Introduction

Since the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) established diplomatic 

relations in 1979, United States policy toward the PRC was largely premised on a hope that 

deepening engagement would spur fundamental economic and political opening in the PRC 

and lead to its emergence as a constructive and responsible global stakeholder, with a more 

open society. More than 40 years later, it has become evident that this approach 

underestimated the will of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to constrain the scope of 

economic and political reform in China. Over the past two decades, reforms have slowed, 

stalled, or reversed. The PRC’s rapid economic development and increased engagement with 

the world did not lead to convergence with the citizen-centric, free and open order as the 

United States had hoped. The CCP has chosen instead to exploit the free and open rulesbased order and attempt to reshape the international system in its favor. Beijing openly 

acknowledges that it seeks to transform the international order to align with CCP interests 

and ideology. The CCP’s expanding use of economic, political, and military power to compel 

acquiescence from nation states harms vital American interests and undermines the 

sovereignty and dignity of countries and individuals around the world. 

To respond to Beijing’s challenge, the Administration has adopted a competitive approach to 

the PRC, based on a clear-eyed assessment of the CCP’s intentions and actions, a reappraisal 

of the United States’ many strategic advantages and shortfalls, and a tolerance of greater 

bilateral friction. Our approach is not premised on determining a particular end state for 

China. Rather, our goal is to protect United States vital national interests, as articulated in 

the four pillars of the 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS). 

We aim to: (1) protect the American people, homeland, and way of life; (2) promote 

American prosperity; (3) preserve peace through strength; and (4) advance American 

influence. 

Our competitive approach to the PRC has two objectives: first, to improve the resiliency of 

our institutions, alliances, and partnerships to prevail against the challenges the PRC 

presents; and second, to compel Beijing to cease or reduce actions harmful to the 

United States’ vital, national interests and those of our allies and partners. Even as we 

compete with the PRC, we welcome cooperation where our interests align. Competition need 

not lead to confrontation or conflict. The United States has a deep and abiding respect for 

the Chinese people and enjoys longstanding ties to the country. We do not seek to contain 

China’s development, nor do we wish to disengage from the Chinese people. The United 

States expects to engage in fair competition with the PRC, whereby both of our nations, 

businesses, and individuals can enjoy security and prosperity. 

Prevailing in strategic competition with the PRC requires cooperative engagement with 

multiple stakeholders, and the Administration is committed to building partnerships to 

United States Strategic Approach to 

The People’s Republic of China
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protect our shared interests and values. Vital partners of this Administration include the 

Congress, state and local governments, the private sector, civil society, and academia. The 

Congress has been speaking out through hearings, statements, and reports that shed light on 

the CCP’s malign behavior. The Congress also provides legal authorities and resources for 

the United States Government to take the actions to achieve our strategic objectives. The 

Administration also recognizes the steps allies and partners have taken to develop more 

clear-eyed and robust approaches toward the PRC, including the European Union’s 

publication in March 2019 of EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, among others.

The United States is also building cooperative partnerships and developing positive 

alternatives with foreign allies, partners, and international organizations to support the 

shared principles of a free and open order. Specific to the Indo-Pacific region, many of these 

initiatives are described in documents such as the Department of Defense June 2019 IndoPacific Strategy Report and the Department of State November 2019 report on A Free and 

Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision. The United States is working in concert with 

mutually aligned visions and approaches such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s 

Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Japan’s free and open Indo-Pacific vision, India’s Security and 

Growth for All in the Region policy, Australia’s Indo-Pacific concept, the Republic of Korea’s 

New Southern Policy, and Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy. 

This report does not attempt to detail the comprehensive range of actions and policy 

initiatives the Administration is carrying out across the globe as part of our strategic 

competition. Rather, this report focuses on the implementation of the NSS as it applies most 

directly to the PRC.

Challenges

The PRC today poses numerous challenges to United States national interests.

1. Economic Challenges

Beijing’s poor record of following through on economic reform commitments and its 

extensive use of state-driven protectionist policies and practices harm United States 

companies and workers, distort global markets, violate international norms, and pollute the 

environment. When the PRC acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, 

Beijing agreed to embrace the WTO’s open market-oriented approach and embed these 

principles in its trading system and institutions. WTO members expected China to continue 

on its path of economic reform and transform itself into a market-oriented economy and 

trade regime. 

These hopes were not realized. Beijing did not internalize the norms and practices of 

competition-based trade and investment, and instead exploited the benefits of WTO 

membership to become the world’s largest exporter, while systematically protecting its 

domestic markets. Beijing’s economic policies have led to massive industrial overcapacity 

that distorts global prices and allows China to expand global market share at the expense of 
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competitors operating without the unfair advantages that Beijing provides to its firms. The 

PRC retains its non-market economic structure and state-led, mercantilist approach to trade 

and investment. Political reforms have likewise atrophied and gone into reverse, and 

distinctions between the government and the party are eroding. General Secretary Xi’s 

decision to remove presidential term limits, effectively extending his tenure indefinitely, 

epitomized these trends.

In his 2018 Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to 

Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act 

of 1974, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) determined that numerous acts, 

policies, and practices of the PRC government were unreasonable or discriminatory, and 

burden or restrict United States commerce. Based on a rigorous investigation, USTR found 

that the PRC: (1) requires or pressures United States companies to transfer their technology 

to Chinese entities; (2) places substantial restrictions on United States companies’ ability to 

license their technology on market terms; (3) directs and unfairly facilitates acquisition of 

United States companies and assets by domestic firms to obtain cutting edge technologies; 

and (4) conducts and supports unauthorized cyber intrusions into United States companies’ 

networks to access sensitive information and trade secrets. 

The list of Beijing’s commitments to cease its predatory economic practices is littered with 

broken and empty promises. In 2015, Beijing promised that it would stop governmentdirected cyber-enabled theft of trade secrets for commercial gain, reiterating that same 

promise in 2017 and 2018. Later in 2018, the United States and a dozen other countries 

attributed global computer intrusion campaigns, targeting intellectual property and 

confidential business information, to operators affiliated with the PRC’s Ministry of State 

Security – a contravention of Beijing’s 2015 commitment. Since the 1980s, Beijing has signed 

multiple international agreements to protect intellectual property. Despite this, more than 

63 percent of the world’s counterfeits originate in China, inflicting hundreds of billions of 

dollars of damage on legitimate businesses around the world. 

While Beijing acknowledges that China is now a “mature economy,” the PRC continues to 

argue in its dealings with international bodies, including the WTO, that it is still a “developing 

country.” Despite being the top importer of high technology products and ranking second 

only to the United States in terms of gross domestic product, defense spending, and outward 

investment, China self-designates as a developing country to justify policies and practices 

that systematically distort multiple sectors globally, harming the United States and other 

countries. 

One Belt One Road (OBOR) is Beijing’s umbrella term to describe a variety of initiatives, 

many of which appear designed to reshape international norms, standards, and networks to 

advance Beijing’s global interests and vision, while also serving China’s domestic economic 

requirements. Through OBOR and other initiatives, the PRC is expanding the use of Chinese 

industrial standards in key technology sectors, part of an effort to strengthen its own 

companies’ position in the global marketplace at the expense of non-Chinese firms. Projects 

that Beijing has labeled OBOR include: transportation, information and communications 

technology and energy infrastructure; industrial parks; media collaboration; science and 
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technology exchanges; programs on culture and religion; and even military and security 

cooperation. Beijing is also seeking to arbitrate OBOR-related commercial disputes through 

its own specialized courts, which answer to the CCP. The United States welcomes 

contributions by China to sustainable, high-quality development that accords with 

international best practices, but OBOR projects frequently operate well outside of these 

standards and are characterized by poor quality, corruption, environmental degradation, a 

lack of public oversight or community involvement, opaque loans, and contracts generating 

or exacerbating governance and fiscal problems in host nations. 

Given Beijing’s increasing use of economic leverage to extract political concessions from or 

exact retribution against other countries, the United States judges that Beijing will attempt 

to convert OBOR projects into undue political influence and military access. Beijing uses a 

combination of threat and inducement to pressure governments, elites, corporations, think 

tanks, and others – often in an opaque manner – to toe the CCP line and censor free 

expression. Beijing has restricted trade and tourism with Australia, Canada, South Korea, 

Japan, Norway, the Philippines, and others, and has detained Canadian citizens, in an effort 

to interfere in these countries’ internal political and judicial processes. After the Dalai Lama 

visited Mongolia in 2016, the PRC government imposed new tariffs on land-locked 

Mongolia’s mineral exports passing through China, temporarily paralyzing Mongolia’s 

economy. 

Beijing seeks global recognition for its environmental efforts and claims to promote “green 

development.” China, however, has been the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter by a 

wide margin for more than a decade. Beijing has put forward vague and unenforceable 

emissions reduction commitments that allow China’s emissions to keep growing until 

“around 2030.” China’s planned growing emissions will outweigh the reductions from the 

rest of the world combined. Chinese firms also export polluting coal-fired power plants to 

developing countries by the hundreds. The PRC is also the world’s largest source of marine 

plastic pollution, discharging over 3.5 million metric tons into the ocean each year. The PRC 

ranks first in the world for illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in coastal nations’ 

waters around the world, threatening local economies and harming the marine environment. 

Chinese leaders’ unwillingness to rein in these globally harmful practices does not match 

their rhetorical promises of environmental stewardship. 

2. Challenges to Our Values 

The CCP promotes globally a value proposition that challenges the bedrock American belief 

in the unalienable right of every person to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under 

the current generation of leadership, the CCP has accelerated its efforts to portray its 

governance system as functioning better than those of what it refers to as “developed, 

western countries.” Beijing is clear that it sees itself as engaged in an ideological competition 

with the West. In 2013, General Secretary Xi called on the CCP to prepare for a “long-term 

period of cooperation and conflict” between two competing systems and declared that 

“capitalism is bound to die out and socialism is bound to win.” 
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The CCP aims to make China a “global leader in terms of comprehensive national power and 

international influence,” as General Secretary Xi expressed in 2017, by strengthening what 

it refers to as “the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” This system is rooted 

in Beijing’s interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology and combines a nationalistic, singleparty dictatorship; a state-directed economy; deployment of science and technology in the 

service of the state; and the subordination of individual rights to serve CCP ends. This runs 

counter to principles shared by the United States and many likeminded countries of 

representative government, free enterprise, and the inherent dignity and worth of every 

individual.

Internationally, the CCP promotes General Secretary Xi’s vision for global governance under 

the banner of “building a community of common destiny for mankind.” Beijing’s efforts to 

compel ideological conformity at home, however, present an unsettling picture of what a 

CCP-led “community” looks like in practice: (1) an anticorruption campaign that has purged 

political opposition; (2) unjust prosecutions of bloggers, activists, and lawyers; 

(3) algorithmically determined arrests of ethnic and religious minorities; (4) stringent 

controls over and censorship of information, media, universities, businesses, and 

non-governmental organizations; (5) surveillance and social credit scoring of citizens, 

corporations, and organizations; and (6) and arbitrary detention, torture, and abuse of 

people perceived to be dissidents. In a stark example of domestic conformity, local officials 

publicized a book burning event at a community library to demonstrate their ideological 

alignment to “Xi Jinping Thought.”

One disastrous outgrowth of such an approach to governance is Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang, 

where since 2017, authorities have detained more than a million Uighurs and members of 

other ethnic and religious minority groups in indoctrination camps, where many endure 

forced labor, ideological indoctrination, and physical and psychological abuse. Outside these 

camps, the regime has instituted a police state employing emerging technologies such as 

artificial intelligence and biogenetics to monitor ethnic minorities’ activities to ensure 

allegiance to the CCP. Widespread religious persecution – of Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, 

Muslims, and members of Falun Gong – includes the demolition and desecration of places of 

worship, arrests of peaceful believers, forced renunciations of faith, and prohibitions on 

raising children in traditions of faith.

The CCP’s campaign to compel ideological conformity does not stop at China’s borders. In 

recent years, Beijing has intervened in sovereign nations’ internal affairs to engineer consent 

for its policies. PRC authorities have attempted to extend CCP influence over discourse and 

behavior around the world, with recent examples including companies and sports teams in 

the United States and the United Kingdom and politicians in Australia and Europe. PRC 

actors are exporting the tools of the CCP’s techno-authoritarian model to countries around 

the world, enabling authoritarian states to exert control over their citizens and surveil 

opposition, training foreign partners in propaganda and censorship techniques, and using 

bulk data collection to shape public sentiment. 

China’s party-state controls the world’s most heavily resourced set of propaganda tools. 

Beijing communicates its narrative through state-run television, print, radio, and online 
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organizations whose presence is proliferating in the United States and around the world. 

The CCP often conceals its investments in foreign media entities. In 2015, China Radio 

International was revealed to control 33 radio stations in 14 countries via shell entities, and 

to subsidize multiple intermediaries through providing free, pro-Beijing content. 

Beyond the media, the CCP uses a range of actors to advance its interests in the United States 

and other open democracies. CCP United Front organizations and agents target businesses, 

universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local, state, and Federal officials in the 

United States and around the world, attempting to influence discourse and restrict external 

influence inside the PRC. 

 

Beijing regularly attempts to compel or persuade Chinese nationals and others to undertake 

a range of malign behaviors that threaten United States national and economic security, and 

undermine academic freedom and the integrity of the United States research and 

development enterprise. These behaviors include misappropriation of technology and 

intellectual property, failure to appropriately disclose relationships with foreign 

government sponsored entities, breaches of contract and confidentiality, and manipulation 

of processes for fair and merit-based allocation of Federal research and development

funding. Beijing also attempts to compel Chinese nationals to report on and threaten fellow 

Chinese students, protest against events that run counter to Beijing’s political narrative, and 

otherwise restrict the academic freedom that is the hallmark and strength of the American 

education system. 

PRC media entities, journalists, academics, and diplomats are free to operate in the 

United States, but Beijing denies reciprocal access to American counterpart institutions and 

officials. The PRC government routinely denies United States officials, including the 

United States Ambassador to the PRC, access to Department of State-funded American 

Cultural Centers, which are hosted in Chinese universities to share American culture with 

the Chinese people. Foreign reporters working in the PRC often face harassment and 

intimidation. 

3. Security Challenges

As China has grown in strength, so has the willingness and capacity of the CCP to employ 

intimidation and coercion in its attempts to eliminate perceived threats to its interests and 

advance its strategic objectives globally. Beijing’s actions belie Chinese leaders’ 

proclamations that they oppose the threat or use of force, do not intervene in other countries’ 

internal affairs, or are committed to resolving disputes through peaceful dialogue. Beijing 

contradicts its rhetoric and flouts its commitments to its neighbors by engaging in 

provocative and coercive military and paramilitary activities in the Yellow Sea, the East and 

South China Seas, the Taiwan Strait, and Sino-Indian border areas.

In May 2019, the Department of Defense issued its annual report to the Congress, Military 

and Security Developments Involving the PRC, assessing current and future trajectories of 

China’s military-technological development, security and military strategies, and People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) organizational and operational concepts. In July 2019, the PRC 
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Minister of Defense publicly acknowledged that OBOR is linked to the PRC’s aspirational 

expansion of PLA presence overseas, including locations such as the Pacific Islands and the 

Caribbean. 

Beijing’s military buildup threatens United States and allied national security interests and 

poses complex challenges for global commerce and supply chains. Beijing’s Military-Civil 

Fusion (MCF) strategy gives the PLA unfettered access into civil entities developing and 

acquiring advanced technologies, including state-owned and private firms, universities, and 

research programs. Through non-transparent MCF linkages, United States and other foreign 

companies are unwittingly feeding dual-use technologies into PRC military research and 

development programs, strengthening the CCP’s coercive ability to suppress domestic 

opposition and threaten foreign countries, including United States allies and partners. 

The PRC’s attempts to dominate the global information and communications technology 

industry through unfair practices is reflected in discriminatory regulations like the PRC 

National Cyber Security Law, which requires companies to comply with Chinese data 

localization measures that enable CCP access to foreign data. Other PRC laws compel 

companies like Huawei and ZTE to cooperate with Chinese security services, even when they 

do business abroad, creating security vulnerabilities for foreign countries and enterprises 

utilizing Chinese vendors’ equipment and services. 

Beijing refuses to honor its commitment to provide travel documents for Chinese citizens 

with orders of removal from the United States in a timely and consistent manner, effectively 

blocking their removals from our country and creating security risks for American 

communities. In addition, the PRC’s violations of our bilateral consular treaty puts 

United States citizens at risk in China, with many Americans detrimentally affected by the 

PRC government’s coercive exit bans and wrongful detentions.

Approach

The NSS demands that the United States “rethink the policies of the past two decades –

policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in 

international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and 

trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to be false. Rival actors use 

propaganda and other means to try to discredit democracy. They advance anti-Western 

views and spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our 

partners.”

Guided by a return to principled realism, the United States is responding to the CCP’s direct 

challenge by acknowledging that we are in a strategic competition and protecting our 

interests appropriately. The principles of the United States’ approach to China are 

articulated both in the NSS and our vision for the Indo-Pacific region – sovereignty, freedom, 

openness, rule of law, fairness, and reciprocity. United States-China relations do not 

determine our Indo-Pacific strategy, but rather fall within that strategy and the overarching 
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NSS. By the same token, our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region does not exclude 

China.

The United States holds the PRC government to the same standards and principles that apply 

to all nations. We believe this is the treatment that the people of China want and deserve 

from their own government and from the international community. Given the strategic 

choices China’s leadership is making, the United States now acknowledges and accepts the 

relationship with the PRC as the CCP has always framed it internally: one of great power 

competition. 

United States policies are not premised on an attempt to change the PRC’s domestic 

governance model, nor do they make concessions to the CCP’s narratives of exceptionalism 

and victimhood. Rather, United States policies are designed to protect our interests and 

empower our institutions to withstand the CCP’s malign behavior and collateral damage 

from the PRC’s internal governance problems. Whether the PRC eventually converges with 

the principles of the free and open order can only be determined by the Chinese people 

themselves. We recognize that Beijing, not Washington, has agency over and responsibility 

for the PRC government’s actions.

The United States rejects CCP attempts at false equivalency between rule-of-law and ruleby-law; between counterterrorism and oppression; between representative governance and 

autocracy; and between market-based competition and state-directed mercantilism. The 

United States will continue to challenge Beijing’s propaganda and false narratives that 

distort the truth and attempt to demean American values and ideals. 

Similarly, the United States does not and will not accommodate Beijing’s actions that weaken 

a free, open, and rules-based international order. We will continue to refute the CCP’s 

narrative that the United States is in strategic retreat or will shirk our international security 

commitments. The United States will work with our robust network of allies and likeminded partners to resist attacks on our shared norms and values, within our own 

governance institutions, around the world, and in international organizations.

The American people’s generous contributions to China’s development are a matter of 

historical record – just as the Chinese people’s remarkable accomplishments in the era of 

Reform and Opening are undeniable. However, the negative trend lines of Beijing’s policies 

and practices threaten the legacy of the Chinese people and their future position in the world. 

Beijing has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not offer compromises in response to 

American displays of goodwill, and that its actions are not constrained by its prior 

commitments to respect our interests. As such, the United States responds to the PRC’s 

actions rather than its stated commitments. Moreover, we do not cater to Beijing’s demands 

to create a proper “atmosphere” or “conditions” for dialogue. 

Likewise, the United States sees no value in engaging with Beijing for symbolism and 

pageantry; we instead demand tangible results and constructive outcomes. We acknowledge 

and respond in kind to Beijing’s transactional approach with timely incentives and costs, or 
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credible threats thereof. When quiet diplomacy proves futile, the United States will increase 

public pressure on the PRC government and take action to protect United States interests by 

leveraging proportional costs when necessary.

The PRC government has fallen short of its commitments in many areas including: trade and 

investment; freedoms of expression and belief; political interference; freedoms of navigation 

and overflight; cyber and other types of espionage and theft; weapons proliferation; 

environmental protection; and global health. Agreements with Beijing must include 

stringent verification and enforcement mechanisms.

We speak candidly with the Chinese people and expect honesty from PRC leaders. In matters 

of diplomacy, the United States responds appropriately to the CCP’s insincere or vague 

threats, and stands up alongside our allies and partners to resist coercion. Through our 

continuous and frank engagement, the United States welcomes cooperation by China to 

expand and work toward shared objectives in ways that benefit the peace, stability, and 

prosperity of the world. Our approach does not exclude the PRC. The United States stands 

ready to welcome China’s positive contributions.

As the above tenets of our approach imply, competition necessarily includes engagement 

with the PRC, but our engagements are selective and results-oriented, with each advancing 

our national interests. We engage with the PRC to negotiate and enforce commitments to 

ensure fairness and reciprocity; clarify Beijing’s intentions to avoid misunderstanding; and 

resolve disputes to prevent escalation. The United States is committed to maintaining open 

channels of communication with the PRC to reduce risks and manage crises. We expect the 

PRC to also keep these channels open and responsive.

Implementation

In accordance with the President’s NSS, the political, economic, and security policies outlined 

in this report seek to protect the American people and homeland, promote American 

prosperity, preserve peace through strength, and advance a free and open vision abroad. 

During the first 3 years of the Administration, the United States has taken significant steps 

in implementing this strategy as it applies to China.

1. Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ)’s China Initiative and Federal Bureau of 

Investigation are directing resources to identify and prosecute trade secrets theft, hacking, 

and economic espionage; and increasing efforts to protect against malign foreign investment 

in United States infrastructure, supply chain threats, and foreign agents seeking to influence 

American policy. For example, DOJ informed PRC state media company CGTN-America of its 

obligation to register as a foreign agent as specified under the Foreign Agents Registration 

Act (FARA), which obligates registrants to disclose their activities to Federal authorities and 
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appropriately label information materials they distribute. CGTN-America subsequently 

registered under FARA.

The Administration is also responding to CCP propaganda in the United States by 

highlighting malign behavior, countering false narratives, and compelling transparency. 

United States officials, including those from the White House and the Departments of State, 

Defense, and Justice, are leading efforts to educate the American public about the PRC 

government’s exploitation of our free and open society to push a CCP agenda inimical to 

United States interests and values. In an effort to achieve reciprocity of access, the 

Department of State has implemented a policy requiring Chinese diplomats to notify the 

United States Government before meeting with state and local government officials and 

academic institutions.

The Administration is raising awareness of and actively combatting Beijing’s co-optation and 

coercion of its own citizens and others in United States academic institutions, beyond 

traditional espionage and influence efforts. We are working with universities to protect the 

rights of Chinese students on American campuses, provide information to counter CCP 

propaganda and disinformation, and ensure an understanding of ethical codes of conduct in 

an American academic environment. 

Chinese students represent the largest cohort of foreign students in the United States today. 

The United States values the contributions of Chinese students and researchers. As of 2019, 

the number of Chinese students and researchers in the United States has reached an all-time 

high, while the number of student visa denials to Chinese applicants has steadily declined. 

The United States strongly supports the principles of open academic discourse and 

welcomes international students and researchers conducting legitimate academic pursuits; 

we are improving processes to screen out the small minority of Chinese applicants who 

attempt to enter the United States under false pretenses or with malign intent.

In the United States research community, Federal agencies such as the National Institutes of 

Health and the Department of Energy have updated or clarified regulations and procedures 

to ensure compliance with applicable standards of conduct and reporting, in order to 

improve transparency and prevent conflicts of interest. The National Science and 

Technology Council’s Joint Committee on the Research Environment is developing standards 

for Federally-funded research, and best practices for United States research institutions. The 

Department of Defense is working to ensure grantees do not also have contracts with China’s 

talent recruitment programs, while also continuing to welcome foreign researchers. 

To prevent foreign malign actors from gaining access to United States information networks, 

the President issued the “Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications 

Technology and Services Supply Chain” and the “Executive Order on Establishing the 

Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States 

Telecommunications Services Sector.” The implementation of these Executive Orders will 

prevent certain companies associated with or answering to the intelligence and security 

apparatus of foreign adversaries from, for example, readily accessing the private and 

sensitive information of the United States Government, the United States private sector, and 
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individual Americans. To ensure protection of our information worldwide, including 

sensitive military and intelligence data, the United States is actively engaging with our allies 

and partners, including in multilateral fora, to promote a set of common standards for secure, 

resilient, and trusted communications platforms that underpin the global information 

economy. To compel Beijing to adhere to norms of responsible state behavior, the 

United States is working with allies and like-minded partners to attribute and otherwise 

deter malicious cyber activities. 

The Administration is implementing the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 

to update and strengthen the capacity of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 

United States (CFIUS) to address growing national security concerns over foreign 

exploitation of investment structures, which previously fell outside CFIUS jurisdiction. This 

includes preventing Chinese companies from exploiting access to United States innovation 

through minority investments in order to modernize the Chinese military. The United States 

has updated its export control regulations, particularly in light of Beijing’s whole-of-society 

MCF strategy and its efforts to acquire advanced technologies related to hypersonics, 

quantum computing, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and other emerging and 

foundational technologies. We are also engaging allies and partners to develop their own 

foreign investment screening mechanisms, and to update and implement export controls 

collaboratively through multilateral regimes and other forums.

The United States Government is also taking concrete actions to protect the American 

consumer from counterfeit and substandard products. Between 2017 and 2018, the

United States Department of Homeland Security seized more than 59,000 shipments of 

counterfeit goods, produced in the PRC, valued at more than $2.1 billion. This represents 

five times the total shipments and value seized from all other foreign countries combined.

In addition to falsely branded apparel, footwear, handbags, and watches, United States 

Customs and Border Protection intercepted three shipments containing 53,000 illegal 

Chinese gun parts and electronics that could have compromised the security and privacy of 

American businesses and consumers. United States law enforcement agencies are also 

targeting counterfeit pharmaceuticals and cosmetics originating from China, which have 

been found to contain high levels of contaminants, including bacteria and animal waste that 

pose a danger to American consumers.

The United States is working with Chinese authorities to stem the deadly flow of illicit 

Chinese fentanyl from the PRC to the United States. In December 2018, the President secured 

a commitment from his Chinese counterpart to control all forms of fentanyl in the PRC. With 

the Chinese regulatory regime in place since May 2019, United States and PRC law 

enforcement agencies are sharing intelligence and coordinating to set conditions for 

enforcement actions that will deter Chinese drug producers and traffickers. The 

United States is also working with China’s postal agencies to improve tracking of small 

parcels for law enforcement purposes.
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2. Promote American Prosperity

In response to the PRC’s documented unfair and abusive trade practices and industrial 

policies, the Administration is taking strong actions to protect American businesses, 

workers, and farmers, and to put an end to Beijing’s practices that have contributed to a 

hollowing-out of the United States manufacturing base. The United States is committed to 

rebalancing the United States-China economic relationship. Our whole-of-government 

approach supports fair trade and advances United States competitiveness, promotes 

United States exports, and breaks down unjust barriers to United States trade and 

investment. Having failed since 2003 to persuade Beijing to adhere to its economic 

commitments through regular, high-level dialogues, the United States is confronting China’s 

market-distorting forced technology transfer and intellectual property practices by 

imposing costs in the form of tariffs levied on Chinese goods coming into the United States. 

Those tariffs will remain in place until a fair Phase Two trade deal is agreed to by the United 

States and the PRC.

In response to Beijing’s repeated failure to reduce or eliminate its market-distorting 

subsidies and overcapacity, the United States imposed tariffs to protect our strategically 

important steel and aluminum industries. For those unfair Chinese trade practices that are 

subject to dispute settlement at the WTO, the United States continues to pursue and win 

multiple cases. Finally, to crack down on China’s dumping and subsidies across a broad 

range of industries, the Department of Commerce is making greater utility of United States 

antidumping and countervailing duties laws than in past administrations.

In January 2020, the United States and the PRC signed Phase One of an economic and trade 

agreement that requires structural reforms and other changes to China’s economic and trade 

regime, addressing several longstanding United States concerns. The agreement prohibits 

the PRC from forcing or pressuring foreign companies to transfer their technology as a 

condition for doing business in China; strengthens protection and enforcement of 

intellectual property in China in all key areas; creates new market opportunities in China for 

United States agriculture and financial services by addressing policy barriers; and addresses 

longstanding, unfair currency practices. The agreement also establishes a strong dispute 

resolution mechanism that ensures prompt and effective implementation and enforcement. 

By addressing structural barriers to trade and making the commitments fully enforceable, 

the Phase One agreement will expand United States exports to China. As part of this 

agreement, the PRC committed over the next 2 years to increase imports of United States 

goods and services by no less than $200 billion in four broad categories: manufactured 

goods, agriculture, energy, and services. This agreement marks critical progress toward a 

more balanced trade relationship and a more level playing field for American workers and 

companies.

Domestically, the Administration is taking steps to strengthen the United States economy 

and promote economic sectors of the future, such as 5G technology, through tax reforms and 

a robust deregulatory agenda. The President’s “Executive Order on Maintaining American 

Leadership in Artificial Intelligence” is an example of a United States Government initiative 
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to promote investment and collaboration to ensure the United States continues to lead in 

innovation and setting standards for a growing industry.

Together with other likeminded nations, the United States promotes an economic vision 

based on principles of sovereignty, free markets, and sustainable development. Alongside 

the European Union and Japan, the United States is engaged in a robust trilateral process to 

develop disciplines for state-owned enterprises, industrial subsidies, and forced technology 

transfers. We will also continue to work with our allies and partners to ensure that 

discriminatory industrial standards do not become global standards. As the world’s most 

valuable consumer market, largest source of foreign direct investment, and leading 

wellspring of global technological innovation, the United States engages extensively with 

allies and partners to evaluate shared challenges and coordinate effective responses to 

ensure continued peace and prosperity. We work closely with United States companies to 

build their competitiveness at home and abroad while fostering sustainable development 

through programs such as Prosper Africa, America Crece in Latin America and the Caribbean, 

and Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy in the Indo-Pacific region.

3. Preserve Peace through Strength

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) prioritizes long-term competition with China and 

emphasizes modernization and partnerships to counter the PLA’s technological 

advancements, force development, and growing international presence and assertiveness. 

As described in the Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration is prioritizing the 

modernization of the nuclear triad, including the development of supplementary capabilities 

designed to deter Beijing from using its weapons of mass destruction or conducting other 

strategic attacks. Meanwhile, the United States continues to urge China’s leaders to come to 

the table and begin arms control and strategic risk reduction discussions as a nuclear power 

with a modern and growing nuclear arsenal and the world’s largest collection of 

intermediate range delivery systems. The United States believes it is in the interest of all 

nations to improve Beijing’s transparency, prevent miscalculations, and avoid costly arms 

buildups.

The Department of Defense is moving quickly to deploy hypersonic platforms, increasing 

investments in cyber and space capabilities, and developing more lethal fires based on 

resilient, adaptive, and cost-effective platforms. Together, these capabilities are intended to 

deter and counter Beijing’s growing ambitions and the PLA’s drive toward technological 

parity and superiority.

As part of our worldwide freedom of navigation operations program, the United States is 

pushing back on Beijing’s hegemonic assertions and excessive claims. The United States 

military will continue to exercise the right to navigate and operate wherever international 

law allows, including in the South China Sea. We are speaking up for regional allies and 

partners, and providing security assistance to help them build capacity to withstand Beijing’s 

attempts to use its military, paramilitary, and law enforcement forces to coerce and prevail 

in disputes. In 2018, the United States military withdrew the invitation for the PLA to 
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participate in the biennial Rim of the Pacific exercise due to Beijing’s deployment of 

advanced missile systems onto manmade features in the South China Sea. 

Stronger alliances and partnerships are a cornerstone of the NDS. The United States is 

building partner capacity and deepening interoperability to develop a combat-credible 

forward operating presence, fully integrated with allies and partners to deter and deny PRC 

aggression. The Administration’s Conventional Arms Transfer policy aims to promote 

United States arms sales and accelerate the transformation of partner military capabilities 

in a strategic and complementary manner. In June 2019, the Department of Defense released 

its first Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, articulating the Department’s implementation of the 

NDS and our whole-of-government strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. 

The United States will continue to maintain strong unofficial relations with Taiwan in 

accordance with our “One China” policy, based on the Taiwan Relations Act and the 

three United States-PRC Joint Communiques. The United States maintains that any 

resolution of cross-Strait differences must be peaceful and according to the will of the people 

on both sides, without resorting to threat or coercion. Beijing’s failure to honor its 

commitments under the communiques, as demonstrated by its massive military buildup, 

compels the United States to continue to assist the Taiwan military in maintaining a credible 

self-defense, which deters aggression and helps to ensure peace and stability in the region. 

In a 1982 memorandum, President Ronald Reagan insisted “that the quantity and quality of 

the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.” In 2019, 

the United States approved more than $10 billion of arms sales to Taiwan.

The United States remains committed to maintaining a constructive, results-oriented 

relationship with the PRC. The United States conducts defense contacts and exchanges with 

the PRC to communicate strategic intent; prevent and manage crises; reduce the risks of 

miscalculation and misunderstanding that could escalate into conflict; and cooperate in 

areas of shared interest. The United States military engages with the PLA to develop effective 

crisis communication mechanisms, including responsive channels for de-escalation in 

unplanned scenarios.

4. Advance American Influence

For the past seven decades, the free and open international order has provided the stability 

to allow sovereign, independent states to flourish and contribute to unprecedented global 

economic growth. As a large, developed country and a major beneficiary of this order, the 

PRC should help guarantee freedom and openness for other nations around the globe. When 

Beijing instead promotes or abets authoritarianism, self-censorship, corruption, mercantilist 

economics, and intolerance of ethnic and religious diversity, the United States leads 

international efforts to resist and counter these malign activities. 

In 2018 and 2019, the Secretary of State hosted the first two gatherings of the Ministerial to 

Advance Religious Freedom. Along with the President’s unprecedented Global Call to Protect 

Religious Freedom during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2019, 

these events brought together global leaders to address religious persecution around the 
15

world. During both ministerials, the United States and partner countries released joint 

statements calling on the PRC government to respect the rights of Uighur and other Turkic 

Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and Falun Gong adherents, all of whom face 

repression and persecution in China. In February 2020, the Department of State launched 

the first ever International Religious Freedom Alliance with 25 likeminded partners to 

defend the right of every person to worship without fear. The President met with Chinese 

dissidents and survivors on the margins of the 2019 Ministerial, and he shared the stage 

during UNGA with victims of religious persecution from China. The United States also 

continues to support human rights defenders and independent civil society working in or on 

China.

In October 2019 at the United Nations in New York, the United States joined likeminded 

nations in condemning Beijing’s ongoing human rights violations and other repressive 

policies in Xinjiang that threaten international peace and security. The latter event followed 

United States Government actions to stop United States exports to select Chinese 

government agencies and surveillance technology companies complicit in the Xinjiang 

human rights abuses and to deny United States visas for Chinese officials, and their family 

members, responsible for violating Beijing’s international human rights commitments. The 

United States has also begun actions to block imports of Chinese goods produced using 

forced labor in Xinjiang. 

The United States will continue to take a principled stand against the use of our technology 

to support China’s military and its technology-enabled authoritarianism, working in 

conjunction with likeminded allies and partners. In doing so, we will implement policies that 

keep pace with rapid technological change and PRC efforts to blend civil and military uses 

and compel companies to support China’s security and intelligence services. 

These efforts demonstrate United States commitment to the fundamental values and norms 

that have served as the foundation of the international system since the end of the Second 

World War. While the United States has no desire to interfere in the PRC’s internal affairs, 

Washington will continue to be candid when Beijing strays from its international 

commitments and responsible behavior, especially when United States interests are at stake. 

For example, the United States has significant interests in the future of Hong Kong. 

Approximately 85,000 United States citizens and more than 1,300 United States businesses 

reside in Hong Kong. The President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State have 

repeatedly called on Beijing to honor the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and preserve 

Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy, rule of law, and democratic freedoms, which enable 

Hong Kong to remain a successful hub of international business and finance. 

The United States is expanding its role as an Indo-Pacific nation that promotes free 

enterprise and democratic governance. In November 2019, the United States, Japan, and 

Australia launched the Blue Dot Network to promote transparently-financed, high quality 

infrastructure through private sector led development around the world, which will add to 

the nearly 1 trillion dollars of United States direct investment in the Indo-Pacific region 

alone. At the same time, the Department of State issued a detailed progress report on the 
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implementation of our whole-of-government strategy for the Indo-Pacific region: 

A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision.

Conclusion

The Administration’s approach to the PRC reflects a fundamental reevaluation of how the 

United States understands and responds to the leaders of the world’s most populous country 

and second largest national economy. The United States recognizes the long-term strategic 

competition between our two systems. Through a whole-of-government approach and 

guided by a return to principled realism, as articulated by the NSS, the United States 

Government will continue to protect American interests and advance American influence. At 

the same time, we remain open to constructive, results-oriented engagement and 

cooperation from China where our interests align. We continue to engage with PRC leaders 

in a respectful yet clear-eyed manner, challenging Beijing to uphold its commitments.