Globaat a Critic
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Global Governance 2025: 

At a Critical Juncture 

Inquiries regarding this report may be made to Mathew Burrows, 

Counselor to the National Intelligence Council, on (703) 482-0741 

and to the EU Institute of Security Studies on 0033-1-56-89-19-51. 

NIC 2010-08 

September 2010 
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i 

443755ID 9-10

Preface

The United States’ National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the European Union’s Institute for 

Security Studies (EUISS) have joined forces to produce this assessment of the long-term prospects 

for global governance frameworks. This exercise builds on the experience of the two institutions in 

identifying the key trends shaping the future international system. Since the mid 1990s, the NIC has 

produced four editions of its landmark Global Trends report. The most recent one, Global Trends 

2025: A Transformed World, published in late 2008, noted that momentous change was ahead, with 

the gap between increasing disorder and weakening governance structures widening. The EUISS 

produced the first EU-level report on the factors affecting the evolution of the international system 

in 2006, The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025? The report stressed that a 

multipolar system is emerging and that matching the new distribution of power with new rules and 

institutions will be critical to preserving international peace and stability.

The US and the EU do not always see eye to eye on every issue on the international agenda, but 

they share fundamental values and strategic interests to an extent not matched by any other partners 

in the world. Transatlantic agreement is no longer enough to effectively manage global challenges. 

Doing so will require renewed efforts to address governance gaps and strengthen multilateralism, in 

partnership with other pivotal centers of power and with the international community at large.

This report provides an informal contribution to an important international debate on the way 

forward for global, regional, and bilateral institutions and frameworks to meet emerging challenges. 

It is not meant as an exhaustive report card evaluating the performance of individual institutions. 

While not being policy prescriptive, the report shares a strong belief—as exemplified by 

multilateralist approaches of the US and EU governments to resolving global problems such as the 

recent financial crisis—that global challenges will require global solutions. 

The report does not seek to examine all the various challenges likely to require multilateralist efforts, 

but rather highlights several important governance gaps. We therefore do not go into depth on 

proliferation or cybersecurity—which we believe are receiving greater attention. Instead, we focus 

on such issues as intrastate conflict, resource management, migration, and biotechnology. Although 

recognized by many as ongoing challenges, we believe the long-term impact of these issues on the 

strength of the international order has not been fully appreciated. 

Global Governance 2025 is the result of an inclusive process, enriched by wide-ranging 

consultations with government officials; as well as business, academic, NGO, and think tank leaders; 

and media representatives in Brazil, China, India, Japan, Russia, South Africa, and in the Gulf region 

(the UAE). The diversity of the comments and insights, which we have included in the body of the 

text, testifies both to the richness of the debate and to the difficulty of reconciling different interests 

and standpoints when reforming global governance. A number of experts, acknowledged elsewhere, 

have contributed to the success of this project and to the high quality of this report. The Atlantic 

Council of the US and the Transatlantic Policy Network have been partners in supporting the project. 

NIC Counselor Mathew Burrows and Giovanni Grevi from the EUISS have steered this process and 

took charge of drafting the bulk of the report. Their work has set an excellent example of cooperation 

in delivering joint analysis and achieving a largely shared perspective. 

The Global Governance 2025 project is innovative in many respects. This is the first time the NIC 

has jointly developed and produced an unclassified report with a non-US body. Global Governance 

2025 provides an important step with a view to future joint projects on matters of common interest.
ii 

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iii

Global governance—the collective management of common problems at the international 

level—is at a critical juncture. Although global governance institutions have racked up many 

successes since their development after the Second World War, the growing number of issues on 

the international agenda, and their complexity, is outpacing the ability of international 

organizations and national governments to cope. 

With the emergence of rapid globalization, the risks to the international system have grown to 

the extent that formerly localized threats are no longer locally containable but are now 

potentially dangerous to global security and stability. At the beginning of the century, threats 

such as ethnic conflicts, infectious diseases, and terrorism as well as a new generation of global 

challenges including climate change, energy security, food and water scarcity, international 

migration flows, and new technologies are increasingly taking center stage. 

Three effects of rapid globalization are driving demands for more effective global governance. 

Interdependence has been a feature of economic globalization for many years, but the rise of 

China, India, Brazil, and other fast-growing economies has taken economic interdependence to a 

new level. The multiple links among climate change and resources issues; the economic crisis; 

and state fragility—“hubs” of risks for the future—illustrate the interconnected nature of the 

challenges on the international agenda today. Many of the issues cited above involve interwoven 

domestic and foreign challenges. Domestic politics creates tight constraints on international 

cooperation and reduces the scope for compromise. 

The shift to a multipolar world is complicating the prospects for effective global governance 

over the next 10 years. The expanding economic clout of emerging powers increases their 

political influence well beyond their borders. Power is not only shifting from established powers 

to rising countries and, to some extent, the developing world, but also toward nonstate actors. 

Diverse perspectives and suspicions about global governance, which is seen as a Western 

concept, will add to the difficulties of effectively mastering the growing number of challenges. 

• Brazilians feel there is a need for a redistribution of power from developed to developing 

states. Some experts we consulted saw Brazil tending to like state-centered multilateralism. 

• Many of our Chinese interlocutors see mounting global challenges and fundamental defects 

in the international system but emphasize the need for China to deal with its internal 

problems. The Chinese envisage a “bigger structure” pulling together the various institutions 

and groups that have been established recently. They see the G-20 as being a step forward 

but question whether North-South differences will impede cooperation on issues other than 

economics.

Executive Summary
iv

• For participants from the Persian Gulf region, the question is what sort of global institutions 

are most capable of inclusive power sharing. They bemoaned the lack of strong regional 

organizations. 

• The Indians thought existing international organizations are “grossly inadequate” and 

worried about an “absence of an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability.” They felt 

that India is not well positioned to help develop regional institutions for Asia given China’s 

preponderant role in the region. 

• Russian experts we consulted see the world in 2025 as still one of great powers but with 

more opportunities for transnational cooperation. The Russians worried about the relative 

lack of “transpacific security.” The United States, Europe, and Russia also have scope for 

growing much closer, while China, “with the biggest economy,” will be the main factor in 

changing the world. 

• The South Africans assessed that globalization appears to be strengthening regionalization as 

opposed to creating a single global polity. They worried that the losers from globalization 

increasingly outnumber the winners. 

In addition to the shift to a multipolar world, power is also shifting toward nonstate actors, be 

they agents or spoilers of cooperation. On a positive note, transnational nongovernmental 

organizations, civil-society groups, churches and faith-based organizations, multinational 

corporations, other business bodies, and interest groups have been equally, if not more effective 

than states at reframing issues and mobilizing publics—a trend we expect to continue. However, 

hostile nonstate actors such as criminal organizations and terrorist networks, all empowered by 

existing and new technologies, can pose serious security threats and compound systemic risks. 

Many developing countries—which are likely to play an increasing role at the regional and 

global level—also suffer from a relative paucity of nonstate actors, that could help newly 

emerging states and their governments deal with the growing transnational challenges. 

Global governance institutions have adapted to some degree as new issues have emerged, but the 

adaptations have not necessarily been intentional or substantial enough to keep up with growing 

demand. Rather, they have been spurred as much by outside forces as by the institutions 

themselves. 

The emergence of informal groupings of leading countries, such as the G-20; the prospects for 

further regional cooperation, notably in East Asia; and the multiple contributions of nonstate 

actors to international cooperation—although highly useful—are unlikely to serve as permanent 

alternatives to rule-based, inclusive multilateral institutions. Multilateral institutions can deliver 

public goods that summits, nonstate actors and regional frameworks cannot supply, or cannot do 

so in a reliable way. Our foreign interlocutors stressed the need for decisions enjoying universal 

legitimacy, norms setting predictable patterns of behavior based on reciprocity, and mutually 

agreed instruments to resolve disputes and redress torts, such as in trade matters. 

We assess that the multiple and diverse governance frameworks, however flexible, probably are 

not going to be sufficient to keep pace with the looming number of transnational and global 

challenges absent extensive institutional reforms and innovations. The capacities of the current 
v

institutional patchwork will be stretched by the type of problems facing the global order over the 

next few decades. 

Numerous studies indicate the growing fragility of many low-income developing states and 

potential for more conflict, particularly in cases where civil wars were never fully resolved. 

Internal conflict or collapse of large populous states on the scale of an Ethiopia, Bangladesh, 

Pakistan or Nigeria would likely overwhelm international conflict management efforts. 

Afghanistan, with approximately 28 million people, and Iraq, with 30 million, are among the 

most populous conflict management cases ever attempted, and they are proving difficult. 

Regional organizations have performed comparatively few large-scale operational responses to 

fragile states requiring humanitarian and peacemaking help. Although we can expect increased 

political and economic engagement from rising powers—in part a reflection of their increasing 

global interests—emerging powers have deep-seated concerns about the consequences of the 

proactive management of state fragility. 

Prevention, for example, often can require direct political intervention or even the threat or use 

of military force as a last resort. Efforts to prevent conflict have often been slowed by reluctance 

and resistance to intervene directly, potentially overriding another country’s sovereignty. Many 

experts in emerging states thought their governments probably would be particularly leery of any 

intervention if it is driven by the “West.” 

Another cluster of problems—the management of energy, food, and water resources—appears 

particularly unlikely to be effectively tackled without major governance innovations. Individual 

international agencies respond to discrete cases, particularly humanitarian emergencies in 

individual countries. However, no overall framework exists to manage the interrelated problems 

of food, water and energy. The stakes are high in view of the impact that growing scarcities 

could have on undermining the open international system. Resource competition in which major 

powers seek to secure reliable supplies could lead to a breakdown in cooperation in other areas. 

Moreover, scarcities are likely to hit poor states the hardest, leading in the worst case to internal 

or interstate conflict and spillover to regional destabilization. 

Other over-the-horizon issues—migration, the potential opening of the Arctic, and risks 

associated with the biotechnology revolution—are likely to rise in importance and demand a 

higher level of cooperation. These issues are difficult ones for multilateral cooperation because 

they involve more preventive action. Under current circumstances, greater cooperation on those 

issues in which the risks are not clear-cut will be especially difficult to achieve. 

Potential Scenarios 

Throughout the main text, we have sprinkled fictionalized scenarios that could result if, as we 

believe likely, the multiple and diverse governance frameworks struggle to keep pace with the 

looming number of transnational and global challenges. The scenarios illustrate various 

permutations that could happen over the next 15 years. The following summarizes what we see 

as the principal potential trajectories of the international system as it tries to confront new 

challenges. We believe the risks of an unreformed global governance system are likely to 
vi

cumulate over time. Crises—so long as they are not overwhelming—may actually spur greater 

innovation and change in the system. Inaction over the long term increases the risks of a 

complete breakdown. 

Scenario I: Barely Keeping Afloat 

In this scenario, seen as the most likely one over the next several years, no one crisis will be so 

overwhelming as to threaten the international system even though collective management 

advances slowly. Crises are dealt with ad hoc and temporary frameworks or institutions are 

devised to avert the most threatening aspects of them. Formal institutions remain largely 

unreformed and Western states probably must shoulder a disproportionate share of “global 

governance” as developing countries prevent disruptions at home. This future is not sustainable 

over the longer term as it depends on no crisis being so unmanageable as to overwhelm the 

international system. 

Scenario II: Fragmentation 

Powerful states and regions try to wall themselves off from outside threats. Asia builds a 

regional order that is economically self-sufficient. Global communications ensure globalization 

does not die, but it slows significantly. Europe turns its focus inward as it wrestles with growing 

discontent with declining living standards. With a growing work force, the US might be in a 

better position but may still be fiscally constrained if its budgetary shortfalls and long-term debt 

problems remain unresolved. 

Scenario III: Concert of Europe Redux 

Under this scenario, severe threats to the international system—possibly a looming 

environmental disaster or a conflict that risks spreading—prompt greater cooperation on solving 

global problems. Significant reform of the international system becomes possible. Although 

less likely than the first two scenarios in the immediate future, such a scenario might prove the 

best outcome over the longer term, building a resilient international system that would step up 

the level of overall cooperation on an array of problems. The US increasingly shares power 

while China and India increase their burden sharing and the EU takes on a bigger global role. A 

stable concert could also occur incrementally over a long period in which economic gaps shrink 

and per capita income converges. 

Scenario IV: Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation 

This scenario is among the least likely, but the possibility cannot be dismissed. The international 

system becomes threatening owing to domestic disruptions, particularly in emerging powers such 

as China. Nationalistic pressures build as middle-class aspirations for the “good life” are 

stymied. Tensions build between the United States and China, but also among some of the 

BRICs as competition grows for secure resources and clients. A nuclear arms race in the Middle 

East could deal an equally destabilizing blow to prospects for continued global growth. 

Suspicions and tensions make reforming global institutions impossible; budding regional efforts, 

particularly in Asia, also are undermined. 
vii

Contents 

Page 

Preface i 

Executive Summary iii 

Introduction 

International Institutions in the Late 20th Century 

1 

1 

Chapter One: Expanding Agenda Stretching Institutional Capacities 

Complex Risks Driving Demands for Global Governance 

Scenario I: Barely Keeping Afloat 

3 

4 

7 

Chapter Two: Power Shifts Complicating Global Governance 

Will Multipolarity Enhance or Erode Multilateralism? 

Scenario II: Fragmentation 

9 

10 

14 

Chapter Three: Some Success in Adapting 

Informal Groupings 

Growth of Regionalism 

Nonstate Actors Step Up to the Plate 

Scenario III: Concert of Europe Redux 

17 

19 

21 

23 

27 

Chapter Four: An Uncertain Future 

Weak and Failing States 

Interlocking Resource Issues 

“Over-the-Horizon” Issues for Global Governance 

Scenario IV: Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation 

29 

30 

32 

33 

37 

Conclusion 

Future Opportunities, but also Limits 

39 

39

Annexes A-F: 41 

A: World Views of Global Governance 43 

B: The Prospects for Regionalism 49 

C: The Arctic: Challenge or Opportunity for Global Governance? 55 

D: Are Global Governance Tools Sufficient for Fragile States? 57 

E: Migration in the Age of Uncertainty 61 

F: Threats from Biotechnology 67 
viii

Acknowledgements 

In preparing this work, the National Intelligence Council and the European Union’s Institute for Security 

Studies received immeasurable and critical help from an array of think tanks, consulting firms, academic 

and governmental institutions, and literally scores of individual experts on all five continents. We would 

first like to thank the Atlantic Council of the US (ACUS) and the Trans-Atlantic Policy Network (TPN), 

who were both partners in supporting this project. ACUS’ Dr. Banning Garrett and Mr. Patrick 

DeGategno were superb in arranging the numerous overseas meetings; ACUS President Frederick Kempe 

and Vice President Fran Burwell also participated in the planning and discussions in several venues. Mr. 

James Elles, Member of European Parliament and head of TPN, was pivotal in helping to design the 

project and orchestrating key discussions in several capitals. He accompanied us on almost all the trips. 

Dr. William Burke-White of the State Department’s Policy Planning Office provided guidance and 

substantive advice in addition to accompanying us on all the trips. Ms. Rosemary Opacic, Administrator 

of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, also provided important contributions 

and participated in most of the research trips. 

The following institutions, their directors, and participating staff were gracious in hosting us for major 

seminars and, in many cases, inviting other experts in their countries and regions to the meetings: 

• Beijing: China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). 

• Tokyo: Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA). 

• Dubai: Dubai Consultancy Research & Media Centre (b'huth). 

• India: Observer Research Foundation (ORF). 

• Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 

• Brasilia: Secretaria De Assuntos Estrategicos (SAE). 

• Sao Paulo: Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardos . 

• Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). 

Special mention goes to Bruce Jones, David Steven, and Alex Evans, at the Center on International 

Cooperation at New York University, for providing comprehensive and critical material on failing states, 

resource issues such as water and food, migration, and innovative biotechnologies. Charles Emmerson, 

former head of the global risks programme at the World Economic Forum and now an independent 

adviser, wrote the appendix on the Arctic. Dr. Alexander van de Putte of PFC Energy provided material 

on energy futures. Within the NIC, Ms. Elizabeth Arens provided essential editorial support. 

o
1 

Global governance—the collective 

management of common problems at the 

international level—is at a critical juncture. 

Although global governance has been a 

relative success since its development after 

the Second World War, the growing number 

of issues on the international agenda, and 

their complexity, is outpacing the ability of 

international organizations and national 

governments to cope. Power shifts are also 

complicating global governance. 

“There has been unprecedented increase in 

the speed of movement of goods, people, and 

communications. This has led to new 

problems and inadequacy of international 

paraphernalia inherited from the 20th

Century.” 

Former Senior Official, 

Government of India 

Some progress has been made to adjust 

international institutions and regimes to meet 

the new demands and to create workarounds, 

if not new frameworks. Such efforts are 

unlikely to suffice, however. If global 

governance structures and processes do not 

keep up with the changes in the balance of 

power in the international system, they run 

the risk of becoming irrelevant. Emerging 

powers are suspicious of current institutional 

arrangements, which appear to favor 

established powers. Without adequate 

frameworks to bring order to an international 

system in flux, disorder could prevail, fueling 

greater instability. The mix of old and new 

challenges generates new requirements for 

collective problem-solving: more 

international cooperation and innovative 

approaches. Much will depend on leadership 

and political will. 

The term “global governance” as used in this 

paper includes all the institutions, regimes, 

processes, partnerships, and networks that 

contribute to collective action and problem 

solving at the international level. This 

definition subsumes formal and informal 

arrangements as well as the role of nonstate 

actors in transnational settings. Regional 

cooperation may also be regarded as an 

element of global governance insofar as it 

contributes to broader efforts. Governance 

differs from government, which implies 

sovereign prerogatives and hierarchical 

authority. Global governance does not equate 

to world government, which would be 

virtually impossible for the foreseeable future, 

if ever. 

International Institutions in the Late 20th

Century 

Preserving international peace and security 

was the central preoccupation of the architects 

of the post-World War II United Nations 

system. The UN Security Council engaged 

all major powers of the time in this 

undertaking; UN peacekeeping operations 

continue to be deployed to monitor peace 

agreements and ensure stability after civil 

wars. Bretton Woods institutions were set up 

to help maintain financial and monetary 

stability and to foster the reconstruction of 

war-torn economies, against the backbone of 

the US dollar as the international exchange 

and reserve currency. Both sets of institutions 

have had their share of problems but have 

made substantial contributions in the postCold War period. 

Although the Cold War was punctuated by 

numerous smaller proxy wars led by the two 

superpowers and some brutal conflicts 

occurred, no large-scale conflicts rivaling the 

first or second World Wars have broken out 

since the formation of the UN in 1945. 

Millions of people continue to be affected, but 

conflicts have declined in number. Faced 

Introduction
2 

with the danger of nuclear war and 

proliferation, nuclear and non-nuclear states 

struck a global contract to stop the spread of 

nuclear weapons—the Nonproliferation 

Treaty—and the United States and Russia 

negotiated several treaties to delimit and 

reduce their respective nuclear arsenals and 

weapon systems. 

On the economic front, trade liberalization 

under the GATT and the WTO provided 

another global public good in the shape of 

increasingly low tariffs and open markets, 

enhancing shared prosperity and preventing 

protectionism from generating political 

confrontation. 

Over time, our expectations have continued to 

grow as the scope for cooperation has 

expanded, especially in view of the push 

provided by globalization to growing 

interactions. Individual agencies focused on 

specific problems have been a growing 

feature of global governance. As a result, the 

problems of “span of control,” increasing 

“stovepipes,” and “lack of strategic oversight” 

have come increasingly to the fore as major 

challenges to ensuring effectiveness in the 

system. 
Chapter 1:

Expanding Agenda Stretching 

Institutional Capacities
4 

With the emergence of rapid globalization, 

the risks to the international system have 

grown to the extent that formerly localized 

threats are no longer locally containable but 

are now potentially dangerous to global 

security and stability. At the beginning of the 

century, threats such as ethnic conflicts, 

infectious diseases, and terrorism as well as a 

new generation of global challenges including 

climate change, energy security, food and 

water scarcity, international migration flows, 

and new technologies—are increasingly 

taking center stage. Although some of the 

emerging issues have been debated in 

multilateral forums for over 20 years, such 

issues have taken on new importance in a 

globalized world because of the potential for 

more widespread disruption. 

• This decade opened with the attacks on 

the Twin towers in New York as well as 

the Pentagon—bringing transnational 

terrorism to the fore of the international 

agenda. The danger of proliferation and 

use of nonconventional weapons took on 

new urgency. Peace operations evolved to 

include broader mandates such as tackling 

the root causes of conflict. 

• Climate change has trespassed the 

boundaries of environmental politics to 

become the subject of the global political, 

economic, and security debate and a new 

focus of multilateral cooperation cutting 

across these and other domains. 

• The nascent recovery from the recent 

economic crisis has highlighted the 

importance of developing countries—

particularly China—to restarting the 

global economy with many Western 

countries lagging behind. 

• In part owing to the rise of economic 

powerhouses China and India and their 

growing appetites for energy and other 

commodities, energy politics and other 

resource issues are taking an increasingly 

pre-eminent place in international affairs. 

• Biotechnologies and nanotechnologies 

bear much potential both for progress, for 

example in the health sector, and for 

unprecedented risks, if diverted for 

criminal purposes. Genetic modifications 

raise profound ethical questions even 

while breakthoughs are likely to be 

critical for societies struggling with 

resource issues such as food and aging 

populations. 

Complex Risks Driving Demands for 

Global Governance 

The cumulative impact of emerging issues as 

well as longstanding ones is transforming the 

scale and nature of the challenges facing the 

international community. Three features of 

rapid globalization are driving demands for 

more effective global governance: deepening 

interdependence, interconnected problems, 

and the mingling of domestic politics with 

international issues. At the same time, fast 

technological progress alerts civil society 

bodies, such as NGOs, to new challenges and 

to the need for cooperation and enables them 

to play a stronger role. 

“What worries me is that you see a more 

chaotic world and less capable US. There are 

centrifugal forces pulling apart the nations of 

the world... Resource constraints will have 

huge implications for global society... The 

trainwreck is right ahead of us...” 

US Think Tank Participant 

Interdependence has been a feature of 

economic globalization for many years, but 

the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other fastgrowing economies has taken economic 

interdependence to a new level. The offshoring of production and business services 

from advanced to emerging countries, and 

increasing economic exchanges within the 
5 

latter group, has markedly diversified trade 

and investment patterns and resulted in value 

chains spread across different countries and 

continents. The accumulation of huge foreign 

currency reserves by emerging powers, 

notably China, has corresponded to the 

ballooning debt of deficit countries, in 

particular the United States. Emerging 

economies financed spending by the United 

States on their own exports. Among other 

factors, such a structural imbalance produced 

the severe financial crisis that flattened 

growth, cut credit, and curbed private 

spending in the developed world. The 

monetary and fiscal policies of the United 

States, China, and the EU, among other 

economic powers, have become more 

intertwined. The coordination of 

macroeconomic measures is imperative to 

sustain global recovery. 

“Climate change is an issue of international 

security—a threat multiplier...The core 

challenge is that it not only threatens us 

environmentally but also that it will 

exacerbate conflicts over resources, water 

shortages, and diminishing food stocks.” 

Administrator, European 

Parliament 

The multiple links among climate change, the 

economic crisis, and state fragility—“hubs” 

of risks for the future—illustrate the 

interconnected nature of the challenges on 

the international agenda today. Problems can 

trigger each other with a cascading effect as 

shown, for example, by the potential impact 

of energy prices on the prospects for 

economic recovery. The interconnection of 

various problems is likely to generate new 

challenges and make traditional ones harder 

to manage because of their increasing 

complexity. 

• Growing energy demand translates into 

higher food prices. Concurrently, climate 

change threatens agricultural output in 

many poor countries with expanding 

populations, compounding their fragility. 

• Technological developments and 

geopolitical instability require additional 

focus on the protection and resilience of 

the electronic and energy infrastructures 

underpinning advanced societies. 

• Concerns regarding the security of energy 

supply, but also demand, may result in 

policy choices that undermine both the 

environment and investment. Reliance on 

domestic reserves of fossil fuels or longterm access to foreign fields makes 

investment in renewables less attractive 

and compounds the growth of greenhouse 

gas emissions. Price uncertainty 

depresses investment in exploration and 

transit infrastructures, possibly paving the 

way to supply shortages over the next 

decade. 

Many of the issues cited above involve 

interwoven domestic and foreign challenges. 

The roots of the financial crisis, for example, 

included internal and external factors. 

National policies prone to encourage loose 

credit and spiraling private debt under little 

supervision have been enabled by capital 

flows from emerging economies. Following 

the crisis, the management of ballooning 

public deficits and debts in some advanced 

countries as well as measures to increase 

domestic demand in China and other 

emerging economies are matters for domestic 

political decisions with huge global 

implications. 

Climate change is another example of an issue 

involving domestic and international 

priorities. The national energy and 

environmental policies of big emitters such as 

China and the United States, but also the EU, 

directly affect the international community, 

given their disproportionate contribution to 
6 

the global stock of greenhouse gases in the 

atmosphere and the variation of climate 

change patterns, with dire consequences for 

the most exposed countries. 

Domestic politics creates tight constraints on 

international cooperation and reduces the 

scope for compromise. This was the case, for 

example, at the recent Copenhagen summit on 

climate change where domestic politics 

constrained the positions of a number of 

participants on reducing emissions. On a 

different matter, China’s pervasive priority of 

domestic economic development, which has 

been largely export-led, limits its willingness 

to allow for an appreciation of Chinese 

currency to help rebalance its trade relations 

with the US and the EU. The tightening of 

political control on Russia’s largest energy 

companies as well as broader concerns 

regarding rule of law and security of 

investment within the country undermine the 

strengthening of the EU-Russia energy and 

economic partnership. 

“The central challenge for most countries in 

their engagement with new forms of global 

governance is not how to replace the state in 

international politics, but rather how states 

regain their regulatory role.” 

South African Think 

Tank Participant 

Projected sluggish economic growth in 

advanced countries over the next few years, 

paralleled by aging populations, suggests that 

public attention may become increasingly 

introverted. Under such circumstances, the 

public would be focused on jobs and welfare, 

with little room for longer term needs such as 

managing diverse societies, environmental 

sustainability, or equity and legitimacy at the 

international level. Many experts see 

nationalism and xenophobia on the rise in 

Russia and China; EU countries and the US 

are not immune from that either. Such 

tendencies contribute to making national 

positions in multilateral forums less 

accommodating. This may trigger a vicious 

circle of ineffective global governance, 

diverging perceptions, and angered national 

public debates fueling each other. 

Scenario I: Barely Keeping Afloat 

In this scenario, which is probably the most 

likely over the next several years, no one 

crisis will be so overwhelming as to threaten 

the international system even though 

collective management advances slowly. 

Crises are dealt with ad hoc and temporary 

frameworks or institutions are devised to 

avert the most threatening aspects of them. 

Formal institutions remain largely 

unreformed and Western states probably must 

shoulder a disproportionate share of “global 

governance” as developing countries prevent 

disruptions at home. This future is not 

sustainable over the longer term as it depends 

on no crisis being so unmanageable as to 

overwhelm the international system. 
Excerpts from a long-running World Economic Forum-sponsored blog 

Posted 3/3/12: Remember when “black swans” were all the rage? We have not had as many 

disasters as some predicted—but why? Is it perception? Are we more agile? Or were the predictions 

off? Or a combination?

Posted 3/4/12: Don’t count your chickens before they hatch! It’s too early to be so confident. There’s 

been a lot less risk-taking since the financial crisis. And the series of mini-disasters and near misses 

has strengthened defenses. The cyclones in the Bay of Bengal have meant we now have a world action 

plan for Bangladesh . . . but a lot of things could still go terribly wrong.

Posted 9/15/14: I don’t usually believe in grand bargains, but I think we’re witnessing one with the 

agreement worked out by the UN Security Council with Iran. No one saw it coming last year. But 

the change in Iran swept out the old government. It reminds me of the fall of the Soviet Union. Few 

saw that coming, though it was clear in hindsight. We may be looking to a honeymoon period in 

international relations when there can be a lot more cooperation. The interesting thing about the Iranian 

developments is that even if the political turnabout of the Iranian Government was necessary, the 

agreement still would not have happened without the deft intervention by some of the emerging powers 

in the G-20. In that vein, it showed that the G-20 had really come of age and could work with the UN.

Posted 5/15/17: Did you hear about the military incident between China and Vietnam in the 

South China Sea? It looks like they both suffered casualties. Had the UN Secretary General not 

jumped on the plane, it could have been much worse.

Posted 5/17/17: Yeah, I worry about the repercussions for multilateral cooperation. We were about to 

see the UN Security Council dramatically transformed for the first time since its founding, but it now 

looks like Japan’s and India’s prospects for permanent UNSC membership are on hold, if not dashed. 

Both Tokyo and New Delhi look like they are taking the side of Vietnam. What happened to developing 

states sticking together? The dispute also questions the theory that resource wars won’t happen. I 

guess Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia got fed up with China . . . 

Posted 5/20/17: India has just come out with a full-scale condemnation of China and expects the US 

and Europe to back it. 

Posted 5/21/17: This is not the time to provoke China, either, with the Party unable to restrain 

rising nationalism. 

Posted 5/22/17: Many developing states feel that China has turned its back on them . . . It is not 

clear where the US stands or whether it can bring the two sides together. Talk about an era of bad 

feelings . . . everything has been affected—from trade to the competition over resources . . . 

Posted 5/23/17: Look on the bright side. Oil exploration in the Arctic is beginning to pay off. We worried 

a decade ago about a Russia growing more hostile. The financial crisis led to Russia opening up; it 

needed Western technology to exploit the riches of the Arctic and now that is slowly coming to fruition. 

Posted 12/1/20: I’m preparing for my Davos panel on the future of the international system . . . 

Posted 12/2/20: Tell them, given the continuing tensions in Asia, we’re just keeping our heads 

above water . . . 

Posted 12/3/20: But we haven’t done too badly: no nuclear war, Iran was settled, and there is a lot 

more stability in the Middle East . . . 

Posted 12/4/20: But Asia has yet to come off the boil, not to speak of the last Failed States Index . . . 

did you see? Years of chattering on security and development and ten countries in Africa are still on 

the verge of implosion, full of youngsters and short on jobs, and we put our heads in the sand. This 

multipolar world is just a lot more difficult to manage. 

Posted 12/5/20: You’re right . . . our resilience has been more a matter of luck . . .

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Chapter 2:

Power Shifts Complicating

Global Governance
10 

The shift to a multipolar world is 

complicating the prospects for effective 

global governance over the next 10 years. In 

the second part of the last century, the United 

States shaped an international order that 

largely reflected its liberal worldview of free 

markets and democracy. The United States 

oversaw provision of global public goods 

such as monetary stability and open trade 

routes. In particular after the end of the Cold 

War, the EU has sought to export its model of 

regional integration and sovereignty-sharing 

and has devised a distinctive discourse on 

global governance and priorities. 

“At issue...it seems to me, is less the risk of 

conflict, but the danger of a loss of coherence 

and direction in the international system 

while the redistribution of power plays itself 

out.” 

European Think Tank 

Participant 

Today, the legitimacy and credibility of the 

US and the EU as political leaders is openly 

questioned by other rising power centers and 

large swathes of the international community. 

This is partly due to their perceived 

shortcomings in providing the public goods 

they guaranteed before the shift to a 

multipolar world, such as economic stability, 

and to the view that their positions on issues 

such as trade and climate change are unfair to 

the interests of others. At the same time, the 

expanding economic clout of emerging 

powers increases their political influence well 

beyond their borders. It can be argued that 

alternative definitions of modernity are taking 

hold. The virtues of open capital markets are 

less than universally shared, and even on the 

trade front, industrial policy appears more in 

vogue, particularly in emerging economies. 

Far more states matter in the international 

system today. Many of these states, which 

differ widely in terms of their economics and 

ideologies, are indispensable to solving 

international problems. 

“The Western approach to global 

governance, with the US and the West as the 

center and creator of laws and rules, 

diminishes the readiness of others to 

cooperate.” 

Russian Think Tank 

Speaker 

Power is not only shifting from established 

powers to rising countries and, to some 

extent, the developing world, but also toward 

nonstate actors, be they agents or spoilers of 

cooperation. On a positive note, transnational 

nongovernmental organizations, civil-society 

groups, churches and faith-based 

organizations, multinational corporations, 

other business bodies, and interest groups 

have become increasingly active in framing 

policy and generating public interest and 

pressure. However, hostile nonstate actors 

such as criminal organizations and terrorist 

networks—all empowered by existing and 

new technologies—can pose serious security 

threats and compound systemic risks. 

In addition, state-owned and state-controlled 

companies and sovereign wealth funds, 

particularly those of China and Russia, are 

likely to play a growing role in global 

governance. These actors do not fit neatly 

into traditional categories as they are driven 

by a mix of political and economic 

considerations. 

Will Multipolarity Enhance or Erode 

Multilateralism? In the emerging multipolar system, pivotal 

global and regional actors have different 

views on sovereignty, multilateralism, and 

legitimacy, often stemming from distinctive 

historical experiences. Addressing such
11 

“Global governance requires giving over 

significant sovereignty to others—that is the 

view in China...So far, sovereignty is the 

number one priority, but China has to 

balance sovereignty and international 

responsibility. When China thinks its 

sovereignty is guaranteed, it will go ahead to 

work with other countries. There is no 

doubt.” 

Chinese Think Tank 

Expert 

diverse perspectives will be critical to 

fostering international cooperation in a 

number of domains. 

There is a risk that the potential competition 

of diverse priorities within regional or global 

institutions will alienate important actors and 

drive negotiations to gridlock in multilateral 

institutions. 

Sovereignty is alive and kicking, according to 

many of the experts we encountered. The 

0

5

10

15

20

25

US China EU India Japan Russia Brazil

Power as percentage of global power

2010

2025

The relative political and economic clout of many countries will shift by 2025, 

according to an International Futures model measuring GDP, defense spending, 

population, and technology for individual states.

Source: International Futures model.

New International Lineup in 2025?

443707AI 9-10
12 

way the renewed emphasis on sovereignty 

will unfold in the next decade will have 

serious implications for global governance. 

The extent to which power should be 

delegated to international bodies and for what 

purposes will be debated. The question of 

whether and, if so, under what conditions the 

international community or international 

institutions can challenge or override the 

authority of a state in its internal affairs will 

also come to the fore. 

The EU is the most advanced experience to 

date of voluntary sharing of sovereignty in a 

unique experiment of regional integration 

which has largely succeeded in including 

post-Communist systems into the larger 

regional order. Most other key global actors 

are reluctant to delegate regulatory powers, let 

alone assign jurisdiction, to an international 

body, or to share sovereignty under majority 

decision-making. While their domestic 

political systems widely differ, the United 

States, Russia, China and India, among 

others, share an ingrained suspicion of global 

governance mechanisms that could impinge 

on their sovereignty. Their positions, 

however, vary depending on the issue. 

On balance, major powers subscribe to 

advanced forms of international cooperation 

and supervision that they regard as 

embodying their interests or, at least, not 

directly affecting them. Nuclear weapon 

states are comfortable with the intrusive 

powers of the IAEA to inspect the nuclear 

facilities of non-nuclear weapon states. 

However, countries are reluctant to endorse 

rules constraining their behavior in areas of 

comparative advantage or strong competition, 

such as energy policy or bans on specific 

types of weapons. Such a selective approach 

is, however, running into trouble because 

those powerful enough to try to opt out are 

growing more numerous. 

In a more heterogeneous international system, 

the question is how to reconcile the interests 

and perspectives of major powers and 

groupings of smaller countries in multilateral 

frameworks and regimes. Participants felt a 

needed precondition is for all the stakeholders 

to trust the system, commit to collective 

action, and accept stronger prerogatives of 

international institutions over their domestic 

governance, where need be. 

“We have a major concern that the new 

organizations do not replicate the 

unrepresentativeness of the past.” 

Brazilian Senior Official

Divergence on values or principles also will 

affect the prospects for multilateral 

cooperation. For example, although the 

positions and the policies of the US and the 

EU do not always coincide, the aim of 

promoting democracy and supporting human 

rights, core values to their domestic political 

regimes, broadly informs their foreign 

policies. Major powers such as China and 

Russia, with considerable support from a 

number of emerging and developing 

countries, take a more relative reading of 

human rights and are uncomfortable with the 

bashing or sanctioning of brutal regimes. 

India, the biggest democracy in the world 

with a political tradition of non-alignment and 

a significant nationalist strand to its foreign 

policy, as well as Brazil, are cautious not to 

appear as exporting their values and 

interfering with the domestic affairs of other 

countries. 

Over the next decade, balancing such 

different perspectives with the imperative for 

cooperation, including on matters of peace, 

stability, and security, will pose a key 

challenge to states and governance 

frameworks alike. New ways of cooperation 

will need to be explored, according to our 

interlocutors, but there are some indications 
13 

World Views of Global Governance

Diverse perspectives and suspicions about “global governance”—seen as a Western concept—

will add to the difficulties of effectively mastering the growing number of challenges, in the view 

of our interlocutors from the countries listed below. (See Annex A for further discussion.) 

Brazil. North-South relations and the need for redistribution of power from developed to 

developing states remain central to the Brazilian outlook on international affairs. Experts saw 

Brazil tending to like “old fashioned” multilateralism, which is state-centered and does not make 

room for nonstate actors. Nevertheless, the issues connected with global governance are 

beginning to gain prominence in Brazil, spurred in part by public debates over climate change. 

China. Many Chinese saw mounting global challenges and “fundamental” defects in the 

international system but emphasized the need for China to deal with its internal problems. The 

Chinese envisage a “bigger structure” pulling together the various institutions and groups that 

have been established recently. They saw the G-20 as being a step forward but questioned 

whether North-South differences would impede cooperation on issues other than economics. 

India. The Indians thought existing international organizations are “grossly inadequate” and 

worried about an “absence of an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability.” They felt that 

India is not well-positioned to help develop regional institutions for Asia given China’s 

preponderant role in the region. Some feared that a system developed by the “West”—which 

includes democracy and rule of law—would suffer as the “East” becomes more powerful. 

Japan. Many Japanese saw the governance gap as more about political leadership than “form or 

structure.” Several questioned whether formal institutions, with their huge bureaucracies, are 

effective. At the same time, the Japanese felt the G-20 needs stronger political cohesion. Most 

emphasized the need to boost national and regional means before reforming international 

organizations. Many were concerned about the lack of regional frameworks—particularly for 

hard security—in East Asia but argued that Japan should take a more proactive role toward 

regional cooperation. 

Russia. Russian experts saw the world in 2025 as still largely one of “great powers,” although 

some expected the influence of multinational businesses to increase and opportunities for greater 

transnational cooperation. The Russians worried about the relative lack of “transpacific 

security.” The United States, Europe, and Russia also have scope for growing much closer, 

while China, “with the biggest economy,” will be the main factor in changing the world. 

South Africa. The South Africans assessed that globalization appears to be strengthening 

regionalization as opposed to creating a single global polity. They worried that the losers from 

globalization increasingly outnumber the winners. The G-20 has little African representation. 

For Africans, the UN remains the global institution with the only “legitimate credential.” Some 

interlocutors were wary of China because in their view it is interested only in African resources. 

UAE. For participants from the Persian Gulf region, the key question was what sort of global 

institutions are most capable of inclusive power sharing. They bemoaned the lack of strong 

regional organizations. A framework or institution is needed to bring together the “rights” of 

energy producers with those of consumers. Several felt let down by lack of support from the 

West on democratization. 
14 

of greater burden sharing by emerging 

powers. Many of the emerging powers are 

interested in international and regional 

stability to better pursue their own 

development. For example, while India, 

Pakistan, and Bangladesh have long been 

among the top troop contributors to UN 

peacekeeping, the involvement of China and 

Brazil in these operations is growing. These 

and other emerging powers may come to play 

a key role in UN-mandated multilateral 

interventions to preserve stability and build 

lasting peace in conflict areas. 

Managing differences to foster cooperation 

leads to addressing the tension between 

inclusiveness and effectiveness in multilateral 

frameworks. This goes to the heart of the 

legitimacy question, which held sway as the 

most important issue for greater multilateral 

cooperation in our discussions with 

emerging power elites. 

“We need ‘politics of inclusion’ of the weak 

not just the powerful.” 

Participant from the 

Persian Gulf Region 

Achieving a fair and equitable distribution of 

burdens and responsibility probably will 

become more contentious in the foreseeable 

future, according to many participants. 

Because some major emerging powers (China 

and India) are relatively poor countries in per 

capita terms, diverse domestic priorities 

generate different assessments of fairness and 

equanimity. This is already apparent in 

negotiations between developed and 

developing countries over climate change and 

trade. 

Scenario II: Fragmentation 

Powerful states and regions try to wall 

themselves off from outside threats. Asia 

builds a regional order that is economically 

self-sufficient. Global communications 

ensure globalization does not die, but it slows 

significantly. Europe turns its focus inward 

as it wrestles with growing discontent over 

declining living standards. With a growing 

work force, the US might be in a better 

position but probably would continue to 

struggle with similar issues, particularly if its 

fiscal problems remain unresolved.
443340ID 9-10

Scenario II

Fragmentation

Financial Times op-ed entitled, 

“Crying Over the Gs,” published March 12, 2023

The Gs are almost a distant memory. The G-20 

ended badly, and for the first time the United 

States, Canada, and the Europeans have 

given up on the G-7. “What’s the use?” they ask. 

The new powers won’t play even if the transatlantic 

partners can get their act together—which is rare 

these days. The political mood is indeed very sour. 

This began several years after the Great Recession 

when it became apparent that it would take a long 

time before the West dug itself out and got back 

on a reasonable growth trajectory. US-Chinese ties 

took a big tumble as Beijing put off again and again 

a decision on allowing its currency to appreciate. 

It was never the right time. The US Congress 

started taking actions against Chinese imports. The 

US-China strategic and economic dialogue was 

suspended. G-20 meetings became less frequent. 

It was always going to be hard to negotiate a 

follow-on to Kyoto, but the strains within the G-20, 

especially between the Chinese and the United 

States, made it virtually impossible. China put more 

energy into developing regional ties, but its rivalry 

with India made even that difficult. Trade within 

Asia has continued to expand. India and China are 

major trading partners now, offsetting some 

of the decline in Chinese commerce with the 

US and Europe.

There was no explosive tearing asunder of 

transatlantic ties, just the relentless drifting apart 

that finally undermined the alliance. Europe 

has been increasingly focused inward after the 

prolonged Eurozone crisis of the 2010s. Many in 

the US thought Europe’s slow recovery was one 

reason for the United States’ tepid growth. More 

importantly, the US sought more military help 

in Afghanistan which the Europeans could not 

give. Personal animosities crept in. The last G-8 

summit came to a screeching halt when two of its 

leaders got into a shouting match over the seating 

arrangements at the final dinner, symptomatic 

of what had been a long period the rising 

transatlantic tensions. 

Does all of this matter? There’s no easy answer. 

Perhaps it is too early to tell. The Gs never had any 

real power. Many outsiders thought they should 

not have any power at all. Diplomats complained 

about all the preparation necessary for what were 

in some cases long-winded statements at the end 

of G summits that did not always lead to concrete 

actions or improvements. A lot of the “unwashed” 

non-Gs thought the Gs were trying to usurp 

the UN’s role. The Gs were a bit like old boys’ 

networks—undemocratic and incestuous. We will 

miss them and at some point they will have to be 

reinvented, although it will take a major crisis that 

hits everybody to bring that about. But now the 

international system is slowly unwinding. 

We’re not yet back in the 1930s, bracing for global 

conflagration. The growing protectionism is more 

subtle. Doha has been definitively shelved so there 

is no forward movement. More sectors are deemed 

“strategic,” requiring some sort of protection. 

Although all states are interested in energy 

efficiency, major concerted steps toward carbon cuts 

are on hold even though there is more evidence of 

climate change. The UN calculates a tenfold increase 

in environmental migrants over the past five years. 

Militancy is growing among disaffected groups in 

India and China while terrorists have stepped up 

their plotting against the West. Without a stronger 

international order, I worry about a nuclear arms 

race in the Middle East and South Asia. Those two 

areas are not “self-governing” and need outside 

help to contain or dampen the potential for conflict 

and regional conflagration. I have no doubt that the 

United States and the Europeans will mend fences 

once the crisis breaks, but it may be too late. At that 

point will they be able to do anything without the 

help of the new powers?
16 

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Chapter 3:

Some Success in Adapting
18 

Multilateral institutions have adapted to some 

degree as new issues have emerged, but the 

adaptations have not necessarily been 

intentional or substantial enough to keep up 

with growing demand. Rather, they have 

been spurred as much by outside forces as by 

the institutions themselves. 

While multilateral institutions have been 

struggling to adapt, innovative approaches to 

global governance have been coming to the 

fore. Three innovations are of particular 

interest as pointers for future developments: 

the emergence of informal groupings of 

leading countries, such as the G-20; the 

perspectives for further regional cooperation, 

notably in East Asia; and the multiple 

contributions of nonstate actors to 

international cooperation. 

All three developments originated from 

outside global multilateral institutions, 

whether they were triggered by governments 

or civil society, and whether their scope is 

global or regional. In some cases, innovative 

approaches stem from dissatisfaction with the 

relative inertia of traditional frameworks or 

with their perceived Western bias. Such 

approaches often involve “lighter” forms of 

cooperation than the highly legalized regimes 

inherited from the 20th century: consultation 

replaces regulation, codes of conduct prevail 

on binding norms, regional initiatives escape 

lengthy debates in multilateral forums, and 

national prerogatives trump international 

authorities in implementing and overseeing 

agreements. 

Innovative approaches to global governance 

are developed through trial and error. Some 

of these experiments will not stand the test of 

time, but on the whole they expose a 

fundamental trend toward looser, more 

flexible, ad hoc and sometimes more 

accountable forms of cooperation. Such 

approaches typically develop in response to a 

shifting international system. 

These innovative approaches cannot serve as 

alternatives to rule-based, inclusive 

multilateral institutions. Multilateral 

institutions can deliver public goods that 

summits, nonstate actors and regional 

frameworks cannot supply, or cannot do so in 

a reliable way. These are, chiefly, decisions 

enjoying universal legitimacy, norms setting 

predictable patterns of behavior based on 

reciprocity, mechanisms for implementation 

and for overseeing national measures and, in 

some sectors, instruments to resolve disputes 

and redress torts, such as in trade matters. As 

the international system grows more diverse 

and potentially more fragmented, the supply 

of these public goods will become more 

important. 

“My preliminary conclusions: Addressing 

different issues with the same mechanism 

does not work—we need different mechanisms 

for different problems. For some challenges, 

we need a combination of bilateral, regional, 

and global responses with a division of 

labor.” 

Chinese Expert 

Looking ahead, neither traditional 

frameworks nor new forms of cooperation are 

likely to solve global governance problems 

exclusively. However, the two forms of 

global governance can complement one 

another, according to many of our 

interlocutors. The former will struggle to 

deliver without serious reform; the latter will 

likely prove unsustainable or unreliable if 

disconnected from the bedrock of multilateral 

bodies in terms of norms, institutional 

experience, and resources. 

In practice, effective cooperation among 

institutions has been the exception and not the 

norm. A crisis such as an environmental 
19 

catastrophe or the implosion of a large failed 

state could spark cooperation, but a reactive 

approach to such extreme contingencies 

probably would prove inadequate. 

“The global financial and systemic nature of 

the crisis has compelled unprecedented 

government responses in scope, speed, and 

novelty. We had global crisis-management 

governance.” 

European Expert 

Progress in setting up a global governance 

system that draws on the added value of 

different bodies and networks in a coherent 

way will depend on three factors: a shared 

knowledge of the issues to be confronted and 

their connections to other challenges; 

innovation at the interface between old and 

new, formal and informal, governmental and 

nongovernmental, and global and regional 

governance frameworks; and an acceptable 

balance between effectiveness and 

inclusiveness. 

Informal Groupings 

The proliferation of regular summit-level 

meetings held outside global or regional 

institutions is a key feature of recent global 

governance innovation. Informal groupings 

such as the G-8 and the G-20 have already 

significantly affected global governance, with 

an emphasis on the networked coordination of 

national policies and on deliverables. The 

decisions of such forums as the G-8 and the 

G-20 are of a political nature and nonbinding. Thus they are unlikely to sideline 

the UN and Bretton Wood institutions as 

frameworks for decisionmaking and rulesetting. Nevertheless, these formats are 

experimenting with new ways of managing 

shared challenges in a more diverse world, 

suggesting interesting avenues for further 

innovation. 

Following the establishment of the G-7 in the 

mid-1970s and of the G-8 in 1998, new 

groups have been set up in the last few years 

in response to pressing issues on the 

international agenda. The G-20 is the most 

noticeable innovation because of the breadth 

of its membership and the scope of its agenda. 

The Major Emitters Forum, set up in 2007 

and renamed the Major Economies Forum 

(MEF) in 2009, deals with climate change. 

The leaders of the BRIC emerging economies 

met in Russia in 2009 and in Brazil in 2010 

and have announced that they will meet in 

China in 2011. 

Over the medium term, the role of the G-8 is 

likely to be circumscribed to sectoral issues, 

where the small club of like-minded countries 

can bring added value if they are prepared to 

mobilize their resources. More generally, the 

G-8 could remain a useful platform, among 

others, to elaborate ideas and bring them to 

larger tables, such as the G-20. It could also 

do so by engaging countries on targeted 

initiatives, provided that these are closely 

linked to the agenda of multilateral 

institutions and of groups such as the G-20. 

In time, this may also become the principal 

contribution of the BRIC countries’ format to 

deliberations in broader frameworks. So far, 

BRIC summits have been more noticeable for 

opposing existing norms than for proposing 

new ones and reaching out to other major 

actors. Given the different foreseeable 

economic and political trajectories of the 

BRIC countries over the next two decades, 

however, the durability of this grouping 

remains to be tested. 

As informal groupings evolve, the main risk 

to be averted is the creation of different 

formats that mirror competing geopolitical 

coalitions. Such a development would defeat 

much of the basic purpose of summit 

diplomacy. The development of the ‘Gs’ 

responds to two basic needs: First, the need 

to foster collective leadership to jointly 
20 

address shared problems outside the 

constraints imposed by formal multilateral 

structures, and second, the need to reflect the 

changing balance of world power. As the 

world grows more heterogeneous, the two 

basic rationales behind the ‘Gs’ may or may 

not prove mutually reinforcing. The clash of 

informal groupings or stable coalitions in 

sector-specific negotiations such as climate 

change and differences on how to consolidate 

global economic recovery expose the tension 

between the shared commitment to problemsolving and the co-existence of different 

political priorities and agendas. 

Under these circumstances, cohesion within 

each grouping and coherence between them 

are essential conditions for their effectiveness. 

Both requirements can be promoted by 

stronger coordination, both at the national and 

at the trans-governmental level, between the 

‘sherpas’ preparing the various summits, to 

ensure the consistency of national positions in 

different formats. 

“There is institutional Darwinism and we will 

see the survival of the fittest institution.” 

European Expert 

The performance of the ‘Gs’ will largely 

depend on their relations with formal 

multilateral structures. Informal groupings 

may be increasingly called upon to set the 

tone and direction of international cooperation 

on important global issues and to serve as toplevel international agenda-setting bodies, as 

the G-20 did in coping with the fallout of the 

financial crisis. The G-20, for example, 

called upon the IMF and the World Bank to 

advise on the summits’ priorities, monitor 

relevant national policy measures, and 

develop targeted initiatives to lend financial 

support to countries in need or to enhance 

food security. Informal groupings also can 

become connectors between different 

frameworks. In the energy sector, the G-20 

has encouraged closer cooperation between a 

variety of institutions including the 

International Energy Agency (IEA), OPEC, 

OECD, and the World Bank. In addition, 

summit decisions can spur institutional 

reform. The G-20 has triggered the transition 

from the Financial Stability Forum to the 

Financial Stability Board and has sustained 

momentum for the incremental reform of the 

IMF. 

 

Informal groupings such as the G-8 have 

proved flexible and proactive in expanding 

their original purview. The agenda of the 

G-20 has also expanded since 2008, with the 

Pittsburgh summit agreeing on a “framework 

for strong, sustainable and balanced growth.” 

A debate is under way regarding whether the 

G-20 has a vocation to enlarge its remit 

further, becoming a sort of informal global 

governance “hub.” According to many 

observers, the G-20 would suffer from a 

“capacity deficit” in dealing with a larger 

agenda. The G-20 infrastructure is not 

considered robust enough to sustain the 

stronger flow of information and exchanges 

that would occur with a greatly expanded 

agenda and is not structurally connected to 

competent bodies at the national level. 

However, as issues become more challenging 

or crisis-driven common interests may expand 

beyond facilitating an economic recovery, 

requiring the G-20 to expand its agenda 

further. 

 

When informal groupings are too small, such 

as the G-8, their legitimacy is contested. The 

limited membership of informal groupings 

entails that deliberations involve fewer 

countries than those affected by them. This is 

regarded with suspicion by the vast majority 

of developing countries and regional powers 

not engaged in the proceedings. When 

informal groupings are relatively large, like 

the G-20, doubts are raised regarding their 

internal cohesion and their ability to reach 
21 

agreement and deliver results—yet their 

legitimacy remains challenged by those states 

inevitably left on the outside. 

Options we heard to improve the ‘Gs’ 

decisionmaking process include strengthening 

the teams of sherpas assisting political 

leaders, setting up support units—perhaps 

focusing on specific issues and embedded in 

existing multilateral bodies—and enhancing 

cooperation between successive annual 

presidencies. Longer yearly meetings could 

be held between national leaders themselves, 

giving them the opportunity to debate issues 

in depth and finalize agreements not only on 

guiding principles but also on concrete 

instruments and arrangements, where action 

often falls short of statements. 

“Instead of looking at what G-20 will look 

like in 2025, we should ask what will make it 

credible and legitimate...how do you ensure 

that voices outside the G-20 are heard while 

also not slowing its ability to make decisions? 

To what extent has the G-20 championed the 

interests of the low-income and developing 

countries? I don’t think so far that it has.” 

South African Expert 

Growth of Regionalism 

No comprehensive trend can be detected 

toward deepening regional governance 

structures. However, some progress toward 

closer cooperation at the regional level has 

been achieved over the last decade in regions 

as diverse as South America, Africa, and most 

notably, East Asia. It is doubtful, however, 

whether increased regional groupings in the 

next decade or two will be able to deal with 

mounting global challenges, compensating for 

lack of updated and reformed global 

governance institutions. 

Regional cooperation is likely to make some 

further strides due to a mix of factors. First, 

there is growing dissatisfaction with the 

performance of global governance institutions 

as either ineffective or carrying political 

agendas not fitting distinctive regional 

contexts, or both. Second, relative power is 

shifting at the regional level as well. Preeminent actors such as China, Japan, or Brazil 

have chosen to invest into regional 

cooperative frameworks to manage political 

differences and confirm their leadership. 

Third, the global financial crisis has impacted 

all global regions and amplified both the 

suspicion of external interference in regional 

affairs and a sense of self-reliance to address 

economic and political challenges. 

Regionalism could bring an important 

contribution to managing shared challenges at 

the local and regional levels and beyond. 

Regional governance arrangements are closer 

to the sources of the problems to be tackled, 

be they security crises, economic disparities, 

or trans-regional threats. Neighboring 

countries are directly affected by threats 

stemming from respective regions, such as 

drug trafficking or state failure, and might 

develop a sense of solidarity in addressing 

them. National leaders may be more familiar 

with one another than in global platforms and 

regional instruments may be mobilized faster 

than those of larger multilateral organizations. 

In practice, however, cooperation has fallen 

well short of its potential in most regions. 

(See Annex B for further discussion.) 

Renewed interest in regional solutions in 

response to economic and political turbulence 

could, however, create new momentum 

behind regional arrangements and enhance 

their effectiveness. If so, the key question is 

whether regionalism will prove to be a 

building block of global governance or a drain 

on it. In the former case, regional cooperation 

would be complementary to and compatible 

with broader multilateral agreements, for 

example in the field of peacekeeping. 

However, the political capital and resources 

available for international cooperation are 
22 

scarce. In the latter case, the investment in 

regional cooperation might detract from the 

ambition to strengthen global governance 

frameworks, for example, in trade matters. In 

turn, this could lead to economic and political 

fragmentation between different regions. 

Contrary to the experience of the European 

Union, regional cooperation has so far not 

resulted in a significant pooling or delegation 

of sovereignty. In fact, most regional 

frameworks uphold the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member 

states. It follows that common institutions are 

relatively weak. Regional cooperation 

dynamics, notably in East Asia and South 

America, reflect the increasingly pivotal 

position of major regional powers and the 

extent to which their leadership is accepted, 

contested, or feared. State-led projects mostly 

lag behind the initiative of private actors. 

Business has often played a pioneering role in 

weaving a dense web of economic links at the 

regional level, including when political 

relations are strained. This can contribute to 

building trust and create incentives to forge 

ahead with regional cooperation. At the same 

time, the benefits may disproportionately 

accrue to the biggest economies in respective 

regions. 

“We need to reinforce regional institutions, 

especially in Asia.” 

Chinese Think Tank Expert 

A new phase of East Asian regionalism may 

be dawning. Although growing nationalism 

may serve as an eventual brake, experts we 

consulted thought both regional 

heavyweights—China and Japan—and the 

members of ASEAN will increasingly favor 

regional cooperation as the framework within 

which to resolve disputes and manage 

interdependence. ASEAN has developed 

over decades a distinctive style of regional 

cooperation based on a low level of 

institutionalization, a non-intrusive agenda, 

informality, permanent consultation, and 

aversion to conflict. From an economic and 

political standpoint, Asian interlocutors saw 

China’s centrality to the region as growing. 

In what has been defined as a “paradigm 

shift,” Japanese interlocutors have 

acknowledged the need to adjust to the new 

regional context and some envisage a sort of 

“look West” policy, turning Japan’s focus 

from its US ally in the Pacific to mainland 

Asia. Our interlocutors were somewhat 

dubious that the bilateral alliance between 

Japan and the US will prove compatible with 

deepening multilateral frameworks in East 

Asia, which may not include the United 

States. 

Contrasting trends indicate potential for either 

regional cooperation or fragmentation in 

South America. The region is diverse, with 

different states following disparate economic 

policies and political trajectories. Countries 

such as Chile, Peru, and Colombia have been 

pursuing economic liberalization and bilateral 

trade deals with the United States and, 

increasingly, China. The countries of the 

Bolivarian Alliance, led by Venezuela, have 

engaged in ideological competition not only 

against US influence in the region but also 

toward Brazil and others that have engaged in 

economic globalization. 

At the same time, South America is relatively 

stable, countries face common transnational 

threats such as drug trafficking, and all would 

benefit from better transport and energy 

infrastructures to boost trade and investment 

and harness their natural resources. Brazil is 

the only country with the critical mass to 

build on these assets and address economic 

asymmetries and political fragmentation with 

a view toward deepening regional 

cooperation. Some of our interlocutors 

thought Brazil has been punching below its 

weight in the region and has no strategy for 
23 

playing a leading role, despite its rapid rise. 

Others saw Brazil outgrowing its 

neighborhood and increasingly focused on 

enlarging its role in global vice regional 

forums. Recent initiatives, such as the launch 

of the Common Market of the Southern Cone 

(UNASUR) in 2008, however, indicate some 

ambition to play a greater regional role. 

Unlike in East Asia and South America, no 

African country has sufficient influence and 

resources to steer regional cooperation at the 

continental level. South Africa has been 

playing a key role by its involvement in the 

creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s 

Development, in the shift from the 

Organization for African Unity to the African 

Union (AU) in 2002, and in the establishment 

of the African Peace and Security 

Architecture (APSA). However, Africa is too 

big and diverse for a single regional leader to 

emerge. Instead, it was argued that the 

domestic evolution and foreign policy 

priorities of a handful of key countries such as 

the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, 

Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa, among 

others, will be decisive for the future of the 

continent. 

Prospects for regionalism in Africa depend on 

a combination of factors besides the 

leadership of major regional players. Crisis 

management and peace-building activities 

would greatly benefit from better cooperation 

among the AU, sub-regional organizations, 

and the UN. From this standpoint, 

regionalism in Africa is likely to draw on 

global governance tools and resources. 

Greater development of home-grown civil 

society organizations attuned to transnational 

needs would contribute to forging more 

effective regional networks on such issues as 

climate change and resource management. 

Long described as marginalized in the context 

of economic globalization, Africa is today 

central to the competition for resources and 

markets (and even for land) among major 

global players. Such renewed centrality could 

encourage coordination and cooperation at the 

regional level in dealing with external 

partners. However, perhaps more likely, it 

could also contain the seeds of more 

fragmentation, with different countries 

reaping the benefits of bilateral deals outside 

regional arrangements. 

Nonstate Actors Step Up to the Plate 

The experts we consulted felt that global 

challenges cannot be effectively tackled by 

individual states acting alone. Likewise, 

transnational challenges cannot be addressed 

by governmental actors on their own. 

Governments often lack the expertise, 

resources, and legitimacy to address issues 

that affect a much wider range of 

stakeholders. Nonstate actors are playing a 

central role both on the “demand” and 

“supply” sides of global governance. They 

contribute to setting the international agenda 

and are essential participants in implementing 

solutions. 

The engagement of nonstate actors is critical 

given the complexity of the risks facing the 

international community and multilateral 

frameworks. Challenges such as climate 

change, pandemics, or the proliferation of 

sensitive materials and technologies require 

flexible responses to a fast-changing agenda 

as well as capacity-building. 

“Increasingly nonstate actors act as policy 

generators and are directly involved in 

decisionmaking and implementation of 

policy.” 

European Expert 

The range of nonstate actors contributing to 

global governance is heterogeneous, including 

transnational nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), networks of experts, and civilsociety groups as well as multinational 
24 

Role of Mass Communications 

New technologies, such as the Internet, 

empower individuals and groups and enable 

nonstate actors to coordinate actions across 

national boundaries. As one participant 

stated, 

“The Internet is an enabler, it gives the weak 

a chance to do things they could not do 

before. That creates a kind of power shift.” 

In the global health arena, for example, the 

exposure by Chinese medical practitioners via 

the Internet of provincial governments’ efforts 

to hide the spread of SARS in 2002-2003 led 

Beijing finally to take action against the virus. 

During the color revolutions and more 

recently in Iran, democratic pressure groups 

used the Internet to organize mass 

demonstrations. Equally, the spread of mass 

media in regions—largely rural—that 

historically have been cut off has increased 

pressures on government for better 

governance—particularly at home. As a 

conference participant put it, 

“To predict the future, you need information 

and technology, but many people in the world 

don’t have these tools. We need to get people 

the tools so they will have a stake in the future 

and policy.” 

Wider public participation through mass 

communications also has been important in 

putting greater emphasis on transparency—

honest and open transactions—generating 

pressure on governments. Governments’ 

efforts to adapt and be more transparent have, 

in fact, fed the desire for greater participation. 

Experts on modern diplomacy recently noted 

that in a globalized world the instruments of 

power themselves have taken on a different 

relative strength, with persuasion and 

legitimacy requiring as much attention as 

military, economic, and political weight. 

corporations and business coalitions. Private 

philanthropy, often associated with business 

and civil society initiatives or to public 

authorities, has made an important difference 

in areas such as health and education. 

Hybrid, public-private partnerships (PPPs) 

have been emerging as an important feature of 

global governance innovation, notably in the 

field of sustainable development. The 

relevance of PPPs is likely to grow in as they 

reach out to multiple stakeholders. 

The mass communications revolution—

notably the invention and increasing 

widespread use of the Internet—probably has 

been the most important vehicle spurring the 

expanded role of civil society groups and 

public opinion at large in agenda-setting for 

governance issues. 

“When the Soviet Union collapsed, people 

said we had only one superpower, but we had 

two: the US and international public 

opinion.” 

Economist from a Dubai Think 

Tank 

As the scope of transnational challenges has 

widened and figured more highly on the 

international policy agenda, nonstate actors 

have been at the forefront, pushing on 

institutions to adapt. They have been equally, 

if not more effective than states at reframing 

issues and mobilizing publics—a trend we 

expect to continue. The International 

Criminal Court (ICC) and Landmines Ban 

Treaties were both led by civil society actors, 

supported by like-minded states. The action 

campaigns behind these measures bypassed 

UN machinery and opposition by the United 

States, China, and Russia. In the realm of 

global health, a combination of states and 

nonstate actors caused a veritable revolution, 

with initiatives leading to the Global Fund to 

Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and 
25 

new global governance regimes such as 

UNAIDS, involving NGOs. Philanthropic 

foundations such as those led by Bill and 

Melinda Gates have made a key contribution 

in this context. Transnational advocacy and 

pressure groups have been instrumental in 

building and keeping momentum behind other 

major governance initiatives, such as the 

Millennium Development Goals launched in 

2000. 

“Maybe we are seeing a shift that is not 

geographical but horizontal—we are seeing 

the emergence of a global management elite 

and wondering what that means for the future 

of liberal democracy.” 

South African 

Participant 

In addition to their role as agenda-setters, 

nonstate actors are essential sources of 

knowledge and expertise. The International 

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an 

intergovernmental scientific body gathering 

the contribution of thousands of scientists 

worldwide to assess the evolution and impact 

of climate change, is perhaps the most 

prominent case in point. Expertise will 

become more salient in all fields of 

international policymaking, from managing 

the implications of technological innovation 

to food and resource scarcity—issues that 

require ongoing monitoring. Scientific advice 

is vital in the field of public health. For 

example, the WHO has created the Global 

Outbreak Alert and Response Network, a web 

of over 140 scientific institutions in over 60 

countries, mandated to detect and respond to 

the outbreak of epidemics, alerting national 

and international bodies. Insights and 

knowledge, often coming from 

nongovernmental sources, are also central in 

the domains of peace and security, where 

NGOs with vast field experience fuel 

decisionmaking through their insights and 

play a key role in conflict prevention and 

peace-building. 

Gathering and sharing knowledge is the basis 

for setting international norms and standards. 

International organizations’ efforts to create 

standards and rules are increasingly 

complemented or paralleled by codes of 

conduct from the private sector and civil 

society. Multi-stakeholder cooperation, 

engaging business, NGOs, and public 

institutions, is a growing feature of 

international standard-setting. Important 

initiatives have been undertaken, for example, 

to enhance transparency in sensitive sectors 

such as extractive industries and for 

commodities like coffee and cocoa as well as 

diamonds. In the environmental domain, 

certification schemes such as the Forest 

Stewardship Council and the Maritime 

Stewardship Council have broken new ground 

with standards adopted by nonstate actors 

progressively endorsed by international and 

national authorities. 

PPPs can also focus on the implementation of 

broad agendas established at the multilateral 

level, as exemplified by the over 300 

partnerships launched following the World 

Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. 

These partnerships can help bridge the gap 

between global rule-making and local 

governance and engage a wide range of 

stakeholders from within and without 

individual countries or regions, thereby acting 

as catalysts of political purpose and resources. 

Looking ahead, opportunities exist to expand 

the interaction between state and nonstate 

actors and enhance the performance of PPPs. 

First, old and new policy domains would 

benefit from greater engagement of nonstate 

actors as partners in standard-setting, 

monitoring, and verification and as providers 

of scientific advice and field experience. 

These include, among others, biosafety and 

biosecurity standards, the global health 
26 

domain at large, transfers of green 

technologies and of dual-use technologies, 

and measures to adapt to climate change as 

well as the management of humanitarian 

crises and international migration. 

Second, thus far multi-stakeholder 

cooperation has been largely initiated, driven, 

and supported by governmental and 

nongovernmental bodies from advanced 

countries. This has hampered the engagement 

of nonstate actors and governments from 

developing and emerging countries. An 

increasing focus on local governance and the 

inclusion of diverse perspectives in the early 

stages of multi-stakeholders dialogues would 

ameliorate this problem. 

Third, the effectiveness of self-regulation and 

of public-private partnership is predicated on 

the existence of clear guidelines and precise 

targets and on mechanisms for regular 

reporting and accountability. This will entail 

close interaction with public authorities at the 

international and national levels to formulate 

shared objectives and uphold viable 

standards. 

Scenario III: Concert of Europe Redux 

Under this scenario, severe threats to the 

international system—possibly a looming 

environmental disaster or a conflict that risks 

spreading—prompt greater cooperation on 

solving global problems. Fundamental 

reform of the international system becomes 

possible. Although less likely than the first 

two scenarios in the immediate future, such a 

scenario would be the best outcome over the 

long term. The US increasingly shares power 

while China and India step up their burden 

sharing and the EU takes over a bigger 

global role. A stable concert could also occur 

incrementally over a long period in which 

economic gaps shrink and per capita income 

converges. 
443341ID 9-10

Extracts from the Final Press Conference of the International Energy Organization Summit; 

New Delhi, 28 November 2025.

Indian Prime Minister: I am pleased to welcome you to the new Global India Congress Center, the largest in the 

world. I was honored to host this summit and I am especially grateful that so many world leaders have joined me 

on this stage.

India World Service: Excellencies, my question goes to all of you. The statement you just released says that the 

establishment of the International Energy Organization (IEO) in Delhi marks an historic turning point. Why is that? 

After many empty promises, please convince us.

Prime Minister of China: It is a pleasure to be here again after the second India-China Comprehensive 

Partnership Summit last year. Today is nothing less than historic. For the first time the entire international 

community has come together to agree to a single package of rules governing energy markets, transit, and 

investment, and to set up an organization overseeing these rules. I am proud of the role that China and its 

Partners of the East Asia Economic Community have played in hosting the preparatory conference to this event. 

Let me also take this opportunity to praise the leadership of the US Government and of the EU, which years ago 

sparked the whole process.

US President: Today matters not just because we set up a new institution but because this is the result of 

long years of collective leadership. You all recall where we stood in 2018, the year when the oil price broke the 

$300/b ceiling. Oil and gas supply could no longer cope with demand, investments had been far below what 

we needed since the Great Recession of 2008 and we found ourselves on the brink of a second economic 

crisis. Back then, my predecessor met in Brussels with the Presidents of China and Russia as well as our 

European allies. They agreed on a massive concerted supply of strategic oil reserves, unlocked joint finance for 

top investment projects, and drafted the Brussels letter to OPEC, later signed by India, Japan, and dozens of 

other countries. OPEC’s response was swift. All of that was good, but it happened almost by chance and after 

dramatic events. That night, we all knew things had to change. Today, that hope becomes a reality.

BBC: I don’t want to spoil the party but, for all the pledges to avert that, will the IEO make us even more reliant 

on fossil fuels? What about the Washington Agreement on emissions?

EU President: You have touched on a crucial point. Of course energy and climate are two sides of the same 

coin. In fact, I think we would not be here today without the 2020 Washington Agreement—global emissions 

to peak in 2025 and be halved by 2045. Yes, this took too long, but all major polluters have finally committed 

to binding targets to reduce the volume of their emissions and we are on track. Pressure from the ACT (Action 

for Climate Treaty) coalition of developing countries was critical to get there. Political momentum in the Major 

Economies Forum has built up for a new deal to coordinate investment in energy efficiency and renewables. The 

EU has pushed for a beefed up UNFCCC Secretariat to play a key convening role among the IEO, the International 

Renewable Energy Agency, the World Bank, and all other relevant actors to coordinate their initiatives and set 

joint funding priorities. This would be much more difficult without the Global Environment and Energy Monitoring 

System launched in Washington; it gives us a stronger basis for taking bold decisions.

Scenario III

Concert of Europe Redux Page 1 of 2
443341ID 9-10

New York Times: The Washington deal was a game-changer, but have private actors followed? Are they doing 

their part to mitigate climate change and uphold energy security?

US President: Well, most of them are. It is not that we have set the stage and others have followed. Private 

actors have been in the lead on many fronts. Public-private partnerships like the Energy Investment Council no 

doubt helped pave the way to the Washington Agreement. They showed how resources could be harnessed and 

channeled to sustain a green industrial revolution not only in Europe and the US but also in new giants like China 

and India. Business has long sought a predictable regulatory framework. Building on earlier national legislation, 

we achieved in Washington a transatlantic cap-and-trade system, and we will soon expand that to other partners, 

including India.

Indian Prime Minister: Nonstate actors have played a key role in facilitating technology transfers to India and 

many other countries from what was called the Global South. Over ten years ago the G-20 asked the WTO and 

the World Intellectual Property Organization to launch a multi-stakeholder process to build a legal framework for 

sharing green technology and promoting joint R&D. The launch of the first generation of power plants equipped 

with carbon capture and storage systems is an example of what has been achieved. The Smart Partnership to 

expand smart grids in Asia and in Africa is the next challenge. Capacity-building at the local level to implement 

mitigation and adaptation measures needs to speed up. But networks of officials and nonstate actors have done 

wonders. The impact of the floods in southern India three years ago would have been catastrophic had we not 

built an efficient alert system and more resilient infrastructure, including through regional cooperation.

Arab News: Turning to geopolitical risks, the crisis in Central Asia showed that energy security remains very 

vulnerable to disruptions. What is your outlook for stability in Central Asia?

President of Russia: In Central Asia, we have learned that all dimensions of security are connected: human 

security and state security; energy security and economic security. When the civil war started, oil and gas 

supplies from Central Asia to Russia, China, and the EU came to a halt. This precipitated the energy crisis in 

2018. Neighboring countries risked contagion. We failed to prevent the crisis, but I think we did a good job in 

responding to the situation. We were all a bit surprised that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, NATO, and 

the EU could achieve such a coordinated response in a matter of weeks, with the UNSC blessing the operation. 

When the UN took over, security conditions had improved. The SCO Regional Dialogue with our European and 

American Partners contributes to the stability of Central Asia. We also agree with our partners that governance 

and the rule of law are important factors for growth and stability. This is the road that we took many years ago 

to modernize and diversify our economy and join the WTO. Over the last 10 years, we have achieved sustained 

growth rates and the share of energy exports in Russia’s GDP has fallen. The IEO Charter that we adopted today 

will provide for more accountability and predictability in the energy sector worldwide, improve the business 

environment, and boost economic growth.

Scenario III

Concert of Europe Redux Page 2 of 2
Chapter 4:

An Uncertain Future
30 

We assess that the multiple and diverse 

frameworks, however flexible, probably are 

not going to be sufficient to keep pace with 

the looming number of transnational and 

global challenges absent extensive 

institutional reforms and innovations. The 

capacities of the current institutional 

patchwork—however much bolstered by 

increasing nonstate support and regional 

mechanisms—will be stretched by the type of 

challenges facing the global order over the 

next few decades. Several clusters of 

problems—weak and failing states and 

resources issues—appear particularly unlikely 

to be effectively tackled without major 

governance innovations because there is no 

overall framework to handle them. We also 

cite over-the-horizon issues—migration, the 

Arctic, and biotechnology—that are likely to 

rise in importance and will demand a higher 

level of cooperation. The issues discussed 

below are difficult subjects for multilateral 

cooperation because they involve more 

preventive action, which is likely to require a 

shared assessment of the challenges ahead 

and close monitoring of the implementation 

of national measures. Under current 

circumstances, greater cooperation on those 

issues in which the risks are not clear-cut will 

be especially difficult to achieve. 

“As for the future, it will not be a linear 

progression but zig-zags and ups and downs, 

probably marked by discontinuities and 

surprises.” 

Participant from the 

Gulf Region

Weak and Failing States1

 

Numerous studies indicate the growing 

fragility of many low-income developing 

states and potential for more conflict, 

particularly in cases where civil wars were 

never fully resolved. Although 

globalization—particularly the rise in 

commodity prices—has provided increased 

benefits, it has also increased pressures as 

income disparities have widened within and 

between countries. The birth rates in many of 

these countries remain relatively high, 

increasing pressures on what are in many 

cases the countries’ limited resources. 

Poverty and weak economic links to the 

global system are often combined with weak 

governance and unresolved ethnic or tribal 

divisions. 

“Some think we have the perfect storm of 

climate change, resource scarcity, and 

economic growth that carries with it changing 

lifestyles and greater resource 

consumption...” 

Senior Research Fellow, EU 

Institute for Security Studies 

Climate change studies indicate growing 

environmental pressures hitting many of the 

lowest income countries particularly hard. 

Experts believe the risks are especially high 

and growing for armed conflict and increased 

instability in Africa, South and Central Asia, 

and the Middle East. Studies show that states 

neighboring weak or failing ones—many of 

which are also struggling—also bear many of 

 

1

 We relied on published works from the University of 

Maryland’s Center for International Development and 

Conflict Management Center and the Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in developing the analysis 

in this section on state failure and civil conflict. 

Commissioned papers from David Steven (Riverpath 

consultancy), Alex Evans (New York University), Alexander 

van de Putte (PFC), Professor Barry Hughes (University of 

Denver), and Dr. Bates Gill (SIPRI), provided additional 

insights for this section as well as later sections on resource 

issues (food, water, and energy) and over-the-horizon issues. 
31 

the spillover effects from weak and failing 

states, increasing the risks of their 

succumbing to failure. Internal conflict or 

collapse of large populous states on the scale 

of Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, or Nigeria2

would likely overwhelm international conflict 

management efforts, given the difficult 

challenges posed by smaller countries such as 

Sudan or Somalia. Afghanistan’s 28 million 

and Iraq’s 30 million are among the most 

populous cases ever attempted, and they are 

proving difficult. 

Regional organizations have done 

comparatively little in terms of large-scale 

operational responses to fragile states. Aside 

from NATO and the EU, a partial exception is 

the African Union’s limited but brave initial 

response in Darfur before the larger joint 

UN/AU efforts. ECOWAS has played an 

important but relatively brief role in rapid 

response in West Africa. ASEAN has no 

peacekeeping capacity, and the League of 

Arab States’ only official peacekeeping 

operation was cover for large-scale Syrian 

intervention in Lebanon after the conclusion 

of the Ta’if Accords. 

The response to Afghanistan has driven a new 

evolution, namely the creation by ISAF 

members of substantial bilateral development 

and civilian operational arms. So far, these 

efforts have been more aspirational than 

actual. Experts see weaknesses in the 

bilateral capacities: they are less wellcoordinated than the panoply of UN agencies 

and lack the comparative experience of 

effective lessons learned. 

 

2

 All these populous countries are listed among the world’s 

most vulnerable and fragile countries across five major risk 

assessment projects, including the Brooking Institution’s 

Index of State Weakness; Carleton University ‘s Country 

Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragile States Index; The Fund 

for Peace Failed States Index; the Goldstone and Marshall 

State Fragility Index; and the Center for International 

Development and Conflict Management (University of 

Maryland) Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger. 

Emerging powers have played an increasing 

role: India is the third largest development 

actor in Afghanistan after the US and the EU. 

Brazil leads the UN peacekeeping effort in 

Haiti. China has chosen to expand its 

operational role primarily through the UN. 

Prevention Particularly Difficult. High-risk 

situations can be anticipated with greater 

accuracy than before, allowing for preventive 

diplomatic, political, and economic responses. 

The UN, major powers, and regional 

organizations have growing expertise and 

success at containing such situations by 

brokering negotiated settlements and using 

peacekeepers to enforce solutions, as shown 

by US, European, and NATO efforts in the 

Balkans. 

Prevention often requires direct political 

intervention or even the threat or use of 

military force as a last resort. Efforts to 

prevent conflict have often been slowed by 

the international community’s reluctance to 

intervene directly, potentially overriding 

another country’s sovereignty. As a result, 

conflict has often only been stopped after a 

significant amount of bloodshed has already 

occurred. Many experts in emerging states 

thought their governments probably would be 

particularly leery of any intervention if it is 

driven by the “West” and not mandated by the 

UN Security Council under Chapter Seven. 

A joint initiative by the Brookings Institution 

and New York and Stanford Universities on 

Russian, Chinese, Indian, and South African 

approaches to fragile states found there are 

deep-seated concerns within emerging powers 

about the consequences of the proactive 

management of state fragility. These 

countries are wary of the internationalization 

of conflicts in their neighborhood. Yet their 

fears of internationalization are balanced by 

their fears of the consequences of failure. The 

researchers on the project argue that the 
32 

eventual verdict on the interventions in past 

years in Iraq and Afghanistan by United 

States and NATO will have far-reaching 

impacts on how pro-active emerging powers 

will be when faced by future calls for 

intervention. 

“The world will be a sad place if by 2025 we 

have not legalized quick military intervention 

for humanitarian causes in cases of failing 

states. We will need a new legal system for 

sending quickly military intervention squads 

to save normal human beings from what they 

are suffering.” 

Japanese Participant 

Sustaining the Effort also Difficult. Over 

the longer run, sustained reconstruction and 

reconciliation after conflict lessens the risk of 

a recurrence of conflict. The downward trend 

in armed conflict that was noticeable through 

the early years of this century has been 

reversed in part because previously dormant 

conflicts such as those in Democratic 

Republic of the Congo and Somalia have 

resumed. Slow economic growth, badly 

timed international aid, and lack of attention 

to social reforms are key factors that lead to 

recurrence. 

Although we can expect increased political 

and economic engagement from rising 

powers—in part as a reflection of their 

increasing global interests—the participation 

of emerging powers is likely to be on an ad 

hoc basis absent a more concerted multilateral 

framework. In many of the emerging powers, 

contact between personnel involved in peace 

operations and those leading on trade and 

investment is limited. This is often the case 

in the US and the EU as well, which hampers 

their efforts at stabilization and peacebuilding. 

Interlocking Resource Issues 

The need for a cross-disciplinary, systematic 

effort is probably most exemplified in the 

case of the interrelated resource issues of 

energy, food, and water. Individual 

international agencies serve to respond to 

discrete cases, particularly humanitarian 

emergencies in individual countries. No 

overall framework exists to manage trends 

interrelated scarcities in the case of food and 

water and increasing volatility in energy 

supply. Climate change also further 

exacerbates the looming food and water 

scarcities as well as injecting added urgency 

to the transition out of fossil into cleaner 

fuels. 

The stakes are high in view of the impact 

growing scarcities could have on undermining 

the current relatively open international 

system. Resource competition in which major 

powers seek to secure reliable supplies could 

lead to a breakdown in cooperation across a 

broad spectrum of issues, such as trade and 

peacemaking. Moreover, scarcities are likely 

to hit hardest on poorer states, leading in the 

worst case to internal or interstate conflict and 

spillover to regional destabilization. 

The global aggregate demand for grain in the 

coming decade (2010 to 2025) promises to be 

substantially increased because of the 

expected additional 700 million people in 

Asia, Africa, and Latin America; increasing 

dietary preferences for protein; and a high 

likelihood of a rise in demand for grain-based 

biofuel. On the supply side, global climate 

change trends are likely to depress 

agricultural productivity in some regions. 

In 2010, 21 countries, accounting for about 

600 million people, are assessed as either 

cropland or freshwater scarce, according to 

internationally accepted benchmarks. Current 

technology and input costs put these countries 

well beyond the realm of food self-
33 

sufficiency. On the basis of the population 

growth, another 15 countries will join their 

ranks by 2025. By that year, 1.4 billion 

people are projected to live in the 36 countries 

that will experience cropland scarcity. 

The water situation is a major driver behind 

food scarcity. Water use is closely 

intertwined with food production. Today, 40 

percent of the world’s food supply comes 

from land that is irrigated, but most irrigation 

is highly inefficient in water use. As 

population and average per capita water use 

have grown, the amount of fresh water 

withdrawn globally each year has grown 

too—from 579 cubic kilometers in 1900 to 

3,973 cubic kilometers in 2000. Demand is 

projected to rise further to 5,235 cubic 

kilometers by 2025. Over one billion people 

live in areas where human use of available 

water supplies has exceeded sustainable 

limits; by 2025 this figure will rise to 1.8 

billion, with up to two-thirds of the world’s 

population living in water-stressed conditions, 

mostly in non-OECD countries. Climate 

change will compound the scarcity problem in 

many regions as precipitation patterns change 

and many populous areas become drier. 

“The real question is whether scarcity 

problems lend themselves to global 

governance. My view is that they do not. The 

competition for scarce resources will 

continue. China will not give up its quest for 

resources and India should not.” 

Indian Think Tank Speaker 

Four decades of oil shocks have proved to be 

extremely disruptive regardless of whether 

countries have been oil consumers or oil 

producers. Examples of the various forms of 

disruptions include several that undermine 

prospects for a smooth transition to less 

carbon intensive fuels: volatility in prices has 

led to stop-and-go investments in 

unconventional sources and renewable and 

increased reliance on coal as a secure 

domestic source regardless of environmental 

consequences. 

Current institutions were created to address 

the immediate interests of constituent 

countries and not the longer term interests of 

the global community of energy producers 

and consumers. OPEC represents oilproducing countries, the International Energy 

Agency represents oil- and gas-consuming 

countries and the International Renewable 

Energy Agency represents the producers of 

alternatives to oil and gas. Experts thought a 

governance framework that allowed for more 

agreement on common objectives could 

reduce price volatility and allow for great 

joint research and development in areas such 

as carbon capture and sequestration and other 

alternative technologies. 

Even as supplies of essential goods such as 

water, food, and energy become more 

difficult, conflict over resources is not 

inevitable. There are numerous historical 

cases of effective preventive action, but 

shared awareness and frameworks—put in 

place before a crisis hits—are required to 

avert the worst-case scenarios. 

“Over-the-Horizon” Issues for Global 

Governance 

Another set of issues looms ahead on which 

even fewer concerted multilateral efforts have 

been undertaken. These include migration, 

the Arctic, and the biotechnology revolution. 

• The peripheral role played by migration in 

post-World War II multilateralism is a 

reflection of the issue’s controversial 

nature, rather than its lack of importance, 

and of the challenge any international 

oversight would pose to what many see as 

central prerogatives of the nation states—

control over borders. Migration is only 

likely to grow as a salient transnational 

issue with the emerging powers becoming 
34 

increasing magnets for economic 

migrants. 

• Climate change is only beginning to open 

up the possibilities in the Arctic. 

Regional cooperation has started, but 

more concerted efforts are required to 

control environmental risks and enhance 

transnational cooperation over 

competition. 

• Like the Arctic, biotechnology is another 

issue that has newly arisen—in this case, 

because of technological innovations and 

the potential for those discoveries to be 

both exceedingly beneficial or harmful, 

depending on their end use. Achieving 

multilateral cooperation is likely to be 

challenging because of the number of 

nonstate actors needed to be involved in 

any efforts to regulate the booming 

technology phenomenon. 

Migration has the potential to increase 

economic interdependence and to reconcile 

the demographic challenges faced by older 

and younger countries. With their fast-paced 

economic development, emerging states are 

likely to receive an increasing number of 

migrants attracted by the economic 

opportunities. However, migration also has 

the potential to act as a disruptive force, 

creating strains for globalization, and 

exacerbating crises caused by other factors, 

such as a sharp economic downturn. 

As migratory flows become more complex, 

many countries are experiencing sudden 

increases in ethnic diversity; other destination 

countries, such as the United States, have seen 

such high rates of migration that their future 

demographic trajectory has been shifted 

upwards. Many developing countries, finally, 

have seen levels of “brain drain” running at 

rates that damage their economic prospects. 

Conversely, levels of remittances have 

accelerated sharply since 1990; such 

remittances are widely seen as among the 

most effective forms of “foreign” or external 

assistance. 

“Thinking backwards from 2025 or even 

2040, one of the things that will happen with 

radical climate change and demographic 

changes in Europe and Russia will be global 

migrations again.” 

South African Participant 

International cooperation on migration has 

generally been weak, and the obstacles to 

greater cooperation are likely to remain 

considerable because of growing national 

sovereignty concerns. The lack of 

governance frameworks nevertheless means 

that there will be a lack of an instrument to 

address crises, including related humanitarian 

concerns. The risks of not trying to better 

manage migration are great, including being a 

potential trigger for increased transnational 

tensions and controversy over globalization. 

Many of the key challenges will be in 

emerging and weaker states. Emerging 

markets will become significant targets for 

migration: their economic power has the 

potential to outstrip their institutional 

strength, leading to greater social problems as 

they become more diverse societies. Poorer 

countries, meanwhile, have little experience 

effectively managing major outflows of 

migration. Some countries already face an 

unsustainable loss of highly skilled workers. 

In many others—even the wealthier 

countries—the potential for tensions along 

ethnic faultlines will persist, if not increase, 

with the likely growing flows of migrants. 

The potential opening of the Arctic as a result 

of climate change can be regarded as a test 

case for multilateral cooperation versus a 

“great game” of competition and potential 

conflict. Climate change and new 
35 

technologies will create more opportunities 

for resource exploitation and economic 

activities and greater potential for 

competition. The way in which the Arctic is 

managed will test the ability of states to 

resolve disputes over sovereignty and to 

enhance current frameworks of international 

law which apply to the sea and the seabed, as 

well as their determination to prevent the 

region from becoming over-militarized. 

Dealing with the range of challenges 

presented by the opening of the Arctic 

requires appropriate governance mechanisms. 

Given the different interests at stake, and the 

nature of the challenges, however, these 

mechanisms are likely to be more fluid and 

more ad hoc than an all-encompassing treaty 

would be. 

No forum currently exists for dealing 

comprehensively across the scientific 

community, industry, and governments on 

measures needed to diminish the risks posed 

by the biotechnology revolution. The 

development of new agents and the expansion 

of access to those with hostile intentions 

increase the bioterrorism threat. Existing 

biological agents such as anthrax and 

botulinum toxin already pose an extremely 

serious threat. The development of new 

agents with the ability to reengineer existing 

life forms to have an offensive capacity poses 

a growing challenge. Rapidly falling costs 

will bring biotechnology within reach of a 

hacker community, while the diffusion of 

relevant technology could lead to increased 

leaks of expertise and materials. 

In addition, biotechnology—which the OECD 

thinks will potentially boost the GDPs of its 

members—can drive new forms of human 

behavior and association, creating profound 

cross-cultural ethical questions that will be 

increasingly politically contentious. Few 

experts believe that current governance 

instruments are adequate for those challenges. 

For example, direct modification of DNA at 

fertilization is widely researched with a goal 

of removing defective genes; however, 

discussions of future capabilities open the 

possibility for designing humans with unique 

physical, emotional, or cognitive abilities. 

The potential for dual-use of biotechnology 

will make the task of regulating and 

controlling current and new developments an 

exceptionally complex one. Governments 

will need unprecedented capacities to reach 

out beyond other governments, enabling them 

to work with a plethora of private actors, 

many of whom will not be amenable to 

traditional regulation. Threats are also 

perceived differently by different 

governments. The poorest countries are most 

concerned about the current impact of 

infectious diseases. Richer countries are 

worried more about their vulnerability to new 

diseases or the hostile use of biological 

agents. Rising powers expect their future 

comparative advantage to lie in a sector where 

there are relatively few entrenched leaders, 

with India and China investing heavily in 

biotechnologies and Brazil in biofuels. They 

are likely to regard heavy handed 

international regulations as “protectionist” 

measures to restrain their freedom to operate. 

Scenario IV: Gaming Reality: Conflict 

Trumps Cooperation 

This scenario is among the least likely, but the 

possibility cannot be dismissed. The 

international system becomes threatening 

owing to domestic disruptions, particularly in 

emerging powers such as China. China 

stumbles and the global economy lapses. 

Nationalistic pressures build as middle-class 

aspirations for the “good life” are stymied. 

Tensions build between the United States and 

China, but also among some of the BRICs as 

competition grows for secure resources and 

clients. Such suspicions and tensions make 

reforming global institutions impossible; 

budding regional efforts, particularly in Asia, 

also are undermined. 
36 

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443342ID 9-10

Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation

Scenario IV

Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation

In summer 2021, I—admittedly a bored 

diplomat—find myself sequestered for several 

weeks in Perth (Australia). A new outbreak of 

bird flu, despite the rapid quarantines put in 

place, has spread and closed down most major 

airports. I am trying to get back to Europe 

for my annual leave, but most connections 

have been cut. To while away the time, I am 

thinking back on world events.

The current international scene holds an 

uncanny resemblance to a computer game 

called “Peace Hero” I used to play with my son 

years ago. Unlike most games, this one was 

constructed so you earned points for finding 

ways to cooperate with fellow contestants, all 

of whom assumed roles of major countries or 

international organizations. The world was 

confronted, for example, with a pandemic—

not unlike the present—and the challenge 

was to find which countries could provide 

emergency vaccines. The game actually 

prompted you to construct a UN Security 

Council resolution that would quickly be 

voted into action. The game was probably 

never a best seller, but it had intrigued me, 

particularly how the players perverted its 

intended objective.

It was as if human nature was doomed: the 

competitive spirit took over even though the 

rewards were greatest for cooperation. In one 

energy scenario, the contestants ended up 

competing over access to oil. This was despite 

the fact that they could opt for technological 

breakthroughs on alternatives and reap 

many more rewards. My son—who was a 

bit of a rebellious teenager at the time—was 

particularly competitive. He went out of his 

way not to cooperate with me. 

Once the competitive juices flowed, 

confrontation was sure to follow. Even I 

had to admit that my blood would boil at 

times. Why couldn’t my son just accept the 

rules laid down in the game? They were for 

everyone’s good. A couple times, when he was 

playing the role of the BRIC, I thought I had 

him over a barrel. China’s economy took a hit 

while the West’s had finally recovered. Lo and 

behold, though, my son became more hostile. 

He said China was of no mind to be deferent 

given past wrongs. 

I suppose he had a good case looking back on 

it. Nationalism has made a big comeback in 

the past decade. What was all that stuff we 

used to talk about—multilateralism, doctors 

without borders, the new Internet society 

that would bring us all together? A lot had 

been swept aside in the ten years since the 

Great Recession. The West resented the new 

powers as their economies continued to grow 

while even the US has struggled. We saw in 

Afghanistan where China actually reaped 

major economic benefits from the Allies’ 

efforts to stabilize the country. Much of 

Afghanistan’s mineral wealth was exploited 

by the Chinese, not Western firms. Such 

economic feats became a contentious political 

issue in America and led to growing USChina frictions. I am reminded a little of how 

the British and French felt as German power 

rose in the years before the First World War. 

Perception is a lot in these situations. It was 

not as if China was at all equal to the US, 

but Americans grew increasingly resentful 

of an ungrateful China not mindful of all 

the “public goods” which the US had provided 

in the world, including to help China rise.

For their part, the new powers were dismissive 

of what they saw as an antiquated 

international system no longer possessing 

any legitimacy—a system that did 

not protect them from the increasing 

environmental and resource problems. Food 

prices have soared, way beyond the 2008 

“spikes.” Governments—including the 

new rising powers—have struggled to keep 

supplies adequate and prices reasonable for 

their publics. A string of extreme weather 

events has added to their woes. Asian cities 

are particularly vulnerable to the huge 

tidal surges which have accompanied some 

of the recent cyclones. No Kyoto followon climate change agreement was reached 

in 2012. The charges and countercharges 

proliferated with groups hardening around 

the US on one side and China-India-Brazil 

and most of the developing world on the 

other. The small island states whose very 

existence is really threatened were left out 

and ignored. This alone was probably enough 

to sour the international atmosphere. It is no 

exaggeration to say we are almost at the point 

of daggers drawn; it would only take a minor 

incident to trigger a major conflict. I wonder 

how the game will go . . . 
38 

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39 

The recent financial crisis has shown that a 

highly diverse set of countries and global and 

regional institutions can come together to 

avert what could have been another Great 

Depression. Many of the experts we engaged 

with in the emerging powers acknowledge the 

inadequacies in and challenges facing the 

global governance system. However, our 

discussions suggested that legitimacy—

bringing multilateral institutions more in line 

with current power realities—has to be an 

objective of reform as much as dealing more 

effectively with “hubs” of risks for the future. 

From our investigations of others’ views, it 

seems likely that the US and the EU will 

continue to be at the forefront of initiatives to 

reform and update the global governance 

agenda and institutions in the short term. 

Over time, however, we were impressed by 

the degree to which elites in most of the 

emerging powers were thinking more 

“globally” and preparing to take greater 

responsibilities. Their engagement will be 

critical to the success of any proposal for the 

adaptation and innovation of governance 

frameworks. Moreover, as has been the case 

for some time, nonstate actors are likely to 

continue to play a vital role in generating not 

only an understanding of potential problems 

but also solutions in any reform of the global 

governance system. Many of the key 

ingredients for improving global governance 

are at hand, but transforming them into both a 

newly effective and legitimate system is 

likely to be the big challenge. 

Conclusion

Future Opportunities, but also Limits 

Global governance is not slated to approach 

“world government” because of widespread 

sovereignty concerns, divergent interests, and 

deep-seated worries about the effectiveness of 

current institutions. However, enhanced and 

more effective cooperation among a growing 

assortment of international, regional, and 

national in addition to nonstate actors is 

possible, achievable, and needed, particularly 

to grapple with the growing 

interconnectedness of future challenges. 

Within that set of parameters, we have 

outlined several scenarios, none of which 

ensures a “perfect” world. The first (barely 

staying afloat) and third (concert redux) 

would avoid the worst outcomes through 

preventive action and forethought. The 

second (fragmentation) and fourth (conflict) 

are scenarios that would reverse the gains—

such as reduction in extreme poverty and 

slowdown in large-scale interstate conflict—

which we have seen over the past half 

century. While not the most likely, the 

“fragmentation” and “conflict” scenarios are 

not so insignificant as to be negligible in a 

world in which localized disruptions have 

global implications and preventive action is 

hard to organize. 
40 

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AnnexES
42 

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43 

Annex A: World Views of Global Governance 

In preparing this analysis, we met with government and think tank leaders; business and NGO 

representatives; and scholars and other experts in Japan, China, the UAE, India, South Africa, 

Brazil, and Russia in addition to the European Union and the United States. Below we have 

encapsulated the country or regional views of our interlocutors on global governance. 

Brazil. Global governance has not featured very high in the Brazilian debate until recently. The 

dominant “matrix” of Brazil’s foreign policy has been the North-South divide. This is changing 

largely because the country is playing a bigger role in international economics, energy, and 

climate change. However, Brazil will continue to look at many issues through the lens of the 

North-South divide and the need for redistribution of power from developed to developing states. 

According to one participant, “The governance gap for Brazil is that too much power is given to 

developed countries at a time when developing countries are emerging.” Multilateral institutions 

“cannot work well from Brazil’s point of view if they do not recognize the role of the emerging 

powers.” For Brazilians, the governance gap is really a legitimacy gap. Effectiveness is not just 

about fast decisionmaking but incorporating a broader range of voices. 

Some experts noted that the Brazilian Government tends to like “old fashioned” multilateralism, 

which is state-centered, does not make room for nonstate actors, and where universal values such 

as human rights and democracy do not play a central role. Nevertheless, the issues connected 

with global governance are gaining prominence within Brazilian society, spurred in part by the 

public debates over climate change and the impact of the financial crisis. Many argued that 

domestic markets and regional cooperation will become more important to ensure sustained 

growth rates. They also noted the progressive “de-concentration” of economic power away from 

the United States and the discrepancy between such a power shift and the enduring role of the 

US dollar as global currency. 

China. Chinese interlocutors recognized the growing scope of global challenges but emphasized 

the need for China to deal with its internal problems. Keeping its house in order is seen as a big 

contribution by China to global governance, at least for now. One Chinese speaker cited the 

need for “a balanced relationship among international governance, national governance, and 

local governance.” Many felt that China needs to manage its domestic development in ways that 

are compatible with the development and security of others. 

The Chinese participants stressed that trust is critical to prospects for cooperation and that it is 

rooted in respect for the interests of each party to a negotiation. The appreciation of respective 

concerns, sovereignty, and “patience” are the key principles at the basis of a sound international 

system, in their view. 

Chinese interlocutors saw the G-20 as being a big step forward but questioned whether NorthSouth differences would impede cooperation on issues other than economics and international 

finance. One said, “For developing countries, the big issues are food security and resource 

scarcity,” not climate change. Others argued that the G-20 is essentially a “crisis management 

tool” which already suffers from a sense of fatigue and cannot be regarded as an alternative to 

the UN system. 
44 

“Be careful about the G-20—I give it at most five years’ lifespan. It will suffer the same fate as 

other such forums. Pretty quickly sending leaders to endless summits will create fatigue.” 

Chinese Expert 

Many Chinese interlocutors see growing convergence on “hard security” despite different 

perspectives on humanitarian intervention. One said, “On terrorism, there is more of a link with 

nontraditional security and more room for cooperation....on piracy, most countries have 

common interests.” Others felt that China is increasingly aware of the responsibilities that come 

with power. That said, approaches could differ among different global actors. In the 

development field, Western actors regard good governance as a precondition for sustainable 

development, whereas China considers economic growth as conducive to better governance over 

time. 

Many Chinese saw “fundamental” defects in the international system. One said, “The IMF has 

focused on developing, not developed, economies and it should take a more balanced approach.” 

The Chinese envisage a “bigger structure” pulling together the different kinds of institutions and 

groups that have been established recently. 

India. Indian officials and think tank experts worried about an “absence of an internal 

equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability.” However, they opined that India was not well positioned 

to help develop regional institutions for Asia given China’s preponderant role in the region. 

Thus, India is primarily interested in transforming global governance institutions. The Indians 

thought existing international organizations are “grossly inadequate” to deal with mounting 

challenges, complaining about a “crisis of leadership.” One said, “Europe is not ready to take up 

the mantle of leadership” and questioned whether it is a regional or a global actor. 

Many experts were concerned about the future of the UN and one argued that if the reform of the 

UN fails the institution will progressively become irrelevant. On the other hand, doubts were 

expressed regarding the legitimacy of the G-20. Some felt this format would benefit from 

broader consultations with non-member countries to underpin its deliberations. 

Many hoped the United States would continue to be “very much part of the Asian region as a 

political, economic, and military power.” Some also feared that a system developed by the 

“West”—which includes democracy and rule of law—would suffer as the “East” becomes more 

powerful. One Indian interlocutor said, “It would be a pity if the West does not hang together to 

influence the future.” 

One expert argued that globalization may have reached a turning point. The impact of the 

economic crisis, ongoing turbulence in the financial markets, and resource constraints point to a 

possible scenario of de-globalization. Some felt that resource issues are not ripe for multilateral 

solutions and that India and China will continue their quest for resources. One noted that global 

deals are to be based on “mutuality of benefits” and questioned whether the Western approach to 

the climate change agenda was fair to India and other poor countries. 

Japan. Many Japanese saw the governance gap as more about political leadership than “form or 

structure.” The Japanese opined that the developing and emerging powers are still stuck in old 

North-South perspectives, expecting others to take on the responsibilities associated with global 
45 

challenges. This is changing, however, because of public opinion. The pressure of world public 

opinion had been on the United States—blaming the Bush Administration for lack of 

commitment to multilateralism—but is now shifting, focusing on countries like China to take 

more action. 

Japanese interlocutors questioned whether formal institutions are still appropriate, in particular 

for challenges such as climate change and resource scarcity. In the energy field, the emphasis on 

energy independence and resource nationalism was regarded as dangerous. Instead, the Japanese 

saw a need to better integrate both advanced countries and new massive energy consumers like 

China and India in relevant international frameworks to avoid unbounded competition. Some 

argued that international organizations with their huge bureaucracies are ineffective. 

Informality—which ensures “spontaneity”—may trump formal structures in advancing solutions. 

One former official talked of expanding the time allotted to G-20 meetings to enable leaders to 

exercise leadership. Two days of meetings with only two hours allotted for each issue results in 

only “tinkering.” Besides, “like-mindedness” in informal groupings is required to achieve 

results, whereas different agendas co-exist in the G-20. The Japanese were concerned that a 

premature institutionalization of the G-20 or the rapid expansion of its agenda could expose 

differences within the group. 

Most Japanese participants emphasized the need to boost national and regional means while 

reforming international organizations. In their view, stronger regional frameworks could 

compensate for weaker global ones. The potential for cooperation between sub-national 

authorities such as cities deserves more attention too, for example on energy and the 

environment. Many were concerned about the lack of regional structures for hard security in 

East Asia, noting that Japan itself has to overcome political and legal obstacles to make a greater 

contribution on hard security. 

The Japanese felt that quick military interventions will be needed in cases of ailing states, which 

international organizations are still not equipped to handle effectively. That will require renewed 

efforts to establish a stronger legal framework for intervention. More generally, the Japanese felt 

that more concrete measures should be devised to compel countries to comply with their legal 

obligations, for example under the nonproliferation regime. 

Russia. Russian experts saw the world in 2025 as still largely one of “great powers,” although 

some expected the influence of multinational businesses to increase and opportunities for greater 

transnational cooperation. Others stressed that “the state is back” and large powers are 

reasserting their sovereignty. The driving concept in Russia is “multilateral diplomacy,’’ with 

great powers relations playing a central role, instead of global governance. 

“... (We) cannot expect Russia to cooperate on global issues without first dealing with bilateral 

issues. Efforts to focus only on global issues and put aside classical state interests are 

unrealistic.” 

Russian Participant

Russian participants worried about the relative lack of “transpacific security.” The Pacific region 

is still less governed and there is a need for a greater security framework. The United States, 
46 

Europe, and Russia have scope for growing much closer while China will be the main factor in 

changing the world “with the biggest economy.” 

Some academics we encountered worried that if Russia does not take into account the main 

trends of global development, Moscow’s role risks being marginalized in the global order. 

However, many felt that Russia’s modernization strategy is inconsistent and that there is little 

confidence among the people for things to change. 

The Russians thought there was only one institution—the UN—that could engage all the key 

actors. In their view, the G-8 and G-20 lack legitimacy and their future is uncertain. Some 

experts saw the EU as serving as a model for future global governance. The European system of 

decisionmaking encourages pluralism and engages networks of officials and nonstate actors, 

thereby connecting the national and international levels of governance. 

South Africa. Our South African interlocutors saw weak states as being threatened by 

unregulated globalization. In their view, strong states are a “prerequisite” for global governance 

in the absence of effective multilateral institutions. However, some noted that many states in 

Africa are ill-equipped to fit globalization and are likely to remain so due to demographic trends 

and poor governance. 

“Think globally and act locally—that means a strong state. These things from global 

governance ultimately happen at the national and local level. The weakening of the state in 

Africa is a real problem.” 

South African Participant 

Globalization appears to be strengthening regionalization as opposed to creating a single global 

polity. The South Africans doubted, for example, that the G-20, whose membership is much 

more diverse than the G-8, could operate effectively on non-financial matters. They worried that 

the losers from globalization increasingly outnumber the winners and cited the need to tackle this 

problem. 

They thought Africans wanted a rules-based international system but worried, even with the shift 

to a multipolar world, that Africans were being left out. The G-20 has little African 

representation. In their view, the South-South solidarity is not likely to hold, India’s demise as a 

leader of the South is only a matter of time, and China uses its status as a developing country as a 

cloak. 

“Some of the BRICs use the South-South agenda to advance their South-North agenda.” 

South African Participant 

For Africans, the UN remains the global institution with the only “legitimate credential.” They 

perceive the proliferation of separate initiatives on development, food, and resources as 

confusing and leading to more uncertainty on the rules of the game. 

A particular problem for Africa is a “lack of capacity in knowledge and ideas to drive politics.” 

Technology is as important as governance, if not more so. As one of our interlocutors put it, 
47 

“Africa did not develop because of a lack of technology.” Even the nonstate actors come mainly 

from the most powerful states. “Africa has never fit anywhere—it has always been the object of 

global trends,” according to one participant. Some were wary of China because it is interested 

only in African resources. One said, “If you look at the BRIC countries, the common feature that 

unites them is resource nationalism, seeing Africa to be exploited for natural resources.” Others, 

however, noted that China is quick to adjust its policies in response to African concerns. 

UAE. For participants from the Persian Gulf region, the key question was what sort of global 

institutions are most capable of inclusive power sharing. One asked, “What is the new 

contract?” After World War II, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America were not 

involved. The participants from the Gulf region thought it will be necessary to incorporate these 

regions if we are to avoid crises in the future. In their view, there is a need to share power to 

make decisions, but they stressed that “sharing is about respective priorities, not about exporting 

Western views.” 

Many interlocutors bemoaned the lack of strong regional organizations—labeling the Arab 

League and Gulf Cooperation Council as weak and not well-connected to international 

institutions. One said, “Too often when we talk about the future of the Gulf, we conclude that 

we are not real actors.” A framework or institution is needed to bring together the “rights” of 

energy producers with those of consumers. Several felt let down by lack of support from the 

West on democratization. One said, “Now there is no interest in democratization in or outside 

the region.” 

In their view, an uneasy accommodation with Iran will have to be found. Most saw the region 

turning to “China and the East” as that region becomes a larger consumer of energy from the 

Persian Gulf. However, some noted that power is about “building consensus, being a model, 

creating a system.” From this standpoint, China and other emerging actors will have a long way 

to go to match the influence of traditional powers. As to the future of the UN, more attention 

needs to be paid to the reasons why it is not working, including the fact that powerful actors have 

sought alternative ways to pursue their interests. 
48 

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49 

Annex B: The Prospects for Regionalism 

Regionalism takes many different shapes across the world, as reflected in the debates we held at 

our seminars overseas. 

East Asia 

A new phase of East Asian regionalism may be dawning. Both regional heavyweights—China 

and Japan—and the member states of ASEAN favor regional cooperation as the framework 

within which to resolve disputes and manage interdependence. ASEAN has developed over 

decades a distinctive style of regional cooperation based on a low level of institutionalization, a 

non-intrusive agenda, informality, permanent consultation, and aversion to conflict. 

The so-called “ASEAN way” has not been very effective in delivering concrete solutions to the 

economic and security concerns of member states at times of crisis. In both fields, ASEAN 

countries have rather developed a range of bilateral relations between themselves and with 

external actors such as the United States, China, and Japan. However, because of its non-binding 

character, this cooperative framework has provided a useful platform to involve regional powers 

in permanent consultation and ad hoc cooperation, on the basis of shared principles. 

From an economic and political standpoint, China’s centrality to the region will grow. Whether 

China will be embedded in a sphere of cooperative security and shared prosperity or will seek to 

steamroll its way through the neighborhood will have far-reaching implications for global 

stability. In the last few years, China has shown its willingness to engage with neighboring 

countries on some issues not only at the bilateral level but also through multilateral regional 

structures. For example, it has signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and it has set up the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization together with Russia and Central Asian countries to tackle 

shared security threats. 

By engaging in regional cooperation, China pursues multiple objectives. First, Beijing extends 

its political influence in parallel with its growing economic clout in the region in a nonconfrontational and therefore less contentious way. Second, China delimits the influence of the 

United States in East Asia by supporting regional structures which, unlike the inter-regional 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, only include Asian countries. Third, China sets 

economic and political competition with Japan on peaceful grounds, downplaying rivalry and 

benefiting from booming mutual trade and investment flows. 

Areas of serious geopolitical tension persist, for example at the interface between China and 

India along common borders and throughout the region, and between China and Vietnam and 

other Southeast Asian countries over rights in the South China Sea. On the whole, however, 

China has sought to reassure the region on the implications of its momentous rise. 

The ongoing shift in the East Asian balance of power has not escaped Japan. In what has been 

defined as a “paradigm shift,” some Japanese interlocutors acknowledged the need to adjust to 

the new regional context and pursue a sort of “look West” policy, turning Japan’s focus from its 

US ally in the Pacific to mainland Asia. The question is whether the bilateral alliance between 
50 

Japan and the US will prove compatible with deepening multilateral frameworks in East Asia, 

which may not include the United States. 

Japan has supported a range of initiatives at bilateral and regional cooperation on economic and 

environmental issues, among others. It has also allocated a large share of its development 

assistance to the region. From a Japanese standpoint, ASEAN should remain the building block 

of a larger regional architecture and the annual East Asia Summit (EAS) should evolve into an 

East Asian Community. Like China, Japan regards regional cooperation as a multiplier of its 

political influence and as a way of diluting that of potential rivals. To this end, Japan supports 

more inclusive regional formats than those traditionally championed by China, involving India as 

well as Australia and New Zealand (the so-called ASEAN+6 that meets at the EAS). 

Regionalism in East Asia presents multiple facets. Established multilateral frameworks such as 

ASEAN co-exist with a thick web of bilateral partnerships and ad hoc functional arrangements 

and diplomatic processes, including for example the Six-Party Talks on North Korea in the 

security domain. The national strategies of major regional actors intersect with cooperative 

initiatives and engender plans to set up new multilateral platforms such as the East Asia 

Community. Soft balancing within the region and vis-à-vis the US underpins many of these 

developments. In perspective, growing economic links among China, Japan, and ASEAN; 

turmoil in global trade and financial markets; as well as environmental interdependence suggest 

that regional cooperation may deepen and expand to new areas. Given current trends, the 

emergence of a “hub-and-spoke” system in East Asia, with China at its core, can be envisaged. 

Such a system would be managed through regional structures that would more likely perform a 

stabilizing and confidence-building function, grounded in shared basic principles, than a binding 

norm-setting role. 

South America 

Regionalism in South America shares some of these features, and developments ahead may 

follow a similar pattern to that envisaged for East Asia. Brazil accounts for about half of South 

America’s territory and population and for two-thirds of its gross domestic product. In the last 

two decades, the gap between the economic performance of Brazil and that of most of its 

neighbors has been widening. Many wonder whether Brazil is going to be too big to remain 

focused on its region in one or two decades. So far, however, South America has been the 

number one priority of Brazilian foreign policy and it is likely to remain so for years to come. 

Most observers regard Brazil’s regional leadership as a vital condition for it to achieve its goal of 

playing a major role on the global stage. 

Contrasting trends indicate potential for either regional cooperation or fragmentation in South 

America. The region is diverse, with different states following disparate economic policies and 

political trajectories. Countries such as Chile, Peru, and Colombia have been pursuing economic 

liberalization and bilateral trade deals with the United States and, increasingly, China. The 

countries of the Bolivarian Alliance, led by Venezuela, have engaged in ideological competition 

not only against US influence in the region but also toward Brazil and others that are engaged in 

economic globalization. However, dependent as they are on the export of energy and other raw 

materials, their economic prospects are shaky. Brazil benefits from sound macro-economic and 

social policies, a large domestic market, a diversified industrial base and huge endowments with 
51 

natural resources. Countries such as Argentina, however, have been losing competitiveness and 

struggle to fit the changing global division of labor. 

At the same time, South America is relatively stable; countries face common transnational 

threats such as drug trafficking and all would benefit from better transport and energy 

infrastructures to boost trade and investment and harness their natural resources. Brazil is the 

only country with the critical mass to build on these assets and address economic asymmetries 

and political fragmentation with a view to deepening regional cooperation. But whether Brazil 

will be willing and able to play such leading role, in ways that gain consensus in the region, 

remains an open question. 

Important initiatives suggest that such an attempt is in the making. A new regional 

organization—UNASUR—was launched in 2008 with the goal of making it the main forum for 

political dialogue and cooperation in South America. Brazil hosted the Latin American and 

Caribbean Summit too, which excluded the United States and that Brazil regards as the harbinger 

of a future permanent organization. Brazil continues to support the Union of South American 

Nations (MERCOSUR), albeit for political more than economic reasons, and has backed the 

membership of Venezuela in this organization. Brazilian capital constitutes the backbone of 

investment in regional infrastructure, although the multilateral Initiative for the Integration of the 

Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) set up in 2000, has achieved less than 

expected. 

The economic and financial crisis has severely hit the credibility of international financial 

markets and institutions and suggested to Brazil and its neighbors that stronger domestic markets 

and regional economic cooperation can help shield the region from future crises. However, 

serious political challenges lie ahead. These include low levels of mutual political trust and 

reluctance by Brazil and other countries in the region to constrain their national sovereignty by 

subscribing to common rules and binding engagements. As in East Asia, regionalism in South 

America has not spurred a deeper institutionalization of cooperation and remains exposed to 

unfolding political circumstances within and between countries. 

Africa 

Political and security crises all over the continent punctuate the laborious development of 

regionalism in Africa. Unlike in East Asia and South America, no African country has sufficient 

influence and resources to steer regional cooperation at the continental level. South Africa has 

been playing a key role by its involvement in the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s 

Development, in the shift from the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union (AU) in 

2002, and in the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). 

However, Africa is too big and diverse for a single regional leader to emerge. Instead, African 

experts argued that the future of the continent and of its governance will depend on the domestic 

evolution and foreign policy priorities of a range of key countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, 

Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia, among others. Some of these countries 

also play a pivotal role in the context of sub-regional organizations such as the Economic 

Community of West African States in West Africa, the South African Development Community 

in the South, and the East African Community to the East of the continent. The interplay 
52 

between these organizations and the AU is critical to support effective regional solutions to 

common problems. 

The presence of strong and assertive states next to many fragile or failing ones, all of them 

attached to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in their respective domestic affairs, 

poses a major challenge to the future of regionalism in Africa and, more particularly, to the 

implementation of the principle of the “responsibility to protect” enshrined in the constitutive act 

of the AU. Poor governance in many countries in the region fuels a vicious spiral of poverty and 

instability that generates a growing demand for crisis management and peace-building. Today, 

around 70 percent of UN peacekeeping troops are deployed in Africa. Efforts at regional 

cooperation since the establishment of the AU have consequently focused on security issues. 

The APSA was launched in 2004 with the aim of providing African answers to regional 

challenges and threats. Relevant institutional structures have been set up at the AU headquarters 

in Addis Ababa and the AU has undertaken some small-scale crisis management operations, for 

example the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. The 

constitution of five stand-by contingents at the sub-regional level, available for rapid 

deployment, is also under way. Although some progress has been achieved, major obstacles lie 

ahead. 

African institutions do not have the resources and expertise to take responsibility for crisis 

response and for peace-building activities. Planning and command structures are weak while AU 

operations heavily depend on external support for funding and logistics. Capacity-building will 

be a core priority for years to come and will require a strong partnership between African actors 

and external donors, with the EU and its Member States likely to remain at the forefront of this 

effort. 

At the political level, preventive diplomacy and mediation among national leaders in regional 

forums can be decisive to managing crises within or between countries. With local opposition to 

the interference by external actors in African affairs on the rise, regional diplomacy may grow in 

relevance. However, such processes and frameworks rarely address the root causes of instability 

because doing so might entail questioning domestic political regimes, which African leaders are 

not inclined to do. The complicated interplay between the AU and sub-regional organizations, 

and between the latter, poses another obstacle to effective regional cooperation. 

Prospects for regionalism in Africa depend on a combination of factors. The leadership of major 

regional players such as South Africa will remain essential, if probably insufficient as such in the 

absence of a concerted effort. Crisis management and peace-building activities would greatly 

benefit from deeper cooperation among the AU, sub-regional organizations, and the UN. From 

this standpoint, regionalism in Africa is likely to complement rather than replace global 

governance tools and resources. The engagement of African nonstate actors in transnational 

cooperative frameworks would contribute to the effectiveness of such frameworks on such issues 

as climate change. 

Long described as marginalized in the context of economic globalization, Africa is today central 

to the competition for resources and markets (and even for land) among major global players. 

Many African leaders and observers claim that Africa should be proactive in shaping old and 
53 

new partnerships, as opposed to being the object of foreign interests. Such renewed centrality 

could encourage coordination and cooperation at the regional level in dealing with external 

partners. However, it could also contain the seeds of more fragmentation, with different 

countries reaping the benefits of bilateral deals outside regional arrangements. 
54 

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55 

Annex C: The Arctic: Challenge or Opportunity for 

Global Governance? 

The potential opening of the Arctic as a result of climate change is a seminal event. A region that 

has generally been understood as being outside the current of global affairs is becoming central 

to them. Using the North Sea Route would cut shipping routes between East Asia and Europe by 

about 40 percent. In 2009 the US Geological Survey estimated that the Arctic region holds 

massive resources of oil and natural gas. Climate change and new technologies will create more 

opportunities for resource exploitation and economic activities, more risks for the environment, 

and greater potential for competition. 

The Arctic can be regarded as a test case for global governance. The way in which the opening 

of the Arctic is managed will test the ability of states to resolve disputes over sovereignty and to 

enhance current frameworks of international law that apply to the sea and the seabed, as well as 

their determination to prevent a region from becoming over-militarized. 

Dealing with the range of challenges presented by the opening of the Arctic requires appropriate 

governance mechanisms. Given the different interests at stake, and the nature of the challenges, 

however, these mechanisms are likely to be more fluid and more ad hoc than an allencompassing treaty would be. A range of frameworks—many of which are essentially forums 

for discussion rather than formal governance mechanisms—already exists. These include the 

Arctic Council, the Barents Euro Arctic Council, and the Northern Dimension of the European 

Union in addition to a number of bilateral arrangements on areas of cross-border interest such as 

the longstanding fisheries arrangements between Norway and Russia. 

The Arctic Council, which has the broadest membership, is perhaps the most effective and the 

obvious candidate as a governance mechanism for the Arctic. However, its agenda, which does 

not include security issues, is narrow, and it lacks a permanent independent secretariat and 

formal powers. 

The members of the self-defined group of five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, 

Russia, and the United States) have preferred to keep discussions of Arctic sovereignty among 

themselves. As a general rule, bilateral agreements, in the Arctic as elsewhere, where interests 

are most closely aligned or at least most clearly understood, tend to produce the greatest degree 

of practical cooperation. Larger groupings provide greater legitimacy and may be the only 

format for dealing with more complex and interrelated issues but are harder to manage and less 

likely to produce practical cooperation. 

Some of the challenges raised by the growing economic and political salience of the Arctic are in 

a sense traditional, relating to questions of sovereignty. But these are complicated in a number 

of ways. 

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the United States has 

not ratified, provides the legal basis on which a state may claim economic sovereignty over the 

sea and seabed. UNCLOS delimits and codifies the potential areas of dispute, but the findings of 

the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, its arbitration body, are not binding. 
56 

Ultimately, overlapping claims have to be resolved by states. There are a number of outstanding 

sovereignty disputes in the Arctic, as elsewhere in the world—many of which pre-date 

UNCLOS—and more could occur. The key question is whether states will be capable of 

resolving their disputes through negotiation and what conditions need to be in place to make that 

happen. 

Rising economic interest in the Arctic could, of course, make some existing disputes more acute 

and increase the perceived strategic importance of such overlapping claims. But this is not 

necessarily the case. In 2010, Norway and Russia moved dramatically toward final resolution of 

a longstanding dispute over ownership of a large portion of the Barents Sea, which is believed to 

hold considerable hydrocarbon wealth. Without an agreement, it was highly unlikely that 

commercial activity would take place in that area, depriving both Norway and Russia of potential 

revenues. 

As in all diplomatic engagement, states might miscalculate, either by over-reaching themselves 

or failing to signal their interests and intentions. This is exacerbated in a region such as the 

Arctic where asserting sovereignty may be as much about power as it is about presence, or a real 

ability to control. Very few states have the ability to adequately surveil or control their Arctic 

territory and seas. But many of the possible challenges facing the Arctic require effective 

policing. There are opportunities within existing institutions for greater cooperation, particularly 

within NATO, in terms of understanding what responsibilities are shared and which fall to each 

NATO-member; or between the United States and Canada over maritime domain awareness and 

possibly ice-breaking capacity. 

The challenges raised by the potential opening of the Arctic concern not only Arctic states but 

non-Arctic states as well. China, in particular, is showing a growing interest in the region—as a 

shipping route both shorter and cheaper than existing shipping routes, but also possibly more 

secure than current routes. It will take decades before the Arctic is a major shipping channel, if 

ever, but getting the governance frameworks right (and the infrastructure in place) for such 

potential activity will be important. The environmental and possible human consequences of a 

shipping disaster need no elaboration, let alone the possible consequences of a political dispute 

over access. 

The future good governance of the Arctic depends to a large degree on the will of states to act 

cooperatively externally as well as their ability to act responsibly domestically. Moreover, much 

of what happens in the Arctic—including how highly controversial questions of resource 

development play out—will happen within a single state. The question of whether US, 

Canadian, or Russian oil and gas resources are developed, for instance, will depend to differing 

degrees on price, accessibility, and domestic political decisionmaking. 

Moving toward more common alignments of incentives and perceptions between states will be 

key. These may take the shape of formal structures—such as a strengthened Arctic Council—or 

more informal data-sharing and network-building. 
57 

Annex D: Are Global Governance Tools Sufficient for 

Fragile States? 

Response to failing and failed states has been a major operational feature of the international 

conflict management system since the end of the Cold War. This system includes UN, bilateral, 

and regional mediation; UN, NATO, EU and other regional peacekeeping and peace 

enforcement, as well as that of coalitions of the willing; UN, NGO and bilateral humanitarian 

programs; and World Bank, bilateral, UN, and NGO financing for reconstruction programs. 

Since 1988, this system has been continuously deployed. At present, more than 40 countries 

have some form of international monitoring, peacekeeping, or enforcement presence within their 

borders. 

The end of the Cold War created the political conditions for the UN Security Council to take a 

more active stance on internal conflicts but did not stop new civil wars from breaking out; 

several wars that ended just after the Cold War later relapsed. Mediation efforts fail roughly 

three-quarters of the time and peacekeeping efforts roughly half. 

The net result of a change in political conditions and of the creation of the conflict management 

system is that from a peak in 1992, the number of civil wars in the world declined steadily to 

2006, with major civil wars—those defined by more than 1,000 battle deaths—declining 80 

percent in that period. Since 2006, however, there has been a slight uptick in the number of both 

interstate and internal wars. 

Looking ahead toward 2025, the risk of state failure will remain high. By the end of this period, 

the world’s population is expected to reach eight billion, with the growth heavily concentrated in 

the towns and cities of poorer countries. A number of countries will experience high levels of 

demographic risk, as the proportion of young men in their population creates competition for 

scarce resources (jobs, land, water, etc.), in societies characterized by weak institutions and the 

destabilizing impact of rapid social change. State fragility seems certain to remain a pressing 

problem until the population of the poorest countries has stabilized. 

Key Weaknesses 

Our interlocutors worry that the international system for conflict management and response to 

failed states has several major weaknesses. 

• Scale. Such successes as have been recorded by international conflict management 

mechanisms have been in countries that are small or modest in scale and/or population. 

Afghanistan’s 28 million and Iraq’s 30 million are among the most populous cases ever 

attempted. Were the current system confronted with state collapse in a country the size of 

Pakistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, or Bangladesh, it would be overwhelmed. 

• Speed. NATO can respond quite quickly to outbreaks of violence, but even NATO has 

discovered limits on its rapid response capacity in Afghanistan. The EU and regional 
58 

organizations such as ECOWAS can deploy small forces rapidly. The UN normally deploys 

very slowly indeed: the time between mandate and deployment is up to nine months. 

• Regional Gaps. The bulk of international conflict management has been in Africa, Asia, and 

Europe. There is little in the toolkit of international systems designed to respond to the 

particular features and particular challenges of conflict and internal crisis in the broader 

Middle East. There are also important questions of legitimacy for international actors in the 

broader Middle East: US and Western actors face greater legitimacy constraints than others, 

meaning that precisely those elements of the international response system that are most 

capable (in terms of force and speed) are least welcome. 

• Transnational Threats. Within conflict management systems, there are few, if any, effective 

tools for dealing with transboundary features of fragile states, such as transnational criminal 

networks or penetration by terrorist organizations. Existing systems for responding to 

organized crime are highly fragmented and designed to integrate with, and reinforce, 

developed or semi-developed ministry of interior/justice/police systems. International 

judicial, police, and transnational threat responses in fragile states are in their infancy. 

• Prevention. Early political, financial, and security responses to the erosion of governance or 

manifest signs of state failure are episodic at best; cases of real prevention of major internal 

wars or state collapse processes are few and far between. They are not unheard of, however: 

arguably the international peacekeeping, political, and economic responses to Lebanon after 

the Israel-Hizballah war (see below) prevented full-blown collapse of the Lebanese state; 

recent preventive efforts by ECOWAS with UN support in Guinea halted a spiral of 

escalation; in Kenya, Kofi Annan led an integrated mediation effort that halted a spiral of 

escalating violence and established a transitional power-sharing government. 

• The Institutional Challenge. Development agencies have had little demonstrable success in 

helping strengthen institutions in states that may be at risk of failure in the future, although 

fresh approaches have been tried in countries such as Nigeria, where a coalition of donors has 

placed governance at the heart of their joint strategy for countries. Many experts believe that 

conversely—and unfortunately—Western policy has often contributed to the hollowing out 

of institutions in fragile states, with Pakistan an example of a country where billion of dollars 

of support has often yielded counterproductive results. Development agencies are 

particularly ill-equipped to understand and respond to the powerful political incentives that 

lead elites to resist reform. 

• Post-crisis Development and Risk. Similar problems bedevil post-conflict recovery. Most 

countries that have experienced internal conflict in the post-Cold War system remain stuck in 

a cycle of low growth/weak capacity. Statistically, they also exhibit a continued high risk of 

relapse. Financing systems for post-conflict recovery is slow, short term, and rigid in terms 

of how it interacts with fractious governments. The international community seldom has a 

coordinated political strategy. 
59 

Rising Powers and Fragile States 

A critical determinant of future capacity to respond to the challenge of state fragility and failure 

will be the strategy pursued by rising powers as they play an increasingly global role and 

potentially see growing threats to their economic and security interests from state failure.3

 Three 

factors are of particular relevance in shaping the approach of rising powers to fragile states. 

First, the perceived importance of a country has a paradoxical impact on the willingness of rising 

powers to engage with the international community in supporting it. For weak or failing states 

that are not of high strategic significance, rising powers currently seem largely aligned with 

broad international patterns of UN-led containment and reconstruction. Although they resist 

measures that have the effect of extending the scope and timing of international intervention, 

they vote (both in formal chambers, and with their feet) in support of UN peacekeeping 

operations—including operations with complex, multi-faceted mandates designed to promote 

democratic governance and market reform. 

However, when it comes to strategically significant countries (most of which happen to be highly 

populous)—such as North Korea, Nigeria, and Pakistan—specific regional and geostrategic 

concerns dominate. In such cases, rising powers tend to cooperate to avoid total collapse (which 

would be detrimental to the interests of regional powers and emerging investors). However, they 

have divergent interests that preclude cooperation on political and economic reconstruction and 

undermine potential management efforts. 

Second, geography matters. There is a fundamental difference in emerging power roles in fragile 

states in their immediate neighborhood and those further afield. In the former, they have—

unsurprisingly—identified strong interests in being heavily involved in both the political 

management of fragility and recovery, and in being commercially engaged in the recovery. 

Practices differ widely. In Afghanistan, for example, India is providing large quantities of 

reconstruction aid linked to local governance reform, aiming to build support among key Afghan 

constituencies in the east of the country as part of its strategy for countering Pakistan’s influence 

in Afghanistan. In the Pacific Rim, by contrast, China is using a combination of unfettered aid 

and commercial investment to take a major position in mineral and energy sectors. In Haiti, 

meanwhile, Brazil is leading international peacekeeping efforts, in a similar political and 

operational role to that played by South Africa in Burundi. 

In more distant fragile states, rising powers are contributing to international conflict management 

systems, by providing peacekeepers, political support to UN and regional operations, and (to a 

lesser degree) aid and civilian support. They are also active investors, prepared to tolerate high 

levels of operational risk, and are increasingly forceful competitors for commercial and national 

 

3 The Managing Global Instability Project—an initiative of the Brookings Institution, New York University’s 

Center on International Cooperation, and Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation—

is conducting a series of case studies of Russian, Chinese, Indian, and South African approaches to fragile states. 

Some early findings have emerged from this work, which we have cited in the main text and this annex.
60 

energy purposes. In Sudan, for example, 13 of the 15 largest companies are Chinese, with China 

now Africa’s second largest trading partner (after the United States) and Brazil seeing its imports 

from Africa rise more than sixfold between 2000 and 2008. 

The potential conflict between extractive commercial practices and more benign peacekeeping 

and reconstruction assistance is not, as yet, a major part of the policy debate within or among 

emerging powers. This reflects a lack of integrated government within the rising powers. There 

is limited contact between personnel involved in peace operations and those leading on trade and 

investment. Even commercial strategies are much less coherent than is commonly perceived. 

Investors are often from the private sector, even if funded by governments or sovereign wealth 

funds. 

Third, there are deep-seated concerns within emerging powers about the consequences of the 

proactive management of state fragility. They are wary of the internationalization of conflicts in 

their neighborhood. Brazil has accepted the internationalization of Haiti but is wary of this trend 

being repeated elsewhere in Latin America. India accepted a UN role in Nepal but has ensured 

that this role is tightly constrained. Yet fears of internationalization are balanced by fears of the 

consequences of failure. China, for example, is worried by the consequences of an influx of 

refugees from North Korea. India remains conscious of potential links between Nepali and 

Indian Maoists (although evidence for these links is limited). Brazil is worried by the nexus of 

criminal interests and ungoverned spaces on its borders, especially in the Amazon. 

Perhaps most importantly, rising powers tend to be highly sensitive to the adverse and 

unintended consequences of Western-led interventions in countries where they have a strategic 

interest. In part, this is rooted in their own histories (India’s experience in Sri Lanka; China’s in 

Vietnam), but to a greater extent, they are influenced by the failure of Western-led attempts to 

build stable states in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The eventual verdict on these 

interventions (eventual success after significant changes of strategy vs. failure and withdrawal) 

will have far-reaching impacts on how proactive emerging powers will be when faced by future 

calls for intervention. They tend to be skeptical about their own capacity to engage in large-scale 

interventions and wary of the political costs of unilateral action. 
61 

Annex E: Migration in the Age of Uncertainty 

International migration poses unique challenges to the global system. Movements of people 

across national borders have a profound economic impact on both source and destination 

countries, transforming societies over many generations. Migration is, by definition, a 

transnational phenomenon. It touches the lives of people more directly than any other facet of 

globalization, affecting not just those who move from a country, but those left behind in societies 

that risk losing skills at an unsustainable rate, and those who live in cultures that will be 

substantially reshaped by migration. 

There is no guarantee that the international community will continue to manage current levels of 

migration, though the demand to migrate almost certainly will remain high. In the past, 

international cooperation on migration has generally been weak. Migration is a contentious 

issue, capable of arousing an intense political reaction that could lead to friction between ethnic 

groups. The right to regulate borders is regarded by governments as a key component of their 

national sovereignty. Countries with high rates of outward migration tend to have little 

international leverage to promote stronger standards of global governance. 

At best, migration could help harmonize the different economic and demographic conditions that 

will be experienced by countries as the world moves toward its peak population. At worst, 

migration could be driven primarily by economic failure, not success; emerge as a destabilizing 

factor before or after conflict within and between nations; and even be placed into reverse, as the 

world again sees the abrupt and involuntary flows of people that were characteristic of some of 

the darkest times in the 20th century. 

Current Migration Trends 

The number of migrants has been accelerating over the latter half of the 20th century. According 

to UN figures, there were 214 million international migrants in 2010, a substantial increase from 

50 years earlier, when there were just 75 million migrants. (These figures may be an 

underestimate because they do not account for “irregular migrants” who enter or remain in a 

country in breach of that country’s laws.) Sixty percent of today’s migrants live in developed 

countries, 40 percent in the developing world. 

At a global level, the increase in the proportion of migrants in the world’s population has been 

modest. Two and a half percent of the world’s people were migrants in 1960. This fell slightly 

in the 1970s and 1980s, before climbing to 2.9 percent in 1990 and 2000, and reaching 3.1 

percent in 2010. 

The global picture, however, does not reveal important patterns, with some regions and countries 

experiencing a sharp increase in migration, both in absolute and relative terms. In 1960, 

migrants represented 3.5 percent of the population of developed countries, with gradual increases 

until the 1980s, at which point there was marked acceleration. Today, more than one in ten of 

those living in a developed country were born elsewhere. 
62 

Regionally, there are also significant disparities. Africa, Asia, and Latin America have all seen a 

falling proportion of migrants as they have experienced rapid population growth. Northern 

America and Oceania have seen both population growth and a substantial increase in relative 

numbers of migrants (from 6.4 percent in 1960 to 14.2 percent in 2010 for the former; and from 

12.6 percent to 16.8 percent for the latter). Europe has seen its population increase only slightly, 

but has experienced a dramatic change in its relative share of migrants (2.3 percent of the 

population in 1960; 9.5 percent in 2010). 

At the country level, patterns of migration are growing more diverse. According to some 

experts, the dichotomy between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving states is being eroded. 

Most countries experience both emigration and immigration while some countries have taken on 

an important role as transit zones for migrants. 

Ten countries host over half of the world’s migrants. One in five lives in the United States, with 

Canada also featuring in the top ten. Europe has four countries on the list, namely Germany, 

France, the United Kingdom, and Spain. Russia and Ukraine feature on the list, following the 

breakup of the Soviet Union, as well as Saudi Arabia and India, reflecting the growing 

importance of rising powers as receivers of migrants. China is an outlier. It is believed to host 

only around 600,000 migrants, but as it is one of only nine countries to provide no data on 

migration to the United Nations, this figure can only be regarded as a very rough estimate. 

In recent years, some countries have experienced sizeable increases in their total number of 

immigrants. Nine have gained more than a million immigrants in just ten years, led by the 

United States, which has seen eight million additional migrants, mainly from Mexico. Spain (4.6 

million) and Italy (2.3 million) have only recently emerged as significant receiving countries, 

with Spain seeing its migrant population increase by 26.4 percent annually over the last decade. 

Syria (1.3 million) and Jordan (1 million) have seen the influx of large numbers of refugees from 

Iraq. Pakistan’s total migrant stock stayed steady over the decade, but it experienced a net 

increase of nearly a million refugees between 2005 and 2010. 

The European Union represents an important case study, as a region that has allowed free 

movement of people since April 2004. Some 2.3 percent of Europeans currently live outside 

their country of origin. 

The United States is the world’s leading migrant-receiving country, with net migration averaging 

above one million per year in the period 2000-2010. The US Census Bureau’s national 

projections illustrate the cumulative impact that these flows will have on US demography over 

the next 40 years, demonstrating the long-term influence of migration on receiving countries and 

the role played by second- and third-generation immigrants. 

Even if no further migration occurred, the United States’ Hispanic population would grow by 25 

million by 2050, making up more than 20 percent of the population. Under one projection, the 

Hispanic population would exceed 20 percent of the total by 2025 and 30 percent by 2050, by 

which time it would have grown by over 80 million. 

American Hispanics will play a crucial role in keeping the country young, a trend strengthened 

by fertility rates that are projected to stay above replacement levels (unlike any other racial or 
63 

ethnic group). Mexico, in contrast, will age rapidly, and is likely to be an older society than its 

neighbor sometime shortly after 2035. 

Among middle income countries with the highest rates of emigration over the past decade, 

Mexico has seen two significant waves of migration, with net outward migration running at 

5 percent of the population in both the 1980s and the 2000s. The Philippines is also noteworthy 

in that its government has pursued a deliberate policy of exporting labor, helping to create a 

“culture of migration” with around 10 percent of its population living overseas, more than half of 

whom are temporary workers. 

Pakistan, meanwhile, shows rapid fluctuations in its net migration. It gained nearly 300,000 

migrants a year in the 1980s but has seen an average of 265,000 people a year leave over the 

subsequent 20 years. Zimbabwe is another country that shows how rapidly migration outflows 

can accelerate. It gained migrants in the 1980s, but lost 4.3 percent of its population in the 1990s 

and a further 11.2 percent between 2000 and 2010. 

Most of Zimbabwe’s migrants have moved only short distances, to South Africa and other 

neighboring countries. This is a part of a pattern that sees refugees concentrated in poorer parts 

of the world, with 85 percent of the world’s refugees in less developed countries. Refugee flows 

are a direct consequence of levels of conflict or other serious social breakdowns. A large upward 

trend in refugee numbers during the second half of the Cold War was followed by steady decline 

as international peacekeeping and mediation helped bring a large number of civil wars to an end. 

While the total number of refugees has fallen somewhat (and significantly so, relative to an 

increasing population), the burden on some countries remains considerable. Three 

countries/areas have more than a million refugees (Jordan, Occupied Palestinian Territory, and 

Syria), while in Chad, Iraq, Lebanon, Tanzania, and Zambia more than 50 percent of migrants 

have refugee status. 

Migration is associated with considerable flows of remittances to countries of origin. In 2008, 

these were estimated at over $600 billion, of which three quarters went to developing countries. 

After many years of sustained increases, remittances are estimated to have fallen slightly in 2009 

as a result of the economic crisis, though the fall has been eased by a “remittance flow boom” to 

East Asia and the Pacific. Remittances accounted for 5.8 percent of the GDP of lower income 

countries in 2008, with countries such as Tajikistan (49.6 percent), Moldova (31.4 percent) and 

Lebanon (25.1 percent) considerably above this level. 

Conversely, the emigration of highly skilled individuals represents a potentially serious loss for 

poor countries. Experts argue that skilled migration offers even poor countries some gains when 

at a modest level, through remittances and other effects such as migrants returning with 

enhanced skills and the creation of business and trade networks. Some experts believe the 

optimal level of skilled worker emigration at 5-10 percent, with harmful effects increasing above 

a 15 percent threshold. 

Experts’ data show 60 percent of developing countries are above the 10 percent threshold. The 

LDC bloc (12.9 percent), Sub-Saharan Africa (12.9 percent), Central America (16.9 percent), 

and the Caribbean (42.8 percent) all show worrying levels of brain drain. Small countries are 

especially vulnerable, with small island developing states seeing 42.4 percent of skilled citizens 
64 

emigrate. Nine countries with a population over five million (Haiti, Ghana, Mozambique, 

Kenya, Laos, Uganda, Angola, Somalia, and El Salvador) experience levels of skilled migration 

that exceed 30 percent, with Haiti’s brain drain running at an astonishing 83.6 percent. 

Future Migration Trends 

According to the OECD, “it is hard, if not impossible to forecast the scale and direction of future 

migration...World migration patterns in the next 20 years or so will be shaped by many different, 

powerful forces—economic, geopolitical, social, technological, and environmental—all of which 

carry within them significant levels of uncertainty.” Predictions are further complicated by a 

lack of in-depth research and the poor quality of much of the available data. 

• The motivation to migrate can be broken into two “push” factors: the desire to find 

opportunities overseas on the one hand and a response to risk at home on the other. 

• The primary “pull” factor creating demand for migrants is the need for labor in receiving 

countries. Running counter to this are policy measures that inhibit the free movement of 

people across borders. 

• Social networks, which link sending and receiving countries through connections between 

migrants and their countries origin, can help encourage and sustain migration. 

• Economic, demographic, and political drivers have a transnational impact, creating a series 

of interlocking incentives for migration. 

Economic drivers have a powerful impact on both origin and destination countries, with the 

migrant’s quest for opportunity largely driven by wealth disparities. Migration is costly, 

especially for those traveling illegally, where average costs have been estimated as ranging from 

US$200 for migration within Africa to US$26,000 for migration from Asia to the Americas. 

Migrants face uncertainty about the rewards that await them, while their quality of life may 

suffer (separation from family and friends, relative poverty in their new country, vulnerability to 

discrimination, etc.). Expected benefits must therefore be sufficiently high for sustained 

migratory flows to occur from one country to another. 

The experience of Southern European countries and Ireland during the 20th century suggests that 

a wage differential of 30-40 percent is needed to create a widespread incentive to emigrate. 

Future Migration Challenges 

Looking forward, the challenges of managing migration will continue to have a significant 

impact on prospects for international cooperation, but the exact nature of this influence is hard to 

predict. Within the constraints of this considerable uncertainty, the following conclusions can be 

drawn about the future evolution of migration and its likely impact on the global order: 

Migration has a profound impact on economies and societies. In discussions of globalization, a 

great deal of attention is paid to the free movement of goods, services, and capital. In contrast, 

the free movement of people has often been neglected. Sudden movements of people may also 
65 

be a symptom of a breakdown in national, regional, or global order, as has been seen in a number 

of fragile states and, regionally, in Europe during the first half of the 20th century and on the 

Indian subcontinent after independence. 

• Migration’s significance has inhibited the policy attention paid to the issue. The peripheral 

role played by migration in the post-World War II settlement (barring the creation of new 

norms for managing refugees) is a reflection of the issue’s controversial nature, rather than 

its lack of importance, and of the threat it poses to what many see as the central prerogatives 

of the nation state. Governments have taken a predominantly national approach to the issue, 

despite its essentially international nature, while national elites have adopted policies that 

often lack popular support, or are ineffective, or both. Trade, in contrast, has been seen as a 

“safer” area for international cooperation. 

Demand for migration is unlikely to abate. Aging societies need labor, while low-income 

countries are unlikely to be able to offer jobs to their baby boomers as they seek jobs in growing 

numbers. Income disparities will remain high enough to maintain the attractiveness of migration 

for a significant section of the global population. Social networks will make it hard to limit 

migratory flows, with family, neighbors, and friends having strong incentives to follow existing 

migrants. Even an era of economic turbulence and resource shocks could lead to new migratory 

flows if it weakens vulnerable states, creates an upsurge in conflict, or simply entrenches global 

economic inequality. 

• Migration will prove highly challenging to manage. Migration’s impact is cumulative, as a 

given “stock” of migrants transforms a society across many generations. Countries without a 

tradition of migration (Spain, Italy), but which have seen substantial recent flows must 

respond to increased diversity. Even the United States will confront issues raised by running 

on two very different demographic tracks (though the potential rewards will be substantial if 

the United States can use its institutional strength to release a “demographic dividend” from 

ethnic groups with a youthful age profile). Migrants themselves will generally face higher 

levels of risk than native populations and will be especially vulnerable at times of economic 

underperformance and/or political turmoil. A significant, and possibly growing, proportion 

of migrants will continue to be “irregular,” a status that increases vulnerability in states that 

have weak institutions and inadequate human rights provision. 

Many key challenges will be in weaker states. Emerging markets will become significant targets 

for migration even as they face severe residual development challenges at home. Their economic 

power has the potential to outstrip their institutional strength, leading to potential problems as 

they become more diverse societies. Poorer countries, meanwhile, have little experience in 

effectively managing major outflows of migration (with exceptions such as the Philippines). 

Some countries already face an unsustainable loss of highly skilled workers; increased 

competition for talent could exacerbate this trend. Risk-avoiding migrants will tend to move 

only short distances, putting pressure on neighboring states that may also lack resilience and be 

destabilized by these flows. Governance systems for dealing with refugees may be stretched to 

the point of a breakdown. 

The critical axis will be between migration and social cohesion. Can origin countries manage 

outwards flows to contain levels of youth unemployment and underemployment while retaining 
66 

sufficient skilled workers to build strong economies and societies? Or will migration be 

dominated by abrupt and chaotic movements, resulting from state failure, conflict, and a lack of 

resilience in the face of natural disasters, all of which are themselves exacerbated by brain drain? 

Will destination countries successfully integrate new arrivals, respond to the needs of secondand third-generation immigrants, and maintain popular support for diversity? Internationally, 

will migration regimes support the relatively free movement of people? Or will the primary 

focus be on sealing borders? 

• Despite future demand for migration, the ongoing movement of people cannot be treated as a 

given. Even in the EU—the region that has the most liberal migration regime—a reversal is 

possible. The potential for political, or actual, conflict along ethnic faultlines will remain, 

with ethnic identities likely to strengthen should this prove to be a turbulent period for 

globalization. A next generation terrorist movement may make a sustained attempt to 

“break” multiethnic societies, while transnational migrant networks will link conflicts and 

facilitate criminal flows across borders. In the worst case, a breakdown in migration is 

possible. 

Flows of forced migration are unlikely to be one way. Even if the period to 2025 is relatively 

peaceful, there are certain to be at least some refugee flows, while natural disasters will also 

continue to displace people over borders. The politicization of migration, however, also makes it 

highly likely that there will be at least some episodes of expulsion of migrant communities, with 

some countries following the model of Libya (which has expelled Egyptians, Tunisians, 

Palestinians, and citizens of various Sub-Saharan African nations at times of political tension). 

The rise of extremist political movements and campaigns of systematic persecution of migrant 

communities will have the potential to seriously destabilize regional and global cooperation and 

even to create demand for intervention from the international community. History suggests that 

the breakup of any large state will be a moment of particular danger. 
67 

Annex F: Threats from Biotechnology 

Biological Governance 

Currently, the international governance regime has the following primary components: 

• The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1975). Under the convention, states 

commit “never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or 

retain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins ....” Twenty-three states have not 

signed the convention, while 16 have signed but not ratified it. Levels of monitoring and 

enforcement of compliance lie somewhere between weak and non-existent. 

• The International Health Regulations (2005). The regulations aim “to prevent, protect 

against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in 

ways that are commensurate with, and restricted to, public health risks, and which avoid 

unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.” The regulations represent a 

significant intrusion on state sovereignty, with states obliged to develop minimum public 

health capabilities and to notify the World Health Organization (WHO) of public health 

events within their borders that meet agreed criteria. WHO is also empowered to investigate 

media and citizen reports of public health emergencies, while the current expert review of the 

response to pandemic flu provides some measure of independent external scrutiny. 

• The Global Outbreak Alert Response Network (GOARN). GOARN is the “early warning 

system” for outbreaks. It requires national compliance, but the 2005 upgrade also gave 

WHO the ability to pre-emptively assess the quality of national mechanisms for compliance 

with GOARN reporting standards. The network, which brings together 140 institutions to 

support countries experiencing a public health emergency, provides an example of the kind 

of distributed systems that are likely to prove effective. 

• General Assembly Resolution 100. Buried in an otherwise obscure General Assemby 

Resolution is the authority for the Secretary-General to investigate any suspicious event that 

could involve a biological weapon. The authority has been used sparingly. 

Few observers, however, would argue that the system is fit for the challenges that the world will 

face in a “biological century.” In developing countries, public health challenges will intensify 

with a billion additional people expected to live in towns and cities by 2025. Mobility will also 

increase, enabling diseases to spread further and faster, while making it more likely that a new 

disease will break out before it can be contained. 

Meanwhile, the potential for dual use of biotechnology will make the task of regulating and 

controlling existing and new developments an exceptionally complex one. Governments will 

need unprecedented capacity to reach out beyond other governments, enabling them to work with 

a plethora of private actors, many of whom will not be amenable to traditional regulation. 
68 

Threats are perceived differently by different governments. The poorest countries are most 

concerned about the current impact of infectious diseases (though, in many cases, not concerned 

enough to implement simple and extremely cheap public health measures). Rich countries are 

worried about potential threats—new diseases or the hostile use of biological agents. Rising 

powers expect their future comparative advantage to lie in a sector in which there are relatively 

few entrenched incumbents, with India and China investing heavily in biotechnologies and 

Brazil in biofuels, and are likely to regard them as protectionist measures that restrain their 

freedom to operate. Countries with traditional views of their sovereignty will often be resistant 

to international cooperation (as China was, at least initially, over SARS). 

There is as yet no forum for creating the consensus that is needed across the scientific 

community, industry, and governments on measures needed to diminish the risks posed by an 

increasingly broadly distributed biological capacity. The situation in public health is somewhat 

more encouraging. The WHO is clearly a more effective actor than it was before Gro 

Brundtland took over in 1998. Health has also received sustained attention from a new breed of 

foundations, in particular the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation with its emphasis on funding 

innovation, and public-private partnerships, such the Global Alliance on Vaccines and 

Immunization. 

Resources, finally, are not effectively aligned to threats. Researchers have found that “the 

majority of our scientific resources [are] focused on places from where the next important 

emerging pathogen is least likely to originate.” Public health systems are weakest in the places 

they are most needed, while investment in health research is extremely poorly matched to the 

global burden of disease. Regulatory structures are most onerous for reputable organizations in 

the public sector in rich countries, while actors on the margins—who pose the greatest threat—

are ungoverned. This is a pressing problem for biosecurity which is a “weakest link” public 

good—the whole is only as safe as the weakest individual effort. 

Response mechanisms for a large-scale outbreak of a deadly infectious disease are not in place 

beyond the highly developed West. If a major outbreak were to occur in a middle income or 

lower middle income state, government response capabilities probably would be overwhelmed 

before they could contain the spread of affected people to international transport hubs. If a 

fragile state that hosted a large refugee population, for example, was to be affected by a naturally 

occurring, accidental, or deliberate release of a deadly toxin, its ability to control population flow 

to its neighbors and beyond would be nearly nonexistent. There are no international contingency 

plans for such an occurrence, nor are even the basic information systems in place to link 

WHO/GOARN reporting to potential response mechanisms like the UN Security Council or 

NATO. An effort to propose basic reporting functions from the WHO to the UNSC was rejected 

by the Chinese in 2005. 

Similarly, although the authority exists for the UN Secretary-General to investigate suspected 

biological incidents, he has no standing capacity to do so. When called upon to investigate a 

biological event (as in Iraq), the UN has to organize the inspection capacity from scratch from 

labs and governments. Efforts to forge standing links between the Secretary-General’s office and 

labs have foundered, producing little in the way of rapid response capacity. 
69 

Between now and 2025, experts expect:

• Levels of Risk to Increase. Existing biological agents such as anthrax and botulinum toxin 

already pose an extremely serious threat (Iraq was believed to have 8,000 liters of the former 

in the 1990s and 18,000 liters of the latter). The development of new agents will increase the 

threat, with the ability to reengineer existing life forms to have offensive capacity already a 

growing threat.

• The Risk to Become More Distributed. Rapidly falling costs will bring biotechnology 

within reach of a hacker community, while a growing number of reputable laboratories will 

“leak” expertise and, potentially, materials.

• The Risk of a Counterproductive Reaction to a Biological Strike is High. A biological 

attack has a psychological impact that outstrips its lethality, placing democratic governments 

under severe pressure to respond forcefully. The use of bioweapons is also easy to conceal, 

potentially making rapid attribution of responsibility impossible, while repeat attacks are 

likely as a bio-capable attacker probably would possess a substantial stockpile. It is easy to 

imagine a state responding in a way that fails to meet long-term strategic goals, while a 

counterstrike against the wrong target is a real (and disastrous) possibility.
Globaat a Critic