 2025: The First with the Most. 

Ed. James A. Fellows. 11 Dec. 1996. 

Air University. 28 Oct. 2002 <http://

www.au.af.mil

au/2025/volume2/chap04/v2c4-1.htm>.

Bedding Down with C-O-T-S. Ed. Christopher J. Bence. 4 March 2002. Air University. 28 Oct. 2002 <https://research.au.af.mil/

js/papers/display_abstract.asp?guidelinks=759>.

“Civil Reserve Air Fleet.” Global Security. 

Ed. John Pike. 8 Nov. 2001. 28 Oct. 

2002 <http:// www.globalsecurity.org/

military/

systems/aircraft/craf.htm>.

Express It: Privatization of Airlift. Ed. Dale 

L. DeKinder. 1992. Global Security. 

28 Oct. 2002 < 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military

/library/report/1992/DDL.htm>.

Keeping MAC Airborne. Ed. J E. Page. 

1992. Global Security. 28 Oct. 2002 

<http://www.globalsecurity.org

/military/library/report/1992/PJE.htm>.

Strategic Mobility for the Future. Ed. 

William L. Nichols. 1993. Global 

Security. 28 Oct. 2002 < http://

www.globalsecurity.org/

miitary/library/report/1993/NWL.htm>.

U.S. Air Force Online Encyclopedia. 

Air University. 28 Oct. 2002 

<http://www.au.af.mil/au/ 

database/projects/ay1996/acsc/96-004/index.htm>.

.

“The old aphorism that 

amateurs talk about strategy while professionals 

talk about logistics was validated again in the Falklands. The outcome of the 

battle maybe seen to be a 

failure of Argentine logistics and a major success of 

British logistics.”

John F. Lehman, Jr.

“Understand that the foundation of an army is the 

belly. It is necessary to 

procure nourishment for 

the soldier wherever you 

assemble him and wherever you wish to conduct 

him. This is the primary 

duty of a general.”

Fredrick the Great
48

The Role of Air Power in 

Peacekeeping and Peacemaking

by C2C John Oberle

As technology advances, air 

forces are now able to fly higher, faster 

and more out of harm’s way than before. 

Despite the recent resurgence of patriotism in the American people, there 

is still a risk-averse mentality that tolerates very few American casualties overseas. These factors make it tempting 

for policy makers to frequently use the 

military only in situations where there is 

very little chance of exposure to danger. 

This not only reduces the effective spectrum of military operations, it degrades 

the foundation upon which the military 

is based, that is, to devote one’s life to 

the preservation of the Constitution and 

the values that it represents. The use 

of air power in a peacekeeping or peacemaking application must not be seen 

as a “cure-all” but rather as part of a 

joint force venture in which it serves 

to greatly enhance the effectiveness of 

peacekeeping forces. This paper will 

explore the use of air power in the 

Kosovo Campaign, relate the dangers 

of solely using air power, and how to 

employ air power in peacekeeping operations.

An excellent, recent application 

of air power in peacemaking operations 

would be NATO’s air campaign over 

Kosovo in 1999. This example serves to 

highlight both the negative and positive 

aspects of using air power in peacemaking operations. Many proponents of a 

new kind of warfare which solely uses 

air forces point to the Kosovo campaign 

as an example of a turning point in warfare. They cite statistics such as the 

Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 

General Wesley Clark’s, briefing to the 

press on the findings of NATO’s Kosovo 

Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team. 

These statistics include 93 tanks, 153 

armored personnel carriers, 339 military vehicles and 398 artillery pieces 

being destroyed or disabled by NATO 

air strikes (Could it Have Been Done 

Better?). They also cite the very appealing fact that in the air strikes, there 

were no NATO casualties. In addition, 

claimants point out the measures used 

to prevent civilian or collateral damage, 

such as precision guidance systems and 

timing. In the end, Milosevic was 

forced to surrender after 78 days of air 

strikes against his forces and submitted 

to the demands of NATO.

But in the end, what was the 

cost? Flying at high altitudes led to 

difficulty in acquiring targets. On 14 

April 1999, a pilot mistook an Albanian 

refugee convoy for a military column, 

resulting in dozens of civilian casualties. 

While these kinds of incidents were few 

in number, they embarrassed NATO 

in the world political scene (Air Power 

Over Kosovo). The air campaign effectively forced Milosevic to capitulate, but 

its effectiveness in implementation left 

much to be desired. In reducing 

the capability of Serbian forces to 

accomplish ethnic cleansing, one of 

the goals of the air campaign, the air 

strikes proved to be only marginally 

effective. Most military assets remained 

unharmed due to targeting restrictions, 

concealment and deception. Air strikes 

provided political protection of the 

Albanians, but did not achieve physical 

protection of the Albanians, meaning 

that they could only serve as a punitive 

act against Serbs after they harmed 

the Albanians. This is a result of 

the fact that since ground troops were 

not deployed, NATO could not stop 

the acceleration of the ethnic cleansing 

while it was happening. Although the 

Serbs eventually were pacified, they succeeded in displacing 1.3 million Albanian Kosovars. While planners originally believed that Milosevic would give 

in to demands after two days of bombing, it took 78 days to achieve his surrender. The supposed lightning air campaign lasted far longer than any of the 

NATO planners predicted (Hinen).

So what exactly are the limitations of solely using air power in 

peacekeeping or peacemaking operations? First, limits exist regarding the 

effectiveness of operations when using 

only air power. Secondly, there are 

inherent dangers to the image of the 

United States. The limit in effectiveness 

can be readily seen in the Kosovo example, where the lack of ground troops 

led to extreme difficulty in protecting 

Albanians under attack. As a result, 

air power served only as a punitive 

action. This means that the application 

of air power in this case is limited 

to long-term strategic objectives rather 

than short-term tactical goals. Furthermore, a psychological cost must be paid 

in order to fly out of harm’s way. While 

this cannot be measured directly in 

terms of dollars or manpower, it is manifested in America’s image. By ensuring 

that there are no American casualties 

in exchange for some “acceptable” collateral damage and civilian fatalities, 

the actions of the military can be construed as promoting the negative idea 

that American lives are far more valuable than the lives of others. More 

radical supporters of this view suggest 

that point that civilian’s lives are taken 

in order to avoid American casualties. 

While this may not be the intent of 

those making policy, the unintended 

cases of civilian casualties convince 

people otherwise and cost America 

politically. 

So what are the ways in which 

air power should be applied? To answer 

this question, we must divide the applications into the categories of lethal and 

non-lethal application. However, in 

either of these cases, it is very important 

to make air power a joint venture, 

not a “magical bullet” which will solve 
49

every situation’s problems. In terms of 

lethal application, air power should be 

employed both in a strategic and tactical 

manner. Just as in Kosovo, air power 

should be used strategically to attack 

enemy centers of gravity such as infrastructure or the population’s will to support a regime. This can reduce the enemy’s will or capability to fight. Tactical 

applications include close air support 

of friendly forces or force protection of 

fielded personnel. In lethal applications, 

the use of air power will resemble the 

same tactics and strategy used to employ 

air power in any other war. 

However, it is important not to 

overlook the non-lethal application of 

air power in peacekeeping operations. 

Firstly, air power can play a critical 

role in communications, which is an 

integral part of any successful operation. 

Through the use of satellites, communication within and between units is 

quicker and more reliable than ground 

based assets. Also, air-borne platforms 

can provide a needs-based augmentation 

of existing command, control and communications networks in a flexible and 

reliable manner (Cook). 

Secondly, air power plays a large 

role in intelligence capabilities. The 

use of air power for observation is a 

large aspect of airborne intelligence support. Unhampered by the restraints 

of ground-based assets, air units can 

quickly provide large amounts of data 

to the analysts, whether it is through 

a satellite, an unmanned reconnaissance 

vehicle, or through patrolling aircraft. 

Imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, measures and signatures intelligence, and electronic intelligence can 

provide forces on the ground much 

needed tactical intelligence about the 

enemy’s size, movement, and composition. In addition, it provides strategic 

targets and allows planners to know 

more of the enemy’s activities than with 

just ground forces. Air power is also 

very important in distributing psychological operations material by air dropping them over the target, whether it is 

enemy soldiers or the enemy population 

(Bash).

Thirdly, air power plays an 

incredible role in peacekeeping operations in the field of mobility. Of all 

the non-lethal applications of air power, 

mobility is probably the largest of them 

all. Mobility is used in peacekeeping 

by global reach and power projection 

through the use of airlift and aerial 

refueling. This allows forces to deploy 

to austere locations around the world 

with little or no existing support infrastructure. This also provides stability 

throughout various regions of the world 

by ensuring that American presence and 

prestige is visibly observed by other 

countries. In addition to making enemies reluctant to act, it also encourages 

support of the United States from other 

countries. It does this by strengthening 

the bonds between America and countries that receive humanitarian aid, 

which relies heavily upon military logistical support. It also improves the 

image of the United States by allowing 

the rapid response needed to declare 

America’s resolve to diffuse crises around 

the world. Finally, it promotes nonlethal means of intervention because it 

allows situations to be resolved before 

the need for military force arises. 

Examples of applications of air mobility 

in peacekeeping are the airlifting of food 

and medical supplies during Operation 

Provide Promise in Bosnia, a massive 

relief effort to people of the former 

Soviet Union in Tajikistan during Provide Hope, and the airlifting of 1,000 

UN peacekeeping forces and their supplies in support of Operation Impressive Lift in Somalia, just to name a few 

examples (Hauck, 19-26).

In conclusion, the use of air 

power in peacekeeping operations is 

vital to many operational successes. 

However, it is important to understand 

that the use of air power can not win a 

war or resolve a conflict by itself. While 

it is possible to bomb an enemy into 

submission, as demonstrated by NATO’s 

Kosovo campaign, such actions carry 

with it political and psychological implications onto the American national 

image, and may not always be replicated 

with great results. In other words, air 

power serves a strategic and tactical purpose in the application of peacekeeping 

by destroying enemy forces and targets, 

but also serves as an auxiliary to augment ground forces through communication, intelligence, and mobility and 

must be an integrated part of any force 

package for any peacekeeping operation.

Bibliography

Bash, LtCol Brooks L., USAF. “Air 

Power and Peacekeeping.” Airpower 

Journal. (Spring 1995).

Cook, Major Gregory P., USAF. 

“Waging Peace: The Non-Lethal Application of Aerospace Power.” Federation 

of American Scientists. 22 May 1995. 

2 Oct 2002 å@<http://www.fas.org/spp/

eprint/cook.htm>.

“Could it have been done better?” 

Federation of American Scientists. 21 

Mar 2000. 2 Oct 2002 <http:// 

www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/2000/

repo2000/better.htm>

Hauck, John D., USAF. “Non-Lethal 

Air Power—Air Mobility’s Other Mission.” Air War College Air University. 

14 Apr 1995. 3 Oct 2002 <http:/

/www.au.af.mil/au/ database/projects/

ay1995/awc/hauckjd.pdf>.

Hinen, Col Anthony L., USAF. 

“Kosovo: ‘The Limits of Air Power 

II’.” Air & Space Power Chronicles. 

16 May 2000. 2 Oct 2002 <http:/
50

/www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/

airchronicles /cc/hinen.html>.

International Institute of Strategic Studies. “Air Power Over Kosovo: A Historic 

Victory.” Strategic Comments. 28 Sep 

1999. 

INFO OPS: the Need for 

Organization

by C2C Jamison Richart

The advent of Information 

Operations (IO) as an official military 

task has summoned the problem of how 

to best organize such a prospective group 

of people. As it currently stands those 

responsible for IO planning are attached 

to a diverse group of organizations and 

have no unified agenda, process, or organization. For IO to become truly 

successful standardized methods must be 

set down to ensure the expansion of 

IO methodology and organization. The 

shear amount of information and communication that Info Ops demand require 

that those involved in the task of IO 

be organized in such a way to maximize 

their available resources, speed, and flexibility while at the same time preserve 

security and the independence of the 

military services. 

There are several problems existing in today’s military that require the use 

of a strong IO program capable of supporting military objectives. The Wave 

Theory proposes 3 different levels of 

human civilizations, with the third being 

one with highly advanced highly trained 

armies. These armies are capable of striking not only with conventional weapons, 

but also with use of technology and information. The enemies of the modern, at 

least those of rational minds, no longer 

consider the United States conquerable 

by conventional means. Instead the 

terrorists and states of the world are 

beginning to attack the United States 

by non-traditional methods. They have 

elements of Third Wave Civilizations as 

they are not attacking en mass. Instead 

they are attacking in small groups using 

sophisticated techniques. As realized by 

several experiences during military and 

civil projects an enemy now exists that 

is not a recognizable army with guns, 

rather it is the small cell of dedicated 

professionals who are dedicated to damaging the United States through the use 

of information. 1 These groups are hard 

to track, can be found in great numbers, 

and consider the United States their primary target. This makes them a dedicated enemy with unpredictable methods 

and varied talents, this in turn makes 

them dangerous. A second type of 

enemy using Info Ops against the United 

States is the more traditional organized 

state. The United States is not popular 

amongst certain states of the world and 

these states are organizing to wage this 

new type of warfare against the United 

States. While reportedly not as advanced 

as the United States these states are developing the capability to attack the United 

States dealing with IO:

China’s military, faced with powerful and technically advanced 

U.S. combat forces, is exploring 

the use of computer viruses, 

information warfare and stock 

market manipulation as 

non-traditional “weapons” to 

offset America’s huge military 

advantage. 2

If left untended and unprepared for, 

these states could pose a serious threat to 

the security to the United States in the 

coming decades.

Both of these examples of enemy 

elements will be using different methods 

to attack the United States. The common 

thought is that Info Ops is a group of 

men at computers attempting sabotage 

against one another. While this “computer hacking” is to some degree true of 

one aspect, the world of Info Ops is more 

extensive. Info Ops covers the realms 

of advertising, public media, disinformation, stealing of information and several 

other possibilities in addition to the stereotyped computer world. Essentially, 

a program meant to use information to 

manipulate the enemy can be considered IO. This makes the possibilities for 

enemy attack numerous, and the capability for defense and possible counterattack essential.

In order to have the capability 

to counter all these potential threats, the 

United States must organize its forces in 

such a way as to make its defense as flexible and powerful as possible. This paper 

will review three proposed methods for 

the basic structure of IO personal. The 

pros and cons of each structure will be 

addressed in terms of practical application, varied theories, and “the OODA 

construct” for the purpose of discovering 

the possibility of the best method for the 

overall structure of IO. While a specific 

chain of command with defined career 

criteria will not be expounded upon, the 

basic underlying structure will.

Method I, Leaving As Is.

The idea of IO is not new. Since the 

beginning of organized warfare Info 

Ops have been waged in order to 

gain advantages over enemies. Sun 

Tzu himself expounded upon the 

use of Info Ops as a critical component of warfare that could gain ultimate victory:

The Master Conqueror frustrated his 

enemy’s plans and disrupted his alliances. He created cleavages between 

sovereign and minister, superiors and 

inferiors, commanders and subordinates. His spies and agents were 

active everywhere, gathering information, sowing dissension, and nurturing subversion. The enemy was 

isolated and demoralized; his will to 
51

resist broken. Thus without battle 

his army was conquered. 3

 It should come then as no surprise that 

the United States military does conduct 

Info Ops on a regular basis. Most notable are the Psy Ops campaigns conducted 

successfully during numerous occasions. 

4

 Thus the United States has successfully conducted Info Ops for a great 

deal of its military history against traditional threats. However, the nature of 

the threat is changing and as such so does 

the organization of our defenses. 

The standard methods at present for 

training technology based Info Ops personal are not standardized. 5 The theories existing about how to best handle 

the technology threat are too new and 

varied and the methods often times to 

complicated to have any standard methodology. 6 As such there is no specific 

job placement for those trained in the 

nature of Info Ops. Instead Info Ops 

has become a function of the more established fields within the military such as 

communications and intelligence. 7

 This practice has lead to a 

rather limited exposure to procedures 

dealing with Info Ops, and methods for 

combating the enemy are only recently 

receiving wide spread exposure quote. 

The issue is compounded by the lack 

of resources now dedicated to Info Ops. 

Being such a new area of warfare it has 

yet to gain the type of popular support 

needed for large-scale research and development. 8

The obvious solution to these 

problems is of course standardized training, resource allocation, and increased 

R&D. This would enable more trained 

personal familiar with the craft in addition to better equipment and methods. 

This would increase the capability of the 

armed forces to handle many of the problems that they may face in the future. 

However, the system would still resemble the current one of random personal 

subservient to larger units. Problems 

exist with the process of personal being 

trained to do tasks that their unit does 

not do, no matter how well trained and 

equipped. Without a specialized career 

field for support the job of Info Ops will 

not receive the priority it needs in order 

to function at its utmost capability. 9 The 

primary mission of the host unit will take 

precedence and the individual missions 

of the Info Ops personal will receive secondary considerations. If we borrow a 

lesson from the OODA loop and look 

at the last portion of “Act” we can safely 

say that the current organization cannot 

effectively execute its decisions. 10

 The inability for those involved 

IO to execute their decisions is problem 

using this model to organize IO. Considering the already stated growing nature 

of the threat this is a dangerous proposition.

At its present state of existence 

IO personal, at least those assigned to the 

military, are organized in a pattern that 

does not resemble any functional organization. As explained by several theorists the United States military follows 

a rather haphazard method for preparing its forces to combat this new type of 

threat:

A culture of change, flexibility and 

adaptability is more important to 

transforming the military than simply 

having new hardware, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told students... 11

While the US military does manage to 

successfully combat the more traditional 

Info Ops such as Psy Ops, it is nevertheless struggling with the emerging technological threat. The solution of simply 

more training and resources is no an 

ideal solution, a more complete restructuring is needed.

Option II: The Independent Info Ops 

Group

The most famous information 

gathering and exploitation groups in history exist in the United States as independent organizations with the resources 

to carry out their specific tasks. The CIA 

and NSA both cater to the need of Info 

Ops and do so in a manner that is independent of any other organizations, and 

they are considered successful in what 

they do. It has been suggested that what 

the military needs is a new branch of service that would serve in a similar capacity as the CIA and NSA. 12

 Much as the Air Force grew out of 

the Army, it is now time for an Info 

Ops branch of service to develop from 

all the services to serve as their intelligence offensive and defensive capability, 

and in the process be independent of all 

of them.

The advantages from such an 

organization are readily recognizable. 

The most identifiable are that this option 

readily rids us of the problems that exist 

in the current system. This independent 

organization would have the soul purpose of training and equipping its personal for its primary mission, that of 

conduction the process of conducting 

modern Info Ops against the enemy and 

for the defense of the branches of the 

military against Info Ops directed against 

them. This resolves the apparent crises 

caused by shortage of manpower and 

acquisition of resources faced by the current branches of the military in handling this new field of expertise. Second 

to this is the additional advantage of 

having a centralized group of people 

with common training, end goals, and 

capabilities, that being that the mission 

is done comparatively better and more 

quickly then if a decentralized effort is 

made with non-standard training and 

improper resources.13

The greatest hazard to the idea 
52

of a separate IO corps is the tendency for 

a large organization to become self-serving. This is the main standing complaint 

with existing organizations such as the 

CIA and NSA, that the information collected by these groups is not sent where 

it is needed in the military world due to 

concerns of security on behalf of these 

intelligence organizations:

The bad news is that all of the 

hype could impede sensible policy analysis, cloud objective resource allocation 

decisions, and mask real technical and 

operational risks and vulnerabilities. In 

the scramble for turf and budget shares, 

clear thinking about the relative value of 

information, in all of its various dimensions and implications for the U.S. military, has too often been a casualty. 

That could lead to unfortunate structural changes in organizations, inadequate analysis of critical issues, and a 

failure to prioritize effectively in applying information technology to warfare 

and broader national security concerns.

14

The phrase “need to know only” 

are often times a great hindrance to military operations as the organizations such 

as the CIA and NSA often determine 

what exactly “need to know” is, and their 

definition often comes into conflict with 

the military’s definition. This tendency 

may well come into play with a brand 

new branch of service, that it may consider it’s own interests before those of its 

sister branches it is supposed to be serving. As with the already existing branches 

of service a new Info Ops Branch may 

in time consider its own interests above 

those it is meant to work with. This 

conflicts with the ideal second step of 

the OODA loop. With the IO branch 

very capable of observing the a situation 

it will nevertheless become incapable of 

passing along the information. The end 

result being that the branch of service 

affected will be unable to properly orient 

itself to the new threat. This will result 

with parts of the military unable to correctly complete their own missions, as 

their capabilities for information would 

rely solely with this new branch of service. With the Navy, Army, and Air Force 

just beginning to understand the benefits and capabilities of joint operations it 

is difficult to imagine how complicated 

it would be to create a new branch of 

service without it causing much confusion and speculation in the foreseeable 

future.

Third Option: Specialized Career Field

The third and final option that 

will be discussed is the idea of a career 

field within the services that would deal 

specifically IO. This option compromises between the two before mentioned 

options and incorporates many of the 

positive aspects each have to offer. What 

this specific option proposes is that a new 

career field be created in a implanted in 

the services in a rather delicate balance 

between a supporting role and a main 

role.

The advantages of this option 

are that it does manage to take advantages from both the option to maintain 

the status quo and from creating a separate branch. From the first option we 

simply strengthen what already exists and 

capitalize on the experiences that have 

been gained thus far. The pool of talent 

and knowledge exists in the branches of 

service at present, it is simply not being 

coordinated properly nor properly used. 

If it is possible with this option to centralize the talents from the ranks of the 

military and gather the resources necessary to complete the varied missions 

of IO then this alone makes it viable. 

The strengths gathered from the second 

option, that of a separate branch, is that 

creating a new career field gives the practice of IO legitimacy with the structure 

necessary to enforce its views and practices:

The current arrangement on the 

Joint Staff presents some unique 

challenges as no one is actually in 

charge. The J3 and J6 principals are 

too busy to dedicate the constant 

attention this area requires and dayto-day responsibility for IW on the 

Joint Staff is delegated. A need 

exists for direct flag officer sponsorship to orchestrate joint IW policy 

and doctrine development, conduct 

operational planning, and establish 

requirements. A dedicated flag officer sponsor would greatly facilitate 

coordination with Services, OSD, 

the Intelligence Community and as 

IW matures, the interagency and 

civilian sectors. It would also send a 

strong message that IW is an important joint war fighting issue requiring immediate high-level attention.

15

A problem with IO as it exists today is 

that many of those in charge do not consider it a primary concern and concentrate a great deal of effort instead on the 

conventional modes of war, that of guns, 

missile, and armed troops. If the structure would exist that those that in charge 

would have to take into consideration 

IO then this option would serve its purpose.

The foreseeable problem with 

this option is one that deals with the role 

of IO in future campaigns. Traditionally the feeling has been that IO should 

exist as a supporting role in the military. 

IO and its many faces have been used 

to support the missions that are the primary purposes of the different services: 

Air, Land, and Sea Supremacy 16. In its 

new position as separate career field it 

can still act in this capacity, as a source 

of power augmentation for the primary 

goals of the different services. However, 

as the danger of IO increases from outside sources then the importance of IO 

will increase as well. 17 In time it is possi-
53

ble that IO will become a separate battlefield in itself and its success will become 

primary mission as well. The separate 

services will need the talents that an IO 

can provide as a force enhancer, but IO 

will have to serve in the capacity as a primary role as well. 18 This dual purpose of 

both primary and support roles may lead 

to several complications of interest, not 

the least of which are resource allocation 

and command structure. The standing 

practice is that during times of crises the 

majority of the resources will go to those 

caring out the primary mission and not 

those serving in a support role. Potentially this will cause problems within the 

OODA loop for the ability to act. The 

first steps of Observe and Orient will be 

carried out well, however with the indecision caused by serving two purposes it 

will be difficult to decide how to best 

serve the best purpose. If the IO career 

field must potentially serve both purposes at the same time then how will 

it use its resources and share them with 

others in the military. This dilemma 

will in turn lead to problems in command, and who has jurisdiction in times 

of crises: 

There is a twofold problem: determining 

how to increase the relative importance 

of information and information-related 

specialties in the overall scheme of things 

and how to integrate information effectively into military operations. The usual 

approach to upgrading career specialties 

in the military involves creating separate 

commands and organizations (e.g., “centers”). Unfortunately, there is a natural 

tension between this approach and the 

need to integrate information more effectively into the entire spectrum of operations. Creating separate organizations 

tends to isolate rather than integrate, confuse means and ends, and mix disparate 

functions in an inappropriate manner. 19

Is it the IO commander who 

decides what information is needed to 

complete the mission and does not release 

anything else, or is it the battlefield commander who decides what he needs and 

IO must supply it? These factors must 

be worked out in order for IO to be successfully integrated as a separate career.

Conclusion: What is the Best Solution?

All three possibilities offer differing levels of pros and cons. What is 

needed is to decide what option is best 

for the military in the future; what are 

the priorities and which option is best 

suited for these priorities. In the future 

the threats will be coming from many 

different factions, using many different 

modes, and seeking many different goals. 

It is specifically the job of the military to 

track down such parties and ensure their 

defeat.

The United States military is 

being asked to conduct a new type of warfare that consists of defense and offense 

using information as the weapon available. It must now combat against any 

person or group of people with access 

to a computer or the media. This 

requires a system that incorporates the 

large amount of resources and training 

to battle necessary to combat this threat, 

has the inherit flexibility to adjust to the 

evolving threats, and have the ability to 

work with other groups within the military. 

With this in mind the option of 

a new field within the armed forces is 

the preferred option of the three. While 

it does it have its potential drawbacks it 

nevertheless combines the assets needed 

to handle the potential IO threat. It 

entails the already existing capability of 

the military to produce trained personal 

with the resources and command structure inherent with a separate branch. 

While nothing exists like it today, and 

several problems must be resolved for it 

to be a viable option, it nevertheless represents the option with the most desirable end process. The ability to have a 

functional unit of IO operators who are 

attached and dedicated to a branch of the 

military is necessary for the future of IO. 

This arrangement will ideally have the 

power and flexibility to wage successful 

IO campaigns. A separate career within 

the military specifically dedicated to 

IO is what is needed to most satisfactorily handle the potential threats in the 

upcoming decades.

Works Cited

Alberts, D.S., The Unintended Consequences of Information Age 

Technologies, National Defense 

University, <www.ndu.edu/ndu/

inss/books/uc/uchome.html> 

April 1996

Alberts, D.S., Defensive Information 

Warfare. NDU Press Book, 

National Defense University, 

August 1996.

Browning, G., 

Infowar.<www.GovExec.Com>, 

April 21, 1997. 

Forno, Richard. The Art of Information 

Warfare. Uppublish. New York. 

1999. 

Fredericks, B., Information Warfare: 

The Organizational Dimension, 

Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, National Defense University <www.ndu.edu/inss/siws/

ch4.html>, 1997

Glenn Buchan. Information War and the 

Air Force: Wave of the Future? 

Current Fad? <www.rand.org/

publications/IP/IP149/> March 

1996 

Jim Garamone. Flexibility, Adaptability 

at Heart of Military 

Transformation. 
54

American Forces Press Service. 

Fort Lesley. Jan. 31, 2002

Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Oxford University Press: London. 1968.

Miller, J.H., Information Warfare: Issues 

and Perspectives, Institute for 

National. Strategic Studies, 

National Defense University 

<www.ndu.edu/inss/siws/

ch7.html> March 1995

Wood, David. China Explores Ways 

to Defeat Superior U.S. Forces 

In Fight

‘Weapons’ Include Computer 

Viruses, Market Manipulation” 

San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 

20, 2001

(Footnotes) 1

 Arquilla, John, David Ronfeldt. ’s 

Camp, Preparing for Conflict 

in the Information Age. 

RAND: Santa Monica, Ca. 

1997, 232 2

Wood,David. 

‘Weapons’ Include Computer 

Viruses, Market Manipulation”. 

San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 

20, 2001, 54

3

 Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Oxford University Press. London, 1968, 

54.

4

 Psychological Operations. Air Force 

Doctrine Documents 2-5.3. 27 

August 1999, 1.

5

Forno, Richard. The Art of Information Warfare. Uppublish. New 

York. 1999, 11.

6

 Ibid. 22

7

Browning, G., Infowar. 

www.GovExec.Com

8

 Alberts, D.S., The Unintended Consequences of Information Age 

Technologies, National Defense 

University, April 1996

9

 Ibid

10 Miller, J.H., Information Warfare: 

Issues and Perspectives, Institute for National. Strategic 

Studies, National Defense University < 

11 Jim Garamone. Flexibility, 

Adaptability at Heart of Military Transformation

American Forces Press Service 

Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 

Jan. 31, 2002, 3.

12 Alberts, D.S., Defensive Information 

Warfare.

13 Miller, J.H., Information Warfare: 

Issues and Perspectives, Institute for National. Strategic 

Studies, National Defense University < > March 1995

14 Glenn Buchan. Information War and 

the Air Force: Wave of the 

Future? Current Fad? <> 

15 Fredericks, B., Information Warfare: 

The Organizational Dimension 

, Institute for National. 

Strategic Studies, National 

Defense University 

<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/siws/

ch4.html>, 1997

16 Ibid

17 Ibid

18 Ibid

19 Ibid

Street Wars: 

MOUT and the 

United States Air Force

by CIC Lee A. Staab III

“Best policy in war—thwart the 

enemy’s strategy, second best—disrupt his 

alliances through diplomacy, third best—

attack his army in the field, worst strategy—attack walled cities” (Sun Tzu). 

Revolution in the Cities

Some of the experts in the past 

have declared that only fools fight in 

cities. That may have been the rule of 

thumb in the past, but to make such 

a pronouncement and abide by it is to 

shut ones eyes to the inevitability of the 

future. The future of warfare lies in the 

streets, sewers, high-rise buildings, industrial parks, and the sprawl of houses, 

shacks, and shelters that form some of 

the broken cities of our world. We will 

fight elsewhere, but as cities and civilizations expand the battlefield of the 

future will be the cities of the world. 

The battle of Grozny in Chechnya, Task 

Force Ranger in Somalia, and the current 

crisis between Palestine and Israel are all 

modern day examples of Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). This 

paper will examine the difficulties and 

limitations in conducting MOUT, and 

based on these difficulties and limitations 

examine how and why information operations and the Air Force will play a vital 

role in these operations. These difficulties and the Air Force’s capabilities will 

be used to answer whether or not force 

structure changes need to be made and 

whether or not the military is in the 

midst of a revolution in military affairs.

Information operations is 

defined as “those actions taken to gain, 

exploit, defend, or attack information 

systems and include both informationin-warfare and information warfare and 

are conducted throughout all phases of 

an operation and across the range of 
55

military operations” (AFDD 2-5, 2). 

The focus on information operations is 

brought about by the preponderance of 

past evidence that such operations are the 

key to successful operations in an urban 

environment. This view is far reaching 

for the Air Force because the Air Force 

is the largest purveyor of information in 

our military. The Air Force supports 

MOUT in two ways, through information operations and through combat 

support which, for the purposes of this 

paper, will be focused on close air support, in which information operations 

plays a large part. In order to establish a 

basis for this paper the difficulties faced 

in past urban operations must be examined.

Difficulties Faced in the Past

Difficulties faced in the past 

were command, control and communication impedance, friendly fire, identification of civilians, friends and foes and 

collateral damage. Two specific cases of 

urban combat will be examined throughout the paper for specific examples (Battle 

of Grozny and Task Force Ranger) but 

it is the difficulty in establishing good 

C3 that needs to be examined first. Task 

Force Ranger in Somalia got out of hand 

when the units involved became separated and lost contact with each other. 

Why is real time situational 

awareness in an urban environment so 

important and why is good command 

control and communication difficult to 

establish? An article that appeared in the 

U.S. Army War College Quarterly examined the importance of cities in future 

warfare and also examined some of the 

difficulties of fighting in such an environment. When comparing traditional 

warfare to urban warfare, it is apparent, 

at the broadest level of examination, that 

there is a “profound spatial difference” 

between the two (Peters 197). “Traditional” warfare has typically been horizontal, with an increasing vertical dimension. In fully urbanized terrain, however, warfare becomes profoundly vertical, reaching both up “into towers of steel 

and cement,” and downward beneath the 

streets into sewers, subway lines, road 

tunnels, communication tunnels and the 

like. The difficulty in maintaining a real 

time operational picture comes from the 

multi dimensional battlefield of urban 

terrain. The multidimensional aspect 

“fragments units” and “compartmentalizes” encounters, engagements and battles. The leader’s span of control can 

easily collapse and maintaining an accurate picture of the multidimensional battlefield proves very difficult. The Army 

and Marines are taking steps to distribute communication down to the lower 

levels—even to the individual soldier in 

some cases. There is also talk of a “digitized” soldier whose every movement can 

be monitored, but it is important for 

those on the ground to know where their 

counterparts are, not just those located 

in a command bunker outside the battle 

zone (Peters 198). These are advancements the Army and Marines are making, 

what can the Air Force do to improve 

this situation?

The Air Force can provide support through information operations. 

Information in war will play a huge part, 

especially in the area of real time surveillance. “The hardest thing in an urban 

environment is finding the enemy,” (Ackerman). Real time surveillance should 

be provided by unmanned aerial vehicles 

such as the predator (though I’m sure 

better technologies and platforms for this 

purpose will come out) and platforms of 

that nature. These unmanned platforms 

can fly at lower speeds than manned airplanes and there is the factor that if they 

are shot down there is no loss of human 

life and no downed pilot to rescue. This 

system should be set up so that those on 

the ground can request specific locations 

to be observed and the video fed directly 

to those on the ground. This would 

require a high bandwidth and secure data 

feed with a light weight receiver for those 

on the ground. Another useful platform 

would be an unmanned UAV that was 

able to act as a thermal imaging platform, again providing data to those on 

the ground when they need it.

The urban environment also 

causes disruptions in short range communications and traditional systems, such as 

radios, experience “reception anomalies” 

(Richards 198). The Air Force might be 

able to counter act this by providing a 

man/unmanned relay station in the air 

or maybe a system where communication was relayed by satellites. The point 

is that one of the Air Force’s roles in 

MOUT would be providing an operational picture of the battlefield and reliable communication network. This realtime picture is also essential in minimizing civilian casualties and incidences 

of fratricide, both of which occur much 

more frequently in an urban environment than anywhere else.

Intelligence/

Counter Information

A wise man once said, “Know 

thy enemy and know thyself.” Gaining 

an intelligence picture in Somalia proved 

to be a difficult task. The U.S. military 

was operating on the highest technology 

in the world while the Somalis were 

operating with relatively unsophisticated 

technology. “They used the simplest 

weapons and made minimal use of 

modern communication equipment...

rarely using telephones or radios and 

ha[d] no radar-controlled air defense systems” (Akers, 7). As a result of this 

extreme dichotomy in capabilities, typical Air Force’s intelligence gathering 

capabilities such as SIGINT, COMINT, 

ELINT, and other such passive methods 

were effectively negated with no effort at 

all. The United States cannot fall prey 

to the mistake of “mirror-imaging” its 

own capabilities/vulnerabilities and must 

adapt to the situation. What is needed 

in circumstances like this is a more active 
56

approach, such as using unmanned aerial 

vehicles to conduct around the clock 

ISR operations. Human intelligence 

(HUMINT) plays an increased role in 

these situations but acquiring such assets 

can be extremely difficult to come by.

Sometimes the simplest enemy 

asset is the most overlooked, and it proves 

to be the most useful. In the Battle 

of Grozny the weapon of choice for the 

Chechens was the rocket propelled grenade launcher (Thomas 209). What was 

considered to be a second weapon by the 

Russians but was not a weapon at all 

was the “multitude of information-technology gadgets” used by the Chechens. 

Cellular phones and commercial scanner 

systems were of real importance. This 

system allowed the Chechens to communicate and coordinate combat operations with each other and also allowed 

Chechens to listen in on Russian conversations. This system proved to be an 

invaluable force-coordination multiplier. 

The “Russians felt the Chechens knew 

what they were going to do ahead of 

time,” hence the Russian’s view that the 

gadgets were like weapons. These are relatively inexpensive and readily available 

technologies and we have to be able to 

counteract them. Counter information 

and disinformation campaigns to negate 

these capabilities of the enemy must be 

undertaken. Jamming of communication systems while allowing our own to 

work, and protecting our own, is vital in 

establishing information superiority. It is 

true that technology will never be able to 

stop a pile of burning tires (Bowden 12) 

or a courier from delivering their message, but instead of virtually instantaneous communication over a cell phone, 

there is a significant passage of time 

before a courier reaches his destination 

and that just might make the difference 

in the end.

Combat Support

The Marines are developing a 

plan where their combined armed teams 

eschew elements such as artillery and air 

support for more of a “direct fire combined arms fight” (Ackerman). A combined arms approach and the ability to 

inflict damage through direct fire is a 

necessary capability, but why deny yourself an asset such as air support? Nothing 

saves the day like (accurate) air support 

when a ground unit is in a bind. For 

an example, one of the favored weapons 

used by Russia in the Battle of Grozny 

was a jet powered flame-thrower that 

was capable of the same effectiveness as 

152mm artillery rounds, and had a maximum range of fire of 1,000 meters, over 

half a mile (Thomas 209). Air support 

will play a role in urban combat, but in 

this environment it is the “slow mover” 

that reigns supreme.

To clarify, combat support in 

this scenario is more along the lines of 

close air support, brought about by a 

maintained presence in the area, not the 

strategic strikes in downtown Baghdad 

conducted by fast movers and stealth 

aircraft. Right now the AC-130 reigns 

supreme (for the Air Force) in conducting this type of mission, but employing 

that aircraft in an environment riddled 

with SAMs would most likely prove to 

be ineffective. The AC-130 is mainly 

employed at night for that reason, but 

there are times when the military will 

have to fight during the day. UAVs have 

already fired missiles in combat and will 

prove to be a viable alternative in such 

situations. They can also be used to conduct SEAD missions and pave the way 

for the heavy hitters. If the threat is 

made up of MANPADS and weapons of 

that nature, there is very little that the 

military can do to eliminate the threat 

entirely. Information operations prepare 

the battle field by providing precision 

targeting, navigation and positioning for 

weapons and platforms. This reveals a 

weakness in our approach to combat. 

GPS is a great system but has some vulnerability associated with it; precautions 

need to be undertaken to secure this 

system since it is so heavily relied upon. 

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)

One form of information operation gaining support over the years 

that cannot be overlooked is psychological operations. Psychological operations should (and hopefully will) play 

a large role in urban conflicts. Conducting psychological operations effectively is a demanding task that requires 

an understanding of the target audience 

and the development of an effective 

message. Once the category and message have been determined the PSYOP 

planner needs to determine the type of 

median to best disseminate the information.

Army field manual 33-1 and 

33-1-1 have outlined four different methods: face-to-face communication, audio 

visual means (television), audio media 

(radio or loudspeaker), and visual media 

(leaflets, newspapers, books, magazines 

and/or posters). The weapon is not how 

it’s sent, but the message it carries and 

how that message affects the recipient. 

Face-to-face (interpersonal) communication is the most effective means of transmitting a persuasive message. Audiovisual media such as television, electronic 

tape recordings, and sound motion pictures are the second most effective means 

of communication available to the psychological operator. Audio media (loudspeakers and radio) lend themselves to 

the transmission of brief, simple messages and to personalization by use of 

the human voice. They require little or 

no effort by the audience, and generally, 

they have more appeal than visual media. 

Also, the barrier of illiteracy may be 

more easily overcome with audio media 

than with visual media (printed material). Visual media can transmit long, 

complex material. Animated or still cartoons may be used to convey themes 

to illiterate and preliterate target audiences. Visual media generally have the 
57

least amount of popular appeal. Themes 

are reinforced and the target audience 

given broad coverage by using several 

media to deliver the same basic message. 

For example, radio and television can 

augment leaflets; face-to-face communication can support newspaper circulation.

The Air Force is able to employ 

the above methods in a variety of ways. 

One of the most used is distributing leaflets, which the Air Force accomplishes 

in a number of ways. Leaflets have 

been airdropped by hand, disseminated 

through high altitude free fall, using a 

static line, unmanned aerial vehicles, and 

the leaflet bomb. The leaflet bomb, 

which is exploded at altitude over a target 

area, is capable of distributing eighty 

thousand leaflets over an area. The Air 

Force’s EC-130 Commando Solo platform is the premier PSYOP platform of 

today and has a wide array of capabilities. 

One development that can be foreseen 

in the future is an unmanned aerial vehicle equipped with a loud speaker system, 

thus providing an around the clock presence with no risk to human operators.

They have proven their potential for greatly influencing the overall 

outcome of an operation. This was especially evident during the Gulf War. On 

Thanksgiving Day 1990, the 193rd Special Operations Wing began broadcasting 

“Voice of America” into the Kuwaiti theater of operations, helping to prepare the 

battlefield psychologically by offering the 

Iraqi soldiers food, bedding and medical 

care if they surrendered and reminded 

them of the consequences if they did not. 

These broadcasts, combined with the 

PSYOP leaflet and loudspeaker broadcast 

programs, were major motivating factors 

to the estimated one hundred thousand 

soldiers who surrendered or deserted by 

the war’s end (Psywarrior webpage). The 

technology level and literacy rates of the 

target audience impacts on what methods 

are available to carry out PSYOPs. The 

United States had taken into account 

the fact that a large percentage of the 

population of Afghanistan is illiterate by 

air-dropping thousands of radios for the 

people to use and listen to the broadcasts from the Commando Solo in the 

area. This is a good example of knowing and understanding the target audience; a process that the IO component of 

the military is heavily involved in. Effective PSYOP campaigns are an invaluable 

force-multiplier in a region. “To capture the enemy’s entire army is better 

than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better 

than to destroy them...To subdue the 

enemy without fighting is the supreme 

excellence” (Sun Tzu).

The U.S. military is not the only 

one that has the capability to participate 

in psychological operations. In Grozny, 

the Chechens conducted a very effective 

PSYOP campaign. The Chechens used 

mobile TV stations to override Russian 

TV transmissions and to deliver messages 

from President Dudayev directly to the 

people. The Internet was also utilized, 

in particular to raise funds and assistance 

from abroad (Thomas 209). This would 

indicate that the military will have to 

have the means to deny the enemy this 

capability and to counteract their actions 

through counter PSYOP campaigns. All 

of these actions, denial of information 

mediums and counter PSYOP, fall within 

the context of information operations.

Psychological operations does 

not apply solely to the adversary, it can 

also be applied to the combatants in the 

field and the civilians at home through 

public affairs and similar venues. Urban 

operations are manpower intensive. It is 

true that unmanned aerial vehicles can 

and will be used more and more in support of combat troops, and there has 

been talk of having robots follow infantry and armor battalions in order to conduct some of the riskier operations, but 

as of right now there is no technology 

that is even close to the level of sophistication necessary to successfully navigate 

and engage in the ever changing urban 

environment; it will be quite some time 

before real-life “Terminators” are fighting our wars. Until that time combat in 

urban operations will be fought mainly 

by human participants and as a result, 

such operations have the potential for 

a soaring casualty count. Reasons for 

this are the dynamic environment discussed earlier and the compartmentalizing of engagements, coupled with a 

higher potential for fratricide (hence the 

need for the real-time situational awareness). PSYOPs conducted by the public 

affairs can be used to galvanize the support from home that is so necessary 

in today’s interconnected world. Support from other countries is also needed 

and an effective PSYOP campaign is a 

method of ensuring that the support is 

there.

Force Structure

What the preceding paragraphs have 

demonstrated is that information operations will play an increased role in operations to come. There is also an underlying complexity in information operations. The definition itself is complex, 

and IO is further subdivided into information-in-warfare and information warfare. Information-in-war is composed 

of multiple elements mainly centered 

around ISR, but there are many components that make up information warfare: 

offensive and defensive counter information, PSYOP and counter PSYOP, 

computer network attack, deception and 

counter deception...the list goes on. The 

complex nature of IO makes the creation 

of an IO core within the Air Force an 

inevitable necessity. The inevitability of 

urban combat makes the formation of 

units that are specially trained to operate 

in this environment another necessity. 

The Marine Corp is exploring just such a 

unit in its Project Metropolis, which calls 

for elite units that are specially trained in 
58

urban warfare (Ackerman). This will not 

result in a significant change in the Air 

Force’s force structure, but is a change 

that the Air Force needs to take into consideration.

Revolution or Evolution?

The question remains: Is the 

military experiencing the normal evolutionary changes that come about over 

time, or is the military in the midst of 

a revolution? Look at the situation that 

was laid out in the preceding pages. The 

combat environment is becoming more 

urbanized. We will still fight on the deserts, in the hills and on the plains, but 

the unavoidable battlefields of the future 

are the world’s cities. Information operations and the Air Force will play a large 

part in these operations and is already 

experiencing an increased role in all operations. A common element throughout 

much of this paper was the use of UAVs. 

These systems are not fully developed 

but money is pouring into the R&D of 

these platforms and they will play a significant role in the future.

The importance of information 

operations, the Air Force’s increasing 

role in MOUT—along with the force 

structure changes—and the movement 

to unmanned aerial vehicles providing 

information and combat support over the 

urban battlefield are all indications that 

the military is in the beginning stages 

of a revolution. When the revolution is 

in full swing, perhaps in the 2020-2030 

timeframe, the specialized urban environment units of the all of the military’s 

services will conglomerate on the latest 

crisis in some foreign city. These specialized troops will deploy to the location 

with their UAVs in hand and, through 

the support of the adolescent information operations core, will be able to bring 

the crisis to an end with minimal loss of 

life and damage to property.

In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing 

displaced refugees - providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, 

they will be holding two warring tribes 

apart - conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a 

highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All 

on the same day, all within three city 

blocks. It will be what we call the three 

block war.” General Charles C. Krulak, 

USMC

Works Cited

Books

AFDD 2-5 “Information Operations” 

Air University. Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Alabama. 5 August 1998.

Army Field Manual 33-1 and 33-1-1 

Downloaded from http://

www.artrans.com/rmsg/mfm.htm

Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down. 

New American Library, New York, 

2000.

Online

Ackerman, Robert K. “Training, Not 

Technology, Is Key to Urban Warfare” 30 April 2002. http://

www.us.net/signal/Archive/

May01/training-may.html

Krulak, Charles C., General USMC. 

“Urban Operations” 01 May 2002. 

http://www.urbanoperations.com/

Psywarrior Webpage “Psychological 

Operations/Warfare” 10 April 2002 

http://www.pipeline.com/

~psywarrior/psyhist.html

Publications

Akers, Frank H. Jr. “Task Force Ranger: 

A Case Study Examining the Application of Advanced Technologies in 

Urban Warfare.” National Security 

Program Office, November 2000.

Peters, Ralph. “Our Soldiers, Their 

Cities.” Parameters, U.S. Army 

War College Quarterly, Spring 

1996, pp. 43-50.

Thomas, Timothy L. “The Battle 

of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for 

Urban Combat.” Parameters, U.S. 

Army War College Quarterly, 

Summer 1999, pp. 87-102

RMA: Info Ops

by C1C Grant Coppin

Nowhere is it written that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has to 

take part within a certain time window 

or during a specific era in history. It is 

not said that it must be a sudden revolution, with immediate results and outcomes. Nor is it agreed that it must be 

resolute in its conclusion and ramifications on warfare. Therefore it can be 

assumed that an RMA can take place 

over any length of time, possibly spanning several centuries, and come to no 

solid conclusion regarding the way a military fights, how it is structured, and the 

doctrine to which it subscribes. History 

has witnessed one such Revolution in 

Military Affairs, and current time continues to struggle with the century-long 

dilemma, the news media. 1

Over the course of a century and 

a half, the news media (and now international news media) has altered the way 

the US Armed Services proctors its wars, 

the way it organizes its forces, and the way 

it defines its basic policies and guidelines. 

In a slow and sometimes painful fashion, 

the love-hate relationship between the 

media and the military has reshaped the 

concept of warfare as defined by classical 

theorists. The two have been locked 

in an intricate dance around alliance, 

acceptance, mutualism, antagonism and 

combat, which has swayed the military 

construct to and fro.

What is being witnessed has 

been in progress since the Civil War. It is 

the complete restructuring of the Clausewitzian Remarkable Trinity. 2 According 

to Clausewitz, the Remarkable Trinity 

is the crucial relationship between “the 

people, their government, and their 

Army.” 3 The media has entered as a 

fourth component to the trinity, serving 

as a relay between the three. It has 

remained the medium through which 

two purposes were traditionally served: 
59

1) It informed the public as to what its 

government was doing regarding policies 

and how the policies were executed and 

2) It served as an independent record 

of history. However with its increasing 

capability to cover wartime events, it has 

now given itself a third function: 3) “the 

public examination of the purposes and 

goals of armed conflict.” 4 By its key 

location equidistant from all three players, it can function as an information 

relay, amplifier, dampener, or blocker. Its 

power to alter the Remarkable Trinity has 

therefore altered the way a military must 

think, organize and fight in order to preserve the perfect triangular relationship 

in the state. The alteration has not been 

a specific event, but rather a gradual progression over time. It is possible to analyze the way the media has served as a 

Revolution in Military Affairs by reviewing the military-media relationship over 

the past 150 years during key military 

operations. From an all-encompassing 

historical perspective it possible to see 

how warfare has been altered and how 

today’s US military is trying to maintain 

the delicate dance between its operations 

and the international news media.

Historical Background

Civil War

Mathew Brady and his team of 

photographers first brought the concept 

of war reporting to American mainstream 

society in 1862 when he displayed his 

photographs of the Civil War at the New 

York Gallery. 5 He called the exhibit 

the “Dead of Antietam,” and its images 

of the bloated and dismembered corpses 

strewn across the battlefield shocked the 

unsuspecting gallery patrons. For the 

first time in history, the horrible outcomes of warfare had been brought into 

the limelight. Prior to the Civil War, warfare in general had been viewed as a glorified means to an honorable end. Information was gained through the cleansed 

stories of those who survived and the 

innocuous field reports forwarded to the 

newspapers. The realities of warfare 

remained in the hearts and minds of 

those who were there, and the pomp and 

circumstance was all that trickled into 

the public life. 

The photos portrayed the Union 

and Confederate Armies on equal levels, 

neither seeming more guilty or innocent 

than the other. What weighed heavy on 

public hearts were the atrocities committed by both sides, and both were held 

accountable for their actions. For the 

first time neither side was seen as heroic 

or villainous. The true enemy appeared 

to be warfare itself and the true victims 

to be those caught in its wake. A sense of 

disillusionment with war-related policies 

and goals ensued. The American public 

began to question whether or not such 

brutal actions in war were necessary 

and key individuals and policy-makers 

began to reconsider how warfare was conducted. The Jus in Bello 6 philosophy of 

warfare came into its own and the tenuous relationships inside the consolidated 

US Army quivered over the thought of 

being held accountable for their actions. 

While no official changes in military 

structure or doctrine was planned, the 

future alterations in how a military could 

fight were slowly being predicted. 7

World War II

With the introduction of news 

reels and radio into war correspondence, 

more timely information on the war in 

Europe and the Pacific was sent back to 

the states en masse. Americans could 

catch war updates at the local movie theater or turn their radios to NBC Radio 

every evening to learn what had happened that week. War correspondents 

frequented the battlefield to get onthe-scene information. While no doctrine was created to deal with handling 

the more timely correspondence reports, 

most forward-deployed Army and Army 

Air Corps units designated a single officer as Chief of Public Affairs. His duties 

included handling the reporters who 

sought information on the local operations, alongside his duties as a soldier. 8

In what may be the first recorded 

use of the news media in warfare, the 

OSS used civilian radio frequencies and 

civilian news broadcasts to send coded 

messages to OSS Operatives deep behind 

enemy lines in the European Theater. 9

For the first time the military acknowledged the potential use of a medium recognized internationally as neutral. By 

the end of the war, both Allied and Axis 

powers had adopted several Psychological Warfare Operations (PsyOps) over 

civilian radio broadcasts in an attempt to 

use the media as a weapon. PsyWar had 

found a new platform, ripe for exploitation, and the world’ most powerful militaries found a new way to wage war.

Korea and Vietnam

After the firm alliance between 

the military and the news media in World 

War II, the military learned of the negative affects the media can have on operations during the Korea and Vietnam 

wars. The Korean campaign was plagued 

by indifferent and apathetic sentiments 

back home. The feelings were largely 

the result of the media’s reports, or lack 

thereof. 10 After WWII, expectations had 

been raised regarding access to timely 

information. For reasons outside the 

scope of this report, the US news media 

chose not to report the events in Korea 

with as much fervor and passion as 

they did in WWII. When unfavorable 

reports surfaced, the immediate military 

response was strict censorship. 11 With 

reports few and far between, and strict 

military censorship imposed, Americans 

grew indifferent to the cause and the sentimental support of the people was lost. 

Furthermore, the link between the three 

nodes of the Remarkable Trinity drifted 

apart, and politicians and military leaders were often pitted against each other, 

as the news reports, which so many 

believed to be true, seemed to conflict 

with the field reports in Korea. Inten-
60

tions crossed and communication channels broke down. For those reasons the 

Korean War is still considered the “Forgotten War” in US history.

The Vietnam War confirmed to 

warriors just how important the role of 

the media is in the Trinity, and how dangerous an antagonist relationship with 

them could be. After the shaky militarymedia relationship in Korea, Vietnam 

pushed it to its breaking point. Both the 

domestic and international media organizations took a firm anti-war position 

at the onset of the conflict. The “Hanoi 

Jane” Fonda incident wound up being 

an incredible propaganda victory for the 

North Vietnamese Army. The US military never formally responded with any 

defense in the new warfare platform, possibly a result of the disillusioned mediarelated sentiments of the Korean War. 

Nevertheless, the defeat was detrimental 

to the war for hearts and minds back 

home, and the importance of winning 

the new media war was made obvious. 12

Gulf War

Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm was the first major conflict 

where the media was considered for use 

in war. Saddam Hussein chose the Cable 

News Network as a key player in his plan 

for the defeat on the US. He called 

upon the adversarial military-media relationship experienced during the Vietnam 

War to defeat the US, and his plan officially called for CNN to “do what was 

necessary to undermine the will of the 

American people” and put pressure on 

the coalition forces to withdraw from 

the conflict. However he overestimated 

the US’s capability to field press inquiries 

and editorials and defend the sanctity of 

the US Remarkable Trinity. President 

George Bush and Generals Colin Powell 

and Norman Schwarzkopf worked hard 

to create a media-friendly environment 

yet still maintain information security. 

While not having the ability to fall back 

on any media-related doctrine, as none 

existed at the time, and having to keep 

up with real-time imagery and reporting, the three managed to reach a relative 

level of success. On lower levels, military Public Affairs officers, whose primary duties remain fielding press questions, managed to find a happy balance 

between satiating the media’s hunger for 

updates while making sure the information was operationally secure. However they too lacked a doctrinal foundation upon which to base their responses. 

Reporters often did cross the lines of operational security, and the tenaciously “neutral” position most news bureaus took 

created a feeling of mistrust among the 

higher military echelons and small corps 

of Public Affairs Officers. 13 Although 

still lacking formal media-related doctrine, and failing to take advantage of the 

new global media as a weapon, as was 

Hussein’s intent, the Gulf War did demonstrate how flexible the military-media 

relationship could be. The military realized the diverse news bureaus could be 

contained and their ability to dictate 

(mostly) what information was reported 

was restored.

Military and the Media Today

Today press bureaus are becoming increasingly global, with the advent 

of global television and real-time data 

relays, video, pictures and reports can 

be sent across the globe in a matter of 

minutes. With their globalized capability, these media organizations have created a less secure medium through which 

information is sent. Videos, pictures and 

reports are more easily accessible by all 

forces, including the enemy. All that is 

required is a radio and/or a television 

tuned to the now global stations.

The newly globalized world and 

global-capable technologies have created 

an even more dangerous international 

news media for two reasons: 1) the 

real-time access to wartime events create 

a greater risk to operational security 

and 2) the environment upon which 

the Remarkable Trinity is projected has 

grown demographically and geographically. 14 Real-time data relays offer the 

enemy greater access to a “poor man’s 

information war.” 15 US enemies can 

simply tap into the wide pool of international news channels to view a relatively accurate “God’s eye” view of the 

battlefield and coalition movements and 

intentions. Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard commanders had their televisions tuned to CNN “24/7” to monitor 

US troop movements in Iraq. 16 Milosovic frequently watched Secretary Cohen’s 

press briefings to track US bombing 

target priorities. 17 The triangular structure of the Remarkable Trinity is also 

harder to maintain due to the global 

nature of the news media. The “people” 

and “government” corners of the Trinity 

now encompass officials and citizens of 

all nations, as they are being forced to act 

as key players in the relationship. With 

a shared access to information, international pressures now have a greater influence on domestic concerns, which then 

influences the policies and tactics of warfare. A ragtag Somali warlord managed 

to force the removal of US warships 

from his coast, simply by tapping into 

an anti-interventionist sentiment among 

the American populace in 1994. He 

arranged a quick segment on CNN 

depicting his thugs chanting anti-American slogans and toting Russian AK-47’s 

shortly after the images of dead US Army 

Rangers dragged through the streets of 

Mogadishu aired on the network. His 

plan worked, and the two segments managed to influence US domestic emotions 

enough to force the warships to leave the 

Somali coast. Surely Clausewitz didn’t 

have third-rate warlords in mind when he 

conceived the Remarkable Trinity concept.

Changing Military-Media Doctrine

The US must answer to these 

new global threats presented by an international news media. It must decide 
61

whether the media must be avoided, 

accepted or manipulated as a weapon. 

Currently no media-specific defense doctrine is in place, however media-related 

doctrine has been added to existing doctrine on Psychological Operations 18 and 

Information Operations, and provides 

general guidelines for handling the media 

presence and requests.19 According to 

DOD Directive S-3600.1, Information 

Operations: “Public Affairs during Information Operations must not focus on 

directing or manipulating public actions 

or opinions but rather seek a timely 

flow of information to both external and 

internal audiences.” 20 The statement 

exists as one paragraph among a hundred pages. Furthermore, the joint doctrine only provides recommendations to 

Public Affairs Officers in order to establish rapport with the news media. 21 No 

doctrine provides a guideline as to how 

the military-media relationship should 

be used in warfare or as an instrument of 

war.

Media-specific doctrine is on the 

way. Military strategic thinkers and theorists are now cranking out theoretic 

papers regarding the military-media relationship by the dozens. Military think 

tanks such as the Air University and the 

US Army War College are now focusing 

their efforts on the Information Revolution, and the changing face of battle as a 

result of the global media. Military journals are also following suit. As Brig. Gen. 

Ronald T. Sconyers quoted in Airpower 

Journal, “In future conflicts, the employment of communications with the media 

and public will be on a par with employing weapons effectively.” Due to the 

shear mass of the theories being presented, and the theorists’ high degree of 

credibility (ranging from Gen. John Shalikashvili to Gen. Ronald Fogelman), the 

cries for reform will not go unanswered.

Changing Military Structure

The international media is now 

forcing a change in the way the US military is structured and how its assets are 

allocated. The Public Affairs Officer 

(PAO) AFSC in the USAF is growing 

in importance and command structure 

and it is now crucial for the PAO to be 

kept in the loop regarding what deception tactics are being used and what elements are OpSec essential. 22 The officer can then more precisely field media 

requests regarding the sensitive information. Plans are also underway to create 

a whole new AFSC given the duties 

of a Political/Military Officer (PMO), 

who would be responsible for acting as 

a liaison between the “government” and 

“media” nodes of the new Remarkable 

Trinity. The general idea is to provide 

a link between the government, military 

and media to ensure sensitive military-related information is not distorted 

during the flow from military to media to 

government. The PMO would also serve 

as a continuation of the PAO duties, 

in that the two would “hand-off” the 

OpSec duties depending on which Trinity node the information is intended for.

23

“Presentation” is also becoming 

a buzzword regarding military structure. 

Forward-deployed forces must be presented in a favorable manner considering 

its media/political environment. In some 

instances certain elements of force structure must be kept on the back burner, 

as is the case at King Fahd AB in Saudi 

Arabia, where an all-male force must be 

presented. Female soldiers must be kept 

out of the international limelight due 

to the customs of their surroundings, 

as images of female soldiers in uniform 

may offend Pax-Arabia and jeopardize 

the future of the airbase. In a sense, the 

international media is not only changing 

physical force structure, but “perceived” 

force structure.

Changing the Fight (SOFTWAR)

The news media is also changing the way war is waged, regardless of 

whether or not doctrine is in place to 

support it. A new form of warfare is 

slowly being discovered and exploited in 

the form of “the hostile use of global television (GTV) to shape another nation’s 

will by changing his vision of reality.”

24 The term is being coined, “Softwar,” 

and it has opened a new front, the 

public forum. The tactics can range 

from directly shaping an enemy’s perception to indirectly shaping it via the 

quirks and qualities of the international 

media. 25 Perceptions can be directly 

shaped by broadcasting state-originated 

information over a global television, as 

Slobodon Milosovic did to incite Serbian 

nationalism. Milo Vasic, editor of the 

Serbian Vreme Magazine commented, 

“Hatred had to be created artificially, and 

the key instrument was TV. Before we 

had the real war, we had the TV war.”

26 TV warriors such as Milosovic are 

finding a growing arsenal from which 

they can wage their media campaign. 

The new weapons include “media amplification,” “political throw-weight,” and 

“quality roulette,” to name a few. 27 All 

three are various forms of distorting reality by giving undue merit to events, 

invalid comparison of key players or basic 

false reporting. They range from the 

practical to the audacious, and thus far 

they have worked. Kuwaiti businessmen 

hired an American PR firm to use “quality roulette” to acquire enough “political 

throw-weight” to force the US to intervene in the invasion of Kuwait. It 

worked. 

Skeptics of the new battlefield 

describe the access to GTV as merely 

another platform from which Psychological Operations can be launched. However most theorists believe global television and the global media to be too 

important to the new Remarkable Trinity to be treated as an asset or simple 

platform. Chuck de Caro, President of 

AEROBUREAU Corp., suggests global 

television is a unique battlefield, worthy 

of specific strategies and tactics. De Caro 
62

recommends the US embraces the new 

battlefield by creating holistic strategic 

PsyWar television doctrine and unique 

“Soft-jamming” tactics. According to de 

Caro, the US could win the GTV war by 

employing K-band and C-band technologies to tap into the television networks 

and uplink military objectives with civilian airwaves, in a sense controlling what 

the people see, think and feel. 28

With the international media 

becoming a key player in policy and 

decision-making, the battlefield is changing, or at least a new one has opened. 

The US military needs to create an allencompassing policy to counter the new 

threats and opportunities presented by 

a globally accessible information source. 

So far little has been done, however the 

waters are currently being tested and 

there is light appearing at the end of the 

tunnel.

Conclusion

The media RMA has not been 

a concentrated and instantaneous event, 

but rather a revolution increasing exponentially over a century and half, which 

has reshaped the Clausewitzian classical 

view of the Remarkable Trinity. From 

the days of the Civil War, to World War 

II, on to Vietnam and into the present, 

the news media has slowly shaped the 

way the US military thinks, organizes 

and fights. With the information-related 

boom in technology in the past decade, 

a more powerful media has muscled its 

way into the Remarkable Trinity as a 

key international actor, and created an 

entirely new battlefield in the process. 

The US has recognized the significance 

of the new battlefield and is currently 

taking steps to maintain a strategic dominance over the global television medium. 

Hopefully sound doctrine, effective force 

structure and precise tactics will help 

the nation embrace the media RMA and 

dominate the new battlefield at the turn 

of the 21st century.

Bibliography

Adams, James. “The Role of the Media.” 

MSS 385 Publications Collection, Vol. VIII. USAF Academy. 

Accessed 28 April 2002.

Asprey, Robert B. War In the Shadows: 

The Guerrilla in History. New 

York: William Morrow and 

Company, 1994.

Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. eds./

trans. Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. 

de Caro, Chuck. “Sats, Lies, and VideoRape: The Soft War Handbook.” 

In Information Warfare, Ch. 4. 

1995. Roberts, Ted L. Assistant Professor of Military History. Interview by Author. 11 

November 2001. USAF Academy, CO.

Hill, Raymond R. Jr. “The Future 

Media-Military Relationship: 

The Media as an Actor in War 

Execution,” Ch. 1. Report: Air 

Command and Staff College, 

1997. 

Johnson, Douglas V. II. “The Impact 

of the Media on National Security Policy Decision Making.” 

Report: US Army War College. 

Strategic Studies Institute, 

1994.

Joint Publicatin (JP) 1. Joint Doctrine of 

the Armed Forces of the United 

States. 10 Jan 1995. JP-02, 

UNAAF. 24 February 1995.

Mark, Henry. “Adhering to Their 

Enemies: Jane Fonda in North 

Vietnam.” Frontpage Online 

Magazine. 15 March 2002. 

Accessed 21 April 2002. 

Available from http://

www.frontpagemag.com/guestcol

umnists2002

holzer03-15-02.htm. Internet.

The National Portrait Gallery. Biography: 

Mathew Brady. Washington: 

Smithsonian Institution, 2001. 

Collection on-line. Accessed 9 

December 2001. Available from 

http://www.npg.si.edu/exh/

brady/timeline/timeli2.htm. 

Internet.

Sconyers, Ronald T. “Revolutionary 

Air Force Public Affairs: The 

Vision.” In Airpower Journal 9, 

no. 3. 1995. 

Smith, James M. Director, INSS. Interview by Author. 10 April 2002. 

USAF Academy, CO.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. UNIDIR 

Meeting Transcript. Geneva. 

On-line transcript. Accessed 

15 April 2002. Available from 

http://www.unog.ch/UNIDIR/

eiw.htm. Internet.

Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars. 

New York: Basic Books, 1977.

(Endnotes) 1

Note—the term “media” refers to news 

print, magazine articles, photographs, 

editorials and video available relative to 

the time period.

2

 Douglas V. Johnson II, “The Impact of 

the Media on National Security Policy 

Decision Making,” (Report: US Army 

War College), Strategic Studies Institute, 

1994.

3

 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds./trans. 

Michael Howard, Peter Paret (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1976), 55.

4

 Raymond R. Hill Jr., “The Future 

Media-Military Relationship: The Media 
63

as an Actor in War Execution,” Ch. 1 

(Report: Air Command and Staff College, 1997), 3.

5

 The National Portrait Gallery, Biography: Mathew Brady, [collection on-line] 

(Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 

2001, accessed 9 December 2001); available from http://www.npg.si.edu/exh/

brady/timeline/timeli2.htm; Internet.

6

 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 

(New York: Basic Books, 1977), 21.

7

 The National Portrait Gallery, Internet, 

2001.

8

 Robert B. Asprey, War In the Shadows: 

The Guerrilla in History (New York: 

William Morrow and Company, 1994), 

Ch. 24.

9

 Ibid., Ch. 26.

10 Ted. L. Roberts, Assistant Professor 

of Military History, (USAF Academy, 

CO), Interview by Author, 11 November 2001.

11 Ibid., 2001.

12 Henry Mark, “Adhering to Their 

Enemies: Jane Fonda in North Vietnam,” Frontpage Online Magazine, 15 

March 2002, available at http://

www.frontpagemag.com/guestcolumnists

2002/holzer03-15-02.htm, accessed 21 

April 2002. 

13 Ibid., 30.

14 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR Meeting Transcript, Internet, 1999, available at http://

www.unog.ch/UNIDIR/eiw.htm.

15 Chuck de Caro, “Sats, Lies, and VideoRape: The Soft War Handbook,” Information Warfare, Ch. 4, 1995.

16 Ibid., Ch.4.

17 Ibid., Ch. 4.

18 Joint Publicatin (JP) 1, Joint Doctrine 

of the Armed Forces of the United States, 

10 Jan 1995, JP-02, UNAAF, 24 February 1995.

19 Raymond R. Hill Jr., Ch. 5, 36.

20 Ibid., 37.

21 Ronald T. Sconyers, “Revolutionary 

Air Force Public Affairs: The Vision,” 

Airpower Journal 9, no. 3, 1995, 39.

22 James M. Smith, Director INSS, 

(USAF Academy, CO), Interview by 

Author, 10 April 2002.

23Ibid., 2002.

24Chuck de Caro, Ch. 4, 4. 

25 James Adams, “The Role of the Media,” 

MSS 385 Publications Collection, Vol. 

VIII., USAF Academy.

26 Ibid., Ch. 4, 3.

27 Ibid., Ch. 4, 6.

28Ibid., Ch. 4, 7.

Combat Search and Rescue for 

the German Armed Forces

by C1C Georg G. Schafer, GAF

The German Air Force (GAF) 

doesn’t have a fully operational Combat 

Search and Rescue (CSAR) component 

yet. Due to the old light transport helicopter that is still in use, the Bell UH-1D 

there is a lack of capability to do CSAR. 

But the future light transport helicopter 

of the German Air Force the NH 90 

will have the capability to perform CSAR 

missions. This paper wants to show how 

CSAR missions should be set up within 

the German Armed Forces doctrine by 

looking at the current US Air Force Doctrine and what equipment is needed to 

be able to accomplish fully independent 

CSAR missions.

Combat Search and Rescue operations are personal recovery operations 

in hostile territory. It is important to 

recognize that CSAR involves Combat. 

CSAR is not reduced to rescuing downed 

pilots; it also means to be capable of 

rescuing special operation forces or any 

other crew, group or team operating 

behind enemy lines. 

Joint Publication 3-50.20 states 

that CSAR operations have exceeded the 

capabilities of the component commanders in their own operations and require 

the efforts of two or more components 

of the joint force to accomplish the operation. This shows that they require precise planning and coordination between 

the involved services. That leads to the 

conclusion that extensive joint training 

is required. Especially since it is proven 

that the first 15 minutes after the initial 

phase of the operation are very critical. 

Historically, U.S. forces have put 

little emphasis on CSAR but expanded 

enormous effort on it in time of war. 

CSAR goes back to the beginning of 

manned flight. The first aerial CSAR 

missions didn’t appear until World War 

II. Navy Kingfisher amphibious aircraft 

fished downed pilots out of the Pacific 

while surviving fighter planes gave aerial 

cover. Not only did they deny enemy 

fighters from penetrating to their downed 

buddies, but they also attacked approaching boats and ships if necessary.

In Korea the need for emergency 

radios and transmitters was discovered. 

Albatross amphibious aircraft were used 

as rescue vehicles while F-51 Mustangs 

gave air cover. There wasn’t a joint effort 

during these operations yet. In Vietnam, 

due to the increasing Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) threat CSAR missions got 

extensively more dangerous. In the beginning of the war many CSAR missions 

failed because there had not been enough 

emphasis in the planning and coordination process. Later in the war the CSAR 

missions were more successful because 

personnel got more proficient. The biggest CSAR event in the war, Bat 21 

Bravo/Nail 38 Bravo showed that it is 

not necessary to rescue the personal by 

air transportation. In this case, air superiority could not be established, so a small 

ground unit evacuated the downed men. 

In the Gulf war a Special Operation Forces (SOF) team was rescued by 

an aerial CSAR. On the first day of the 

ground war, January 24th 1991, a 140 

man strong SOF team was discovered by 

locals. An immediate joint rescue force 

consisting of United States Air Force 

(USAF) F-16s and UH-60s of the 160th
64

Special Operation Aviation Regiment rescued the team without casualties. Time 

was very critical in this case; heavy enemy 

forces were almost in range when the 

team got rescued. 

During Operation Deny Flight 

over Bosnia-Herzigovina in 1995, Captain Scott O’Grady was shot down by 

a SAM over Serbian-controlled territory. 

He escaped from the Serbs for 6 days 

before a CSAR team could rescue him. 

During Operation Deny Flight the Combined Air Forces had established a Combined Search and Rescue Center (CSRC) 

in the Combined Air Operation Centre 

(CAOC) in Vicenza, Italy. A combined 

rescue team was deployed from there 

to establish local Air Superiority while 

a Marine task force recovered Captain 

O’Grady.

Especially the more recent CSAR 

operations show that it is important for 

CSAR operations to have joint support. 

The individual services don’t have all 

the capabilities that are needed during a 

CSAR operation. Time has been a very 

critical factor during all recent operations. A recent test at Nellis Air Force 

Base (AFB) in Nevada showed that the 

odds turn against the rescue team after 2 

hours, according to Whitecomb.

German forces haven’t been 

involved in combat operations since 

WWII until Operation Allied Force in 

March 1999. One Squadron of Tornado 

ECR was stationed in Piacenza, Italy 

and took part in Combined Air Operations from there. Their primary mission was Suppression of Enemy Air 

Defense (SEAD). That was the first time 

that German military personnel were in 

danger of being shot down and captured 

by the enemy. CSAR operations were 

covered by the Combined Search and 

Rescue Centre in Vicenza, Italy. 

For future operations it might be 

necessary that German Forces can deploy 

CSAR operations without allied help, 

since it is a critical resource and allied 

CSAR forces might be already deployed 

by their own military forces. 

CSAR is a very important type 

of operation since it can affect a country’s 

war-making capability. Combat casualties influence the populations’ support 

for a campaign, therefore it is critical to 

keep them as low as possible. The population at home can be a centre of gravity 

in the enemy’s campaign plan. By capturing military personal and using them 

in the media to decrease popular support 

of the war, the enemy will have a very 

effective tool to affect a nations’ warmaking capability. This had been shown 

to a great extent during the Vietnam 

War.

It does not only affect the population on the home front, it also greatly 

affects the morale of one’s own troops. 

It is proven that soldiers put more effort 

in their mission when they know that 

friendly forces will try to rescue them 

before they get captured. The conclusion 

is that CSAR is a very important factor 

in a country’s war making capability. 

The German forces have relied on allied 

CSAR because they neither have the 

equipment nor the doctrine to deploy 

CSAR forces.

Just recently the German Air 

Force (GAF) started to train CSAR helicopter crews on the Bell UH-1D in Holzdorf, Germany. The Bell UH-1D is not 

capable of a true CSAR mission. It lacks 

armor, range, endurance, defensive counter measures and especially modern avionic equipment that allows’ low level 

flights deep into enemy territory. Therefore it is just used as a trainer for future 

CSAR air crews.

With the new helicopter NH 

90, which is going into service with 

the German forces in 2004, the GAF 

will have a very capable CSAR platform. 

France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands were working on the NH 90 Project since the early 90s when the development contract had been signed. From 

the beginning, two different helicopters 

on the same platform were developed. 

There was the Tactical Transport Helicopter (TTH) and the NATO Frigate 

Helicopter (NFH). The German Army 

is buying 108 LTH, the GAF 73 LTH, 

23 of these are going to be equipped for 

CSAR and the German Navy is buying 

38 NFH NH 90 helicopters. The first 

CSAR capable helicopters will be going 

into service in 2006.

The NH 90 is a 9 ton class helicopter with two Rolls Royce/ Turbomeca 

RTM 322 or two General Electric/ Alfa 

Romeo GE T700 – T6E engines each 

producing 1690 horsepower. It is capable of carrying 20 fully equipped soldiers 

over a range of 547 miles with a speed 

of 185 mph. The CSAR version is capable of air refueling to extend range for 

flights deep into enemy territory. It is 

equipped with self-sealing tanks, capable 

of sustaining hits of 12.7 mm ammunition. Further it has a radar and laser 

detecting system as well as sensor for 

incoming surface to air missiles, both 

connected to chaff and flare dispensers. 

The engines have an infrared suppressor 

system and are equipped with cable cutters. The Internal Navigation System 

is combined with Global Positioning 

System Navigation to allow exact, independent navigation. This system, combined with an advanced navigation computer system, allows one man cockpit 

operation. For night, bad weather low 

level missions it is further equipped with 

a digital map, IFR equipment, weather 

radar capable of imaging the ground surface, pilot Forward Looking Infrared, 

ground warning equipment and electrical deicing rotor blades. These facts make 

the NH 90 CSAR a very capable helicopter with very good combat survivability properties.

The size, capabilities and mission profile make it very similar to the 

HH60G Pave Hawk. The HH60G is 

the main CSAR helicopter in the USAF 
65

besides the bigger MJ53J Pave Low III.

The NH 90 CSAR Combined 

with the Kommando Spezial Kraefte 

(Commando Special Forces—KSK SOF), 

the future Tiger PAH-2 attack helicopter, which will be introduced in 2003 

and is also capable of close air to air 

engagement, the future AM 400 transport plane, which will be capable of refueling helicopters, and the Eurofighter 

2000 for Air Superiority, will be a great 

task force for CSAR from the technical 

standpoint

But it is not only the equipment 

that has to be suited for CSAR, there also 

has to be a doctrine that directs personal 

and machinery into the right direction.

 Since the equipment as well as 

the structure of the German military is 

very close to that of the American military, both are using similar tactics and 

strategies. The NATO command structure helps to standardize military procedures. This will make combined CSAR 

operations similar to those during Operation Deny Flight a lot easier.

The American Doctrine is published in the Joint Publication 3-50.20. 

The Doctrine is a good frame work but 

does not ensure certain important criterias. It does not forcefully ensure 

that organizations and procedures are 

indeed joint. It says, that components 

should consider joint CSAR only if their 

own capabilities are exceeded. It should 

acknowledge that even if service capabilities are not exceeded, pre-planned joint 

CSAR efforts are practical and appropriate and also merit initial consideration, 

according to JFQ. 

It does not guarantee that the 

lessons learned from recent successes are 

incorporated on the combatant command and joint task force level. There is 

no doctrine loop incorporated into the 

Joint Publication. This should be highly 

emphasized, since lessons learned from 

history can be vital in future operations.

The command structures in the 

Publication are too complex, which 

allows for failures and confusion within 

the system. According to the Publication, 

the theater’s JFC is responsible for CSAR. 

He has to establish the Joint Search and 

Rescue Center . The Rescue Component 

Centers is the responsibility of the Joint 

Forces Component Commanders. Since 

both the JSRC and the RCCs have the 

similar responsibilities they often do the 

same work. The effort of work is doubled and there is no clear line of command between the JFC, the JSRC and 

the RCCs.

It should also emphasize joint 

training to a much higher degree and 

ask for pre defined joint planning, command and execution staffs and teams. 

This would mean that there are ready 

to go CSAR teams with great experience 

through extensive training. These could 

be assigned to the theater JFCs quickly 

and would aid a very mature tool to the 

JFCs hand.

These weaknesses in the Publication are known to the Department of 

Defense (DoD) and the Joint Chief of 

Staff. They are working to update the 

Publication to improve the quality and 

effectiveness of CSAR. 

For the German CSAR Publication this means that the U.S. Joint Publication 2-50.20 is a very good framework. It should be taken over with the 

improvements mentioned. It would be 

very important to set up a joint training 

facility where the CSAR forces can train 

constantly. 

Considering how essential CSAR 

can be to a country’s war-making capability, it is essential for the German Armed 

Forces to have CSAR-capable forces to 

either work independent or in combined 

operations. The capability of CSAR does 

not only help the population at home by 

producing war heroes and keeping casualties low, it also helps the morale and the 

will to fight of the fielded troops. Since 

both Air and SOF assets lower costs and 

casualties in war, these will be the kind of 

operations future war planners are going 

to rely on. Especially for them, since 

operating behind enemy lines, CSAR is 

going to be essential. 

Works Cited

Air Force. Doctrine Document 2-1.6. 

SEP 1998

Federation of American Scientists. 

Combat Search and Rescue. April 

2000. 03 NOV 2002

. <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/

ac/csar.htm>

Gerharz, Juergen. Europaeische Sicherheit: NH-90 ein europaeisches Hubschrauberprogramm. JUL 2000. 02 NOV 2002 

< http://www.gfw-sicherheitspolitik.de/ES00-

03GerharzNH90.htm#Geräteauswahl>

JFQ. Spring 1998. 02 NOV 2002 

<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/

jfq_pubs/1018.pdf>

Joint Pub 3-50.20. Doctrine for Joint 

Combat Search and Rescue. JAN 

1996.

Menges, W. Der NATO Hubschrauber 

90: Der zukuenftige Vielzweck-Hubschrauber. FEB 1997. 03 NOV 2002 

<http://www.german-helicopter.com/

Pages/content/cont_nh90.html>

Whitecomb, Darrel, Col, USAFR, 

Retired. Combat Search and Rescue: 

A Longer Look. 2000.

“To subdue an enemy 

without ghting is the 

supreme excellence.” 

 Sun Tzu
66

The New Longbow: Space 

Weaponry, Medieval Knights, 

and the Future of the United 

States at War

by C1C Jared Smith

I have recorded these events in the hope that 

the readers of this history might profit from 

them, for there are two ways by which men 

may reform themselves, either by learning 

from their own errors or from those of others... For it is history alone which without 

causing us harm enables us to judge what is 

the best course in any situation or circumstance. 1

Polybius, The Rise of the Roman 

Empire

The mounted knight of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was the 

unrivaled ruler of the medieval battlefield. Riding atop a robust war-horse 

and clothed in heavy armor that dependably protected the body, the knight possessed the power and the ability to freely 

maneuver about the field and strike fear 

in the hearts of the unfortunate yeomen 

on foot; but their time for supremacy 

faded with an increase in technology and 

change of warfare. French knights of 

the Hundred Years War, despite their 

superiority in numbers, training, skill, 

and equipment in their discipline, met 

their horrible fates at the tips of English 

arrows at countless battles such as Crécy, 

Poitiers, and Agincourt. Their end 

arrived unsuspectingly, even after “the 

flower” of the French nobility repeatedly 

fell by these means the knights refused to 

believe that English peasants armed with 

longbows could stop the shocking assault 

of the French lance. 2 Their conceit and 

self-inflated air of chivalric invulnerability combined to produce senseless carnage and sacrifice unparalleled in medieval times:

In France those absurd perversions of the art of war which covered themselves under the name 

of chivalry were more omnipotent than any other country 

in Europe. The strength of 

the armies of Philip and John 

of Valois was composed of a 

fiery and undisciplined aristocracy which imagined itself to be 

the most efficient military force 

in the world, but which was in 

reality little removed from an 

armed mob. 3

In the same fashion, today’s 

American fighter pilot prides himself on 

being the finest on earth, unmatched in 

numbers, training, skill, and equipment. 

Pilots of the United States Air Force, 

Navy, and Marine Corps can effortlessly 

dispatch any threat in the air, and any 

potential foe would be a fool to contest 

them; but this comparison applies only 

to the fighter pilots and aircraft of other 

nations, and not to totally new forms of 

warfare. 

Eerily similar to the French 

knights 650 years them, today’s fighter 

pilots are remarkably vulnerable to 

increases in technology that can significantly alter warfare. The perpetually 

advancing space weapons program, coupled with improvements to laser weaponry, will become the new longbow to 

today’s chivalric fighter pilots; these men 

will share the same fate as the French 

knights at Agincourt if they do not 

voluntarily yield their current vanguard 

status to the progressions of warfare and 

recognize that the regression of their discipline follows a historical theme. For 

the benefit of all, air power and space 

power need to become coequal, each 

with its individual sphere of offensive, 

defensive, and support arms. Just as it 

did the knights no good to discount the 

role of the medieval archer and save valiant death on the battlefield for themselves, today’s airpower advocates cannot 

disregard the current and future role of 

space power, and subjugate it to a solely 

supportive role.

Medieval knights had fair reason 

to discard the importance of the armed 

peasantry. The mere thought that a man 

outside the nobility could take up arms 

against his superior was an insult of the 

highest level. Young men of the nobility 

started their martial training at the age 

of eight, learning the three basic tenets 

of the gentry: riding, fighting, and hawking. At the age of fourteen boys started 

service as a squire and acquired greater 

competence in the areas of jousting and 

swordplay, along with education in managerial and clerical skills associated with 

running a castle. 4 By the time a knight 

reached the battlefield, he had accumulated over twenty years of training in his 

highly disciplined, and exclusive, profession. The nobility’s laymen counterpart, 

if fortunate enough to survive birth and 

infancy, spent his early life either scraping away a meager existence in the field 

belonging to a lord, or in direct service 

to a social superior as a servant or page.

5

 The entire social order of French society forbade the two from ever engaging 

in combat with one another because, 

“French chivalry refused to concede a 

serious role in war to the non-noble”; but 

this phenomenon did not occur in England. 6

Faced with the troublesome fact 

that England could not begin to match 

France in the number of mounted 

knights, King Edward III took the necessary steps to involve his nation’s greatest resource in the coming conflict—the 

yeomen. Banning all sports on the island 

in 1336 except archery on pain of decapitation, the King ensured that his army 

would have a force ready to match that 

of the French. 7 English longbowmen 

also began their training near age seven, 

and competed constantly in tournaments 

and other competitions meant to hone 

their skills. Compared with the massive 

upkeep needed to house and train a 

medieval knight, the archer needed only 
67

his bow, some arrows, and a target to 

practice his discipline. A skilled archer 

was able to fire ten to twelve arrows a 

minute, at a range of up to 300 yards, 

with such force that one of their threefoot arrows could penetrate an oak door 

four inches thick. 8 Unbeknownst to 

the heavy cavalry across the channel, the 

English archers were training with means 

in every way comparable, and in some 

ways more efficiently and resourcefully, 

than their elite continental adversaries on 

horseback.

Fighter pilots in the United 

States Air Force undergo the most rigorous training in their field, anywhere in 

the world. Without a doubt they are 

their nation’s premier, and most lethal, 

fighting force. A pilot undergoes roughly 

three years of extremely intense training 

before he can join an operational unit, 

and even then he continues to constantly 

train and upgrade in his particular weapons system for several more years. Undeniably they are today’s knighthood, cased 

in their “iron cocoons”, and riding atop 

a jet-powered steed. They fancy themselves the last defenders of individual, 

chivalric combat, facing their opponents 

on equal ground and matching their 

skills and weapons in an open fight. But 

they carry too much of the knight’s unappreciative mentality—purposefully keeping a potentially valuable and lethal portion of their forces in a subsidiary role. 9

America’s space operations officers do not serve their nation in hazardous battle zones, nor do they daily 

place themselves in harm’s way; they are 

more akin to the longbowmen of medieval times, fatally striking from a safe distance using extreme skill and technology 

to ensure both their protection and the 

enemy’s death. The United States currently possesses both the technology and 

the means to employ space as an offensive arm, utilizing the “ultimate high 

ground” to deliver a spectacular arsenal 

of weaponry without any threat of injury 

to the men operating the systems. 10 The 

future of an offensive space arm is as 

bountiful and unimaginable as airpower 

was in the days of Billy Mitchell, and 

there is no doubt spacepower’s importance and vitality will grow exponentially 

from today onward. The men controlling these weapons will eventually match, 

and eclipse the longbowmen in their 

ability to strike the enemy with lethality 

from a position of total safety.

The best comparison of a 

modern day weapon to the medieval 

longbow is the airborne, or potentially 

space-based, laser. Striking from almost 

ridiculous distances of up to 400 miles, 

the laser brings absolute supremacy to 

the area in which it operates; completely 

nullifying entire areas of air, or space, 

to enemy operations—just as massed 

archers could wholly prevent enemy 

knights from riding into chosen vicinities of a battlefield by threat of saturating the sky with arrows. 11 In addition, as 

no horse was able to outrun or dodge an 

arrow launched from a crossbow, no aircraft has the capability to evade or escape 

a laser traveling at the speed of light.

The absolute pinnacle of the 

knightly disregard for the archer’s potential capabilities, and the subsequent 

slaughter of the mounted noblemen by 

the opposing archers, occurred at the 

Battle of Crécy in 1336. Supremely 

overconfident in their skill and disdainful of the massed peasants before them, 

the French knights began the battle: 

Without giving the crossbowmen 

a chance to soften the English 

lines, the forward knights plunged 

uphill against the enemy. Out of 

range of their targets and pierced 

by English arrows, the Genoese 

crossbowmen fell back, throwing 

down their bows. The King... 

shouted ‘Slay these rascals who get 

in our way!’ while his knights ‘in 

haste and evil order slashed at the 

archers in their effort to cut a way 

through... The French launched 

after attack upon the enemy but 

the disciplined line of England’s 

longbowmen, stiffened by the long 

practice their weapon required, 

held firm and sowed confusion 

and death by their missiles. 12

The Genoese archers, though not as 

skilled as their English counterparts, 

could have provided the firepower necessary to overwhelm the English forcesbut only if they had received the opportunity to perform their duties on the battlefield.

The United States Air Force 

admittedly declares its assigned mission 

in Air Force Doctrine Document 1 

(AFDD 1) as the ability to “organize, 

train, equip, and provide forces for the 

conduct of prompt and sustained combat 

operations in the air”—not in space. 13

When detailing counter-space operations 

AFDD 1 confesses the need to “attain 

and maintain a desired degree of space 

superiority by the destruction of or neutralization of enemy forces.” The document states that the Air Force can 

reach these results by operations that 

can “destroy or neutralize an adversary’s 

space systems or the information they 

provide at a time and place or our choosing through attacks on the space, terrestrial, or link elements of space systems”- 

admitting that the Air Force must eventually bring the fight into space. 14 

Though acknowledging that 

space has a role in combat, current Air 

Force doctrine is unwilling to separate 

them into two, mutually beneficial and 

coequal spheres. In the preface to AFDD 

2-2, Space Operations, the document 

requests that the title of the Joint Force 

Air Component Commander (JFACC) 

become the Joint Force Air and Space 

Commander (JFASCC) to “more accurately reflect the emerging role of space 

in regional operations, and trends occurring in the Joint and Combined Air 
68

operations Centers.” 15 The document 

does not go far enough in its request for 

the recognition of space power; the air 

component should not reign over space, 

rather there should be a Joint Force Space 

Component Commander. Again, the 

knights are forcefully pushing the archers 

to the rear of the fight, and not allowing 

them to exploit their full, and lethal, 

potential.

In his work, The Knight Triumphant: The High Middle Ages, 1314-1485, 

author Stephen Turnbull argues that 

though briefly halted by the longbowmen at the beginning of the Hundred 

Years War, the knight again ascended 

to hegemon of the battlefield thanks to 

improvements of plate armor. He states 

that between the battles of Crécy and 

Poitiers the addition of plate armor to the 

knight’s protective cover enabled him to 

withstand direct hits from the longbowman’s arrows. 16 As plate armor increasingly replaced the weaker and more easily 

penetrable mail and covered more and 

more of the knight’s body, only the unarmored portions of the knight’s horse 

remained vulnerable to attack. Turnbull 

vies that by the time of the War of the 

Roses the advancement of armor reached 

the point that only a bolt from a steel 

crossbow fired at close range, impacting 

perpendicularly to the plate could pierce 

the armor and do damage to the knight.

17 In his opinion, a technological advance 

had rescued the guardians of chivalry for 

the time being- at least until the introduction of gunpowder on a large scale.

 Today’s aircraft do not have the 

luxury of allowing further technological 

advances to salvage their profession; the 

limits of the human circulatory system 

exist as the single restraining point in jet 

technology, and have been so for the past 

twenty-five years. The inability of the 

human body to withstand more than six 

G’s for any longer than a minute greatly 

reduces the maneuverability and performance of an aircraft. Without a human 

in the cockpit, aircraft could make tighter 

turns, accelerate, and decelerate at much 

greater rates. Aircraft technology reached 

this point with the introduction of the 

F-4 Phantom. Designers now place governors aboard their aircraft to ensure that 

the pilots will not exceed the tolerable 

G limits. 18 Unless engineers develop an 

extremely effective G-suit, greatly surpassing today’s standard, technology will 

not come to the aid of the pilot like 

plate armor did to the knight; when the 

human is the weak link in the system 

only evolution can improve the system.

To truly foster an environment 

conducive to developing space power, 

future space warriors need to believe and 

recognize that they are indeed the future 

of warfare; they cannot feel as if they are 

cowardly crouching inside their silos or 

their operations centers. Since the first 

recorded use of the missile weapon in 

Homer’s The Odyssey, where Paris used 

the cowardly bow to finally kill Achilles, 

men have looked down upon those 

who hit their enemies from afar, keeping themselves in relative safety. In 

the twelfth century, an anonymous poet 

wrote that the archer was “a coward who 

dared not come close to his foe.” 19 These 

instances highlight one simple fact; one 

man was able to kill another without 

placing himself in harm’s way, while the 

other felt that the situation was not fair. 

The tide of warfare favors those who 

adapt to overcome their enemy—not 

those whose strict abidance to doctrine, 

whether it be the chivalric code or air 

superiority, restricts their ability to efficiently execute combat.

Soldiers of every successive generation have looked back in awe at their 

warrior predecessors, amazed at how 

true and untainted their style of warfare 

was. Some generations feared advances 

in technology—examples include Japan’s 

abandonment of the gun in the early 

1600’s due to fears that it threatened 

the Samurai class and Pope Innocent 

II’s 1139 declaration of the immorality 

of the crossbow in its use against other 

Christians. 20 In the scope of aviation, 

today’s pilots look at the tenacity and 

bravery exhibited by Vietnam era pilots, 

who have only admiration for the valiant and selfless bomber crews of World 

War Two, who in turn looked at the 

intrepid and fearless barnstormers and 

biplane pilots of World War One to find 

true acts of heroism. 21 The constantly 

changing role of technology in warfare 

breeds certain nostalgia for the past, but 

it is those who embrace the future, today, 

that will be triumphant in the battles of 

tomorrow.

French knights in medieval times 

died by the multitudes in the Hundred 

Years War because they refused to believe 

that there was anything on Earth that 

could challenge their chivalric training, 

skill, and noble breeding. Today’s fighter 

pilot will soon find himself in the same 

precarious position, unsure of what hit 

him and perhaps in denial of his own 

decline. There is no current threat to 

America’s pilots, as the United States 

has an overwhelming superiority in space 

technology; but this disparity is not permanent as new threats emerge. 

The United States Air Force 

needs to either fully embrace the boundless potential of space power and release it 

from its subordinate role, placing it on a 

nominally independent status with itself 

comparable to the United States Marine 

Corp’s relationship with the United States 

Navy, or relinquish all control of its space 

assets and allow the formation of a completely independent United States Space 

Force. From either of these points, space 

warriors will be able to cultivate their 

own particular military ethos, unhampered by the boastful cries of those who 

would have a purely supportive role for 

space assets. 

If the French knights would have 

allowed their own crossbowmen, who 

were in many ways inferior to the English 
69

longbowmen, to operate on an equal level 

with their mounted comrades, the combined force of the two would have proved 

thoroughly destructive to the greatly outnumbered English forces. The same 

could be true for a united, and cooperative Space and Air Force, which has the 

potential to rule the battlefield- whether 

in space or the air - for many years to 

come.

Bibliography

Primary Resources

Air Force Doctrine Document 

1. Basic Air Force Doctrine. Headquarters Air Force 

Doctrine Center: Maxwell Air 

Force Base, Alabama, September 1997.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2. Space 

Operations. Headquarters Air Force 

Doctrine Center: Maxwell Air 

Force Base, Alabama, November 2001.

Froissart, Jean. Chronicles. Translated 

by Geoffrey Brereton. Edited by Betty 

Raddice. 

London: Penguin Books, 1968.

Space Warfare Presentation. Space Warfare Center- Peterson Air Force Base, 

Colorado. 

17 Oct 2002.

Secondary Sources

Dehart, Roy L. ed. Fundamentals of Aerospace Science. 2d ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott, Williams, and Walker, 

1996.

Diamond, Jared. Guns, Germs, 

and Steel: The Fates of Human Civilizations. New York: W.W. Norton and 

Company, 1999.

Grenier, John, Maj, USAF. “A 

New Construct for Air Force Counterspace Doctrine.” Journal of Airpower, 

(November 2002).

Oman. C.W.C. The Art of War 

in the Middle Ages. John H. Beeler, ed. 

London: Cornell University Press, 1953.

Polybius. The Rise of the Roman 

Empire. Translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert. 

London: Penguin Books, 1979.

Tuchman, Barbara. A Distant 

Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century. 

New York: Ballantine Books, 1978.

Turnbull, Steven. The Knight 

Triumphant: Chivalry in the High Middle 

Ages, 1314-1485. London: Cassell and 

Company, 2001.

The Beckoning Web Page of 

Medieval History, Folklore, Poetry and 

Prose. Chronology of the Crossbow. 

1 June 2001, 4 December 2002. 

http://www.thebeckoning.com/

medieval/crossbow/chronology.html.

Endnotes 1

 Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, 

trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert, ed. Betty Raddice (London: Penguin Books, 1979), 80. 

2

 Froissart, Chronicles, trans. Geoffrey 

Brereton , ed. Betty Raddice (London: 

Penguin Books, 1968), 140-142, 

146-148. Froissart speaks of “the finest 

flower” of French chivalry falling at the 

Battle of Poitiers and goes on to detail 

how the French government had to operate with so many leading men now 

dead.

3

 C.W.C. Oman, The Art of War in the 

Middle Ages, ed. John H. Beeler (London: 

Cornell University Press, 1953), 125.

4

 Barbara W. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: 

The Calamitous 14th Century (New York: 

Ballantine Books, 1978), 51-53.

5

 Ibid., 50. Tuchman gives the ratio of 

infant death at around one or two out of 

three, with the peasantry reproducing at 

a much lower rate than the nobility “the 

investment of love in a young child may 

have been so unrewarding that by some 

ruse of nature, as when overcrowded 

rodents in captivity will not breed, it was 

suppressed.

6

 Ibid., 85. 

7

 Froissart, 58. 

8

 Oman, 119. 

9

This point is particularly remarkable 

due to the fact that the Air Force once 

served in this same subservient fashion 

under the army before its independence 

in 1947. The Air Force’s unwillingness 

to recognize the potential of space power 

stems from either of two options: it does 

either not believe that space has the assets 

and the capability to become a force by 

itself, or the realization that it has become 

what it had fought against fifty-five years 

ago is too much for the Air Force leadership to accept. 

10 The current mission of Air Force Space 

Command is to provide support for 

the warfighter in the forms of intelligence, reconnaissance, and warning. The 

proposed weapons include the spacebased laser, capable of exploding missiles 

and aircraft in mid-flight, high-powered 

microwaves capable of disabling other 

satellites, and the ability to launch titanium “Rods from God” that travel to 

earth at exceedingly high velocities, delivering enormous amounts of energy on 

impact. See Space Warfare Presentation, 

Space Warfare Center: Peterson Air Force 

Base, Colorado, 17 Oct 2002 for more 

information on current, and future space 

weapons systems. 

11 Ibid.

12 Tuchman, 87. Froissart adds that the 

English archers “poured out their arrows 

on the Genoese so thickly and evenly 

that they fell like snow.” When the 

French knights took to hacking through 

their own line of archers, “The English 

continued to shoot into the thickest of 

the crowd, wasting none of their arrows. 

They impaled or wounded horses and 

riders, who fell to the ground in great 

distress, unable to get up again without 

the help of several men.” See Froissart, 

88-89.

13 Air Force Doctrine Document 1- 

Air Force Basic Doctrine, Headquarters 

Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell Air 

Force Base, Alabama, September 1997, 

43. 

14 Ibid 47. To take out an enemy’s 

“space link” system, a force would have 

to use weapons in space—either fired 

from Earth, or more logically, from space. 
70

The document further addresses the need 

for intensification of space power, stating “Continued suppression of the space 

threat may be required in conjunction 

with other offensive actions under way 

within the joint area of operation.” For 

more information on prospective problems in the Air Force’s space doctrine see 

John Grenier, Maj, USAF, “A New Construct for Air Force Counterspace Doctrine”, Journal of Airpower, (Nov. 2002). 

Maj Grenier argues that the Air Force is 

trying to mirror counterair doctrine onto 

its counterspace doctrine. He states this 

action as inherently unworkable due to, 

among other things, the difference of the 

mediums in which the systems operate.

15 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, 

Space Operations, Headquarters Air 

Force Doctrine Center Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Alabama, November 2001, 2.

16 Stephen Turnbull, The Knight Triumphant: The High Middle Ages, 1314-1485

(London: Cassell and Company, 2001), 

65. 

17 Ibid., 231.

18 Roy L DeHart, ed., Fundamentals 

of Aerospace Medicine, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Williams, and Wilkins, 

1996), 207, 257. Cadet (formerly A1C) 

Adam Wolfe, a former jet mechanic, also 

informed me that the Pratt and Whitney 

220 Engines used on an F-15C greatly 

out produce the acceptable G levels for a 

human merely during acceleration. 

19 Tuchman, 86.

20 Jared Diamond, Guns Germs and 

Steel: The Fates of Human Civilization

(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999), 257-258, and Chronology 

of the Crossbow, 

h t t p : / / w w w. t h e b e c k o n i n g . c o m /

medieval/crossbow/chronology.html, 4 

December 2002. respectively.

21 These ideas originated in the mind of 

C1C Adam Wolfe during a conversation 

I had with him about nostalgic heroism 

in combat, and I cannot take credit for 

them.

Author Biographies

Major Charles D. Dusch, Jr. is an 

Assistant Professor of Military Strategic 

Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy. 

He is the Director of the Cadet Air and 

Space Strategy and Instructor School 

(CASIS), a specialized institution linking 

Operational Art with National Security 

Strategy. He received a Bachelor of 

Arts Degree in History from West Virginia University and a Master of Science 

Degree in Operations Management from 

Arkansas University. He has over 2,100 

flight hours in USAF F-15E and F-4 aircraft, including over 90 hours of combat 

time. He has also been a Titan II 

ICBM crewmember. Major Dusch has 

recently published a history of arms 

control during the Reagan Administration in Milestones in Strategic Arms Control, 

1945-2000: United States Air Force Roles and 

Outcomes (Air University Press), as well as 

an article on Operation Anaconda and 

joint doctrine in Proceedings (U.S. Naval 

Institute Press). He will pursue his Ph.D. 

in History at West Virginia University 

this fall.

Major Michael J. McCarthy is an intelligence officer in the United States Air 

Force. He received a Bachelor of Arts in 

International Studies of the Soviet Union 

and Eastern Europe from Ohio State 

University in 1984, a Diploma in Russian Language from the Pushkin Institute in Moscow in 1984, a Master of Arts 

in International Relations from Catholic 

University of America in 1996, and a 

Master of Military Science from US 

Marine Corps Command and Staff College in 2000. He has served as a squadron 

intelligence officer, intelligence analyst, 

executive officer, and squadron operations officer. Major McCarthy recently 

served as a United Nations Military 

Observer in Tbilisi, Georgia. He is currently assigned to the Air Force Information Warfare Center, San Antonio, 

Texas.

Major Richard L. White is an Assistant Professor of Military Strategic Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy. He 

is the Chief, Wargaming Branch, 50th 

Education Squadron and an instructor in 

“Introduction to Joint and Multi-national 

Operations”. He holds a Bachelor of 

Science Degree in History from Southern Illinois Unviersity, Edwardsville, and 

a Master of Science degree in Computer 

Science from Old Dominion University. 

Major White designed software for the 

joint cruise missile program. He commanded a U.S. detachment assigned to 

Allied Air Forces, Central Europe. He 

most recently was Deputy Commander, 

721st Communications Squadron, Cheyenne Mountain Air Station, Colorado.

Cadet Grant Allan Coppin is from San 

Diego, California and is a first class cadet 

at the USAF Academy. He is majoring 

in Military Strategic Studies and maintains a 3.4 GPA. He is a member of 

cadet squadron 12 and is also a Soaring 

Instructor Pilot at the 94th FTS. He 

wrote his paper for his “Information 

Operations” class in the spring of 2002. 

C1C Coppin will be attending UPT at 

Columbus AFB, MS on 9 October 2003 

and hopes to pursue a career in national 

security studies.

Cadet Adam Jeffrey Kawatski is currently a Second Class Cadet at the USAF 

Academy. He is pursuing a major in 

Mechanical Engineering and maintains a 

3.7 grade point average. He is a member 

of Cadet Squadron 31. He is a member 

of Officer’s Christian Fellowship and 

also qualified for the U.S. Army Sapper 

School joint military training program 

this summer. He wrote this paper as part 

of an honors course in MSS. He is seeking graduate school opportunities after 

graduation and hopes to serve as a pilot 

in the Air Force.
71

 

C2C John Oberle is currently a Second 

Class Cadet at the United States Air 

Force Academy. He is pursuing a double 

major in political science and foreign 

area studies, with a minor in Japanese. 

He wrote this paper as a member of an 

honors course in Military Strategic Studies

Cadet Lee A. Staab III

Cadet Squadron 34 ‘Loose Hawgs’

Son of Col. Lee A. Staab and Wanda 

M. Staab, Cadet Staab graduated from 

Junction City High School, Junction City, 

Kansas. He is a Military Strategic Studies major and his hobbies and interests 

include snowboarding,and reading. Cadet 

Staab participates in the following sports: 

football, boxing, and racquetball. He 

avidly follows both Notre Dame and the 

Green Bay Packers

Cadet Barbara Soucy was born in Angeles City, Philippines, and is a Physics 

major at the United States Air Force 

Academy. She is the eldest child of a 

career Air Force officer and a pharmaceutical researcher who live in North 

Carolina. Upon graduation from the 

Academy, she will begin her military 

career in laser physics.

Cadet Jamison Richart is from Hebron, 

Nebraska. Before coming to the USAF 

Academy he spent 3 years in Nigeria as 

a missionary and graduated with honors 

from Central High School in Omaha 

Nebraska. Since coming to the Academy he has become an active member of 

the Triathlon team having competed in 

a number of races to include the Ironman Wisconsin. He is an MSS major 

and member of Cadet Squadron 4.

Cadet (Fahrenjunker) Georg Schafer is the son of Dr. Gerhard Schäfer 

and Gerda Schäfer in Rottweil, Germany. The first 7 years of his life I 

lived in Greece, were his dad worked 

as a teacher at the German School in 

Thessaloniki. He attended school in 

Rottweil, Germany. He spent a year 

as an exchange student in Carl Junction, Missouri. He joined the German 

Air Force where he served in compulsory military service for 10 months. 

During August 2001 he became a 

cadet in the Offizierschule der Luftwaffe (German Air Force Academy).

 On exchange at the USAF 

Academy he became a member of the 

swim team. 

Cadet Jared Smith At the Academy 

I’ve been an Honor representative for 

both the academic and summer periods. 

I’m a history major, a member of Phi 

Alpha Theta (National History Honor 

Society), and have a French minor. I will 

be entering the 13S career field (space 

and missile operations) and hope to enter 

the Foreign Area Officer Program later 

in my career. I am from Vacaville, CA 

and the son of Harry and Carol Smith.

Cadet Jason Kramer, from Salem, 

Oregon, is a member of the USAF Academy’s class of 2003. He is majoring in 

Military History and has a minor in Japanese language. In his spare time he 

performs in air shows and other demonstrations with the USAF Academy Parachute Team, the Wings of Blue. After 

graduation he will be attending Undergraduate Pilot Training. 

Cadet Beacher Randy Webb is a proud 

member of the Class of 2004 at the 

USAF Academy. He is pursuing a major 

in Mechanical Engineering and hopes to 

attend graduate school and pilot training 

after graduation. A member of Cadet 

Squadron 36, Randy is currently serving 

on Wing Staff as the Wing Athletic 

NCO. He wrote this paper as part of an 

honors course in Military Strategic Studies.

Cadet P. J. Davis is currently a second 

class cadet at the USAF Academy. He is 

majoring in political science and hoping 

to attend graduate school. Cadet Davis 

is slated to participate in a summer 

research opportunity through the USAF 

Academy Political Science Department. 

The research experience will take him 

to Brussels, Belgium, to work with the 

U.S. Military Mission to NATO. Following this trip, he will serve as the 

cadet group commander for one period 

of Global Engagement during the Academy’s second summer period. Cadet 

Davis wrote this paper as part of an 

honors course in MSS.