Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/csce

RUSSIAS ELECTION:

WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

JULY 10, 1996

[CSCE 104-2-X]

 
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RUSSIAS ELECTION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

WEDNESDAY, JULY 10, 1995

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC

The Commission convened, pursuant to adjournment, at 1:04 p.m.,

in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Honorable Christopher H. Smith, Chairman of the Commission, presiding.

Commissioners present: the Honorable Christopher H. Smith, the

Honorable Steny B. Hoyer, the Honorable Frank R. Wolf, the Honorable Matt Salmon, and the Honorable Benjamin Cardin.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

Mr. SMITH. The Commission will come to order. First of all, let me

welcome you to this hearing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the subject of the recent Presidential election

in Russia. The just-completed Presidential elections set the course of

Russias future in terms of economic and political development, rule

of law, and foreign policy, and will inevitably affect Russias relations

with the international community and the United States.

As an aside, on March 6th of this year, the Commission was honored to have Sergei Kovalev of the Russian Duma to testify in our

hearing on Chechnya. I hate to reportand I heard this yesterday at

a hearing we had on international broadcastingthat he has had a

heart attack, he is in very serious condition, and I would just hope

that you would all join me in praying for his very swift recovery.

Hes a very brave man, he spoke out boldly on behalf of human

rights, and as the former head of the Presidential Commission on

Human Rights in Russia, did so in a way that could be seen very

negatively back home, and yet he did it. He came here, he spoke to us,

and did not mince his words about what a violation of human rights

the aggression in Chechnya was. So I hope you will join me in that.

After two rounds of voting, as you know, Boris Yeltsin was reelected

President of Russia. In the first round, he surpassed his closest challenger, the Communist Party chairman Zyuganov by only 3 percentage points. However, in the second round, Yeltsin trounced Zyuganov

by an impressive 13 percentage points. Voter turn-out in each round

was about 67 percent. The high turn-out testifies to the electorates

continuing involvement in the political process despite many disappointments and economic hardships, and ominous predictions of a

low turn-out.
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Results also show that, despite their hardships and criticism of

President Yeltsin, a considerable majority of Russians were not willing to see the return of the Communist Party reincarnated. Between

the first and second round of the elections, Yeltsin appointed third

party place finisher and former Russian army general, Aleksandr

Lebed, as his National Security Advisor and Secretary of the Security

Council.

General Lebed initiated a Kremlin cleaning that saw the departure

of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and other hard line associates of

President Yeltsin. Lebed also made some extremely offensive statements regarding religious groups in Russia and Western influence on

Russian culture that caused concern about Russias political future,

direction, and tolerance toward minorities. The Commission has publicly expressed its abhorrence of such statements.

President Yeltsin appeared healthy and vigorous during the campaign, but his disappearance from public view after the first round

raised doubts about his resilience for a second term. Mr. Yeltsins

health will be of great concern to his colleagues in the Kremlin, his

political opposition, and the entire international community.

Meanwhile, Vladimir Zhirinovskys political health suffered considerably. For the second time in a row, his liberal Democratic Party

saw its vote count cut almost in half, going from approximately 23

percent in 1993 in the parliamentary elections of that year, to 11 percent in 1995, and to somewhat less than 6 percent in the 1996 contest.

Although there have been widespread fears and charges that there

would be significant fraud and ballot-rigging in the elections, candidates and observers agree that the elections themselves were fair

and, with few exceptions, free and fair. The same could not be said of

the media coverage, however, during the campaign period as the major

Moscow press and the electronic outlets unabashedly supported President Yeltsin, and not just on their editorial pages, out of fear of a

return to Communists to power.

Finally, let me mention an issue close to this member and many

other members of the Commission and that is the ongoing problems

of Chechnya. The Commission has held four hearings on this bloody

conflict. Prior to the elections, the Yeltsin administration announced

a plan to end the war. Negotiations with the Chechen forces organized by the OSCE mission in Grozny actually looked promising. Mr.

Lebed, for his part, has announced his own peace plan, which includes

a referendum on independence for part of the Chechen territory.

Unfortunately, in the last couple of days, indications are that the

peace process has fallen apart once again. In any event, we now know

who will be the head of the state for Russia for the immediate future,

but time will tell who will actually rule Russia. Will it be the re-energized President Yeltsin? Will Mr. Lebed make the weather, as the

Russians say, or will he burn out in a struggle of wills within the

walls of the Kremlin?

Or is it, as some would contend, that the mafia rules Russia anyway? Maybe the true rulers of Russia are the 10,000 bureaucrats as

Tsar Nicholas the First once lamented. These are just some of the

questions that our guests today are uniquely qualified to answer, along

with other questions, which will surely arise as a result of the Russian Presidential election.
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For our first panel today, its a great pleasure to welcome again

Ambassador James Collins, Ambassador-at-large for the Newly Independent States and Russia. Ambassador Collins previously served

as Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Moscow from

1990 to 1993. In addition to various management positions at the

State Department, Ambassador Collins has served as Director for

Intelligence Policy at the National Security Council. Before joining

the Department of State, he taught Russian and European history at

the United States Naval Academy.

On our second panel, we are pleased to have Dr. Michael McFaul,

assistant professor of political science at Stanford University and senior colleague at the Carnegie Endowment. Dr. McFaul is just returning from his Carnegie office in Moscow and I think I can say he is

the most widely quoted Western specialist on the recent Presidential

elections, and perhaps last Decembers parliamentary elections as well.

The professors articles have appeared in numerous scholarly journals and other major U.S. newspapers and journals. He is the author

of several books including, with Sergei Markov, The Troubled Birth

of Russian Democracy: Political Parties, Programs and Profiles.

Our next panelist is a gentleman recognized not only for his professional expertise in Soviet and Russian studies, but for his significant

contribution in the area of human rights, especially in exposing the

abuse of psychiatry during the Soviet era. Peter Reddaway is a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.

The professor has also been the Director of the Kennan Institute

for Advanced Russian Studies, a senior fellow at Columbia University, and a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for

Scholars. Hes the author of many works, including Authority, Power

and Policy in the USSR; Uncensored Russia; Lenin: The Man, the

Theorist, The Leader; and Russias Political Hospitals.

Our third panelist is a scholar with a wide background in issues on

Russia and the Soviet Union. Blair Ruble is Director of the Kennan

Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. He previously worked at the

Social Science Research Council in New York City and the National

Council for Soviet and East European Research in Washington.

His most recent book publications include Money Sings! The Politics of Urban Space in Post-Soviet Yaroslavl and Leningrad, Shaping

a Soviet City. Dr. Ruble has been published in the opinion pages of

many U.S. newspapers and is a frequent commentator on national

news media programs.

Gentlemen, I do thank you for taking the time to prepare your testimonies and for being willing to offer your considerable expertise

and advice to the Commission and, by extension, to the Congress.

Ambassador Collins, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES COLLINS

Amb. COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First I join

you in hoping that Sergei Kovalev will fully recover. Ive known and

worked with him since 1990. He is one of the great men of his time in

Russia and has contributed immensely to the process of bringing about

a more open society.

I have a statement that Ive given which I would ask to have entered in full in the record, and I have a brief opening statement.
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Mr. SMITH. Without objection, your full statement will be made a

part of the record.

Amb. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to

appear before you and the Commission members today to address

your interest in the Russian Presidential election. The two rounds of

the Russian Presidential election conducted June 16 and July 3 were

an enormous success for the Russian people. They represent a milestone in Russias pursuit of democracy and for the course of U.S. engagement with post-communist Russia.

In terms of process, the election has been generally judged as free

and fair. It was a vigorously fought campaign. In terms of political

message and mandate, the Russian people faced a clear choice between two different records, two different systems, and two different

hopes for the future.

By a margin of more than 13 percent, they rendered a decisive judgment, to reject the communist option with its appeal to the values

and models of the past and to stay with leadership which seeks to

base Russias future on the principles of a market economy and a

society based on a constitution and consent of the governed.

Its the administrations view, as Secretary Christopher stated in

1993 and again earlier this year, that Russias struggle to transform

itself will be long and hard and that success is by no means assured.

The Russian Presidential election, I would argue, both reaffirmed

rejection of the past and kept open important opportunities for the

success of Russias positive transformation.

It also reaffirmed the Russian peoples belief in the politics and

economics of choice, and their view that the path to success leads

forward rather than backward. Many pundits, experts, and observers doubted the elections would succeed or even be held. Predictions

held, for example, that widespread and substantial fraud was inevitable despite the presence of election monitors in polling places and

comprehensive means of checking the vote counts.

Yet, that was not the outcome. Mr. Chairman, I ask to be included

in the record the report of the observer mission of the OSCE which

concluded that, and I quote, In general, the election was well-managed and efficiently run, and that, this election is a further consolidation of the democratic process in the Russian Federation.

Mr. SMITH. Your full statement and that report will be included.

Amb. COLLINS. Thank you very much. An historic event for Russia, the Russian electorates decision has vital consequences for all of

us as well. In revalidating the mandate for President Yeltsin to lead

Russia and to persevere in Russias transformation, the Russian people

have also validated the progress our nations have made in building

the new relationship based on cooperation, not confrontation.

The election result reflected the work of 5 years of bipartisan foreign policy. Americans cannot and should not claim credit for the outcome of Russias election, but the United States, in large part thanks

to the work of Congress, can claim credit for maintaining policies of

support for democracy and economic reform in Russia.

Together with our comprehensive engagement with Russia, these

policies provided incentives for the peoples of Russia to build new

lives, new economic mechanisms which are closely connected with

the outside world and not isolated from it. Steady as she goes should

be our watchword now. We can afford to remain patient, assuring the
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Russians that our doors remain open to cooperation on the full range

of security, economic, and political issues, while at the same time

neither ignoring nor condoning Russian policies and actions which

are destructive.

Over the past 5 years, the United States has supported democratic

change and free markets, and we have encouraged Russias increasingly close and beneficial association with the community of democratic nations. This policy of engagement has had direct benefits to

the United States and has already helped make every American more

secure.

The START I Treaty will enable us to cut our nuclear arsenals by

9,000 warheads; and the START II Treaty, which was ratified by the

Senate in January, and which President Yeltsin has pledged to get

ratified in the Duma later this year, will cut another 5,000. Weve

also worked with Russia and three of its neighborsUkraine, Belarus and Kazakastanto make sure that the break-up of the Soviet

Union did not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons states.

Russia has withdrawn its soldiers from Germany, the former Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. We will

continue to support Russias reform and integration into the world

economy. We believe that the mandate President Yeltsin has won can

and should be used to re-energize reform.

Were therefore encouraged by the statement President Yeltsin

made today, pledging that Russia will remain on the course of reform. In the months ahead, we will continue to pursue a wide-ranging security and foreign policy agenda with the Russian Federation.

We would like to see the Duma move forward with ratification of

START-II. We would like to sign a comprehensive test ban treaty in

September. We would like to continue our cooperation addressing

regional conflicts in the Middle East and Bosnia.

Of course, differences remain, for instance, on Chechnya, on NATO

enlargement, and Moscows proposed nuclear reactor sale to Iran. We

will continue to address these issues frankly. It is high time that Russia ended its brutal operation in Chechnya and found a peaceful solution to the problems there. As Secretary Christopher has said, however, we will cooperate with the Russians where we can and we will

manage our differences where necessary.

We have acted promptly on our agenda following the economics.

President Clinton spoke with President Yeltsin on July 5th, and Vice

President Gore will travel to Moscow July 13th for the seventh meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. In Moscow, the vice President will have the opportunity to review key elements of our agenda

with the highest levels of the Russian Government.

We have been quick off the mark after the elections, but consistent

with a deliberately conceived policy in place since the first days of the

administration. It is a policy that has helped to turn a former adversary into a country with which we cooperate on many issues. It is a

policy that has contributed to our own and to global security, and it is

a policy, Mr. Chairman, behind which I think all Americans can continue to unite. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Ambassador Collins. I recognize

Commissioner Cardin, if he has any opening statement.

Mr. CARDIN. No, thank you.
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Mr. SMITH. Ambassador, let me ask you a couple of questions.

Meeting for lunch below us, just a few feet away, is Prime Minister

Netanyahu. We heard him give a very rousing address to a joint session of Congress, and I asked him a question 15, 20 minutes ago about

General Lebed and what this might portend for a rise or a continued

rise of anti-Semitism in Russia; and his answer basically was that

they want to keep the doors open. Theyre hoping that the free flow of

emigres will continue out of Russia, and, you know, didnt go much

further beyond that; and I think he has a number of thoughts that

perhaps in private he might express.

But, you know, we all heard some very discouraging comments coming out of the generals mouth, calling Mormons scum and saying

some very derogatory things about Jews; and hes also calling for a

restoration of the vice presidency, presumably he wants a name plate

with his own name on there. But he certainly has a tremendous

amount of power in his new position, as we all know.

What has the administration done to protest those kinds of statements? The human rights record in Yeltsins first term was questionable. We saw a diminution of various rights. Some churches became

more or less second-class churches, and religious freedom was notoriously attacked in many of these countries. In Russia, we would like to

see true openness in religious freedom and tolerance respected.

General Lebed, in my viewespecially given the questionable character or status of President Yeltsins healthcould very quickly

emerge even more powerful than he already is. Given those statements, what is the administration doing to convey our concerns about

this?

Amb. COLLINS. Well, first of all, we spoke out very quickly. We

called them objectionable, obnoxious, disturbing; made it very clear

publicly that this is the kind of statement and, more importantly I

suspect, the kind of thinking that is very distressing and can be very

disruptive of our relations if it carried into some kind of action.

In addition to that, I can tell you that the statements were raised at

the highest levels in Lyon at the summit, and we have made very

clear to other officials our great concern about what they might portend. At the same time, we have been in touch with our colleagues in

other countries and we have tried to maintain our own sense of perspective on the position that Mr. Lebed actually holds.

Under the Russian constitution, Mr. Lebed is not the successor to

President Yeltsin should anything untoward happen. Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin holds that position; and, under the constitution, were

anything to incapacitate President Yeltsin, he would succeed and there

would then have to be elections within a period of 90 days.

Secondly, I would note that President Yeltsin has actually asked

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to form the new government. He did

that very quickly; and, therefore, in some sense, Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin is being given very substantial authority to shape the

nature and the course of the Yeltsin administration.

Thirdly, I would simply say that at this time, it seems a bit premature to go as far as many, I think, in the media have been inclined to

do in rendering a judgment about just what Mr. Lebeds responsibilities are going to be. Yes, we know what his title is, but the actual

position has varied over the course of its existence in the last 4 years.
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We know that Mr. Lebed himself focused very heavily in his campaign on military reform and on law and order in dealing with crime

and corruption. I think, simply to sum up, we are all watching this

very closely. We believe that any signals that would lead to the idea

there will be a resurgence of religious intolerance is something to be

taken very seriously and to be brought up to the attention of the officials very quickly and very forcefully, and that has been done in this

case.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. You may know, earlier in this session, I offered legislation that passed the House and eventually passed

both bodies as part of a larger bill and that was to extend the Lautenberg Categories. Since that was vetoed, I have another bill for which

I am trying to gather support among Democratic and Republican colleagues. The bill takes non-controversialas non-controversial as they

comeitems which were included in previous bills that had been vetoed and tries to repackage them.

One of the most important elements of that Human Rights Restoration Act, as were calling it, would be an extension of the Lautenberg Categories as a safety valve, if you will, for people who have

traditionally been victimized, and may indeed still be, allowing them

to escape. Does the administration support extending the Lautenberg Categories?

Amb. COLLINS. I think Id have to review the question. We, of

course, are doing what we can to try to build the structures and the

assurances within Russian society that this kind of persecution is not

going to take place. I think for the most part, the record has been a

constructive one over the last 4 or 5 years of a growing environment

of religious tolerance, and we believe that is the most important policy

we can pursue.

I would look very carefully and would be happy to come back to you

with an opinion on the pending legislation.

Mr. SMITH. It seems to me that, at worst, it would be benign legislation if theres no problem since we are still in a very questionable

period. You know, it could bridge the gap between what we think

may be going on and some of the concerns of resurgence. The subcommittee had a full day of hearings on the rising tide of anti-Semitism

and it is very troubling. So I would hope that you would take a good

look

Amb. COLLINS. We certainly will.

Mr. Smith [continuing]. Then you could get back to us.

Amb. COLLINS. Absolutely.

Mr. SMITH. As you know, on the question of Chechnya, weve had

differences of opinion and weve had arguments about that issue.

Yelena Bonner and many others have testified before the Commission about that terrible situation. Well, Boris Yeltsin gave some indications right before the election that they would really try to pursue

peace aggressively there.

Now that the election is over and especially in light of some of the

recent events during the last couple of days, do you believe that there

is a sincere effort? Was it a political ploy? Is the jury still out?

Amb. COLLINS. I have to say the news from the last couple of days

is disturbing and discouraging. There has been a breakdown, not widespread but still disturbing, of the cease-fire. We are seeing some revival of artillery shelling against one or two villages and some aerial

bombardment. This is a very distressing and disturbing development.
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At the same time, we have seen pledges that the political process is

something that will go forward and that theres a determination to

negotiate a settlement, and I guess my answer to you has to be that

the returns are out. What I can tell you is that we are making clear at

every possible occasion, at the political and most senior levels, our

view of the importance and indeed the vital importance of getting

this conflict stopped and getting a political settlement in place.

Again, I can tell you that it was raised in Lyon, and if it is necessary and appropriate, it will be raised when the Vice President goes.

I think at the same time, a great deal of credit is due to the OSCE and

to its people who have been working very hard to try to continue to

encourage the process of a negotiated settlement in Grozny. Theyre

still doing that. Im quite proud of the fact that we have had an American Foreign Service officer as part of that mission, really for some

time. We happen to have a hiatus at the moment, but another will be

joining them shortly.

We are doing also what we can through that mechanism to push

the process of negotiation and conciliation, but it is very frustrating

and I would not try to say to you anything other than that I am quite

discouraged to see, you know, a revival of fighting at this point.

Mr. SMITH. In a recent New York Times article, Vice President

Gore indicated that trade and investment would be the centerpiece of

our relations with Russia. Could you tell me what specifically the

administration is planning on doing with regards to human rights?

Ive been working, along with many of my colleagues, on the human rights issue, and I chair the International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee, and the biggest disappointment has been

this de-linking, de-coupling of human rights with trade, most notably

with regards to the Peoples Republic of China, but with other areas,

too, including Vietnam. Without question, in my view at least, Russia

is not out of the woods. I think it would be premature to make human

rights a sub-issue or a back-burner issue. Perhaps now more than

ever in the recent couple of years, I think it really needs to be put

forward. What is the administration going to do on that?

Amb. COLLINS. Well, I dont think that the Vice President, in any

way, meant to suggest that if youre going to do trade and investment, youre not going to do human rights. That certainly isnt the

case. Human rights, the reform of Russias society and its transformation to a pluralistic democracy that respects human rights have

been, in a sense, at the very foundation of the kind of relationship

that has been evolving and developing.

It is also quite true that Russians themselves and certainly we do

not find Russia has made that transformation and is now fully, somehow, in a position to say that its institutions are in place to assure

that democracy and human rights are somehow permanent. Indeed,

it seems to me, we have agreed with the Congress for the last 4 years

that the support of programs that can lead to respect for human rights,

democratization, rule of law, has to be a priority effort of our joint

work.

The Congress has been quite generous in funding Freedom Support Act programs that have done everything from work as they did

before this election to ensure that Russians are trained in how to

conduct an election and how parties organize and work, poll watch-
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ing and so forth, on up through the efforts to institutionalize trial by

jury and many of the aspects of human rights and civil liberties that

are, we think, essential to the future.

That process is going to continue and that priority is going to continue. At the same time, I think it is also fair that one of the most

important things that has taken place to develop, if you will, an open

and more pluralistic society has been the economic transformation of

Russia.

The de-monopolization of economic powerand, if you will, the deevolution of economic decisionmaking and the ability to use resources

through privatizationis also a democratizing factor; and I think we

are at a stage where, in some sense, perhaps one of the great threats

to democracy would be a failure to assist and work with the Russians

to begin to turn their economy around and create growth.

In that spirit, as well as the fact that its in our interest to develop

trade and investment with Russia, that the Vice President was also

speaking about the importance of that as a priority matter for the

coming phase. President Yeltsins government is also putting emphasis on growth, trade and investment, and the reform of the sector of

social issues, as theyve been called, in this coming phase.

Mr. SMITH. I have a number of questions, and Ill submit some for

the record. Let me ask one final question before yielding to Mr. Cardin. What progress is being made on the Russian troops leaving

Moldova by October 1997 as stipulated in the treaty?

Amb. COLLINS. The agreement that Russia signed with Moldova

calls for the withdrawal of troops in 3 years. The problem is there is a

disagreement between Moldova and Russia over when those 3 years

start. The Russian Duma has taken the position that it starts when

the agreement is ratified, and it has not yet been ratified.

The position of our Government is that the Moldovans have the

right to request the withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment and

that this is something that should be done. They have removed some

equipment, not a substantial amount. They have destroyed some,

basically because it was dangerous, but we have not yet seen the kind

of progress on that issue that we want to see; and it is a subject on our

agenda, and its something with which I had intense discussions over

the last year with President Snegur and other members of his government.

They make no bones about two things. They want the Russian army

out and they are not prepared to accept bases under the present conditions, and they are working with the Russian Government to achieve

both of these objectives and we support them in doing so.

Mr. SMITH. On a very technical point, do we agree with the Russians that the clock starts ticking upon ratification by the Duma?

Amb. COLLINS. Well, Im not sure were in a position to agree or

disagree. As far as Im concerned, the Government of Moldova has

the full right, because it is a sovereign state, to request the withdrawal of the Russian troops and its up to them, I think, to agree

with the Russians on how to accomplish that. I guess its a matter of

Russian law. I dont want to pronounce myself on how they interpret

their law. Moldovans believe that this should be taking place, and I

think they have the right to that.

Mr. SMITH. Do we consider that treaty obligation binding on the

Russians?
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Amb. COLLINS. I think Im going to have to ask a lawyer forI

mean, in terms of a legal opinion. Id have to ask my legal people. Ill

do that.

Mr. SMITH. Youll do that and provide

Amb. COLLINS. But I want to make clear that the Government of

Moldova has every right to request and to have achieved the withdrawal of those troops.

Mr. SMITH. I know as a policy, but when theres a specific legal

obligation

Amb. COLLINS. Ill find out.

Mr. Smith [continuing]. I think Secretary Talbott put it very well

that after the elections, we fully expect Russians to live up to all of

their international treaties and obligations.

Amb. COLLINS. I will find out.

Mr. SMITH. This is one agreement that they should be living up to.

Amb. COLLINS. I will find out what our legal people would consider it.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Cardin?

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First let me thank you for

holding these hearings. I think theyre extremely important and, obviously, very timely.

Mr. Ambassador, let me thank you for your presentation and also

your service to our country. A group of us just came back from the

OSCE meetings in Stockholm, and we had a chance to meet with our

fellow parliamentarians from Russia to talk a little bit about the elections and some of the other issues that have been raised today.

We also had the displeasure of listening to Mr. Zhirinovsky several

times give his remarks and obviously, most of the times, we simply

dismissed his comments. However, General Lebeds comments had

many of us concerned that perhaps there are more widespread extremist views in Russia than we would like to see. Perhaps some of

these extremists are becoming part of the Government of Russia.

I appreciate your comments and the comments of our Government

in condemning the anti-Semitic comments of General Lebed. Im curious as to whether weve had any response from Mr. Yeltsin or the

Government of Russia in regards to those comments.

Amb. COLLINS. Not in an official sense. When we have raised this

subject, we have had an affirmation of the position that religious freedoms and religious toleration are basic to the Russian constitution

and the Russian Government under President Yeltsin.

Mr. CARDIN. Of course, your response is very diplomatic before this

Commission. Let me just say in a very undiplomatic way that it seems

to me that if a representative of the Russian Government makes those

types of statements, its incumbent upon Mr. Yeltsin and others to

condemn those remarks. That is leadership. I certainly expect to see

that type of response by the Russian Government and would ask you

to relay that message.

During this past election, there was a much closer relationship between Russia and Iran, Iraq, and Cuba and other countries that are a

great concern to the United States foreign policy. Will you give us an

assessment as to whether these relationships were primarily a result
11

of the politics in Russia for the election or if it is an indication of

closer ties between Russia, Iraq, and Iran and perhaps Cuba in the

second term of the Yeltsin administration.

Amb. COLLINS. I think, first of all, its probably fair to say that the

relationship that Russia has had with those countries has never been

really interrupted. They have maintained diplomatic relations and so

forth with these countries really all the way through. I think its also

the case that they have observed the U.N. sanctions regimes when

its come to their dealings with the countries where thats a factor.

At the same time, I think we dont see eye to eye with the relationships with those countries. We certainly have a strong difference of

opinion with the Government of Russia over their nuclear cooperation with Iran, for instance, and that has been a subject of high level

and continuous discussion. I think its very difficult to say what the

policy will develop to be. I would certainly see no indication that the

Russians intend to abandon their observation of the sanctions regimes,

for instance. I think they understand thats a legal obligation.

But I think it is certainly the case that they believe that the conduct of trade and normal relations on an economic and commercial

basis is something which they have the right to do, and they probably

are going to pursue that. We have been paying very close attention to

the trade with Cuba to see whether that, in fact, is on a commercial

basis, and we continue to monitor that, partly because of new legislation.

I do not, at this point, see any indication of some great major change

in these relations, but I dont see a move to curtail them either. I

think we will see Russia pursuing its interests and relations with

these countries, particularly commercial interests, as it is appropriate from their point of view and consistent with the U.N. regimes.

I dont think we have seen, however, the kind of relations of the

former Soviet period when those relations were essentially politically

driven and where the economic aspect had virtually no commercial

content to it. Today, if you dont get paid, you dont get goods out of

Russia; and that is a limiting factor in the degree to which theyre

going to develop their relations with all of these states.

Mr. CARDIN. Let me just conclude by underscoring the point that

our chairman, Mr. Smith, made regarding his disappointment with

the de-linkage of trade and human rights as it relates to our relationship with Russia. It is very important, considering the historical linkage that weve made, that it is clear to the Russian Federation that

we expect cooperation on the international human rights front.

Let me just give you one example. Judge Cassese, who is the chief

judge of the War Crimes Tribunal in Yugoslavia, sent a letter to the

United Nations requesting sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro

for their failure to cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal. I would

hope that our country would assume a leadership role in cooperating

with the Tribunal, imposing the necessary sanctions against those

countries that do not cooperate and turn over war criminals to the

Tribunal.

Russia may take a different view on the issue of cooperation with

the Tribunal. We might have a very strong position toward Russia on

this issue. Otherwise, it would be very easy for this matter to go unnoticed and, under those circumstances, war criminals would remain

at large.
12

So I would just urge you to make it clear that is U.S. policy with

regards to Russia that we expect Russias leadership, along with ours,

to request that all nations comply with the U.N. resolution establishing the work of the War Crimes Tribunal and cooperate and turn over

those persons that have been indicted for war crimes in the former

Yugoslavia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Cardin.

Mr. Wolf.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. WOLF

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Mr. Collins, two issues. One, I

wanted to follow up on what Mr. Cardin said. I think they have, before this election, privatized anti-Semitism in the former Soviet Union

and Russia and now, I think it may be going from the privatizing to

bringing it back into the Government. I think the administration will

have to speak out and be much bolder in talking about these issues,

similar to what President Reagan did back in the 80s.

You all make too much of your relationship with Boris Yeltsin and

your telephone calls back and forth; and everything you do tends to

be in private, but very little of it tends to be in public. You will demoralize the people in the former Soviet Union and you will make those

of us on this side who are suspect of you even more suspect. So if this

is the policy of the Clinton administration, it should speak out very

boldly to President Yeltsin publicly and to every Soviet official publicly whenever and wherever you can.

Every time your administration testifies, its always off the record

privately were saying this and saying that. I dont think youve done

enough publicly. Now, moving into the second point, your policy, not

knowingly, but your policy in Chechnya has resulted in the death of a

lot of people. Every time administration people go to Russia and when

the President meets with Yeltsin, if you talk to people in Chechnya

and down there, they come in and they clean the place out.

I was in Grozny; I was in Chechnya. We saw what they did down

there. They literally cleaned the place out. They shell it. The grad

missiles come in, MIGs come in. They bomb it, they bomb it, they

bomb it, and they bomb it until finally the Chechens go underground

and then theres a period of calm for 2 or 3 days. You can almost track

the death rate with the visits that we make.

The one time Secretary Christopher went there, he never publicly

raised the issue. Now, he privately may have whispered in somebodys

ear, but he never publicly raised the issue. I would bring to your attention the article that was by Ms. Geyer that was in The Washington

Times yesterday. Its time for this administration to publicly be involved, and the OSCE people are captive, basically, in their compounds. Theyre not moving around down there nearly as much as

you may think they are.

If the United States does not publicly get involved, offer to be a

mediator or do something publicly, then, frankly, I think a lot of the

death that takes place will be as a result, indirectly I stress. Im not

suggesting anybody in the administration directly is knowing that

this will take place, but indirectly the deaths of a lot of people will be

basically as a result of the administration not being active.
13

There will be nothing wrong with offering, and frankly, in OSCE,

nothing happens there really if the United States is not directly involved, offering to send somebody, whether it be a retired general or

somebody to come over there and offer as a mediator or to talk to

them. Now I worry, after the elections are over and weve seen whats

happened, they will resume fighting down there; and I heard NPR

the other day where theyre going to go in and its just devastating

what little is left and in the process, a lot of Russian soldiers are

frightened to death. At nighttime the Russian soldiers literally hunker

down because they are afraidand then those missiles and the things

start coming in and then innocent civilians will be killed.

So Id like to hear you tell us that rather than having these great

telephone conversations back and forth with Boris Yeltsin, that our

Government will forcibly, publicly speak out to be the beacon that

Netanyahu was talking about when he spoke to the Congress today.

Be the beacon with regard to human rights and democracy. It cant be

private back channels. It has to be public so that not only do the

American people know what youre saying, but the average person in

Moscow and the Ural Mountains, wherever they may be, know that

the United States is being a pressure point with regard to human

rights and human rights in Chechnya, human rights with regard to

anti-Semitism, and any other things that are taking place.

Do you have any comments? Why hasnt the administration spoken

out more on Chechnya? Do you consider Chechnya to be kind of a

civil war? I have an exchange of letters with the administration that

go back and forth and back and forth. I probably have 10 or 11 letters,

and it seems that nothing ever changes.

Mr. SMITH. Would the gentleman yield before Ambassador Collins

responds?

Mr. WOLF. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. I was very disappointed by President Clintons statement, a reiteration of what the State Department put out in the early

dark days of the Chechen conflict, when he again likened it to the

United States Civil War. I thought that very wrong-headed and misguided perception of that conflict had been discarded in the trash

heap, only to be resurrected by the President himself.

Again, and weve argued over this, Vice President Gore was standing there with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and said this is an internal matterand I know you differ with thisbut if that didnt

send a green light or at least a were not going to do much about this

type of lightand again, this isnt partisan. If this message was sent

by the Bush administration, I would have been equally concerned, as

I was on Bosnia in terms of their foul-ups there.

Im concerned, and I share the gentleman from Virginias perspective on this, that the killing continues and, you know, we hear little

or nothing about it and again, we get analogies to the United States

Civil War. Ambassador?

Mr. WOLF. If I may, before you speak, just to follow-up with what

the gentleman said? The Bush administration gave a green light to

what took place in some respectsnot knowingly, but indirectly

what took place in the former Yugoslavia. They sent green light after

green light after green light, which allowed the Serbs and others to

do what they did. What the gentleman said, exactly the same thing is

taking place here. I will now yield.
14

Amb. COLLINS. Id like to address the two issues separately. One is

anti-Semitism. I am not prepared to accept the premise that we have

not spoken forcefully about anti-Semitism or acted forcefully about

anti-Semitism. Now, we may disagree about how whats most effective

Mr. WOLF. Would you submit for the record then all the statements that the administration has made?

Amb. COLLINS. I will submit the ones that weve made at least

recently about Mr. Lebed, which is the most recent issue.

Mr. WOLF. No, I think within the last year and a half. We ought to

see the ones that youve done within the last year and a half.

Amb. COLLINS. Well, I will be happy to look through the record

and provide it. I will also provide for you the almost daily remarks

and statements of the spokesman from the department about Chechnya as well as for the record the things that Secretary Christopher

and others have said repeatedly and regularly on the record publicly.

Mr. WOLF. Very few, very few.

Amb. COLLINS. Im sorry. Its not very few, Mr. Wolf. I respectfully

disagree.

Mr. WOLF. But why has

Amb. COLLINS. They may not be

Mr. WOLF. If I may interrupt you, sir, why hasnt the President of

the United States and the Vice President of the United States spoken

out?

Amb. COLLINS. I will provide you the statements that I can provide you. Im saying only that there has been a regular and steady

and forceful record from the Secretary of State and others in this

administration publicly calling for an end to that war, a halt to the

bloodshed, and a settlement by political means. Now, I cant say more

than that and Ill be happy to provide the statements.

Mr. WOLF. The last question. Well, I dont agree with you. Ive read

every article that has appeared on Chechnya and every statement

and youve done very few.

Secondly, what would be wrong with the United States using its

good offices, particularly after the victory of Mr. Yeltsin who we all

wanted to see win, its victory really not only for us clearly, but more

for the Russian people? What would be wrong with now offering an

intermediary, a retired general or somebody like that to come over

and begin to kind of work to see if we could bring the parties together

to resolve the issue whereby the fighting and the killing would stop?

What would be wrong with offering that?

Amb. COLLINS. I will take it under consideration. Weve discussed

this before. We would hope we can get to work the mediation of Mr.

Guldimann and his team, which has produced, over the last several

weeks, a much diminished situation of fighting; and we are trying to

support that effort.

Mr. WOLF. I appreciate that. I think the reason its been somewhat

successful was the elections, the fact that the elections were being

held. Now that the elections are over, I think, and I may be wrong

and I hope that I am, that the fighting will escalate. There are some

in the Russian Government who elected just to devastate that place.

I would ask you again, and not to personally criticize you. I apologize

publicly if it comes across that way, but what would be wrong?
15

They may not accept it. The Russians may not accept it, I understand that, but what would be wrong with publicly offering a representative of the United States, somebody like you or retired General

Vessey or somebody like that, to offer to go over and work to be the

intermediary?

Amb. COLLINS. Well, I dont know that it would be wrong. Let me

look at it.

Mr. WOLF. Could you just come back and let me know?

Amb. COLLINS. I will do so.

Mr. WOLF. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Hoyer.

Thank you, Mr. Wolf.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STENY B. HOYER

Mr. HOYER. Thank you very much. I apologize for being late. I was

on the floor, there was an amendment to the legislative appropriations bill in which I was interested on the floor. First of all, Mr. Chairman, Ive got a statement, if I can include that in the record?

Mr. SMITH. Without objection.

Mr. HOYER. In the time that I was here, I have read your statement, Mr. Ambassador. First, I want to thank you for all you have

done. You are one of the United States real experts on the former

Soviet Union, on Russia itself, and your testimony is welcome. I want

to congratulate the chairman for having this hearing.

Clearly all of us were pleased by the outcome of the election, not

just to the extent that Mr. Yeltsin won, but I think most of us perceived this more expansively as a statement by the Russian people

that they did not want a return to the past. As difficult as the present

has been and as they perceive the future to be, they wanted to press

forward with reforms; and you make that point in your statement. I

agree with that wholeheartedly.

Mr. Cardin and II dont know whether you mentioned thishave

just returned from Stockholm, representing the Commission at the

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly meeting. Mr. Zhirinovsky was there

and made a couple of speeches. He received less than 6 percent support at the Parliamentary Assembly. I think it is a good sign that his

support is subsiding drastically.

I want to ask you about the relationship between Chernomyrdin

and Lebed. I understand that Chairman Smith, and perhaps Mr. Cardin in his remarks, mentioned the great concern we have about statements made by Mr. Lebed which were anti-Semitic, anti-religious and

highly offensive within the Helsinki framework. I have not seen the

statement by the administration on this issue, but you just referenced

it, and I am pleased to hear that we made a strong statement.

What do you perceive to be the relationship between Lebed, who

obviously is very ambitious, and Chernomyrdin, and what will that

pose for the Yeltsin administration in the upcoming term?

Amb. COLLINS. Well, President Yeltsin has asked Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin to form the next government and hes in the process of

doing so. He will be, unless the Duma were for some reason not to

accept his nomination, and he will continue to head the government;

and therefore, he has a specific set of constitutional responsibilities

as well as a very important political position, certainly the most important political position next to President Yeltsin with respect to the

economy and many other aspects of the reform agenda.
16

As I noted earlier in response to another question, the Prime Minister would be the constitutional successor to President Yeltsin were

anything to incapacitate the President.

The position of Mr. Lebed, who received some 15 percent of the

vote in the first round, is National Security Advisor, so-called, although its actually Secretary to the National Security Council and

National Security Advisor to the President. This is a position which,

not unlike our own, I suppose, in some ways, very much depends on

the President.

It is not a position which has an official constitutional mandate, at

least at present, and certainly is not in the chain of succession, does

not have the kind of responsibility for the performance of ministries

in the legal sense that the Prime Minister does. Therefore, what his

responsibilities will be and how they are carried out is very much

going to be a function of how President Yeltsin defines his job.

I think it is premature to say how thats going to take place. Its

certainly true that in his campaign. General Lebed, in focusing on

the need for a more effective fight against crime and corruption, struck

a responsive note among the electorate. I think he also struck a responsive note, in some sense, by appealing, in part, to the nationalist

sentiment, although I think its more the sense of wounded pride.

Those are issues which are before the government of President

Yeltsin and what role Mr. Lebed will play in addressing them I dont

know, but theyre the ones that he made his priorities. The other issue which has been associated with his name, in particular, is military reform; he has called very vigorously for military reform; and I

might say hes also called for ending the war in Chechnya, and hes

been quite outspoken on that, and I heard on the Russian news before I came down that hes planning to go to Chechnya this week.

I cant really be very precise. I think the role of Mr. Lebed is yet to

be defined. Its something that will depend in large part on how President Yeltsin wishes to see him perform those functions. Some of his

predecessors in that position have been influential and others have

been largely not very influential at all. Its just too early to tell.

Mr. HOYER. Let me ask you a question with respect to another

player in the electionthe Yavlinsky/Gaidar wing. I dont say its necessarily the same view, but certainly they are aligned in some ways.

What is your perspective in terms of what role, if any, they or their

views will play as Mr. Yeltsin moves forward to try to manage and

shape the Russian economy?

Obviously the Russian people have made a choice not to go back.

What do you believe will be the dynamics between the Yavlinsky/

Gaidar view of more vigorous economic reform and Yeltsins more

moderate policies?

Amb. COLLINS. Well, I think, first of all, theres probably one big

distinction between Mr. Gaidar and Mr. Yavlinsky. Mr. Gaidar endorsed President Yeltsin; Mr. Yavlinsky ran against him and never

really did endorse him, although he asked his supporters to vote

against the Communists.

President Yeltsin gave a speech this morning our time, or this afternoon his time, in which he affirmed that his government will continue reformthat it is committed to democracy and to the pursuit of

democratic norms. It seems to me that the support that President
17

Yeltsin received from, if you will, the community that in some sense

lies behind the symbols of Mr. Gaidar and Mr. Yavlinsky and other

leaders of the democratic movement certainly will have influence.

I think theres no question from what we know of the voting patterns that the younger generation, in many ways, the democratic elements, were very much motivated to support President Yeltsin, and

therefore one assumes that those views will find reflection in the government. Exactly how that will happen I dont know. Mr. Yavlinsky

at the moment seems not to be destined to have a government position. I doubt that Mr. Gaidar will, but I dont know that.

But I think its almost a certainty that we will have some members

of the community within which they work back in the government.

But I think one alsowhat Mr. Yeltsin said today, in some sense, was

that he hoped to have an inclusive government; that they had had a

hard-fought election; that it was now time to try to attract into the

government those who will help him continue the reform process and

work with his government.

He wasnt more precise than that, but I assume it means that hes

hoping to have not a narrow-based Government, at least; and I would

think that the democrats will have representation there in some capacity given the kind of support that they gave the President in his

reelection.

Mr. HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Let me just state that I

share the views expressed by Mr. Wolf, and Im sure by Mr. Smith,

and Mr. Cardin. I am a big fan of Secretary Schulz. I think he was

someone who very viscerally felt the human rights issue and stood up

very strongly for it. When he was in the Soviet Union, or other places,

he made very clear his empathy for those who were demonstrating

for human rights and for those who had been discriminated against.

I think that is a useful policy for the United States. As Prime Minister Netenyahu indicated today, America is very special in that sense;

and the fact that our voice in support of human rights is strong is

critically important not only for us, but also for the rest of the world.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Hoyer. Let me ask one additional question, and I will submit a number for the publication of the record. If

anyone has any additional questions, please pose them. There was a

Washington Post story right before the election, in which Yeltsin had

suggested that several of the ministries, health and education, I believe, were mentioned, would go to the Communists. You mentioned

the inclusive Government in response to Mr. Hoyers question.

Do we have any further indication as to whether or not parts of the

Government will come under the direction of the Communists?

Amb. COLLINS. No, sir, we dont. Theres lots of speculation, of

course. The question of whos going to get what jobs is the cottage

industry in Moscow now. Mr. Chernomyrdin has said, and Mr. Yeltsin

said, there was a victor and therefore its not going to be a coalition

Government. I dont think that anyone has ruled out having some

representation from the Communist side there.

But I think its also important to keep in mind that the Communist

Party that ran against Mr. Yeltsin was a very diverse group of people;

and most of us, I think, who have watched it believe it kind of runs

from Social Democrats over to the old really hard-lined Stalinists,

and Mr. Zyuganov performed quite a feat in keeping it together.
18

But I think it is entirely possible that there will be those who would

wish to work with this Government, and I suspect Mr. Yeltsin will

look very hard at that in terms of whether or not he can count on

them really to be part of a Government that is committed to the kind

of values that he is setting out.

Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Collins, thank you very much for your

testimony. We appreciate it and we look forward to your timely response on the outstanding questions.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, just as Ambassador Collins goes, I was

mentioning to Mr. Cardin that there is no one, I think, in the United

«MD30»States Government who is more respected on a bipartisan

fashion than Ambassador Collins when it comes to his knowledge and

wisdom with reference to the history of the Soviet Union and the

Russian Federation and the emerging CIS states. I have had the

opportunity, as I am sure you have, Mr. Chairman, to work with him

for over a decade, and have always been impressed with his judgment and his knowledge.

Amb. COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Hoyer.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Id like to ask Dr. McFaul, Mr. Reddaway,

and Dr. Ruble if they would come to the witness table. Dr. McFaul,

could you begin?

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MCFAUL

Dr MCFAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Its a real honor to be

here. Let me start by apologizing for not having written remarks. Ive

just arrived from Moscow. Ill submit those to you and hopefully you

can get them into the record later.

Mr. SMITH. Theyll be made a part of the record.

Dr MCFAUL. This election and this, really this last 12 months, this

electoral cycle was a real test for Russian democratic institutions and

was a real test for us analysts, I think, in predicting and talking about

what is going on in Russia. Moving on, what should we expect in Russia. Let me give you my report card.

The first and most important thing I think weve got to realize is

that this election happened. This is the first time in the history of this

country, the 1000-year history of this country, that the head of state

was elected directly by the people. Before we get into the minutia of

the problems of that democratic society, I think its very important

that we remember the historical point that weve just seen.

Lets remember the record over the last 12 months. There were

very few people that predicted a free and fair election; very few that

predicted it would happen at all. We had threats from the Kremlin

itself that there was going to be postponement of these elections; and

despite all that, at the end of the day, it happened. I was at the conference with the Communists when they talked about the results of

the second round.

Nobody, including Mr. Zyuganov, has said that this was not a free

and fair election. There were abuses, and well get into those; but on

the whole, the report card has been very positive for this process. I

think thats a real testament to Mr. Yeltsin. It doesnt mean that we

have to forgive him for his past problems, but I think we do need to

recognize what he did in this electoral process.
19

Second, in terms of positive news, was the fact that Russians themselves decided that this election was important. Weve heard in the

Western press and in the nationalist press in Russia, by the way

really interesting combination therethat Russians are somehow genetically prone to authoritarianism, that because of their culture and

their history they like czars and they dont like the democratic process.

I think this test for the Russians has proven emphatically that

Russians care about the democratic process. If we could get the kinds

of turn-out that they got in the first and second rounds, 70 percent

and 67 percent, in our elections, I think that would be a great testament to what we think about our democratic institutions. I think its

time that we recognize the Russian people, that they really do care

about the democratic process.

Third, and perhaps most impressively, was how Russians voted.

Wed heard in the run-up, especially after the December 1995 elections, that if Russians are given the chance to vote freely and fairly,

that they would vote for Communists on the one hand or imperialist

nationalists on the other. Now, what is shown very clearly in both the

first and second round was that that is just absolutely not true.

Russians knew what the choice was. Despite media manipulation

and all that, it was very clear to everybody what this election was

about. I spent the entire time watching this election campaign and

every person who voted, who showed up to vote on the first and second round, knew the kind of choice they were making and they voted

emphatically for reform, not for regression.

Incidentally, this is the first time that a post-communist leader has

won the second round of the election. Even the other heroes of democracy in Eastern Europe have never won on the second time around. I

think again its a real testament to show that people knew what they

were voting for, to go forward and not backwards.

Fourth and finally, I think the political cultureand this may be

too early to tellbut the culture of reconciliation that you see on behalf of Boris Yeltsin and the way that hes talking about dealing with

the Duma and dealing with his enemies after the election is also a

positive sign. This is something we wouldnt have seen 3 years ago.

We most certainly wouldnt have seen it 6 years ago.

The fact that hes talking about reconciliation, bringing in people

from other parties into his government, and ultimately submitting

his government before the parliament, again is something thats never

happened in the history of this country, where the legislative branch

actually approved the government. Lets hope it happens peacefully

and democratically, but I think all the signs are good that it will.

Having noted those four very positive signs, I think its also important to recognize that this administration, the United States administration, that took a lot of criticism in their stance and their policy

toward this democratic process, should be recognized ultimately that

throughout this period, Im not saying in past periods and future periods theyre correct, but throughout this period, I think the policy

was right: quiet support for Boris Yeltsin and emphatic emphasis on

the democratic process. Thats the good news.

Let me turn to the bad news, and this bad news was equally obvious in watching this democratic process. First, theres no party system in Russia. This was a referendum about the past. It had nothing
20

to do with ideologies. You talked about Mr. Gaidar and Mr. Yavlinsky.

It had nothing to do with social democracy, liberalism, conservatism.

It was communism, anti-communism. This will be the last election

that you ever see in Russia that will be constructed that way.

Now, what happens in the absence of those organizing ideologies is

that it allows for extremists, populists, people without a set of ideas,

as Mr. Lebed has shown very clearly in the last few weeks, to come

out of the woodwork and with a couple of million dollars and a couple

of good campaign handlers, go from being a back-bencher in the Duma

to being one of the most powerful men in Russia. That, to me, is a

very dangerous sign, and its dangerous because theres not a party

system there to control that kind of movement.

Second, civil society is very weak in Russia; there should be no bones

about it. The capitalists, that is bankers, business interests, have organized their society and played a very important and crucial role in

this election, but other aspects of society did not and thats very alarming and disturbing for the future of democracy.

Third, the super-Presidential system, I think, is very scary. There

needs to be an adjustment. There is simply too much power in the

office of the presidency in Russia, especially when you have a man

like Boris Yeltsin, whom nobody I know in Russia thinks will be able

to serve out his second term. Its a very dangerous situation to have

too much power concentrated in the presidency.

Fourth, the media showed that when push comes to shove, they

were willing to abide by the rules laid down by the President. This,

for them, after all was a vote about their survival. I dont blame them

for making that choice, but I think its now incumbent upon them to

re-prove their democratic credentials and be a critical force for democracy.

Fifth and finally, rule of law and human rights. Theres no good

evidence, no good signs, I think, in this electoral process for those

concerned with human rights. The draconian statements youve heard

from Mr. Lebed that are popular amongst voters, anti-Semitic remarks, anti-Chechen remarks, anti-Caucasian remarks, these are

things that are very scary; and its not a time for people that are

worried about this to kick back and say, Well, democracy has succeeded in Russia. We dont need to think about this.

Now, ultimately, Russians themselves have to deal with these imperfections in their democratic system. When Americans come back

from a holiday tour in Russia claiming that they have destroyed the

evil empire, I think it does a real disservice to the literally decades of

work that have been done by real Russian democrats fighting for the

democratic process.

Having said that, I still think the United States can help and has a

real role to play in those five areas that I just now outlined. After all,

the Agency for International Development in Russia and its grantees

working on the democratic process have a very good infrastructure in

place to help those very people that are working on those imperfections. The Eurasia Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, these are the kinds of agencies and these are folks that you

support that can play an important role to help these people when

the focus, the international focus, is no longer on Russia watching

what happens day to day.
21

Let me just say finally, to come back to the conversation you had in

the first hour, I think its very clear how you resolve this problem

about Chechnya on the one hand versus U.S. support for Mr. Yeltsin

and trade and investment on the other. In fact, I wrote about it after

the beginning of the war in Chechnya in the WashingtonTimes right

after the war.

That is, I think too much of foreign assistance has been devoted to

the state, to the institutions of the Russian Government. Somehow it

was believed that if we spent money on these bureaucrats that have

been there for the last 10 to 20 years, that they would somehow become democratic. Thats not the way you get good democratic institutions in Russia.

You need to spend that money on society so that society will be

empowered to demand from those institutions the democratic processes; and therefore, it seems to me rather simple how you deal with

that. You stop giving money to the Russian state; you start giving

money to people like Mr. Kovalev and his organizations that after

this election, I think youre quite right, their voice is going to be a lot

harder to be heard in Russia. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your very succinct and compelling testimony.

Professor Reddaway.

STATEMENT OF PETER REDDAWAY

Mr. REDDAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Its a pleasure, as in the

past, to give testimony to your Commission. What did the election

show? Russians faced a choice between two unattractive candidates

for the presidency, Boris Yeltsin and Gennadi Zyuganov. Neither

evoked any public enthusiasm except among a few close supporters.

President Yeltsins popularity rating had dipped down earlier in the

year to the single digits.

What did Yeltsins victory in round two show? I believe that it

showed for sure probably only one major thing. A little over half of

those who voted for a candidate felt that it would be a mistake to

entrust Russia again to the Communists. The Communists had done

bad things to Russia for 09 years; they could not be trusted to do

better a second time around. So most of Yeltsins voters were primarily, I believe, casting a negative vote against the Communists.

What they were voting for is much less clear. My colleague, Michael

McFaul, just said they were voting for reform. I think thats a confusing statement because I dont think its at all clear now in Russia

what reform means. Its a vague, contentless word. Mr. McFaul also

said communism/anti-communism. OK. I go with the anti-communism, thats part of my analysis, but anti-communism is not in itself a

program.

Its not a set of policies, and what I want to try to indicate is that I

think Mr. Yeltsin is moving toward authoritarianism. So is it reform

authoritarianism? I think this loose use of the word reform gets us

into a lot of trouble. The election also showed, of course, the converse

of my main point, namely that almost a half of those who voted for a

candidate were ready to entrust Russias future to a Communist. This

was predictable, but of course, discouraging.

However, some, at least of these voters, were simply registering a

protest against Yeltsin, not supporting Zyuganovs recipes for Russia. So faith in communism is not as high in Russia as it seems. Also,
22

Zyuganovs loss of the election will probably lead to serious splits in

the Communist camp. This will reduce the threat of Russia being

ruled by Communists again in the future, perhaps reduce it forever

to nonexistence.

However, it will not lessen the threat that extreme forces of a nationalist variety might, before long, capture the Communist constituency and pose new dangers.

 What did the election not show? The election did not show, in my

view, those things that conventional wisdom in the United States has

claimed that it did. President Clinton set the tone for government

statements, and we saw a reflection of it just now from Ambassador

Collins, by calling the result a triumph for democracy, which showed

just how far Russias political reform has come over the last 5 years.

Among academics, my colleague Michael McFaul called the outcome, A tremendous victory for democracy and democrats, adding

that, Russians overwhelmingly opted to continue the present course

of reform. On the conduct of the election, Deputy Secretary of State

Strobe Talbott praised what everyone acknowledges has been a free

and fair election.

To take the last point first, in a narrow sense, Mr. Talbott is correct. The voting was orderly and relatively few cases of suspected

fraud were reported. These were big pluses, reiterating that Russians

are already fully capable of exercising at least one basic democratic

procedure. However, in two important regards, the election was not

fair.

First, during the campaign the Yeltsin team abused its extensive

control of the media to bias them heavily, national television in particular, in favor of the President and against Mr. Zyuganov. They did

this in terms both of who got air time and of who received favorable

or critical commentary.

Not surprisingly then, the European Institute for the Media, which

studied and quantified media coverage from May 5th through July

3rd, concluded that the coverage, marred the fairness of the democratic process. [From the newspaper, Moscow Times, an article entitled, Poll Observers Blast Media Bias.] Other election monitoring

groups downplayed this bias with the dubious claim that it was justified by the threat of a Communist victory.

Second, the Yeltsin team grossly violated the campaign expenditure limit of $3 million for each side. Zyuganov appears to have observed it. The Washington Post investigated this issue carefully and

reported on July 7th. The lowest estimate given to the reporters was,

and it was given by members of Mr. Yeltsins own team, that Yeltsins

spendingthe lowest estimate was $100 million. However, the article went on, Russian journalists and sources close to the campaign

have said the minimum figure is closer to $500 million and possibly a

good deal more.

I think if Mr. Talbott found that his opponent in an election, say a

Mr. X, had violated the expenditure law by 17,000 percent, and Mr. X

had also abused his powers in order to bias the media against Mr.

Talbott, Mr. Talbott would, of course, not say that everyone acknowledges the election to be fair. Why Mr. Talbott claimed this in the

analogous Russian case is to me a mystery.
23

No one can say, of course, how many votes Mr. Yeltsin gained from

assets that Zyuganov did not have, i.e., buying television coverage

and a blitz of high-quality advertising on TV and billboards all over

Russia. But these may have turned what would have been a fairly

even race into the 53 to 40 percent result in Yeltsins favor. Zyuganov,

not surprisingly, claimed that these robbed him of victory.

The reason the Communists have evidently decided not to challenge the outcome in court on these grounds may be Zyuganovs ambivalence about winning the election at all. He saw daunting political

risk in having to rule a Russia that is poised on the edge of a financial

and economic crisis. I have developed this theme in an article that I

would like to ask the Commission to insert in the record, an op-ed

from The New York Times that has been distributed outside

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, it will be made a part of the record.

Mr. REDDAWAY. Thank you. Why was the election not a triumph to

democracy? Clearly an unfair election, however orderly, cannot be a

triumph to democracy. It creates disillusion with democracy and not

only on the losing side. Those wavering voters who were persuaded to

vote for Yeltsin only by media bias and his blanket advertising campaign are likely to feel disillusioned if they become aware of the unfairness, and also if Yeltsins extravagant election promises are not

fulfilled.

Likewise, voters who supported Yeltsin only because he suddenly

made Lebed his partner will feel tricked if, as seems quite likely, before long he pushes Mr. Lebed aside and abandons policies Mr. Lebed

favored. These voters are bound to believe that Yeltsin promoted Lebed

only to get himself reelected, and therefore he was guilty of a sort of

false advertising.

The claims by Western optimists that the election was a triumph

for democracy hold, at least implicitly, that Yeltsin nurtured a young

democracy for several years, focused his electoral appeal on promoting it, and thus its prospects are now, despite certain problems of the

sort that Mr. McFaul started to list, better than ever. Unfortunately,

I believe this interpretation to be wrong.

My view is that Yeltsin has drifted toward authoritarianism since

1993, and the election just now will only confirm this trend. This view

derives from my attempt to set up criteria for democratic development, to see how Russia matches up to them, and to measure whether

the trends are in the direction of more or of less democracy. In general, in my view, Yeltsin has undermined, not nurtured, democracy.

In recent months, for example, he repeatedly indicated that he was

listening to his hard-line advisors and might follow their publicly

stated advice to find a pretext to cancel the election. In March, fearing he would lose to Zyuganov, he ordered decrees drawn up that

would have canceled the election, closed down the parliament, and

banned the Communist Party.

On the night of March 17-18, security forces combed the parliament building to make sure that unlike in October 1993 when Mr.

Yeltsin last abolished the legislature in Russia with tanks and 150

deaths, no deputies were inside. Only when his more cautious advisors declined to go along did Mr. Yeltsin, on March the 18th, back off.

In the campaign itself, Mr. Yeltsin said almost nothing about how

he would develop democracy. With much justification, he blasted the

Communists. He claimed that he was bringing Russia out of its eco-
24

nomic depression and would care for those who had suffered from it.

He handed out pork by the ton. He said he would restore order and

also end the Chechnya war. But he did not address the ills of Russian

democracy, evidently because he does not intend to address them.

He did not, for example, promise to reverse the growing disregard

for human rights by his own government which had caused his advisor on human rights, Sergei Kovalev, to resign in protest last February. Likewise, he did not put forward a program for building up the

independence of Russias intimidated judiciary and thus reverse the

discouraging trend that has led key liberals among his legal advisors

to resign like Mr. Kovalev.

He did not say he was going to defend Russias battered rule of law

by countering the dangerous trend of the countrys 89 administrative

units to set their own laws and regulations without regard to Federal

legislation. He did not lay out, to the business world, how he would

combat organized crime so that it would then be able to stop making

its regular payments to the Mafia.

He did not promise either to reduce the excessive powers and size

of his Presidential administration and the bloated executive branch

as a whole, or to strengthen the legislature, measures that most constitutional experts consider necessary if democracy is to develop. He

did not regret the lack of accountability of himself and his administration to the Duma and the public, nor promise to do better in the

future.

He did not announce ways of strengthening the countrys weak,

mostly nominal political parties so that democracy and Russias pitifully weak civil societyand I agree with what Mr. McFaul said on

thiscould be strengthened. He did not regret the bias of the media

and the widespread bribing of journalists to write favorable articles

about himself or, in some cases, Mr. Zyuganov, and promise to reverse the trend toward lessened autonomy for the media.

Thus, Mr. Yeltsin did not promise, except in vague, formal rhetoric,

that he would push to strengthen democracy. On the contrary, by

aligning himself with Lebed, a self-described semi-democrat, by stressing his own czar-like qualities, by featuring nationalist themes and

the restoration of order, Mr. Yeltsin suggested that he was set on

continuing to move gradually toward authoritarianism.

This, indeed, was the conclusion of Russias leading democrat, Sergei

Kovalev, who predicted that under a Yeltsin/Lebed alliance, Russia

would quickly cease to be a state based upon law and would instead

be governed in a draconian manner. It may be that Mr. Yeltsin will

now try to combine creeping authoritarianism in politics with a new

push for market reform, a la General Pinochet of Chile in the 1970s.

But the rise of the consolidated budget deficit to 11.8 percent of

GDP in April compared to the IMFs limit of 3.85 percent for 1996,

and the specter of recently controlled inflation taking off again and

perhaps reaching 10 percent a month do not bode well for economic

stability. Also, a serious economic crisis, which some observers predict for the fall, could easily set off social unrest, especially if increases

in inflation, unemployment, and non-payment of wages all should

occur at the same time.
25

The other potential catalyst for instability in Russia is Mr. Yeltsins

weak health. If he is incapacitated or dies and still no obvious successor is in sight, a destabilizing struggle for the succession seems almost inevitable with a possible abandonment of constitutional methods and resort to coup-type procedures.

Thus, in my view, that of someone no doubt considered a

doomsayer by Messrs. Talbott, McFaul, and others, Russia has not

experienced a tremendous victory for democracy. The election was

orderly and has temporarily resolved some uncertainties, but the results should, I believe, be summarized like this. A very unpopular

President, having seriously considered through March 17, flouting

democracy and canceling the election, managed to be reelected through

the successful but negative strategy of branding his opponent

Zyuganov as a backward looking representative of the Communist

past.

He was remarkably lucky that Zyuganov ran an inept campaign

and allowed the strategy to succeed. Mr. Yeltsin cheated in the campaign by grossly violating legal spending limits and by manipulating

the media. He said little about his programs for the future, but very

few indications suggest that he has any real concern for democratic

reform and very many suggestions indicate an intention to continue

on his previous course of creeping authoritarianism.

For the near future, then, Russia seems headed, alas, toward authoritarianism and probably continuing political and economic instability.

 My footnote, which I will not read out, simply explains that assuming that I may be considered to be among the so-called doomsayers,

I have not, in fact, said the things that the doomsayers are claimed to

have said, but I will not burden you with that footnote. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Professor. Youve raised a number of very important points and I do appreciate your very fine testimony. Dr. Ruble.

Mr. HOYER. Dr. Ruble will now say the two previous speakers were

both right.

STATEMENT OF BLAIR RUBLE

Dr. RUBLE. Thats right. But before I say that, Id like to thank the

Commission and the chairman for holding these hearings. Its certainly an honor to be here. I have submitted a written statement and

would like to move on.

Mr. SMITH. Were pleased to make it a part of the record.

Dr. RUBLE. Before I move on to saying that both the previous

speakers were correct, I would like to applaud Mr. Smith for his opening statement about Sergei Kovalev. Mr. Kovalev is one of those remarkable human beings that Russia somehow produces from time to

time, and I think its very important that our prayers are with him

and that we wish him well. Im very pleased that you began, sir, the

hearing that way.

Mr. HOYER. Doctor, if you would yield just for a second, I was late

as you observed, and did not hear the comments, nor had I heard of

Dr. Kovalevs heart attack, about which I had just been advised. As

someone who has had the opportunity of meeting with Dr. Kovalev in

Moscow on a number of occasions in a number of roles that he has

played both in and out of the government, I share your view and, Mr.
26

Chairman, I share yours. He is indeed a giant voice on behalf of human rights and democracy in Russia. It is indeed a sad thing that he

has been stricken, and all of us join in what you have said, Frank, in

praying for his quick and full recovery.

Mr. WOLF. How serious was it?

Mr. SMITH. The word that I got yesterday was that it was very

serious.

Dr MCFAUL. I called folks that work with him last night. Its very

serious and its a real crisis. This is the last champion of human rights,

and the human rights community in Moscow, last night, anyway, was

in a real state of shock.

Mr. REDDAWAY. Not the last champion. Another is Elena Bonner.

Mr. HOYER. Doctor, I was going to say Dr. Bonner. I have talked to

a lot of people in Moscow who I would say are very strong proponents

of human rights. Dr. Bonner is as famous, if not more famous, certainly with the world than Mr. Kovalev; however, sometimes we think

that there is only one person who carries the mantle. Having said

that, Mr. Kovalev has been a giant. His illness is a blow and extremely

sad. Hopefully he will recover. Excuse me, Doctor. Thank you.

Dr. RUBLE. Well, George F. Kennan once counseled that when

confronted with two contradictory statements about Russia, you should

always assume that both are correct. As is frequently the case when

Professor Kennan speaks of Russia, I think,, that his words are worth

heeding. This is a time when statements about Russia and Russian

reform are certainly contradictory, as weve just heard.

On the one hand, the Presidential elections on July 3rd represent a

great victory for reform and democracy, a triumph for democracy.

Yet, at the same time, the Presidential elections changed little and

Russia is on the verge of catastrophic collapse. Both statements have

a certain ring of truth. The issue is not merely a debate over whether

the proverbial glass of water is half full or half empty. One side sees

the water level of democracy and market reform rising even if its

only one-quarter full.

The other side is arguing something different. It argues that there

are so many cracks and holes in the glass that it wont hold water no

matter how much you pour in. It argues that Russia is not going to

complete the transition to democracy or perhaps even to a market

economy. Both sides look at different aspects of Russian reality.

Those who see the Presidential elections as a great victory for democracy emphasize, weve heard today, the apparent procedural correctness of the balloting and the defeat of the Communists. Skeptics

highlight the closing off of press coverage which, voluntary or not,

hardly points in the direction of a free and open election fairly fought.

The odd disappearance of Boris Yeltsin in the campaigns closing

days, the uncertain relationship between General Lebed and the

Presidents men, the quasi-coup against the hard-liners in the Presidential administration following the first round all underscore the

weakness of democratic institutions and traditions. Weve just heard

this debate played out by my colleagues.

To my mind, this debate reflects very interesting parallel developments of mass electoral politics and chamber elite struggles surrounding the President. This parallel development has been one of the most

fascinating aspects of post-Soviet Russian politics and one of the hardest to get a handle on.
27

It might be worth our while to brush up on American political science theory to understand the first development, mass electoral politics, while Stanford University historian Nancy Shields Kollmanns

study of 14th, 15th and 16th century Muscovite clan politics seems

closer to the mark when looking at the second development: chamber

elite struggles.

As Kollmanns work on medieval Russia demonstrates, the battles

within the Kremlin walls are not merely personal disputesstruggles

among advisors for the imperial ear, as one might see in other national capitals. Rather, these are brutal battles which represent the

clashing of almost primordial interests that are played out through

the selection of personnel for pivotal Kremlin positions.

The internal Kremlin wars have been quite literally struggles to

the death for centuries. The post-Soviet period is remarkable because

the participants of these never-ending Kremlin battles have figured

out how to use electoral mass politics as yet another tool in their repertoire in these struggles.

As has been pointed out, the recent elections were not a clash among

political parties. They really represented in public forum, in mass

forum, disputes that are taking place within the Kremlin walls. Such

a perspective suggests that we are not seeing the emergence of democracy so much as the playing out of clan politics in another forum.

Having said that, we also have to recognize that the world does

change. The future is seldom identical to the past. Elections have a

way of taking on their own meaning. Whatever the Kremlin oligarchs

may want, Russians have voted and voted often over the past 7 years.

The 67 percent turn-out on July 3rd will undoubtedly make our turnout look paltry when we get to November and our own Presidential

elections.

With each election, even if it is arguably a flawed election, Russias

democratic roots grow that much deeper into the soil. Russian democracy is both a hardy and a fragile plant and in this sense, both the

optimists and pessimists are right. But we have to begin to ask what

is necessary for democracy to take further root. What has to happen

if it will be possible to look back 5, 10, 100 years from now to July 3,

1996 and say yes, that was a good day for Russian democracy.

What has to happen is that a dense net of stable institutions must

arise which will cover over all the cracks and holes in the democratic

water glass. The next stage in the drama of Russian reform will be

whether or not institutions such as political parties will indeed emerge,

as optimists such as Professor McFaul has suggested, or will the efforts to the contrary, as weve heard from Professor Reddaway, end

up holding sway.

For the optimists to be correct, Boris Yeltsin is going to have to do

something that he has never done before. Hes going to have to govern. Yeltsin has remarkable, even super-human capacity, to rally his

forces in times of crisis. Institution-building, however, is about a

longer-term commitment to governance, to the nitty-gritty of everyday public administration and politics, with a small p.

We presently have a situation that is, if anything, more dangerous

than a year ago. Russia would appear to have a partially incapacitated President with authoritarian inclinations; a prime minister and

a national security advisor at odds with one another, at various times

both claiming to be the second most powerful person in the country;
28

as weve heard from Professor Reddaway, a looming economic crisis;

a disaffected 40 percent of the electorate, nearly 30 million politically

aware adults, who were willing to vote for the Communists and are

concentrated in specific geographic areas; and a group of foreign supporters of reform who can easily serve as flashpoints for popular anger.

On top of this, we have the Lebed wild card. The problem here is

not that we dont know retired Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed.

The issue is really of his inexperience, his inexperience in the political games which he must now play without delay; and we cant know

how quickly hes going to learn and make the transition to a Kremlin

insider.

Now, the problems run far deeper than President Yeltsin and General Lebed. The issue at hand is really not the nature of the Russian

people. I fully concur with Professor McFaul when he pointed out

that the Russian people have demonstrated an inspiring commitment

to democracy and theyve done so over and over again during the past

decade. The problem isnt the Russian people. The problem is the

Russian political elite.

Earlier this week, Polish President Aleksandr Kwasniewski, speaking at a session organized by the World Affairs Council and the Atlantic Council here in Washington, was asked to clarify his campaign

slogan of a common Poland. President Kwasniewskis response shed

considerable light on the difference between the Polish and Russia

post-socialist transitions.

The Polish President explained that despite often sharp disagreements over public policy issues such as abortion, every Polish politician understands that Poland has before it perhaps the best moment

in 4 to 5 centuries to join the community of democratic and prosperous nations. One would have to search long and hard to find a Russian politician who has managed to elevate such a concept of personal

responsibility to fellow Russians above the petty power politics of the

old Stalinist game of kto kogo, who over whom.

Neither the reformers nor the Communists in Russia appear able

to step beyond the most immediate political fray to seize the historical moment. Michael McFaul speaks of a culture of reconciliation that

weve seen after the elections. President Yeltsins conciliatory victory

speech, and evidently a speech he made today, are certainly gestures

in this direction. This is a heartening sign. It shows that perhaps

President Yeltsin is ready to govern.

Yet, we have to note that President Yeltsin has made similar

speeches before; and yet his behavior and especially the actions of

those around him demonstrates a reluctance bordering on incapacity

to step above petty politics. The new institutions so lacking in Russia

that must eventually cover the cracks in the glass of democracy cannot develop until and unless the Russian political elite demonstrates

not just strategic prowess but genuine wisdom.

Now, that might be putting the bar awfully high, but that is where

the bar sits at a historic moment. We, for our part, need not forget

that the fire is not out. We should be pleased that the elections went

as well as they did. We should be pleased that they were held. But we

shouldnt delude ourselves into thinking that everything is under control.
29

Russians must do more to control the flames of authoritarianism

and totalitarianism and intolerance before we can begin to be assured

that Russia is indeed joining the community of democratic marketoriented nations. This does not mean that the elections have been a

useless exercise. On the whole, they have advanced the process of

Russian democratization, as by the way, did the December 1995 parliamentary elections, despite the rather different outcome.

These recent elections demonstrate the heroic commitment to decency on the part of many Russians, perhaps a majority of the Russian people, a commitment not always evident among the leadership.

This is not the time to bask in glory. Its a time to look forward. Russian politicians have before them serious hard work, the hard work of

everyday governing and state-building.

Unfortunately, theres been little evidence to date to suggest that

President Yeltsin either has an interest or capacity in governing, in

building a state. Lets hope in this sense that the pessimists are wrong

and that the optimists are right and that President Yeltsin and his

fellow politicians will get on with the task thats before them. Thank

you.

Mr. SMITH. Again, thank you very much, Dr. Ruble, for your very

excellent testimony. Mr. Salmon and I will have to leave shortly for a

mark-up on the NATO expansion legislation thats before the International Relations Committee, and Mr. Wolf has agreed to assume

the chair. I have just a couple of questions and then Mr. Salmon, I

think, has one or two. Steny, can you stay?

Mr. HOYER. I must leave at 3:00 oclock. I have an appointment.

Mr. SMITH. Just to be very brief then, you mentioned Kwasniewskis

election. I followed thatI think we all followed thatsomewhat

closely in Poland. It seemed to be a victory of a very attractive candidate and a very attractive team, he and his wife utilizing the modernday techniques, especially television; which Yeltsin apparently has

done rather well, too, in the closing hours of his campaign.

Sometimes I wonder if its more of a reflection of perception than

the deepest feelings and yearnings of people either of Poland or of

Russia. They were fed a certain message by the mass media, particularly television, and we know even with our own elections that polling sometimes shows that theres not as much as depth as all of us

would like as to why people vote the way they do.

They see an image, they like the image, and Zyuganov certainly

didnt have the same persona that the Polish President had and could

not project that youthful figure, almost Kennedy-like appearance. I

wonder at the impact it had. When it comes to human rights, again,

what would be your recommendations to the Congress, to the Commission, and to the President, above all, as chief policy implementer

of foreign policy to project the seriousness within which we regard

human rights? Because again, the record on many countries, especially the PRC, has been atrocious.

Dr. RUBLE. If I may begin quickly, I think were, in a way, very

fortunate that Polish Communists and Russian Communists are not

the same. I think had the Russian Communist Party reinvigorated

itself and come to terms with its previous defeat as the Polish Communist Party did, we could be talking about a Zyuganov victory, but

Zyuganovits a difference between perhaps neo-communists and
30

paleo-communists. The Russian Communists have not reformed, the

Polish Communists did, and I think that does reflect an important

difference.

I would add that, of course, media made a difference; but I think

over the past decade, and here I would certainly agree with Mr.

McFauls previous comments, the Russian people have demonstrated

over and over again their commitment to voting. Theyve gone out in

large numbers, theyve voted from 1989 on, and I think that we need

to begin to recognize that yes, they like to sit at home and watch soap

operas, as do people in many parts of the world, but they did go out

and they do vote and I think that in that way, theres a very heartening commitment to democratic process, and I think that thats important.

Dr MCFAUL. If I could just add two things? First, on the Communists in Russia versus Poland, the vote that we just witnessed was

the vote that Poland had 5 years ago; that is, once Poland had decided what kind of system they were going to be in, which was democratic and capitalist, then elections after that are about left of center,

right of center.

Russia, for a variety of mistakes, I think, that Boris Yeltsin made,

he didnt have elections in the fall of 1991, he didnt adopt a new

constitution, and as a result of those things, parties didnt develop;

and you had this polarized electoral system which this, I think, will

be the last one.

Secondly, in terms of the media, we have produced an 800-page

book at the Carnegie Endowment on electoral behavior from 1989 to

1996. Whats very obvious from that book is that voting behavior in

Russia has remained very stable for the last 7 years. Its not all over

the place. Fifty percent of the electorate didnt change their mind

between December 1995 and June 1996.

On the contrary, almost 75 percent of the voters knew who they

were going to vote for in January, well before this media campaign

happened. Sound familiar to you guys? Then theres the middle and

that is where, you know, that is where I do think the media came in,

but it didnt change voters minds in Bryansk, where they voted for

Communists in 89, they voted for them in 90, 91, 93, 95 and 96. It

didnt change the voters minds in Moscow where they voted for reformists in 90, et cetera, and so this notion that somehow the Russians dont understand the choice, that theyve been duped by some

sort of media blitz is just absolutely false.

Third, on human rights, I think its very obvious what needs to be

done. I heard it in this committee already. We need to have a voice

America needs to be a voice for human rights. We dont need to be

comparing Chechnya to the Civil War. That is terrible for the Russians on the ground. That is where the mistake is made. It doesnt

matter to Boris Yeltsin, but the Russians, thats what they hear.

Second, we can do it in a very concrete way. Mr. Kovalev, you all

know him, I know him, I just saw him a week ago. I know his colleagues well; Ive worked with them for a decade. They used to be

part of the administration, right? They used to have a place to sit.

They used to have financial resources from the state. They no longer

do. I know exactly where I would start if I was going to be developing

human rights in Russia.
31

Mr. REDDAWAY. A very brief comment. Up to now, it seems to me

that our administration has hesitated to speak out strongly on human rights issues because we have been afraid that we would undermine Mr. Yeltsin and this might let the Communists back into power.

Just, of course, a very condensed summary. I think this has been a

bad policy from the start.

I thoroughly felt with Mr. Wolf as he let his feelings out about Chechnya. I think it is correct to formulate that the United States has had

a strong indirect moral responsibility for partial genocide in Chechnya. Those are rather strong words, but theyre not chosen lightly,

and I wrote about this in the New York Times. [April 3, 1996]

So I hope from now on, with Mr. Yeltsin now reelected and with the

Communists unlikely to pose a serious political challenge in the near

future, perhaps never again in terms of ruling Russia, that we can at

least speak out properly on human rights, and I agree with Mr. Wolf.

Nothing of any serious strength was said at any high levels by the

United States administration.

Of course, there were a few spokesmen speaking out at low levels

quietly, but that doesnt count. The Russian Government knows that

is insignificant and doesnt count for anything. Its only when Mr.

Clinton and Mr. Christopher, Mr. Talbott and others speak out and

when they hold out the prospect that there will be something, there

will be a price to pay for continuing partial genocide in Chechnya.

Mr. SMITH. Those words, I think, should also be directed to the vice

President as he brings that message to Russia.

Mr. REDDAWAY. Indeed, indeed.

Mr. SMITH. Trade investment, fine, but human rights has to be at

the core of it, because I think youre right. I think your point is welltaken about this being a time when the elections are over now. If they

were inhibited before, there is no reason to have a bridle in the mouth.

Speak out loudly and boldly on behalf of human rights.

Mr. HOYER. I must go. Matt, you can stay for a few minutes? Let

me say that I dont have any questions at the time, although a number of questions were raised by your testimony. I remember, Professor, when you, Marshall Goldman, and others testified at hearings

that I convened with reference to the Gorbachev presidency and the

Gorbachev future. I remember the testimony of you both and others

who said that Gorbachev undoubtedly could not last.

As one who had met with Mr. Gorbachev in 1987 and on a number

of other occasions, particularly for a relatively extensive period of

time with Speaker Wright and Bob Michel, I thought Gorbachev was

an extraordinarily able politician. However, seeing that he has zero

support effectively at this point in time, I am more taken with the

testimony of the three of you and I have read Dr. Rubles testimony. I

think you are all correct in your assessment.

I agree with Dr. Ruble that if the three of you got together, you

probably could come up with a consensus because although it seems,

Professor Reddaway, that there may be more disparity between you

and Dr. McFaul, I think it is more apparent than real in the sense

that we are dealing with an extraordinarily complicated transition.

But let me say something on behalf of the U.S. voters. If, for the

first time in 1,000 years, the citizens of the United States were asked

to vote for their President, I guarantee you more than 70 percent of
32

them would show up. I think that one of the reasons U.S. citizens

probably dont vote in as high a percentage as some other countries is

because in many ways they are very satisfied with the stability of the

Government and the democracy that they have.

I make that comment only because we tend to say, Well, look at

the other guys. Americaagain, Netanyahu said todayis the example in the world of what democracy ought to be, even though perhaps we dont hit 70, 75, 80 percent voting on a regular basis. I think

that is because so many Americans believe their votes dont make a

difference. But, if they thought it was really bad, they would be there.

I think all three of you gave excellent testimony. I very much appreciate it. Thanks to our chairman for convening this hearing. Thank

you very much.

Mr. WOLF. Go ahead. You have to get going.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MATT SALMON

Mr. SALMON. Thanks a lot, Frank. I have a couple of comments. I,

with Mr. Hoyer, was fortunate enough to go to Stockholm for the last

week to participate in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly annual

conference. It was very productive.

One of the things that I noted was, as we went into the plenary

session and we started to debate, a very simple straight-forward measure on statement of purpose about Bosnia, about prosecuting the

war criminals, we heard a very inflammatory rebuttal to, I think, a

pretty modest, timid- proposal from the international community regarding the Bosnia peace process from Mr. Zhirinovsky, who Im sure

wed all recognize as somewhat of an outlier, that he doesnt represent the mainstream of Russia. He didnt do exceptionally well in his

bid for the top spot.

However, he is in a position of authority being elected to their legislature. He seemed to take some very strident positions saying hands

off when it comes to dealing with any other nation, simple straightforward comments about the ethnic cleansing and that should stop.

He even opposed that.

Needless to say, I guess in summary, he was seen as very radical in

his presentation. It was commented by some that he kind of looked

around the room and figured out, is there anybody I havent offended

yet? If so, Im not through. That kind of seemed to be his tone.

Now, I mention that because I know that hes not in a position of

great authority in Russia right now, but there is a man that is in a

position of great authority that I dont think is far behind in his extremism and thats Mr. Lebed. I am a member of the Mormon religion

and was deeply offended at his comments a couple of weeks ago calling members of my religion scum and his anti-Semitic comments as

well.

If thats the kind of person that is either next in line or next to next

in line to be in the top spot, I think we in America have great reason

to fear a man with such a small mind making small-minded comments; and, frankly, as a member of Congress looking to propose financial aid and assistance to Russia as they try to pursue some of the

economic reforms and political reforms, it would be wise, somehow,

for Mr. Yeltsin to get a clue that his No. 2 guy, secretary of security,
33

ought to think before he speaks in the future or there will be a great

hesitancy in this country to help out. When the time comes to help

out, hell look around, and he will have offended everybody.

I want your comments. I know Lebed has since recanted what he

said. It was extremely stupid of him to say those remarks in the first

place. You dont say remarks like that unless you think them. He may

have retracted his comments because it was politically expedient to

do so, but in his heart what does he believe? Is he a bigot? Is he the

kind of a guy that is going to try to take Russia two steps back when

it comes to religious freedom? Im interested in your comments.

Mr. REDDAWAY. Well, let me go first. On the first part about Mr.

Zhirinovskylet me get him out of the way and go on to Lebedhe

did get between 5 and 6 percent of the vote in the first round for the

Presidential election. His support is very much down in Russia from

what it was in the past. I think hes a fading star, if you can call him

a star.

What I want to say, though, is that in recent months Russian journalists and scholars have started to write articles about Mr.

Zhirinovsky with which I am very inclined to agree, that he is not

actually a representative of Russian public opinion, of a limited section of Russian public opinion; he is, to use their terminology, a scarecrow created and largely financed by the Government. This is a perplexing statement, and these articles explain how this is the case.

Mr. Zhirinovsky was launched on the political scene in Russia in 1990

by the KGB, the old KGB, and the purpose then was a particular

purpose. Under Mr. Yeltsin, he appears to have continued in this role.

The purpose is to scare the West about the forces of extreme nationalism allegedly about to take over in Russia unless we in the West support the democrats.

That is the analysis which is now based on a lot of very detailed,

factual material, and its interesting that none of the articles written

saying this have been refuted by anybody. So Mr. Zhirinovsky comes

to the Stockholm conference. He speaks in this outrageous way. This

is the fifth or sixth time that hes done this in the last 2 or 3 years.

The West thinks, Oh, gracious, there are terrible, terrible forces in

Russiaextreme nationalism, fascismwe must support Mr. Yeltsin

and help him hold back that tide. Well, that tide, fortunately, I think,

does not exist in Russia. It only exists on a very small scale. So we

dont need to be too worried about it now.

Turning to Mr. Lebed, here I think we have somewhat more to be

worried about, although again Im not as worried, I think, perhaps as

you are. The reason Im not so worried is not because I disagree with

your characterization of him, but because I think he is in the process,

probably, of self-destructing politically. I think he does not have the

experience to survive and prosper in Russian politics in the Kremlin.

Hes in a very big fight already with the Prime Minister, Mr.

Chernomyrdin. I think that Mr. Yeltsin, having used Lebed to get

himself reelected, will now distance himself somewhat from him. Hes

already done that in one or two minor ways. So it would not surprise

me if Mr. Lebed is eased aside in the future. certainly I would very

much doubt him being the next in line.

Mr. SALMON. Professor Reddaway, I wanted to comment. As far as

his political demise, I can guarantee you hes lost the Utah vote.

[Laughter.]
34

Mr. REDDAWAY. Just one final comment. The danger is that, if Mr.

Yeltsin should collapse or die in the near future and Mr. Lebed is still

up there at the top, it is always, of course, possible he might make

some sort of thrust for power. One cant rule out completely that he

might conceivably succeed, but I think thats not terribly likely.

Dr MCFAUL. If I could just add one remark, and then Im going to

have to go home, a place I havent been for the last 2 months, two

things on Mr. Zhirinovsky and Mr. Lebed.

First, Zhirinovsky is not done, unfortunately, and those kind of

politicians in Russian will remain. Whether he fades, and I suspect

he will, as a kind of politician, theyre going to be around. Thats all

the more so why the absence of this party system that I was talking

about is so desperately needed. Russia needs social democrats and

liberals, not just populist extremists. Once you have a consolidated

party system, that pushes extremists out.

Secondly, in terms of Mr. Lebed, I think the important thing to

remember about him is that hes only been abroad once. It was to

Afghanistan. You know what he was doing there in his, you know,

junior year abroad. [Laughter.] He really has no exposure to the

West whatsoever. This man is a tabula rasa. I know his campaign

advisors well. They report Lebed doesnt know anything about anything outside of the military. Twenty-five years in the military does

not train you to be the kind of leader that he is.

Thats the first point. The secondso there are two solutions to

that. One is every time he says a stupid thing he has to be criticized.

It was a stupid thing, and he didnt even know what he was saying.

Hes that naive, that stupid frankly, as a politician. Every time he

says that you have to criticize it and say, you know, You cant say

that kind of stuff.

Two, I would encourage you to invite him to Salt Lake City. I really

do. I sincerely believe that. Thats the best way. Ignorance is the biggest danger we have with Russia. Once he knows something about

the Church that he was criticizing, once he knows what America is, I

think his views on America and religion could be changed, because he

really is a tabula rasa. Hes a clean slate.

Third, and then most dangerously, however, is that he is a man

who has no allies. I totally agree its a very dangerous situation for

him. Theyre already pushing him out. But that scares me even more,

because then Lebed becomes Boris Yeltsin from 1989. Then he becomes a guy that got 11 million voters. Hes got a political mandate.

You guys know what that is, too, right? He has people that voted for

him to do something in the Kremlin, and if he then goes and says,

Well, I have to resign because I came here to fight crime and corruption, and, guess what, the criminal and the corrupt have pushed me

out, he becomes the leader of the opposition; and that, to me, is a

real recipe for disaster in Russia.

Thank you very much. Really thank you for having me here.

Dr. RUBLE. If I can add a few very quick comments, I think Michael

is exactly correct about Zhirinovsky, that he himself may be eclipsed,

but we will see other politicians like him, because unfortunately there

is an intolerance in Russian society which politicians like Zhirinovsky

represent.
35

Lebed is a different issue from Zhirinovsky, although perhaps a

less happy one. General Lebed is not a clown, and I think we have to

take him very seriously. I dont care how uninitiated he is in civilized

behavior, those statements reflect inner views which should be reprehensible in any national political leader in any society. So I dont

think we can simply say, well, he didnt know any better.

Having said that, there is a problem with General Lebed. He hasnt

been to the outsideto the West. We were involved in an invitation

which he had accepted to come to the United States 18 months ago,

and the business funders were led to believe that their business opportunities in Russia would be closed off if they sponsored the trip, so

they withdrew it. We tried to find foundation support, and a number

of the leading foundations in this country in leading cities like New

York, Chicago and Washington, all said, Well, why should we fund

this guy? Hes not going anywhere. So the trip fell apart. There was

interest in a number of places in Washington, and he had accepted

the invitation and even held a press conference announcing that he

had accepted this invitation. I think in retrospect its very unfortunate he wasnt exposed to the United States.

The pressure, as we understood it, although we were dealing with

business sponsors indirectly, came from the Presidential administration in Russia; and it was made very clear to them that, if General

Lebed came under their auspices, they would lose business opportunities. I think that was a very short-sighted development.

I think it is the case that General Lebed, because he hasnt been

exposed to the outside world, perhaps there is a modicum of hope

that he will grow in the job. Hes not going to have a lot of time to do

a lot of learning. Hes going to have to be a very quick learner. But he

potentially has a lot of power, and I would counsel against simply

writing him as the next Zhirinovsky. This is, from the United States

point of view, potentially a very dangerous man.

Mr. SALMON. I have to go.

Mr. WOLF. Sure, I understand.

I have a couple of questions. One, let me thank you for your testimony. I have picked up a lot. Im sorryis there a representative of

Ambassador Collins from the State Department here? You know, they

really should have stayed. They dont really know it all, and I think it

would have been helpful.

Secondly, Ive spoken to Chairman Smith and Mr. Hoyers staff,

and we will do a letter and call over today asking that the administration send a cardiologist from Bethesda or Walter Reed over to examine Kovalev, to see if there is something that can be done, if he can

be moved to an American hospital. If you know the administration

people very wellif you know Ambassador Collins, you may want to

call over there, too. Because I think that would be helpful.

The two other questions that I would have, and I didnt know that

I was going to have all this time, so I didnt prepare a lot of questions,

but based on your commentsone was Lebeddid you think he was

next in line? I think youve answered that.

If you could elaborate a little bit more on the Chechnya thing. I

went to Chechnya last year. We went down into Ingushetia, and then

we went in. We went through Grozny, and we saw Russian soldiers.

We stopped at checkpoints. We werent with anybody from the military or the government. We were by ourselves. The soldiers were drink-
36

ing beer. They had bandanas on. They almost looked like pirates in

some respects. They were wearing sneakers. We talked to them. They

didnt know I was a Congressman. We just kind of chatted. We had an

interpreter there. They were very afraid. At nighttime when its dark

they all just hunker down in their bunkers.

We went into the village of Shamaski, where we talked to a number

of the residents there, and they told us of the Russian soldiers coming

in injecting morphine in their veins with fruit juice. The schools destroyed. We walked through the village and saw homes where they

threw hand grenades into the basement. But as we talked to the Russian soldiers, they were afraid, and they were all anxious to get out of

there.

Secondly, there was a lot of stealing going on. The indication was

that they were given the ability to take whatever they wanted to take

as part of their payment.

What do you think the U.S. policy should be? Is there any merit?

What do we want from the OSCE office? Theyre good people and I

could commend them, but theyre not at the level that really have the

opportunity to talk to the leadership of the Russian Government or of

the others in the region.

Would it make sense for the administration to offer? They may very

well turn it down, but to offer, whether it be a retired general, a General Vessey or somebody like that to go over not necessarily to be the

intermediary, but to begin to kind of bring them together or to offer

some cooperation? Thats what Id like you to comment on.

Second, would it be your guess now that the elections are over and

I know the administration was reluctant to say anything critical because they didnt want to do anything to harm Yeltsins re-election

now that Yeltsin has been reelected, is it your feeling that the war in

Chechnya will increase or will peter out?

Dr. RUBLE. I fearI have not been to Chechnya. I havent had

your experiences, so Im speaking from the distance, but I dont simply see how this conflict can be turned on and off. Its a conflict that

began long before the latest outbreak, and I dont see any simple solution. I think its not a bad idea for the United States to try to offer

our good offices and to get involved in negotiations, particularly if we

can find an appropriate person who is acceptable to both sides. But

Im very skeptical that thisits been referred to as partial genocide

and thats exactly what it is and it cant simply be swept under the

rug.

There are a number of disturbing things about the administrations

position on Chechnya. Certainly the comparisons by the President

with the American Civil War are outrageous, and it is beyond my

comprehension how those statements could have been made.

Secondly, its not simply that the administration has been waiting

until after the elections to raise the issue. There has been a willful

denial of the importance of Chechnya from the very beginning. Theres

been an effort to try to put it in a box and put it away. Im speaking

personally here. I want to make that clear. Im not speaking at this

moment on behalf of my institution.

I have been very disturbed by how we have squandered our moral

capital in the former Soviet Union and the former socialist world over

the past 5 years under both administrations, but this administration

certainly has never understood that the values which the United States
37

stands for had real meaning in that part of the world to people. It

may not have had meaning to the people in the Kremlin, but it had

meaning to the people on the streets.

By denying the importance of our values in our statements about

incidents like Chechnya, weve done a great disservice to ourselves

and to Russia.

Mr. REDDAWAY. I would like to add to what Dr. Ruble has so eloquently said because I have similarly strong feelings. It may be preaching to the converted when we talk to each other on this issue. But to

respond to some of your particular questions, I think its uncertain

whether the Chechnya war will go on indefinitely or whether there is

now an opportunity to try to move toward a solution, toward some

sort of settlement.

At the very least, there may be an opportunity; therefore, we need

to try to seize it, try and help, try and help it along. Part of the opportunity, oddly enough, lies in the man weve been criticizing in the last

couple of hours on and off, Mr. Lebed. Mr. Lebed has repeatedly stated

that, first of all, the war was a mistake in the first place.

Recently, he has, even since he was elevated to his high position he

has said, We have got to talk to the Chechens, realizing that we may

have to give them what they want, namely secession from the Russian Federation. Hes said theyre not probably going to survive very

well if they secede, in which case they may come back to us, but he

appears himself to be ready for secession.

Of course, part of the United States disastrous position on this

issue was that we said from the start that that was quite unthinkable

because we made this false analogy with the American Civil War. So

if we can perhaps build on what may be an increasing readiness within

the Yeltsin administration to regard secession as a possibility, then I

think we should try to take that chance.

How to do it? I think, the idea of the United States offering a sort of

mediator/coordinator may not work very well. The problem is that

the United States in Chechnya is seen as a very compromised party.

We have supportedour Government has supported Mr. Yeltsin,

strongly supported him in the first 2 weeks of the invasion in December 1994, one of the most shameful episodes in the history of American diplomacy.

Since then, weve backed off a little bit, but were still strongly compromised in the eyes of the Chechen people. So were not best placed

to be an impartial mediator. I think it may be better to continue to

operate through the OSCE mission there and build on that in trying

to produce a new mediating or an accelerated mediating effort.

If those efforts fail and the Russian Government goes back to its

policies of the last year-and-a-half, policies as you say only briefly

interrupted for the visits of people like yourself when they pretend to

be trying to solve the issue and then they start bombing as soon as

you leave, if they do that again and revert to the policies that have

predominated in the last year and a half, we have to speak out really

loudly and we have to mobilize international organizations strongly.

The reason that this is a partial genocide is because most of the

40,000 people who have been killed are civilians, innocent civilians;

and they have been killed, most of them, because the Russians have

used blanket bombing, and blanket bombing is what the German
38

planes did in Guernica in 1937, the last major atrocity of that sort in

Europe, apart from one or two other parallels in World War II, but

Guernica is a particularly vivid comparison, I think.

So if the Russian Government does revert, I hope you and others in

the Commission and the Congress will really put pressure on President Clinton and the administration to speak out extremely strongly

and to mobilize international organizations. That is what Russians

will take account of, if they know that theyre going to lose International Monetary Fund loans, loans from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and so on, if they continue with this

barbaric genocidal policy in Chechnya. Theyll stop; theyll stop quickly.

Mr. WOLF. Well, I appreciate your answer. Im sorry that the Foreign Operations bill has passed the House. I serve on that committee.

The idea did not come up with regard to cutting off aid to them. Ive

written the administration, and Ill send both of you copies of letter

after letter after letter after letter, a friendly letter, but tough letter.

I got the last letter back yesterday from the President and it just is

more of the same.

I thought the Bosnia situation would not have been resolved had it

not been for the United States involvement. Europe just didnt have

the capacity, whether they did have it, but didnt have the will, and I

thought if you were to pick someone who was not necessarily in the

administration, but somebody who had been, either like a General

Vessey because it is a military-type thing, or perhaps Secretary Baker

or somebody like that who would dedicate themselves, that that may

be, because when we were there, the people did ask whats the position of the United States.

Now, this was last June, so were almost a year ago: but they did

ask over and over, what is the United States doing? What does the

United States think? You could hear at nighttime the bombing of

Bamut. Boom! Just bombing and bombing and bombing and bombing

and bombing. A number of the people who have been killed are not

only Chechens, but there are a number who are Russians that have

been killed.

So let me share that with you, and I dont know how effective this

Congress can be in mobilizing the world community because it just

doesnt seem that the administration listens. We havent had any kind

of success, to be honest. Mr. Collins said he would look at it again. If

you have any suggestions of anybody in the United States that you

think may be appropriate, as you go and drive back today or tomorrow, Id like to hear from you as to who you might think that we can

try again. At least we are going to try again with Mr. Collins.

The last question I would haveand I have a number of others Ive

written down about human rights, and I think youve covered a lot of

themand that would be next in line, well, yes or no, I guess, but do

you think theres a good chance that Lebed could be next in line?

Because my next question that Im going to ask you, the last question

is, would you make a comment for the record with regard to Yeltsins

health?

He disappeared, and maybe you covered it before I came in. He had

disappeared for that last 5 or 6 days. Was he just exhausted, as you

can be exhausted in a campaign, or was it something more serious?

Mr. McFaul said he does not think Mr. Yeltsin can finish his 4 years.
39

So will you make a comment on Mr. Yeltsins health and then if the

health situation is serious, and, of course, we just heard about the

recent heart attack, could Mr. Lebed be next in line if something were

to happen in a relatively short span, 3 to 6 months? So one, Mr.

Yeltsins health and what happened to him during that 5 days and

anything you know about his health, and second, if something happened in the next short timeframe, would Mr. Lebed be close to being

at the top.

Dr. RUBLE. Id like to go back first to something you said about

being in Chechnya and people asking you on the streets what is the

American position, because I think that is very important, and it goes

back to something that I said that people in this town seem not to

care about. Even if all we did were to make public statements, that

has meaning for people.

Mr. WOLF. If I could interrupt? Youre exactly right. Im sorry Chris

isnt here. In 1988, Chris Smith and I visited Perm Camp 35 where

Scharansky had been. We got into the camp, and we turned on a video

camerawe have this all on filmand prisoner after prisoner came

in. We said, Were American Congressmen, and they went on a hunger strike. They went on a sit-down strike until they could talk to us.

These men who had been in Perm Camp 35 in the Ural Mountains

knew of the position that President Reagan had taken with regard to

human rights. They told usthey told us about President Reagans

speech where he called the Soviet Union the evil empire. Whether

you agree with that speech or not, I happen to agree with it. They

knew, and here they knew in an area that they dont sell Pravda or in

downtown Perm. Camp 35. So you make a very good point. If men in

that condition knew the position of the Reagan administration, youre

exactly right.

Dr. RUBLE. Well, one of the lessons of the collapse of the Soviet

Union and the Communist empire that we seem not to take seriously

is that ideas and values matter, and the history of the Helsinki Accords shows that. Yet, over and over againand again, this is a bipartisan failing in both the Bush administration and Clinton administration. Theres been no seeming appreciation of the fact that this is

the case, but maybe I should continue.

I was talking to a former advisor of Mikhail Gorbachev, Aleksandr

Tsipko, who was joking with me about how when he first raised the

specter of a challenge from Boris Yeltsin, Gorbachev responded, Well,

hell never live long enough. I dont know if that story is true or not,

but Yeltsins health record would seem to suggest that hes not going

to complete his term in office, and yet he hasnt been a particularly

healthy person for a long time.

Im not prepared as yet to write him off. He does seem to have a

super-human capacity to recover. I think it would be prudent, however, to begin to think about the succession and at this moment I

would say that General Lebed probably hasnt learned the Moscow

politics game well enough to succeed. But a lot depends on timing

and circumstance of when the issue comes forward, and by that time,

General Lebed may well have learned how to play the game. I think

it would be prudent, not to be alarmist, but to begin to pay attention

to what the general says he stands for.
40

Mr. REDDAWAY. Let me add a few comments. I would agree with

Blair Ruble that it would be a mistake to view Mr. Yeltsin as already

into a sort of irreversible decline in his health. He has bounced back

several times over the last couple of years. Mr. McFaul said that nobody in Moscowand he meets a lot of people in Moscowbelieves

that Yeltsin will complete his term, however.

So I give some weight to that because opinion in Moscow, some of

the well-informed opinion, does get bits and pieces from doctors who

got it from colleagues who know something about Yeltsins health.

Friends of mine who have come back recently from Moscow were talking with Yeltsins people in Yeltsins entourage.

They said that his latest collapse was a mixture of nervous depression following his result in the first round of the election; that he had

kidded himself he was going to get over 50 percent in the first round,

and when he got much less, he went into a sort of nervous depression;

that was aggravated by his being maneuvered by Mr. Chubais and

others into firing his very close buddies, particularly General

Korzhakov, which was extremely painful to him.

Since I heard these reports, Mrs. Yeltsin has confirmed that and

said that when Yeltsin had to dismiss Korzhakov and Borsukov and

Soskovetsespecially Korzhakovit was as though one of his limbs

had been cutoff, as though hes cutting off one of his own limbs. So

that appears to be part of it. Another part appears that he had some

sort of chest pains which may be a recurrence in a relatively mild

form this time of the heart trouble that he has had in the past, which

they believe to be ischemia.

As regards Lebeds chances, I would go along with Dr. Ruble. Perhaps Id be just a little bit more optimistic. I think Lebeds chances of

thriving in the Kremlin are not good. Hes capable of learning certain

things, but hes not capable of changing his temperament, and I think

his temperament is one that is not going to adjust to the Kremlin.

Also, I think that the so-called clans, the big financial and industrial interests which run Russia in many ways today and of which

Mr. Chernomyrdin is one of the leaders, those clans are very worried

about Mr. Lebeds appearance on the horizon and are already plotting to get rid of him, to push him aside, because if he means half of

what he says about combatting organized crime, then the clans interests would be very quickly, seriously affected.

These clans, in large measure, make up what the Russians call the

mafia, organized crime, corrupt officialdom, working together in very

mysterious but powerful ways; and Mr. Lebed has said hes serious

about dealing with this issue. So I dont think the people in the Kremlin who are very closely connected to these clans will want Mr. Lebed

to dig in and to entrench himself. I think they will probably find ways

of easing him out.

But as Dr. Ruble said, its always possible that you might have an

extraordinary combination of circumstances with Yeltsin suddenly,

his health collapsing, Lebed still being high up, military units perhaps being mobilized on Lebeds side since he has a lot of support in

the military, the constitution is thrown out of the window. That sort

of thing cannot be completely ruled out in Russia, because the quasiconstitutional procedures have extremely shallow roots.
41

Finally, on the question of the immediate, coming back to the immediate question again, I think I would encourage you and others to

look for a really suitable, good, non-American who would be viewed

as an impartial figure, perhaps from Europe, who could perform the

role which I think is important at this stage. I think there really is

perhaps, maybe probably, an opportunity to move toward some solution to the Chechnya situation, and any possibility of an opportunity

needs to be grabbed.

I cant offhand think of a good European to choose. I dont think

Mr. Bildt has done very well in Bosnia, so not him. But maybe you

and we can think of other possible candidates.

Mr. WOLF. Well, if you do, you could just give us a call and let me

know and we would be glad to run that up the flagpole and make that

recommendation. I want to thank both of you, and also Dr. McFaul. I

found it very interesting. I, frankly, wish that this would have been

filled, and I thank Mr. Smith and the staff for having the hearing. Its

very interesting. Unfortunately, just a handful of people heard you,

but I guess thats just the way things are up here on Capitol Hill. But

thank you very much.

Dr. RUBLE. Thank you.

Mr. REDDAWAY. Thank you.

[Whereupon at 3:42 p.m., the Commission adjourned.]
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