In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-14-00169-CV 

WAHID YAMMINE, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A YAM YAM TRADING, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

HDH FINANCIAL, LLC, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 96th District Court 

Tarrant County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 96-262931-12, Honorable R. H. Wallace, Presiding 

 

June 12, 2015 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

Appellant Wahid Yammine, individually and d/b/a Yam Yam Trading (Wahid),

appeals from a summary judgment adjudicating title to certain property in HDH Financial 

LLC (HDH) and awarding the latter attorney’s fees against Wahid. Two of the issues 

before us appear via the trial court’s denial of Wahid’s motion for new trial. They 

concern whether HDH served Wahid with notice of the summary judgment setting and 

reinstatement of the suit and whether the summary judgment should have been set
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aside under Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 

(1939). The third issue involves the award of attorney’s fees. We affirm.

Background

The dispute arose after Wahid released liens attaching to various parcels of 

realty. The liens arose from deeds of trust executed in his favor by the landowner. 

After the liens were released, the landowner sold the property to HDH via warranty 

deeds. After the latter transaction occurred, the trustee under the prior deeds of trust 

conveyed to Wahid title to the realty. HDH then sued Wahid to remove the cloud on its 

title. So too did it move for summary judgment. 

HDH served its motion for summary judgment on Wahid through Wahid’s 

attorney of record, John Leslie. The latter filed a response that Wahid apparently did 

not like. So another individual named Wally Yammine (Wally) filed his own response on 

behalf of Wahid. No one disputes that Wally was neither a lawyer nor legal counsel of 

record for Wahid. Thereafter, various events of import ensued. 

First, Leslie moved to withdraw as counsel for Wahid. Second, and before the 

trial court granted Leslie’s motion to withdraw, Wahid filed for bankruptcy. Third, all 

proceedings in the HDH suit were automatically stayed due to the bankruptcy. Fourth, 

the bankruptcy court entered an order stating that “[t]he automatic stay . . . [was]

terminated to allow HDH to proceed with the State Court Lawsuit with respect to the 

relief requested in HDH’s first amended petition filed in the State Court Lawsuit 

regarding the Property (as defined in the Motion and located on 1401, 1405, and 1409 

W. Pulaski Street, Fort Worth, Texas).” Fifth, and after the stay was lifted, the motion 

for summary judgment was scheduled for hearing and the proceeding was reinstated on 
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the trial court’s docket. Sixth, notice of the hearing date was served upon Leslie. 

Seventh, the summary judgment hearing transpired, which resulted in the motion being 

granted. Eighth, a final summary judgment was entered adjudicating title of the realty in 

HDH and awarding the latter attorney’s fees. Ninth, Wahid moved for a new trial about 

a month after the trial court signed the summary judgment. Tenth, a motion substituting 

another attorney in place of Leslie was not signed by the trial court until after it denied 

the motion for new trial; no order granting Leslie’s motion to withdraw was ever signed. 

Issue One

Wahid initially argues that he “. . . received no notice of either the Order 

reinstating . . . [the cause after bankruptcy] matter nor the summary judgment hearing to 

be held on January 24, 2014. There was no strict compliance with the rules relating to 

proper service, rendering the service invalid.” Thus, he believed that he should have 

been granted a new trial. We overrule the issue.

A decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial is reviewed under the standard 

of abused discretion. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. 

2009). Thus, we cannot interfere with the decision unless the appellant shows it to be 

arbitrary, capricious, or a deviation from applicable rules and principles. Downer v. 

Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). 

No one disputes that HDH served Leslie with notice of both the trial court’s 

reinstatement of the proceeding and the date on which the trial court would hear the 

pending summary judgment motion. Nor does anyone dispute that the trial court had 

yet to grant Leslie’s motion to withdraw when the aforementioned service occurred. 

This is of import because simply moving to withdraw does not mean counsel is no 
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longer attorney of record. The trial court must grant the motion. See Ward v. State, 740 

S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Cooks v. State, 190 S.W.3d 84, 87 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005), aff’d, 240 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting 

that the trial court must permit counsel to withdraw). Indeed, withdrawal being 

dependent upon approval of the trial court is implicit in Rule 10 of the Texas Rules of 

Civil Procedure. The latter not only requires counsel to file a motion but also imposes 

obligations upon him “[i]f the motion is granted.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 10. So too does it 

permit the trial court to “impose further conditions upon granting leave to withdraw.” Id. 

Because the trial court had yet to grant Leslie’s motion to withdraw, Leslie 

remained counsel of record for Wahid when the cause was reinstated and the summary 

judgment motion was set for hearing. This entitled HDH to serve notice of those events 

upon Wahid via Leslie under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a. TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a(a) 

(stating that “[e]very notice required by these rules, and every pleading, plea, motion, or 

other form of request required to be served under Rule 21 . . . may be served by 

delivering a copy to the party to be served, or the party's duly authorized agent or

attorney of record”). Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court’s refusal to accept 

Wahid’s argument regarding notice and the sufficiency of service was unreasonable or 

deviated from controlling rules and principles.

Issue Three

Because it influences the outcome of issue two, we next address issue three. 

Through it, Wahid posits that “[t]he Motion for Summary Judgment improperly awarded 

fees and expenses to HDH, in contravention of the express language of the Agreed 

Order Lifting the Automatic Stay from the bankruptcy court.” We overrule the issue.
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We construe orders in the same manner as contracts. Hemyari v. Stephens, 355 

S.W.3d 623, 626 (Tex. 2011). While orders pertaining to the modification of a 

bankruptcy stay are strictly construed, Dickinson v. Dickinson, 324 S.W.3d 653, 656 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.), we nonetheless “enforce unambiguous orders 

literally.” Hemyari v. Stephens, 355 S.W.3d at 626. So too do we strive to afford 

meaning to each provision of an order. Id. Finally, interpreting an order implicates a 

question of law that we review de novo. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 

995 S.W.2d 647, 650-51 (Tex. 1999). 

As previously mentioned, the bankruptcy court ordered that “[t]he automatic stay 

is terminated to allow HDH to proceed with the State Court Lawsuit with respect to the 

relief requested in HDH’s first amended petition filed in the State Court Lawsuit 

regarding the Property (as defined in the Motion and located on 1401, 1405, and 1409 

W. Pulaski Street, Fort Worth, Texas).” Wahid would have us construe that verbiage as 

permitting solely the adjudication of title to the realty at issue. That is, he reads the 

order to allow HDH to “proceed with the State Court Lawsuit with respect to the relief 

requested . . . regarding the Property.” (Emphasis in original). Yet, his use of the 

ellipsis is telling. By doing so, he omits the phrase “in HDH’s first amended petition filed 

in the State Court Lawsuit.” We are not free to ignore words appearing in the directive; 

again, meaning must be afforded to each provision if possible. More importantly, the 

omitted passage describes the measure of relief that HDH was free to pursue. That 

measure encompassed the “relief requested in HDH’s amended petition filed in the . . .

lawsuit regarding” the realty at issue. Attorney’s fees were specifically requested in that 
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petition. Therefore, the trial court did not exceed the authority granted it under the order 

lifting the automatic stay by awarding HDH attorney’s fees.

Issue Two

In his second issue, Wahid argues that he satisfied the elements of Craddock v. 

Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., and that entitled him to a new trial. We overrule the issue.

Again, the standard of review is one of abused discretion. Dolgencorp of Tex., 

Inc. v. Lerma, supra. Furthermore, the Craddock elements to which Wahid refers 

obligated him to establish that 1) the failure to appear at the summary judgment hearing 

was neither intentional nor the result of conscious indifference, but due to accident or 

mistake, 2) he had a meritorious defense, and 3) granting a new trial would not 

occasion delay or otherwise work an injury to HDH. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 

Inc., 133 S.W.2d at 126.

Regarding the first element, Wahid states that he failed to appear at the hearing 

because he did not get notice of it or the order reinstating the suit. As we concluded

under issue one, though, he did receive notice via his attorney of record, Leslie. As for 

the matter of a meritorious defense, he argues that the trial court exceeded the scope of 

the order lifting the bankruptcy stay when it awarded attorney’s fees. As we concluded 

under issue three, though, the trial court did not. Consequently, we cannot say that the 

trial court abused its discretion in rejecting this ground as basis for a new trial.
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Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.1

Brian Quinn 

Chief Justice

 

 

1 We do not ignore the argument proffered in Wahid’s reply brief and pertaining to the timing of 

the summary judgment hearing. The argument consists of the notion that the setting of the summary 

judgment for hearing on the day selected was defective because “Appellee apparently reset the hearing 

date” before the trial court reinstated the case. In response, we first note that an appellant cannot raise 

new issues via a reply brief. Fox v. City of El Paso, 292 S.W.3d 249, 251 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. 

denied). This appears to be a previously unmentioned issue. Second, Wahid cites no authority 

supporting his position, contrary to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i); given this instance of 

inadequate briefing, the issue was waived. Bullock v. American Heart Ass’n, 360 S.W.3d 661, 665 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied). Third, in addressing the matter, the trial court explained that “[b]ut my 

practice is, when we receive a notice that a case -- that a bankruptcy stay is effectively precluding a case 

from going forward, we enter an order removing it from the active docket and placing it on a, quote, 

inactive docket, because somewhere in the monthly statistics that are ground out every month there's a 

distinction. It doesn't actually close the case. It's not like a final judgment where the clerk closes the file.” 

This suggests that the suit was simply dormant for purposes of statistics. And without the benefit of 

authority holding otherwise, we forego the opportunity to hold that removing a cause from the active 

docket for statistical reasons voids any action pertaining to that suit until replaced on the active docket.