IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-20196

Summary Calendar

VERANDA ASSOCIATES, L.P.,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

MICHAEL HOOPER,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No: 4:11-CV-4206

Before KING, CLEMENT, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Michael Hooper appeals the district court’s award of costs and

fees, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), to appellee Veranda Associates, L.P.

(“Veranda”) and also the district court’s denial of his motion to strike some of

Veranda’s pleadings. We AFFIRM.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 13, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 11-50481

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Veranda filed this suit against Hooper in Texas state court for breach of

contract after Hooper allegedly abandoned a multi-year commercial lease. 

Hooper removed the case to federal court on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1332

diversity jurisdiction, claiming that as a New York domiciliary he was diverse

from Veranda, a Texas domiciliary, and that the amount in controversy exceeded

the jurisdictional minimum of $75,000. Veranda filed a motion to remand and

for sanctions, alleging that Hooper was actually domiciled in Texas and that

diversity jurisdiction was therefore improper. Hooper then moved to strike

Veranda’s pleadings on the grounds that they included immaterial information

and that they were deficient with respect to a number of local rules governing

typography, formatting, and electronic filing. The district court granted

Veranda’s motion to remand, denied sanctions on the ground that Veranda had

not complied with the service requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,

awarded Veranda costs and fees, and ordered Veranda to supplement the record

so as to allow the amount awarded to be fixed. It also denied Hooper’s motion

to strike. After Veranda supplemented the record, the district court set the

amount of costs and fees at $14,859.27. Hooper timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

Hooper contends that the district court abused its discretion in awarding

attorney fees and costs to Veranda because he had an objectively reasonable

basis for removal. In the alternative, he argues that the district court abused its

discretion in setting the amount of its award. Finally, he asserts that the

district court abused its discretion in failing to grant his motion to strike.

“We review a district court’s section 1447(c) order for attorney fees under

an abuse of discretion standard.” Hornbuckle v. State Farm Lloyds, 385 F.3d

538, 541 (5th Cir. 2004). A district court “may award attorney’s fees when the

removing party lacks an objectively reasonable basis for removal,” and

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“attorney’s fees should be denied if an objectively reasonable basis exists.” 

Howard v. St. Germain, 599 F.3d 455, 457 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a party’s “citizenship has the

same meaning as domicile. It imports permanent residence in a particular state

with the intention of remaining.” Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir.

1954). 

In determining a litigant’s domicile, the court must address a

variety of factors. No single factor is determinative. The court

should look to all evidence shedding light on the litigant’s intention

to establish domicile. The factors may include the places where the

litigant exercises civil and political rights, pays taxes, owns real and

personal property, has driver’s and other licenses, maintains bank

accounts, belongs to clubs and churches, has places of business or

employment, and maintains a home for his family.

Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 251 (5th Cir. 1996).

Hooper contends that he had an objectively reasonable basis for removing

because he was domiciled in New York at the time of the suit. In support of his

purported New York domicile, Hooper advances the facts that, despite residing

in Texas with his family, he was registered to vote in New York, he owned

property in New York, he maintained driver’s and law licenses in New York, and

he maintained an office in New York. 

However, the district court considered these facts and nevertheless

concluded that Hooper was domiciled in Texas at the time of the suit and that

he therefore had no objectively reasonable basis for removal. In doing so, it

noted the uncontroverted facts that Hooper had purchased a home in Texas for

his family in 2007 and that, in a lawsuit against the sellers of that home,

Hooper’s wife stated that she and Hooper had intended to live and raise their

children there. The district court also described Hooper’s long history of

maintaining residences in Texas, carrying on business dealings in Texas, and

being party to lawsuits in Texas.

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Considering the record before the district court, and viewing Hooper’s

various factual arguments in light of our longstanding rule, as stated in Prot,

that “[n]o single factor is determinative,” id. at 251, we see no abuse of discretion

in the district court’s determination that Hooper had no objectively reasonable

basis for removal, and we therefore affirm the award of attorney fees and costs

to Hooper.

Hooper also argues that, even if an award of fees and costs was

appropriate, the district court abused its discretion in the amount of its award

because Veranda claimed fees that were either unnecessary or irrelevant to its

motion for remand. In particular, Hooper takes issue with claimed fees and

costs for legal research and administrative tasks occurring before the notice of

removal had been filed with the district court, claimed fees and costs related to

a motion for sanctions that the district court denied, and claimed fees and costs

related to Veranda’s investigation into Hooper’s life as far back as the 1990’s.

None of these arguments are availing. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides that

“[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual

expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 

Veranda’s fees and costs related to the removal that were incurred prior to

removal being docketed still were “incurred as a result of the removal,” as were

Veranda’s fees and costs related to the sanctions motion—had Hooper not

removed the case, none of these fees and costs would have been incurred. 

Furthermore, in light of the fact-intensive nature of the remand issue, and

particularly in light of what the district court termed Hooper’s “efforts to conceal

and mislead” with respect to jurisdictional facts, the background investigation

conducted by Veranda’s counsel was highly relevant to its remand motion. In

short, we see no abuse of discretion in the amount of the district court’s fees and

costs award.

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Finally, Hooper contends that the district court abused its discretion in

denying his motion to strike Veranda’s pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(f). In particular, Hooper argues that the district court

misapplied the law in holding that the objected-to documents and allegations

were related to the issue of the propriety of a remand. He asserts that, since

motions to remand are considered purely on the basis of jurisdictional facts

present at the time of removal, the extensive information about his life and

dealings provided by Veranda in its pleadings were unrelated and should have

been stricken. Furthermore, he alleges that the district court abused its

discretion in not striking documents containing his un-redacted address and

pictures of his minor children.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to strike for abuse of

discretion only. United States v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379 (5th Cir. 2012). “The

motion to strike should be granted only when the pleading to be stricken has no

possible relation to the controversy.” Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 306

F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962) (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.

United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953)); see Coney, 689 F.3d at 379. We

agree with the district court that the pleadings that were the subject of Hooper’s

various motions to strike were in fact “directly relevant [as] to the central issue

of the removal.” Although Hooper is correct that only his domicile at the time

of removal is relevant to the remand issue, where he has lived, for how long, and

in what capacity—all of which are spoken to by the pleadings in question—are

undeniably relevant in assessing his proper domicile at the time of removal.

Furthermore, we see no reason why inclusion of Hooper’s unredacted

address and a picture of one of his minor children in Veranda’s pleadings or the

purported failure of the pleadings to accord with certain formatting standards 

would necessitate the drastic remedial measure of striking those pleadings. We

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No. 11-50481

therefore decline to find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of

Hooper’s motion to strike.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court.

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