GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Testimony

Before the Subcommittees on Military Procurement and on 

Military Research and Development, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10:00 a.m., EDT

Wednesday,

October 20, 1999

CHEMICAL AND 

BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Observations on Actions 

Taken to Protect Military 

Forces

Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Security

Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs 

Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49

Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) continuing efforts to protect U.S. military forces against chemical 

and biological weapons. Problems experienced during the Gulf War 

demonstrated that U.S. forces were inadequately prepared for surviving 

and operating in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. 

We have issued reports and provided testimonies before Congress on 

DOD’s efforts to resolve the problems identified in 1991. This statement 

summarizes the message in those reports and testimonies. It also describes 

some of our ongoing efforts to update the status of DOD’s actions.

Summary Between 1996 and 1999, GAO issued many reports and testimonies dealing 

with various aspects of U.S. forces’ preparedness for surviving and 

operating on a chemically or biologically contaminated battlefield. (These 

reports and testimonies are listed in appendix I.) In 1996, we reported that 

DOD was slow in responding to lessons learned from the Gulf War. 

Problems encountered during this conflict demonstrated that chemical and 

biological defense equipment and training, and medical factors, needed 

more emphasis during peacetime in order to meet the demanding 

requirements of current U.S. strategy for the rapid deployment of forces 

based in the United States to regional conflicts overseas. We concluded 

that despite increased DOD emphasis on chemical and biological defense, 

problems with equipment, training, medical care, and other areas persist 

and are likely to result in needless casualties and a degradation of U.S. warfighting capability. In 1997 and 1998, we issued reports and testimonies 

addressing more specific chemical and biological defense topics such as 

the protection of critical rear-area facilities, defenses against biological 

agents, and concerns specific to the Northeast Asian theater. These efforts 

reported that many doctrinal and planning aspects of chemical and 

biological defense remained largely unaddressed and that biological agent 

vaccines were insufficient to protect the force. In 1998 and 1999, our work 

expanded to address topics such as DOD’s coordination of chemical and 

biological research and development programs, its strategy for low-level 

exposures, and implementation of DOD’s anthrax vaccine program. We 

reported that existing chemical and biological defense program 

coordinating mechanisms may not ensure that program gaps and 

opportunities for collaboration would be addressed, and that the program 

had not incorporated key Results Act’s principles. We also reported that 

DOD’s anthrax vaccine program was being affected by the sole-source 

manufacturer’s cash flow problems and the lack of studies on the safety 
Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49

and human efficacy of the vaccine. Another anthrax-related product will be 

completed later this month addressing the issues faced by DOD regarding 

the regimen, production capability, record keeping, adverse reactions, and 

educational efforts affecting DOD’s anthrax vaccine program. We are 

currently conducting additional reviews addressing the status of 

improvements in chemical and biological defense doctrine and unit and 

logistical readiness, the capacity of the chemical and biological defense 

industrial base, and the status of the Defense Counterproliferation 

Initiative.

Background DOD has determined that the threat or use of nuclear, biological, or 

chemical weapons is a likely condition of future warfare and could occur in 

the early stages of war to disrupt U.S. operations and logistics. Potential 

adversaries, especially in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, have 

chemical and biological weapons stocks and the means to deliver them. 

These weapons are particularly attractive to adversaries seeking to counter 

U.S. conventional military superiority through less expensive and more 

attainable means. U.S. forces therefore need to be properly trained and 

equipped to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated 

environment. When the threat of chemical and biological weapons use 

occurred during the Gulf War, deploying U.S. forces encountered a wide 

array of problems, including unsuitable and inadequate supplies of 

protective equipment, inadequate training in its use, unsuitable chemical 

and biological detectors, and an ineffective program for utilizing existing 

biological warfare vaccines.

1996 Assessment of 

Progress Since the Gulf 

War

Our first major report, issued in 1996 to the Readiness Subcommittee, 

discussed the overall capability of U.S. forces to fight and survive chemical 

and biological warfare, and is the centerpiece for much of the work we 

have performed since.1

 We reported that DOD was slow in responding to 

the lessons learned during the Gulf War. Although some improvements had 

been made, we found that

• early deploying units lacked required equipment,

• research and development progress was slower than planned,

1 Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing 

Problems (GAO/NSIAD-96-103, Mar. 29, 1996).
Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49

• Army and Marine forces remained inadequately trained for effective 

chemical and biological defense,

• joint exercises included little chemical or biological defense training,

• biological agent vaccine stocks and immunization plans remained 

inadequate, and 

• Army medical units often lacked chemical and biological defense 

equipment and training.

We concluded that equipment, training, and medical problems persisted 

and were likely to result in needless casualties and a degradation of U.S. 

war-fighting capability. We noted that despite DOD’s increased emphasis on 

chemical and biological defense, it continued to receive a lower level of 

emphasis at all levels of command than other tasks, such as performing 

traditional mission tasks. Many field commanders had accepted a level of 

chemical and biological defense unpreparedness and told us that the 

resources devoted to that area were appropriate, given other threats and 

budgetary constraints.

Progress in Defense 

Against Biological 

Agents

In April 1997 we issued a classified report to the Chairmen and Ranking 

Members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in response 

to a directive in the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1997. 

The report dealt with DOD’s progress in implementing its policy to 

immunize its forces against biological threat agents, its policies and 

procedures regarding the use of investigational drug biological agent 

vaccines, and its use of investigational drugs for other prevention and 

treatment purposes. Our report concluded that DOD’s actions at the time 

were not sufficient to protect the force from existing biological warfare 

threats.

DOD’s Efforts to 

Protect Critical RearArea Facilities

In June 1997 we issued another classified report to Chairman Floyd 

Spence. We addressed the nature of the threat of chemical and biological 

warfare, the adequacy of U.S. military joint chemical and biological defense 

doctrine, and the preparations and plans for the chemical and biological 

defense of critical overseas rear-area facilities like ports and airfields. 

Although these facilities are critical to the ability of U.S. forces to deploy to 

an overseas conflict, we found that chemical and biological defense 

doctrine, plans, equipment, and training at these facilities were largely 

unaddressed. The report included findings and observations at specific 

critical military installations in South Korea and Southwest Asia.
Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49

Chemical and 

Biological Defenses in 

South Korea

In 1998 we issued another classified report to Congressman Duncan Hunter 

on the capability of the combined U.S–South Korean force to defend 

against North Korean artillery and chemical and biological warfare. In this 

report we noted a number of improvements in artillery counterfire and 

chemical and biological defense in South Korea and identified areas of 

continuing risk specific to this theater.

DOD’s Strategy for 

Protecting Forces 

Against Low-Level 

Exposures

In September 1998 we issued a report to the Ranking Members of the 

Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Governmental 

Affairs on DOD’s approach to addressing U.S. troop exposures to low levels 

of chemical warfare agents.2

 Low-level exposure is a concern because it 

may potentially cause or contribute to health problems that may not 

become evident for years after exposure. Specifically, we reported the 

following:

• Past research by DOD and others indicated that single and repeated lowlevel exposures to some chemical warfare agents could result in adverse 

psychological, physiological, behavioral, and performance effects that 

may have military implications. We also highlighted limitations of the 

current research.

• DOD had allocated nearly $10 million (about 1.5 percent) of its chemical 

and biological defense research, development, testing, and evaluation 

program to fund projects on low-level chemical warfare agent 

exposures.

• DOD did not have an integrated strategy to address exposure to low 

levels of chemical warfare agents.

DOD’s Coordination of 

Research and 

Development 

Programs

Earlier this year we issued a report to the Ranking Members of the Senate 

Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services on the coordination of 

federal research and development efforts to develop nonmedical

2 Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have a Strategy to Address Low-Level Exposures

(GAO/NSIAD-98-228, Sept. 23, 1998).
Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49

technology related to chemical and biological defense.3 We identified four 

programs engaged in activities ranging from applied research to prototype 

development: two of these programs developed technologies primarily for 

military war-fighting applications and two others developed technologies 

primarily to assist civilians responding to terrorist incidents. We concluded 

that the formal and informal program coordination mechanisms may not 

ensure that potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration 

would be addressed. We pointed out that agency officials were aware of the 

deficiencies in the existing coordination mechanisms and that some had 

initiated additional informal contacts.

DOD’s Application of 

the Results Act

In August of this year we reported on the extent to which DOD has applied 

the Government Performance and Results Act’s outcome-oriented 

principles to its Chemical and Biological Defense Program.4

 We concluded 

that the program in general, and its research and development activities in 

particular, had not incorporated key Results Act principles, as evidenced by 

the fact that the goals of the program were vague and unmeasurable and 

did not articulate specific desired impacts. We also pointed out that the 

program was not being evaluated according to its impact on the defensive 

or operational capabilities of U.S. forces, either individually or collectively.

DOD’s Anthrax Vaccine 

Program

As part of our work on chemical and biological defense, we have testified 

four times this year before the House Government Reform Committee. The 

first testimony dealt with the safety and efficacy of the anthrax vaccine.5

We noted the lack of studies on long-term safety, the lack of studies on 

human efficacy testing against inhaled anthrax, and the limited studies of 

short-term reactions to the vaccine.

3 Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological 

R&D Programs (GAO/NSIAD-99-160, Aug. 16, 1999).

4 Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow Results 

Act Framework (GAO/NSIAD-99-159, Aug. 16, 1999).

5 Medical Readiness: Safety and Efficacy of the Anthrax Vaccine (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-148, 

Apr. 29, 1999).
Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49

In our second testimony, we reported on DOD’s financial relationship with 

the sole-source manufacturer of the anthrax vaccine.6

 We observed that the 

company faced serious cash flow problems due to its inability to achieve an 

overly optimistic business plan. A recent renegotiation of the contract has 

mitigated some of these concerns.

In the third testimony, we reported that DOD’s data on adverse reactions to 

the vaccinations indicated that female servicemembers reported such 

events in greater numbers than male servicemembers and that no clinical 

studies had been done to determine the optimum number of doses of the 

vaccine.7

 We also noted that DOD had conducted some research on a 

second-generation anthrax vaccine but considered such research an 

unfunded priority and that the Department of Health and Human Services 

recently funded several research grants to develop a second-generation 

vaccine.

Earlier this week, we testified again about the studies conducted to 

determine the need for a 6-injection regimen, the long- and short-term 

safety of the vaccine, and the vaccine’s effectiveness. In addition, we 

addressed whether problems the Food and Drug Administration found in 

the vaccine production facility in Michigan might compromise the safety, 

efficacy, and quality of the vaccine.8

We are also currently working on a report to the Chairman and Ranking 

Member of the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs on some of the 

programmatic issues DOD faces in implementing its anthrax vaccine 

immunization effort. This report, which we expect to complete later this 

month, will cover DOD’s

• ability to maintain an adequate supply of anthrax vaccine for its 

immunization schedule,

6 Contract Management: Observations on DOD’s Financial Relationship With the Anthrax 

Vaccine Manufacturer (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-214, June 30, 1999).

7 Medical Readiness: Issues Concerning the Anthrax Vaccine (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-226, July 21, 

1999).

8 Anthrax Vaccine: Safety and Efficacy Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-48, Oct. 12, 1999).
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49

• system for recording and tracking servicemembers’ vaccinations,

• efforts to monitor possible adverse reactions to anthrax vaccinations, 

and 

• steps to educate servicemembers about the program.

Ongoing GAO 

Evaluations

We currently have several evaluations underway that will enable us to 

comment further on DOD’s efforts to protect military forces against 

chemical and biological weapons.

In response to a request from the Readiness Subcommittee, we are 

reviewing several aspects of DOD’s chemical and biological defense 

program. These include the status of improvements to joint doctrine and 

policy, the chemical and biological defense readiness of U.S. units and of 

critical logistics and command facilities in South Korea and the Persian 

Gulf (as well as units based in the United States but designated for early 

deployment to these areas), and the ability of medical units and logistics 

systems to support operations in a chemical or biological warfare 

environment.

In response to a request from the Chairman of the Government Reform 

Subcommittee on National Security and the Ranking Member of the Senate 

Appropriations Committee, we are examining the capacity and willingness 

of the chemical and biological defense industrial base to meet DOD’s 

planned development and production requirements.

In response to a recent request from the full House Armed Services 

Committee, we are reviewing the status of the Defense 

Counterproliferation Initiative, launched by DOD in December 1993. Our 

work covers 

• DOD’s organizational structure for the initiative, including its 

management and oversight of the counterproliferation mission;

• the integration of the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical 

weapons against U.S. and allied forces into DOD’s planning, acquisition, 

intelligence, doctrine, training, and exercises;

• DOD’s success in integrating and coordinating counterproliferation 

initiatives with other federal agencies, particularly with the Department 

of Energy and the intelligence community; and 

• improvements in offensive and defensive capabilities under the 

counterproliferation initiative, and remaining shortfalls.
Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49

We expect to issue reports on all these evaluations sometime next year.

This concludes my formal statement. If you or other members of the 

subcommittees have any questions we will be pleased to answer them.

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Norman 

Rabkin at (202) 512-3610. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony included Raymond Decker, Joseph Murray, and William Cawood.
Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49
Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49

Appendix I

GAO Chemical and Biological Defense 

Products 1996-99 ApendxIi

Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to 

Resolve Continuing Problems (GAO/NSIAD-96-103, Mar. 29, 1996). Also by 

the same title in testimony before the House Committee on National 

Security, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development 

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123, Mar. 12, 1996) and before the Presidential Advisory 

Committee on Gulf War Veteran’s Illnesses (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123, May 1, 

1996).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD’s Plans to Protect 

U.S. Forces (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-83, Mar. 17, 1998).

Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have a Strategy to Address Low-Level 

Exposures (GAO/NSIAD-98-228, Sept. 23, 1998).

Medical Readiness: Safety and Efficacy of the Anthrax Vaccine 

(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-148, Apr. 29, 1999).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical 

and Biological R&D Programs (GAO/NSIAD-99-160, Aug. 16, 1999).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should 

Follow Results Act Framework (GAO/NSIAD-99-159, Aug. 16, 1999).

Contract Management: Observations on DOD’s Financial Relationship With 

the Anthrax Vaccine Manufacturer (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-214, June 30, 1999).

Medical Readiness: Issues Concerning the Anthrax Vaccine

(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-226, July 21, 1999).

Anthrax Vaccine: Safety and Efficacy Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-48, Oct. 12, 

1999).

Note: Classified reports are not shown.

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