RENDERED: MAY 21, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2019-CA-1595-MR

DAVID HATFIELD AND AMANDA J. 

HATFIELD APPELLANTS 

v. 

APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 17-CI-00301 

BLUEGRASS COMMUNITY BANK, 

INC.; J. THOMAS HENSLEY, 

MASTER COMMISSIONER OF 

BOYLE COUNTY; SALLY STATOM; 

STEVE P. KIESLER; AND THE 

MONTICELLO BANKING 

COMPANY APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: JONES, MAZE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Acting without the assistance of counsel, the Appellants, David 

Hatfield and his wife, Amanda Hatfield (“Hatfields”), appeal the Boyle Circuit 

Court’s orders of September 18, 2019, overruling their objections to the Master 
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Commissioner’s report, and confirming the sale of a parcel of real estate located at 

1145 Gwinn Island Road in Danville, Boyle County, Kentucky (“the Property”). 

The Appellees are Bluegrass Community Bank, Inc. and the Monticello Banking 

Company; J. Thomas Hensley Master Commissioner of Boyle County; and Steve 

P. Kiesler and Sally Statom, the parties who purchased the property at the judicial 

sale.1 On appeal, the Hatfields assert the trial court erred because the appraised 

value set by the Master Commissioner was too low. Having reviewed the record, 

and being otherwise sufficiently advised, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2017, Bluegrass Community Bank, Inc. (“Bluegrass”) 

filed a complaint against the Hatfields. Bluegrass alleged that on or about June 17, 

2015, the Hatfields executed and delivered to Bluegrass a Promissory Note by 

which they promised and agreed to pay the sum of $144,724.44, with interest 

accruing thereon, initially, at a fixed rate of 5.5%, due in full on June 27, 2035 

(“Note”). The Promissory Note was secured by a mortgage in favor of the 

 

1 None of the appellees filed a brief. When the appellee does not file a brief our court may, but is 

not required to impose penalties, against the non-responding appellee, including (1) accepting the 

appellant’s statement of facts and issues; (2) reversing the judgment if reasonably supported by 

the appellant’s brief; or (3) regarding the appellee’s failure to file a brief as a confession of error 

and reversing the judgment without considering the merits of the case. Kentucky Rules of Civil 

Procedure (“CR”) 76.12(8)(c). “The decision as to how to proceed in imposing such penalties is 

a matter committed to our discretion.” Coblentz v. Day, 540 S.W.3d 384, 385-86 (Ky. App. 

2018) (citing Roberts v. Bucci, 218 S.W.3d 395, 396 (Ky. App. 2007)). The record in this case is 

relatively short and the issues are straightforward. Accordingly, we have elected not to impose a 

penalty, and will proceed to review the merits of this appeal in the normal course.
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Property.2 Bluegrass further alleged that the Hatfields defaulted under the terms of 

the Note. As of August 1, 2017, Bluegrass alleged the Hatfields were jointly and 

severally liable to it for $140,590.49 plus accruing interest, late fees, expenses, 

attorney’s fees, and court costs, as also provided for under the Note. By virtue of 

the mortgage, Bluegrass alleged it had a valid and existing first lien on the Property 

to secure payment of all sums owed under the Note, and that terms of the mortgage 

provided for the filing of an action to sell the Property in the event of a default by 

the Hatfields. 

As relief, Bluegrass sought: (1) a judgment against the Hatfields, 

jointly and severally, in the principal sum of $140,590.49 plus interest at the 

agreed rate, late fees, expenses, court costs, and attorney’s fees; (2) that the court 

adjudge that Bluegrass had a valid and enforceable first lien on the Property; and 

(3) that if the court ordered the Property be sold, a sufficient portion of the net 

proceeds of such sale (after paying the current year’s property taxes and the costs 

of selling the property) be remitted to Bluegrass to fully satisfy any judgment 

against the Hatfields.

The Hatfields were individually served with copies of Bluegrass’s 

complaint on September 4, 2017. They did not file an answer or responsive 

 

2

It does not appear that the Hatfields resided at the Property. It is described as being 

approximately one acre with a 50-foot by 145-foot building located thereon, and commercial in 

nature.
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pleading. Accordingly, on November 27, 2017, Bluegrass filed a motion for 

default judgment. By order entered December 28, 2017, the trial court granted 

Bluegrass a default judgment against the Hatfields in the amount of $140,590.49, 

as of August 1, 2017, plus interest at the agreed legal rate, late fees, costs and 

attorneys’ fees. It further adjudged that Bluegrass had a valid lien on the Property. 

On May 29, 2018, Bluegrass moved for an order directing sale of the 

Property to satisfy its judgment against the Hatfields. On June 5, 2018, the trial 

court granted Bluegrass’s motion and referred the matter to the Master 

Commissioner for a judicial sale. However, the sale was stalled when the Hatfields 

filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. After the Hatfields bankruptcy action was 

dismissed for failure to make the required filings, Bluegrass removed the trial court 

to reinstate the judicial sale. Bluegrass’s motion was granted, and on December 

10, 2018, the matter was again referred to the Master Commissioner for a judicial 

sale. 

Two “disinterested housekeepers” of Boyle County were appointed to 

appraise the Property. On July 3, 2019, they filed a sworn affidavit attesting they 

appraised the value of the property to be $63,000.00. A judicial sale was 

conducted on July 23, 2019, at which Steve Kiesler and Sally Statom purchased the 

property for $43,000.00. Since the purchase price was over two-thirds of the 
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appraised value, the Hatfields could not claim a right of redemption. On July 24, 

2019, the Master Commissioner filed a report of sale. 

Acting with the assistance of counsel, on August 3, 2019, David filed 

exceptions to the Master Commissioner’s Report of Sale and requested an 

evidentiary hearing.3 The motion argued the appraised value set by the Master 

Commissioner was so low as to be unconscionable where: (1) in 2005 the Property 

was appraised with a market value of $155,000.00; (2) on June 17, 2015–just four 

years prior–Bluegrass loaned the Hatfields $144,724.44 based on the value of the 

Property; (3) that the tax assessed value of the Property was $70,000.00; and (4) 

that upon information and belief a prospective buyer had offered Bluegrass 

$80,000.00 prior to sale. The motion included David’s affidavit, a copy of the 

2005 appraisal, and the affidavit of Kevin Cooley, a “longtime friend” of David. 

Mr. Cooley averred that he was familiar with the Property and based on his 

familiarity with the area believed the Commissioner’s appraisal was “dramatically 

understated and unconscionable.” 

On September 16, 2019, the trial court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on the objection. Two days later, on September 18, 2019, the trial court 

overruled David’s exceptions finding “the appraisal entered on July 3, 2019, stands 

as correct and valid” and denying David’s motion to assign a different value to the 

 

3

It is unclear why Amanda did not join in the exceptions. 
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property. A separate Confirmation of Sale was also entered on September 18, 

2019. 

This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS

 The disposition of property through a judicial sale requires the court 

to “refer the matter to the master commissioner or appoint a commissioner to 

conduct a public sale[.]” KRS 389A.030(4). “[T]he terms of a judicial sale are 

ultimately determined by the circuit court; and the court may accept or reject the 

master commissioner’s suggestions.” Sterling Grace Mun. Securities Corp. v. 

Central Bank & Tr. Co., 926 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Ky. App. 1995). We review the 

trial court’s finding as to the appraised value for an abuse of discretion. Eagle Cliff 

Resort, LLC v. KHBBJB, LLC, 295 S.W.3d 850, 852-53 (Ky. App. 2009).

The Master Commissioner’s report set the appraised value of the 

Property at $63,000.00. Two-thirds of this amount is $42,000.00. Mr. Kiesler and 

Ms. Statom purchased the property at the judicial sale for $43,000.00 thereby 

cutting off the Hatfields’ right of redemption. KRS 426.530. “When a party 

whose redemption rights are at stake believes the appraisal of his property is 

inadequate in any way, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine 

whether the appraisal was ‘irregular, fraudulent, or so erroneous as to be 
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unconscionable[.]’” Eagle Cliff Resort, 295 S.W.3d at 852-53 (quoting Burchett v. 

Bank Josephine, 474 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Ky. 1971)). 

As required, the trial court conducted a hearing at which the Hatfields 

were given an opportunity to introduce evidence regarding the appraisal process 

and value assigned to the Property. With respect to the appraisal process, the 

Hatfields failed to show that there was any irregularity or fraud. KRS 426.520

establishes the requirements for real property sold under an order or judgment of 

court. It provides: 

(1) Before any real property is to be sold under an order 

or judgment of a court, other than an execution, the 

commissioner or other officer selling the property shall 

have it appraised, under oath, by two (2) disinterested, 

intelligent housekeepers of the county, who may be 

sworn by the officer. If they disagree, the officer shall 

act as umpire. If only a part of a tract of land is sold, the 

part sold shall, after the sale, be revalued in like manner.

(2) The appraisal made shall be in writing, signed by the 

persons making it, and returned by the commissioner or 

officer to the court which made the order or rendered the 

judgment for the sale of the property. Prior to the sale, 

the appraisal shall be filed among the papers of the cause 

in which the judgment was rendered or the order made, 

and entered on the records of the court.

KRS 426.520. The record confirms that this statute was followed. 

Moreover, we disagree that the Hatfields’ evidence was so compelling 

as to require a finding that the Commissioner’s appraisal value was 

unconscionable. The 2005 appraisal was performed almost fifteen years prior to 
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the sale. Its age alone calls its reliability into question. While Kevin Caudill, the 

appraiser, testified on behalf of the Hatfields that he believed the estimate by the 

Master Commissioner was erroneous insomuch as it discounted the property more 

than 30%, he did not testify to any actual fraud or irregularity. Finally, the tax 

assessment of $70,000.00 is only $7,000.00 more than $63,000.00 set by the 

Master Commissioner. Such a small discrepancy is insufficient to compel a 

finding of unconscionability. 

Finally, we cannot agree with the Hatfields that the testimony of Ray 

Preston, one of the two appraisers, compelled a finding in their favor. The fact that 

Mr. Preston could not recall the precise details of a property he appraised over two 

months prior is not entirely surprising, and it is certainly not indicative of fraud or 

irregularity. And, contrary to the Hatfields’ implications otherwise, there is no 

requirement for an appraiser to go onto the property. See Southwood v. Willis, 222 

Ky. 782, 2 S.W.2d 660, 660 (Ky. 1928). 

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, we can discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. 

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Boyle Circuit Court. 

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

David Hatfield, pro se

Amanda Hatfield, pro se

Danville, Kentucky

NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEES.